United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to the Subcommittee on 

Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate 

SPACE 

ACQUISITIONS 

DOD Is Making 

Progress to Rapidly 

Deliver Low Cost 

Space Capabilities, 

but Challenges 

Remain 

April 2008 

 

GAO-08-516 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2008

SPACE ACQUISITIONS

DOD Is Making Progress to Rapidly Deliver Low Cost 

Space Capabilities, but Challenges Remain 

Highlights of GAO-08-516, a report to the 

Subommittee on Strategic Forces,

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. 

Senate 

The Department of Defense (DOD)

invests heavily in space assets to 

provide the warfighter with 

intelligence, navigation, and other 

information critical to conducting 

military operations. In fiscal year 

2008 alone, DOD expects to spend 

over $22 billion dollars on space 

systems. Despite this investment, 

senior military commanders have

reported shortfalls in tactical space

capabilities in each recent major 

conflict over the past decade. 

To provide short-term tactical 

capabilities as well as identify and 

implement long-term solutions to 

developing low cost satellites, DOD 

initiated operationally responsive

space (ORS). Following a 2006

GAO review of ORS, the Congress 

directed DOD to submit a report 

that sets forth a plan for providing 

quick acquisition of low cost space 

capabilities. 

This report focuses on the status of 

DOD’s progress in responding to 

the Congress and is based on

GAO’s review and analyses of ORS 

documentation and interviews with 

DOD and industry officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the 

Secretary of the Air Force develop

an investment plan—approved by

stakeholders—that identifies how 

to achieve future capabilities, 

establishes funding priorities, and 

implements mechanisms to

measure progress. DOD concurred 

with the recommendation.

Since GAO last reported on DOD’s ORS efforts in 2006, the department has 

taken several steps toward establishing a program management structure for 

ORS and executing research and development efforts. On the programmatic 

side, DOD provided Congress with a plan that lays out an organizational 

structure and defines the responsibilities of the newly created Joint ORS 

Office, and describes an approach for satisfying warfighters’ needs. DOD has 

also begun staffing the office. On the research and development side, DOD has 

launched one of its TacSat satellites—small experimental satellites intended 

to quickly provide a capability that meets an identified need within available 

resources—and has begun developing several others. It has also made 

progress in developing interface standards for satellite buses—the platform 

that provides power, altitude, temperature control, and other support to the 

satellite in space—and continued its sponsorship of efforts aimed at acquiring 

low cost launch vehicles. Despite this progress, it is too early to determine the 

overall success of these efforts because most are still in their initial phases. 

Achieving success in ORS will be challenging. With relatively modest 

resources, the Joint ORS Office must quickly respond to the warfighter’s 

urgent needs, while continuing research and development efforts that are 

necessary to help reduce the cost and time of future space acquisitions. As it 

negotiates these priorities, the office will need to coordinate its efforts with a 

broad array of programs and agencies in the science and technology, 

acquisition, and operational communities. Historically, it has been difficult to 

transition programs from the science and technology environment to the 

acquisition and operational environment. At this time, DOD lacks a plan that 

lays out how it will direct its investments to meet current operational needs 

while pursuing innovative approaches and new technologies. 

 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-516. 

For more information, contact. 

Cristina Chaplain, (202) 512-4859,

chaplainc@gao.gov
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2

Background 3

DOD Has Made Progress to Develop a Management Structure and 

Build a Technological Foundation for ORS 4 

ORS Challenges Magnified by Lack of a Plan to Guide Investments 

and Efforts 10 

Conclusions 12

Recommendation for Executive Action 13 

Agency Comments 13 

Scope and Methodology 13 

Appendix I Comment from the Department of Defense 15 

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 16 

Tables 

Table 1: Status of Efforts to Develop a Management Structure by 

Action 5

Table 2: Status of Efforts to Develop and Demonstrate TacSat 

Experimental Satellites 7 

Table 3: Status of Efforts to Develop and Test Satellite Interface 

and Bus Standards 8 

Table 4: Efforts to Develop a Launch Infrastructure 10 

Page i GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Abbreviations 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Project Agency 

DOD Department of Defense 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

ORS operationally responsive space 

SpaceX Space Explorations Technologies 

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reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 25, 2008

