GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Briefing Report to the Chairman, Caucus 

on International Narcotics Control, U.S. 

Senate

December 2000 DRUG CONTROL

International 

Counterdrug Sites 

Being Developed

GAO-01-63BR

Page 1 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Contents

Letter 3

Briefing Sections Briefing Section I: Background 8

Briefing Section II: Selecting Sites That Meet 

Operational Requirements 12

Briefing Section III:Costs to Develop and Maintain 

Forward Operating Locations 18

Briefing Section IV:Issues Affecting Operational Capabilities 28

Appendixes Appendix I: U.S. Operations in the Source and Transit Zones 

(May 1, 1999, Through September 30, 2000) 32

Appendix II: U.S. Overflight Arrangements With 

Selected Countries 33

Appendix III: Comments From the Department of Defense 35

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36
Page 2 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control
Page 3 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548 Letr

December 28, 2000

The Honorable Charles E. Grassley

Chairman, Caucus on International Narcotics Control

United States Senate

Dear Mr. Chairman:

From the 1980s until 1999, Howard Air Force Base in Panama was the main 

location from which the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. Coast 

Guard, and the U.S. Customs Service conducted counterdrug operations in 

South America, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific. However, the 

United States ceased counterdrug operations from Howard on May 1, 

1999.1

 To permit the United States to continue to mount counterdrug 

operations close to the drug producing or source zones and illicit drug 

transshipment or transit zones, the U.S. Southern Command, which is 

responsible for counterdrug operations within the region, sought usable 

airfields. The United States has secured 10-year agreements for the use of 

four airfields for counterdrug activities. However, each airfield requires 

some construction to support a designated mix of aircraft. Since the spring 

of 1999, the Defense Department and the U.S. Customs Service have been 

conducting limited counterdrug operations from airfields at Manta, 

Ecuador; and from Aruba and Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles;2

 and 

since August 2000 from San Salvador, El Salvador.

You expressed concern over the costs of developing and operating the four 

sites and whether these “forward operating locations” would meet the 

needs of the interagency users, principally DOD and the U.S. Customs 

Service. As requested, on July 20, 2000, we briefed your staff on (1) the 

process the United States used to select the sites, (2) the estimated costs to 

develop and maintain the sites, and (3) issues that might affect operational 

capabilities at the sites. This report updates information provided in that 

briefing. 

1

Under the Panama Canal Treaty, the United States agreed to leave the base at the end of 

1999.

2

Aruba is a protectorate of the Netherlands; Curacao is a possession.
Page 4 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Results in Brief The United States used a two-track process to select the four forward 

operating locations. First, U.S. embassies canvassed regional governments’ 

willingness to host U.S. military counterdrug operations. Second, Defense 

Department and U.S. Customs Service personnel assessed airfields within 

the region to determine whether they met operational requirements by 

providing proximity to the source and transit zones and force protection. 

Defense and Customs users of the sites indicated that with enhancements, 

the sites would be adequate to meet their operational requirements. They 

said the sites collectively would 

• accommodate the mix of interagency aircraft required to perform 

counterdrug missions;

• provide greater geographic coverage of the Eastern Pacific transit zone 

and deeper access into the source zone than was possible from Howard 

Air Force Base; and

• provide more flexibility than Howard did to vary flight operations, thus 

complicating traffickers’ attempts to monitor U.S. aircraft operations.

As of July 2000, DOD estimated the total cost of developing the four 

airfields, which is driven by the anticipated aircraft mix, would be about 

$136.6 million. Approximately $61.3 million is required to enhance the 

Manta, Ecuador, site, primarily to construct airfields, taxiways, and parking 

aprons and housing to support the U.S. Air Force’s E-3 Airborne Early 

Warning System aircraft and its crews and other detection and monitoring 

assets. DOD estimated that about $63.4 million would be needed for 

enhancements to runways and aircraft parking areas at the international 

airports in Aruba, Curacao, and San Salvador. In addition, the Air Force 

estimated operations and maintenance costs3

 for Aruba/Curacao and 

Manta to be about $22.9 million through 2001 and anticipated that this cost 

would increase to an average of $32.3 million annually once the sites 

became fully operational in late 2002. Navy estimates for these costs at 

San Salvador, which will be fully operational in late 2003, were about 

$3.6 million through 2001 and would decline to about $2.8 million annually 

thereafter.

