Selection of “High Performance Work

Systems” in U.S. Manufacturing

Christopher P. Adams∗

Federal Trade Commission

March 29, 2002

Abstract

This paper analyzes the use of two important human resource practices

(self-managed work teams and formal training programs) in U.S. manufacturing. These practices are often used in conjunction with each other and

their use is associated with improved firm performance, thus the term “high

performance work systems.” The results of this paper raise concerns about

the interpretation of studies that show a relationship between the use of particular systems of practices and higher performance but do not account for

selection of practices by the firm. The paper uses a theoretical model to

analyze the mechanism via which these practices improve firm performance.

The results of the theoretical model are tested using an empirical model that

allows practices to be chosen simultaneously, allows for the choice of practices to interact, and allows for this interaction to vary based on observable

characteristics of the firm. The paper shows that the value of individual

practices to a firm depends on characteristics of the firm’s product market,

and on the choice of other practices by the firm.

∗The author thanks in particular Larry Samuelson for all his help and suggestions and

also Deena Ackerman, and Phil Haile, John Kennan, Aileen Thompson and colleagues at

FTC. The views of expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal

Trade Commission or its Commissioners. All errors are my own.

1
1 Introduction

A number of studies purport to show that particular human resource practices are complementary and lead to higher firm performance, for example

Appelbaum et al. (2000) and Ichniowski et al. (1997). These “high performance work systems” include employee involvement programs like selfmanaged work teams, incentive programs like profit sharing and other human resource practices like formal training programs. This paper analyzes

the firm’s choice of two important human resource practices: self-managed

work teams and formal training programs. The paper shows that the value of

individual practices to a firm depends on characteristics of the firm’s product

market, and on the choice of other practices by the firm. In particular, conditional on the use of training programs, firms that produce custom products

value the use of teams more highly than firms that don’t produce custom

products, and firms value the use of teams and the use of training in a way

that is consistent with the two practices being complements.

The paper analyzes a theoretical model and illustrates the mechanism via

which the use of two human resource practices (self-managed work teams and

formal training programs) increase firm productivity. Analysis of the model

gives two main results. First, it shows that self-managed work teams increase

productivity of firms with substantial volatility in the types of orders produced, by allowing faster decision making. Second, it shows that for workers

in teams, formal training programs increase the accuracy of their information, allowing them to make better choices. These two results form the basis

for the paper’s two hypotheses. First, firms value teams more when orders

are customized to individual customer needs. Second, teams and training

programs are complements. The empirical model allows the firm to choose

both self-managed work teams and formal training programs simultaneously.

The model also allows for the possibility that the two practices are complements, while not requiring that the firm choose “systems” of practices.

The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical model, giving further insight into the firm’s motivation for selecting high performance work

systems.

2
The paper contributes to the theoretical literature on the use of selfmanaged work teams and formal training programs. It does so by presenting

a model of the firm’s decision making process and analyzing the impact of

teams and training on the effectiveness of the process. Previous work analyzed the value of self-managed work teams when they are combined with

profit sharing (Adams (2001); Che and Yoo (Forthcoming); Drago (1995);

Kandel and Lazear (1992)). However, there is no work on the direct value

of teams. The analysis presented below is related to the “team theoretic”

literature on decision making in firms. The focus of that work is on the

optimal size and structure of the firm given time and communication constraints.1 The focus of the analysis below is on choosing the optimal decision

maker given informational differences between decision makers and assuming

communication constraints between decision makers.

The decision making environment is characterized as a dynamic decision

making problem under uncertainty. Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) present

a relatively simple model of such a problem. This paper uses a slightly

more general version in which the decision maker observes noisy signals of

outcomes. Their model and results serve as the limiting case. The model

is a countable state Markov decision making problem, important results for

which are described in Puterman (1994).2

The paper contributes to the empirical literature on the use of work practices in two ways (Black and Lynch (1998); Jones and Pliskin (1997); Osterman (1994, 1995); Whitfield (2000)). First, by using an empirical model

that allows the two practices (self-managed work teams and formal training

programs) to be chosen simultaneously. Second by using an empirical model

that allows the two choices to interact (and for this interaction to vary with

observable characteristics of the firm). The approach used in this paper,

generalizes the approach adopted by Jones and Pliskin (1997) who analyze

the use of human resource practices in Canadian manufacturing firms. Jones

1See Borland and Eichberger (1998) for an overview of the team theoretic literature.

2Results for finite state Markov decision making problems are described in Derman

(1970). Results for more general dynamic decision making problems are described in

Stokey and Lucas (1989).

3
and Pliskin (1997) allow the firm to choose two individual practices simultaneously. The approach used in this paper allows a richer structure in which

practices are chosen simultaneously and observable characteristics can affect

the interaction between choices of practices. This more general model allows

the paper to explicitly test the hypothesis that self-managed work teams and

formal training programs are complements.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical analysis of the firm’s decision to use high performance work systems.

A model of dynamic decision making under uncertainty is used to analyze

the value of using self-managed work teams and formal training programs.

Section 3 presents an empirical model that allows the firm to choose multiple

practices simultaneously and for those practices to be complements. The section presents two hypotheses based upon the theoretical analysis. The first

hypothesis states that self-managed work teams are more valuable to the

firm when there is volatility in the types of orders on the firm’s production

line. The second hypothesis states that self-managed work teams and formal

training programs are complements. Section 4 discusses the data set which is

based on a large economy wide survey of U.S. manufacturing establishments.

