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S. HRG. 109–1009

FORMING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO

MEETING THE WATER RESOURCES NEEDS OF

COASTAL LOUISIANA IN THE WAKE OF

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 9, 2005

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress.senate
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, Chairman 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ANDREW WHEELER, Majority Staff Director 

KEN CONNOLLY, Minority Staff Director

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

NOVEMBER 9, 2005

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 46

Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New York, 

prepared statement .............................................................................................. 46

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 1

Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 5

Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from the State of Louisiana ............................ 3

WITNESSES

Brink, Peter H., senior vice president, Programs, National Trust for Historic 

Preservation .......................................................................................................... 30

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 64

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 68

Curole, Windell, general manager, South Lafourche Levee District ................... 28

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 62

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 63

Dunlop, George, principal deputy assistant secretary, civil works, U.S. Army .. 8

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 47

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 49

Ellis, Steve, vice president, Taxpayers For Common Sense ................................ 34

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 75

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 77

Faber, Scott, water resources specialist, Environmental Defense ....................... 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 71

Mittal, Anu, director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. General 

Accountability Office ............................................................................................ 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 56

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 61

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 60

Riley, Don T., Major General, director of civil works, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers .............................................................................................................. 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50

Responses to additional questions from Senator Jeffords ............................. 52

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

Reports: 

The Center For Progressive Reform; Broken Levees: Why they failed ........ 80

The U.S. General Accounting Office; Improved Planning Needed by the 

Corps of Engineers to Resolve Environmental, Technical, and Financial 

Issues on the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project .............. 93

(1)

FORMING A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO 

MEETING THE WATER RESOURCES NEEDS 

OF COASTAL LOUISIANA IN THE WAKE OF 

HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9, 2005

U.S. SENATE

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 406, 

Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. James Inhofe (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Inhofe, Thune, Isakson, Vitter, Jeffords, Carper, Clinton. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. We will ask the hearing to come to order. It 

happens today that I have an amendment on the floor, and Senator 

Vitter has been good enough to say that he would chair this meeting. 

I would ask unanimous consent that my statement be made a 

part of the record. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

OKLAHOMA

Good morning and welcome to our third full committee hearing in response to 

Hurricane Katrina. Our first two hearings focused on initial Federal Agency responses to the storm, while this one will look at the future—specifically near-term, 

intermediate and long-term steps by the Army Corps of Engineers needed to facilitate the rebuilding of coastal Louisiana. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming today. I know some of you have 

been here before, and I appreciate your willingness to speak with us again. We also 

have a couple newer faces on this issue, and I look forward to hearing ideas from 

a fresh perspective. 

As everyone here knows, the Senate Environment & Public Works Committee has 

sole jurisdiction over the Civil Works mission of the Army Corps of Engineers and 

will be the focal point for the development of any legislation necessary to direct the 

corps’ activities, as well as for providing oversight of these activities. As chairman 

of this committee, I take that responsibility very seriously, and I am pleased we 

have heard from so many willing to help us fulfill our mission. 

The committee held a stakeholders meeting on October 20th for staff to hear from 

a broad range of interested parties, local and national, as to what needs to be done 

to ensure the recovery of the region. 

One of the common themes to emerge was the importance of taking a comprehensive and integrated approach to the three main missions of the Army Corps in coastal Louisiana, which are flood and storm damage reduction, navigation and wetlands 
2

restoration. Today we will further explore this idea to find out how such an approach might be structured and how we can ensure its effectiveness. 

By anyone’s measure, the Federal investment to be made in rebuilding and protecting the city of New Orleans and the surrounding coastal area will be substantial. It is vital that this investment be made in the context of a well-thought-out 

plan and with maximum coordination with State and local planning decisions. 

Another common theme from the stakeholders meeting is that it is the people who 

live there, not the Federal Government, who should be deciding where and how to 

rebuild the area. As a former mayor myself, I agree that it is unacceptable to have 

the Federal Government making local planning decisions, but I am afraid it could 

happen by default if we don’t receive a clear message from the local communities 

as we move forward with Federal activities to provide storm protection. 

We also have to ensure that there is proper oversight and cost controls on these 

Federal activities—we cannot afford to do this wrong or for it to be a free spending 

boondoggle. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses their ideas on what safeguards might be appropriate and most effective. 

I do want to add that before we get too far down the road of deciding what we 

should do when rebuilding, we must first know what happened to the levees and 

why the city was flooded. There are a number of experts taking a look at this very 

issue and we will remain in close contact with those investigations. When we have 

facts and the time is appropriate, the committee will hold a hearing on the findings 

and take whatever steps are necessary. 

While it is too early for final conclusions, I understand that the corps has been 

making some adjustments when restoring the current protection to take into account initial findings. I hope to hear more details from General Riley and Mr. Dunlop. 

Once again, thank you all for coming today. I look forward to hearing your testimony and to discussing some topics more in-depth during questions.

Senator INHOFE. One thing I would like to ask at the appropriate 

time, and perhaps you can do it for me, there has been some confusion, and we have a witness from the GAO. I had felt, after researching after the tragedy of Katrina took place that in 1977 there 

was an effort by the Corps of Engineers to do something recognizing that it wasn’t a matter of if but when we would have a more 

devastating type of a hurricane. They were talking about enhancing the levee at that time. 

That was enjoined by an environmental group that, my feeling 

was after studying it, if they had not done that, they would have 

corrected that situation and we would not have had the devastation 

that Katrina produced for us. 

There was a GAO report that came out that said no, that was 

not the case. I understand that Ms. Mittal, you are going to clarify 

that. So I would like to ask, since I won’t be here, Mr. Chairman, 

that you be sure that you pursue that for me, if you would do that. 

Senator VITTER. Absolutely. 

Senator INHOFE. I thank you very much, sir. 

Senator VITTER. [Presiding] Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for calling this hearing and this meeting to order. I don’t 

know if you had any other opening comments. 

Senator INHOFE. No, for the record is fine. Oh, I do have one 

more thing here. I want to introduce somebody in the audience, 

John Berry. Stand up John. John is chief of the Quapaws. 

While we are not dealing with Superfund in this particular hearing, the most devastating Superfund site in America is located in 

northern Oklahoma, called Tar Creek. We have something where 

we think that, in helping our situation, we can also help the recovery and the rebuilding of the levee that you and I and Chief Berry 

will be meeting on later on today. So welcome to our hearing, Mr. 

Chairman. 
3

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 

Senator VITTER. Welcome, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

that—the other Mr. Chairman. 

I have a brief opening statement. Again, I want to thank the 

chairman of the committee for calling this hearing today. It is a 

vital step in understanding the unique situation in south Louisiana 

and the vital need, the vital national need to design a new, innovative and effective program to move forward. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for agreeing to testify before 

the committee, especially Windell Curole, who traveled from Louisiana to be with us today. I also particularly look forward to discussing the protection plans with the corps representatives here 

today, George Dunlop and Major General Riley from the Army 

Corps of Engineers. 

The important point here is that the old system did not work and 

we need to move forward under a dramatically new and improved 

structure. 

Over the past few months the devastation from Hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita has brought attention to how reliant our Nation 

is on south Louisiana’s ports, our energy resources, our seafood and 

trade. Americans have felt the economic impact of the storms 

through increased prices at the gas pump, higher payments for 

their electric and heating bills, disruption to commerce, particularly trade and seafood. Of course, Louisianans have felt the impact 

both economically and emotionally, and they have lost their homes, 

their jobs, their communities in some cases. 

Those are only some of the reasons why it is important that we 

rebuild Louisiana quickly, not only so Louisianans can get their 

lives together and return home, but so Americans across the 

United States can feel relief in energy costs and so commerce can 

continue to flow and all of those vital services to the Nation can 

continue. 

Louisianans want to come back home and our businesses want 

to rebuild. But more than anything else, they need reassurance 

that their homes and businesses will not wash away come the next 

storm. A comprehensive and integrated approach is necessary to 

rebuild and meet the water resources needs of coastal Louisiana. 

That integrated approach includes strong hurricane protection, 

much stronger than what we had before, strong flood prevention, 

ecosystem restoration and efforts to meet vital navigation needs. 

We must make sure this tragedy we have all experienced and lived 

through and observed never happens again. 

And there is really no reasonable time line to do that. We need 

the levees rebuilt now, we need stronger hurricane protection now. 

Rebuilding to pre-Katrina conditions is not an option, since that 

was clearly inadequate. By June 2006, the start of the next hurricane season, we need a stronger level of protection than was there 

right before Katrina. Of course, better design and better technology 

must be incorporated into those efforts. 

We cannot rebuild the same as before and expect different results. This time around we need better, stronger hurricane protection. Our protections need improvement with the use of better design and technology. Of course, coastal restoration efforts must be 
4

fully integrated with these protection efforts, because coastal land 

is the first defense against hurricanes and is an important part of 

the overall picture. 

Two months before Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana, I sat before 

the Commerce Committee hurricane preparedness hearing and said 

that we could spend millions now preventing hurricane damage to 

south Louisiana or we could spend billions later responding to a 

major hurricane disaster. Unfortunately, those words came true 

just 2 months later. 

We can’t make this mistake again. Congress has already responded to Hurricane Katrina by providing almost $70 billion in 

emergency relief. About 1,000 of my constituents have lost their 

lives. Had we an expedited corps process and just a fraction of 

these funds, we could have virtually eliminated the need for that 

loss. 

Just as the traditional corps project and appropriation process 

was inadequate before the storm, it is clearly inadequate now after 

the storm. We need to rebuild, so people are safe from future hurricanes. We need hurricane protection levees that will sustain a category 5 hit. The only appropriate response to these needs has to 

include programmatic authority to implement strong hurricane protection and flood prevention in an expedited manner. 

In closing, I want to re-emphasize that we have already appropriated or provided tax incentives totaling twice the cost of even 

the most generous estimates for armoring all of south Louisiana 

and fully restoring our coast. Our delegation has been fighting for 

this proactive effort for years. Now that over 1,000 lives have been 

lost, we have to do this. We have to do it right and quickly so that 

we don’t suffer those losses again. 

I look forward to working with this committee, working with all 

of our witnesses and many others on advancing a new, comprehensive, integrated, system-wide, streamlined, expedited program to do 

all of this. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Vitter follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF LOUISIANA

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very important hearing. Today’s hearing is a vital step in understanding the unique situation in south Louisiana and designing a new, innovative and effective program to move forward. 

I would like to thank all of the witnesses for agreeing to testify before the committee, especially Windell Curole who traveled from Louisiana to be with us today. 

I also look forward to discussing protection plans with the corps here today—George 

Dunlop and Major General Riley from the Army Corps of Engineers. The important 

point here is that the old system did not work and we should not be moving forward 

under the same structure. 

Over the past few months, the devastation from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita has 

brought attention to how reliant our nation is on South Louisiana’s ports, energy 

resources, seafood, and trade. Americans have felt the economic impact through increased prices at the gas pump, higher payments for their electric and heating bills. 

Louisianans have felt the impact both economically and emotionally—they have lost 

their homes, their jobs, their communities. 

Those are only some of the reasons why it is important that we rebuild Louisiana 

quickly—not only so Louisianans get their lives back together and return home, but 

also so Americans across the United States can feel relief in energy costs. 

Louisianans want to come back home and our businesses want to rebuild but they 

need reassurance that their home will not wash away come the next storm. A comprehensive and integrated approach is necessary to rebuild and meet the water re-
5

sources needs of coastal Louisiana. Integrated approach should include strong hurricane protection, flood prevention, ecosystem restoration and navigation. 

We must make sure this never happens again. There is no reasonable timeline. 

We need the levees rebuilt now. We need stronger hurricane protection now. Rebuilding to ‘‘pre-Katrina conditions’’ is not an option. By June 2006—the start of the 

next hurricane season—we need a stronger level of protection. It is the only option. 

Better design and better technology must be incorporated into our ongoing efforts. 

We can not rebuild the same as before and expect different results. This time 

around we need better, stronger hurricane protection. Our hurricane protections 

need improvement with the use of better designs and technology. Coastal restoration efforts should be fully integrated with these protection efforts. 

Two months before Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana, I sat before a Commerce 

Committee hurricane preparedness hearing and said that we could spend millions 

now preventing hurricane damage to south Louisiana or we could spend billions 

later responding to a major hurricane. Unfortunately, we have chosen the later. We 

must not make this mistake again. Congress has already responded to Hurricane 

Katrina by providing over $60 billion in emergency relief and approximately 1,000 

of my constituents have lost their lives. Had we had an expedited corps process and 

just a fraction of these funds, we could have virtually eliminated the need for this 

emergency relief spending. 