The level of operations at the sites could be affected by the unavailability of 

U.S. aircraft to conduct counterdrug operations. In December 1999, we 

3

The costs of operating and maintaining the sites, i.e., utilities, airfield fuels, and ground 

maintenance, are borne by DOD.
Page 5 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

reported that between 1992 and 1999, DOD allocated fewer aircraft to the 

counterdrug mission, particularly in the high priority source zone. Since 

then, some key aircraft have continued to be unavailable.4

 For example, 

only one of the two required E-3 aircraft has been in the region since the 

beginning of 1999, and DOD has not been able to provide the required zone 

coverage. In addition, an ongoing DOD and Customs assessment of aircraft 

used to track suspect traffickers could affect the asset mix at Aruba and 

Curacao as well as construction costs. Another unresolved issue is the lack 

of interagency agreement over who will pay to ship the equipment and 

spare parts necessary to maintain operations at Manta. The success of 

counterdrug operations mounted from the forward operating locations also 

partially depends on U.S. assistance provided to foreign governments for 

interdicting or apprehending traffickers over their territory.5

 To assist 

Colombia and Peru in the short term, the State Department began, in fiscal 

year 1999, a $29.6-million effort to upgrade these counties’ A-37 aircraft. 

However, Defense and State Department officials are concerned that the 

aging aircraft will likely be operable for only 4 to 6 more years even with 

these upgrades, and no long-term effort is under way to replace the aircraft. 

This could affect the level of interdiction in both countries. Finally, U.S. 

operations can also be adversely affected if U.S. aircraft cannot fly over 

countries in transit or in pursuit of traffickers. 

Agency Comments We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the 

Department of Defense (see app. III). DOD concurred with the report and 

provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and 

Methodology 

To determine how the United States selected sites, we met with officials at 

the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S. Customs Service, the Office 

of National Drug Control Policy, the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, and the 

Joint Interagency Task Force−East. We examined these agencies’ 

documents outlining operational requirements for potential locations and 

site selection criteria. We also reviewed official site surveys and messages 

regarding the identification of potential host nations and possible sites 

from the Department of State, U.S. embassies in the region, the Department 

4

Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined

(GAO/NSIAD-00-9, Dec. 21,1999).

5

Interdiction is the arrest of personnel and seizure of equipment or illegal drugs. 
Page 6 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

of Defense, the U.S. Southern Command, and the U.S. Customs Service. 

Further, we reviewed and analyzed operational requirement documents 

and flight data and spoke with aircraft operators and interagency members 

of the Office of the U.S. Interdiction Coordinator, which coordinates 

counterdrug asset requirements, about the capabilities of the selected sites. 

To identify the cost of developing and maintaining the forward operating 

locations, we analyzed cost estimates generated by the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, the U.S. Southern Command, and the U.S. Air Force 

and U.S. Navy—the two DOD components responsible for operating and 

maintaining the sites. We also met with Air Force officials to discuss the 

operations and maintenance functions they are supporting at Aruba, 

Curacao, and Manta. 

To determine issues that might affect operational capabilities at the sites, 

we spoke with officials at the Departments of State and Defense. We 

obtained and analyzed documentation on U.S. counterdrug aircraft flight 

hours beginning on May 1, 1999. We used this date because historical flight 

hour data was not available prior to Howard’s closure. We also discussed 

logistics issues affecting aircraft availability and plans to provide and 

upgrade foreign governments’ interdiction aircraft with U.S. Customs 

Service, Defense, and State Department officials.

We conducted our review from May through October 2000 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional 

committees and to the Honorable William S. Cohen, the Secretary of 

Defense; the Honorable Madeline Albright, the Secretary of State; the 

Honorable Lawrence H. Summers, the Secretary of the Treasury; the 

Honorable Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service; and 

the Honorable Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug 

Control Policy. We will send copies to other interested parties upon 

request.
Page 7 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Please contact me on (202) 512-4128 if you or your staff have any questions 

about this report. An additional contact and major contributors to this 

report are listed in appendix IV.

Sincerely yours,

Jess T. Ford, Director

International Affairs and Trade
Page 8 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Briefing Section I

Background BBreinfrenigSfgeoctionnIs

Howard’s Proximity to Key Trafficking

Zones

Howard Air Force Base, Panama

PERU

BOLIVIA

COLOMBIA

Source Zone Nations

Principal Trafficking Routes
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 9 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Before the closure of Howard Air Force Base in December 1999, the U.S. 

government had used the secure base to provide unified logistical support 

for counterdrug operations and other missions covering a wide geographic 

area. From the centrally located base, the Department of Defense (DOD); 

the U.S. Customs Service; and the U.S. Coast Guard, directed by the Joint 

Interagency Task Force,1

 operated airborne early warning, marine patrol, 

and tracker aircraft in support of U.S. counterdrug objectives. These 

aircraft patrolled the drug trafficking routes within the South American 

source zone and Caribbean and Eastern Pacific transit zones. 

