Effects of 

Climate Change on Energy Production and Use 

in the United States

U.S. Climate Change Science Program

Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.5

February 2008
FEDERAL EXECUTIVE TEAM

Acting Director, Climate Change Science Program ......................................................William J. Brennan

Acting Director, Climate Change Science Program Office ...........................................Peter A. Schultz

Lead Agency Principal Representative to CCSP;

Division Director, Department of Energy, Office of Biological 

and Environmental Research .........................................................................................Jerry W. Elwood

Product Lead; Department of Energy,

Office of Biological and Environmental Research ........................................................Jeffrey S. Amthor

Synthesis and Assessment Product Advisory Group Chair,

Associate Director, EPA National Center for Environmental

Assessment.....................................................................................................................Michael W. Slimak

Synthesis and Assessment Product Coordinator,

Climate Change Science Program Office ......................................................................Fabien J.G. Laurier

EDITORIAL AND PRODUCTION TEAM

Report Coordinator, ORNL............................................................................................Sherry B. Wright

Technical Advisor ..........................................................................................................David J. Dokken

Graphic Production ........................................................................................................DesignConcept

Disclaimer: This document, part of the Synthesis and Assessment Products described in the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP)

Strategic Plan, was prepared in accordance with Section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year

2001 (Public Law 106-554) and the information quality act guidelines issued by the Department of Energy pursuant to Section 515

(http://cio.energy.gov/infoquality.htm). The CCSP Interagency Committee relies on Department of Energy certifications regarding compliance with Section 515 and Department guidelines as the basis for determining that this product conforms with Section 515. For purposes

of compliance with Section 515, this CCSP Synthesis and Assessment Product is an “interpreted product” as that term is used in Department of Energy guidelines and is classified as “highly influential.” This document does not express any regulatory policies of the United

States or any of its agencies, or provide recommendations for regulatory action.
Effects of 

Climate Change on Energy Production and Use 

in the United States

Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.5

Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program

And the Subcommittee on Global Change Research

AUTHORS:

Thomas J. Wilbanks, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Coordinator

Vatsal Bhatt, Brookhaven National Laboratory

Daniel E. Bilello, National Renewable Energy Laboratory

Stanley R. Bull, National Renewable Energy Laboratory

James Ekmann*, National Energy Technology Laboratory

William C. Horak, Brookhaven National Laboratory

Y. Joe Huang*, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Mark D. Levine, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Michael J. Sale, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

David K. Schmalzer, Argonne National Laboratory

Michael J. Scott, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

*Retired.

January 2008

Members of Congress:

On behalf of the National Science and Technology Council, the U.S. Climate Change Science Program

(CCSP) is pleased to transmit to the President and the Congress this report, Effects of Climate Change

on Energy Production and Use in the United States, as part of a series of Synthesis and Assessment

Products produced by the CCSP. This series of 21 reports is aimed at providing current evaluations of

climate change science to inform public debate, policy, and operational decisions. These reports are also

intended to inform CCSP’s consideration of future program priorities. This Synthesis and Assessment

Product is issued pursuant to Section 16 of the Global Change Research Act of 1990.

CCSP’s guiding vision is to provide the Nation and the global community with the science-based knowledge to manage the risk and opportunities of change in the climate and related environmental systems.

The Synthesis and Assessment Products are important steps toward that vision, helping translate CCSP’s

extensive observational and research base into informational tools directly addressing key questions that

are being asked of the research community.

This product will enhance understanding of the effects of climate change on energy systems in the

United States. It was developed with broad scientific input and in accordance with the Guidelines for

Producing CCSP Synthesis and Assessment Products, Section 515 of the Treasury and General Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (Public Law 106-554), and the Information Quality Act

guidelines issued by the Department of Energy pursuant to Section 515.

We commend the report’s authors for both the thorough nature of their work and their adherence to an

inclusive review process.

Carlos M. Gutierrez

Secretary of Commerce

Vice-Chair, Committee on 

Climate Change 

Science and Technology Integration

Samuel W. Bodman

Secretary of Energy

Chair, Committee on 

Climate Change

Science and Technology Integration

John H. Marburger III, Ph.D.

Director, Office of 

Science and Technology Policy 

Executive Director, Committee on 

Climate Change 

Science and Technology Integration
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This report has been peer reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The expert review and selection of reviewers followed the OMB’s Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review.

The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the Climate Change

Science Program in making this published report as sound as possible and to ensure that the report meets institutional

standards. The peer review comments, draft manuscript, and response to the peer review comments are publicly available at: www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-5/peer-review-comments/default.htm

We wish to thank the following individuals for their peer review of this report:

Malcolm Asadoorian, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Richard Eckaus, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Guido Franco, California Energy Commission

Howard Gruenspecht, Energy Information Administration, DOE

Richard Haut, Houston Advanced Research Center

Paul Pike, Ameren Corporation

Terry Surles, University of Hawaii

We would also like to thank the individuals who provided their comments during the public comment period. 

The public review comments, draft manuscript, and response to the public comments are publicly available at:

www.climatescience.gov/Library/sap/sap4-5/public-review-comments/default.htm

Benjamin J. DeAngelo, U. S. Environmental Protection Agency

Brigid DeCoursey, U.S. Department of Transportation

Bill Fang, Edison Electric Institute

Guido Franco, California Energy Commission

Richard C. Haut, Houston Advanced Research Center

Haroon S. Kheshgi, ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company

Jeffrey Michel, Ing. Buro Michel

Paul Pike, Ameren Corporation

Jeffrey Stewart, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT (SAP) 4.5 AUTHOR TEAM

Thomas J. Wilbanks, Coordinator

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

P. O. Box 2008, MS 6038

Oak Ridge, TN 37831

E-mail: wilbankstj@ornl.gov

Vatsal Bhatt

Brookhaven National Laboratory

MS 475C

Upton, NY 11973-5000

E-mail: vbhatt@bnl.gov

Daniel E. Bilello 

National Renewable Energy Laboratory

1617 Cole Blvd.

Golden, CO 80401-3393

E-mail: dan_bilello@nrel.gov

Stanley R. Bull 

National Renewable Energy Laboratory

1617 Cole Blvd.

Golden, CO 80401-3393

E-mail: stan_bull@nrel.gov

James Ekmann

National Energy Technology Laboratory

Retired

William C. Horak

Brookhaven National Laboratory

MS 475B

Upton, NY 11973-5000

E-mail: horak@bnl.gov

Y. Joe Huang

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Retired

Mark D. Levine

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

1 Cyclotron Road, MS 90R3027D

Berkeley, CA 94720

E-mail: MDLevine@lbl.gov

Michael J. Sale

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

P. O. Box 2008, MS 6036

Oak Ridge, TN 37831

E-mail: salemj@ornl.gov

David K. Schmalzer

Argonne National Laboratory

9700 S. Cass Avenue

Argonne, IL 60439

E-mail: schmalzer@anl.gov

Michael J. Scott

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

P.O. Box 999

Richland, WA 99352

E-mail: Michael.scott@pnl.gov
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface ................................................................................................................iii

Executive Summary............................................................................................1

CHAPTERS

1 ........................................................................................................................ 3

Introduction

2 ........................................................................................................................ 7

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

3 ...................................................................................................................... 29

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution in the United States

4 ...................................................................................................................... 49

Possible Indirect Efects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use 

in the United States

5 ...................................................................................................................... 59

Conclusions and Research Priorities

References ........................................................................................................ 65

Annexes ............................................................................................................ 73

Annex A – Technical Note: Methods for Estimating Energy Consumption .. 73

Annex B – Organizations and Individuals Consulted ................................ 75

Annex C – Glossary................................................................................ 77

Annex D – Acronyms.............................................................................. 83

i
For the Report as a Whole:

CCSP, 2007: Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States. A Report by the U.S. Climate

Change Science Program and the subcommittee on Global Change Research. [Thomas J. Wilbanks, Vatsal Bhatt, Daniel

E. Bilello, Stanley R. Bull, James Ekmann, William C. Horak, Y. Joe Huang, Mark D. Levine, Michael J. Sale, David K.

Schmalzer, and Michael J. Scott (eds.)]. Department of Energy, Office of Biological & Environmental Research, Washington, DC., USA, 160 pp.

For the Executive Summary:

Wilbanks, T. J., et al., 2007: Executive Summary in Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United

States. A Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the subcommittee on Global Change Research. Washington, DC. 

For Chapter 1: 

Wilbanks, T. J. et al., 2007: Introduction in Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States.

A Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the subcommittee on Global Change Research. Washington, DC. 

For Chapter 2: 

Scott, M. J. and Y. J. Huang, 2007: Effects of climate change on energy use in the United States in Effects of Climate

Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States. A Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and

the subcommittee on Global Change Research. Washington, DC.

For Chapter 3: 

Bull, S. R., D. E. Bilello, J, Ekmann, M. J. Sale, and D. K. Schmalzer, 2007: Effects of climate change on energy production and distribution in the United States in Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States.

A Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the subcommittee on Global Change Research. Washington, DC.

For Chapter 4: 

Bhatt, V. J. Eckmann, W. C. Horak, and T. J. Wilbanks, 2007: Possible indirect effects on energy production and distribution in the United States in Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States. A Report by the

U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the subcommittee on Global Change Research. Washington, DC.

For Chapter 5: 

Wilbanks, T. J., et al., 2007: Conclusions and research priorities in Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and

Use in the United States. A Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the subcommittee on Global Change

Research. Washington, DC.

For Annex A:

Scott, M. J. and Y. J. Huang, 2007: Annex A: Technical Note: Methods for Estimating Energy Consumption in Buildings

in Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States. A Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the subcommittee on Global Change Research. Washington, DC.

RECOMMENDED CITATIONS

ii
This report was not originally scheduled to be a part

of the portfolio of Synthesis and Assessment Products

(SAPs) of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program

(CCSP). It was added when the U.S. Congress compared the proposed coverage of the SAP process with

subjects identified as national concerns in the U.S.

Global Change Research Act of 1990, which listed energy as one of the climate change impact sectors of national concern. After this comparison, questions from

the Congress led CCSP in mid-2005 to add a report on

climate change effects on energy production and use

in the United States: SAP 4.5.

This addition is important in at least two ways. First,

it fills a gap left by the first U.S. National Assessment

of Climate Variability and Change (NACC), carried out

from 1997-2000. NACC commissioned studies of five

sectors; but energy was not one of them, at least in part

because NACC was focused on impacts and it was felt

at that time that an energy sector impact assessment

could not be separated from politically controversial

issues related to emission reduction (mitigation). Second, it directly addresses a kind of myopia where relationships between the energy sector and climate

change are concerned. The energy sector is universally

considered a key part of mitigation strategies that emphasize reductions in fossil fuel use; but it is also a sector that is subject to impacts of climate change. Now

that climate change is increasingly being accepted as a

reality over the next century and more, it is important

to consider vulnerabilities and possible adaptation

strategies for this sector as well as others such as

health, water, agriculture, and forestry. 

For a combination of these reasons, SAP 4.5 is a timely

contribution to U.S. discussions of possible climate

change response strategies. Although it is possible to

politicize issues of climate change implications for energy needs and energy supplies, it is also possible to

provide both a foundation for that discussion based on

available scientific and technological information and

to indicate where additional knowledge would be useful in resolving issues and developing effective adaptation strategies.

This report has benefited from the thoughtful leadership of Jerry Elwood of DOE’s Office of Science, without whose perspectives the job would have been

impossible. When Dr. Elwood succeeded Ari Patrinos

as acting Director of DOE’s Office of Biological and

Environmental Research (BER), Jeff Amthor moved in

smoothly and professionally as the activity contact and

manager, maintaining continuity and oversight. The

report has also benefited from the steady roles of the

CCSP principals and the CCSP program office, who

have consistently insisted on such values as scientific

independence and stakeholder participation. Finally,

we acknowledge and express our gratitude to Jim Mahoney, who as Director of CCSP recognized the value

of producing a set of statements of current knowledge

about the various aspects of climate change science as

a vitally important way to reduce uncertainties about

what actions make sense now. 

One of Jerry Elwood’s decisions was to rely on a team

of DOE national laboratory leaders and staff members

to produce the report. This decision arose from a number of considerations, including the fact that the national laboratories as a family were in close touch with

all of the relevant research communities. But it proved

to be especially important because of the imperatives

of the CCSP time schedule for the SAPs, which called

for the first draft of SAP 4.5 to be produced so quickly

that contracting with other participants would have

been incompatible with established deadlines. The

schedule could not have been met otherwise. 

iii

PREFACE

Authors:

Thomas J. Wilbanks, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Vatsal Bhatt, Brookhaven National Laboratory; 

Daniel E. Bilello, National Renewable Energy Laboratory; Stanley R. Bull, National Renewable Energy 

Laboratory; James Ekmann*, National Energy Technology Laboratory; William C. Horak, Brookhaven 

National Laboratory; Y. Joe Huang*, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory; Mark D. Levine, Lawrence

Berkeley National Laboratory; Michael J. Sale, Oak Ridge National Laboratory; David K. Schmalzer, Argonne

National Laboratory; Michael J. Scott, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

*Retired.
iv

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Preface

Given this reality, the DOE national laboratories responded

with a collaboration among seven laboratories, including

high-level leaders of many of them, and produced drafts and

a final product that is intended as a starting point for a national discussion of a set of issues that had been previously

largely overlooked.

But SAP 4.5 is not just a product of the DOE national laboratories. It has benefited profoundly from comments, questions, and other insights from a host of stakeholders in

industry, federal, and state government, nongovernmental institutions, and academia. For a list of specific contributors,

see Annex A; but research and assessment contributions

from many others have been included as well. This is intended to be a summary on behalf of interested parties across

the nation, not a summary of the knowledge of the national

laboratories.

Having said this, the fact is that a summary of the current

knowledge about possible effects of climate change on energy production and use in the United States, as of early

2007, does little more than scratch the surface of a very important and complex topic. Because of a natural tendency to

focus on the energy sector as a driving force where climate

change is concerned, the impacts on the energy sector from

climate change have been under-studied. Until this oversight is corrected, the energy sector – on both the energy use

and energy supply sides – is vulnerable to stresses from climate change that, if identified early enough, can probably

be addressed by adaptation strategies that will reduce unnecessary costs to society and to the energy institutions that

seek to meet social needs for energy services.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

This report summarizes what is currently known about effects of climate change on energy production and use in the United

States. It focuses on three questions, which are listed below along with general short answers to each. Generally, it is important to be careful about answering these questions for two reasons. One reason is that the available research literatures on

many of the key issues are limited, supporting a discussion of issues but not definite conclusions about answers. A second

reason is that, as with many other categories of climate change effects in the U.S., the effects depend on more than climate

change alone, such as patterns of economic growth and land use, patterns of population growth and distribution, technological change, and social and cultural trends that could shape policies and actions, individually and institutionally. 

The report concludes that, based on what we know now, there are reasons to pay close attention to possible climate change

impacts on energy production and use and to consider ways to adapt to possible adverse impacts and take advantage of possible positive impacts. Although the report includes considerably more detail, here are the three questions along with a brief

summary of the answers:

• How might climate change affect energy consumption in the United States? The research evidence is relatively clear that climate warming will mean reductions in total U.S. heating requirements and increases in total cooling requirements for buildings. These changes will vary by region and by season, but they will affect household and business

energy costs and their demands on energy supply institutions. In general, the changes imply increased demands for electricity, which supplies virtually all cooling energy services but only some heating services. Other effects on energy consumption are less clear.

• How might climate change affect energy production and supply in the United States? The research evidence about effects is not as strong as for energy consumption, but climate change could affect energy production and supply (a) if extreme weather events become more intense, (b) where regions dependent on water supplies for hydropower

and/or thermal power plant cooling face reductions in water supplies, (c) where temperature increases decrease overall thermoelectric power generation efficiencies, and (d) where changed conditions affect facility siting decisions. Most effects are

likely to be modest except for possible regional effects of extreme weather events and water shortages. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Climate change is expected to have noticeable effects in the United States:

a rise in average temperatures in most regions, changes in precipitation

amounts and seasonal patterns in many regions, changes in the intensity

and pattern of extreme weather events, and sea level rise. Some of these

effects have clear implications for energy production and use. For instance,

average warming can be expected to increase energy requirements for

cooling and reduce energy requirements for warming. Changes in precipitation could affect prospects for hydropower, positively or negatively. Increases in storm intensity could threaten further disruptions of the sorts experienced in 2005 with

Hurricane Katrina. Concerns about climate change impacts could change perceptions and valuations of energy technology

alternatives. Any or all of these types of effects could have very real meaning for energy policies, decisions, and institutions

in the United States, affecting discussions of courses of action and appropriate strategies for risk management.

Executive Summary

Authors: Thomas J. Wilbanks, et al.
2

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Executive Summary

• How might climate change have other

effects that indirectly shape energy

production and consumption in the

United States? The research evidence

about indirect effects ranges from abundant

information about possible effects of climate

change policies on energy technology

choices to extremely limited information

about such issues as effects on energy security. Based on this mixed evidence, it appears that climate change is likely to affect

risk management in the investment behavior

of some energy institutions, and it is very

likely to have some effects on energy technology R&D investments and energy resource and technology choices. In addition,

climate change can be expected to affect

other countries in ways that in turn affect

U.S. energy conditions through their participation in global and hemispheric energy

markets, and climate change concerns could

interact with some driving forces behind

policies focused on U.S. energy security.

Because of the lack of research to date,

prospects for adaptation to climate change effects by energy providers, energy users, and society at large are speculative, although the

potentials are considerable. It is possible that

the greatest challenges would be in connection

with possible increases in the intensity of extreme weather events and possible significant

changes in regional water supply regimes. But

adaptation prospects depend considerably on

the availability of information about possible

climate change effects to inform decisions about

adaptive management, along with technological

change in the longer term. 

Given that the current knowledge base is so limited, this suggests that expanding the knowledge

base is important to energy users and providers

in the United States. Examples of research priorities – which call for contributions by a wide

range of partners in federal and state governments, industry, nongovernmental institutions,

and academia – are identified in the report. 
CHAPTER

1

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Introduction

Authors: 

Thomas J. Wilbanks, et al.

CHAPTER

1

3

These reports arise from the five goals of CCSP (http://www.climatescience.gov), the fourth of

which is to “understand the sensitivity and adaptability of different natural and managed ecosystems and human systems to climate and related global changes.” One of the seven SAPs related

to this particular goal is concerned with analyses of the effects of global change on energy production and use (SAP 4.5). The resulting SAP, this report, has been titled “Effects of Climate

Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States.” 

This topic is relevant to policy-makers and other decision-makers because most discussions to date

of relationships between the energy sector and responses to concerns about climate have been very

largely concerned with roles of energy production and use in climate change mitigation. Along with

these roles of the energy sector as a driver of climate change, the energy sector is also subject to

effects of climate change; and these possible effects – along with adaptation strategies to reduce

any potential negative costs from them – have received much less attention. For instance, the U.S.

National Assessment of Possible Consequences of Climate Variability and Change (NACC, 2001)

considered effects on five sectors, such as water and health; but energy was not one of those sectors, even though the Global Change Research Act of 1990 had listed energy as one of several sectors of particular interest.

As a major expression of its objective to provide the best possible scientific information to support decision-making and public discussion on key climaterelated issues, the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) has commissioned 21 “synthesis and assessment products” (SAPs) to summarize current

knowledge and identify priorities for research, observation, and decision support in order to strengthen contributions by climate change science to climate

change related decisions.
4

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 1 - Introduction

Because the topic has not been a high priority

for research support and institutional analysis,

the formal knowledge base is in many ways limited. As a starting point for discussion, this

product compiles and reports what is known

about likely or possible effects of climate

change on energy production and use in the

United States, within a more comprehensive

framework for thought about this topic, and it

identifies priorities for expanding the knowledge

base to meet needs of key decision-makers.

1.1 BACKGROUND

Climate change is expected to have certain effects in the United States: a rise in average temperatures in most regions, changes in

precipitation amounts and seasonal patterns in

many regions, changes in the intensity and pattern of extreme weather events, and sea level

rise [(IPCC, 2001a; NACC, 2001; also see other

SAPs, including 2.1b and 3.2)]. 

Some of these effects have clear implications

for energy production and use. For instance, average warming can be expected to increase energy requirements for cooling and reduce

energy requirements for warming. Changes in

precipitation patterns and amounts could affect

prospects for hydropower, positively or negatively. Increases in storm intensity could

threaten further disruptions of the sorts experienced in 2005 with Hurricanes Katrina and

Rita. Concerns about climate change impacts

could change perceptions and valuations of energy technology alternatives. Any or all of these

types of effects could have very real meaning

for energy policies, decisions, and institutions

in the United States, affecting discussions of

courses of action and appropriate strategies for

risk management. 

According to CCSP, an SAP has three end uses:

(1) informing the evolution of the research

agenda; (2) supporting adaptive management

and planning; and (3) supporting policy formulation. This product will inform policymakers,

stakeholders, and the general public about issues associated with climate change implications for energy production and use in the

United States, increase awareness of what is

known and not yet known, and support discussions of technology and policy options where

the knowledge base is still at an early stage of

development.

The central questions addressed by SAP 4.5 follow:

• How might climate change affect energy

consumption in the United States?

• How might climate change affect energy

production and supply in the United States?

• How might climate change affect various

contexts that indirectly shape energy production and consumption in the United

States, such as energy technologies, energy

institutions, regional economic growth, energy prices, energy security, and environmental emissions?

SAP 4.5 is being completed by the end of the

second quarter of calendar year 2007 (June 30,

2007), following a number of steps required for

all SAPs in scoping the study, conducting it, and

reviewing it at several stages (see the section

below on How the Report Was Developed). 

1.2 THE TOPIC OF THIS

SYNTHESIS AND ASSESSMENT

REPORT

This report summarizes the current knowledge

base about possible effects of climate change on

energy production and use in the United States

as a contributor to further studies of the broader

topic of effects of global change on energy production and use. It also identifies where research could reduce uncertainties about

vulnerabilities, possible effects, and possible

strategies to reduce negative effects and increase

adaptive capacity and considers priorities for

strengthening the knowledge base. As is the

case for most of the SAPs, it does not include

new analyses of data, new scenarios of climate

change or impacts, or other new contributions

to the knowledge base, although its presentation

of a framework for thought about energy sector

impacts is in many ways new.
5

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

As indicated above, the content of SAP 4.5 includes attention to the following issues:

• possible effects (both positive and negative)

of climate change on energy consumption in

the United States (Chapter 2),

• possible effects (both positive and negative)

on energy production and supply in the

United States (Chapter 3), and

• possible indirect effects on energy consumption and production (Chapter 4).

These chapters are followed by a final chapter

that provides conclusions about what is currently known, prospects for adaptation, and priorities for improving the knowledge base.

1.3 PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS 

OF THIS TOPIC

As mentioned on page 1, unlike some of the

other sectoral assessment areas identified in the

Global Change Research Act of 1990—such as

agriculture, water, and human health—energy

was not the subject of a sectoral assessment in

the National Assessment of Possible Consequences of Climate Variability and Change,

completed in 2001 (NACC, 2001). As a result,

SAP 4.5 draws upon a less organized knowledge base than these other sectoral impact areas.

On the other hand, by addressing an assessment

area not covered in the initial national assessment, SAP 4.5 will provide new information

and perspectives.

The subject matter associated with SAP 4.5 is

incorporated in two chapters of the Working

Group II contribution to the Intergovernmental

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report (Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability), scheduled for completion in 2007.

Chapter 7, “Industry, Settlement, and Society,”

Section 7.4.2.1, briefly summarizes the global

knowledge base about possible impacts of climate change on energy production and use, reporting relevant research from the United States

but not assessing impacts on the United States.

Chapter 14, “North America,” summarizes the

knowledge base about possible impacts of climate change in this continent, including the

United States, in Sections 14.2.8 and 14.4.8.

1.4 HOW THE REPORT WAS

DEVELOPED

SAPs are developed according to guidelines established by CCSP based on processes that are

open and public. These processes include a

number of steps before approval to proceed, emphasizing both stakeholder participation and

CCSP reviews of a formal prospectus for the report, a number of review steps including both

expert reviewers and public comments, and

final reviews by the CCSP Interagency Committee and the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).

The process for producing the report was focused on a survey and assessment of the available literature, in many cases including

documents that were not peer-reviewed but the

authors determined to be valid, using established analytic-deliberative practices. It included identification and consideration of

relevant studies carried out in connection with

CCSP, the Climate Change Technology Program

(CCTP), and other programs of CCSP agencies

(e.g., the Energy Information Administration),

and consultation with stakeholders such as the

electric utility and energy industries, environmental non-governmental organizations, and the

academic research community to determine

what analyses have been conducted and reports

have been issued. Where quantitative research

results are limited, the process considers the degree to which qualitative statements of possible

effects may be valid as outcomes of expert deliberation, utilizing the extensive review

processes built into the SAP process to contribute to judgments about the validity of the

statements.

SAP 4.5 is authored by staff from the Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories,

drawing on their own expertise and knowledge

bases and also upon other knowledge bases, including those within energy corporations and

utilities, consulting firms, nongovernmental organizations, state and local governments, and

the academic research community. DOE has assured that authorship by DOE national laboratory staff will in no way exclude any relevant

research or knowledge, and every effort is being

made to identify and utilize all relevant expert-
6

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 1 - Introduction

ise, materials, and other sources. For the author

team of SAP 4.5, see Box 1.1.

Stakeholders participated during the scoping

process, have provided comments on the

prospectus, and submitted comments on the

product during a public comment period, as well

as other comments via the SAP 4.5 web site.

The development of SAP 4.5 included active

networking by authors with centers of expertise

and stakeholders to assure that the process was

fully informed about their knowledge bases and

viewpoints. 

1.5 HOW TO USE THIS REPORT

The audience for SAP 4.5 includes scientists in

related fields, decision-makers in the public sector (federal, state, and local governments), the

private sector (energy companies, electric utilities, energy equipment providers and vendors,

and energy-dependent sectors of the economy),

energy and environmental policy interest

groups, and the general public. Even though this

report is unable—based on existing knowledge—to answer all relevant questions that

might be asked by these interested parties, the

intent is to provide information and perspectives

to inform discussions about the issues and to

clarify priorities for research to reduce uncertainties in answering key questions. 

As indicated above, because of limitations in

available research literatures, in some cases the

report is only able to characterize categories of

possible effects without evaluating what the effects are likely to be. In other cases, the report

offers preliminary judgments about effects, related to degrees of likelihood: likely (2 chances

out of 3), very likely (9 chances out of 10), or

virtually certain (99 chances out of 100).