The section also discusses the measures that are used to test the hypotheses.

Section 5 discusses the empirical results, which give support for the two main

hypotheses. Section 6 concludes.

2 Theoretical Model

This section presents a model that can be used to determine the value of high

performance work systems. The model is based on a dynamic decision making

problem under uncertainty (Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995)). The section

presents two propositions. The first proposition states that conditional on

the use of training programs, for firms facing volatility in the types of orders

on the production line, there is greater value in giving substantive decision

making power to production line workers. The second proposition states that

the use of training programs increases the value of giving decision making

4
power to production line workers. These two propositions form the basis for

the hypotheses presented in the next section.

2.1 The Model

The firm chooses whether or not to use teams and whether or not to use

formal training. I assume that the use of teams corresponds with choosing an

“on-line” decision maker (as opposed to an “off-line” decision maker. An online decision maker is someone like a production line worker who is physically

located on the production line. An off-line decision maker is someone like a

production manager or production engineer who is physically located away

from the production line (in their office for example).3 while the use of

formal training programs increases the accuracy of the information available

to the on-line decision maker. The value of some combination of teams and

training is denoted, VMR where M = 1 if teaMs are used and M = 0 if teams

are not used, and R = 1 if tRaining is used and R = 0 if training is not

used. Whomever the firm gives decision making power to, their problem is

as follows:

1. At period t = 0, the firm chooses (M, R) ∈ {(0, 0),(1, 0),(0, 1),(1, 1)}

to maximize

VMR =

X∞

t=0

δ

t

fE(πt(τt

, st)|ω0 : σMRt, γR) (1)

where δf ∈ (0, 1) is the firm’s discount factor, πt ∈ {0, 1} is the payoff

in period t, τt ∈ {0, 1} is the task choice of the decision maker in period

t, st ∈ {0, 1} is the state of the world in period t, ωt = Pr(st = 1) is the

firm’s belief about the state of the world, σMRt ∈ {0, 1} is the decision

maker’s signal of the state of the world, and γR ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter

capturing the amount of noise there is in the decision maker’s signal.

2. At the beginning of period t the decision maker has a belief about that

state of the world, such that ω

0

t = Pr(st = 1).

3See Drago (1995), Levine (1995) or Eaton et al. (1997) for a discussion of the different

types of employee involvement.

5
3. The decision maker observes a signal of the state of world, σMRt, and

updates her belief via Bayes’ Rules, ωt = Pr(st = 1|σMRt, ω0

t

).

4. Given, ωt, the decision maker chooses a task, τt to optimize

Ut =

X∞

j=t

δ

j−t

d E(πj (τj

, sj )|ωt) (2)

where δd ∈ (0, 1) is the decision maker’s discount rate.

5. The payoff at time t, is a function of the task and the state.

πt(τt, st) =







1 with probability k if τt = 0

0 with probability 1 − k if τt = 0

1 with probability ωtif τt = 1

0 with probability 1 − ωtif τt = 1

(3)

where k ∈ (0, 1) is some constant.

6. In the next period, t + 1, the probability the state changes is α =

Pr(st+1 = 1|st = 0) = Pr(st+1 = 0|st = 1) ∈ (0, .5).

7. The decision maker updates her belief, ω

0

t+1 = Pr(st+1 = 1|ωt).

If the firm chooses M = 0, then σ01t = σ00t = st−2. That is, if no teams

are used, the decision maker observes the exact state of the world two periods

ago. Adams (2001) shows that there exists an optimal “cutoff” strategy. If

two assumptions are made, then the value of the firm’s choice can be written

as follows

V00 = V01 =

1 + (1 − 2α)

2 + 2k

4

(4)

where Pr(st = 1|st−2 = 1) = 1+(1−2α)

2

2

. The first assumption is that α is

small enough that the decision maker never chooses the same task (τt) in

every period t. This assumption is made for ease of exposition. The second

assumption is that δf is close to 1. This assumption corresponds to the

idea that the firm consider’s the “long run” in making its choice about the

6
best decision maker.4 Adams (2001) shows that if δf is close to 1, then

it is equivalent to evaluating the decision maker by the “long run” average

expected payoff. Equation (4) shows that in the long run the off-line decision

maker chooses task τt = 1 half of the time and the state is 1 with probability

1+(1−2α)

2

2

. Note that this probability is decreasing in α. The other half of the

time, the off-line decision maker chooses τt = 0 and the expected payoff is k.

If the firm chooses M = 1 and R = 0, then σ10t = γ0πt−1 + (1 − γ0)(1 −

πt−1). If M = 1 and R = 1, then σ11t = γ1πt−1 + (1 − γ1)(1 − πt−1), where

γ1 > γ0. The decision maker observes a noisy signal of the previous period’s

payoff where the level of noise depends on whether or not training is also

used. Adams (2001) shows that there exists an optimal “cutoff” strategy.

It is assumed that α is small enough and γR is large enough that it is not

optimal for the decision maker to choose the same task τtin every period t.

Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) analyze the case where γ1 = 1, and show

V11 =

2Nαk + 1 − (1 − 2α)

N

2(N + 1)α + 1 − (1 − 2α)

N

(5)

where N is the number of times in a row that τt = 1. The case where γR < 1

is left to the appendix.