The Honorable Bill Nelson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Bill Nelson 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jeff Sessions 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing heavily in large, complex 

satellites and other space assets to provide the warfighter with 

communications, intelligence, navigation, missile-warning, and other 

information critical to conducting military operations. In fiscal year 2008 

alone, DOD expects to spend over $22 billion dollars to develop and 

procure satellites and other space systems. Yet, for the past two decades,

major satellite programs have been beset with significant cost overruns 

and schedule delays. Moreover, in each major conflict over the past 

decade, senior military commanders reported shortfalls in tactical space 

capabilities, such as those intended to provide communications and 

imagery data to the warfighter in theater. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) is investing heavily in large, complex 

satellites and other space assets to provide the warfighter with 

communications, intelligence, navigation, missile-warning, and other 

information critical to conducting military operations. In fiscal year 2008 

alone, DOD expects to spend over $22 billion dollars to develop and 

procure satellites and other space systems. Yet, for the past two decades,

major satellite programs have been beset with significant cost overruns 

and schedule delays. Moreover, in each major conflict over the past 

decade, senior military commanders reported shortfalls in tactical space 

capabilities, such as those intended to provide communications and 

imagery data to the warfighter in theater. 

To help address these issues, DOD recently initiated an effort known as 

operationally responsive space (ORS). The ORS initiative encompasses 

several separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical

capabilities as well as identifying and implementing long-term technology 

and design solutions to reduce the cost and time of developing and 

delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. More specifically, these 

include developing and launching small-size satellites, acquiring lower cost 

launch systems, developing standardized satellite components, as well as 

exploring a variety of new common design techniques. Though DOD has 

tried to make space acquisition more responsive in the past, the current 

ORS initiative is a concerted effort to create an environment where new 

concepts and ideas can be fostered and transitioned to users. 

To help address these issues, DOD recently initiated an effort known as 

operationally responsive space (ORS). The ORS initiative encompasses 

several separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical

capabilities as well as identifying and implementing long-term technology 

and design solutions to reduce the cost and time of developing and 

delivering simpler satellites in greater numbers. More specifically, these 

include developing and launching small-size satellites, acquiring lower cost 

launch systems, developing standardized satellite components, as well as 

exploring a variety of new common design techniques. Though DOD has 

tried to make space acquisition more responsive in the past, the current 

ORS initiative is a concerted effort to create an environment where new 

concepts and ideas can be fostered and transitioned to users. 

We reviewed aspects of the ORS initiative in 2006 and concluded that DOD 

needed a departmentwide strategy for pursuing low cost, responsive 

tactical capabilities—both satellite and launch—for the warfighter, and to 

We reviewed aspects of the ORS initiative in 2006 and concluded that DOD 

needed a departmentwide strategy for pursuing low cost, responsive 

tactical capabilities—both satellite and launch—for the warfighter, and to 

Page 1 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
identify corresponding funding.1

 Subsequently, the Congress directed DOD 

to submit a report that sets forth a plan for providing quick acquisition of 

low cost space capabilities.2

 Given the potential these efforts offer for 

changing the way DOD acquires and fields space capabilities, you asked us

to report on the status of DOD’s progress to date in implementing the 

program and assessing associated challenges. We also reviewed DOD’s 

development of a higher level strategy to guide the ORS initiative, an

action that we reported separately to you in March 2008. Further, we are 

reviewing ORS’ requirements setting process and its integration into 

warfighting concepts of operation, which we will report on later in June 

2008.

3

To conduct our work for this report, we reviewed and analyzed ORS 

documentation and interviewed officials representing the ORS initiative as

well as officials from the warfighting, acquisition, science, and technology 

communities and industry. We conducted this performance audit from 

May 2007 to February 2008 in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DOD is making progress in putting a program management structure in 

place for ORS as well as executing ORS-related research and development 

efforts. On the programmatic side, DOD provided Congress with a plan 

that lays out an organizational structure and defines the responsibilities of 

the newly created Joint ORS Office, and describes an approach for 

satisfying warfighters’ needs. DOD has also begun staffing the office. On 

the research and development side, DOD has launched one of its smallsized satellites and begun developing several others, made progress in 

developing interface standards for satellite buses, and continued its 

Results in Brief 

 1

 GAO, Space Acquisitions: DOD Needs a Departmentwide Strategy for Pursuing LowCost, Responsive Tactical Space Capabilities, GAO-06-449 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14,

2006). 

