Ne e le yv . W est O ra ng e Cov e -C

on so lid ate d I nd e p. Sc h. Di st. , 176 S.W .3d 746 (Tex. 2005). 1 The supre me cour

t held that Texas’s public school financ e sy stem constituted an unconstitutional state prope rty

tax and gave the leg islature until J une 1, 20 0 5 to enac t corre ctive leg islation. Id . at 800. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 501 -CV

Ed He nde e , I ndiv idua llyand a s Ex e c ut ive Di r e c to r of C .L. O.U .T. , A ppe lla nt
v. David Dewh urst, Tom Craddick, State of Texas, an d the Texas Legislative Bud get Board , Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-06- 0021 56 , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM E. BENDER , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
I n response to th e T e xas Supreme Court’ s decision in the Neeley v. W est Orange Cove
case , the 79th L eg islature, duringits thi rd ca lled session of April and Ma y 2005, enact ed H.B. 1, 1 which the Gove rnor signe d into law on May 31 of that y ear . Among other things, H.B
. 1 attempted to shift some of the burden of funding Tex as’s publi c schools from local proper ty taxpay ers to the state and, to that end, made additional appropr iations of $3.825 billion for the biennium ending on Aug us t 3 1 , 2 0 0 7
. I n J une 2005, Ed He ndee, individually and as e x ecutive dir ector of the g roup Citi zens L ower ing O ur Unfa ir Taxes (C.L .O.U.T.) ( collectively , Plaintiffs), filed suit ag ainst the L ieutenant Gove rnor, the Spea ker of the House of

Represe ntatives, t h e C o m ptroller, and theThe L BB i s a per manent joint committee of the Te x as L eg islature compr ised of the 2 lieutenant g overnor , speake r of the house of repr esentatives, the chair man of the sena t e finance committee, the cha irman of the house appr opriations committee, the cha irman of the house way s and means c ommitt ee, thr ee me mbers of the senate appointed by the lieutenant g overnor , and two additional house member s appointed by the speaker. Te x . Gov’t Code. Ann. § 322.001(a) (W est 20 05 ). T he l ieu ten ant go v erno r and sp eaker of t he h ou se ar e jo in t ch air s o f t he L BB. Id. § 322.001(b). The L BB develops bud get and policy rec ommendations for leg islative appropr iations, including a dra ft Gene ral Appr opriations Act ea ch session, id. § 3 22 .0 08 (c ) ( Wes t 2005), and fiscal impact statements re g ardingother propose d leg islation. Id. § 314.001 (West 2005). 2 members of the L eg islative Budg et Bo ar d (LB B) , a ll i n th e ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s, and

the State 2 of Texas, seekingdecla

rations that H.B . 1 was unc onstitut ion al an d unlawful. Plaintiffs’ c entra l

a lle g a tio n is that th e a

pp ro pr ia tio n c a lle d f

or in H. B
. 1 c a

us e d th e De fe nd ants to e xce e d th e a g g re g a te biennial ca

p on the rate of g rowth of a ppropriations under

article VI I I , section 22 o f t h e Te x as Constit ution and chapte r 316 of the gover nment code. These provisions mandate that the “ rate of g rowth of appropriations from state t ax reve nues” not dedicated by the constitution not ex cee d the “estimated r ate of

g rowth of the state’s economy .” Te x . Const. art. VI I I , § 22(a) ; Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 31 6. 00 1 ( Wes t 20 05 ). Al l de fe nd ants e xce pt t he Com ptr oll e r ( c oll e c tiv e ly , th e “ State Def endants” ) filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The district court g rante d the plea w ithout specifying its grounds, and dismiss ed Plaintiffs’ claims ag ainst the State Def endants for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs bring this int erloc utory appea l from the district cour t’s order

. See Tex. Ci v. Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 5 1. 01 4( a )( 8) (We st Su pp . 2 00 6) ; Pe rry

v . D e l R io , 53 S.W .3d 818, 820- 23 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001), p e t. dis m ’d , 6 6 S
. W
. 3 d 239, 242 (Tex. 2001). We aff irm the dis tr ic t c o u rt’ s o r d e r

o f d is mi s s a l i np art, r e v e r s e in p art, an d

r e ma n d f o r f urther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.T h e p arti e s a p p e ar to a g r e e th a t t

h e r e le v an t “ b ie n n ium” is th e s tate ’ s fiscal 3 biennium, w hich runs from September 1 of eac h odd-numbere d y ear throug h Aug ust 31 of t he succe eding odd-numbere d y ear . 3 BACK GR OUND Co nst it ut ion al a nd st at ut or y pr ov isi ons

B e fo re tur

nin g to t he jur isd ic tio na l is su e s p re se nte d b y thi s a pp e a l, i t is he lpf

ul t o consider the constitutional and statutory context in which they

arise. Ar tic le VI I I , s e c tio n 2 2( a ) o f t he Te xas C on sti tut ion

pr ov ide s:
I n no biennium sha ll the rate of g rowth of appr opriations from state ta x reve nues not dedicated by

this constitut ion exceed the e stimated ra t e of g rowth of the state’s economy . The leg islature shall provide by g ener al l aw p ro cedures to implement this subsection.
Te x. Con st. art
. VI I I , § 22 (a ). An “ a pp ro pr ia tio n” re fe rs to a le g isl a tiv e e na c tme nt a uth or izin g state funds to be expended f

or par ticular purpose s. The constitution elsewher e re quires that “[n]o money sh a ll b e dr awn

fr om the Tr e a sury

bu t in purs ua nc e of sp e c if ic a pp ro pr ia tio n ma de by

law; no r s ha ll any appropr iation of money

be made for a

longe r term than two y ear s.” See T e x . C o n s t
. art
. V III , § 6. “State tax revenue s not dedicat ed by this constitut ion” re fer s to one source of funds that the 3 le g isl a tur e cou ld a

pp ro pr ia te ; ot

he rs inc lud e no n- ta x re ve nu e s a nd ta x re ve nu e s w ho se use is dedicated by

the constitution. Subsection (b) of a

rticle VI I I , section 22 authorizes the leg islature to over ride the

a p p r o p r i a t i o n s l i m i to t h e r

w i s e i m p o s e d b y s u

b s e c t i o n ( a ) b y a d o p t i n g a

r e s o l u t i o n , a

p p r o v e d b y a
rec o r d v o te o f e a c h h o u s e , f

in d in g th a t a

ne me r g e n c y

e xis ts an d

id e n ti f y in g th e n a tu

r e o f th at
emer g ency , in which ca se the leg islatur e ’ s e xc e s s appropr iation may not exceed the amount specifiedAr tic le I I I , s e c tio n 4 9a

pr ov ide s in

fu ll: 4 (a) I t shall be the duty of the Comptroller of Public Acc ounts in advanc e of ea ch Reg ular Session of the L eg islature to pr epar e and submit to the Gover nor and to th e L e g isl a tur e up on

its c on ve nin g a

state me nt u

nd e r o a th s ho wi ngfu lly the financ ial condition of the S t at e Trea sury at the close of the last fisca l period a nd an estimate of

the proba ble receipts and disbursements for the then curr ent fisca l y ear . There shall also be contained i n said statement an itemized e sti ma te of

the anti c ipate d r e ve nu e ba se d on the laws the n in e ff e c t th a t w ill be re c e ive d by and fo r the State fr om a ll s ourc e s sh ow ingthe fu nd a c c ounts to b e c re dit e d d

ur in g t he su c c e e din g bie nn ium a nd sa id s ta te me nt s ha ll contain such othe r information as may be re quired by

law. Supplement al statements shall be submitted at any Special Session of the L eg is l at u re and at such other

times as may

be nec essar

y to show probable c hang es. (b) Ex cept in the case of emer g ency and imperative public nece ssity and with a fo ur -f if ths vo te of the tot a l me mbe rs hip of e a c h Ho us e , n o a pp ro pr ia tio n in e xc e s s o f th e c a s h an d an ti c ip ate d r e v e n u e o f th e f u n d s f r o m w h ic h such appropr iation is to be made shall be va lid. No b i l l containing an appropr iation shall be consider ed as pa ssed or be sent to the Gover no r for consideration until and unless the Comptroller of Public Ac counts endorse s his certif i ca t e thereon showing that the amount appr opriated is within the amount estimated to be available in the aff ecte d funds. When the Comptroller fi nd s an a pp ro pr ia tio n b il l exce e ds the e sti ma te d r e ve nu e he sh a ll e nd or se such finding there on and return t o the House in which same orig inated. Such information shall be i m m ediately made known to both the House of Represe ntatives and the Senate and the ne cessa ry steps shall be taken to bring such appr opriatio n to within the revenue , either by providing additional reve nue or r educingthe appr opriation. Tex. Cons t. art. I I I , § 49a. 4 in the resolution. Id. art. VI I I , § 22(b). F urther, the se limits ex pressly do not alter, amend or re peal the Texas Constit ution’s “pay -as- y ou-g o” or ba lance d budg et limitat i on of ar ticle I I I , section 49a. Id. art . V I I I , § 22 (c ). Th e “ pa y -a s- y ou -g o” lim itatio n g e ne ra lly re qu ir e s th a t befo re any bil l containing an appr opriation ca n be conside red pa ssed and be sent to the g overnor , the comptroller

mus t c e rt if

y tha t e a c h a mou

nt a pp ro pr ia te d is wi thi n th e a mou nt o f r e ve nu e e sti ma te d to be a va ila ble in the corr esponding aff

ecte d funds. Id. art. I I I , § 49a(b)

. 4See J ohn Gre ene & L arr y Toomey , The Tax Reform Ac t of 1979 , 42 Tex. B.J . 1007, 1007 5 (1979 ) (contemporaneously observing , with refe renc e to the notable Ca lifornia taxpay er- relief measure s of the 1970s, that “Proposition 13 sentiment has invaded the Texas L eg islature.”)

. 5 Ar tic le VI I I , s e c tio n 2 2 w a s bor ne of a ta x re fo rm e ff

or t in the la te 19 70 s. I t was one 5 of seve ral c omponents of a “Ta x Relief Amendment” t o the consti tution proposed earlier that y ear by the 65t h leg islature during a specia l session called for that purpose by Gover nor Dolph B riscoe. H.J .R. 1, 6 5 t h L eg. , 2 d C.S. I t was appa rently modeled on a T ennesse e provision. See Jani c e C. May , The T

ex a s S t a t e C onstitut ion: A Refe renceGuide 310 (1996). Ar ticle VI I I , section 22 wa s ratified by

the voters in Nove mber 1978. As the sec ond sentenc e of A rticle VI I I , section 22(a ) re quires, the legislature enac ted law s t o i mp l e m e n t t h e p r o v i s i o n . T h e l e g i s l a tu r e d i d s o d u r i n g t h e r e g u l ar s e s s i o n b e g i n n ing in J anuar y 1979, immediately following article VI I I , section 22’s ratification. See ge nerally Acts 1979, 66th L eg ., R.S., ch. 302. Wit h some intervening amendments, these e nactments a re nowcodified in chapter 316 of the g overnme nt code. See id. art. 9, § 1. Section 316.001, g overnme nt code, tra cks the mandate of a rticle VI I I , section 22(a ): “The rate of g rowth of a

ppropriations in a biennium fr om state tax re venue not de dicated by the constitution m ay

not e x cee d the estimated rate of g rowth of the state’s ec onomy .” Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. § 316.001. Other

provisions of chapte r 316 addr ess how “the est i m ated rate of g rowth of the state’s e conomy ” is ca lculated a nd provide mec hanisms fo r ensuringthat, as article VI I I , section 2 2 (a) require s, the rate of g rowth in appropr iations does not exceed the estimated rate of g rowth of the state’s ec onomy . The L BB is charg ed with sever al key responsibilities within t his statutory scheme

.We base the f ollowing obse rvations regar d i n g t h e nature of a ppropriations chie fly

on 6 public documents Plaintiffs attache d to their petition. 6 Un de r s e c tio n 316 .0 02 (b ), the L B B is to de te rm ine bo th “the e sti ma te d r a te of g ro wth of the state’s economy” and the rate of appropr iations g rowth by compar ing those fig ures f rom the baseline of the curr ent biennium to the next biennium. Id. § 316.002(b) (West 2005). I t calculates

“ th e e s ti mate d

r a te o f g r o w th of t he s tate ’ s e c o n o my” f r o m t h e c u r r e n t b ie n n ium t o th e n e xt biennium by

“dividing the estimated Texas total persona l in co m e fo r the next biennium by the estimated Texas total persona l income for the curr ent biennium.” Id. § 316.002(a) (1), (b). “Using standard statisti cal methods, the boa rd shall make the estimate by projec ting throug h the biennium the estimated Te x as total persona l income reported by the Unit ed S tates Department of Commerc e or i ts succe ssor in function.” Id. § 3 1 6
. 0 0 2 ( b )

. H o w e v e r , s e c ti o n3 1 6
. 0 0 2 ( c ) c o n te mp late s th a t “ [i ]f

a mor e c omp re he ns ive de fi nit ion of the ra te of g ro wth of the state ’s e c on omy is de vel op ed an d is approve d” by

a committee of

the g overnor , lieutenant g overnor , speake r of the house of representatives, and comptroller , “the boa rd may use that def

inition.” Id. § § 3 1 6
. 0 0 2 ( c ) , 316.005 (West 2005). The State De fenda nts repre sent that such an a lt er native, “mor e compr ehensive ” definition has neve r bee n adopted.

