NO. 4-03-0351

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

          Plaintiff-Appellee,

          v.

ANTHONY W. BARTIMO,

          Defendant-Appellant.	)

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)	  Appeal from

  Circuit Court of 

  Woodford County

  No. 02CF24

  Honorable

  Charles M. Feeney,

  Judge Presiding.

________________________________________________________________

		JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:

		In March 2002, the State charged defendant, Anthony W.

Bartimo, with unlawful possession of a controlled substance,

unlawful use of a weapon, and unlawful possession of cannabis. 

In July 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the

trial court denied.  In January 2003, the trial court found

defendant guilty of unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful posses

sion of cannabis.  The court denied defendant's posttrial motion

and sentenced him to 24 months' probation on each offense.

		On appeal, defendant argues (1) the trial court erred

in denying his motion to suppress, (2) he was wrongfully con

victed of unlawful use of a weapon, and (3) he received ineffec

tive assistance of counsel.  We affirm.     

I. BACKGROUND

		In March 2002, the State charged defendant by informa

tion with (1) unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720

ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2002)), alleging he knowingly possessed

less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine; (2) unlaw ful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2002)), alleging

he knowingly possessed in a vehicle a 9-millimeter handgun; and

(3) unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(c) (West

2002)), alleging he knowingly possessed more than 10 grams but

less than 30 grams of a substance containing cannabis.

		In July 2002, defendant filed a motion to suppress

evidence, alleging he was illegally seized by an officer for an

expired license plate when the plates were valid as evidenced by

a temporary sticker.  In August 2002, the State dismissed the

unlawful-possession-of-a-substance -containing -cocaine charge.  In

September 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on defen

dant's motion to suppress.  Defendant testified he was driving

his car on March 11, 2002, at about 11 p.m.  He testified his

license plates expired on November 30, 2001, but the "yellow 'T'

sticker" extended them for 120 days.  He received a new set of

license plates a "few days prior to being stopped," and they were

in the backseat of the car when the officer pulled him over.  The

State moved for a directed finding on defendant's motion, which

the trial court denied.

		The State called Woodford County deputy sheriff Shawn

Trent, who testified he observed a black Audi on March 11, 2002,

and he ran the registration plate on the vehicle.  A dispatcher

advised him the registration expired in November 2001.  Prior to

stopping the vehicle, Deputy Trent observed a November 2001

sticker on the back of the license plate.  He then stopped the

vehicle to investigate the status of the plates.  After shining his spotlight on defendant's vehicle, he noticed a temporary

registration sticker.  At the time of the stop, he was unaware of

how long a "T" sticker was valid.  The trial court found Deputy

Trent had a "good-faith basis" to stop the vehicle because of the

expired plates and denied defendant's motion.

		In January 2003, defendant's bench trial commenced. 

Deputy Trent testified to the expired license plate and his stop

of defendant's vehicle.  Upon approaching the vehicle, Trent

noticed a "hard-cased shotgun or rifle case protruding from the

trunk" and an unzipped soft-sided shotgun or rifle case on the

floorboard of the backseat.  Trent then asked defendant for

identification and he presented a traffic citation in lieu of his

license.  Trent returned to his squad car and checked defendant's

license.  

		Upon returning to defendant's car, Trent noticed

defendant with his hand "behind the passenger seat," which he

later removed.  Deputy Trent then asked defendant if he had any

weapons in the vehicle.  Trent stated defendant appeared "ner

vous" and advised him that he had a rifle in the trunk.  When

asked if he had other firearms in his vehicle, defendant re

sponded "No."  When Deputy Trent asked for defendant's consent to

search the vehicle, defendant "did not respond."  Trent again

asked defendant if he had any weapons in the vehicle.  Appearing

nervous, defendant reached toward "the center console passenger

seat area like he was going to grab an object."  Trent again

asked him about any other weapons, and defendant stated "he had a pistol in the laundry basket on the passenger seat next to him." 