Prior to the closure of the airfield at Howard Air Force Base, DOD moved 

some U.S. aircraft to the United States. Because these locations were far 

from the source and transit zones, these aircraft spent more time transiting 

to the zones and less time executing their monitoring mission. For 

example, according to DOD officials, the Air Force Airborne Early Warning 

and Control System E-3 aircraft operating from the United States could fly 

only about half of the required hours over the transit zone and provide very 

limited source zone coverage. To counter the loss in capability, the Office of 

National Drug Control Policy, which provides policy and guidance for 

international and domestic counterdrug efforts, instructed DOD to 

establish a post-Panama presence in the region. After an initial search, the 

Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command concluded that no 

single location could support the aircraft used in the counterdrug mission.

1

The Joint Interagency Task Force-East tasks aerial and maritime assets in counterdrug 

operations throughout the Caribbean and Central and South American Regions. 
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 10 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Process for Tacking and Interdicting

Drug Traffickers

1. Ground-based radar detect suspected trafficker 2. Early warning aircraft, such as the U.S. Air Force

E-3 and the U.S. Customs P-3B, track the target with

radar

3. Tracker aircraft, such as the Air Force F-16 and

the Customs Citation, visually identify and track

the target

4. Foreign government forces interdict trafficker
Briefing Section I

Background

Page 11 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

In a multiphase process, U.S. aircraft detect and monitor suspected drug 

traffickers operating over land and sea. These detection and monitoring 

efforts help foreign authorities interdict or apprehend traffickers on or over 

their land. To illustrate, the U.S. Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar2

 or 

other ground-based radar first detects small, low-flying aircraft on a known 

trafficking route. Using this data and intelligence information, the Joint 

Interagency Task Force−East in Key West, Florida, directs U.S. aircraft to a 

suspect’s approximate location.

Second, aircraft, such as the U.S. Customs P-3 or a U.S. Air Force E-3, use 

their sophisticated radar systems to track the suspect. These aircraft make 

routine short-term deployments from either the United States or regional 

sites to support their operations. Third, using information supplied by these 

airborne early warning aircraft, the Task Force directs a U.S. tracker 

aircraft, such as a U.S. Air Force Reserve F-16 or a U.S. Customs Citation, 

to approach the suspect aircraft to make a visual identification of it. Last, 

U.S. aircraft provide location and identification information to foreign 

government law enforcement officials, who are responsible for 

intercepting the aircraft. Participating nation liaison officers, called host 

nation riders, travel on board U.S. airborne detection, monitoring, and 

tracking aircraft to facilitate interdiction efforts by communicating 

information to their defense agencies on the ground. Colombia, Peru, and 

Ecuador currently participate in this program. 

2

Located in the United States and Puerto Rico, these radar systems continually scan source 

and transit zones for potential drug traffickers.
Page 12 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Briefing Section II

Selecting Sites That Meet Operational 

Requirements BerinfgSecotinI

Note: Ratification of the agreement by the Parliament of the Netherlands expected in early 2001.

BH=Belize

CR=Costa Rica

EC=Ecuador

ES=El Salvador

HN=Honduras

NL=The Netherlands

PE=Peru

Process for Selecting Sites for

Counterdrug Operations

Countries Approached to Host Counterdrug Operations

Peru (PE) Ecuador (EC)

Costa Rica (CR) Netherlands (NL)

Honduras (HN) Belize (BH) El Salvador (ES)

Sites Surveyed

1999

Belize City (BH)

Liberia (CR)

2000

Soto Cano (HN)

San Salvador (ES)

1998

Manta (EC)

Salinas (EC)

Guayaquil (EC)

Aruba (NL)

Curacao (NL)

April 1999

Ecuador

Netherlands

Interim Agreements

May 1, 1999: Howard Air Force Base

runway closes; interim operations

begin at Aruba, Curacao, and Manta

1999

Ecuador

Final Agreements

2000

Netherlands

El Salvador
Briefing Section II

Selecting Sites That Meet Operational 

Requirements

Page 13 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

By July 1998, the United States recognized that U.S. access to Howard Air 

Force Base would not be extended beyond December 31, 1999. By 

September 1998, DOD had developed basic site selection criteria and had 

begun the search for new operating locations. Key criteria were 

(1) proximity to the source and transit zones, (2) protection of U.S. 

personnel and equipment, and (3) adequate infrastructure to minimize 

construction costs.