Section 316.002 also requir es the L BB to establish “the leve l of appropr i ati ons for the current biennium from st ate tax reve nues not dedicated by the constitution.” Id. § 316.002(a) (2). Th is fig ur e is i tse lf

pa rt ly an e sti ma te , f

or re a so ns re la tin g to t

he natur e of

a pp ro pr ia tio ns . 6 Even without additional leg islative action, the amount of an a ppropriation, as w ell as its funding

so ur c e , ma

y c ha ng e duri nga

bie nn ium , s uc h a s wh e n c ha ng e s in e c on omi c c on dit ion s n ot o ri g ina llyNo tic e of Me e tin g of

the L e g isl a tiv e B ud g e t Bo ard , Ag e nd a I te m 3 (N ov . 17, 20 04 ) ( C.R
. 7 57, Ex . E to Plainti ff’ s orig inal petition). Id

. 8 7 fore caste d impact the amount or c ompositi on of fund i n g source s subject to an appr opriation. Be cause the “leve l of appropr iations for t he current biennium from st ate tax reve nues not dedicated by the c o n s t i tution” is calculate d during the cur rent biennium, it is comprised of both ac tual appropr iations of non-dedic ated tax reve nues (a ppropriate d non-dedic ated tax reve nues that have alre ady been spe nt, and whose a

mount is thus f

inally asce rtainable ) and estimated a ppropriations of non-dedic ated tax reve nues (the a mount of such f

u n ds that the L BB anticipates w ill be spent pursuant to appr opriations during the re mainder of the biennium). Refle ctin g the potential for

un for esee n ch anges i n t he am ou nt or f un di ng so urce of appr op ri ati on s l ate r i n t he b ien ni um , t he L BB deter mines “the leve l of appropr iations for the c urre nt biennium from state tax reve n ues not dedicated by

the constitution” “subject to adjustments resulting from revenue fore cast re visions or subsequent appr opriations cer tified by the Comptroller.” 7 The L BB appli es the “ rate of g rowth of the state’s ec onomy ” to the “the level of appropr iations for the c urre nt biennium from state tax revenue s not dedicate d by the constitution” to y ield the appropr iations limit, or “spending cap” : “the amount of state tax reve nues not dedicated by the constitution that could be appropr iated for the next biennium within the limit established by the estimated ra

te of g rowth of the state’s ec onomy .” Id. § 316.002(a) (3). Ref lecting the potential that the cur

rent-bie nnium appropriation base line might cha ng e, the L BB ’s s pending cap c alculation is ex pressly

made “ subject to adjustments in [ curr ent] biennial appropriations.” 88 The L BB is to “hold a public hear ing” by Dec ember

1 of ea ch eve n-numbere d y ear ( i.e ., tho se pr e c e din g a

re g ula r le g isl a tiv e se ssi on ) “t o soli c it tes tim on y re g ard ing the pr op os e d it e ms of information and the methodolog y used in making the ca lculations require d by Section 316.002.” Id. § 316.004 (West 2005). Be fore it approve s the i tems of information re quired by section 316.002, the L BB is require d t o p u b l i sh in the Texas Register the proposed items of inf ormation and “a de scription of the methodolog y and sourc es used in the c alculations.” Id. § 316.003 (West 2005). Af te r t he L B B a pp ro ve s th e ite ms o f i nf

or ma tio n re qu ir e d by

se c tio n 3 16 .0 02 , it

mus t submit t he information to the committ ee c omposed of the g ov er n o r, l i eutenant gove rnor, spe aker of the house of

repr esentatives, and comptroller

. Id. § 316.005(a) . This committe e has ten day s to adopt t h e i t ems, with any amendments it might make

. Id. § 316.005(b). I f the committee fa ils to act within the t en-da y period, the items are de emed a pproved by

the committee. Id. § 316.005(c) . Th e S t at e Def endants re prese nt that this commi ttee “ha s never met to approve these items,” so that “the items have historica lly been a pproved by

the inaction of the committee.” “To e nsure c ompliance with Ar ticle VI I I , Section 22, of the Texas Consti tution,” the L BB is prohibited from transmitting “ in any form” to the gove rnor or leg islature either

the “budg et of e sti ma te d a

pp ro pr ia tio ns ” or

the g e ne ra l a

pp ro pr ia tio ns bil l un til “ the lim it o n th e rate of g ro wth of appropriations has been adopted as require d by this subchapter.” Id. § 31 6. 00 2( d)

. Th e se e ve nts
are ordinarily require d to occur not later than the fifth and se venth day s, respe ctively , afte r a r eg ular session convene s. Id. § 3 22 .0 08 (c) & (d ) (W est 20 05 ). “I n t he ab sen ce of an act io n b y

th e [ L BB]Subsections ( d) and (e) , added in 1991, appar ently responde d to a n initial failure or r efusa l 9 of the L B B to c omp ly

wi th i ts s ta tut or

y req uir e me nts to s e t a

sp e nd ingc a

p. C.R . 5 4; see J anice C. May , The Texas State Constitut ion: A R eference G uide 31 0 ( 19 96 ) ( no tin g that tw e nty leg islators had soug ht mandamus with the Texas Supreme Court to compel the L BB to act). 9 to adopt a spendinglimit ,” the estimated rate of g rowth of the state’s economy is de emed to be zer o, meaningthat ap p r o p r ia

ti o n s f o r the next bi ennium from non-de dicated ta x reve nues could not excee d the amount of such a

ppropriations in the cur

rent biennium. Id. § 316.002(e)

. 9 Additionally , section 316.006 provides that unless authorized by a majority

vote of the L BB members f

rom ea ch house, the L BB ’s budg et re commendations re lating to the pr oposed appropr i at i o n s o f state tax reve nue not dedicated by the constitution may

not exceed the limit on estimated appr opriations. Id. § 316.006 (West 2005). Moreove r, sec tion 316.008 provides that the “propose d limit ” on appropr iations is “binding on the leg islature with re spect to all appr opriations fo r t he ne xt bie nn ium

ma de fr om s ta te ta x reve nu e s n ot d e dic a te d b y the c on sti tut ion ” a

bs e nt a resolu tion to raise the ca

p under a rticle VI I I , section 22(b)

. Id. § 316.008(a) (West 2005). “The rules of the house of r epre sentatives and se n at e shall provide for enfor ceme nt” of this limit ation. Id. § 316
. 0 0 8 (b ). Both the house and se nate r ules in eff

ect dur ing the 79th L eg islature’s Third Ca lle d Se ssi on , w he n H .B . 1 wa s e na c te d, c on ta ine d v ir tua lly ide nti c a l pr ov isi on s th a t:
Un le ss wit

hin the a uth or ity of a re so lut ion or re so lut ion s ado pte d pur su ant to A rt ic le VI I I , Se c tio n 22 (b ), of the Te xas Con sti tut ion , it is no t in or de r fo r the [ch a mbe r] t o consider f

or final pa ssag e on third re ading , on motion to concur in [the other cham ber’ s] ame nd men ts , o r on mo ti on to ado pt a con feren ce com mi tt ee rep ort, a bil l a pp ro pr ia tin g fu

nd s f ro m th e state tr e a sury in an amou nt t hat, w he n a dd e d to amounts previously

appropr iated by

bil l s p reviously

passed a nd sent or due to be sent to the comptroller, w ould exceed the lim it on appropr iations established under Chapter 316, Gove rnment Code.Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 37.001-.011 (West 1997 & Supp. 2006) (“UD J A”)

. 10 10 Te x. H. R. R

u l e 8 , § 2 1 ( f

) , T e x. H
. R
. 5 , 7 9 t h L e g . , R
. S
. , 2 0 0 5 H
. J. o f T e x. 1 0 8 , 1 1 4 ; T e x. S. Ru le 7.20, Tex. S . Res. 3, 80th L eg ., R
. S
. , 2007 S.J . of Tex. 24. I n other wor ds, a bill that members believe w ould exceed the spending cap is subject t o a point of order. I f dete rmined meritorious and

su sta ine d b y

the c hambe r’ s p re sid ing of fi c e r, su c h a

ru lin g wo uld

pr e ve nt p a ssa g e of

the bil l un til the def ect is re medied. See Tex. H.R. Rule 1, § 9, Tex. H.R. 3, 80th L eg ., R.S.; Tex. S . Rule 4.03, Te x. S. Re s. 3, 80 th L e g ., R.S. P lai nt iffs’ all e ga ti ons

Pla int if fs ’ liv e ple a din g be fo re the dis tr ic t court wa s the ir or ig ina l pe tit ion , f

ile d in J une 2005. I n it, Plaintiffs soug ht r elief under the Uniform De clar atory J udg ments Act based on 10 claims that the Defenda

nts violated article VI I I , section 22(a) of the Tex as C onstitut ion and sec tion 316.001 of the g overnm en t co d e. Plaintiffs seek “ decla ratory relief to stop and preve nt unconstitutional a

nd illega l spe nding by the Texas State g overnme nt.” They alleg e tw o chief the or ie s r e g a rd ing ho w H. B
. 1’ s a pp ro pr ia tio n vio la te s art ic le VI I I , se c tio n 22 or c ha pte r 3 16 , a s w e ll

a s a the or y that c ha pte r 3 16 vio la te s th e se pa ra tio n o f p ow e rs . Pla int if fs a lle g e that th e le g isl a tur e ’s re qu ir e me nt t hat th e “ e sti ma te d r a te of

g ro wth of the state’s economy” be presumptively based solely on g rowth in Texas’s total persona l income,

see Tex. Gov’ t C o de Ann. § 316.002( b) & (c) , and the L BB ’s sole re liance on that measure , are inconsistent with the tex t and intent of ar ticle VI I I , sec t i o n 2 2 (a) . As a matter of constitutional interpre tation, Plaintiffs urg e, the “estimated rate of g rowth of the state’s ec onomy ” me ans g ro wth of the e ntire state e conomy , not merely the g rowth of a s i n g le component—pe rsonal income.As int ro du c e d in

the ho us e of

re pr e se ntativ e s, the pr op os e d T a x Rel ie f A me ndme nt, in 11 rele vant par

t, would have limited the growth of all leg islative appropr iations from st ate tax reve nue to a fixed annual incre ase of 71⁄2 perc ent. H.J
. of Tex., 65th L eg ., 2d C.S. 9 (1978) . That provision was de leted entire ly in the committee substitute, se e id . at 92, but the following provision was later a dd e d thro ug h a

ho us e fl oo r a

me ndme nt:
That Article VI I I of t he Tex as C onstitut ion be amended by adding Section 21 to rea d a s f oll ow s: Sec. 21 (a ) Except as otherw ise provided by this Section, leg islative appropr iations fr om S ta te ta x re ve nu e fo r a fi sc a l bi e nn ium

may no t e xce e d th e tot a l of

tho se a pp ro pr iati on s f

or the pr e c e din g bie nn ium by mor e tha

n w ou ld r e su lt f

ro m a pe rc e nta g e e qu a lin g the pe rc e nta g e of g ro wth o f t ota l pe rs on a l in c ome of the State duri ngthe pr e vio us bie nn ium , a s r e po rt e d b y the Com ptr oll e r o f P ub lic Ac c ounts
. (b) The limit ation in subsection (a) hereof shall not apply to appropriations and ta x inc rea se s n e c e ssa

ry to p ro vid e fo r r e imb ur se me nt t o s c ho ol d ist ri c ts t o repla ce r evenue s lost by

partial or total a

bolition of ad valorem pr operty taxes. (c ) I f the le g isl a tur e by a do pti on of a re so lut ion a pp ro ve d b y

a re c or d v ote of three -fifths of the memb ers of eac h house, finds that an e merg ency exis ts and identifies t he nature of the emerg ency , the leg islature may provide for

appropr iations in e xce ss o f t

he a mou nt a uth or ize d b y S ub se c tio n ( a ) o f t his se c tio n. Th e e xce ss authorized under this subsec tion may not exceed the amount specified in the resolution. (d ) I n no ca se sh a ll a

pp ro pr ia tio ns e xce e d r e ve nu e s a s p ro vid e d in Ar tic le I I I , Section 49a.
Id . at 142-43. This ver sion of the provision that beca me ar ticle VI I I , section 22 re mained in the Taxpay er Relief

Amendment passe d by

the house, id ., but was d el et ed i n the senate committee substitut e and omitted fr om the version appr oved by that chambe r. Id

. at 3 0 9
. T h e confere nce committee ag ree d on the lang uag e that now appea rs in a rticle VI I I , section 22, which w as submitted to a nd ratif ie d b y the vo te rs . 11 Plaintiffs also rely

on the leg islative history of ar ticle V I I I , section 22. They observe that the leg islature appa

rently considere d but e ventually reje cted a version of subsection (a) that would have expli citly tied the spending limit to g rowth in personal income , and urge us to infer intent to reje ct 11To the extent Pl aintiffs are complaining about spec ific appr opriations and expenditures 12 made dur ing pr ior biennia, a s opposed t o forthcoming expenditures under the H.B . 1 appropr iation, they would lack standing under t he principles we discuss below. Se e Ho ffm an v . D av is , 100 S.W .2d 94, 95 (Tex. 1937). I n t h ei r orig inal petition, Pl aintiffs also alleg ed unconstitutional deleg ation of 13 le g isl a tiv e po we rs to t he c omm itt e e e sta bli sh e d und e r s e c tio n 3 16 .0 05 , b ut d o n ot a pp e a r t o pr e ss t his c la im o n a

pp e a l. 12 persona l income g rowth as the sole basis for the spending cap. Plaintiffs alleg e that “this bar ometer [personal income g rowth] ha s been historica lly proven to wildly

overstate the g rowth of the state’s economy ,” ca

using spe nding c aps set on that basis to per m it appropriations excee ding the true constitutional li mit. P laintiffs complain that, in this wa y , H.B
. 1’s appropr iation is unc onstitut ional

r e lati v e to th e “ r e a l” r a te o f e c o n o mi c g r o w th a s c o mp ar e d to b o th th e b a s e li n e o f the 2004-2005 biennium and 1978, when a rticle VI I I , s ec t ion 22 was ratified. Reg ardingthe latter, Plaintiffs complain t hat overestimations of economic g rowth have “compounde d over the deca des” w ithout

c or re c tio n, c a

us ingthe sp e nd ingc a

p to lik e wi se de viate fr om c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nts
. 12 Se c on d, Pla int if

fs a lle g e that th e me c ha nis ms the le g isl atur e ha s ado pt e d to implement and enf

orce article VI I I , section 22—chie fly found in cha

pter 316 of the g overnme nt code —constitute unconstitutional dele gati ons of its leg islative power to the L BB in violation of separ ation-of- power s limi tations. Tex. C onst. art. I I , § 1. Plaintiffs also complain that 13 when e nactin g H. B. 1 , the leg islature re lied on an upwa rd re vision of the L BB ’s
or ig ina l sp e nd ing c a

p ma de by

L B B sta ff

—n ot t he bo ard its e lf —w hic h, the y

c on te nd , w a s in va lid

and vo id. Spe c if

ic a lly , Pl a int if

fs a lle g e —a

nd the S tat e De fe nd ants a c kn ow le dg e —th a t in No ve mbe r 2 00 4, the L B B a pp ro ve d a re so lut ion

c omp lyingwi th c ha

pte r 3 16 that se t a

sp e nd inglim itNo tic e of Me e tin g of the L e g isl a tiv e B ud g e t Bo ard , Ag e nd a I te m 3 (N ov . 1 7, 20 04 ) ( C.R
. 14 57, Ex . E to Plainti ff’ s orig inal petition).