Just as the traditional corps project and appropriation process was inadequate before the storm, it is inadequate after the storm. We need to rebuild Louisiana so 

people are safe from future hurricanes. We need hurricane protection and levees 

that will sustain a category 5 hurricane. The only appropriate response to the protection of south Louisiana must include programmatic authority to implement 

strong hurricane protection and flood prevention in an expedited manner. 

In closing, I would like to reemphasize that we have already appropriated or provided tax incentives totaling twice the cost of fully armoring all of south Louisiana 

and fully restoring our coast. Our delegation had been fighting for this pro-active 

effort for years. Now that 1,000 lives have been lost and we have spent billions and 

billions of dollars—and will spend much more—let us act quickly and wisely in insuring we protect our citizens with a new process, a new program and a bright, new 

future for south Louisiana. 

I look forward to working with the committee and hearing from all of the witnesses on advancing a new, comprehensive, integrated, system-wide, streamlined 

and expedited program to address the hurricane, flood and coastal protection and 

navigation program for south Louisiana.

Senator VITTER. Now I will ask Senator Jeffords, our Ranking 

Member, if he has opening comments. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator JEFFORDS. Yes, I do. I want to thank you for holding today’s hearing on water resource needs in the wake of Hurricane 

Katrina. In the eyes of many, taking action on water resource 

issues is really the first step in the recovery of southern Louisiana. 

Without adequate flood control, redevelopment will be impossible. 

Today’s hearing is a follow-up from the stakeholders’ meeting we 

held several weeks ago, at which time more than 30 people came 

before our committee to provide their views on the next steps. 

Today we are hearing from a smaller group. But our work has already been influenced by that larger gathering. I know some of our 

witnesses today were at the previous meeting and I want them to 

know I value their insights. 

Today we are essentially covering two main questions: why do we 

need investment in water resources and what do we need to do. I 

look forward to hearing from our witnesses on those points. 

At the stakeholders meeting we heard several major themes that 

I see are echoed in today’s written testimony. We have heard the 

personal stories of how Katrina impacted the lives of so many peo-
6

ple. We have heard about the special, unique features this area of 

the Country brings to us. 

For me, this is why, this is the why of investment in our water 

resources. I will never tire of hearing these stories, and I encourage 

our witnesses to share your experiences with us. 

We have heard that the water resource investment must be comprehensive and include flood control, ecosystem restoration, and 

navigation. Piecemeal solutions will not solve the problem. 

We have heard the message loud and clear that time is of the 

essence. People in Louisiana are frustrated with the lack of 

progress in developing a WRDA proposal and enacting that critical 

reauthorization bill. We need to move quickly but balance the need 

for speed with the need for safety. We should not rebuild an entire 

levee system without incorporating the lessons learned from the 

failure of that system. I am a little dismayed that there is an $8 million study included 

in the Energy and Water Conference Report that covers only flood 

control. This seems to be a narrow evaluation that will take a long 

time, rather than a comprehensive study that will be finished 

quickly. It seems to be the exact opposite of what we have been 

hearing that we need. 

We have also heard that local redevelopment plans must guide 

future spending decisions. We may or may not need category 5 

flood protection everywhere. The Mayor of New Orleans testified 

before our committee last week that he has a group working on 

this, as does the Governor. I would like to hear from each of the 

witnesses as to how you think this process is going. 

To give some additional perspective to today’s hearing, I want to 

emphasize as I have in our last several Katrina events a little bit 

of the history about disaster response. Over the past 200 years, our 

Nation has moved from an ad hoc approach to a coordinated, orderly approach with the help of the Stafford Act. 

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, I believe we witnessed 

the degradation of our Nation’s response system as a result of a 

bad decision to move FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security. There, FEMA became lost in endless bureaucracy, and we 

have seen the tragic consequences. I have joined Senator Clinton 

in an effort to correct that mistake. 

Mr. Chairman, since my good friend, Senator Bob Stafford of 

Vermont, for whom the Stafford Act was named, was a member of 

this committee, we have traditionally been the go-to committee for 

emergency response. We have an opportunity here with the Army 

Corps of Engineers to continue in that tradition and take meaningful action to change the way we do business and help Louisiana recover. 

I stand ready to help and to make that happen. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Jeffords follows:]

STATEMENT OF JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT

Good morning. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding today’s hearing on 

water resource needs in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. 

In the eyes of many, taking action on water resource issues is really the first step 

in the recovery of southern Louisiana. Without adequate flood control, redevelopment will be impossible. 
7

Today’s hearing is a follow-up from a stakeholders’ meeting we held several weeks 

ago, at which more than 30 people came before our committee to provide their views 

on next steps. Today we are hearing from a smaller group, but our work has already 

been influenced by that larger gathering. I know some of our witnesses here today 

were at that previous meeting, and I want them to know that I value their insights. 

Today we are essentially covering two main questions: Why do we need investment in water resources, and what do we need to do? I look forward to hearing from 

our witnesses on those points. 

At the stakeholders meeting, we heard several major themes that I see are echoed 

in the written testimony for today. We have heard the personal stories of how 

Katrina impacted the lives of so many people, and we have heard about the special, 

unique features this area of the country brings to us. For me, this is the ‘‘why’’ of 

investment in water resources. I will never tire of hearing these stories, and I encourage our witnesses to share your experiences with us. I want us all to remember 

that it is the people of this region we are talking about at this hearing. 

We have heard that water resource investment must be comprehensive, and include flood control, ecosystem restoration, and navigation. Piecemeal solutions will 

not solve the problem. We have heard the message loud and clear that time is of 

the essence. People in Louisiana are frustrated at the lack of progress in developing 

a WRDA proposal and enacting that critical reauthorization bill. We need to move 

quickly, but balance the need for speed with the need for safety. We should not rebuild an entire levee system without incorporating the lessons learned from the failure of that system. 

I am a little dismayed that there is an $8 million study included in the Energy 

and Water conference report that covers only flood control. This seems to be a narrow evaluation that will take a long time, rather than a comprehensive study that 

will be finished quickly. It seems to be the exact opposite of what we’ve been hearing we need. 

We have also heard that local redevelopment plans must guide Federal spending 

decisions. We may or may not need Category 5 flood protection everywhere. The 

Mayor of New Orleans testified before our committee last week that he has a group 

working on this, as does the Governor. I would like to hear from each of the witnesses on how you think this process is going. 

Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed that I even need to raise this next point, but 

I know that there is interest in this. The claims that environmental litigation is 

somehow responsible for flooding in New Orleans are false, and distract us from 

what I believe is our real purpose here: to use water resource investments as a positive tool in the rebuilding of the New Orleans area. 

To give some additional perspective to today’s hearing, I also want to emphasize, 

as I have at our last several Katrina events, a bit of history about disaster response. 

Over the last 200 years, our Nation has moved from an ad hoc approach to a coordinated, orderly approach, with the help of the Stafford Act. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, I believe we witnessed the degradation of our national response system as a result of the bad decision to move FEMA into the Department of Homeland 

Security. Once there, FEMA became lost in an endless bureaucracy and we have 

seen the tragic consequences. I have joined Senator Clinton in an effort to correct 

that mistake. 

Mr. Chairman, since my good friend Senator Bob Stafford of Vermont, for whom 

the Stafford Act was named, was a member of this committee, we have traditionally 

been the ‘‘go to’’ committee for emergency response. We have an opportunity here 

with the Corps of Engineers to continue in that tradition, and take meaningful action to change the way we do business and help Louisiana recover. I stand ready 

to help make that happen.

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, Senator. Now we will go 

to our first panel. We have Mr. George Dunlop, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary for Civil Works at the U.S. Army; we have 

Major General Don Riley, Director of Civil Works with the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers; and Ms. Anu Mittal, Director of the Natural Resources and Environment Section of the U.S. General Accountability Office. 

Thank you all very much for your work, first and foremost, but 

also for being here and testifying. 

Mr. Dunlop. 
8

STATEMENT OF GEORGE DUNLOP, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

ASSISTANT SECRETARY, CIVIL WORKS, U.S. ARMY 

Mr. DUNLOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Jeffords. We greatly appreciate the opportunity to come and share 

our thinking with you today. I am pleased to discuss the role of the 

Department of the Army and General Riley will discuss the role of 

the Corps of Engineers and the recovery and rebuilding efforts that 

lie ahead in the Gulf Coast area. 

Our respective prepared testimonies go into detail as to the tasks 

now underway and how they provide a comprehensive and integrated approach that you both have addressed to meeting the challenges of the Gulf Coast hurricanes. I trust that our prepared testimonies can be entered into the record. 

Senator VITTER. Without objection, that will happen. 

Mr. DUNLOP. Thank you, sir. 

General Riley will summarize the various initiatives in which the 

Administration and the corps are now engaged, and if you will permit me, I would like to take my time to emphasize seven policy 

issues and objectives that we believe are important to guide this 

work. 

First, we believe that careful attention must be given to how we 

can best integrate and coordinate future flood and storm damage 

reduction objectives with one another and with the needs of the 

coastal wetlands ecosystem. Second, we emphasize the importance 

of working with State and local officials as they plan for the future 

of New Orleans, for the parishes in southern Louisiana and Mississippi and other parts of the Gulf Coast. 

Third, the President has established by Executive Order the cabinet level White House Gulf Coast Recovery and Rebuilding Council 

to further strengthen Federal support for the recovery and rebuilding efforts through an effective, integrated, fiscally responsible coordination effort through this, what we trust will be an effective, 

integrated and fiscally responsible coordination from all the relevant Federal agencies working together. Also with the State, local, 

tribal Governments, the private sector, faith-based and other community and humanitarian relief organizations. 

Fourth, we believe that a comprehensive, definitive, forensic 

analysis is essential. Already, an independent team of the American Society of Civil Engineers is collecting information to apply to 

the development of the design criteria for storm protection and 

other features that are necessary. 

Other organizations and individuals are doing important work in 

this regard. Perhaps you have read or are familiar with the study 

from LSU, the National Science Foundation. It is our policy that 

to the extent practicable, all relevant information is to be carefully 

considered and objectively assessed. 

To assure this, the Secretary of Defense has directed the Secretary of the Army to convene a panel of experts under the auspices of the National Academies of Sciences to evaluate the information collected by the corps and all these other parties, so as to 

provide an independent, peer-reviewed assessment of the performance of the storm damage reduction system in place in New Orleans and the surrounding areas. 
9

The National Academies will report directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, Mr. Woodley. This definitive 

study is expected to take approximately 8 months to complete. 

Fifth, following this forensic analysis, all of us will need to evaluate the broad range of options before we develop recommendations 

as to the best ways to reduce the risks in the future, for future 

storm damages for the city of New Orleans and the surrounding 

parishes. Senator Jeffords mentioned the $8 million that was provided for in the conference report that would fund an already authorized feasibility study to undertake that kind of analysis. 

Sixth, to emphasize the importance of the coastal wetlands ecosystem, last week the Administration requested a reallocation of 

$250 million of the emergency supplemental appropriations to provide funds for the Secretary of the Army to undertake immediate 

construction activities related to the restoration of the natural 

coastal features that will help reduce the risk of storm damage in 

the greater New Orleans area. 

Seventh, the Administration is working with Congress and with 

the State of Louisiana to develop a generic authorization for the 

near-term Louisiana coastal ecosystem protection and restoration 

program. This generic programmatic approach will expedite the approval process for projects and their implementation. 

I think that picking up on some of the terms that I heard you 

address in your remarks, streamlining, quickly, and to avoid piecemeal activity, this programmatic approach will provide greater 

flexibility in setting future priorities and increased opportunities 

for the application of adaptive management decisionmaking. 

Such an integrated, programmatic approach to the coastal wetlands protection and restoration will be innovative and it is essential for program efficiency and efficacy. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my summary statement. I look forward to working with you, and Secretary Woodley does, and the 

ranking member of the committee and other committee members 

on matters of mutual interest and concern. Following Major General Riley’s statement, I would be pleased to respond to any questions you may have. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. 

General Riley. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL DON T. RILEY, DIRECTOR 

OF CIVIL WORKS, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS 

General RILEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Jeffords. 

As the Director of Civil Works, I am honored to be here today 

to testify with Mr. George Dunlop on our participation in the Federal recovery and rebuilding efforts. 

