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Strategic Attack 

Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2 

12 June 2007

This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-0, 

Joint Operations.
BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE DOCTRINE DOCUMENT 2-1.2 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 12 June 2007 

SUMMARY OF CHANGES 

 This revision updates and clarifies the definitions of strategic attack (page 2) and 

centers of gravity (page 3). It updates the discussion of effects-based approach to 

operations with respect to strategic attack (page 6). It rewords the role of air, space and 

cyberspace power in strategic attack (page 11). It emphasizes command relationships 

to ensure unity of command and unity of effort (page 14) and removes language that 

was redundant with Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Operations and Organization. It 

changes and updates the discussion of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

weapons (page 28). The discussion of denial and coercion has been changed to 

coercive strategy with one or more mechanisms (page 32). 

Supersedes: AFDD 2-1.2, 30 September 2003 

OPR: HQ AFDC/DD 

Certified by: HQ AFDC/DD (Col Jon Wolfe) 

Pages: 58 

Accessibility: Available on the e-publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil for downloading 

Releasability: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication 

Approved by: Allen G. Peck, Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters Air Force Doctrine Center 
FOREWORD 

 War is one of mankind’s most complex endeavors. 

Destroying or incapacitating enemy military forces and 

attriting them into ineffectiveness is one means, but not the 

only means, of achieving warfare’s objectives. Airmen have 

always envisioned going directly to the heart of an enemy. 

Modern air, space, and cyberspace power has come a long 

way toward realizing this vision. The combination of 

advanced systems with stealth and precision has made 

airpower a force to be reckoned with. Commanders now 

have the capability to directly affect an adversary’s strategic 

center of gravity, helping to accelerate achievement of US 

national objectives.

 Strategic attack is offensive action specifically selected to achieve national 

strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to 

engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to 

achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Strategic attack involves the 

systematic application of force against enemy systems and their centers of gravity, 

thereby producing the greatest effect for the least cost in blood and treasure. Vital 

systems to be affected may include leadership, critical processes, popular will and 

perception, and fielded forces. Strategic attack provides an effective capability that may 

drive an early end to conflict or achieve objectives more directly or efficiently than other 

applications of military power. 

 Air, space, and cyberspace power has inherent, unique advantages in 

conducting strategic attack, with the distinct aim is producing effects well beyond the 

immediate tactical and operational effort expended and of directly contributing to 

achieving strategic, war-winning effects and objectives. 

 Air Force Doctrine Document 2-1.2, Strategic Attack, is doctrine for 

understanding, planning, and executing this crucial function across the range of military 

operations. Air Force personnel need to be able to articulate the rationale for strategic 

attack as an essential and valuable warfighting option for the combatant commander. 

More importantly, Air Force personnel must understand how strategic attack can help 

fulfill or enhance our national security and military strategies as a tool for defeating our 

nation’s adversaries. 

ALLEN G. PECK 

 Major General, USAF 

 Commander, Headquarters 

 Air Force Doctrine Center 
iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................. v

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS...............................................................vii

CHAPTER ONE—Fundamentals of Strategic Attack ...................................................... 1

Defining Role for Air, Space, and Cyberspace Power ................................................. 1

Definition...................................................................................................................... 2

Basic Characteristics ................................................................................................... 4

Strategic Attack and Warfighting Strategy ................................................................... 5

Objectives and Effects................................................................................................. 6

Strategic Objectives ................................................................................................. 6

Strategic Effects....................................................................................................... 6

Systemic Effects................................................................................................... 8

Decisive Effects.................................................................................................... 9

Role of Air, Space, and Cyberspace Power in Strategic Attack................................. 11

Strategic Attack in Irregular Warfare Operations ....................................................... 11

CHAPTER TWO—Command and Control .................................................................... 13

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution...................................................... 13

Command Relationships............................................................................................ 14

CHAPTER THREE—Planning and Assessment ........................................................... 16

Planning..................................................................................................................... 16

Strategic Attack in Campaign Planning .................................................................. 16

Strategic Attack in Air Operations Planning ........................................................... 18

Mission Analysis................................................................................................. 18

Situation and Course of Action Development ..................................................... 20

Joint Air Operations Plan Development.............................................................. 23

Assessment............................................................................................................... 24

Planning for Assessment ....................................................................................... 25

Requirements......................................................................................................... 25

Operational Assessment and Campaign Assessment ........................................... 26

CHAPTER FOUR—Employment Considerations.......................................................... 28

Resources ................................................................................................................. 28

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Weapons Considerations............... 28

Elements of Effective Employment ............................................................................ 30

Parallel Versus Sequential Operations................................................................... 30

Coercion................................................................................................................. 32

Complementary Operations and Synergy .............................................................. 35

Pitfalls and Limitations............................................................................................... 36

Friction ................................................................................................................... 36

Failure of Analysis.................................................................................................. 38

Misprioritization ...................................................................................................... 39

Restraints and Constraints..................................................................................... 39

Failure of Assessment............................................................................................ 40
iv 

Conclusion................................................................................................................. 40

SUGGESTED READINGS ............................................................................................ 41

GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................. 44
v 

INTRODUCTION 

PURPOSE 

 This Air Force doctrine document (AFDD) establishes doctrinal guidance for the 

United States Air Force on strategic attack. It articulates fundamental Air Force 

principles for the application of combat force and provides commanders operational 

guidance on the employment and integration of Air Force resources to achieve desired 

objectives. 

APPLICATION 

 

 This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, 

including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. 

Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of 

military operations. 

 The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, 

commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation 

when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. 

SCOPE 

 This doctrine provides guidance for planning and conducting strategic attack in 

support of our national security and combatant/joint force commander objectives. 
vi 

COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC 

A note on terminology 

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that the US Air Force 

prefers―and in fact, plans and trains―to employ through a commander of Air 

Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air, space, 

and cyberspace component commander (JFACC). 

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will 

assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated 

otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component 

commander while the term ”JFACC” refers to the joint component-level 

operational commander. 

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will 

normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are 

different, and should be executed through different staffs. 

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control/ 

administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through a 

Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air and 

space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a 

combined force air, space, and cyberspace component commander (CFACC). 

Likewise, the air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as 

an AOC in joint or combined operations, is correctly known as a joint AOC 

(JAOC) or combined AOC (CAOC). 

 

Since nearly every operation the US conducts will involve international 

partners, this publication uses the terms CFACC and CAOC throughout to 

emphasize the doctrine’s applicability to multi-national operations. 
vii 

FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS 

 Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which 

AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDD expands on or supports these 

statements. 

 Strategic attack (SA) is offensive action that is specifically selected to achieve 

national strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability 

or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily 

having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. (Page 2) 

 SA seizes upon the unique capability of air, space, and cyberspace power to 

achieve objectives by striking at the heart of the enemy, disrupting critical leadership 

functions, infrastructure, and strategy, while at the same time avoiding a sequential 

fight through layers of forces. (Page 4) 

 SA achieves objectives through indirect effects. (Page 7) 

 SA can play a crucial role in coercing an enemy into adopting a desired course of 

action. (Page 10) 

 Unity of effort is key to the success of SA operations and can only be achieved 

through command and control arrangements that ensure unity of command. (Page 

13) 

 When air operations constitute the bulk of SA capability, the joint force commander 

(JFC) will normally task the joint force air and space component commander, as a 

supported commander, to conduct such operations. (Page 15) 

 The commander, Air Force forces should provide the JFC with SA options early in 

the planning process. (Page 16) 

 Effective use of SA requires clear, attainable, relevant, and decisive objectives. It 

also requires clear definition of the commander’s criteria for the operation’s overall 

success—a logical and achievable end state. (Page 18) 

 SA is normally most effective when employed using parallel operations. (Page 30) 
1 

Historical Strategic Attack Examples 

 Alexander the Great defeated the Persians at Issus (331 B.C.) by leading a 

cavalry assault at King Darius himself (a center of gravity), which removed Darius 

from the battlefield and resulted in the Persian Army leaving their positions in full 

rout. 

 Charles Martel’s Frankish infantry at Tours in 732 isolated Muslim Emir Abd-erRahman and “pierced him through with many spears, so that he died; then all the 

[Muslim] host fled before the enemy”... thus saving Western Europe from Muslim 

domination. 

 Allied bomber crews and commando teams destroyed the German heavy water 

program—and Hitler’s hope for an atomic bomb with it—during World War II. 

 Allied submarines destroyed Japanese merchant shipping in the Pacific during 

World War II, consciously avoiding engagement with Japanese naval forces while 

denying Japan crucial war-sustaining resources. 

 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) SA operations coerced Yugoslav 

leader Slobodan Milosevic to submit to NATO demands (1999). 

―Various Sources 

CHAPTER ONE 

FUNDAMENTALS OF STRATEGIC ATTACK 

DEFINING ROLE FOR AIR, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE POWER 

 Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5100.1, Functions of the DOD and Its 

Major Components, states that the Air Force is specifically directed to “organize, train, 

equip, and provide forces for...strategic air and missile warfare.” Formerly, strategic 

attack (SA) was defined in terms of nuclear delivery systems or weapons. This is no 

longer true. SA is not defined in terms of weapons or delivery systems used—their 

type, range, speed, or destructiveness—but by its effective contribution to achieving 

strategic objectives. 

 Advances in information technology, precision weaponry, tactics, and warfighting 

doctrine have made SA an even more capable tool, giving airpower the potential to 

achieve decisive effects more directly without the need to engage enemy fielded forces 

first. Operation DESERT STORM proved the efficacy of SA and Operations 

DELIBERATE FORCE (ODF), ALLIED FORCE (OAF), ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), 

and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) further refined it. In these operations, air assets 

conducting SA have often proven able to deny the enemy access to critical resources 
2 

The civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection 

against dangers arising from military operations....The civilian population as such, 

as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack. 

―Geneva Additional Protocol I, Article 51 

Note: Although the US is not a party to Protocol 1, the US considers many of the Protocol 1 

provisions, including this one, to be either legally binding as customary international law or 

acceptable practice, though not legally binding. It should also be noted that Geneva Convention IV 

and Hague Convention IV, both of which the US has signed, provide various protections for civilians 

and civilian populations, and limit the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy. 

and infrastructure, defeat enemy strategies, and decisively influence enemy decisions to 

end hostilities on terms favorable to US interests. In addition to its ability to destroy 

enemy surface forces and support friendly surface forces, today’s Air Force provides 

joint force commanders with enormous lethal and non-lethal capabilities that can 

contribute directly to the achievement of strategic objectives. 

 Properly implemented, SA achieves disproportionate results. It allows 

commanders to literally strike at the enemy’s heart and thus shape a conflict in ways 

favorable to the US. This publication examines what SA is and how to properly plan, 

execute, assess, and adapt it. 

DEFINITION 

SA is offensive action specifically selected to achieve national strategic 

objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary’s ability or will to engage 

in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to 

achieve operational objectives as a precondition. 

 SA is an approach to war focused on the adversary’s overall system and the 

most effective way to target or influence that system. It examines the full spectrum of 

that system: Political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information in the 

context of stated national security objectives. SA involves the combination of effects that 

most effectively and efficiently achieves those objectives at the strategic level. In the Air 

Force context, SA is a discrete set of military operations aimed at achieving those 

strategic objectives. Air, space, and cyberspace power offers the quickest and most 

direct means to conduct those operations. 

 SA involves the systematic application of lethal and/or non-lethal capabilities 

against an enemy’s strategic centers of gravity (COGs), to undermine the enemy’s will 

and ability to threaten our national security interests. Strategic centers of gravity may 

include: Leadership; operational processes such as communications, electrical, 

petroleum etc; infrastructure such as railroads and bridges; popular will and perception; 

and fielded forces. 
3 

 SA includes analysis, planning, targeting, command and control (C2), execution, 

and assessment in combination to support achievement of strategic objectives. An 

analysis of the definition clarifies SA: 

 “Strategic” refers to the highest level of an enemy system that, if affected, will 

contribute most directly to the achievement of our national security objectives. It 

does not mean nuclear, although in some instances the weapon most appropriate 

for a particular set of circumstances may be nuclear. (System: A regularly 

interacting or interdependent group of items forming a unified whole... [MerriamWebster Online Dictionary]) 

 “Attack” entails offensive, proactive action. It implies aggressive operations 

conducted against an enemy state, non-state, or other organization and may be 

used preemptively and without regard to the enemy military force. Attacks may 

employ lethal or nonlethal means, from conventional destructive weapons to forms 

of cyber power such as network attack. 

 The aim of SA is to contribute directly to the achievement of national security 

objectives by generating effects that significantly influence centers of gravity. SA 

operations are essentially effects-based and should be planned, executed, and 

assessed as part of a seamless, adaptive whole, starting with the desired outcome 

and working backwards to determine the required actions/effects. It is focused on 

the objectives achieved rather than the platforms, weapons, or methods used. 

 SA is oriented on the adversary’s system, changing it to conform to our national 

objectives. SA accomplishes this change by affecting (positively or negatively) the 

COGs in the enemy (not just military) system that will force the overall system to 

change as desired in the shortest possible period of time. COGs are the leverage 

points in the system that, when affected, create significantly more change than 

would be achieved by affecting parts of the system that are not centers of gravity. 

COGs can be physical things like leaders, key production, structures, people, or 

organizations. Affecting COGs will yield results disproportionate to the effort 

expended, that is, they will provide the highest payoff (enemy system change) for 

the least cost (lives, resources, time, etc). 