2

 The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 

109-364, § 913(c) (2006). 

3

 GAO, Defense Space Activities: National Security Space Strategy Needed to Guide 

Future DOD Space Efforts, GAO-08-431R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2008). 

Page 2 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
sponsorship of efforts aimed at acquiring low cost launch vehicles. It is too 

early to determine how successful these efforts will be because most are 

still in their initial stages.

As DOD moves forward, it will be challenged on many fronts as ORS is 

expected to execute a range of efforts within relatively modest resources 

and amid competing demands and pressure to produce quick results. For 

example, rapid development and deployment of small satellites is being 

currently considered as a potential solution for various capability gaps 

that may occur because of schedule delays on larger acquisition programs. 

But concentrating efforts to fill just one gap could be relatively expensive 

and time consuming for the ORS initiative and divert resources from other 

ORS efforts. For example, some officials we spoke with asserted that not 

enough attention was being paid to acquiring low cost launch vehicles—a 

linchpin to reducing satellite development costs in the future. At this time, 

DOD currently lacks tools needed to negotiate these challenges—

primarily, a plan that lays out how it will direct its investments to meet 

existing gaps while at the same time pursuing innovative approaches and

new technologies to rapidly respond to future warfighter needs. To help 

DOD successfully negotiate this challenge, we are recommending that 

DOD develop an investment plan. 

In May 2003, the Office of Force Transformation began funding small 

experimental satellites to enhance the responsiveness to the warfighter 

and to create a new business model for developing and employing space 

systems.4

 As we have reported over the past two decades, DOD’s space 

portfolio has been dominated by larger space system acquisitions, which 

have taken longer, cost more, and delivered fewer quantities and 

capabilities than planned.5

 The ORS initiative is a considerable departure 

from DOD’s large space acquisition approach. The initiative aims to 

quickly deliver low cost, short-term tactical capabilities to address unmet

needs of the warfighter. Unlike traditional large satellite programs, the 

ORS initiative is intended to address only a small number of unmet tactical 

needs—one or two—with each delivery of capabilities. It is not designed 

to replace current satellite capabilities or major space programs in 

Background 

 4

 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (September 2001). 

5

 GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Systems Acquisitions and 

Keys to Achieving Them, GAO-06-626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
development. Also, the initiative potentially aims to identify and facilitate 

ways to reduce the time and cost for all future space development efforts. 

As we have previously reported, managing requirements so that their 

development is matched with resources offers an opportunity to mature 

technologies in the science and technology environment—a best 

acquisition practice.6

 We also have reported that the ORS initiative could 

provide opportunities for small companies—who often have a high 

potential to introduce novel solutions and innovations into space 

acquisitions—to compete for DOD contracts. Consolidations within the 

defense industrial base for space programs have made it difficult for such

companies to compete. ORS could broaden the defense industrial base and 

thereby promote competition and innovation. 

Since we last reported on DOD’s ORS efforts in 2006, the department has 

taken several steps toward establishing a program management structure 

for ORS and executing research and development efforts. Despite this 

progress, it is too early to determine the overall success of these efforts 

because most are still in their initial phases. 

Congress directed that DOD submit a report that sets forth a plan for the 

quick acquisition of low cost space capabilities and establish a Joint ORS 

Office to coordinate and manage the ORS initiative. In the first half of 

2007, DOD delivered an ORS plan to Congress and established a Joint ORS 

Office. DOD created the Joint ORS Office to coordinate and manage 

specific science and technology efforts to fulfill joint military operational 

requirements for on-demand space support and reconstitution. In addition, 

DOD is working with other government agencies to staff the office, 

developing an implementation plan, and establishing a process for 

determining which existing requirements for short-term tactical 

capabilities the office should pursue. Responsiveness is an attribute 

desired by the entire space community, including the National Aeronautics 

DOD Has Made 

Progress to Develop a 

Management 

Structure and Build a 

Technological 

Foundation for ORS 

Program Management 

Structure 

 6

 GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology Transition 

Processes, GAO-06-883 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2006). 