Trent then ordered defendant out of the car to "get him away from

the pistol" and for officer safety.  Trent began searching

defendant, who "reached down towards his waistband consistent

with producing a weapon," and Trent handcuffed him.  A frisk of

defendant for weapons turned up a "wooden dugout," a "one-hitter

pipe," and a "[B]aggie of cannabis" in his pants pocket.  Trent

searched the car and found cannabis and an unloaded 9-millimeter

pistol in a nylon holster and "an ammunition pouch in the front

of the holster with a loaded magazine" in a laundry basket in the

rear seat.  Trent also found a rifle in a case protruding from

the car's trunk area.  

		Defendant testified he uses his 9-millimeter handgun

for target shooting, and he had targets and other similar items

in his car when he was stopped.  He stated he placed the handgun

"all the way to the bottom of the [laundry] basket," and it was

unloaded and in a closed holster.  He testified he could not have

accessed the gun from the driver's seat.  When the officer

returned to his car, defendant had his hand behind the passenger

seat looking for his license plates.  Defendant stated the

holster did not completely cover the gun.  He also admitted

owning the marijuana on his person and in his car.  

		Following closing arguments, the trial court found

defendant guilty of unlawful use of a weapon and unlawful posses

sion of cannabis.  In February 2003, defendant filed a posttrial

motion for a new trial, alleging, inter alia, the State failed to prove him guilty of unlawful use of a weapon beyond a reasonable

doubt and he received ineffective assistance of counsel.  In

March 2003, the trial court denied the motion.  Thereafter, the

court sentenced defendant to 24 months' probation on each offense

along with various fines.  This appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Motion To Suppress

		Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress.  We disagree.

1. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof

		In reviewing a motion to suppress on appeal, mixed

questions of law and fact are presented.  People v. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d 165, 175, 784 N.E.2d 799, 805 (2003).  A trial court's

assessment of witness credibility and factual determinations will

be reversed only if manifestly erroneous.  People v. Anthony, 198 Ill. 2d 194, 200-01, 761 N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (2001).  However, the

ultimate determination of whether the evidence is suppressed is

entitled to de novo review.  See People v. Crane, 195 Ill. 2d 42, 51, 743 N.E.2d 555, 562 (2001).

		On a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant has the

burden of proving the search and seizure were unlawful (725 ILCS

5/114-12 (West 2002)).  "However, once the defendant makes a

prima facie showing of an illegal search and seizure, the burden shifts to the State to produce evidence justifying the intru

sion."  People v. Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2000). 

		Defendant argues the trial court misapplied the eviden

tiary burden.  We disagree.  Defendant testified in support of

his motion to suppress.  After defense counsel indicated no

further evidence would be presented, the State moved for a

directed finding.  The trial court denied the motion, and the

State went forward with its evidence to establish the officer was

justified in his intrusion.  Defendant's claim that the trial

court incorrectly understood the burden has no support in the

record.  The court commented on defendant's burden in the context

of his motion to suppress evidence and consistent with the burden

required of the movant in that instance.  Further, defendant's

claim that his motion for a directed verdict at the close of his presentation of evidence may have been successful if the court

had understood the burden is meritless because it was the State

thatwho moved for a directed finding.  Thus, we find no error.

2. The Traffic Stop

		The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution

guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures."  U.S. Const., amend. IV.  Similarly, the

Illinois Constitution affords citizens with "the right to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers[,] and other possessions

against unreasonable searches, [and] seizures."  Ill. Const.

1970, art. I, §6.  Our supreme court has interpreted the search

and seizure clause of section six6 in a manner consistent with the

United States Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence.  People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 224, 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003). 

		When a police officer observes a driver commit a

traffic violation, the officer is justified in briefly detaining

the driver to investigate the violation.  People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 433, 752 N.E.2d 1078, 1084 (2001).  A temporary detention of an individual during a vehicle stop constitutes a

seizure of his person within the fourth amendment, even if the

stop is brief and for a limited purpose.  Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).  "An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitu

tional imperative that it not be 'unreasonable' under the circum

stances.  As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile

is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe

that a traffic violation has occurred."  Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 95, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.

		"Because a traffic stop is more analogous to

a Terry investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) than to a formal arrest, the

reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed

under Terry principles.  [Citation.]  A Terry analysis involves a dual inquiry: '(1)

"whether the officer's action was justified

at its inception," and (2) "whether it was

reasonably related in scope to the circum stances which justified the interference in

the first place."'  Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, [789 N.E.2d at 266],] quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct.

at 1879."  People v. Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d 7, 13-14, 796 N.E.2d 1024, 1029 (2003).

