U.S. Marine Corps

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PCN 143 000145 00

 Marine Corps

Tank Employment 

MCWP 3-12
To Our Readers

Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes that

will improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, Marine

Corps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite

318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail to

nancy.morgan@usmc.mil. Recommendations should include the following information:

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Additional copies: A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine Corps

Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600,

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the

Doctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following universal reference locator: https://www.doctrine.usmc.mil.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both 

men and women are included.
Department of the Navy

Headquarters United States Marine Corps

Washington, DC 20380-1775

17 February 2005

FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-12, Marine Corps Tank Employment,

provides Marine Corps doctrine and supporting tactics, techniques, and procedures for the

employment of Marine tanks in support of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).

Historically, Marine tanks have played critical roles in the success of the Corps’ combat

operations. From World War II to Iraq, the commander’s ability to effectively employ

Marine tanks has provided him with a devastating direct fire capability. Today, the

Marine Corps’ M1A1 Abrams tanks are the most lethal direct fire and survivable

weapons system within the arsenal of the ground combat element. 

This publication is intended for Marine Corps combat, combat support, and combat service

support unit commanders and their staffs operating with or supporting Marine tank units. It

describes how the Marine Corps employs tanks throughout the range of military operations

and focuses on preparing, planning, and conducting MAGTF operations with tanks.

MCWP 3-12 supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual 9-1, Tank Employment/Countermechanized Operations, dated 1982.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

J. N. MATTIS

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commanding General

Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Publication Control Number: 143 000145 00

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.
MARINE CORPS TANK EMPLOYMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter 1. Overview

Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1

Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Battalion Commander. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

Executive Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

S-1 (Adjutant) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

S-2 (Intelligence) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

S-3 (Operations) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Fire Support Coordinator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

Air Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

NBC Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5

S-4 (Logistics) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Motor Transport Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Maintenance Management Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

S-6 (Communications and Electronics) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Unit Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6

Command Echelons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-7

Combat Operations Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-8

Tank Battalion Fire Support Coordination Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-9

Command Relationships. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-11

Chapter 2. Offensive Operations

Section I. Types of Offensive Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Movement to Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Advance Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1

Flank and Rear Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Main Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-2

Actions with Contact Imminent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Actions After Contact. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3

Meeting Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4
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Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Spoiling Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-4

Counterattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Feint . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-5

Demonstration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Reconnaissance in Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Raid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Exploitation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6

Pursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-7

Direct Pressure Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Encircling Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Section II. Tank Unit Formations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-8

Column . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

Wedge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

Vee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

Echelon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11

Coil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11

Frontal Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

Envelopment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

Penetration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Turning Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Infiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-13

Chapter 3. Defensive Operations

Organization of the Battlespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Security Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

Main Battle Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Rear Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Organization of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Security Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

Main Battle Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-4

Rear Area Forces. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Preparing for the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Deliberate Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Hasty Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Use of the Reserve in the Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5

Types of Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

Position Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

Mobile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

Defensive Maneuver . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-6

Sectors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Battle Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Strongpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7

Alternate and Supplementary Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-7
Marine Corps Tank Employment _________________________________________________________________________________ v 

Engagement Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Determine Likely Enemy Schemes of Maneuver. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Determine Where to Kill the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Plan and Integrate Obstacles to Support

Mechanized Unit Weapons Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Emplace Weapons Systems for Maximum Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9

Plan and Integrate Available Indirect Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Plan and Integrate Available CAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Rehearse the Execution of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10

Chapter 4. Employment with Infantry

Task Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1

Mechanized Task Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Company Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Mutual Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2

Employment Methods. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Tanks and Mechanized Infantry Attack Together . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-3

Tanks and AAVs Support by Fire Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4

Multiaxis Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Mechanized Movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Maneuver Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Dismounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5

Dismount Short of the Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Dismount on the Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6

Dismount After Passing Through the Objective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Base of Fire and Maneuver Elements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7

Assault on the Objective. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

Mounted Assault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

Dismounted Assault . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-8

Consolidation and Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

Transporting Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-9

Chapter 5. Other Tactical Operations

Section I. Security Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1

Covering Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Offensive Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2

Defensive Cover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Guard Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-3

Advance Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Flank Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-4

Rear Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5
vi _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Screening Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5

Stationary Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5

Moving Screen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Screening Operations During Limited Visibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Integration of Intelligence Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6

Section II. Retrograde Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Techniques of Delay Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-7

Organization of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

Execution of the Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8

Rear Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

Concluding the Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

Withdrawal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-9

Types of Withdrawals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10

Organization of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11

Retirement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12

Section III. Reconnaissance Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Route Reconnaissance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Zone Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Area Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Force-Oriented Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Reconnaissance in Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13

Section IV. River Crossing Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Hasty River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Deliberate River Crossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Retrograde River Crossing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-14

Section V. Linkup Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

Linkup When One Unit is Stationary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

Linkup Between Two Moving Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15

Section VI. Passage of Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16

Section VII. Relief in Place. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16

Section VIII. Breakout From Encirclement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17

Organization of Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17

Rupture Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17

Reserve Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Main Body. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Rear Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Diversionary or Supporting Force. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18

Conduct of the Breakout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ vii 

Exfiltration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Attacking Deeper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20

Section IX. Road March and Assembly Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Tactical Road March. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Assembly Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21

Chapter 6. Tactical Logistics

Trains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1

Combat Trains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Field Trains. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Organic Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Identify Critical Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-2

Enhance Organic Capability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Safeguard Resources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Outside Agency Support. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Prioritize Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Rapid Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Redundant Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Collocation of Key Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-3

Logistic Responsibilities of Tank Battalion Personnel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Battalion S-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Battalion S-4 Assistant (S-4A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Headquarters and Service Company Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Motor Transport Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Battalion Maintenance Platoon Commander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4

Tank Maintenance Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Battalion Supply Officer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Battalion Maintenance Management Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Battalion Motor Transport Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Battalion Communications Maintenance Officer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Battalion S-4 Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Headquarters and Service Company Gunnery Sergeant. . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Company Maintenance Chief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Tank Leader . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Company Supply Sergeant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-5

Resupply Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

Prepositioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

Routine Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

Emergency Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6

Techniques of Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7
viii ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Maintenance Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10

Unit Maintenance—Operator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10

Unit Maintenance—Organizational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10

CSSG Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10

Evacuation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11

Destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11

M1A1 Logistic Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11

Fuel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-11

Additional POL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12

Ammunition Resupply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12

Chapter 7. Amphibious Operations

Staff Planning Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Embarkation Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Landing Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Intelligence Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1

Embarkation/Debarkation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Environmental Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

Equipment Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Planning Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-3

Operational Checks and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-4

Chapter 8. Military Operations Other Than War

Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-1

Tempo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

Rules of Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-2

Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Public Affairs and the Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Clearing of Evacuation Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-3

Foreign Humanitarian Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Convoy Security Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Tactical Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Escort Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Large-scale Escort Missions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-4

Mounted Patrols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6

Checkpoints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6

Reaction Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-6
Marine Corps Tank Employment ________________________________________________________________________________ ix 

Chapter 9. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain

Tank Units and the Infantry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-1

Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-2

Employment Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-3

Control Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4

Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Frontages, Formations, and Zones of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Phase Lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Checkpoints and Contact Points . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Offensive MOUT Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Attacking in Urban Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-5

Attack Phases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-8

Defensive MOUT Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10

Defensive Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11

Fighting Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11

Chapter 10. Scout and TOW Platoons

Scout Platoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

Capabilities and Limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-2

TOW Platoon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Capabilities and Limitations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

Appendices

A. Armor Vehicle Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1

B. Operations in Extreme Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1

C. NBC Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1

D. Ammunition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

E. Breaching Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1

F. Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1

G. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1
x ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Tables

6-1. POL Capacity for a Single M1A1 Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12

6-2. Arming Capacity for M1A1 Tank Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12

C-1. Decontamination Levels/Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3

Figures

1-1. Marine Tank Battalion Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4

2-1. Tank Battalion in Column Formation with

Dispersal for Added Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-9

2-2. Tank Battalion in Wedge Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

2-3. Tank Battalion in Vee Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-10

2-4. Tank Battalion in Line Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11

2-5. Tank Battalion in Echelon Right Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-11

2-6. Coil Formation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-12

3-1. Organization of the Battlespace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1

3-2. Organization of the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2

3-3. Correct Hull-defilade and Turret-defilade

Defensive Tank Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-8

3-4. Example of Tank Company Engagement Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11

4-1. Notional Positions for Infantry Riding on a Tank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10

6-1. Tailgate Resupply Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7

6-2. Service Station Resupply Technique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-8

6-3. Combination of Resupply Techniques. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-9

7-1. M1A1 Tank with Fording Kit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-2

8-1. Tanks Performing Forward Security for a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5

8-2. Tanks Performing Flank Security for a Convoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8-5

9-1. Tank Cannon Dead Space at Street Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-4

9-2. Tank Cannon Dead Space Above Street Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-6

9-3. M1A1s Advancing with Infantry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-10

9-4. Hull-Down Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-11

9-5. Hide Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9-12

10-1. Scout Platoon Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-1

10-2. TOW Platoon Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10-3

A-1. M1A1 Tank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2

A-2. M88A2 Recovery Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-5

A-3. AVLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-8

D-1. Example of 120mm Main Gun Ammunition Markings . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1

D-2. M829A1/M829A2 APFSDS-T (120mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-3

D-3. M829 APFSDS-T (120mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-4

D-4. M830 HEAT-MP-T (120mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-5

D-5. M830A1 HEAT-MP-T (120mm) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-6

D-6. Link Belts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-7

D-7. Ammunition Color Code/NATO Marking Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-7
Marine Corps Tank Employment ________________________________________________________________________________ xi 

Figures (Continued)

D-8. L8A1 and L8A3 Smoke Grenade. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-8

D-9. M76 Smoke Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-9

D-10. M82 Smoke Grenade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-10

D-11. XM908 HE-OR-T (120mm). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-11

E-1. Plow Tanks Create Multiple Lanes While

the Section Leaders’ Tanks Provide Overwatch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-6

E-2. Plow Tanks use Staggered Movement to

Create a Wider Lane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-7

E-3. Track Width Mine Plow for M1Al . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E-8
CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW

The success of amphibious operations and subsequent operations ashore require the coordinated

employment of all Marine air-ground task force

(MAGTF) resources: reconnaissance, infantry, aviation, tanks, artillery, engineers, amphibious assault vehicles (AAVs) and other combat support

and combat service support (CSS) units. Throughout the full range of military operations, all elements of the MAGTF are employed to achieve the

effects of combined arms against enemy forces.

Tank units provide the MAGTF commander the

ability to attack, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces

through firepower, shock effect, and maneuver in

coordination with other elements of the MAGTF.

The M1A1 tank offers the MAGTF a vast array of

capabilities—excellent cross-country mobility, sophisticated communications, enhanced day and

night target acquisition, lethal firepower to defeat

most enemy mechanized platforms, highly effective armor protection—and all of its capabilities

are interrelated.

Mission 

The tank is designed primarily as an offensive

weapon, regardless of the type of operation (defensive or offensive) conducted. Tank units, as maneuver elements, are employed throughout the full

range of military operations. Therefore, the tank

battalion’s mission is to close with and destroy the

enemy by using armor-protected firepower, shock

effect, and maneuver and to provide antimechanized fire in support of the Marine division.

Employment

The tank battalion is best employed as a maneuver

element without detaching units. However, the

ground combat element (GCE) commander may

create mechanized forces by task-organizing tank,

mechanized infantry, and other combat support

and CSS units based on mission, enemy, terrain

and weather, troops and support available—time

available (METT-T). Employment of the tank battalion must take advantage of the speed, mobility,

and firepower of the organization.

To win in battle, leaders must have a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of

their equipment in order to employ them effectively. Appendix A provides a list of the specifications, characteristics, and significant features of

the M1A1 main battle tank and its supporting

equipment and assists the Marine tanker and the

MAGTF commander (with an attachment of

tanks) in evaluating transportability, sustainment, and mobility considerations.

In extreme environments, tanks have their own

unique set of employment capabilities and limitations. A detailed discussion of operating tanks in

extreme environments can be found in appendix B.

Capabilities

Tanks provide five major capabilities to the MAGTF:

armor-protected firepower, mobility, shock effect,

extensive communications, and flexibility.

Armor-Protected Firepower

The tank is an integrated weapons system capable

of defeating most targets on the battlefield. The

amount and type of ammunition carried aboard the

M1A1 tank allows it to engage a wide variety of

targets for sustained periods of combat. The M1A1

tank’s 120mm main gun is a high velocity, direct

fire weapon used primarily against enemy tanks

and hard targets. Along with the main gun, the

M1A1 tank has one heavy machine gun (.50 cal)
1-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

and two medium machine guns (7.62mm). The

coaxial-mounted 7.62 machine gun is integrated

into the tanks target acquisition system, which provides for extremely accurate small-arms fire.

The M1A1’s armor affords protection to the tank,

including its crew, from the effects of small-arms

fire, shell fragments, and some direct hits

depending on the type and range of the enemy

weapon. Its armor also allows the tank to close

with the enemy and maneuver while under either

enemy fire or friendly close supporting fires with

a degree of survivability that other weapons systems do not possess. The M1A1 tank also provides a significant degree of protection for the

crew while operating in an environment contaminated with chemical weapons.

Mobility

Tank units are capable of conducting mobile

ground combat over a broad area of operations

because they can remain dispersed, yet they can

mass quickly for employment at a decisive time

and place. Tanks, by virtue of their full track and

global positioning systems, possess a high degree

of cross-country mobility that allows them to

deliver firepower against several enemy locations within a short period of time. Tanks can

also quickly mass the effects of their weapon systems while remaining physically dispersed in

order to limit effective enemy counteraction.

Shock Effect

The shock effect on the enemy that tank units can

create is both physical and psychological. Shock

effect, if properly executed, can also have a

favorable effect on friendly morale. Additionally, shock effect increases in proportion to the

number of tanks employed. To exploit a tank’s

shock effect, aggressive employment of the combined-arms team is essential.

Extensive Communications

The radio is the primary means of communications for tank units. Each M1A1 tank is capable

of transmitting/receiving on one frequency while

simultaneously receiving on another frequency.

The use of visual signals and the single-channel

ground and airborne radio system (SINCGARS)

facilitates rapid and secure communication of

orders and instructions.

Flexibility

Tank units are capable of responding rapidly to

the everchanging environment of the battlefield.

Units engaged with the enemy have the flexibility, with the proper use of supporting arms, to

disengage and receive a new mission. Therefore,

tanks can group, disperse, and quickly regroup

again in response to changing tactical situations.

Limitations

A clear understanding of a tank’s employment

limitations enables commanders to both plan

effectively and fully exploit the capabilities of

tank units. Limitations fall into three general categories: inherent vehicle characteristics, existing

obstacles, and reinforcing obstacles.

Size

The size of a tank makes it difficult to conceal in

some terrain. This limitation can be overcome by

positioning tanks in areas that minimize their

exposure to enemy observation until they are

ready to be employed.

Weight

A tank’s weight prevents use of low capacity

bridges and requires the use of special equipment

and techniques for recovery of immobilized vehicles. Planning for the necessary support, as well

as the careful selection of routes and areas of

operation, reduces this limitation. Appendix A

contains M1A1 weight specifications.

Noise

The noise created from the operation of a tank

warns of their presence. Surprise, however, may
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 1-3 

be achieved by moving tanks forward just prior to

their commitment and by advancing rapidly

under the cover of supporting arms.

Visibility

Tank crews enhance visibility with vision

devices; however, peripheral vision is still limited. Therefore, unless a crewmember observes

the sector in which hostile actions occur, the

action may go unseen. When operating in close

terrain, the tank is susceptible to ambush. It is

also vulnerable to mechanical damage caused by

terrain (e.g., brush covered gullies) or obstacles

that are hidden from view (e.g., concealed tank

ditch). Conducting a detailed terrain analysis can

reduce, but may not eliminate, these limitations.

Infantry should accompany a tank operating in

close or broken terrain and provide visual assistance in order to protect the tank from ambush.

Fuel Consumption

A tank’s fuel consumption is high in comparison

to a wheeled vehicle. The M1A1 tank crew can

use the on board external auxiliary power unit

during operational pauses to reduce the amount

of fuel consumed. Careful planning and a coordinated logistic effort are required to ensure that

tanks fuel requirements do not impose a logistic

burden. Specifications for the refueling requirements of the M1A1 tank units can be found in

chapter 6.

Maintenance

A tank’s complexity requires dedicated maintenance time. Tank vehicle crews accomplish preventive maintenance during halts, rest periods,

and periods of resupply without interrupting support functions. However, systematic relief of

individual tanks or tank units is required to permit thorough maintenance. Failure of commanders to recognize or plan for this relief results in

unnecessary and excessive tank nonavailability

due to mechanical failure.

Communications

The heavy reliance upon radio communications

for command, control, and coordination of a tank

unit makes it vulnerable to enemy electronic warfare and/or signals intelligence efforts. The tank

unit commander and tank crew must be able to

operate in a hostile electronic warfare environment and employ communications security procedures to overcome this limitation.

Existing Obstacles

Of all the limiting factors that inhibit tank vehicle

operations, none has a more decisive effect than

terrain. The type of terrain may dictate the number

of tanks that can be employed, but it will seldom

prohibit their employment entirely. The full striking power of a tank is best achieved over rolling

terrain that permits massing and exploitation of

their cross-country mobility. Nevertheless,

between the extremes of terrain—rolling terrain as

opposed to impassable terrain—there is considerable ground that can still be negotiated by tanks.

In addition to obstacles created by terrain,

extremes in weather can also create obstacles and

reduce the efficiency of tank crews. For example, tanks may have little difficulty in snow less

than 24-inches deep, but they tend to skid or slide

off of embankments and are unable to negotiate

slopes when the snow becomes packed or icy.

Heavy rainfall usually reduces the trafficability of

an area and therefore imposes restrictions on tank

movements. The limiting effects of terrain and

weather can be reduced by prior reconnaissance

of tank routes, proper planning, and by providing

for the reduction of existing obstacles that cannot

be bypassed.

Reinforcing Obstacles

In past operations, the most effective reinforcing

obstacle, and the one most frequently employed,

was the antitank minefield. Mines, whether

arranged as a barrier or planted at random, can
1-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

temporarily stop the forward movement of tanks.

Other reinforcing obstacles that are frequently

encountered and tend to restrict the movement of

tanks are tank ditches, tank traps, and roadblocks.

Many of these obstacles are temporary deterrents

that can be overcome by proper employment of

organic weapons, equipment, and personnel. Normally, engineers can reduce difficult obstacles if

given adequate time and resources.

Organization

A typical tank battalion consists of four tank

companies, a headquarters and service company

(H&S Co), one antitank (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-command link guided missile

[TOW]) platoon, and one scout platoon (see fig.

1-1). The tank companies are the basic tactical

unit with which the battalion accomplishes its

mission. The antitank platoon provides antimechanized support to the battalion. The battalion

scout platoon performs reconnaissance, provides

limited security, and assists in controlling movement of the battalion. Each tank battalion has 58

M1A1 tanks, 26 TOW weapons systems, 4

armored vehicle-launched bridges (AVLBs) with

8 bridges, and 6 M88A1 tank recovery vehicles.

Battalion Commander

The battalion commander has overall responsibility for the tank battalion. During operations, the

tank battalion commander positions himself

where he can best control the battle: he may

choose to be in the battalion combat operations

center (COC) or he may deploy aboard the tank

in order to move about the battlefield.

Executive Officer

The tank battalion’s executive officer is second in

command and must be prepared to assume the

duties of the commander. He is the commander’s

principal staff assistant and advisor and directs,

coordinates, and supervises the activities of the

staff. The executive officer keeps the commander informed of current and developing situations, issues instructions to the staff to implement

the commander’s decisions, studies all situations

to ensure preparedness for future operations, and

represents the commander when authorized. During operations, the executive officer is normally

located in the main echelon, but may also be

positioned by the commander if the situation dictates. Typically, either the commander or the

executive officer is present in the planning section at all times unless the executive officer is

placed in command of a force organized for a

specific mission or task. During displacement of

the main echelon, the executive officer normally

moves with and oversees the displacement to the

next location unless the commander is present.

However, if the commander is present, the executive officer may move with the last element to

displace in order to supervise the overall effort.

S-1 (Adjutant)

The tank battalion’s S-1 is the principal staff

officer in matters pertaining to personnel management and administration. He monitors the

administrative chain from subordinate units to

higher headquarters and keeps the commander

abreast of the personnel situation within the unit.

The S-1 also recommends personnel policy and

assists the commander in handling personnel and

morale factors that influence the combat effectiveness of the unit, including supervision of legal

Scout HQ

Figure 1-1. Marine Tank

Battalion Organization.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 1-5 

matters and disciplinary action. During operations, the S-1 is normally located within the combat field trains and may also have the additional

duty of graves registration officer.

S-2 (Intelligence)

The tank battalion’s S-2 is the commander’s

intelligence assistant for the planning and supervision of command intelligence functions. He

makes recommendations for the assignment of

intelligence resources and the management and

coordination of intelligence means and activities

of other elements of the command. The S-2 is

responsible for the production and dissemination

of intelligence, counterintelligence, graphic intelligence aids, and intelligence training. During

operations, the S-2 is usually in the main echelon

COC and must be knowledgeable of enemy

mechanized and antiarmor capabilities and work

closely with the S-3 in operational planning.

S-3 (Operations)

The tank battalion’s S-3 is responsible for matters

pertaining to the battalion’s organization, training,

and tactical operations. He is responsible for planning, coordinating, and supervising the tactical

employment of units; integrating fires and maneuver; planning and supervising civil-military operations; and determining priorities for allocation of

personnel, weapons, equipment, and ammunition.

Within the operations section are staff assistants

dedicated to aviation and to nuclear, biological,

and chemical (NBC) warfare defense and training.

Tank battalion S-3s are usually one of the most

experienced tank officers on the battalion staff and

must be very familiar with all aspects of mechanized operations. Therefore, during operations, the

S-3 is located in the main echelon COC and works

closely with the S-4 to ensure that the tactical plan

is logistically feasible. 

Fire Support Coordinator

Within a tank battalion’s table of organization (T/O),

an artillery officer is assigned and designated as the

fire support coordinator (FSC). The FSC is responsible for developing fire support plans that support the

unit’s scheme of maneuver and for making recommendations for priority of fire support to subordinate units. During operations, the FSC works closely

with the S-3 and is usually located in the main echelon COC.

Air Officer

The air officer is the subject matter expert on

matters pertaining to aviation. He is a naval aviator or naval flight officer and is under the staff

cognizance of the S-3. The air officer is the

officer responsible for coordinating tactical air

assets and operations (e.g., close air support

[CAS]) and acts as the point of contact for the

two forward air controllers (FACs) assigned to

the battalion. During the planning process, the air

officer provides input on aviation capabilities and

availability as they affect courses of action

(COAs) and schemes of maneuver. The air

officer has the staff responsibility for coordination of aviation support in the battalion’s fire support coordination center (FSCC). The tank

battalion’s air officer must understand mechanized operations and the rapid and fluid nature of

those operations. During operations, the air

officer is usually in the main echelon COC.

NBC Officer

The NBC officer is responsible for preparing

plans, annexes, and unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) on NBC defense. He develops

and monitors NBC defense training of the unit

and supervises and coordinates operational and

technical activities essential to NBC early warning and defense. The NBC officer is under the

cognizance of the S-3. During operations, the

NBC officer is usually in the field train but his

position depends on the nature of the NBC threat/

situation. If the battalion must conduct decontamination procedures, the NBC officer will oversee

those procedures. Decontamination procedures

can be found in appendix C.
1-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

S-4 (Logistics)

The tank battalion’s S-4 determines logistic and

CSS requirements. He coordinates requirements

for supply, transportation, health services, maintenance, and food services with higher headquarters. The S-4 makes recommendations for the

allocation of logistic assets, prepares computation of detailed requirements for logistic support,

and assists in the development of plans and

orders. Within the logistic section are staff assistants for embarkation, supply, motor transport,

and maintenance management. A detailed discussion regarding the personnel resident within the

battalion S-4 shop is included in chapter 6. 

The S-4 constantly monitors responsiveness of

support. Therefore during operations, the S-4 is

usually located in the field trains to ensure that

the tank battalion is properly supported. However, geographic separation of units during battalion operations may require the S-4 to move

throughout the area of operations to ensure that

support is being maintained.

Motor Transport Officer

The tank motor transport officer (MTO) is

responsible for matters concerning control of

transportation and normally operates under the

staff cognizance of the S-4. During operations,

the MTO is usually located in the field trains. The

tank battalion MTO is critical to proper logistic

support and must be familiar with the demands

placed on equipment during tank operations

because he controls one of the largest motor

transport units within the Marine division.

Maintenance Management Officer

Tank battalion maintenance management officer

(MMO) has one of the largest units to maintain

within the Marine division. The tank MMO is

responsible to the commander, through the S-4,

for the coordination and integration of all command maintenance efforts. The MMO’s duties

involve the management and coordination of the

eight maintenance management functional areas.

These functional areas are maintenance administration, personnel and training, records and

reports, publications control, equipment availability, preventive maintenance checks and services

and corrective maintenance, supply support, and

maintenance-related programs. In order to conduct sustained mechanized operations in austere

environments, the MMO’s maintenance plan is

critical. During operations, the MMO is usually

located with the field trains.

S-6 (Communications and Electronics)

The tank S-6 is responsible for the planning and

supervision of the installation, operation, and

maintenance of communications systems; disseminating communications-electronics operating instructions; and managing the cryptographic

material systems. The S-6 coordinates with the

S-3 to ensure that communications planning and

training are compatible with the overall plan. He

recommends, in coordination with the S-3 and

H&S Co, the location of key installations. To

improve communication, the S-3 coordinates

with the higher headquarters and communications officers of reinforcing, adjacent, and supporting/supported units. During operations, the

tank battalion communications officer has a difficult job because of the separation of units. The

distance and terrain often require the communications plan to have relay points/redundant communications to provide effective command and

control (C2). In addition, the large number of

radios and specialized communications equipment requires a tank battalion communications

officer to have an effective preventative maintenance and training program.

Unit Command and Control

To be successful, the mechanized commander

must see the battlefield and respond quickly,

this can be achieved through an effective and

responsive C2 system. However, the relatively
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 1-7 

large size, dispersion, and mobility of mechanized forces can pose C2 challenges for the

commander. Key variables that determine how

the C2 system organizes and functions include

echelons of command, desires of the commander, and METT-T.

In order to see the battlefield, the commander positions himself wherever he can best influence the

battle and gain as much situational awareness as

possible while still being able to exercise command and control. During operations, the commander normally moves forward in order to

observe and influence the course of the battle. During mechanized operations, the commander and

his command group must be mounted in vehicles

in order to keep up with maneuver elements.

Command Echelons

The commander establishes command echelons

to assist him in the continuous collection, processing, and dissemination of combat information and orders. Control of the battle is focused

through only one command echelon at a time.

Command echelons must have the requisite

mobility to locate where the commander wishes

and should be as mobile as the rest of the unit.

The echelon in which the unit or subordinate

commander is located or from which the commander operates is called a command post.

Depending on the situation, the commander may

establish as many as three command echelons:

the tactical echelon, the main echelon, and the

rear echelon. Command echelons may also be

split into increments to facilitate displacement

and survivability.

Tactical Echelon

The commander normally collocates with the

main effort during critical events and focuses on

the current operations of committed forces.

Therefore, the tactical echelon provides the commander freedom of movement and the information required to maintain situational awareness.

The tank battalion’s table of equipment includes

a section of tanks that enable the commander to

establish the battalion’s tactical command post or

tactical air coordinator (airborne) command post.

These tanks allow the commander to position

himself forward, stay mobile, and maintain the

communications and situational awareness necessary to command and control his unit. His survivability is directly related to their armor protection

and capability to rapidly displace.

Main Echelon

The main echelon is designed, manned, and

equipped to direct the actions of all organic,

attached, and supporting units. The main echelon

is responsible for monitoring and directing current operations and planning future operations.

The main echelon includes a COC (see the Combat Operations Center paragraph on page 1-8 for

more information on the COC).

When the commander is located forward of the

main echelon during combat, he monitors communications between the COC and higher and

subordinate units. He also might designate an

individual, normally the executive officer or S-3,

to act in his behalf in the event that communications with the COC are lost.

Rear Echelon

The principal function of the rear echelon is to

support combat operations by providing command and control of rear area operations. The S-1

and S-4 are normally located in the rear echelon.

The rear echelon must be capable of monitoring

the activities of the forward units and the other

two echelons. Normally, the rear echelon is collocated with, or sited near, CSS units to facilitate

logistical efforts.

Increments

If a command element is split into increments,

the commander organizes both increments with

nearly identical structure. Typically, these increments are referred to as alpha and bravo. The

alpha increment is usually composed of the S-2,
1-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

S-3, FSC, and principal fire support liaison officers. Normally, the primary function of the alpha

command element is to command and control the

operation that is underway. The bravo increment

is usually composed of the assistants for each of

the functional areas: S-2A, S-3A, assistant FSC,

etc. The bravo command element monitors the

current tactical situation and is immediately prepared to assume control in the event that the

alpha command element becomes disabled or if

operations become protracted. The bravo command may also be tasked to conduct future plans,

maintain records, and submit reports. If the force

is extended, the bravo command element may be

used as a relay to higher and supporting units.

The alpha and bravo command elements may be

consolidated when required by the tactical situation. Consolidation allows full utilization of the

entire staff for planning and the establishment of

a single watch section and provides more time to

rest personnel.

Combat Operations Center

The COC is the primary operational agency

required to control the tactical operations of a

command that employs ground and aviation combat, combat support, and CSS elements, or portions thereof. A COC is a unit headquarters where

the commander and the staff perform their activities. The COC continually monitors, records, and

supervises operations and includes all personnel

and communications required to perform its mission. The COC also includes the FSCC.

Most units have established SOPs for COC operations. Well-developed SOPs and repeated rehearsals for passing command and control between

increments are vital to success. When task-organized as a mechanized force, these procedures may

have to be modified to maintain the ability to echelon the command element, maintain a high degree

of COC mobility, and to make rapid decisions

required in mechanized operations.

Typically, the tank battalion COC is comprised of

an assault amphibian vehicle command model 7

(AAVC7) and an assault amphibian vehicle personnel model 7 (AAVP7) chase vehicle. The

lack of space in these vehicles limits the number

of personnel that can be carried on board. This

arrangement often requires staff members and

commanders to personally monitor radios in

order to facilitate rapid decisionmaking. All staff

officers operating inside the AAVC7 must maintain a high level of situational awareness. Standard message form usage within the command

vehicle is imperative when the primary officers

are operating on a number of radio nets. Occasionally, staff members should conduct a brief

staff meeting to coordinate efforts.

The high speed, high stress, and continuous nature

of mechanized operations can create a great deal of

physical and mental fatigue. To provide rest and

allow for continuous operations, personnel assigned

to the COC should be organized into work shifts.

The AAVC7 has map boards mounted in front of

the staff stations that can be removed and

mounted on the outside of the vehicle for briefings. Ideally, S-2, S-3, and FSC maps/charts

should be in close proximity to allow the commander and principal staff officers to view this

information at one time and from a general location. However, consideration must be given to a

system of maintaining and changing graphics

while the vehicles are on the move.

AAVC7 can have communication problems. Many

of these problems are caused by tank units operating

at vast distances from one another, engine noise

when moving, located in a poor position for communications, and poor preventive maintenance.

Some of the following considerations may alleviate

these problems:

z Utilize communications personnel to position

backup radios so they do not interfere with other

vehicle radios. Do not operate strap-on radios

unless the primary radio is not functional.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 1-9 

z When moving and engine noise interferes with

an important transmission, conduct a hasty and

temporary halt. Sometimes reducing the speed

of movement will improve the transmission.

z Communications requirements should be considered when selecting a position for a temporary or extended halt. If communications is

poor, often moving to another position will

greatly improve communications.

z Occasionally, in the fast-paced nature of a

mechanized operation, time is not allowed for

preventive maintenance. During extended halts,

backup radios may be used while preventive

maintenance is conducted on vehicle radios.

z Backup handsets and headsets should be maintained in each command vehicle.

During a mechanized operation there are temporary halts and extended halts. Temporary halts are

relatively short term and staff personnel operate

outside of the vehicle. During extended halts,

chase vehicles move forward and personnel in

those vehicles are employed in the COC. Consideration should be given to notifying subordinate

units and all vehicles in the command group of

the anticipated duration of the halt, which allows

the staff to begin preparations for the COC stopping and becoming static.

Consideration should also be given to creating

SOPs for immediate emplacement and displacement. These procedures might include designated

teams that camouflage the vehicles, establish security, lay wire, remote antennas, and configure the

COC for stationary operation. These and other procedures for emplacement and displacement should

be trained and executed as drills.

Procedures that might be included in operations

from a static position include the following:

z Establish a standard configuration of the COC.

z Establish standard watch sections.

z Establish standard locations for resting. A

designated sleeping position for each member

of the command groups will simplify finding a

needed member of the group in a hurry or

during periods of darkness.

z Establish a method of providing power to the

vehicle radios. The AAVC7’s radios can operate

off the vehicle’s batteries; however, they must be

recharged periodically. There will be a brief disruption of all radios when the engine is started.

The engine should not be started without the

approval of the watch officer. While the engine is

running, noise may become a problem. Another

method is to slave another vehicle to the AAVC7

to provide the required power. Any vehicle with a

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) slave

adapter may provide the required power.

z Establish standardized force resupply system

for the command group.

Tank Battalion Fire

Support Coordination Center 

The tank battalion FSCC is organized similarly to

that of an infantry battalion. The tank battalion

FSCC normally consists of an air officer, an artillery officer FSC, and the battalion S-3. While the

battalion FSCC is built around this nucleus, the fire

support coordination cell is augmented with personnel and equipment appropriate to the fire support coordination functions to be conducted.

Augmentation sources may include Marine Corps

and external sources; for example, watchstanders

may require individuals with specific skills such as

electronic warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, air

defense, or proficiency in fire support coordination.

During an operation, FSCC staff members are

required to plan fires, conduct targeting, and integrate fires simultaneously with maneuver elements. The FSCC’s coordinating responsibilities

include the requirement to disseminate timely fire

support information; to institute coordination measures as required; and to integrate fire support

activities that affect two or more fire support agencies, subordinate elements, or adjacent units.
1-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Fire Support Coordinator

The FSC in a tank battalion is normally an artillery captain by T/O. His responsibilities include—

z Supervising the operation of the FSCC, including organizing and training personnel.

z Advising the battalion commander on all fire

support matters.

z Developing the fire support plan based on the

scheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,

requests from subordinate units, and the fire

support available.

z Coordinating all fire support within the battalion zone of action.

z Processing of target information, including the

shelling report.

z Ensuring the safety of friendly troops from our

own fire support.

Air Officer

The air officer is a pilot or naval flight officer and

is normally a captain by T/O. His responsibilities

include—

z Advising the battalion commander/FSC on all

air support matters.

z Developing the air fire plan based on the

scheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,

assets available, and coordination with the FSC.

z Submitting air requests.

z Coordinating the actions of FACs.

Artillery Liaison Officer

The artillery liaison officer is normally a lieutenant provided by a direct support artillery battalion. His responsibilities include—

z Advising the battalion commander/FSC on all

artillery support matters.

z Developing the artillery fire plan based on the

scheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,

assets available, and coordination with the FSC.

z Passing requirements for support to the appropriate artillery fire direction center for action.

z Coordinating artillery unit requirements with

the battalion commander/FSC.

z Coordinating the actions of the artillery forward observers.

Mortar Liaison Noncommissioned Officer

The mortar liaison noncommissioned officer is

normally a sergeant provided by the weapons

company of an infantry battalion if that unit is

tasked to support a tank battalion. He is typically accompanied by two mortar forward

observers who will travel with the tank companies. His responsibilities include—

z Advising the battalion commander/FSC on all

mortar employment issues.

z Developing the mortar fire plan based on the

scheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate,

assets available, and coordination with the FSC.

z Coordinating the actions of the mortar forward

observers.

z Coordinating mortar platoon requirements with

the battalion commander/FSC.

Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer

The naval gunfire liaison officer is normally a

Navy lieutenant provided by the direct support

artillery battalion. His responsibilities include—

z Advising the battalion commander/FSC on all

naval gunfire support matters.

z Developing the naval gunfire support plan

based on the scheme of maneuver, the intelligence estimate, assets available, and coordination with the FSC.

z Assisting in calling for naval gunfire support. 

z Coordinating the actions of the naval gunfire

spot team. 

z Passing requirements for support to the appropriate naval gunfire support ship.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 1-11 

Target Information Officer

The target information officer is normally the

battalion S-2 officer. His responsibilities concerning target intelligence include—

z Disseminating target information and intelligence to the FSCC.

z Advising the battalion commander/FSC on

enemy weapons capabilities.

z Keeping appropriate records of targets.

Command Relationships

Command relationships and levels of authority,

although authoritative, must be adapted to meet

mission requirements. Commanders must have

the flexibility to establish nonstandard relationships when required by the situation. Collectively, command relationships and levels of

authority provide the flexibility necessary to

organize forces to respond to all situations. Command relationships foster understanding and

freedom of action and establish the basis for

interaction among unit commanders.

When a Marine unit is under the command of a

senior Marine unit, the subordinate Marine unit is

either organic or attached. (If organic, a unit is

assigned to and forms an essential part of a military organization. If attached, a unit or personnel

is temporarily placed in an organization.) When a

Marine unit is in a support relationship, one element or unit of the MAGTF provides a required

capability to another element.

Units with tank attachments must be aware of the

logistical and tactical challenges inherent with

armor. Unless the attachment orders qualify the

degree of control involved, attachment of a tank unit

to an infantry battalion or regiment implies that the

infantry battalion or regiment assumes full responsibility for the tank unit’s logistics, administration,

training, and operations—the tank unit is under the

command of the unit to which it is attached. However, transfer and promotion responsibility normally remain with the command to which the tank

unit is organic.
CHAPTER 2

OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

When the MAGTF is involved in offensive

operations, the main effort is weighted with

superior combat power. Superior combat power

allows the MAGTF to retain the initiative, set

the tempo of operations, and achieve decisive

results on the battlefield. Tank units—by their

inherent speed, mobility, armor-protected firepower, and shock effect—contribute greatly to

the GCE’s combat power while operating in the

offensive. Tank units also provide the GCE with

flexibility that allows the commander to rapidly

shift his main effort. The inherent flexibility of a

tank unit allows the commander to maintain the

momentum of attack by quickly focusing the

combat power of the force at various locations

on the battlefield.

SECTION I. TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

There are four general types of offensive operations: movement to contact, attack, exploitation,

and pursuit. See Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 1-0, Marine Corps Operations,

for a detailed discussion of each type of offensive operation.

Movement to Contact

A movement to contact develops the situation

and establishes or regains contact with the

enemy. It is normally employed when the enemy

situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct a deliberate attack. Most mechanized operations begin with a movement to contact,

regardless of whether or not a deliberate attack is

planned on the final objective. The movement to

contact is characterized by decentralized control

and rapid commitment of forces from the march.

A movement to contact ends when the commander has to deploy the main body to conduct

an attack or establish a defense.

A tank battalion executing a movement to contact mission is normally given a zone of action or

an axis of attack and an objective. Inherent to

planning a movement to contact is the assumption that enemy contact will be made and actions

on contact must be immediate and successful. A

properly executed movement to contact allows

the tank battalion commander to make initial contact with minimum forces and to expedite the

employment and concentration of the force.

Key considerations of a movement to contact

using mechanized forces include:

z Focusing all efforts on finding and fixing the

enemy.

z Initiating contact with the smallest element.

z Maintaining freedom of action and executing

actions on contact wherever the enemy is

encountered.

z Concentrating the effects of overwhelming

combat power at the decisive point.

A mechanized force conducting a movement to

contact normally organizes in an approach march

formation with advance, flank, and rear security

elements protecting the main body.

Advance Guard

The advance guard protects its main body against

ground observation and surprise from the front. It

prevents premature deployment of the main body

and provides adequate time and space for the

main body to deploy for combat. The advance
2-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

guard destroys the enemy’s security and combat

forces and reports and breaches obstacles within

its capability. It may be directed to report and

bypass small enemy forces. When the advance

guard comes in contact with a superior enemy

force, it normally attempts to seize key terrain

and conduct a hasty defense to facilitate deployment of the main body. It operates within supporting range of the main body. The advance

guard prevents unnecessary delay of the main

body and defers the deployment of the main body

as long as possible. Reconnaissance elements

normally operate to the front and flanks of the

advance guard.

A tank or mechanized company usually provides

the advance guard element for a tank or mechanized battalion (the main body). As the company

moves along the axis of advance, it usually will

have a 3 to 5 kilometer frontage if unhindered by

terrain or obstacles. Advance guard responsibilities include—

z Providing security and early warning for the

main body and facilitating its uninterrupted

advance.

z Conducting reconnaissance to locate enemy

forces along the unit’s axis of advance.

z Conducting actions on contact to retain freedom of maneuver for the main body.

z Calling for indirect fires and/or close air support

to impede or harass the enemy. The advance

guard for a tank battalion usually has a forward

observer and FAC located with the company

command to help execute these missions.

z Destroying enemy reconnaissance units. Tanks

are well-suited to destroy enemy mechanized

reconnaissance due to their ability to acquire

and kill targets at long ranges and to mass fires

quickly (daylight or night).

z Finding, fixing, defeating, destroying, or containing enemy security forces in order to retain

freedom of maneuver for the main body. A

tank’s ability to acquire and kill targets at long

ranges and to mass fires quickly allows it to

protect the main body and suppress the enemy.

Bypassing and reporting obstacles or acting as

the tank or mechanized unit’s support or breach

force during breaching operations.

Flank and Rear Security

When adjacent units do not protect the flanks of a

command it is necessary to provide protection by

using a portion of the force to conduct flank security. Flank security missions include both guard

and screen missions. The purpose of flank security is to protect the main body from observation,

direct fire, and surprise attack. The mission and

available combat power of the flank security element depends on METT-T. Flank security elements are subordinate to the main body. They

travel on routes parallel to the main body, either

by continuously marching or moving by alternating bounds. Flank security for a tank or mechanized unit must be far enough away from the

main body to provide early warning and allow the

main body freedom of maneuver. However, flank

security should remain close enough to the main

body to be responsive and provide mutual support to the main body.

The rear security element protects the rear of the

main body from attack and/or observation. When

properly resourced, the rear security element can

be given a screen, guard, or cover mission.

Main Body

Ideally, the main body is unhindered during the

movement to contact and is well positioned to conduct an attack against main enemy forces and seize

the final objective. Elements from the main body

may be deployed to eliminate small pockets of

resistance bypassed by the advance guard. However, the main body must not be committed piecemeal. Committing tank units piecemeal diminishes

their ability to mass effective fires and provides a

shock effect. Tank battalions or mechanized forces

normally keep the majority of its tanks within the

main body and employ the main body to decisively

defeat the enemy and/or secure the objective.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 2-3 

Maximum consideration is given to attacks upon

the enemy flanks and rear before the enemy is

prepared to counter these envelopments. Attacks

by the main body may consist of a coordinated

attack by the entire main body or an attack from a

march column conducted while the remainder of

the main body deploys. Piecemeal commitment is

to be avoided except when rapidity of action is

essential due to fleeting windows of opportunity

and when local combat superiority can be

achieved at a decisive point. Mechanized units

use all available supporting arms to suppress the

enemy forces in contact, disrupt its attacking formations, and neutralize its indirect fire assets.