Page 4 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
and Space Administration and the military service laboratories. Most of 

the efforts under the ORS initiative are being executed by science and 

technology organizations and other DOD agencies. The office will be 

responsible for coordinating, planning, acquiring, and transitioning those 

efforts. Its work is to be guided by an executive committee, comprised of 

senior officials from DOD, the military services, the intelligence 

community, and other government agencies. Most requirements for 

needed short-term tactical capabilities are expected to come through the 

U.S. Strategic Command. To respond to unmet warfighter needs, ORS 

requirements will be based on existing validated requirements. Table 1 

summarizes the status of some of DOD’s efforts related to the 

management structure. 

Table 1: Status of Efforts to Develop a Management Structure by Action

Status Description

Deliver a plan to Congress as required by the 2007 National Defense Authorization Act 

Completed; DOD submitted the plan in 

April 2007 

• The plan identifies a general approach for establishing the responsive space initiative and 

establishes an office to coordinate and execute ORS activities. 

• The Joint ORS Office, located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 

was officially activated in May 2007. 

Staff the Joint ORS Office 

In progress; 8 of the 20 expected 

government positions have been filled 

as of February 2008. 

• The office is to be staffed with up to 20 government (military and civilian) positions to be

provided by the various military services and agencies associated with responsive space 

activities. 

• As of February 1, 2008, 8 government positions were staffed by personnel from the United

States Air Force, Army, and Navy; the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the 

National Reconnaissance Office; the National Security Agency; the Air National Guard; 

and Sandia Laboratory. 

• Additional support is being provided by 14 Federally Funded Research and Development

Centersa

 and Systems Engineering and Technical Assistanceb contractors. 

Develop an implementation plan

In progress; the plan is expected to be 

approved in February 2008 

• In July 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Executive Agent for Space to 

develop an implementation plan that describes how the office will deliver existing space 

capabilities, evolve new capabilities, and leverage innovative approaches to meet 

requirements identified by the U.S. Strategic Command. 

• DOD established a working group with five subgroups tasked with making

recommendations on requirements, acquisitions, manpower, lead service, and executive 

committee. One of the subgroups is tasked with developing a charter for the Executive 

Committee that would define the roles and responsibilities of the committee members from 

the various and diverse agencies. 

Page 5 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Status Description

Establish a requirements process 

In progress • ORS requirements are to be based on existing but unsatisfied validated requirements to 

respond to combatant commanders’ needs. The Joint ORS Office received a request from 

U.S. Strategic Command to develop a communications capability that cannot be satisfied

by the current ultra high frequency system. The requested capability falls within the 

validated requirements set for the Mobile User Objective System, currently under 

development.c

 

Source: DOD data and GAO analysis. 

a

Federally Funded Research and Development Centers conduct research for the U.S. government. 

b

Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance contractors are civilian employees of government 

contractors who are contracted to assist DOD components and acquisition programs. 

c

The Navy’s Mobile User Objective System is expected to provide low data rate voice and data 

communications capable of penetrating most weather, foliage, and man-made structures beginning in 

late 2009. 

Research and 

Development Efforts 

DOD is continuing to make progress in developing TacSats—its small 

experimental satellite projects. In addition, DOD is funding research 

efforts by industry to facilitate the development of future capabilities and 

is working with industry and academia to develop standards for building 

satellite components. Finally, DOD is working to improve the capabilities 

of existing small launch vehicles and providing some funding for future 

launch vehicles. 

The TacSat experiments aim to quickly provide the warfighter with a 

capability that meets an identified need within available resources—time, 

funding, and technology. Limiting the TacSats’ scope allows DOD to trade 

off higher reliability and performance7

 for speed, responsiveness, 

convenience, and customization. Once each TacSat satellite is launched, 

DOD plans to test its level of utility to the warfighter in theater. If military 

utility is established, DOD will assess the acquisition plan required to 

procure and launch numerous TacSats—forming constellations—to 

provide wider coverage over a specific theater. As a result, each satellite’s 

capability does not need to be as complex as that of DOD’s larger satellites 

and does not carry with it the heightened consequence of failure as if each

satellite alone were providing total coverage. DOD currently has five 

TacSat experiments in different stages of development (see table 2). 