 A center of gravity is defined in joint doctrine as the source of power that provides 

moral strength, freedom of action, or will to act. In the context of SA against enemy 

systems, COGs are focal points that hold a system or structure together and draw 

power from a variety of sources and provide purpose and direction to that system. 

In practical terms, COGs have critical requirements, some of which may be 

vulnerable to attack – critical vulnerabilities. These critical vulnerabilities may yield 

decisive points: geographic places, specific key events, critical factors, or functions 

that, when acted upon, allow commanders to gain a marked advantage over an 

adversary or contribute materially to creating a desired effect. Affecting these 

decisive points should exploit a COG’s critical vulnerabilities in a manner that 

creates desired effects against the COG itself. SA may often be the function of 

choice for exploiting adversary decisive points. 
4 

 SA affects conflict-sustaining resources. While it may often be difficult to directly 

target an adversary’s will, we can often target the means the adversary employs to 

conduct or continue the conflict. Modern high-technology warfare is resource 

intensive; the support necessary to sustain it provides many lucrative targets which, 

when attacked, speeds enemy collapse and removes options. This is true across 

the range of military operations and not just for modern, high-technology combat. 

The target sets may change, but the principle remains the same. 

 SA affects the enemy’s strategy. Sun Tzu said the best policy in war is to defeat the 

enemy’s strategy; this requires we hold at risk what the enemy holds dear or deny 

them the ability to obtain what they seek. While other forms of military or national 

power can also deny the enemy strategic choices, SA can often do so more 

effectively and efficiently. 

BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 

SA seizes upon the unique capability of air, space, and cyberspace to 

achieve objectives by striking at the heart of the enemy, disrupting critical 

leadership functions, infrastructure, and strategy, while at the same time avoiding 

a sequential fight through layers of forces.

 Unless the enemy’s military forces are deemed to be a strategic COG, 

they are not useful as SA targets. In fact, the goal of SA operations is to bypass the 

fielded forces to the maximum extent possible. A way to illustrate this concept is to 

think of the military as a tool being used by a nation or organization to enforce or force 

its will. It very often makes more sense to attack the person, nation, or organization 

using the tool rather than the tool itself. SA’s goal is to exert influence on the decisionmaker rather than the tool being used by the decision-maker. 

Next, SA conducted against an enemy system in a deliberate, systematic way 

generates strategic-level effects without first having to fight the enemy’s fielded forces. 

SA seeks to prevent an enemy from achieving goals (reactive) or enabling us to achieve 

our goals (proactive). By affecting strategic-level COGs, the results should be greater 

than those generated by a similar effort against peripheral systems or targets. 

SA can also act on the psychology of the enemy leadership by changing the 

political climate or denying options or choices. These attacks could indirectly affect the 

adversary’s will to fight. 
5 

 During the combined bomber offensive (CBO) in 

Europe in World War II, Allied air attacks against the 

German rail and inland waterway systems fatally 

disrupted the German economy. Even though the 

productive capacity of individual factories increased 

through most of 1944, the disruption of transportation 

nearly immobilized the economy as a whole, almost 

stripped Germany of electrical power (due to disruption 

of coal shipments), and greatly hampered the 

movement of Germany’s armies. These efforts might 

have ended the war in Europe by themselves had 

Germany’s resistance in the field not been collapsing 

simultaneously.

 “The attack on transportation was the decisive blow that completely disorganized 

the German economy. It reduced war production in all categories and made it difficult 

to move what was produced to the front. The attack also limited the tactical mobility of 

the German army.” 

 — United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report (European War) 

STRATEGIC ATTACK AND WARFIGHTING STRATEGY 

 SA represents one key element of a unified national approach to handling a 

conflict and should not be employed in isolation. A sound, unified approach will 

comprise diplomatic, informational, military, and economic activities orchestrated 

carefully to achieve national security objectives. It is most effectively used in a manner 

that complements and is complemented by other operations. For example, action 

against an enemy’s forces may expose critical targets and increase their consumption 

of war-sustaining resources. Such operations may also be necessary to enable SA, as 

the defeat of the Luftwaffe through offensive counterair operations did during World War 

II. Certain coercive applications of SA simply may not work in the absence of 

complementary diplomatic, political, or economic actions. 

Regardless of these considerations, the United States can pursue a 

comprehensive strategy designed to place maximum stress on the enemy system 

(nation or terrorist organization). The process of developing this strategy should start 

with the desired end state and then be worked backwards from big to little, strategic to 

tactical. The enemy should be analyzed as a system and an effects-based approach 

used to determine required effects and actions. Striking an enemy system’s COGs 

should be accomplished as quickly and from as many directions and sources as 

possible, in order to place overwhelming strain on the system. 

Victory in any conflict requires some mechanism for changing the enemy’s 

behavior. Behavior can be influenced by affecting the enemy’s capability to fight or by 
6 

Effects-Based Approach 

 “Effects-based” describes the operations that are planned, executed, assessed 

and adapted to influence or change systems or capabilities in order to achieve 

desired outcomes. Effective operations should be part of a coherent plan that 

logically ties all actions to the achievement of the desired end state. 

NOTE: For a full discussion of the effects-based approach see AFDD 2, Operations and 

Organization. 

influencing his will to fight; most situations will involve aspects of both. There are 

several mechanisms that can be used to implement a coercive strategy (see Chapter 4). 

OBJECTIVES AND EFFECTS 

 Centuries of surface warfare have conditioned leaders of world powers to raise 

armies and navies, the primary attributes of which are mobility, armor, firepower, depth, 

and sustained presence in foreign lands. These attributes are necessary to withstand 

force-on-force engagements until strategic breakthrough can be attained. Military force 

is one instrument of national power; bypassing it altogether or simultaneously attacking 

other instruments of national power or centers of gravity may result in a change of an 

adversary’s ability or will to fight. 

Strategic Objectives 

Ends, not means, drive the SA effort. Successful SA requires clear and 

attainable objectives. Objectives and desired end states should be clearly understood 

by planners and commanders orchestrating the SA effort and should be tied to the SAs 

themselves by a clear, logical mechanism of cause and effect. SA operations are 

designed to produce political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, cyber, and 

information effects that contribute directly to achieving the strategic objectives of the 

joint force commander (JFC) and higher authorities. The senior commander and 

national leaders should also weigh SA operations against potential unintended effects, 

since attacking certain COGs could have undesired impacts on populations and 

neighboring countries. Strategic objectives, like those at all levels, should be 

measurable. Commanders and national leaders should know when those objectives 

are achieved. 

Strategic Effects 

 SA seeks to achieve the greatest effect for the least cost in lives and resources 

by systematically applying force to COGs within the pertinent systems. Systematic 

application of force should not be confused with sequential application, but instead 

refers to a systematic approach to planning and executing attacks to achieve desired 

effects. System change that drives enemy compliance is the goal of SA. This system 

change will most effectively be achieved by applying force through parallel operations 

where the targeted systems are struck in a compressed timeframe. This type of attack 

has the highest probability of pushing a system beyond its ability to react or adapt. 
7 

Attempting to change the system through attacks on its periphery will not be as effective 

as overwhelming system-wide parallel attack. 

 

SA achieves objectives through indirect effects. SA, even more than other 

forms of attack, is concerned with higher-level indirect effects. Direct effects are the 

results of actions with no intervening causal mechanism between act and outcome. 

Direct effects trigger additional outcomes―intermediate effects or mechanisms that 

produce higher-order outcomes or results. From the commander, Air Force forces’ 

(COMAFFOR’s) perspective, individual missions or sorties are actions that cause 

higher-order direct effects, which in turn cause indirect effects. An example might be 

the action of an aircraft dropping weapons, resulting in the direct effect of destroying a 

bridge span. This in turn leads to the indirect effects of impeding movement of enemy 

forces and perhaps, in terms of SA, by severing fiber-optic cables running under the 

bridge span, forcing the adversary to use alternate forms of communication. It may 

seem that indirect effects will take longer to be realized but in fact the end results will 

often occur sooner than if the operation begins at the periphery and moves to the heart. 

 The intended and desired indirect effects of SA may, however, coincide with 

unintended and undesired effects if there are gaps in our understanding of the 

operational environment. Destruction of a bridge span, for example, could also result in 

the unintended disruption of electrical power and telephone communications to a nearby 

community if we were unaware that these utilities were attached to the bridge. This 

could cause hardship in that community and erode any popular support that might have 

existed prior to the event. Commanders and planners must appreciate that 

unpredictable third-party actions, unintended consequences of friendly operations, 

subordinate initiative and creativity, and the fog and friction of conflict will contribute to 

an uncertain operational environment. (Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operations Planning) 

 SA can generate all types of effects, including direct, indirect, physical, 

behavioral, or psychological, and may occur sequentially or in parallel, cascading or 

cumulative. The effects generally will occur as a result of how operations are 

conducted—usually parallel operations will result in parallel effects which put the most 

stress on a system and are most likely to result in permanent system change. 

Sequential operations generally yield sequential effects. Also, the type of system being 

attacked, the action taken against it, the number of nodes struck and the amount of time 

used to carry out the attacks will affect whether effects are cascading―sudden, 

catastrophic changes in system states that often affect surrounding related systems―

or cumulative―building sequentially in small amounts toward system change. The 

more compressed the attack across a wide spectrum of the system, the more likely 

cascading effects are to occur. 

 Effects occur at all levels of operations. The relationships of SA and the 

traditional (or customary) approach to warfare are illustrated in Figure 1.1. The effects of 

SA should be felt at the strategic level and cascade down to the operational and tactical 

levels. Effects upon fielded forces will generally be a byproduct of achieving broader 

strategic objectives. For example, the British retaliatory bombing of Berlin during the 

Battle of Britain shocked Nazi leadership, provoking a decisive change in campaign 
8 

focus. German attacks that had been distributed across southern Britain (and were 

sorely taxing Royal Air Force [RAF] Fighter Command) now concentrated on London, 

greatly facilitating defense efforts, relieving pressure on the beleaguered RAF, and 

ultimately turning the tide of the campaign in Britain’s favor. The significant effect of the 

Berlin raid, although "indirect” from an effects-based perspective, was achieved directly 

upon Hitler and Goering. Subsequent effects cascaded down to the German Luftwaffe 

and the RAF at the operational and tactical levels. 

 

 Figure 1.1. Strategic Attack and the Levels of War 

Systemic Effects 

 Every party to a conflict, whether a modern nation-state or terrorist organization, 

is a complex, adaptive system. Every system has elements critical to its functioning: 

key strengths and sources of power. Some aspects or elements of every system are 

vulnerable to attack or influence. The key to understanding systemic effects is 

understanding how these two are related: what the system’s critical vulnerabilities are. 

Each system has a leadership or governing function (e.g., Osama Bin Laden), some 

adaptable plan or strategy, some means of carrying out its strategy (armed forces or 

terrorist cadres), and key infrastructure supporting the system and allowing it to act on 
9 

its strategy (communications, warfighting resources). SA seeks to incapacitate one or 

more of these key functions, either by affecting the functions themselves (attacks 

against leadership, for instance), or by affecting the linkages between them (as in 

severing the leadership’s means of communication with its control mechanisms). 

Strategic attack may also undermine the elements providing support to these functions 

(for example, propaganda and internal security as they support leadership). Since 

components of complex systems are interrelated, affecting the appropriate linkages and 

nodes in one part of a system can cause cascading changes or failures throughout the 

system as a whole. Further, the disturbances that cause these changes can often be 

very small. Such efficiency is the soul of SA: finding those key relationships within 

systems where small inputs will yield desirable system-wide changes. 

 It is not possible to predict exactly what level of stress will cause a system to fail 

or change its behavior; that level may vary from day to day, even moment to moment. 

However, systems stressed with sufficient intensity and rapidity can suffer effects much 

like shock in the human body—relative inaction coupled with very low system energy 

levels. Shock is achieved when stress is induced faster than a system is able to adapt 

to it. Parallel attack may be the best means of inducing such shock: striking multiple 

targets across a system to induce system-wide stress while also striking critical nodes 

or vulnerabilities chosen to maximize dislocation effects within the system. This may 

hold the best prospect of causing cascading system-wide changes in behavior. SA is 

the critical method to create these effects and may be most efficient when conducted 

through parallel attack. 

Decisive Effects 

 SA offers commanders many options for winning conflicts outright or for shaping 

them in decisive ways. It supports or underpins a variety of potential strategies. 

 Attacks on leadership can often provide significant strategic leverage. Attacks 

against Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, his inner circle, and his key security infrastructure 

during OIF effectively decapitated the Iraqi military, opening the door for a swifter 

counterforce operation against the Republican Guard. Attacks against al Qaeda 

terrorist leaders in Afghanistan and Yemen are further examples of the successful 

removal of enemy leadership. Leadership can be affected in a variety of ways from 

removal to undermining popular support to isolation. Due to SA during DESERT 

STORM, Saddam Hussein was not removed but was forced to take protective 

measures that effectively reduced his command and control capability. 

 SA can be a very flexible tool effective across the range of military operations. 