		In the case sub judice, defendant acknowledges Deputy Trent had probable cause to initiate the traffic stop.  Deputy

Trent received the dispatcher's report that the license plates on

defendant's car were expired.  According to section 3-413(f) of

the Illinois Vehicle Code, "[n]o person shall operate a vehicle

*** upon which is displayed an Illinois registration plate,

plates[,] or registration stickers after the termination of the

registration period for which issued or after the expiration

date

***."  625 ILCS 5/3-413(f) (West 2002).  Thus, the initial stop

of defendant's car was justified.  

							3. Defendant's Arrest

		Under the second prong of the Terry analysis, the length of the detention and the manner in which it was carried

out are considered.  Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 14, 796 N.E.2d at 1029.  The United States Supreme Court has stated "an investi gative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."  Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion).  Upon initiating a minor traffic

stop, a police officer may briefly detain the driver to request his driver's license and determine its validity and, under

certain circumstances, conduct a speedy warrant check.  Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 220, 738 N.E.2d at 1018.  Once a check of a driver's license and any warrant information is completed, "if no

further suspicion is aroused, the traffic stop must cease and the

individual should no longer be detained."  Ortiz, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 220, 738 N.E.2d at 1018.  The police officer should then

issue a warning ticket or citation and allow the driver to

continue on his way.  See People v. Koutsakis, 272 Ill. App. 3d 159, 164, 649 N.E.2d 605, 609 (1995).

		In this case, Deputy Trent testified he stopped defen dant's car for the expired license plates and did not notice the

temporary registration sticker until he shined his spotlight on

the car.  Defendant argues Deputy Trent's reason for stopping him

then no longer existed and further intrusion was unnecessary and

unwarranted.  We find the circumstances warranted Deputy Trent's

approach to defendant's car and the resulting questions put forth

to defendant.  

		In People v. Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d 208, 209, 685 N.E.2d 426, 427 (1997), an officer stopped the defendant's car,

which had no license plates and a "license-applied-for (LAF)

sticker with an unreadable expiration date."  The officer ap

proached the car and determined the LAF sticker on the rear

windshield was valid.  Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 209, 685 N.E.2d at 427.  Upon granting the defendant's motion to suppress,

the trial court found that once the officer determined the LAF sticker was valid, the purpose of the stop was complete and the

officer "could do nothing more than explain to defendant the

reason he had been stopped."  Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 210, 685 N.E.2d at 427.  

		On appeal, the State argued that after the officer had

properly stopped the defendant to check the validity of the LAF

sticker, he could then approach the defendant and request to see

his driver's license.  Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 210, 685 N.E.2d at 427.  This court held that once the officer determined

the LAF sticker was valid, the officer "could then approach

defendant, explain to him why he had been stopped, and ask

defendant to produce his driver's license."  Bradley, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 211, 685 N.E.2d at 428.  

		In People v. Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d 815, 816, 587 N.E.2d 592, 593 (1992), an officer initiated a traffic stop of

the defendant's car for not having any visible registration

plates.  The officer shined his spotlight on the vehicle and

noticed a valid license-applied-for slip in the rear window. 

Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 816, 587 N.E.2d at 593-94.  The officer went to the defendant's car to explain the reason for the

stop, and later events led to the defendant's driving under the

influence (DUI) arrest.  Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 587 N.E.2d at 594.  

		On appeal, the defendant argued that once the officer

determined the LAF form was valid, no justification existed to

detain him further and arrest him for DUI.  Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 587 N.E.2d at 594.  This court held that it 

		"naturally follows that once it was deter

mined that defendant had a valid license-

applied-for form displayed, the officer would

approach the defendant, explain the reason

for the stop, apologize, and advise defendant

he was free to leave.  In so doing, any

observations the officer made may form the

basis of probable cause to arrest the defen

dant for a reason totally unrelated to the

stop."  Adams, 225 Ill. App. 3d at 819, 587 N.E.2d at 595.