As you know, the corps is continuing today with our contractors 

to execute the FEMA missions of debris removal and temporary 

roofing in the impacted area. Additionally, we are working around 

the clock on the repair of levees and flood walls to reduce the risk 

of damage through the remainder of this hurricane season as well 

as the rainy season this winter. Our goal is to repair the levee system to the authorized design level prior to the start of the next 

hurricane season in June. 
10

We are also actively gathering data and employing lessons from 

the recent storms and have begun an assessment of the existing 

storm damage reduction system. Furthermore, the Chief of Engineers has commissioned an interagency performance evaluation 

task force to conduct the engineering evaluation. This team includes engineers and scientists from our engineering research and 

development center, as well as other Federal agencies such as the 

Bureau of Reclamation and NOAA. 

The American Society of Civil Engineers is also supporting our 

efforts with an external review panel and will provide an independent oversight of the evaluation. 

Before the final team report is released in June of next year, all 

important findings are being shared with those who are involved 

in the design, engineering and repair of existing New Orleans levees and floodwalls. Further, we are making all of our findings 

available to the public and invite the public and the scientific and 

engineering community to share any information they may have. 

As Mr. Dunlop referred to the process of evaluating the flood and 

storm damage reduction system in the New Orleans area, we are 

deliberately integrating the important role of coastal wetlands. The 

proposed near term aquatic ecosystem restoration plans for the 

Louisiana coastal area would prevent some of the ongoing wetland 

losses, create new marshlands and nourish existing marshes. 

To close, the corps stands ready to work in close partnership 

with the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, the city of New Orleans 

and other Gulf Coast cities to assist them in an integrated, holistic 

approach to plan for their future. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to testify and I will be happy to answer any questions. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, General. 

Ms. Mittal. 

STATEMENT OF ANU MITTAL, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. MITTAL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my 

testimony today will cover the history, status and funding of the 

Army Corps of Engineers Lake Pontchartrain hurricane protection 

project. Hopefully my statement will clarify some of the confusion 

that Senator Inhofe referred to earlier. 

The beginnings of the Lake Pontchartrain project go all the way 

back to the early 1960’s. At that time, the corps was considering 

two different hurricane protection designs that were expected to 

protect New Orleans from flooding caused by a standard project 

hurricane, which is roughly equal to a fast-moving category 3 hurricane. 

The first design considered was known as the Barrier Plan, and 

included a series of levees and floodwalls combined with a set of 

barriers and flood control gates to prevent storm surges from entering Lake Pontchartrain. The second was known as the high level 

plan, and did not include the barriers and flood control gates, but 

instead relied on higher levees to protect the city. 

In the 1960’s, the corps favored the Barrier Plan, because for the 

same level of protection, it was less expensive and quicker to construct. At that time, it was estimated that the Barrier Plan would 
11

cost about $85 million and would be completed by 1978. The project 

was authorized by Congress in 1965 as a joint Federal, State and 

local project, with the corps having responsibility for project design 

and construction and local sponsors having responsibility for operations and maintenance. The Federal share of project costs was set 

at 70 percent, and the State and local share was set at 30 percent. 

The corps started building the Barrier Plan in 1967, but almost 

immediately ran into a variety of challenges that caused the project 

to undergo significant design changes, caused delays in construction and also increased project costs. Specifically, lessons learned 

from Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and foundation problems encountered during construction resulted in design changes to the levees 

and the flood walls. 

In addition, parts of the project faced significant opposition from 

local sponsors, and they did not provide the rights of way that the 

corps needed to build the levees on schedule. 

Finally, there were serious concerns relating to the environmental impacts of the control barriers that were to be constructed 

at the tidal passes to the lake. This ultimately resulted in a legal 

challenge, and in 1977, the courts enjoined the corps from constructing the barrier complexes until a revised environmental impact statement could be prepared. 

After the court decision, in the mid–1980’s, for several reasons 

the corps decided to change course and abandoned the Barrier Plan 

and shifted instead to constructing the High Level Plan. Since that 

time, the corps has been working to complete these higher levees 

and floodwalls. The total cost of the project had grown to $738 million and its completion date had slipped to 2015, which is nearly 

50 years after it was first authorized. Before the Katrina damage 

occurred, the corps estimated that the project was about 60 to 90 

percent complete. 

With regard to funding provided for the project, over the last 10 

fiscal years, Federal appropriations have totaled over $128 million. 

Also through reprogramming actions, the corps has made an additional $13 million available for the project. Nonetheless, according 

to the corps, the budget request for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and 

the appropriated amount for fiscal years 2005 were insufficient to 

fund new construction contracts. 

In recent years, questions have also been raised about the ability 

for the project to withstand hurricanes larger than what it was designed for. In 2002, the corps completed a pre-feasibility study and 

was making plans to conduct a full feasibility study, which it estimated would take several years and cost over $8 million. 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the corps faces a daunting challenge to effectively rebuild the hurricane protection system for New 

Orleans to pre-Katrina levels by June 2006, which as you know is 

when the next hurricane season will begin. This is especially true 

now that we know from the preliminary reports of the investigative 

teams who are studying the levee breaches that a number of mechanisms, and not just scouring caused by overtopping the flood 

walls, actually contributed to system failure in various places. 

As the corps moves forward with its efforts, it will have to consider this new evidence and will have to devise effective solutions 
12

that will allow it to appropriately rebuild the hurricane protection 

system for New Orleans. 

That concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much, Ms. Mittal. 

Now we will get to questions in the order that Senators have arrived for the hearing. I will start first. This is really for either Mr. 

Dunlop or General Riley. 

I am very, very concerned that we are in the process of slipping 

back to the same old ways and the same old schedules, even after 

this major disaster. I hope we all share the goal of avoiding that, 

because that’s simply not good enough. An example of that concern 

is the forensic analysis and other study about what caused the 

levee breaches after Katrina. 

As I understand your testimony, Mr. Dunlop, that analysis will 

be completed in 8 months. That’s about exactly the same period of 

time that the work to fix the levees and correct for those design 

and/or construction flaws must be completed. 

Does that strike you as not making a whole lot of sense, to have 

a time table to figure out what went wrong that ends at the same 

time as all the work to fix it must end? 

Mr. DUNLOP. Thank you, Senator, that is an excellent point. But 

in fact, I think that it is not inconsistent. The nature of the forensic 

study and the way that I explained about how it is going to be peer 

reviewed for the National Academies of Science, including the 

Academy of Engineering and all these other people, in 8 months 

there will be a definitive, comprehensive, reliable analysis available 

for the public, for Congress and others to consider. 

In the interim, while that study is ongoing, there are all kinds 

of people who are collecting information. I addressed some of those 

in my remarks, particularly as General Riley has gone into some 

detail about the interagency performance review team. That work 

is underway right now as we speak. 

As they work at this, if I can use the acronym IPET, the team 

that the corps has assembled with the interagency people, the work 

for the American Society of Civil Engineers that is contributing to 

that data collection, as that work is going on collecting this information, and that is, as we speak now, the teams are being put together by the National Academies of Science to assess these things, 

all that information is being able to be used by the people who are 

engineering this work, who are out there now with construction 

equipment mobilizing people and resources to do the tasks. 

So the concept of the forensic study, I emphasize the word definitive in my remarks because I think that we owe the Congress and 

we owe the American people a report that will be comprehensive 

and definitive. In the meantime, we will undertake the interim information, and we have provided for in our contract with the National Academies of Science that there will be regular reports as 

they are assessing information and data that would be used by the 

engineers and the people that the Corps of Engineers contracts 

with to do the work. 

General Riley, could you address some of the particular and specific activities that are now underway that Senator——
13

Senator VITTER. If I could, the time is limited, so if I could just 

follow up on that. I guess I just respectfully disagree. If the work 

has to be done by next June, and I think that in itself should be 

pushed up in some ways, if the work has to be done by next June, 

I think we should have the definitive findings well before that. I 

don’t understand why that’s not possible. 

But in any case, since this development of understanding is ongoing, as we sit here today, what is your and the General’s understanding of what caused the breaches at the 17th Street Canal, at 

London Avenue and at the Industrial Canal? 

Mr. DUNLOP. General, I will let you respond to that, but do let 

me say that if we could share with you the details of the commission to the IPET, you will see that the comprehensive nature of 

that data collection could not reasonably be done in a definitive 

way before this 8-month period. 

Nevertheless, General, would you address the point? 

General RILEY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, if I could. My understanding, 

and what I observed out there on the ground of the Inner Harbor 

Canal was clearly an overtopping. The surge there was a great 

surge. There are questions now where that surge came from, 

whether directly from Lake Borgne, how much the Mississippi 

River Gulf Outlet contributed to that, and how much was contributed from Lake Pontchartrain. 

So that’s what the study will definitively analyze for us. In the 

interim, we are rebuilding those levees to design levels. So in some 

cases on the back side of St. Bernard Parish where the levees were 

not up to design level, our goal is to get those back up to design 

level. 

On the 17th Street Canal, clearly there is evidence of under-seepage as well as a soft layer under there. So what we have done as 

part of the data collecting effort, once they found that, is to now 

take the repair of the pile driving down to 45 feet vice the 25 feet 

where they were previously. 

The second thing we will do, that we have already pulled in from 

that effort that is ongoing, is acknowledging that there may be 

other locations on the 17th Street or London Canal that are not up 

to design standards, because there may be something on the 

ground that we do not now see. So we will close off the lake, and 

the canals from the lake in order to prevent any other storm surge. 

What the research effort that Mr. Dunlop described will also do 

is both numeric and physical modeling of those canals. So that will 

give us a better idea as we move to improve levels of protection 

later on. But in the interim, we will take steps to protect——

Senator VITTER. What about London Avenue? 

General RILEY [continuing]. Sir, I don’t have much data on that 

myself. I know it clearly was a breach and involved some deep 

scouring that I saw and observed. I don’t have the data from that, 

or any assessment now if there is an underlying layer of peat 

under there that also caused that. 

Senator VITTER. Going back to the 17th Street Canal, is there 

any significant evidence you have seen of overtopping? 

General RILEY. No, sir. I have looked at the canal myself, and 

I have looked at multiple photographs. I have seen some of the interim reports that the American Society of Civil Engineers have 
14

given us. They saw no evidence of overtopping. The typical scour 

that you see behind the floodwalls, I have looked at a ton of photographs and have not seen that. 

Senator VITTER. So just to be clear, that would suggest a pure 

failure in terms of that system holding up? 

General RILEY. That is exactly what we are interested in finding 

out, what caused the breach, if it was that under-seepage. 

What this effort will also tell us is, you had a certain design 

level, but what were the storm conditions? Were the storm conditions above? It is just not the water level, but you had a tremendous dynamic effort in the canal of the water action. So was it designed for that, I don’t know. That’s what we need to find out. 

Senator VITTER. Certainly, to use layman’s terms, the general design level has always been described as category 3. Certainly to my 

knowledge, there is no evidence that by the time the storm hit 

there that it was above category 3. Do you know of any such evidence? 

General RILEY. Yes, sir. They are already seeing some of the conditions in it. It really wasn’t a category 3 design, although it has 

been described as that. So you are right to say, the description of 

that. The surge was, the standard project hurricane it was designed against sort of varies between a 2, 3 and 4, depending on 

whether you’re looking at surge, wind or barometric pressure. 

As a result of the conditions inside the canal and inside the lake, 

you already had the storm and the surge waters already pushed 

into the lake from the category 4 and 5 storm that preceded. By 

the time it got up there to category 3, it was pushing that 4 and 

5 surge down into the city at 125 mile an hour wind speeds. 

So I have asked the evaluation team to tell me exactly what went 

on in the canal, did it exceed or was it under design condition. So 

we just don’t know at this point. 

Senator VITTER. OK. I certainly have more follow-up questions. 

But we will do that in the next round. Now I will turn to Senator 

Jeffords. 

Senator JEFFORDS. General Riley, at our stakeholders meeting, 

and in the written testimony for today’s hearings, one common 

theme is that the actions we take after Hurricane Katrina with regard to water resources need to be comprehensive. They need to involve flood control, ecosystem restoration, and navigation. 

the corps’ traditional process is not set up that way. Can you describe what your plans are to respond to this desire to develop a 

comprehensive approach and if there are any barriers that Congress needs to remove to allow this to happen? 

General RILEY. Yes, sir, and thank you for that very good question. We have had in our civil works planning and our civil works 

strategy a great effort to move toward a more holistic watershed 

approach. In the particular case of New Orleans, we are working 

with the State and local agencies and the Federal agencies to bring 

in all the appropriate agencies to look across the system, not to just 

look at flood control for one area. 