Strikes against al Qaeda leadership took place during the major operations phase in 

Afghanistan, but those in Yemen were done outside the context of major operations, as 

part of the broader Global War on Terror. Cyberspace operations such as network 

attacks against terror systems across the globe are another example. This is an 

important insight: modern SA capabilities can create discrete, precise effects on short 

notice directly from the continental United States (CONUS). SA can be conducted 

across the range of military operations, as the strategic context warrants. 
10 

 SA can deny an enemy the means and resources it requires to continue a 

conflict. Allied air attacks against the German transportation and oil industries 

eventually crippled German war production and significantly reduced Germany’s 

intertheater mobility, which in turn significantly degraded the Wehrmacht’s ability to 

maneuver and fight. Many potential adversaries today do not produce their own 

weapons, complicating interdiction or destruction of warfighting means. In many cases, 

cyber power can be used to deny an enemy access to financial and informational 

resources it needs to operate effectively. Such operations were used successfully 

against the Yugoslav regime during OAF. 

 SA can deny an enemy strategic options or choices. One example is the 

elimination or disruption of enemy weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. In 

World War II, British and Norwegian commandos successfully carried out raids against 

a Nazi heavy water production plant in Norway. This SA denied the Germans a critical 

capability in developing their version of the atomic bomb. It was also an important 

element of US and coalition strategy during and after Operation DESERT STORM, as a 

combination of coalition air strikes and UN inspections sought to deny the Iraqi regime 

access to WMD. 

 SA can also defeat an enemy strategy that is “in play.” During Operation 

DESERT STORM, SAs against Iraqi surface-to-surface missile system (SCUD) missiles 

combined with strategic defensive measures and deft political initiatives countered 

Saddam Hussein’s intended strategy of breaking the US-led coalition by dragging Israel 

into the war. SCUD suppression efforts achieved the politically vital effect of dissuading 

Israeli retaliation and thus were critical to maintaining the coalition, despite the fact that 

few “hard kills” were achieved. 

 SA can play an important part in a strategy designed to break apart an enemy 

warfighting coalition or use its system of alliances against it. It can also be used to help 

hold together a friendly coalition. In 1943, Allied air attacks against Rome played a 

crucial role both in driving Italian dictator Benito Mussolini from power and in coercing 

Mussolini’s successor to surrender. Rome had been “off-limits” to Allied bombing until 

July 1943, when Allied leaders made a conscious decision to twice bomb a rail yard 

near the center of the city in order to induce psychological shock that would help drive 

Italy from the war. The effort was successful and deprived the Axis one of its important 

component states. During OAF, NATO’s deliberate increase in the intensity of SA 

operations against Yugoslavia coupled with its diplomatic initiatives helped convince 

Russia of NATO’s resolve. Russia then used its influence to pressure Yugoslav 

president Milosevic to accede to NATO’s demands. 

 

SA can play a crucial role in coercing an enemy into adopting a desired 

course of action. Often, this involves accession to demands other than simple 

capitulation, although that may be among the desired objectives. In successful 

instances, SA is most often coupled with complementary diplomatic and information 

initiatives. In December 1972, the US bombing campaign along with Operation 

POCKET MONEY (the mining of Haiphong harbor and other North Vietnamese ports) 
11 

In our victory over Japan, airpower was unquestionably decisive. That 

the planned invasion of the Japanese Home islands was unnecessary is clear 

evidence that airpower has evolved into a force in war co-equal with land and 

sea power, decisive in its own right and worthy of the faith of its prophets. 

— General Carl A. 'Tooey' Spaatz,

Evolution of Air Power, Military Review, 1947 

combined effectively with diplomatic pressure to coerce the North Vietnamese 

leadership to the come to the Paris peace talks. US-led efforts to defeat the North 

Vietnamese Easter Offensive in 1972 culminated in Operation LINEBACKER I (largely 

an aerial interdiction effort), which stopped North Vietnamese action in the field. This 

created the context for diplomatic initiatives, which made good progress until after the 

US November elections. Post-election North Vietnamese diplomatic retrenchment was 

answered with Operation LINEBACKER II’s SAs against COGs in Hanoi and Haiphong 

harbor, which effectively coerced the North Vietnamese into signing a peace accord 

amenable to the US. As previously mentioned, coercion efforts also drove Milosevic to 

withdraw his troops from Kosovo and sign the peace agreement ending OAF. 

ROLE OF AIR, SPACE, AND CYBERSPACE POWER IN SA 

 The role of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities in SA is founded on the 

characteristics of air and space resources. These characteristics (range, speed, 

precision, flexibility and lethality) enable a JFC to access to the depths of adversary’s 

centers of gravity where land and maritime forces cannot easily reach. Added to 

traditional domains is the cyberspace domain. Employing the Air Force’s cyber 

capabilities throughout this domain, in combination with the traditional capabilities of air 

and space power, allows synergy and flexibility across a range of lethal and non-lethal 

options. Air, space, and cyber power used in SA comprises the JFC’s maneuver 

elements that can operate in the third dimension. Through cyber power, the 

commander has access to the cognitive and information dimensions that can give an 

asymmetric advantage and unprecedented access to an adversary’s decision-making 

cycle. Through the employment of Air Force forces and capabilities, the JFC is not 

limited to two-dimensional warfare, using his surface forces in a series of tactical battles 

to position maneuver elements that threaten an adversary’s centers of gravity. The 

application of airpower, integrated with information operations, creates effects more 

rapidly than surface forces alone, thereby accessing the psychological and cognitive 

aspects of warfare directly. Properly employed, SA is the Air Force’s most decisive 

warfighting capability. 

STRATEGIC ATTACK IN IRREGULAR WARFARE OPERATIONS 

 Throughout history, strategic attack has been employed as part of traditional 

warfare between states and groups of states for “traditional” military purposes—political 
12 

victory in the context of those nation states’ purposes. Strategic attack has a place in 

irregular warfare (IW)—violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy 

and influence over the relevant population—as well. The COG in IW is generally the 

relevant populace and the intent of warfare conducted in this realm is to favorably 

influence the COG, not “attack” it. Airpower can influence this strategic COG positively 

and directly in many different ways; these are detailed in AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare. 

There are uses for strategic attack in IW which have historically shown wide 

applicability: 

 Conducting precision-strike operations that eliminate enemy personnel, resources, 

and infrastructure while minimizing unintended collateral on innocent members of 

the populace—all of which enhances the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 

supported government, reassures the populace, and undermines popular support for 

the enemy. The killing of al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June of 2006 is 

an example of this. 

 Conducting precision cyberspace strikes on enemy financial resources to deny use 

of these resources, as has been done throughout OEF and OIF. 

 Conducting strikes or raids on enemy weapons of mass destruction caches or 

production facilities, to prevent use of these weapons as part of enemy strategy, as 

in striking chlorine storage facilities in Iraq to prevent this chemical WMD from being 

used in insurgent improvised explosive devises. 
13 

Order or disorder depends 

on organization. 

— Sun Tzu

CHAPTER TWO 

COMMAND AND CONTROL 

 Effective command and control arrangements and relationships are crucial to the 

success of SA. Unity of effort is key to the success of SA operations and can only 

be achieved through command and control arrangements that ensure unity of 

command. The COMAFFOR/joint force air and space component commander 

(JFACC) should be the supported commander for SA operations who, in turn, supports 

the achievement of the JFC’s objectives. The concept of centralized control and 

decentralized execution of air and space forces is vital to effective SA because the 

synergy of all applied force elements is needed to debilitate the adversary’s willingness 

and capability to wage war. The fragmented air command structure used during the 

Vietnam War proved that piecemeal application of force by the various Air Force and 

other Service force elements dilutes the effectiveness of an operation and often serves 

to extend an operation without achieving US national or military objectives. 

CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION 

 

 Two tenets of air and space power that drive the discussion of how to achieve 

unity of command for air forces are flexibility and versatility. They are also keys to 

ensuring unity of effort of a strategic air campaign. Flexibility allows power to be applied 

to multiple missions and tasks often with little, if any, weapons or systems modifications. 

Even with this inherent flexibility, however, there is rarely enough airpower available to 

satisfy all demands. The versatility is derived from the fact that it can be employed to 

achieve effects at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Centralized 

control of resources maximizes airpower’s potential by emphasizing the integration of 

limited air, space, and cyber resources during planning for operations. It also minimizes 

undue dissipation and fragmentation of effort and ensures coherence and focus on 

essential national or theater objectives. Because no single commander can personally 

direct all the detailed actions of a typical complement of forces, decentralized execution 

of missions and tasks is usually necessary and is accomplished by delegating 

appropriate authority for execution. As a rule, centralized control of operations ensures 

effective employment of limited assets, while decentralized execution allows tactical 

adaptation and accommodates the components’ different employment concepts and 

procedures in a joint environment. 
14 

The combined air and space 

operations center (CAOC) integrates 

all air and space operations into a 

seamless whole based on the JFC’s 

guidance. 

However, the nature of SA operations may require increased direct influence in 

execution. Centralized control, to focus the effective capabilities against desired tasks, 

and decentralized execution, to give 

tactical commanders the ability to fight in 

the most effective way, continue to be 

the preferred methods to employ air, 

space, and cyberspace power. SA 

operations, however, may require very 

precise timing and highly focused 

actions based upon rapidly changing 

intelligence. In these circumstances, 

increased direct influence into tacticallevel execution of SA missions may be 

appropriate. Nevertheless, centralized 

control and decentralized execution 

remain fundamental tenets of air, space, 

and cyberspace power employment. 

Commanders should continue to push 

decision-making authority to the lowest 

practical and appropriate level. 

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS 

SA is employed in a joint construct in a unified command structure under the 

authority of combatant commanders tasked at the direction of the President and 

Secretary of Defense (SecDef). In this context, air, space, and cyber forces organize, 

train, equip, and plan as an integral element of a joint or multinational force. However, 

the air component can be employed independently of the surface components in a joint 

force to help a JFC achieve objectives. This is particularly true for operations with 

strategic objectives that require direct attack. The criteria to attack using the air 

component independent of surface components of the joint force depend on the 

expected effectiveness and availability of capabilities appropriate to achieving the 

desired effects. In most instances, deep-ranging Air Force forces would be employed in 

conjunction with other component air elements of the joint force. 

The command relations described in Joint Publication (JP) 1, Joint Warfare of the 

Armed Forces of the United States and AFDD 2 apply when conducting SA. If air, 

space, and cyber forces comprise the preponderance of SA capability, the JFACC 

should be the supported commander for SA operations. In other instances, the 

JFC/combatant commander may wish to retain direct control of SA operations in order 

to integrate and coordinate the efforts of all participating components and agencies. 

US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) creates global attack plans (both 

nuclear and non-nuclear) based on guidance from the President and SecDef and 

designates appropriate assets to achieve desired effects. Under these circumstances, 

the combatant commander (theater or USSTRATCOM) may opt to form a single-
15 

Service task force. This task force would maintain a C2 system designed to quickly 

disseminate posturing and execution orders from the President and SecDef to the 

forces in the field. During operations in support of a geographic combatant commander, 

USSTRATCOM will coordinate strikes with the affected combatant commander. 

However, USSTRATCOM may relinquish operational control (OPCON) or tactical control

(TACON) of these forces to the supported commander if directed by the President or 

SecDef. 

Some assets critical to effective SA may operate from other combatant 

commanders’ areas of responsibility (AORs). OPCON of strategic attack assets 

operating from CONUS or stationed in another AOR outside the theater of operations, 

may transfer to the supported JFC. For instance, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, B-2s 

launching from CONUS and B-52s launching from Europe were employed in US Central 

Command’s AOR. These forces were attached with specification of OPCON to 

Commander, US Central Command who, in turn, delegated OPCON to Commander, 

US Central Command Air Forces. Circumstances may require other arrangements, but 

these arrangements should be worked out as far in advance and in as much detail as 

possible to avoid confusion. See AFDD 2 for more specific guidance on command 

relationships. 

Special operations forces (SOF) offer a unique set of capabilities that may be 

leveraged to support SA. SOF may conduct SA unilaterally, or in conjunction with other 

forces, but they normally do not fall under the operational control of the air and space 

component. SOF air assets may require air component support to conduct their 

missions and in some instances SOF ground personnel may require air component 

close air support or air interdiction. They may also enable other components to perform 

SA through special reconnaissance or other actions. As an example, during Operation 

DESERT STORM, SOF directed coalition aircraft to targets as part of SCUD-hunting 

efforts. During OEF and OIF, similar operations were conducted to target Taliban, al 

Qaeda, and Iraqi leadership. 

When air operations constitute the bulk of SA capability, the JFC will 

normally task the JFACC, as a supported commander, to conduct such 

operations. Acting in this capacity, the JFACC can assess the effects required, define 

the objectives to be achieved, designate targets to be attacked, integrate air operations 

and allocate air and space resources to achieve the desired effects and objectives. 

Centralized control and decentralized execution maximizes the synergy between SA 

and other uses of military power in achieving national or theater objectives. 
16 

When blows are planned, whoever contrives them with 

the greatest appreciation of their consequences will 

have a great advantage. 

— Frederick the Great

CHAPTER THREE 

PLANNING AND ASSESSMENT 

 SA should be a key element of any warfighting strategy. It has been a major 

element of every conflict the United States has engaged in since World War II and has 

enhanced or decisively shaped many of them. This powerful weapon in the JFC’s 

arsenal cannot be employed effectively if it is not well understood. At the tactical level—

to aviators in the cockpit—SA missions look very much like any other force application 

mission, and this may incline strategists at the operational level to treat them as such. 

However, there are significant differences between SA and counterforce missions, 

especially in terms of planning and assessment. 

 Planning and assessment are combined in this chapter because many of the 

considerations that govern the former apply to the latter as well. As part of an effectsbased approach, they form a seamless whole with employment (covered in Chapter 4) 

in the context of an overall strategy. Planning before operations will obviously be 

separated in time from employment and assessment, but many of the factors that guide 

them are the same and should be considered during planning. Once an operation’s 

battle rhythm has begun, the three operate together as part of an ongoing cycle. 