L eg islative Budg et Board’ s “F iscal S ize Up 2006-2007 Editi on” (published De c. 2005) 15 (C.R. 58, 61, Ex . F to Plaintiffs’ orig inal petition). 13 of $52.145 billion t hat could be a ppropriate d from non-de dicated state tax revenue s during the 2006- 07 bie nn ium

. Plaintiffs also alleg e—and the State Def endants a g ree —that the spending cap w as 14 adjusted upwa

rd in late 2005 to $55.6 billion. I n contendingthat this adjustment was void, Pl aintiffs emphasize stat em en t s in a Dec ember 2005 L BB publication that “[t] he [L BB ] i nstructed sta ff to adjust the level of 2004- 2005 appropr iations from state tax revenue s not de d i ca t ed by the Constit ution and 2006-2007 spendinglimit calc ulations to ref lect subseque nt 2005 appropriations

cer tified by the Comptroller.” (Emphasis adde d). Pla int if fs ur g e that su c h a

n a dju stm e nt w ou ld 15 have be en valid only if enac ted by the leg islature throug h g ener al law pr ocedur es, or at least by the L BB itself throug h a for

mal resolution under c hapter 316. Be cause this upward adjustment of the spen d in g c a

p w a s inv a li d , Pl a in ti f

f s a s s e rt, th e c a

p r e ma in e d

a t $ 5 2
. 1 4 5 b il li o n , a

le v e l tha t undisputedly

was e x cee ded by

subsequent appr opriations for that biennium. I n th e a lt e r

n a ti v e , Pl a in ti f

f s a ll e g e th a t H
. B
. 1 ’ s a p p r o p r iati o n “ c a

u s e[s] total appropr iation s t o ex cee d even the unapprove d staff- g ener ated limit by $1.3 billion dollars.” Plaintiffs alleg e—and the State Def endants a cknowle d ge— t hat “ba sed on the appro p r iati o n [s ] m a d e p r io r to th e 2 0 0 6 s p e c ia l s e s s io n , th e L e g is latu r e h a d a p p r o p r iate d

$ 5 3 .0 billion i n Non-De dicated G ener al Reven u e R el ated Funds.” Plaintiffs conc ede that this l eft $2.6Id. 16 Although na

med as a defe ndant, the Comptroller—then Car ole Kee ton Stray horn—filed 17 an answe r denying responsibility for the complained- of appr opriations, as we ll as a “Stateme nt of Realig nment” with Plaintiffs to the ext ent of “ contendingthat meaning ful control of, a nd eff ective limit ations on, state spending was intende d by the voters in adoptingArticle V I I I , § 22(a) , and that the same should be e nforc ed by appropriate judg ments of this Court, to t he extent authorized by law. ” Th e Com

ptr oll e r i s n ot a

pa rt y to t his a pp e a l. 14 billion i n appropr iations f rom non-dedic ated state tax revenues that c ould have be en made without exceeding“the $55.6 billion staff g ener ated una pproved limit.” Be cause H.B
. 1’s appr opriation 16 was $3.9 billion, Pl aintiffs alleg e, it “ca used total ap propriations to exceed e ven the una pproved staff- g ener ated limit by

$1.3 billion dol lars.” Pla int if fs re qu e st d e c laratio ns inc ludi ng that “ the a pp ro pr ia tio n in

H. B . 1
. . . is unconstitutional on the basis that i[ t] exceeds the mandates of Article VI I I , Section 22(a) as applied sin c e it s ena c tme nt, or

a lte rn a tiv e ly

that sa id a

pp ro pr ia tio n is un c on sti tut ion a l on the ba sis tha

t it

e xce e ds the mand a te s o f Ar tic le VI I I , Sec tio n 2 2( a ) a s a pp lie d o ve r t

he la st b ie nn ium , o r a lte rn a tiv e ly that sai d ap pr op ri a tio n is unc on sti tut ion a l be c a us e it e xce e ds e ve n th e e xtre me ly g e ne ro us and

fa ult y
e sti ma te s p ro vid e d b y

the L e g isl a tiv e B ud g e t Bo ard and is, a c c or din g to the L B B ’s ow n c a lc ulatio ns , in violation of Article VI I I , Section 22(a) .” P roce edings b elow

The State De fenda

nts filed a plea

to the jurisdiction challeng ing only the suffic iency 17 of Pla int if fs ’ ple a din g s; the y did no t cha lle ng e the jur isd ic tio na l f a c ts Pl a int if

fs ple a de d o r s ub mit

e vid e nc e in s up po rt

of the ir ple a . T he State De fe nd ants argue d th a t Pla int if fs fa ile d s uf

fi c ie ntl y toSe e Mc Lan e Co. v . S

tra y ho rn , 148 S.W .3d 644, 649 (Tex. Ap p . — Au s t in 2004, 18 pet. denied)

. 15 plead standingor an ult

ra v ire s a c t ( so a s to a vo id s ov e re ig n im mun ity ) and that the claims present 18 non-justiciable political questions. Following a brie f hea ring at wh i ch neither side pr esente d

e vid e nce, t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

ru le d f ro m th e be nc h th a t it

wo uld g ra nt t he State De fe nd a nts ’ jurisdictional plea and dismiss Plainti ffs’ suit. This appe al followed.
DI SCU SSIO N On appe al, Plaintiffs bring a sing le i ssue complaining t hat t he dis trict court erre d or abused its discre tion in gra nting the State D efe ndants’ plea to the jurisdiction. Stand ard of review

A c ha lle ng e to a

tr ia l c ourt ’s su

bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n ma y be a sse rt e d in

a ple a to the jurisdiction. Texas Dep’t of Parks &W

ildlif e v. M iranda , 133 S.W .3d 217, 225-26 (Te x . 2004); Bland Indep. Sc h. Dist. v. Blue , 34 S.W .3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226. The de termination of whe ther a trial court ha s subject m atter jurisdiction beg ins with the pl eading s. Id. The plea der ha s the initial burden

o f alleging fac ts that a ffirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear the cause . Id. (c i t i n g Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). Whether the pl eade r has met this burden is a question of l aw that we review de novo. Id. We c onstrue the pleading s liberally

and look to the p l ea d er ’s i n tent. Id. I f the plea dings do not c ontain sufficie nt fa c ts t o a ff

ir ma tiv e ly de mon str a te the tr ia l c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio n bu t do no t a ff ir ma tiv e ly de mon str a te16

incura ble def ects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of plea ding suf ficienc y and the plaintiffs should be aff orded the opportunity

to amend. Id. a t 22 6- 27 ; El gin In de p. Sc h. Di

st. v . R .N. , 191 S.W .3d 263, 272 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.). I f the plea dings affirmatively neg ate the e x istence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jur isdiction may be g rante d without allowing the pla intiffs an opportunity

to amend. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227. Ho we ve r, “ a

c ourt de c idi ng a ple a to the jur isd ic tio n is not re qu ir e d to look so le ly to the pleading s but may consider evidence and mus t do so when ne cessa ry to resolve the jur isdictional issues raised.” Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 555. “When a plea to the jurisdiction challeng es the e x istence of fa cts alleg ed by

the pleade r to establish the trial cour t’s subject matter jur isdiction, the trial court must consider re levant evide nce subm i t t ed by the par ties.” Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227 (c iting Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 555 ). T o v ar y ing de g ree s, this jurisdi ctional inquiry may also implicate the merits of the pleade r’s c ause of action. Compare Bland , 3 4 S. W.3 d at 55 4- 55 (c iti ngc ha lle ng e s to associational standingand per sonal jurisdiction as entailing “an evidentiar y inquiry [t hat] . . . does

no t in vo lve a

sig nif ic ant i nq uir y int o th e su

bs tance o f the c la ims ” and ho ldi ngthat c ha lle ng e to taxpay er standing d id not impl icate me rits), with Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227-28 (de scribing overla pping jur isdictional and merits inquiry reg ardingchalleng e to whethe r par ks and wildlife d e p artm e n t a c te d

w it h g r o s s n e g li g e n c e s o a s to w a iv e s o v e r e ig nim mu n it y u n d e r th e r e c r e a tiona l use statute). When the consideration of a trial cour t’s subject matter jur isdiction requires the examination of evidenc e, the trial court exercises its discr etion in de termining wh et h er the jurisdictional de termination should be made at a preliminary hear ing or awa it f uller deve lopment of17

the ca se, mindful that the jurisdictional deter mination mustbe ma d e as soon a s prac ticable. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227-28.

“[I ]n a case in whic h t h e j u ri s dictional challeng e implicates the me rits of the plaintiff’s ca

use of a ction and the plea to the jurisdiction includes evidenc e, the tria l court re views the re levant evide nce to de termine if a fac t issue exi sts.” Id . at 22 7. Th is s tand ard , w hic h “ g e ne ra lly mir ro rs that of

a su mma ry jud g me nt u

nd e r T e x as Ru le of Civil Pr oc e dure 16 6a (c ), ” se e ks to
re c on c ile “ the fu

nd a me nta l pr e c e pt t

hat a c ou rt mu st n ot p ro c e e d o n th e me ri ts o f a c a se un til leg itimate challeng es to its jurisdi ction have be en dec ided” while “ protec t[ ing] the intere sts of the state and the . . . claimants in ca ses . . . in w hich the deter mination of

the subject matter

of the c ourt implicates the merits of the pa rties’ c ause of

action.” Id . at 227-28. Ac cording ly , when r eviewing a plea t o t h e j urisdiction in which the pleadingrequire ment has bee n met and evide nce ha s been submitt ed to support th e p lea that implicates the merits of the c ase, w e take as true a ll evidence favor able to the nonmovant a nd indulge ever

y infere nce and re solve any doubt in the nonmovant’s favor

. Id . at 22 8. Whe the r t he e vid e nc e pr e se nts a fa c t que sti on re g ard inga

jur isd ic tio na l f

a c t is a question of law that we revie w de novo. Id

.

Be cause the district c ourt did not specify its grounds f or dismissal, we may

aff irm on any meritorious g round on which the c ourt could have relied. Se e At mo s E ne rg yCor p. v . A bb ott , 127 S.W .3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.); cf. Provident Life & Acc ident Ins. Co. v. Kno tt , 128 S.W .3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2004) (apply ing pr inciple in summary judgme nt context). I n the district court, a s previously noted, the State De fenda nts challeng ed only

the sufficie ncy

of Plaintiffs’ plea dings; they did not challeng e jurisdi ctional fa cts or introduce evidenc eSelected portions of t his document were attache d as Ex hibits I and J to Plainti ffs’ pe tition, 19 bu t no t th e e nti re do c ume nt. As previously

noted, H.B . 1 appropr iated $3.825 billion. 20 18 to suppor t the ir jurisdictional ple a. Howeve r, Plaintiffs did attach evidenc e to the irp et ition. On appe al, the State De fenda nts attempt to broaden their challeng e to attac k cer

tain jurisdiction al fa c ts und e rl y ingPla int if

fs ’ a lte rn a tiv e c la im that H .B . 1 ’s a p p r o p r i a t i o n “ e xc e e d s e ve n th e e xtre me ly g ener ous and fa

ulty estimates provided by

the L eg islative Budg et Boa rd and is, ac cordingto the L B B ’s ow n c a lc ulatio ns , in vio la tio n of Ar tic le VI I I , Se c tio n 22 (a ). ” Spe c if ic a lly , th e y

a tta c h to the ir brief two public r ecor ds they asser t conclusively

establish that H.B . 1’s appr opriation did not ex cee d the spending cap a s determined by the L BB : (1) the e ntirety of the Comptroll er ’s Ap ri l 17, 2006 “Reve nue Estimate for

the 79th L eg islature, Third Called Session,” and (2) an Apr il 27, 2006 19 memo from the L BB ’s deputy direc tor to the L ieutenant Gove rnor a nd Speaker

sta ting that $3.95 billion in additional appropr iations c ould be made from g ener al reve nue “without exceeding t he Article VI I I , Section 2 2 limit .” The State De fenda nts acknowle dg e that these documents “w ere 20

no t be fo re the tr ia l c ou rt ,” bu t req ue st u s to take jud ic ia l no tic e of the m, u rg ingtha t th e fa c ts stated within them are not subject to rea sonable dispu t e and a re c apable of ac curate and

rea dy asce rtainment fr om reliable public sour ces. See Tex R. Evi d. 201. Pl a i n t i f f s r e p l y t h a tt h e S t a t e D e f

e n d an t s ar e i n a

p p r o p r i a t e l y

s e e k i n g t o lit ig a te the merits of their c laims in the guise of a j u ri s d i ct i o n al challeng e. Allowing them to do so, espec ially if allowed “ to chang e theor ies and introduce evidenc e [on] appea l,” Plaintiffs urg e, is inconsistent with supreme court pr eced en t an d “funda mental notions of due proc ess.”19

I n a ny e ve nt, Pla int if

fs c on te nd , th e ne w d oc ume nts “ have n o b e ari ng ” on wh e the r t

he State Def endants c omplied with the spending cap.