Actions with Contact Imminent

The enemy situation becomes clearer as the

advance guard conducts actions on contact. Key

actions include developing the situation and refocusing reconnaissance, surveillance, and target

acquisition (RSTA) assets. The mechanized force

must remain flexible enough to rapidly exploit

both intelligence and combat information. All

RSTA assets are focused on determining the

enemy’s dispositions and ensuring the commitment of friendly forces under optimal conditions.

As contact becomes imminent, advance guards

move forward on a progressively broader front.

Based upon the situation, the advance guard

engages in accordance with the commander’s plan

or seizes terrain essential to the development of its

main body that affords essential observation.

Actions After Contact

Once contact with a strong enemy is made, measures are taken—hasty attack, hasty defense,

report and bypass, delay and withdraw—to

develop the situation and protect the deployment

of the mechanized force. Knowledge of hostile

dispositions, particularly enemy flank locations,

is important to provide the essential information upon which the commander can base his

plan of attack. When the security elements of

mechanized forces lack the strength to develop

the situation fully, they may be quickly reinforced by main body elements to obtain adequate knowledge of hostile dispositions before

the coordinated attack is launched.

When strong resistance is met, reconnaissance

units are quickly withdrawn and replaced or reinforced by the combat elements of the advance

guard. Reconnaissance units are then employed

on the flanks to screen the enemy’s main force,

conduct further reconnaissance, or harass the hostile flanks and rear. Every effort is made to retain

the initiative and to prevent the enemy from stabilizing the situation. Premature deployment of

the main body is costly in terms of time,

resources, and disclosure of the main effort.

While the main body is deploying for attack, the

advance guard gains contact and continues to

develop the enemy situation. Their mission is to

determine the strength and dispositions of the

enemy and the location of his flanks in order to

provide the commander as complete a picture as

possible before conducting an attack.

Hasty Attack

The hasty attack is characterized by rapid reconnaissance to determine the size and location of

the enemy force to allow a rapid attack of the

enemy by available forces.

Hasty Defense

The hasty defense is characterized by the seizure

of key terrain to facilitate the deployment of the

main body. The enemy reaction to such action

frequently indicates both the strength and disposition of the enemy force.

Report and Bypass

Bypass criteria are established by the commander and are based on METT-T. Typically,

commanders specify bypass criteria based on the

size of the unit.
2-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Delay

Units conduct delays when forces are insufficient to either attack or defend or when the

design of the operation dictates maneuvering the

enemy into an area for subsequent attack.

Withdraw

Withdrawal is normally the last option and only

occurs when the enemy has an overwhelming

superiority and the survival of the advance guard

is at risk. The unit normally withdraws only after

receiving permission and then only withdraws

back toward the main body.

Meeting Engagement 

A movement to contact often results in a meeting

engagement. Meeting engagements are clashes

that take place at unexpected places and times

when forces are not fully prepared for battle.

Such encounters often occur in small-unit operations and when reconnaissance has been ineffective. A meeting engagement may also occur when

each opponent is aware of the other and both

decide to attack without delay to obtain a tactical

advantage. A meeting engagement may result in

confusion, delay, or even in the premature

employment of the main body before the commander has set conditions for decisive action.

The premature employment of the main body

slows the mechanized force’s tempo of operations and may cause it to lose the initiative.

Attack

The purpose of an attack is to defeat, destroy, or

neutralize the enemy. An attack emphasizes maximum application of combat power, coupled with

bold maneuver, shock effect in the assault, and

prompt exploitation of success. Principal elements in an attack include preventing effective

enemy maneuver or counteraction, maneuvering

to gain an advantage, delivering an overwhelming assault to destroy the enemy, and exploiting

the advantages gained. Commanders conduct various types of attacks to achieve different effects:

spoiling attack, counterattack, feint, demonstration, reconnaissance in force, and raid.

The commander conducts either a hasty or a

deliberate attack based on time available. A hasty

attack is an attack in which preparation time is

traded for speed in order to exploit an opportunity. (Joint Pub [JP] 1-02, Department of Defense

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)

Typically, a hasty attack is the result of a meeting engagement. The goal of a hasty attack is to

destroy the enemy before he is able to concentrate or establish a defense. In order to maintain

momentum or retain initiative, minimum time is

devoted to preparation. Those forces readily

available are committed immediately to the

attack. A hasty attack seeks to take advantage of

the enemy’s lack of readiness and involves boldness, surprise, and speed to achieve success. A

deliberate attack is characterized by preplanned

coordinated employment of firepower and

maneuver to close with and destroy the enemy.

The deliberate attack is a fully coordinated operation that is conducted when preparation time is

available for lengthy reconnaissance, precise

planning, and rehearsals. Deliberate attacks normally include large volumes of supporting fires,

main and supporting attacks, and deception measures. Tanks are best suited for either a hasty or

deliberate attack because of their speed, mobility, and armor-protected firepower.

Spoiling Attack

A spoiling attack is a tactical maneuver

employed to seriously impair a hostile attack

while the enemy is in the process of forming or

assembling for an attack. It is a pre-emptive,

limited objective attack aimed at preventing,

disrupting, or delaying the enemy’s ability to

launch an attack. It may be conducted like a raid

with a planned withdrawal. The circumstances

in which a spoiling attack is conducted normally preclude full exploitation. All or part of
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 2-5 

the reserve normally conducts a spoiling attack;

therefore, it may require that another reserve

force is temporarily formed.

Counterattack

Counterattacks are limited objective attacks conducted by part or all of a defensive force to prevent

the enemy from attaining the objectives of his

attack. It may be conducted to regain lost ground,

destroy enemy advance units, and wrest the initiative from the enemy. It may also be a precursor to

resuming offensive operations. The circumstances

in which a counterattack is conducted normally

preclude full exploitation. Normally the commander will attempt to retain his reserve to conduct a decisive counterattack once the enemy has

committed his main force to the attack. All or part

of the reserve normally conducts a counterattack;

therefore, it may require that another reserve force

is temporarily formed. Tank units counterattack by

two methods: counterattack by fire and movement

or counterattack by fire. The intent of the counterattack by fire and movement method is to close

with and destroy the enemy. The intent of the

counterattack by fire method is to use weapon

standoff and/or cover to full advantage and destroy

the enemy by direct fires.

When tanks counterattack by fire and movement

it is also referred to as support by fire. During

conduct of the counterattack by fire and movement, the tank or mechanized unit commander

takes the following actions to plan and execute

the attack:

z Conduct a line of sight analysis to identify

advantageous positions for tanks and other

weapon systems to support by fire.

z Plan to integrate both indirect and direct fires.

z Determine triggers for lifting and/or shifting

direct and indirect fires.

z Plan and rehearse actions on contact, as well as

maneuver to support by fire positions.

z Plan for class V expenditures depending on

the mission.

z Use infantry to support mounted platforms

whenever possible. They can be used to

secure positions for vehicles, augment antitank fires with Javelins, and provide local

security for vehicles.

z Continually scan the area of operations to

acquire, track, and destroy any enemy threatening the movement of the attack. 

z Maintain 360-degree security.

z Use the tank’s main guns to destroy enemy

armor while other systems engage enemy light

armor or vehicles.

z Move and maneuver continually to increase

survivability of the attacking force. 

Counterattacking by fire is also referred to as

attack by fire. The planning and execution considerations are the same as for counterattack by

fire and movement; however, counterattack by

fire takes advantage of long-range standoff fires

inherent in tanks and other antitank systems.

Counterattacking by fire most often is conducted

from dominating terrain and is used when the

mission or situation does not dictate occupying

enemy positions.

Feint

A feint is a limited objective attack made at a

place other than that of the main effort with the

aim of distracting the enemy’s attention away

from the main effort, and it involves direct, physical contact with the enemy. A feint must be sufficiently strong to confuse the enemy as to the

location of the main effort. Ideally, a feint causes

the enemy to shift forces to the diversion and

away from the main effort. Feints are usually

shallow, limited objective attacks conducted

before or during the attack of the main effort.

Tanks are effective in confusing the enemy into

thinking he is being attacked by the main effort

when he is not. The appearance of tanks attacking

can cause the enemy commander to commit his

reserve forces to counter the feint; thereby leaving him no reserves when the main body attacks
2-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

him from a different direction and/or place. The

employment of a tank unit in a feint must be

heavily weighed against the loss of combat power

that is rendered unavailable to the main effort.

Demonstration

Demonstrations are operations designed to divert

enemy attention, which allows MAGTF forces to

execute decisive action elsewhere. A demonstration is a show of force that threatens an attack at

another location but does not make contact with

the enemy. The commander executes a demonstration by an actual or simulated massing of

combat power, troop movements, or some other

activity designed to indicate the preparations for

or the beginning of attack at a point other than the

main effort. The employment of a tank unit in a

demonstration must be weighed with the potential

loss of combat power that could be applied to the

main effort.

Reconnaissance in Force

The reconnaissance in force is a deliberate attack

by major forces to obtain information and to locate

and test enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. While the primary purpose of a reconnaissance in force is to gain information, the

commander must be prepared to exploit any

opportunity. The protection afforded by the tank

battalion can be used to protect the force; however,

if the situation warrants, the tank battalion can also

exploit any opportunity. A reconnaissance in force

usually develops information more rapidly and in

more detail than other reconnaissance methods.

Since a reconnaissance in force is conducted when

knowledge of the enemy is vague, combined-arms

forces containing tanks are often employed

because the force is capable of disengagement if

superior enemy forces are encountered.

Raid

A raid is an attack, usually small-scale, involving

a penetration of hostile territory for a specific

purpose other than seizing and holding terrain. It

ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion

of the assigned mission. The organization and

composition of the raid force are tailored to the

mission. Raids are characterized by surprise and

swift, precise, and bold action. Tanks can be

employed on mechanized raids to destroy enemy

installations and facilities, disrupt enemy command and control or support activities, divert

enemy attention, and secure information.

Exploitation

Exploitation is an offensive operation that usually

follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. Exploitation

extends the initial success of the attack by preventing the enemy from disengaging, withdrawing, and re-establishing an effective defense. The

objective of the exploitation is the destruction of

enemy forces to the point where they have no

alternative but surrender or flight. The mechanized force is ideally suited for exploitation operations because of its inherent speed, mobility, and

shock action.

The commander must be prepared to exploit

every attack without delay. In the hasty attack,

the force in contact normally continues the attack,

transitioning to exploitation. In the deliberate

attack, the commander’s principal tool for exploitation is normally the reserve. The reserve is generally positioned where it can exploit the success

of the main effort or supporting efforts. Typical

missions for the exploitation force include cutting

lines of communication, isolating and destroying

enemy units, and disrupting enemy command and

control. The psychological effect of an exploitation creates confusion and apprehension throughout the enemy force, reduces the enemy’s

capability to react, and may be decisive. Enemy

forces, which cannot jeopardize the mission, are

suppressed, bypassed, and reported to higher

headquarters for clearing by follow-on forces.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 2-7 

Opportunities for exploitation occur when—

z The enemy is having difficulty maintaining his

position.

z There is a significant increase in the number of

prisoners captured.

z Enemy units disintegrate after initial contact.

z The enemy lacks an organized defense.

z There are confirmed reports of the capture of

or absence of enemy leaders.

z There is an increase in abandoned material.

z Equipment from various units is intermixed in

formations or columns.

z Enemy fire decreases in intensity and

effectiveness.

z Enemy artillery, C2 facilities, and supply

dumps are overrun.

Once the exploitation is begun, it is carried out to

the final objective. An exploitation continues day

and night, the enemy is given no relief from

offensive pressure. The exploiting force retains

terrain only as necessary to accomplish its mission. The exploiting force commander must be

careful not to dissipate combat power in achieving minor tactical successes or in reducing small

enemy forces.

Exploitation should be decentralized. The mechanized unit commander maintains sufficient control to alter the direction of the command or to

prevent its overextension. He relies on his subordinates to find the fastest way to their objectives,

to deploy as necessary to fight, and to seize all

opportunities to destroy the enemy and accelerate the tempo of operations. The commander uses

minimum control measures, but issues clear

instructions concerning seizure of key terrain and

the size of enemy forces, which may be bypassed.

The exploitation force and the follow-on support

force must maintain direct communications.

The commander must exercise aggressive and

demanding leadership to keep units advancing.

When fatigue, disorganization, or attrition has

weakened the force or when it must hold ground

or resupply, the commander should exploit with a

fresh force. Exploitation ends when the enemy

loses his ability and will to fight; enemy resistance increases requiring deliberate attack; or the

force conducting the exploitation can no longer

be supported or sustained.

Pursuit

A pursuit often develops after a successful

exploitation operation, and its purpose is the

annihilation of the enemy; therefore, forces are

orientated on the enemy rather than the seizure of

terrain. A pursuit is an offensive operation

designed to catch or cut off a hostile force

attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying

it. The difference between an exploitation and a

pursuit is the condition of the enemy. Like

exploitation, pursuit requires broad decentralized

control and rapid movement; therefore, the speed

and shock effect of a tank unit greatly improves

the impact and effect of a pursuit.

The decision to conduct a pursuit operation is

made when the enemy has lost the ability to

defend or delay and begins to withdraw. Therefore, the decision to execute a pursuit must be

made quickly, before the enemy can regain control or organize a defense or before the opportunity is lost.

Unlike an exploitation, in which the attacking

force may or may not focus on the enemy force,

the attacker in a pursuit focuses on catching and

destroying the fleeing enemy force. A pursuit follows a successful attack or exploitation and is

ordered when the enemy cannot conduct an organized defense and attempts to disengage. Direct

pressure against the retreating forces must be

combined with an enveloping or encircling

maneuver to place troops across the enemy’s

lines of retreat. Tanks are usually assigned as the

enveloping or encircling force. If it becomes

apparent that enemy resistance has broken down
2-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

entirely and that the enemy is fleeing the battlefield, any type of offensive operation can transition into a pursuit.

During the pursuit, commanders conduct air and

ground operations to intercept, capture, or destroy

the enemy. The aviation combat element can also

interdict fleeing enemy forces.

Unlike exploitation, commanders are rarely able

to anticipate pursuit, so they do not normally hold

forces in reserve solely to accomplish this mission. Therefore, commanders must be agile

enough to react when the situation presents itself.

During a pursuit, the commander task-organizes

the force into a direct pressure force and an encircling force.

Direct Pressure Force

The mission of the direct pressure force is to prevent enemy disengagement and subsequent

reconstitution of the defense. Leading elements

of the direct pressure force move rapidly, on all

available routes, containing or bypassing small

enemy forces that are reduced by follow-on support forces. The direct pressure force must have

sufficient combat power to maintain pressure on

the enemy; it attacks on a broad front and provides relentless pressure on the enemy.

Encircling Force

The mission of the encircling force is to get

behind the enemy and block his escape so that he

can be destroyed between the direct pressure

force and the encircling force. If the encircling

force cannot outrun the fleeing enemy force, it

attacks the flank. The encircling force must have

continuous fire support and greater mobility than

the enemy, which lends it to being a mechanized

force. The encircling force may seize deep blocking positions to prevent the enemy’s escape. This

may require that the encircling force move without flank security.

SECTION II. TANK UNIT FORMATIONS

Tank units use formations to facilitate positive

command and control and to avoid confusion in

combat. Formations also enhance speed and security and improve the ability to react to anticipated situations. Formations are chosen based on

METT-T analysis; therefore, the commander

must continuously analyze the situation and

change formations as the situation changes—formations are not rigid. Subordinate commanders,

down to the individual tank level, must also have

the freedom to adjust to the terrain/enemy situation. The tank battalion uses formations for several purposes—

z Establish the relationship of one unit to another

on the ground.

z Allow tank companies to position firepower

where it is needed in support of the direct

fire plan.

z Establish responsibilities for sector security

among companies/platoons.

z Facilitate the execution of battle drills and

directed COAs.

Formations (like movement techniques) are

planned based on where enemy contact is

expected and how the commander expects to

react to the contact. The commander of the

mechanized force must evaluate the situation

and determine which formation best suits the

mission and the situation. The battalion formation establishes the relationship between the battalion’s companies, the actual positioning of

platoons within each company is dictated by the

company commanders. It is not necessary for all

of the company formations to be the same

within the battalion formation. It is critical,
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 2-9 

however, for company commanders to coordinate their formation with those of other elements

of the tank/mechanized force. In some cases, the

company may use the same formation as the battalion (for example, the companies may use the

column formation within a battalion column). In

other situations, however, battalion and company formations may be different as a result of

METT-T factors (such as the companies moving in wedge formations within a battalion vee).

An important consideration in movement planning and execution is that formations are not

rigid. Spacing requirements, as well as other

METT-T considerations, will require the battalion commander and subordinate leaders to adapt

the basic formations as necessary. They must be

ready to adjust the distance between companies

and individual platoons based on terrain, visibility, and mission requirements.

Column

The column is used when speed is critical, when

the battalion is moving through restricted terrain

on a specific route, and/or when enemy contact is

not likely. Each company normally follows

directly behind the company in front of it. If the

situation dictates, however, platoons can disperse

laterally to enhance security (see. fig. 2-1). The

column formation has the following characteristics, advantages, and limitations:

z Provides excellent control and fires to the

flanks.

z Permits only limited fires to the front and rear.

z Is easy to control.

z Provides extremely limited overall security.

z Is normally used for traveling only.

Option

Flank

Screen

TOW PLT

CO Z

CO Y

CO X

SCT PLT

CO W

Option

RECON

5-7 km

Frontage

Advance

Guard

Main

Body

Rear

Guard

Direction ofMovement

3-5 km

1-3 km

(-)

Figure 2-1. Tank Battalion in Column Formation

with Dispersal for Added Security.
2-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Wedge

The wedge formation, illustrated in figure 2-2,

is often used when the enemy situation is

unclear or contact is possible. In the battalion

wedge, the lead company is in the center of the

formation, with the remaining companies

located to the rear of and outside the lead company. The wedge has the following characteristics, advantages, and limitations:

z Permits excellent fires to the front and good

fires to the flanks.

z Is easy to control.

z Provides good security to the flanks.

z Can be used with the traveling and traveling

overwatch techniques.

z Allows rapid transition to bounding overwatch.

Vee 

The vee formation, illustrated in figure 2-3, is

used when enemy contact is possible. In the battalion vee, the center company is located in the

rear of the formation, while the remaining companies are to the front of and outside the center

company. The vee has the following characteristics, advantages, and limitations:

z Permits more firepower to the front than the

wedge and affords greater fires to the flanks.

z Is more difficult to control than the wedge and

makes it more difficult for vehicles to maintain

proper orientation.

z Allows one unit in the formation to maintain

freedom of maneuver when contact occurs.

z Facilitates rapid deployment into any other

formation.

z Can be used with the traveling and traveling

overwatch techniques.

z Allows rapid transition to bounding overwatch.

Line

The line formation is primarily used when a unit

or element is crossing a danger area or needs to

maximize firepower to the front (see fig. 2-4). In

the battalion line, companies move abreast of one

TOW

CO Z CO W CO Y

CO X

SCT PLT

Direction ofMovement

Figure 2-2. Tank Battalion

in Wedge Formation.

TOW

CO Z

CO W

CO Y

CO X

SCT PLT

Direction ofMovement

Figure 2-3. Tank Battalion

in Vee Formation.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 2-11 

another and are dispersed laterally. The line formation has the following characteristics, advantages, and limitations:

z Permits maximum fires to the front or rear, but

minimum fires to the flanks.

z Is difficult to control.

z Is less secure than other formations because of

the lack of depth.

z Is the most difficult formation from which to

make the transition to other formations.

The line may be used in the assault to maximize

the firepower and/or shock effect of the heavy

company. This is normally done when there is no

more intervening terrain between the unit and the

enemy, when antitank systems are suppressed,

and/or when the unit is exposed to artillery fire

and must move rapidly.

Echelon

The echelon formation is used when the battalion wants to maintain security and/or observation of one flank and enemy contact is not

likely (see fig. 2-5). The battalion echelon formation (either echelon left or echelon right)

has the lead company positioned farthest from

the echeloned flank, with each subsequent

company located to the rear of and outside the

company in front of it. The echelon formation

has the following characteristics, advantages,

and limitations:

z Is difficult to control.

z Affords excellent security for the higher formation in the direction of the echelon.

z Facilitates deployment to the echeloned flank.

Coil

The coil is a battalion or below-level formation

employed when elements of the battalion are stationary and must maintain 360-degree security.

See figure 2-6 on page 2-12.

TOW

CO Y CO X CO W CO Z

SCT PLT

Direction ofMovement

Figure 2-4. Tank Battalion

in Line Formation.

TOW

CO Z

CO W

CO Y

CO X

SCT PLT

Direction ofMovement

Figure 2-5. Tank Battalion

in Echelon Right Formation.
2-12 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

SECTION III. FORMS OF MANEUVER

Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire (or

fire potential) to achieve a position of advantage in

respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. The basic forms of maneuver are frontal

attack, envelopment, flanking attack, penetration,

turning movement and infiltration.

Frontal Attack

A frontal attack is an offensive maneuver in

which the main action is directed against the front

of the enemy force. This is the least desirable

form of maneuver for a mechanized force

because it attacks into the enemy’s strength and

does not take full advantage of a tank’s ability to

maneuver. The advantages of a tank/mechanized

force conducting a frontal attack are—

z Greater combat power than pure infantry

forces.

z Inherent speed reduces exposure time to enemy

fire.

z Vehicle armor reduces effects of enemy direct/

indirect fires.

Envelopment 

An offensive maneuver in which the main attacking force passes around or over the enemy’s principle defensive positions to secure objectives to

the enemy’s rear. (JP 1-02) This is the most

desirable form of maneuver for a tank/mechanized force because it utilizes maneuver and

speed to avoid enemy strengths and in doing so

destroys the enemy’s cohesion. The advantages

of a tank/mechanized force conducting an envelopment are as follows:

z Possess greater speed, which is required to surprise the enemy from an unexpected direction.

CO Y

CO W CO Z

CO X

Figure 2-6. Coil Formation.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 2-13 

z Has the required ground mobility to rapidly

seize deep objectives while providing a greater

threat than a turning movement.

An envelopment is a form of offensive maneuver

by which the attacker bypasses the enemy’s principal defensive positions to secure objectives to

the enemy’s rear. An envelopment compels the

defender to fight on the ground of the attacker’s

choosing. It requires surprise and superior mobility relative to the enemy. In mechanized tactics,

an envelopment normally requires a base of fire

element and a bounding element. The bounding

element avoids the enemy’s strength en route to

the objective. The base of fire element fixes the

enemy’s attention to his front, forcing the enemy

to fight in two or more directions simultaneously

to meet the converging efforts of the attacks.

Penetration

A penetration seeks to break through the enemy’s

defense and disrupts the defensive system. The

purpose of a penetration is to break through the

enemy’s main defenses, in effect creating an

assailable flank where none had existed before. A

penetration generally occurs in three stages: rupturing the position, widening the gap, and seizing

the objective.

A penetration’s main effort concentrates overwhelmingly superior combat power deep into a

narrow front. A penetration is appropriate when

the enemy is overextended, when his flanks are

secure, or when there is no assailable flank.

Because tanks can maneuver quickly and mass

overwhelming fires, they are well-suited to perform this type of offensive maneuver. However,

care must be taken to ensure that the enemy does

not close the penetration. If this happens, it

endangers the penetration forces and subjects

them to being cut off from follow-on forces and

possibly destroyed by an enemy counterattack.

Turning Movement

A turning movement is a form of offensive

maneuver in which the attacker passes around or

over the enemy’s principal defensive positions to

secure objectives deep in the enemy’s rear. Normally, the main effort executes the turning movement as the supporting effort fixes the enemy in

position. The main effort seizes objectives so

deep that the enemy is forced to abandon his

position and divert major forces to meet the

threat. Unlike an envelopment, the main effort

usually operates at such a distance from the supporting effort force that mutual support is

unlikely. Therefore, the main effort must be selfsufficient and reach the objective before becoming decisively engaged. Seldom would a turning

movement be executed by a MAGTF smaller

than a Marine expeditionary force (MEF). Typical objectives of the main effort in a turning

movement are ideally suited for mechanized

forces are as follows:

z Critical logistic sites.

z C2 nodes.

z Lines of communications.

Infiltration

Infiltration is a form of maneuver in which

forces move covertly through or into an enemy

area to attack positions in the enemy’s rear.

Forces move over, through, or around enemy

positions without detection to assume a position

of advantage over the enemy. The commander
2-14 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

orders an infiltration to move all or part of his

force through gaps in the enemy’s defense to—

z Achieve surprise.

z Attack enemy positions from the flank or rear.

z Occupy a position from which to support the

main attack by fire.

z Secure key terrain.

z Conduct ambushes and raids in the enemy’s

rear to harass and disrupt his command and

control and support activities.

z Cut off enemy forward units.

Infiltrations normally take advantage of limited

visibility, rough terrain, or unoccupied or unobserved areas. Theses conditions often allow undetected movement of small elements when the

movement of the entire force would present

greater risks. Infiltration routes must be reconnoitered to minimize the chance that the enemy can

observe or hear mechanized forces moving;

therefore, it is difficult for tanks and mechanized

forces to perform infiltrations due to noise, dust

signatures, and the large number of vehicles usually found in mechanized units.
CHAPTER 3

DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The purpose of the defense is to force the

attacker to reach his culminating point without

achieving his objectives, to gain the initiative for

friendly forces, and to create the opportunity to

shift to the offense. The essence of defensive tactics is to place the enemy into a position that permits his destruction through the intelligent use of

terrain and firepower, thereby creating favorable

conditions for counterattack and resumption of

the offense. Defensive operations achieve one or

more of the following:

z Destroy the enemy.

z Weaken enemy forces as a prelude to the

offense.

z Cause an enemy attack to fail.

z Gain time.

z Concentrate forces elsewhere.

z Control key or decisive terrain.

z Retain terrain.

General planning considerations include—

z Enemy’s strength and mobility.

z Initial disposition, assembly areas, coordination measures, and routes or axis.

z Coordination with frontline units (key considerations include frontline unit obstacle plans

and passage lanes).

z Communications/signals.

z The tank unit coordinating, reconnoitering,

rehearsing, and preparing for the priority

reserve missions as time allows.

Organization of the Battlespace

During defensive operations, the commander

organizes his battlespace into three areas—security area, main battle area, and rear area—in

which the defending force performs specific

functions (see fig. 3-1.) These areas can be further divided into sectors. The size and nature of a

sector depends on the situation and the factors of

METT-T. A defensive sector is an area assigned

to a subordinate commander in which he is provided the maximum latitude to accomplish

assigned tasks in order to conduct defensive operations. Commanders of defensive sectors can

assign their subordinates their own sector.

Security Area

The security area is that area that begins at the

forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) and

extends as far to the front and flanks as security

forces are deployed, normally to the forward

Security

Area

Rear

Area

Main Battle

Area

Reserves

FEBA FEBA

XX

XXX

Figure 3-1. Organization of the Battlespace.
3-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

boundary of the area of operations. Forces in the

security area conduct reconnaissance to furnish

information on the enemy and delay, deceive, and

disrupt the enemy. The commander adds depth to

the defense by extending the security area as far

forward as is tactically feasible.

Actions in the security area purposely cause the

enemy to prematurely deploy into attack formations and to disrupt his plan of attack. Slowing

the enemy’s attack enables MAGTF forces, particularly Marine aviation, to strike the enemy’s

critical vulnerabilities (i.e., movement, resupply,

fire support, and command and control). The utilization of tanks in the security area provides the

commander with the long-range firepower necessary to engage and wear down the enemy’s forward elements. The tank’s speed and mobility

also permits the security force to rapidly withdraw and fall back to the main defensive position.

Main Battle Area

The main battle area is that portion of the battlespace in which the commander conducts close

operations to defeat the enemy. Normally, the

main battle area extends rearward from the FEBA

to the rear boundary of the command’s subordinate units. The commander positions forces

throughout the main battle area to defeat, destroy,

or contain enemy assaults. Reserves may be

employed in the main battle area to destroy

enemy forces, reduce penetrations, or regain terrain. The greater the depth of the main battle area,

the greater the maneuver space for fighting the

main defensive battle. Due to its range and firepower, the tank’s various weapons systems provide the commander with the capability to engage

multiple targets simultaneously and accurately.

Rear Area

The rear area is that area extending forward from a

command’s rear boundary to the rear of the operational area of the command’s subordinate units.

This area is provided primarily for the performance of CSS functions. Rear area operations

include those functions of security and sustainment

required to maintain continuity of operations by

the whole force. Rear area operations protect the

sustainment effort as well as deny use of the rear

area to the enemy. The rear area may not always

be contiguous with the main battle area.

Organization of the Force

During defensive operations, the commander

organizes his force as depicted in figure 3-2.

Security Forces

The commander uses security forces forward of the

main battle area to delay, disrupt, and provide early

warning of the enemy’s advance and to deceive the

enemy as to the true location of the main battle area.

Operations of security forces must be an integral part

of the overall defensive plan. To ensure optimal

unity of effort during security operations, a single

commander is normally assigned responsibility for

xx

Security

Forces

Rear Area

Forces

Main Battle

Forces

Reserves

Phase Line

(battle

handover)

FEBA FEBA

xxx

Figure 3-2. Organization of the Force.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 3-3 

the conduct of operations in the security area. The

element of the MAGTF assigned as the security

forces depends on METT-T factors.

The commander seeks to engage the enemy as far

out as possible. Suppression and obscuration fires

are employed to facilitate maneuver of the security force. Maximum use may be made of all fire

support assets to disrupt and destroy enemy formations as they move through the security area

approaching the main battle area. Obstacles and

barriers are positioned to delay or canalize the

enemy and are covered by fires to destroy him

while he is halted or in the process of breaching.

The commander assigns screen, guard, or cover

missions to security forces:

z A security element screens a stationary force

by establishing a series of positions along a

designated screen line. The positions are

located to provide overlapping observation.

Areas that cannot be observed from these positions are normally patrolled. Screening forces

report any sightings of enemy activity and

engage enemy forces with fires. Maintaining

contact, the screen falls back along previously

reconnoitered routes to subsequent positions.

Screening forces should avoid becoming decisively engaged. 

z A security element guards a force by establishing a series of mutually supporting positions.

The guard may establish a screen line forward

of these positions. These positions immediately

report any enemy contact and engage with fires

at maximum range. The guard defends in

place, attacks, or delays to rearward positions.

Routes and subsequent positions should have

been previously reconnoitered.

z Covering forces compel the enemy to deploy

prematurely, confirm the direction and strength

of the enemy attack, conduct counterreconnaissance, destroy the enemy advance guard, canalize the enemy advance in accordance with the

commander’s plan, and provide the main force

time to react. A covering force should be a selfsufficient, combined-arms force that is large

enough to convince the enemy that they are the

main battle force.

The security force engages the enemy first,

screening, guarding, and covering as ordered.

Normally, the commander designates the security force as his initial main effort. Since a tank

can withdraw rapidly to the main battle area and

maintain continuous long-range contact with the

enemy, it can allow the security force to maintain contact with the enemy while falling back

under pressure. The effectiveness and firepower

of the tank’s various weapon systems also facilitates the engagement and attrition of the enemy’s

advance guard during the withdrawal. This action

impedes the enemy’s momentum, forcing him to

deploy his main body.

At a predetermined location, normally a phase

line designated as a handover line, control of the

battle is transferred to the main battle force. A

handover line is a control feature; preferably following easily defined terrain features, at which

the responsibility for the conduct of combat operations is passed from one force to another. The

transfer of control must be carefully coordinated.

The main battle force supports the disengagement

of the security force as it withdraws in preparation for its subsequent mission. The commander

may shift the main effort to the appropriate element of the main battle force. As the enemy’s

advance force approaches the main battle area,

execution of the defensive battle becomes

increasingly decentralized.

At some point, the defending commander must

plan for the enemy force breaking through the

security forces and approaching the main battle

area. This requires transitioning friendly forces

and control of the battle from security forces to

the main battle force. Whenever the battle is transitioned, it requires coordination from the highest common commander.
3-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Main Battle Forces

Main battle forces engage the enemy to slow,

canalize, disorganize, or defeat his attack. The

commander positions these forces to counter the

enemy’s attack along the most likely or most

dangerous avenue of approach. As in offensive

operations, the commander weights his main

effort with enough combat power and the necessary support to ensure success. Tanks provide

the commander with the fastest tactical assets

available, which provide a defensive maneuver

capability. Tanks also provide an effective platform for the destruction of other ground platforms (e.g., mechanized forces can successfully

eliminate lightly armored enemy vehicles). Tank

platoons are normally employed intact in order

to properly mass their fires and still distribute

the effects.

Main battle forces engage the enemy as early as

possible unless fires are withheld to prevent the

loss of surprise. Commanders make maximum

use of fires to destroy and disrupt enemy formations as they approach the main battle area. As

the enemy closes, he is subjected to an everincreasing volume of fires from the main battle

area forces and all supporting arms. Again,

obstacles and barriers are used to delay or canalize the enemy so that he is continually subjected to fires.

Combat power that can be quickly concentrated,

such as fires, is brought to bear while maneuver

units move into position. The defender reacts to

the enemy’s main effort by reinforcing the threatened sector or allowing the enemy’s main effort

to penetrate into engagement areas within the

main battle area to cut him off and destroy him

by counterattack. Main battle forces maintain an

offensive spirit throughout the battle, looking to

exploit any advantageous situations.

A counterattack is an attack by part or all of a

defending force against an attacking enemy force,

for such specific purposes as regaining ground

lost or cutting off and destroying enemy advance

units, and with the general objective of denying

to the enemy the attainment of his purpose in

attacking. In many cases, the counterattack is

decisive action in defensive operations. It is the

commander’s primary means of breaking the

enemy’s attack or of regaining the initiative.

Once commenced, the counterattack is the main

effort. Its success depends largely on surprise,

speed, and boldness in execution. A separate

counterattack force may be established by the

commander to conduct planned counterattacks

and can be made up of uncommitted or lightly

engaged forces and the reserve.

The reserve is the commander’s tool to influence

the course of the battle at the critical time and

place to exploit opportunities. It is the force that

provides flexibility to the commander by allowing him to strike the enemy at the time and place

of the commander’s choosing. The commander

uses his reserve at the decisive moment in the

defense and refuses to dissipate it on local emergencies. It is a designated force, as robust and

mobile as possible, that exploits success, conducts counterattacks, contains penetrations, and

regains the initiative. The less that is known of

the enemy or his intention, the greater the proportion of combat power that must be held in

reserve. The reserve is usually located in assembly areas or forward operating bases in the main

battle area. Once the reserve is committed, the

commander establishes or reconstitutes a new

reserve. Reserves are organized based on the factors of METT-T. The tactical mobility of mechanized and helicopterborne forces makes them

well-suited for use as the reserve. Mechanized

reserve forces are best employed offensively.

Timing is critical to the employment of the mechanized reserve. As the area of probable employment

of the mechanized reserve becomes apparent, the

commander alerts his reserve to have it more readily

available for action. When he commits his reserve,

the commander must make his decision promptly

and with an accurate understanding of movement

factors and deployment times. If committed too

soon or too late, the mechanized or tank reserve

may not have a decisive effect. The commander
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 3-5 

may choose to use security forces as part of or all of

his reserve after completion of their security mission. He must weigh this decision against the possibility that the security forces may suffer a loss of

combat power during its security mission.

Rear Area Forces

Rear area forces protect and sustain the force’s

combat power. They provide for freedom of

action and the continuity of logistic and C2 support. Rear area forces facilitate future operations

as forces are positioned and support is marshaled

to enable the transition to offensive operations.

When facing a threat equipped with heavy

armored vehicles, the tactical combat force

within the reserve area may be required to be

tasked-organized with tanks. Tanks can be held in

the reserve area until it can be determined where

the enemy main attack is directed. Once that is

determined, tanks can quickly counterattack to

meet the enemies main attack and defeat it. 

Preparing for the Defense

In the defense, tank units are employed to take

maximum advantage of their inherent speed,

mobility, armor-protected firepower, and shock

effect. Tank units are ideally suited to conducting spoiling attacks and counterattacks, thereby

providing offensive action during a defensive battle. They also provide long-range, direct fire

capability into engagement areas and have the

capability to engage both ground and air targets.

Tanks have considerations that should be taken

into account for both deliberate and hasty

defenses and as a reserve in the defense. 

Deliberate Defense

A deliberate defense is normally organized when

out of contact with the enemy or when contact is not

imminent and time for organization is available. A

deliberate defense normally includes fortifications,

strongpoints, extensive use of barriers, and fully

integrated fires. The commander normally is free to

make a detailed reconnaissance of his sector, select

the terrain on which to defend, and decide the best

distribution of forces. Tanks and/or mechanized

units are given specific missions and tasks and must

be integrated into the entire defensive plan to maximize each weapons platform advantages and lessen

the disadvantages. Tanks and mechanized units

must prioritize deliberate defensive planning and

preparations according to the mission they are given

and the time available to complete preparations

before the enemy attacks.

Hasty Defense

A defense is normally organized while in contact

with the enemy or when contact is imminent and

time available for the organization is limited. It is

characterized by improvement of the natural

defensive strength of the terrain by utilization of

emplacements and obstacles. The hasty defense

normally allows for only a brief leader’s reconnaissance and may entail the immediate engagement by security forces to provide time for the

establishment of the defense. Because tanks have

a high degree of survivability, mobility, and can

engage at long ranges, they can keep enemy pressure off of other units preparing to conduct a

hasty defense and buy time for friendly forces to

find suitable defensive positions.

Use of the Reserve in the Defense

The reserve is the commander’s tool to influence

the course of the battle at the critical time and

place in order to exploit opportunities. It is a designated force, as robust and mobile as possible,

that exploits success, conducts counterattacks,

contains penetrations, and regains the initiative.

Its primary purpose is to retain flexibility through

offensive action. Reserves are organized based on

the factors of METT-T. The tactical mobility of

mechanized forces makes them well-suited for

use as the reserve. 
3-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Types of Defense

Every defense contains two complementary characteristics: a static or positional element, which

anchors the defense to key terrain, and a dynamic

or mobile element, which generates combat power

through maneuver and concentration of forces. The

positional element is characterized by use of battle

positions, strongpoints, fortifications, and barriers

to halt the enemy advance. The mobile element is

characterized by the use of offensive action, supplementary positions, planned delaying actions, lateral shifting of forces, and commitment of the

reserve. Conceptually, this results in two defensive

extremes: the position defense and the mobile

defense. However, neither type can be used exclusively in practice. Although these descriptions convey the general pattern of each type of defense, any

defense will include both positional and mobile elements. Commanders may simultaneously conduct

position and mobile defenses in order to take

advantage of the strengths inherent in mechanized

organizations. Mechanized forces possess the

mobility required to conduct mobile-type defenses

or may be tasked to be the reserve given the situation and terrain within their assigned sector. 

While the positional defense is normally used to

retain key terrain, the mobile defense is used to

destroy the enemy force. Clearly, the positional

defense weights its forces forward while the

mobile defense weights its forces toward its

reserve or counterattack force. The position

defense normally uses its reserve to re-establish

the FEBA following penetration by the enemy. In

the mobile defense, the reserve or counterattack

force is used to destroy the enemy. Although the

mobile defense has inherent risks, it stands a

greater chance of inflicting a decisive defeat and

complete destruction of the enemy force than

does the area defense.

Position Defense

The position defense is conducted to deny the

enemy access to critical terrain for a specified

period of time. It is seldom capable of achieving

the outright destruction of the attacking force due

to the position defense’s limited mobility. However, once the attacker is dealt a tactical setback,

the defender can take advantage of other opportunities to maintain the initiative. Thus, the position defense relies on other simultaneous or

subsequent operations by adjacent or reinforcing

forces to achieve decisive results. A position

defense occurs when the bulk of the defending

force is disposed in selected tactical localities

where the decisive battle is to be fought. Principle reliance is placed on the ability of the forces

in the defended localities to maintain their positions and to control the terrain between them.

The tank battalion is typically used as the reserve in

a positional defense. As a reserve, tank units are

normally employed to add depth, block penetrations, or restore the battle position by counterattack.

Mobile Defense

A mobile defense is an area or position in which

maneuver is used together with fire and terrain to

seize initiative from the enemy. It requires depth

and focuses on the destruction of the enemy by

permitting him to advance into a position that

exposes him to counterattack by a strong mobile

reserve. Tank units will not normally conduct a

mobile defense as a separate maneuver element;

they are usually employed as part of a mechanized force within a MAGTF mobile defense.

Mechanized pure units are normally assigned to

the main battle area while units task-organized

with tanks (teams or task forces) are often

assigned reserve roles.

Defensive Maneuver

Mechanized units can be given the mission to

defend in sector, from battle positions or from a

strong point. Regardless of the defensive mission,

tanks must carefully choose their positions to

properly engage the enemy using engagement

areas to defeat him.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 3-7 

Sectors

Sectors are areas designated by boundaries within

which a unit operates and for which it is responsible. Assignment of a defensive sector provides

tank units with maximum latitude to accomplish

assigned tasks. It is the most common method of

defending with a mechanized force and prevents

the enemy from concentrating overwhelming

firepower on the bulk of the defending force at

one time. The strength of this defense comes

from its flexibility and focus on the enemy, rather

than terrain. Its depth must come from the initial

positioning of units throughout the sector and a

viable reserve/counterattack force. The extent of

the sector is METT-T dependent. Forces

deployed in depth must confront the enemy with

effective fires from multiple, mutually supporting locations as the enemy tries to maneuver. The

sector is organized around many dispersed, small

units, which attack the enemy throughout the

depth of his formations.

Battle Position

A battle position is a defensive location oriented

on the most likely avenue of approach from

which a unit may defend. Battle positions should

be positioned to achieve depth, surprise, mutual

support, and to allow for maneuver. They effectively concentrate combat power into an engagement area, while preventing the enemy from

isolating any one part of the unit. Units of platoon to battalion size may be assigned a battle

position. The use of on-order battle positions

adds flexibility and depth to the defensive plan.

Tanks units are normally tasked to provide security outside of a battle position, overwatch a battle position, or serve as a spoiling attack or

counterattack force.

Strongpoints

Strongpoints are heavily fortified battle

positions that are tied to a natural or reinforcing

obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to

block a key piece of restricted terrain; therefore,

they are typically located on key or decisive

terrain. The tank’s survivability makes it an

effective addition to a strongpoint. They also

retain the capacity to carry enough ammunition

for a sustained engagement should resupply

efforts become difficult.