The United States used a two-track process to identify suitable airfields and 

nations willing to host U.S. operations. DOD and U.S. Customs Service 

officials surveyed several sites in the Caribbean and South America 

between September and December 1998. DOD officials also surveyed sites 

in Central America in 1999. Concurrently, the State Department queried 

regional nations on their willingness to allow the United States to conduct 

counterdrug missions from their territories. The United States sought to 

secure agreements before the closure of the Howard Air Force Base 

runway on May 1, 1999.

The operational limitations of potential sites, the difficulty protecting U.S. 

forces, and the reluctance of some nations to have U.S. military aircraft at 

their airports narrowed DOD’s choices. DOD ultimately selected Manta, 

Ecuador, and Aruba and Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles and continued 

to search for a Central American site. By April 1999, the United States had 

signed interim operating agreements on the use of the sites with the 

governments of Ecuador and the Netherlands. These agreements permitted 

shared use of the international airports in Aruba and Curacao and an air 

force base in Manta and allowed the United States to continue limited 

counterdrug operations from these three locations after ceasing operations 

at Howard Air Force Base.

By November 1999, the United States finalized a long-term agreement with 

Ecuador for the use of Manta, and in early March 2000, the United States 

concluded long-term agreements for the use of the Aruba and Curacao 

sites. State Department officials expect ratification of the agreement by the 

Parliament of the Netherlands in early 2001. Also, by late March 2000, the 

United States had signed a long-term agreement with El Salvador for use of 

the San Salvador international airport. DOD officials said that this site 

located northwest of Panama extends the geographic coverage of the 

Eastern Pacific transit zone beyond that available from Howard Air Force 

Base. 
Briefing Section II

Selecting Sites That Meet Operational 

Requirements

Page 14 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Agreements Allow Unrestricted Use for

Counterdrug Operations Only

• United States may conduct only counterdrug detection, tracking, and

monitoring operations

• Following consultation, facilities and U.S.-funded improvements

revert to host nations

• Contracts are for 10-year duration with renewable 5-year terms

• Access is 24 hours a day, 7 days a week

• Host nations provide perimeter security

Ecuador

The Netherlands

El Salvador

Netherlands Antilles Aruba

Kingdom of The Netherlands
Briefing Section II

Selecting Sites That Meet Operational 

Requirements

Page 15 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

The agreements with the governments of Ecuador, El Salvador, and the 

Netherlands allow the United States unrestricted airfield access solely to 

conduct U.S. counterdrug detection and monitoring operations. The United 

States does not own or rent any facilities but may receive the use of any 

land it needs to establish the sites. After the agreements’ expiration and 

with mutual agreement of the parties, facilities built by the United States 

for its use during the period of the agreement will be transferred to the 

other nations’ governments. The airfields and national airspace remain 

under the sovereign control of the governments. 

Each agreement is for a 10-year period, which State and Defense officials 

told us is the minimum period needed to justify the capital investment in 

these facilities. After the initial 10-year period, either party may terminate 

the agreement with 1 year’s notice. However, if both parties agree, the 

agreements may be renewed for 5-year periods.

Under the agreements, host nation authorities have overall responsibility 

for air traffic control and the physical security of the airfield. Each of the 

locations requires some enhancements, and the agreements permit the 

United States to construct the necessary facilities. The United States will 

also maintain these facilities and provide physical security for its aircraft. 

The agreements also state that the United States will pay reasonable 

charges for services such as utilities and fire protection. 
Briefing Section II

Selecting Sites That Meet Operational 

Requirements

Page 16 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Comparative Coverage From Howard

and Forward Operating Locations

P-3: 5 Hours

on Station

Howard Air Force Base

Forward Operating Location

Approximate P-3 Coverage Range From Howard Air Force Base

Approximate P-3 Coverage Range From Forward Operating Locations
Briefing Section II

Selecting Sites That Meet Operational 

Requirements

Page 17 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Together, the four sites provide greater geographic coverage than did 

Howard Air Force Base, according to DOD officials. In particular, they 

provide deeper source zone coverage and extend coverage farther into the 

increasingly trafficked Eastern Pacific because of their proximity to the 

targeted zones. The actual coverage provided will depend upon the type of 

aircraft and its ability to fly over foreign territories when tracking or 

pursuing suspect traffickers. (See app. II for information on U.S. regional 

overflight agreements.) DOD officials said that with multiple sites, flight 

operations could be varied, thus complicating traffickers’ attempts to 

monitor U.S. aircraft operations.