In summary, the choice of teams is modelled as a choice to use a noisy

and indirect signal of the previous periods state as opposed to a noiseless and

direct signal of the state two periods ago. The choice of training is modelled

as a choice to increase the accuracy of the indirect signal of the state. This

representation corresponds with the observation that when teams are used,

production line workers are given substantive decision making power over

how to run the line (Drago (1995); Levine (1995)). While these workers are

right on the production line, they often lack significant levels of education

or training. In the model, the on-line decision maker is learning by doing,

as the informativeness of the signal she observe depends on the choices she

makes. The alternative decision making structure is the more traditional one

in which the choice of production method is made by highly trained production managers and production engineers. While these decision makers have

4Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) use this idea.

7
accurate information, that information may be subject to significant delay

as these decision makers are not on the production line. Training programs

increase the worker’s ability to make good choices given the information she

observes.

2.2 Results

There are two main theoretical results. The first result states that conditional

upon whether training programs are used, teams are more valuable to the

firm when the probability that the state will change from period to period is

high (α is high), relative to the case when the probability that the state will

change from period to period is low (α is low). The second result states that

training increases the value of using teams. These two results are presented

as Proposition 1 and Proposition 2, respectively.

Proposition 1 1. There exists αL, αH such that αL < αH and if αl < αL

and αH < αh then

V10(αl) − V00(αl) < V10(αh) − V00(αh) (6)

2. There exists α

0

L

, α0

H such that α

0

L < α0H and if αl < α0L and α

0

H < αh

then

V11(αl) − V01(αl) < V11(αh) − V01(αh) (7)

Proof. In the appendix.

Part (1) of the proposition states that conditional on not using training,

the firm values teams relatively higher when α is relatively large. Part (2)

of the proposition states that conditional on using training, the firm values

teams relatively higher when α is relatively large. The proof of this proposition is based upon a result of Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) which states

that α converges to 0, there is incomplete learning by the decision maker

whose information is based upon their action choices (the one with teams in

this case). It is shown that for the alternative case (where there is no teams

8
and information is not conditional on action choices), there is no incomplete

learning as α approaches 0. At the other end, when α is large, the delay associated with the off-line decision maker makes her information poor relative

to the on-line decision maker.

Intuitively, when α is small there is little variation in the state and the

off-line decision maker’s information remains good. However, the on-line

decision maker is learning by doing, the implication of which is that she may

get “trapped” making the wrong choice. This occurs because the outcome

from that choice is not informing her of the true state, and she does not

switch to the correct choice. On the other hand, when α is large the offline decision maker’s information deteriorates very quickly, and the on-line

decision maker has more accurate information.

Proposition 2 V00 + V11 > V10 + V01

Proof In the appendix.

Proposition 2 states that self-managed work teams and formal training

programs are “super-modular” in the firm’s value function and thus are complements (Athey and Stern (1998); Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). The proof

of the proposition is based on the assumption that when self-managed teams

are used formal training programs increase the accuracy of the on-line decision maker’s information and thus the expected value of the decision maker’s

choices. However, if teams are not used, then formal training programs will

have no affect on the accuracy of the (off-line) decision maker’s information

and thus the expected value of the decision maker’s choices will not change.

The next section presents the empirical model used to test the hypotheses.

3 Empirical Model

This section presents the empirical model that is used to test the implications

of the theoretical model presented above. The model is a latent profit model.

There are three subsections. The first subsection presents the notation for

9
a linear latent profit model. The second subsection presents the restrictions

imposed on the structure of the firm’s latent profits by the theoretical model

and the hypotheses to be tested in the empirical section. The third subsection presents the estimated model, including a description of distributional

assumptions.

3.1 Linear Latent Profit Model

There exist four possible choices for the firm, the latent value of each is

presented below. VMR is the latent value to the firm, where M indicates

whether teaMs are used by the firm and R indicates whether tRaining is

used by the firm. First, the value of neither using teams nor training is

denoted by Aifor firm i. The latent profits of the other choices will be

compared to this one.

V00 = Ai (8)

The value of using teams but not using training is V10. The relative value

of this choice is a function of the measure of how much volatility there is on

the firm’s production floor, Xiα, and of other characteristics of the firm (Xi).

V10 is also affected by unobservable characteristics of the firm (2iM).

V10 = Ai + XiαβαM + XiβiM + 2iM (9)

The value of using training but not teams is V01.

V01 = Ai + XiαβαR + XiβiR + 2iR (10)

where 2iR represents unobservable characteristics that affect the relative value

of using training only. The other variables are defined above. The value of

both teams and training is V11.

V11 = Ai + XiαβαMR + XiβiMR + 2iMR (11)

where 2iMR represents the unobservable characteristics that affect the relative

value of using both teams and training. Again the other variables are defined

above.

10
One of the main objectives of the empirical analysis is measuring the

complementarity between using teams and using training programs. If the

two practices are complements then they are super-modular in the firm’s

latent profits (Athey and Stern (1998); Milgrom and Roberts (1990)). This

implies that,

V00 + V11 ≥ V01 + V10 (12)

To see the implications of this assumption, and measure the factors that affect

the complementarity, it is easier to rewrite Equation (11) in the following

way, where the β∗MR variables are substituted for equivalent βMR −βM −βR

variables.