PLANNING 

SA in Campaign Planning 

 SA planning requires understanding not only of the strategic level of warfare, 

where the effects of SA are manifested, but also of the operational level of war, because 

it is at this level the planning, conduct, control, and sustainment of SA occur. Hence, 

planning should take place within the overall context of campaign planning. 

The COMAFFOR should provide the JFC with SA options early in the 

planning process. Even though SA is a function often carried out by Air Force forces, 

it is vital that its use be sponsored and embraced at the JFC/combatant commander 

level during course of action (COA) development and before component planning starts 

and before COAs are developed. To be used effectively, SA should be integrated and 
17 

Figure 3.1. The Joint Air Estimate Process 

[Based on JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations]

Mission Analysis 

JIPOE is initiated. Stage focuses on analyzing the JFC’s mission and guidance to 

produce air and space component mission statement 

Situation and COA Development 

JIPOE is refined to include adversary COAs. Adversary and friendly COGs are 

analyzed. Multiple air and space COAs or one COA with significant branches and 

sequels are developed 

COA Analysis 

Friendly COAs are wargamed against adversary COAs 

COA Comparison 

Wargaming results are used to compare COAs against predetermined criteria

COA Selection 

Decision brief to the JFACC with COA recommendation. JFACC selects COA 

JAOP Development 

Selected COA is developed into a joint air and space operations plan

JOINT AIR ESTIMATE PROCESS 

sequenced with other 

instruments of national power. 

For example, some forms of 

coercive diplomacy may 

require that political actions 

be carefully synchronized with 

military actions in order to 

credibly convey a threat of 

force or an appropriate sense 

of urgency. SA during 

LINEBACKER II in Vietnam 

was carefully orchestrated 

with diplomatic overtures to 

North Vietnam, the Soviet 

Union, and China, which 

combined to coerce a peace 

settlement with terms 

acceptable to the US. Other 

situations may require the 

careful integration of 

informational or economic 

efforts as well. 

 Once planning for an operation is initiated, the JFC’s strategic estimate 

constitutes the “first look” at military objectives, the strategic environment, the threat, 

and possible alternative COAs. This is when a COA featuring SA, whether stand-alone 

or in a complementary role, should be introduced. The COMAFFOR, as the component 

commander possessing the preponderance of capability, should recommend a SA 

option at this stage even though taskings to the components have not yet been 

formalized. 

 Analysis usually contained in the strategic estimate can be vital for effective SA 

operations. The estimate should include an evaluation of enemy leadership (in 

particular its underlying psychology and motivations), governing mechanisms, 

bureaucratic politics, and political vulnerabilities. Enemy leadership is usually the 

“target audience” (if not the outright target) for SA and so it is vital to understand how 

the leadership thinks, gathers/disseminates information and what underlies its choice of 

COAs. The estimate may also be the only place where strategic COGs, the focus of 

SA, are defined. Analysis of leadership in the estimate is critical because some aspect 

of the leadership most often comprises a strategic COG. Even if leadership is not the 

sole COG, its connectivity and relationship to others shape how other COGs are 

affected. Proper strategic-level causal linkage analysis is a critical part of strategic 

attack planning. 
18 

SA in Air Operations Planning 

 Planners formulate COAs for the COMAFFOR to recommend to the JFC through 

the joint air and space estimate process (JAEP), which is the air component portion of 

the joint operations planning process. The JAEP culminates in production of the joint air 

and space operations plan (JAOP), which details how air and space efforts will 

accomplish or support the JFC’s overall objectives. The JAEP consists of the following 

stages: mission analysis, situation and COA development, COA analysis, COA 

comparison, COA selection, and JAOP development. The following discussion 

highlights considerations specific to planning SA within the JAEP. 

Mission Analysis 

 The mission analysis portion of the JAEP establishes the purpose of the 

operation and broad guidance for its conduct, usually expressed in terms of a JFACC’s 

mission statement. This stage is also where joint intelligence preparation of the 

operational environment (JIPOE) begins. A thorough understanding of the adversary, 

the adversary’s centers of gravity and critical infrastructure and support mechanisms is 

critical. Thoroughly understanding when, where, and how to attack the adversary’s 

military targets is essential to achieving military objectives. Further, understanding the 

historical, cultural and economic sensitivities is critical for justifying the use of force and 

gaining the support (or at least the acquiescence) of the target audience. Figure 3.1 

illustrates the JAEP. 

Objectives and Intent. Determining the purpose of the operation and its desired 

outcome—establishing the objectives and end state—is the most important part of 

mission analysis. Effective use of SA requires clear, attainable, relevant, and 

decisive objectives. It also requires clear definition of the commander’s criteria 

for the operation’s overall success—a logical and achievable end state.

 Clear understanding of the commander’s intent, which consists of the end state, 

objectives, and a comprehensive method for accomplishing them, is especially critical 

for SA operations. This is greater than for many other forms of force application, which 

primarily engage enemy fielded forces. Most counterforce applications seek to achieve 

strategic objectives through accumulation of tactical- and operational-level effects 

against enemy fielded forces. Since the defeat of fielded forces will usually aid 

achievement of strategic-level objectives, efforts against these forces may still be of 

value even if strategic objectives are not clearly developed. This is not so with SA. 

Unclear or unattainable objectives will lead to ineffective operations. This is especially 

so when SA is used in concert with other instruments of national power such as 

diplomacy. Objectives that were unclear and unattainable within the context of North 

Vietnamese motivations (e.g., “create conditions for a favorable settlement by 

demonstrating to the North Vietnamese that the odds are against their winning”) 

contributed to failure of the SA portion of Operation ROLLING THUNDER in Vietnam. 

Even though closely coordinated with diplomatic efforts, the 1966-67 bombing 

accomplished no effects that contributed to attainment of national objectives and sent 

confusing signals to the enemy, the enemy’s allies, and the rest of the world, and 
19 

 Defeat of the enemy consists in overcoming the resistance concentrated in his 

center of gravity....

— Carl von Clausewitz, On War

emboldened the North Vietnamese to expand their involvement in the insurgent struggle 

in South Vietnam. 

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. Successful SA 

operations place unique demands on intelligence professionals involved in planning 

them. “Traditional” intelligence methods are well suited to estimating the strength and 

disposition of enemy forces. Even the intent of the enemy’s military forces can usually 

be surmised from their overt actions. As planning progresses, the effects of force-onforce engagement are relatively easy to estimate, since cause and effect relationships 

are generally straightforward and well understood, and measures of effect (MOEs) are 

easy to derive, especially if attrition-based. 

 This is not the case with SA, which requires clear and in-depth understanding of 

two vital areas beyond those traditionally focused on during JIPOE. The first is how the 

enemy functions as a system—how the various components of their state, group, or 

entity interact and support one another; which functions are key to sustaining other 

functions; what processes are required to keep the system running; and so on. Those 

components or processes that enable many other components of the system to function 

are often the most lucrative targets, as transportation and oil were during the strategic 

bombing campaign of World War II. Enemy leadership is always such a component 

and, by definition, is always in some way a target of SA. 

 The second vital JIPOE requirement is to understand the causal linkages 

between actions and effects. As stated before, the effects of SA are almost always 

indirect—there is some intervening mechanism (often there are several) between the 

direct effects of attack and the ultimate outcome. This means that some thought must 

be put into determining these mechanisms or causal linkages—in thinking through the 

likely consequences of attacks beyond the immediate damage caused by the bombs (or 

missiles, SOF actions, cyber actions (such as computer network attack, etc.). 

 Deriving such intelligence and analyzing it properly are not easy tasks. In-theater 

intelligence and assessment resources are geared to give limited target systems 

analyses, but are probably not sufficient for the kind of in-depth understanding 

necessary for successful SA. Planners can obtain assistance from organizations 

outside the theater (like the Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC)) or outside the DOD 

(like the Central Intelligence Agency), and may even require insight from intelligence 

assets of foreign governments. These agencies should know what is required of them 

and working relationships should be built before operations begin. In many cases 

appropriate access will require coordination above the JFC level. 
20 

Situation and Course of Action Development 

Situation Development. This phase of planning begins with a crucial refinement of the 

ongoing JIPOE process. Compelling an enemy to do our will requires denying them 

those things they need to continue the fight or placing at risk those things they value—

we must critically weaken their sources of power. Thus we must understand what their 

sources of power are and where those sources are, or can be made, critically 

vulnerable and where decisive points for attack are. This may be accomplished through 

COG analysis. 

Center of Gravity Analysis. A center of gravity is a source of power that provides 

moral strength, freedom of action, or will to act. In the context of SA against enemy 

systems (nation, alliance, or other group), COGs are focal points that hold a system or 

structure together and draw power from a variety of sources and provide purpose and 

direction to that system. In practical terms COGs can be thought of as balance points, 

focal points, or leverage points that, if have appropriate action taken against them, will 

have a greater affect on the overall system that has been targeted. They provide a 

means of relating critical system elements to those that are vulnerable—determining 

critical vulnerabilities. Critical vulnerabilities will have decisive points within them; 

attacking these will critically affect the COG and confer decisive advantage for friendly 

commanders. 

 COGs differ from operation to operation. In the case of a major campaign 

against an industrialized opponent, the adversary’s war sustaining resources may 

constitute a COG and its critical vulnerability may be the transportation system that 

serves all of its elements. Decisive points may be nodes within that system. This was 

the case in World War II in Europe, for instance. In the case of stability operations, the 

leadership of an adversary terrorist network may be the COG and the means of 

affecting it may be cyber-operations based SA against its means of financial support, 

which may have decisive points vulnerable to cyber attack. Some aspect of the 

adversary’s leadership will likely form a COG regardless of the type of conflict, even 

though the means of affecting it may change from situation to situation. 

 Affecting the appropriate COGs in the right way should have the most decisive 

effect on a conflict. A number of tools and models exist to aid planners in analyzing 

COGs and how to best attack them. Regardless of the analysis method used, 

opportunities exist to achieve physical and coercive effects that are well out of 

proportion to the effort and resources required to accomplish the attacks. Identifying 

these opportunities requires sophisticated analysis of a specific system’s COGs which 

gives a broad view of those parts of the enemy’s system that friendly action should 

orient upon. 

 One of the key insights of the systems approach is that it emphasizes the 

vulnerability of complex systems to attacks upon the linkages and interrelationships 

among components. In many cases, it may be beneficial to strike at a COG through 

parallel attack. This may synergistically place greater stress on the COG than 
21 

sequential or serial attack could alone. Allied attacks against the German rail network 

accomplished this effect during the last ten months of World War II. Allied bombers 

struck rail yards, while near-parallel attacks by medium altitude bombers and fighters 

destroyed rolling stock and rail track away from cities. These efforts crippled a system 

the Germans relied upon for freedom of action. 

 Another technique involves affecting target systems so as to expose new, more 

accessible vulnerabilities. During Operation DESERT STORM, coalition forces disabled 

a key portion of the fiber optic network in the Iraqi communication system in order to 

force reliance on more exploitable forms, such as ultrahigh frequency radios. 

Course of Action Development, Analysis, Comparison, and Selection 

 Subsequent phases of the JAEP involve the development, analysis, comparison, 

and selection of COAs. COAs address who, what, when, where, how, and why joint air 

operations are to be conducted, including objectives, forces required, and concepts for 

projecting, employing, and sustaining those forces. In many cases SA will form part of a 

larger COA or set of COAs, complementing efforts against fielded forces and action by 

nonmilitary elements of national power, as it did in both Europe and the Pacific in World 

War II and again in OIF. In some cases, it may form a distinct phase, “sub-campaign,” 

or sequel within a larger conflict, as LINEBACKER II did in Vietnam or the bombing of 

Serbia did in OAF. In other cases, it may be employed in an independent COA, an 

alternative to force-on-force engagement. Finally, SAs may be employed separately to 

accomplish very specific purposes, as in Doolittle’s raid on Tokyo, US and British strikes 

on Rome in 1943 (helping bring about Italian surrender), or Israel’s attack on Iraq’s 

Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. Regardless of how large or small a part of the joint 

campaign, however, planners should develop and validate a concept of operations for 

SA, just as they do for counterforce applications. 

 When developing COAs, planners should think through the causal links between 

an affected system or target and the achievement of objectives. This is not easy—it is 

much more art than science. These links almost always involve subjective judgments 

about the nature of the enemy and how they will react to us, especially at the very 

highest levels of the “causal chain,” where changes in actual behavior occur. 

Ultimately, COA development should discern objectives, tasks, measures, and 

indicators to create effects among adversary systems in a manner consistent with the 

operation’s assumptions, guiding strategy, and end state. In doing so, the campaign 

transitions from merely dismantling the systems studied in the COG analysis phase to 

creating appropriate effects at the right time in the proper location. Sorting out the 

linkages will probably require assistance from sources outside the theater and insight 

from sources with deep knowledge of the enemy. Automated tools may someday help 

sort through them, but such tools will only be as accurate as the underlying assumptions 

planners make concerning enemy motivations, psychology, and structure. 