We will addre ss the s pecif ic questi on of whe ther we may consider the jurisdictional

c ha lle ng e and

e vid e nc e that the State De fe nd ants se e k to ra ise on a pp e a l a s th e y

be c ome re le va

nt t o
our a na ly sis . H ow e ve r, the pa

rt ie s’ re sp e c tiv e argume nts su g g e st that w e sh ou ld cl ari fy he re so me br oa de r p ri nc ipl e s g ov e rn ingour r e vie w. To the e xten t that Pla int if fs su g g e st that it i s c a te g or ic a lly improper to adjudicate, throug h a jurisdictional plea, jur isdictional issues that impl icate or overla p t h e m e r i t s , t h a tn o t i o ni s b e l i e d b y Miranda

. See M

iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227-28 (r eg ardingwhether parks a nd wildlife depa

rtment ac ted with g ross neg lige nce so a s to waive sover eig n immunit y under the re cre ational use statute) . I t is also well-e stablished that wher e a trial court’s jurisdiction depe nds upon whether a state officia l’s acts are within he r constitutional or statutory authority , such as whe n
a pla int if f a lle g e s ult

ra v ire s action to avoid sover eig n immunit y , the t rial court may sometimes be able to dec ide the jurisdictional issue as a matter of la

w base d on the pleading s b y co nstruing the constitutional and s t at u t o ry provisions defining the ac tor’s authority and asc erta ining whe ther the acts a lleg ed would excee d that authority

. See , e.g. , Mc Lan e Co. v . S

tra y ho rn , 148 S.W .3d 644, 649 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. deni ed ) (acknowledg ing that in determining whether decla ratory j u d gm en ts u i tm ay

b e m ai n t ai n edaga i n s ta s t at e o ff i ci al , i twa s fi rs tn ec es s ary , i n l i gh to f s o v er ei gn immun ity pr inc ipl e s, to c on str

ue statut e s d e fi nin g of

fi c ia l’ s p ow e rs to “ de c ide wh e the r t he [of fi c ia l] validly e xer c ise d h e r d isc re tio n o r a c te d o uts ide of he r l e g a l a

uth or ity .” ); c

f. D ir e c to r

o f D e p t. of A gr ic

. & E

n v ir o n . v . P r in ti n g

I n d u s . A s s ’n , 6 00 S.W .2d 264, 265-70 (Te x . 1980) (c onstruing constitution t o deter

mine wh et h er p laintiff alleg ed ult ra v ire s action by

state off icials; state hadOur de cision in Davis v. Burnam is not to t he contr ary . 1 3 7 S
. W
. 3d 325, 334-35 21 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pe t.). I n rele vant part, we vacated a trial court’ s denial of a plea to the jurisdic t i o n t h at had c halleng ed whe ther the pla intiff had alleg ed that a state ag ency direc tor had a c ted ultra vires . Whil e we char acte rized the issue as involving “ the merits” a nd turning on “statutory construction” of the age ncy ’s powers, the basis for our holding wa s that the plaintiff had a dd e d th is ult

ra v ire s c la im o nly

on e da y be fo re a he ari ng on the ple a to the jur isd ic tio n re la te d to oth e r c la ims and

tha t th e a g e nc y

the re fo re ha d in a de qu a te no tic e that th e tr ial cou rt mig ht r ule regardi ng its jur isd ic tio n o ve r t he ne wl y -a dd e d c la im, and ina de qu a te op po rt

un ity to d e ve lop its arguments and authorities. Id. & n.16. 20 raised issue via spec ial exceptions). And Miranda wo uld fu rt he r a llo w jur isd ic tio na l c ha lle ng e s, 21 via its summary

judgme nt-like proce ss, to the exi stence of the alleg ed ac ts that are a sserted to have b e e nb e yo n d

t h e a c t o r ’ s c o n s t i tu t i o n a l o r s t a tu t o r y a u t h o r i t y. Y e t th is d o e s n o t m e anth a t d e f e n d an ts an d

tr ia l c o u rts h a v e f

r e e r e ig nto “ r e qu ir e [] that the pl aintiff prove his case . . . at t he plea ding sta g e, bef ore a ny discovery

has bee n conducte d,” as P laintiffs contend occurr ed here. To succe ed, a de fenda nt challeng ing a

jurisdictional fac t via a plea to the jurisdiction must satisfy the same initial burden a s in a “tra ditional” summary judgme nt—conclusively

neg ating the exist ence of the fa ct—and judg ment is proper in such instance

on ly if the pla int if

f c ann ot p re se nt c on tr ov e rt inge vid e nc e ra isi nga g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t. Miranda , 1 33 S.W. 3d at 22 7- 28 . M or e g e ne ra lly , a tr ia l c ourt

mus t e xer c ise so un d d isc re tio n in de c idi ngwh e the r a

jur isd ic tio na l determ inatio n im pli c a tin g the me ri ts “ sh ou ld b e ma de a t a pr e lim ina ry he ari ngor

awa it a fu lle r de ve lop me nt of the c a se , mind fu l tha t this d e te rm inatio n mu st be made as soon as pra cticable .” Id. a t 22 7; see Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 554. I t fo l l o ws t h at a tria l court’s de cision to de termine a jurisdictional issue implicating the merits at a pa rticular pr eliminary stag e of ca s e development may be so ar bitrary or unre asonable , g iven the state of the re cord, that it c onstitut es an abuse of di s cretion. Cf. Davis v. Burnam , 137 S.W .3d 325, 334-3521

(Tex. A p p . —

A u s ti n2 0 0 4 , n o p e t. ) ( v a c a ti n g tr ia l c o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f ju r is d ic ti o n a l p le a

tu r ning on statutory

construction to deter

mine whether

alleg ed ac ts were ultra vires ; defe ndant had inade quate notice to brief a nd argue the issue)

. P oli ti c al q ue st ion /se lf- e xe c ut ing c ons ti tu ti ona l pr ov isi on

Th e Sta t e D e f

e n d an t s ar g u e t h a tt h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s d i s m i s s a l o f P l a i n t i f f s ’ c l a i ms should be aff

irmed because the court lacked subjec t matter jurisdiction to provide a r emedy for a ny alleg ed violation of article VI I I , section 22. They attempt to invoke the political question doctrine and the r elated doc trine of se lf-executing constitutional provisions, each of w hich em an ate f rom separ ation-of- power s conce pts. L ong rec og nized in Tex as law, the doctrine of self-e x ecuting

c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s is c on c e rn e d w ithwh e the r a pr ov isi on

c on fe rs su ffi cient ly

de te rm inate sta nd ard s to pe rm it j ud ic ia l a sc e rt a inm e nt a nd e nf or c e me nt:
A c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on is sa id to be se lf -e xec uti ng

if it s up pli e s a

su ff ic ie nt r ule by means of w hich the rig ht give n may be enjoy ed and pr otected, or the duty imposed may be enf orce d; and it is not self-ex ec u t i n g when it mere ly indicates principles, without laying dow n rules by means of w hich these pr i n ciples may be g iven forc e of la

w. Neeley , 1 7 6 S
. W
. 3 d

at 7 8 2 (q u o t i n g Mitchell County v. City Nat’l Bank , 43 S.W . 880, 883-84 (Tex. 1898) (quoting T. Cooley , Con sti tut io na l L im itatio ns 99-100 (6th ed. 1890) )). Similarly , a “political questi on,” at least as it has been define d in the fede ral c ourts, is one that involves (1) “ a la c k o f j ud ic ia lly

dis c ov e ra

ble and mana g e a ble standard s for

re so lvi ngit, ” or

(2 ) “ a te xtua lly demo n s t ra b le constitutional commitm ent to a coor dinate political depa rtment.” Id. at 777-78 (q u o t i n g Ba k

e r v . Ca rr , 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1963)).22 The State De fenda

nts arg ue that ar

ticle VI I I , s ec t i o n 22(a) , by requiringthat “[t] he l egi s l at u re s h al l p ro v i d e b y gen er al l aw p ro c e d

u re s t o i mp l em en tt h i s s u b s ec t i o n , ” i n cl u d i n g a method for determining “the estimated rate of g ro wth of the state ’s e c on omy ,” e mbo die s a “ te xtua lly demonstrable c onstitut ional commitment” of these matters to the leg islature. See Te x. Con st. a rt
. VI I I , section 22(a ). And the r equire ment that “[i] n no biennium shall the rate of g rowth of

a pp ro pr ia tio ns fr om s ta te ta x re ve nu e s n ot d e dic a te d b y thi s c on sti tut ion

e xce e d th e e sti ma te d r a te of g ro wth o f t

he state ’s e c on omy ,” the State De fe nd ants ur g e , d oe s n ot p ro vid e su ff ic ie ntl y de fi nit e sta nd ard s to pe rm it j ud ic ia l de te rm inatio n a nd e nf or c e me nt. The State De fenda

nts equate a

rticle VI I I , section 22(a ) to the constitutional provision addre ssed in City of Cor

pus Christ i v. City of Pleasanton , 276 S.W .2d 798, 803 (Tex. 1955). I n City of Pleasanton , the supreme court a pp lie d th e do c tr ine of

se lf -e xec uti ngc on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s to article XVI , section 59 of the T exas Const itution, whic h decla res that “ [t ]he conservation and development of all the natural resour ces of this State [are] public rig hts and duti es” and requir es the leg islature to “pa ss all such laws as ma y be appr opriate thereto.” Tex. Const. art. XVI , § 59. The court he ld that this provisi on did not provide courts a basis to declar e “w hat ty pes of c onduits and

rese rvoirs may

be used f

or the tra

nsportation and st orag e of w ater , lawfully obtained and lawfully used” or “dec lare the use of c erta in ty pes of c onduits and re s er v o i rs to be unlawf ul when the L eg islature, by nece ssary

implication, has d ecla

red the m to be lawful.” City of Pleasanton , 276 S.W .2d at 803.

The State De fenda

nts a lso r ely on a prior decision of this Court in w hich we held that the fo rm e r a

rt ic le I I I , s e cti on 61 of

the Te xas C on sti tut ion

did no t c on fe r a

jud ic ia lly

e nf or c e a bleT h e s u p r e m e c o u r td i d

n o te x p l i c i t l y

h o l d t h a t“ s u i t a

b i l i t y ” c l a i m s u n d e r

art i c l e V II, 22 section 1 we re justiciable until af ter our Br idge City decision. Compare Neele y , 176 S.W .3d at 776- 23 rig ht. Te x as W or k e rs’ Com p. Comm ’n v. City o

f B rid geCity , 900 S.W .3d 411, 414-15 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, writ denied). A rticle I I I , section 61 provided:
The L egi s lature sha ll have the powe r to ena ct laws to ena ble cities, towns, and village s . . . to provide W orkmen’s Compensation I nsuranc e . . . and the L eg islature sh a ll p ro vid e su ita

ble laws fo r t

he a dmi nis tr a tio n o f su ch ins ur anc e in t he sa id municipalities and for pa y ment of the c osts, charg es, and pr emiums on policies of insurance and the be nefits to be paid ther eunder

.
Te x. Con st. a rt . I I I , § 61 (r e pe a le d N ov emb er 6, 20 01). We h e ld t ha t “ the qu e sti on

of wh a t is a ‘s u it a b le ’ la w is n o t w it

h in th e p o w e r o f a c o urt to d e c id e . B y it s v e r y n a tu r e , it is a political question committed to the leg is l at u re be cause it calls for pure public policy decisions beyond a court’s c ompetence .” City of B rid ge City , 900 S.W .3d at 415. Plaintiffs contend that ar

ticle VI I I , section 22(a) i s compar able to article VI I , section 1 of the Te x as Constitut ion, and emphasiz e the Texas Supreme Court’s jurisprudenc e holding that this provision i s self-e nforc ing to the e x tent of prohibiting inc onsistent laws and that claims under it d o n ot p re se nt n on -j us tic ia ble po lit ic a l qu e sti on s. Ar tic le VI I , s e c tio n 1 pr ov ide s: A g ener al diffusion of knowle dg e being essential to the prese rvation of the liberties and ri g hts of the pe op le , it sh a ll be the du ty of the L e g isl a tur e of

the State to e sta

bli sh and make suitable provision f or the support and maintena nce of an ef ficient sy stem of pu bli c fr e e sc ho ols