This report avoids the use of highly technical

terminology, but a glossary and list of acronyms

are included at the end of the report. 

Thomas J. Wilbanks Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Coordinator

Vatsal Bhatt Brookhaven National Laboratory

Daniel E. Bilello National Renewable Energy Laboratory

Stanley R. Bull National Renewable Energy Laboratory

James Ekmann National Energy Technology Laboratory

William C. Horak Brookhaven National Laboratory

Y. Joe Huang Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 

Mark D. Levine Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

Michael J. Sale Oak Ridge National Laboratory

David K. Schmalzer Argonne National Laboratory

Michael J. Scott Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Sherry B. Wright Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Administrative Coordinator

BOX 1.1 SAP 4.5 Author Team
CHAPTER

2

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Effects of Climate Change 

on Energy Use in the United States 

Authors: 

Michael J. Scott, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

Y. Joe Huang*, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory

CHAPTER

* Retired

2

7

2.1 INTRODUCTION

In the United States, some of these effects of climate change on energy consumption have been

studied enough to produce a body of literature with empirical results. This is especially the case

for energy demand in residential and commercial buildings, where studies of the effects of climate

change have been under way for about 20 years. There is very little literature on the other effects

mentioned above. 

This chapter summarizes current knowledge about potential effects of climate change on energy

demand in the United States. The chapter mainly focuses on the effects of climate change on energy consumption in buildings (emphasizing space heating and space cooling, but also addressing

net energy use, peak loads, and adaptation), because studies of these effects account for most of

the available knowledge. The chapter more briefly addresses impacts of climate change on energy

use in other sectors, including transportation, construction, and agriculture, where studies are far

less available. The final section summarizes the chapter’s conclusions. 

7

As the climate of the world warms, the consumption of energy in climate-sensitive sectors is likely to change. Possible effects include (1) decreases in the

amount of energy consumed in residential, commercial, and industrial buildings

for space heating and increases for space cooling; (2) decreases in energy used

directly in certain processes such as residential, commercial, and industrial water

heating, and increases in energy used for residential and commercial refrigeration and industrial process cooling (e.g., in thermal power plants or steel mills);

(3) increases in energy used to supply other resources for climate-sensitive

processes, such as pumping water for irrigated agriculture and municipal uses;

(4) changes in the balance of energy use among delivery forms and fuel types,

as between electricity used for air conditioning and natural gas used for heating; and (5) changes in energy consumption in key climate-sensitive sectors of

the economy, such as transportation, construction, agriculture, and others.
8

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

2.2 ENERGY CONSUMPTION 

IN BUILDINGS

2.2.1 Overview

U.S. residential and commercial buildings currently use about 20 quadrillion Btus (quads) of

delivered energy per year (equivalent to about

38 quads of primary energy, allowing for electricity production-related losses). This energy

consumption accounts directly or indirectly for

0.6 GT of carbon emitted to the atmosphere

(38% of U.S. total emissions of 1.6 GT and approximately 9% of the world fossil-fuel related

anthropogenic emissions of 6.7 GT (EIA,

2006). The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) has projected that residential and

commercial consumption of delivered energy

would increase to 26 quads (53 quads primary

energy) and corresponding carbon emissions to

0.9 GT by the year 2030 (EIA, 2006). However,

these routine EIA projections do not account for

the effects any temperature increases on building energy use that may occur as a result of

global warming, nor do they account for consumer reactions to a warmer climate, such as an

increase in the adoption of air conditioning.

To perform an assessment of the impact of climate change on energy demand, it is helpful to

have as context a set of climate scenarios. The

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

(IPCC) projected in 2001 that climate could

warm relative to 1990 by 0.4 ̊C to 1.2 ̊C by the

year 2030 and by 1.4 ̊C to 5.8 ̊C by the end of

the 21st century (Cubasch et al., 2001 and Ruosteenoja, et al. 2003) performed a reanalysis

of the seventeen 2001 IPCC climate simulations

by seven different climate models at the regional

level. Their results for the United States are reported for three subregions, four seasons, and

three major time steps, as summarized in Table

2.1. This is not the only set of climate scenarios available, and the energy studies cited in this

chapter often use other scenarios; but the table

broadly characterizes the range of average temperature changes that might occur in the United

States in the 21st century and can provide context for the various energy impact analyses that

have been done.

Approximately 20 studies have been done since

about 1990 concerning the effect of projected

climate change on energy consumption in residential and commercial buildings in the United

States. Some of these studies concern particular states or regions, and the impacts estimated

depend crucially on local conditions. 

Region 

and

Season

TIME STEP

2010-2039 (2020) 2040-2069 (2050) 2070-2099 (2080)

Median Range Median Range Median Range

WESTERN U.S.

DJF 1.6 0.5-2.4 2.3 1.0-4.2 4.1 2.0-7.6

MAM 1.4 0.5-1.9 2.5 1.1-4.1 3.8 1.0-7.6

JJA 1.8 0.8-2.6 2.8 1.7-5.2 4.2 2.8-9.1

SON 1.3 0.5-2.1 2.8 1.4-4.6 3.9 1.6-8.0

CENTRAL U.S.

DJF 1.6 0.0-2.6 3.0 1.2-4.5 4.2 1.9-7.9

MAM 1.8 0.5-2.8 2.9 1.2-5.1 4.4 1.9-8.0

JJA 1.8 0.9-2.2 3.0 1.5-5.4 4.4 1.9-8.5

SON 1.3 0.4-2.3 2.8 1.2-5.0 4.1 1.8-8.8

EASTERN U.S.

DJF 1.8 0.4-2.6 2.6 1.4-5.8 4.6 2.2-10.2

MAM 1.7 0.6-3.2 2.7 1.4-6.0 4.4 1.9-9.6

JJA 1.6 0.8-1.9 2.8 1.4-5.5 4.2 1.8-8.6

SON 1.5 0.6-2.3 2.8 1.4-5.4 4.0 1.8-9.0

Table 2.1. Seasonal

Temperature

Increases For Three

U.S. Regions ( ̊C) 

In Winter (DJF),

Spring (MAM),

Summer (JJA), And

Fall (SON). Derived

From Ruosteenoja

et al., 2003.
9

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Some of the studies analyze only electricity. Almost all show both an increase in electricity

consumption and an increase in the consumption of primary fuels used to generate it, except

in the few regions that provide space heating

with electricity (for example, the Pacific Northwest). The few studies that examine effects on

peak electricity demand emphasize that increases in peak demand would cause disproportionate increases in energy infrastructure

investment. 

Some studies provide demand estimates for

heating fuels such as natural gas and distillate

fuel oil in addition to electricity. These all-fuels

studies provide support for the idea that climate

warming causes significant decreases in space

heating; however, whether energy savings in

heating fuels offset increases in energy demand

for cooling depends on the initial balance of energy consumption between heating and cooling,

which in turn depends upon geography. Empirical studies show that the overall effect is more

likely to be a significant net savings in delivered

energy consumption in northern parts of the

country (those with more than 4,000 heating degree-days per year) and a significant net increase in energy consumption in the south for

both residential and commercial buildings, with

the national balance slightly favoring net savings of delivered energy.

Studies vary in their treatment of the expected

demographic shifts in the United States, expected evolution of building stock, and consumer reaction to warmer temperatures.

Roughly half of the studies use building energy

simulation models and account explicitly for the

current trend in U.S. population moving toward

the south and west, as well as increases in

square footage per capita in newer buildings and

increases in market penetration of air conditioning in newer buildings (See Annex A for a

summary of methods). They do not, however,

include consumer reactions to warming itself.

For example, the market penetration of air conditioning is not directly influenced by warming

in these studies. The other studies use econometric modeling of energy consumption

choices. Many of these studies emphasize that

the responsiveness of climate change of energy

use to climate change is greater in the long-run

than in short run; for example, consumers not

only run their air conditioners more often in response to higher temperatures, but may also

adopt air conditioning for the first time in regions such as New England, which still feature

relatively low market penetration of air conditioning. Commercial building designs may

evolve to reduce the need for heating by making

better use of internal energy gains and warmer

weather. Rising costs of space conditioning

could modify the current trend in floor space

per capita. Most econometric studies of building energy consumption estimate effects like

this statistically from databases on existing

buildings such as the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA’s) Residential Energy Consumption Survey (RECS) (EIA, 2001b) and

Commercial Building Energy Consumption

Survey (CBECS) (EIA, 2003). 

Table 2.2. Summary

of Qualitative Effects

of Global Warming

on Energy

Consumption in the

United States 

Sector National Effects Regional Effects Other Effects Comments

Residential and

Commercial

Buildings

Annual 

Energy Use 

Slight decrease or

increase in net

annual delivered

energy; likely net

increase in

primary energy 

Space heating

savings dominate

in North; space

cooling increases

dominate in South

Overall increase

in carbon

emissions

Studies agree on

the direction of

regional effects;

national direction

varies with the

study 

Peak 

Electricity

Consumption

Probable increase Increase in

summer peaking

regions; probable

decline in winter

peaking regions

Increase in carbon

emissions

Most regions are

summer-peaking

due to air

conditioning

Market

Penetration of

Energy-Using

Equipment

Increase in market

penetration of air

conditioning 

Air conditioning

market share

increases primarily

in North

—

Very few studies.

Strength of the

effect is not clear.
10

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

When losses in energy conversion and delivery

of electricity are taken into account, primary energy consumption (source energy) at the national level increases in some studies and

decreases in others, with the balance of studies

projecting a net increase in primary energy consumption. When the higher costs per delivered

Btu of electricity are taken into account, the national-level consumer expenditures on energy

increase in some studies and decrease in others,

with the balance of studies favoring an increase

in expenditures. 

Various studies include a range of climate

warming scenarios as well as different time

frames and methods. Table 2.2 summarizes the

main qualitative conclusions that can be drawn

from an overview of this literature concerning

the marginal effect of climate warming on energy use in buildings. These effects are discussed further in Sections 2.3 through 2.5. 

2.2.2 The Literature in Greater

Detail

The general finding about the net impact of climate warming on the consumption of delivered

heating fuel and electricity is that for regions

with more than about 4000 heating degree-days

Fahrenheit (EIA Climate Zones 1-3, roughly the

dividing line between “north” and “south” in

most national studies—see Figure 2.1) climate

warming tends to reduce consumption of heating fuel more than it increases the consumption

of electricity (e.g., Hadley et al., 2004, 2006).

The reverse is true south of that line. By coincidence, the national gains and losses in delivered energy approximately balance. Existing

studies do not agree on whether there is small

increase or decrease. The picture is different for

primary energy and carbon dioxide. Because

the generation, transmission, and distribution of

electricity is subject to significant energy losses,

Figure 2.1. U.S.

Climate Zones

(Zones 1-3 are

“North,” Zones 4-5

are “South”).

Source: Energy Information

Administration, Residential

Energy Consumption

Survey (EIA, 2001c).

http://www.eia.doe.gov/
11

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

national primary energy demand tends to increase with warmer temperatures. Finally, because electricity is about 50% generated with

coal, which is a high-carbon fuel, and about 3.2

Btu of primary energy are consumed for every

Btu of delivered electricity (EIA, 2006), carbon

dioxide emissions also tend to increase. The extent of this national shift in energy use is expected to depend in part on the strength of

residential adoption of air conditioning as the

length of the air conditioning season and the

warmth of summer increases in the north, where

the market penetration of air conditioning is still

relatively low. The potential reaction of consumers to a longer and more intense cooling

season in the future has been addressed in only

a handful of studies (e.g., Sailor and Pavlova,

2003) and must be considered highly uncertain.

There is even less information available on theoff-setting effects of adaptations such as imEnergy Use, Activity, Intensity and Other Factors in the Residential Sector - Delivered 

Energy, 1985-2004

Total energy use of delivered

energy in households increased from 1985 to 2004.

While both the number of

households and housing size

has increased over the period,

the weather-adjusted intensity of energy use has fallen.

Heating and cooling energy

use declined, while appliance

energy use increased enough

to offset the declines in other

end-uses. EIA (2006) projects

an increase in building residential floor space per household of 14% during the period 2003-2030.

Commercial Energy Use, Activity, Weather, and Intensity - Delivered Energy

Estimated total floor space in

commercial buildings grew

35% during the 1985-2004

period, while weather-adjusted energy intensity remained about constant.

Declines in 1991 and since

2001 resulted from recessions, during which commercial vacancies increased and

the utilization of occupied

space fell. EIA (2006) projects

the ratio of commercial floor

space per member of the U.S.

labor force to increase by

23% in the period 2003-2030.

(Data from the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, “Indicators of Energy Intensity

in the United States,” http://intensityindicators.pnl.gov/index.stm) and from EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook (EIA, 2006).

BOX 2.1 Trends in the Energy Intensity of Residential and Commercial Buildings

1985 1987 1989

1.6

1991 1993 1995

Year

Index (1985 = 1.0)

1997 1999 2001 2003

Energy Use

Number of Households

Housing Size

Structure (incl. Weather)

Intensity (per sq. foot)

1.4

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4

0.2

0

1985 1987 1989

1.6

1991 1993 1995

Year

Index (1985 = 1.0)

1997 1999 2001 2003

Energy Consumption

Floorspace

Intensity Index (weather adj.)

Weather Factor

1.4

1.2

1.0

0.8

0.6

0.4
12

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

proved energy efficiency or changes in urban

form that might reduce exacerbating factors

such as urban heat island effects. 

Box 2.1 provides insight into the recent trends

in the intensity of energy consumption in residential and commercial buildings in the United

States. There are a number of underlying

trends, such as an ongoing population shift to

the South and West, increases in the floor space

per building occupant in both the residential and

commercial sectors, and improvements in building shell performance, the balance of which

have led to overall reductions in the intensity in

the use of fuels for heating. Climate warming

could be expected to reinforce this trend. At the

same time, the demographic shifts to the South

and West, increases in floor space per capita,

and electrification of the residential and commercial sectors all have increased the use of

electricity, especially for space cooling. This

trend also would be reinforced by climate

warming. 

Amato et al., (2005) observe that many studies

worldwide have analyzed the climate sensitivity of energy use in residential, commercial, and

industrial buildings and have used these estimated relationships to explain energy consumption and to assist energy suppliers with

short-term planning (Quayle and Diaz, 1979; Le

Comte and Warren, 1981; Warren and LeDuc,

1981; Downton et al., 1988; Badri, 1992;

Lehman, 1994; Lam, 1998; Yan, 1998; Morris,

1999; Considine, 2000; Pardo, et al., 2002).

The number of studies in the U.S. analyzing the

effects of climate change on energy demand,

however, is much more limited. One of the very

early national-level studies was of the electricity sector, projecting that between 2010 and

2055 climate change could increase capacity

addition requirements by 14–23% relative to

nonclimate change scenarios, requiring investments of $200–300 billion ($1990) (Linder and

Inglis, 1989). The Linder-Inglis results are similar to electricity findings in most of the studies

that followed. Subsequently, a number of studies have attempted an “all fuels” approach and

have focused on whether net national energy demand (decreases in heating balanced against increases in cooling) would increase or decrease

in residential and commercial buildings as a result of climate change (e.g., Loveland and

Brown, 1990; Rosenthal et al., 1995; Belzer et

al., 1996; Hadley et al., 2004, 2006; Mansur et

al., 2005; Scott et al., 2005; Huang, 2006). The

picture here is more clouded. While the direction of regional projections in these studies are

reasonably similar, the net impacts at the national level differ among studies and depend on

the relative balance of several effects, including

scenarios used, assumptions about demographic

trends and building stock, market penetration of

equipment (especially air conditioning), and

consumer behavior. 

In the sections that follow, this chapter discusses

the impacts of climate warming on space heating in buildings (divided between residential

and commercial), space cooling (again divided

between residential and commercial buildings),

net energy demand, market penetration of air

conditioning, and possible effects of adaptation

actions such as increased energy efficiency and

changes to urban form, which could reduce the

impacts of some compounding effects such as

urban heat islands. 

2.3 EFFECTS OF CLIMATE

WARMING ON ENERGY USE FOR

SPACE HEATING

2.3.1 Residential Space Heating 

Temperature increases resulting from global

warming are almost certain to reduce the

amount of energy needed for space heating in

residential buildings in the United States. The

amount of the reduction projected by a number

of U.S. studies has varied, depending mainly on

the amount of temperature change in the climate

scenario, the calculated sensitivity of the building

stock to warming, and the adjustments allowed

in the building stock over time (Table 2.3). 

In most areas where it is available, the fuel of

choice for residential and commercial space

heating is natural gas, which is burned directly

in a furnace in the building in question. There

are some exceptions. In the Northeast, some of

these savings will be in fuel oil, since fuel oil

still provides about 36 % of residential space

heating in that region, according to the 2001

RECS. In some other parts of the country with

relatively short, mild winters or relatively inexpensive electricity or both, electricity has a sig-
13

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

nificant share of the space heating market. For

example, electricity accounted for 15% of residential heating energy in the Pacific Census Division and 19% in the South Atlantic Census

Division in 2001 (EIA, 2001).

In Mansur et al., the impact of climate change

on the consumption of energy in residential

heating is relatively modest. When natural gas

is available, the marginal impact of a 1°C increase in January temperatures in their model is

predicted to reduce residential electricity consumption by 2.8% for electricity-only consumers and 2% for natural gas customers. 

Scott et al., (2005), working directly with residential end uses in a building energy simulation

model, projected about a 4% to 20% reduction

in the demand for residential space heating energy by 2020, given no change in the housing

stock and with winter temperature increases

ranging from 0.4° to 3.2° C, or roughly 6% to

10% decrease in space heating per degree C increase. This is roughly twice the model sensitivity of Mansur et al., 2005. The Scott et al.

analysis utilized the projected seasonal ranges

of temperatures in Table 2.1 (Ruosteenoja et al.,

2003). Huang, 2006 also found decreases in average energy use for space heating. While these

varied considerably by location and building

vintage as well, the overall average was about a

12% average site energy reduction for space

heating in 2020, or 9.2% per 1°C. 

Regional level studies show similar effects, with

a sensitivity of about 6% to 10% per 1°C in temperature change among the studies using building models and only about 1% per degree 1°C

in studies using econometrics, in part possibly

due to reactive increases in energy consumption

(energy consumption “take-backs”) as heating

energy costs decline with warmer weather in

this type of model, but also due to choice of region. In two studies with many of the same researchers and using very similar methodologies,

Amato et al., 2005 projected about a 7% to 33%

decline in space heating in the 2020s in Massachusetts, which has a long heating season, while

Study: 

Author(s) and Date

Change in 

Energy Consumption (%)

Temperature Change ( ̊C)

and Date for Change

National Studies

Rosenthal et al., 1995 -14% +1°C (2010)

Scott et al., 2005 -4% to -20%

+About 1.7°C median (varies from

0.4° to 3.2°C regionally and

seasonally) (2020)

Mansur et al., 2005

-2.8% for electricity-only

customers; -2% for gas customers;

-5.7% for fuel oil customers 

+1° C January temperatures (2050)

Huang, 2006

Varies by location 

and building. vintage average

HVAC changes: 

-12% heating in 2020 

-24% heating in 2050

-34% heating in 2080

18 US locations, (varies by

location, month, and time of day)

Average winter temperature increases

1.3° C in 2020

2.6° C in 2050

4.1° C in 2080

Regional Studies

Loveland and Brown,

1990 -44 to -73% 3.7°C to 4.7°C (Individual cities) (No date given)

Amato et al., 2005

(Massachusetts)

-7% to -14%, natural gas

-15% to 20%, fuel oil

-15% to -25%, natural gas

-15% to -33%, fuel oil

-8.7% in HDD (2020)

-11.5% in HDD (2030)

Ruth and Lin, 2006

(Maryland)

-2.5% natural gas

-2.7% fuel oil 1.7°C-2.2°C (2025)

Table 2.3. Effects of

Climate Change on

Residential Space

Heating in U.S.

Energy Studies
14

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

Ruth and Lin, 2006 projected only a 2%-3% decline space heating energy during the same time

frame in Maryland, which has a much milder

heating season and many days where warmer

weather would have no impact on heating degree-days or heating demand. 

2.3.2 Commercial Space Heating 

Although historically the intensity of energy

consumption in the commercial sector has not

followed a declining trend in the residential sector (Box 2.1), the effects of climate warming on

space heating in the commercial sector (Table

2.4) are projected in most studies to be similar

to those in the residential sector. 

Belzer et al., (1996) used the detailed CBECS

data set on U.S. commercial buildings, and calculated the effect of building characteristics and

temperature on energy consumption in all U.S.

commercial buildings. With building equipment and shell efficiencies frozen at 1990 baseline levels and a 3.9°C temperature change, the

Belzer model predicted a decrease in annual

space heating energy requirements of 29% to

35%, or about 7.4% to 9.0% per 1°C. Mansur

et al. 2005 projected that a 1°C increase in January temperatures would produce a reduction in

electricity consumption of about 3% for electricity for all-electric customers. The warmer

temperatures also would reduce natural gas consumption by 3% and fuel oil demand by a sizeable 12% per 1°C. This larger impact on fuel

oil consumption likely occurs because warming

has its largest impacts on heating degree days

in the Northeast and in some other northern tier

states where fuel oil is most prevalent. Another

factor may be the fact that commercial buildings that use fuel oil may be older vintage buildStudy: 

Author(s) and Date

Change in 

Energy Consumption (%)

Temperature Change ( ̊C)

and Date for Change

National Studies

Rosenthal et al., 1995 -16% +1°C (2010)

Belzer et al., 1996 -29.0% to -35% +3.9°C (2030)

Scott et al., 2005 -5% to -24%

+About 1.7°C median (varies from

0.4° to 3.2°C regionally and

seasonally) (2020)

Mansur et al., 2005 -2.6% for electricity; -3% for

natural gas; -11.8% for fuel oi +1° C January temperatures (2050)

Huang, 2006

Varies by location 

and building vintage; 

Average heating savings: 

-12% heating in 2020 

-22% heating in 2050

-33% heating in 2080

5 US locations, (varies by

location, month, and time of day)

Average winter temperature increases

1.3° C in 2020

2.6° C in 2050

4.1° C in 2080

Regional Studies

Loveland and Brown,

1990 -37.3% to -58.8% 3.7°C to 4.7°C (Individual cities) (No date given)

Scott et al., 1994

(Minneapolis and

Phoenix)

-26.0% (Minneapolis); 

-43.1% (Phoenix) 3.9°C (no date)

Amato et al., 2005

(Massachusetts)

-7% to -8%

-8% to 13%

-8.7% in HDD (2020)

-11.5% in HDD (2030)

Ruth and Lin, 2006

(Maryland) -2.7% natural gas 1.7°C-2.2°C (2025)

Table 2.4. Effects of

Climate Change on

Commercial Space

Heating in U.S.

Energy Studies
15

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

ings whose energy consumption is more sensitive to outdoor temperatures. Similar to its residential findings, Huang, 2006 showed that the

impact of climate change on commercial building energy use varies greatly depending on climate and building type. For the entire U.S.

commercial sector, the simulations showed 12%

decrease in energy use for space heating or

9.2% per 1°C. 

Again, the regional level studies produce more

dramatic decreases in energy demand in colder

regions than in warmer ones; however, the differences are less between cold regions and

warm regions than in residential buildings because commercial buildings are more dominated by internal loads such as lighting and

equipment than are residential buildings.

2. 4 EFFECTS OF CLIMATE

WARMING ON ENERGY USE FOR

SPACE COOLING

2.4.1 Residential Space Cooling 

According to all studies surveyed for this chapter, climate warming is expected to significantly

increase the energy demand in all regions for

space cooling, which is provided almost entirely

by electricity. The effect in most studies is nonlinear with respect to temperature and humidity, such that the percentage impact increases

more than proportionately with increases in

temperature (Sailor, 2001). Some researchers

have projected that increases in cooling eventually could dominate decreases in heating as temperatures continue to rise (Rosenthal et al.,

1995), although that effect is not necessarily observed in empirical studies for the temperature

increases projected in the United States during

the 21st century (Table 2.5). 

Study: 

Author(s) and Date

Change in 

Energy Consumption (%)

Temperature Change ( ̊C)

and Date for Change

National Studies

Rosenthal et al., 1995 +20% +1°C (2010)

Scott et al., 2005 +8% to +39%

+About 1.7°C median (varies from

0.4° to 3.2°C regionally and

seasonally) (2020)

Mansur et al., 2005

4% for electricity only customers;

6% for natural gas customers;

15.3% for fuel oil customers

+1° C July temperatures (2050)

Huang, 2006

Varies by location 

and building vintage; 

Average HVAC savings: 

+38% heating in 2020 

+89% heating in 2050

+158% heating in 2080

18 US locations, (varies by

location, month, and time of day)

Average summer temperature increases

1.7° C in 2020

3.4° C in 2050

5.3° C in 2080

Regional Studies

Loveland and Brown,

1990 +55.7% to +146.7% 3.7°C to 4.7°C (Individual cities) (No date given)

Sailor, 2001 +0.9% (New York) to

+11.6% (Florida) per capita 2°C (No date given)

Sailor and Pavlova, 2003

(Four states) +13% to +29% 1°C (No date given)

Amato et al., 2005

(Massachusetts)

+6.8% in summer

+10% to +40% (summer)

+12.1% in CDD (2020)

+24.1% in CDD (2030)

Ruth and Lin, 2006

(Maryland)

+2.5% in May-Sep. (high energy

prices); +24% (low energy prices) 1.7°C-2.2°C (2025)

Table 2.5. Effects of

Climate Change on

Residential Cooling

Space in U.S. Energy

Studies
16

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

Electricity demand for cooling was projected to

increase by roughly 5% to 20% per 1oC for the

temperature increases in the national studies

surveyed. This can differ by location and customer class. For example, Mansur et al., 2005

projected that when July temperatures were increased by 1oC, electricity-only customers increased their electricity consumption by 4%,

natural gas customers increased their demand

for electricity by 6%, and fuel oil customers

bought 15% more electricity. The impact on all

electricity consumption is somewhat lower because electricity also is used for a variety of

non-climate-sensitive loads in all regions and

for space heating and water heating in some regions. Looking specifically at residential sector

cooling demand (rather than all electricity) with

a projected 2020 building stock, Scott et al.

2005 projected nationally that an increase of

0.4° to 3.2°C summer temperatures (Table 2.5)

results in a corresponding 8% to 39% increase

in national annual cooling energy consumption,

or roughly a 12% to 20% increase per 1°C.