The strongpoint requires significant engineer support. Positions are prepared for all weapons systems, vehicles, Marines, and supplies. Positions

are prepared for all-around defense when they

anticipate being surrounded. Once isolated, unit

movement will be restricted within the confines

of the strongpoint position.

Alternate and Supplementary Positions

The alternate position is a position given to a

weapon, unit, or individual to be occupied when

the primary position becomes untenable or

unsuitable for carrying out its task. Alternate

positions provide additional lines of sight into the

same engagement area or sector of fire and are

sited to fulfill the original task. Alternate and

supplementary positions should be designated

and prepared as time permits. They increase the

survivability of a weapons system by enabling it

to engage the enemy from multiple positions.

Supplementary positions provide the means to

accomplish a task that cannot be accomplished

from the primary or alternate positions. They

allow a unit or weapons system to engage enemy

forces approaching from another direction such

as the rear or flank.

When considering primary and alternate positions, the commander must ensure that the fires

from these positions support his obstacle array in

the engagement area. The alternate position may

be slightly to the front, flank, or rear of the primary position. These positions must provide

excellent observation and fields of fire covering

the area where the commander desires to engage

the enemy, and should also have covered and

concealed routes into and out of the positions.

These positions must enable the tanks to identify

all designated target reference points (TRPs) in
3-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

the tank units sector so that the tank unit can adequately cover its sector with mutually supporting

and overlapping fires.

Tanks do not have an organic capability to dig

their own positions when needed and must rely

on engineer assets to perform this task. Normally, engineer armored combat earthmover

vehicles or dozers dig these positions. Each tank

position should be constructed to provide both a

level hull-defilade firing position and a level turret-defilade observation position. Hull-defilade

allows the tank to engage targets with its main

gun and machine guns. The turret-defilade allows

the tank commander to observe the engagement

area without exposing the tank to enemy fire.

Figure 3-3 illustrates a correctly prepared tank

defensive position.

Digging positions for tanks and vehicles can take

a considerable amount of time. Time to dig tank

positions is determined by how many digging

assets are available to the unit, other tasks

assigned to engineer digging assets, and the composition of the terrain being excavated (i.e., hard

rocky soil takes longer than soft clay). Therefore,

to avoid having to dig a position for each tank,

the tank/mechanized unit commander should take

advantage of the natural terrain when selecting

tank positions. Specific Marines in the tank unit

should be given the task of marking tank positions for the engineers and ensuring that the positions are dug correctly (i.e., they are large enough

and oriented correctly into the engagement area).

Engagement Areas

The engagement area is where the tank/mechanized unit commander intends to trap and

destroy the enemy force using the massed fires

of all available weapons. The success of the

engagement depends on how effectively the

commander can integrate the obstacle plan, the

indirect fire plan, and the direct fires plan within

the engagement area to achieve the unit’s tactical purpose. Therefore, effective planning is

critical to the commander’s success. At the tank/

mechanized company level, the following areas

must be considered when properly developing

an effective engagement area.

Hull-defilade

Position

Berms attract attention. Dig down, not up.

Do not put spoil to the front, sides, or rear of the firing

position. Reduce spoil so that it blends into existing terrain.

Tie down all antennas and keep reflective surfaces covered.

Make sure the firing position has a covered exit route and a

covered route to the next firing position.

Construct overhead cover and add camouflage to create a

hide position if time and materials are available.

Turret-defilade

Position

Hide

Position

Figure 3-3. Correct Hull-defilade and Turret-defilade

Defensive Tank Positions.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 3-9 

Identify Likely Enemy Avenues of Approach

Reconnaissance must be performed to identify all

likely enemy avenues of approach. If possible,

this should be done from the enemy’s perspective (direction). During reconnaissance, key land

or terrain that affords positions over the enemy as

well as natural obstacles/chokepoints that restrict

forward movement of the enemy are identified.

After reconnaissance, planners determine which

of the avenues afford the enemy the greatest

cover and concealment while allowing him to

maintain his attack tempo and evaluate lateral

routes adjoining each enemy avenue of approach.

Determine Likely Enemy Schemes of Maneuver

To determine the enemy’s most likely scheme of

maneuver, the commander should again view the

engagement area from the enemy’s perspective in

order to determine how the enemy will most likely

be structured for the attack and how he will use his

reconnaissance assets. Planners then determine

how the enemy will change formations and/or

establish firing positions within the engagement

area. For example, if the enemy is a mechanized

company, when will he most likely shift from a

company wedge formation to a company vee formation just prior to assaulting on line? 

Determine Where to Kill the Enemy

Determining where to kill the enemy starts by

identifying TRPs that match the enemy’s most

likely scheme of maneuver in the engagement

area. Each TRP is then identified and recorded by

grid. TRPs should also be marked for tank thermal identification. Next, the commander determines how many tanks and/or weapons systems

will fire on each TRP to achieve the desired end

state. The commander may also determine which

subordinate units will fire on each TRP. Once the

TRPs are established, the outside boundaries of

the engagement area can be determined. Finally,

planners develop the direct fire plan.

Plan and Integrate Obstacles to Support 

Mechanized Unit Weapons Systems

Once TRPs are identified, the next step is to plan

and integrate obstacles into the engagement area.

Initially, planners must determine the desired

intent of the obstacles with the engineer commander and ensure that the obstacle plan meets

the intent of the engagement area commander.

With the engineers, planners identify, site, and

mark the obstacles within the obstacle group and

integrate protective obstacle types and locations

within the unit’s defensive plan. All obstacles

need to be covered by direct fire and responsibility for guides to open and close obstacle lanes

must be assigned. The engagement area commander must also work with the engineer commander to ensure that everyone understands

disengagement criteria, actions on contact, and

security requirements. Effective tank engagement obstacles force the enemy to slow or halt

his attack or force the enemy to expose his vehicles’ flanks, which present easier targets for tank

gunners to acquire and kill. 

Emplace Weapons

Systems for Maximum Effect

The emplacement of weapons systems maximizes each weapons platform’s ability to support the mission. The commander selects

tentative battle positions within and/or overseeing the engagement area and confirms that the

battle positions are tactically advantageous. The

battle positions are marked after ensuring that

they do not conflict with those of adjacent units

and have mutually overlapping fires with other

battle positions. Once the battle position is established, primary, alternate, and supplementary

positions are established for tanks, vehicles, and

other weapon systems. Each position should support firing on TRPs that are the responsibility of

that battle position. 
3-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Once the positions are chosen, commanders proof

the positions to ensure that they are correct. The

battle positions utilizing tanks must consider the

M1A1 tank gun’s standoff ranges: optimal

engagement ranges are from 2,300 to 2,700

meters for main gun engagements but the guns

are capable of engagements over 3,000 meters. In

addition, tanks can be used for closer engagements of enemy infantry or antitank guided missile (ATGM) teams using their machine guns

and/or main gun. Tanks should also have their

combat trains close by the battle position (usually one terrain feature behind their battle position) in case they need to rearm and/or resupply.

Antiarmor weapons (i.e., TOWs and Javelins) are

usually placed in depth along the flanks of the

engagement area in battle positions for longer

range flanking fires into the engagement area.

Plan and Integrate Available Indirect Fires

Planners must plan and integrate indirect fires

based on the purpose of the fire and where that

purpose will best be achieved in the engagement

area. Planners establish an observation plan with

redundancy for each target, determine firing triggers based on enemy movement rates, and obtain

accurate target locations using global positioning

system devices. Target locations are then refined

to ensure coverage of obstacles and artillery and

mortar targets are adjusted. Final protective fires

are planned. All no-fire areas are identified and

requested for the engagement area. Indirect fires

should also be planned for all dead space in the

engagement area that cannot be covered by direct

fire systems.

Plan and Integrate Available CAS

Planning for CAS requires knowing what CAS is

available on station during the expected time of

the enemy attack or knowing how long it will

take for CAS to be on station to support the

defense. Marine attack helicopters should be used

to engage and attrite the enemy deep in the

engagement area and/or even before the enemy

enters the engagement area. Attack helicopters

are able to engage enemy tanks and vehicles with

ATGMs and chain guns and to provide the

engagement area commander with enemy locations and actions. Attack helicopters may also act

as an airborne forward observer for deep indirect

fires or as a FAC for other fixed-wing aircraft

delivering munitions. Tank fires combined with

attack helicopters are very effective in slowing or

stopping enemy mechanized attacks.

Rehearse the Execution of Operations

One of the most important engagement area preparation steps is to conduct a rehearsal. The

rehearsal ensures that every Marine understands

the defensive plan and knows what to do and

when to do it. One effective rehearsal technique

is to have vehicles drive through the engagement

area from the attackers avenue of approach and

simulate engaging the vehicles within the engagement area. A rehearsal should include the following when required:

z Rearward passage of lines.

z Closure of lanes.

z Movements from hide positions into the battle

positions.

z Fire commands, triggers, and/or maximum engagement lines to initiate fires.

z Shifting and redistributing fires.

z Preparation and transmission of critical reports.

z Assessment of effects of enemy weapons

systems.

z Disengagement and/or displacement of units to

their alternate or supplemental positions or to

subsequent battle positions.

z Resupply of the battle positions.

z Evacuation of casualties.

Figure 3-4 illustrates what an engagement area

might look like for a mechanized company with

tanks and a section of TOWs.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 3-11 

EA YELLOW

ROU TE

DO G

ROU

TE DOG

Enemy

Axis of

Attack

AB 001

AB 002

TRP 02

TRP 03

TRP 07

TRP 06

TRP 04

TRP 01

TRP 05

Figure 3-4. Example of Tank Company Engagement Area.
CHAPTER 4

EMPLOYMENT WITH INFANTRY

Marine tank units rarely fight alone. Typically,

tank units fight as part of a MAGTF where they

are task-organized with other MAGTF elements

to achieve a combined-arms effect. Combined

arms integrate the effects of various arms—infantry, tank, artillery, and aviation—to achieve the

greatest possible effect against the enemy. The

strengths of various arms complement and offset

each other, while the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of each arm are protected and offset by the

capabilities of others.

Mechanized operations are tactical operations

designed to maximize the ground mobility, protection, shock action, and firepower of combat

vehicles in order to concentrate combat power

rapidly against the enemy. Combat power is generated by the massed employment of tanks and by

enhancing the mobility of infantry through the

use of AAVs and other ground mobility means.

Unrestricted terrain (e.g., flat countryside, desert,

plains) is conducive to the conduct of mechanized operations characterized by the employment of massed armor formations. In such

terrain, infantry supports the forward movement

of the tank units by providing local security,

retaining key terrain, clearing dug-in enemy positions, and enhancing direct fires with organic

small-arms and antitank fires. Restrictive terrain

(e.g., urban areas, forests, jungles) increases the

vulnerability of tank units by reducing the speed,

mobility, and firepower advantages of the tank.

In such terrain, it is necessary for tanks to work

closely with dismounted infantry.

When infantry and tanks move together, the

infantry moves using one of three methods: dismounted, truck-mounted, or AAV-mounted. This

chapter examines how a tank unit is employed to

support the advance of infantry.

Task Organization

The Marine Corps does not maintain permanent, mechanized infantry units; instead, it

maintains well-trained, general-purpose infantry units capable of task organizing to execute a

myriad of ground combat missions. In Marine

mechanized operations, mechanized infantry

refers to a task-organized force of Marine infantry mounted in AAVs.

Note: Outside the Marine Corps, mechanized

operations used in conjunction with infantry

(friendly or enemy) operations traditionally

refers to the personnel riding in an armored

personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle

that are organic to infantry units. 

A Marine mechanized force is a task-organized,

ground combat force of combined arms built

around an infantry or tank unit and reinforced

with substantial assault amphibian assets. A

Marine mechanized force is normally supported

by air, artillery, light armor, antitank, engineer,

reconnaissance, motor transport, combat support,

and CSS units. Commanders at every level of

command determine their best organization for

combat; typically, by cross-attaching units. Cross

attachment is the exchange of subordinate units

with other units for a temporary period. For

example, a tank battalion detaches a tank company that is subsequently attached to an infantry

battalion mechanized in AAVs, and the infantry

battalion mechanized in AAVs detaches a company to the tank battalion to create two battalionsized task forces. Mechanized forces are taskorganized into mechanized task forces at the regimental and battalion level and company teams at

the company level.
4-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Mechanized Task Force

Mechanized task forces are organized as follows:

z A tank-heavy force has more subordinate tank

than infantry units. The headquarters of a

tank-heavy task force is usually that of a tank

battalion.

z A mechanized-heavy force has more subordinate infantry units mounted in tracked vehicles

than subordinate tank units. The headquarters

of a mechanized-heavy task force is usually

that of an infantry battalion or regiment.

z A balanced task force is organized with an

equal number of subordinate tank and infantry

units. The headquarters for a balanced task

force can be either that of a tank battalion or

infantry battalion/regiment.

z A pure tank/infantry task force has either tank

or infantry units, but not both.

Company Team

A company team is organized by the cross attachment of one or more tank platoons and/or

mounted or dismounted infantry platoons. Based

on METT-T, an infantry or tank battalion commander who is receiving tank or mechanized

infantry companies may increase the effectiveness of his units by forming company teams. This

is done by cross-attaching tank platoons and

mechanized infantry platoons. Company teams

are organized as follows:

z Tank-heavy teams.

z Mechanized-heavy teams.

z Balanced teams.

The tank company is normally the smallest taskorganized mechanized element. The tank platoon

is normally the smallest unit that is attached/

detached. When tanks are task-organized at the

company team level, logistic support is normally

obtained from the infantry battalion S-4. If the

platoon’s parent company is in the vicinity, it

may be able to coordinate some assistance

through the parent unit. Habitual assignment is

the routine task organization of one unit to

another; although it may not always be practical,

it is highly desirable for the following reasons:

z Attached units become familiar with unit SOPs

of the units to which they are attached.

z Teamwork is built between units, which is key

to achieving unity of effort.

z Unit commanders joining an attached unit

become familiar with unit capabilities.

Coordination 

Mechanized operations demand effective coordination between the tank unit and the infantry unit

it is supporting. The tank platoon/company commander must have a thorough tactical and technical knowledge of his tank’s systems and

logistical needs in order to advise the infantry

unit commander and/or the S-3 with respect to

tank employment. Plans should maximize use of

a tank’s lethal firepower, enhanced target acquisition (including thermal sights), and effective

armor protection capabilities. In addition to

understanding a tank’s capabilities and limitations, the tank unit leader must also understand

the disparate capabilities of the mechanized

force. For example, infantry mounted in AAVs

has less firepower and armor protection and normally moves slower than tanks over certain types

of terrain. Another specific example is that sabot

ammunition cannot be fired over the heads or

flanks of unprotected infantry because of the danger created by the discarding sabot petals and the

concussion of the main gun.

Mutual Support

Based on METT-T, the mechanized force’s combination of tanks, AAVs, and infantry provides

the commander with several options:

z Mounted maneuver with tanks.

z Mounted maneuver with AAVs.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 4-3 

z Mounted maneuver with tanks and AAVs.

z Dismounted maneuver alone.

z Dismounted maneuver combined with any of

the mounted maneuver options.

To best exploit the mechanized force’s offensive

capabilities, tanks and mechanized infantry must

work together in pursuit of a common goal. Each

element of the mechanized force provides a

degree of mutual support to the other element.

Tanks support mechanized infantry by—

z Providing mobile protected firepower.

z Neutralizing or destroying hostile weapons by

fire and movement.

z Clearing paths for dismounted infantry through

obstacles.

z Neutralizing fortified positions with direct fire.

z Supporting dismounted infantry by direct fire.

z Assisting in the consolidation of the objective

Mechanized infantry assists tanks and AAVs by—

z Breaching or removing antiarmor obstacles.

z Assisting in the neutralization or destruction of

enemy antiarmor weapons.

z Designating targets for tanks and AAVs.

z Protecting tanks and AAVs from enemy infantry and antiarmor weapons.

z Clearing bridges and fording areas.

z Clearing restrictive terrain such as urban,

swamp, or woodland areas.

z Conducting dismounted security patrols.

Employment Methods

There are two general methods to employ tanks

and mechanized infantry together in an attack:

z Tank and mechanized infantry (mounted in

AAVs or dismounted) attack together.

z Tanks and AAVs support by fire only.

Based on METT-T, a combination of the two

methods (called a multiaxis attack) may also be

employed.

Tanks and Mechanized Infantry Attack Together

This method of attack allows tanks and mechanized infantry to advance together within mutually supporting distances of each other. Tanks

normally lead the formation. Ideally, the infantry

remains mounted in AAVs to close with the

enemy. However, the infantry remains mounted

in AAVs only when the enemy presents a low

antiarmor threat. Advantages of tanks and infantry attacking together are as follows:

z Exploits the complete mobility, speed, armor

protected firepower, and shock action of the

mechanized force.

z Reduces enemy reaction time. 

z Disorganizes the enemy’s defense since his

positions have been breached before the infantry dismounts.

z Conserves the energy of the mechanized infantry since they are carried by AAVs to dismount

points short of, on, or behind the objective.

z Reduces the amount of time that the infantry is

exposed to enemy fires.

Disadvantages of tanks and infantry attacking

together are as follows:

z Greater potential for casualties among elements of the mechanized force if enemy antiarmor fires cannot be bypassed or effectively

reduced by suppressive fires.

z AAVs with light armor protection are vulnerable to antiarmor weapons and may be

destroyed if employed like a tank. AAV armor

can provide protection against hand grenades,

shell fragments, and some small-arms fire.

However, even when enhanced appliqué armor

kits are installed, the AAV can be vulnerable to

the fires of tank and antitank guns, ATGMs,

and rockets.
4-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z The entire mechanized force can become vulnerable to enemy fires if obstacles are not

breached quickly or bypassed. 

Tanks and AAVs Support by Fire Only

During planning, the commander of the mechanized force may decide to attack using the tanks

and AAVs support by fire only method. However,

if during a mounted assault, surprise antiarmor fire

is received in such volume that it cannot be suppressed by all immediately available fire support

resources, and to continue would result in unacceptable casualties, the infantry dismounts in defilade locations if possible. Tanks and AAVs then

adopt the tanks and AAVs support by fire only

method. Therefore, commanders must develop

plans that provide multiple COAs. Specifically, a

plan that incorporates the tanks and mechanized

infantry attack together method should also have

the flexibility to incorporate the tanks and AAVs

support by fire only method if the situation

changes unexpectedly. The following are examples

of situations in which the infantry should plan to

dismount from the AAVs and use the tanks and

AAVs support by fire only method:

z Obstacles prevent mounted movement and

cannot be quickly breached or bypassed.

z Enemy antiarmor capability poses significant

threat to both tanks and AAVs.

z Terrain canalizes mounted movement into

likely enemy ambush sites and minefields

(e.g., close terrain such as urban or woodland,

restrictive terrain such as defiles).

z Visibility is limited.

Key considerations are as follows: 

z Prior planning to ensure communications can

be maintained between the base of fire element(s) and dismounted infantry during the

attack (e.g., prepositioned retransmission sites

and preplanned radio relay procedures that can

overcome a potential loss of communications

during the attack). 

z The scheme of maneuver and fire support plan

(direct fire, indirect fire, and aviation delivered

fires) are developed concurrently and understood by all elements of the mechanized force.

Fires are primarily used to engage targets on the

objective. Fires are also planned to isolate the

objective by engaging targets on adjacent positions or likely enemy avenues of approach. Illumination and obscuration fires are planned

regardless or not the mechanized forces intend

to employ these fires in the attack. 

z Positive control of supporting fires between the

dismounted infantry and base of fire element(s)

must be maintained throughout the attack.

z Radio communications, pre-arranged visual signals (e.g., pyrotechnic), and/or messengers are

used by the infantry to designate targets and

coordinate supporting fires. 

z AAVs, tanks, and other available direct fire

support assets normally displace forward to

new support by fire positions as they become

available.

z A sustained, heavy volume of fires helps the

dismounted infantry maintain the momentum

of the attack. Suppressive fire helps compensate for the infantry’s lack of armor protection

and decreased mobility. Long-range accurate

fires (e.g. TOWs) are employed against enemy

vehicles, protected antitank guns and ATGMs,

and other priority hard targets. 

z Ideally, the base of fire element supports from

covered and concealed positions. Units comprising the base of fire element should regularly

reposition themselves to avoid presenting the

enemy with easily acquired stationary targets.

z Dismounted infantry advances on a route that

provides cover and concealment and prevents

or minimizes masking of the fires of the base of

fire element. If available, engineers accompany

the dismounted infantry to breach obstacles and

destroy fortified positions.

A disadvantage of the tanks and AAVs support by

fire only method is that the infantry loses the mobility, shock action, and close support of the tanks and
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 4-5 

AAVs. The infantry is unsupported on the objective

when the tanks and AAVs shift or cease fires. Also,

tanks and AAVs are not initially available on the

objective to cover the consolidation.

Multiaxis Attack

A multiaxis attack is a combination of the two

employment methods: tanks and mechanized

infantry attack together and tanks and AAVs support by fire only. The adoption of this method is

based on METT-T. A primary consideration in

choosing to use a multi-axis attack is the availability of suitable avenues of approach for tanks,

AAVs, and the infantry. The multiaxis attack is

used to exploit the amphibious capability of the

AAV in crossing streams, rivers, lakes, and

marshes. Another application is when a single

avenue of approach is too narrow to accommodate the entire mechanized force and tanks follow the more open terrain, while the infantry

advance follows an axis offering cover and concealment. Tanks initially support the infantry

advance by fire and join the infantry as soon as

practicable. Tank movement is normally timed so

that the tanks assault the objective slightly in

advance of the infantry to take maximum advantage of their shock effect. The greatest challenge

to employing this method is to achieve proper

timing among the various elements and the coordination of fires during the attack.

Mechanized Movement

Tanks normally lead the mechanized formation

due to the tanks relative advantage over the AAV

in terms of armor protection and main gun firepower. When the situation permits, AAVs can

support the mechanized force by following the

tanks close enough to fire around the tanks and

deliver suppressive fire against enemy infantry

and antiarmor weapons encountered on exposed

flanks. Movement of tanks with AAVs is generally based on the following criteria:

z Tanks lead in open areas or when faced with a

significant armor threat.

z Mechanized infantry leads mounted only if

enemy infantry is pure with no antiarmor reinforcements or capabilities.

The desired distance between tanks and AAVs

should be determined before starting the attack.

This distance is based on METT-T.

Maneuver Considerations

The critical decision of whether the infantry

attacks mounted or dismounted is based on the

following considerations.

z Tanks lead and infantry remains mounted

when—

 Enemy antiarmor fires can be effectively bypassed or suppressed by fire.

 Terrain is relatively open or manmade and

natural obstacles can be easily overcome. 

 Terrain and weather affords good trafficability and visibility.

z Infantry leads dismounted when—

 Terrain and vegetation are restrictive. For

example, when terrain and vegetation canalizes movement into likely enemy ambush

sites and minefields (e.g., urban areas and

woodland terrain).

 Visibility is limited.

 Antiarmor fire cannot be bypassed or suppressed by fire.

 Significant obstacles or fortified positions

are encountered that may prevent mounted

movement and cannot be bypassed.

Dismounting

Note: The decision to dismount must be

made prior to committing the force to the

final assault.
4-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Once the commander of the mechanized force

decides to dismount his infantry, he chooses

when and where (the dismount point) to dismount the infantry. Commanders normally stay

well forward to personally judge the situation

and make an appropriate decision of whether or

not to change the dismount point. Timing is

critical because dismounting too early slows

the force’s momentum and unnecessarily

exposes the infantry to hostile fire. The commander should also take into account that

speed can provide for the security of a mechanized force already committed to the final

assault. Ideally, the infantry is dismounted

after forward defensive positions have been

breached. The following are some dismount

point considerations: 

z The dismount point should provide good cover

and concealment, yet be as near to the objective as possible to reduce the amount of time

that the dismounted infantry is exposed to fires

while closing with the enemy.

z Rapid dismount and good vehicle dispersion

reduces the mechanized force’s vulnerability to

enemy fires. 

Dismount points may be short of the objective, on

the objective, or after passing through the objective.

Dismount Short of the Objective

Tactical conditions may require seeking a dismount point short of the objective. Infantry dismounted short of the objective is usually not

within range of small-arms and handheld antiarmor weapons. Ideally, the dismount point should

be located on easily recognizable terrain that provides cover from enemy direct fires. Advantages

of dismounting short of the objective include—

z Dismounted infantry are protected from

small-arms and observed indirect fires while

dismounting.

z Infantry can be oriented as they approach the

objective.

z Control can be established in the dismount

point.

z Organic and supporting fires can suppress the

enemy while the infantry is dismounting.

Disadvantages of dismounting short of the objective include—

z Dismounted infantry are exposed longer to

enemy small-arms and indirect fire as they

move forward in the assault.

z Suitable dismount points that are forward of

enemy positions may be targeted by enemy

direct and indirect fires.

Dismount on the Objective

Dismount on the objective is a technique used

when the mechanized force has achieved surprise or when the enemy’s antiarmor defense is

weak. The following are advantages of dismounting on the objective:

z Greater speed and shock effect.

z Mechanized infantry remains protected by

AAV light armor longer from the fires of

enemy small arms.

z Supporting fires can continue while the mechanized force approaches its objective since

mounted infantry have greater protection against

shell fragments and other small projectiles.

Disadvantages of dismounting on the objective

include—

z Difficulty orienting mechanized infantry to

specific objectives.

z Difficulty establishing control at the dismount

point due to potentially close enemy fires.

z Difficulty in directing supporting fires against

enemy positions in close proximity to friendly

dismounted infantry.

z Vulnerability of AAVs to short-range antiarmor weapons.

z High volume of suppressive fire is required to

support dismounted infantry.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 4-7 

Dismount After Passing Through the Objective

Dismounting after passing through the objective is employed when a mounted attack is more

effective. The capabilities of the enemy antiarmor defense dictate if this is feasible. Advantages of dismounting after passing through the

objective include—

z Dismounted infantry fights from an area and

direction unexpected from the enemy.

z Control is usually more easily established

when not on the objective.

z Shock effect on the enemy caused by a mechanized force moving through its position is likely

to be considerable.

Disadvantages of dismounting after passing

through the objective are as follows:

z This method may run afoul of enemy positions

in depth.

z Enemy indirect and direct fires might still target suitable dismount points.

z Facing the AAV toward the objective before dismounting is desirable from the viewpoint of limited armored protection and the AAV crew

employment of the upgunned weapons station.

However, the act of turning AAVs around in

close proximity to enemy fires can make the

AAVs more vulnerable to flank shots. Also, turning AAVs and dismounting infantry may reverse

the relative positions of the tanks, AAVs, and

infantry. The dismounted infantry may initially

mask direct fires from AAVs and tanks until the

AAVs and tanks can maneuver around the infantry to new support by fire positions.

Base of Fire and Maneuver Elements

To facilitate fire and maneuver, mechanized

forces normally organize into a maneuver element and base of fire element. Fires are primarily employed to suppress, neutralize, destroy,

and demoralize enemy forces. Maneuver, which

is movement supported by fire, brings firepower

into positions from which it extends and completes the destruction of the enemy force. The

composition of base of fire and maneuver element is determined by the commander’s task

organization of the mechanized force.

The base of fire element covers the maneuver element’s advance toward the enemy position by

engaging all known or suspected targets. Upon

opening fire, the base of fire seeks to gain fire

superiority over the enemy. Fire superiority is

gained by subjecting the enemy to fire of such

accuracy and volume that the enemy fire ceases

or becomes ineffective.

The mission of the maneuver element is to close

with and destroy or capture the enemy. It advances

and assaults under covering fire of the base of fire

element. The maneuver element uses available

cover and concealment to the maximum. Fire

superiority is maintained throughout the attack in

order to ensure the success of any maneuver.

When mechanized units conduct attacks, they will

utilize one or more of the following techniques:

z Fire and maneuver is the process of one or

more elements establishing a base of fire to

engage the enemy, while the other element(s)

maneuvers to an advantageous position from

which to close with and destroy or capture the

enemy. Supporting fires may consist of direct,

indirect, and aviation-delivered fires, which are

integrated to achieve the effects of combined

arms. Supporting fires should be followed

closely by the maneuver element so that the

shock effect of fire upon the enemy is not lost.

z Fire and movement is employed once the

maneuver element meets enemy opposition and

can no longer advance under the cover of the

base of fire. It allows forward movement to a

position from which units can continue to

assault the enemy position. Fire and movement

is primarily used in the assault wherein a unit

or element advances by bounds or rushes, with

subelements alternately moving and providing
4-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

covering fire for other moving subelements.

Fire and movement may be done by individuals

(personnel or vehicles) or units. Usually, fire

and movement is used only when under effective fire from the enemy because it is relatively

slow and difficult to control.

There are situations when maneuvering to close

range of the enemy is not required. Attack by fire

is fires employed to destroy the enemy from a

distance. This task is usually given to the supporting element during offensive operations and

as a counterattack option for the reserve during

defensive operations. An attack by fire is not

done in conjunction with a maneuvering force.

When assigning this task, the commander of the

mechanized force specifies the intent of fires—

either to destroy, fix, or suppress.

Assault on the Objective

The purpose of the assault is to place violent and

intensive firepower on the objective and move

rapidly across it to destroy or capture the enemy

as quickly as possible. The term assault refers

only to that phase of an attack when the attacking force actually closes with the enemy. Mechanized forces assault the objective either mounted

or dismounted.

Mounted Assault

The decision to make a mounted assault is based

upon METT-T. A mounted assault is best used

when the enemy is occupying a hasty fighting

position, antiarmor fires can be suppressed, and

when the terrain in the vicinity of the objective

allows for rapid movement onto and across the

objective. The assault must be carried out rapidly.

Normally, tanks lead and are followed closely by

AAVs. As the assault force approaches the objective, the AAVs should move closer to the tanks

for added protection from enemy, short-range

antiarmor weapons.

Movement across the objective must be fast and

continuous. A heavy volume of suppressive fires

is maintained to keep enemy soldiers down in

their positions. Stabilized turrets allow tanks to

continue moving while conducting fire and

movement. AAVs normally stay as close to the

tanks as possible to provide protection to the

flanks and rear of the tank.

Once the tanks and AAVs reach the far side of

the objective, they occupy hull-down positions (if

possible). From support by fire positions, the

tanks and AAVs can engage any retreating

enemy forces, continue the attack, or defend

against counterattack. If it is necessary to seize

the objective, the dismounted infantry is used to

clear remaining pockets of enemy resistance and

to secure prisoners.

A mechanized pure force assaults mounted without tanks in essentially the same way it assaults

with them.

Dismounted Assault

If the enemy is in well-prepared, defensive positions, antiarmor fires cannot be suppressed, or the

terrain restricts vehicle movement onto the objective then the assault is normally conducted dismounted. If the attack starts as mounted, the

infantry should be dismounted in a covered and

concealed position that is as close to the objective

as possible. The base of fire element delivers supporting fires while the dismounted infantry

deploys. Dismounted infantry uses radios, prearranged visual signals (e.g., pyrotechnic), and/or

messengers to direct the base of fire element to

shift and cease supporting fires. The dismounted

infantry then employs fire and movement through

the objective. Elements of the base of fire element normally displace to subsequent support by

fire positions just before their fires are masked by

the dismount element. When the tanks and AAVs

from the base of fire element rejoin the dismounted infantry, the infantry—

z Suppresses any remaining enemy position as

the tanks and AAVs move to the objective.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 4-9 

z Reconnoiters initial support by fire positions

and guides tanks and AAVs into the positions

when necessary. 

z Provides flank and rear security for the AAVs

and tanks.

Based on METT-T, the tanks may be employed

to continue through the objective, engage resistance, and pursue by fire until the infantry has

consolidated the position.

Consolidation and Reorganization

The mechanized force consolidates and reorganizes as soon as it takes the objective. This is

done so the force can either repel a counterattack

or continue the attack. The mechanized force

consolidates the objective by—

z Tanks and AAVs are positioned in support by

fire positions and assigned sectors of fire

while antiarmor weapons are being positioned. Tanks and AAVs are normally positioned on terrain that both provides cover and

concealment and permits the vehicles to overwatch the infantry in the event of enemy

counterattack. If possible, tanks and AAVs

are placed in hull-down positions.

z All elements of the mechanized force establish

local security and mutual support between

units.

z The dismounted infantry eliminates any

remaining pockets of enemy resistance and

secures prisoners of war. Dismounted infantry

normally designates targets for the overwatching vehicles and uses organic and supporting

fires to destroy any enemy resistance.

z After consolidation, the infantry either

remounts the AAVs to continue the attack or

sets up a hasty or deliberate defense.

Reorganization consists of the following:

z Replacing key leaders who became casualties.

z Redistributing ammunition.

z Arranging for medical evacuation of casualties.

z Safeguarding prisoners of war to collection

points or to the rear.

During mechanized operations in unrestricted terrain, tanks should always lead in offensive movement formations. Speed, mobility, firepower, and

survivability are otherwise reduced. The survivability, superior target acquisition, range of

weapon systems, and lethality of tank units provide the unit commander with time to develop the

situation and choose an appropriate COA.

Transporting Infantry

On very rare occasions, the platoon leader may

be required to transport infantrymen on tanks (see

fig. 4-1 on page 4-10). This occurs only when

contact is not expected. If the platoon is moving

as part of a larger force and is tasked to provide

security, the lead section or element should not

carry infantry.
4-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Platoon

Leader

Rifleman

Rifleman

Rifleman

Rifleman

SAW

M203

Grenadier

M203

Grenadier

Team

Leader

Figure 4-1. Notional Positions for Infantry Riding on a Tank.
CHAPTER 5

OTHER TACTICAL OPERATIONS

SECTION I. SECURITY OPERATIONS

Security operations are designed to provide reaction time, maneuver space, and protection for the

force as a whole. The primary mission of the

security force is the protection of the main body

as opposed to a terrain or enemy objective.

At the tactical level, security forces protect

against surprise attack and observation by hostile

air and ground forces by ensuring the enemy is

not able to see or engage the main force. They

maintain freedom of maneuver for the main force

by providing reaction time and maneuver space.

Forces conducting security missions focus their

movements on the main force or facility that they

are assigned to secure.

Security forces may operate at varying distances

from the main body based on conditions of

METT-T. They employ the minimum combat

power necessary to cover extended frontages in

order to provide the main body commander early

warning. This allows the commander to retain the

bulk of his combat power to be committed at the

decisive place and time to engage the enemy.

Security forces report enemy activities to the

main body commander and to other affected

security forces. The main body commander

ensures that the security force commander has

access to all pertinent intelligence and combat

information obtained by the main body to supplement the security force’s capabilities. Through

the continuous exchange of information, both the

security force and main body commander have

the time to choose a COA suitable to the situation. When tanks are employed as a security

force, they are usually augmented with other

forces that help provide intelligence and quick

analysis in order to develop the situation as

quickly as possible once contact is made. Tank

units usually focus on avenues of approach large

enough for enemy mechanized units to utilize

since they can be the largest threat to a mechanized main force.

To help tank units conduct security operations,

aviation assets work in concert with ground security forces to create a synergism that facilitates

rapid mission execution. Aviation assets can alert

tanks of the approaching enemy, and they may

also help to attrite the enemy forces before

engagement with ground security forces.

Tank units conducting security operations must

also take into account that the enemy may have

assets that are employed to detect them. Careful

planning before the security mission should be

done to determine the enemy’s ability to employ

its air and RSTA assets, likely enemy locations

and/or routes, enemy surveillance devices, indirect fire capabilities, and both mounted and dismounted antitank platform capabilities.

Regardless of the type of security mission, a

tank’s ability to perform a successful security

operation depends on the proper application of

the following fundamentals:

z Providing early warning and reaction time.

The security force provides early warning by

detecting the enemy force quickly and alerting

the main body. It provides reaction time for the

main body by taking actions within its capability and mission constraints to delay the

enemy’s advance.
5-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z Orienting on the force to secure. The security

force orients all its actions to protect and provide early warning to the force that it is to

secure. It aggressively seeks out the enemy and

only occupies terrain in order to enhance its

ability to protect the main body.

z Performing continuous reconnaissance. The

security force conducts its operations by

aggressively seeking out the enemy and reconnoitering key terrain. Security forces continuously employ a combination of observation

posts, mounted/dismounted patrols, sensors,

and defensive positions.

z Maintaining enemy contact. The security force

commander arrays his available assets to

ensure continuous contact with the enemy. At

the same time, the security force must not

become decisively engaged and fixed in place.

It must retain its flexibility to stay in front of

the enemy and ability to report. Contact with

the enemy is maintained both physically and

with technical assets.

There are three types of security operations:

cover, guard, and screen. Each type of operation

provides an increased measure of security and

reaction time to the force; however, the more

combat power allocated to the security force, the

less will be available for the main effort. A cover

allocates considerable combat power to engage

an enemy force at a considerable distance from

the main force if provided the maximum early

warning and reaction time. A guard contains sufficient combat power to defeat or contain lead

elements of an enemy force. A screen allocates

minimal combat power to cover an extended

flank, yet only provides early warning.

Covering Force

Typically, a covering force operates forward of the

main force; however, it may operate to the rear or

on either flank. Although a covering force aggressively develops the situation independent of the

main force, its main role is to prevent the surprise

and untimely engagement of the main force.

A covering force differs from a screening or

guarding force in that it is normally a self-sufficient, combined-arms force equipped with

enough combat power to develop a situation at a

considerable distance away from the main force.

While the covering force provides the most security to the main force, it generally requires a considerable amount of dedicated logistic support.

Therefore, a commander only assigns a covering

force mission whenever the enemy possesses a

strong mobile force that is capable of rapid and

decisive action and there are sufficient assets to

resource both the covering force and the main

force. A rear covering force normally protects a

force moving away from the enemy. The covering force deploys behind the forward maneuver

units of the main force, accepts battle handover

and passes the main force through it, and then

defends or delays. Alternatively, the covering

force may conduct a relief in place as part of a

deception plan or to take advantage of the best

defensive terrain. The covering force establishes

passage points and assists the rearward passage

of the main force if necessary. As the main force

moves, the covering force displaces to subsequent phase lines in depth.

Offensive Cover

During offensive operations, a covering force

may operate to the front or flanks of the main

body. An offensive covering force may accomplish the following: 

z Perform reconnaissance along the main body’s

axis of advance. 

z Deny the enemy information about the size,

strength, composition, and objective of the

main body. 
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 5-3 

z Destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance and

security zone forces.

z Penetrate enemy defense in order to develop

the situation to determine enemy strengths,

weaknesses, and dispositions.

z Defeat, repel, or fix enemy forces as directed

by the higher commander.

z Exploit opportunities.

The covering force should clear the zone of enemy

security and small combat elements and penetrate

the leading elements of the enemy’s defensive

positions. When it can advance no further, it prepares for the main body to conduct a forward passage of lines. It continues to perform close

reconnaissance of enemy positions to locate gaps

or vulnerable flanks. A good covering force allows

the commander of the main force the ability to

attack the enemy’s weak point at the time of his

choosing with previously uncommitted forces.

Defensive Cover

A defensive covering force operates to the front,

flanks, or rear of a main force. The primary mission of a defensive covering force is to strip away

enemy reconnaissance, force the enemy to reveal

his main effort, disrupt his attack, and deny him

the initiative. Defensive covering forces—

z Maintain continuous surveillance of highspeed avenues of approach.

z Destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance and

security forces.

z Determine the size, strength, composition, and

direction of the enemy’s main effort.

z Defeat the lead enemy echelons if possible.

z Force the enemy to deploy repeatedly in order

to fight through the covering force and commit his reserve or follow-on forces to sustain

momentum.

z Create ambiguity as to location and disposition

of the main force.

The covering force screens, defends, delays, and

counterattacks to execute a defensive cover. If the

covering force area is not yet occupied, the covering force may have to reconnoiter and clear the

area or route. As in offensive operations, aerial

reconnaissance is critical to extending the battlespace. It can screen less threatened sectors and

rapidly reinforce fires when other elements of the

covering force are heavily engaged. During

defensive operations, the commander of the main

force designates the forward and rear boundaries

of the security force with phase lines. The lateral

boundaries of the security area are normally

extensions of main body boundaries. The rear

boundary of the covering force area is the FEBA.

Guard Force

A guard force protects the main force by preventing the enemy from being able to engage main

forces with direct fire weapons. The guard force

accomplishes its task by reconnoitering, attacking, defending, and delaying enemy forces in

order to provide time for the main force to

counter enemy actions.

A guard differs from a screening force in that it

contains greater combat power and is employed

to engage enemy forces within its capability as

opposed to a screen that only provides early

warning and destroys enemy reconnaissance. A

screening mission may transition to a guard mission upon the approach of a sizable enemy force.

For example, a tank company conducting a

screen may be reinforced with the remaining tank

battalion if it is determined that a sizeable enemy

mechanized force is approaching and may need

to be destroyed before reaching follow-on forces.

A guard force is normally task-organized from

elements of the main force; therefore, it operates

within supporting range of the main body. If units

need both protection and early warning, the commander of the main force assigns a guard mission to subordinate units when there are little or

no other security forces between the main force

and probable enemy forces. The commander may

use a guard to the front of his main forces
5-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

(advance guard), to the rear (rear guard) especially during retrograde operations, or to the flank

(flank guard) when there is a threat of significant

enemy contact.

The commander may designate a tank unit as a

guard force for protection from enemy ground

observation, direct fire, and surprise attack for a

given period of time. A guard force allows the

commander to extend the defense in time and

space to prevent interruption of the organization

of the main battle area.

Advance Guard

The advance guard is the lead element of an

advancing formation or column. The advance

guard’s mission is to clear the axis or zone of

enemy elements and to allow the unimpeded

movement of the main force. If an advance guard

operates behind the security force of a higher

echelon, then the higher echelon security force

initially develops the situation. The advance

guard may then reinforce the higher echelon

security force or expand the area of contact with

the enemy force.

Flank Guard

The flank guard has the responsibility to clear the

area between the main force and the flank guard’s

position. Typically, the flank guard operates on a

smaller frontage than a screen. The commander

of the flank guard considers the axis taken by the

main force, enemy’s capabilities, and avenues of

approach in order to determine his initial dispositions. Sectors should be sufficiently deep to provide early warning and reaction time, yet remain

within supporting range of the main force.

Should an enemy attack appear imminent from

the flank, the flank guard normally occupies

preplanned or hasty defensive positions.

Should the enemy prove too strong for the

flank guard, the flank guard will normally

delay in sector. Flank guard operations can be

employed while the main force is stationary or

moving. Whichever technique is used, the

flank guard must remain in contact with the

leading elements of the main body.

A stationary flank guard reconnoiters out to its

initial security positions. This allows the flank

guard to clear the zone and become familiar with

the terrain that may subsequently be defended.