.
Te x. Con st. art . V I I , § 1. Th e su pr e me c ourt

ha s repe ate dly

re a ff ir me d th a t c ha lle ng e s und e r t his provision to the “e fficie ncy ,” “a dequac y ” and “ suitabilit y ” of Te x as’s public school f inance sy stem do not present non-

justiciable political questions. See Ne eley , 176 S .W.3d at 776-80. 2280, w i th T e x a s W o r k e r s ’ C o m p . C o m m ’ n v . C i t

y o f B rid ge City , 900 S.W .3d 411, 415 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, w ri t d en ied) (e mphasizi ng that the supreme court’s holding reg arding the “e fficie ncy ” cla

use in Edgewood Inde

p. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby , 7 7 7 S.W .2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989) (“

Edgewood I

”), w as “the only

instance of

which we are awa

re in whic h a cour

t has under taken suc h a task.” ). 24 Most rece ntly , in Neeley , the cour t assumed without deciding that the Ba k e r v . Ca rr te st a

pp lie d to the Texas Constit ution and rea ffirme d that claims under a rticle VI I , section 1 did not prese nt politi cal questions. Id. Whil e a c kn ow le dg ingthat art ic le VI I , se c tio n 1 “ c omm its to t he L e g isl a tur e , th e mos t de moc ratic br anc h o f t

he g ov e rnme nt, the a

uth or ity to de te rm ine the br oa d rang e of po lic y iss ue s in providing for public e ducation,” id. at 778, the cou rt re i t er ated that “ [t ]hi s duty is not commit ted unconditionally to the l eg islature’s discretion, but instead i s acc ompanied by standards.” Id. at 776 (q u o t i n g Edgewood Inde

p. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby , 777 S.W .2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1989) (“ Edgewood I

”))

. As for whether those “standa rds” wer e capa

ble of judicial enfor ceme nt, the supreme cou rt s t ated:
Nor do we ag ree with the State defe ndants that t he constitutional standards of adequa cy , eff

iciency , and suitabilit y are judicially unmanag eable . These sta ndards import a wide spectrum of consider ations and ar e admittedly imprecise, but they

are not without content. . . . The jud i ci ar y i s well-a ccustomed to a pply ing substantive standards the crux of which is r easona bleness. This is not to say that the standar ds in article V I I , sect i o n 1 i nvolve no political considerations bey ond the judiciary ’s po we r t o d e te rm ine . We have a c kn ow le dg e d th a t mu c h o f t he de sig n o f a

n a de qu a te pu b l i c e d u ca t i o ns y s t em ca n n o tb e j u d i ci al l y p re s cr i b ed

. L i t i gat i on over the adequa cy of public educa

tion may well invite judicial policy -making , but the invitation need not be ac cepte d. The judiciar y ’s choice is not between co m p l et e abstinence fr om article VI I , section 1 issues, and being , in the State defe ndants’ words, “the ar b i ter of educ ation and policy , overse eing such issues as cu rr iculum and testing development, textbook approval, a nd teac her c ertification.” Rather, the judiciary ’s du ty is t o d e c ide the le g a l is su e s pro pe rl y be fo re it w ith ou t di c ta tin g po lic y ma tte rs . The c onstitut ional s t an d ar d s provide an a ppropriate basis for judicial r eview a nd deter mination.25

Id

. a t 77 8- 79 ; see also Edge wood I , 7 7 7 S. W. 2 d a t 3 9 4 ( “ B y e xp r e s s c o n s ti tuti o n a l ma n d a te , the leg islature must make ‘suitable ’ provision for an ‘ef ficient’ sy stem for the ‘ essential’ pur pose of a ‘g ener al diffusion of knowle dg e.’ While these a re a dmi t t edly

not prec ise terms, they

do provide a st an d ar d b y which this court must, when c alled upon to do so, measur e the c onstitut ionality of the leg islature’s a ctions.”).

The Neeley

court sim ilarly reje cted the contention t hat article VI I , section 1 was not self-e x ecutingand not susceptible to judicial action to enfor ce its provisions. 176 S.W .3d at 782-83. Whil e re cog nizi ng that article VI I , section 1 wa s not “self-e x ecuting ” in the sense o f m andating the spec ific mea

ns throug h which t h e l egis lature must comply with its dut y

under that provision, the cour t held that it was “self -executing ” to the extent of prohibiting l egi s l ative ac tion inconsistent with the provision:
The standards of article VI I , section 1—ade quacy , eff iciency , and suitability

—do not dictate a particula r structure that a sy stem of fre e public schools must have. We have str e sse d th is r e pe a te dly

. . . . B ut .
. . art ic le VI I , s e c tio n 1 di cta tes wha t th e pu bli c education sy stem cannot be : it ca nnot be so inadequate that it does not provide for a g ener al diffusion of knowle dg e, or so inefficient that dist ricts which must ac hieve thi s g ener al diff

us ion of kn ow le dg e do no t ha

ve su bs tanti a lly

e qu a l a c c e ss t o a va ila ble re ve nu e s to pe rf

or m th e ir mis sio n, or so un su ita ble tha t it c ann ot b e c a

us e of its structure a chieve its purpose. Thus, we a g ree with the State defe ndants that article VI I , section 1 does not provide the cour ts a basis for de clar ing w hat educ ation or finance sy stems will alone satisfy its standards. B ut the provision is self-ex ecutinginsofar a s it prohibits any sy stem that f a ils to m e e t th os e sta

nd ard s.
Id . at 783 (footnotes omitted). F or this disti ncti o n , t h e s u preme court re lied on the rationale of Mitchell County v. City Nat’l Bank , 43 S.W . at 883-84. Mi tc he ll Co un ty involved t wo sec tionsI n their orig inal petiti o n , Pl a in ti f f s r e q u e s ted seve ral de clar ations that would have spe cified 23 pa rt ic ula r me tho ds by wh ic h the State De fe nd ants or the le g isl a tur e wo uld be re qu ir e d to c a lc ulate the rate of g rowth in the state e conomy or the s p en d i n g ca p . On appeal, Plaintiffs appea r to have conce ded that they would not be entitled to those sorts of dec larations, but onl y those deter

mining that article VI I I , section 22 has be en violated. 26 of art ic le XI

of the Te xas C on sti tut ion

—s e c tio n 2 , w hic h s ta te s th a t “ [t]he c on str uc tio n o f j a ils , court-house s and bridg es . . . shall be provided for by g ener al laws,” and sec tion 7, which prohibited cities and counties from incur ring debt for c erta in projects without imposing taxes for a sinking fund to repa y the debt—and article VI I I , section 9, which limited the amount of c erta in tax es that cities and counties could i mpose. Tex. Const. arts. VI I I , § 9, XI , §§ 2, 7. The Mi tc he ll Co un ty court stated that “[i] n the sense that all laws in conflict with these pr ohibitions are void, section 9 of ar ticle 8 and section 7 of a

rticle 11 a

re se lf-executing ; but, in so far as a ny thin g i s require d to be done to ca rry the m in to e ff

e c t, t he y are no t so, be c a

us e the y pr e sc ri be no ru le s by wh ic h an y a c t cou ld be do ne in the enfo rcem ent of

the ir re qu ir e me nts .” 43 S.W. a t 88 2- 83 ; see Nee ley , 176 S.W .3d at 782 (summarizing this holding: “the constitutional provisions were self -executing only in prohibiting conflicting laws and did not pre clude statutes pa ssed to eff ectuate the provisions.”). We a g re e wi th Pla int if

fs that the Te xas Sup re me Court ’s jur isp ru de nc e un de r a rt ic le VI I , section 1 compe ls us t o hold that article V I I I , section 22 is self-e x ecutingto the extent of prohibiting leg islative a c tion inconsistent with its provisions, and that Plainti ffs’ c laims of violations do no t p res ent no n-

jus tic ia ble po lit ic a l qu e sti on s. Although the leg islature is deleg ated the 23 authority to make laws to implement ar ticle VI I I , section 22 (a ), t his is not t he sort of br oad deleg ation to enac t “laws a s may be appr opriate” at issue in City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W .2d at 803,

or eve n the mandate to “provide suitable la ws” we addre ssed in City of B rid ge City . T his a

uth or ity27

is “not committed unconditionally to the leg islature’s discr eti o n , but instead is acc ompanied by standards.” Neeley , 1 7 6 S
. W
. 3 d at 7 7 6 -7 7 (q u o t i n g Edgewood I , 7 7 7 S
. W
. 2 d

a t3 9 4 )

. S p e c i f

i c a l l y, le g isl a tio n th a t pu

rp or ts t o imp le me nt the re qu ir e me nt that “ [i]n no bie nn ium sh a ll the rate of

g ro wth of appr opriations from state ta x reve nues not dedicated by this constitut ion ex cee d the estimated

rate of g ro wth o f t

he state ’s e c on omy” mus t ne c e ssa ri ly be c on sis te nt w iththose sta nd a rd s. Mi tc he ll Co un ty , 43 S.W . at 882-83.

Al tho ug h th e sta

nd ard s o f a

rt ic le VI I I , s e c tio n 2 2( a ) “ are a dmi tte dly no t pr e c ise terms,” Neeley , 1 7 6 S
. W
. 3 d at 7 7 6 -7 7 (q u o t i n g Edgewood I , 7 77 S.W. 2d

a t 39 4) , th e y

sure ly mus t be conside red suf

ficiently deter minable and enfor cea

ble by courts if, as the supreme court ha s held, such nebulous conc epts as “a d e q u a c y , ” “ef ficienc y ,” and “ suitabilit y ” under article VI I , section 1 ar e. I n su m , article VI I I , section 22(a ) g ives the leg islature the “ sole rig ht to decide how to mee t the standards se t by

the people” in that provision, but “the J udiciary has the fina l authority

to determine whether they have be en met.” Id

. at 7 7 7 & n
. 1 6 9 (qu o t i n g W est Orange-Cov e Consol. Indep. Sch. Di st. v . A lan is , 107 S.W .3d 558, 563-64 (Te x . 2003)).

Our rea soning is f

urther informe d b y

t h e Neeley

court’s obse rvations that nonjusticiable political questions are rar e, id . at 77 9- 80 , a nd that City of Pleasanton is the sole instance in w hich it ha s used the doctrine of self-e x ecuting constitutional provisions to pr eclud e j u d i ci al action. Id. at 782-83. We a re also mindful of the supreme court’s obse rvations that while the Te x as Constit ution do es n o t empower the judicial bra

nch to eng ag e in leg islative policy making in the g uise of constitutional interpre tation, neither doe s it permit courts t o av o i d their duties, when called upon, to strike dow n laws that ar e inconsistent with constitutional provisions. Id. at 776-82.Th e State De fe nd ants “ do no t qu e sti on that H e nd e e is a

ta xpay e r u

nd e r t he fa c ts s e t f

or th 24 in the pleading s.” 28 As t h e supre me cour

t observed w hen first summoned to strike down a n act of the Re pu bli c of Te xas C on g re ss: [W ]e have not been unmindful of t he magnitude of the principles involved, a nd the respe ct due to the popular branc h of the g overnme nt.
. . . For tunately , howeve r, for the people, the function of the judicia ry in deciding constitutional questions i s not on e wh ic h it

is at libe rt

y to de c lin e . . . . [We] cann ot, a s th e le g isl a tur e may , avo id a me a sure be c a

us e it a pp ro a c he s th e c on fi ne s o f t he c on sti tut ion; [ we ] ca

nn ot p a ss it b y be c a us e it i s d ou

btf ul; wi th wh a te ve r d ou

bt, wi th w hate ve r d if

fi c ult ie s a c a se may be a tte nd e d, [we ] mus t de c ide it, wh e n it ari se s in jud g me nt.
Morton v. Gordon , D a llam 39 6, 39 7- 98 (T e x. 18 41 ); see also Nee ley , 1 76 S.W. 3d a t 77 7 ( “ wh a t th is court said [in Morton ] . . . i s still true.” ).

Be cause article VI I I , section 22 is self-e x ecutingto t h e extent of prohibiting le g isl ati ve a c tio n in c on sis te nt w ithits sta nd ard s, wh ic h a

re jud ic ia lly

a sc e rt a ina

ble , a nd be c a us e Plaintiffs’ claims that these standards have been violated do not pr esent a non-justiciable political qu e sti on , w e c ann ot a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s or de r o f d ism iss a l ba se d o n th e se do c tr ine s. Unlaw fu l app ropriation

Th e State De fend ant s fur the r c on te nd

that Pla int if

fs la c k s tand ingand

that th e ir claims are barr ed by

sovere ign immunity

beca use they have not, a

nd cannot, a ssert a va lid claim that H.B . 1’s appr opriation is unlawful. P laintiffs pleade d that they have sta nding a s “re sidential and business tax pay ers,” an alleg ation that we c onstrue, in the conte x t of their other alleg ations, to assert t h at t h ey p ay s t at e t ax es t h at co u l d

es t ab l i s h t ax p ay er

s t an d i n g. T h e Te x as Supreme Court ha s

24Plaint i ff s d o not contend that the UD J A alone suf fice s to confer

them standing as 25 ta xpay e rs . The State De fenda

nts raise seve ral other

arguments disput i n g wh et her Plaintiffs have 26 a d e qu a te ly p le a d e d s ta

n d in g u n d e r

th e taxp ay e r

e xc e p ti o n . We a d dr e s s th o s e ar g u me n ts in th e n e xt section of this opinion. 29 explained that “[i] n g ener al, taxpay ers do not have a rig ht to bring suit to contest g overnme nt de c isi on -m a kin g be c a

us e . . . g ov e rnme nts c ann ot op erat e if e ve ry c iti zen wh o c on c lud e s th a t a public officia l has abused his discr etion is gr anted the ri gh t t o co me into court and br ing suc h officia l’s public acts unde r re view.” Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 555 (quoti n g Os bo rn e v. Ke ith , 177 S
. W
. 2 d 1 98, 200 (Tex. 1944)). Unless standingis confer red by statute, taxp ay e r s mu s t s h o w as

25

a ru le that the y have su ff

e re d a par tic ula ri zed inj ur

y dis tin c t fr om t

hat su ff e re d b y the g e ne ra l pu

bli c in order to ha

ve standing to challeng e a g overnme nt action or a ssert a public r ight. Id at 555-56. Texas law, however, ha s long r ecog nized an important exception to thi s g ener al rule: a taxpay er ha s
s t an d i n g t o s u e i n

eq u i t y t o en j o i nt h e i l l ega l ex p en d i tu re o f p u b l i c f u n d s , ev en wi t h o u t s h o wi n g a distinct inj ury . Id.