So clearly the inclusion of wetlands restoration is a very, very 

important aspect of this, as well as how it ties in to the impact of 

navigation on the flood control system and the hurricane protection 

system. Within the corps, we have made a lot of changes in our 
15

planning processes over the last couple of years to move toward 

that approach. We have issued planning circulars, engineering circulars to describe a newer process of how to go about making it 

more holistic across a watershed view. 

Clearly, to your last question of how we could be helped, certainly in any legislation that authorizes a study or project, if that 

legislation described the need for a more integrated, holistic approach rather than just simply a project focus, I think that would 

be helpful. 

Senator JEFFORDS. The National Levee Safety Program, I would 

like to refer to that for a minute, General Riley. Given the corps’ 

experience in Hurricane Katrina, can you tell us if you feel that the 

Federal Government should do more to ensure the safety of our 

Nation’s levee program? For example, should safety standards and 

an inspection regime be established? 

General RILEY. Sir, I think there is an inspection regime. There 

is not quite, for local levees, the corps or the Federal Government 

doesn’t participate in the inspection regime. I cannot talk to that. 

But clearly, I think it would be helpful for Congress and the Administration to look at certain standards for urban areas vice agricultural areas vice other areas. It seems appropriate to me. That 

is worth discussion. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, I am disappointed that I have 

to bring this up. However, I believe that the claims that the environmental litigation is somehow responsible for flooding in New 

Orleans I think are false and distract from what I believe is the 

real purpose here, to use water resource investments as a positive 

tool in the rebuilding of the New Orleans area. 

Ms. Mittal, I note that in the GAO’s earlier work, the canal levees were identified as a critical element that ‘‘should have been 

considered earlier.’’ There also appear to be have been some disagreements with the local sponsors on how to proceed. 

Is it critical that we know what happened with the failure of the 

canal levees before making judgments about what levels and types 

of flood control should be provided through the system? 

Ms. MITTAL. My response to that, sir, is that you are right. the 

corps knew as early as 1965 that the drainage canals were a vulnerable spot in the whole system. In fact, the drainage canal work 

was not included in the original design of the system. It was something that was added on later. 

For the first 17 years, while the corps was working on enhancing 

or building the hurricane protection system, they could not reach 

agreement with the local sponsors on how to enhance the protection along the drainage canals. In fact, based on the records that 

we have seen, it was not until the early 1990’s that the corps was 

able to reach agreement with the local sponsors on how to build the 

extra protection along the drainage canals. 

So that is a very important issue and as General Riley suggested, 

it is something that needs to be studied in terms of why did the 

canals fail, why did the flood walls on the canals fail and what factors did they consider when they developed that design system. 

Senator JEFFORDS. General Riley, the USGS has reported extensive wetland losses post-Katrina. Shouldn’t the corps reevaluate its 
16

recommendations for restoration of coastal Louisiana in terms of 

their feasibility given these wetland losses? 

General RILEY. Sir, I think there will be a continual evaluation 

of that. Clearly there have been losses before the storm and certainly additional losses. So I think in the coastal Louisiana effort 

that is going on right now, we will include all of that and incorporate it to ensure that we have an approach across the entire wetlands system and how much that contributes to storm damage reduction. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator CARPER. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Senator, and thanks to our witnesses for joining us today and for your testimony. 

This is one of an ongoing series of Katrina-related hearings that 

I have been privileged to participate in. I am leaving here shortly 

to go to yet another one. Let me just ask, what questions have you 

been asked to answer in your testimony today? 

Mr. DUNLOP. Well, we’ve been asked to consider whether or not 

the forensic study that we believe is necessary to lay the foundation for all of our considerations of these things whether it is realistic to expect that this report in 8 months would be useful or is 

it going to be too late, is it going to be a day late and a dollar short. 

The response we gave to that is that, no, it is a good point made, 

but no, we have designed this in a way that we think the information can be used. That was the principal question directed to me. 

Then General Riley was asked some specific questions. 

Senator CARPER. General Riley? 

General RILEY. Yes, Senator. We were asked to address how we 

see ourselves working with the Federal and State and local agencies to move forward in an integrated and holistic fashion to meet 

the water resources needs of the hurricane damaged areas. 

Senator CARPER. So that was the question? 

General RILEY. That was the guidance we received from the committee staff. 

Senator CARPER. Summarize again your response then to that. 

General RILEY. Yes, Senator, if I may. What we are doing in 

many venues across the corps, both in Washington and at the division regional level as well as at local levels, working with the State 

and local and all the Federal agencies. We work closely with FEMA 

and all the agencies in the FEMA response and we also have our 

own authorities under flood control and hurricane protection as 

well as navigation. 

For instance, if I may use an example, this week, just the last 

2 days, Governor Blanco and Admiral Allen hosted a 2-day town 

hall meeting with all the Federal agencies, the State agencies and 

the parish presidents. That ended last night, so I don’t have the 

feedback from the parish presidents on what the end result was. 

They were going to give the Federal and State agencies what their 

highest priorities were. 

Second, I am flying this afternoon, Governor Blanco is hosting a 

reconstruction and rebuilding conference beginning tomorrow 

morning for 3 days where she is bringing in all the Federal agencies and State and local agencies to participate, not only in large 
17

discussions but in work group discussions to come out of that with, 

here are the priorities of the State and local interests and sort of 

here’s how the Federal Government can help. 

So those are two examples of efforts ongoing right now as we 

work in this integrated approach with the State and local Governments. We can bring everything we can to bear, but we can’t of 

course do anything, to direct how they want to rebuild. But we provide all the technical assistance we possibly can to do that, and 

working with the Federal agencies as well. 

Senator CARPER. Would you pronounce your last name for me, 

please? 

Ms. MITTAL. Mittal. 

Senator CARPER. Has your name ever been mispronounced? 

Ms. MITTAL. All the time, sir. No problem. 

Senator CARPER. I will try not to do it. 

Ms. Mittal, what were you asked to share with us today? 

Ms. MITTAL. Our focus was primarily to provide a history of the 

project. Since the work that GAO did was in 1976 and 1982, we 

looked at the project very thoroughly at those times. We did comprehensive reviews of the project and we were asked to provide a 

history of the project. 

Senator CARPER. Summarize that again. I realize we only have 

a couple of minutes, but just take a couple of minutes and in your 

own words just summarize the history. 

Ms. MITTAL. Basically this project has been ongoing for the last 

40 years. It has been delayed for a variety of reasons, both technical as well as for challenges and local sponsor issues. It has been 

expanded and changed over time. 

Senator CARPER. Has it been delayed from time to time because 

of lack of funds? 

Ms. MITTAL. No. Lack of funding has generally not been a problem. It has always been a high priority project for the district. But 

it has changed. There have been technical changes, there have 

been other modifications made to the project which have delayed 

its construction. It is still not complete. 

Senator CARPER. OK. If you were sitting in our shoes, let me just 

start with you, Mr. Dunlop, if you were sitting in our shoes, what 

would you be doing next? 

Mr. DUNLOP. Well, sir, we believe that the most important thing 

for us to undertake in the immediate future is to use the authorities we have, the emergency authorities we have under law to use 

funds to undertake the immediate restoration of this activity. I 

think that this hearing itself is a significant function of the committee, because you are providing oversight to make sure that we 

are using good judgment and it is well considered and it is defensible. 

So the most important thing you can do, I believe, right now is 

exactly what you are doing, and that’s conducting this kind of oversight. The other committees of the Congress that provide appropriations have done so. We have made some additional requests in 

the Administration to have some of those funds reallocated to ecosystem restoration activity right away. That would be very, very 

helpful for us to have enacted by the Congress at the earliest possible time, that is that reallocation. 
18

But I guess in summary the oversight function right now is probably the most definitive and effective thing you could do. 

Senator CARPER. General Riley, same question. 

General RILEY. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question. I guess 

I have never been asked to advise Congress, but certainly I 

think——

Senator CARPER. People do it all the time. 

General RILEY [continuing]. Yes. In any legislation, sir, that you 

consider, I think both the need not only to expedite the work but 

also to integrate the work with all the other State, local and Federal Agency work I think would be very helpful to us. 

Senator CARPER. Ms. Mittal, last word. 

Ms. MITTAL. I think you need to look at it from a comprehensive 

standpoint. Engineering solutions may not be the best solutions for 

the city of New Orleans. We should look at a comprehensive project 

that includes wetlands restoration, ecosystem restoration and 

whatever feasible engineering solutions make sense. 

Senator CARPER. Good. My thanks to each of you. Thanks very 

much. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Clinton. 

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be submitted for the record. 

Senator VITTER. Without objection. 

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, I really appreciate your comments at the beginning and then the follow-up questions by my colleagues, because I do think that we are confronting a dilemma 

here. On the one hand, restoration in the short-term is an important goal in order to expedite the normalization of New Orleans 

and the surrounding parishes. On the other hand, it is going to 

take 8 months, apparently, to get the results of these studies. So 

it is sort of difficult to know how to proceed in the absence of that 

kind of factual analysis. 

There are many questions that I have based mostly on press reports of what the various civil engineering and other scientific experts are concluding, in a preliminary manner. I think Senator 

Carper’s point is a really important one. The Congress is not in a 

position to integrate and create the comprehensive planning process. Somebody has to be in charge of that. I don’t yet know who 

that is. I don’t know the conferences you are going to, the advice 

you are getting, the direction you are receiving. At what point does 

the rubber hit the road and somebody says, this is what we are 

going to do and this is how we are going to go about doing it? 

For example, there has been a lot of discussion about the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. It has very little navigation on it, and 

many people have urged that it be closed. I don’t know whether 

that’s the right thing to do, but who in this process is empowered 

to make that decision? 

I have a special feeling for what Senator Vitter and Senator 

Landrieu and the other people from Louisiana are going through, 

because they are doing the best job they can up here trying to figure out how to get the help that their folks need. But I honestly 

don’t know where you turn. I don’t know who’s in charge. 
19

So I guess I would ask each of you, starting with Mr. Dunlop, 

who is making the decisions on this? Let’s just take the example 

of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. Who might decide ultimately 

that it should remain open even though it has very little navigation, has never fulfilled its promise, or conclude that this was a 

mistake and it has served as a supercharged channel through 

which a lot of water can come and cause damage? I know the St. 

Bernard Parish Council in 1998 said, close this, it’s not a good deal. 

So Mr. Dunlop, who would make the decisions ultimately about 

what is going to happen here with respect to all the engineering 

issues? 

Mr. DUNLOP. Senator Clinton, your question is really right on the 

mark and it really hits at one of the key policy concerns that all 

of us would have about how we proceed on these things, so I am 

delighted that you have raised that point. 

The normal way, the conventional way in which the Corps of Engineers receives its funds for projects and activities is through a 

complicated and lengthy process that involves reconnaissance studies that have to be authorized and feasibility studies that have to 

be authorized and funded, and then once those are done after several years, then other things that generally stretch out construction 

of projects as we have heard, 30, 40 years, 11 years is standard for 

a Corps project. This comes because of the way in which the corps 

receives its funding and its authority for a project. 

What we have asked for as an interim step in the coastal restoration aspect of things, we’ve asked for the Congress to consider giving us more programmatic or generic authority. A lot of the science, 

a lot of the engineering is developing, a lot of the state-of-the-art 

stuff and things, how these things interact, the consequences of 

doing this here, what will be the consequences over there that are 

not now known. In the Corps of Engineers we call that adaptive 

management. 

So if we could get authorities from the committee and appropriations in no-year funds so that instead of having to do one thing in 

a non-integrated way that we could use adaptive management to 

go along and make changes and modify these things as we learn 

new information. 

Very specifically, as I mentioned previously and as General Riley 

mentioned also, but we have this request for reallocation of $250 

million to be able to allow the Secretary of the Army to make decisions, to go to construction, that is the term they use when they 

talk about doing stuff, going into construction, for some ecosystem 

restoration stuff that would be over and above and beyond anything that is in the overall comprehensive Louisiana coastal restoration program that we’ve got. 

So if we could get that kind of programmatic, generic authority, 

the Secretary of the Army would take that responsibility about 

when he has sufficient information that he would have to defend 

before this Congress to go to construction for a particular activity. 

That would be the most helpful thing right now. 

Senator CLINTON. General Riley. 

General RILEY. Yes, ma’am, and thank you for the question. If 

I may give you our perspective on that, Congress of course did authorize the opening of that canal and they will have to authorize 
20

the closure of it. In the process of doing that, we have been asked 

to study a couple of different aspects of the Mississippi River Gulf 

Outlet, both environmentally and the economic analysis of that to 

see if it is still economically viable. 