Upon reaching its initial positions, the flank

guard establishes a defense. The commander

plans the defense or delay in depth from the initial positions. The following critical tasks apply

during a stationary flank guard mission:

z Maintain continuous surveillance of enemy

avenues of approach.

z Maintain contact with the main body.

z Provide early warning and defeat, repel, or fix

enemy ground forces, within capabilities,

before they can engage the main body with

direct fire.

The techniques for movement and establishment

of a moving flank guard force are similar the to

techniques used during flank screening operations. Whichever technique is used, the flank

guard must remain in contact with the leading

elements of the main body.

Based on the speed of the main body, the likelihood of the enemy attack, and the distance to the

objective, the guard force uses one or a combination of the following movement techniques:

z Successive bounds is used when the enemy

action against the flank is light and the movement of the main force is expected to include

frequent short halts.

z Alternate bounds is used when strong enemy

action is anticipated against the flank, this

technique requires slow movement by the main

force. Alternate bounds are the most secure,

yet the slowest technique.

z Continuous movement is used when enemy

activity on the flank is unlikely and the main

force is moving with all possible speed. Traveling in column with an on-order defensive mission is the quickest but least secure technique.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 5-5 

Rear Guard

The rear guard protects the exposed rear of the

main force during offensive operations or retrograde operations. Rear guards are normally established during a withdrawal, during a retirement, or

when conducting deep maneuver forward of the

forward line of own troops when there is significant enemy threat to the rear of the main force.

Establishing a rear guard during a retrograde

operation may be done in two ways. The rear

guard may relieve other units in place along the

forward line of own troops as they move to the

rear. Alternatively, the rear guard may establish a

position in depth behind the main force and pass

those forces through.

The rear guard employs both sector and battle

positions while executing its mission. The commander of the main force prescribes the distance that the rear guard must maintain between

itself and the main force. The rear guard for a

moving force displaces to successive, in-depth

battle positions as the main force moves. The

nature of enemy contact determines the method

of displacement.

Screening Force

A screening force primarily provides early warning. It observes, identifies, and reports information. It generally fights only in self-defense, but

does engage enemy reconnaissance elements

within its capabilities. Commanders generally

establish screens on an extended flank, to the

rear, or to the front of a stationary force. A screen

is often executed as a series of observation posts

with patrolling between them.

The GCE commander may establish a screening

force utilizing tank units to gain and maintain

contact with the enemy, to observe enemy activity, to identify the enemy main effort, and to

report information. In most situations, the minimum security force, normally organized by the

GCE, is a screening force. Normally, the screening force only fights in self-defense, but it may be

tasked to—

z Repel enemy reconnaissance units as part of

the GCE’s counterreconnaissance effort.

z Prevent enemy artillery from acquiring terrain

that enables a front line unit to be engaged.

z Provide early warning.

z Attack the enemy with supporting arms. 

A screen is not conducted forward of a moving

force. The security element forward of a moving

force must conduct either a guard or cover. The

senior commander determines the general location at which he wants the screening force to

operate. Screens for a moving force must remain

physically tied into the main force. The initial

screen line must be within supporting range of

the main force, yet far enough away to provide

sufficient early warning. Normally, there is little

or no depth along the screen, except along highspeed avenues of approach. This depth allows

commanders to maintain continuous contact

while observation posts along the initial screen

line are displacing.

The screening force commander controls movement in sector by designating subsequent screen

lines. Subsequent screen lines are essentially

phase lines. Displacement to a subsequent screen

line is event driven. The approach of an enemy

force, relief of a friendly unit, or movement of

the protected force dictate screen movements.

A screening force provides security for a main

force that is either stationary or moving. The

terms stationary and moving describe the actions

of the protected force, not the screening force.

Stationary Screen

A security force conducts a screen to the front,

flank, and rear of a stationary force in a similar

manner. The tasks associated with a stationary

screen normally consist of movement to the initial screen line, establishment of the screen, and
5-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

displacement to subsequent screen lines. Additionally, the screening force commander coordinates battle handover lines (BHLs) and passage

of lines with the main force commander.

Moving Screen

A screen is maintained along the flanks and/or

the rear of the main force. Responsibilities for a

moving flank screen begin at the front of the lead

combat element in the main force and end at the

rear of the protected force.

A moving screen may be placed to the rear of the

main force conducting an attack or a retrograde

operation. In this situation, the screen line displaces to a subsequent screen line based on

movements of the main body or enemy force.

Movement along the screen line is determined by

the speed of the main force, the distance to the

objective, and the enemy situation. There are four

basic methods of controlling movement along the

screen line:

z Alternate bound by individual observation

posts from rear to front.

z Alternate bound by subordinate units from rear

to front.

z Successive bound by units along the screen line.

z Continuous march along the route of advance.

The movement of the screen is keyed to the

movement of the main force. There are three

techniques of performing this type of screen:

z Screening force crosses the line of departure

separate from the main force when the main

force is moving quickly or the line of departure

is uncontested. This is the fastest but least

secure technique.

z Screening force’s lead element reconnoiters the

zone when the main force is moving slow or

the line of departure is uncontested. This technique is slower than the previous technique,

but provides better security.

z Screening force crosses line of departure with

the main force when the main force is moving

slowly, the line of departure is also the line of

contact, or the enemy situation is vague. This

technique provides security for the screening

force and the main force, but it is the most time

consuming.

Screening Operations During Limited Visibility

Limited visibility caused by weather conditions

often affects the screening force’s ground and air

observation capabilities. While technical intelligence assets can be employed to offset limited

visibility, the screening force should adjust its

techniques and procedures (e.g., observation

posts should be adjusted; night and thermal

observation devices employed; electronic surveillance devices, trip flares, and observation posts

placed along dismounted avenues of approach).

Depth in the screen can facilitate acquisition of

enemy forces that may elude forward elements.

Patrols are closely coordinated to prevent misidentification and engagement by friendly elements. Indirect illumination is planned and used

as necessary.

Integration of Intelligence Systems

In addition to aviation, technical assets can

greatly expand the area covered by screening

forces. Remote sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, and downlinks from theater and national

assets can all greatly expand the area covered by

a screening force, thereby providing the main

force and the screening force commanders time

to adjust to situations if necessary.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 5-7 

SECTION II. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

Retrograde operations are organized movements

to the rear or away from the enemy. The enemy

may force these operations or a commander may

execute them voluntarily. Retrograde operations

are transitional operations, and they are not considered in isolation. They are conducted either

before or after defensive or offensive operations.

They are part of a larger scheme of maneuver to

regain the initiative and defeat the enemy. In any

retrograde, consideration must be given to possible refugee traffic that will both clog high-speed

avenues of approach and also require displacement assistance/humanitarian aid, which will be

exacerbated in the highly populated regions of

the world. Commanders execute retrogrades to—

z Wear down the enemy, trading space for time

in situations that do not favor a defense.

z Disengage from combat.

z Avoid combat under undesirable conditions

such as continuing an operation that no longer

promises success.

z Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation.

z Place forces in a more favorable position.

z Allow the use of a portion or all of the force

elsewhere.

z Conform to the movement of other forces.

The forms of retrograde include delay, withdrawal, and retirement operations.

Delay

In the delay, the destruction of the enemy force is

secondary to slowing his advance in order to gain

time for friendly forces. Mechanized units are

ideally suited for delay operations because their

long-range weapons and mobility allow the

enemy advance to be slowed and/or attrited while

forces conduct the delay and gain time. Delays

are conducted—

z When the force’s strength is insufficient to

defend or attack.

z To reduce the enemy’s offensive capability by

inflicting casualties.

z To gain time by forcing the enemy to deploy.

z To determine the strength and location of the

enemy’s main effort.

z When the enemy intent is not clear and the

commander desires intelligence.

z To protect and provide early warning for the

main battle area forces.

z To allow time to re-establish the defense.

The delay succeeds by forcing the enemy to

repeatedly concentrate his forces to fight through

delay positions. Delaying forces displace once

the enemy concentrates sufficient resources to

decisively engage and defeat friendly forces. 

Tanks are well-suited for delay operations due

to their high rate of fire, armor protection

against enemy artillery, and mobility. Tanks

may also be retained in a reserve to extricate

forces that have been decisively engaged or to

conduct counterattacks.

Techniques of Delay Operations

There are two main techniques of delay operations: delay from alternate positions and delay

from successive positions. In the execution of

either technique, it is crucial that the delay

force maintains contact with the enemy

between delay positions.

Alternate Positions

Delay from alternate positions involves two or

more units in a single sector that occupy delaying
5-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

positions in depth. As the first unit engages the

enemy, the second occupies the next position in

depth and prepares to assume responsibility for the

operation. The first force disengages and passes

around the second. It then prepares to re-engage

the enemy from a position in greater depth, while

the second force takes up the fight.

Delay from alternate positions is useful on particularly dangerous avenues of approach because it

offers greater security than delay from successive positions. However, it requires more forces

and continuous maneuver coordination. Additionally, there is the risk of losing contact with the

enemy between delay positions.

Successive Positions

Delaying from successive positions occurs when

the sector is so wide that available forces cannot

occupy more than a single tier of positions.

Delaying units are positioned forward in a single

echelon. Maneuver units delay continuously on

and between positions throughout their sectors.

As a result, this technique is simpler to coordinate than the delay from alternate positions.

Delaying from successive positions is easier to

penetrate than a delay from alternate positions

because the force has less depth and less time to

occupy subsequent positions. To facilitate the

rapid occupation of positions, units normally perform reconnaissance on subsequent positions

before occupation and post guides on one or two

subsequent positions.

In restrictive terrain, where infantry conducts the

primary action, successive positions may be close

together. In more open terrain, delay positions are

often further apart. In the selection of positions,

commanders consider the location of natural and

artificial obstacles, particularly when the enemy

possesses sufficient armored combat systems.

Organization of Forces

As in defensive operations, commanders assign

their delaying force a sector with flank and rear

boundaries and the commander selects delay

positions on key terrain astride likely enemy avenues of approach. Delay positions are normally

battle positions that commanders plan throughout the depth of the delay sector. Phase lines are

designated along identifiable terrain features to

control the displacement of friendly forces.

Selected phase lines may be designated as delay

lines. Delay lines require the delaying force to

prevent the enemy from crossing the line until a

specified time or the occurrence of an event.

Coordination is critical during a delay. To ensure

coordination, commanders designate contact

points at the boundaries along delay lines to ensure

units coordinate each series of delay positions.

In the delay, reconnaissance and surveillance

assets are focused on named and target areas of

interest. It is essential that the delaying commander identify the enemy’s advance early

enough to adjust his scheme of maneuver and

concentrate sufficient combat power to effectively delay the enemy.

Commanders normally retain a reserve to contain

enemy penetrations between delay positions, reinforce fires into an engagement area, or help a unit

disengaging from the enemy. The size of the reserve

depends on the situation and forces available.

Execution of the Delay

A mechanized force will normally be assigned

sectors in which to delay and the initial delay

positions. Phase lines may be employed to control the timing of the delay. The tank should be

employed as the primary weapon to engage

enemy tanks.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 5-9 

Rear Operations

Rear operations in a delay are similar to rear operations in the defense. However, the echeloning of

CSS organizations required to maintain continuous support during the delay, coupled with the

additional dispersion inherent to the delay, complicates the conduct of these operations. Critical to

the success of the delay is the ability of the rear to

provide class III and V to the force.

Concluding the Delay

A delay operation terminates when one of the following three conditions exist:

z The advancing enemy force reaches a culmination point. The delaying force then has three

choices: they maintain contact in current positions, they withdraw, or the delaying force

transitions to the offense.

z The delaying force passes through another

force. Typically, the delaying force will conduct a rearward passage of lines, which may be

under enemy pressure, at the BHL and move

into the assembly areas. Smooth transfer

requires coordinating passage points, establishing recognition signals, and determining supporting fires and routes through the defended

position. The BHL should be in front of the

FEBA. It is preferable to pass delaying units

to the rear in sectors not under direct attack.

z The delaying force reaches defensible terrain

and transitions to the defense.

Withdrawal

A withdrawal occurs when a force in contact disengages from an enemy force. It is a type of retrograde operation in which a force in contact

plans to disengage from the enemy and moves

away from the enemy. The tank battalion’s

mobility makes it ideally suited to perform rear

guard duties for a withdrawing force. Withdraws

may be executed at any time and during any type

of operation. Units undertake a withdrawal for

the following reasons:

z If the unit achieves its objective and there is no

further requirement to maintain contact.

z To avoid baffle under unfavorable tactical conditions (e.g., if a force cannot achieve the object

of its operation and defeat threatens the force).

z To draw the enemy into an unfavorable position.

z To extend the enemy’s lines of communication.

z To conform to the movements of adjacent

friendly forces.

z As an economy of force measure that allows the

use of the force or parts of the force elsewhere.

z As a prelude to a retirement operation.

z For logistical reasons.

Withdrawals are inherently dangerous since they

involve moving units to the rear away from what

is usually a stronger enemy force. An aggressive

enemy will attempt to prevent or delay a unit’s

withdrawal. In all withdrawals, the commander

should attempt to conceal from the enemy the

force’s intention to withdraw. Since the force is

the most vulnerable if the enemy attacks, commander’s plan for a withdrawal under pressure.

Commanders then develop contingencies for a

withdrawal without pressure. In both cases, the

commander’s primary concerns will be to:

z Break contact with the enemy.

z Displace the main body rapidly, free of enemy

interference.

z Safeguard the withdrawal routes.

z Retain sufficient combat, combat support, and

CSS capabilities throughout the operation.

A withdrawal normally occurs in three overlapping phases. The preparatory phase occurs when

all nonessential personnel, including combat

trains, are relocated to the rear. Next, the disengagement phase has units begin sequenced movement to the rear. When contact is broken, a

tactical march is conducted to an assembly area.

During the security phase, a detachment left in
5-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

contact assists disengagement of other elements,

it assumes responsibility for the battalion sector,

deceives the enemy, and protects the movement

of disengaging elements with maneuver and fires.

This phase is completed when the detachment left

in contact breaks contact with the enemy and

completes its movement to the rear.

Types of Withdrawals

Withdrawal Under Enemy Pressure

A withdrawal under enemy pressure depends on

maneuver and firepower to break contact as the

enemy attacks the withdrawing unit. The goal is

to preserve the unit and prevent the enemy from

forcing the withdrawal into a disorganized

retreat. In a withdrawal under pressure, you conduct fire and movement to disengage from the

enemy. The withdrawal begins with the withdrawing unit (not the security force) engaging the

enemy along all avenues of approach. The withdrawing unit disengages, conducts a rearward

passage through the security force, assembles,

and moves to the next position. The security

force assumes the fight from the forward elements. This includes delaying the enemy advance

while the bulk of the withdrawing unit conducts a

movement to the rear. On order or when predetermined criteria are met, the security force disengages itself and moves to the rear as a rearguard.

The rearguard may be required to maintain contact with the enemy throughout the operation.

Withdrawal Not Under Enemy Pressure

If the unit is not under actual attack, the withdrawal is not under pressure. A withdrawal not

under pressure depends on deception and speed

of execution. The enemy must not be aware

that the withdrawal is taking place. Deception

and operations security are essential to the success of the operation. Two things can be done

to deceive the enemy: leave a detachment left

in contact (DLIC) to make the enemy believe

that forces are still in position or use limited

visibility to cover the withdrawal. If a tank battalion must form its own DLIC, it is normally

organized from elements of each tank company in contact with the enemy. The DLIC

would normally be commanded by the battalion executive officer or operations officer. The

company DLICs would normally be commanded by the company executive officers.

Another option is for the tank battalion commander to leave a single company as the DLIC.

If enemy contact is just in one company’s sector, this approach is preferred. The DLIC

should be able to engage the enemy on all avenues of approach with both direct and indirect

fire. The main body and combat support elements displace using stealth along designated

routes to a new assembly area. Reserve forces

may be positioned along the withdrawal routes

and be given on-order missions to defend,

delay, or counterattack during the withdrawal.

Assisted Withdrawal

In an assisted withdrawal, the assisting force may

provide:

z The security force through which the withdrawing force will pass.

z Reconnaissance of withdrawal routes.

z Forces to secure chokepoints or key terrain

along withdrawal routes.

z Elements to assist in movement control such as

the establishment of traffic control points.

z Required combat, combat support, and CSS.

This can involve conducting a counterattack to

assist the withdrawing unit disengage from the

enemy.

Unassisted Withdrawal

In an unassisted withdrawal, the withdrawing

unit must do everything by itself. It must establish its own security force, perform reconnaissance and secure routes to the rear, and

disengage from the enemy.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 5-11 

Organization of Forces

Units avoid changing their task organization,

unless they have sufficient planning time.

However, circumstances may dictate rapid task

organization changes immediately before the

withdrawal. A commander typically organizes

his force into security forces, a main body, and

a reserve.

Security Forces

If the security force cannot prevent the enemy

from closing on the main body, it must either be

reinforced by the reserve or the overall commander must commit some or all of the main

body to restore the situation. The greater the

stand-off advantage that the security force has,

the easier it will be for the security force to successfully cover the main body’s withdrawal. The

security force maintains contact with the enemy

until ordered to disengage or until another force

takes over this task.

When a security zone exists between the two

main opposing forces, the existing security forces

can transition on order to a rear guard. They then

conduct delay operations until ordered to disengage and break contact with the enemy.

Sometimes the withdrawing force is in close contact with an enemy and a security zone does not

exist. Withdrawals under these conditions require

different techniques by security forces. If a security zone is not possible, a DLIC provides the

means to sequentially break contact with the

enemy. The DLICs attempt to deceive the enemy

by giving the impression that the original defending unit continues to hold the position in strength.

The detachments left in contact simulate, as

nearly as possible, continued presence of the

main body until it is too late for the enemy to

react. This force must have specific instructions

about what to do when the enemy attacks, and

when and under what circumstances to withdraw. If required, these detachments receive additional recovery, evacuation, and transportation

assets for use after disengagement to speed up

their rearward movement.

Often when a detachment is left in contact, additional security forces set up behind the existing

main defensive positions to assist the withdrawal

process. These additional forces can be part of

the withdrawing unit or an assisting unit may provide them. The DLIC can then delay back on

these additional security forces and join them.

Alternatively the detachment delays back to the

additional security force, conducts battle handover, and conducts a rearward passage of lines.

In either case, the security force then becomes the

rear guard.

Main Body Forces

On order, the main body moves rapidly on multiple routes to reconnoitered positions (having previously dispatched quartering parties). It may

occupy a series of intermediate positions before

completing the withdrawal. Usually CSS and

combat support units (with their convoy escorts)

precede combat units in the withdrawal movement formation. The main body itself delays or

defends if the security force fails to slow the

enemy. If the enemy blocks movement to the

rear, the main force shifts to alternate routes to

bypass the interdicted area or the main force can

choose to attack through the enemy.

Reserve

When the complete formation withdraws under

pressure, the task of the reserve may be to take

limited offensive action, such as spoiling attacks,

to disorganize, disrupt, and delay the enemy. It

can counter penetrations between delay positions, reinforce threatened areas, and protect

withdrawal routes. Reserves may also extricate

encircled or heavily engaged forces.
5-12 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Retirement

A retirement is a retrograde operation in which a

force, out of contact with the enemy, moves away

from the enemy (usually to the rear). Retiring

units organize for combat, but do not anticipate

interference by enemy ground forces. Typically,

another unit’s security force covers the movement of one formation as it conducts a retirement.

Mobile enemy forces, unconventional forces, air

strikes, air assaults, or long-range fires may

attempt to interdict the retiring unit and commanders must plan accordingly. A unit conducts

a retirement to:

z Extend the distance from the enemy.

z Reduce the support distance from other friendly

forces.

z Secure more favorable terrain.

z Conform to the dispositions of the larger

command.

z Allow its employment in another area.

When a withdrawal from action precedes a retirement, the actual retirement begins upon completion of the organization of march formations.

In a retirement there will normally be designated

security elements and the main body. The initial

action is to move logistical and administrative

units and supplies to the rear. The formation and

number of columns employed by the retiring unit

depends upon the number of available routes and

potential enemy interference. If there is a threat of

enemy interference, the column may designate an

advance guard that is augmented with engineers.

At the designated time, troops execute a withdrawal from action, move into assembly areas (if

necessary), and form into march formation. During the initial phase, the force retires in multiple

small columns. As the distance from the enemy

increases, smaller columns consolidate into larger

ones. Road nets and the potential for hostile interference influence the time and manner in which

this occurs.

The commander designates flank security responsibilities to guard against potential enemy interference against the retiring force and a surprise

flanking attack against the retirement’s extended

columns. Flank guard responsibilities may be

designated to subordinate march units. Flank

guards must be mobile. Light armor reconnaissance, mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, and

engineer forces usually form part of the flank and

rear guards.

Terrain and the enemy threat dictate if the retiring

force establishes a single rear guard or if each

column forms a separate rear guard. The rear

guard is normally the principal security element

of each retiring column. It protects the column

from surprise, harassment, and attack by any pursuing enemy force. Its size and composition

depend upon the strength and imminence of the

enemy threat. The rear guard generally remains in

march columns unless there is a potential for

enemy interference. Should the enemy establish

contact, the rear guard conducts a delay.

The main body organizes in a manner inverse to

that for an approach march. The movement of

CSS and combat support units should precede

the movement of combat forces. When necessary, elements of the main body can reinforce

the rear guard or any other security element.

Fire support and attack helicopter elements of

the main body are usually the first elements

tasked for this mission because they are capable

of rapid respond. If the retiring formation can

resource a reserve, it performs the same functions as discussed in the withdrawal.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 5-13 

SECTION III. RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

Reconnaissance is continuous and intrinsic to

all Marine operations. Reconnaissance is a

directed effort to collect information about the

enemy and the friendly commander’s operational area. Reconnaissance information

includes information relating to the activities

and resources of an enemy, or about the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of the particular area of operation.

Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort,

accomplished by observation or mechanical

detection method. There are five forms of

reconnaissance operations: route, zone, area,

force-oriented, and reconnaissance in force.

Tank units are rarely assigned reconnaissance

operations but the tank battalion can utilize its

scout and TOW platoons to conduct limited

reconnaissance operations for its own tactical

missions. For a more detailed discussion on the

capabilities of the scout and TOW platoons

refer to chapter 10.

Route Reconnaissance

The route reconnaissance effort occurs along a

specific line of communications, such as a road,

railway, or waterway. It provides new or updated

information on route conditions and activities

along a specific route.

Zone Reconnaissance

A zone reconnaissance is a directed effort to

obtain detailed information within a zone

defined by boundaries. A zone reconnaissance

provides data concerning all routes, obstacles

(to include chemical or radiological contamination), terrain, and enemy forces within the zone

of action.

Area Reconnaissance

An area reconnaissance provides detailed information concerning the terrain or enemy activity within

a prescribed area, such as a town, ridgeline, woods,

or other feature critical to operations. Areas are

smaller than zones, and a zone reconnaissance may

include several areas. At its most basic level, an

area reconnaissance could be made of a single

point, such as a bridge or an installation.

Force-Oriented Reconnaissance

Force-oriented reconnaissance differs significantly

from the previous forms of reconnaissance. The

objective of force-oriented reconnaissance is to

quickly find a specific enemy force and stay with it

wherever it moves on the battlefield. Units performing this mission provide timely, accurate, first-hand

information on the enemy force’s disposition and its

depth. Units conducting force-oriented reconnaissance may sift through the enemy to reconnoiter in

depth. They may also guide attacking friendly

forces to the preferred point of attack. Very little

time is spent on detailed terrain reconnaissance and

terrain-related reports and terrain-oriented control

measures are minimal.

Reconnaissance in Force

Reconnaissance in force is a limited purpose form

of reconnaissance conducted by a considerable

force to obtain information and test enemy dispositions, strengths, and reactions. It is conducted by

reconnaissance and general-purpose forces to

aggressively develop the situation. The size and

strength of the force must be sufficient to cause the

enemy to respond in some manner, and it must able

to protect itself.
5-14 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

SECTION IV. RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS

The purpose of a river crossing, whether in the

offensive or in a retrograde operation, is to

project combat power across a water obstacle in

order to accomplish a mission. River crossings

require specific procedures for success because

the water obstacle prevents normal ground

maneuver. Inherent within the tank battalion T/O

is four AVLBs and their compliment of six

bridges. Typically organized as a bridging platoon within the tank battalion, the AVLB enables

the tank battalion to traverse 40-foot water obstacles without the assistance of MEF bridging

assets. Refer to appendix A for vehicle characteristics of the AVLB.

There are three basic river crossing types: hasty,

deliberate, and retrograde. For a more in-depth

discussion on river crossing operations refer to

MCWP 3-17.1, River-Crossing Operations.

Hasty River Crossing

A hasty river crossing is a task conducted as part

of a larger operation, typically an attack, with no

intentional pause at the water line to prepare. It

capitalizes on speed while suppressing the

enemy. A hasty crossing is possible with appropriately equipped forces when the enemy is not

defending the river line in strength at the crossing and the characteristics of the river do not

exceed the capabilities of the engineer systems

accompanying the force. A hasty crossing is the

preferred option. Characteristics of a hasty river

crossing include: speed and surprise, minimum

loss of momentum at the river, minimal concentration of forces, and well-understood unit SOPs

and detailed prior planning.

The hasty crossing uses all possible organic,

existing, or expedient means to get across the

obstacle in stride. Clearance of enemy forces

from the near bank is not a prerequisite to a

hasty river crossing. Air assault and airborne

forces can simplify the crossing of a river line

by use of vertical envelopment. Most combat

systems organic to armor and mechanized

infantry units cannot swim. Therefore, these

units must rely on accompanying engineers for

the means to conduct the hasty river crossing.

Although success of a hasty crossing is not

predicated on the seizure of intact bridges, a

rapid advance to the river may allow seizure of

bridges before the enemy can destroy them. A

force crossing a river should prepare to take

maximum advantage of any bridges seized.

Deliberate River Crossing

When a hasty river crossing is not feasible, a

hasty crossing attempt fails, or friendly offensive

operations resume at a river line after a pause, the

force conducts a deliberate river crossing operation. The deliberate river crossing requires unique

planning, control, and specialized support measures. Detailed planning, deliberate buildup and

preparation, deception, and clearance of enemy

forces from the near bank characterize this type

of crossing. Commanders conduct extensive

reconnaissance, full-scale rehearsals, and ensure

all necessary logistic preparations.

Retrograde River Crossing

A retrograde crossing is a movement to the rear

across a water obstacle while in contact with the

enemy. The retrograding force may re-establish

its defense.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 5-15 

SECTION V. LINKUP OPERATIONS

Linkup operations are conducted to join two

forces. Linkup operations may occur in a variety

of circumstances. They are most often conducted:

z To join two forces regardless of where they are

on the battlefield. 

z To join an attacking force with a force inserted

into the enemy’s rear; e.g., a helicopterborne

force or an infiltration force.

z To complete the encirclement of an enemy force. 

z To assist the breakout or come to the relief of

an encircled friendly force.

The headquarters ordering the linkup establishes the command relationship between the

forces and the responsibilities of each. It

should also establish control measures, such as

contact points and boundaries between converging forces, restrictive fire lines, and other

measures to control maneuver and fires. Such

control measures may be adjusted during the

operation to provide for freedom of action as

well as positive control.

A linkup involves a stationary force and a

moving force. If both units are moving, one is

designated the stationary force and should

occupy the linkup point at least temporarily to

effect the linkup. The commanders involved

must coordinate their schemes of maneuver.

They agree on primary and alternate linkup

points where physical contact between the

advance elements of the two units will occur.

Linkup points must be easily recognizable to

both units and are located where the routes of

the moving force intersect the security elements of the stationary force. Whenever possible, joining forces exchange as much

information as possible prior to the operation.

There are two methods of linkup: linkup when

one unit is stationary and linkup between two

moving units.

Linkup When One Unit is Stationary

Linkup when one unit is stationary is the preferred

linkup method when the moving force(s) has an

assigned limit of advance near the other force.

When one of the units involved is stationary, linkup

points are usually located near the limit of advance.

It is also near the stationary force’s security elements. Alternate linkup points are also designated

since enemy action may interfere with linkup at primary points. Stationary forces assist in the linkup by

opening lanes in minefields, breaching or removing

selected obstacles, furnishing guides, and designating assembly areas. A restrictive fire line is established between the two forces and a restrictive fire

area may be established around one or both forces

linking up. A fire support coordination line is established beyond the area where the two forces are

linking up. When a moving force is coming to

relieve an encircled force, it brings the additional

logistical assets required to restore the encircled

unit’s combat effectiveness to the desired level.

Linkup Between Two Moving Units

Linkup between two moving units is used during

highly fluid, mobile operations when an enemy

force is escaping from a potential encirclement or

when one of the forces affecting the linkup is at

risk and requires reinforcement immediately. In

this method, the moving force or forces continue

to move and conduct long-range recognition via

radios or other communications means, stopping

only when they make physical contact.

Linkup between two moving or converging units

is one of the most difficult operations. Limits of

advance are established to prevent fratricide. Primary and alternate linkup points for two moving

forces are established in the vicinity of the limit

of advance. Fire support considerations are similar to when a stationary and moving force linkup.

Leading elements of each force should exchange

liaison teams and be on a common radio net.
5-16 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

SECTION VI. PASSAGE OF LINES

A passage of lines is an operation in which a

force moves forward or rearward through another

force’s combat position with the intention of

moving into or out of contact with the enemy. It

is always conducted in conjunction with another

mission, such as to begin an attack or to conduct

an exploitation or security force mission. Passage of lines operations are conducted to—

z Sustain the tempo of an offensive operation

with fresh forces.

z Maintain the viability of the defense by introducing fresh forces.

z Free a unit for another mission, reconstitution,

routine rest, resupply, refresher/specialized

training, or maintenance.

The conduct of a passage of lines involves two

forces: the stationary force and the moving force.

In the offense, the moving force is normally the

attacking force and is organized to assume its

assigned mission after the passage. The stationary

force facilitates the passage and provides maximum support to the moving force. Normally, the

plans and requirements of the moving force have

priority. The time or circumstances at which

responsibility for the zone of action transfers

from the stationary force to the moving force

must be agreed upon by the two commanders or

specified by higher authority. Normally, the

attacking commander assumes responsibility at or

before the time of attack. Responsibility may be

transferred before the time of attack to allow the

attacking commander to control any preparation

fires. In this latter case, elements of the stationary force that are in contact at the time of the

transfer must be placed under the operational

control of the attacking commander. Liaison

between the forces involved should be established as early as possible.

SECTION VII. RELIEF IN PLACE

A relief in place is an operation where one unit

with a tactical mission is replaced by another. It

is conducted as part of a larger operation primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units. The higher headquarters directs

when and where to conduct the relief and establishes the appropriate control measures. The

directing authority transfers responsibility for the

mission and the assigned sector or zone of operations of the replaced unit to the incoming unit.

Normally, the unit relieved is defending. However, a relief may set the stage for a resumption

of offensive operations. A relief during an offensive operation will most likely occur during an

operational pause. Otherwise, during an offense,

the two forces concerned in the relief conduct a

forward passage of lines. A relief may also serve

to free the relieved unit for decontamination,

reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance, specialized training, or another mission.

There are two types of reliefs: a deliberate and

a hasty relief in place. The major differences

between them are the depth and detail of the

planning and, potentially, the execution time.

In a deliberate relief, units exchange plans and

liaison personnel, conduct briefings, perform

detailed reconnaissance, and publish orders

with detailed instructions. In a hasty relief,

commanders use an abbreviated planning process and direct the execution using oral or fragmentary orders. In both cases, the relieved unit

designates liaison personnel from its combat,

combat support, and CSS elements that remain

with the relieving unit until completion of the

necessary plans.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 5-17 

SECTION VIII. BREAKOUT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT

Units normally attempt to conduct breakout operations when—

z They are specifically directed by the senior

commander or if it falls within commander’s

intent.

z They do not have sufficient, relative combat

power to defend themselves if encircled.

z There is not adequate defensible terrain available.

z They are not able to sustain themselves for a

sufficient period of time.

Generally, the best opportunity for a breakout

attempt comes in the early stages of enemy

encirclement because the enemy does not have

sufficient combat power to encircle the friendly

force in strength and weak points exist in the

enemy force. 

An encircled force may be operating under

adverse conditions and may not have all of its

technical intelligence systems operating. The

commander may be forced to operate with low

levels of intelligence concerning enemy

strengths, weaknesses, and intentions. Within this

environment, aggressive reconnaissance is

required in order to ascertain information on the

enemy. The commander should also obtain information from available reconnaissance and surveillance assets. If the enemy is in close contact,

the commander may be forced to conduct reconnaissance in force to ascertain information on

enemy strengths.

The unit must re-organize to conduct the breakout based on available resources. Without resupply, tank and mechanized infantry units may not

be able to move all their vehicles in the breakout

attack. Priority of support may be limited to the

rupture force and rear guard, with the remainder

of the force keeping only sufficient transportation assets to move them. The breakout plan

should outline destruction criteria, identify all

vehicles and equipment that cannot be moved,

and destroy unmovable items as soon as possible.

Organization of Forces

The encircled force normally conducts a breakout

by task-organizing with a rupture force, a main

body, and a rear guard. If the commander has

enough forces, he may organize separate reserve,

diversionary, and supporting elements. The forces

may consist of aviation or ground combat units

(one or both as individual elements or as taskorganized, combined-arms teams) and appropriate

CSS organizations based on METT-T.

Rupture Force

The encircled forces attack as soon as possible by

employing one or more rupture forces to penetrate the enemy defensive positions. The commander must produce overwhelming combat

power at the breakout point. The rupture force,

which may vary in size from one-third to twothirds of the total encircled force, is assigned the

mission of penetrating the enemy-encircling position, widening the gap, and holding the shoulder

of the gap until all other encircled forces can

move through. The rupture force must be of sufficient strength to penetrate the enemy line. A

favorable combat power ratio must be achieved at

the point of attack by means of surprise, troop

strength, mobility, and firepower.

Initially, the rupture force is the main effort.

The rupture force commander will probably

have additional assets attached to his unit. These

assets might include air defense or additional

engineer personnel from any encircled engineer

unit. The commander should integrate these

assets properly for maximum combat power to

achieve the rupture.

Tanks are well-suited to be all or part of the rupture force because their speed and mobility

allow them to quickly engage targets and clear a

gap through the enemy for other follow-on

forces to exploit. 
5-18 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Reserve Force

The reserve follows the rupture attack in order

to maintain the attack’s momentum and secure

objectives past the rupture. After the rupture

force secures the gap, the reserve normally

becomes the lead element. When a unit receives

the reserve force mission, the commander must

coordinate closely with the rupture force commander on the gap’s location, the enemy situation at the rupture, and the enemy situation (if

known) along the direction of attack past the

rupture point.

Initially, the reserve passes through the gap created by the rupture force. It is essential that the

reserve continue a rapid movement from the

encircled area toward the final objective (probably a linkup). If the reserve makes secondary

attacks, it is important that it does not become

bogged down. Artillery preparation may assist

the reserve force in maintaining momentum out

of the encircled area.

Main Body

The main body consists of the main command

post, the bulk of the CSS, and some combat support assets. It contains those combat forces not

required for other missions and should contain sufficient combat power to protect itself. It moves

rapidly as a single group on multiple routes immediately behind the reserve. Security elements protect the flanks of the main body during movement.

One commander should have sole command of

this element to ensure orderly movement.

Rear Guard

The rear guard consists of the personnel and

equipment left on the perimeter to provide protection for the rupture and diversionary attacks (if

a diversionary attack force exists). Forces left in

contact must fight a vigorous delaying action on

the perimeter so that no portion of the force is cut

off. Under a single commander, the rear guard

acts as a covering force to protect the main body

from attack while it is moving from the area. In

addition to providing security, it deceives the

enemy as to the encircled force’s intentions. It

simulates the activities of the encircled force until

they clear the gap. Once the breakout commences, the rear guard and any diversionary

forces disengage or delay toward the rupture.

Perimeter forces integrate smoothly into the rear

of the breakout column. Upon achieving the breakout, priority of fires may be shifted to the rear

guard action. Above all else, the force must maintain the momentum of the attack or the force will

be more vulnerable to destruction than it was

prior to the breakout.

As other units support or follow the breakout, the

rear guard commander must spread his forces

over an extended area. This requires flexibility

and mobility on the part of the rear guard. The

rear guard must also ensure that the perimeter

withstands enemy pressure.

Diversionary or Supporting Force

The encircled force should divert enemy attention

from the location of the rupture. A supporting or

diversionary attack can assist the breakout attack

by diverting enemy attention and resources away

from the rupture effort. The forces conducting a

supporting or diversionary effort may be from

either inside or outside the encirclement area. The

commander should direct their efforts to a point

where the enemy might expect a breakout or where

a relief effort might occur. The forces participating in these efforts are as mobile as available vehicles and trafficability will allow. Mobile, selfpropelled weapons systems ideally suit the needs

of a diversionary or supporting force.

Success of the diversionary force is important to

the success of any breakout operation. If the

force fails to deceive the enemy of the encircled

force’s intentions, the full combat power of the
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 5-19 

enemy could be directed at the rupture point. On

the other hand, the diversionary force may rupture the enemy’s lines. If a rupture occurs, the

diversionary force commander must know the

commander’s intent. He may exploit this success, or he may have to disengage and follow

and support the reserve force.

Conduct of the Breakout

Detailed planning for a breakout attack may not be

possible because the attack must be initiated so

quickly after a friendly force is encircled. Units

will conduct aggressive reconnaissance to confirm

the enemy disposition. If the enemy-encircling

force occupies strong positions in close proximity,

the encircled unit may be required to conduct a

reconnaissance in force at selected locations to

ascertain enemy strengths and reactions. The unit

initiates its breakout attack as soon as it develops

sufficient intelligence concerning enemy dispositions. Its attack exploits conditions of limited visibility and gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’s

positions. If friendly forces enjoy air superiority,

the breakout attack may be initiated during daylight hours to fully exploit the capabilities of close

air support. Additionally, the probability of a successful breakout increases measurably if another

friendly force attacks toward the encircled force as

it attempts to breakout.

The unit takes all possible precautions to deceive

the enemy as to the location of the main attack.

The rupture force minimizes occupation of attack

positions prior to the main attack. A supporting

attack may be required to assist the rupture force

in penetrating enemy positions and expanding the

shoulders. Feints and demonstrations may also be

employed to deceive the enemy as to the main

attack. However, diversionary attacks need not

always occur first.

The commander organizes and controls his rupture force as he would a deliberate attack or movement to contact. The rupture force generates

overwhelming combat power at the point of the

main attack and attempts to rapidly penetrate

enemy positions and expand the penetration. If the

commander is hard-pressed to generate sufficient

combat power with the rupture force and still

maintain the perimeter defense, he may have to

initiate a withdrawal in certain sectors, prior to the

main attack, to generate combat power. If enemy

forces are in strength at the point of penetration,

the rupture force will likely hold the shoulders. If

the enemy is not in strength, the commander may

have the rupture force continue its attack as the

main effort. If there are no identified enemy formations beyond the penetration, the rupture force

may transition to a movement to contact. The follow and assume force is prepared to assume the

main effort if the rupture force becomes decisively engaged short of its objectives.

The reserve moves in the approach march formation and is prepared to react to enemy counterattacks or exploit the success of the rupture force.

The main body follows the reserve. It moves on

multiple routes in either the approach or road

march formation. It contains sufficient combat

power to protect itself and reinforce the flank or

rear security forces should they come under

attack. Typically, flank security forces conduct a

screen or guard mission.

Initially, the rear guard conducts a withdrawal to

break contact with enemy forces around the

perimeter and then diminish the perimeter as it

delays back behind the main body. If the enemy

closely pursues the breakout force, the rear guard

may become the main effort. The reserve should

then be positioned where it can also support the

rear guard.

The priority for fire support is initially with the

rupture force. Fire support assets must also move

with the main body and rear guard so that security forces have adequate fires.

Engineers with the rupture force focus on mobility

operations. Engineers with a follow and assume
5-20 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

force or reserve improve routes and replace

AVLBs with other bridging assets. Engineers are

also task-organized with the flank security elements whose focus is countermobility operations.

The rear guard must also have adequate engineers

to conduct countermobility operations.

Air defense assets are prioritized to protect the rupture force, rear guard, and then the main body.

Sufficient medium- and short-range air defense

systems must be dedicated to cover all critical

points through which the encircled force will pass.

All units and vehicles will carry the maximum

supplies possible, with emphasis on classes III

and V. The encircled force will only take those

vehicles it can support. It may be possible for the

encircled force’s higher headquarters to establish

an intermediate support base as the breakout

attack moves toward a linkup.

Exfiltration

If success of a breakout attack appears questionable and a relief operation is not planned, one

way to preserve a portion of the force might be

through organized exfiltration. Exfiltration is the

act of passing stealthily out of enemy-held territory. An exfiltration effort is preferable to capture and can distract the enemy from his main

effort. It may produce intelligence for the main

force. Exfiltration by the encircled force is

employed only as a last resort by the encircled

force after destroying or incapacitating all

equipment (less medical) not accompanying the

breakout force. Casualties may have to be left in

place by exfiltrating forces with supplies and

medical attendants.

Exfiltration is most feasible over rough or difficult terrain, through areas unoccupied by the

enemy, or through areas not covered by enemy

observation and fire. These conditions often

allow undetected movement of small elements

when movement of the entire force would present

more risk. It is unlikely that the entire force will

be able to exfiltrate since there may be a requirement to create a diversion. 

Based on reconnaissance, the exfiltrating unit

subdivides into small groups and exfiltrates during periods of limited visibility by passing

through and around enemy defensive positions. If

detected, they seek to bypass. Units use preparatory fires to cover their movement as well as to

get rid of stockpiled ammunition. Rally points,

routes, and linkup plans all must be coordinated.

Exfiltration may be more difficult to accomplish

in tanks and/or mechanized vehicles. This is due

to the limitations they impose upon exfiltration

routes and the increased noise involved in their

operation that makes their detection by the enemy

more likely.

Attacking Deeper

A COA that the enemy is not likely to expect

from an encircled force is that the force attacks

deeper. This involves great risk, but may offer the

only feasible COA under some circumstances. It

is only feasible if a unit can sustain itself while

isolated. When the enemy is attacking, attacking

deeper into the enemy rear may disrupt the

enemy’s offense and provide an opportunity for

linkup from another direction. If the enemy is

defending and the attacking force finds itself isolated through its own offensive action, it may

continue the attack toward its assigned objective.

Logistical shortfalls can be relieved somewhat by

aerial resupply, external forces establishing intermediate support bases, and possibly by using captured supplies. Close air support will have greater

difficulty in providing support due to the enemy

situation around the encircled force.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 5-21 

SECTION IX. ROAD MARCH AND ASSEMBLY AREAS

Tactical Road March

A tactical road march is a tactical movement used

to relocate units within the combat zone in order to

prepare for combat operations. Typically, mechanized units travel long distances, via a road march,

in order to position themselves to perform their

next assigned mission. The primary consideration

of the march is rapid movement, but security is

also required even though contact with enemy

ground forces in not expected. During tactical road

marches, the commander is always prepared to

execute maneuver. A mechanized unit, when executing its tactical mission, moves across the terrain using the formations and techniques of

movement appropriate to the situation.