		In this case, Deputy Trent observed the temporary

sticker after he stopped the car.  Defendant argues the officer's

suspicion was allayed and no further intrusion was justified.

However, Deputy Trent was not required to drive away and leave

defendant wondering why the stop had been initiated in the first

place.  Instead, Trent could approach defendant's vehicle to

further inspect the "T" sticker, explain the reason for the stop,

apologize, and advise defendant he was free to leave.   

  		Moreover, the fact that Deputy Trent did not know the

length of the temporary sticker's validity is of no consequence. 

Deputy Trent stopped defendant for having expired plates on his

car.  Upon further inspection after the stop, Trent noticed the

temporary sticker.  His incorrect belief as to the sticker's

validity did not prohibit him from then approaching defendant's car.  Thus, as Deputy Trent's suspicions concerning the purpose of the stop had not been fully answered, his approach of defen

dant's car to ask for a driver's license was reasonable.  

		Defendant does not challenge the officer's actions

after he approached the car and engaged defendant in conversa

tion.  Instead, defendant argues Trent had no basis for further intrusion upon seeing the temporary renewal sticker.  As we have

found the further intrusion valid, we need not analyze the later

search of defendant's person and vehicle.

		Nonetheless, we note the officer, upon initially approaching the vehicle, noticed a gun case protruding from the

trunk and an unzipped soft-sided gun case in the backseat floor

board.  The officer asked for defendant's identification and was

presented a traffic citation instead of defendant's license.  The

officer returned to his squad car, checked defendant's license,

and upon returning to defendant's car noticed defendant with his

hand behind the passenger's seat.  The officer thought defendant

appeared nervous and asked defendant if he had any weapons in the

vehicle.  Defendant responded "no" but failed to respond to the

officer's request to search the vehicle.  When the officer again

asked if defendant had any weapons in the vehicle, defendant

admitted he had a pistol in the laundry basket on the passenger's

seat next to him.  Thus, the intrusion leading to the discovery

of the weapon was justified based upon the officer's observa

tions, the officer's legitimate questions posed to defendant

based upon the officer's observations, and defendant's actions and responses.  

4. Hearsay Testimony

		Defendant next argues the trial court erred in admit

ting Deputy Trent's alleged hearsay testimony.  During the motion

to suppress, defense counsel asked Deputy Trent whether a tempo

rary sticker was good for 120 days.  Trent stated he was unaware

at the time of the stop, but after the arrest he "talked to

somebody with the Secretary of State's office, and they advised

the temporary [sticker] was good for 90 days."  Defense counsel

moved to strike, but the trial court overruled the objection.

		"Hearsay evidence is an out-of-court statement offered

to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and is generally

inadmissible unless it falls within a recognized exception." 

People v. Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d 141, 154, 687 N.E.2d 930, 936 (1997).  The State argues Deputy Trent's statement was not presented to establish that temporary stickers were valid for 90

days and thus does not constitute hearsay, but instead shows

Trent's state of mind.  We agree with defendant that what the

Secretary of State's office told Trent is irrelevant.  However,

based upon our discussion in the preceding section, we disagree

it prejudiced defendant and find its admission into evidence

harmless error.  Moreover, the trial court is presumed to con

sider only proper evidence.  People v. Todd, 154 Ill. 2d 57, 69, 607 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (1992).  The record does not indicate the

trial court relied on this testimony in making its ultimate

determination on the motion to suppress, and we find Deputy Trent's testimony harmless and without prejudice to defendant.

5. License Renewal Sticker

		Defendant argues the trial court's failure to determine

the correct period of time for a valid temporary renewal sticker

resulted in an abuse of discretion in its ruling on his motion to

suppress.  We disagree.

		The length of time a license renewal sticker is valid

is irrelevant to the question of whether Deputy Trent could

approach defendant after stopping him for an expired license

plate and later discovering the renewal sticker.  If Trent had

known the renewal sticker was valid for 120 days, he could still

have walked up to defendant's car, explained his error, and

allowed him to be on his way.  Defendant's due process concerns

are therefore unfounded.    

B. Unlawful Use of a Weapon

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence

		Defendant argues the evidence at trial was insufficient

to convict him of unlawful use of a weapon.  We disagree.