Huang’s (2006) projections show an even

stronger increase of about a 38% increase in

2020 for a 1.7°C increase in temperature, or

22.4% per 1°C, perhaps in part because of differences in the in the details of locations and

types of new buildings in particular, which tend

to have more cooling load and less heating load.

Among the state studies, Loveland and Brown,

1990 found very high residential cooling sensitivities in a number of different locations across

the country. Cooling energy consumption increased by 55.7% (Fort Worth, from a relatively

high base) up to 146% (Seattle, from a very low

base) for a temperature increase of 3.7°C to

4.7°C. This implies about a 17% to 31% increase in cooling energy consumption per degree C. Using a similar model in the special

case of California, where space heating is already dominated by space cooling, Mendelsohn, 2003 projected that total energy

expenditures for electricity used for space cooling would increase nonlinearly and that net

overall energy expenditures would increase with

warming in the range of 1.5°C, more for higher

temperatures. In such mild cooling climates,

relatively small increases in temperature can

have a large impact on air-conditioning energy

use by reducing the potentials for natural ventilation or night cooling. The residential electricity results in Sailor, 2001, Sailor and

Pavlova, 2003; for several locations, and Amato

et al., 2005 for Massachusetts are consistent

with the national studies, with the expected direction of climate effects and about the expected

magnitude, but the Ruth et al., 2006 results for

the more southerly state of Maryland turn out

to be very sensitive to electricity prices, ranging from +2.5% at high prices (about 8 cents per

kWh, 1990$) prices to +24% if prices were low

(about 6 cents per kWh, 1990$). 

2.4.2 Commercial Space Cooling 

U.S. studies also have projected a significant increase in energy demanded for space cooling in

commercial buildings as a result of climate

warming, as summarized in Table 2.6.

Commercial sector studies show that the percentage increases in space cooling energy consumption tend to be less sensitive to

temperature than are the corresponding energy

increases in the residential sector for the same

temperature increase. For example, Rosenthal

et al. 1995 found residential cooling increased

20% but commercial sector cooling only 15%

for a 1°C temperature increase. The increase in

Scott et al. 2005 had a range of 9.4% to 15%

per 1°C for commercial and 12% to 20% per

1°C for residential customers. As with heating,

in both cases this is likely to be in part because

of the relatively greater sensitivity of space conditioning to internal loads in commercial buildings. Mansur et al., 2005 econometric results

were less clear in this regard, possibly because

geographic and behavioral differences among

customer classes tend to obscure the overall effects of the buildings themselves. With building

equipment and shell efficiencies frozen at 1990

baseline levels, Belzer et al., 1996 found impacts in the same range as the other studies. A

3.9°C temperature change increased annual

space cooling energy requirements by 53.9% or

about 9.0% to 13.8% per 1°C. Huang, 2006

also showed strong increases in cooling energy

consumption at the national level. In 2020, his

average increase was 17% for a 1.7°C temperature increase, or +10% per 1°C.

State-level studies generally show impacts that

are in the same range as their national counterparts. Analyses performed with building energy
17

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Study: 

Author(s) and

Date

Change 

in Energy Consumption

(%)

Temperature Change ( ̊C)

and Date for Change Comments

National Studies

Rosenthal et al.,

1995 +15% +1°C (2010)

Energy-weighted

national averages 

of census 

division-level data

Belzer et al., 1996 +53.9% +3.9°C (2030)

Scott et al., 2005 +6% to +30%

+About 1.7°C median (varies

from 0.4° to 3.2°C regionally

and seasonally) (2020)

Varies by region

Mansur et al.,

2005

+4.6% (electricity-only

customers); -2% (natural

gas customers); +13.8%

(fuel oil customers) 

+1° C January temperatures

(2050)

A negative effect on

electricity use for

natural gas customers

is statistically

significant at the 10%

level, but unexplained

Huang, 2006

Varies by location 

and building vintage; 

Average HVAC 

savings: 

+17% heating in 2020 

+36% heating in 2050

+53% heating in 2080

5 US locations, (varies by

location, month, and time of day)

Average winter temperature

increases

1.7° C in 2020

3.4° C in 2050

5.3° C in 2080

Regional Studies

Loveland and

Brown, 1990

(general office

buildings in 6

individual cities)

+34.9% in Chicago

+75.0% in Seattle

3.7°C to 4.7°C (Individual

cities) 

(No date given)

Scott et al., 1994

(small office

buildings in

specific cities)

58.4% in Minneapolis 

36.3% in Phoenix 3.9°C (no date)

Sailor, 2001 

(7 out of 8

energy-intensive

states; one state–

Washington–

used electricity

for space heating)

+1.6% in New York;

+5.0% in Florida

( per capita)

2°C (No date given)

Amato et al.,

2005

(Massachusetts)

+2% to +5% summer

+4% to +10% summer

+12.1% in CDD (2020)

+24.1% in CDD (2030)

Monthly 

per employee

Ruth and Lin,

2006 (Maryland)

+10% per employee in

Apr-Oct +2.2°C (2025)

Table 2.6. Effects of

Climate Change on

Commercial Space

Cooling in U.S.

Energy Studies
18

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

models generally indicate a 10% to 15% electric

energy increase for cooling per 1°C. The

econometric studies also show increases, but

because the numerator is generally the change

in consumption of all electricity (including

lighting and plug loads, for example) rather than

just that used for space cooling, the percentage

increases are much smaller.

2.4.3 Other Considerations: Market

Penetration of Air Conditioning and

Heat Pumps (All-Electric Heating

and Cooling), and Changes in

Humidity 

Although effects of air conditioning market

penetration were not explicitly identified, the

late-1990s econometrically based cross-sectional studies of Mendelsohn and colleagues

might be interpreted as accounting for increased

long run market saturations of air conditioning

because warmer locations in the cross-sectional

studies have higher market saturations of air

conditioning as well as higher usage rates.

However, more recent studies have examined

the effects directly. In one example, Sailor and

Pavlova, 2003 have projected that potential increases in market penetration of air conditioning

in the residential sector in response to warming

might have an effect on electricity consumption

larger than the warming itself. They projected

that although the temperature-induced increases

in market penetration of air conditioning had little or no effect on residential energy consumption in cities such as Houston (93.6% market

saturation), in cooler cities such as Buffalo

(25.1% market saturation) and San Francisco

(20.9% market saturation), the extra market

penetration of air conditioning induced by a

20% increase in CDD more than doubled the

energy use due to temperature alone. Using

cross-sectional data and econometric techniques

Mendelsohn, 2003 and Mansur et al., 2005 also

have estimated the effects of the market penetration of space cooling into the energy market.

Mansur et al. found that warmer winter temperatures were associated with higher likelihood of

all-electric space conditioning systems in the

sample survey of buildings in EIA’s RECS and

CBECS datasets. In warmer regions they noted

that electricity has a high marginal cost but a

low fixed cost, making it desirable in moderate

winters. Electric heating is currently more

prevalent in the South than in the North (EIA,

2001a). In general, however, the effects of

adaptive market response of air conditioning to

climate change have not been studied thoroughly in the United States. 

High atmospheric humidity is known to have an

adverse effect on the efficiency of cooling systems in buildings in the context of climate

change because of the energy penalty associated

with condensing water. This was demonstrated

for a small commercial building modeled with

the DOE-2 building energy simulation model in

Scott et al., (1994), where the impact of an identical temperature increase created a much

greater energy challenge for two relatively

humid locations (Minneapolis and Shreveport),

compared with two drier locations (Seattle and

Phoenix). A humidity effect does not always

show up in empirical studies (Belzer et al.,

1996), but Mansur et al., 2005 modeled the effect of high humidity by introducing a rainfall

as a proxy variable for humidity into their crosssectional equations. In their residential sector,

a one-inch increase in monthly precipitation resulted in more consumption by natural gas users

of both electricity (7%) and of natural gas (2%).

In their commercial sector, a one-inch increase

in July precipitation resulted in more consumption of natural gas (6%) and of fuel oil (40%).

2.5 OVERALL EFFECTS OF

CLIMATE CHANGE ON ENERGY

USE IN BUILDINGS 

2.5.1 Annual Energy Consumption 

Many of the U.S. studies of the impact of climate change on energy use in buildings deal

with both heating and cooling and attempt to

come to a “bottom line” net result for either

total energy site consumed or total primary energy consumed (that is, both the amount of natural gas and fuel oil consumed directly in

buildings and the amount of natural gas, fuel oil,

and coal consumed indirectly to produce the

electricity consumed in buildings.) Some studies only deal with total energy consumption or

total electricity consumption and do not decompose end uses as has been done in this chapter. Recent studies show similar net effects.

Both net delivered energy and net primary energy consumption increase or decrease only a
19

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Study: 

Author(s) 

and Date

Change in 

Energy 

Consumption (%)

Temperature 

Change ( ̊C) and 

Date for Change

Comments

National Studies

Linder-Inglis,

1989

+0.8% to +1.6% Annual

electricity consumption;

+3.4% to +5.1% annual

electricity consumption.

+0.8°C to +1.5°C

(2010)

+3.5°C to +5.0°C

(2050)

Results available for 47 state

and substate service areas

Rosenthal, et al.,

1995

-11% Annual energy load;

balance of heating and

cooling nationally.

1oC (2010) Space heating and air

conditioning combined

Mendelsohn,

2001

+1% to +22% 

Residential expenditures

-11% to +47%

Commercial Expenditures

+1.5°C to +5°C (2060)

Takes into account energy

price fore-casts, market

penetration of air

conditioning. Precipitation

increases 7%.

Scott et al., 2005

-2% to -7% (Residential

and commercial heating

and cooling consumption

combined (site energy).

Energy used for cooling

increases, heating energy

decreases.

About +1.7°C median

(varies from +0.4° to

+3.2°C regionally and

seasonally) (2020)

Varies by region. Allows for

growth in residential and

commercial building stock,

but not increased adoption

of air conditioning in

response to warming

Mansur et al.,

2005

+2% Residential

expenditures , 0%

commercial expenditures

+1°C Annual

temperature (2050)

Takes into account energy

price forecasts, market

penetration of air

conditioning. Precipitation

increases 7%.

Hadley et al.,

2004, 2006

Heating -6%, cooling

+10%, +2% primary

energy

Heating -11%

cooling +22%

-1.5% primary energy

+1.2°C (2025)

+3.4°C (2025)

Primary energy, residential

and commercial combined.

Allows for growth in

residential and commercial

building stock.

Huang. 2006

Varies by location,

building type and vintage

average HVAC changes:

-8% site, +1% primary in

2020 -13% site, +0%

primary in 2050 -15%

site, +4% primary in 2080

18 U.S. locations (varies

by city, month, and time

of day); average summer

temperature increases:

1.7° C in 2020

3.4° C in 2050

5.3° C in 2080

Regional Studies

Loveland and

Brown, 1990

+10% to +35% HVAC

load in general offices;

-22.0% to +48.1% HVAC

load in single-family

houses

+3.2oC to +4.0oC

(2xCO2, no date)

Multiple state study: results

are for individual areas

Sailor, 2001 

(8 energyintensive states;

electricity only)

Residential: 

-7.2% in Washington 

to +11.6% in Florida

Commercial: 

-0.3% (Washington) 

to +5% in Florida

+2°C (Derived from

IPCC; but no date

given)

Table 2.7. Climate

Change Effects in

Combined

ResidentialCommercial Studies

and Combined

Results from Sector

Studies
20

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

few percent; however, there is a robust result

that, in the absence of an energy efficiency policy directed at space cooling, climate change

would cause a significant increase in the demand for electricity in the United States, which

would require the building of additional electricity generation (and probably transmission facilities) worth many billions of dollars. 

In much of the United States, annual energy

used for space heating is far greater than space

cooling; so net use of delivered energy would

be reduced by global warming. Table 2.7 summarizes the results from a number of U.S. studies of the effects of climate change on net

energy demand in U.S. residential and commercial buildings. The studies shown in Table 2.7

do not entirely agree with each other because of

differences in methods, time frame, scenario,

and geography. However, they are all broadly

consistent with a finding that, at the national

level, expected temperature increases through

the first third of 21st Century (Table 2.1) would

not significantly increase or decrease net energy

use in buildings. The Linder and Inglis, 1989

projections concerning increases in electricity

consumption have been generally confirmed by

later studies, but there are geographical differences. For example, Sailor’s state level econometric analyses (Sailor and Muñoz, 1997,

Sailor, 2001, Sailor and Pavlova, 2003) projected a range of effects. A temperature increase of 2°C would be associated with an

11.6% increase in residential per capita electricity used in Florida (a summer-peaking state

dominated by air conditioning demand), a 5%

increase per 1oC warming. On the other hand,

a 7.2% decrease in Washington state (which

uses electricity extensively for heating and is a

winter-peaking system), had about a 3% decrease per 1oC warming. 

The Rosenthal et al., 1995 projections of reduced net total delivered energy consumption

and energy expenditure reductions have not

been confirmed. Results of more recent studies

follow a temperature increase of 2°C that would

be associated with an 11.6% increase in residential per capita electricity used in Florida (a

summer-peaking state dominated by air conditioning demand) and a 5% increase per 1oC

warming. On the other hand, a 7.2% decrease in

Washington state (which uses electricity extensively for heating and is a winter-peaking system), had about a 3% decrease per 1oC warming. 

Scott et al., 2005 projected that overall site energy consumption in U.S. residential and commercial buildings is likely to decrease by about

2% to 7% in 2020 (0.4°C to 3.2°C warming).

This amounts to about 2% per 1oC warming,

which is in the same direction of the Rosenthal

et al. results, but smaller. This effect takes into

account expected changes in the building stock,

but not increased market penetration of air conditioning that specifically results from climate

change. For a 1°C increase in year-round temperatures, Mansur et al., 2005 provide only projections of net energy expenditures—a 2%

increase in total residential energy expenditures

-- and no net change in commercial energy demand for the year 2060. In residences, electricity expenditures (presumably mainly for

cooling) generally increase, while use of other

fuels generally decreases. Projected commercial sector expenditures show increases in electricity expenditures that are almost exactly

offset by declines in the expenditures for natural gas and fuel oil. Since the Mansur et al.

analysis claims to estimate long-term climate

elasticities that include fuel choices and comfort choices as well as the direct effect of

warmer temperatures on building energy loads,

its results likely reflect at least some of the increased adoption of air conditioning that would

be expected in residences in currently cooler climates as temperatures increase; residential sector electricity use is projected to grow faster

than electricity use in the commercial sector,

where air conditioning is more common and internal loads such as lighting dominate electricity use. Hadley et al., 2004, 2006 also project

cooling energy consumption increasing and

heating energy consumption decreasing. The

projected national net effect on delivered energy

consumption is slightly negative; but the impact

on primary energy consumption is a slight increase. For all three studies, the impact of 1°C

to 2°C warming is small. At the individual city

level, Loveland and Brown, 1990 projected

lower residential energy load in northern cities

such as Chicago, Minneapolis, and Seattle and

increased energy loads in southern cities such

as Charleston, Ft. Worth, and Knoxville. A general office building increase showed increased

overall energy loads in all six cities. 
21

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Most recently, Huang, 2006 used results from

the HADCM3 GCM that project the changes in

temperature, daily temperature range, cloud

cover, and relative humidity by month for 0.5o

grids of the earth’s surface to produce future

weather files for 18 U.S .locations. under 4

IPCC climate change scenarios (A1FI, A2M,

B1, and B2M) for three time periods (2020,

2050, and 2080). These weather files were then

used with the DOE-2 building energy simulation program to calculate the changes in space

conditioning energy use for a large set of prototypical residential and commercial buildings to

represent the U.S. building stock. This study

looked in detail at the technical impact of climate change on space conditioning energy use,

but did not address socio-economic factors or

adaptive strategies to climate change. 

These simulations indicate that the overall impact of climate change by 2020 on the U.S.

building stock would be a 7% reduction in site

energy use, corresponding to a 1% reduction in

primary energy, when the generation and transmission losses for electricity are taken into account. The savings were noticeably larger for

residential buildings (9% reduction in site and

2% reduction in primary energy use) than for

commercial buildings (7% reduction in site, but

a 3% increase in primary energy use). The

counterbalancing effect of heating savings in the

north, however, tends to mask the appreciable

impact that climate change can have on cooling-dominant locations in the south. For example, cooling energy use in single-family houses

in Miami and New Orleans was expected to increase by about 20%. In the North or West, the

percentage increase of cooling was actually

much larger, but due to the short cooling season, the savings were more than offset by the reductions in heating energy use. For example,

cooling energy use was expected to rise by

100% in San Francisco, 60% in Boston and

Chicago, and 50% in New York and Denver.

Because of their larger internal heat gains and

less exposure to the outdoors in commercial

buildings, these simulations project that commercial buildings would require less heating

and more cooling than residential houses. Consequently, some building types such as large hotels and supermarkets showed an increase in site

energy use with climate change, and almost all

showed increases in primary energy use. In Los

Angeles and Houston, commercial building energy use would increase by 2% and 4% in site

energy use, and by 15% and 25% in primary energy use. 

Huang, 2006 also looked at the impact of climate change out to 2050 and 2080, where there

are cumulative effects of further temperature increases coupled with newer, tighter buildings

that require much less heating and proportionally more cooling than older existing buildings.

By 2050, heating loads were expected to be reduced by 28%, and cooling loads increased by

85% due to climate change, averaged across all

building types and climates. By 2080, heating

loads were expected to be reduced by nearly

half (45%), but cooling loads were expected to

more than double (165%) due to climate

change, averaged across all building types and

climates. With falling energy use for heating

and rising energy use for cooling, by 2080 the

ratio of cooling to heating energy use would be

60% in site energy and close to 180% in primary energy. 

There are also a number of specific regionallevel studies with similar outcomes. For Massachusetts in 2020, Amato et al., 2005 projected

a 6.6% decline in annual heating fuel consumption (8.7% decrease in heating degree days—

overall temperature change not given) and a

1.9% increase in summer electricity consumption (12% increase in annual cooling degreedays). Amato et al. noted that per capita

residential and commercial energy demands in

Massachusetts are sensitive to temperature and

that a range of climate warming scenarios may

noticeably decrease winter heating fuel and

electricity demands and increase summer electricity demands. For 2030, the estimated residential summer monthly electricity demand

projected increases averaged about 20% to

40%. Wintertime monthly natural gas demand

declined by 10% to 20%. Fuel oil demand was

down about 15% to 30%. For the commercial

sector, electricity consumption rose about 6%

to 10%. Winter natural gas demand declined by

6% to 14%. 

The Hadley et al., 2006 study used the DDNEMS energy model. Two advantages of this

approach are that it provides a direct compari-
22

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

son at the regional level to official forecasts and

that it provides a fairly complete picture of energy supply, demand, and endogenous price response in a market model. One disadvantage is

that the DD-NEMS model only projected to

2025 at the time of that study (now 2030),

which is only the earliest part of the period

where climate change is expected to substantially affect energy demand. Hadley’s regional

results were broadly similar to those in Scott et

al., 2005. For example, they showed decreases

in energy demand for heating, more than offsetting the increased demand for cooling in the

north (New England, Mid-Atlantic, West North

Central and especially East North Central Census Division). In the rest of the country, the increase in cooling was projected to dominate.

Nationally, the site energy savings were shown

to be greater than the site energy increases, but

because of energy losses in electricity generation, primary energy consumption (primary energy) increased by about 3% by 2025, driving

up the demand for coal and driving down the

demand for natural gas. Also, because electricity costs more than natural gas per delivered

Btu, the increase in total energy cost per year

was found to be about $15 billion (2001 dollars). 

2.5.2 Peak Electricity Consumption 

Studies published to date project that temperature increases with global warming would increase peak demand for electricity in most

regions of the country. The amount of the increase in peak demand would vary with the region. Study findings vary with the region or

regions covered and the study methodology—

in particular, whether the study allows for

changes in the building stock and increased

market penetration of air conditioning in response to warmer conditions. The Pacific

Northwest, which has significant market penetration of electric space heat, relatively low market penetration of air conditioning, and a

winter-peaking electric system, is likely to be

an exception to the general rule of increased

peak demand. The Pacific Northwest power

system annual and peak demand would likely

be lower as a result of climate warming (Northwest Power and Conservation Council, 2005). 

Concern for peak electricity demand begins

with the earliest studies of the climate impacts

on building energy demand. Linder and Inglis,

1989, in their multiregional study of regional

electricity demand, found that although annual

electricity consumption increased from +3.4 to

+5.1% , peak electricity demand would increase

between 8.6% and 13.8% , and capacity requirements between 13.1% and 19.7%, costing

tens of billions of dollars. 

One of the other few early studies of the effects

of climate change on regional electricity was

conducted by Baxter and Calandri, 1992 . The

case of California has received particular attention (See Box 2.2). For instance, the study used

degree day changes from General Circulation

Model (GCM) projections for 2010 to adjust the

baseline heating and cooling energy uses in residential and commercial models that were derived from building energy simulations of

prototypical buildings. Two climate change scenarios were considered; a low temperature increase scenario of 0.72°C in the winter, 0.60°C

in the spring and fall, and 0.48°C in the summer, and a high temperature increase scenario

of 2.28°C in the winter, 1.90°C in the spring and

fall, and 1.58°C in the summer. Results were

presented for the five major utility districts, and

showed a 0.28% decrease in heating coupled

with a 0.55% increase in cooling energy use for

the low-temperature increase scenario, and a

0.85% decrease in heating coupled with a

2.54% increase in cooling energy use for the

high-temperature increase scenario. The statewide impacts on energy demand were a 0.34-

1.51% increase in cooling electricity demand

for the low- temperature increase scenario, and

a 2.57-2.99% increase in cooling electricity demand for the high-temperature increase scenario. 

The authors concluded that the impacts of climate change appear moderate on a percentage

basis, but because California's electricity system is so large, a moderate percentage increase

results in sizeable absolute impacts. For energy

use, the 0.6% and 2.6% increases for the two

scenarios signify increases of 1741 GWh and

7516 GWh. For electricity demand, the 0.34-

1.51% and 2.57-2.99% increases correspond to

increased peak demand by 221-967 MW and

1648-1916 MW. To put these impacts in perspective, uncertainties in the state’s economic

growth rate would have had comparable or

larger impacts on electricity demand over this
23

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

There has been probably more analysis done in California on impacts of climate change than anywhere else

in the U.S. (also see Box 5.1). The reasons for this are: (1) California’s relative mild climate has been shown

to be highly sensitive to climate change, not only in terms of temperature, but also in water resources, vegetation distribution, and coastal effects, and (2) California is vulnerable to shortfalls in peak electricity demand, as demonstrated by the electricity shortage in 2001 (albeit mostly man-made) and the recent record

heat wave in July 2006 that covered the entire state and was of greater intensity and longer duration than

previously recorded. The pioneering work by Baxter and Calandri, 1992 on global warming and electricity

demand in California has already been described elsewhere in this report (see main text, this section).

Mendelsohn, 2003 investigated the impact of climate change on energy expenditures, while Franco 2005,

Franco and Sanstad 2006, and Miller et al,. 2006 have all focused on the impact of climate change on electricity demand. Miller et al., 2006 studied the probability of extreme weather phenomena under climate

change scenarios for California and other Western U.S. locations. GCMs show that, over time, California

heat waves will have earlier onsets, be more numerous, and increase in duration and intensity. "For example, extreme heat days in Los Angeles may increase from 12 to as many as 96 days per year by the end of

the century, implying current-day heat wave conditions may extend the entire summer period". Overall, projected increases in extreme heat by 2070-2099 will approximately double the historical number of days for

inland California cities, and up to four times for coastal California cities like Los Angeles and San Diego. The

following plots show how the duration of extreme periods in California increases based on GCM results

(from Miller et al., 2007).

BOX 2.2 California’s Perspective on Climate Change
24

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

20-year projected estimation. Actual growth in

noncoincident peak demand between 1990 and

2004 was actually 8,650 MW for total end use

load and 9,375 MW for gross generation (California Energy Commission, 2006).

Much more recently, using IPCC scenarios of

climate change from the Hadley3, PCM, and

GFDL climate models downscaled for California, Franco and Sanstad 2006 found a high correlation between the simple average daily

temperature and daily peak electricity demand

in the California Independent System Operator

region, which comprises most of California.

They evaluated three different periods: 2005-

2034, 2035-2064, and 2070-2099. In the first

period, depending on the scenario and model,

peak summer demand was projected to increase

relative to a 1961-1990 base period before climate change by 1.0%-4.8%; in the second,

2.2%-10.9%; in the third, 5.6%-19.5%.

A few U.S. regions could benefit from lower

winter demand for energy in Canada. An example is in the New England-Middle AtlanticEast North Central region of the country, where

Ontario and Québec in particular are intertied

with the U.S. system, and where demand on either side of the international border could influence the other side. For example, since much

of the space heating in Québec is provided by

hydro-generated electricity, a decline in energy

demand in the province could free up a certain

amount of capacity for bordering U.S. regions

in the winter. In Québec, the Ouranos organization (Ouranos, 2004) has projected that net

energy demand for heating and air conditioning

across all sectors could fall by 30 trillion Btus,

or 9.4 % of 2001 levels by 2100. Seasonality

of demand also would change markedly. Residential heating in Québec would fall by 15%

and air conditioning (currently a small source

of demand) would increase nearly fourfold.

Commercial-institutional heating demand was

projected to fall by 13% and commercial air

conditioning demand to double. Peak (winter)

electricity demand in Québec would decline.

Unfortunately, Québec’s summer increase in air

conditioning demand would coincide with an

increase of about 7% to 17% in the New York

metropolitan region (Ouranos, 2004); so winter

savings might be only of limited assistance in

the summer cooling season, unless the water not

used for hydroelectric production in the winter

could be stored until summer and the transmission capacity existed to move the power south

(Québec’s hydroelectric generating capacity is

sized for the winter peak and should not be a

constraint). 

Although they discuss the impacts of climate

change on peak electricity demand, Scott et al.,

2005 did not directly compute them. However,

they performed a sensitivity analysis using nuclear power’s 90% average capacity factor for

2004 as an upper-thatbound estimate of base

load power plant availability and projected that

national climate sensitive demand consumption

(1.3 quads per year by 2080) would be equivalent of roughly 48 GW, or 48 base load power

plants of 1,000 MW each. At the much lower

2003 average U.S. generation/capacity ratio of

47%, 93 GW of additional generation capacity

would be required. This component of demand

would be a factor in addition to any increases

due to additional climate-related market penetration of air conditioning and any other causes

of increased demand for electricity that the national electrical system will be dealing with for

the rest of the century.