Development of Small-Sized 

Satellites 

 7

 Existing systems have been designed for longer life and increased reliability, requiring 

years to develop and a significant investment of resources. 

Page 6 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Table 2: Status of Efforts to Develop and Demonstrate TacSat Experimental Satellites 

Status Description

TacSat 1 

In progress; satellite has been developed 

but not demonstrated. 

• The Naval Research Laboratory led a year-long effort to develop TacSat 1, at a cost 

of $23 million. 

• TacSat 1 was completed in May 2004, but has yet to be demonstrated because of 

delays incurred with the development and testing of a low cost launch vehicle. 

• Given the launch delay, the Naval Research Laboratory decided to add a new 

sensor—an automated identification system to support maritime missions. The new 

sensor and other new capabilities are estimated to cost $10.5 million. 

• The Joint ORS Office, the Navy, Coast Guard, and Department of Defense Research 

and Engineering are currently working to develop a cost sharing agreement. 

TacSat 2 

Complete; satellite developed and 

demonstrated in 2006 through 2007. 

• TacSat 2 development, led by the Air Force Research Laboratory, was completed in 

29 months at a cost of $39 million. 

• Its payload includes tactical imaging and radio frequency equipment, and an 

automated identification sensor. 

• TacSat 2 was launched in December 2006 on a Minotaur I launch vehicle and 

participated in military exercises during the summer of 2007.

• The Air Force Research Laboratory ended the demonstration in December 2007. 

TacSat 3 

In progress; satellite expected to be 

launched in August 2008. 

• The Air Force Research Laboratory is leading the effort to develop TacSat 3 which 

will provide the first implementation of selected bus standards. 

• Its primary payload is a hyperspectral imager for tactical targeting of camouflaged 

and hard-to-detect targets. 

• The cost is estimated to be $62.7 million, and the planned launch date is August 

2008 on a Minotaur I launch vehicle. 

TacSat 4 

In progress; expected to be launched in 

September 2009. 

• The Naval Research Laboratory is leading the effort to develop TacSat 4, which will 

include equipment to demonstrate mobile data communications services, friendly 

forces tracking, and data relay from terrestrial sensor. 

• It will also evaluate the DOD system bus standards effort in a realistic launch-andflight operations environment.

• The cost is estimated to be $114 million, and the planned launch date is September 

2009 on a Minotaur IV launch vehicle. 

TacSat 5 

In progress; launch date to be determined. • The Army Space and Missile Defense Center, the Joint ORS Office, the Air Force 

Research Laboratory, and Space and Missile Systems Center will lead the

development of TacSat 5. 

• Payload experiments have not been finalized.

• The cost and schedule are to be determined. 

Source: DOD data. 

In addition, DOD is sponsoring the development of new capabilities 

provided mostly by the small satellite industry. These efforts include the 

Page 7 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
ORS Payload Technology Initiative, which awarded 15 contracts to 

satellite industry contractors for payload technology concepts that may be 

developed in the future. The Air Force has been funding additional 

research conducted by small technology companies that could provide 

ORS capabilities, such as faster ways of designing satellites, and 

identifying the types and characteristics of components based on mission

requirements. 

DOD is also working to establish standards for the “bus”—the platform 

that provides power, attitude, temperature control, and other support to 

the satellite in space.8

 Establishing interface standards for bus 

development would allow DOD to create a “plug and play” approach to 

building satellites—similar to the way personal computers are built. 

According to DOD officials, interface standards would allow the 

development of modular or common components and would facilitate 

building satellites—both small and large—more quickly and at a lower 

cost. DOD’s service laboratories, industry, and academia have made 

significant progress to develop satellite bus standards. The service labs 

expect to test some standardized components on the TacSat 3 bus and 

system standards on the TacSat 4 bus. Table 3 provides a description of 

the bus standardization efforts and their status. 

Efforts to Develop and Test 

Satellite Interface and Bus 

Standards 

Table 3: Status of Efforts to Develop and Test Satellite Interface and Bus Standards 

Status Description

Demonstrate “plug and play” architecture 

In progress. • The Air Force Research Laboratory is demonstrating capabilities of a “plug and play” 

architecture that accelerates satellite production through the use of standardized

computer-like ports to connect standardized components. 