Once that is complete, and that is done with public comment and 

State and Agency review, Federal Agency review, then we bring 

that to the Chief of Engineers, he would issue a report to the Secretary of the Army, Secretary Woodley, Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Civil Works, who would then, after he is satisfied, present 

that to Congress for a decision. 

So that is the process. That is how we bring in all the different 

agencies and the public involved in that, including the NEPA process and environmental impact statement. So that is sort of the incharge piece of how that would work. 

Senator CLINTON. Ms. Mittal, do you have any comments? I was 

very impressed by your report, which I thought was very thorough, 

easy to follow, 40 years of history in an abbreviated summary form. 

It was very helpful. Do you have any concluding thoughts? 

Ms. MITTAL. The one thing we have heard experts say is that we 

need to move to a watershed approach for managing our Country. 

Instead of going from a piecemeal approach, like this is a navigation project, this is a flood control project and this is an ecosystem 

restoration project, we really need to start thinking in terms of watershed management. I think that if we start moving in that direction, both from a congressional perspective as well as from a leadership perspective at the corps, you could start seeing some of the 

issues and concerns that you raised being addressed. 

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, I know my time is up. Some of 

the witnesses we will hear in the next panels make recommendations about the Congress acting quickly to require the development 

of a comprehensive plan that would be developed by a team. Obviously the corps would be involved, but outside experts and others 

would be involved as well. It could be led by an independent commission appointed by the President. 

I think that this has immediate impact for the Mississippi River 

Gulf Coast. But it has broader implications for much of the rest of 

the Country, where we are facing not the level of disaster that you 

have experienced but certainly a lot of problems that are in the 

making. They are either already happening or we predict them to, 

as many people predicted that the levees wouldn’t hold in New Orleans. 

So I feel like we are, and I agree with Mr. Dunlop, we kind of 

go in a piecemeal by piecemeal basis, project by project basis. I just 

don’t know if that’s adequate to the task that these witnesses have 

presented to us. So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Senator. I would put it stronger, I 

think it’s very clearly inadequate, given the last several months. I 

would urge all of us to at a minimum authorize an integrated, comprehensive structure like you are describing for this immediate are, 

at least as a pilot to possibly broaden in the future. But to me it 

is a no-brainer that we need it in a pretty streamlined, quick way 

for this activity. 

By the way, to address your question specifically about MRGO, 

I already have a provision in WRDA that would, because Congress 
21

does need to act ultimately to close MRGO, we authorized it, we 

have to de-authorize it, it would mandate for the corps to come up 

with a closure plan by a date certain within 1-year. It would give 

the corps authority without even future action by Congress to implement that plan. I hope we can move forward with that in 

WRDA. 

We can have a second round of questions, because certainly I feel 

like I just scratched the surface. 

In terms of the ongoing sort of emergency work that’s going on 

now specifically on the 17th Street Canal and the Industrial Canal, 

where we are rebuilding to a different design because the prior design was pretty clearly inadequate, are we building the whole canal 

to that new and different design? 

General RILEY. Senator, if I may, we will build it to the design 

levels. So where we find in this investigation that what we see on 

the surface was undamaged, if we find something subsurface that 

needs repair, we need to go ahead and do that. 

Now, we don’t have a cost figure on that yet. 

Senator VITTER. What I’m asking is, for instance, on the 17th 

Street Canal, you’re going down what, 40 plus feet? 

General RILEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. Instead of 20. Are we doing that for the whole 

length of the canal, both sides? 

General RILEY. No, sir, we will only do that where we find that 

soft peat layer underneath there. Apparently that is fairly localized 

from the data I have read. So when we complete all the data acquisition, then we can determine the full extent of the damage. But 

we are actively seeking that, and that is a major concern of ours, 

that we don’t just repair one piece and have the next on both sides 

of it that are weaker. 

Senator VITTER. How broad-based or localized is that peat layer 

you are talking about? 

General RILEY. From what I read, I don’t have all the details but 

I understand it is pretty much around the area that failed. So up 

to 300, 400 feet. From reports I have read of boring data that they 

have, it was fairly localized, and the rest of the canal did not have 

that problem that they saw right there. 

Senator VITTER. That surprises me. Why would you expect it to 

be particularly localized? 

General RILEY. I think that’s what the borings are finding, the 

underground borings that they are looking through in the old research. Our study will go further to determine the full extent of 

that. 

Senator VITTER. What about the Industrial Canal? Where is that 

new design which is a dramatically different design being implemented? 

General RILEY. Sir, I don’t know of any dramatically new design 

on the Industrial Canal. It was clearly an overtopping there. So 

they’ve got the challenge to determine again what were the exact 

storm conditions. But what we are authorized to bring it to, clearly, 

is the design——

Senator VITTER. I was there Sunday and at least for the breach 

area, they are implementing a dramatically new design which is an 

inverted T wall going down much deeper than ever before with an-
22

gled supports under the T. That’s very different. So what I’m asking is, where is that new design being built? All along the length 

of the canal on both sides or not? 

General RILEY [continuing]. I do not have those specifics. I would 

have to get back to you on that. 

Senator VITTER. OK, if you could. My concern obviously is that 

we do the new design only where it breached and it was pretty accidental that it breached in point A and not in point B or point C. 

So that by next June, in fact, all those other points are going to 

be basically just as vulnerable as point A was right before Katrina. 

General RILEY. We have the exact same concern, yes, sir. 

Senator VITTER. That flows into the next question, which is what 

is your definition of pre-Katrina levels? 

General RILEY. Sir, what we want to do is bring it to design levels. So even pre-Katrina, where there are certain areas that 

weren’t to design level, they had either subsided and they needed 

another lift, our goal is to bring those all up to a proper design 

level. So even a little bit more than pre-Katrina in some cases, in 

some breaches of the levees. 

Senator VITTER. So you would include in that building back up 

what has fallen from subsidence? 

General RILEY. Yes, sir, absolutely. So certainly clearly in the repaired areas, the Public Law 84–99 is very clear in flood control 

that you bring that back up to design level, which was above where 

it has subsided to. 

Senator VITTER. In a whole lot of areas, that is going to be several feet above where I was? 

General RILEY. Yes, sir, I agree. 

Senator VITTER. Now, let’s take a next step. When that system 

was originally designed, a lot of things were different, including the 

wetland buffer outside the system. Are you going to take that into 

account and buildup to the true protection that was supposed to be 

which it no longer offers because of those changes? 

General RILEY. Sir, we need to take all that into account. We are 

not there yet, though. We don’t have that level of detail. 

What we have now is the level of detail of the design that it was 

before the storm. So what you are talking about is a design after 

the storm as a result of that. We don’t have that, but it is clearly 

necessary to do. 

Senator VITTER. But will you have that and do it by next June? 

General RILEY. Sir, I don’t know. On that one, I really haven’t 

given that much thought on the impact of loss of wetlands and 

what we can do because of that before June of next year. 

Senator VITTER. Well, it’s a pretty major question if you all can 

get back to me. It seems to me you have present authority to do 

that, because that is not going beyond the original mandate of the 

system. It is updating the system to that original mandate. 

Mr. Dunlop. 

Mr. DUNLOP. Yes, sir, if I could address that. I don’t mean to be 

a Johnny one-note, but you know, I have mentioned three times the 

$250 million reallocation specifically to attend to those kinds of 

things. It might be of interest to you, if you would indulge me 

showing you some photographs that I’m sure you might have already seen, sir. 
23

Here’s an example of what you are talking about. Here is a photograph of a wetland area near Fort Pike. This area that you can 

see in green is where there is vegetation. The darker area is where 

the storm scoured away the vegetation. We would probably use 

some of that $250 million to go into and get some sediment on top 

of this before it, or in places like this, if not this particular place, 

this is all over the coast where you have had the scouring, where 

we could prevent this from turning into open water, which would 

address the kind of thing you are talking about. 

Senator VITTER. Would you also use some of that money to upgrade the system to take into account 30 years of that sort of activity? 

Mr. DUNLOP. Yes, sir, I would think that the $250 million that 

I’m referring to isn’t the additional $1.6 billion to tend to the structures and levees and things. But specifically to the coastal wetlands. 

Another example, and I don’t mean to over-speak, but here are 

some barrier islands before. Some of that $250 million might be 

used in certain areas to fix some of these barrier islands. It would 

be maybe a little bit of a drop in the bucket. 

Senator VITTER. Just to be clear, you agree you have the authority to do that if we can get you the money? 

Mr. DUNLOP. Well——

Senator VITTER. I think that’s what you just told me. 

Mr. DUNLOP [continuing]. If we get the money——

Senator VITTER. You said if we get the money, this is what we 

are going to do. 

Mr. DUNLOP [continuing]. If we get the money in the appropriations reallocation, I think there is a standard assumption that 

those funds would be de facto then authorized to be used for that 

purpose. Because the nature of the request says that the Secretary 

of the Army could use these funds to do these kinds of things. 

Now, specifically doing this, or here’s another example that 

might address your question specifically, there is a structure at 

Canaravan, which is north of New Orleans. It is a flood control 

structure. It is authorized by Congress to move water into this area 

here where you see the green in the event of a flood. It is not authorized by Congress to move sediment. That is how granular we 

get in some of these authorizations. 

So what we would do is use some of that $250 million to go in 

and you can see that before, the green was where there was vegetation, the blue is now where it’s open water. We believe that if we 

could begin to take actions now with some of that $250 million, we 

could rescue this back to where maybe we could get this vegetation 

back if we could move some sediments and things like that in. 

Specifically, we are not authorized under current uses of the 

Canaravan structure to move sediment. But we believe if we got an 

appropriation of the sort I have talked about, the reallocation of existing appropriations, and it was done in the fashion that we have 

asked, making the money available to the Secretary to use it for 

these funds, we could do this kind of thing. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Final question, because I am way over my 

time, I want to get to Senator Jeffords, will you do the same thing 

if we get you the money with regard to upgrading the levee protec-
24

tion system to its original design grade, given the degradation of 

wetlands and other things in the last 30 years? 

Mr. DUNLOP. I think General Riley’s testimony is to the extent 

that we have information and data that would inform that, that 

would certainly be our intentions. 

Senator VITTER. Senator Jeffords. 

Senator JEFFORDS. General Riley and Mr. Dunlop, can you comment on the degree to which having a dedicated revenue source for 

Louisiana flood protection would affect your ability to complete a 

comprehensive project in a timely manner? 

General RILEY. Sir, I guess your question goes to dedicated and 

appropriation. I am not sure if we need a dedicated appropriation. 

Clearly we’ve got some authorities now, we are looking for other 

authorities in the coastal Louisiana hurricane protection system for 

those areas. I guess that would be the extent of dedication. I am 

not sure if I am getting to your question or not, though, Senator. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Well, let us work together on that and make 

sure you get what you need. 

General RILEY. Yes, sir, thank you. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Ms. Mittal, it is worth noting that the Barrier 

Plan experienced significant local opposition at the time documented in part by an informal poll conducted by Congressman Livingston, which showed that 62 percent of New Orleans residents either opposed the barrier or wanted to wait to construct it until 

studies were completed. 

I ask unanimous consent to submit for the record a complete 

record of the House hearing discussing these issues. 

[The referenced material was not submitted at the time of print.] 

Senator JEFFORDS. Ms. Mittal, can you describe what GAO found 

out as to the reasons for the corps’ abandoning the Barrier Plan? 

Ms. MITTAL. After the court order that enjoined the corps from 

constructing the barrier part of the Barrier Plan, until they prepared a revised environmental impact statement, the corps considered several things. One was how much time it would take to complete the environmental impact studies that would be necessary to 

address the court’s concerns. What they told us at that time was 

that they did not have the in-house expertise to conduct those studies, and that in order to complete the environmental impact studies, it would take a lot of resources and a lot of time. 

The other issue was, as you just mentioned, the local opposition. 

This project is a joint partnership between the Federal Government 

and State and local sponsors. the corps takes into consideration the 

extent to which the local sponsors are supportive of the project as 

part of their decisionmaking. The local sponsors, as you just noted, 

were very much against building the barriers because of the effect, 

the detrimental effects that they believed that the barriers would 

have on the Lake Pontchartrain ecosystem. 

The third issue that the corps considered in the mid–1980’s when 

it changed its decision was the cost of the plan. the corps usually 

goes with the most cost-effective plan. What they found was that 

because of the time it had taken to build the Barrier Plan, the Barrier Plan had increased in cost significantly. It had become nine 

times more expensive to build the Barrier Plan. 
25

And the High Level Plan was no longer the more expensive plan. 