Plaintiffs contend that their p le a d in g s a ll e g e f

a c ts b r in g in g

th e m w it h in this e x ception. Th e fo un datio n o f the ir sta nd ing the or

y is the ir c on te nti on that the y have a lle g e d s uf fi c ie nt f a c ts that, if proven, w ould establish that H.B. 1 v i olates ar ticle VI I I , section 22 or c hapter 316 (which, the y
rea son, would rende r illeg al any expenditures made under t he appr opriation). See Te x. Con st. art
. VI I I , § 6 (for

bidding e x penditure of

state funds “but i n pursuanc e of specific appropr iations made by law”)

. For the s ame reasons, P laintiffs urg e that they have pleaded a valid claim of ultra vires

26 action that is not barr ed by sovere ign immunity

. See , e.g. , Cobb v. Harrington , 190 S.W .2d 709, 71230

(Tex. 1945) (re cog nizi ng that sovere ign immunity does not bar c laim of u l tra vires acts); McClane Co. , 148 S.W .3d at 649.

We conclude that the district court would have abused its discretion if it dismiss ed on this basis P l ai n t i ff

s’ claims that (1) the use of pe rsonal income a s the “sole ba rometer ” of “ the

e sti ma te d r a te of

g ro wth o f the state ’s e c on omy” c a us e s the sp e nd ingc a

ps se t on that ba sis to p e rm it

un c on sti tut ion a lly

e xce ssi ve a

pp ro pr ia tio ns , an d tha t H.B . 1 is suc h an a pp ro pr ia tio n; an d (2) the ir

a lte rn a tiv e c la im that th e H. B . 1 a pp ro pr ia tio n “ e xce e ds e ve n th e e x tr eme ly g e ne ro us and

fa ult y estimates provided by

the L eg islative Budg et Boa rd.” The dispositive issues—as they have e volved on appea l—controlling w hether Plaintiffs have va lidly

p l ea d ed each theor

y wer e not ra ised, br ie fe d, or

de ve lop e d in

the dis tr ic t c ourt
. I n th e ir ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n, the State De fe nd ants c on te nd e d tha t Pla int if fs ’ c la im reg ardingthe use of persona l income to set the spendingcap did not validly alleg e unlawf

ul conduct beca use t h e S tate De fenda

nts had complied with section 316.002 of the g overnme nt code, whic h

re qu ir e d th e us e of

the pe rs on a l in c ome me a sure . As fo r w he the r s e c tio n 3 16 .0 02 its e lf mig ht v iol a te article VI I I , section 22, the S tate Defenda nts did not address that claim other than to comment that “i f P laintiffs succe ed in invalidating § 316.002(b),” injunctive relief (which Plaintiffs had not

re qu e ste d) wo uld

be “ pr e ma tur e ” be c a

us e the law p re su me s th a t the State De fe nd ants wo uld c omp ly with a dec laration of the statute’s invalidity . On appe al, in response t o q u es t i ons from the Court during oral argument, the parties have beg un to a ddress one aspec t of a deter mination of

whether Plaintiffs’ alleg ations assert a valid claim t hat H.B. 1’s appropriation is unlawful: the standar d for establishing a

violation of article VI I I , section 22(a ). The pa rties conc ur that the a

ppropriate standardAn a c tio n is arb itr ary

wh e n it is tak en wi thout

re fe re nc e to guid ingru le s o r p ri nc ipl e s. 27 Neeley , 1 7 6 S
. W
. 3 d

at 7 8 4 (c i t i n g Ge ne ra l Tir e, I nc . v . Ke pp le , 970 S.W .2d 520, 526 (Tex. 1998)). Whether a le g islative enac t m en t is arbitrary and ther efor e unconstitutional is a question of law. Id . at 785. Althoug h this determination may rest in par

t upon determinations of disputed fa ctual matters, such f

indings “ have a

limit ed role ” in dec iding ultimately the constitutional issues. Id. As applied to ar

ticle VI I , section 1, the a

rbitrar iness standard a ccounts for the discre tion the constitution affords the le g islature in fa shioning a public school fin an ce s y s t em satisfying the require ments of “a dequac y ,” “ef ficienc y ,” and “suitability ” while rec og nizi ng the judiciary ’s prope r ro le in e nf

or c ingthe se re qu ir e me nts :
I f t he L e g isl a tur e ’s c ho ic e s are inf or me d b y g uid ingru le s a

nd pr inc iple s p ro pe rl y related to public education—that is, i f t he choices are not ar bitrary —then the sy stem does not violate the c onstitut ional provision. For article VI I , section 1, as with other provisions, “[t] he final authority to determine adher ence to the Constit ution resides with the J udiciary .” As we have sa id, “‘a mere dif fe re nc e of op inion [ bet ween ju dges an d l egis lat ors ] , wh ere reas on abl e mi nd s co uld differ , is not a sufficient basis for striking dow n leg islation as arbitrar y or unrea sonable.’” At the same tim e, “[ l] eg islative action .

. . is not without bounds.” I n a sse ssi ngc ha lle ng e s to the pu bli c sc ho ol s y ste m un de r a rt ic le VI I , s e c tio n 1 , c ourt s mus t no t on the on e ha

nd su bs tit ute the ir po lic y c ho ic e s fo r the L egis lature ’s , howeve r undesira

ble the latter

may appea r, but must on the other hand examine the L eg islature’s c hoices c are fully to determine w hether

tho s e choice s meet the require ments of the Constit ution. By steering this c ourse, the J udici ar y ca n assure that th e pe op le ’s gua

ra nte e s und e r t

he Con sti tut ion

are pr ote c te d

w i t h o ut s t r a y i n g int o the pre rog atives of the L eg islature.
Id. (footnotes a

nd citations omitt ed). 31 is a rb itr ari ne ss, the sta

nd ard that th e su

pr e me c ourt ha s a

pp lie d to c la ims c ha lle ng ingTe xas’ s p ub lic school financ e sy stem under a rticle VI I , section 1. See Ne eley , 176 S.W .3d at 783-85. Yet much 27

rema ins to be addre ssed conce rning how this standa rd would apply here

. Be cause the par ties have

no t ha d a n a de qu a te op po rt

un ity to d e ve lop the se iss ue s, the dis tr ic t c ourt woul d h a ve a

bu se d it s discretion by

dismiss ing Plaintiffs’ c laim on this basis. Se e Da v is , 137 S.W .3d at 335 & n.16.I n such instance s, appellate courts mus t consider the petition, construed in the plea der’ s 28 favor , and, if ne cessa

ry , revie w the entire rec ord to deter mine if any

evidenc e supports subject matter jurisdiction. Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex as Air Contr ol Bd. , 852 S.W .2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993).

32 Simi larly , the State Def

endants did not sep a

r a te ly c h a ll e n g e th e d is tric t c o u

r t’ s subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ a lternative c laim that H.B. 1’ s appropr iation, even by the L BB ’s
own measur es under

section 316.002(b) , exceede d the spending cap. O n appea l, a s previously noted, the State Def

endants attempt to initiate a challeng e to the jurisdictional f act of whether H.B . 1 ’s

a pp ro pr ia tio n e xce e de d th e sp e nd inglim it s e t by the L B B , w hic h th e y

a tte mpt to s up po rt

wi th evidenc e they did not prese nt to the district court. Althoug h subject matter jur isdiction, as a g ener al principle, may

be challeng ed for the f

irst time on appeal ( and may be ra ised by

an appe llate cour

t sua sponte), see Tex as Ass’n of Bus ., 852 S.W .2d at 445 -4 6 (c o n s i deringassociational standing of appellant sua

sponte), there are limit s to this principle where the cha lleng e conc erns jurisdictional

28 evidenc e. Miranda indicates t h at wh er e, as here, the challeng e conc erns a jurisdictional fac t that implicates the merits, such challeng es must (1) be raised in the trial court, and (2) be supported by jur isd ic tio na l e vid e nc e that c on c lus ive ly ne g a te s the e xiste nc e of the c ha lle ng e d ju ri sd ic tio na l f

a c t. This standard thus “gen er al l y mirrors” a

“tra ditional” summary

judgme nt motion. Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 227-28 (c iting Te x . R. Civ. P. 166a (a) ). The supreme court e x plained that this standard appropr iately

balanc es the c ompet in g

in te r e s ts o f th e state a nd claimants in ca ses wher e jurisdictional iss ue s a lso imp lic a te the me ri ts:33

We adher e to the funda

mental pre cept that a

court must not proce ed on the merits of a ca se until leg itimate challeng es to its jurisdiction have been decided. This standard acc omplishes this g oal and more . I t also protect s t h e int ere sts of the state and the injured cla imants in cases like this one, in wh i ch the deter mination of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court implicates the merits of the pa rties’ c ause of

action. Th e sta nd ard a llo ws the state in a tim e ly mann e r to e xtri c a te its e lf fr om l iti g a tio n if it is tr u ly im mu n e . H o w e v e r , b y r e s e r

v in g f o r th e f a c t f in d e r th e r e s o lution of disputed jurisdictional facts that implicate the merits of the c laim or defe nse, we prese rve the parties’ rig ht to present the m er i t s of their c ase at trial. Sim ilar to the purpose of

a plea to the jurisdiction, whic h is to defeat a ca use of a ction for whic h the s tate h a s n o t w a iv e d s o v e r e ig n im mu n it y ( u s u a ll y b e f

o r e th e s tate h a s in c u r

r ed the fu ll c os ts of lit ig a tio n) , the purp os e of su mma ry jud g me nts in T e xas i s “ ‘t o e lim inate patently unmeritorious claims and untena ble def enses.’ ” Casso v. B r a nd , 776 S.W .2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) (quoting City of Ho us ton v . Cle ar Cre e k Ba sin Au th ., 589 S.W .2d 671, 678 n.5 (Tex. 1979)). B y requiringthe s tate to meet the summary judgme nt standard of

proof in ca ses like this one, we p ro t ec t the plaintiffs fr om having to “put on their ca se simply to establ ish jurisdiction.” Bland , 34 S.W .3d at 554. I nstead, a fter the state a s serts and suppor ts with evidence that the trial cour t la c ks su bje c t matte r j ur isd ic tio n, we sim ply re qu ir e the pla int if

fs , w he n th e fa c ts underlying the merits and subject matter jur isdiction are inter twined, to show that there is a disputed materia l fac t reg ardingthe jurisdictional issue. See H uckabe e v. Time W arner Entm’t Co. L.P. , 1 9 S. W.3 d 4 13 , 4 20 (T e x. 20 00 ); Phan S o n V an v. Pena , 990 S.W .2d 751, 753 (Tex. 1999).
Miranda , 133 S.W .3d at 228.

When review ing a

summary

judgme nt, an appe llate cour t cannot conside r independe nt gr ounds—much less summary judgme nt e v id e n c e

—

n o t p r e s e nte d

to the trial court. See , e.g. , Cincinnati L ife Ins. Co. v. Cates , 9 27 S.W. 2d 62 3, 62 6 (T e x. 19 96 ). We be lie ve that Miranda compels the same result re g ardingthe State Def endants’ attempt to attack jurisdi ct ionalBland Indepe ndent School District v. Blue may a lso be ins tr uc tiv e . As d isc us se d in

de ta il 29 below, the c ase involved a s ch o o l d i s t rict’s a ppeal f rom a de nial of its plea to the jurisdiction ch a ll e n g in g th e s ta

n d in g o f taxp ay e r s to s e e k

a p e r ma n e n t i n ju n c ti o na g a in s t a

s c h o o l d istric t’s expenditures of funds re lating to the construction of a school building. In the trial cour t, the district had p r e s e n te d

e v id e n c e th at t

h e b u il d in g h a d

a lr e a dy b e e nc o n s tr

u c te d , w h ic h im

p li c a te d the plaintiffs’ standing t o sue as taxpay ers. The trial court ha d ref used to consider

the evidenc e in the belief that it was bound to consider only the pleading s, a ruling that the Texas Supreme Court later held erro n eo u s . 3 4 S.W .3d at 555. I n relianc e on the tria l court’s de cision not to consider the evidenc e, the plaintiffs had not attempted to offe r contra ry evidenc e. Id. On appe al, they urg ed the supreme court not to consider the district’s evidenc e without g iving them the opportunity on rema nd to have a full evidentiary

hear ing. Id. The supre me cour t stated that such a r emand would have bee n appropri at e i f t h e plaintiffs’ sta nding ha d been de pendent on e vidence they had disputed and conte nded wa s not conclusive. I d. How ever , be c a

us e the pla int if

fs did “ no t di sp ute BI SD’s evidenc e that construc ti o n of the school building is complete,” the court proc eede d to c on sid e r “ wh e the r t

his un dis pu te d e vid e nc e c on c e rn ingthe s ta tus of the pr oje c t de fe a ts t h e [ plaintiffs’] claim of standing .” Id. H e r e , P l a i n t i f f s d i s p u t e t h e e v i d e n c e t h a tthe Sta te De fe nd ants wo uld

pr e se nt o n a

pp e a l. We expr e ss no opi nio n re g ard ing wh e the r t he jur isd ic tio na l e vid e nc e the State De fe nd a nts 30 seek to pr esent on appea l w ould me et their bu rd en u n d er Miranda if prese nted to the district court on re mand. 34 fa c ts w ithe vid e nc e on

a pp e a l. We t

he re fo re c annot affi rm th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of thi s 29 claim on this gr ound. 30