• For example, the Air Force Research Laboratory is developing standard bus panels 

with an embedded wiring system and standard ports for easy assembly and

integration. 

Determine class of ORS satellites needed 

Complete; report issued in March 2005. • This effort, led by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory, 

determined the class of satellite needed to be militarily useful. 

Develop interface standards, and develop TacSat 3 bus

In progress. • This effort, being led by the Air Force Research Laboratory, is to provide interface 

standards between the bus and the payload, and to rapidly provide a bus for the 

TacSat 3 hyperspectral payload experiment. 

 8

 Satellites primarily consist of the payload and the bus. Currently, DOD’s buses are 

custom-made for each space program. 

Page 8 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Status Description

Develop bus standards for initial blocks of operational satellites, and transition plan

In progress. • This effort, being led by the Naval Research Laboratory and the John Hopkins 

University Applied Physics Laboratory, is using a broad consortium of industry and 

government members to develop bus standards along with the associated costs and 

business considerations for acquisition. 

• The consortium is also working to develop a plan that explains how to transition from 

a science and technology environment to an acquisition phase. The transition plan is 

in final coordination within DOD. 

Acquire initial standardized satellite buses

Slated to begin after bus standards have 

been developed. 

• This effort, to be carried out by the Joint ORS Office, will be the acquisition of the 

initial block of standard satellite buses. 

Source: DOD data. 

Launch Infrastructure To get new tactical space capabilities to the warfighter sooner, DOD must 

secure a small, low cost launch vehicle on demand. Current alternatives 

include Minotaur launch vehicles, ranging in cost from about $21 million 

to $28 million, and an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle—DOD’s 

primary satellite launch vehicles—at an average cost of roughly $65 

million (for medium and intermediate launchers). DOD is looking to small 

launch vehicles, unlike current systems, that could be launched in days, if

not hours, and whose cost would better match the small budgets of 

experiments. Both DOD and private industry are working to develop small,

low cost, on-demand launch vehicles. Notably, DOD expects the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) FALCON launch program 

to flight-test hypersonic technologies and be capable of launching small 

satellites such as TacSats. In addition to securing low cost launch vehicles, 

DOD plans to acquire a more responsive, reliable, and affordable launch 

tracking system to complement the existing launch infrastructure. Table 4 

describes DOD’s efforts to develop a launch infrastructure and their 

status. 

Page 9 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Table 4: Efforts to Develop a Launch Infrastructure 

Status Description

Develop low cost launch vehicles through DOD’s FALCON program 

In progress. • DARPA, along with the Air Force, established FALCON, to accelerate efforts to 

develop a vehicle that can send 1,000 pounds to low-earth orbit for less than $5

million with an operational cost basis of 20 flights per year for 10 years. 

• DARPA contracted with Space Exploration Technologies (SpaceX) to develop a twostage vehicle for launches into space. According to DOD, SpaceX completed its 

activity for the FALCON program with a test launch of their rocket in March 2007. 

• For fiscal year 2008, the Appropriations conferees encouraged ORS to continue to 

work with the FALCON program to develop a small launch vehicle. Another SpaceX 

flight demonstration is expected to occur in mid 2008. 

• According to DARPA, between fiscal years 2003 and 2007, it provided SpaceX with a 

total of more than $15.6 million dollars for advanced technology development, 

facilities, test-range and mission support, and program office support. 

Develop new launch vehicle capabilities through the Air Force Research Laboratory 

In progress. • The Air Force Research Laboratory continues its work on spacecraft payload shock 

protection and noise reduction technologies during launch. 

• The laboratory has developed technologies to reduce vibration in launch vehicles that 

have been used on the Minotaurs. 

• The laboratory has also funded science and technology research on solid rocket 

motors. 

Develop other elements that support responsive launch systems 

In progress • In September 2006, the DOD Executive Agent for Space signed a memorandum 

stating that by January 1, 2011, all DOD, civil, and commercial vehicles launched will 

need to be tracked through use of the Global Positioning System.a

 The DOD 

Executive Agent for Space sees this as the first logical step towards a space-based 

control system that is more responsive, reliable, and affordable than the current 

terrestrially based system. 