It was actually the most cost-effective plan. So there were three 

factors. One was the environmental impact statement that they 

had to prepare, the second was the local opposition and the third 

was the cost-effectiveness of the High Level Plan versus the Barrier Plan. That was what caused the corps to change its decisions. 

Senator JEFFORDS. General Riley, the NAS report released today 

expresses some concern about the completeness of the corps’ restoration plans for coastal Louisiana. I know the corps has completed more extensive analysis on a more comprehensive plan before the Administration insisted that it be scaled back. Can you describe the difference between the original, more comprehensive 

plan and what was proposed to Congress earlier this year? 

General RILEY. Sir, I think as part of the planning process, we 

looked at the entire system across the coast and looked at comprehensively integrating all aspects of that. What the Administration said was, OK, you’ve got this overall conceptual blueprint, is 

really what it was, now let’s propose to Congress what we can do 

now and quickly in the near term to move this project forward 

quickly. 

So I think that is the essential difference, take your large, comprehensive concept that you have and then what can you do and 

what can we offer to Congress to authorize and appropriate in the 

near term. 

Senator JEFFORDS. General Riley, I have a question that I have 

tried a couple of times to get an answer to regarding notification 

and emergency planning. I am going to ask it again as I believe 

that it has national implications for Corps flood control features. 

What process did the corps have in place prior to Katrina for providing notice and warning to Federal, State and local officials about 

the status of the levees before the storm arrived and after the levees failed? 

General RILEY. Senator, from two aspects, first, we conduct annual inspections. We turn the levees over to the locals, so the locals 

operate and maintain the levees. We conduct annual inspections, 

they are out there daily and weekly maintaining the levees. We 

conduct a joint annual inspection with them and make those inspection results public. 

So that is a notification on the status of the levees pre-storm. 

During the flood, again the local levee boards will all be along 

a flood levee observing and participating in communications. Of 

course, during a hurricane you can’t do that, you have to evacuate. 

So in this case, in the particular case, instant case in New Orleans, 

they had the local citizens that were there on the ground that they 

called in to the State, I was in the State EOC, the local sheriff’s 

department and the director of homeland security for the city 

called into the State. 

I was right there with the State sheriff, so there was immediate 

notification that went out post-levee breach of the levee breaches 

that went out through the city, through that system that they had 

with the available communications that we had. So we were there, 

Corps, FEMA, Federal agencies right there in the State emergency 

operations center where some initial reports came in and immediate notification went back out. 
26

Senator JEFFORDS. General Riley, as a follow-up question, was 

that process used effectively and have you made any changes as a 

result of Katrina, and have you applied these lessons learned to 

other flood control features such as the Waterbury Dam in 

Vermont, where thousands of people live minutes downstream? 

General RILEY. One thing we clearly learned, I think all the Government agencies learned and locals, was the difficulty of communications when a massive storm comes in and you wipe out your 

cell phone network. Even our satellite phones, after 2 days, had difficulty. 

So an improvement in our communications ability clearly is important for that kind of notification. Then in close conjunction, 

working with the local levee boards to make sure if they can get 

out on the levees to get out and watch them over time. In a hurricane, it is a different story, though, and you have to rely on people 

that are in bunkers and hurricane protected bunkers to get out and 

observe as soon as they can get out when the storm passes. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. I just have a few follow-up questions 

before we go to the second panel. 

I am very happy to hear everybody talking about a new, integrated approach. I have been preaching this for a while, so I hope 

this is a developing consensus. It seems to me this is not going to 

happen unless we have a new and different structure to make all 

this happen. Is the Administration going to propose such a structure, such a fundamentally different structure to make sure this 

new, integrated approach happens on a more streamlined basis? 

Mr. DUNLOP. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think what we are trying to 

do in the chief’s report and the leadership that you yourself have 

provided in the Louisiana coastal area wetlands restoration program, we have tried to take that, the lessons that we learned from 

the Florida Everglades restoration activity, and we put together a 

system of partnerships with the State and other Federal agencies 

and other local entities to manage the way in which we are redoing 

the Florida Everglades. 

We tried to take those lessons learned and apply them to the 

Louisiana coastal area restoration activity. We believe that the legislation that you have passed from your committee and which is 

awaiting consideration in the Senate has a lot to commend to it as 

a mechanism to move forward on that front. 

As regarding the structures that we have been discussing, the 

levees and the storm protection structures, the process that we are 

taking now is, as I indicated in my testimony, part of what the 

White House has put together as a cabinet council coordination activity. We believe that with the existing authorities of different 

agencies of Government that we can effectively carry out those activities if we get appropriate authorizations and appropriations to 

undertake the work. 

Senator VITTER. All of that is way shy of what Senator Clinton 

and I were suggesting in terms of a different structure, a commission to have clear programmatic authority to get this done on a region-wide basis. Are you all, meaning the Administration, going to 

suggest such a new structure? Because it seems to me without 

that, talk of this new integrated approach means we go to a bunch 
27

of conferences and talk to a bunch of different agencies, and then 

day to day it devolves into the same fragmented way of doing 

things. 

Mr. DUNLOP. Yes, sir, it could happen that way. I am sure you 

are correct. Although I do believe that if we take some of these programmatic approaches, my testimony would be that the Secretary 

of the Army, with appropriate oversight from Congress, of course, 

and all the rest, would be able to be most effective in executing 

those types of decisions to do those things without a new layer of 

bureaucracy and a new layer of Government. 

But ultimately that will be Congress’ judgment to make, because 

we execute those laws that you enact. We do it faithfully, we trust. 

Senator VITTER. OK. Ms. Mittal, I want to ask this question for 

the chairman. He wanted your thoughts for the record on, was the 

GAO testimony before the House Appropriations Committee correct 

involving the choices between different hurricane protection plans 

in the past? 

Ms. MITTAL. For the record, sir, when we prepared that statement, there was very little known about what actually caused the 

levee breaches. In the last 4 weeks, there has been a lot more information that has become available on what caused the levees to actually breach. When we prepared our statement today, we tried to 

incorporate that information, and therefore we revised the statement that we prepared in September. 

Senator VITTER. Again for the record, highlight the differences 

between what you are saying now versus that House testimony. 

Ms. MITTAL. In the September testimony, we obtained some general information from the corps about funding levels and also construction status as well as some general opinions from Corps officials about what they believed had caused the breaches. We now 

know that there are many more reasons that resulted in the 

breaches and that’s why we made the changes to our current statement. 

Senator VITTER. OK, Senator Isakson has arrived. Senator, do 

you have questions? 

Senator ISAKSON. I apologize for missing the testimony. I will 

save my questions for the second panel. Thank you for being here. 

Senator VITTER. Senator Jeffords? 

Senator JEFFORDS. Ms. Mittal, did the High Level Plan barriers 

fail? 

Ms. MITTAL. The High Level Barriers on the lake side, according 

to the preliminary results, indicate that those actually performed 

very well after Hurricane Katrina. The part of the High Level Plan 

that failed would be along the drainage canals, and that I believe 

the corps is still in the process of investigating why those breaches 

occurred. 

But the parts of the High Level Plan that were along the lake 

front, those actually performed very well, according to preliminary 

results. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you all very much. 

Now we will have our second panel, if they will approach the witness table. As our next panel of witnesses approaches, I am going 

to go ahead and introduce them. We have Mr. Windell Curole, Gen-
28

eral Manager of the South Lafourche Levee District; Mr. Peter 

Brink, Senior Vice President for Programs with The National Trust 

for Historic Preservation; Mr. Scott Faber, a Water Resources Specialist with Environmental Defense; and Mr. Steve Ellis, Vice 

President of Taxpayers for Common Sense. 

We will begin with Mr. Curole. Windell, thank you for joining us. 

STATEMENT OF WINDELL CUROLE, GENERAL MANAGER, 

SOUTH LAFOURCHE LEVEE DISTRICT 

Mr. CUROLE. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify 

here today. 

Being the only person from Louisiana besides yourself, my whole 

life ancestry is coastal Louisiana. Seven generations in south Louisiana, five generations living on the coast. Hurricane of 1893 hit, 

I had 7 out of my 8 great-grandparents living on the coast, they 

retreated 12 miles inland as far as 45 miles inland. In 1915, they 

retreated 15 miles inland and continued to retreat inland. 

So these five generations of living on the coast line, yet here in 

Louisiana when you look at oil support, seafood, 30 percent of the 

oil in the 48 States, you look at the trade on the port, the reasons 

to build the coast line are still there. But we are the only community in the United States basically with a population that is still 

retreating from the coast line. Some people say, why are you there? 

We are there because that is where the business is. But we have 

Port Fourchon, which supports 75 percent of all deep offshore oil. 

U.S. Treasury gets $5 billion from that support every year. Yet at 

that port, you virtually have no one living there. They all live 22 

miles further inland in the levee system that we have constructed. 

The other thing about our area is that the uniqueness of it ties 

in culturally and also geographically. Culturally, I am the first generation of those seven generations to learn English before French. 

When I grew up, our communities in south Louisiana, along our 

bayou, were French-speaking. Now they have converted to English. 

But it is because this area is so unique, with all the tremendous 

productivity. The only place that can match it might be Alaska as 

far as making it really easy just to get a meal. Like one gentleman 

said, if you are ever hungry in south Louisiana, it is because you 

are on a diet. 

But you look at the geography of south Louisiana, it is the understanding that this major river, people forget how important the 

Mississippi River is, that the force of that river draining 41 percent 

of the United Sates built south Louisiana. South Louisiana is a gift 

from the river. It was actually built by the flooding of the river. Basically the Gulf of Mexico and the river have been in a battle to 

the river building land and the Gulf trying to take it back. We find 

ourselves today, after the 1927 flood, we became very good at stopping the flooding of the river, although that was actually the life 

blood that actually built the land to begin with. 

So with this situation, I think 1947 was the last time we had a 

major crevasse. You talk about major flooding, New Orleans’ biggest threat, even when this tremendous disaster took place, flooding from the Mississippi River at high river would be more of a disaster because the water would continue flowing for maybe months 
29

at a time, and not just the lower areas in New Orleans flooding, 

but the entire city. 

So you look at this place, this geography, and it makes things 

very different, a different approach. It is very important to understand why we are there. We are a pass-through. When you look at 

30 percent of the oil and gas coming into this Country, the energy 

needs to come through there. The area that I am involved with, in 

my district that I work, we have the only deep offshore oil port, 1.2 

million barrels a day of foreign oil comes through our parish. It 

provides good taxes and energy to the rest of the Country. 

Senator JEFFORDS. What were those figures again? 

Mr. CUROLE. One point two million barrels a day. Actually, that 

structure was designed for only a million barrels a day. But the demand is so large. In fact, I sit on their safety panel. They were 

talking where the storms had hit, they have had their customers, 

80 of these supertankers backed up because of the problems. 

Right alongside that pipeline, the Morris pipeline from deep offshore oil, was producing about 350,000 barrels a day. But because 

of the damage from Katrina, no oil is coming through there. But 

in the same corridor, British Petroleum is about to put in the 

Mardi Gras line and this is supposed to be about 600,000 barrels 

a day. 

So the importance of why we are where we are is the support of 

these things that provide for the rest of America. 

We looked at the 1927 flood. Although when New Orleans was 

first established there was a need for levees, and they started 

building levees immediately, there has always been the need to improve that levee protection. But until the 1927 flood, the success 

wasn’t great. Since that time, we have been very good at it. They 

did form a new commission, a new way of doing business. It 

changed the way the United States looked at that flood protection. 

We think what has happened here, we need to do the same type 

of thing, we need to look at it differently. 

What I find in dealing with most of the professionals in Government, very good people, very good. But they are more research and 

planning. They do a good job. But when you have a business, research and development does their research and development, but 

the chairman says when you move forward. I think what we do is 

we mix sometimes the research and development mentality gets to 

the leadership. That’s why I think some type of separate group 

with the marching orders to move forward, sometimes doing 70 

percent of an answer is enough to move forward. 

Especially with the battle that we have in south Louisiana, we 

have a very changing—the environment changes very quickly. We 

need to get things done. 

I need also to mention that I am the manager of a Corps of Engineers project, local sponsor, the Larose to Golden Meadow project. 

We were the only system south of the intercoastal that didn’t flood. 

Now, it was a combination of things. First, we were lucky. You get 

a category 5 hurricane, there is no place on the United States coast 

line that wouldn’t be devastated. You look at Waveland, MS. They 

are talking about water elevations up to 30 feet. 
30

In fact, I was reading a book on the 1938 hurricane that hit 

Providence, RI. Fifteen feet of water in Providence, RI, with about 

700 people losing their lives. 