Wargaming. Planners should be aware that during the COA analysis and comparison 

phases of the JAEP, it may be difficult to accurately wargame the effects of SA. 
22 

Counterforce operations (e.g., counterland) are somewhat easier to model, since the 

effects of attrition on enemy forces are often assumed to be linear. The effects of SAs 

are most often nonlinear and simple force-on-force models are not useful in predicting 

outcomes. This is true even of strikes against enemy resources, due to the complex 

adaptive nature of economic activity. It is essential that COA comparison and 

wargaming be done qualitatively, not just quantitatively, and airmen should be prepared 

to speak to the complex, nonlinear nature of effects on enemy leadership, perceptions, 

strategies, and systems. A wargaming format that emphasizes friendly action, enemy 

reaction, and friendly counteraction may be best suited for SA planning. 

 The unsuccessful Allied SA effort against the German ball bearing industry 

during their bombing effort offers an excellent illustration of difficulties involved in 

determining and modeling (or wargaming) causal linkages. Operations analysis 

revealed that ball bearings represented a critical potential bottleneck in the German war 

economy. Virtually all German manufactured machinery used them, and over half of all 

used were manufactured at a single plant in Schweinfurt. In 1943, US bombers leveled 

the plant, reducing German ball bearing production by 38% in one strike. Unfortunately 

for the Allies, the Germans had anticipated such an attack and had laid up months of 

reserve stock, purchased tons more from neutral nations, begun the full-scale dispersal 

of the industry, and researched use of a different type of bearing that was more readily 

available. The Schweinfurt raid, though successful in its direct effects, ultimately failed 

to have the desired effect on the Nazi war effort. Even the opportunity costs involved in 

dispersing the industry and researching use of alternative bearings represented net 

improvements for the German war economy. Further, the price Germany exacted for 

the raid (over 15% losses) forced Allied planners to dramatically reduce attacks on 

German industry until a greater degree of air superiority could be attained. 

Branches and Sequels. The Schweinfurt raid points out another element critical to 

successful SA planning and COA selection: The anticipation of likely enemy responses 

to our actions. Planners and commanders should assume the enemy is intelligent and 

adaptive; that he will develop ways to work around the damage caused to his systems, 

or find ways to deny elements of friendly strategy (especially easy to do when subjected 

to serial attacks). We should anticipate those workarounds and build branches and 

sequels into our plans accordingly. 

 Branches are options built into the basic or initial plan. They will usually have a 

specific trigger or triggers delineated, such as a particular enemy action or success of a 

friendly operation. In terms of SA, a branch might involve shifting the COG or COGs the 

friendly effort is focused upon, opening or closing certain target systems to attack, 

escalating or de-escalating the intensity of effort. In 1943, senior Allied leaders built the 

option to bomb Rome into plans for the invasion of Italy. Implementation of this branch 

had the desired effects, hastening the downfall of the Mussolini government and Italian 

surrender. 

 A branch may also entail a change in the way force is applied through SA. 

LINEBACKER II represented a dramatic increase in the tempo and intensity of SA 
23 

coupled with a change in target focus, as did the last several weeks of operations during 

OAF. Both efforts were successful. Such branches should be planned before 

operations begin. 

 Sequels are subsequent operations based on possible outcomes of current 

operations. At the operational level, campaign phases can be viewed as sequels to the 

basic plan. They usually represent larger changes in focus or emphasis than branches 

do. The strategic bombing campaign against Germany involved several sequels—in 

this case implicit campaign phase changes—as the Germans devised workarounds to 

the damage caused by Allied bombing. The largest was a shift in early 1944 away from 

bombing war-sustaining resources for their own sake to bombing aircraft production 

infrastructure and Berlin, which had the effect of drawing the Luftwaffe into the teeth of 

escorting Allied fighters. SA became subordinate to a larger offensive counterair effort 

until the Luftwaffe was defeated. Essentially, this shift represented a new phase of the 

Allied bombing effort. “Industrial web” bombing resumed in full force (and was much 

more effective) after defeat of the Luftwaffe, introducing another phase or sequel. Of 

course, “reactive phasing” is not the best way to conduct operations. Sequels in the 

form of phases should be planned for and made part of the JAOP. 

Joint Air Operations Plan Development 

 Air component planning culminates in production and validation of a JAOP, which 

provides general guidance and a framework for succeeding air operations directives, 

master air attack plans, air tasking orders, and similar products that direct air and space 

efforts once execution has begun. There are a number of considerations unique to SA 

operations that planners should consider as they assemble the JAOP. 

Targeting Considerations. As the JAOP is developed, commanders and planners 

should continually assess whether the military effects they are planning to impose are 

achievable and support the campaign’s overall objectives. As planning progresses into 

tactical tasks and individual targets, planners sometimes have a tendency to devolve 

into “input” or “target-based” planning rather than effects-based planning. Planners may 

begin to say, “The plan has these resources; what can we hit with them?” or “let’s hit the 

usual list of targets,” rather than determining the desired effects on the enemy system 

and then deriving resources and capabilities required to achieve those effects. Inputbased planning often leads to logical disconnects between ends and means, such as 

military COAs that cannot achieve the overall political goals, as was the case in 

Vietnam. Such logical disconnects may not seriously hamper efforts to defeat enemy 

fielded forces. However, such disconnects may greatly hamper SA efforts, because 

success usually requires clear understanding of the more complex logical links between 

actions and desired effects. The temptation to resort to an inputs-based approach often 

becomes more pronounced as planning progresses into execution and the stress of a 

daily battle rhythm. Planners should be aware of this temptation and compensate. 

Commanders should be prepared to redirect or refocus planners if they see this 

happening. Airmen should think effects-based if they are to successfully operate 

effects-based. 
24 

 The conceptual problems in constructing an 

adequate or useful measure of military power have 

not yet been faced. Defining an adequate measure 

looks hard, and making the estimates in real 

situations looks even harder. 

— Andrew W. Marshall 

Force Considerations. Airmen should be aware that a wide variety of tools can 

perform SA operations. There is no such thing as an inherently “tactical” or “strategic” 

asset—virtually any system, regardless of what it is ordinarily used for, may contribute 

to the overall SA effort. Planners should think broadly: many options will be available. 

They should avoid resorting to a particular system or weapon because “that’s what we 

usually use.” The desired effects should drive the capabilities used and the targets 

selected. 

ASSESSMENT 

 Assessment is essential to successful operations in general and successful SA in 

particular. It is integral to the effects-based planning-execution-assessment cycle from 

beginning to end. Planning for it should begin long before forces are engaged and 

actual assessment efforts may continue long after a conflict ends. It informs day-to-day 

operations once a battle rhythm is established and influences doctrine, strategy, and 

even procurement in peacetime. Analysts involved in the assessment process are a 

vital part of US warfighting efforts. Operational and campaign assessment, performed 

by the air component and JFC respectively, extend analysis far beyond the tactical 

realm of combat assessment and are especially vital to SA efforts. The focus of these 

must go beyond assessments of battle damage or weapons effectiveness to 

anticipatory judgments about what effects SA may have over the course of a campaign 

or a conflict. 

 Nonetheless, assessment is often the most difficult part of the planningemployment-assessment cycle to perform consistently well. While direct physical 

effects normally provide key indicators for measuring the success or effectiveness of an 

operation, the indirect effects are most important for the SA effort and are harder to 

measure, relying on qualitative and subjective measures of effectiveness, not 

quantitative and empirical measures of performance. This will continue to present 

significant challenges to analysts for the foreseeable future. 
25 

 The industrial measures [the US Strategic Bombing 

Survey] utilized to criticize the Combined Bomber 

Offensive (CBO) [were] simply too coarse and 

unappreciative of all but the most direct economic and 

military effects of strategic bombing. 

— James G. Roche and Barry D. Watts, 

Choosing Analytic Measures 

Planning for Assessment 

 Planners, commanders, and analysts may not know the impact of SAs 

immediately because SA most often works through psychological, systemic, cascading, 

or other higher-order effects. Therefore, successful SA may depend on anticipatory 

operational and campaign assessment done as part of planning. Accurate assessment 

provides the groundwork for analysts to determine how well the plan is developing 

during execution. This applies even more so to SA operations. The subjective and 

sometimes tenuous linkage between cause and effect could make intermediate steps in 

the effects chain hard to detect, leading to the false impression that particular 

operations are ineffective. As with JIPOE, deriving such insight is not easy and should 

be thoroughly planned for. Planners will need help from national-level assets (many of 

the same used for “up-front” analysis) and since these resources are “low density, high 

demand,” gaining access will be much easier if coordinated early. Planners and 

intelligence collection managers should also consider ongoing collection requirements 

during plan execution: What type of information will be needed, what assets will be 

needed, and how will these assets be controlled and sustained. Planners should be as 

thorough and detailed when planning for assessment as when planning for any other 

aspect of SA. 

Requirements 

 SA is able to impose systemic/functional and psychological effects that may 

achieve strategic objectives more directly than defeat of enemy fielded forces. 

Historically, the ability to measure such effects in order to gauge effectiveness (overall 

progress toward objectives) has been very limited. Traditional assessment efforts were 

geared to analyzing the immediate, physical effects of combat: The attrition of enemy 

troops or equipment, or the damage to facilities caused directly by bombs or other 

weapons. Planners and analysts during World War II, Vietnam, and even Operation 

DESERT STORM lacked tools with which to evaluate their progress. Even the US 

Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) after World War II, as deep and comprehensive an 

analysis as has ever been done, relied on very simplistic linear measures to gauge 

economic effects of the Allied bombing effort, ignoring much beyond direct production 

figures. This missed many of the indirect effects—military, economic, political, and 

psychological—such as the diversion of resources to air defense and the growing 
26 

popular pressure for retaliation that led the Nazi regime to waste resources on largely 

ineffective terror weapons like the V-1 and V-2.

 In general, strategists need to know what kind of indicators can be used to 

determine progress toward achievement of particular effects and objectives. Most of 

the indicators available are objective and quantitative; they help measure physical 

effects. What is often most important for SA operations are subjective and qualitative 

indicators that help measure indirect effects, especially in realms like economic and 

psychological impact. These will most likely have to be derived by planners themselves, 

or by the analysts and intelligence managers assisting them. Some easily quantifiable 

measures exist, but they may often be deceiving (like the USSBS’ production figures). 

Planners may be tempted to use them because they are easy to obtain, but should 

understand their limitations. Some qualitative measures may be straightforward; if 

enemy capitulation is the objective, it either happens or it doesn’t. Most will be much 

less “black or white,” involving a range or gradation of possible effects that will be hard 

to measure objectively. The indirect economic effects of Allied bombing during World 

War II are examples. So are the beneficial effects friendly actions have upon parties 

outside a conflict, like the influence NATO attacks on Serbia had in getting the Russians 

to coax Milosevic to concede during OAF. Nonetheless, these are real effects that may 

have a great deal more influence upon strategy and the conduct of operations than do 

more easily quantifiable effects. 

 Progress toward accomplishment of even straightforward objectives like 

surrender can often be very difficult to measure. In many cases, complex systems 

accumulate effects over time that move them toward a change in state or behavior, but 

may not exhibit indicators of change until a critical point is reached, at which time the 

system will fail catastrophically. The point at which this “catastrophe” will occur is often 

impossible to predict reliably. This was the case with the final deterioration of the 

German war economy in early 1945, the sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet 

Union in 1991, and the rapid collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan during OEF. 

This unpredictability may frustrate strategists and leaders as a conflict progresses and 

may translate into pressure to change COAs, refocus efforts, or divert resources from 

SA prematurely. 

Operational Assessment (OA) and Campaign Assessment 

 Planners, in conjunction with intelligence and operations research analysts, 

should develop solid and logical measures and indicators, and plan for ways to collect 

intelligence against them during execution. From the Air Force perspective, this effort is 

the responsibility of the operational assessment team within the strategy division of the 

AOC. OA evaluates the performance of the commander’s air and space strategy in 

terms of its ability to achieve desired effects and objectives. It builds on the objective 

analysis performed during combat assessment, taking a critical look at the selected 

strategy and COAs to determine if adjustments need to be made. OA is the “entering 

argument” for assessment of SA, but is only a starting point. Deriving the necessary 

measures and collection requirements is difficult, conceptually and practically, and 
27 

commanders should not restrict the assessment to component efforts. Campaign 

analysis at the JFC level will add perspective, as will assistance from organizations like 

JWAC and other national-level resources. Assistance from such organizations should 

be planned for and coordinated as early as possible. 
28 

CHAPTER FOUR 

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 

RESOURCES 

 

SA may be carried out with nuclear and conventional global strike capabilities 

from all the components: bombers, attack aircraft, SOF, ballistic and cruise missiles, 

information operations, offensive space capabilities, and surface forces. Each system 

or weapon has unique capabilities that should be exploited based on the nature of the 

desired effects. Normally, Air Force forces will have the preponderance of capability to 

conduct and support SA operations. 

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) 

WEAPONS CONSIDERATIONS 

Nuclear operations are a form of SA, authorized only by the President of the 

United States, which can produce political and psychological effects well beyond their 

actual physical effects. The employment of nuclear weapons may lead to such 

unintended consequences as escalation of a current conflict or long-term deterioration 

of relations with other countries. For this reason above all others, the decision whether 

or not to use, or even threaten to use, nuclear weapons will always be a political 

decision, not a military one. 

The fundamental purpose of US nuclear forces is deterrence and in that context, 

the US uses nuclear weapons every day. Deterrence attempts to dissuade or prevent 

an adversary’s, or potential adversary’s, leadership from initiating a course of action 

contrary to our interests. An adversary must believe the cost of aggression against the 

US, its interests, or its allies will be so high as to outweigh any possible gain. Thus, 

deterrence attempts to maintain the status quo while ultimately influencing the state of 

mind in the adversary’s leadership to a point where the course of action is not even 

contemplated. Deterrence requires the US to maintain the ability to use force and the 

credible threat of the use of that force. Without the capability and perceived will to use 

nuclear weapons, deterrence will fail. 