Source: DOD data. 

a

The Global Positioning System is a space-based radio-positioning system nominally consisting of a 

24-satellite constellation providing navigation and timing data to military and civilian users worldwide. 

DOD faces several challenges in succeeding in its ORS efforts. With 

relatively modest resources, the Joint ORS Office must quickly respond to

the warfighter’s urgent needs, including gaps in capabilities, as well as 

continue its longer-term research and development efforts that are 

necessary to help reduce the cost and time of future space acquisitions. As 

the office negotiates these priorities, it will need to coordinate its efforts 

with a broad array of programs and agencies in the science and 

technology, acquisition, and operational communities. Historically it has 

been difficult to transition programs initiated in the science and 

technology environment to the acquisition and operational environment. 

At this time, DOD lacks tools which would help the program office 

navigate within this environment—primarily, a plan that lays out how the 

ORS Challenges 

Magnified by Lack of 

a Plan to Guide 

Investments and 

Efforts

Page 10 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
office will direct its investments to meet current operational needs while 

at the same time pursuing innovative approaches and new technologies. 

The Joint ORS Office has a budget totaling about $646 million for fiscal 

years 2008 through 2013 and with no more than 20 government staff. These 

resources are relatively modest when compared with the resources 

provided major space programs. For example, the ORS fiscal year 2008 

budget represents less than 12 percent of the budget of the

Transformational Satellite Communications System program9

 which is in 

the concept development phase, and staffing is about a quarter of that 

program’s staff. While the Joint ORS Office’s responsibilities are not the 

same as those of large, complex acquisition programs, it is expected to 

address urgent tactical needs that have not been met by the larger space 

programs. At this time, for example, the office has been asked to develop a 

solution to meet current communications shortfalls that cannot be met by

the current Ultra High Frequency Follow-On satellite system.10 And, while 

the office has not yet been asked, officials have told us that ORS could 

potentially satisfy a gap in early missile warning capabilities because of 

delays in the Space Based Infrared Systems program, as well as gaps in 

communications and navigation capabilities. Taking on any one of these 

efforts will be challenging for ORS as there are constraints in available 

technologies, time, money, and other resources that can be used to fill 

capability gaps. 

At the same time, the Joint ORS Office will be pressured to continue to 

sponsor longer term research and development efforts. According to the 

Air Force Research Laboratory, the average cost of a small satellite is 

about $87 million. This is substantially higher than the target acquisition 

cost of about $40 million for an integrated ORS satellite in the 2007 

National Defense Authorization Act.11 In addition, concerns are being 

expressed that not enough funding and support are being devoted to 

acquiring low cost launch capabilities. Some government and industry 

officials believe that achieving such capabilities is a linchpin to reducing 

satellite development costs in the future. The current alternatives for 

launching ORS satellites—an Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle and 

 9

 The Air Force’s Transformational Satellite Communications System is expected to

provide high data rate military satellite communications services to DOD users. 

10 This system is expected to be replaced by the Navy’s Mobile User Objective System. 

11 The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L.No. 

109-364 § 913(b)(1)(2006)(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2273a(e)(5)). 

Page 11 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Minotaur launch vehicles—do not meet DOD’s low cost goal. DARPA 

expects its responsive launch capabilities, currently in development, will 

total about $5 million to produce—a significantly lower cost than that of 

current capabilities. However, in order to achieve the lower cost launch 

capability, DOD will have to continue to fund research beyond the $15.6 

million already spent on advanced technology development, facilities, testrange and mission support, and program office support. 

To execute both its short- and long-term efforts, the Joint ORS Office will 

also need to gain cooperation and consensus from a diverse array of 

officials and organizations. These include science and technology 

organizations, the acquisition community, the U.S. Strategic Command, the 

intelligence community, and industry. We have previously reported on 

difficulties DOD has encountered in bringing these organizations together,

particularly when it comes to setting requirements for new acquisitions 

and transitioning technologies from the science and technology 

community to acquisition programs. As a new and relatively small 

organization, the Joint ORS Office may well find it does not have the clout 

to gain cooperation and consensus on what short- and long-term projects 

should get the highest priority. 