For further information about methods for estimating energy consumption in buildings, see

Annex A.

2.6 ADAPTATION: INCREASED

EFFICIENCY AND URBAN FORM

Although improving building energy efficiency

should help the nation cope with impacts of climate change, there is relatively little specific information available on the potential impacts of

such improvements. Partly this is because it has

been thought that warming would already be reducing energy consumption, so that the additional effects of energy efficiency have not been

of much interest. Scott et al., 1994 and Belzer

et al., 1996 concluded that in the commercial

sector, very advanced building designs could increase the savings in heating energy due to climate warming alone. Loveland and Brown

1990, Scott et al. 1994, Belzer et al., 1996, and

Scott et al., 2005 all estimated the effects of energy-efficient buildings on energy consumption

in the context of climate change and also concluded that much of the increase in cooling en-
25

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

ergy consumption due to warming could be offset by increased energy efficiency. 

Loveland and Brown, 1990 projected that

changes leading to -50% lighting, +50% insulation, and +75% window shading would reduce

total energy use in residential buildings by

31.5% to 44.4% in the context of a 3.2° to 4°C

warming. This suggests that advanced building

designs are a promising approach to reducing

energy consumption impacts of warming, but further verification and follow-up research is needed

both to confirm results and design strategies.

Scott et al., 1994 examined the impact of “advanced” building designs for a 48,000-square

foot office building in the context of climate

change in the DOE-2 building energy simulation model. The building envelope was assumed to reduce heat transfer by about 70%

compared to the ASHRAE 90.1 standard. It included extra insulation in the walls and ceiling,

reduction in window conductivity by a factor of

6, and window shading devices. The result was

that, assuming a 3.9°C increase in annual average temperature, rather than experiencing between an 8% reduction in energy use

(Minneapolis) and a 6.3% increase in overall

energy use (Phoenix), an advanced design

building would show a 57.2% to 59.8% decrease in energy used. In addition, the cooling

energy impact was reversed in sign–a 47% to

60% decrease instead of a 35% to 93% increase.

Cost, however, was not analyzed (also see SAP 4.6). 

Belzer et al., 1996 projected that with a 3.9°C

increase in annual average temperature, the use

of advanced buildings would increase the overall energy savings in EIA’s year 2030 projected

commercial building stock from 0.47 quads

(20.4%) to 0.63 quads (27%). Use of advanced

building designs in the 2030 commercial building stock would increase the overall energy savings by 1.15 quads (40.6%) relative to a 2030

building stock frozen at 1990 efficiency. The

cooling component of building energy consumption was only reduced rather than reversed

by advanced designs in this study. 

Finally, Scott et al., 2005 explicitly considered

the savings that might be achieved under the

Department of Energy’s energy efficiency programs as projected in August 2004 for the EIA

building stock in the year 2020 (temperature

changes of about 0.4°C at the low end to about

2.8°C at the high end). This is the only study to

have estimated the national effects of actual energy efficiency programs in the context of

global warming. (The analysis did not count

any potential increase in energy demand due to

additional climate change-induced market penetration of air conditioning). The efficiency

programs, which mainly targeted heating, lighting, and appliances instead of cooling, were less

effective if the climate did not change; however,

buildings still saved between 2.0 and 2.2 quads.

This was a savings of about 4.5%, which would

more than offset the growth in temperature-sensitive energy consumption due to increases in

cooling and growth in building stock between

2005 and 2020.

Except for Scott et al., 2005, even where studies consider adaptive response (e.g., Loveland

and Brown, 1990; Belzer, et al. 1996; Mendelsohn, 2001), they generally do not involve particular combinations of technologies to offset

the effects of future climate warming. Regionally, Franco and Sanstad, 2006 did note that the

very aggressive energy efficiency and demand

response targets for California’s investor-owned

utilities such as those recently enacted by the

California Public Utilities Commission could,

if extended beyond the current 2013 horizon --

provide substantial “cushioning” of the electric

power system against the effects of higher temperatures.

2.7 OTHER POSSIBLE EFFECTS,

INCLUDING ENERGY USE IN

KEY SECTORS

2.7.1 Industry

Except for energy used to heat and cool buildings, which is thought to be about 6% of energy

use in industry (EIA, 2001b) and is generally

not analyzed for manufacturing activities in existing studies, it is not thought that industrial energy demand is particularly sensitive to climate

change. For example, Amato et al. 2005 stated

that “industrial energy demand is not estimated

since previous investigations (Elkhafif, 1996;

Sailor and Munoz, 1997) and our own findings

indicate that it is non-temperature-sensitive.”

Ruth and Lin, 2006 observe that in contrast to
1 Data supplied by Robert Boundy, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, based on Ward’s Automotive Yearbooks.

2 Data supplied by Lawrence Chaney, National Renewable Energy Laboratory

26

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

residential households, which use about 58% of

their energy for space conditioning, and commercial buildings, which use about 40%, industrial facilities devote only about 6% of their

energy use to space conditioning. In absolute

numbers, this is about a third of what the commercial sector uses and about 8% of what the

residential sector uses for this purpose. According to the 2002 Manufacturing Energy

Consumption Survey, among the energy uses

that could be climate sensitive, U.S. manufacturing uses about 4% of all energy for directly

space conditioning, 22% for process heating,

and 1.5% for process cooling (EIA, 2002a).

This does not mean, of course, that industry is

not sensitive to climate, or even that energy

availability as influenced by climate or weather

does not affect industry. Much of the energy

used in industry is used for water heating; so energy use would likely decline in industry if climate and water temperatures become warmer.

Electrical outages (some caused by extreme

weather) cause many billions in business interruptions every year, and large events that interrupt energy supplies are also nationally

important (see Chapter 3). However, little information exists on the impact of climate

change on energy use in industry. Considine,

2000 econometrically investigated industrial energy use data from the EIA Short Term Energy

Forecasting System based on HDD and CDD

and calculated that U.S. energy consumption per

unit of industrial production would increase for

an increase 0.0127% per increase in one heating

degree day (Fahrenheit) or by 0.0032% per increase of one cooling degree day (Fahrenheit).

On an annual basis with a 1°C temperature increase (1.8°F), there would be a maximum of

657 fewer HDD per year and 657 more CDD

(Fahrenheit basis, and assuming that all industry was located in climates that experienced all

of the potential HDD decrease and CDD increase). This would translate into 6.2% less net

energy demand in industry or a saving of

roughly 0.04 quads.

A few studies have focused on a handful of exceptions where it was assumed that energy consumption would be sensitive to warmer temperatures, such as agricultural crop drying and irrigation pumping (e.g., Darmstadter, 1993;

Scott et al., 1993). While it seems logical that

warmer weather or extended warm seasons

should result in warmer water inlet temperatures

for industrial processes and higher rates of evaporation, possibly requiring additional industrial

water diversions, as well as additional municipal

uses for lawns and gardens, the literature review

conducted for this chapter did not locate any literature either laying out that logic or calculating any associated increases in energy

consumption for water pumping. Industrial

pumping increases are likely to be small relative to those in agriculture, which consumes the

lion’s share (40%) of all fresh water withdrawals

in the United States (USGS, 2004). Some observations on energy use in other climate-sensitive economic sectors follow. 

2.7.2 Transportation 

Running the air conditioning in a car reduces its

fuel efficiency by approximately 12% at highway speeds (Parker, 2005). A more extended

hot season likely would increase the use of automotive air conditioning units, but by how

much and with what consequences for fuel

economy is not known. Based on preliminary

unpublished data, virtually all new light duty

vehicles sold (well over 99% in 2005) in the

United Sates come with factory-installed air

conditioning (up from about 90% in the mid1990s)1 , but no statistics appear to be available

from public sources on the overall numbers or

percentage of vehicles in the fleet without air

conditioning. No projections appear to be available on the total impact of climate change on

energy consumption in automotive air conditioners; however, there are some estimates of the

response of vehicle air conditioning use to temperature. Based on a modeling of consumer

comfort, Johnson (2002) estimates that at ambient temperatures above 30°C (86°F), drivers

would have their air conditioning on 100% of

the time; at 21°C-30°C (70°F-86°F), 80%; at

13°C-20°C (55°F-70°F), 45%; and at 6°C-12°C

(43°F-55°F), 20% of the time.2 Data from the
27

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Environmental Protection Agency’s model of

vehicular air conditioning operation suggests

that U.S. drivers on average currently have their

air conditioning systems turned on 23.9% of the

time. With an increase in ambient air temperature of 1°C (1.8°F), the model estimates that

drivers would have their air conditioning systems turned on 26.9% of the time, an increase of

3.0% of the time.3

Much of the food consumed in the United States

moves by refrigerated truck or rail. One of the

most common methods is via a refrigerated

truck-trailer combination. As of the year 2000,

there were approximately 225,000 refrigerated

trailers registered in the United States, and their

Trailer Refrigeration Units (TRUs) used on average 0.7 to 0.9 gallons of fuel per hour to maintain 0°F. On a typical use cycle of 7200 hours

per year (6 days per week, 50 weeks per year),

the typical TRU would use 5,000 to 6,000 gallons of diesel per year (Shurepower, LLC,

2005), or between 26 and 32 million barrels for

the national fleet. Even though diesel electric

hybrid and other methods are making market inroads and over time could replace a substantial

amount of this diesel use with electricity from

the grid when the units are parked, climate

warming would add to the energy use in these

systems. No data appear to be available on the

total impact of climate change on energy consumption in transportation, however (also see

SAP 4.7).

2.7.3 Construction

Warming the climate should result in more days

when outdoor construction activities are possible. In many parts of the northern states, the

construction industry takes advantage of the

best construction weather to conduct activities

such as some excavation, pouring concrete,

framing buildings, roofing, and painting, while

sometimes enclosing buildings, partially heating them with portable space heaters, and conducting inside finishing work during “bad”

weather. While the construction season may

lengthen in the North, there also may be an increasing number of high-temperature heat stress

days during which outdoor work may be hindered. The net effects on energy consumption

on construction are not clear. The literature survey conducted for this chapter was not able to

locate any studies in the United States that have

investigated either the lengthening of the construction season in response to global warming

or any resulting impacts on energy consumption.

2.7.4 Agriculture

Agricultural energy use generally falls into five

main categories: equipment operations, irrigation pumping, embodied energy in fertilizers

and chemicals, product transport, and drying

and processing. A warmer climate implies increases in the demand for water in irrigated

agriculture and use of energy (either natural gas

or electricity) for pumping. Though not a factor

in many parts of the country, irrigation energy is

a significant source of energy demand west of

the 100th meridian, especially in the Pacific

Southwest and Pacific Northwest. For example,

irrigation load in one early climate change impact assessment increased from about 8.7% to

about 9.8% of all Pacific Northwest electricity

load in July (Scott et al., 1993), even with no

change in acreage irrigated. 

In some parts of the country, the current practice

is to keep livestock and poultry inside for parts

of the year, either because it is too cold or too

hot outside. Often these facilities are space-conditioned. In Georgia, for example, there are

11,000 poultry houses, and many of the existing houses are air-conditioned due to the hot

summer climate (and all new ones are) (University of Georgia and Fort Valley State University, 2005). Poultry producers throughout the

South also depend on natural gas and propane

as sources of heat to keep their birds warm during the winter (Subcommittee on Conservation,

Credit, Rural Development, and Research,

2001). The demand for cooling livestock and

poultry would be expected to increase in a

warmer climate, while that for heating of cattle

barns and chicken houses likely would fall.

3 Data supplied by Richard Rykowski, Assessment Standards and Support Division, Environmental Protection Agency.

The model used in this analysis is described in Chapter III of the Draft Technical Support Document to the proposed

EPA rulemaking to devise EPA’s methodology for calculating the city and highway fuel economy values pasted on

new vehicles.
28

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 2 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Use in the United States

There are no available quantitative estimates of

the effects on energy demand.

Food processing needs extensive refrigerated

storage, which may take more energy in a

warmer climate. However, there seem to be no

U.S. studies on this subject.

2.8 SUMMARY OF KNOWLEDGE

ABOUT POSSIBLE EFFECTS

Generally speaking, the net effects of climate

change in the United States on total energy demand are projected to be modest, amounting to

between perhaps a 5% increase and decrease in

demand per 1oC in warming in buildings, about

1.1 Quads in 2020 based on EIA 2006 projections (EIA, 2006). Existing studies do not agree

on whether there would be a net increase or decrease in energy consumption with changed climate because a variety of methodologies have

been used. There are differences in climate sensitivities among models and studies as well as

differences in methodological emphasis. For example, econometric models have incorporated

some market response to warming and fuel

costs but not necessarily differences in building

size and technology over time and space, while

the opposite is true of building simulation approaches. There are also differences in climate

and market scenarios. It appears likely that

some of the largest effects of climate change on

energy demand are in residential and commercial buildings, however, with other sensitivities

in other sectors being of secondary or tertiary

importance.

Another robust finding is that most regions of

the country can be expected to see significant

increases in the demand for electricity, due both

to increases in the use of existing space-cooling

equipment and also to likely increases in the

market penetration of air conditioning in response to longer and hotter summers. This is

likely in Northern regions where market penetration of air conditioning is still relatively low. 

To some extent, it is possible to control for differences in climate scenarios by comparing percentage changes in energy use per a standardized

amount of temperature change, as has been

done in this chapter. It is also possible to search

for a set of robust results and to compare impacts, for example, that come from models that

have fixed technologies and no market responses with those that allow technology to

evolve and businesses and individuals to respond to higher or lower energy bills. 

Some of the apparently conflicting results are

more likely to be correct than others. Because of

compensating market and technological responses, impacts of climate change should be

less with models that allow technology to evolve

and businesses and individuals to respond to

higher or lower energy bills. Because they also

assess more realistically the factors actually

likely to be in play, they are likelier to be closer

to correct. None of the models actually does all

of this, but Mansur et al., 2005 probably comes

the closest on the market side and Scott et al.,

2005 or Huang, 2006 on the technology side.

Using the results from these two approaches, together with Sailor and Pavlova, 2003 to inform

and modify the Hadley et al., 2006 special version of NEMS, probably has the best chance of

being correct for buildings.
CHAPTER

3

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Effects of Climate Change on Energy 

Production and Distribution in the 

United States 

Authors: 

Stanley R. Bull and Daniel E. Bilello, National Renewable 

Energy Laboratory

James Ekmann*, National Energy Technology Laboratory

Michael J. Sale, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

David K. Schmalzer, Argonne National Laboratory

CHAPTER

* Retired

3

29

This chapter discusses impacts on energy production and distribution in the United States associated with projected changes in temperature, precipitation, water resources, severe weather events,

and sea level rise, although the currently available research literatures tend to be limited in most

cases. Overall, the effects on the existing infrastructure might be categorized as modest; however,

local and industry-specific impacts could be large, especially in areas that may be prone to disproportional warming (Alaska) or weather disruptions (Gulf Coast and Gulf of Mexico). The existing assemblage of power plants and distribution systems is likely to be more affected by ongoing

unidirectional changes, compared with possible future systems, if future systems can be designed

with the upfront flexibility to accommodate the span of potential impacts. Possible adaptation

measures include technologies that minimize the impact of increases in ambient temperatures on

power plant equipment, technologies that conserve water use for power plant cooling processes,

planning at the local and regional level to anticipate storm and drought impacts, improved forecasting of the impacts of global warming on renewable energy sources at regional and local levels, and establishing action plans and policies that conserve both energy and water.

Energy production in the U.S. is dominated by fossil fuels: coal, petroleum, and

natural gas (Fig. 3.1). Every existing source of energy in the United States has

some vulnerability to climate variability (Table 3.1). Renewable energy sources

tend to be more sensitive to climate variables; but fossil energy production can

also be adversely effected by air and water temperatures, and the thermoelectric cooling process that is critical to maintaining high electrical generation 

efficiencies also applies to nuclear energy. In addition, extreme weather events

have adverse effects on energy production, distribution, and fuel transportation. 
30

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

3.1 EFFECTS ON FOSSIL AND

NUCLEAR ENERGY

Climate change can affect fossil and nuclear energy production, conversion, and end-user delivery in a myriad of ways. Average ambient

temperatures impact the supply response to

changes in heating and cooling demand by affecting generation cycle efficiency, along with

cooling water requirements in the electrical sector, water requirements for energy production

and refining, and Gulf of Mexico (GOM) produced water discharge requirements. Often

these impacts appear “small” based on the

change in system efficiency or the potential reduction in reliability, but the scale of the energy

industry is vast: fossil fuel-based net electricity

generation exceeded 2,500 billion kWh in 2004

(EIA 2006). A net reduction in generation of 1%

due to increased ambient temperature (Maulbetsch and DiFilippo 2006) would represent a

drop in supply of 25 billion kWh that might

need to be replaced somehow. The GOM temperature-related issue is a result of the formation of water temperature-related anoxic zones

and is important because that region accounts

for 20 to 30% of the total domestic oil and gas

production in the U.S. (Figure 3.2). Constraints

on produced water discharges could increase

costs and reduce production, both in the GOM

region and elsewhere. Impacts of extreme

weather events could range from localized railroad track distortions due to temperature extremes, to regional-scale coastal flooding from

hurricanes, to watershed-scale river flow excursions from weather variations superimposed

upon, or possibly augmented by, climate

change. Spatial scale can range from kilometers

to continent-scale; temporal scale can range

from hours to multiyear. Energy impacts of

episodic events can linger for months or years,

as illustrated by the continuing loss of oil and

Energy Flow, 2006

(Quadrillion Btu)

Petroleum

2.79

Otherg

2.14

Othere

5.46

aIncludes lease condensate.

bNatural gas plant liquids.

c

Conventional hydroelectric power, biomass, geothermal, solar/PV, 

 and wind.

dCrude oil and petroleum products. Includes imports into the Strategic 

 Petroleum Reserve.

eNatural gas, coal, coal coke, fuel ethanol, and electricity.

f

Stock changes, losses, gains, miscellaneous blending components, 

 and unaccounted-for supply.

gCoal, natural gas, coal coke, and electricity.

hNatural gas only; excludes supplemental gaseous fuels.

i

Petroleum products, including natural gas plant liquids and crude oil

 burned as fuel.

j

Includes 0.06 quadrillion Btu of coal coke net imports.

k

Includes 0.06 quadrillion Btu of electricity net imports.

l

Primary consumption, electricity retail sales, and electrical systems energy

 losses, which are allocated to the end-use sectors in proportion to each

 sector’s share of total electricity retail sales.

 Notes: •Data are preliminary. •Values are derived from the source data

prior to rounding for publication. •Totals may not equal sum of components

due to independent rounding. 

 Sources: Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 2.1a, and 10.1. 

NGPLb 2.35

Exports

4.93

Consumptionk

99.87

Fossil

Fuelj

84.76

Fossil

Fuel

56.03

Domestic

Production

71.03

Coal

22.51

Coal

23.79

Imports

34.49

Supply

104.80

Natural Gash

22.43

Petroleum

39.76

Nuclear Electric Power 8.21

Petroleumd

29.03

Adjustmentsf

0.72

Nuclear Electric

Power

8.21

Renewable Energyc

6.84

Transportationl

28.40

Crude Oil 10.87

a

Natural Gas

19.02

Industriall

32.43

Commerciall

18.00

Residentiall

21.05

Renewable Energyc

6.79

i

Figure 3.1.

Energy Flow in

the U.S. (EIA,

Annual Energy

Review 2006)

Energy Flow, 2006

(Quadrillion Btu)
31

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

gas production in the GOM (MMS 2006a,

2006b, and 2006c) eight months after the 2005

hurricanes.

3.1.1 Thermoelectric Power

Generation

Climate change impacts on electricity generation at fossil and nuclear power plants are likely

to be similar. The most direct climate impacts

are related to power plant cooling and water

availability.

Projected changes in water availability throughout the world would directly affect the availability of water to existing power plants. While

there is uncertainty in the nature and amount of

the change in water availability in specific locations, there is agreement among climate models that there will be a redistribution of water,

as well as changes in the availability by season.

As currently designed, power plants require significant amounts of water, and they will be vulnerable to fluctuations in water supply.

Regional-scale changes would likely mean that

some areas would see significant increases in

water availability, while other regions would see

significant decreases. In those areas seeing a decline, the impact on power plant availability or

even siting of new capacity could be significant.

Plant designs are flexible and new technologies

for water reuse, heat rejection, and use of alternative water sources are being developed; but, at

present, some impact—significant on a local

level—can be foreseen. An example of such a

potential local effect is provided in Box 3.1—

Chattanooga: A Case Study, which shows how

Energy Impact 

Supplies

Climate Impact 

Mechanisms

Fossil Fuels

(86%)

Coal (22%) Cooling water quantity and quality (T), cooling

efficiency (T, W, H), erosion in surface mining

Natural Gas (23%)

Cooling water quantity and quality (T), cooling

efficiency (T, W, H), disruptions of off-shore

extraction (E)

Petroleum (40%)

Cooling water quantity and quality, cooling

efficiency (T, W, H), disruptions of off-shore

extraction and transport (E)

Liquified Natural Gas (1%) Disruptions of import operations (E)

Nuclear (8%) Cooling water quantity and quality (T), cooling

efficiency (T, W, H)

Renewables

(6%)

Hydropower

Water availability and quality, temperature-related

stresses, operational modification from extreme

weather (floods/droughts), (T, E)

Biomass

• Wood and forest 

products

Possible short-term impacts from timber kills or

long-term impacts from timber kills and changes in

tree growth rates (T, P, H, E, carbon dioxide levels) 

• Waste (municipal solid 

waste, landfill gas, etc.) n/a

• Agricultural resources

(including derived biofuels)

Changes in food crop residue and dedicated energy

crop growth rates (T, P, E, H, carbon dioxide levels)

Wind Wind resource changes (intensity and duration),

damage from extreme weather

Solar Insolation changes (clouds), damage from extreme

weather

Geothermal Cooling efficiency for air-cooled geothermal (T)

(Source: EIA, 2004)

Table 3-1.

Mechanisms Of

Climate Impacts On

Various Energy

Supplies In The U.S.

Percentages Shown

Are Of Total

Domestic

Consumption; (T =

water/air temperature, W

= wind, H = humidity, P =

precipitation, and E =

extreme weather events) 
32

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

Figure 3.2.

Distribution Of 

Off-Shore Oil And

Gas Wells In The Gulf

Of Mexico (GOM)

And Elsewhere In

The U.S.

cooling conditions might evolve over the 21st

century for generation in one locality. Situations

where the development of new power plants is

being slowed down or halted due to inadequate

cooling water are becoming more frequent

throughout the U.S. (SNL, 2006b). 

In those areas seeing an increase in stream flows

and rainfall, impacts on groundwater levels and

on seasonal flooding could have a different set

of impacts. For existing plants, these impacts

could include increased costs to manage on-site

drainage and run-off, changes in coal handling

due to increased moisture content or additional

energy requirements for coal drying, etc. The following excerpt details the magnitude of the intersection between energy production and water use. 

An October 2005 report produced by the National Energy Technology Laboratory stated, in

part, that the production of energy from fossil

fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) is inextricably

linked to the availability of adequate and sustainable supplies of water. While providing the

United States with a majority of its annual energy needs, fossil fuels also place a high demand on the Nation’s water resources in terms

of both use and quality impacts (EIA, 2005d).

Thermoelectric generation is water intensive; on

average, each kWh of electricity generated via

the steam cycle requires approximately 25 gallons of water, a weighted average that captures

total thermoelectric water withdrawals and generation for both once-through and recirculating

cooling systems. According to the United States

Geological Survey (USGS), power plants rank

only slightly behind irrigation in terms of freshwater withdrawals in the United States (USGS,

2004), although irrigation withdrawals tend to

be more consumptive. Water is also required in

the mining, processing, and transportation of

coal to generate electricity all of which can have

direct impacts on water quality. Surface and underground coal mining can result in acidic,

metal-laden water that must be treated before it

can be discharged to nearby rivers and streams.

In addition, the USGS estimates that in 2000 the

mining industry withdrew approximately 2 billion gallons per day of freshwater. Although not

directly related to water quality, about 10% of

total U.S. coal shipments were delivered by

barge in 2003 (USGS, 2004). Consequently, low

river flows can create shortfalls in coal inventories at power plants. 

Freshwater availability is also a critical limiting

factor in economic development and sustainability, which directly impacts electric-power

supply. A 2003 study conducted by the Government Accountability Office indicates that 36

states anticipate water shortages in the next 10

years under normal water conditions, and 46

states expect water shortages under drought

conditions (GAO 2003). Water supply and demand estimates by the Electric Power Research

Institute (EPRI) for the years 1995 and 2025

also indicate a high likelihood of local and regional water shortages in the United States

(EPRI 2003). The area that is expected to face

the most serious water constraints is the arid

southwestern United States. 

Oil Gas

Shallow-water

GOM

10%

Shallow-water

GOM

13%

Deepwater

GOM

18%

Other U.S.

72%

Other U.S.

80%

Deepwater

GOM

7%
33

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

In any event, the demand for water for thermoelectric generation will increasingly compete

with demands from other sectors of the economy such as agriculture, residential, commercial, industrial, mining, and in-stream use. EPRI

projects a potential for future constraints on

thermoelectric power in 2025 for Arizona, Utah,

Texas, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, Florida,

and all of the Pacific Coast states. Competition

over water in the western United States, including water needed for power plants, led to a 2003

Department of Interior initiative to predict, prevent, and alleviate water-supply conflicts (DOI

2003). Other areas of the United States are also

susceptible to freshwater shortages as a result

of drought conditions, growing populations, and

increasing demand. 

Concerns about water supply expressed by state

regulators, local decision-makers, and the general public are already impacting power projects

across the United States. For example, Arizona

recently rejected permitting for a proposed

power plant because of concerns about how

much water it would withdraw from a local

aquifer (Land Letter 2004). An existing Entergy

plant located in New York is being required to

install a closed-cycle cooling water system to

A preliminary analysis of one

IPCC climate change scenario

(A1B) provides one example

of how cooling conditions

might evolve over the 21st

century for generation in the

Chattanooga vicinity (ORNL

work in progress). In this example, a slight upward trend

in stream flow would provide

a marginal benefit for oncethrough cooling, but would be

offset by increasing summertime air temperatures that

trigger limits on cooling

water intake and downstream

mixed temperatures. Closedcycle cooling would also become less effective as ambient

temperature and humidity increased. Utilities would need

to maintain generation capacity by upgrading existing cooling systems or shifting

generation to newer facilities

with more cooling capacity.