		When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, in a criminal case, the relevant inquiry is whether,

when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189, 217, 780 N.E.2d 669, 685 (2002).  It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to deter

mine the credibility of witnesses and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw

reasonable inferences from that evidence.  People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259, 752 N.E.2d 410, 425 (2001).  A court of review

will not overturn the verdict of the fact finder "unless the

proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there exists a

reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt."  People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 353, 747 N.E.2d 339, 349 (2001).

			"A person commits the offense of unlaw

ful use of weapons when he knowingly:

* * *

				(4) Carries or possesses in

any vehicle or concealed on or

about his person *** any pistol,

revolver, stun gun or taser or

other firearm, except that this

subsection (a)(4) does not apply to

or affect transportation of weapons

that meet one of the following

conditions:

				(i) are broken down

in a non[]functioning

state; or

				(ii) are not immedi

ately accessible; or

				(iii) are unloaded

and enclosed in a case, firearm carrying box,

shipping box, or other

container by a person who

has been issued a cur

rently valid Firearm

Owner's Identification

Card[.]"  720 ILCS 5/24-

1(a)(4) (West 2002).

		The defendant has the burden of proving he falls within

the exceptions set forth in section 24-1(a)(4) by a preponderance

of the evidence.  People v. Martinez, 285 Ill. App. 3d 881, 884, 674 N.E.2d 944, 947 (1996).  "Accessibility refers to the proxim

ity of the weapon to the defendant and the capability of the

defendant to reach the weapon.  In other words, a weapon is

'immediately accessible' if it is within 'easy reach' of the

defendant."  People v. Shields, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1064, 787 N.E.2d 342, 343 (2003), citing Martinez, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 884, 674 N.E.2d at 947.

		In this case, Deputy Trent testified he found the

holstered pistol in a laundry basket in the backseat of defen

dant's car.  He stated the defendant's vehicle was "not a large

car" and a front seat occupant could "probably touch that basket"

in the backseat if he reached back.  Deputy Trent located the

pistol at the bottom of the laundry basket under clothes and

paper targets.  Defendant testified he placed the gun "all the

way to the bottom of the basket," and he believed "[t]here was no way [he] could have accessed the gun from the driver's seat." 

The trial court determined that defendant could have easily

grabbed the basket or pulled it to him to gain access to the

weapon.  Thus, the court found the weapon was immediately access

ible.

		In People v. Smith, 71 Ill. 2d 95, 99, 374 N.E.2d 472, 473 (1978), a jury convicted the defendant of unlawful use of

weapons.  The supreme court affirmed his conviction, finding a

gun in a locked glove compartment was immediately accessible to

the driver even though the defendant claimed he had no key and

could not access the glove compartment while driving.  Smith, 71 Ill. 2d at 100, 374 N.E.2d at 474.  In People v. Bolling, 181 Ill. App. 3d 845, 850, 537 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (1989), the appel

late court affirmed the defendant's unlawful use of weapons

conviction, finding the driver could have easily retrieved his

handgun from a zippered athletic bag located in the rear seat of

his car.

		 We find the evidence in this case was sufficient to

allow the trial court to find the pistol was immediately accessi

ble to defendant.  The trial court, as the finder of fact, has

the responsibility to draw reasonable inferences from the evi

dence, and in viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to

the State, we hold the trial court could have found the weapon

was immediately accessible beyond a reasonable doubt.

		We need not address the merits of our colleague's

dissent because defendant did not argue his gun was enclosed in a case, but he instead argued the gun's placement in a holster at

the bottom of a laundry basket filled with clothes rendered it

inaccessible.  The trial court rejected this argument, and the

State presented sufficient evidence to support the court's

finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

2. Statutory Interpretation

		Defendant argues the trial court misinterpreted the

unlawful use of weapons statute and its "case" or "other con

tainer" exceptions, requiring reversal of his conviction.  We

disagree.

		First, defendant sets forth a hypothetical regarding

enclosing a handgun in a Tupperware container in the passenger

seat versus the same gun in a holster in a cardboard box in the

backseat.  However, we need not analyze defendant's hypothetical

because the trial court had ample evidence before it to conclude

the holstered gun, with parts of the gun exposed, was immediately

accessible and not enclosed in a case.