Despite the significant expectations placed on the Joint ORS Office and 

the challenges it faces, DOD does not have an investment plan to guide its 

ORS decisions. DOD has begun to develop an ORS strategy that is to 

identify the investments needed to achieve future capabilities. However, 

the strategy is not intended to become a formalized investment plan that 

would (1) help DOD identify how to achieve these capabilities, (2) 

prioritize funding, and (3) identify and implement mechanisms to enforce 

the plan. At the same time, there are other science and technology projects 

in DOD’s overall space portfolio competing for the same resources, 

including those focused on discovering and developing technologies and 

materials that could enhance U.S. superiority in space. Further, as DOD’s 

major space acquisition programs continue to experience cost growth and 

schedule delays, DOD could be pressured to divert funds from ORS. We 

have previously recommended that DOD prioritize investments for both its 

acquisitions and science and technology projects—the ORS plan could be

seamlessly woven into an overall DOD investment plan for space. 

However, DOD has yet to develop this overall investment plan. 

Providing the warfighter with needed space capabilities in a fiscally 

constrained and rapidly changing technological environment is a daunting 

task. ORS provides DOD with a unique opportunity to work outside the 

Conclusions 

Page 12 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
typical acquisition channels to more quickly and less expensively deliver 

these capabilities. However, even at lower costs, pressure on ORS funding 

will come in DOD’s competition for its resources. As DOD moves forward, 

decisions on using constrained resources to meet competing demand will 

need to be made and reevaluated on a continuing basis. Until DOD 

develops an investment plan, it will risk forgoing an opportunity to get 

continuing success out of the ORS initiative. 

To better ensure that DOD meets the ORS initiative’s goal, we recommend 

that the Secretary of the Air Force develop an investment plan to guide the 

Joint ORS Office as it works to meet urgent needs and develops a 

technological foundation to meet future needs. The plan should be 

approved by the stakeholders and identify how to achieve future 

capabilities, establish funding priorities, and identify and implement 

mechanisms to ensure progress is being achieved.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. DOD 

concurred with our findings and our recommendation but clarified that the 

Secretary of the Air Force, specifically the Executive Agent for Space, 

would be responsible for developing an investment plan since the Under 

Secretary of the Air Force position is vacant. Full comments can be found

in appendix I. 

To assess DOD’s progress to date in implementing its ORS goal and 

addressing associated challenges, we interviewed and reviewed 

documents from officials in Washington, D.C., at the Office of the Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense for Advanced Systems and Concepts; National 

Security Space Office; Office of the Director of Defense Research and 

Engineering; Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation;

Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory; and

the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 

Development and Acquisition. We also interviewed and reviewed 

documents from officials in Virginia at the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Networks Information and Integration; Office of

the Under Secretary of the Air Force; Defense Advanced Research Project

Agency; and U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. In addition, 

we interviewed and reviewed documents from officials at the Navy 

Blossom Point Satellite Tracking Facility in Maryland; Air Force Space 

Command, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado; Space and Missile Systems 

Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, California; the U.S. Strategic 

Command, Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska; and the Air Force Research 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action 

Agency Comments 

Scope and 

Methodology 

Page 13 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Laboratory and Joint Operationally Responsive Space Office, Kirtland Air 

Force Base, New Mexico. We also interviewed officials from the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C., and industry 

representatives involved in developing small satellites and commercial 

launch vehicles. We reviewed and analyzed the documents that we 

received. 

We will send copies of the letter to the Department of Defense and other 

interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available 

to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 

charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions on matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-4859 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. Principal contributors to this 

report were Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Maria Durant; Jean Harker; 

Arturo Holguin; and Karen Sloan. 

Cristina Chaplain 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 14 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Appendix I: Comment from the Department of Defense Appendix I: Comment from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 15 GAO-08-516 Space Acquisitions
Appendix II: 

St

GAO Contact and 

aff Acknowledgments

Page 16 GAO-08-516

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Cristina Chaplain (202) 512-4859 or chaplainc@gao.gov

In addition, key contributors to the report include Maria Durant, Art 

Gallegos, Jean Harker, Arturo Holguin, and Karen Sloan.

Contact 

Acknowledgments 

(120648) Space Acquisitions
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