Without technology-based

improvements in cooling system energy efficiency or

steam-cycle efficiency, overall

thermoelectric generation efficiency would decrease.

BOX 3.1 Chattanooga: A Case Study of Cooling Effects

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007 2008

2009

2010 2011 2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2024 2023

2025

2026

2027

2028

2029

2030

2031

2032

2033

2034

2035

2036

2037

2038

2039

2040

2041

2042

2043

2044

2045

2046

2047

2048

2049

2050

2051

2052

2053

2054

2055

2056

2057 2058

2059

2060

2061

2062

2063

2064

2065

2066

2067

2068

2069

2070 2071

2072

2073

2074

2075

2076

2077

2078 2079

2080

2081

2082

2083

2084

2085

2086

2087

2088

2089 2090

2091

2092

2093

2094

2095

2096

2097

2098

2099

0 23,816 70,000

96.0

Hot–Wet

Cool–Dry Cool–Wet Mean Streamflow (Model) 1978–2004

Air Temperature (oF)

Streamflow (cubic feet per second)

Chattanooga

Summertime Average* Temperature vs Streamflow, 2000–2100

Mean Air Temperature (Model) 1978–2004

Hot–Dry

*Mean of June – September monthly mean values

81.3

76.0

Distribution of Streamflow

June – September Monthly Means

 2001 – 2100

 1978 – 2000

120

Counts

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000

Streamflow (cubic feet per second)

100

80

60

40

20

0
34

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

prevent fish deaths resulting from operation of

its once-through cooling water system (Greenwire, 2003). Water availability has also been

identified by several Southern States Energy

Board member states as a key factor in the permitting process for new merchant power plants

(Clean Air Task Force 2004). In early 2005,

Governor Mike Rounds of South Dakota called

for a summit to discuss drought-induced low

flows on the Missouri River and the impacts on

irrigation, drinking-water systems, and power

plants (Billingsgazette.com 2005). Residents of

Washoe County, Nevada expressed opposition

to a proposed coal-fired power plant in light of

concerns about how much water the plant would

use (Reno-Gazette Journal. 2005). Another

coal-fired power plant to be built in Wisconsin

on Lake Michigan has been under attack from

environmental groups because of potential effects of the facility’s cooling-water-intake structures on the Lake’s aquatic life (Milwaukee

Journal Sentinel, 2005).

Such events point toward a likely future of increased conflicts and competition for the water

the power industry will need to operate their

thermoelectric generation capacity. These conflicts will be national in scope, but regionally

driven. It is likely that power plants in the west

will be confronted with issues related to water

rights: that is, who owns the water and the impacts of chronic and sporadic drought. In the

east, current and future environmental requirements, such as the Clean Water Act’s intake

structure regulation, could be the most significant impediment to securing sufficient water,

although local drought conditions can also impact water availability. If changing climatic conditions affect historical patterns of precipitation,

this may further complicate operations of existing plants, and the design and site selection of

new units.

EIA 2004a reports net summer and winter capacity for existing generating capacity by fuel

source. Coal-fired and nuclear plants have summer/winter ratios of 0.99 and 0.98 and average

plant sizes of 220 MW and 1015 MW, respectively. Petroleum, natural gas, and dual fuelfired plants show summer/winter net capacity

ratios of 0.90 to 0.93, indicating higher sensitivity to ambient temperature. Average sizes of

these plants ranged from 12 MW to 84 MW,

consistent with their being largely peaking and

intermediate load units. Although large coal

and nuclear generating plants report little degradation of net generating capacity from winter to

summer conditions, there are reports (University

of Missouri-Columbia 2004) of plant derating

and shutdowns caused by temperature-related

river water level changes and thermal limits on

water discharges. Actual generation in 2004

(EIA, 2004a) shows coal-fired units with 32%

of installed capacity provided 49.8% of generation and nuclear units with 10% of installed capacity provided 17.8% of power generated,

indicating that these sources are much more

heavily dispatched than are petroleum, natural

gas, and dual-fired sources. To date, this difference has been generally attributed to the lower

variable costs of coal and nuclear generation,

indicating that the lower average dispatch has

been more driven by fuel costs than temperature-related capacity constraints.

Gas turbines, in their varied configurations, provide about 20% of the electric power produced

in the U.S. (EIA 2006). Gas turbines in natural

gas simple cycle, combined cycle (gas and

steam turbine), and coal-based integrated gasification combined cycle applications are affected by local ambient conditions, largely local

ambient temperature and pressure. Ambient

temperature and pressure have an immediate

impact on gas turbine performance. Turbine performance is measured in terms of heat rate (efficiency) and power output. Davcock et al.

(Davcock, DesJardins, and Fennell 2004) found

that a 60°F increase in ambient temperature, as

might be experienced daily in a desert environment, would have a 1-2 percentage point reduction in efficiency and a 20-25% reduction in

power output. This effect is nearly linear; so a

10 degree Fahrenheit increase in ambient temperature would produce as much as a 0.5 percentage point reduction in efficiency and a

3-4% reduction in power output in an existing

gas turbine. Therefore, the impact of potential

climate change on the fleet of existing turbines

would be driven by the impact that small

changes in overall performance would have on

both the total capacity available at any time and

the actual cost of electricity. 

Turbines for NGCC and IGCC facilities are designed to run 24 hours, 7 days a week; but sim-
35

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

ple cycle turbines used in topping and intermediate service are designed for frequent startups

and rapid ramp rates to accommodate grid dispatch requirements. Local ambient temperature

conditions will normally vary by 10 – 20°F on

a 24-hour cycle, and many temperate-zone areas

have winter-summer swings in average ambient

temperature of 25-35°F. Consequently, any

long-term climate change that would impact

ambient temperature is believed to be on a scale

within the design envelope of currently deployed turbines. As noted earlier, both turbine

power output and efficiency vary with ambient

temperature deviation from the design point.

The primary impacts of longer periods of offdesign operation will be modestly reduced capacity and reduced efficiency. Currently

turbine-based power plants are deployed around

the world in a wide variety of ambient conditions and applications, indicating that new installations can be designed to address long-term

changes in operating conditions. In response to

the range of operating temperatures and pressures to which gas turbines are being subjected,

turbine designers have developed a host of tools

for dealing with daily and local ambient conditions. These tools include inlet guide vanes,

inlet air fogging (essentially cooling and mass

flow addition), inlet air filters, and compressor

blade washing techniques (to deal with salt and

dust deposited on compressor blades). Such

tools could also be deployed to address changes

in ambient conditions brought about by longterm climate change.

3.1.2 Energy Resource Production

And Delivery

Other than for renewable energy sources, energy

resource production and delivery systems are

mainly vulnerable to effects of sea level rise and

extreme weather events.

IPCC 2001a projected a 50-cm. (20-in.) rise in

sea level around North America in the next century from climate change alone. This is well

within the normal tidal range and would not

have any significant effect on off-shore oil and

gas activities. On-shore oil and gas activities

could be much more impacted, which could create derivative impacts on off-shore activities. 

A number of operational power plants are sited

at elevations of 3 ft or less, making them vulnerable to these rising sea levels. In addition,

low-lying coastal regions are being considered

for the siting of new plants due to the obvious

advantages in delivering fuel and other necessary feedstocks. Significant percentages of

other energy infrastructure assets are located in

these same areas, including a number of the nation's oil refineries as well as most coal import/export facilities and liquefied natural gas

terminals. Given that a large percentage of the

nation’s energy infrastructure lies along the

coast, rising sea levels could lead to direct

losses such as equipment damage from flooding or erosion or indirect effects such as the

costs of raising vulnerable assets to higher levels or building future energy projects further inland, thus increasing transportation costs. 

IPCC 2001a and USGS 2000 have identified

substantial areas of the U.S. East Coast and Gulf

Coast as being vulnerable to sea-level rise.

Roughly one-third of U.S. refining and gas processing physical plant lies on coastal plains adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico (GOM), hence it

is vulnerable to inundation, shoreline erosion,

and storm surges. On-shore but noncoastal oil

and gas production and processing activities

may be impacted by climate change primarily

as it impacts extreme weather events, phenomena not presently well understood. Florida’s energy infrastructure may be particularly

susceptible to sea-level rise impacts. (See Box

3.2 Florida).

Alaska represents a special case for climate

adaptation because the scale of projected impacts is expected to be greater in higher latitudes (See Box 3.3: A Case Study). Extreme

weather events, which could represent more significant effects, are discussed in 3.1.4. Even

coal production is susceptible to extreme

weather events that can directly impact opencast mining operations and coal cleaning operations of underground mines. 

Potential impacts on novel energy resources are

speculative at present. Oil shale resource development, which is considered to be water intensive, could be made more difficult if climate

change further reduces annual precipitation in

an already arid region that is home to the major
36

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

oil shale deposits. Water availability (Struck

2006) is beginning to be seen as a potential constraint on synthetic petroleum production from

the Canadian oil sands. Coal-to-liquids operations also require significant quantities of water. 

3.1.3 Transportation of Fuels

Roughly 65% of the petroleum products supplied in the Petroleum Administration for Defense (PAD) East Coast District (Figure 3.3)

arrive via pipeline, barge, or ocean vessel (EIA

2004). Approximately 80% of the domestic-origin product is transported by pipeline. Certain

areas, e.g., Florida, are nearly totally dependent

on maritime (barge) transport. About 97% of the

crude oil charged to PAD I refineries is imported, arriving primarily by ocean vessels.

PAD II receives the bulk of its crude oil via

pipeline, roughly two-thirds from PAD III and

one-third from Canada. Both pipeline and barge

transport have been susceptible to extreme

weather events, with pipeline outages mostly

driven by interdependencies with the electrical

grid. In addition (see 3.3.2), increased ambient

temperatures can degrade pipeline system performance, particularly when tied to enhanced

oil recovery and, if practiced in the future, carbon sequestration. The transportation of coal to

end users, primarily electrical generation facilities, is dependent on rail and barge transportation modes (EIA 2004b). Barge transport is

Florida’s energy infrastructure may be particularly susceptible to sea-level rise impacts. Most of the petroleum

products consumed in Florida are delivered by barge to three ports (NASEO, 2005) two on the East Coast

of Florida and one on the West Coast. The interdependencies of natural gas distribution, transportation fuel

distribution and delivery, and electrical generation and distribution were found to be major issues in Florida’s

recovery from multiple hurricanes in 2004. In addition, major installations such as nuclear power plants are

located very close to the seacoast at elevations very close to sea level. The map on the left shows major

power plants susceptible to sea-level rise in Florida. The map on the right illustrates power plants in the path

of Tropical Storm Ernesto.

BOX 3.2 Florida
37

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Alaska represents a special case for climate adaptation where temperatures have risen (3°C) over the last few

decades, a rate that is almost twice that of the rest of the world. Some models predict this warming trend

will continue, with temperatures possibly rising as much as 4-7°C over the next 100 years (ACIA 2004).

In areas of Alaska’s North Slope, change is already being observed. The number of days allowed for winter

tundra travel dropped significantly since the state began to set the tundra opening date in 1969, and a chart

of that decline has been widely used to illustrate one effect of a warming Arctic (Alaska Department of Natural Resources 2004). There is a significant economic impact on oil and natural gas exploration from a shorter

tundra travel season, especially since exploration targets have moved farther away from the developed Prudhoe Bay infrastructure, requiring more time for ice road building. It is unlikely that the oil industry can implement successful exploration and development plans with a winter work season consistently less than 120 d.

Further, melting permafrost can cause subsidence of the soil, thereby threatening the structural integrity of

infrastructure built upon it. It was anticipated that the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System would melt surrounding

permafrost in the areas where it would be buried. Therefore, extensive soil sampling was conducted and 

in areas where permafrost soils were determined to be thaw-stable, conventional pipeline building techniques

were utilized. But in ice-rich soils, the ground is generally not stable after the permafrost melts. Therefore,

unique aboveground designs integrating thermal siphons were used to remove heat transferred in the permafrost via the pilings used to support the pipeline. And in a few selected areas where aboveground construction was not feasible, the ground around the pipeline is artificially chilled (U.S. Arctic Research

Commission 2003 and Pipeline Engineering 2007). Such extensive soil testing and unique building techniques

add substantial cost to large development projects undertaken in arctic climates but are necessary to ensure

the long-term viability of the infrastructure.

Exploration in the Arctic may benefit from thinning sea ice. Recent studies indicate extent of sea ice covering the Arctic Ocean may have reduced as much as 10%, and thinned by as much as 15%, over the past few

decades. These trends suggest improved shipping accessibility around the margins of the Arctic Basin with

major implications for the delivery of goods as well as products such as LNG and oil from high latitude basins

(ACIA 2004) . A reduction in sea ice may also mean increased off-shore oil exploration (ACIA 2004).

BOX 3.3 Alaska: A Case Study

19701972

1974

19761978

1980

19821984198619881990

1992

19941996

1998

20002002

Calender Year

Winter Work Season Length

Duration in Days

250

200

150

100

50

0

Source: ACIA, 2004.
38

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

susceptible to both short term, transient weather

events and to longer-term shifts in regional precipitation and snow melt patterns that may reduce the extent of navigability of rivers and

reduce or expand the annual navigable periods.

In addition, offshore pipelines were impacted

by Hurricane Ivan even before the arrival of

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (see 3.1.4).

3.1.4 Extreme Events

Climate change may cause significant shifts in

current weather patterns and increase the severity and possibly the frequency of major storms

(NRC 2002). As witnessed in 2005, hurricanes

can have a debilitating impact on energy infrastructure. Direct losses to the energy industry in

2005 are estimated at $15 billion (Marketwatch.com 2006), with millions more in restoration and recovery costs. Future energy projects

located in storm prone areas will face increased

capital costs of hardening their assets due to

both legislative and insurance pressures. For example, the Yscloskey Gas Processing Plant was

forced to close for 6 months following Hurricane Katrina, resulting in both lost revenues to

the plant’s owners and higher prices to consumers as alternative gas sources had to be procured. In general, the incapacitation of energy

infrastructure – especially of refineries, gas processing plants and petroleum product terminals

– is widely credited with driving a price spike in

fuel prices across the country, which then in

turn has national consequences. The potential

impacts of more severe weather are not, in fact,

limited to hurricane-prone areas. Rail transportation lines, which transport approximately

2/3 of the coal to the nation’s power plants (EIA

2002), often closely follow riverbeds, especially

in the Appalachian region. More severe rainstorms can lead to flooding of rivers that then

can wash out or degrade the nearby roadbeds.

Flooding may also disrupt the operation of inland waterways, the second-most important

method of transporting coal. With utilities carrying smaller stockpiles and projections showing a growing reliance on coal for a majority of

the nation’s electricity production, any significant disruption to the transportation network has

serious implications for the overall reliability of

the grid as a whole.

Off-shore production is particularly susceptible

to extreme weather events. Hurricane Ivan

(2004) destroyed seven GOM platforms, significantly damaged 24 platforms, and damaged

102 pipelines (MMS 2006). Hurricanes Katrina

and Rita in 2005 destroyed more than 100 platforms and damaged 558 pipelines (MMS 2006).

The two photographs in Figure 3.4 show the

PADD 4: PADD 4:

Rockies Rockies

PADD 5: PADD 5:

West Coast, West Coast, 

AK,HI

PADD 3: PADD 3: Gulf Coast Gulf Coast 

PADD 2: PADD 2:

Midwest Midwest

PADD 1: PADD 1:

East Coast East Coast

PADD 4:

Rockies

PADD 5:

West Coast, 

AK,HI

PADD 3: Gulf Coast 

PADD 2:

Midwest

Petroleum Administration

for Defense Districts (PADD)

PADD 1:

East Coast

Figure 3.3.

Petroleum

Administration

for Defense

(PAD) Districts

Petroleum Administration 

for Defense Districts (PADD)
39

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Mars deepwater platforms before and after the

2005 hurricanes. The $250 million Typhoon

platform was so severely damaged that Chevron

is working with the MMS to sink it as part of an

artificial reef program in the GOM; the billion

dollar plus Mars platform has been repaired and

returned to production about 8 months post hurricane. 

3.1.5 Adaptation to Extreme Events

Energy assets can be protected from these impacts both by protecting the facility or relocating it to safer areas. Hardening could include

reinforcements to walls and roofs, the building

of dikes to contain flooding, or structural improvements to transmission assets. However, the

high cost of relocating or protecting energy infrastructure drives many companies to hedge

these costs against potential repair costs if a disaster does strike. For example, it is currently estimated to cost up to $10 billion to build a new

refinery from the ground up (Petroleum Institute for Continuing Education undated), compared with costs to fully harden a typical at-risk

facility against a hurricane and with the few

million dollars in repairs that may or may not

be required if a hurricane does strike. Relocation of rail lines also faces a similar dilemma.

BNSF’s capacity additions in the Powder River

Basin are expected to cost over $200 million

dollars to add new track in a relatively flat region with low land prices; changes to rail lines

in the Appalachian region would be many times

more due to the difficult topography and higher

land acquisition costs. 

Industry, government agencies, and the American Petroleum Institute met jointly in March

2006 (API 2006a) to plan for future extreme

weather events. Interim guidelines for jackup

(shallow water) rigs (API 2006b) and for floating rigs (API 2006c) have been developed.

MMS, DOT, and several industry participants

have formed a Joint Industry Program (JIP)

(Stress Subsea, Inc. 2005) to develop advanced

capabilities to repair damaged undersea

pipelines.

3.2 EFFECTS ON RENEWABLE

ENERGY PRODUCTION 

Renewable energy production accounted for

about 6% of the total energy production in the

United States in 2005 (Figure 3.5); biomass and

hydropower are the most significant contributors (EIA 2005d), and the use of renewable energy is increasing rapidly in other sectors such

as wind and solar. Biomass energy is primarily

used for industrial process heating, with substantially increasing use for transportation fuels

Figure 3.4

Hurricane damage

in the Gulf of

Mexico – Mars

platform 

Before Hurricane

After Hurricane
40

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

and additional use for electricity generation.

Hydropower is primarily used for generating

electricity, providing 270 billion kWh in 2005

(EIA, 2005d). Wind power is the fastest growing renewable energy technology, with total

generation increasing to 14 billion kWh in 2005

(EIA 2006). Because renewable energy depends

directly on ambient natural resources such as

hydrological resources, wind patterns and intensity, and solar radiation, it is likely to be

more sensitive to climate variability than fossil

or nuclear energy systems that rely on geological stores. Renewable energy systems are also

vulnerable to damage from extreme weather

events. At the same time, increasing renewable

energy production is a primary means for reducing energy-related greenhouse gas emissions and thereby mitigating the impacts of

potential climate change. Renewable energy

sources are therefore connected with climate

change in very complex ways: their use can affect the magnitude of climate change, while the

magnitude of climate change can affect their

prospects for use. 

3.2.1 Hydroelectric Power

Hydropower is the largest renewable source of

electricity in the United States. In the period

2000-2004, hydropower produced approximately 75% of the electricity from all renewable

sources (EIA 2005d). In addition to being a

major source of base-load electricity in some regions of the United States (e.g., Pacific Northwest states), hydropower plays an important role

in stabilizing electrical transmission grids,

meeting peak loads and regional reserve requirements for generation, and providing other

ancillary electrical energy benefits that are not

available from other renewables when storage is

unavailable. Hydropower project design and operation is very diverse; projects vary from storage projects with large, multipurpose reservoirs

to small run-of-river projects that have little or

no active water storage. Approximately half of

the U.S. hydropower capacity is federally owned

and operated (e.g., Corps of Engineers, Bureau

of Reclamation, and the Tennessee Valley Authority); the other half is at nonfederal projects

that are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Nonfederal hydropower

projects outnumber federal projects by more

than 10:1.

The interannual variability of hydropower generation in the United States is very high, especially relative to other energy sources (Figure

3.6). The difference between the most recent

high (2003) and low (2001) generation years is

59 billion kWh, approximately equal to the total

electricity from biomass sources and much

more than the generation from all other non-hydropower renewables (EIA 2006). The amount

of water available for hydroelectric power varies

greatly from year to year, depending upon

weather patterns and local hydrology, as well as

on competing water uses, such as flood control,

water supply, recreation, and instream flow requirements (e.g., conveyance to downstream

water rights, navigation, and protection of fish

Figure 3.5.

Renewable Energy’s

Share In U.S. Energy

Supply (2005)

(http://www.eia.doe.

gov/cneaf/solar.rene

wables/page/trens/hi

ghlight1.html)

Total = 100.278 

Quadrillion Btu

Total = 6.117 

Quadrillion Btu

Coal 

23%

Solar 1%

Wind 2%

Biomass 47%

Geothermal 6%

Hydroelectric 45%

Petroleum

40%

Natural Gas 

23%

Renewable

Energy 

6%

Nuclear

Energy

Power 

8%

(Source: EIA 2005d)
41

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

and wildlife). The annual variability in hydropower is usually attributed to climate variability, but there are also important impacts

from multiple use operational policies and regulatory compliance.

There have been a large number of published

studies on the climate impacts on water resource

management and hydropower production (e.g.,

Miller and Brock 1988; Lettenmaier et al. 1999;

Barnett et al. 2004). Significant changes are

being detected now in the flow regimes of many

western rivers (Dettinger 2005) that are consistent with the predicted effects of global warming. The sensitivity of hydroelectric generation

to both changes in precipitation and river discharge is high, in the range 1.0 and greater (e.g.,

sensitivity of 1.0 means 1% change in precipitation results in 1% change in generation). For

example, Nash and Gleick (1993) estimated

sensitivities up to 3.0 between hydropower generation and stream flow in the Colorado Basin

(i.e., change in generation three times the

change in stream flow). Such magnifying sensitivities, greater than 1.0, occur because water

flows through multiple power plants in a river

basin. Climate impacts on hydropower occur

when either the total amount or the timing of

runoff is altered, for example when natural

water storage in snow pack and glaciers is reduced under hotter climates (e.g., melting of

glaciers in Alaska and the Rocky Mountains of

the U.S.). Projections that climate change is

likely to reduce snow pack and associated

runoff in the U.S. West are a matter of particular concern.

Hydropower operations are also affected indirectly when air temperatures, humidity, or wind

patterns are affected by changes in climate, and

these driving variables cause changes in water

quality and reservoir dynamics. For example,

warmer air temperatures and a more stagnant atmosphere cause more intense stratification of

reservoirs behind dams and a depletion of dissolved oxygen in hypolimnetic waters (Meyer

et al. 1999). Where hydropower dams have tailwaters supporting cold-water fisheries for trout

or salmon, warming of reservoir releases may

have unacceptable consequences and require

changes in project operation that reduce power

production.

Evaporation of water from the surface of reservoirs is another important part of the water

cycle that may be will be affected by climate

change and may lead to reduced water for hydropower. However, the effects of climate

change on evaporation rates is not straight-forward. While evaporation generally increases

with increased air or water temperatures, evaporation also depends on other meteorological

conditions, such as advection rates, humidity,

and solar radiation. For example, Ohmura and

Wild (2002) described how observed evaporation rates decreased between 1950 and 1990,

contrary to expectations associated with higher

temperatures. Their explanation for the deFigure 3.6.

Historical Variability

Of Total Annual

Production Of

Hydroelectricity

From Conventional

Projects In The U.S.

(data from EIA

Annual Energy

Outlook, 2005).

1940

400

1950 1960 1970 1980

Year

1990 2000 2010

350

300

250

Generation (Billion BTU) 200

150

100
42

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

crease was decreased solar radiation. Large

reservoirs with large surface area, located in

arid, sunny parts of the U.S., such as Lake Mead

on the lower Colorado River (Westenburg et al.,

2006), are the most likely places where evaporation will be greater under future climates and

water availability will be less for all uses, including hydropower.

Competition for available water resources is another mechanism for indirect impacts of climate

change on hydropower. These impacts can have

far-reaching consequences through the energy

and economic sectors, as happened in the 2000-

2001 energy crises in California (Sweeney, 2002). 

Recent stochastic modeling advances in California and elsewhere are showing how hydropower systems may be able to adapt to

climate variability by reexamining management

policies (Vicuña et al., 2006). The ability of

river basins to adapt is proportional to the total

active storage in surface water reservoirs (e.g.,

Aspen Environmental Group and M-Cubed,

2005). Adaptation to potential future climate

variability has both near-term and long-term

benefits in stabilizing water supplies and energy

production (e.g., Georgakakos et al., 2005), but

water management institutions are generally slow

to take action on such opportunities (Chapter 4).

3.2.2 Biomass Power and Fuels

Total biomass energy production has surpassed

hydroelectric energy for most years since 2000

as the largest U.S. source of total renewable energy, providing 47% of renewable or 4% of total

U.S. energy in 2005 (EIA, 2006). The largest

source of that biomass energy (29%) was black

liquor from the pulp and paper industry combusted as part of a process to recover pulping

chemicals to provide process heat as well as

generating electricity. Wood and wood waste

from sources such as lumber mills provide more

than 19% (industrial sector alone) and combusted municipal solid waste and recovered

landfill gas provide about 16%, respectively, of

current U.S. biomass energy (EIA, 2005d). Because energy resource generation is a byproduct of other activities in all these cases, direct

impacts of climate change on these or most

other sources of biomass power production derived from a waste stream may be limited unless there are significant changes in forest or

agricultural productivity that are a source of the

waste stream. There are few examples of literature addressing this area, though Edwards notes

that climate-change-induced events such as timber die-offs could present a short-term opportunity or a long-term loss for California

(Edwards, 1991). 

Liquid fuel production from biomass is highly

visible as a key renewable alternative to imported oil. Current U.S. production is based

largely on corn for ethanol and, to a lesser extent, soybeans for biodiesel. In the longer term,

cellulosic feedstocks may supplant grain and

oilseed crops for transportation fuel production

from biomass. Cellulosic crop residues such as

corn stover and wheat straw would likely be affected by climate change the same way as the

crops themselves due to a rise in average temperatures, more extreme heat days, and changes

in precipitation patterns and timing, with greater

impact on fuel production because that would

be their primary use. Potential dedicated cellulosic energy crops for biomass fuel, such as

grasses and fast-growing trees, would also be

directly affected by climate change. As discussed below, limited literature suggests that for

at least one region, one primary energy crop

candidate—switchgrass—may benefit from climate change, both from increased temperature

and increased atmospheric carbon dioxide levels.