Aruba and Curacao, situated in the Caribbean Sea just off the South 

American coast, can support both DOD and U.S. Customs Service source 

zone operations. DOD officials also noted that the sites’ strategic locations 

allow U.S. aircraft to detect traffickers flying from the northern coast of 

Colombia over the Caribbean Sea. Manta, located about 500 miles from the 

Southeastern Colombian source zone, permits coverage of this area while 

also being closer than Howard Air Force Base to source zones in Peru and 

Bolivia. DOD officials said that the advantage of the San Salvador site is 

that it extends the ability to support aerial and marine detection of 

maritime traffickers in the Eastern Pacific.
Page 18 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations BrenifgSecotinI

Construction and Operations and

Maintenance Costs

Aruba

CuracaoM

anta

San Salvador

Estimated Annual Operations and Maintenance Costs Through Fiscal Year 2001

Estimated Design and Construction Costs

$3.6

$16.8

Dollars in Millions

Command Support

Aruba, Curacao, Manta $6.1

San Salvador $9.3

$61.3 Manta

$10.2 Aruba

Curacao $43.9

$11.9 Design costs for

all sites
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 19 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

As of July 2000, DOD estimates that it will cost a total of about 

$136.6 million to design and complete construction. When fully operational 

between late 2002 and late 2003, the four sites will be able to accommodate 

a planned mix of aircraft. As the lead U.S. agency, DOD is responsible for 

upgrading and building facilities at the sites to meet interagency 

requirements. Estimates for operating and maintaining the sites vary by 

location.

• Manta will require the most construction, which DOD estimates will 

total about $61.3 million. The costs are largely driven by the need to 

strengthen the runway and widen the taxiway and build a parking area 

to accommodate the U.S. Air Force E-3 aircraft and its accompanying 

refueling tanker. Other aircraft such as P-3s and C-130s will also use the 

site.

• Curacao and Aruba construction costs are estimated at about 

$43.9 million and $10.2 million, respectively. The Curacao construction 

will include a taxiway, aircraft parking spaces, and a hangar, also 

partially in support of the E-3 as well as other aircraft. Aruba, which will 

support fewer and smaller aircraft, will require aircraft parking space 

and small operations and maintenance facilities. 

• The San Salvador site will require aircraft parking space, an operations 

center, and other facilities that DOD estimates will cost about 

$9.3 million.

Operating and maintenance costs for Aruba, Curacao, and Manta are 

estimated to be about $22.9 million through fiscal year 2001, including 

$6.1 million for command support. The funds will be used to provide 

support such as communications, airfield management, maintenance, and 

supplies. DOD officials said that these costs are likely to increase to about 

$32.3 million annually, as the sites become fully operational. For the San 

Salvador site, annual operating and maintenance costs are estimated to be 

about $3.6 million in 2001 and to decrease to about $2.8 million annually in 

later years.
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 20 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Manta: Primary Site for Staging Source

Zone Operations

05

FEET

0 500 1000

N

1oW

05

Current

Operating

Facility

Pacific Ocean

U.S.-Constructed Facilities

Dining Facility and Quarters

Ramp, Runway, Taxiway

Taxiway

Fire Station

Hangar/Maintenance/Operations

Facilities

100
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 21 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Manta, Ecuador, will serve as the primary site for staging operations in the 

source zone, which, since 1993, has been the highest U.S. priority for 

counterdrug operations. Manta requires the most construction of all the 

sites because the runway and taxiway do not meet U.S. standards for large 

aircraft. When runway construction is completed, currently estimated to be 

by September 2001, the site will accommodate the large U.S. Air Force E-3 

airborne early warning aircraft and its accompanying KC-135 aerial 

refueling aircraft. When fully operational in about mid-2002, the site is to 

accommodate four large and seven medium aircraft, such as the U.S. 

Navy’s or Customs Service’s P-3 aircraft. On a periodic basis since April 

1999, one U.S. Navy P-3 has flown from Manta; the U.S. Customs Service 

began periodic, 7-day deployments of P-3 aircraft in June 2000.