It is stated US policy not to employ biological or chemical weapons. CBRN 

weapons have great potential for any foe who seeks to induce strategic effects. For 

example, such weapons may be used to induce terror or mass dislocation, to deter a 

course of action (e.g., intervention), to deny access, to blackmail, or to enhance 

international prestige. Air and space forces should be prepared to deter CBRN use and 

respond against any adversary that threatens to use or uses CBRN. Preemptive SA 

against an adversary’s CBRN capability before it can be weaponized, relocated, 

exported, hidden, or used may be a commander’s best option against those threats. 

The growing danger from proliferation of such weapons requires that air and space 

forces be capable of locating and attacking them with a high degree of accuracy, in 

order to ensure their destruction while minimizing collateral damage. 
29 

During the Cuban Missile Crisis [and] the 

Korean War...the possibility of nuclear use—by 

one side—contributed to successful coercive 

diplomacy. As the confrontation over Cuba 

unfolded, US intelligence informed the Kennedy 

administration that Soviet nuclear forces were in a 

poor state of preparedness and that the United 

States could, if necessary, launch a devastating 

first strike with a low probability of a robust Soviet 

response. This dominance allowed Kennedy to 

stake out a demanding public profile; he knew that 

the costs of escalation would weigh more heavily 

on Moscow. In the Korean War, the North agreed 

to accept talks leading to the continued partition of 

the country in part because of the election of 

President Eisenhower, who threatened the use of 

nuclear weapons to end the conflict. 

—Daniel Byman, Matthew Waxman, and Eric Larson, 

Air Power as a Coercive Instrument 

The potential for catastrophic collateral damage is a particularly important 

concern when attacking such weapons directly. If an enemy relocates CBRN weapons 

systems close to civilian population centers with the intent of shielding them from attack 

(a violation of Article 58 of Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions), it may be 

politically, legally, or morally difficult to target them unless their use is certain and 

imminent. In such cases, an indirect approach may be better. Directly attacking 

production or supporting infrastructure, such as plants where nontoxic chemical 

precursors are made or key means of transportation used to move them may have the 

desired effects and achieve the objectives. It may be necessary to use nonlethal means 

to force an adversary to move the weapons to locations where they can be safely 

attacked. It may also be safest to degrade or destroy some production facilities before 

they begin production, as the Israelis did against Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. 

Close coordination of SA with information and diplomatic efforts are especially important 

when preemptive strikes against CBRN capabilities are considered, since strategies to 

publicly justify the strikes or mitigate the undesired effects of collateral damage are 

likely to play a central role in both deterring the adversary and sustaining political will for 

subsequent attacks. Targeting decisions against potential CBRN threats involve 

significant issues under the law of war and should be assessed for compliance with 

international law, including the law of armed conflict, and relevant US treaty obligations. 
30 

 The successful prosecution of parallel war requires more 

than compressing sequential attacks into one simultaneous 

attack. Parallel war exploits three dimensions—time, space, 

and levels of war. In the opening hours of the Gulf War, all 

three dimensions were exploited: 

• Time—within the first 90 minutes over 50 separate targets 

were on the master attack plan. Within the first 24 hours, 

over 150 separate targets were designated for attack. 

• Space—the entire breadth and depth of Iraq was 

subjected to attack. No system critical to the enemy 

escaped targeting because of distance. 

• Levels of war—national leadership facilities (strategic level), Iraqi air defense and 

Army operation centers (operational level), and Iraqi deployed fighting units—air, 

land, and sea (tactical level)—came under attack simultaneously. 

—Maj Gen David A. Deptula, 

Effects-based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare 

ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE EMPLOYMENT 

Parallel versus Sequential Operations 

SA is normally most effective when employed using parallel operations. 

Strikes on COGs are almost always necessary, but a parallel approach—simultaneously 

striking a wide array of targets chosen to cause maximum shock effect across an 

enemy system—limits an adversary’s ability to adapt and react and thus places the 

most stress on the system as a whole. This may offer the best opportunity to trigger 

system-wide shock, thus inducing paralysis or collapse. The object is to effectively 

control the opponent’s strategic activity through rapid decisive operations. Even when 

this is not fully realized, parallel attack should work synergistically with other actions to 

cause favorable changes in enemy behavior. 

 Examples of successful parallel attack at the operational level abound. Coalition 

forces effectively destroyed Iraqi ground resistance using this approach during 

Operation DESERT STORM and OIF. The Israelis used similar methods to achieve 

similar results against Arab armies in the 1956 and 1967 wars, and the Egyptians 

achieved it at the tactical level against the Israeli Bar-Lev defensive line in 1973. While 

the theoretical ideal of complete paralysis was not achieved in any of these instances, 

enemy forces were still prevented from functioning as coherent systems through the 

mechanism of parallel attack. SA aims at similar effects upon an enemy system as a 

whole. The Allies sought such effects against Germany during World War II’s allied 

bombing effort, enjoying success during the last ten months of the war in Europe, when 

near-parallel and unrelenting attack on Germany’s transportation network became 

feasible on a large scale. Coalition bombing during Operation DESERT STORM also 
31 

approached this result, but the effect was fleeting and did not prevent the Iraqis from 

taking action such as launching the SCUD campaign against Israel. Similar bombing in 

OIF may have been more effective if it worked synergistically with parallel attacks 

against Iraqi fielded forces to ensure swift victory. While not foolproof, a parallel 

approach may hold the best prospect of causing cascading changes throughout an 

enemy system. 

 In some circumstances, parallel operations may not be possible or desirable. 

Typically, political or resource constraints are what preclude the use of parallel 

operations. In these cases, attacks should be conducted so that the resulting effects 

attain the objectives in priority order. When employed this way, much of the mass and 

shock effect of air and space power may be compromised. 

 One of the highest-priority enabling objectives for air commanders will always be 

to gain the degree of air superiority needed to make other operations possible. 

Developments in air defense technology may necessitate devoting a substantial weight 

of effort to obtaining air superiority. The employment of stealth assets may reduce the 

weight of effort required. This should be done in concert with (and sometimes before) 

SA operations are commenced if there is a significant risk of losing the assets 

employed. The US found this was necessary during World War II, having lost thousands 

of bombers in attacks against the heart of Europe before switching focus to defeat of the 

Luftwaffe in early 1944. The effectiveness of Allied bombing improved remarkably after 

this was accomplished. The Israelis also found it necessary to neutralize the Egyptian 

ground-based air defense system before their air force could operate effectively during 

the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 

 It is possible to combine parallel and sequential attack strategies. Such a 

combination recognizes those cases where constraints and restraints may limit the 

ability to carry out simultaneous attacks, but incorporates as many of the advantages of 

parallel attack as possible. In combined parallel and sequential operations, high priority 

objectives are the focus of the initial air and space effort. At phase points, the campaign 

can be expanded to incorporate additional objectives, while continuing to ensure the 

previous requirements are met. For example, the first air and space objectives might be 

to isolate national leadership; destroy CBRN and the means of delivery; achieve air, 

space, and information superiority; and destroy certain C2 capabilities. Once these 

objectives have been met, air and space operations could then expand to incorporate 

additional objectives, such as disruption of national fuel stocks, electric power, and 

transportation systems, or dislocation of enemy fielded forces. In effect, this was the 

approach adopted in Operation DESERT STORM, although the first “phases” were 

completed much faster than originally planned. The JFACC can tailor a campaign in 

this manner to a level that maximizes intensity but maintains focus and enhances 

control. A phased strategy, with varying operational intensity, may also be forced on 

commanders by external constraints, as occurred in OAF. 
32 

Coercion 

 Coercion is a concerted effort to modify an adversary’s behavior by manipulating 

the actual or perceived costs and benefits of continuing or refusing to pursue a certain 

course of action. A coercive strategy may involve one or more of several potentially 

overlapping mechanisms to include denial, decapitation, power base erosion, unrest 

and weakening. 

 The mechanism by which SA can most effectively coerce the enemy is through 

denial whereby it threatens the enemy with defeat or prevents it from achieving its 

military objectives. In this way, denial seeks to change enemy behavior by hindering or 

destroying his capability to fight. Denial can be implemented in two ways; counter-force 

or counter-strategy. Counter-force reduces the enemy’s capability to carry out its 

intended actions by affecting its ability to fight while counter-strategy seeks to convince 

the enemy that its actions will not succeed, instilling a sense of hopelessness. Denial 

convinces the enemy that defeat is inevitable and that it would be more prudent to 

capitulate sooner rather than later. In other cases, denial induces strategic paralysis 

within entire enemy systems, thus rendering effective resistance impossible, i.e., 

denying the enemy the ability to act at least temporarily. The Allied bombing effort and 

Pacific bombing campaigns that targeted German and Japanese industrial resources 

and the coalition strategic air effort against the Iraqi regime during Operation DESERT 

STORM and OIF are examples of denial. 

 Decapitation threatens the enemy’s military and national leadership. Attacking 

the military chain of command via counter-control decapitation supports denial by 

rendering enemy command and control ineffective. Attacking national leadership via 

counter-regime decapitation supports power base erosion by putting at risk the regime’s 

ability to maintain power. Enemy regimes either comply with the coercer’s demands or 

risk removal from power. 

 Power base erosion is tied to decapitation and involves threatening a regime’s 

relationship with its key supporters. SA can accomplish this by using air strikes to turn 

elites against a regime or foster concern among key decision-makers. This mechanism 

can backfire, however. For example, in Operation El Dorado Canyon, US air strikes on 

Moammar Qhaddafi’s command center, a naval special operations training school, a 

military portion of the Tripoli airport, and barracks of elite troops did not have one of 

their intended effects―provoking the Libyan military to overthrow his regime. Instead, 

the raids appeared to strengthen Qaddafi vis-à-vis his rivals. 

 Finally, SA of valid military objectives can have the coercive effect of creating 

unrest among an enemy’s population and/or weakening of the enemy’s infrastructure. 

These mechanisms are aimed at impacting the enemy’s popular will or perception. In 

the past, these mechanisms have involved directly targeting civilian populations to 

increase disaffection and pressure the adversary leadership to accept the demands of 

the coercer. However, the legality and morality of directly attacking an enemy’s civilian 

populace is against international law concerning the conduct of war. The US remains 

committed to these laws and principles that support them. Additionally, historical 
33 

evidence suggests that strategies directed against an enemy’s population seldom 

succeed. Now, however, with the advent of precision weaponry, the US is capable of 

carefully regulating the destructive effects of SA thereby minimizing collateral damage. 

This capability enables the US to use these coercive mechanisms in a way that 

complies with the laws of armed conflict. 

 Early attempts to coerce the enemy through SA had a mixed record of success. 

In the Korean War, the “strategic” air effort against the North’s resources was 

unsuccessful, however, North Korean concerns that we would escalate by using nuclear 

weapons helped bring about a permanent cease-fire. Initial SA efforts in Vietnam also 

failed due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and motivation of the 

enemy. Nevertheless, LINEBACKER II did aid in persuading the North Vietnamese to 

accept a limited settlement that permitted US withdrawal from the war. The advent of 

precision weaponry and stealth, however, enables a more discriminate use of airpower, 

improving SA’s coercive ability. In fact, coercive use of SA proved indispensable to 

success in ODF and OAF. 

 Past operations have shown that successful coercion with air and space power is 

a product of one or more of the following factors: 

Escalation Dominance. Escalation dominance is the ability to increase the enemy’s 

costs of defiance while denying them the opportunity to neutralize those costs or 

counter-escalate. Nuclear retaliation remains the ultimate form of escalation dominance 

and its threat is still valuable in deterring an adversary’s use of CBRN, but many nonnuclear applications of SA offer options as well. The credible threat of a major increase 

in the tempo or destructiveness of bombing may be effective, as may a change in 

intended effects: Switching from attacks on purely military targets to attacks on dual-use 

infrastructure (civilian infrastructure supporting military functions). Both of these proved 

effective during OAF. Escalation dominance should be planned through the full 

spectrum of actions and counter-actions in the conflict. Effective use requires a clear 

understanding of the desired friendly political and military end state. 

Defeating the Enemy’s Strategy. SA can accomplish this in a variety of ways. One of 

the most obvious, deterring or denying use of CBRN, may be accomplished through 

threat of nuclear retaliation or by limited or threatened conventional attacks on 

production and delivery systems. Direct strikes against enemy leadership (as in OEF), 

or its connectivity to instruments of national power (such as control links to fielded 

forces, as in Operation DESERT STORM), can remove strategic options. Effects of the 

latter sort may be difficult to achieve with SA alone, however. 

Magnifying Threats from Third Parties. In many cases, threats to a hostile regime 

from third-party sources, such as internal dissidents or a nation external to the conflict, 

can wield significant coercive power. SA can contribute to such coercive efforts by 

reducing the ability of an adversary to defend against a hostile third power or by 

weakening internal control mechanisms, thus highlighting the fragility of the regime. 

Efforts of the latter sort played a part in Saddam Hussein’s decision to begin his troops’ 

withdrawal from Kuwait during Operation DESERT STORM, and in Slobodan 
34 

 I think...that had we [the Serbian government] rejected that 

joint [peace] proposal of...the G-7 plus Russia, then there 

would have been yet another change for the worse that would 

have placed yet another trump card into the hands of our 

enemies.... Without doubt, even more massive bombing 

would have followed in retaliation, with the loss of a great 

number of lives. 