Howeve r, the district cou

r t w o u ld n o t h a v e err ed or a

bused its discretion in dismiss ing Plaintiffs’ “unlawf

ul deleg ation” cla im ba sed on the re cord be fore it. Pl aintiffs’ plea dings r eg arding that claim demonstrate fata l and incura ble jurisdictional defe cts. See M iranda , 133 S.W .3d at 226- 27
. P lai nti ff

s a lle g e that th e le g isl a tur e vio la te d s e pa ratio n- of -p ow e rs pr inc ipl e s b y

imp ro pe rl y deleg ating its leg islative powers ove r the spendingcap to the L BB or its staff. See Te x. Con st. art
. I I , § 1, interpre tive commentar y (“Asettled maxi m of constitutional law is that the power confe rre d upon th e leg islature to make la ws ca nnot be deleg ated by

that depar

tment to any

other body

or authority .”). H oweve r, as our ear lier discussion of chapte r 316 illust rate s, the only “dele g ation” of35

leg islative power that Plainti ffs attack is mere ly an assig nment of duties within the leg islative branc h

a k in to e a c h c h a mb e r ’ s r e f e r r a l o f b il ls to c o mm itte e s p r io r to c o n s id e r a ti o n b e f o r e th e entire chambe r. The T exas Const itution not only contemplates but r equire s eac h chambe r of the leg islature to refe r all bills to a committee, which must repor t the bill b ef

o re co n s i d eration by

the entire chambe r. Tex. Const. art. I I I , § 37. I n simil ar fashion, the L BB , a permanent joi nt committee of the Texas L eg islature, Te x . Gov’t Code. Ann. § 322.001(a) , proposes for eac h chambe r’s c onsideration budg et and policy

rec ommendations reg ardingproposed leg islative appropr iations, including a draf t Gene ral Appr opriations Act ea ch session, id

. § 322.008(c) ; fiscal impact statements reg ardingother proposed leg islation, id

. § 314.001; and calculations of t he spending cap. As with bills reported f rom other leg islative committees, t h e u l timate leg islative power—w hether a bill containing an appropr iation is pa ssed, amende d, or reje cted—r emains not w ith the L BB or its staf f, but with each

re sp e c tiv e c hambe r a

nd its ind ivi du a l me mbe rs , w ho c an u til ize se ve ra l pr oc e dura l me c ha nis ms t o resist passag e of bill s containing appr opriations they believe w ould exceed the spe nding c ap. Id . §§ 316.006, 316.008
. P l ai n t i ffs a ccor dingly cannot a lleg e a violation of the constitutional

se pa ratio n o f p ow e rs on

thi s b a sis

. Other standing i ssues

Th e State De fe nd ants ra ise a dd iti on a l, p ote nti a lly d i s p o s i t i v e c h a lle ng e s to Pla int if fs ’ pleading s of standing . As previously noted, Pl ai n t i ff

s rely on the exception to ge nera l standing

re qu ir e me nts that pe rm its a ta xpay e r to su e in e qu ity to e njo in the ill e g a l e xpe nd iture of state fu nd s,
even w ithout showing a distin ct i n jury

. Se e W

ill iam s v . La ra , 52 S.W .3d 171, 180 (Tex. 2001); Bland , 3 4 S. W.3 d at 55 5- 56 ; Cal v e rt v . H ull , 475 S.W .2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972) (citing with approva lThe State De fenda nts do not sugg est that Plaintiffs lack standing to challeng e prospe ctive 31 unlawful e x penditures unde r this exception merely beca use t hey have not y et soug ht an injunction ag ain st t h o s e e x p e n d i tu r e s , b u tr e qu e s to n l y d e c l a r a t i o n s th a t t h e H.B. 1 appr opriation and e xpe nd iture s ma de un de r i t are ill e g a l. I n f a c t, i n th e ir

ple a to t he jur isd ic tio n, the State De fe nd a nts c on te nd e d th a t in

jun c tiv e re lie f w ou ld b e “ pr e ma tur e ” be fo re the y ha d th e op po rt

un ity to co mpl y wi th any dec laratio n th a t th e c ourt mig ht i ssu e be c a

us e “ [t]he law p re su me s th a t a de fe nd ant w ill rec og nize and respe ct the rig hts de clar ed by a dec laratory

judgme nt and will abide by the judg ment i nca rry i n g o u t i t s d

u t i es . ” P l eat o t h e J u ri s d i ct i o n , C
. R
. 1 3 9 -4 0 (q u o t i n g Ho we ll v . Te x as W or k e rs’ Comp. Comm’n , 143 S.W .3d 416, 433 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied))

. At least to the extent that Pl aintiffs prope rly challeng e the le gal i t y o f future e x penditures made unde r the H.B . 1 appropr iation, we conclude that Plaintiffs w ould ha ve standing to assert that claim under

the UDJA without seeking injunctive r elief. While the UDJA does not expand a trial court’s jurisdiction or dispense with the j usticiability require ments of ripene ss and standing , it does provide a reme dy wher e subject matter jurisdiction other wise exis ts. Te x . Civ. P rac . & Re m. Code Ann. § 37.003(a) (West 1997) (“Acourt of r ecor d withi n its juri sdiction ha s p ow e r t o d e c lare ri g hts , 36 Os bo rn e v . Ke ith , 1 77 S.W. 2d 19 8, 20 0- 01 (T e x. 19 44 ); City of A us tin v . M

c Cal l , 68 S.W . 791, 793- 94 (T e x. 19 02 ); Terrell v. Middleton , 187 S.W
. 367, 368-70 (Te x . Civ. App.—San Antonio 1916), writ r ef’d , 191 S.W
. 1138 (Tex. 1918) ). Plaintiffs c ontend that, beca use their plea dings a lleg e that the H. B . 1 a

pp ro pr ia tio n is unc on sti tut ion a l and ill e g a l, the y ne c e ssa ri ly c omp la in o f t

he “ sp e c if

ic illega l e x penditure” of state funds made pur suant to that appropr iation. See Tex. Const. art. VI I I , § 6 (re quiring that state funds not be e x pended “ but in pur s u an ce o f s p ecif ic appr opriations made by law”)

. I n addition to their challeng es to Plaintiffs’ predic ate a lleg ations that the H.B . 1 appropr iation is i lle g a l, t

he State De fe nd ants c on te nd that Plai nti ff s fa il to all e g e ill e g a l e xpe nd iture s su ff ic ie nt t o bring them within the t axpay er standing ex ception. Specifica lly , the State Def endants urg e that (1) Plaintiffs were require d to plead that expenditures are being made f or par ticular illeg al purposes or ends, not mere ly

that the amount of the appropr iations authorizing the expenditures would excee d the sp e nd ingc a

p; and (2 ) t

he e xpe nd iture s th a t Pla int if fs c ha lle ng e sh ou ld b e de e me d a lr e a dy sp e nt. See B land , 34 S.W .3d at 556-57. 31status and

oth e r l e g a l r e la tio ns . . . . ” ) ( e mph a sis a dd e d) ; T e x a s A s s ’ n o

f B u s. , 8 5 2 S.W .2d at 444. Thu s , if Pl a in ti f f s w o u ld h a v e s ta n d in g to s e e k

anin ju n c ti o nto p r e v e n t e xp e n d it u r e s th a t t h e tr ial court de termined to be illeg al, the UDJ A would l ikewise a uthorize them to obtain declarations reg ardingthe component issue of whether the expenditures wer e illeg al. Cf. El Pa so Co. Ho sp . D ist

. v. G il bert , 6 4 S. W. 3 d 2 0 0 , 2 0 2

- 0 3 ( T e x. A p p . — E l Pa s o 2 0 0 1 , p e t. d e n ie d ) ( w h e r e p la in ti f f s had jus t iciable inter est in controver sy arising under se ction 26.04 of prope rty code, the y

likewise had standing to seek re lief under UDJA). Se e W ill iam s v . La ra , 52 S.W .3d 171, 180-83 (Te x . 2001) (c omplaint of public funds 32 be inge xpe nd e d at pr iso n in vio la tio n o f E sta

bli sh me nt C la

us e ); Cal v e rt v . H ull , 475 S.W .2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972) (suit t o enjoin funds appr opriated by leg islature to proc ure site of University

of Te xas o f t

he Pe rm ian B a sin

on ba sis that c on dit ion s f

or a pp ro pr ia tio n were no t met) ; Osborne v. Ke ith , 1 7 7 S
. W
. 2 d 1 9 8 , 2 0 0

- 0 1 ( T e x. 1 9 4 4 ) ( “ r e c o g n i z [i n g ] t h e r i g h t o f a t a xp ay i n g c iti zen to maintain an ac tion in a court of e quit y t o enjoin public officia ls under a c ontrac t that is void or ill e g a l.” ); City

of A us tin v . M

c Cal l , 68 S.W . 791, 793-94 (Te x . 1902) (same). Pla int if fs su g g e st that Terrell v. Middleton , the not able “ chicke n salad c ase,” se e Hu ll , 475 S.W .2d at 908, is closely analog ous to this case and squarely supports the proposition that tax pay ers may s u e t o e n

j o i n s t a t e e xp e n d i tu r e s t h a t e xc e e d c o n s t i tu t i o n a l s p e n d i n g l i m i t s . I nfa c t, i t is somewhat unc lear

whether the alleg edly

unlawful e x penditures that c onfer red s t an d i n g upon the taxpay er pla intiff did so beca use the e x penditures e x cee ded a c onstitut ional l i m i t o r b ecause the purposes of the expenditures wer e alleg edly unlawful. See 187 S.W . 367, 372-73 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 1916), writ r ef’d , 191 S.W . 1138 (Tex. 1918). Te rre ll involved whether

the Comptroller could use state funds to pay cer tain enter tainment bills i ncurr ed by the g overnor

—including c hicken salad fr om the Driskill. Although these e x penditures would have violated c onstitut ional limit s on the amount of the g overnor ’s salar y , the court of appea ls a lso e mphasized that the items that were to be paid by

the Comptroller “we re f

or private and individual purposes , and not for the public g ood, and the a ppropriation made for that pur pose by the L eg islature wa s directly in the fac e of article 16, § 6 of the Constit ution, whic h commands that ‘no appropr iation f or private or individual purposes shall be made.’” Id

. at 372 (empha sis a dded). The c ourt also noted that “a lending of the c redit of the State t o a Governor for hi s private ex penses, to incre ase his compe nsation is not only a violation of the c o n s ti tuti o n a l p r o v is io n a s to h is c o mp e n s ati o n , b u t is in v io lati o n o f arti c le 3 , § 5 0 , of the 37 Reg ardingthe State Def endan t s ’ first arg ument, we disag ree that Plaintiffs lack standing to challeng e “spe cific illeg al expenditures” b ec au s e they complain that a limit has been

e xce e de d a

nd do no t all ege tha t th e e xpe nd iture s a re dir e c te d s pe c if

ic a lly to u nla wf ul p ur po se s. Whil e many

of the case s upholding taxpay er standingto enjoin illega l expenditures have involved

c ha lle ng e s to the le g a lity

of tho se e xpe nd iture s’ purp os e s, we disag ree that such fa cts prec lude the 32Constit ution.” Id . at 37 3; see also Tex. Cons t. art. I I I , § 50 (prohibiting leg islature from g iving or

lending cre dit of State to any person or

pledg ing cre dit of State in any manner whatsoeve r for pay ment of individual’s liabiliti es). The court’s opinion concluded by stating that wheneve r taxes are imposed for private purposes , t hey “ce ase to be taxation and become plunder .” Id . (quoting W ap le s v . M arra st , 184 S.W . 180, 182 (Tex. 1916)). 38 application of the taxpay er standingexception here . We see no meaning ful distinction, for example, betwee n a taxpay er suit to enjoin expenditures under a n alleg edly

void o r i l l eg al contra ct, long permitted in Texas law, s e e Osborne , 177 S. W.2 d at 20 0- 01 ; Mc Cal l , 68 S.W . at 793-94, a nd a t ax p ay er s u i tt o p re v en t ex p en d i tu re s u n d er an u n l aw fu l l egi s l at i v e ap p ro p ri at i o n , as P l ai n t i ff s al l ege here . I n fa ct , s tate taxpay ers ha ve bee n permitted to sue to enjoin state e x penditures ba sed on alleg ations that the expendi t u re s wo uld not be pursuant to a va lid appropriation. See J ohnson v. Ferguson , 55 S .W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.—Austi n 1932, writ dism’d) (c halleng ing g rant of temporar y injunction prohibiti ng further state hig hway

construction contr acts be cause there was not
any le g isl a tiv e a

pp ro pr ia tio n ava ila

ble fo r t hat pu rp os e ); Te rre ll , 187 S.W . at 374 (c hallen ging appropr iation of $2 , 0 0 0 and additional $1,500 deficienc y appropr iation for Gove rnor’ s persona l

e xpe ns e s) . Si mil arl y , c ounty ta xpay e rs have long be e n p e rm itt e d to su e to e njo in c ounty expenditures not properly authorized in a budg et, in contra vention of the Unifor

m Budg et Act. See Ga rc ia v . S

tat e , 2 90 S.W. 2d

55 5, 55 9 ( Te x. Civ

. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 19 53 , w ri t r e f’ d n .r .e .) ; Gu e rra v. Mc Clellan , 2 43 S.W. 2d 71 5, 71 7 ( Te x. Civ