Of the estimated total cost for construction at Manta ($61.3 million), 

73 percent, or $44.4 million, is directly attributable to construction needed 

to support the E-3 aircraft, according to DOD officials. Runway and 

taxiway construction are estimated to cost $38.6 million. The current 

runway’s strength will not support the E-3 aircraft, and the taxiways are not 

wide enough for safe movement on them. Other construction estimates are 

for lodging and dining facilities ($6.3 million), hangar facilities 

($6.7 million), a maintenance facility ($4.9 million), a squadron operations 

facility ($2.6 million), and a fire/rescue station ($2.2 million).1

The U.S. Air Force will manage base support services such as airfield 

management, security, communications, and food services. Base operating 

costs are estimated to total about $7.4 million in fiscal year 2001 but will 

likely rise once the construction is completed and Manta becomes fully 

operational. Air Force officials told us that they expect Manta will require a 

permanent staff of eight persons that will be augmented by contractor 

support staff. 

1

Personnel under contract with DOD will operate the fire station.
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 22 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Aruba: Supporting U.S. Customs

Service Operations

FEET

0 500 1000

100

•

29

11

N

VAR

8 Wo

29

11

Operations Center/Hangar

Taxiways

Ramp

U.S.-Constructed Facilities

Caribbean Sea
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 23 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

The forward operating location at Aruba will support the U.S. Customs 

Service’s operations in the South American source zone and the Caribbean 

transit zone. According to officials at the U.S. Southern Command, Aruba 

can accommodate two medium-sized P-3 aircraft and three small-sized 

tracker aircraft when fully operational in late 2002. U.S. Customs officials 

said that the P-3 aircraft would conduct airborne early warning and 

tracking operations mainly in the source zone. At least one tracker aircraft 

will be on alert at all times to track potential traffickers over the Caribbean 

Sea. Customs aircraft have been operating from this site since April 28, 

1999, and share parking spaces and other facilities with commercial 

aircraft.

Of the estimated $10.2 million total construction costs, DOD will use about 

$8.8 million to construct a new ramp, taxiway, and rinse facility for the use 

of U.S. Customs aircraft. The Department will also spend about $1.5 million 

to construct a new hangar and squadron operations facility. These costs 

could increase if Customs assumes a larger role in tracking traffickers and 

requires additional hangar and operations space. DOD and Customs will 

not need lodging facilities because Aruba has an ample supply of hotels.

The Air Force estimates that it will spend about $1.9 million in fiscal 

year 2001 for base operations. The Air Force expects to maintain a 

permanent staff of about three personnel to operate and maintain the site. 
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 24 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Curacao: Supporting DOD Operations

H

FEET

0 500 1000

100

N

VAR 10o W

Free Trade Zone Royal Netherlands

Naval Air Station

Current Operating Facility

Operations/Hangar/

Maintenance Facilities

Realigned Taxiway

U.S.-Constructed Facilities

Existing Runway

Caribbean Sea

Ramp
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 25 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

The forward operating location at Curacao will host a range of DOD 

aircraft supporting both source and transit zone operations. The facility 

will accommodate four to six F-16s used in the transit zone: one to two 

Navy P-3s, one Navy E-2, and one Air Force E-3 airborne early warning 

aircraft for detection and monitoring in the source and transit zones and 

two C-130-type planes. DOD has operated aircraft from this site since

May 1, 1999. 

Initially, DOD planned to construct the U.S. facilities at the eastern end of 

the airport. However, according to a DOD official, this construction would 

have required extending electric and utility lines. DOD ultimately decided 

to construct the facilities at the western end near the Royal Dutch Naval Air 

Station. The Dutch favored the move since they use similar aircraft to 

conduct counterdrug operations and can share facilities if necessary. In 

addition, DOD can benefit from the security provided by Royal Dutch 

forces and minimize the overall visibility of U.S. personnel. The official said 

that DOD had not studied the costs of making the change but did not 

anticipate that the move would increase overall costs.

DOD estimates it will spend about $43.9 million to construct new facilities 

and upgrade existing ones. Of the total costs, about $29.5 million will be 

used to construct new parking spaces and a taxiway that will connect the 

aircraft parking area to the runway. An additional $14.4 million will be used 

to construct an operations center and hanger and maintenance facilities. 

The Air Force estimates that operating costs will average about $7.5 million 

through fiscal year 2001. A permanent presence of six personnel will 

provide support services such as site maintenance, communications, and 

resupply.
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 26 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

San Salvador: Supporting U. S. Navy

Maritime Operations

Commercial

Maintenance Hangar

Cargo Ramp Commercial Ramp Fire Station

Hangar

Cross

Runway

Military

Ramp

Maintenance

Ramp

Ramp

Taxiway

U.S.-Constructed Facilities

Runway
Briefing Section III

Costs to Develop and Maintain Forward 

Operating Locations

Page 27 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

From the San Salvador, El Salvador, forward operating location, U.S. Navy 

aircraft will conduct maritime patrol operations in the Eastern Pacific 

Ocean. According to DOD officials, traffickers are increasingly using the 

Eastern Pacific Ocean to move drugs toward the United States. The 

Defense Department plans to build this site to host four medium-sized DOD 

and Customs aircraft. DOD projects that the construction in San Salvador, 

the last of the locations to be selected, will begin in 2002 and be completed 

by late 2003. The Navy began conducting limited operations from this site 

in August 2000. The site will be fully operational upon completion of ramp 

and taxiway construction.