Prior to the execution of the road march, the tank

battalion plans and issues a march order that

includes the following: 

z Routes to the release point and start point.

z Route strip map.

z Order of march. 

z Start point and reference point locations and times.

z Maximum catch-up speed. 

z Designation of quartering parties. 

z Intervals between vehicles and march units.

z How routes will be marked and by whom.

z Road restrictions. 

z Actions on enemy contact.

z Actions at halt or for disabled vehicles.

z Actions in assembly area. 

z Resupply, maintenance, and feeding procedures.

z Scheduled halts. 

z Fire support plan.

The tank battalion scout platoon conducts a route

reconnaissance that identifies the following:

z Availability and conditions of routes.

z Start point/release point confirmation.

z Location of critical points.

z Location and suitability of holding/assembly

area and areas for maintenance/refueling.

z Distances between critical points and total distance between start point and release point.

z Location of obstacles.

z NBC monitoring of assemble area.

z Information on the enemy positioned along the

routes.

z Alternate routes, if required.

The tank battalion conducts the road march ensuring

that it maintains security during the march. Designated security elements eliminate enemy elements,

allowing uninterrupted movement of the main body.

Assembly Area

An assembly area is an area in which a command

assembles in order to prepare for further action.

The tank battalion’s assembly area typically

requires a minimum of a four square kilometer

area. In the assembly area, the tank unit reviews

and issues orders, services and repairs vehicles,

receives and issues supplies, and feeds personnel. The assembly area, when used to prepare for

an attack, is usually well forward. If possible, it

should be out of range of enemy artillery.

The tank battalion selects an assembly area with

the following characteristics: cover from direct

fire, good exits and entrances, adequate internal

roads, and space for dispersion of vehicles and

equipment. Overhead concealment is important if

the unit is to remain in the area for any length of

time. Vehicles, equipment, entrances, and exits

should be camouflaged to keep the enemy from

detecting the location of the unit.

As the battalion occupies the assembly area, the

main body moves into position without halting or

blocking routes. Security is established immediately and radio listening silence or minimum radio

transmissions is maintained. All units are resupplied and operation orders (OPORDs) are issued.
CHAPTER 6

TACTICAL LOGISTICS

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying

out the movement and maintenance of forces.

Logistics provides the resources of combat power

and limits what tank units can do on the battlefield. Marine tank units strive to use precision

logistics that seeks to maximize its logistic asset

capabilities. To improve efficiency, precision

logistics applies a “just-in-time” inventory management mindset, which ensures that the right

logistics are forecasted for and delivered on the

battlefield in an effective and efficient manner.

During operations and training, tank units typically consume tremendous amounts of resources.

Therefore, it is imperative that thorough logistical

planning be conducted in order to sustain tank

units. The tank battalion is capable of self-administration, organic supply support, food service

support, and medical services that provide routine

and emergency medical care. The battalion has

significant, organic logistic capabilities for shortterm self-sufficiency, but it requires extensive

CSS (especially fuel and ammunition) for sustained operations. The battalion’s tank companies conduct first and second echelon

maintenance of all organic equipment. The battalion provides second echelon maintenance on

motor transport equipment and third echelon

maintenance on tanks, tank-mounted weapons,

and TOW systems.

Distribution procedures of logistical resources

generally fall into one of two categories: demand

pull or supply push. In the pull method, the supported unit directly controls the orders for resupply and other support services. The push method

relies on precalculated logistic requirements to

position/deliver resources when and where they

are likely to be needed. Marine logistics traditionally employ a combination of both methods. Routine support, such as resupply of food, water, and

fuel, are planned on a standard schedule, or

pushed, based on consumption rates and employment. The pull method means the supported unit

requests specific kinds of resupply (such as maintenance, medical support, and ammunition) on an

as-required basis.

Trains

A train is a means of internally task-organizing

and employing the organic CSS assets of the tactical unit. They are the link between the forward/

subordinate elements of the tactical units and the

supporting combat service support element

(CSSE). The organization and capabilities of the

trains vary with the mission and the tactical situation. Trains predominately provide supply, evacuation, and maintenance services. At tank

battalion and company levels, trains increase

responsiveness to the tactical situation.

Unit trains centralize CSS assets of the supported

unit at a single location under the control of the

unit commander. Unit trains are most appropriate

in either the defense or during periods of low

operational tempo. The commander uses this

option when the tactical situation dictates selfcontained train operations or when the terrain

may require this configuration. Unit trains provide simplicity, economy, and survivability

against ground attack.

The most important criterion for trains is responsiveness. However, seldom will the commander

find a site that provides all the desired characteristics to provide maximum responsiveness. Therefore, the commander must prioritize and weigh the

characteristics based on METT-T and the associated risk. Good train locations should have—

z Defensible terrain that allows the best use of

limited personnel.
6-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z Enough space to permit dispersion of both

vehicles and activities.

z Concealment from hostile ground and air

observation.

z Firm ground to support materials handling;

heavy equipment operations; and ammunition

and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL)

activities.

z A helicopter landing site for helicopter resupply and medical evacuation.

z An adequate road network between the train

and forward elements and between the train

and the CSSE supporting the tank battalion.

z Good communications with forward elements

and the supporting CSSE.

z A source of water.

z No terrain features that are obstacles to CSS

operations or that give the enemy targeting

sources.

Built-up areas are often good locations for trains

because they provide cover and concealment for

vehicles and sheltered areas for maintenance at

night. When located in built-up areas, trains normally occupy buildings near the edge of the area

for better security and to reduce the chances of

being cut off and trapped.

Proper positioning of trains minimizes displacements and increases the quantity and quality of

CSS. The tactical situation determines the

method of displacement. Trains may be displaced in their entirety concurrently with the

maneuver of the tank unit or by echelon. 

To increase responsiveness of CSS assets, the

tank battalion will often task-organize and echelon its CSS assets into combat trains and field

trains. Echelonment of the trains provides

immediate responsive support, flexibility in

usage, and may increase survivability of assets.

When trains are echeloned into combat and

field trains, the S-4 normally controls the combat trains and designates the commander of the

field trains. 

Combat Trains

Combat trains are organic elements that provide

critical CSS in forward areas, and they are tailored

for the tactical situation. They normally contain

POL; ammunition and other ordnance items; maintenance contact teams with a recovery and limited

repair capability; and medical support. However,

their exact composition depends on METT-T. The

combat trains area must not take up space needed

by the forward units, and supply and maintenance

vehicle traffic must not impede the freedom of

movement of combat and combat support units.

Combat trains at the tank battalion level normally

include the battalion aid station.

Field Trains

Field trains consist of the remaining organic and

attached CSS elements that are located further to

the rear. The commander selects this option to

improve responsiveness, flexibility, and survivability against air attack. This option is preferable when the unit is in the offense.

Organic Capabilities

The nature of mechanized warfare demands that

tank units be self-sufficient to a certain degree. In

order to maximize the tank unit’s organic logistical capabilities, the unit must identify critical

requirements, enhance its organic logistics

through other sources when possible, and ensure

its logistics are safeguarded. 

Identify Critical Requirements

Many logistic requirements cannot be predicted

with satisfactory accuracy. High-use repair items

can be identified and stockpiled prior to a deliberate operation. The CSSE of the MAGTF builds

and maintains a class IX repair parts block based

on empirical data. Repair items that are lowdemand, but critical, may not have been planned
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 6-3 

for by the CSSE so the tank unit should always

plan for alternative sources when possible (e.g.,

Army logistic units operating close by). The class

IX block should be reviewed by the tank unit

commander, or his representative, to identify any

combat deadlining components that may be overlooked. Critical logistic requirements should be

forecasted to the CSSE.

Enhance Organic Capability

Mechanized forces tend to operate over great distances throughout the battlespace. The mobility

of the M1A1 tank provides for a nonlinear array

of forces with considerable separation between

units, including CSSE units. Tank units should

enhance their organic CSS capability whenever

possible. For instance, qualifying several crewmen as helicopter support teams allows for

greater flexibility in vertical resupply.

Safeguard Resources

Tank units require certain organic CSS capabilities. These organic capabilities are vital to the

success of most tank operations and need to be

protected. Protection of these resources is normally afforded by locating them at safe distances

from direct combat, which reduces responsiveness, or by allocating sufficient forces for

defense, which reduces forces available for other

operations. However, these safeguards are necessary because failure to protect the tank unit combat trains from enemy destruction could quickly

render the tanks ineffective in combat, hinder or

halt the operational tempo, and make the tanks

vulnerable to a mechanized counter attack.

Outside Agency Support

Because tanks require such a large degree of

logistics, they will usually have to interface with

outside agencies if operations are of a lengthy

duration. To ensure that tank logistic operations

are carried out correctly with outside agencies,

requirements must be prioritized, resupply must

be responsive, a redundant request policy is used,

and key personnel should be collocated.

Prioritize Requirements

Resupply requests must be prioritized. The establishment of priorities and the allocation of

resources in accordance with those priorities is a

function of command, not logistics. The priorities are determined by the commander.

Rapid Response

Anticipated future resupply, not identified as preplanned support, must be prepared for immediate

shipment. Resupply items identified but not carried by the maneuver forces should be packaged

for rapid resupply.

Redundant Requests

Requests for logistic resupply should be concurrently routed through higher headquarters to the

supporting unit and to the supported unit. Current communications systems, such as the data

automated communications terminal, support

redundant and immediate requests. Preformatted

messages allow users to quickly compose and

transmit logistic requests to higher headquarters

and the supporting unit.

Collocation of Key Personnel

Positioning key personnel, where they can be

most effective in the relay and transfer of information, can be tremendously beneficial. For

instance, a maintenance representative from the

GCE cross-decked to the operations section of

the CSSE would be able to interpret and forecast

maintenance requirements.
6-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Logistic Responsibilities of

Tank Battalion Personnel

Battalion S-4

The battalion S-4 is responsible to the commanding officer for the battalion’s CSS. When

trains are echeloned into combat and field

trains, the S-4 normally controls the combat

trains and designates a commander for the field

trains. The battalion S-4 is responsible for the

immediate logistical needs of the supported

units and the logistical needs of the field trains

for future resupply. The S-4 must keep abreast

of the tactical situation at all times in order to

anticipate the battalion’s needs. He also keeps

the S-4A informed of the current situation and

coordinates any special logistical requirements

with him.

Battalion S-4 Assistant (S-4A)

The S-4A is positioned by the S-4. He must

work in unison with the S-4 to deconflict logistical requirements, ensuring that logistic

requests have not been duplicated by mistake

and that logistics are consolidated for transport whenever possible. He works with the

H&S Co for security requirements, the supply

officer for resupply, and the MTO for delivery

of logistics packages (LOGPACs). He is

responsible to the S-4 for organizing and

directing resupply forward from the field trains

to the combat trains. The S-4A directs the formation of LOGPACs for any special or nightly

resupply. He works closely with the MTO in

forming the composition of the LOGPACs. He

keeps the S-4 informed of the current situation

and anticipates any special logistical requirements that may exist.

Headquarters and Service Company Commander

The H&S Co commander normally serves as the

headquarters commandant in the field. In addition to his duties in planning for the security and

displacement of the COC, the H&S Co commander has responsibility for the layout, physical security, and movement of the battalion’s

trains. He works closely with the S-4A and

advises him of all security matters. He is also

responsible for coordinating fire support with

the FSC for the field trains. Additionally, he

normally leads the quartering party to locate

new sites prior to displacement of the COC and

trains or acts at the convoy commander when

moving the COC and/or battalion trains.

Motor Transport Officer

The MTO is normally positioned in the field trains.

During the planning stages of the operation, the

MTO is tasked with consolidating all wheeled

vehicle requirements and organizing convoys. The

MTO must be aware of what supplies and equipment will be sent forward so that an adequate

number of vehicles are available. He assembles

any special LOGPACs and the nightly LOGPAC

as directed by the S-4A. The MTO will work

closely with the S-4A to ensure all convoys are

prepared to move in a timely manner. The MTO

may lead delivery of the LOGPACs forward personally or task one of his subordinate. When the

field trains must move, the MTO assists the H&S

Co in preparing all movement orders and may

become the convoy commander when moving.

Once at the new field trains location, the MTO

assists in the initial layout of the field trains.

Battalion Maintenance Platoon Commander

The battalion maintenance platoon commander is

normally positioned in the field trains with the

tank maintenance platoon. He advises the S-4A

as to what maintenance assets should be sent to

the combat trains when needed. The battalion

maintenance platoon commander coordinates

with the H&S Co commander concerning security and is responsible for the security of his

assigned sector within the field trains perimeter.

He establishes maintenance operations and makes

liaison with CSSE maintenance elements for

requested support.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 6-5 

Tank Maintenance Officer

The tank maintenance officer (TMO) is normally

positioned in the combat trains and coordinates the

forward maintenance and evacuation effort. The

TMO acts as the officer in charge of the maintenance contact teams located in the combat trains.

When called forward to assist the company/team,

the TMO, in conjunction with company personnel, decides whether the tank can be fixed in place,

taken to the unit maintenance collection point

(UMCP), or evacuated to the field trains.

Battalion Supply Officer

The battalion supply officer is located in the field

trains. He is responsible for the requisition,

receipt, maintenance, and disposition of supplies

necessary to the operation. The battalion supply

officer is normally the officer in charge and is

responsible for logistics operations center operations and setting up a logistics operations center

watch. He is the primary point of contact with the

CSSE for classes I, III, and V resupply.

Battalion Maintenance Management Officer

The battalion MMO serves as the battalion liaison officer at the CSSE. He is the primary point

of contact for the coordination of logistical support for all elements, including detachments and

attachments. The MMO monitors the CSS nets,

and he is linked, by wire, to the field trains when

possible. If the MMO is not with the force service

support group, he is responsible to the H&S Co

for the security of his assigned sector within the

field trains perimeter.

Battalion Motor Transport Officer

The battalion MTO is normally located in the field

trains. He normally works under the supervision of

the battalion MTO and coordinates repair/recovery/evacuation of all wheeled assets.

Battalion Communications Maintenance Officer

The battalion communications maintenance

officer is normally located in the field trains. He

normally works under the supervision of the battalion communications officer and coordinates

repair/evacuation of communications assets.

Battalion S-4 Chief

The battalion S-4 chief is normally located in the

combat trains and assists the S-4 with the operation

and movement of the combat trains. He assists the

battalion S-1 (located with the S-4) with security

for the combat trains and personnel accountability.

Additionally, the battalion S-4 chief is responsible

to the H&S Co for the security of his assigned sector within the field trains perimeter.

Headquarters and Service

Company Gunnery Sergeant

The H&S Co gunnery sergeant assists the H&S

Co commander with his duties. He normally

works in the logistics operations center and

assists the H&S Co commander with security. He

also provides logistical support for all personnel

in the field trains.

Company Maintenance Chief

The maintenance chiefs of the tank companies

organize and supervise company mechanics.

They supervise engine running onload/offload

preparation, distribute class IX supplies, and

coordinate with platoon sergeants on platoon

maintenance status and recovery of vehicles to

the UMCP.

Tank Leader

Tank leaders normally receive LOGPACs and

guide service support elements to and from their

tank company positions.

Company Supply Sergeant

The company supply sergeant is normally

located in the field trains. During the day, he

coordinates the company resupply needs and

ensures that all items are placed in the company

LOGPAC for the night resupply. At night, the

company supply sergeant usually accompanies
6-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

the resupply convoy forward to the combat

trains and checks in with the S-4, and/or the

tank leader, and leads the appointed vehicles to

their respective resupply. Once resupply has

taken place, the supply sergeant returns to the

combat trains that are en route to the field trains.

Resupply Operations

The Marine tank unit uses three methods while

conducting supply operations: prepositioning,

routine resupply, and emergency resupply. The

method to be used is determined after an analysis

of METT-T factors.

Prepositioning

Prepositioning of supplies may be required in some

defensive operations. Normally, only class V items

are prepositioned, but class I and class III supplies

may be included. The location and amount of prepositioned assets must be carefully planned and then

verified through reconnaissance and rehearsals.

Each tank commander must be informed of prepositioning locations. The following considerations

influence selection of prepositioned sites and execution of the resupply operation:

z Availability of overhead cover for the prestock

location.

z Cover and concealment of the location and

routes used by vehicles.

z Security procedures required to safeguard the

resupply operation.

z Procedures for protecting friendly personnel

and vehicles in the event prestocked ammunition is ignited. 

There are several techniques for accomplishing

prepositioned resupply in the defense. Normally,

class V (ammunition) is positioned next to or

within a vehicle's fighting position, enabling the

tank crew to resupply during an engagement

without displacing. Another technique is to

locate class V supplies en route to or within a

subsequent battle position. Use of this method

requires consideration of security procedures to

safeguard the prepositioned assets. Resupply of

class III (specifically fuel) is usually accomplished behind a unit’s current battle position or

en route to a subsequent battle position. In the

defense, the tank unit may rotate vehicles or

sections through prestock positions based on the

enemy situation and shortages within the unit.

Routine Resupply

Routine resupply operations include regular

resupply of items in classes I, III, V, and IX and

of any other items requested by the tank unit.

Routine resupply is planned at the battalion level

and occurs whenever possible. The company

LOGPAC is a mixture of company and battalion

assets that transport supplies to the company.

LOGPACs are normally assembled in the battalion

field trains area under the supervision of the S-4 (or

designated representatives) and the tank company

commander (or designated representatives).

Replacements and hospital returnees normally

travel to company/platoon locations on LOGPAC

vehicles as required. Once the LOGPAC is prepared for movement, the tank leader moves the

vehicles forward from the field trains as part of the

task force resupply convoy to the logistic release

point (LRP). The company first sergeant or his representative meets the LOGPAC and guides it to the

company resupply point. The company then executes tailgate or service station.

Emergency Resupply

Emergency resupply, normally involving classes

III and V, is executed when the tank unit has

such an urgent need for resupply that it cannot

wait for the routine LOGPAC. Emergency

resupply procedures start with immediate redistribution of ammunition in individual vehicles,

followed by cross leveling of ammunition. Once

requested through the commander, first sergeant, or tank leader, the battalion brings emergency supplies forward. The tank unit may have
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 6-7 

to conduct resupply while in contact with the

enemy. To resupply the unit in contact:

z Limited supplies are brought forward to the

closest concealed position, where the tailgate

technique of resupply is used.

z Individual vehicles or sections disengage and

move to a resupply point, obtain their supplies,

and then return to the fight. This is a version of

the service station technique. 

Techniques of Resupply

The tactical situation dictates which technique of

resupply the tank unit will use: tailgate, service

station, a variation of one type, or a combination

of both types. The situation also dictates when to

resupply. Generally, the unit should attempt to

avoid resupply during the execution of offensive

operations and resupply should be done during

mission transition. Resupply is unavoidable during defensive missions of long duration.

Tailgate Resupply

In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition are

brought to individual tanks by the tank leader or

his assistant (see fig. 6-1). This technique is used

when routes leading to vehicle positions are

available and the unit is not under direct enemy

LOGPAC

From LRP

Led By

PlSgt/1st Sgt Back To LRP

1st Platoon 2d Platoon Mechanized

Platoon

Figure 6-1. Tailgate Resupply Technique.
6-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

observation and fire. It is time-consuming, but it

is useful in maintaining stealth during defensive

missions because tanks do not have to move.

Service Station Resupply

In the service station technique, vehicles move

to a centrally-located point for re-arming and

refueling, either by section or as an entire platoon (see fig. 6-2). Service station resupply is

inherently faster than tailgate resupply because

vehicles must move and concentrate; however,

it can create security problems. During defensive missions, the platoon must be careful not

to compromise the location of fighting positions. A company being resupplied using this

technique can maintain security by having only

one platoon move at a time; a platoon can do

the same by moving a section to the resupply

point at a time.

Combination Resupply

A platoon leader can use the two basic techniques in combination. For example, during a

defensive mission, a platoon leader may use the

tailgate technique for a mounted forward observation post and the service station method for

the remainder of the platoon located in hide

positions (see fig. 6-3).

Mortuary

Affairs

Fuel Fuel

Inspection

Area

Maintenance

Holding Area

Maintenance

Area

Medic

1st Sgt

EPW

Holding

Area

Supply

Truck

Ammuni

Truck

tion

Ammunition

Truck

M 88

Figure 6-2. Service Station Resupply Technique.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 6-9 

Mounted OP

Tailgate to Forward Mounted OP

Platoon Hide

Position

Service

Station

LOGPAC

Led By

PlSgt

Back to LRP

Figure 6-3. Combination of Resupply Techniques.
6-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Maintenance Operations

Proper maintenance keeps equipment and materiel

in serviceable condition. It includes preventive

maintenance checks and services, as well as the

functions of inspecting, testing, servicing, repairing, requisitioning, recovering, and evacuating

equipment and materiel whenever necessary.

Maintenance tasks are divided into levels: unit

(which includes both operator and organizational

maintenance), combat service support group

(CSSG) (direct support and general support), and

depot. The tank company commander and tank

platoon leader are concerned primarily with

supervising operator maintenance, ensuring

scheduled services are performed as part of organizational maintenance, and providing support for

direct support maintenance elements when equipment must be evacuated.

Repair and recovery are accomplished as far forward as possible. When equipment cannot be

repaired on site within 2 hours, it is moved to

the rear (but only as far as necessary for repair)

to a UMCP.

Unit Maintenance—Operator

Operator maintenance includes proper care, use,

and maintenance of assigned vehicles and crew

equipment such as weapons, NBC equipment,

and night vision devices. The driver and other

crewmembers perform daily services on the vehicle and equipment, to include inspecting, servicing, tightening, performing minor lubrication,

cleaning, preserving, and adjusting. The driver

and gunner are required to record the checks and

services, as well as all equipment faults that they

cannot immediately correct, on the equipment

inspection and maintenance worksheet. The

worksheet is the primary means of reporting

equipment faults through the tank commander to

the platoon sergeant and platoon leader and ultimately to organizational maintenance personnel. 

Checks and services prescribed for the automotive

system, weapon systems, and turret are divided

into three groups: before-operation, during-operation, and after-operation. These checks and services are explained in every operator’s manual and

should be conducted as stated in the manual.

Unit Maintenance—Organizational

Organizational maintenance is the responsibility

of the operators and unit mechanics whose unit is

assigned the equipment. Organizational maintenance has become quicker for tank units because

the M1A1’s design allows rapid modular replacement of parts. Many equipment failures can be

corrected without evacuating the tank for repairs

and the vehicle is returned to combat with minimum delay.

When the operator identifies a problem that is

beyond his level of maintenance capability, he

notifies his chain of command so the problem can

be corrected. The company maintenance team has

trained mechanics who are authorized to perform

unit maintenance tasks as prescribed in the tank’s

technical manuals. If the company or battalion

maintenance team is not authorized to make a

repair, arrangements are made for CSSG maintenance assets to perform the repair.

CSSG Maintenance

Personnel from the CSSG maintenance company, which normally supports a battalion or

regiment, perform this level of maintenance.

CSSG maintenance consists of repair and/or

replacement of parts, assemblies, and components. Maintenance support teams from CSSG
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 6-11 

units are usually located forward with the battalion field trains. These support teams may go

forward to fix disabled equipment on site, but

they are limited in what they can fix and where

they can go.

Evacuation

Evacuation is necessary when a damaged tank/

vehicle cannot be repaired on site within 2 hours

or when evacuation is the only means (besides

friendly destruction) available to prevent capture

or destruction by the enemy. When a tank/vehicle needs to be evacuated, the platoon leader or

platoon sergeant reports its exact location, the

vehicle type, and the extent of damage, if known,

on the company net to the company maintenance

chief. The crew remains with the vehicle to assist

in evacuation and repair, to provide security, and

to return the repaired vehicle to the platoon as

soon as possible.

A recovery vehicle from the company or battalion

maintenance team evacuates the damaged vehicle.

The tank/vehicle is evacuated to an LRP, the main

supply route, or the UMCP as necessary. The

recovery team normally employs a M88A2 Hercules recovery vehicle. This vehicle travels with

the company maintenance team under the direction

of the maintenance chief. The location of the company maintenance team during operations is designated in the company OPORD.

If a recovery vehicle is not available or if time is

critical, other platoon vehicles can evacuate the

damaged vehicle for short distances—this decision is made by the platoon leader. Towing procedures are listed in the operator’s manual. Selfevacuation by the platoon is a last resort that

should be considered only to prevent losing the

damaged tank/vehicle to the enemy.

Destruction

When damaged or inoperable equipment cannot

be evacuated and it becomes apparent that enemy

capture is imminent, the equipment must be

destroyed. Platoon leaders must ensure that crews

are trained to destroy their vehicles rather than

allow them to fall into enemy hands. Instructions

for destroying equipment are included in the

operator’s manual for each item. 

The platoon leader should obtain the commander’s permission before destroying any

equipment. However, if the ability to communicate with the commander fails, the platoon leader

must use his judgment to decide whether or not

evacuation is possible. Every reasonable effort

must be made to evacuate secure equipment, classified materials, and all weapons.

M1A1 Logistic Requirements

Fuel

Tanks require a large amount of fuel. To refuel a

tank company, heavy expanded mobile tactical

trucks are required to conduct refueling operations quickly and efficiently. The M1A1 tank

engine can run on a variety of fuels: DF-1, DF-2,

DF-A, JP-4, JP-5, or JP-8. JP-8 is the preferred

fuel. Fuel requirements are as follows:

z One M1A1 tank: 504.4 gallons.

z Tank platoon (4 tanks): 2,107.6 gallons.

z Tank company (4 tanks): 7,061.6 gallons.
6-12 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Additional POL

In addition to fuel, the M1A1 requires other lubricants to keep the tanks functioning properly. Table

6-1 shows the type of lubricants and amounts

needed in each M1A1 tank. This table should be

used as a guide for logistic planning.

Ammunition Resupply

Tanks carry a large amount of ammunition and

can carry several different types of main gun

rounds depending on the mission. For a discussion of the types of rounds and their specifications see appendix D. Table 6-2 is a matrix to

help logisticians properly re-arm tank units. Not

only must the main gun rounds be resupplied, but

also the on board machine guns, the small arms

of the tank crews, and the tank smoke discharger

rounds must also be replenished. The frequency

of resupply depends on the type of mission being

conducted and the types of targets engaged by the

tank units.

Table 6-1. POL Capacity for a Single M1A1 Tank.

POL Placement Type of POL Amount per Tank

Engine Turbo shaft 25 qt

Transmission 30 weight (OEA/HDO) 45 gal

Final drives 30 weight (OEA/HDO) 5.5 qt

Suspension/shocks 30 weight (OEA/HDO) 30.6 qt

Suspension/hubs 30 weight (OEA/HDO) 20 qt

Hydraulic system FRH 20 gal

Recoil mechanism FRH 10.3 gal

Fire extinguisher Halon 225 psi

Accumulator/LRU Nitrogen 1000 lb bottle

Table 6-2. Arming Capacity for M1A1 Tank Units.

Type Ammunition One M1A1

Tank Platoon

(4 tanks)

Tank Company

(14 tanks)

Main gun, 120mm 40 160 560

M2, .50 cal 1,000 4,000 14,000

Coax, 7.62mm 10,000 40,000 140,000

Loaders, 7.62mm 1,400 5,600 19,600

M16A2, 5.56mm 210 840 2,940

Pistol, 9mm 400 1,600 5,600

Phosphorous smoke 24 96 336
CHAPTER 7

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

An amphibious operation is launched from the

sea by naval and landing forces with the primary

purpose of introducing the landing force ashore to

accomplish the assigned mission. Marine tank

units normally participate in amphibious operations as part of an amphibious task force, maritime prepositioning force, or marine expeditionary

unit (special operations capable). There are four

types of amphibious operations, each designed to

have a specific impact on the adversary: amphibious assault, raid, demonstration, and withdrawal.

Planning for the employment of tanks during the

four types of amphibious operations differs little

from planning for tank operations ashore. The

operation plan provides basic information for a

buildup of tanks ashore, their initial employment, and logistical support in combat operations

ashore. Amphibious planning for tanks is conducted concurrently and in coordination with the

planning of other units of the landing force.

Staff Planning Considerations

After receipt of planning guidance, the landing

force’s senior tank officer and his staff prepare

estimates of supportability that are based on—

z Mission and concept of operations of the landing force.

z Enemy situation with particular attention to the

enemy antitank defenses. 

z Terrain, weather, and beach conditions. 

z Shipping and landing craft availability.

z Tank strength available to the landing force.

Embarkation Plan

Upon receipt of the shipping allocation, the tank

battalion begins planning. A listing of personnel

and equipment to be assigned to each ship is created. During embarkation planning, it is determined whether tanks will be preboated prior to

completing the embarkation plan. Final embarkation plans are developed after studying the

assigned ships’ characteristics pamphlets and

direct liaison with the ships’ officers.

Landing Plan

The landing plan is the basis upon which an

orderly ship-to-shore movement is conducted by

the landing force. The ship-to-shore movement

plan includes the detailed plans, tables, diagrams, and schedules prepared by both Navy

and landing force commanders, and the plans

establish priorities for landing units of the landing force. Based on the method of landing, the

tank battalion prepares all necessary forms.

When subordinate units of the tank battalion are

attached to infantry units, their plan for landing

is reflected in the landing document of the units

they are supporting. Plans for the landing of tactical units are found in the landing plan appendix to the amphibious operations annex of the

operation plan.

Intelligence Requirements

The timely and continuous receipt of intelligence

is critical to the employment of tanks. During

amphibious planning, every effort is made to gain

extensive information and intelligence relative to
7-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

terrain, weather, and enemy situation. Intelligence

for the employment of tanks during an amphibious operation should focus on what and where

enemy antitank systems could be employed and

the enemy’s most likely COA to stop tanks from

coming ashore and moving inland.

Terrain

Tank intelligence requires terrain information on

beaches and terrain inland from the beaches.

Required information about the beaches includes:

z Location, length, width, gradient, and composition of the beach and land adjacent to the

beach.

z Trafficability of the land.

z Existing and reinforcing tank obstacles on and

adjacent to the beach.

z Suitable exits.

z Sea approaches including underwater gradient

and offshore obstacles.

z Surf, tide, and current conditions.

Weather

Weather affects the surf conditions and conditions of the sea, which are critical to the use of

landing craft and landing ships attempting to

place tanks on the shore. Winds and visibility

influence control and coordination of tank units

during landing. Rough seas have an adverse

effect on the offloading of tanks. Precipitation

affects not only visibility, but also trafficability.

Extremes in temperature give added importance

to the logistic requirement.

Enemy Situation

Amphibious planning requires current intelligence on the enemy at all stages of the planning

process. However, the difficulty to alter plans

once the assault has begun and the need of the

tank battalion and its subordinate units to be

well informed demands accurate and detailed

intelligence. The following information is

important to tank battalion planning:

z Beach antitank defenses.

z Enemy’s overall countermechanized capability (including location of enemy armored units

and reaction time against the landing force).

z Enemy air capability.

z Enemy electronic warfare capability.

z Enemy NBC capabilities.

Embarkation/Debarkation

Amphibious operations involving Marine Corps

tank personnel and assets are normally characterized by movement from ship to shore via landing

craft, utility (LCU) or landing craft air cushion

(LCAC). Every tank has a fording kit that needs

to be applied before conducting amphibious operations (see fig. 7-1).

Environmental Characteristics

Environmental characteristics that affect embarkation/debarkation are as follows:

z Fording depth: 78 inches (2 m).

z Additional wave action: 12 inches (30.48 cm).

Fording

Stacks

Figure 7-1. M1A1 Tank with Fording Kit.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 7-3 

z Fording depth capability: maintained on slopes

up to 40 percent.

z Crosscurrent: 20 miles per hour (32 kph).

z Sea state: condition 2.

z Water: fresh or salt.

Equipment Characteristics

Equipment characteristics that affect embarkation/debarkation are as follows:

z Fording duration: 10 minutes.

z Automotive power performance degradation of

M1Al: not more than 30 percent (acceleration

and speed).

z Dimensions: not more than 24 inches (60.96 cm)

(length increases with fording kit installed).

z Weight: 350 pounds (159 kg) (weight increases

with fording kit installed).

z Installation or removal: 2 hours with three-man

crew.

z M1Al operating speed: 4 to 6 miles per hour (6

to 10 kph) at 78 inches (2 m) of water depth.

Planning Considerations

Planning considerations are as follow:

Beach

z Review the beach survey prior to embarkation

or debarkation from landing craft. It is the

beachmaster’s responsibility to provide a copy

of the survey to the craftmaster.

z Ensure the beach gradient is 40 percent or less.

z Ensure the path to and from the craft is void of

obstacles.

LCU Loads

z When loading two M1Al tanks, utilize rear and

amidship spots and reposition LCU after first

tank is off loaded.

z AVLBs and tanks with track-width mine plows

must be loaded in the forward spot due to the

width of the vehicles.

z Griping vehicles down is performed by the

embarked crewman. It is the LCU craftmaster’s decision when to gripe down.

z When practical, keep LCU loads tank-pure.

LCAC Loads

z One MlAl can be loaded on an LCAC.

z Vehicles are always griped down.

z The tank crew rides in the crafts crew compartment, but the tank driver rides in the tank.

Tank With Mine Plows on LCUs 

z The M1A1 with an attached plow must be

positioned in the forward spot on an LCU.

z The tank must be on loaded and off loaded

with a negative ramp (ramp angle below horizontal) on the LCU to prevent damage to

the LCU.

z Dunnage must be placed parallel along the path

of the track, under the craft ramp and perpendicular to the path of the tank with the plow

(creating a speed bump), in order to raise the

height of the mine plow to prevent damage to

the ship when off loading vehicles from landing craft into the well deck.

Responsibilities

It is the responsibility of the tank commander to

determine if the tank’s embarkation/debarkation

procedures are safe. The tank commander must

ensure that there is a coordinated effort between

the tank crews and Navy personnel. These

responsibilities include:

Embarked Tank Crews

z Griping down.

z Remaining on the tank (LCU)/crew compartment (LCAC).
7-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z Ensuring that the gun tube does not interfere

with movement of the landing craft into or out

of the ship.

Craftmaster

z Provides gripes.

z Provides depth soundings along the end of the

ramp (3 feet is considered a good ramp) and at

the hinge and aft of the wingwall.

z Grounds the craft prior to off loading.

Beachmaster

z Provides modified surf index and hydrographic

survey to craftmaster.

z Salvages grounded equipment.

Ship

z Provides life jackets.

z Provides dunnage.

Operational Checks and Procedures

Pre-amphibious Operations Checks

The following must be coordinated prior to the

amphibious operation:

z Complete installation of fording gear.

z Ensure that all communications cords are taped up.

z Ensure positive communication between the

tank commander and driver.

z Use battery vice vehicle power when using the

driver’s night sight to prevent arching from

leakage through the driver’s hatch. 

z Ensure that no gear is attached to the left turret

sponson box that will interfere with fording stacks

and not allow the turret to traverse to front. The

gun should be at maximum elevation during on

load and then leveled once it is griped down.

Caution

Once fording stacks are in place the tank can be run

for approximately 10 minutes before overheating.

Before Embarking on an LCU

Ensure that the following are completed before

embarking on an LCU:

z Turret seal is inflated.

z Loader’s hatch is closed.

z Turret power is in the manual position at the

loader station.

z Driver’s hatch is correctly locked.

z Positive communications between the tank commander and driver.

z Hand-and-arm signals have been reviewed

with naval personnel to ensure that there is a

common understanding.

z Proper positioning of naval personnel to preclude them from being caught between the tank

and a bulkhead.

z Loading instructions are taken from the boat

commander.

Predisembarkation of the LCU

Ensure that the following is completed before

predisembarkation of the LCU:

z Turret seal is inflated.

z Loader hatch is closed.

z Turret power is in the manual position at the

loader station.

z Driver hatch is correctly locked.

z Positive communications between the tank

commander and driver.

z The boat commander checks the depth in front

of the entire ramp.

z The depth of the water from the bow ramp to

the end of the wingwall is no more than 5 feet.

z Tank commander checks the depth of the

water. If he feels that the water is too deep,

tanks will not exit the landing craft.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 7-5 

Disembarkation of LCU

The following occurs during disembarkation of

the LCU:

z Driver takes all commands from the tank

commander.

z When disembarking from the LCU, the tank

commander should time the movement of the

tank to coincide with a lull in the wave swells.

z The tank moves forward slowly. Once two-thirds

of the vehicle is off the ramp, the tank commander has the driver gradually increase speed to

full throttle until the vehicle is out of the water.

z Drivers need to remember to listen to the tank

commander and to expect some leakage

through the driver’s hatch as water comes over

the front slope of the tank. 

Procedures to Abandon the Tank

If the tank has aborted and will not restart, the tank

is taking water in through the tank commander’s

hatch, and the tank commander feels that the crew

is in danger of being trapped inside the tank, the

tank commander gives the signal to abandon the

tank. If the signal to abandon the tank is given, the

following procedures are executed:

z Commander orders the crew to start emergency

drill and exit the tank when flooding cannot be

controlled by the bilge pump.

z Driver verifies that the parking brake is released

and the engine is shut down.

z Driver unscrews the turret seal valve to deflate

turret seal.

z Loader unlocks the turret lock.

z Commander positions AUX HYDR POWER

switch to ON.

 WARNING

Before traversing turret, alert crew and make

sure all personnel are clear of turret.

Crewman can be injured or killed if turret is

traversed while body parts are extended

between turret and hull.

z Gunner traverses the turret counterclockwise

until turret opening is aligned with driver’s station. If turret cannot be traversed with hydraulic power, traverse and align turret manually. If

turret cannot be traversed, inform driver to exit

through driver’s hatch.

z Loader locks the turret lock.

z Commander turns off the VEHICLE MASTER

POWER switch.

z Loader opens the driver’s station access screen.

z Driver lowers the seat and headrest and disconnects helmet leads.

 WARNING

Do not extend any part of the body from the

turret into the driver’s station unless the

turret lock is set to LOCKED. A crewman

may be killed if the turret is traversed while

he is between the turret and the driver’s

station.

z Driver exits the driver’s station to the turret

through the turret opening.

z Crew exits the tank if flooding becomes excessive. If flooding is not excessive, wait in the

tank until the tank is towed ashore or emergency personnel arrive.
7-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

The following steps are performed only after

determining that the turret cannot be traversed:

z Driver disconnects the leads to the helmet at

the quick-disconnect. Driver’s hatch may be

difficult to open until water has completely

filled compartment. Once hatch is open, exit as

quickly as possible.

z Gunner elevates the main gun tube to its maximum height.

In shallow water where only the hull is submerged, the following procedures apply:

z Driver lifts drain valve handle to open drain

valves.

z Driver unscrews two wing nuts and removes

middle periscope.

z Driver presses button on hatch, lifts handle, and

pushes up on handle all the way, then releases.

z Driver turns crank clockwise to open driver’s

hatch.

z Driver assumes a safe position on hull or turret

until tank is towed ashore or emergency personnel arrive.

z Remaining crew exits through the turret hatch.

Embarkation/Debarkation Communications

While backing onto the LCU, the driver stops and

the crew attempts to re-establish communications. If communications cannot be re-established, and if the entire tank is on the boat, the

crew with assistance from members of the boat

crew will ground guide the tank onto the boat. If

the tank is still partially in the water, the tank

commander informs (the best way he can, SOPs

should be established before the operation) the

driver to move the tank straight off the ramp up

onto shore and attempts to fix the communication problem.

While driving off the LCU, the driver stops and

the tank crew attempts to re-establish communications. If communications cannot be re-established and if the entire tank is on the boat, the

crew will stand fast until communication can be

re-established. If the tank is partially on the ramp

and the boat, the crew with assistance from members of the boat crew will ground guide the tank

back onto the boat and stand fast until communications can be re-established. If the tank has

already started to leave the ramp, the driver continues to drive straight until he is out of the water.
CHAPTER 8

MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Military operations other than war (MOOTW)

focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and giving support to civil authorities in

response to domestic crises. MOOTW may

involve elements of both combat and noncombat.

Tanks are employed in both offensive and defensive missions during MOOTW. Task-organized as

part of a MAGTF, Marine tank units may be called

upon to support a wide range of operations in various political and geographical environments.

Because of the large amount of resources necessary to deploy, operate, and sustain mechanized

forces, tank units are usually used to execute

MOOTW activities that take maximum advantage

of their inherent capabilities: armor protected firepower, cross-terrain mobility, and shock effect.

Recently, Marine tank units have participated in

MOOTW operations in Somalia and Haiti. During

these operations, tanks were effective deterrents in

lessening attacks towards Marines conducting

peacekeeping operations. In addition, tanks served

as powerful security escorts for food relief convoys carrying food to the local population, keeping

them safe from convoy hijackers.

In MOOTW, tank units may be assigned missions

traditionally handled by infantry or military police

forces. For example, a tank unit could be tasked as a

reaction force to support crowd and riot control;

however, potential casualties to noncombatants and

collateral damage of local infrastructure can occur if

tank units are used in this type of role. To perform

effectively and efficiently, tank crewmen should

receive special equipment and training (e.g., the

operational environment, rules of engagement

[ROE], force protection, and civil affairs) before

executing such operations. Disciplined, welltrained, combat-ready commanders and crewmen

can adapt to the specialized demands of MOOTW.

Flexibility and situational awareness are paramount

requirements, especially for unit commanders.

The M1A1 tank’s armor protection is well-suited

to take the impact of small-arms fire and the

rocks and bottles that might be encountered during a MOOTW operation. Tank units provide the

MAGTF with a highly effective graduated

response. Tanks can provide a graduated escalation in the use of force while providing a high

level of protection to the tank crews. Graduated

response options include using the tank’s physical presence for crowd control or the use of the

tank’s main gun and machine guns to destroy barricades or engage snipers.

Environment

Note: In the following discussion of MOOTW,

the term environment refers to both the cultural, political, and military context in which

these operations take place and to the terrain

and weather of the area of operation.

Tank units involved in MOOTW emphasize

their psychological effects more than the offensive capabilities of the tank. Tanks can be

viewed as a positive symbol of power and political resolve but they can also be viewed negatively and can insight violence if not carefully

employed. Since MOOTW is often conducted in

a politically sensitive environment, tank crewmen should realize that every individual action

could have a significant political or operational

impact. Tank commanders need to ensure consistent discipline, decentralized execution of

lawful orders, cultural training, and, if necessary, the use of a language interpreter. One act

of civil disturbance or intolerant treatment of

civilians can turn a supportive populace against

the force and can be exploited by potential
8-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

adversaries. Marines should understand the military situation, especially the doctrine, tactics,

and equipment that are employed by belligerent, guerrilla, terrorist, militant, or paramilitary

forces. Orientation training should also clarify

the following environmental conditions: the

tempo of operations, local news media, and the

United States’ role in the operation.