V11 = Ai + XiαβαM + XiβiM + 2iM + XiαβαR + XiβiR + 2iR

+Xiαβ ∗αMR +Xiβ ∗iMR +2∗iMR

(13)

Therefore, β∗iMR = βiMR − βiM − βiR and 2∗iMR = 2iMR − 2iM − 2iR. In

this sense, the β∗ coefficients determine the “extra” value of having both

practices together. If 2∗iMR = 0, then Equation (12) holds if and only if

Xiαβ ∗αMR +Xiβ∗iMR ≥ 0 (14)

3.2 Hypotheses

Proposition 1 states that conditional on the use of training programs firms

value the use of teams more highly for high values of α relative to low values

of α. The appropriate differences in the empirical model are

V10 − V00 = XiαβαM + XiβiM + 2iM (15)

and

V11 − V01 = XiαβαM + XiβiM + 2iM + Xiαβ ∗αMR +Xiβ ∗iMR +2∗iMR (16)

The empirical model presented above assumes that the firm’s value of teams

is linear in the measure of α, therefore the proposition implies the following

hypothesis.

11
Hypothesis 1 1. (∂V10−V00)

∂Xα

= βαM > 0

2. (∂V11−V01)

∂Xα

= βαM + β∗αMR > 0

Part (1) of the hypothesis states that conditional on not using training,

the firm values the use of teams more highly when the measure of α is higher.

Part (2) of the hypothesis states that condition on the use of training, the

firm values the use of teams more highly when the measure of α is higher.

Proposition 2 states that teams and training programs are complements.

The appropriate inequality is Equation (14). Assuming that the measures

Xiα and Xi are positive (which they are in this case), the proposition implies

the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2 β ∗αMR +β∗iMR > 0

The hypothesis states that the “extra” effect of having both practices

together is positive for every firm. The measures used to test this hypothesis

are discussed below. It would be preferable to know whether the workers

receiving training were the same workers that are involved in teams, unfortunately this information is not available in this data set.

3.3 Estimated Model

This subsection presents the empirical model of the firm’s decision to use

teams and training. The model allows the firm’s choice on teams and training to be made simultaneously, and it allows the two choices to interact. The

model’s key characteristic is that it allows this interaction to vary from firm

to firm in observable ways. In order to make the estimation of this model

tractable it is assumed that the unobservables {2M, 2R} are distributed standard bivariate normally where the correlation is represented by ρ.

5 As a

5This includes the assumption that 2∗iMR = 0 or 2iMR = 2iM + 2iR. Adams (2001)

presents a model which allows a third error term 2iMR, however it is significantly more

difficult to estimate.

12
−XβR

−Xβ∗MR

−XβR

−XβM

−Xβ∗MR

−XβM

❅

❅

❅

❅

❅

(0, 1) (1, 1) (1, 1)

(1, 1)

(0, 0)

(0, 0) (1, 1)

(0, 0) (0, 0) (1, 0)

2M

2R

Figure 1: The State Space

consequence of this assumption, the likelihood function is not continuous

unless it is either assumed that

Xiαβ ∗αMR +Xiβ∗iMR ≥ 0 (17)

or it is assumed that

Xiαβ ∗αMR +Xiβ∗iMR ≤ 0 (18)

Therefore, in this paper, it is further assumed that Equation (14) holds (with

a weak inequality). Note that if this equation is actually 0 for all i, then the

model is equivalent to the standard bivariate probit model. The implication

is that the choice of one practice cannot decrease the latent profits from the

other practice.

Figure 1 depicts the state space over 2M and 2R. It can be seen that as

Xβ∗MR increases, more probability weight is placed on events (0,0) and (1,1)

relative to events (0,1) and (1,0). In this sense, complementary choices are

13
associated with greater probability weight on the diagonal events of choosing both practices or neither practice. The corresponding probabilities are

determined by the following three equations.

Pr(M = 1, R = 0|Xβ) = Φ(−XβR − Xβ∗MR)

−Φ2(−XβM, −XβR − Xβ∗MR, ρ)

(19)

Pr(M = 0, R = 1|Xβ) = Φ(−XβM − Xβ ∗M R)

−Φ2(−XβM − Xβ∗MR, −XβR, ρ)

(20)

and

Pr(M = 0, R = 0|Xβ) = Φ2(−XβM − Xβ∗MR, −XβR, ρ)

+

R −XβM

−XβM−Xβ∗MR

Φ

μ

−XβM−XβR−XβMR−2M(1+ρ)

(1−ρ

2)

1

2

¶

d2M

(21)

where Φ is the cumulative density of the standard normal distribution and

Φ2 is the cumulative density of the standard bivariate normal distribution.

The cumulative distribution that is integrated in Equation (21) is the standardized cumulative distribution of 2R conditional upon a particular value of

2M (the diagonal line in Figure 1). The log likelihood function is then

L(M, R, Xβ) = Pn

i=1((1 − M) · (1 − R) · ln(Pr(M = 0, R = 0|Xβ))

+M · (1 − R) · ln(Pr(M = 1, R = 0|Xβ))

+(1 − M) · R · ln(Pr(M = 0, R = 1|Xβ))

+M · R · ln(1 − Pr(M = 0, R = 0|Xβ)

− Pr(M = 1, R = 0|Xβ) − Pr(M = 0, R = 1|Xβ))

(22)

where n is the number of observations. This log likelihood function can

be estimated using standard maximum likelihood techniques, with the addition of a procedure to approximate the integral in Equation (21).6 Using

the standard calculus technique of Riemann integration, this integral can be

approximated “from below” by the following finite sum (Browder (1996)).