DOD plans to spend about $9.3 million on construction. The construction 

of new parking spaces and a taxiway is estimated to cost about $5 million. 

The remaining amount will be used for new maintenance and squadron 

operations facilities and other site improvements.

The San Salvador international airport includes both a commercial terminal 

and an adjacent, secure Salvadoran air force base. The new U.S. facility will 

be located on this military facility. This facility will offer security for U.S. 

personnel and equipment. However, Salvadoran munitions previously 

housed in a bunker located near the intended U.S. site have been moved to 

a temporary location to allow for safe U.S. operations. A permanent bunker 

will be constructed at U.S. expense. A DOD official estimated that this 

construction could cost an additional $1.2 million.

The U.S. Navy expects annual base operating costs to be about $3.6 million 

in fiscal year 2001 and drop to about $2.7 million annually thereafter. The 

Navy estimates the permanent U.S. presence to be about eight support 

personnel. 
Page 28 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Briefing Section IV

Issues Affecting Operational Capabilities BrenifgSecotinIV

Certain Issues May Limit the

Counterdrug Mission

Colombia

Peru

Ecuador

Aircraft Availability and

Logistics Support

Overflight

Overflight

Interdiction Capability

Venezuela
Briefing Section IV

Issues Affecting Operational Capabilities

Page 29 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

The U.S. counterdrug mission supported by the forward operating 

locations may be affected by the (1) availability of U.S. aircraft, (2) U.S. 

efforts to equip foreign forces responsible for interdicting traffickers within 

their territories, and (3) standing overflight authority in foreign airspace for 

U.S. aircraft supporting counterdrug operations.

DOD has allocated fewer aircraft to the counterdrug mission since 1992 in 

part due to DOD-wide force reductions, which affected its ability to fly the 

required number of hours over the trafficking zones.1

 For example, in 1999, 

we reported that between fiscal year 1998 and 1999, DOD’s detection and 

monitoring flight hours over the high-priority source zone countries of 

Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru decreased by 48 percent.2

 Customs, which has 

provided primary early warning and tracking coverage of the source zone 

since April 1999, has partially offset this decrease and plans to add six more 

planes to its inventory by October 2001. While constructing the Manta site 

to support the required two Air Force E-3 aircraft, DOD has been able to 

provide only one E-3 aircraft in nearly 2 years due to higher priority 

operations. Between May and December 1999, the only available E-3 

aircraft operated primarily in the lower priority transit zone. This aircraft 

has not been able to provide its required flight hours.3

 During the period, it 

conducted very few sorties in the source zone but it has provided about 

39 hours of coverage per month since January 2000. (See app. I for flight 

hour information.) In addition, a current DOD assessment of the aircraft 

being used to track suspect traffickers could affect the asset mix planned 

for some of the locations. 

Two aspects of logistics support affect aircraft availability—timely 

resupply of the remote Manta site and delivery costs for non-DOD parts. On 

its first deployment to Manta in June 2000, for example, U.S. Customs 

aircraft could not operate for several days because the crew was awaiting 

delivery of replacement propeller parts. Ultimately, DOD delivered the 

parts; however, the agencies have not resolved who is responsible for the 

$71,215 cost of the delivery. The logistics issue remains to be resolved, and 

neither agency has budgeted for Customs logistics support in its fiscal 

year 2001 budget.

1

The military services provide required equipment from their existing inventories.

2

Drug Control: Assets DOD Contributes to Reducing the Illegal Drug Supply Have Declined

(GAO/NSIAD-00-9, Dec. 1999). 

3

The required number of flight hours spent over the zones of interest is classified.
Briefing Section IV

Issues Affecting Operational Capabilities

Page 30 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

The success of counterdrug operations mounted from the forward 

operating locations depends in part on the U.S.-provided assistance that 

enables foreign governments to interdict traffickers over their territories.4

The United States, for example, provides foreign forces with equipment 

and spare parts, largely under an excess equipment program so that they 

can interdict suspect traffickers.5

 To assist Colombia and Peru in the short 

term, the State Department began, in fiscal year 1999, a $29.6-million effort 

to upgrade its A-37 aircraft. However, Defense and State Department 

officials are concerned that the aging aircraft will likely be operable for 

only 4 to 6 more years, even with these upgrades, and no long-term effort is 

underway to replace the aircraft. 