The tank/mechanized commander must consider

his activities in relation to similar activities carried out by agencies of the United States, its

allies, and the host nation, as well as nongovernmental organizations. The presence of tanks or

heavy mechanized forces in certain areas or situations could be counter to what other organizations are trying to achieve with the local

population. MOOTW considerations for using

tanks include the following:

z Media scrutiny may be extensive and tanks can

be represented negatively.

z ROE may be more restrictive thereby limiting

the tanks full offensive capabilities.

z Identification of hostile parties may be more difficult making security of tanks more difficult (e.g.,

concealed antitank weapons in large crowds).

z Tanks and other military assets may be routinely used to support noncombat functions

(e.g., protection of civilian food, fuel convoys).

z Interaction with civilian noncombatants will be

routine at every level of command.

Tempo

Although extreme tension may underlie

MOOTW, the tempo of operations is generally

slow. Therefore, the key to creating a secure tank

environment is not only maintaining operational

security but also varying security techniques and

procedures to avoid predictability.

Rules of Engagement

ROE are directives issued by the military

authority that delineate the circumstances and

limitations under which United States’ forces

initiate and/or continue combat engagement

with other encountered forces. ROE dictate

when, where, against whom, and how force—

especially lethal force—may be used. Key considerations in the design of ROE for tank

employment include the following:

z United States policy.

z International law.

z Host nation law.

z The threat.

z Commander’s intent.

z Operational considerations.

z Tactical capabilities.

Specific aspects of ROE may be intended to

address force protection issues like combat identification, fratricide, or the use of a particular type

of weapon in certain situations. Culture may be

an important factor as well. ROE may forbid

engagements in the vicinity of cultural or artistic

sites, because such sites are often irreplaceable.

For these reasons, tank crews must understand

the lethality of the tank’s weapon systems and

destructive capabilities with regard to potential

collateral damage to noncombatants, property,

and local infrastructure (e.g., buildings, roads,

rails, and bridges).

ROE issues are also greatly complicated by the

urban environment. ROE designed for use in one

area of a city may be irrelevant or counterproductive in another because of differences in the urban

geometry, structural materials, and in the nature

of the mission. For instance, the use of tank main

gun rounds and coaxial machine rounds in a

shantytown may pose more danger to adjacent

friendly forces and to noncombatants than to the

enemy. In other sections of the city, the use of

tank high explosive rounds may threaten to disperse hazardous materials or contaminants into

the air or water. The presence of adversary fighters dressed in civilian clothes, common in urban

conflicts, will further complicate operations.

In all circumstances, ROE for tanks should be

tactically sound, flexible, understandable, and
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 8-3 

enforceable. They must be disseminated and

understood at all levels. Inappropriate or poorly

enforced tank ROE may result in friendly casualties (including fratricide), collateral damage,

and the deaths of noncombatants, all of which

seriously hamper an operation. ROE CAN

NEVER NEGATE THE RIGHT AND

RESPONSIBILITY OF FRIENDLY FORCES

TO SELF-PROTECTION.

Force Protection

Force protection is a primary responsibility for

every commander involved in MOOTW. The

armor protected firepower and automotive capabilities of the tank allow it to be employed in a

number of MOOTW missions that provide the

commander with options for minimal risk of personnel, equipment, and supplies because of the

tank’s inherent self-protection and security that it

can provide to supported forces.

Antiterrorism protective measures training should

include operational security, physical security,

and personal security measures to protect tanks

and their crews. Examples include avoiding

employing tanks in patterns and routines; strict

noise and light discipline; and use of cover and

concealment, obstacles, observation posts, and

early warning devices. Tanks can be viewed by

terrorists or insurgents as powerful symbolic targets if they are able to destroy them and/or injure

the crew. Commanders must protect armored

vehicles and secure locations for eating, resting,

and conducting maintenance while providing

adequate force protection measures. For more

information, see Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 3-02D, Combating Terrorism,

and MCRP 3-02E, The Individual’s Guide for

Understanding and Surviving Terrorism.

Public Affairs and the Media

In many MOOTW environments, the local populace may view the presence of tank units as a

highly visible and potentially intimidating military presence. Therefore, the employment of

tanks infers a firm commitment and demonstration of American resolve in the respective crisis

and often draws media attention. Consequently,

the tank crew’s actions may be highly visible,

scrutinized and questioned by the media. See

MCWP 3-33.3, Marine Corps Public Affairs, for

more information.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

The tank unit in MOOTW can be used in a noncombatant evacuation operation scenario as an

element of a security force or reaction force (see

page 8-6 for details on the reaction force).

Security

The tank unit can establish a battle position or

conduct a relief in place of a battle position as

part of a MAGTF perimeter or strongpoint

defense. (See chap. 3 for detailed information on

defensive operations.) Dismounted infantry may

or may not be integrated with the tank unit. Coordination with dismounted patrols and observation posts outside the perimeter is critical for

situational awareness. See chapter 4 for detailed

information on employment of tanks with infantry. In restricted terrain, commanders must understand that with each application of a tank in a

static position, the danger and vulnerabilities of

that tank are maximized. A team of four Marines

is optimum to provide security for a tank in a

defensive or overwatch position. The tank commander should be responsible for the team and

their emplacement. In open terrain, such a team

may not be required.

Clearing of Evacuation Routes

A tank unit can proof routes to detect and neutralize

mines or improvised explosive devises (IEDs).

Based on METT-T factors, the unit may use tactical

movement techniques to provide overwatch for the

proofing vehicle, which can be a tank (equipped with

a mine roller, if available) or an engineer vehicle. If

mines and/or IEDs are detected, the unit conducts
8-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

breach force operations or bypasses within its capability. Whenever possible, the unit should be

equipped with a mine plow and a breaching kit containing wire and bolt cutters, grappling hooks, and

demolitions. If the mines and/or obstacles are not

within the unit’s breaching capability, engineers are

called forward. While the breaching is occurring, the

proofing and overwatch vehicles should take notice

of anything that is out of the ordinary, such as new

construction, repairs to damaged buildings, plants or

trees that seem new or out of place, and freshly dug

earth. These conditions may indicate the presence of

newly emplaced or command-detonated mines or

IEDs. The tank unit conducts tactical movement

breaching operations as discussed in appendix E.

Foreign Humanitarian Operations

The tank’s intimidation factor is always present;

therefore, the tank unit is normally positioned as

far away as possible from those who are benefiting from foreign humanitarian efforts. Tanks can

be used to man a battle position as part of a

MAGTF foreign humanitarian supply site providing security from insurgents who wish to confiscate the supplies or destroy them. (See chap. 3 for

detailed information on defensive operations.)

When tanks are used for this purpose, coordination with dismounted patrols and observation posts

outside the perimeter is critical for security. Signs,

in the local language, should be posted as necessary around the supply site to identify movement

restrictions for the local populace.

Convoy Security Operations

Because of the tank’s mobility, firepower, and

armor protection, tank units can provide convoy

security and close-in protection from direct fire

to convoys while they are on the move. Depending on a variety of factors (e.g., size of the convoy, escort assets available, METT-T), convoy

escort missions are normally conducted by

Marine tank units at the platoon level, either

independently or as part of a larger unit’s convoy security mission. See MCRP 4-11.3F, Convoy Operations Handbook, for detailed tactics,

techniques, and procedures.

Command and Control

The relationship between the tank platoon and the

convoy commander must provide for unity of

command. In most cases, the tank unit commander may serve as the security element or support the security force commander.

Tactical Disposition

During escort missions, the tank unit leader supports

the convoy commander by positioning his tanks to

provide security in all directions and throughout the

length of the convoy. The convoy commander

adjusts the disposition of the tank unit, either as a

unit or dispersed, to fit the security requirements of

each particular situation.

Escort Missions

When the tank unit is deployed during an escort

operation, it can provide forward, flank, rear, or

close-in security. In such situations, it executes

tactical movement based on the factors of

METT-T. Figures 8-1 and 8-2 show the platoon

using various formations while performing

escort duties as a unit. These formations can

also be used by the platoon while part of a largescale escort mission.

Large-scale Escort Missions

If sufficient escort assets are available, the convoy commander usually organizes the convoy

into three distinct elements: advance guard,

close-in protective group, and rear guard.

The tank unit is normally best employed as an

element of the close-in protective group. This

group provides immediate, close-in protection for

the main body of the vehicle column with escort

vehicles positioned either within the column or
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 8-5 

on the flanks. The convoy commander’s vehicle

is located within this group.

The advance guard reconnoiters and proofs the

convoy route and searches for signs of enemy

activity, such as ambushes and obstacles.

Within its capabilities, it attempts to clear the

route and provide the convoy commander with

early warning before the arrival of the vehicle

column. A tank section or the entire platoon

may be designated as part of the advance

guard. The platoon commander may also be

required to attach a mine plow or mine roller to

the tank unit.

The rear guard follows the convoy and provides

security in the area behind the main body of the

vehicle column, often moving with medical and

recovery assets. A tank section or the entire tank

platoon may be part of this element.

Note: The convoy commander may also designate the tank as part of a reserve (quick reaction) force for additional firepower in the

event of enemy contact. The reserve will either move with the convoy or be located at a

staging area close enough to provide immediate interdiction against the enemy. 

Convoy

Convoy Escort Using Platoon Wedge Formation

Convoy

Convoy Escort Using Column Formation

Figure 8-1. Tanks Performing Forward Security for a Convoy.

Figure 8-2. Tanks Performing Flank Security for a Convoy.
8-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Mounted Patrols

Mounted patrols should be carefully planned to

ensure that chosen routes do not canalize tanks

(i.e., tanks unable to maneuver without backing

up or waiting for vehicles behind them to move).

Choosing such routes makes a tank an easy target for insurgents armed with antitank weapons.

When selecting a route, tanks should avoid areas

that are culturally sensitive or that their presence

would escalate the level of violence.

The tank unit, when patrolling urban areas or

close terrain, normally overwatches and/or follows in support of dismounted infantry. Procedures for operating with infantry are discussed in

chapter 4 and are very similar for operating in a

MOOTW environment.

Checkpoints

A tank unit can overwatch an infantry or military

police traffic control point. Additionally, the

overwatch element must ensure it coordinates for

its own local security; it usually does this by

coordinating with dismounted infantry for observation posts and dismounted patrols. See chapter

3 for more information on overwatch and occupation of a defensive position.

The tank unit (supported by infantry) can be

employed to occupy a perimeter defense to protect traffic and facilitate movement through a

chokepoint along the main supply route. Infantry

is normally integrated into the perimeter defense

to augment the tank unit’s firepower and to provide security by means of dismounted patrols and

observation posts.

The tank unit can be employed to overwatch a

blockade or roadblock. The blockade or roadblock can either be a manned position or a reinforcing obstacle covered by fires only. It

coordinates with dismounted infantry for local

security (observation posts and dismounted

patrols). Positions are improved using procedures for deliberate occupation of a battle position (see chap. 3).

Reaction Force

Tank units can be employed as an element of the

MAGTF reserve (sometimes referred to as the

quick reaction force) during tactical recovery of

aircraft and personnel (TRAP) missions. Typical

missions include reinforcement and relief of

encircled friendly forces that are conducting the

TRAP mission or securing an objective in an

operation to rescue a downed aircraft or stranded

vehicle. In all these scenarios, the tank unit conducts a movement to contact and, if required,

actions on contact. See chapter 2 for more information on offensive operations.

Tank units can be employed with infantry to conduct a cordon and search mission. During the cordon and search, the tank unit normally occupies

overwatch and/or hasty defensive positions to isolate a search area. Close coordination and communication with the dismounted elements conducting

the search is critical. Dismounted forces are also

employed in observation posts and patrols to maintain surveillance of dead space and gaps in the cordoned area. The tank unit must be prepared to take

immediate action if the search team or observation

posts identify enemy elements. Enemy contact

may require the unit to execute tactical maneuver

and deliver fires directed by the dismounted elements (see chap. 4).
CHAPTER 9

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBANIZED TERRAIN

The powerful, high-velocity cannon mounted on

the M1A1 tank provides Marines with a key

requirement—a highly survivable direct-fire

asset—for victory in urban areas. Although the

infantry assumes the lead role during combat in

urban areas, tanks and infantry work as a close

team. Tanks move down streets after the infantry

has cleared the street of any suspected ATGM

positions. Tanks, in turn, support the infantry

with fires. The tank is one of the most effective

weapons for heavy fire against structures. The

primary role of the tank cannon during combat in

urban areas is to provide heavy direct fire against

buildings and strongpoints that are identified as

targets by the infantry. The quick, accurate, and

devastating effects of the 120mm tank cannon,

coaxial 7.62mm machine gun, and .50 caliber

machine gun are major assets to Marines fighting

in urban areas.

The tank provides an all-weather, direct-fire platform. Crewmen have the ability to utilize the

tank’s thermal viewer to engage targets in low

illumination and limited visibility conditions,

which often accompanies urban fighting environments. Precision engagement systems enable our

forces to locate the objective or target with

enhanced optics, engage with desired effect, and

retain the flexibility to re-engage when required.

Even from extended ranges, a tank unit’s precision engagement capability provides a degree of

force protection for the GCE and can limit collateral damage to noncombatants (such as civilians

in adjoining buildings from being engaged) and

local infrastructure. The wide arrays of responsive and accurate weapons on the tank provide

the commander with flexible options.

Tank Units and the Infantry

Tanks have been the primary fire and maneuver

force on the armor heavy battlefield, but they

have also begun to play a major role in the lower

end of the range of military operations. In the

military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)

environment, the tank clearly is in a support role

for infantry. If properly integrated in the scheme

of maneuver, the tank is also a great combat multiplier and can provide a tremendous advantage to

combined-arms forces engaged in urban combat.

Some key considerations for tanks and infantry

working together in urban areas are as follows:

z Situational awareness must exist between the

tanker and the infantry. Crosstalk between

tankers and the infantry fosters a good working

team. Communications between elements can

take many forms (e.g., radio communication,

use of field phones externally mounted on the

right rear fender of the tank, visual signals such

as hand-and-arm signals and pyrotechnics).

z Both the infantry and tankers must exercise tactical patience. Tanks, indoctrinated in moving

quickly from one position to another, must

remember that they are in a support role to the

infantry and that they also depend on infantrymen

for support and protection against close ambush.

z Terrain can create mobility restrictions for a

tank and the terrain that is easily trafficable by

the infantry may be impassable by a tank.

z The use of tanks does not negate the need to use

smoke, obscurants, and indirect fire when moving

up to an obstacle and support-by fire positions.
9-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z It is essential that tankers attached to the infantry unit be involved in every step of the

OPORD development, especially rehearsals.

z To be effective, the tank and infantry units are

organized as a combined-arms team.

When the mechanized Marine force is employed

in an urban area that is very restricted, tank units

may have to be task-organized into sections.

Marine tank units support Marine infantry in

urban areas by—

z Providing overwhelming firepower and shock

effect using both its main gun and/or machine

guns.

z Isolating objectives with direct fire to prevent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement, or

counterattack.

z Neutralizing or suppressing enemy positions

with smoke, high explosive, and automatic

weapon fire as infantry closes with and

destroys the enemy.

z Assisting opposed entry of infantry into buildings when debris, obstacles, or enemy fire

blocks doorways by firing breaching holes into

buildings.

z Breaking through street barricades or reducing

barricades by fires.

z Using fires to reduce enemy strongpoints in

buildings.

z Holding cleared portions of the objective by

covering avenues of approach.

z Attacking by fire any other targets designated

by the infantry.

z Establishing roadblocks.

z Suppressing identified sniper positions.

Marine infantry facilitates tank employment in

urban terrain by—

z Locating targets for engagement by the tank.

z Suppressing and destroying antiarmor weapons

with mortars, automatic weapons, and grenades.

z Assaulting positions and clearing buildings.

z Providing local security for tanks.

Planning

Compared to combat in open terrain, urban operations are compressed in space and time. This

compression limits observation distances;

engagement ranges; weapons effectiveness;

mobility; and time to maneuver, generate more

fires, anticipate enemy actions, plan and conduct

operations, and, if necessary, respond to enemy

actions. These limitations tend to force extremely

close combat with troops fighting from building

to building and from room to room. Command

and control is difficult because small-unit leaders

cannot see their troops and radio communications is subject to interference caused by the presence of structures. Historically, urban combat has

required a high degree of initiative by small-unit

leaders who were directing the employment of

task-organized special assault teams, of which

tanks were a part.

When tanks are to be task-organized for MOUT,

it is vital that tank unit representatives be integrated into the planning process as early as possible. Familiarity with unit SOPs must be achieved

down to infantry squad and tank section levels for

effective tank-infantry employment in MOUT

operations. Additionally, the tank unit leader

must keep the infantry commander informed

regarding his units; supply, crew, and weapons

status; and any special equipment available (e.g.,

mine plows and rollers). 

When planning a mission, commanders must consider the capabilities, limitations, and likely COAs

available to the enemy. The commander and staff

must consider the strength, composition, disposition, and activities of the enemy forces. Enemy tactics may range from ambushes, snipers, and urban

terrorism to large-scale conventional operations.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 9-3 

Therefore, the tactics and techniques utilized by

tanks and infantry may require different tactics,

techniques, and procedures. The addition of armor

creates the following planning considerations for the

infantry commander:

z Conducting full dress rehearsals utilizing tanks

whenever possible.

z Standardizing reporting formats for both tanks

and the infantry.

z Establishing SOPs for tanks working with

infantry emphasizing safety of friendly infantry maneuvering with tanks, signals between

tanks and infantry, marking of cleared buildings/areas, ROEs, and mutual security between

tanks and the infantry.

z Determining tank maintenance and logistical

support requirements to the supported unit.

z Considering battle damage assessment and

recovery, resupply, and casualty evacuation of

tank crew personnel.

Employment Considerations

Marine infantry and/or tank commanders should

consider the following when employing the

M1A1 in urban terrain:

z Tank main gun fire is an effective method for

eliminating a sniper in a building or creating a

psychological effect that destroys the enemy’s

will to continue, but this method creates a

higher degree of collateral damage.

z Streets and alleys constitute ready-made fire

lanes and firing zones that can greatly restrict

and canalize vehicular traffic.

z Tanks should be employed by section. All fundamental fire and movement techniques are

conducted at the section level, so tanks should

never be employed individually. In extreme

cases, tanks can work separately, but it is not

recommended.

z Typically, a tank and an infantry squad work in

intimate support of each other. The infantry

furnishes local security and designates targets

for the tank.

z SINCGARS radios are utilized for intervehicular communications and should be the primary

means of communications between the infantry

and the vehicle commander. If SINCGARS

radios are unavailable, a rigged external TA-1

phone or hand-and-arm signals can be used.

z The tank should use multipurpose antitank

(MPAT) ammunition to create holes in the

walls of buildings so the infantry can enter.

High explosive antitank (HEAT) ammunition

may also be used but is less effective in creating holes.

z The tank should use MPAT ammunition

against barricades. MPAT rounds can be used

to demolish towers, steeples, chimneys, and

other tall structures likely to contain enemy

artillery observers. This technique depends on

established ROEs.

z Tank sabot ammunition has limited utility

against most nonvehicular targets and the discarding sabot petals can endanger friendly

infantry or civilians nearby. The hazard area

extends 70 meters to each side of the tank gun

out to 1 kilometer.

z The tank main gun has an overpressure that,

when fired, can kill friendly troops. The danger

to dismounted troops is a 90-degree arc out to

200 meters from the end of the tank main gun.

z Tanks should avoid stopping or moving slowly

near nonsecure buildings due to the threat of

possible enemy close range ATGM fires.

z Tanks should mount the fording kit elbow

exhaust plenum pipe attachment or the heat

deflector to allow Marine infantry to safely

approach the rear of the M1A1 tank without

being burned by the tank’s hot exhaust.

z Units should check all bridges and overpasses

for mines and determine the bridge’s weightcarrying capacity.

z Tanks should stay near buildings held by

friendly troops. Crewmembers should watch

for signals from the infantry inside the buildings on their flanks.
9-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z Tank crewmembers should keep their personal

weapons ready for close-in combat.

z Tanks should be used to destroy enemy strongpoints with main gun fire:

 Firing armor-piercing ammunition to penetrate the reinforced wall of a building followed by MPAT or HEAT rounds to kill or

neutralize the enemy.

 Firing into the ground floor to drive the enemy into the basement, where infantry can attack them, or to higher floors, where the

wing tank can destroy them.

z Tanks are sometimes at a disadvantage because

their main guns cannot depress or elevate sufficiently to fire into basements and upper floors

at close range (see fig. 9-1). The M1A1 can

depress to –10 degrees or elevate to a height of

+20 degrees.

z The M1A1 has a coaxial M240 machine gun

and can use it to engage enemy troops and

enemy positions behind light cover while the

tank crew remains protected. The coaxial

machine gun has the same elevation and

depression restrictions as the main gun.

z Tanks can use the tank commander’s .50 caliber machine gun but it can only elevate to

+36 degrees.

z When buttoned up, tank crews have limited visibility. Security infantry for the tank must help

the tank crew “see” by communicating to the

tank crew possible targets relative to the tanks

position and orientation.

Control Measures

Combat in urban areas requires control measures

with which all troops must be familiar. One of the

keys to ensuring ease of coordination of fires, linkup

points, and patrol routes is the use of an effective

map system. Intelligence sections should provide an

accurate map, down to exact buildings if possible.

Buildings and roads can be sectioned off and

labeled alpha-numerically. Without an effective and

universally used map, MOUT operations verge on

impossible. MOUT control measures include

boundaries; objectives; frontages, formations, and

zones of actions; and phase lines.

Weapon Dead Space

16 Meters

Figure 9-1. Tank Cannon Dead Space at Street Level.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 9-5 

Boundaries

In dense urban areas, units should place boundaries along one side of the street to provide

easy and definite identification. In areas where

observation and movement are less restricted,

they may place boundaries in alleys or within

blocks so that one unit’s zone includes both

sides of the street.

Objectives

Objectives are specific and limited. Choosing

major intersections, choosing and numbering

principal buildings, and choosing other readily

identifiable physical features along the route of

attack improve control. As the unit moves forward through an area, unit commanders should

designate the near side of the street as the objective. If they choose the far side of the street, the

unit will have to secure buildings on both sides of

the street to take the objective. Units must

promptly report seizure of objectives.

Frontages, Formations, and Zones of Action

Attacking battalions normally operate within

relatively narrow zones of action. The frontages depend on the enemy’s strength, the size

of the buildings, and the anticipated resistance. Normally, a battalion-sized unit has a

frontage of three to six blocks and companies

one to two blocks.

Frontages and zones of action influence tank

employment. The tanks should be well forward to

add momentum to the attack, exploit success,

repel counterattacks, and protect the flanks and

rear against enemy action.

Phase Lines

Phase lines increase control by regulating the

advance of attacking forces. Phase lines are less

restrictive than objectives, and they encourage

the rapid exploitation of success without halting.

Principal streets, rivers, and trolley or railroad

lines make good phase lines.

Checkpoints and Contact Points

Street corners, buildings, railway crossings,

bridges, and easily identifiable features can be

checkpoints or contact points, and they facilitate

the reporting of locations. The commander can

use them as specific points where he desires units

to make physical contact.

Offensive MOUT Operations

Because of the nature of the terrain, offensive

urban area operations are typically conducted by

dismounted infantry. Tanks should be employed as

much as possible in close support of dismounted

infantry in order to secure locations and provide

direct fire support. Formations depend on the composition of the combined-arms force. The best formation for command and control for security

purposes is a column. The column must be flexible

and provide 360 degrees of spherical security. The

combined-arms column travels within the security

bubble, with dismounted infantry clearing buildings and providing security along the route. Once

enemy contact is made, expedient coordination is

done to use the proper weapons system to engage

the enemy. Buildings and terrain will most likely

not permit an on-line formation.

Attacking in Urban Areas

A detailed study of the city and the enemy’s dispositions in and around it forms the basis for planning the attack and seizure of an urban area.

Planning may include tanks for both maneuver and

fire support. The attacking force is normally separated into two forces: the enveloping force (tankheavy) and the direct assault force (infantryheavy). Follow the procedures and considerations

listed below when attacking in an urban area:

z Dissipate the enemy’s strength by causing him

to react to demonstrations, feints, or ruses. 

z Concentrate overwhelming combat power to

force a quick and violent disruption of the

defenses, envelop the urban area, and move

rapidly to the enemy’s rear.
9-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z Reduce strongpoints with fires only (if possible), secure them with follow-on forces, and

maintain the momentum of the attack.

z Cut lines of communications and defeat the

enemy through isolation.

z Attack at night to gain surprise or to take

objectives whose assault during daylight would

be too costly.

z Attack continuously once the momentum has

been gained and continue to attack until

defenses have been splintered.

Obliquity

The tank cannon produces its best urban target

effects when fired perpendicular to the hard

surface (zero obliquity). However, during combat in built-up areas, finding a covered firing

position that permits low-oblique firing is

unlikely. Most shots strike the target at an angle

that normally reduces penetration. With tank

cannon armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds, oblique angles of

up to 25 degrees have little effect in reducing

penetration, but angles greater than 45 degrees

greatly reduce penetration.

Ammunition

APFSDS rounds are the most commonly carried

tank ammunition. These rounds work best against

armored vehicles. However, the 120mm cannon

also fires an effective HEAT round. Tank units conducting MOUT should carry a HEAT/MPAT heavy

mix. A detailed discussion of each round’s composition and capabilities can be found in appendix D.

M1A1 Tank Fires Dead Space Characteristics

The M1A1 tank has limited elevation in an urban

environment; it can elevate its cannon 20 degrees

and depress it 10 degrees. This lower depression

limit creates a 35-foot dead space around a tank

(see fig. 9-1). There is also a zone overhead in

which the tank cannot fire (see fig. 9-2). This

dead space offers ideal locations for short-range

antiarmor weapons and allows hidden enemy

Housetop

6-7th Story

9-10th Story

20o 20o 20o

30m 60m 90m

Dead Space

Figure 9-2. Tank Cannon Dead Space Above Street Level.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 9-7 

gunners to fire at the tank when the tank cannot

fire back. It also exposes the tank’s most vulnerable areas: the flanks, rear, and top. Infantry must

move ahead, alongside, and to the rear of tanks to

provide close protection. The M1A1 tank also has

a blind spot caused by the zero-degree depression available over part of the back deck. To

engage any target in this area, the tank must pivot

to convert the rear target to a flank target.

The 120mm MPAT has a short arming range; it

arms a round at about 60 feet. This arming distance allows the tank to engage targets from short

ranges. The armor of the tank protects the crew

from both the blowback effects of the round and

enemy return fire. The APFSDS round does not

need to arm and can; therefore, it can be fired at

very close targets at almost any range. The discarding portions of the round can be lethal to

exposed infantry forward of the tank.

When the tank main gun fires, it creates a large

fireball and smoke cloud. In the confines of a

built-up area, dirt and masonry dust are also

picked up and added to the cloud and the target is

further obscured by the smoke and dust of the

explosion. Depending on the conditions, this

obscuration could last as long as 2 or 3 minutes.

Marines can use this period to reposition or

advance unseen by the enemy.

A tank cannon creates an overpressure and noise

hazard to exposed Marines. All dismounted

Marines working near tanks should wear Kevlar

helmets and protective vests, as well as ballistic

eye protection. If possible, they should also wear

earplugs and avoid the tank’s frontal 60-degree

arc during firing. The overpressure can also cause

glass in surrounding buildings to shatter. Falling

glass can cause injury to Marines if they are not

warned to stay clear of windows.

 WARNING

The overpressure from the tank’s 120mm

cannon can kill a Marine within a 90-degree

arc that extends from the muzzle of the gun

tube out to 200 meters. From 200 to 1,000

meters along the line of fire and on a frontage

of about 400 meters, dismounted Marines

must be aware of the danger from discarding

sabot petals, which can kill or seriously injure

personnel. Personnel outside the tank should

remain at least 50 meters from the tank in all

directions as they may receive damaging

effects from firing noise and overpressure.

Personnel must also wear hearing protection

when operating within 704 meters of a tank

that is firing its main gun.

Tanks are equipped with powerful thermal sights

that can be used to detect enemy personnel and

weapons that are hidden in shadows and behind

openings. Dust, fires, and thick smoke can

degrade this sight capability.

Tanks have turret-mounted grenade launchers

that project screening smoke grenades. The grenades use a bursting charge and burning red

phosphorous particles to create the screen. Burning particles can easily start uncontrolled fires

and are hazardous to dismounted Marines near

the tank. The tank commander and the infantry

small-unit leader must coordinate when and

under what conditions these launchers can be

used. Grenade launchers are a useful feature for

protecting the tank, but can cause problems if

unwisely used.

The tank’s size and armor can provide dismounted Marines with cover from direct-fire

weapons and fragments. With coordination, tanks

can provide moving cover for Marines as they
9-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

advance across small open areas. However,

enemy fire that strikes but does not penetrate a

tank is a major threat to nearby Marines. Fragmentation generated by antitank rounds and ricochets off of a tank’s armor have been a prime

cause of casualties while infantry were working

with tanks in built-up areas.

Target Effects

MPAT rounds are most effective against masonry

walls. The APFSDS round can penetrate deeply

into a structure but does not create as large a hole

or displace as much spall behind the target. In

contrast, tank MPAT or HEAT rounds are large

enough to displace enough spall to inflict casualties inside a building. One MPAT round normally

creates a breach hole in all but the thickest

masonry construction—a single round demolishes brick veneer and wood-framed constructions. Even the 120mm MPAT round cannot cut

all of the building’s reinforcing rods, which are

usually left in place, often hindering entry

through the breach hole. MPAT, HEAT, and

APFSDS rounds are effective against field fortifications. Only large earth berms and heavy massconstruction buildings can provide protection

against tank fire.

Security

Tanks need infantry to provide security in builtup areas and to designate targets. If targets are

protected by structures, tanks should be escorted

forward to the most covered location that provides a clear shot. On-the-spot instructions by

infantry commanders ensure that the tank’s fire is

accurate and its exposure is limited. The tank

commander may have to halt in a covered position, dismount, and reconnoiter his forward route

into a firing position.

Attack Phases

Reconnoiter the Objective

Intelligence gathering and reconnaissance and

surveillance are critical to the planning process. Whenever possible, leaders should make a

personal reconnaissance of the objective area to

collect first-hand information regarding the area

to be attacked. Avenues of approach for both

infantry and the tanks, observation posts, supply routes, and the emplacement positions of

direct and indirect fire weapons systems for

both tanks and/or infantry are all examples of

information that can be obtained during reconnaissance. Likely enemy ATGM positions can

also be determined as danger areas for tanks.

Composition and structure of buildings and

roadbeds, cover and concealment opportunities, and other information not apparent in a

map study may have a significant impact on the

plan. For example, determining that the buildings that are to be attacked are made of brick

means tanks will have an easier time making

building breach holes for infantry then if the

building walls contained reinforced rebar.

Isolate the Objective

Seizing natural and manmade features that dominate the area can isolate the objective. Isolation

may also be accomplished by coordinated use of

supporting arms to seal off enemy lines of communication. This phase may be conducted simultaneously with the third phase, which is securing

a foothold.

To isolate an urban objective, tanks can be used

two ways. Tanks can be used to isolate an enemy

objective by becoming a support element or they

can be employed as part of the attack. By using

tanks as a support element they can be held in

reserve or given a mission to keep enemy reinforcements from moving into the isolated attack

objective (such as a main avenue of approach into

a town). When tanks are used in the attack force

they may be employed to directly support the

attacking infantry to help clear buildings and/or

areas. They can also engage enemy forces trying

to hinder the attack. Tanks should always be

aware of enemy mounted avenues of approach.

Once the attacker has isolated the city, he can

either continue the attack or fix the defender and

force him to capitulate. If necessary, the unit then
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ 9-9 

secures positions outside the urban area from

which to support entrance into the city itself. If

tanks are of limited use within a town due to the

inability to maneuver, they can be employ just

outside the urban area to restrict further enemy

forces from entering. The tactics and techniques

for this phase of the operation are similar to those

used in an attack against an enemy strongpoint.

Secure a Foothold

Once the objective is isolated, a foothold should be

secured as soon as possible in order to maintain

tempo. Dismounted forces can be employed to

attack from any direction. If infantry is working

with tanks, areas above, at, and below the street

level (e.g., cellars, building, sewers, subways)

must be cleared before tanks move through the

area in order to ensure that enemy antitank teams

are not able to move around the attacker and

engage the tanks. Both tanks and infantry should

ensure that areas are cleared for possible mines

and/or IEDs. The attacking force uses the foothold

area to reorganize, regain control, and emplace

units to supporting positions. After seizing a foothold, the attacking force continues the attack

through the objective area. Normally, the attacking force penetrates the enemy defenses on a narrow front. The assault is supported by all available

supporting arms and usually maximizes use of

smoke to screen the attacking forces movement.

The tank or mechanized unit commander may

employ variations of the column formation to

better maneuver into urban areas. For example, a

tank battalion may use a column, with each of its

companies in a line, wedge, or echelon. These

formations tend to shorten the length of the column, reducing the time necessary to move into

the urban area. The leading tank elements normally use a formation that speeds the delivery of

maximum fire on the point of penetration. Airbursting artillery and mortar fires are usually

placed over the entry point to prevent the enemy

from manning crew-served or individual antitank

weapons. The infantry moves as close to the

objective as possible. When the infantry attacks a

strongly defended area, it provides close-in protection for the tanks. Unit leaders may assign fire

teams or squads to work with each tank. If radios

are not available, visual signals and TA-1 phones

external to the tank may help maintain direct

communication between the infantry leaders and

the tank commanders. The infantry maneuvers to

suppress or destroy the enemy, and tanks move

forward as soon as possible to support them.

Suppressive tank fires can be used to cover the

attacking forces exposed flanks.

Seizing the Objective

Once a foothold is seized and consolidated, supporting forces move to the built-up area to support the seizing of the objective area. To maintain

tempo, the transition between the phases should

be seamless. Once the foothold has been established, forward units continue the attack through

the objective area. The attack can vary from a

systematic block-by-block, house-to-house reduction of the urban area to a rapid advance with

clearance of critical areas and buildings. Clearance and seizure techniques depend on the mission; the size of the town, construction and

building arrangement; and the enemy’s disposition, strength, and objective. The momentum of

the assault is continued until the objective area is

cleared or controlled.

When the urban area is small or lightly defended,

the attacking force should drive through or into it

as rapidly as possible. Marine armor should lead

the column in this instance, closely followed and

supported by infantry. It will rarely be possible to

employ more than two tanks at the head of the

column except when advancing on a wide street.

Tanks continuously concentrate main gun and
9-10 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

automatic weapons fire on windows and the rooftops of buildings (see fig. 9-3). The infantry protects the tank from close-in enemy fire. When

required to protect tanks from fire from nearby

buildings, an infantry squad moves along each

side of the street, keeping abreast of the lead

vehicles. Depending on the resistance, the infantry may challenge every doorway or ground floor

window by throwing in hand grenades and spraying the interior with small-arms fire. Unit leaders

will usually assign Marines in each squad to

locate and engage targets on the upper floors and

rooftops of the buildings. The infantry may also

assist in the removal of obstacles or barriers halting the advance. Lead tank crews must continually be aware of where the infantry is in order to

avoid possible fratricide or moving forward of

their infantry security and being engaged by

enemy antitank teams.

The assault force should establish limited objectives to ensure that the attacking forces do not

become strung out along the axis of advance.

Gaps give the enemy the opportunity to infiltrate

along the line of advance or make isolated

friendly forces vulnerable to attack.

Defensive MOUT Operations

In urban combat, the defender possesses key

advantages over the attacker. The defender can

shape the battlespace to his advantage by maximizing the natural restrictions and obstacles

found in the urban environment. Knowledge of

the terrain and time available for preparing defensive positions are advantages that may enable the

defender to successfully resist a numerically

superior force. Defensive operations in a built-up

Direction Of Travel

Figure 9-3. M1A1s Advancing with Infantry.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 9-11 

area require thorough planning and precise execution based on METT-T. This discussion examines MOUT considerations that affect the tank

unit in the defense.

Defensive Techniques

In the defense, Marine tanks provide the MOUT

commander with a mobile force that can respond

quickly to enemy threats. They should be located

on likely enemy avenues of approach in positions that allow them to take advantage of their

long-range fires. Effective positioning allows the

commander to employ the armored vehicles in a

number of ways:

z On the edge of the city in mutually supporting

positions.

z On key terrain on the flanks of towns and villages.

z In positions from which they can cover barricades and obstacles by fire.

z As part of the reserve.

The commander may also employ sections or

individual armored vehicles with infantry platoons and squads; this allows the tank crew to

take advantage of the close security provided by

the infantry.

Fighting Positions

Fighting positions for tanks are an essential component of a complete and effective defensive plan

in built-up areas. Vehicle positions must be

selected and developed to afford the best possible cover, concealment, observation, and fields of

fire; at the same time, they must not restrict the

vehicle’s ability to move when necessary.

If fields of fire are restricted to the street area, hulldown positions should be used to provide cover

and to enable tanks to fire directly down the streets

(see fig. 9-4). From these positions, the armored

vehicles are protected while retaining their ability

to rapidly move to alternate positions. Buildings

Top View

Side View

Figure 9-4. Hull-Down Position.
9-12 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

collapsing from enemy fires are a minimal hazard

to the armored vehicles and their crews.

Before moving into position to engage the

enemy, a tank can occupy a hide position for

cover and concealment. Hide positions for

armored vehicles may be located inside buildings or underground garages, adjacent to buildings (using the buildings to mask enemy

observation), or in large ditches. 

Since the crew will not be able to see the advancing enemy from the hide position, an observer

from the vehicle or a nearby infantry unit must be

concealed in an adjacent building to alert the

crew (see fig. 9-5). When the observer acquires a

target, he signals the armored vehicle to move to

the firing position and firing at the proper time.

After firing, the tank moves to an alternate position to avoid compromising its location.

Infantry are usually employed abreast of the

tanks so that they can fire toward the expected

direction of attack. Too much separation between

the tanks and infantry does not allow them to easily support one another. However, in a company

team battle position, the limited number of available infantrymen may require infantry fighting

Hide

Position

Fire

Direction

Observer

(inside building)

Figure 9-5. Hide Position.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 9-13 

positions to be interspersed with vehicle positions. In urban areas, rooms within a building

may separate small units such as platoons,

squads, and fire teams, or they may be positioned in different buildings. Infantry positions

must be mutually supporting and allow for overlapping sectors of fire, even when they are in separate buildings or are divided by walls.

The commander’s defensive scheme of maneuver in MOUT must always include the employment of a reserve force. This force should be

prepared to counterattack to regain key positions,

block enemy penetrations, protect the flanks of

the friendly force, or provide a base of fire for

disengaging elements. For combat in urban areas,

the reserve force has these characteristics:

z Normally consists of infantry elements.

z Must be as mobile as possible.

z May be supported by tanks, light armored vehicles (LAVs) and/or AAVs.
CHAPTER 10

SCOUT AND TOW PLATOONS

The scout and TOW platoons found in Marine

tank battalions are unique and provide the tank

units with organic reconnaissance, security, and

countermechanized capabilities while operating.

These capabilities are an integral part of Marine

Corps tank battalion operations and they perform

a number of important roles in helping to shape

the battlefield.

Scout Platoon

Mission

The tank battalion’s scout platoon performs

reconnaissance, provides limited security, and

assists in controlling the battalion’s movements.

The platoon is not organized or equipped to conduct independent offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations. It operates as part of the tank

battalion and should be assigned missions that

capitalize on its reconnaissance capabilities. The

scout platoon is one of the battalion commander’s

primary sources of organic combat intelligence

both before and during the battle. Although the

platoon has an antitank capability, it cannot perform its scouting roles when employed as an antitank force.

Organization 

The scout platoon is organized into a headquarters

section and two other sections. The headquarters

section consists of the platoon commander and

platoon sergeant and their vehicles. Each section

contains a section leader and two other vehicles.

See figure 10-1.

Employment

There are six fundamentals required for the successful employment of the tank battalion scout

platoon:

z Use maximum reconnaissance force forward.

z Orient on the reconnaissance objective.

z Report all information rapidly and accurately.

z Retain freedom of maneuver.

z Gain and maintain enemy contact.

z Develop the situation rapidly.

Use Maximum Reconnaissance Force Forward

Do not keep scouts in reserve. This does not mean

scouts must be on line and oriented forward;

rather, all available scouts must be employed executing reconnaissance tasks. 

Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective

The platoon’s scheme of maneuver is focused

toward a specific objective or set of objectives

based on the OPORD and the battalion commander’s intent.

Scout

HQ

4 MK19 or M2 Carriers

2 TOW Carriers

1 AN/MRC-145

1 M998

1 TOW Carrier

1 M2 Carrier

1 MK 19 Carrier

1 AN/MRC-145

1 M998

2 TOW Carriers

4 MK 19 or M2 Carriers

Figure 10-1. Scout Platoon Organization.
10-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Report all Information Rapidly and Accurately

Commanders base their decisions and plans on the

battlefield information that scouts provide during

reconnaissance. Since information loses value over

time, scouts must report all information exactly as

it is seen and as fast as possible. They must never

assume, distort, or exaggerate information—inaccurate information is dangerous.

Retain Freedom to Maneuver

Scouts must be able to maneuver on the battlefield. If the enemy fixes them, scouts must free

themselves; otherwise, they can no longer accomplish their mission. Scouts must continually

maintain an awareness of tactical developments.

They must employ the proper tactical movement

and react appropriately to unexpected situations.

If contact is made, the platoon commander develops the situation at the lowest possible level

while retaining the initiative, the ability to continue the mission, and the ability to maneuver his

other elements.

Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact

Scouts seek visual contact with the enemy on

favorable terms. They employ sound tactical

movement, target acquisition methods, and

appropriate actions in order to see the enemy

first, thereby retaining the initiative and control

of the situation. Once scouts find the enemy, they

use all available means to maintain contact until

directed to do otherwise.

Develop the Situation

Whether scouts encounter an obstacle or the

enemy, they must quickly assess the situation. If

scouts encounter the enemy, they—

z Determine the enemy’s size, composition, and

activity.

z Find the enemy’s flanks.

z Find any barriers or obstacles surrounding the

enemy position and determine if any other

enemy forces can support the position.

If the scouts encounter an obstacle, they find and

mark a bypass or, if appropriate, execute or assist

in a breach. This must be accomplished with minimum guidance from higher headquarters.

Capabilities and Limitations

In addition to its primary missions, the scout platoon can conduct other missions such as:

z Conduct liaison between units.

z Perform quartering party duties.

z Provide traffic control.

z Conduct chemical detection and radiological survey and monitoring operations as part of a NBC

defense.

z Conduct limited pioneer and demolition work.

z Participate in area security.