—Slobodan Milosevic 

Interview on Belgrade Palma Television 

 12 December 2000 

Milsoevic’s decision to come to terms with NATO during OAF. Strikes against dual-use 

assets like electrical power, in addition to having system-wide denial effects, may prove 

effective in coercing regimes in which popular unrest is an issue. 

Credible Threat or Use of Force. The use of SA, or the threat of its use, should be 

credible in an adversary’s mind if coercion is to be successful. Through words and 

actions, we must be able to convey to the enemy that we can and will deliver on our 

promises. Success hinges on the integration of physical attacks with the right 

informational, diplomatic or economic activities to demonstrate that we have both the 

will and the capability to endanger what they value. The restricted and graduated 

nature of US SA efforts in Operation ROLLING THUNDER failed to convey to the North 

Vietnamese leadership that we intended to inflict damage meaningful enough to warrant 

even a temporary halt to their military action in South Vietnam. In LINEBACKER II, by 

contrast, the US was able to deliver a threat of retaliation with sufficient scope and 

intensity to coerce a limited settlement from North Vietnam. 

 There is a danger here: While successful threats or use of force can enhance 

credibility, unsuccessful use can as easily destroy credibility. The “mystique” of certain 

forms of airpower (such as the B-52 bomber) helped convey the seriousness of US 

intent during the LINEBACKER operations. On the other hand, some have argued that 

airpower “failed” in Vietnam, hurting America’s overall military credibility. While US 

failure in Vietnam was a failure of overall political and military policy, not of airpower 

alone, the perception of the “failure of airpower” in some circles led many to discount its 

capabilities as a coercive tool for a number of years. This may have contributed to 

Saddam Hussein’s decision calculus when planning for Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 

(Hussein’s pre-war statements concerning US airpower lend credence to this idea) and 

contributed to the failure of American efforts to coerce Iraqi withdrawal from that country 

during Operation DESERT SHIELD. 

Enemy Vulnerability and Susceptibility to Coercion. Not all enemies can be 

coerced and an enemy who was successfully coerced in the past may not be coercible 

in the future. For coercion to succeed, the enemy must not be so desperate or so 

devoted to their course of action that they are unwilling to change their behavior for 
35 

anything short of complete subjugation. Traditionally, parties to ethnic, religious, civil, or 

national liberation wars have been difficult to coerce. Coercion may still be possible in 

such conflicts, but it may be more difficult, take more time, and require more force to 

affect. In general, the coercive “track record” of SA in Vietnam was very poor, due 

mainly to the implacability of enemy leadership. A dramatic escalation in the level of 

force used, however, did wring moderate concessions from the North Vietnamese 

during LINEBACKER II, albeit at a substantial political cost back in the US. 

Detailed Understanding of Enemy Leaders’ Thinking and Motivations. This is 

necessary for most aspects of planning and executing SA, but is particularly vital for 

successful coercion. US failure to understand North Vietnamese leadership led to 

coercion’s poor performance in that war. Much more sophisticated appreciation of the 

enemy (for example, strike and information operations against dual-use commercial 

assets controlled by the Serbian ruling elite) enabled successful coercion of Slobodan 

Milosevic during OAF. 

Complementary Operations and Synergy 

 While SA offers commanders independent, potentially decisive options, it is 

usually most effective when employed in conjunction with surface forces and other 

instruments of national power. SA contributes to and benefits from the synergistic 

effects of other operations. Counterspace and information operations separate an 

adversary from indigenous or third party support, preventing enemy space or 

information systems from interfering with SA. Surface maneuver benefits from and 

supports SA by creating a dynamic environment that the enemy must confront with 

degraded capabilities. Land offensives create high demands upon both enemy 

infrastructure and fielded forces by speeding consumption of vital war materiel, thus 

potentially creating enemy critical vulnerabilities. 

 SA may have immediate effects that enhance other operations. For example, 

during Operation DESERT STORM, one objective was to sever Iraqi leadership’s 

communication links to its fielded forces. The critical vulnerabilities within these links 

were the fiber optic lines that ran across the Tigris River bridges in Baghdad. Coalition 

aircraft destroyed these bridges, crippling the Iraqi national C2 network, which greatly 

contributed to accomplishment of theater objectives against Iraqi forces in addition to 

weakening Iraqi leadership. 

 Complementary operations can enhance delayed strategic effects. Many times, 

counterforce operations can work hand-in-hand with SA to place maximum pressure on 

an enemy system. Similarly, SA can be used to force crucial elements of enemy fielded 

forces into a conflict, where they can be destroyed by complementary counterforce 

action. 
36 

During the CBO, the Allies waged an extended 

strategic attack campaign against German oil 

production before the effects became apparent. German 

oil consumption began to exceed production in May 

1944 and by December the fuel shortage reached 

catastrophic proportions. The Germans launched the 

Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 in part to capture 

Allied stocks of fuel, but failed when many Panzer units 

ran out of fuel before reaching their objectives. 

Strategic attack and counterair efforts also worked 

synergistically to help defeat the Luftwaffe in early 1944, 

by offering the Germans bomber formation targets they 

couldn’t ignore in order to draw German fighters into the 

teeth of the new US P-47 and P-51 fighter escorts. 

Germany’s pilots, not its airframes, were its 

vulnerability. The result took months, but was decisive 

in achieving the Allies’ counterair objectives. 

 “Between January and April 1944 our daytime fighters lost over 1,000 pilots. 

They included our best squadron, Gruppe and Geschwader commanders. Each 

incursion of the enemy is costing us some fifty aircrews. The time has come when 

our weapon is in sight of collapse.” 

—General der Jagdflieger Adolf Galland 

Luftwaffe War Diaries 

PITFALLS AND LIMITATIONS 

 SA has a proven record of success, but it has also failed in application in a 

number of cases. Failure was generally due to poor understanding of the enemy or of 

the pitfalls inherent in a conceptually difficult form of force application. Success requires 

careful planning; thorough, sophisticated understanding of the enemy; complete 

knowledge of one’s own capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities; and anticipation 

of the effects that problems like friction, incrementalism, misprioritization, and 

restraints/constraints can have on operations. 

Friction 

 The workings of chance and the natural inertia that exist within any large 

organization, like a military force, play havoc in all forms of warfare. There are, 

however, elements of Clausewitz’s concept of “friction” that uniquely influence very 

complex operations like SA. These include, but are not limited to: 

Imperfect Knowledge and Misunderstanding. All forms of warfare may suffer from 

imperfect understanding of the enemy and their motivations, but SA will almost certainly 

fail if the enemy is seriously misjudged. Such was the case in Vietnam, where both the 
37 

military and civilian authorities misunderstood the nature of the conflict and the enemy’s 

degree of resolve. This resulted in part from “mirror-imaging,” assuming that the 

enemy’s motivations and priorities are similar to our own. Planners and commanders 

can guard against the dangers inherent in imperfect knowledge (but not eliminate them 

entirely) by trying to understand the conflict from the enemy’s perspective. 

A “Target Servicing” or Attritional Mindset. One of the sources of friction inherent in 

much US warfighting has been the devolution of effects-based planning and execution 

into a simplistic approach focused on attrition of enemy systems or the servicing of 

target lists. This occurs because the latter approach is conceptually simpler and is 

easier to implement in practice. If enemy fielded forces are the focus of the air and 

space effort, such a mindset may not significantly hamper operations, even though it is 

fundamentally a less efficient way to approach warfighting. In SA operations, however, 

such an approach is almost always harmful. A robust effects-based approach to 

warfighting, enforced by commanders, is the best means to avoid a shift to targetservicing or attrition. 

Unintended Direct Effects—Collateral Damage. US forces will always be directed to 

minimize civilian casualties and mitigate collateral damage. First, America’s moral 

values demand it. Second, the US is committed to adhering to the Geneva Conventions 

and other international laws and customs pertaining to the way we conduct war and 

armed conflict. Third, the goodwill of populations in countries whose ruling regimes we 

are fighting is often an important element in US strategy and this will be harmed by such 

damage. When it does occur, it may significantly hamper operations, usually by making 

commanders or national leaders more cautious. 

 This happened following the coalition bombing of the al Firdos C2 bunker in 

Baghdad during Operation DESERT STORM. As a major national military command 

center, this was a legitimate and legal target for SA, but the unfortunate fact that the 

attack killed many civilians the Iraqi regime had quartered in its top levels harmed US 

efforts publicly and hampered strikes on targets near the center of Baghdad for the rest 

of the war. 

 Also, while the US must fight to win, collateral damage may complicate 

reconstruction and stability operations efforts and diminish popular support for military 

operations, thus directly hampering attainment of the overall end state. Careful 

planning, especially for intelligence collection and strategic communication 

requirements, and precise crafting of rules of engagement can mitigate some of the 

dangers of unintended consequences and collateral damage, but cannot eliminate them 

entirely. 

Unintended Indirect Effects. The cause and effect chain is usually very complex in 

SA operations and some actions will almost certainly entail consequences that cannot 

be foreseen. These consequences can be good or bad from the friendly perspective, 

but some will inevitably hurt friendly efforts. An example of both followed in the wake of 

the Doolittle Raid: Many indirect results of the raid were favorable and helped shorten 
38 

For success, two major problems must be solved—dislocation and 

exploitation.... The importance of these two problems has never been 

adequately recognized—a fact that goes far to explain the common 

indecisiveness of warfare. 

—B.H. Liddell Hart 

S

the war, but the raid also provoked the Japanese into a major retaliatory campaign in 

eastern China that cost the Allies tens of thousands of casualties. 

“Kill Chain” Considerations. A form of friction inherent in the way US forces are 

organized and controlled may affect the prosecution of time-sensitive or fleeting 

strategic targets. Striking such targets will likely have high-level political implications 

and therefore may require approval from the JFC or even the President. The unique 

political nature of SA may, of necessity, add layers and seams to the target approval 

process, which costs the executing commander time. Successful strikes, however, may 

require swift action. This essential tension has led to the escape of important fleeting 

targets in the past. Modern communication technology has made it possible to 

compress the time required to find, fix, track, target, and engage such targets, but has 

not compressed decision time involved in attacking them. In fact, it may even lengthen 

the time required to obtain approval to attack politically sensitive targets. Effective 

operations against such targets require careful planning beforehand and thorough 

understanding of the risks and consequences of ad hoc SA without careful prior 

coordination at all levels of command, and a shared view of the intent of commanders 

above the JFACC’s level. 

Failure of Analysis 

 Sometimes the intelligence preparation process is simply wrong in choosing 

COGs or their critical vulnerabilities. Among the more famous examples is the case of 

early operations analysts choosing the German ball bearing industry as a focus for 

attack. Assuming a static, unreactive enemy is most often the cause of such analysis 

failures. Strategists must never lose sight of the fact that the enemy is a thinking, 

adaptive agent and that war is fundamentally a contest of wills. Wargaming friendly 

COAs against the gamut of potential enemy COAs, a process built into the joint 

planning construct, is the best way to avoid such failures, but no method is foolproof. 

Planners should expect that the enemy will aggressively attempt to defeat US SA efforts 

by continually adapting its defensive strategies. 

 History has shown that one of the most powerful methods of defeating an enemy 

is to impose shock upon them. In many cases, the most efficient use of SA is to impose 

shock directly upon enemy leadership or upon an entire enemy system at the strategic 

level. Such a strategy may not be appropriate for all conflicts. Nonetheless, in those 

cases where it is possible and appropriate, there may be pressure on commanders to 

employ force incrementally or sequentially, in ways that prevent the imposition of 

system-wide shock and dislocation (“gradualism”). This may arise from a lack of 

understanding of the nature of armed conflict on the part of higher-level leadership (as 
39 

was the case with President Johnson and SecDef McNamara during Vietnam). It may 

also arise if the military personnel prosecuting a conflict devolve into a “target-servicing” 

or attritional mindset. The first problem may be intractable from the COMAFFOR’s 

perspective (although commanders should make the effort to convince those “up the 

chain” of the correct course of action), but the second can be combated with thorough 

planning and conscious maintenance of an effects-based approach throughout a 

conflict. 

 Technical or physical limitations may also force incremental or sequential 

operations, as the limitations of existing weapon systems did during World War II and 

Vietnam. Lack of available resources may do so as well. Planners and commanders 

must be flexible and adaptive, always prepared to seek the highest “payoff” for the least 

“cost” in operations. The increasing sophistication of the planning tools used for SA 

may help ameliorate some of these considerations. 

Misprioritization 

 The prioritization of SA missions versus others may create dilemmas for the 

JFACC as well as the JFC. Air and space power is immensely flexible and capable and 

will always be pulled in different directions by competing demands. Since SA 

represents the highest potential payoff, commanders should avoid the temptation to 

divert resources from it to service the operational- or tactical-level fight, unless it is 

necessary in the JFC’s view to affect. Near-term parts of the fight may be more urgent, 

but they are not necessarily more important. The temptation to divert resources may be 

exacerbated by the fact that it is sometimes difficult to perceive progress toward SA’s 

objectives until they are met. As a general rule, SA should constitute a campaign’s 

highest priority unless the JFC deems other efforts essential for attainment of campaign 

objectives or survival of some part of the joint force is threatened. 