The United States has overflight and pursuit agreements with many of the 

countries in the counterdrug region. However, U.S. operations can be 

adversely affected if U.S. aircraft cannot fly over countries in transit to 

their search areas or in pursuit of traffickers. For example, the lack of an 

overflight agreement with Venezuela increases the transit time for 

U.S. aircraft flying from Aruba and Curacao to the source region. 

Appendix II provides information on countries overflight provisions.

4

DOD personnel are prohibited from interdicting suspect aircraft over foreign territory and 

must cooperate with foreign government forces to execute an interdiction.

5

Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22U.S.C. 2318), authorizes 

the President to provide up to $150 million per fiscal year, subject to limitations, in articles 

and services from any U.S. agency, and military education and training to foreign countries 

for certain purposes, including international narcotics control assistance, if it is in the 

national interest of the United States to do so. 
Page 31 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control
Page 32 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Appendix I

U.S. Operations in the Source and Transit Apendxies

Zones (May 1, 1999, Through September 30, 

2000) ApendxiI

a

From January 2000 through September 2000, the E-3 conducted, on average, six source zone sorties 

per month, which totaled an average of 39 monitoring hours per month.

Note: Data prior to May 1999 was not available. The aircraft listed above are the primary detection and 

monitoring types operating from forward operating locations, but the data also includes operations from 

other sites. Other U.S. aircraft not listed also operate in the sources and transit zones.

Source: GAO analysis of Joint Interagency Task Force−East data.

Type of aircraft

Average sorties

per month

Average monitoring hours

per month

Source Zone

U.S. Air Force E-3a 3 20

U.S. Customs Service P-3B 8 50

U.S. Customs Service P-3A 6 34

U.S. Navy P-3CDU 10 53

Transit Zone

U.S. Air Force E-3 8 53

U.S. Customs Service P-3B 19 114

U.S. Customs Service P-3A 8 47

U.S. Navy P-3CDU 4 18

U.S. Navy P-3C 61 288

U.S. Navy E-2C 66 232
Page 33 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Appendix II

U.S. Overflight Arrangements With Selected 

Countries ApendxiI

a

Overflight arrangements allow U.S. law enforcement assets to fly in foreign airspace in support of 

counterdrug operations.

b

Pursuit arrangements allow U.S. law enforcement assets to pursue suspect vessels or aircraft in 

foreign waters or airspace.

Country

Overflight 

alloweda

Pursuit 

allowedb Comments

Antigua and Barbuda Yes Yes

Bahamas Yes Yes

Barbados Yes Yes

Belize Yes Yes

Colombia Yes Yes

Costa Rica No Yes

Cuba No No

Dominica No Yes

Dominican Republic Yes Yes

Ecuador Yes Yes Overflight permitted as part of the forward operating agreement

El Salvador Yes Yes Overflight permitted as part of the forward operating agreement

French West Indies No No

Grenada Yes Yes

Guatemala No No

Haiti Yes Yes

Honduras Yes Yes

Jamaica Yes Yes

Mexico Yes Yes

Netherlands Antilles Yes Yes Overflight permitted as part of the forward operating agreement

Nicaragua No No Agreement pending

Panama Yes Yes On a case by case basis

Peru Yes Yes On a case by case basis

St. Kitts and Nevis Yes Yes

St. Lucia Yes Yes

St. Vincent Grenadines Yes Yes

Suriname Yes Yes

Trinidad and Tobago Yes Yes

Turks and Caicos No No

Venezuela No No With preflight plan, U.S. Customs aircraft recently flew over Venezuelan air 

space
Appendix II

U.S. Overflight Arrangements With Selected 

Countries

Page 34 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Note: This table represents only a portion of counterdrug-related arrangements covered in 

U.S. bilateral agreements. Ship boarding and port access are examples of other agreed-upon 

arrangements. 

Source: U.S. Coast Guard and the Joint Interagency Task Force-East.
Page 35 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Appendix III

Comments From the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Page 36 GAO-01-63BR Drug Control

Appendix IV

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiIV

GAO Contact Lawrence L. Suda (202) 512-5380

Acknowledgments In addition to Mr. Suda, Andrew Crawford, Patricia Martin, 

Nancy Ragsdale, Maria-Alaina Rambus, and Ray Wrysch made key 

contributions to this report.

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