		Second, defendant appears to ask this court to insert

the word "locked" into section 24-1(a)(4)(iii) of the Criminal

Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(iii) (West

2002)) to promote highway safety.  Defendant maintains a proper

construction of the statute would require guns to be unloaded and

enclosed in a locked case, firearm carrying box, shipping box, or other locked container.  However, defendant's argument is un availing and irrelevant to his case on appeal considering his

weapon was not enclosed in a locked case or container.  

		Moreover, courts "cannot read words into a statute that

are not there."  Chicago Tribune Company. v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 3d 60, 67, 773 N.E.2d 674, 680 (2002).  Further, "'[u]nder the doctrine of separation of powers,

courts may not legislate, rewrite[,] or extend legislation.  If

the statute as enacted seems to operate in certain cases unjustly

or inappropriately, the appeal must be to the General Assembly,

and not to the court.'"  Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 522, 732 N.E.2d 528, 544 (2000), quoting People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 475-76, 590 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1992).  Defendant offers no authority to support his

request for us to add words to the unlawful use of weapons

statute to avoid its alleged "absurd" construction.  Thus, we

have no basis to vacate defendant's conviction.

C. Assistance of Counsel

		Defendant also argues he received ineffective assis

tance of counsel.  We disagree.

		Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evalu ated under the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), which requires a showing that counsel's performance was

deficient and resultant prejudice.  To establish deficient

performance, the defendant must show his attorney's performance

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 163, 687 N.E.2d at 940, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.  Preju dice is established when there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.  Cloutier, 178 Ill. 2d at 163, 687 N.E.2d at 940, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.  A defendant must satisfy both

prongs of the Strickland standard, and the failure to satisfy either prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of

counsel.  People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 107, 735 N.E.2d 616, 626 (2000).  

		Defendant argues his trial counsel failed to establish

the 120-day duration of the "T" sticker, which allowed the trial

court and prosecutor to assume its duration was 90 days.  How

ever, as noted earlier, the duration of a valid "T" sticker did

not change the circumstances surrounding the stop. 

		Defendant also argues his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to object to testimony regarding the discovery of

defendant's new license plates in his car following the stop and

the trial court's later reference to such testimony.  Generally, "[a] review of counsel's competency does not extend to those

areas involving the exercise of judgment, discretion, or trial

tactics."  People v. Sutton, 229 Ill. App. 3d 960, 967, 594 N.E.2d 752, 756 (1992).  Further, "defense counsel is not re

quired to make losing motions or objections in order to provide

effective legal assistance."  People v. Kelley, 304 Ill. App. 3d 628, 636, 710 N.E.2d 163, 170 (1999).   

		The record indicates defense counsel offered objections

throughout the proceedings.  The making of objections is ordi

narily a matter of trial strategy (People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 327, 677 N.E.2d 875, 891 (1997)), and we do not find

defense counsel's representation fell outside the range of

reasonable professional assistance.  Moreover, we find no preju

dice because the trial court did not focus on the newly found

license plates but instead determined the stop was justified

considering the expired plates and later discovery of the "T"

sticker.  Therefore, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel fails.

III. CONCLUSION

		For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's

judgment.

		Affirmed.

		APPLETON, J., concurrings.

		COOK, J., dissentingts.

		JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:

		I agree that defendant's vehicle was properly stopped

because of the apparently expired registration plates.  I also

agree the officer was not required to immediately walk away from

the vehicle when he saw the "T" sticker.  

		I disagree, however, that defendant was properly

convicted of the offense of unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS

5/24-1(a)(4) (West 2002)).  I would reverse that conviction and

vacate that sentence.  

		The evidence is clear that the handgun in question was

unloaded, in a snap-closed nylon holster, located in the

passenger-side backseat.  Section 24-1(a)(4) does not apply to

weapons thatwhich "are unloaded and enclosed in a case, firearm

carrying box, shipping box, or other container by a person who

has been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner's Identification

Card."  720 ILCS 5/24-1(a)(4)(iii) (West 2002).  A "holster" is a

"case."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 554 (10th ed. 2000).  "Enclose" means 

			"1 a (1): to close in: SURROUND (-(<a porch 

		with glass>) (2) to fence off (common land) for 

		individual use b: to hold in: CONFINE."  Mer-

		riam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 380 (10th 

		ed. 2000).   