Pμ

m=1 Φ2

3

−XβM −

(m−1)

μ XβMR, −XβR −

μ−m+1

μ XβMR, ρ ́

−Φ2

3

−XβM −

m

μ XβMR, −XβR −

μ−m+1

μ XβMR, ρ ́ (23)

6Note that a similar model is discussed in some detail in Greene (2000, pp. 852-856),

where it is called a “recursive simultaneous equations model.”

14
The model can be consistently estimated as long as μ → ∞ as n → ∞.

Summing up, if it is the case that the term Xβ∗MR is always 0, then

the model corresponds to the standard bivariate probit model that has been

used previously in the literature (Jones and Pliskin (1997)). By allowing this

term to be positive, extra probability weight can be placed on the “diagonal”

events to use both teams and training (the event (1,1))or to use neither

teams nor training (the event (0,0)). As shown above, the skewing of the

probabilities and placing more weight on the diagonal events, corresponds to

the two practices being complements.

The model is estimated on the data set presented in the next section.

4 Data

The data set used to analyze the firm’s decision to use these high performance

work systems is based on a large survey of U.S. manufacturing establishments. National Employer Survey (NES) 1994 is a stratified random sample

of US private sector establishments with over 20 employees conducted by the

Bureau of the Census working with the University of Pennsylvania’s Center

on the Educational Quality of the Workforce. The survey was administered

by telephone in August and September 1994. The respondent to this survey

is the plant manager. The response rate is 72 % with 3,358 establishments

participating, including 1,621 manufacturing establishments.7

The data set has unique advantages for testing the hypotheses presented

above. In particular it is a large data set that provides information on training programs, the use of human resource practices such as self-managed work

teams, and information on the general characteristics of the establishments

surveyed.8 The large representative sample is necessary for understanding

the adoption of human resource practices in U.S. manufacturing. Much of

7For further discussion of the data see Black and Lynch (1998). The public use data

files for NES 1994 and NES 1997 may be obtained at http://www.irhe.upenn.edu/.

8The more recent NES 1997 data is similar to NES 1994, although it does not contain

any information regarding the firm’s product market. Therefore it is not appropriate for

this paper.

15
the previous analysis is undertaken on surveys of particular industries, including steel, automobiles and apparel, leading to substantive extrapolation

problems.9 The survey design oversampled manufacturing firms and large

firms (Black and Lynch (1998)) allowing for somewhat more sophisticated

econometric modeling than would be possible with other data sets.

The sample used below includes 907 of the original 1,621 manufacturing

firms.10 These establishments have the following characteristics: they have

over 50 employees, at least 50 % of the employees are production workers,

and the respondent gave complete answers to all of the relevant survey questions. The smaller firms were dropped because these firms are less likely to

use institutions such as self-managed work teams and formal training programs, simply because they are small enough and flexible enough that the

increased structure is unnecessary. Therefore, for very small firms the use

of particular human resource practices is a poor measure of how much decision making power is actually delegated to production line worker and how

much training these workers are provided with. Firms with a smaller proportion of production workers were dropped because the question on the use of

self-managed work teams asks about “non-managerial and non-supervisory”

employees, while the question on training asked specifically about production

workers.

The analysis uses two dependent variables: whether self-managed work

teams are used and whether formal training programs are used. Both are

dichotomous variables. TEAMS is 1 if the respondent answered that more

than 10 % of “non-managerial and non-supervisory employees are currently

involved in self-managed teams” and 0 if less than 10 % of these employees

are currently involved in self-managed teams. By assuming that firms with

less than 10 % of employees in self-managed work teams are not using them,

the measure states that the firms using the practice are the ones that have

made a substantial commitment. Such firms have considerably altered their

decision making structure to delegate more decision making power to the

9Noteworthy exceptions include Osterman (1994, 1995) and Black and Lynch (1998).

10The survey actually sampled individual establishments within firms. However, for the

most part the paper uses the terms “establishment” and “firm” interchangeably.

16
production line workers.11

TRAINING is 1 if the respondent answered that some number of production workers have received formal instruction in the last year. TRAINING is

0 if no production workers have received formal instruction in the last year.

Formal instruction includes “structured or formal training either on-the-job

(by supervisors or outside contractors) or at a school or technical institute”.

This definition is meant to capture those training programs that do more

than simply show the worker how to perform the required tasks, but also

increase the decision making ability of the production line worker. It would

be preferable to have information on the proportion of production workers

involved in these training programs in order to have a better idea of the

penetration. Unfortunately that information is not available in this data

set.12

The analysis uses two measures of the firm’s product market. CUSTOM

is 1 if the respondent answered that tailoring its products to specific customer

needs is the most important way to compete in the firm’s product market.

CUSTOM is 0 if the respondent answered that some other method is the

most important way to compete in the product market. QUALITY is 1 if

the respondent stated that producing quality products is the best way for

the establishment to compete in its product market. QUALITY is 0 is some

other method is the most important way to compete.13

The proxy for the volatility of the firm’s product market (α) is CUSTOM.