Approximately 10% of U.S. biomass energy

production (EIA, 2005d), enough to provide

about 2% of U.S. transportation motor fuel

(Federal Highway Administration, 2003), currently comes from ethanol made predominantly

from corn grown in the Midwest (Iowa, Illinois,

Nebraska, Minnesota, and South Dakota are the

largest ethanol producers). Climate change sufficient to substantially affect corn production

would likely impact the resource base, although

production and price effects in the longer term

are unclear. Production of biodiesel from soybeans—growing rapidly, but still very small—is

likely a similar situation. In the long term, however, significant crop changes—and trade-offs

between them as they are generally rotated with

each other—would likely have an impact in the

future. Looking at Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska,

and Kansas, with an eye toward energy production, Brown et al., 2000 used a combination of
43

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

the NCAR climate change scenario, regional

climate, and crop productivity models to predict

how corn, sorghum, and winter wheat (potential ethanol crops) and soybeans (biodiesel crop)

would do under anticipated climate change.

Negative impacts from increased temperature,

positive impacts from increased precipitation,

and positive impacts from increased atmospheric carbon dioxide combined to yield minimal negative change under modest carbon

dioxide level increases but 5% to 12% yield increases with high carbon dioxide level increases.

This assessment did not, however, account for potential impact of extreme weather events – particularly the frequency and intensity of events

involving hail or prolonged droughts – that may

also negatively impact energy crop production.

Although ethanol production from corn can still

increase substantially (mandated to double

under the recently enacted renewable fuel standard), it can still only meet a small portion of

the need for renewable liquid transportation

fuels to displace gasoline if dependence on petroleum imports is to be reduced. Processing the

entire projected 2015 corn crop to ethanol

(highly unrealistic, of course) would only yield

about 35 billion gallons of ethanol, less than

14% of the gasoline energy demand projected

for that year. Biomass fuel experts are counting

on cellulosic biomass as the feedstock to make

larger scale renewable fuel production possible.

A recent joint study by the U.S. Departments of

Agriculture and Energy (USDA and DOE), Biomass as Feedstock for a Bioenergy and Bioproducts Industry: The Technical Feasibility of

a Billion-Ton Annual Supply, projected that by

2030, enough biomass could be made available

to meet 40% of 2004 gasoline demand via cellulosic ethanol production and other technologies. The two largest feedstocks identified are

annual crop residues and perennial dedicated

energy crops (NREL, 2006). 

The primary potential annual crop residues are

corn stover—the leaves, stalks, and husks generally now left in the field—and wheat straw.

Corn stover is the current DOE research focus

in part because it is a residue with no incremental cost to grow and modest cost to harvest,

but also particularly because of its potential

large volume. Stover volume is roughly equivalent to grain volume, and corn is the largest U.S.

agricultural crop. As such, it would be affected

by climate change in much the same way as the

corn crop itself, as described above.

Frequently discussed potential dedicated perennial energy crops include fast-growing trees

such as hybrid poplars and willows and grasses

such as switchgrass (ORNL, 2006) Switchgrass

is particularly attractive because of its large regional adaptability, fast growth rate, minimal

adverse environmental impact, and ease of harvesting with conventional farm equipment. The

primary objective of the Brown et al. , 2000

study referenced above for Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, and Kansas was to see how climate

change would affect growth of switchgrass. The

study projected that switchgrass may benefit

from both higher temperatures (unlike the grain

crops) and higher atmospheric carbon dioxide

levels, with yield increasing 74% with the modest CO2 increase and nearly doubling with the

higher CO2 increase. Care should be taken in

drawing definitive conclusions, however, from

this one study. One may not expect the projected

impact to be as beneficial for southern regions

already warm enough for rapid switchgrass

growth or more northern areas still colder than

optimal even with climate change, but this

analysis has not yet been conducted.

3.2.3 Wind Energy 

Wind energy currently accounts for about 2.5%

of U.S. renewable energy generation, but its use

is growing rapidly, and it has tremendous potential due to its cost-competitiveness with fossil fuel plants for utility-scale generation and its

environmental benefits. In addition, wind energy does not use or consume water to generate

electricity. Unlike thermoelectric and fossil fuel

generation that is inextricably linked to the

availability of adequate, sustainable water supplies, wind energy can offer communities in

water-stressed areas the option of economically

meeting increasing energy needs without increasing demands on valuable water resources. 

Although wind energy will not be impacted by

changing water supplies like the other fuel

sources, projected climate change impacts--

such as changes in seasonal wind patterns or

strength--would likely have significant positive

or negative impacts because wind energy gen-
44

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

eration is a function of the cube of the wind

speed. One of the barriers slowing wind energy

development today is the integration of a variable resource with the utility grid. Increased

variability in wind patterns could create additional challenges for accurate wind forecasting

for generation and dispatch planning and for the

siting of new wind farms.

In addition to available wind resources, state

and federal policy incentives have played a key

role in the growth of wind energy. Texas currently produces the most wind power, followed

by California, Iowa, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and

Oregon (AWEA, www.awea.org/projects,

2006). These regions are expected to continue to

be among the leading wind-power areas in the

near term. Although North Dakota and South

Dakota have modest wind development, they also

have tremendous wind potential, particularly if

expanded transmission capacity allows for development of sites further from major load centers. 

The siting of utility-scale wind generation is

highly dependent on proximity and access to the

grid and the local wind speed regime. Changes

in wind patterns and intensity due to climate

change could have an effect on wind energy

production at existing sites and planning for future development, depending on the rate and

scale of that change. One study modeled wind

speed change for the United States, divided into

northern and southern regions under two climate-change circulation models. Overall, the

Hadley Center model suggested minimal decrease in average wind speed, but the Canadian

model predicted very significant decreases of

10%–15% (30%–40% decrease in power generation) by 2095. Decreases were most pronounced after 2050 in the fall for both regions

and in the summer for the northern region

(Breslow and Sailor, 2002).

Another study mapped wind power changes in

2050 based on the Hadley Center General Circulation Model—the one suggesting more modest change of the two used by Breslow and

Sailor above. For most of the United States, this

study predicted decreased wind resources by as

much as 10% on an annual basis and 30% on a

seasonal basis. Wind power increased for the

Texas-Oklahoma region and for the Northern

California-Oregon-Washington region, although

the latter had decreased power in the summer. For

the Northern Great Plains and for the mountainous West, however, the authors predicted decreased wind power (Segal et al. 2001).

Edwards suggests that warming-induced offshore current changes could intensify summer

winds for California and thus increase its wind

energy potential (Edwards, 1991). Changes in

diurnal wind patterns could also have a significant impact on matching of wind power production with daily load demands. 

3.2.4 Solar Energy

Photovoltaic (PV) electricity generation and

solar water heating are suitable for much of the

United States, with current deployment primarily in off-grid locations and rooftop systems

where state or local tax incentives and utility incentives are present. Utility-scale generation is

most attractive in the Southwest with its high direct-radiation resource, where concentrating

high-efficiency PV and solar thermal generation systems can be used. California and 

Arizona currently have the only existing utility-scale systems (EIA, 2005d) with additional

projects being developed in Colorado, Nevada,

and Arizona. 

Pan et al. 2004 modeled changes to global solar

radiation through the 2040s based on the

Hadley Center circulation model. This study

projects a solar resource reduced by as much as

20% seasonally, presumably from increased

cloud cover throughout the country, but particularly in the West with its greater present resource. Increased temperature can also reduce

the effectiveness of PV electrical generation and

solar thermal energy collection. One international study predicts that a 2% decrease in

global solar radiation will decrease solar cell

output by 6% overall (Fidje and Martinsen,

2006). Anthropogenic sources of aerosols can

also decrease average solar radiation, especially

on a regional or localized basis. The relationship between the climate forcing effect of

greenhouse gases and aerosols is complex and

an area of extensive research. This field would

also benefit from further analysis on the nexus

between anthropogenic aerosols, climate

change, solar radiation, and impacts on solar energy production.
45

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

3.2.5 Other Renewable Energy

Sources

Climate change could affect geothermal energy

production [6% of current U.S. renewable energy (EIA, 2005d) and concentrating solar

power Rankine cycle power plants] in the same

way that higher temperatures reduce the efficiency of fossil-fuel-boiler electric turbines, but

there is no recent research on other potential impacts in this sector due to climate change. For a

typical air-cooled binary cycle geothermal plant

with a 330°F resource, power output will decrease

about 1% for each 1°F rise in air temperature. 

The United States currently does not make significant use of wave, tidal, or ocean thermal energy, but each of these could be affected by

climate change due to changes in average water

temperature, temperature gradients, salinity, sea

level, wind patterns affecting wave production,

and intensity and frequency of extreme weather

events. Harrison observes that wave heights in

the North Atlantic have been increasing and discusses how wave energy is affected by changes

in wind speed (Harrison and Wallace, 2005), but

very little existing research has been identified

that directly addresses the potential impact of

climate change on energy production from

wave, tidal, or ocean thermal technologies.

3.2.6 Summary

Of the two largest U.S. renewable energy

sources, hydroelectric power generation can be

expected to be directly and significantly affected by climate change, while biomass power

and fuel production impacts are less certain in

the short term. The impact on hydroelectric production will vary by region, with potential for

production decreases in key areas such as the

Columbia River Basin and Northern California.

Current U.S. electricity production from wind

and solar energy is modest but anticipated to

play a significant role in the future as the use of

these technologies increases. As such, even

modest impacts in key resource areas could substantially impact the cost competitiveness of

these technologies due to changes in electricity

production and impede the planning and financing of new wind and solar projects due to

increased variability of the resource.

Renewable energy production is highly susceptible to localized and regional changes in the

resource base. As a result, the greater uncertainties on regional impacts under current climate change modeling pose a significant

challenge in evaluating medium to long-term

impacts on renewable energy production. 

3.3 EFFECTS ON ENERGY

TRANSMISSION, DISTRIBUTION,

AND SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE

In addition to the direct effects on operating facilities themselves, networks for transport, electric transmission, and delivery would be

susceptible to changes due to climate change in

stream flow, annual precipitation and seasonal

patterns, storm severity, and even temperature

increases (e.g., pipelines handling supercritical

fluids may be impacted by greater heat loads if

temperatures increase and/or cloud cover diminishes). 

3.3.1 Electricity Transmission 

and Distribution 

Severe weather events and associated flooding

can cause direct disruptions in energy services.

With more intense events, increased disruptions

might be expected. Electricity reliability might

also be affected as a result of increased demand

combined with high soil temperatures and soil

dryness (IPCC, 2001a). Figure 3.7 illustrates

the major grid outage that was initiated by a

lightning strike, as one example.

Grid technologies in use today are at least 50

years old and, although “smart grid” technologies exist, they are not often employed. Two

such technologies that may be employed to help

offset climate impacts include upgrading the

grid by employing advanced conductors that are

capable of withstanding greater temperature extremes and automation of electricity distribution

(Gellings and Yeager, 2004).

3.3.2 Energy Resource

Infrastructure

A substantial part of the oil imported into the

United States is transported over long distances

from the Middle East and Africa in supertankers. While these supertankers are able to of-
46

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

fload within the ports of other countries, they

are too deeply drafted to enter the shallow U.S.

ports and waters. This occurs because, unlike

most other countries, the continental shelf area

of the eastern United States extends many miles

beyond its shores and territorial waters. This

leads to a number of problems related to operation of existing ports, and to programs (such as

NOAA's P.O.R.T.S. Program) to improve efficiency at these ports. In addition, the Deepwater Ports Act, 1975, has led to plans to develop

a number of deepwater ports either for petroFigure 3.7.

Approximate Area

of Blackout of 2003

In The United

States. Source: NETL

Approximate Area of the Blackout of 2003 in the United States

Calypso Port

Cabrillo Port

Compass Port

Pearl Crossing LOOP

Main Pass Energy Hub

Gulf Gateway Energy Bridge

Northeast Gateway

Neptune Project

Clearwater Port

Port Pelican

License Issued

Under Review

Closed

Gulf Landing

Bienville Offshore

Energy Terminal

Beacon Port

Figure 3.8.

Proposed

Deepwater Ports

For Petroleum

And LNG. 

(Source: U.S. Maritime

Administration)
47

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

leum or LNG import. These planned facilities

are concentrated in relatively few locations, in

particular with a concentration along the Gulf

Coast (Figure 3.8). Changes in weather patterns,

leading to changes in stream flows and wind

speed and direction can impact operability of

existing harbors. Severe weather events can impact access to deepwater facilities or might disrupt well-established navigation channels in

ports where keel clearance is a concern

(DOC/DOE, 2001).

Climate change may also affect the performance

of the extensive pipeline system in the United

States. For example, for CO2-enhanced oil recovery, experience has shown that summer injectivity of CO2 is about 15% less than winter

injectivity into the same reservoir. The CO2 gas

temperature in Kinder Morgan pipelines during

the winter is about 60°F and in late summer

about 74oF. At higher temperatures, compressors and fan coolers are less efficient and are

processing a warmer gas. Operators cannot pull

as much gas off the supply line with the given

horsepower when the CO2 gas is warm (Source:

personal communication from K. Havens of

Kinder Morgan CO2).

Efficiencies of most gas injection are similar,

and thus major gas injection projects like produced gas injection on the North Slope of

Alaska have much higher gas injection and oil

production during cold winter months. Persistently higher temperatures would have an impact

on deliverability and injectivity for applications

where the pipeline is exposed to ambient temperatures.

3.3.3 Storage and Landing Facilities

Strategic Petroleum Reserve storage locations

(EIA 2004b) that are all along the Gulf Coast

were selected because they provide the most

flexible means for connecting to the commercial oil transport network. Figure 3.9 illustrates

their locations along the Gulf Coast in areas

USGS 2000 sees as being susceptible to sealevel rise, as well as severe weather events. Similarly located on the Sabine Pass is the Henry

Hub, the largest gas transmission interconnection site in the U.S., connecting 14 interstate and

intrastate gas transmission pipelines. Henry

Hub was out of service briefly from Hurricane

Katrina and for some weeks from Hurricane

Rita, which made landfall at Sabine Pass. 

3.3.4 Infrastructure Planning And

Considerations For New Power

Plant Siting

Water availability and access to coal delivery

are currently critical issues in the siting of new

coal-fired generation capacity. New capacity,

except on coasts and large estuaries, will generally require cooling towers rather than oncethrough cooling water usage based on current

and expected regulations (EPA, 2000) independent of climate change issues. New turbine

capacity will also need to be designed to respond to the new ambient conditions. 

Siting of new nuclear units will face the same

water availability issues as large new coal-fired

units; they will not need to deal with coal deliverability but may depend on barge transport

to allow factory fabrication rather than site fabrication of large, heavy wall vessels, as well as

for transportation of any wastes that need to be

stored off-site.

Capacity additions and system reliability have

recently become important areas for discussion.

A number of approaches are being considered,

such as to run auctions (or other approaches) to

stimulate interest in adding new capacity, such

as efforts by FERC to encourage capacity investments through regional independent system

operator (ISO) organizations, without sending

signals that would result in overbuilding (as has

happened in the past). Planning to ensure that

both predictions of needed capacity and mechanisms for stimulating companies to build such

capacity (while working through the process required to announce, design, permit, and build

it) will become more important as future demand is affected by climatic shifts. Similarly,

site selection may need to factor in longer-term

climatic changes for technologies as long-lived

as coal-fired power plants (which may last for

50 - 75 years) (NARUC, 2006).
48

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 3 - Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Distribution

3.4 SUMMARY OF KNOWLEDGE

ABOUT POSSIBLE EFFECTS

Significant uncertainty exists about the potential impacts of climate change on energy production and distribution, in part because the

timing and magnitude of climate impacts are

uncertain. This report summarizes many of the

key issues and provides information available

on possible impacts; however this topic represents a key area for further analysis. 

Many of the technologies needed for existing

energy facilities to adapt to increased temperatures and decreased water availability are available for deployment; and, although decreased

efficiencies and lower output can be expected,

significant disruptions seem unlikely. Incorporating potential climate impacts into the planning process for new facilities will strengthen

the infrastructure. This is especially important

for water resources, as electricity generation is

one of many competing applications for what

may be a (more) limited resource. 

There are regionally important differences in

adaptation needs. This is true for the spectrum

of climate impacts from water availability to increased temperatures and changing patterns of

severe weather events. The most salient example

is for oil and gas exploration and production in

Alaska, where projected temperature increases

may be double the global average, and melting

permafrost and changing shorelines could significantly alter the landscape and available opportunities for oil and gas production

Increased temperatures will also increase demand-side use, and the potential system-wide

impacts on electricity transmission and distribution and other energy system needs are not

well understood. Future planning for energy

production and distribution may therefore need

to accommodate possible impacts 

Figure 3.9. Strategic

Petroleum Reserve

Storage Sites 

(Source: NETL) SPR Storage Sites

Gulf of Mexico

Bryan

Mound

West

Hackberry

Bayou

Choctaw

Big Hill
CHAPTER

4

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Possible Indirect Effects of Climate 

Change on Energy Production and Use 

in the United States 

Authors: 

Vatsal Bhatt, Brookhaven National Laboratory

James Ekmann*, National Energy Technology Laboratory

William C. Horak, Brookhaven National Laboratory

Thomas J. Wilbanks, Oak Ridge National Laboratory

CHAPTER

4

49

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In order to provide a basis for such a discussion, this chapter of SAP 4.5 offers a preliminary taxonomy of categories of indirect effects that may be of interest, along with a summary of existing

knowledge bases about such indirect effects. Some of these effects are from climate change itself,

e.g., effects on electricity prices of changing conditions for hydropower production or of more intense extreme weather events. Other effects could come from climate change related policies (e.g.,

effects of stabilization-related emission ceilings on energy prices, energy technology choices, or

energy sector emissions) (Table 4.1).

Most of the existing literature is concerned with implications of climate change mitigation policies on energy technologies, prices, and emissions in the U.S. Because this literature is abundant,

relatively well-known, and in some cases covered by other SAPs (such as SAP 2.2), it will be only

briefly summarized here, offering links to more detailed discussions. Of greater interest to some

readers may be the characterization of other possible indirect effects besides these.

49

Changes in temperature, precipitation, storms, and/or sea level are likely to have

direct effects on energy production and use, as summarized above; but they

may also have a number of indirect effects—as climate change affects other

sectors and if it shapes energy and environmental policy-making and regulatory

actions (Fig. 4.1). In some cases, it is possible that indirect effects could have a

greater impact, positive or negative, on certain institutions and localities than direct effects.

* Retired
50

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 4 - Possible Indirect Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use

4.2 CURRENT KNOWLEDGE

ABOUT INDIRECT EFFECTS 

4.2.1 Possible Effects On 

Energy Planning

Climate change is likely to affect energy planning, nationally and regionally, because it is

likely to introduce new considerations and uncertainties to institutional (and individual) risk

management. Such effects can arise either

through anticipated changes in climate-related

environmental conditions, such as hydropower

potentials, possible exposure to storm damages

(see Chapter 3), or changed patterns of energy

demand (see Chapter 2), or through possible

changes in policies and regulations. 

For instance, a path-breaking study supported

by EPRI and the Japanese Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI) assessed possible impacts of global climate

change on six utilities, five of them in the

United States (ICF, 1995). The study considered

a variety of scenarios depicting a range of underlying climate, industry, and policy conditions. It found that GHG emission reduction

policies could cause large increases in electricity prices, major changes in a utility’s resource

mix related to requirements for emission controls, and significant expansions in demand-side

management programs. Major impacts are

likely to be on Integrated Resource Planning regarding resource and capacity additions and/or

plant retirements, along with broader implications of increased costs and prices. In another

Indirect Effect 

On Energy Systems

From 

Climate Change

From 

Climate Change Policy

On energy planning and investment Very limited Considerable literature

On technology R&D and preferences Very limited Considerable literature

On energy supply institutions Very limited Limited

On energy aspects of regional economies Very limited Some literature

On energy prices Almost none Considerable literature

On energy security Almost none Very limited

On environmental emissions 

from energy production/use Very limited Considerable literature

On energy technology/service exports Almost none Very limited

Table 4.1. Overview

Of The Knowledge

Base About Possible

Indirect Effects Of

Climate Change

And Climate

Change Policy On

Energy Systems In

The U.S.

Figure 4.1 

This Chapter Is

Concerned With

The Dashed Lines In

This Flow Diagram

Of Connections

Between Climate

Change And Energy

Production And Use

Impacts on 

other systems 

and infrastructures

Climate

change

Impacts on 

energy production

and use

Climate change 

policy responses
51

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

example, Burtraw et al., 2005 analyzed a ninestate northeastern regional greenhouse gas initiative (RGGI), an allowance-based regional

GHG cap-and-trade program for the power sector. They found that how allowances are allocated has an effect on electricity price,

consumption, and the mix of technologies used

to generate electricity. Electricity prices increase in most of the cases. They also note that

any policy that increases energy costs in the region is likely to cause some emission leakage to

other areas outside the region as electricity generation or economic activity moves to avoid regulation and associated costs. 

Electric utilities in particular are already sensitive to weather as a factor in earnings performance, and they utilize weather risk management

tools to hedge against risks associated with

weather-related uncertainties. Issues of interest

include plans for capacity additions, system reliability assurance, and site selection for longlived capital facilities (O’Neill, 2003). Even

relatively small changes in temperature/demand

can affect total capacity needs across the U.S.

power sector, especially in peak periods. 

Some current policy initiatives hint at what the

future might be like, in terms of their possible

effects on energy planning. U.S. national and

state climate policy actions include a variety of

traditional approaches such as funding mechanisms (incentives and disincentives); regulations (caps, codes, and standards); technical

assistance (direct or in kind); research and development; information and education; and

monitoring and reporting (including impact disclosure) (Rose and Zhang, 2004). Covered sectors include power generation, oil and gas,

residential, commercial, industry, transportation, waste management, agriculture, and

forestry. These sectors cut across private and

public sector facilities and programs, as well as

producers and consumers of energy (Peterson

and Rose, 2006).

A variety of policy alternatives and mechanisms

are described and analyzed in published literatures, including production tax credits (incorporated in the Energy Policy Act of 2005),

investment tax credits, renewable energy portfolio standards, and state or regional greenhouse

gas initiatives.

4.2.2 Possible Effects On Energy

Production And Use Technologies

Perhaps the best-documented case of indirect

effects of climate change on energy production

and use in the United States is effects of climate

change policy on technology research and development and on technology preferences and

choices. 

For instance, if the world moves toward concerted action to stabilize concentrations of

greenhouse gases (GHG) in the earth’s atmosphere, the profile of energy resources and technologies being used in the U.S. – on both the

production and use sides – would have to

change significantly (CCTP, 2005). Developing

innovative energy technologies and approaches

through science and technology research and

development is widely seen as a key to reducing

the role of the energy sector as a driver of climate change. Considering various climate

change scenarios, researchers have modeled a

number of different pathways for the world and

for various regions, including the U.S., in order

to inform discussions about technology options

that might contribute to energy system strategies (e.g., Edmonds et al., 1996; Akimoto et al.,

2004; Hoffert et al., 2002; van Vuuren et al.,

2004; Kainuma et al., 2004; IPCC, 2005a;

Kurosawa, 2004; Pacala and Socolow, 2004 and

Paltsev et al., 2005). Recently published scenarios in CCSP SAP 2.1a, explore the U.S. implications of alternative stabilization levels of

anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and they explicitly consider the economic

and technological foundations of such response

options (CCSP, 2007a). In addition, there have

been important recent developments in scenario

work in the areas of non-carbon dioxide GHGs,

land use and forestry emission and sinks, emissions of radiatively important non-GHGs such

as black and organic carbon, and analyses of uncertainties, among many issues in increasing

mitigation options and reducing costs (Nakicenovic and Riahi, 2003; IPCC, 2005b; van Vuuren et al., 2006; Weyant et al., 2006; and

Placet et al., 2004).

These references indicate that an impressive

amount of emissions reductions could be

achieved through combinations of many different technologies, especially if diversified tech-
52

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 4 - Possible Indirect Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use

nology advancement is assumed. Although the

full range of effects in the future is necessarily

speculative, it is possible that successful development of such advanced technologies could result in potentially large economic benefits,

compared with emission reductions without significant technological progress. When the costs

of achieving different levels of emission reductions have been compared for cases with and

without advanced technologies, many of the advanced technology scenarios projected that the

cost savings from advancement would be significant (CCTP, 2005; Weyant, 2004; IPCC,

2007; CCSP, 2007a). Note, however, that there

is considerable “inertia” in the nation’s energy

supply capital stock because institutions that

have invested in expensive facilities prefer not

to have them converted into “stranded assets.”

Note also that any kind of rapid technological

transformation would be likely to have crosscommodity cost/price effects, e.g., on costs of

specialized components in critical materials that

are in greater demand. 

4.2.3 Possible Effects On Energy

Production And Use Institutions

Climate change could affect the institutional

structure of energy production and use in the

United States, although relatively little research

has been done on such issues. Institutions include energy corporations, electric utilities, governmental organizations at all scales, and

nongovernmental organizations. Their niches,

size and structure, and operation tend to be sensitive to changes in “market” conditions from

any of a variety of driving forces, these days including such forces as globalization, technological change, and social/cultural change (e.g.,

changes in consumer preferences). Climate

change is likely to interact with other driving

forces in ways that could affect institutions concerned with energy production and use.

Most of the very limited research attention to

this type of effect has been focused on effects

of climate change policy (e.g., policy actions to

reduce greenhouse gas emissions) on U.S. energy institutions, such as on the financial viability of U.S. electric utilities (see, for instance,

WWF, 2003). Other effects could emerge from

changes in energy resource/technology mixes

due to climate change: e.g., changes in renewable energy resources and costs or changes in

energy R&D investment patterns.

Most of these issues are speculative at this time,

but identifying them is useful as a basis for further discussion. Issues would appear to include

effects on planning, above.

4.2.3.1 EFFECTS ON THE INSTITUTIONAL

STRUCTURE OF THE ENERGY INDUSTRY

Depending on its impacts, climate change could

encourage large energy firms to move into renewable energy areas that have been largely the

province of smaller firms, as was the case in

some instances in the wake of the energy

“shocks” of the 1970s (e.g., Flavin and Lenssen,

1994). This kind of diversification into other

“clean energy” fields could be reflected in horizontal and/or vertical integration. Possible effects of climate change on these and other

institutional issues (such as organizational consolidation vs fragmentation) have not been addressed systematically in the research literature;

but some large energy firms are exploring a

wider range of energy technologies and some

large multinational energy technology providers

are diversifying their product lines to be prepared for possible changes in market conditions.