The following identifies some of the scout platoon’s limitations:

z The scout platoon depends on its parent unit

for combat support and CSS augmentation.

z The high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) scout platoon can reconnoiter

only two routes simultaneously (reconnoitering

for trafficability only).

z The scout platoon reconnoiters a zone 3 to 5

kilometers wide. METT-T conditions may

increase or decrease the size of the zone.

z During screening operations, all scout platoons are limited in their ability to destroy or

repel enemy reconnaissance units.

z The HMMWV scout platoon can man up to six

observation posts for short durations or up to

three observation posts for long durations.

z When properly organized, scouts can conduct

effective reconnaissance and security patrols.

The HMMWV scout platoon has a very limited

dismounted capability. It must be properly taskorganized to conduct dismounted operations.

z The distance the scouts can operate away

from the main body is restricted to the range

of communications and the range of supporting indirect fire.
Marine Corps Tank Employment ______________________________________________________________________________ 10-3 

z The scout platoon has limited obstacle creation

ability and carries a basic load of demolitions.

z The scout platoon has a very limited obstacle

breaching capability (limited to hasty point

obstacles).

TOW Platoon

Mission

The primary mission of the antitank TOW platoon is to provide countermechanized support

that utilizes the TOW to engage and destroy

enemy armored vehicles, particularly tanks.

When not performing its primary mission, the

antitank TOW platoon may assume a secondary

mission of engaging other point targets or providing limited security to the commander in the form

of a screen or observation posts.

Organization

The TOW platoon has three squads and a headquarters section. See figure 10-2.

Employment

The TOW platoon may be employed as an

organic unit for a specific mission such as setting

a screen or a blocking position; but it will typically be broken down into sections that are then

attached in direct or general support to individual

tank or infantry companies. The TOW’s long

standoff range allows it to cover likely avenues of

approach for armored vehicles, which allows

tanks to conduct offensive missions.

Capabilities and Limitations

Some advantages of the TOW weapon systems

are as follows:

z Can be manpacked to obtain an advantageous

firing position not accessible while mounted,

but only for short distances due to the heavy

weight of the system.

z Engagement of the maximum effective range

does not significantly decrease its accuracy.

z Has a fire down munition that can penetrate a

vehicle’s armor at its thinnest point (on the top).

z Contains a thermal sight that provides enhanced

capability at night and during limited visibility.

z Does not lose power in direct proportion to the

engagement range.

The TOW’s limitations are as follows:

z Employed in squads with two launchers at a

minimum so that the crews can provide mutual

support. 

z Vulnerable to both direct and indirect fire; therefore, cover and concealment are extremely

important. 

z Large amount of backblast are produced,

which must be taken into consideration when

planning firing positions. Clearing the backblast area of loose debris or watering the area

down can help reduce the signature. 

z Reduced range when firing over water obstacles.

z Cannot fire on the move and the gunner must

keep his sights on the target throughout the

time of flight (14 to16 seconds to reach maximum range). 

TOW

HQ

24 TOWs

3 M2 or MK 19 Carriers

2 M998s

1 AN/MRC-145

2 TOW Vehicles

Per Squad

1 AN/MRC-145

2 M998s

8 TOWs

1 M2 or MK 19 Carriers

Figure 10-2. TOW Platoon Organization.
APPENDIX A

ARMOR VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS

1. M1A1 Tank

The M1A1 combat (main battle) tank uses high speed, maneuverability, and a variety of weapons to attack and destroy enemy tanks, equipment, and forces. See

figure A-1 on pages A-2 and A-3. The M1A1 combat tank consists of the hull and

turret assemblies. The turret can rotate a full 360 degrees. 

The tank is equipped with a laser rangefinder. The laser rangefinder can range on

targets 200 to 7,990 meters from the tank with an accuracy of plus/minus 10 meters.

It is also equipped with a thermal imaging system. The thermal imaging system provides the M1A1’s fire control system with a night vision capability by presenting a

thermal scene in the gunner’s primary sight eyepiece. The thermal imaging system

picture can be viewed at 3- or 10-times magnification.

Crew: 4 (commander, gunner, loader, and driver)

Armament:

Main gun, M256, 120mm

Ammunition, 120mm combustible cartridge

Machine Guns: 

Coaxial machine gun, M240, 7.62mm

Loader’s machine gun, M240, 7.62mm

Maximum effective range: 900 meters (tracer burnout)

Maximum range: 3,725 meters

Commander’s machine gun: M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50

Maximum effective range: 1,200 to 1,600 meters (tracer burnout)

Maximum range: 6,700 m

M16 A2, 5.56mm rifle

Grenade launcher, M250

Ammunition Quantity:

120mm (main gun), 40 rounds

M240, 7.62mm (coaxial machine gun), 10,000 rounds

M240, 7.62mm (loader’s machine gun), 1,400 rounds

.50 cal (commander’s machine gun), 900 rounds

UKL8 series (smoke grenades for grenade launcher), 24 grenades

5.56mm rifle, M-16, 210 rounds

Engine: Turbine engine

Transmission:

Model X1100-3B

Range: four speeds forward, two reverse, with pivot and neutral selections

Performance and Specifications:

Forward speed, maximum (paved level surface): 42 mph

Reverse speed, maximum (paved level surface): 25 mph

Range (dry level secondary roads without refueling): 273 to 298 mi

Forward climb of a vertical obstacle: 49 in
A-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Maximum width of forward crossable ditch: 108 in

Fording depth:

Without kit: 48 in

With kit: turret roof

Weight:

Combat loaded: 67.6 tons

Military load classification (MLC): 68 tons

Dimensions:

Length (overall, main gun rearward): 356 in

Length (gun forward): 387 in

Width: 144 in

Height (ground to turret roof): 96 in

Height (maximum overall): 114 in

Ground clearance (center portion of the hull): 19 in

Ground clearance (other portion of hull structure): 16.5 in

Ground pressure: 15.00 psi

Fuels and Oils: 

Fuel tanks (total in tank): 504.4 gal

Transmission, initial fill: 40 to 45 gal

Transmission, refill approximate: 30 to 35 gal

Engine lubrication oil tank (refill, approximate): 17 qt

Recommended fuel types: DF-1

DF-2

JP-8

DF-A

JP-4 may be used in an emergency

For more information concerning the M1A1 tank refer to technical manual (TM) 08953A-10, Tank

M1A1 (120mm Gun).

Figure A-1. M1A1 Tank.

312 Inches

Side View
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ A-3 

387 Inches

Top View

144 Inches

Front View

113.60

Inches

Maximum

137 Inches

Back View

68

Inches

93.5

Inches

Figure A-1. M1A1 Tank (Continued).
A-4 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

2. M88A2 Recovery Vehicle, Fully Tracked: Heavy

The M88A2 heavy recovery vehicle is an armored, full-tracked, low silhouette vehicle (see fig. A-2). It is used for hoisting, winching, and towing operations for all vehicles up to 70 tons (63.49 metric tons). It is equipped to assist in repairing disabled

vehicles under field conditions. The vehicle has a crew of three: commander, operator, and mechanic/rigger. Specific vehicle capabilities and features are as follows: 

z Combination transmission, differential, steering, and braking unit.

z Hydraulic power-assisted braking.

z Main winch, a hoist winch, and an auxiliary winch.

z Hull and cab armor protect vehicle from 30 millimeter direct fire.

z 10.8 horsepower, diesel auxiliary power unit.

z Gas-particulate filter unit.

z M239 smoke grenade system.

z Exhaust smoke generating system.

z Deep water fording kit.

z M2 heavy-barrel, caliber. 50 machine gun.

z Two M16A2, 5.56mm rifle.

Refer to Field Manual (FM) 4-30.3, Maintenance Operations and Procedures,

for recovery methods using the vehicle’s equipment.

Crew: 3 (commander, operator, and mechanic)

Armament:

M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50 machine gun

Two M16A2, 5.56mm rifle

10 light antiarmor weapon rockets

Ammunitions Quantity:

M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50 machine gun, 900 rounds

M16A2, 5.56mm rifle, 300 rounds

Engine:

12-cylinder diesel engine

4-cycle, air-cooled model AVDS-1790-8CR

Transmission:

Twin disc, XT-1410-5A

Performance and Specifications:

Speed, maximum (without towed load): 25 mph

Cruising range, maximum: 300 mi

Grade ascending ability, maximum: 60 percent

Grade descending ability, maximum: 60 percent

Side slope grade, maximum: 30 percent

Maximum vertical wall: 42 in

Maximum trench crossing width: 8.5 ft

Minimum turning radius: pivots in one vehicle length
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ A-5 

Draw bar pull: 107,000 lb

Boom lift height:

At 8-ft reach: 22.5 ft

At 4-ft reach: 25.0 ft

Hoist winch capacity, (four-part line): 70,000 lb

Boom capacity:

Spade up, 4 part line, with lockout blocks installed: 50,000 lb

Spade down: 70,000 lb

Main winch capacity, single line, continuous pull: 140,000 lb

Auxiliary winch capacity, single line: 6,000 lb

Fording depth:

Without fording kit: 56 in

With fording kit: 90 in

Weight, Combat Loaded: 139,000 lb

Dimensions:

Length: 28.33 ft

Width: 12 ft

Height: 9.75 ft

Ground pressure: 13.7 psi

Fuels and Oils:

Fuel tanks: 413 gal

Main engine crankcase (refill): 18.5 gal

Transmission (refill): 17 gal

Main winch: 9.5 gal

Hoist winch: 9 pt

Auxiliary winch: 6 pt

Hydraulic system: 80 gal

Electromagnetic clutch: 5.2 qts

14

1 2 3 4 56 8 7

9

10

11

1. M2 heavy-barrel, caliber .50, machine gun 8. Tow bar

2. Machine gun mount 9. Left side stowage compartment door

3. Commander's cupola 10. Bumper sprint (4)

4. Personnel door, left side 11. Crow bar (2)

5. Boom 12. Roadwheel (12)

6. Tarpaulin and 100 ft rope 13. Shock absorber (6)

7. Snatch block, 90-ton 14. Snatch block, 10-ton

13 12

Figure A-2. M88A2 Recovery Vehicle.
A-6 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

3. Armored Vehicle-Launched Bridge

The M60A1 AVLB is primarily employed to cross short gaps (e.g., narrow

streams), antitank ditches, craters, canals, or partially-blown bridges. It provides

heavy armor protection for personnel and can provide a limited smoke screen from

either the smoke grenade launcher or engine smoke generator (if equipped). The

AVLB can operate in an NBC environment and on rough ground. See figure A-3

on page A-8.

The M60A1 AVLB is divided into two sections: hull and launching mechanism.

The hull contains the following:

z Crew compartment with all controls for operating the launching mechanism.

z Engine compartment with engine and transmission that supplies power for

operating hull and launching mechanism.

z Operator and commander cupolas to enter crew compartment.

z Cupola vision blocks and periscopes for visual operation when hatches are

closed.

z Bridge seat on which bridge rests during transporting. 

The launcher mechanism contains the following:

z Hydraulic system (pump, fluid, cylinders, hoses, and other parts for moving

the bridge, outrigger, and tongue during launch and retrieval).

z Outrigger (steadies vehicle during bridge launch and retrieval).

z Tongue (connects vehicle to bridge).

Crew: 2 (commander, operator)

Armament: unarmed

Engine: Model AVOS-1790-20, type V-12, turbo-supercharged

Transmission: 

Type CD-850-6A

Range: two speeds forward, one reverse

Performance and Specifications:

Land performance speeds (maximum):

Low: 10 mph

High: 30 mph (governed)

Reverse: 5 mph

Launch or retrieve bridge

Uphill or downhill slope: 15 pct

Side slope: 8 pct

Fording depth: up to 4 ft without special equipment

Weight:

Vehicle (without bridge): 92,200 lb (46.1 tons)

Vehicle (with bridge): 121,700 lb (61 tons)

Dimensions (travel position):

Length:

Without bridge: 28.3 ft
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ A-7 

With bridge: 37.0 ft

Height:

Without bridge: 10.0 ft

With bridge 12.8 ft

Width:

Without bridge: 12.0 ft

With bridge: 13.2 ft

Ground clearance: 14 in

Ground pressure, vehicle:

Without bridge: 9.0 psi

With bridge: 12.2 psi

Brakes: hydraulic, mechanical foot pedal

Steering:

Type: hydraulic mechanical

Turning capability: 360-degree pivot

Fuels and Oils:

Fuel: diesel oil

Fuel consumption: 1.13 gpm (gal per mile)

Fuel tanks (total): 375 gal

Hydraulic system:

Without bridge: 115 gal

With bridge: 135 gal

Bridge:

Length:

Extended: 63 ft

Folded: 32 ft

Bridge span:

60 ft with prepared abutments

17 ft with unprepared abutments

Height: unfolded, 3.1 ft

Weight: 14.65 tons

Weight capacity: one MLC 60 vehicle (waived for M1 series tank during combat operations)

Launching time: 2 to 5 minutes using only the two-man AVLB crew
A-8 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Figure A-3. AVLB.
APPENDIX B

OPERATIONS IN EXTREME ENVIRONMENTS

Tank employment in changing operational conditions and environments presents special problems, challenges, and situations. Planners must

consider the tank’s capabilities and limitations,

the principles of tank employment, and the environmental conditions. Each operation may

require modification in tactics and augmentation

in equipment in order to support the environmental conditions. For detailed discussions on operating tanks in varying environmental conditions

refer to the M1A1’s technical manuals.

Jungle Operations

MCWP 3-35.5, Jungle Operations, addresses jungle operations in depth. Jungle combat involves

operations with such impediments as swamps,

undulating terrain, extreme heat, heavy rains, and

areas largely overgrown with thick tropical foliage. Marine tank crews need to be acclimated to

live and fight in the jungle because tank maintenance and operations are exhausting in jungle

operations. The basics of successful jungle operations are decentralized control, flexibility, security, and intelligence.

Cover and concealment are excellent in this type

of terrain and increase the possibility of achieving surprise. As a result, both the attacker and the

defender usually commit large portions of available forces to security missions. However, the

restrictive nature of a jungle environment

impedes typical tank operations. 

In the offense, security elements prevent surprise

and protect the MAGTF. In jungles, successful

security force operations depend on proper implementation of security elements. Units find their

direction of movement hard to maintain without

navigation aids such as global positioning system

receivers. The thick foliage and rugged terrain of

most jungles limit fields of fire ground movement

speed and the range of combat net radios and

automated command information systems.

Restrictions on observation and fields of fire may

reduce the capabilities of tanks to acquire targets

and deliver accurate direct fires. Additionally, the

difficulties associated with jungle operations

increase in proportion to the size of the force

involved. These limitations drive the conduct of

operations to the company, platoon, and individual tank crew level.

Despite their limitations, tank employment can

still be effective in jungle operations. Although

tanks must move slower in the jungle due to difficult trafficability, they are one of the few vehicles

capable of traversing through thick foliage and

undergrowth where wheeled vehicles could never

operate. In addition, tanks can provide effective

reconnaissance by fire and suppressive fires for

supported infantry. The tank’s ability to produce

a large volume of fire from its machine guns and

main gun antipersonnel rounds can be devastating

to the enemy as long as the tank is protected by a

good infantry security element. 

The critical aspect of a defensive operation in a

jungle environment is the security of the line of

communications sustaining the MAGTF. To

guard against surprise, the defending commander

organizes his forces in depth. He secures or provides alternative routes around chokepoints and

provides for the security of resupply convoys.

He also ensures the all-around defense of units

and installations operating in jungles and installations. The commander establishes a mobile

reserve to counter unanticipated enemy actions,

to block enemy penetrations of his defensive

perimeter, to counterattack, or to pursue a

detected enemy. Tanks are best suited as a mobile

reserve in most situations. 
B-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Tank considerations during a jungle operation

include the following: 

z The dense foliage and weather alter the effective range of a weapon system. Engagements

for tanks are usually at close ranges requiring

quick target recognition by the tank crews.

z Units must allow for slower movement and

restricted fire support. The jungle’s limited visibility may make the observation and adjustment of indirect fires difficult.

z Heat, thick vegetation, and rugged terrain will

tire Marines rapidly. Supported infantry may

want to ride on the back of the tanks if enemy

contact is not expected.

z Lack of roads hinder resupply and evacuation

in the absence of helicopter support.

Desert Operations

Desert terrain varies considerably from place to

place. Certain environmental characteristics (e.g.,

extreme temperature ranges, lack of water,

absence of vegetation, dust /sandstorms) are common to all deserts, and their adverse effect must

be considered during planning. Highly mobile

forces play a dominant role in operations in

desert regions. Tanks provide the freedom of

maneuver in the vastness of these regions that

favor a fluid type of warfare characterized by dispersed formations on extended frontages with

considerable depth. Properly employed and maintained, the tank can be the most decisive supporting arm available to the MAGTF commander

during desert operations.

Desert topography may consist of loose sand

and sand dunes that greatly impede the movement of vehicles or it may have a hard surface

that facilitates large mechanized formations.

Successful desert operations require adaptation

to the environment and to the limitations of its

terrain and climate. Units must modify and

adapt their equipment and tactics to a dusty and

rugged landscape. See MCWP 3-35.6, Desert

Operations, for detailed information.

Desert offensive operations tend to favor wide

envelopments and fast and wide flanking movements by armored formations because of the freedom of maneuver. Because of the limited

concealment offered by the bare terrain, units must

attain surprise by use of deception, appropriate

security measures, and rapid movement and commanders must exploit periods of limited visibility.

Defensive operations in desert regions emphasize mobility and flexibility. Commanders should

make provisions for long-range direct fire weapons, construction of extensive obstacle systems to

canalize or slow the enemy, a high degree of

mobility, and secure communications. The organization of the defense should emphasize measures against both air and armored attack.

The following additional considerations are necessary when planning tactical operations:

z Long-range direct fire capability makes the

tank an ideal weapon in desert terrain. The

long-range fields of fire common to desert

areas tend to allow all weapons systems to

engage at their maximum range. However,

these same extended engagement ranges hinder

positive target identification.

z Dust is an observational, control, and maintenance hazard to a maneuvering force.

z Land navigation may be difficult in the absence

of navigation aids and current maps due to

changing terrain features and minimal key

landmarks.

Mountain Operations

Rugged, compartmented terrain with steep slopes

and few natural or manmade lines of communications generally characterize military-significant

mountains. The compartmented terrain causes a

corresponding compartmentalization of military
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ B-3 

operations. Successful mountain operations

require special equipment, training, acclimating

personnel to altitude conditions, self-discipline,

and modifications of standard tactics and procedures. MCWP 3-35.2, Mountain Operations,

provides additional information.

The focal point of mountain operations is to control the heights. Key terrain features normally

include those heights that dominate lines of communications, mountain passes, roads, bridges,

and railroads. Fighting from higher ground gives

the possessor distinct tactical advantages. Tanks

are best used in this environment to control key

terrain. Restricted mechanized routes in the

mountains do not lend themselves to maneuver

warfare of mechanized units. Tightly channelized routes should be anticipated by mechanized

units and recognized as danger areas that require

good infantry security until the units are clear of

the area. Inherent in mountain operations are the

difficulties that the terrain offers to movement.

Operations in mountainous regions take longer

than normal to plan and execute. Key mountain

operational characteristics include the following:

z Communications and sustainment are increasing difficult to execute in rugged terrain. In

general, operations in mountainous terrain

retard and restrict maneuver and make communications and resupply of tanks difficult.

z Defenses may have to locate on the military

crest to fire into an engagement area. Mountainous terrain can be either a dangerous obstacle to operations or a valuable aid, according to

how well it is understood and to what extent

the tank commander takes advantage of its

peculiar characteristics.

z Night and periods of limited visibility are the

best movement times due to the extended range

of observation from enemy positions. Movement times are slower due to terrain and altitude effects. Any differences in elevation over

the march route also have an impact on unit

movement times. 

z The terrain reduces the effectiveness of firepower. The M1A1 tank has only a limited ability to depress its main gun. The ability to

elevate its main gun should also be considered

when employing the tanks. 

z Centralized planning and decentralized small

unit execution characterize operations because

the terrain limits the commander’s capability to

directly control operations. Command and control of tanks is therefore decentralized with

small units often operating independently. 

Operations in Deep Snow and Extreme Cold

Deep snow and extreme cold weather present

employment problems in operations involving

tanks, which increases engineer support requirements and may require the extensive use of lines

of communications. Combat operations in deep

snow or extreme cold weather present two opponents: the enemy (who must be defeated) and

nature (who must be made an ally). Planning and

training can reduce the effect of the climatic conditions, but commanders and their staffs must

understand the impact that these severe conditions impose on tank operations. Many of the

missions assigned to tanks are the same as those

assigned in normal operations and the tactics and

techniques employed in offensive and defensive

operations are also similar. See MCWP 3-35.1,

Cold Weather Operations, for detailed information on cold weather operations.

Tactical employment is modified to offset the

characteristics of the area and its weather. When

planning tactical operations for execution during

rigorous winter weather, commanders must carefully consider the probable effects of weather upon

operations, the health of Marines, supply, evacuation, and also the maintenance of lines of communication. Ice, deep snow, and extreme cold weather

modify the normal use of terrain features. Planning

considerations during operations in snow or

extreme cold weather are as follows:

z Operations take longer than normal to plan and

execute. 
B-4 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z Tanks are mostly metal which can become difficult to work around in extreme cold. Gloves

have to be worn at all times by the crews and

this in turn slows the ability to operate/maintain the tank. 

z Cold weather impacts a weapons’ reliability;

therefore the M1A1’s machine guns require the

same cold weather considerations as ground

mounted machine guns. 

z Tanks can generally negotiate deep snow better

than wheeled vehicles. However, packed snow

and ice will often cause tracked vehicles to

slide and possibly lose control. This is particularly true on hills or roads with steep inclines.

Tank drivers must be trained how to properly

steer, brake, and accelerate under these conditions. Infantry on roads should stay clear of

heavy tracked vehicles in these conditions

while they are moving. 

z Concealment and camouflage is more difficult

due to the white snow. Depending of the mission and environment, tanks may need to be

painted white for better camouflaging.

z Increased requirements for CSS. 
APPENDIX C

NBC OPERATIONS

Planning

Planning is critical to the success of any operation;

therefore, all staff sections must make NBC an integral part of their operational planning process. One

major factor that must be considered is the NBC

effect on individuals and operations once the unit

enters a mission-oriented protective posture

(MOPP): the operational tempo will slow, Marines

will require more rest and hydration to recover from

physical exertion, and the possibility of heat casualties will increase. Proper planning must address

threat analysis, vulnerability analysis, MOPP analysis, and the decontamination site.

Threat Analysis

A threat analysis focuses on the enemy’s capabilities and willingness to use NBC weapons and

includes the following:

z History of NBC weapons use.

z Availability of NBC weapons and support

equipment.

z Production and stockpile of NBC weapons.

z Delivery systems.

z Doctrine and training.

Vulnerability Analysis

A vulnerability analysis focuses on United

States forces and our weaknesses and includes

the following:

z Effects of weapons on personnel and equipment.

z Type and size of weapons within range.

z Detection/warning systems available.

z Unit protection available.

z Personnel training levels.

z Unit location in relationship to the battlefield.

z Weather, climate, terrain.

z Medical supplies and services available.

For more information on NBC vulnerability

assessments, see MCRP 3-37.1A, Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis.

MOPP Analysis

A MOPP analysis focuses on the effects of

placing the unit into MOPP and includes the

following:

z The mission.

z Likelihood of a follow-on mission.

z Commander’s acceptable degree of risk/percent of casualties.

z Likelihood and types of agents to be employed.

z Additional protection afforded/required.

z Expected warning time.

z Mental demands of work.

z Physical demands of work.

z Duration of mission.

See MCWP 3-37.2, Multiservice Tactics,

Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Protection, for

detailed information on performing a MOPP

analysis.

Decontamination Site

The battalion scout platoon can be tasked to locate a

decontamination site. The following are characteristics of a good decontamination site:

z Easy to find.

z Located on or along a hard stance road network.
C-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

z Access to a potable water source.

z Removed from the main battle area.

z Good cover and concealment.

z Access to a clean route out for decontaminated

units.

For further information on decontamination see

MCWP 3-37.1, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological,

and Chemical Defense Operations, and MCWP

3-37.3, NBC Decontamination.

React to a Nuclear Attack 

When a tank crew observes a brilliant flash of

light and a mushroom-shaped cloud, crewmen

must act quickly to minimize the effects of a

nuclear detonation. The nuclear attack drill

involves four steps:

Step 1. Take immediate protective actions, including the following: 

z If mounted, button up and close the breech and

ballistic doors. If time permits, position the

vehicle behind a protective terrain feature and

turn off the master power until the effects of

the blast have passed.

z Dismounted crewmen drop to the ground and

cover exposed skin until blast effects have passed.

Step 2. Implement SOPs and accomplish related

actions in the following areas: 

z Re-establish communications.

z Prepare and forward an NBC-1 report.

z Implement continuous monitoring.

z Submit a situation report to the commander. 

Step 3. Re-organize the platoon: 

z Evacuate casualties and fatalities.

z Redistribute personnel as needed.

z Conduct essential maintenance. 

Step 4. Continue the mission that is given at the

end of the monitoring phase.

React to a Chemical/Biological Attack 

During an operation, the tank crew initiates the

following steps whenever an automatic masking

event occurs, the chemical agent alarm sounds,

M8 and M9 detection paper indicates the presence of chemical agents, or a Marine suspects the

presence of chemical or biological agents:

Step 1. Crewmen recognize and then react to the

hazard: 

z Put on protective mask (and hood) within 15

seconds.

z Alert remainder of the platoon and company.

z Within 8 minutes, assume MOPP 4, then button

up/activate the tank over pressurization system.

z Perform immediate decontamination of any

possibly contaminated, exposed skin using the

M291 individual decontamination kit.

Step 2. Implement SOPs in these areas:

z Administer self-aid and buddy-aid to platoon

members with symptoms of chemical/biological agent poisoning.

z Conduct operator’s spray-down and decontamination of equipment as necessary.

z Submit NBC-1 and follow-up reports as needed.

Step 3. Continue the mission.

Step 4. Monitor for chemical/biological agents

and, as the situation warrants, initiate actions

to reduce MOPP levels and discontinue agent

monitoring. 

Note: If the M256 detection kit records a

negative reading inside an over pressurized

M1A1 tank, the crew can initiate unmasking

procedures.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ C-3 

Decontamination

Successful avoidance and protection may prevent

the need for decontamination; however, due to the

large area of coverage of NBC weapons, the unit

must be prepared to conduct decontamination operations. The primary purpose of decontamination is

to restore the unit’s combat power and reduce the

number of casualties caused by NBC weapons.

When planning and conducting decontamination

operations, the following decontamination principles will be the controlling factor:

z Decontaminate as soon as possible. This limits

the effects of NBC agents by reducing exposure time and concentration on personnel and

equipment.

z Decontaminate as far forward as possible. This

limits the spread of contamination, thus reducing

the possibility of contaminating units and personnel that have not been affected previously.

z Decontaminate only what is necessary. Decontaminate only those items, or areas of equipment, that are considered essential for mission

accomplishment. Do not attempt to decontaminate personal items or equipment that is not

normally used.

z Decontaminate by priority. Set priorities for

decontamination according to the unit’s mission and the threat.

Decontamination operations are conducted on

four levels based upon decontamination principals

and METT-T. The four levels of decontamination are immediate/operational and thorough/

clearance (see table C-1). Immediate and operational decontamination are time-critical and

designed to remove life-threatening contamination on personnel and equipment as quickly as

possible in order to save lives and regenerate

combat power. Thorough and clearance decontamination are time and resource intensive,

designed to remove virtually all of the contamination and are usually conducted as part of a reconstitution effort. Decontamination is not a

sequential process that requires the conduct (in

order) of immediate, operational, and thorough

decontamination. For example, conducting operational decontamination to remove gross contamination in order to continue the mission, combined

with the natural weathering process may alleviate

the requirement to conduct thorough decontamination. The detailed procedures and techniques

for the following decontamination operations are

contained in MCWP 3-37.3.

Table C-1. Decontamination Levels/Techniques.

Levels Techniques1 Purpose Best Start Time Performed By

Immediate Skin decontamination

Personal wipedown

Operator spraydown

Saves lives and stops agent 

from penetrating

Before 1 min

Within 15 min

Within 15 min

Individual

Individual or crew

Individual or crew

Operational MOPP gear exchange2

Vehicle washdown3

Provides temporary MOPP4 

and limits agent spread

Within 6 hr Unit

Battalion crew or

decontamination platoon

Thorough Detailed equipment

decontamination and detailed

aircraft decontamination

Detailed troop decontamination

Provides probability long-term 

MOPP reduction with less risk

When mission allows 

reconstitution

Decontamination platoon

Unit

Clearance Unrestricted use of resources METT-T depending on type of 

equipment contaminated

When mission permits Supporting strategic resources

1. The techniques become less effective the longer they are delayed.

2. Performance degradation and risk assessment must be considered when exceeding 6 hours.

3. Vehicle washdown is most effective if started within 1 hour.
C-4 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Immediate

Immediately upon becoming contaminated, individuals must carry out immediate decontamination. This may include decontamination of some

personnel, clothing, and equipment. Immediate

decontamination consists of skin decontamination

and personal and operator wipe down. It is

designed to prevent casualties and permit the use

of individual equipment and key systems.

Operational

Operational decontamination is carried out by an

individual and/or a unit and is restricted to specific parts of operationally essential equipment,

materiel, and/or work areas in order to minimize

contact and transfer hazards and to sustain operations. Operational decontamination reduces the

spread and the level of contamination. In some

cases, when combined with weathering, MOPP

levels may be reduced without further decontamination, depending on the surface or material

being decontaminated. Operational decontamination consists of MOPP gear exchange and vehicle washdown.

A MOPP gear exchange should be performed

within 6 hours of being contaminated due to the

inherent performance degradation that occurs the

longer a unit is in MOPP 4. MOPP gear exchange

allows a unit to remove the gross contamination

from personnel and equipment and provides temporary relief from MOPP 4 and a return to an

increased operational tempo in pursuit of mission accomplishment.

Vehicle washdown should be performed within

6 hours of being contaminated if the mission

does not permit a thorough decontamination.

This process removes gross contamination and

limits its spread.

Thorough

Thorough decontamination operations reduce and

sometimes eliminate contamination. They restore

combat power by reducing or removing nearly all

of the contamination on personnel, equipment,

and materiel; permitting the partial or total

removal of individual protection equipment; and

allowing units to maintain operations with minimum degradation. Detailed troop and detailed

equipment decontamination are conducted as part

of a reconstitution effort during breaks in combat

operations. These operations require immense

logistical support and are manpower intensive.

Thorough decontamination removes the unit from

performing its primary mission but allows it to

return with restored effectiveness.

Clearance

Clearance decontamination of equipment and/or

personnel accomplishes the decontamination process to a standard that allows unrestricted transportation, maintenance, employment, and

disposal. Clearance decontamination consists of a

combination of all of the techniques and procedures known to reduce contamination to levels

below that which can be detected using current

detection suites

Unmasking Procedures 

Once the unit goes into MOPP 4, unmasking will

not be conducted unless approved by the battalion

commander. Once approval to unmask is received,

the following procedures will be executed:

Selective Unmasking with a Chemical Detector:

z At least two separate detection samples are

taken from different locations within unit position. All results must be negative.

z The senior man present selects two/three

Marines of different size/weight/ethnic backgrounds and checks their physical condition.

z The Marines disarm and are placed in a shaded

area. Ensure a corpsman is present if available.

z The Marines remove their mask for 5 minutes.

Keep a close and constant watch for chemical

agent symptoms while Marines are unmasked.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ C-5 

z After 5 minutes, have the Marines don and clear

their masks. Monitor them for 10 minutes.

z After 10 minutes, if no symptoms appear,

begin selective unmasking within the unit.

z If at any time symptoms appear, stop the

unmasking process and treat as appropriate.

Selective Unmasking Without a Chemical

Detector:

z The senior man present selects two/three Marines

of different size/weight/ethnic backgrounds.

z The Marines disarm and are placed in a shaded

area. Ensure a corpsman is present if available.

z The Marines break the seal of their masks for

15 seconds, keeping their eyes open and holding their breath.

z After 15 seconds, have the Marines don and

clear their masks. Monitor these Marines for

10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, continue.

If symptoms appear, stop selective unmasking.

z Have the Marines break the seal of their masks

once again and take two to three normal breaths.

z After taking two to three breaths, they will don

and clear their masks. Monitor these Marines for

10 minutes. If no symptoms appear, continue. If

symptoms appear, stop selective unmasking.

z Have the Marines remove their masks for 5

minutes.

z After 5 minutes they will don and clear their

masks. Monitor these Marines for 10 minutes.

z After 10 minutes, if no symptoms appear,

continue. If symptoms appear, stop selective

unmasking.

z Selective unmasking within the unit can begin.
APPENDIX D

AMMUNITION

Main Gun Ammunition

Classification

Conventional main gun ammunition is classified

according to type and use:

z Armor-defeating ammunition:

 Kinetic energy ammunition (sabot) is the primary round used against tank and tank-like

targets.

 Chemical energy ammunition (HEAT and

MPAT) is the primary round used against

lightly armored targets, field fortifications,

and personnel. It is also used against tank

and tank-like targets. MPAT is also used

against helicopters.

z Beehive and high explosive plastic ammunition

are used against troops or field fortifications.

z White phosphorus ammunition is used for

marking, screening, and incendiary purposes.

z Target practice ammunition is used for gunnery training. These rounds have ballistic characteristics similar to service ammunition.

z Dummy ammunition is used for practicing gunnery-related tasks and has no propellant or

explosive charge.

Identification

Main gun ammunition can be identified by shape

and the projectile’s color code and markings. A

standard NATO color code is used for main gun

ammunition (see fig. D-1 for example of 120mm

Case

Base

Propelling

Charge

Projectile

Penetrator

Cartridge

Case

Discarding

SABOT

Igniter

Tube

Point Initating

Base-Detonating

Fuze

Figure D-1. Example of 120mm Main Gun Ammunition Markings.
D-2 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

main gun ammunition markings). The projectile and

the cartridge case have markings that provide additional information about the ammunition and the firing weapon. Marking information is as follows:

z Tracer.

z Caliber and type of weapon.

z Type of filler.

z Type of projectile (round).

z Model of projectile (round).

z Ammunition lot number.

Components of a Main Gun Round

A complete round of main gun ammunition is

usually composed of the following basic parts:

Note: Not every type of round will have all the

parts listed, and every possible part is listed.

z Cartridge case: the brass, steel, or combustible

casing that contains the propellant and primer.

When the round is fired, the cartridge case

expands to seal the rear of the gun tube. (On

the 120mm round, the obturator on the base

stub seals the rear of the gun tube.)

z Case base: the rear portion of the 120mm

ammunition that houses the primer and is

ejected after firing.

z Propellant: the composition that burns, producing gas pressure that forces the projectile

from the cartridge case toward the target.

z Primer: the cap in the base of the cartridge

case that ignites the propellant charge.

z Projectile: the part of the round that travels

through the gun tube.

z Subprojectile: the part of the projectile that

travels to the target.

z Fuze: the part of the projectile that causes it to

function upon impact or at a specific time (not

used in kinetic-energy rounds).

z Ogive: the forward portion of the projectile.

The ogive is designed to reduce air resistance

and provide aerodynamic stability.

z Bourrelet: a raised metal or plastic ring around

the outer forward surface of the projectile. Its

purpose is to center the forward part of the projectile as it travels through the bore.

z Body: the part of the projectile between the

bourrelet and the rotating bands. It contains

either a subprojectile or an explosive chemical

filler and fuze; it can also contain all three.

z Rotating band: the hard plastic or metallic

ring(s) around the base of the projectile. It

seals the propellant gas behind the base of the

projectile and imparts spin (for rifled guns) to a

spin-stabilized round or absorbs spin on finstabilized rounds.

● Obturator: the rubber seal that helps the rotating

band seal the propellant gas behind the projectile.

z Tracer: an element inserted in the base of projectiles that, when ignited, burns and allows

both the projectile’s trajectory and the impact

to be observed during flight.

Armor-Defeating Ammunition

Sabot Rounds

Sabot rounds are the primary, armor-defeating

round for the 120mm main gun and the most

accurate of all tank ammunition. Currently the

M1A1 can fire the M829A1/M829A2 armorpiercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot-tracer

(APFSDS-T) (120mm). Sabot rounds use kinetic

energy (the combined mass [weight] and velocity [speed] of the projectile) to penetrate the target, no explosives are needed. The effectiveness

of sabot rounds depends on the density of the target surface; therefore, target armor thickness

must be considered when selecting the appropriate armor-defeating round for a specific target.

Also, when possible, tanks should maneuver to

engage armored targets from the flank or rear

where the armor is less dense. See figure D-2 and

D-3 on page D-4.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ D-3 

Figure D-2. M829A1/M829A2 APFSDS-T (120mm).

Steel

Case Base

Propellant Aluminum

Fin

Projectile

Composite (M829A2) Sabot or Aluminum (M829A1) Sabot

Depleted

Uranium

Penetrator

Combustible

Cartridge Case

Muzzle Velocity: 1,575 m/s (M829A1)

1,680 m/s (M829A2)

Penetrator Composition: Depleted uranium

Announced in Fire Command as: Sabot (pronounced SAY-BO)

Fuze: None

Employment: Primary armor-defeating round against tanks or 

tank-like targets

Projectile Color Code: Black with white letters

Weight: 46.2 lb (M829A1)

44.9 lb (M829A2)

Length: 38.7 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -25°F to 125°F

Performance Temperature 

Limits:

-25°F to 125°F
D-4 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Figure D-3. M829 APFSDS-T (120mm).

HEAT Rounds

HEAT rounds are the secondary armor-defeating

ammunition. The HEAT round is used primarily

against lightly armored targets, field fortifications, and personnel. Each round consists of a

steel body that contains a high explosive shaped

charge, formed by a copper shaped charge liner;

the M830 (high explosive antitank, multipurposetracer [HEAT-MP-T] includes a wave shaper (see

fig. D-4). The projectile embodies a steel spike

with a shoulder and nose switching mechanism

for full frontal area functioning. Upon impact,

one of the fuze sensors is activated. The fuze then

detonates the high-explosive shaped charge,

which collapses the cone assembly creating a

high-velocity focused shock wave and a jet of

metal particles that penetrate the target. Fragmentation of the projectile body sidewall provides an

antipersonnel capability. 

Due to its slower muzzle velocity, HEAT

rounds are not as accurate as sabot rounds at

ranges beyond 2,000 meters. However, this

round depends on chemical energy and not

striking velocity; therefore, its ability to penetrate armor is as effective at 4,000 meters as it

is at 200 meters.

Steel

Case

Base

Propellant

Aluminum

Fin

Projectile

Aluminum

Sabot Depleted

Uranium

Penetrator

Combustible

Cartridge Case

Muzzle Velocity: 1.670 m/s

Penetrator Composition: Depleted uranium

Announced in Fire Command as: Sabot (pronounced SAY-BO)

Fuze: None

Employment: Primary armor-defeating round against tanks 

or tank-like targets

Projectile Color Code: Black with white letters

Weight: 41.2 lb

Length: 38.8 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Performance Temperature Limits: -25°F to 125°F
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ D-5 

Figure D-4. M830 HEAT-MP-T (120mm).

MPAT Ammunition

The 120mm M830A1 MPAT round contains a

high explosive warhead equipped with a proximity fuze that allows it to be fired in either an air or

ground mode (see fig. D-5 on page D-6). Its primary targets are light armored ground targets,

which are engaged with the fuze set to ground

mode. MPAT ammunition may also be used

against bunkers, buildings, the side and rear of

enemy tanks, and enemy personnel. When the

fuze is set in the air mode, the round can be used

in a self-defense role against enemy helicopters.

When fired in the air mode, a black puff of smoke

is produced when the proximity sensor and fuze

function. This permits the crew to observe when

and where the round functions in relation to the

target. M830A1 cartridges are shipped to units

with the fuze set in the ground mode. The MPAT

round is a fin-stabilized round with a three-piece

discarding sabot and is used in the 120mm

M256A1 smooth-bore cannon.

 WARNING

The nose of the M830A1 contains the air/

ground sensor. This sensor can be damaged

if it is struck on hard surfaces inside the turret

(turret strut, breech, etc.) with moderate force.

Loaders must take precaution to avoid striking the nose during the loading process.

Muzzle Velocity: 1,410 m/s

Announced in Fire Command as: HEAT

Fuze: Point-initiating, base-detonating and

full frontal area impact switch.

Employment: Light-armored targets and field fortifications.

Secondary round for tanks or tank-like targets.

Projectile Color Code: Black with yellow letters

Weight: 53.4 lb

Length: 38.6 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Performance Temperature Limits: -25°F to 125°F

Steel Case

Base Propellant

Full Frontal

Impact Switch

Assembly

Combustible

Cartridge Case

Standoff

Spike
D-6 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

Figure D-5. M830A1 HEAT-MP-T (120mm).

Ammunition Stowage Plan

The ammunition stowage plan for all tanks within

a battalion-size unit is part of the unit SOP. The

stowage plan should include the location of all

ammunition, by type and number of rounds,

authorized for the basic load. During darkness,

when lights inside the turret reduce the crew’s

night vision or give away the tank’s position, a

standardized stowage plan helps the loader rapidly locate the ammunition announced in the initial fire command. The stowage plan also helps

the crew keep track of the number of rounds (by

type) that have been fired.

When loading the M1A1, the loader should

place sabot rounds along the sides and across

the top in the turret and hull compartments.

HEAT rounds should be loaded in the center

racks of the compartments.

Muzzle Velocity: 1,410 m/s

Announced in Fire Command as: MPAT (ground mode)

MPAT AIR (air mode)

Fuze: Point-initiating, base-detonating (ground mode)

Proximity or point-initiating, base-detonating (air mode)

Employment MPAT GROUND: LAVs, buildings, bunkers, ATGM platforms, and personnel.

Secondary round for tanks or tank-like targets.

Employment MPAT AIR: Helicopters

Projectile Color Code: Black with yellow letters

Weight: 50.1 lb

Length: 38.7 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -25°F to 120°F

Performance Temperature Limits: -25°F to 120°F

Steel

Case Base

Propelling Charge

Combustible

Cartridge Case

Base-Detonating

Fuze

Sabot

Shaped Charge

Liner

Air/Ground

Switch

Explosive Tracer
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ D-7 

Machine Gun Ammunition

Link Belts

Machine gun ammunition is belted in disintegrating metallic link belts. The .50 caliber machine

gun ammunition is linked with the M9 closed

link. Both the 7.62mm coax machine gun and the

loader’s machine gun use the M13 clip-type open

link. See figure D-6.

Color Code Identification

Machine gun ammunition is identified by type,

caliber, model, and lot number. A color code on

the bullet tip or band identifies the type. Markings are also located on packing containers. See

figure D-7.