Rewriting Hypothesis 1 in terms of this measure, the hypothesis is supported

if the following two equations hold.

βCUST OMM > 0 (24)

11It would be preferable to use a higher cutoff (say 50 %), but the data set is not large

enough to allow that possibility. See Osterman (1994, 1995) for further discussions of the

penetration of human resource practices.

12While the data provides information on the number of production workers who have

received training, it does not provide information on the number of production workers

there are in the firm.

13The other major answer to this was question is price.

17
and

βCUST OMM + β∗CUST OMMR > 0 (25)

If the firm states that tailoring its product to specific customer needs is the

most important way to compete then such a firm is likely to have many

different products on the production line and a lot of day to day changes

on the best method to use in completing the order. One concern with this

proxy and with the related measure QUALITY is that the respondent was

asked to choose the “best” answer, and so there may be firms that compete

both on customized products and quality, but choose quality because that is

the “most important” way the firm competes. It would be preferable to have

much more detailed information about how much change is occurring on the

production line, rather than making inferences from general characteristics

of the firm’s product market.

A number papers in the literature suggest that firms that produce high

QUALITY products will more likely to use employee involvement programs

such as TEAMS (Arthur (1994); Eaton and Voos (1992); Osterman (1994)).

It also seems reasonable that firms that produce high QUALITY products

will be more likely to use TRAINING programs in order to increase the skill

of the workforce. This explanation for the use of training differs from the

explanation presented in the theory section. It would be preferable to have

more information on the nature of the training programs used by these firms.

Do these programs improve decision making? Do they simply improve the

worker’s skill? Do they do both? Training programs that do different things

will be used for different reasons, unfortunately the data does not allow the

researcher distinguish between the different types of training programs.

The analysis uses four other measures of firm characteristics. UNION is

1 if there is at least one union in the establishment. UNION is 0 if there

is no union in the establishment. Previous work suggests that the existence

of unions decreases the likelihood that the firm will use TEAMS (Osterman

(1994)) and increases the likelihood of using TRAINING programs (Adams

(2001); Black and Lynch (1998); Osterman (1995)). It is argued in the literature that unions tend to appose the use of practices (like self-managed

18
Variable Percentage

Firms that use self-managed work teams (TEAMS) 22

Firms that use formal training programs (TRAINING) 77

Firms that tailor products to customer needs (CUSTOM) 27

Firms that produce high quality products (QUALITY) 35

Firms with at least one union (UNION) 26

Firms with 50 to 99 employees (50TO99) 48

Firms with 100 to 249 Employees (100TO249) 32

Firms with multiple establishments (MULTI) 59

Table 1: Frequencies

work teams) that reduce their bargaining power, particularly practices that

increase the flexibility of the firm to move workers from job to job. Unions

may support training programs that improve the workers skill and human

capital, but may not support training programs that increase worker flexibility. 50TO99 is 1 if there are less than 100 employees in the establishment

(note that all establishments have at least 50 employees). 50TO99 is 0 if the

establishment has 100 or greater employees. 100TO249 is 1 if the establishment has between 100 and 249 employees. 100TO249 is 0 if there are less

than 100 employees or more than 249. MULTI is 1 if this establishment is

part of a firm with multiple establishments. MULTI is 0 if this establishment is the only establishment in the firm. All three variables measure the

size of the firm. Results from previous work suggests larger firms are more

likely to use both TEAMS and TRAINING (Adams (2001); Black and Lynch

(1998); Osterman (1994, 1995)). As argued above, using these formal human

resource practices in small firms is often unnecessary.

Table 1 shows the frequencies for each of the variables in the data set.

TEAMS are used by 22 % of firms and TRAINING is used by 77 % of firms.

The measures of characteristics of the product market are CUSTOM and

QUALITY, with 27 % categorized as the first and 35 % categorized as the

second. The rest of the table shows that 26 % of establishments are unionized,

19
almost half have less than 100 employees and 59 % belong to firms with more

than one establishment.

5 Results

Table 2 presents the results of the model.14 To test Hypothesis 1 the appropriate equation is Equation (24),

βCUST OMM = .30 > 0 (26)

which is statistically significantly different from 0, and Equation (25) is,

βCUST OMM + β∗CUST OMMR = .30 − .02 = .28 > 0 (27)

which is also statistically significant. These results give support for Hypothesis 1, and suggest that conditional on the use of TRAINING, firms value the

use of TEAMS more highly when there is volatility on the firm’s production

floor.

To test Hypothesis 2 the appropriate equation is,

β ∗CUST OMMR +β∗CONST ANT = −.02 + .85 = .83 > 0 (28)

The alternative hypothesis is that this equation is always 0, is equivalent

to a standard bivariate probit model. A log-likelihood ratio test between

the model presented above and the standard bivariate probit model, shows

that the test statistic is 10.92, which is statistically significant. This result

supports Hypothesis 2 and suggests that firms view TEAMS and TRAINING

as complements.

Overall these results support the hypotheses presented above. The results

show that whether the firm produces customized products has a positive effect on the probability that the firm uses TEAMS. The probability (unconditional on the use of TRAINING programs) that the firm uses TEAMS is

14These particular results are from a model in which μ = 100 (see Equation (23)),

although the results vary little from the results in which μ = 2.