4.2.3.2 EFFECTS ON ELECTRIC UTILITY

RESTRUCTURING

Recent trends in electric utility restructuring

have included increasing competition in an open

electricity supply marketplace, which has sharpened attention to keeping O&M costs for infrastructure as low as possible. Some research

literature suggests that one side-effect of restructuring has been a reduced willingness on

the part of some utilities to invest in environmental protection beyond what is absolutely required by law and regulation (Parker, 1999;

Senate of Texas, 1999), although this issue

needs further study. If climate change introduces new risks for utility investment planning

and reliability, it is possible that policies and

practices could encourage greater cooperation

and collaboration among utilities.

4.2.3.3 EFFECTS ON THE HEALTH OF FOSSIL

FUEL-RELATED INDUSTRIES

If climate change is associated with policy and

associated market signals that decarbonization

of energy systems, industries focused on the
53

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

production of fossil fuels, converting them into

useful energy forms, transporting them to demand centers, and providing them to users

could face shrinking markets and profits. The

coal industry seems especially endangered in

such an eventuality. In the longer run, this type

of effect depends considerably on technological

change: e.g., affordable carbon capture and sequestration, fuel cells, and efficiency improvement. It is possible that industries (and regions)

concentrated on fossil fuel extraction, processing, and use will seek to diversify as a hedge

against risks of economic threats from climate

change policy.

4.2.3.4 EFFECTS ON OTHER SUPPORTING

INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS FINANCIAL

AND INSURANCE INDUSTRIES

Many major financial and insurance institutions

are gearing up to underwrite emission trading

contracts, derivatives and hedging products,

wind and biofuel crop guarantee covers for renewable energy, and other new financial products to support carbon emission trading, while

they are concerned about exposure to financial

risks associated with climate change impacts. In

recent years, various organizations have tried to

engage the global insurance industry in the climate change debate. Casualty insurers are concerned about possible litigation against

companies responsible for excessive GHG

emissions, and property insurers are concerned

about future uncertainties in weather damage

losses. However, it is in the field of adaptation

where insurers are most active, and have most to

contribute. Two hundred major companies in the

financial sector around the world have signed

up to the UN Environment Program’s - Finance

Initiative, and 95 institutional investment companies have so far signed up to the Carbon Disclosure Project. They ask businesses to disclose

investment-relevant information concerning

their GHGs. Their website provides a comprehensive registry of GHGs from public corporations. More than 300 of the 500 largest

companies in the world now report their emissions on this website, recognizing that institutional investors regard this information as

important for shareholders (Crichton, 2005).

4.3 POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON

ENERGY-RELATED DIMENSIONS

OF REGIONAL AND NATIONAL

ECONOMIES 

It is at least possible that climate change could

have an effect on regional economies by impacting regional comparative advantages related

to energy availability and cost. Examples could

include regional economies closely associated

with fossil fuel production and use (especially

coal) if climate change policies encourage decarbonization, regional economies dependent

on affordable electricity from hydropower if

water supplies decrease or increase, regional

economies closely tied to coastal energy facilities that could be threatened by more intense

coastal storms (Chapter 3), and regional

economies dependent on abundant electricity

supplies if demands on current capacities increase or decrease due to climate change.

Attempts to estimate the economic impacts that

could occur 50–100 years in the future have

been made using various climate scenarios, but

the interaction of climate and the nation’s economy remains very difficult to define. Most studies of the economic impacts of global warming

have analyzed the impacts on specific sectors

(such as agriculture) or on regional ecosystems

(e.g. Fankhauser, 1995; Mendelsohn and Neumann, 1999; Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000;

Mendelsohn et al., 1994; Tol, 2002; Nordhaus,

2006). However, not many impact studies have

concentrated on the energy sector. Significant

uncertainties therefore surround projections of

climate change induced energy sector impacts

on the U.S. or regional economies. Changnon

estimated that annual national economic losses

from the energy sector will outweigh the gains

in years with major weather and climate extremes (Changnon, 2005). Jorgenson et al.,

2004, studied impacts of climate change on various sectors of the U.S. economy from 2000 –

2100. In three optimistic scenarios, they conclude that increased energy availability and cost

savings from reduced natural gas-based space

heating more than compensate for increased expenditures on electricity-based space cooling.

These unit cost reductions appear as productivity increases and, thus, improve the economy,

whereas other three pessimistic scenarios show

that electricity-based space conditioning expe-
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The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 4 - Possible Indirect Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use

riences relatively larger productivity losses than

does space conditioning from coal, wood, petroleum or natural gas; accordingly its (direct)

unit cost rises faster and thus produces no benefits to the economy. Additionally, higher domestic prices discourage exports and promote

imports leading to a worsening real trade balance. According to Mendelsohn et al., 2000, the

U.S. economy could benefit from the climate

change induced energy sector changes. However, Mendelsohn and Williams, 2004 suggest

that climate change will cause economic damages in the energy sector in every scenario. They

suggest that temperature changes cause most of

the energy impacts. Larger temperature increases generate significantly larger economic

damages. The damages are from increased cooling expenditures required to maintain desired

indoor temperatures. In the empirical studies,

these cost increases outweighed benefits of the

reduced heating expenditures unless starting climates are very cool (Mendelsohn and Neumann, 1999; Mendelsohn, 2001) (also see

Chapter 2).

In California, a preliminary assessment of the

macroeconomic impacts associated with the climate change emission reduction strategies

(CEPA, 2006) shows that, while some impacts

on the economy could be positive if strategies

reduce energy costs, other impacts might be less

positive. For example, the study emphasizes that

even relatively small changes in in-state hydropower generation result in substantial extra

expenditure burdens on an economy for energy

generation, because losses in this “free” generation must be purchased from other sources; for

example, a 10% decrease in hydroelectric supply would impose a cost of approximately $350

million in additional electricity expenditures annually (Franco and Sanstad, 2006). Whereas

electricity demand is projected to rise in California between 3 to 20 % by the end of this century, peak electricity demand would increase at

a faster rate. Since annual expenditures of electricity demand in California represent about $28

billion, even such a relatively small increase in

energy demand would result in substantial extra

energy expenditures for energy services in the

state; a 3 % increase in electricity demand by

2020 would translate into about $930 million (in

2000 dollars) in additional electricity expenditures (Franco and Sanstad, 2006). Particular

concerns are likely to exist in areas where summer electricity loads already strain supply capacities (e.g., Hill and Goldberg 2001; Kelly et

al. 2005; Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2001) and

where transmission and distribution networks

have limited capacities to adapt to changes in

regional demands, especially seasonally (e.g.,

London Climate Change, Partnership 2002).

Rose and others have examined effects of a

number of climate change mitigation policies

on U.S. regions in general and the Susquehanna

River basin in particular (Rose and Oladosu,

2002; Rose and Zhang, 2004; Rose et al., 1999;

Rose et al., 2006). In general, they find that

such policy options as emission permits tradable among U.S. regions might have less than

expected effects, with burdens impacting at

least one Southern region that needs maximum

permits but whose economy is not among the

nation’s strongest. Additionally, they discuss

Pennsylvania’s heavy reliance on coal production and use infrastructure that increases the

price of internal carbon dioxide mitigation.

They suggest that the anomalies stem from the

fact that new entrants, like Pennsylvania, into

regional coalitions for cap-and-trade configuration may raise the permit price, may undercut

existing states’ permit sales, and may be able to

exercise market power. Particularly, they raise

an issue of the “responsibility” for emissions.

Should fossil fuel producing regions take the

full blame for emissions, or are the using regions also responsible? They find that aggregate

impacts of a carbon tax on the Susquehanna

River Basin would be negative but quite modest. 

Concerns remain, however, that aggressive climate policy interventions to reduce GHG emissions could negatively affect regional

economies linked to coal and other fossil energy

production. Concerns also exist that climate

change itself could affect the economies of

areas exposed to severe weather events (positively or negatively) and areas whose economies

are closely linked to hydropower and other aspects of the “energy-water nexus.”
55

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

4.4 POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIPS

WITH OTHER ENERGY-RELATED

ISSUES 

Many other types of indirect effects are possible, although relatively few have received research attention. Without asserting that this

listing is comprehensive, such effects might include the following types.

4.4.1 Effects Of Climate Change 

In Other Countries On U.S. Energy

Production And Use

We know from recent experience that climate

variability outside the U.S. can affect energy

conditions in the U.S.; an example is an unusually dry year in Spain in 2005 that led the country to enter the international LNG market to

compensate for scarce hydropower, which in

turn raised LNG prices for U.S. consumption

(Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, 2005). It

is important, therefore, to consider possible effects of climate change not only on international

energy product suppliers and international energy technology buyers but also on other countries whose participation in international

markets could affect U.S. energy availability

and prices from international sources, which

could have implications for energy security (see

below). Climate change-related energy supply

and price effects could be coupled with other

price effects of international trends on U.S. energy, infrastructures, such as effects of aggressive programs of infrastructure development on

China and India. 

As indicated in Chapter 2, a particularly important case is U.S. energy inputs from Canada.

Canada is the largest single source of petroleum

imports by the U.S. (about 2.2 million barrels

per day) and exports more than 15% of the natural gas consumed in the U.S. (EIA 2005a,

2006). In 2004, it exported to the U.S. 33 MWh

of electricity, compared with imports of 22.5

MWh (EIA, 2005b). Climate change could affect electricity exports and imports, for instance

if electricity demands for space cooling increase

in Canada or if climate change affects hydropower production in that country.

4.4.2 Effects Of Climate Change 

On Energy Prices*

A principal mechanism in reducing vulnerabilities to climate-related (and other) changes potentially affecting the energy sector is the

operation of the energy market, where price

variation is a key driver. Effects of climate

change on energy prices are in fact interwoven

with effects of energy prices on risk management strategies, in a dynamic that could work in

both directions at once; and it would be useful

to know more about roles of energy markets in

reducing vulnerabilities to climate change impacts, along with possible adaptations in the

functioning of those markets. Although price effects of climate change itself are not analyzed

in the literature, aside from effects of extreme

events such as Hurricane Katrina, substantial research has been done on possible energy price

effects of greenhouse gas emission reductions. 

Estimates of costs of emission reduction vary

widely according to assumptions about such issues as how welfare is measured, ancillary benefits, and effects in stimulating technological

innovation; and therefore any particular set of

cost estimates includes considerable uncertainty. According to an Interlaboratory Working

Group (IWG, 2000), benefits of emission reduction would be comparable to costs, and the

National Commission on Energy Policy 2004

estimates that its recommended policy initiatives would be, on the whole, revenue-neutral

with respect to the federal budget. Other participants in energy policymaking, however, are

convinced that truly significant carbon emission

reductions would have substantial economic impacts (GAO, 2004).

Globally, IPCC, 2001 projected that total CO2

emissions from energy supply and conversion

could be reduced in 2020 by 350 to 700 Mt C

equivalents per year, based on options that could

be adopted through the use of generally accepted policies, generally at a positive direct

cost of less than U.S.$100 per t C equivalents.

Based on DOE/EIA analyses in 2000, this study

includes estimates of the cost of a range of specific emission-reducing technologies for power

* Adapted in part from CCSP SAP 2.2, State of the Carbon Cycle Report, Chapter 6, “Energy Conversion.”
56

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 4 - Possible Indirect Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use

generation, compared with coal-fired power, although the degree of uncertainty is not clear.

Within the United States, the report estimated

that the cost of emission reduction per metric

ton of carbon emissions reduced would range

from –$170 to +$880, depending on the technology used. Marginal abatement costs for the

total United States economy, in 1990 U.S. dollars per metric ton carbon, were estimated by a

variety of models compared by the Energy

Modeling Forum at $76 to $410 with no emission trading, $14 to $224 with Annex I trading,

and $5 to $123 with global trading.

Similarly, the National Commission on Energy

Policy 2004 considered costs associated with a

tradable emission permit system that would reduce United States national greenhouse gas

emission growth from 44% to 33% from 2002

to 2025, a reduction of 760 Mt CO2 (207 Mt C)

in 2025 compared with a reference case. The

cost would be a roughly 5% increase in total

end-use expenditures compared with the reference case. Electricity prices would rise by 5.4%

for residential users, 6.2% for commercial

users, and 7.6% for industrial users.

The IWG 2000 estimated that a domestic carbon trading system with a $25/t C permit price

would reduce emissions by 13% compared with

a reference case, or 230 Mt CO2 (63 Mt C),

while a $50 price would reduce emissions by 17

to 19%, or 306 to 332 Mt CO2 (83-91 Mt C).

Both cases assume a doubling of United States

government appropriations for cost-shared

clean energy research, design, and development.

Net costs to the consumer, however, are balanced in some analyses by benefits from advanced technologies that are developed and

deployed on an accelerated schedule due to policy interventions and changing public preferences. The U.S. Climate Change Technology

Program, 2005: pp. 3–19, illustrates how costs

of achieving different stabilization levels can

conceivably be reduced substantially by the use

of advanced technologies, and IWG (2000) estimates that net end-user costs of energy can actually be reduced by a domestic carbon trading

system if it accelerates the market penetration

of more energy-efficient technologies (see Section 4.2.2 above). 

4.4.3 Effects Of Climate Change 

On Environmental Emissions 

Climate change is very likely to lead to reductions in environmental emissions from energy

production and use in the U.S., although possible effects of climate change responses are complex. For instance, cap and trade policy

responses might not translate directly into lower

total emissions. In general, however, the available research literature indicates that climate

change policy will affect choices of energy resources and technologies in ways that, overall,

reduce greenhouse gas and other environmental emissions (see indirect impacts on technologies above).

4.4.4 Effects Of Climate Change 

On Energy Security 

Climate change relates to energy security because different drivers of energy policy interact.

As one example, some strategies to reduce oil

import dependence, such as increased use of renewable energy sources in the U.S., are similar

to strategies to reduce GHG emissions as a climate change response (e.g., IEA, 2004;

O’Keefe, 2005). Other strategies such as increased domestic fossil fuel production and use

could be contradictory to climate change policies. The complexity of connections between

climate change responses and energy security

concerns can be illustrated by choices between

uses of biomass to reduce fossil fuel use in electricity generation, a priority for net greenhouse

gas emissions, and uses of biomass to displace

oil and gas imports, a priority for energy security policy. Although the relative effects of the

two options are not entirely unrelated (i.e., both

could have some effect in reducing oil and gas

imports and both could have some effect in reducing net greenhouse gas emissions), the balance in contributions to these two policy

priorities would be different.

As another example, energy security relates not

only to import dependence but also to energy

system reliability, which can be threatened by

possible increases in the intensity of severe

weather events. A different kind of issue is potential impacts of abrupt climate change in the

longer run. One study has suggested that abrupt
57

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

climate change could lead to very serious international security threats, including threats of

global energy crises, as countries act to defend

and secure supplies of essential commodities

(Schwarz and Randall, 2004). Clearly, then, relationships between climate change response and

energy security are complex, but they are potentially important enough to deserve further study.

4.4.5 Effects Of Climate Change 

On Energy Technology And 

Service Exports 

Finally, climate change could affect U.S. energy

technology and service exports. It is very likely

that climate change will have some impacts on

global energy technology, institutional, and policy choices. Effects of these changes on U.S. exports would probably be determined by whether

the U.S. is a leader or a follower in energy technology and policy responses to concerns about

climate change. More broadly, carbon emission

abatement actions by various countries are

likely to affect international energy flows and

trade flows in energy technology and services

(e.g., Rutherford, 2001). In particular, one

might expect flows of carbon-intensive energy

forms and energy technologies and energy-intensive products to be affected.

4.5 SUMMARY OF KNOWLEDGE

ABOUT INDIRECT EFFECTS

Regarding indirect effects of climate change on

energy production and use in the United States,

the available research literature tells us the most

about possible changes in energy resource/technology preferences and investments, along with

associated reductions in GHG emissions and effects on energy prices. Less-studied but also potentially important are possible impacts on the

institutional structure of energy supply in the

United States, responding to changes in perceived investment risks and emerging market

and policy realities, and possible interactions

between energy prices and roles of energy markets in managing risks and reducing vulnerabilities. Perhaps the most important insight from

the limited current research literature is that climate change will affect energy production and

use not only as a driving force in its own right

but in its interactions with other driving forces

such as energy security. Where climate change

response strategies correspond with other issue

response strategies, they can add force to actions such as increased reliance on domestic

noncarbon energy supply sources. Where climate change impacts contradict other driving

forces for energy decisions, it is much less clear

what their net effect would be on energy production and use.
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The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 4 - Possible Indirect Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use
CHAPTER

5

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

Conclusions and Research Priorities 

Authors: 

Thomas J. Wilbanks, et al.

CHAPTER

5

59

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Accordingly, this final chapter of SAP 4.5 will sketch out what appear, based on the current knowledge base, to be the most likely types of effects on the energy sector. These should be considered

along with effects on other sectors that should be considered in risk management discussions in the

near term. As indicated in Chapter 1, conclusions are related to degrees of likelihood: likely (2

chances out of 3), very likely (9 chances out of 10), or virtually certain (99 chances out of 100).

The chapter will then discuss issues related to prospects for energy systems in the U.S. to adapt to

such effects, although literatures on adaptation are very limited. Finally, it will suggest a limited

number of needs for expanding the knowledge base so that, when further assessments on this topic

are carried out, conclusions about effects can be offered with a higher level of confidence.

59

The previous chapters have summarized a variety of currently available information about effects of climate change on energy production and use in the

United States. For two reasons, it is important to be careful about drawing firm

conclusions about effects at this time. One reason is that the research literatures

on many of the key issues are limited, supporting an identification of issues but

not a resolution of most uncertainties. A second reason is that, as with many

other categories of climate change effects in the U.S., the effects depend on a

wide range of factors beyond climate change alone, such as patterns of economic growth and land use, patterns of population growth and distribution, technological change, and social and cultural trends that could shape policies and

actions, individually and institutionally. 
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The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Research Priorities

5.2 CONCLUSIONS 

ABOUT EFFECTS

Based on currently available projections of climate change in the United States, a number of

conclusions can be suggested about likely effects on energy use in the U.S. over a period of

time addressed by the research literature (near

to midterm). Long-term conclusions are difficult due to uncertainties about such driving

forces as technological, change, institutional

change, and climate change policy responses.

• Climate change will mean reductions in total

U.S. energy demand for space heating for

buildings, with effects differing by region

(virtually certain).

• Climate change will mean increases in total

U.S. energy demand for space cooling, with

effects differing by region (virtually certain).

• Net effects on energy use will differ by region, with net lower total energy requirements for buildings in net heating load areas

and net higher energy requirements in net

cooling load areas, with overall impacts affected by patterns of interregional migration

– which are likely to be in the direction of

net cooling load regions – and investments

in new building stock (virtually certain).

• Temperature increases will be associated

with increased peak demands for electricity

(very likely).

• Other effects of climate change are less

clear, but some could be nontrivial: e.g., increased energy use for water pumping

and/or desalination in areas that see reductions in water supply (very likely).

• Lower winter energy demands in Canada

could add to available electricity supplies for

a few U.S. regions (likely).

A number of conclusions can be offered with

relatively high levels of confidence about effects of climate change on energy production

and supply in the U.S., but generally the research evidence is not as strong as for effects on

energy use: 

• Changes in the distribution of water availability in the U.S. will affect power plants;

in areas with decreased water availability,

competition for water supplies will increase

between energy production and other sectors

(virtually certain).

• Temperature increases will decrease overall

thermoelectric power generation efficiency

(virtually certain).

• In some regions, energy resource production

and delivery systems are vulnerable to

effects of sea level rise and extreme weather

events, especially the Gulf Coast and the

East Coast (virtually certain).

• In some areas, the siting of new energy 

facilities and systems could face increased

restrictions, related partly to complex interactions among the wider range of water uses

as well as sea-level rise and extreme event

exposures (likely

• Incorporating possible climate change impacts into planning processes could

strengthen energy production and distribution

system infrastructures, especially regarding

water resource management (likely).

• Hydropower production is expected to be directly and significantly affected by climate

change, especially in the West and Northwest (very likely).

• Climate change is expected to mean greater

variability in wind resources and direct solar

radiation, substantially impacting the planning, siting, and financing of these technologies (likely).

• Increased temperatures and other climate

change effects will affect energy transmission and distribution requirements, but these

effects are not well-understood.

Overall, the current energy supply infrastructure is often located in areas where climate

change impacts might occur, but large-scale disruptions are not likely except during extreme

weather events. Most of the effects on fossil and

nuclear electricity components are likely to be

modest changes in water availability and/or

cycle efficiency.

California is one U.S. state where impacts on

both energy use and energy production have

been studied with some care (See Box 5.1: California: A Case Study).
61

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

About indirect effects of climate change on energy production and use in the U.S., conclusions

are notably mixed. Conclusions related to possible impacts of climate change policy interventions on technology choice and emissions

can be offered with relatively high confidence

based on published research:

• Climate change concerns are very likely to

affect perceptions and practices related to

risk management behavior in investment by

energy institutions (very likely).

• Climate change concerns, especially if they

are expressed through policy interventions,

are almost certain to affect public and private sector energy technology R&D investments and energy resource/technology

choices by energy institutions, along with

associated emissions (virtually certain).

• Climate change can be expected to affect

other countries in ways that in turn affect

U.S. energy conditions (very likely).

Other types of possible indirect effects can be

suggested as a basis for discussion, but conclusions must await further research:

• Climate change effects on energy production and use could in turn affect some regional economies, either positively or

negatively (likely).

• Climate change may have some effects on

energy prices in the U.S., especially associated with extreme weather events (very

likely).

• Climate change concerns are likely to interact with some driving forces behind policies

focused on U.S. energy security, such as reduced reliance on conventional petroleum

products (likely).

These conclusions add up to a picture that is

cautionary rather than alarming. Since in many

cases effects that could be a concern to U.S. citizens and U.S. energy institutions are some

decades in the future, there is time to consider

strategies for adaptation to reduce possible negative impacts and take advantage of possible

positive impacts.

California is unique in the United States as a state that has examined possible effects of

climate change on its energy production and use in some detail (also see Box 2.2). Led

by the California Energy Commission and supported by such nearby partners as the

Electric Power Research Institute, the University of California–Berkeley, and the Scripps

Institution of Oceanography, the state is developing a knowledge base on this subject that

could be a model for other states and regions (as well as the nation as a whole).

Generally, the analyses to date (many of which are referenced in Chapters 2 and 3) indicate that electricity demand will grow due to climate change, with an especially close

relationship between peak electricity demand and temperature increases (Franco and

Sanstad 2006), and water supply – as an element of the “energy-water nexus” – will be

affected by a reduction in the Sierra snowpack (by as much as 70-90 % over the coming century: Vicuña et al. 2006). Patterns of urbanization could add to pressures for

further energy supplies. Adaptations to these and other climate change impacts appear

possible, but they could be costly (Franco 2005). Overall economic impacts will depend

considerably on the effectiveness of response measures, which tend currently to emphasize emission reduction but also consider impact scenarios and potential adaptation

measures (CEPA 2006).

Other relevant studies of the California context for climate change effects reinforce an

impression that effects of warming and snowpack reduction could be serious (Hayhoe

et al. 2004) and that other ecosystems related to renewable energy potentials could be

affected as well (Union of Concerned Scientists 1999).

BOX 5.1 California: A Case Study
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The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Research Priorities

5.3 CONSIDERING PROSPECTS

FOR ADAPTATION

The existing research literature tends to treat the

U.S. energy sector mainly as a driving force for

climate change rather than a sector subject to

impacts from climate change. As a result, there

is very little literature on adaptation of the energy sector to effects of climate change, and the

following discussion is therefore largely speculative. 

Generally, both energy users and providers in

the U.S. are accustomed to changes in conditions that affect their decisions. Users see energy prices fluctuate with international oil

market conditions and with Gulf Coast storm

behavior, and they see energy availability subject to short-term shortages for a variety of reasons (e.g., the California energy market crises

of 2000/2001 or electricity blackouts in some

Northeastern cities in 2003). Energy providers

cope with shifting global market conditions,

policy changes, financial variables such as interest rates for capital infrastructure lending,

and climate variability. In many ways, the energy sector is among the most resilient of all

U.S. economic sectors, at least in terms of responding to changes within the range of historical experience. For instance, electric utilities

routinely consider planning and investment

strategies that consider weather variables

(Niemeyer, 2005); and one important guide to

adaptation to climate change is what makes

sense in adapting to climate variability (Franco

2005).

On the other hand, such recent events as Hurricane Katrina (Box 5.2: Hurricane Katrina and

the Gulf Coast: A Case Study) suggest that the

U.S. energy sector is better at responding to relatively short-term variations and uncertainties

than to changes that reach beyond the range of

familiar short-term variabilities (Niemeyer

2005). In fact, the confidence of U.S. energy institutions about their ability to reduce exposure

to risks from short-term variations might tend

to reduce their resilience to larger long-term

changes, unless an awareness of risks from such

long-term changes is heightened.

Adaptations to effects of climate change on energy use may focus on increased demands for

space cooling in areas affected by warming and

associated increases in total energy consumption costs. Alternatives could include reducing

costs of cooling for users through energy efficiency improvement in cooling equipment and

building envelopes; responding to likely increases in demands for electricity for cooling

through expanded generation capacities, expanded interties, and possibly increased capacIt is not possible to attribute the occurrence of Hurricane Katrina, August 29, 2005, to

climate change; but projections of climate change say that extreme weather events are

very likely to become more intense. If so (e.g., more of the annual hurricanes at higher

levels of wind speed and potential damages), then the impacts of Katrina are an indicator of possible impacts of one manifestation of climate change.

Impacts of Katrina on energy systems in the region and the nation were dramatic at the

time, and some impacts remained many months later. The hurricane itself impacted

coastal and offshore oil and gas production, offshore oil port operation (stopping imports

of more than one million bbl/d of crude oil), and crude oil refining along the Louisiana

Gulf Coast (Figures 3.4 a-d). Within only a few days, oil product and natural gas prices

had risen significantly across the U.S. As of mid-December 2005, substantial oil and gas

production was still shut-in, and refinery shutdowns still totalled 367, 000 bbl/d (EIA

2005) (see Chapter 3). 

Possibilities for adaptation to reduce risks of damages from future Katrinas are unclear.

They might include such alternatives as hardening offshore platforms and coastal facilities to be more resilient to high winds, wave action, and flooding (potentially expensive)

and shifting the locations of some coastal refining and distribution facilities to less vulnerable sites, reducing their concentration in the Gulf Coast. (potentially very expensive).

BOX 5.2 Hurricane Katrina and the Gulf Coast: A Case Study
63

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

ities for storage; and responding to concerns

about increased peak demand in electricity

loads, especially seasonally, through contingency planning for load-leveling. Over a period

of several decades, for instance, technologies

are likely to respond to consumer concerns

about higher energy bills where they occur.