So No. 1 of the things we need to understand, major hurricanes 

will cause damage anywhere they hit in the coastal United States. 

But understanding the comprehensive work that needed to be done 

to handle the flooding of the Mississippi River, I think we look now 

in trying to deal with those issues the same way in coastal Louisiana. 

Again, growing up in the area, if you are a community in south 

Louisiana, it makes sense to have your hurricane protection, your 

hurricane evacuation routes, your navigation, your businesses, also 

the natural production that you have, the great estuaries that we 

have on the Barataria side and the Terrebonne side, that these 

things have to work together. It is just common sense. 

I have been trying to promote this idea for a number of years. 

But you know, it almost takes disaster to make things happen. 

Even in the Netherlands, where they spent 600 years taking land 

from the Zeiderzee, it took the 1953–54 flood for them to get very 

serious about it. 

Well, now I think the mule has been hit in the head with a two 

by four. We need to do comprehensive planning to go forward. 

Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BRINK. 

STATEMENT OF PETER H. BRINK, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

PROGRAMS, NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION 

Mr. BRINK. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. 

I am representing The National Trust for Historic Preservation, 

America’s largest private preservation organization actually chartered by Congress in 1949. 

As the people of the Gulf Coast move to restore countless historic 

homes, buildings, and landscapes damaged by Katrina, there are 

critical roles that Congress can and should play to ensure that historic properties and neighborhoods in this region are afforded the 

maximum possible protection against catastrophic storms. 

This part of the Country has an enormously rich history with one 

of the largest concentrations of historic buildings in the United 

States. These are important for their own sakes, but historic preservation is also a powerful force in the local, State and national 

economy. In Louisiana, culture means business. 

This is why we are participating in the national advisory board 

that Lieutenant Governor Mitch Landrieu has put together to develop a detailed action plan to rebuild Louisiana, relying on its cultural and historic assets. Prior to Katrina, his office conducted a 

comprehensive study that showed that the cultural economy was 

growing faster and creating more jobs than any other sector of the 

State’s economic clusters. This powerful force should be one of the 

tools we use to attract reinvestment in the hurricane damaged 

areas. 

A pre-storm survey shows that 28 percent of those visiting Louisiana came to enjoy its distinctive neighborhoods and visit individual historic properties. With regard to New Orleans, 10.1 mil-
31

lion people visited in 2004 and spent $5.5 billion. Seventy-five 

thousand people in New Orleans are directly employed by the travel industry. 

Louisiana ranks sixth in the Nation in rehabilitation activity 

using the Federal Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit. Contrary to 

some misconceptions that historic preservation’s benefits are lost 

on those of low and moderate income, over 60 percent of America’s 

national register historic districts overlap census tracts where the 

poverty rate exceeds 20 percent. 

Moreover, the Rehab Tax Credit can be used in conjunction with 

housing and new markets tax credits to spur the creation of affordable housing and revitalized neighborhoods serving business corridors. This is exactly what we need to do. 

I visited southeastern Louisiana in September. I might also mention that I led the preservation effort in Galveston, TX for 17 years. 

So I have been through hurricanes and disaster response on the 

ground. The damage in New Orleans to buildings is catastrophic. 

In New Orleans alone, the National Trust onsite survey teams estimate that Katrina’s devastating winds, rain and subsequent flooding have in some way affected the 38,000 contributing structures 

in the city’s historic districts. 

In New Orleans, unlike almost any other American city, there 

are 20 National Register districts that cover more than half of the 

land area of the city. These are made up of residents of every income level. 

I saw first-hand that the world-known French Quarters and Garden Districts are largely intact. That was wonderful news. But the 

downtown heart of the city beats in lesser-known neighborhoods, 

such as Holy Cross, Tremay, Broadmore and Mid-City, where designated historic districts have the creole cottages, corner stores and 

shotgun houses that are essential ingredients in the rich architectural mix that is New Orleans. Preserving as many of them as possible is essential to preserving the city’s very character. 

In order to save that history from being lost forever, the Trust 

urges the committee to safeguard coastal Louisiana’s legacy by supporting the following four basic principles. One, provide the best infrastructure for the Nation’s premier historic area. Congress should 

provide all necessary resources to rebuild a levee system that recognizes the need to protect the Nation’s richest inventory of historic 

treasures. 

This includes the city’s levees and completing a comprehensive 

system of hurricane protection in the whole area once and for all. 

It should anticipate the worst, a category 5 hurricane as well as 

a slow, drenching storm. 

Two, restore and redevelop protective wetlands. Natural water 

resources must complement man-made infrastructure to mitigate 

the damaging effects of future catastrophic storms. Erosion along 

Louisiana’s coast has eliminated over one million acres of wetlands. 

As a result, the Army Corps’ own hurricane protection levees 

have become more vulnerable. They were built with the understanding that they would be buffeted from winds and storm surges 

by 40 to 50 miles of protective swamp and marsh. The communities 

these levees protect are now constantly vulnerable. 
32

Three, assure full compliance with the National Historic Preservation Act’s Section 106 requirements. Thorough Section 106 review must be part of any Corps work. This is a process that protects and balances the different interests involved. 

Four, use historic preservation as a tool for revitalizing coastal 

Louisiana’s economy wherever feasible. In this, we have introduced, and I would be glad to answer in Q&A, specific suggestions 

for preservation grants, streamlining of tax incentives and a pilot 

homeowner’s tax credit. 

All in all, we think historic preservation is a framework for everything that should be done in the recovery, and I would be glad 

to talk more about how that can be done. 

Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Mr. Brink. Mr. Faber. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT FABER, WATER RESOURCES 

SPECIALIST, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE 

Mr. FABER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to echo your 

opening statement, the notion that we have to quickly, very quickly 

identify ways to improve our existing flood control infrastructure, 

that we have to quickly identify opportunities to relocate vulnerable homes and businesses in harm’s way, and that we must at 

least begin the thorough restoration of our lost coastal wetlands 

and barrier islands. 

Our fear is that nothing less than the future of New Orleans is 

at stake. If we can’t provide assurances that we can provide a category 5 level of protection to New Orleans and the surrounding 

parishes, our fear is that business leaders, community leaders will 

not reinvest in the city’s future once again. I just want to summarize by making four central points. 

One is something you have alluded to, Senator Clinton alluded 

to, the notion that we need to create an independent commission 

to develop a comprehensive plan to provide a category 5 level of 

protection for New Orleans and surrounding parishes. In our view, 

the Congress should immediately create, or authorize the creation 

of a commission of three national experts of national reputation appointed by the President after consultation with the Governor to 

develop a comprehensive plan that provides the required level of 

protection. 

Our sense is that a commission can do more and provide more 

resources, provide more expertise than the Army Corps of Engineers alone can provide today, and that it will provide the accountability that many Americans, many Members of Congress are seeking as we make a major reinvestment in the region. 

The second point I would like to make is that we should make 

an immediate down payment of $10.5 billion in the next supplemental appropriations bill to begin the restoration of our lost coastal wetlands and barrier islands and to begin efforts to improve our 

levees and other flood control infrastructure. Contrary to what you 

might have heard, we can begin today and build many of the restoration projects, diversions, pipelines, other projects that can 

today begin to restore much of what has been lost in the last 75 

years. 
33

This is one of many volumes of a draft study that was not released in 2003 that identifies literally scores of projects that could 

be built today to help begin the long overdue restoration of this 

natural hurricane buffer system. We shouldn’t wait another day to 

begin those efforts. 

As you have heard before, these wetlands are critically important 

to the protection of our homes, our businesses, our oil and gas infrastructure. For every 2.7 linear miles of wetlands that we restore, 

and I brought a copy of a report by an LSU professor, Greg Stone, 

that I am sure you have become aware of. For every 2.7 miles of 

wetlands we restore, we can reduce storm surge by approximately 

1 foot. If we had begun to restore lost coastal wetlands and barrier 

islands 30 years ago, when scientists first began to understand the 

consequences of the loss of our natural hurricane buffer system, 

then the storm surge created by Hurricane Katrina would have 

been dramatically reduced. 

The third point I would like to make is that we should not wait 

to close the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. As I speak here today, 

we are in the process of repairing the levees along MRGO, also 

known as the hurricane highway. It seems irrational, frankly, to 

reload the shotgun, to rebuild those levees, to continue to leave 

those parts of New Orleans vulnerable to a storm surge that has 

been increased anywhere from 20 to 40 percent by the construction 

of MRGO. 

If there were a significant amount of traffic on the waterway, 

then I think there would be an argument perhaps that we should 

keep it open. But given the low levels of traffic, given the fact that 

traffic has fallen to less than 50 percent of what the corps predicted when the project was constructed, it simply makes no sense 

to continue to operate a waterway that poses such a significant 

threat to people and property. 

The last point I would like to make is a general point. We need 

to set much clearer priorities for our water resources spending. At 

the same time that overall spending on Army Corps construction 

and maintenance increased from $3.2 billion to $4.7 billion, we saw 

a significant decrease in the amount of money that we were spending to upgrade New Orleans’ levee protection system from roughly 

about $15 million a year to about $5 million a year. That seems 

to me a case of seriously misplaced priorities. 

I think it is important for this committee to create an interagency council to help the corps and the Administration and the 

Congress make better judgments about what our national civil 

works priorities ought to be. We should only be building the most 

important projects, worthy projects. We should subject our most 

costly and controversial projects to independent review. We should 

prioritize those projects to make sure that we are putting people 

and property first. 

So let me just close by saying that as we rebuild, we think it is 

critically important that we provide a higher level of protection 

than we had just 3 months ago. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. Mr. Ellis. 
34

STATEMENT OF STEVE ELLIS, VICE PRESIDENT, TAXPAYERS 

FOR COMMON SENSE 

Mr. ELLIS. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

Jeffords, Senator Isakson. I am Steve Ellis, Vice President for Programs at Taxpayers for Common Sense, a national, non-partisan 

budget watchdog. 

I would like to commend the chairman and the committee for 

holding this series of hearings. 

In the Gulf Coast region, we are faced with a significant challenge: the need for speed and the need to do it right. As a budget 

watchdog, I would add that we need to do it fiscally responsibly as 

well. The outpouring of individual support for this relief effort, 

which has already reached $2 billion, shows just how important 

this issue is to the American people. We owe it to the American 

people to spend their tax dollars wisely, to rebuild effectively and 

intelligently. 

The fundamental responsibility of Government is to take care of 

its citizens. In the area of flood and storm damage reduction, it is 

clear that the Government has failed. We spent $123 billion on 

flood control projects in the last century, but annual costs from 

flood damages have increased from $2.6 billion annually in the first 

50 years of the 20th century to more than $6 billion per year over 

the last decade of that same century. 

Right after Katrina flooded New Orleans, the airwaves were full 

of Army Corps of Engineers officials stating that the levees and 

floodwalls performed as expected. They provided category 3 protection and Katrina was a category 4 storm. But according to recent 

testimony and what we heard today, Katrina was no longer a category 4 hurricane when it hit New Orleans. Independent engineering panels found that the levees and flood walls did not perform 

to design or promise. 

If it is true that the levees were brought down by shoddy craftsmanship, we need to know whether this was an isolated case or 

whether this is just one of many projects nationwide that we 

should be concerned about. We need to take a close look at how the 

corps supervised construction. In one of my jobs with the Coast 

Guard, I was the contracting officer’s technical representative for 

a boat construction contract. In that capacity, I learned that inspection and oversight is as important as the initial construction itself. 

the corps’ failures in overseeing the New Orleans flood protection 

is quite possibly the most troubling incident in the Agency’s recent 

history. Here are a few principles that TCS would urge the committee, Congress and the Administration to consider. 

Rethink the level of protection. First, New Orleans must get the 

category 3 level of protection that it was promised before Katrina. 

However, we cannot expect any levee to automatically meet all our 

needs just because the corps has deemed it a category 3 or even 

a category 5. Mother Nature is very creative, versatile and powerful. 

We can mitigate risks with levees, floodwalls and constructed 

wetlands. But the risk of catastrophic flood damage will always be 

there. We should endeavor to obtain significant protection from a 

variety of threats, not just a repeat of Katrina. 
35

Identify what to rebuild. Although it will be a difficult process, 

we will have to identify areas that are too damaged or so vulnerable to future storms that they should not be rebuilt. Just like after 

the great Midwest flood of 1993, this is a difficult task that has to 

be managed and led by Louisianans. 