20
Variable ∂P rob

∂x

Teams (XβM)

Custom .30 (.11) .10

Quality .18 (.10) .05

Union -.16 (.10) -.04

50to99 -.22 (.11) -.06

100to249 -.28 (.12) -.08

Multi .14 (.09) .04

Constant .04 (.13) -

Training (XβR)

Custom .43 (.12) .13

Quality .28 (.09) .10

Union -.23 (.09) -.09

50to99 -.25 (.10) -.08

100to249 -.24 (.11) -.06

Multi .19 (.08) .07

Constant .77 (.13) -

Both (Xβ∗MR)

Custom -.02 (.07)

Constant .85 (.03)

ρ .9990

Log likelihood -911.68

Table 2: Bivariate Probit with Complementarity (standard errors)

21
10 percentage points higher for firms that believe tailoring the product to

customer needs is the best way to compete in the their product market. This

is the largest effect on the probability of using self-managed work teams of

any of the observable characteristics. The results also show that the use of

TRAINING has a large positive effect on the firm’s propensity to choose

TEAMS. If the mean firm does not use TRAINING, then it chooses TEAMS

with 7 % probability. However, if the mean firm does use TRAINING, then

it chooses TEAMS with 25 % probability.15

These results also give some support for the claim that firms that produce

high quality products will be more likely to use self-managed work teams.

However, the mean firm is only 5 % more likely to use self-managed work

teams if it produces a quality product, and the coefficient is not statistically

significantly different from 0. As suspected above, firms that produce QUALITY products are more likely to use TRAINING. The reason is that some of

these training programs improve the skill of the workers. Similar to previous

results in the literature, firms with unions are less likely to use self-managed

work teams and larger firms are more likely to use both self-managed work

teams and formal training programs (Adams (2001); Black and Lynch (1998);

Osterman (1994, 1995)). However, unlike in earlier papers, firms with unions

are less likely to use formal training programs (Adams (2001); Black and

Lynch (1998); Osterman (1995)). Black and Lynch (1998) use the same

data but find that firms with unions are more likely to use formal training

programs although the estimated coefficient is not statistically significantly

different from 0. A possible explanation for the discrepancy is that the model

estimated by Black and Lynch (1998) includes the use of self-managed work

teams an explanatory variable, even though it may be simultaneously chosen

and complementary to the use of formal training programs.

One issue with these estimation results is the unusually large estimate for

ρ. Note that ρ is bounded above by 1. As discussed above, when ρ increases

it skews the distribution on to the diagonal (places greater probability weight

15These probabilities are not presented in Table 2. They are calculated by inserting the

estimated parameters back into the model and calculating the effect of forcing R = 0 and

R = 1 respectively.

22
on events using both practices and using neither practice). This result then

suggests that there are other unmeasured factors that affect the degree to

which these practices are complements.16

6 Conclusion

The literature suggests that the use of high performance work systems leads

to productivity improvements in at least some manufacturing industries (Appelbaum et al. (2000); Ichniowski et al. (1997)). One concern with these types

of results is the observation that firms are not randomly adopting these practices leading to biased results. This paper attempts to better understand

why firms adopt particular high performance work practices and whether

firms are more likely to adopt groups of practices (or systems of practices).

The paper analyzes the adoption of two important human resource practices, self-managed work teams and formal training programs. The paper

has two important results. The first result shows that particular types of

firms value particular practices more highly, for example firms that produce

customized products place greater value on the use of teams. The second

result shows that self-managed work teams and formal training programs are

complements, and therefore are more likely to be chosen in combination as

part of “work systems.”

The paper analyzes a theoretical model to better understand the mechanism via which a manufacturing firm would value the use of self-managed

work teams and the use of formal training programs, both independently

and in combination with each other. The use of self-managed work teams

is modelled as the decision to take decision making power away from a production manager or production engineer (an “off-line” decision maker) and

give that decision making power to a production line worker (an “on-line”

16Adams (2001) shows that in the analysis of Australian data, when other measures are

added to the Xβ∗MR equation, the estimate for ρ decreases. Adams (2001) also shows

that the value of ρ decreases when an extra error term (2iMR) is allowed to be non-zero

and correlated with the other error terms. Note further that if ρ = 1, then the model

corresponds to a particular example of the ordered probit model.

23
decision maker). The model illustrates the trade-off between the fast decisions of the on-line decision maker and slow but more educated decisions of

the off-line decision maker. There are two main theoretical results. The first

result states that conditional on whether the firm uses training, firms value

the use of teams more when there is a lot of volatility on the production

floor, relative to when there is little volatility. The second result states that

teams and training programs are complements. Hypotheses based on these

two theoretical results are tested on a data set based on a large survey of

U.S. manufacturing establishments.

An empirical model is presented that is more general than models used in

previous work (for example Jones and Pliskin (1997)). This model allows the

firm to choose to adopt both teams and training programs simultaneously and

it allows the choices to interact and for this interaction to vary across firms.

The results of the empirical analysis give support for the two hypotheses. In

regards to the first hypothesis, the results show that conditional on the use

of training programs, firms that produce custom products value the use of

teams more highly than firms that don’t. It is argued in the paper that firms

that produce custom products will face greater volatility on the production

floor. In regards to the second hypothesis, the results show that an empirical

model that allows for a positive interaction term between the two choices is

more likely given the data than a model which allows for no interaction. It

is shown in the paper, that this test is equivalent to testing for whether the

two practices are complements.