"Enclosed" means "held in" or "confined," such as cattle that are

enclosed in a pen.  The handgun here was clearly held in or confined in the snap-closed nylon holster, and accordingly there

can be no violation of section 24-1(a)(4).

		The State argues that "By using this holster which left

parts of the gun exposed, the defendant failed to bring himself

within the exemption," citing a definition of "case" found in the

Wildlife Code (520 ILCS 5/1.2b-1 (West 2002)): 

		"[']Case['] means a container specifically 

		designed for the purpose of housing a gun or 

		bow and arrow device which completely en-

		closes such gun or bow and arrow device by 

		being zipped, snapped, buckled, tied[,] or 

		otherwise fastened with no portion of the 

		gun or bow and arrow device exposed."  

		(Emphasis added.)

		The legislature chose to employ an unusual definition

of "enclosed case" in the Wildlife Code.  The legislature,

however, did not choose to employ that definition in the Criminal

Code.  

		The Criminal Code is broader than the Wildlife Code. 

The Criminal Code does not just provide an exemption for cases,

it provides an exemption for cases, firearm carrying boxes,

shipping boxes, and "other container[s]."  Even if the words from

the Wildlife Code, "no portion of the gun *** exposed," were held

to apply to the word "case" in section 24-1(a)(4), there is no

justification for applying them to the word "container."  

		The words, however, should not even be applied to the

word "case."  The words are simply not contained in or referred

to in section 24-1(a)(4).  As the majority points out:

			"[C]ourts 'cannot read words into a statutee

		that are not there.'"  Chicago Tribune Co.

		v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 

		332 Ill. App. 3d 60, 67, 773 N.E.2d 674, 680 

		(2002).  Further, '"'[u]nder the doctrine of 

		separation of powers, courts may not legis-

		late, rewrite[,] or extend legislation.  If 

		the statute as enacted seems to operate in 

		certain cases unjustly or inappropriately, 

		the appeal must be to the General Assembly, 

		and not to the court.'"'  Michigan Avenue

		National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.

		2d 493, 522, 732 N.E.2d 528, 544 (2000), 

		quoting People v. Garner, 147 Ill. 2d 467, 

		475-76, 590 N.E.2d 470, 474 (1992)."  Slip

		op. at 18-McCULLOUGH 19.

		The proscriptions of a criminal statute must be clearly

defined.  The statute must provide a person of ordinary intelli

gence a reasonable opportunity to distinguish between lawful and

unlawful conduct so that he or she may act accordingly.  People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483-84, 732 N.E.2d 545, 549 (2000).  No one may be required at peril of life, liberty, or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.  "'All are enti

tled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.'" 

City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440, 450, 687 N.E.2d 53, 60 (1997), aff'd, 527 U.S. 41, 144 L. Ed. 2d 67, 119 S. Ct. 1849, (1999), quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 83 L. Ed. 888, 890, 59 S. Ct. 618, 619 (1939).  "[T]he statute must

provide sufficiently definite standards for law enforcement

officers and fact finders that its application does not depend

merely on their private conceptions."  People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 256, 644 N.E.2d 1147, 1150 (1994). It is irrelevant

that section 24-1(a)(4) would make better sense if the words

"with no portion of the gun exposed" were read into it.

		Apparently the State would concede there was no viola

tion here if the holster had been large enough to completely

cover the handgun.  What sense does that make?  The handgun would

have been equally accessible if the holster had been larger. 

Perhaps the State would concede there was no violation if the

handgun were contained in a brown paper bag with the top folded

shut.  Such a handgun would not have any portion exposed, but the

State would probably insist that the bag be "zipped, snapped,

buckled, tied[,] or otherwise fastened."  A paper clip?  

		There is no justification for reading the words of

section 24-1(a), "enclosed in a case *** or other container," to

include the requirement that no portion of the gun be exposed. 

The unlawful use of a weapon conviction should be reversed.