Smoke Grenade Ammunition

The L8A1, L8A3, and M76 infrared smoke grenades are fired from the M250 grenade launcher

mounted on the M1A1 to provide screening protection for the tank and crew. The M82 smoke

grenade is designed to simulate the L8A3 and

M76 smoke grenade. The M250 grenade launcher

consists of two dischargers (one on either side of

the turret), mounting hardware, arming and firing switches on the tank commander panel, and

wiring. Six smoke grenades are loaded in each

discharger.

Caution

Smoke grenades contain fire-producing chemicals and are dangerous to exposed personnel outside the vehicle.

L8A1 and L8A3 Grenades

The L8A1 and L8A3 red phosphorus screening

smoke grenades are identified by the markings at

the base of the casing (see fig. D-8 on page D-8).

Caliber .50

( Closed Link ) 7.62mm

( Open Link )

Figure D-6. Link Belts.

NATO TYPE OF

MARKING CARTRIDGE

COLOR OF TIP OR

BAND ON BULLET

Black Armor-Piercing

Silver Armor-Piercing

Incendiary Tracer

Red and Silver Armor-Piercing

Incendiary Tracer

Red Tracer

Not Painted

Green and White

Ball

Frangible

Blue Incendiary

Notes: Dummy ammunition is identified by a corrugated or

perforated cartridge case. It is used to train clearing,

loading, and immediate action on the machine gun.

Blank ammunition is identified by a colored plug or

crimped forward end in place of the projectile for

caliber .50 ammunition and an elongated case and

plug for 7.62mm ammunition.

Figure D-7. Ammunition Color

Code/NATO Marking Chart.
D-8 _____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

The grenade is propelled from the discharger by

pressure build-up in the metal base when electrical current at the electrical firing clip ignites the

squib-type electric fuze and propellant charge.

The propellant charge simultaneously ignites the

delay composition within the delay holder. During flight, the delay composition burns through

and ignites the black powder bursting charge. The

bursting charge ignites the red phosphorus and

butyl rubber composition and bursts the rubber

body, dispensing the burning red phosphorus and

butyl rubber pellets to produce a smoke cloud.

M76 Grenade

The M76 infrared screening smoke grenade is

identified by the markings at the base of the

casing. The grenade is propelled from the discharger when an electrical current at the firing

contact activates the electrical match. The electrical match ignites the propellant, which both

launches the grenade and ignites the pyrotechnic time delay detonator. Launch acceleration

causes the setback lock to displace aft, out of

engagement with the safe and arm slider/bore

rider. When the slider/bore rider clears the

launch tube, it moves into the armed position,

which aligns the transfer lead with the time

delay detonator and the booster lead. When the

time delay detonator ignites the transfer lead,

booster lead, and central burster, the grenade

bursts, creating an infrared obscuring cloud.

See figure D-9.

RG

RGHCSD NE

RCS K MS

Rubber

Body

Plastic

Burster

Tube

Delay

Assembly

With Delay

Composition

Gas

Propulsion

Holes

With

Metal Foil

Diaphragm

Red

Phosphorus/Butyl

Rubber Smoke

Composition

Black Powder

Burster Charge

Adapter

Propellant

Charge and

Electric

Fuze

Grounding/Securing

Clip Electrical

Firing Clip

66.3 mm

(2.61 in)

185 mm

(7.28 in)

Figure D-8. L8A1 and L8A3 Smoke Grenade.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ D-9 

M82 Grenade

The M82 smoke grenade is identified by the markings at the base of the casing. The M82 is an electronically-initiated, propellant-launched grenade

that functions to disseminate a screening cloud 30

meters forward of the firing vehicle. The environmentally acceptable smoke composition consists

of 1.8 pounds of titanium dioxide. The grenade’s

plastic body houses the launch system, the safe and

arming mechanism, the explosive booster and

burster, and the smoke composition. The M82 is

designed to simulate the L8A3 and M76 smoke

grenade and can be used during gunnery or forceon-force training. See figure D-10 on page D-10.

Limited-Issue 120mm Ammunition

The XM908 is a highly explosive, obstacle

reducing round with tracer (see fig. D-11 on

page D-11). It is a full-service, tactical, 120mm

round fired from the M256 cannon system. The

round is similar in appearance to the M830A1

MPAT round. Major differences include:

z A steel nose cap painted yellow in place of the

proximity sensor.

z Markings on the projectile.

z Markings on the case base that identify the

round as the HE-OR-T XM908.

The weight of the round and center of gravity are

nearly identical to the M830A1 MPAT round.

Loading and firing procedures for the XM908 are

basically the same as those used for all 120mm

tank rounds. The XM908 contains a high-explosive filler with a three-part fusing system. This

fusing system consists of the M774 base element, flexible communications circuit, and frontal impact switch assembly. Upon impact, the

steel nose penetrates the target, and a firing signal

is sent to the M774 fuze. This initiates the firing

sequence and full detonation occurs. The steel

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Center

Burster

Booster

Lead

Slider/Bore

Rider

Setback Lock

Transfer Lead

Pyrotechnic Time

Delay/Detonator

Propellant

Electrical Match

Firing Contact

Casing

Base

Figure D-9. M76 Smoke Grenade.
D-10 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

nose penetration allows the munition to explode

inside the target. When firing at concrete obstacles, this penetration will reduce the obstacle

more efficiently.

The XM908 round is primarily used to reduce

concrete obstacles into rubble that is small

enough to be cleared by either unit organic

equipment or external support. Live-fire test

results have shown that this round is also effective against concrete bridge pylons. Units now

have the capability to destroy bridges or damage

them enough to greatly hinder their carrying

capacities. This action could be used to create an

obstacle that would greatly restrict or impede

enemy movement.

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kljf eur gt ej nf ef gi uf gkf g

ugf e

ml ev egh genf

bn wokdf qe9i hf qej wkqf jf f

cf mkl h wqei

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Center

Burster

Booster

Lead

Slider/Bore

Rider

Setback Lock

Transfer Lead

Pyrotechnic Time

Delay/Detonator

Propellant

Electrical Match

Firing Contact

Casing

Base

Figure D-10. M82 Smoke Grenade.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _____________________________________________________________________________ D-11 

Figure D-11. XM908 HE-OR-T (120mm).

Steel

Case Base

Propelling Charge

Combustible

Cartridge Case

Base-Detonating

Fuze

Sabot

Shaped Charge

Liner

Steel Nose

Explosive Tracer

Muzzle Velocity: 1,410 m/s

Announced in Fire Command as: OR (pronounced Oh Are)

Fuze: Point-initiating, base-detonating

Employment: To reduce concrete structures

Projectile Color Code: Black with yellow letters and a yellow steel nose

Weight: 50.1 lb

Length: 38.7 in

Storage Temperature Limits: -50°F to 145°F

Safe-to-Fire Temperature Limits: -25°F to 120°F

Performance Temperature Limits: -25°F to 120°F
APPENDIX E

BREACHING OPERATIONS

Obstacle breaching is conducted during offensive operations with the goal of projecting combat power to the far side of an obstacle. Key

considerations for the commander include an

understanding of the various types of obstacles

and the capabilities and limitations of available

mobility assets.

Fundamentals

Breaching fundamentals are suppress, obscure,

secure, reduce, and reconstitute:

z Sufficient support elements are employed to

suppress enemy elements that are overwatching the obstacle.

z The support force requests smoke to obscure

breach force operations.

z The breach force creates and proofs a lane

through the obstacle, allowing the assault force

to secure the far side of the obstacle.

z The required actions are taken to further reduce

and mark obstacles in order to allow the assault

force, main attack force, and any follow-on

forces to continue the attack.

z The reconstitution of personnel and assets are

executed as necessary in order to conduct subsequent breaches.

These fundamentals are the same for all breaches,

but they may vary in degree based on the situation. Tanks have the capability to be the support

force, part of the breach force or the assault force.

Suppress

Suppression is focusing all available fire on

enemy personnel, weapons, or equipment in order

to prevent the enemy from prohibitively interfering with friendly forces during breaching operations. It includes the full range of lethal and

nonlethal fires from direct and indirect fire weapons, aviation, and electronic warfare. Suppression

helps to isolate the breaching site and fix the

enemy in position thus providing protection to

forces reducing and maneuvering through the

obstacles. Suppression is primarily the responsibility of the support force; therefore, tanks and

their ability to mass fires quickly and to engage

targets at long ranges using sophisticated sights

and thermal targeting are effective suppression

tools. Tanks in the support force make it difficult

for the enemy to engage the breach force because

he must expose himself, making him vulnerable to

accurate and effective tank fire. (See the breaching elements paragraph on page E-4 for a discussion of forces.)

Obscure

The most effective obstacles are those covered by

fire and observation and obscured during breaching. While the primary obscuration means is

smoke, electronic warfare is also a way to

obscure breaching activities by providing protection from direction finding and jamming. Obstacle reduction efforts should be hidden from

enemy observation as much as possible. Consideration is always given to selecting a breaching

site where the terrain provides natural concealment from enemy observation. Obscuring smoke

placed on the breaching area and screening

smoke placed between the breaching area and the

enemy conceals friendly activities, intentions,

and obstacle reduction activities. Smoke should

be employed across a wide front in order to

deceive the enemy as to the actual breach site(s)

Tanks can use their smoke dischargers to help
E-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

obscure their movement but this capability is limited and designed as a defensive measure. Once

the smoke rounds are discharged, they must be

manually reloaded, which is time-consuming.

Therefore, smoke rounds from artillery units provide a higher volume of smoke for obscuration,

builds up quickly, is thicker, and lasts longer than

using smoke from a vehicle.

Secure

The breaching site is secured to prevent the enemy

from interfering with obstacle reduction and

exploitation of the breach force. A friendly force

must control the breaching site, to include enemy

listening/observation posts, before it can reduce

the obstacle. This is accomplished by suppressive

fire and/or physical occupation. Generally, tactical

obstacles are secured by fires and protective obstacles are secured by force. The support force is

responsible for securing the nearside of the obstacle. The breach force creates and proofs a lane

through the obstacle, allowing the assault force to

secure the far side of the obstacle. The breach

force must also contain sufficient assets to provide

local security against forces that the support force

cannot sufficiently engage due to terrain or other

cover. Tanks contribute to the breach force by

using plows attached to the front of the tank to

either plow and/or proof a breach lane. They also

provide effective armor-protected firepower to the

breach force by engaging the enemy with their

main guns and/or machine guns while being

impervious to small-arms and indirect fires

directed at the breach force. Tanks in the assault

force are effective for the same reasons.

Reduce 

Reduction is the creation and marking of lanes

through a minefield or obstacle to allow passage

of the attacking ground force. The number and

width of lanes created varies with the situation

and type of breaching operation. Lanes must be

wide enough to allow a force to pass through the

obstacle rapidly and continue the attack. The unit

reducing the obstacle marks and reports obstacle

and lane locations and conditions to higher headquarters. Lanes are normally handed over to follow-on forces that will further reduce or clear the

obstacle when possible, but they will not reduce

or clear the obstacle when under enemy fire.

Reconstitute

Upon completion of the breach, the breaching

task force normally has seriously depleted, yet

essential, class V and possibly personnel and

breaching equipment. The commander is normally faced with two options: reconstitute forces

for continued breaching operations or release the

elements back to their respective commands. If

the commander intends to continue breaching

operations, resupply of critical materiel must be

conducted and assets redistributed for future

breaching operations. See appendix A for the

M1A1 tank’s class V requirements.

Types of Breaching Operations

The following paragraphs cover the major types

of breaching operations: hasty, deliberate and

covert. Amphibious breaches are covered in

MCWP 3-17.3, MAGTF Breaching Operations.

Also included is a discussion of the bypass operation, which the commander must consider as an

alternative to conducting an actual breach.

Bypass

When a unit bypasses an obstacle, it physically

changes direction, moving along a route that

avoids the obstacle. Obstacles should be
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ E-3 

bypassed whenever possible to maintain the

momentum of the operation. Commanders, however, must ensure that conducting the bypass provides a tactical advantage without exposing the

unit to unnecessary danger. Previously unreported obstacles and bypassed enemy forces

should be reported to higher headquarters. If possible, they should conduct a reconnaissance to

evaluate tactical considerations such as—

z The limits of the obstacle.

z Physical aspects of the bypass route, including

location, availability of cover and concealment, and key terrain influencing the route.

z Confirmation that the bypass route will take the

unit where it needs to go while avoiding possible enemy ambush sites and engagement areas

(also known as kill sacks).

Tank units should expect to be engaged by enemy

antitank weapons while trying to find an obstacle

bypass. The enemy obstacle may have been

designed to stop, slow, or turn the tanks and

direct them into his kill sacks.

Hasty Breach

A hasty breach or in-stride breach is the rapid

creation of a route through a minefield, barrier, or

fortification by any expedient method. A hasty

breach is used against a weak defender when the

enemy situation is vague or changes rapidly or

against very simple obstacles. Little or no time

may be available in which to plan or prepare for

this type of breach, particularly during the conduct phase of an attack; therefore, well-rehearsed,

pre-planned standard battle drills must be used.

To maintain momentum and take advantage of

the enemy situation, the hasty breach is normally

conducted with the resources that are immediately available. Because tanks can carry mine

plows or mine rollers, tank units have the ability

to conduct hasty breaches without the assistance

of engineers. When tanks are attached to other

units, SOPs and rehearsals for breaching are

essential to ensure quick and effective breaching

when confronting obstacles.

Deliberate Breach

A deliberate or assault breach is used against a

strong defense or complex obstacle system. It is

similar to a deliberate attack, requiring detailed

knowledge of both the defense and the obstacle

systems. With this knowledge, forces conducting

the deliberate breach can develop detailed plans,

task-organize to accomplish the mission, and execute rehearsals. A deliberate breach is further

characterized by a buildup of combat power on

the near side of obstacles. The term deliberate

breach does not apply to the speed or tempo with

which the attack is executed. Deliberate breaching operations require significant planning, coordination, and preparation.

In a battalion deliberate breach, the tank company

is most likely to be part of the support or assault

force. The engineer company, task-organized

with plow and roller tanks, serves as the breach

force. The battalion commander may also form

the breach force by task-organizing a tank or

mounted infantry company with one or more

engineer platoons.

Overt and Clandestine Breaching

Breaches can be conducted either overtly or clandestinely. Overt operations are conducted in the

open without concealment. Clandestine operations are conducted in secret or under limited visibility. Thorough reconnaissance and detailed

intelligence assists the commander in determining the best location to breach, concealed routes

to the obstacle, and the type of breaching equipment and number of personnel required. The

covert breach relies on stealth and dismounted

maneuver, with the breach force employing quiet,

manual lane reduction techniques. Coordination

is of the utmost importance. All forces must

know what event triggers the shift from clandestine to overt breaching, without this information

they may be prematurely exposed to the enemy or

to friendly fire. Because surprise is critical, the

key to conducting a breach clandestinely may

require delaying suppression of the enemy until
E-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

the last possible moment (depending on the

enemy situation). For example, suppression of the

enemy may be delayed until:

z The breach force is detected by enemy forces.

z The breach force is close to the obstacle and

must expose itself in order to reduce the obstacle.

z Lanes are open and the assault force attacks. 

z The breach force completes lane reduction and

detonates charges to clear obstacles, signaling

direct and indirect suppressive fire to support

the assault force.

Clandestine breaching also requires withholding

the use of obscuring smoke. Weather and darkness are the best concealment for clandestine

operations. Security is achieved through stealth,

which outweighs the need for speed. Silently

eliminating enemy outposts provides additional

security, but may give away friendly activity.

Obstacle reduction must be conducted as silently

as possible by using manual techniques vice

mechanical equipment.

Breaching Elements

Support Force

The support force’s mission is to suppress the

enemy’s ability to interfere with the actions of the

breach force. The support force usually leads

movement of the breach elements. After identifying the obstacle, the support force moves to covered and concealed areas and establishes support

by fire positions. The support force leader sends a

spot report to the commander. This report

describes the location and complexity of the

obstacle, the composition of enemy forces that

are overwatching the obstacle, and the location of

possible bypasses. The commander decides

whether to bypass or to breach the obstacle and

must keep in mind that a bypass may lead to an

enemy kill zone.

Whether the decision is made to breach or

bypass, the support force suppresses any enemy

elements that are overwatching the obstacle to

allow the breach force to breach or bypass the

obstacle. All available assets, including artillery,

air, electronic warfare, naval surface fire support,

and direct fire weapon systems should be used to

suppress and obscure the enemy. As the breach

and assault forces execute their missions, the support force lifts or shifts supporting fires. Because

the enemy is likely to engage the support force

with artillery, the support force must be prepared

to move to alternate positions while maintaining

suppressive fires. The support force may have

reserve breaching and assault assets (e.g., line

charges, track width mine plows, AVLBs,

armored combat earthmovers) that are intended

for use only in the event the breach and assault

forces become ineffective and to expedite reconstitution where multiple obstacles must be

breached in quick succession.

The M1A1’s range, armor protection, and magnified sights allow it to carry out the support force

role very efficiently.

Breach Force

The mission of the breach force is to create and

mark lanes that enable the main attack force to

pass through an obstacle in order to continue the

attack. It is normally a combined-arms force that

may include engineers, infantry, tanks, AAVs,

LAVs, and AVLBs. The breach force must be

capable of overcoming an enemy counterattack.

Assets are allocated based on the number of lanes

required. Two breached lanes per each battalionsized task force are highly recommended. The

commander of the breaching force should also

plan for at least 50 percent redundancy in breaching equipment due to expected losses during
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ E-5 

opposed breaching operations. The breach force

is organized into an engineer reconnaissance

team, security team, obstacle reduction team, and

a lane marking team:

z The engineer reconnaissance team verifies

intelligence about the obstacles, locates the forward edge of obstacle zones so the rest of the

breach force does not inadvertently enter the

obstacle, and marks the standoff distance for

explosive reduction.

z If the support force cannot provide local security to the breach force, the security force will

provide local security. Infantry, LAVs, tanks,

and AAVs normally provide security while the

engineers are reducing obstacles.

z The obstacle reduction team physically creates

the lanes and proofs the lanes for mines, if

required.

z The lane marking team initially marks the

newly created lanes for passage of the assault

force, the main attack force, and follow-on

forces. The lane marking team is also ready to

assume the mission of obstacle reduction if the

obstacle reduction team is rendered ineffective.

Once the breach force has reduced the obstacle

and the assault force has passed through the

lanes, guides are employed to conduct the handover to follow-on units. At a minimum, lanes

must be marked and their locations and conditions reported to higher headquarters and followon units.

Proofing is verifying that a breached lane is free

of live mines. This can be accomplished by

checking the breached lane with a secondary

breaching means other than explosives, such as

probing, mine detectors, mine plows, or mine

rollers. Proofing is done only when the potential

risk of live mines remaining in the lane exceeds

the risk of loss to enemy fire while a lane is being

proofed. It is important to remember, obstacle

reduction is the physical creation of a lane

through or over obstacles. 

Tank units may be some of the first units to move

through the lane to provide security for the

assault force on the far side of the obstacle. In

some instances, the breach force may move to a

hull-down firing position that allows it to suppress enemy elements overwatching the obstacle.

At other times, it may assault the enemy with

suppressive fires provided by the support force. 

A tank platoon can create a lane by itself if it is

equipped with the assets required to breach the

type of obstacle encountered. If the tank unit does

not have this capability, it may be required to

provide close-in protection for attached engineers with breaching assets. Three breaching

methods are available to the platoon: 

z Mechanical breaching, usually with mine

plows.

z Explosive breaching, employing such means as

the mine-clearing line charge (MICLIC), M173

line charge, or 1/4-pound blocks of TNT. 

z Manual breaching, with Marines probing by

hand or using such items as grappling hooks,

shovels, picks, axes, and chain saws. Manual

breaching is the least preferred method for the

tank platoon. 

In extreme cases, the commander may order the

tank platoon to force through an obstacle. This

technique requires the breach force to move in

column formation through the obstacle location.

If available, a disabled vehicle can be pushed

ahead of the lead breach vehicle in an attempt to

detonate mines. 

The mine plow is the breaching device most commonly employed by the tank platoon. The battalion or company commander may allocate one to

three plows per platoon. When properly equipped

and supported, the platoon can create up to two

lanes through an obstacle. 

Plow tanks lead the breach force. Immediately

following them are vehicles that proof the lanes;
E-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

these are usually tanks equipped with mine rollers. This process ensures that the lane is clear. 

Note: If the location and/or dimensions of the

obstacle are unknown, the platoon leader may

choose to lead with tanks equipped with mine

rollers to identify the beginning of the obstacle.

If the platoon is allocated one plow, the platoon

sergeant’s wingman normally serves as the

breach tank. The platoon sergeant follows immediately behind to proof the lane and provide overwatch. The platoon leader’s section follows the

platoon sergeant. 

If the platoon has two or more plows, it can create

multiple lanes, usually 75 to 100 meters apart. The

wingman tanks are normally equipped with the

plows and the section leaders’ tanks follow to proof

the lanes and provide overwatch (see fig. E-1).

To create a wider lane, two plow tanks can stagger

their movement along a single lane (see fig. E-2).

This technique is also used in order to clear a lane

that HMMWVs and other wheeled vehicles can go

through without a center lane of mine-ridden spoil.

Using figure E-2 as a literal example, a wide lane

with no center lane would be created on the right

side of the double proofed lane. 

Minefield

75-100

Meters

Figure E-1. Plow Tanks Create Multiple Lanes

While the Section Leaders’ Tanks Provide Overwatch.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ E-7 

Note: The lanes created on the left side

would not be doubled proofed, and spoil

from the second tank through would be put

into the first tank’s right lane.

After a lane is created and proofed, it is normally

turned over to attached engineers for marking.

The platoon leader reports the location of the lane

and the method of marking to higher headquarters in order to expedite the movement of the

assault force. If no engineers are available, an

attempt should be made to at least mark the

entrance and exit of the breach using NATO

marking procedures. Unit SOPs will dictate

marking methods and materials, which commonly include engineer stakes with tape, guides,

and chemical lights.

Throughout the operation, the platoon leader provides continuous updates of the breach force’s

progress to higher headquarters and other elements involved in the breach. He also coordinates

with the support force for suppressive fires.

The assault force will often move behind the

breach force and closely follow the breach vehicles through the new lane. 

Assault Force

The mission of the assault force is to destroy or

dislodge the enemy on the far side of the obstacle, or in between obstacle belts, in order to allow

other combat forces to continue the attack. While

the breach is in progress, the assault force assists

the support force or follows the breach force

while maintaining cover and dispersion. Once a

lane is cleared through the obstacle, the assault

force moves through the breach. It secures the far

side of the obstacle by physical occupation and/or

continues the attack in accordance with the

Minefield

Figure E-2. Plow Tanks use Staggered

Movement to Create a Wider Lane.
E-8 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

scheme of maneuver. The assault force must be

of sufficient size to eliminate the enemy and

should be a combined-arms force consisting of

elements such as infantry, LAVs, AAVs, tanks,

and engineers. Fire control measures must be

coordinated so support force and breach force

fires are lifted and shifted as the assault force

maneuvers into the enemy position.

Tank units are ideally suited for assault force

operations against mobile enemy defenses in

open terrain. Tanks also work well with mechanized infantry as an assault force attacking dug-in

enemy positions in close terrain.

Mobility Assets

Mine Plow

The mine plow, also known as the mine-clearing

blade, is used to breach and proof minefields and

affords good survivability (see fig. E-3). When

fully operational, a tank equipped with a mine

plow can quickly clear two, 58-inch wide lanes,

one in front of each track.

Note: The plow’s dogbone assembly will detonate the tilt rods of mines in the area between

the two plowed lanes; however, only plows

equipped with the improved dogbone assembly

(IDA) will defeat magnetically activated mines.

The plow must be dropped at least 100 meters

before the tank reaches the minefield, and it is not

lifted until the tank is at least 100 meters past the

far edge of the minefield. The plow must have 18

inches of spoil to be effective, which limits the

tank’s speed to 10 miles per hour or less in the

lane. The mine plow should be used only in a

straight line; it does not work well on hard, rocky,

or uneven ground where it cannot maintain adequate spoil. Mine detonation can cause violent

upward movement of the blade; therefore, the crew

traverses the tank’s main gun to the side during

plowing to prevent damage to the gun tube. The

crew must also ensure the plow’s lifting straps

don’t become entangled in wire obstacles.

Figure E-3. Track Width Mine Plow for M1Al.

Mine Roller

The mine roller is used to identify the forward

edges of a minefield and to proof lanes. The

roller sweeps a 44-inch path in front of each

track and is also equipped with a dogbone

assembly. It is also effective at breaching wire

obstacles. The roller, however, is not effective

on broken or uneven ground. The mine roller,

like the mine plow, will not defeat magnetically

fuzed mines unless equipped with the IDA. The

main gun must be traversed to the side or rear

when contact with a mine is possible or imminent; detonation can throw the roller (or pieces

of it) violently upward, possibly damaging the

120mm main gun. The mine roller can usually

withstand two mine explosions before needing

repairs or replacement.

Weight: 3 tons

Speed when mounted and lowered: <10 kph 

Primary use: Clearing path through minefield

Width of path: Creates 58-in cleared path in front 

of each track

Depth of path: Lifts and pushes surface-laid 

mines or buried mines up to 4 in 

deep in front of its path.
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ E-9 

AVLB

The AVLB is primarily employed to cross short

gaps (such as narrow streams), antitank ditches,

craters, canals, or partially blown bridges. Its

span is 18 meters (60 feet) using prepared abutments and 17 meters with unprepared abutments.

The capacity of the bridge is one MLC 60 vehicle

(this is waived for M1-series tanks during combat operations). The AVLB launcher, which

requires 10 meters of overhead clearance for

transportation and operation, is most visible and

vulnerable during launching of the bridge. An

experienced crew can launch the bridge in 2 to 5

minutes. Technical characteristics of the AVLB

are provided in appendix A.

MICLIC

Used to breach wire and mine obstacles, the MICLIC

clears a lane 100 meters deep and 14 meters wide. 

Note: The MICLIC must be fired 62 meters

from the obstacle to get the full 100 meters of

depth.

The charge may create two skip zones, where

the mines are not detonated, on the right and left

side of the centerline of the cleared lane. The

skip zones, which are about 1.5 meters wide,

require all MICLIC lanes to be proofed. The

MICLIC is effective against pressure-activated

antitank mines and against mechanically activated antipersonnel mines. Effectiveness is limited against magnetically activated mines,

including scatterable mines and those with

multi-impulse (double-impact) or time-delay

fuzes. The MICLIC is not effective on severely

broken ground where the line charge cannot lay

flat. When detonated, the MICLIC has a danger

area with a radius of 1,600 meters.

Armored Combat Earthmover

The armored combat earthmover uses its blade to

defeat berms and antitank ditches. It can also

skim a minefield with its blade; however, it is

slow and vulnerable in this role and should be

employed this way only as a last resort. Its oneman crew further limits the vehicle’s capability.

Engineer Attachment

The engineer attachment is the most versatile of

all breaching assets. It can be used to conduct

explosive or manual breaches and proofs and to

mark lanes through an obstacle. However, while

it is conducting these breaching and proofing

operations, the attachment is extremely vulnerable to enemy direct and indirect fires.

If other breaching assets are unavailable, an

infantry or tank platoon can conduct explosive

breaches (with hand-emplaced charges) and/or

use manual breaching kits (normally consisting of

grappling hooks, gloves, and wire cutters). At the

same time, however, employment of either type

of platoon organization in breaching operations

has distinct disadvantages. The pace of the breach

will be slow, and the operation will leave the platoon vulnerable to enemy attack. 
APPENDIX F

GLOSSARY

Section I. Acronyms

AAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . amphibious assault vehicle

AAVC7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .assault amphibian

vehicle command model 7

AAVP7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .assault amphibian

 vehicle personnel model 7

APFSDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .armor-piercing,

fin-stabilized, discarding sabot

APFSDS-T . . . . . . armor-piercing, fin-stabilized,

discarding sabot-tracer

ATGM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . antitank guided missile

AVLB . . . . . . . .armored vehicle-launched bridge

BHL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . battle handover line

C2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .command and control

cal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .caliber

CAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . close air support

cm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .centimeter

CO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .company

COA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . course of action

COC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat operations center

CSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . combat service support

CSSE. . . . . . . . . .combat service support element

CSSG . . . . . . . . . . combat service support group

DLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . detachment left in contact

EA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .engagement area

EPW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . enemy prisoner of war

o

F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .degree Fahrenheit

FAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . forward air controller

FEBA . . . . . . . . . .forward edge of the battle area

FM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . field manual

FPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . final protective fires

FRH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire resistant hydraulic

FSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . fire support coordinator

FSCC. . . . . . . . . . fire support coordination center

ft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . feet

gal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gallon(s)

GCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ground combat element

GPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gallons per minute

HEAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . high explosive antitank

HEAT-MP-T . . . . . . . . . high explosive antitank,

multipurpose-tracer

HMMWV . . . . . . . . . high mobility multipurpose

wheeled vehicle

hp . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .horsepower

HQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . headquarters

hr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . hour

H&S CO . . . . headquarters and service company

IDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . improved dogbone assembly

IED . . . . . . . . . . . . . improvised explosive device

in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .inch

JP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . joint publication

kg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . kilogram

km . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . kilometer

kph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . kilometers per hour

LAV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . light armored vehicle

lb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pound

LCAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .landing craft air cushion

LCU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . landing craft, utility

LOGPAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics package

LRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistic resupply point

LRU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . line replaceable unit

m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . meter

MAGTF . . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task force

MCRP . . . . . .Marine Corps reference publication

MCWP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Corps

warfighting publication

MEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary force

METT-T . . . . . . . . . . mission, enemy, terrain and

weather, troops and support

available—time available

mi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .miles

MICLIC . . . . . . . . . . . .mine-clearing line charge

min . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . minute
F-2 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

MLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . .military load classification

mm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .millimeter

MMO . . . . . . . maintenance management officer

MOOTW. . . . . military operations other than war

MOPP . . . . . .mission-oriented protective posture

MOUT. . . . . . military operations in urban terrain

MPAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .multipurpose antitank

mph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . miles per hour

m/s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .meters per second

MTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . motor transport officer

NATO . . . . . North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBC . . . . . . . . .nuclear, biological, and chemical

OP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . observation post

OPORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operation order

pct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . percent

PlSgt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . platoon sergeant

plt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . platoon

POL . . . . . . . . . . . petroleum, oils, and lubricants

psi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .pounds per square inch

pt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pint

qt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . quart

RECON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reconnaissance

ROE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rules of engagement

RSTA . . . . . . . . . . . reconnaissance, surveillance,

and target acquisition

S1 . . . . . . . . . . . personnel staff officer (adjutant)

S1A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . personnel staff officer

(adjutant) assistant

S2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . intelligence staff officer

S2A . . . . . . . . .intelligence staff officer assistant

S3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . operations staff officer

S3A . . . . . . . . . .operations staff officer assistant

S4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics staff officer

S4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . logistics staff officer assistant

S6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . communications staff officer

SAW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .surface-to-air weapon

sct . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . scout

Sgt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sergeant

SINCGARS. . . . . . . . . . . . single-channel ground

and airborne radio system

SOP . . . . . . . . . . . . .standing operating procedure

TM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . technical manual

TMO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tank maintenance officer

TNT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .trinitrotoluene

T/O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . table of organization

TOW . . . . . . . . tube-launched, optically tracked,

wire-command link

guided missile

TRAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .tactical recovery of

aircraft and personnel

TRP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . target reference point

UMCP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . unit maintenance

collection point
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ F-3 

Section II. Definitions

armor—Steel, iron, or other materials used as a

protective covering on tanks.

avenue of approach—An air or ground route of

an attacking force of a given size leading to its

objective or to key terrain in its path. (JP 1-02)

axis of advance—A line of advance assigned for

purposes of control; often a road or a group of

roads, or a designated series of locations, extending in the direction of the enemy. (JP 1-02)

basic load (ammunition) —That quantity of

ammunition authorized to be on hand in a unit

to meet combat needs until resupply can be

accomplished. Size of the basic load is

normally determined by corps or the major

overseas commander.

battle position—1. In ground operations, a

defensive location oriented on an enemy avenue

of approach from which a unit may defend. 2. In

air operations, an airspace coordination area

containing firing points for attack helicopters.

Also called BP. (MCRP 5-12C)

Beehive—A term associated with antipersonnel

projectiles, loaded with flechettes.

bounding overwatch—A tactical movement

technique used when contact with enemy ground

forces is expected. The unit moves by bounds.

One element is in position to overwatch the other

element’s move. The overwatching element is

always positioned to support the moving unit by

fire or fire and maneuver. This is the slowest but

most secure movement technique. (MCRP 5-12A)

caliber—1. The diameter of the bore of a gun. In

rifled gun barrels, the caliber is obtained by

measuring between opposite lands. 2. The diameter of a projectile. Also called cal.

cartridge case—A container that holds the

primer, propellant, and projectile.

coax machine gun—A machine gun mounted in

the turret of a tank in a way that its line of fire is

parallel (coaxial) to that of the cannon set on the

same mounting.

command post—A unit’s or subunit’s headquarters where the commander and the staff perform

their activities. In combat, a unit’s or subunit’s

headquarters is often divided into echelons; the

echelon in which the unit or subunit commander is

located or from which such commander operates is

called a command post. Also called CP. (JP 1-02)

company team—A combined arms organization

formed by attaching one or more nonorganic

tank, mechanized infantry, or light infantry

platoons to a tank, mechanized infantry, or light

infantry company either in exchange for or in

addition to organic platoons. (MCRP 5-12A)

concealment—The protection from observation or

surveillance. (JP 1-02, part 4 of a 6 part definition)

cover—Shelter or protection, either natural or

artificial. (JP 1-02, part 4 of a 6 part definition)

covering force—1. A force operating apart from

the main force for the purpose of intercepting,

engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving

the enemy before the enemy can attack the force

covered. 2. Any body or detachment of troops

which provides security for a larger force by

observation, reconnaissance, attack, or defense, or

by any combination of these methods. (JP 1-02)

dead space—1. An area within the maximum

range of a weapon, radar, or observer, which

cannot be covered by fire or observation from a

particular position because of intervening obstacles, the nature of the ground, or the characteristics
F-4 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

of the trajectory, or the limitations of the pointing

capabilities of the weapon. 2. An area or zone

which is within range of a radio transmitter, but in

which a signal is not received. 3. The volume of

space above and around a gun or guided missile

system into which it cannot fire because of

mechanical or electronic limitations. (JP 1-02)

defilade—Protection from hostile observation and

fire provided by an obstacle such as a hill, ridge,

or bank. (JP 1-02, part 1 of a 3 part definition)

direct fire—Gunfire delivered on a target using

the target itself as a point of aim for either the

weapon or the director. (JP 1-02)

dummy ammunition—Ammunition that is used

for practicing gunnery-related tasks; it has no

propellant or explosive charge.

elevation—The degree above the horizon to

which a gun is aimed. Also called EL.

fire control system—A group of interrelated fire

control equipments and/or instruments designed for

use with a weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02)

fire support—In Marine Corps usage, assistance

to elements of the Marine air-ground task force

engaged with the enemy rendered by other firing

units, including (but not limited to) artillery,

mortars, naval surface fire support, and offensive

air support. (MCRP 5-12C)

fuze—A device that initiates an explosive train.

(MCRP 5-12A)

hide—The positioning of a vehicle, individual, or

unit so that no part is exposed to observation or

direct fire. (MCRP 5-12A)

hull down—The positioning of an armored vehicle so that the muzzle of the gun or launcher is

the lowest part of the vehicle exposed to the

front. Hull-down positions afford maximum

protection for vehicles that are engaging targets

with direct fire. (MCRP 5-12A)

identification—The process of determining the

friendly or hostile character of an unknown

detected contact. (JP 1-02, part 1 of a 3 part

definition)

incendiary—A compound that generates sufficient heat to cause the target to catch fire or causes

melting or burning of equipment. (MCRP 5-12A)

indirect fire—Fire delivered on a target that is

not itself used as a point of aim for the weapons

or the director. (JP 1-02)

kinetic energy ammunition—The primary

armor-defeating round for the 120-mm main gun

and the most accurate of all tank ammunition.

Kinetic energy is a combination of mass (weight)

and velocity (speed) of the projectile; no explosives are needed to penetrate the target.

laser—Any device that can produce or amplify

optical radiation primarily by the process of

controlled stimulated emission. A laser may emit

electromagnetic radiation from the ultraviolet

portion of the spectrum through the infrared

portion. Also, an acronym for “light amplification

by stimulated emission of radiation.” (JP 1-02)

laser rangefinder —A device which uses laser

energy for determining the distance from the device

to a place or object. Also called LRF. (JP 1-02)

line of contact—A general trace delineating the

location where two opposing forces are engaged.

(MCRP 5-12C)

line of departure—1. In land warfare, a line

designated to coordinate the departure of attack

elements. 2. In amphibious warfare, a suitably

marked offshore coordinating line to assist

assault craft to land on designated beaches at

scheduled times. (JP 1-02)

line of sight—The unobstructed path from a

[Marine], weapon, weapon sight, electronic-sending and -receiving antennas, or piece of reconnaissance equipment to another point. Also called

LOS. (MCRP 5-12A) 
Marine Corps Tank Employment _______________________________________________________________________________ F-5 

lot number—An identification number assigned

to a particular quantity or lot of materiel, such as

ammunition, from a single manufacturer.

muzzle velocity—The velocity of a projectile

with respect to the muzzle at the instant the

projectile leaves the weapon.

obscuration—The effects of weather, battlefield

dust, and debris, or the use of smoke munitions to

hamper observation and target-acquisition capability or to conceal activities or movement.

(MCRP 5-12A)

obstacle—Any obstruction designed or employed

to disrupt, fix, turn, or block the movement of an

opposing force, and to impose additional losses in

personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing

force. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or a

combination of both. (JP 1-02)

phase line—A line utilized for control and coordination of military operations, usually an easily

identified feature in the operational area. (JP 1-

02) A line utilized for control and coordination of

military operations, usually an easily identified

feature in the operational area. (NATO) A line

utilized for control and coordination of military

operations, usually a terrain feature extending

across the zone of action. Also called PL.

(MCRP 5-12A)

point target—A target of such a small dimension that it requires the accurate placement of

ordnance in order to neutralize or destroy it. 

primer—The cap in the base of the cartridge

case that ignites the propellant charge. It may be

actuated by friction, blow, pressure, or electricity.

projectile—That part of the round that travels

through the gun tube.

propellant—An explosive charge for propelling

a projectile.

pyrotechnic—A mixture of chemicals which,

when ignited, is capable of reacting exothermically to produce light, heat, smoke, sound, or gas

and may also be used to introduce a delay into an

explosive train because of its known burning

time. The term excludes propellants and explosives. (MCRP 5-12A)

reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to

obtain, by visual observation or other detection

methods, information about the activities and

resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to

secure data concerning the meteorological,

hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a

particular area. Also called RECON. (JP 1-02)

reconnaissance by fire—A method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected

enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose a

presence by movement or return of fire. (JP 1-02)

sabot—A lightweight carrier in which a subcaliber projectile is centered to permit firing the

projectile in the larger caliber weapon. The

carrier fills the bore of the weapon from which

the projectile is fired; it is normally discarded a

short distance from the muzzle.

shaped charge—An explosive charge shaped so

the explosive energy is focused and concentrated

to move in one direction.

shock effect—The combined destructive (physical and psychological) effect on the enemy

produced by the violent impact of mounted and

mobile armor protected firepower of tanks and

supporting troops.

signature—The visible or audible effects, such

as noise, smoke, flame, heat, or debris, produced
F-6 ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ MCWP 3-12

when a weapon is fired or a piece of equipment

operated; also, an electronic emission subject to

detection and traceable to the equipment producing it. Also called footprint.

situation report—A report giving the situation

in the area of a reporting unit or formation. Also

called SITREP. (JP 1-02)

spall—Fragments torn from either the outer or

inner surface of armor plate as the result of a

complete or partial penetration of the armor, or

by dynamic effects of an explosive charge.

spot report—A concise narrative report of essential information covering events or conditions

that may have an immediate and significant effect

on current planning and operations that is

afforded the most expeditious means of transmission consistent with requisite security. Also

called SPOTREP. (Note: In reconnaissance and

surveillance usage, spot report is not to be used.)

(JP 1-02).

suppressive fire—Fires on or about a weapons

system to degrade its performance below the

level needed to fulfill its mission objectives,

during the conduct of the fire mission. (JP 1-02)

target acquisition—The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail to

permit the effective employment of weapons.

Also called TA. (JP 1-02)

target location—The determination of where a

potential target is on the battlefield.

target reference point—An easily recognizable

point on the ground (either natural or man-made)

used to initiate, distribute, and control fires.

Target reference points (TRPs) can also designate the center of an area where the commander

plans to distribute or converge the fires of all his

weapons rapidly. They are used by task force and

below, and can further delineate sectors of fire

within an engagement area. TRPs are designated

using the standard target symbol and numbers

issued by the fire support officer. Once designated, TRPs also constitute indirect fire targets.

Also called TRP. (MCRP 5-12A)

thermal imaging system—The system that

provides the Abrams fire control system with

night-vision capability by presenting a thermal

scene in the gunner’s primary sight. It operates

on emitted thermal radiation rather than visible

light. Also called TIS.

tracer—A powder element inserted in the base

of some projectiles that, when ignited, burns and

allows the projectile to be observed during flight.

trajectory—The flight path of a projectile from

the point of fire to impact.

white phosphorus—A yellow, waxy chemical

that ignites spontaneously when exposed to air;

used as a filling for various projectiles; a smokeproducing agent with an incendiary effect. Also

called WP.

wingman—One of two tanks in a section,

normally the other tank in the platoon leader’s or

platoon sergeant’s section.
APPENDIX G

REFERENCES

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)

1-0 Marine Corps Operations

3-17.1 River-Crossing Opeations

3-17.3 MAGTF Breaching Operations (currently FMFM 13-7)

3-25.2 Mountain Operations (currently FMFM 7-29)

3-33.3 Marine Corps Public Affairs

3-35.1 Cold Weather Operations (under development)

3-35.5 Jungle Operations (currently FMFM 7-28)

3-35.6 Desert Operations (currently FMFM 7-27)

3-37.1 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological,

and Chemical Defense Operations

3-37.1A Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Vulnerability Analysis

3-37.2 Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, 

and Chemical (NBC) Protection

3-37.3 NBC Decontamination

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)

3-02D Combating Terrorism

3-02E The Individual’s Guide for Understanding and Surviving Terrorism

4-11.3F Convoy Operations Handbook

5-12A Operational Terms and Graphics

Army Technical Manual (TM)

08953A-10 Tank M1A1 (120mm Gun)

Army Field Manual (FM)

4-30.3 Maintenance Operations and Procedures