. Ap p. —Sa n An ton io 1 95 1, no wr it) ; see also Act of May 21, 1931, 42nd L eg ., R.S., ch. 206, 1929-31 Tex. Gen. L aws 339, repeale d by Act of A pril 30, 1987, 70th L eg ., R.S., ch. 149, § 49(1), 1987 Tex. Ge n. L aws 707, 1306 (cur rent version at Te x . L oc.We a lso fi nd un pe rs ua siv e the State De fe nd ants ’ a tte mpt s to e qu a te Pla int if fs ’ c la ims to 33 those asser

ted in Robinson v. Neele

y , 192 S.W .3d 904, 911 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pe t.), which they cite for the proposition that “whe n the authority to e ng ag e in an ac tivity is disputed, but not t he leg ality of the a ction itself, taxpay ers have no standing to challeng e it.” Robinson arose from t he education c ommissi oner’ s appointment of a board of manag ers to c ontrol the operations of the Wil mer-H utchins I ndepende nt School District. After the boa rd voted to “e ssentially

shut down the dis tr ic t,” a

g ro up tha

t in c lud e d a dis tr ic t ta xpay e r su e d fo r de c lara tor y and inj un c tiv e re lie f. Th e ir petition was dismissed for want of standing , which the c ourt of ap p ea l s affirmed. Reg ardingthe ta xpay e r’ s st and ing , th e c ourt ob se rv e d tha t “ [n]ow he re in a pp e lla nts ’ a c tiv e ple a din g or

the ir brief do they acc use the Commi ssioner, the [board], or [t he superintende nt] o f e x p ending public funds on illegal ac t i v i t y [but ] complain that the ex penditures we re ma de by an ‘invalid’ boar d.” Id. at 911. The c ourt furthe r noted t h at “[ a] ppellants cite no a uthority for the proposition that a p u b l i c office r, per forming his duties in good fa ith, is enga g ed in an illega l activity

if his authority

is in disput e.” Id. I n an attempt to bring this c ase w ithin Robinson , th e State De fe nd ants c ha ra c te ri ze P la int if

fs ’ claims as “attack[ing] only the proc ess by

which the f

unds were allocate d.” Plaintiffs ’ claims are clea rly not so lim ited. They

challeng e expenditures claimed to be unla wful bec ause the y

are being made pur suant to alleg edly unconstitutional or unlawful appropr iations. A t most, Robinson might have implications for

Plaintiffs’ standing to assert their c laims that chapter 316 unlawfully

deleg ates leg isl a ti v e p o w e r to th e L B B , a c la im th a t w e h av e a lr e a dy h e ld is b ar r e d b y la c k o f s ta

n d in g and s o v e r e i g ni m m u n i t y. 39 Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 111.010, .039( b) (West 1999)). We rejec t the State Def endants’ na

rrow vie w of the taxpay er standingexception. 33

Turning to the State Def endants’ se cond ar g ument, it is well-establ i s hed that taxpay ers have standing only to cha l leng e prospectivestate expenditures, but do not have st an d in g to c o mp la in o f p u b li c f u n d s th a t h a v e a lr e a dy b e e n s p e n t. A s th e s u p r e me cour t has explained: When a taxpay er br ings a

n action to re strain the illeg al expenditure . . . of tax money he sues for himself, and it is held that his inter est in the subject-matter is sufficient to s up po rt

the a c tio n; b ut w he n th e mon e y ha d a lr e a dy be e n sp e nt, an a c tio n f or its rec overy is for the [tax ing e ntity ]. The cause of ac tion belongs to it alone.40

Ho ffm an v . D av is , 1 00 S.W. 2d 94 , 9 5 ( Te x. 19 37 ); see Bland , 3 4 S. W.3 d at 55 6- 58 . T he Sta te Def endants a ssert that the e x penditures a uthorized under the a

ppropriations in H.B . 1 “have essentially

alre ady been spe nt.” They appar ently mean this in a functional rather than litera l sense. Th e State De fe nd ants ur g e that “ sc ho ols a c ro ss t he state have re lie d o n th is f un din g in pla

nn ingthe ir y e ar ly b u d g e ts a s th o u g h th e y h a v e b e e n r e c e iv e d an d p la c e d in p e r ma n e n t u s e , ” an d th at “[t]o
reve rse the appropr iation would upset the s ettled ex pecta tions of the district and their e mploy ees.” The State De fenda

nts rely on an extension of the principles a pplied in Bland

. I n Bland , ta

xp a ye r s sued to enjoin a school district fr om making pa y ments under what the y c on te nd e d w a s an inva lid le a se -p ur c ha se a g re e me nt w ithCiti c or p. Th e dis tr ic t ha d e nte re d in to the ag ree ment to help financ e the c onstruction of a ne w hig h school . By the time of suit, the new building had a lrea dy opened, the district ha d paid the contra ctor in f ull, a nd the only

obligation that

rema ined was f

or the d i s trict to make semiannua l loan repa y ments to Cit icorp throug h 2011. 34 S.W .3d at 549-50. Unde r these c ircumstance s, the supreme court he ld t h at the taxpay ers lac ked standing to sue the school district to enjoin the future loan re pay ments. The cour

t expl ained:
We a re no t in c lin e d to e xten d th e e xce pti on to ta xpay e r s tand ingto i nc lud e the B lue s’ suit. The juri s p ru d enti al justification for taxpay er suits to enjoin perf ormanc e of ill e g a l a g re e me nts is that th e int e rf e re nc e su c h s uit s p os e to g ov e rnme nt a c tiv iti e s is slight in compar ison to the protection af forde d taxpay ers f

rom preve nting the c ulm inatio n o f i lle g a l a g re e me nts ma de by pu bli c of fi c ia ls. B ut t

he ba lanc e in c os ts and be ne fi ts s hif

ts sig nif ic antl y on c e the g ov e rnme nta l e nti ty ha s r e c e ive d a ll that it barg ained f

or and must simply

pay for it. We n ee d n o t decide he re whether a g overnme ntal entity ’s re ceipt of something less than full perf ormanc e under

an al l ege d ly illega l ag ree ment is enoug h to prec lude a taxpay er suit to prohibit future perf ormanc e. When a l l t hat re mains is a school district’s repa y ment of a loa

n for work c ompleted, allowanc e of a taxpay er action to prohibit such repay ment threatens a su bs tan ti a l in te rf

e re nc e wi th g ov e rnme nta l a c tio ns . T he B lue s’ a c tio n n ot o nly threatens BI SD’s alre ady substantial investment in its hi g h school, and what by now41

are the settled expectations of other taxpay ers in the district w ho are also serve d by the hig h school, but should the action succ eed on the merits, it would signal incr ease d risks to lenders a

nd others in dea ling with g overnme ntal entities. The potential for disruption of g overnme nt operations is t oo g reat to allow a taxpay er w ith no special injury dis ti n c t f

r o m t h e g e n e r a l p u

b li c ’ s to s u e to p r o h ib it

th e g o v e r

n me n t f r om paying f or g oods and ser

vices it has alr eady

rec eived a

nd place d in permane nt use.
Id. at 557-58. The State Def endants urg e that “the school districts and teac hers, just a s the building contra ctor in Bland , have or dere d their oper ations based on a n expectation of pay

ment from the State,” that “[t]o depr ive teac hers of salary incre ases and school districts of money for their operating budg ets midway

throug h the y ear

is precise ly

the ‘disruption’ the Bland Court sought to avoid,” and that we should conc lude that “the mone y is, as a matter

of law, a lrea dy

spent.” Unlike the Bland school district, however , the State Def endants have not deve loped an evide ntiary

rec ord that might support such a conclusion. As previously noted, they

did not present evidenc e in support of their ple a t o the jurisdiction, and re ly entirely upon broad, unsuppor

ted assumptions about the eff ect of H.B
. 1 on Texas sc hool districts. More over, this leg al theory was
no t pr e se nte d to the dis tr ic t c ourt , a nd the pa rt ie s h a ve on ly be g un to ad dr e ss it on app e a l. E sp e c ia lly under the se circ umstances, we are reluc tant to adopt the State Def en d an t s ’ p ro posed extension of Bland ’s rationale. Se e Da v is , 137 S.W. 3d a t 33 4- 35 & n. 16 ; see also Pe tco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuste r , 144 S.W .3d 554, 565 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2004, no pet.). Give n the state of the rec ord and the law , this arg ument does not provide us a basis for a ffirming the district court’s or der. Issues raised sua s ponte Ass oc iat ion al s tan din

g Whil e the State De fenda nts have no t s ep arately challeng ed the a ssociational st an d i n g o f C
. L
. O.U.T., we must consider that issue sua sponte. Se e Te x as As s’ n o

f B us . , 85242

S.W .2d at 445-46. An association has standing to sue on behalf of its members if: (1) its members would otherwise ha

ve standing to sue in their own rig h t ; (2) the inter ests the org anization seeks to pro te c t a

r e g e r ma n e to th e o r g an iz a ti o n ’ s p u r p o s e s ; a n d ( 3 ) n e it h e r th e c la im

a s s e rte d n o r the relief reque sted requir es the pa rticipati o n o f i n d i vidual members in the law suit. Id. (adopting the te st f ro m Hunt v. W

ashington Stat e Apple Adv er. Comm’n , 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). We construe Plaintiffs’ a lleg ation that C.L.O

. U. T . would have sta nding a s a state taxpay er a s
an asse rtion that its members would have indiv i d u al s t an ding to sue as taxpay ers, thus addre ssing the f

irst element of the associational s t anding test. Howeve r, Plaintiffs’ plea dings do

no t a dd re ss the r e ma ini nge le me nts , n or is the re e vid e nc e e sta bli sh ingthe se e le me nts in the attac hments to their pleading s. See id. B ut b e c a us e Pla int if

fs ’ p le a din g s d o n ot a ff

ir ma tiv e ly

ne g a te the se e le me nts bu t merel y fail to a dd re ss t he m, P la int if

fs are e nti tle d to the op po rt un ity to amend. See M

iranda , 1 33 S.W. 3d

a t 22 6- 27 ; El

gin , 191 S.W .3d at 272. The c onc urr e nc e ’s “ripe ne

ss” c onc e rn Finally , the conc urre nce w ould decline to addr ess an y i s s ue in this case othe r than those conc erningthe claim alleg ing unc onstitut ional deleg ation of powe rs. The state d basis is that the other c laims are not “ ripe for decision” a

nd that a “fuller ventilation of pleading s, evidenc e, and briefingin the district court” wo u l d b e needed to avoid a n advisory

opinion. W e do not view ripene ss as an issue in this case . Ripeness conc erns whe ther, at the time a lawsuit is broug ht, the fac ts have de veloped suff iciently such that an injury

has occ urre d or is likely

to oc cur, r ather

than being conting ent or re mote. Patterson v. Planned Pare nthood , 971 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998). I t is a re quirement of subje ct matter jurisdiction. W aco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson , 22 S.W .3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000). I f t he S tate Defenda nts have acted in a manner so as t o violate the spendingcap,43

a s Pla int if fs a lle g e , th os e a c tio ns have be e n co mpl e te d an d Plai nti ff s’ c la ims are ri pe . We a lso no te that none of the parties ha ve sug g ested that ripe n es s i s a proble m, and that the re medy the conc urre nce pr oposes—re mand rather than dismissal—is inconsistent with t he e x i s t en ce of a ripene ss defe ct. See id. at 853.

The c oncurr ence ’s ref

ere nce to a “fuller ventilation of the pleading s, evidenc e, and br ie fi ng ” may

e xpre ss a c on c e rn tha t th e re is a pr ob le m he re wi th t

he State De fe nd ants ra isi ngthe ir jurisdictional complaints through the proce dural device of a plea to the jurisdiction without opt ing for some othe r devic e like a summar y judgme nt motion. S imi l ar co n ce rn s wer e voice d by the dissenting justices in Miranda , b u t th e ir v ie w s d id n o t c ar r y th e day

. See id. at 234, 235-36 (Je ff e rs on , C.J., dis se nti ng ); id. at 239, 239-45 (B rister, J., dis senting ). The c oncurr ence may intend its c omm e nts a s an invit a tio n to the su pr e me c ourt

to r e vis it Miranda

. I f so, it would seem more direc t to sim ply

say so. I n any

event, a s an intermediate appellate court, we are bound to follow Miranda until the supre me cour t reve rses or modifie s that decision. Petco , 144 S.W .3d at 565. To the extent the concur

ren ce expresses conc erns that issues have bee n raised f or the fir st tim e on appea l without the development of a n adequate re cord, w e h av e noted those issues and have

re mand e d th e m f

or fu rt he r p ro c e e din g s.
CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , w e a ff ir m the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of Pla int if fs ’ c la im alleg ing unc onstitut ional deleg ation of leg islative powers f or want of jurisdiction. Howeve r, to the extent that P laintiffs’ re maining two c laims seek declar ations that future e x penditures unde r H.B .1’s

a pp ro pr ia tio n a

re un c on sti tut ion a l or

ill e g a l, t he dis tr ic t c ourt

e rred or abu se d it s d isc re tio n in44

dismiss ing those claims based on the record before it, and we reve rse those por tions of the district court’s judg ment. Additionally , we hold that, while Plaintiffs fa iled t o s u fficiently plead the

a sso c ia tio na l st and ingof

C.L .O .U .T ., Pla int if

fs are e nti tle d to le a ve to a me nd to a dd re ss t hat de fe c t.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Waldrop; ConcurringOpinion by

J ustice Patterson Affir med in part, Reve rsed a

nd Remanded in pa

rt Filed: Apr il 17, 2007