Restraints and Constraints 

 Commanders operate within political, legal, and diplomatic restraints and 

constraints that may force less than optimal uses of military power and should consider 

them during planning and employment. Restraints prohibit certain actions; constraints 

compel them. Commanders should realize that political considerations may limit or 

meter the pace of a campaign, and may even dictate incremental or sequential air 

operations. During OAF, an early gradualistic approach to the campaign was a political 

necessity until consensus developed among NATO allies that stronger military force 

would be necessary to prevail. Some research suggests that this benefited the NATO 

effort by affording escalation dominance. In other cases, however, restrictions may 

hamper even combined SA/diplomatic efforts and prevent effective coercion, as 

happened during ROLLING THUNDER. 

 In conducting SA, commanders are constrained under the law of war by their 

obligation to minimize enemy civilian casualties. Their need to minimize friendly 

combatant casualties is another necessary constraint. Additionally, commanders are 

restrained from striking targets of special cultural, religious, or humanitarian 
40 

significance, especially because they generally have no value as targets in the enemy’s 

system. Commanders are constrained to minimize friendly combatant and enemy 

civilian casualties. Restraint and constraint challenges include: 

 Proactively articulating how SA operations can achieve the combatant commander’s 

objectives for the existing political and diplomatic situation. It may help to point out 

that SA often offers the least expensive alternative in terms of physical destruction. 

 Monitoring the political and diplomatic situation to anticipate events and 

circumstances that affect SA operations. 

 Developing and implementing proactive strategic communication operations to 

establish and maintain the credibility and legitimacy of SA options within the 

information environment. 

 Developing alternative plan branches and sequels based on probable changes in the 

political and diplomatic environment.

Failure of Assessment 

 Assessment failures can degrade effectiveness, cause unnecessary expenditure 

of resources, or even cause SA operations to fail. Such problems most often result 

from a lack of assessment planning. In Operation DESERT STORM, almost no 

assessment planning was done and all echelons in the process lacked trained 

personnel and other resources. As a result, many important targets, like WMD storage 

facilities and electrical system components, were struck again and again, long after 

initial precision strikes had destroyed them. While this did not cause operations to fail, it 

did divert scarce resources from other priorities and place flyers at risk over welldefended targets. Robust assessment and intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance collection planning are the best preventive measures. 

CONCLUSION 

 The proper use of air, space, and cyber superiority, centralized command and 

control, and accurate intelligence assessment are vital to successful SA. Realizing that 

SA can be the most effective use of limited Air Force forces, commanders should be 

willing to resist the temptation to divert resources to other efforts unless such diversions 

are vital to attaining objectives or to the survival of an element of the joint force. 

Whether used in parallel attack that overwhelms enemy systems with multiple crises or 

more limited strikes that disrupt or coerce the enemy, SA can have a decisive impact in 

war and its aftermath. 

At the very heart of warfare lies doctrine... 
41 

SUGGESTED READINGS 

Air Force Publications (Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on 

the Air Force Doctrine Center web page at https://www.doctrine.af.mil)

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine

AFDD 2, Operations and Organization 

AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare

Joint Publications 

JP 1, Doctrine Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States 

JP 3-0, Joint Operations

JP 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations

JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations

JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning 

DOD Publications 

DOD Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major 

Components.

Other Publications 

Alberts, David S. and Czerwinski, Thomas J., eds., Complexity, Global Politics, and 

National Security (Washington DC: National Defense University). 1997. 

Barlow, Jason B., Strategic Paralysis: An Airpower Theory for the Present (Maxwell 

AFB AL: Air University Press). 1994. 

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics Of Coercion : American Foreign 

Policy And The Limits Of Military Might (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University 

Press). 2002. 

Byman, Daniel L., Matthew C. Waxman and Eric Larson, Air Power as a Coercive 

Instrument (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). 1999. 

Davis, Richard G., Decisive Force: Strategic Bombing in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: 

Air Force History and Museums Program). 1996. 
42 

Deptula, David A., Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare

(Arlington: Aerospace Education Foundation). 2001. 

Fadok, David S., John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power’s Quest for Strategic 

Paralysis (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press). 1995. 

Felker, Edward J., Airpower, Chaos, and Infrastructure: Lords of the Rings (Washington 

DC: National Defense University). 1998. 

Hinman, Ellwood P., The Politics of Coercion: Toward a Theory of Coercive Airpower for 

Post-Cold War Conflict (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press). 2002. 

Hosmer, Stephen T., Operations Against Enemy Leaders (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). 

2001 

Hosmer, Stephen T., The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When 

He Did (Santa Monica, CA: RAND). 2001. 

Keaney, Thomas A. and Eliot Cohen, Revolution in Warfare: Air Power in the Persian 

Gulf (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press). 1995. 

Keaney, Thomas A. and Eliot Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report

(Washington DC: US Government Printing Office). 1993. 

Lambeth, Benjamin S., The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press). 2000. 

Liddell Hart, B. H., Strategy (New York, Praeger). 1967. 

Mann, Edward C.; Gary Endersby; and Thomas R. Searle; Thinking Effects: EffectsBased Methodology for Joint Operations (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press). 2002. 

Pape, Robert A., Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, (Ithaca NY, Cornell 

University Press). 1996. 

Roche, James G. and Barry D. Watts, “Choosing Analytic Measures,” Journal of 

Strategic Studies 11, issue 2, pages 165-209. 1991. 

Strange, Joe, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities: Building on the 

Clausewitzian Foundation So that We Can All Speak the Same Language (Quantico, 

VA: Marine Corps University). 1996. 

Schelling, Thomas C., Arms and Influence (New Haven CT, Yale University Press). 

1966 
43 

Schelling, Thomas C., The Strategy of Conflict (Boston MA, Harvard University Press). 

1970 

Strange, Joe. Capital “W” War (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University). 1998. 

The United States Strategic Bombing Surveys (European War, Pacific War Summary 

Volumes) (Maxwell AFB, AL: reprinted by Air University Press). 1987. 

Warden, John A., III. The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press). 1988. 

Warden, John A., III. “The Enemy as a System,” Air Power Journal, Spring 1995 

Watts, Barry D., et al, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol II, Part II, Effects and 

Effectiveness (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office). 1993. 

Watts, Barry D., Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press). 1996. 
44 

GLOSSARY

Abbreviations and Acronyms 

AFDD Air Force doctrine document 

AOC air and space operations center [USAF] 

AOR area of responsibility 

C2 command and control 

CAOC combined air and space operations center 

CBO combined bomber offensive (World War II) 

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

CFACC combined force air and space component 

commander 

COA course of action 

COG center of gravity 

COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces 

CONUS continental United States 

DOD Department of Defense 

IADS integrated air defense system 

JAEP joint air and space estimate process 

JAOC joint air and space operations center 

JAOP joint air and space operations plan 

JFACC joint force air and space component 

commander 

JFC joint force commander 

JIPOE Joint intelligence preparation of the operational 

environment 

JP joint publication 

MOE measures of effectiveness 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

OA operational assessment 

OAF Operation ALLIED FORCE 

OEF Operation ENDURING FREEDOM 

ODF Operation DELIBERATE FORCE 

OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 

OPCON operational control 
45 

RAF Royal Air Force (UK) 

SA strategic attack 

SCUD surface-to-surface missile system 

SecDef Secretary of Defense 

SOF special operations forces 

TACON tactical control 

USAF United States Air Force 

USSBS United States Strategic Bombing Survey 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

WMD weapons of mass destruction 

Definitions 

air and space power. The synergistic application of air, space, and information 

systems to project global strategic military power. (AFDD 1) 

air interdiction. Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s 

military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at 

such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the 

fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. Also call AI. (JP 1–02) 

assessment. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or 

planned intelligence activity. (JP 1-02). [The evaluation of progress toward creation of 

effects and the achievement of objectives and end state conditions.] {Italicized words 

in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.} (AFDD 2) 

campaign. A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or 

operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1–02) 

campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at 

accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1–

02) 

cascading effect. One or more of a series of successive indirect effects that propagate 

through a system or systems. Typically, cascading effects flow throughout the levels of 

conflict and are the results of interdependencies and links among multiple connected 

systems. (AFDD 2) 

causal linkage. An explanation of why an action or effect will cause or contribute to a 

given effect. It answers the question, “why do planners believe this action will create or 
46 

help create the desired effect?” (AFDD 2) 

 

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, 

freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 5.0 SD) [In the context of 

strategic attack against enemy systems, COGs are focal points that hold a system or 

structure together and draw power from a variety of sources and provide purpose and 

direction to that system.] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force 

and is offered for clarity.} (AFDD 2-1.2) 

centralized control. 1. In air defense, the control mode whereby a higher echelon 

makes direct target assignments to fire units. 2. In joint air operations, placing within 

one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating 

a military operation or group/category of operations. (JP 1-02) [The planning, direction, 

prioritization, allocation, synchronization, integration, and deconfliction of air and space 

capabilities to achieve the objectives of the joint force commander.] {Italicized definition 

in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} (AFDD 1) 

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing 

mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, 

through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or 

functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02) 

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly 

designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of 

the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 

personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a 

commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in 

the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 0-2)

counterspace. Those offensive and defensive operations conducted by air, land, sea, 

space, special operations, and information forces with the objective of gaining and 

maintaining control of activities conducted in or through the space environment. (AFDD 

2-2) 

critical vulnerability. An aspect or component of a critical requirement, which is 

deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant 

effects. (Upon approval of JP 5.0, this term and its definition and will be included in JP 

1-02.) (JP 5.0 FD) 

cyberspace. The notional environment in which digitized information is communicated 

over computer networks. (JP 1-02). [A domain characterized by the use of electronics 

and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange data via networked 

systems and associated physical infrastructure. (AFDD 1)] {Text in brackets applies 

only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}
47 

decentralized execution. Delegation of execution authority to subordinate 

commanders. (JP 1-02) [Decentralized execution of air and space power is the 

delegation of execution authority to responsible and capable lower-level commanders to 

achieve effective span of control and to foster disciplined initiative, situational 

responsiveness, and tactical flexibility.] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to 

the Air Force and is offered for clarity.} (AFDD 1)

decisive point. A geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, 

when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an adversary 

or contribute materially to achieving success. (This term and its definition are provided 

for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.) 

direct effect. First order result of action with no intervening effect or mechanism 

between act and outcome. Usually immediate, physical, and readily recognizable (e.g., 

weapons employment results). (AFDD 2) 

effects. A full range of outcomes, events, or consequences of a particular cause. The 

cause may be an action, a set of actions, or another effect. The action can derive from 

any element of power—economic, political, military, diplomatic, or informational—and 

may occur at any point across the continuum from peace to global conflict. (AFDD 2-

1.2) 

effects-based. Actions, such as operations, targeting, or strategy that are designed to 

produce distinctive and desired effects while avoiding unintended or undesired effects. 

(AFDD 2-1.2) 

effects-based approach to operations. An approach in which operations are 

planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change systems or 

capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes. (AFDD 2-1.2) 

indirect effect. A second, third, or nth-order effect created through an intermediate 

effect or causal linkage following a causal action. It may be physical, psychological, 

functional, or systemic in nature. It may be created in a cumulative, cascading, 

sequential, or parallel manner. An indirect effect is often delayed and typically is more 

difficult to recognize and assess than a direct effect. (AFDD 2) 

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 

electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 

deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 

capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 

decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02) 

joint force air component commander. The commander within a unified command, 

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing 

commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, 

attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air 
48 

operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint 

force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish 

missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 

1-02). [The joint force air and space component commander (JFACC) uses the joint air 

and space operations center to command and control the integrated air and space effort 

to meet joint force commander’s objectives. The Air Force position is that air power and 

space power together create effects that cannot be achieved through air or space power 

alone.] {Italicized words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for 

clarity.} [AFDD 2] 

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, 

subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant 

command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called 

JFC. (JP 1–02) 

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of 

advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the 

ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to 

cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the battlespace 

through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in 

respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1–02) 

measures of effectiveness. Tools used to measure results achieved in the overall 

mission and execution of assigned tasks. Measures of effectiveness are a prerequisite 

to the performance of combat assessment. Also called MOEs. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at 

any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is 

inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the 

command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command 

relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will 

relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. 

Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over 

subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning 

tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish 

the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of 

military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the 

command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of 

subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint 

force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational 

control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ 

those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to 

accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction 

for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. 

Also called OPCON. (JP1-02) 
49 

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations 

are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within 

theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by 

establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, 

sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying 

resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader 

dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative 

support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are 

exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (JP 1–02) 

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and 

indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 

and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 

individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign 

attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 

1–02) 

strategic air warfare. Air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, 

through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the 

progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s war-making capacity to a 

point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or will to wage war. Vital targets may 

include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, 

power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of 

uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such 

target systems. (JP 1–02) 

strategic attack. Strategic attack is offensive action that is specifically selected to 

achieve national or military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the 

adversary’s ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives 

without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Also 

called SA. (AFDD 2-1.2) 

strategic communication. Focused United States government (USG) efforts to 

understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve 

conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives 

through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products 

synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power. (JP 1-02) 

strategic level of war. The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a 

group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security 

objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish 

these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military 

objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and 

other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to 

achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in 

accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1–02) 
50 

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, 

or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed 

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary 

to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational 

control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the 

level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant 

commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the 

losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary 

of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the 

application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission 

or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1–02) 

tactical level of war. The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned 

and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. 

Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat 

elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (JP 

1–02)