Many technologies that can enable adaptations

to effects on energy production and supply are

available for deployment. The most likely adaptation in the near term is an increase in perceptions of uncertainty and risk in longer-term

strategic planning and investment, which could

seek to reduce risks through such approaches as

diversifying supply sources and technologies

and risk-sharing arrangements.

Adaptation to indirect effects of climate change

on the energy sector is likely to be bundled with

adaptation to other issues for energy policy and

decision-making in the U.S., such as energy security: for instance, in the development of lower

carbon-emitting fossil fuel use technology ensembles, increased deployment of renewable energy technologies, and the development of

alternatives to fossil fuels and effects on energy

institutional structures. Issues related to effects

of climate change on other countries linked with

U.S. energy conditions are likely to be addressed through attention by both the public and

private sectors to related information systems

and market signals.

It seems possible that adaptation challenges

would be greatest in connection with possible

increases in the intensity of extreme weather

events and possible significant changes in regional water supply regimes. More generally,

adaptation prospects appear to be related to the

magnitude and rate of climate change (e.g., how

much the average temperature rises before stabilization is achieved, how rapidly it moves to

that level, and how variable the climate is at that

level), with adaptation more likely to be able to

cope with effects of lesser amounts, slower rates

of change, and less variable climate (Wilbanks

et al., 2007). 

Generally, prospects for these types of adaptations depend considerably on the level of awareness of possible climate changes at a relatively

localized scale and possible implications for energy production and use – the topic of this

study. When the current knowledge base to support such awareness is so limited, this suggests

that expanding the knowledge base is important

to the energy sector in the United States.

5.4 NEEDS FOR EXPANDING THE

KNOWLEDGE BASE

Expanding the knowledge base about effects of

climate change on energy production and use in

the United States is not just a responsibility of

the federal government. As the work of such institutions as the Electric Power Research Institute and the California Energy Commission

demonstrates, a wide variety of parts of U.S. society have knowledge, expertise, and data to

contribute to what should be a broad-based

multi-institutional collaboration. 

Recognizing that roles in these regards will differ among federal and state governments, industry, nongovernmental institutions, and

academia and that all parties should be involved

in discussions about how to proceed, this study

suggests the following needs for expanding the

knowledge base on its topic, some of which are

rooted in broader needs for advances in climate

change science.

5.4.1 General Needs

• Improved capacities to project climate

change and its effects on a relatively finegrained geographic scale, especially of precipitation changes and severe weather

events: e.g., in order to support evaluations

of impacts at local and small-regional scales,

not only in terms of gradual changes but also

in terms of extremes, since many energy 

facility decisions are made at a relatively 

localized scale; 

• Research on and assessments of implications of extreme weather events for energy

system resiliency, including strategies for

both reducing and recovering from impacts;

• Research on and assessments of potentials,

costs, and limits of adaptation to risks of adverse effects, for both supply and use infrastructures; 

• Research on efficiency of energy use in the

context of climate warming, with an em-
4Note that CCSP SAP 4.7, The Impacts of Climate Change on Transportation: A Gulf Coast Study, considers imacts

on pipelines and other transportation infrastructures in the Gulf Coast region (CCSP, 2007b).

64

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Chapter 5 - Conclusions and Research Priorities

phasis on technologies and practices that

save cooling energy and reduce electrical

peak load;

• Research on and assessments of implications of changing regional patterns of energy

use for regional energy supply institutions

and consumers;

• Improvements in the understanding of effects of changing conditions for renewable

energy and fossil energy development and

market penetration on regional energy balances and their relationships with regional

economies;

• In particular, improvements in understanding likely effects of climate change in Arctic

regions and on storm intensity to guide applications of existing technologies and the

development and deployment of new technologies and other adaptations for energy infrastructure and energy exploration and

production in these relatively vulnerable regions; and

• Attention to linkages and feedbacks among

climate change effects, adaptation, and mitigation; to linkages between effects at different geographic scales; and relationships

between possible energy effects and other

possible economic, environmental, and institutional changes (Parson et al., 2003;

Wilbanks, 2005). 

5.4.2 Needs Related To Major

Technology Areas

• Improving the understanding of potentials to

increase efficiency improvements in space

cooling;

• Improving information about interactions

among water demands and uses where the

quantity and timing of surface water discharge is affected by climate change;

• Improving the understanding of potential

climate change and localized variability on

energy production from wind and solar technologies;

• Developing strategies to increase the resilience of coastal and offshore oil and gas

production and distribution systems to extreme weather events;

• Pursuing strategies and improved technology potentials for adding resilience to energy supply systems that may be subject to

stress under possible scenarios for climate

change;

• Improving understandings of potentials to

improve resilience in electricity supply systems through regional intertie capacities and

distributed generation; and 

• Research on and assessments of the impacts

of severe weather events on sub-sea pipeline

systems, especially in the Gulf of Mexico,

and strategies for reducing such impacts.4

Other needs for research exist as well, and the

process of learning more about this topic in

coming years may change perceptions of needs

and priorities; but based on current knowledge,

these appear to be high priorities in the next several years. 
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ANNEX A

73

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

TECHNICAL NOTE: 

METHODS FOR ESTIMATING ENERGY

CONSUMPTION IN BUILDINGS

Previous authors have used a number of approaches to

estimate the impact of climate change on energy use

in U.S. buildings. Many of the researchers translate

changes in average temperature change on a daily, seasonal, or annual basis into heating and cooling degree

days, which are then used in building energy simulation models to project demand for space heating and

space cooling (e.g., Rosenthal et al. 1995, Belzer et al.

1996, and Amato et al. 2005). Building energy simulation is often done directly with average climate

changes used to modify daily temperature profiles at

modeled locations (Scott et al. 2005, and Huang 2006).

(See Box A.1 on heating and cooling degree-days.) 

Building energy simulation models such as CALPAS3

(Atkinson et al. 1981), DOE-2 (Winkelmann et al.

1993), or FEDS and BEAMS (PNNL 2002, Elliott et

al. 2004) have been used to analyze the impact of climate warming on the demand for energy in individual

commercial buildings only (Scott et al. 1994) and in

groups of commercial and residential buildings in a variety of locations (Loveland and Brown 1990, Rosenthal et al. 1995, Scott et al. 2005, and Huang 2006).

Other researchers have used econometrics and statistical analysis techniques (most notably the various

Mendelsohn papers discussed in Chapter 2, but also

the Belzer et al. 1996 study using the CBECS microdata, and Sailor and Muñoz 1997, Sailor 2001, Amato

et al. 2005, Ruth and Lin 2006, and Franco and Sanstad

2006, using various state-level time series.) A subcategory of the econometric technique is cross-sectional

analysis. For example, Mendelsohn performed crosssectional econometric analysis of the RECS and

CBECS microdata sets to determine how energy use

in the residential and commercial building stock relates

to climate (Morrison and Mendelsohn 1999; Mendelsohn 2001), and then used the resulting equations to

estimate the future impact of warmer temperatures on

energy consumption in residential and commercial

buildings. Mendelsohn 2003 and Mansur et al. 2005 subsequently elaborated the approach into a complete and

separate set of discrete-continuous choice models of energy demand in residential and commercial buildings.

Finally, Hadley et al. 2004, 2006, directly incorporated

changes in heating degree-days and cooling degreedays expected as a result of climate change into the residential and commercial building modules of the

Energy Information Administration’s National Energy

Modeling System, so that their results incorporated

U.S. demographic trends, changes in building stock

and energy-using equipment, and (at least some) consumer reactions to energy prices and climate at a regional level. Hadley et al. translated temperatures from

a single climate scenario of the Parallel Climate Model

Energy analysts often refer to concepts called heating and cooling degree-days when calculating the

impact of outdoor temperature on energy use in buildings. Buildings are considered to have a minimum energy use temperature where the building is neither heated nor cooled, and all energy use is

considered to be nonclimate sensitive. This is called the “balance point” for the building. Each degree

deviation from that balance point temperature results in heating (if the temperature is below the balance point) or cooling (if the temperature is above the balance point). For example, if the balance point

for a building is 60°F and the average outdoor temperature for a 30-d period is 55°F, then there are

5 x 30 heating degree days for that period. Energy demand is usually considered to increase or decrease proportionately with increases in either heating degree-days or cooling degree-days.

Balance points by default are usually considered to be 65°F because many weather datasets come

with degree-days already computed on that basis (See Amato et al 2005). However, empirical research on regional datasets and on the RECS and CBECS microdata sets suggests that regional variations are common. In Massachusetts, for example, Amato et al. found a balance point temperature

for electricity in the residential sector of 60°F and 55°F for the residential sector. Belzer et al. (1996)

found that the newer commercial buildings have even lower balance point temperatures, probably because of tighter construction and the dominance of lighting and other interior loads that both aid with

heating and make cooling more of a challenge. 

BOX A.1 Heating and Cooling Degree-Days and Building Energy Use
The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Annex A –Technical Note

into changes in heating degree days (HDDs) and cooling degree-days (CDDs) that are population-averaged in each of

the nine U.S. Census divisions (on a 65o F base –against the

findings of Rosenthal et al., Belzer et al., and Mansur et al.

2005, all of which projected a lower balance point temperature for cooling and a variation in the balance point across

the country). They then compared these values with 1971-

2000 average HDDs and CDDs from the National Climate

Data Center for the same regions. The changes in HDD and

CDD were then used to drive changes in a special version

(DD-NEMS) of the National Energy Modeling System

(NEMS) of the U.S. Energy Information Administration,

generally used to provide official energy consumption forecasts for the Annual Energy Outlook (EIA 2006). Table A.1

contains a summary of methods used in the various studies

employed in this chapter.

Authors Methods Comments

National Studies

Linder-Inglis 

1989 Electric utility planning model Electricity only. Results available for 47 state and substateservice areas. Calculates peak demand.

Rosenthal 

et al. 1995

Reanalysis of building energy consumption in

EIA Annual Energy Outlook Energy-weighted national averages of census division-level data

Belzer et al. 

1996

Econometrics on CBECS commercial sector

microdata Used HDD and CDD and estimated energy balance points

Mendelsohn 

2001

Econometric analysis of RECS and CBECS

microdata

Takes into account energy price forecasts, market penetration

of air conditioning. Precipitation increases 7%.

Scott et al. 

2005 Building models (FEDS and BEAMS)

Varies by region. Allows for growth in residential and

commercial building stock, but not increased adoption 

of air conditioning in response to warming

Mansur et al. 

2005

Econometric analysis of RECS and CBECS

microdata

Takes into account energy price forecasts, market penetration

of air conditioning. Precipitation increases 7%. 

Affects both fuel choice and use. 

Hadley et al. 

2004; 2006

NEMS energy model, modified for changes in

degree-days

Primary energy, residential and commercial combined. Allows

for growth in residential and commercial building stock. 

Huang et al. 

2006 DOE-2 building energy model Impacts vary by region, building type.

Regional Studies

Loveland and

Brown 1990 CALPAS3 Building Energy Model Single family detached house, commercial building, 6 individual cities 

Baxter and

Calandri 1992 Building energy model Electricity only, California. 

Scott et al. 

1994 DOE-2 building energy model Small office building, 4 specific cities

Sailor 

2001 Econometric on state time series Total electricity per capita in 7 out of 8 energy-intensive states;one state (Washington) used electricity for space heating

Sailor and

Pavlova 2003 Econometric on state-level time series Four states. Includes increased market saturation of airconditioning

Mendelsohn 

2003

Econometric on national cross sectional data on

RECS and CBECS data

Impacts for California only. Residential and commercial.

Expenditures on energy.

Amato et al. 

2005 Time series econometric on state data Massachusetts (North), Winter monthly residential capitaconsumption, commercial monthly per employee consumption

Ruth and Lin 

2006 Time series econometric on state data Maryland (borderline North-South), residential natural gas,heating oil, electricity expenditures

Franco and

Sanstad 2006

Regression of electricity demand in California

Independent System Operator with average

daily temperature anddaily consumption in the

CalISO area in 2004, and the relationship

between peak demand and average daily maximum temperature over the period 1961–1990

Electricity only

Table A.1 Methods Used in U.S. Studies of the Effects of Climate Change on Engergy Demand in Buildings

74
ANNEX B

ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED

Vicki Arroyo Pew Center

Malcolm Asadoorian Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Kelly Birkinshaw California Energy Commission

Benjamin J. DeAngelo U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Richard Eckaus Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Bill Fang Edison Electric Institute

Guido Franco California Energy Commission

Howard Gruenspecht Energy Information Administration

Jay Gullege Pew Center

Richard C Haut Houston Advanced Research Center

Haroon S. Kheshgi ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Co.

Joe Loper Alliance to Save Energy

Sasha Mackler National Commission on Energy Policy

Victor Niemeyer Electric Power Research Institute

Paul Pike Ameren Corporation

Will Polen U.S. Energy Association

Walt Retzch American Petroleum Institute

Terry Surles University of Hawaii

Tom Wilson Electric Power Research Institute

Laurie ten Hope California Energy Commission

Barry Worthington U.S. Energy Association

Kate Zyla Pew Center

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

75

ANNEX B
76

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Annex B – Organizations and Individuals Consulted
ANNEX C

77

GLOSSARY

A

Adaptation 

In climate change discussions, refers to actions that respond to climate change risks and/or impacts by reducing sensitivity to climate variables and/or increasing

coping capacity

Aerosols 

A substance packaged under pressure with a gaseous

propellant for release as a spray of fine particles

Ambient temperatures 

The temperature of the air surrounding a power supply

or heating/cooling medium

Analytic-deliberative practices 

Combining systematic analysis with processes for collective qualitative consideration of broader issues

Aquifer 

An underground bed or layer of earth, gravel, or porous

stone that yields water

B

Biodiesel

An oxygenated fuel, primarily alkyl (methyl or ethyl)

esters, produced from a range of biomass-derived feedstocks including oilseeds, waste vegetable oils, cooking

oil, animal fats and trap grease, which can be used in

blends or in "neat" form in compression-ignition engines

to reduce emissions and improve engine performance

Btus 

British thermal units, a quantity of energy

Building equipment

Energy-using equipment within a building, such as electric appliances

Building shell

The external envelope of a building, including foundation, floor, walls, windows, outside doors, and roof

Building stock 

The total quantity of buildings in an area or sector of interest

C

Canadian model

A climate change projection model from the Canadian

Climate Change Centre (CGCM1), used in the U.S. National Assessment of Possible Consequences of Climate

Variability and Change (2001)

Cap-and-trade

A market-based system of limiting emissions in which

a limited number of emissions permits are issued in the

aggregate (cap); these permits are then freely exchangeable in markets (trade)

Cellulosic 

Pertaining to cellulose, a constituent of plant tissues and

fibers

Climate change 

Changes in climate that depart from normal variability,

representing significant changes in averages and/or extremes

Climate change impacts 

Effects of climate changes such as temperature change,

precipitation change, severe weather events, and sea

level rise on human and/or natural systems

Climate change related policies 

Public policy interventions in response to concerns

about or impacts of climate change

Climate forcing effect

Increases in certain trace gas molecules in the atmosphere that change the balance between incoming solar

radiation and re-radiation of energy into space, leading

to long-term atmospheric warming

Climate variability 

Changes in climate around averages, not necessarily associated with climate change

Climate-sensitive 

Refers to systems or phenomena whose behavior is noticeably affected by differences in climate

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States
78

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Annex C – Glossary

Closed-cycle cooling

A method of cooling power plants in which water is withdrawn from a body of water, passed through the facility to cool

power-production processes, cooled down in a cooling tower

or similar method, and then reused for cooling

Combined cycle

An electric-power generating method in which combustible

gases are burned in a combustion turbine (topping cycle) and

high-temperature gases from that operation are used to raise

steam that is passed through a steam turbine (bottoming

cycle). Both cycles drive electric generators

D

Delivery forms 

Forms in which energy is delivered to users: solid, liquid,

gaseous, electricity

Demographic 

Related to the size, growth, and distribution of human populations

Discrete-continuous choice models

A family of economic models in which the probability of a

handful of choices (e.g., whether or not to select a particular

heating technology) are modeled mathematically as a function of continuous variables such as income and price

Distribution systems 

Systems for moving energy delivery forms from producers 

to users

E

Econometric 

A field of economics that applies statistical procedures to

mathematical models

Elasticities 

Refers to changes in one variable as the result of changes in

another variable

Empirical 

Derived from observation or experiment, generally implying

quantitative data

Energy consumption

The amount of fuels and electricity (measured in common

units such as British thermal units or Btus) utilized during a

period of time to provide a useful service such as heating,

cooling, or transportation

Energy conversion

Changing energy-bearing substances from one form to another; e.g., petroleum refining or electric power generation

Energy demand

The quantities of energy desired in the marketplace at various

prices.

Energy infrastructure

The capital equipment used to supply energy; e.g., power

plants, refineries, natural gas pipelines, electric power lines

and substations, etc.

Energy intensity

The amount of energy consumed per unit of desired service

Energy markets

Groups of buyers and sellers of energy goods and services and

the institutions that make such exchanges possible

Energy prices

Prices of petroleum and petroleum fuels, natural gas and manufactured gases, coal, uranium fuels, other fuels, and electricity, formed in energy markets via buying and selling processes

Energy production

Extraction, conversion, and transportation of fuels and electricity to ultimate end use

Energy security

Reliable and predictable supplies of fuels and electricity in national markets at stable prices, usually associated with the concerns about reliability of foreign supplies

Energy use

See energy consumption

Ethanol

An alcohol fuel produced chemically from ethylene or biologically from the fermentation of various sugars from carbohydrates found in agricultural crops and cellulosic residues

from crops or wood. Often made from plants such as corn and

typically blended in various proportions with conventional

gasoline to make transportation fuel (gasohol)

Extreme weather events 

Weather events that are infrequent or unusual in their magnitude or intensity
79

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

F

Fossil fuels 

Hydrocarbon fuels derived from fossils: coal, petroleum, natural gas

Fuel types

End-use delivery forms for energy: solid, liquid, gaseous, electricity

G

Gas turbine

A rotary engine that extracts energy from a flow of combustion gas

Global Change Research Act of 1990

An act of the U.S. Congress that established the U.S. Global

Change Research Program and called for periodic assessments

of climate change implications for the U.S.

H

Hadley Centre Model 

A well-known British model for projecting climate change

Heating loads

The amounts of energy necessary to keep the internal temperature in a building above a specific temperature range

Hydropower 

Hydroelectric power, derived from the energy value of running water

I

Indirect effects

Effects derived not from the primary driver of interest but from

effects of that driver on another system, process, or phenomenon

Integrated Resource Planning

An approach to electric utility planning that integrates demand-side planning with supply-side planning 

Intensity 

A measure of concentration, such as the amount of energy

consumed for a particular purpose

K

Knowledge base 

The stock of knowledge about a particular topi

kWh 

Kilowatt hour, a measure of electricity delivered or consumed

L

Likelihood 

A measure of probability and/or level of confidence

Long-run 

The relatively far future

M

Market penetration

The degree to which a new technology or practice enters a

market for a type of equipment or service, usually measured

as a percentage of sales

Market saturation 

The highest percentage of a market that can be captured by a

type of equipment, practice, or process

Mitigation 

In climate change discussions, refers to actions that respond to

concerns about climate change by reducing greenhouse gas

emissions or enhancing sinks

O

Once-through cooling

As distinct from the use of cooling towers, the practice in

power plants of taking in water from a body of water (e.g., a

river), using it to cool the power plant, and releasing the water

back to the body of water after a single pass through the plant

P

Peaking load units 

Electricity supply units designed to respond to demands, often

short-lived, that are significantly above normal base loads

Portfolio standards 

Guidelines or requirements that total electricity supply include

one or more set minimums for particular sources, such as renewable energy

Power plants 

Facilities that produce electricity
80

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Annex C – Glossary

Primary energy

The amount of energy embodied in natural resources (e.g.,

coal, crude petroleum, sunlight) before transformation by humans. Also known as source energy

Projections 

Characterizations of the future, often quantitative either from

extrapolations of historical trends or from models

Prospectus

A formal summary of a proposed venture or project or a document describing the chief features of a proposed activity

Q

Quad 

Quadrillion Btus

Qualitative 

Characterized by units of measure that are not numerical

R

R&D 

Research and development

Renewable energy 

Energy based on resources that are naturally renewed over

time periods equivalent to resource withdrawals

Risk management

Practices followed by companies and individuals to limit exposure to hazards and to limit the consequences of remaining

exposure

S

Scenario 

A characterization of changes in the future, often associated

with quantitative projections of variables of interest

Seasonal 

Pertaining to a season of the year, as in winter or summer

Sectors

Subdivisions of a larger population, most often subdivisions of

an economy such as residential, commercial, and industrial

Shell

See “building shell”

Short-run 

The relatively near future

Simulation models

Mathematical models designed to approximate the performance of a system (e.g., the energy market or the world’s climate) and commonly used to quantitatively forecast elements

of that system’s performance

Site energy consumption

The amount of energy consumed at the point of end use, not

accounting for conversion losses

Solar radiation

The Sun’s radiant energy (in the context of this study) as deposited on the Earth in all wavelengths

Space conditioning 

Human interventions to modify the temperature of built

spaces, including cooling and heating

Space cooling

Space conditioning processes used to reduce the temperature

in built spaces

Space heating

Space conditioning processes used to increase the temperature in built spaces

Spatial scale 

Geographical size

Stakeholders 

Individuals, groups, and/or institutions with a stake in the outcome of a decision-making process

Statistical analysis

Analyzing collected data for the purposes of summarizing information to make it more usable and/or making generalizations about a population based on a sample drawn from that

population

Stochastic

Characterized by risk, randomness, or uncertainty. Random

or probabilistic but with some direction

Strategic Petroleum Reserve 

A U.S. national program and set of facilities to store petroleum as a protection against risks of supply disruptions
81

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

T

Take back

A consumer reaction wherein beneficiaries of cost reductions

from improvement to a technology or process undermine the

improvement by using more of the improved technology or

process; e.g., be setting the thermostat higher when a building

is better insulated and therefore less expensive to heat

Thermal power plant 

A facility that produces electricity from heat

Thermoelectric 

See thermal power plant

Time series 

A series of measurements occurring over a period of time

Transient weather events 

Very short-lived weather happenings (e.g., thunderstorms, tornadoes) as opposed to general, long-term changes in temperature, precipitation, etc.

U

Uncertainties 

Unknowns that limit the completeness of an explanation or

the precision and accuracy of a prediction

Urban form 

The physical configuration and pattern of an urbanized area

Urban heat islands

The semipermanent warming of up to several degrees in urban

areas compared to nearby rural areas, due to density of population, high use of energy, and prevalence of solar energy absorbing and reradiating surfaces such as concrete buildings

and streets

V

Vulnerability 

The degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to

cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of

the character, magnitude, and rate of climate variation to

which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its adaptive capacity
82

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Annex C – Glossary
ANNEX D

83

Effects of Climate Change on Energy Production and Use in the United States

ACRONYMS

API American Petroleum Institute

ASHRAE American Society of Heating, 

Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning 

Engineers

AWEA American Wind Energy Association

BEAMS a building energy simulation model

CALPAS a building energy simulation model

CBECS Commercial Building Energy 

Consumption Survey

CCSP Climate Change Science Program

CCTP Climate Change Technology Program

CDD cooling degree days

CDM Clean Development Mechanism 

CEPA California Environmental Protection 

Agency

CO2 carbon dioxide

CRIEPI Japanese Central Research Institute of 

Electric Power Industry

DD-NEMS an energy system model based on 

NEMS (see below)

DOC U.S. Department of Commerce

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOE-2 building energy simulation software

DOI U.S. Department of the Interior

DOT U.S. Department of Transportation

EIA Energy Information Administration

EPA Environmental Protection Agency

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

FEDS a building energy simulation model

GCM General Circulation Model of the earth’s 

atmosphere

GHG greenhouse gas(es)

GOM Gulf of Mexico

GW gigawatt

GWh gigawatt/hour

HADCM3 Hadley Center Coupled GCM Model, 

Version 3

HDD heating degree days

HVAC heating, ventilating, and air conditioning

ICF an international consulting firm 

in Washington, DC

IEA International Energy Agency

IGCC integrated gasification combined cycle

IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on 

Climate Change 

ITC investment tax credit

JIP Joint Industry Program

LNG liquefied natural gas

MMS U.S. Minerals Management Service

MW megawatt 

NACC U.S. National Assessment of Implications 

of Climate Variability and Change

NARUC National Association of Regulatory Utility 

Commissioners

NCAR National Center for Atmospheric Research

NEMS National Energy Modeling System 

(Energy Information Administration)

NGCC natural gas combined cycle

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NREL National Renewable Energy Laboratory

NSTC National Science and Technology Council
84

ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory

PAD Petroleum Administration for Defense

PCM parallel climate model

PTC production tax credit

PV photovoltaic

RECS Residential Energy Consumption Survey

RGGI Regional greenhouse gas initiative

SAP Synthesis and Assessment Product

SAP 4.5 Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.5 

(this document)

TRU Trailer Refrigeration Units

USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture

USGS U.S. Geological Survey

WWF World Wildlife Fund

The U.S. Climate Change Science Program Annex D – Acronyms
CONTACT INFORMATION

CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH

Global Change Research Information Office

c/o Climate Change Science Program Office

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Suite 250

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202-223-6262 (voice)

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The Climate Change Science Program incorporates

the U.S. Global Change Research Program and the

Climate Change Research Initiative.

To obtain a copy of this document, place an order at

the Global Change Research Information Office

(GCRIO) web site: http://www.gcrio.org/orders

William J. Brennan, Chair

Department of Commerce

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Acting Director, Climate Change Science Program

Jack Kaye, Vice Chair

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Allen Dearry

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Jerry Elwood

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Mary Glackin

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Patricia Gruber

Department of Defense

William Hohenstein

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Linda Lawson

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Mark Myers

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Jarvis Moyers

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Patrick Neale 

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Jacqueline Schafer

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Joel Scheraga

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Harlan Watson

Department of State

Executive Office 

and other Liaisons

Melissa Brandt

Office of Management and Budget

Stephen Eule

Department of Energy

Director, Climate Change Technology Program

Katharine Gebbie

National Institute of Standards & Technology

Margaret McCalla

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Bob Rainey

Council on Environmental Quality

Gene Whitney

Office of Science and Technology Policy
U.S. Climate Change Science Program

1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW • Suite 250 • Washington, D.C. 20006 USA

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