These results suggest caution in interpreting the estimated productivity

effects of using “high performance work systems.” Firm’s choose practices

systematically and this selection of practices must be accounted for in the

empirical analysis.

7 Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. (1). The proof has two parts. Part (i) shows that

there exists an αl such that for α < αl, V10 − V00 < 0. Part (ii) shows that

24
there exists an αh such that for αh < α, V10 − V00 > 0.

i) Let γR = 1. The off-line decision maker’s belief at time t is one of two

values,

ωt =







r

2

(0) if st−2 = 0

r

2

(1) if st−2 = 1

(29)

where r(st) = (1 − α)st + α(1 − st). As α → 0 the off-line decision maker

knows the state and always makes the correct choice. By Claim 5 Rustichini

and Wolinsky (1995), limα→0 the stationary probability that τt = 0 given

st = 1 is strictly positive (ie, that the on-line chooses the incorrect task).

So as α → 0, V10 < V00, and thus there exists such an αl. The Proof of

Proposition 2, shows V10 is non-increasing in γR, and by assumption V00 is

constant in γR.

ii) There are two cases. Case 1) Let k < 0.5. Let γR = 1. Let αh be such

that r

2

(0) = k, that is

αh =

2 − (4 − 8k)

1

2

4

(30)

By Claim 2 (Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995)), if

1

k

≥

2(1 − δd(1 − 2α)) log δd

2α log δd − (1 − δd)(1 − 2α) log(1 − 2α)

(31)

Then τt = 1 for all t. Let α3 be such that Equation (31) holds with equality.

We know αh < α3 as at αh, Equation (31) does not hold. At αh, V00 =

1

2

and

at α3, V10 =

1

2

. We know that for α < α3, τt 6= 1 for all t and therefore by

revealed preference P∞

j=t

δ

j−t

d Pr(πj

|ωt) >

1

2

for all δd and so V10 >

1

2 = V00.

Let γR < 1. The result holds for large enough γR as by definition VW is

continuous in γR. The rest follows in a similar fashion to Case (1). Case 2)

Let k ≥ 0.5. Let γR = 1. Let αh be such that r

2

(1) = k, so

αh =

2 − (4 − 8(1 − k)) 1

2

4

(32)

By Claim 2 Rustichini and Wolinsky (1995) if

1

k

≤ 2 − δd(1 − 2α) (33)

25
then τt = 0 for all t. Let α3 be such that Equation (33) holds with equality.

At αh, Equation (33) does not hold if

δd >

(2k − 1) 1

2

k

(34)

By a similar argument to Case (1), if Equation (34) holds αh < α3 and at

αh, V10 > V00. Let γR < 1. For large enough γR, the result holds as V10 is

continuous in γR.

(2). The proof is identical to the proof of (1), replacing V10 with V11 and

V00 with V01. QED.

Proof of Proposition 2. Let γ1 = γ0. Then V00 = V01 and V10 = V11 and

so V00 + V11 = V01 + V10. The proof follows by showing that

∂((V00 + V11) − (V01 + V10)

∂γ1

> 0 (35)

Noting that γ1 > γ0. By assumption, only V11 is a function of γ1, therefore

it is sufficient to show that ∂V11

∂γ1

> 0. Consider some period t, Adams (2001)

(Lemma 2) shows that assuming δf is close to 1 is equivalent to assuming

that firm values the decision maker by looking at the average distribution

over a large number of periods .

V11 = lim

T→∞

1

T

Σ

t+T

j=t

(Pr(τj = 0|ωt)k + Pr(τj = 1 and sj = 1|ωt)) (36)

The derivative of V11 with respect to γ1 has two parts. First, ∂ Pr(τj=1 and sj=1|ωt)

∂γ

can be re-written as E(Pr(ωj > W|sj = 1, ωj−1)|ωt), where W is the on-line

decision maker’s “cut-off” belief (Adams (2001), Lemma 1). By assumption,

there exists some j such that τj−1 = 1. Let ω

1 be the belief if τj−1 = 1 and

σ11j = 0 and let ω

2 be the belief if τj−1 = 1 and σ11j = 1. Given ωj−1, there

are three cases:

1) ω

1 ≤ ω2 ≤ W,

2) W ≤ ω

1 ≤ ω2

, and

3) ω

1 < W < ω2

,

26
In cases (1) and (2), nothing changes with an increase in γ1, but it is also

true that the on-line decision maker learns nothing from choosing τj−1 = 1.

By assumption, case (3) must hold at least some of the time. If τj−1 = 1,

consider case (3) and let sj = 1, then

Pr(ωj > W) = (1 − α)γ1 + α(1 − γ1) (37)

this is because Pr(sj−1 = 1) = 1 − α, and if sj−1 = 1 then πt−1 = 1 and

Pr(σj = 1) = γ1. We thus have that

∂ Pr(ωj > W)

∂γ1

= 1 − 2α > 0 (38)

Note that α ∈ (0, .5).

Similarly, we can look at ∂ Pr(τj=0|ωt)

∂γ1

. If τj−1 = 1, Case (3) holds and

sj = 0, then

Pr(ωj < W) = (1 − α)γ1 + α(1 − γ1) (39)

and

∂ Pr(ωj < W)

∂γ1

= 1 − 2α > 0 (40)

QED.

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29