But the Federal Government needs to be clear that if individuals 

want to rebuild in high-risk areas, they should do it without the 

aid or encouragement of Uncle Sam. In past crises, some affected 

towns have responded by relocating out of the flood plain. Also, 

critical infrastructure should be moved out of the flood plain where 

possible. 

Reevaluate our policies. Our Nation’s water resources policies are 

antiquated. The Principles and Guidelines, the rules governing the 

Corps of Engineers’ project design and selection, are more than two 

decades old. We need to update those rules to fully account for all 

costs and benefits of Corps projects, modernize economic procedures, and remove biases toward large construction projects. 

We have a $58 billion backlog of Corps of Engineers projects and 

the Agency has a roughly $5 billion budget. Rather than pumping 

up the corps budget, as some insist, we must establish a system of 

prioritizing project investments so we don’t squander precious tax 

dollars maintaining waterways with no traffic, rather than constructing essential flood damage reduction projects. 

Flood insurance has been a failure. FEMA estimates that flood 

insurance claims this year will exceed $22 billion, more than in the 

whole history of the program. But the National Flood Insurance 

Program has the capacity to pay about $2 billion per year. 

Further, our policies discourage adequate flood protection. Since 

the typical homeowner does not have to buy flood insurance if they 

have 100 year flood protection, we have essentially dumbed down 

our flood protection to the 100 year level. 

Let the economy help itself. Congress has already been asked to 

fund the do everything for everyone approach. Small business, the 

oil and gas industry, fishing industry, the port all are seeking significant Federal support to get them back on their feet. We strongly urge the incentives to be small, targeted and short in duration. 

Some businesses or infrastructure may have been inappropriately 

located at high risk from storms. Taxpayers should not subsidize 

them to be built right back into harm’s way. 

Forward thinking. There are a lot of plans on the books for providing flood protection for New Orleans and Louisiana. We must 

resist an urge to simply dust them off and get building. Our approach to providing adequate flood protection must be integrated 

and multi-faceted, and it must be tailored to include lessons 

learned from this unthinkable tragedy. A czar overseeing Federal 

reconstruction has precedent and makes sense. 

Finally, the major concern for Taxpayer for Common Sense: cost. 

The Nation needs to set some investment priorities in the Gulf 

Coast region. We cannot afford to protect everything everywhere 

and pay everyone to come back. We had a $317 billion budget deficit last year. We are fighting a war. New Orleans is important and 

the Gulf Coast is an important, valuable investment. But we have 

to target our funding wisely. 
36

Thank you very much for inviting me here to testify. I would be 

happy to answer any questions you might have. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you very much. Now we will get to questions. 

Mr. Curole, could you share with the committee your experience 

in building the Leonteria lock? 

Mr. CUROLE. Well, it’s a long and depressing story. Back when 

the study was first done for the Larose to Golden Meadow hurricane protection project, the floodgate in Golden Meadow was looked 

at and even mentioned that it might have to convert to a lock. We 

completed the construction of that floodgate in 1985. 

By 1990 it was obvious that this floodgate, which was designed 

to close only during hurricanes, due to subsidence problems it was 

allowing flooding to take place. South winds were blowing, water 

was getting into the system where we had to start closing the 

floodgate to stop the waters from coming in and inundating the 

communities. 

Once we closed those floodgates, we stopped our oystermen, our 

crabbers. The fuel, the drilling mud and the other things that go 

to Port Fourchon, again, that support 75 percent of all deep offshore oil in the Gulf. So that became a problem. We were able to 

document that problem. In 1996, we asked the corps to move forward with working toward getting this completed. They wrote back 

saying that they would have a study done, and probably within a 

year, have the study complete. The study was completed, I think, 

2 months ago. 

We could not afford to wait on that situation. In 1999, we had 

requested Congressman Tauzin to help us in urging the corps to 

move forward. There was some language in the WRDA bill with the 

intent to urge the corps to move forward. Our project was not on 

the back burner. It was probably evidently behind the stove. So we 

were doing everything we could to move it forward. 

With that interpretation of the 1999 WRDA, they looked at it as 

new authorization and basically it just caused more problems for 

the project. We finally had to say, well, we hired a local engineer 

and are sort of designing the project ourselves, started the report. 

There were Corps individuals who did work with us in getting this 

done. The report has been done, the corps has been doing oversight 

and that has worked out well. 

We are actually in the process of building the structure right now 

with zero dollars from the corps. We hope to have it in place next 

year. It was just a problem, it obviously is a problem that helps the 

national need. It was talked about in our original authorization. 

Yet all these years later, and we still haven’t resolved that issue. 

But we will build it and we will put it in place. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you for all your leadership there on the 

ground. I am going to bounce around during my time. Mr. Ellis, 

some have quite frankly suggested that New Orleans as a significant city should not be rebuilt in the same place. What is your reaction to that? 

Mr. ELLIS. Well, I have a personal tie to New Orleans. I actually 

flew my wife down there to get engaged. So I certainly have a great 

affection for the city and for the area. I think New Orleans——
37

Senator VITTER. I am sure Taxpayers for Common Sense won’t 

let that impact their policies. So why don’t we go to that organizational viewpoint? 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ELLIS. The organizational viewpoint is that significant portions of New Orleans were not damaged in this hurricane. New Orleans is always going to be vulnerable to hurricanes, and that is 

something that it is going to have to be dealt with. But I think that 

absolutely we should be looking at rebuilding, and maintaining 

that great city. That is my personal and our organization’s view. 

That said, I don’t think it will look exactly the same that it did 

before Katrina. I think that is responsible. 

Senator VITTER. You also talked about prioritizing what we do 

there. Where on that priority list should be a more robust system 

of hurricane and flood protection? 

Mr. ELLIS. I think that in looking at some of the lessons learned 

from previous large natural disasters, for instance, the flood of 

1993, the recommendations there are that if you have highly urbanized, densely populated areas that are at flood risk, they should 

receive the highest level of protection possible. I think that is exactly going to be the wisest approach, and it should be a significantly high priority, you know, we will have to look at it compared 

to everything else. 

Everybody I have heard seems to agree that getting to level 3 by 

next hurricane season is the first and highest priority and then we 

go from there identifying what we are going to do to get to a significantly higher level of protection. I fully recognize that there 

may be some investments that we are going to make in the next 

several months, in doing that, that’s going to be lost. Because of 

the change or whatever, or going to category 5, those investments 

are going to be lost. But I think that is the responsible approach, 

at least in the short term. 

Senator VITTER. Given those priorities, what is your reaction, or 

Taxpayers for Common Sense’s reaction to the fact that we have 

now appropriated almost $70 billion or spent, counting tax issues, 

almost $70 billion? Not a penny of that is for higher level protection. 

Mr. ELLIS. Right. Although in the President’s recent recommendation, he was essentially reallocating some of the $60 billion in appropriations that has not been spent and is not expected 

to be spent out of the disaster relief fund during that time. I think 

that is a wise decision, to shuffle that deck. 

Senator VITTER. But none of that reallocation goes to a higher 

level of protection. 

Mr. ELLIS. Right. We are going to have to go forward from there. 

One of the things that our organization did when we first started 

hearing the estimates that it is going to be a $200 billion cost for 

reconstructing in the Gulf was come up with our own offset proposal. We provided our own, it is on our web site, 

www.taxpayer.net, and it has basically every other organization’s 

that we could find, offset proposals to try to find a way to offset 

the cost of what we are going to have to bear. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. Senator Jeffords. 
38

Senator JEFFORDS. I would like Mr. Faber and Mr. Curole to 

comment on the interaction between natural features and manmade features as part of a comprehensive flood control plan. What 

role do natural features such as wetlands and barrier islands play? 

Mr. CUROLE. It’s a very important, critical point. I have been 

dealing with actually wetlands issues since about 1975 and levee 

issues since 1980. It was always a battle to get people involved in 

wetlands issues, all the way until about the 1990’s. I found it surprising that we have gotten to the point right now where a lot of 

people interpret wetlands restoration in the place of hurricane protection. We have statistics showing that there is no doubt having 

wetlands projects helping out in reducing storm surge. 

But there is, I have been told by the National Hurricane Center, 

some of their modelers over there, they believe when you are talking about a powerful hurricane, marsh elevations will not make a 

big difference. Now, what is different when we are talking about 

the natural terrain in south Louisiana, we always had not only 

marshes, but we had ridges, chenieres, we call them, ridges that 

would develop higher areas. 

We have right now, with all the negative things, a delta being 

constructed south of Morgan City, Louisiana, because we have 30 

percent of the Mississippi River going into shallow water. The flood 

elevations we saw in Morgan City were a lot lower than on either 

side of Morgan City, even though Rita was to the west of Morgan 

City. But you have not just marshes being built, you have this 

shoaling area where you get elevations of four to five feet. 

So basically they do work together. On the everyday issue, we 

have, our levee district has built marsh, we call them marsh 

aprons, alongside of our levee that can reduce the effects of everyday wave action in causing erosion along our levees. So they do 

work together. 

But we absolutely need levees to protect where we live. We also 

have a subsidence issue that even with all the restoration our communities are still going to have less elevation. So the levees are 

definitely needed. Any restoration we do will help the effects and 

the performance of those levees. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Faber. 

Mr. FABER. I would agree with Mr. Curole. There is obviously a 

combination of structural protection enhancing existing levees, 

building new levees, perhaps reevaluating other structural solutions that needs to be a part of this future picture. In addition, 

there needs to be a real commitment to implement the restoration 

plan for Louisiana’s barrier islands and coastal wetlands as it has 

been developed by the State and by the corps of Engineers. 

I think in both cases, both of these efforts have suffered from a 

critical lack of urgency. I think sadly the people in this room are 

among the few thousand who fully understood what would happen 

when a category 4 or category 5 storm would strike. Despite our 

best efforts, we were unable to really alert the Nation to the costs 

of our failure to act. Again, if we had really begun in earnest to 

address this issue 10 years ago or even 5 or 6 years ago when Governor Foster first kind of really put this on the Nation’s radar 

screen, we would be in a much better position to prepare for the 

next hurricane. 
39

Mr. CUROLE. One other thing about structures, we talked about 

the Barrier Plan across Lake Pontchartrain, that barrier that was 

objected to by the locals. Since I have been working with the Levee 

Board Association on comprehensive hurricane protection, we have 

involved the foremost environmental group in the Lake Pontchartrain Basin, and they now support a barrier across. Of course, 

done in a way that the flow of water stays at a normal pace until 

you have to close for hurricanes. So there has been good cooperation over the years and more trust between, let’s say the Corps of 

Engineers and some of the environmental groups. So there is 

progress in making those things work together better. 

Mr. FABER. I will just add, another critical piece that is missing 

right now, one is obviously the funding to quickly repair levees, to 

begin coastal restoration. But another critical piece that is missing 

is the funding necessary to relocate vulnerable, frequently flooded 

homes and businesses where that is the choice of a homeowner or 

business owner. 

There have been some changes in the Stafford Act since the great 

flood of 1993 that are making it significantly harder for parishes 

and for State officials to relocate people who want to get out of 

harm’s way and get to higher ground. In particular, there are owners’ cost share requirements, we no longer set aside 15 percent of 

all disaster relief to help move or elevate structures so that they 

are better positioned when the next hurricane strikes. 

So there are things that the Congress can do right now to amend 

the Stafford Act to make the voluntary relocation of some of these 

structures that in retrospect should not have been built in these 

certain places to make that relocation possible. 

Senator JEFFORDS. Mr. Brink, you mentioned the role of historic 

preservation in economic recovery. My colleagues from Louisiana 

recognize this, and they have proposed $150 million in grants for 

historic preservation in Louisiana, with $25 million earmarked for 

your organization. 

Can you expand on how these resources could be used to drive 

economic development in low income communities? 

Mr. BRINK. The idea of the request for preservation grant money, 

and thank you, Senator Vitter and also Senator Landrieu, for including that amount in your joint bill. Our request was more modest at $60 million that takes into account the authorization level 

of the historic preservation fund. We will be happy to have more. 

These would be grants that we hope will tip the balance when 

a homeowner is making the decision as to whether the economics 

work for them to rehab as opposed to demolish. They would be 

available in the 20 National Historic district areas. They are not 

for the high style fancy house as much as they are for the middle 

income, more modest house. 

We see the providing of overall character in the city as a key element of its ongoing heritage tourism attraction. The French Quarter, of course, is well known. But having that alone is not going to 

continue to draw the 10 million people a year that New Orleans 

previously drew. The real attraction of New Orleans beyond the 

French Quarter is food, jazz, the mix of people, the mix of architecture. It is a marvelous city, and it needs to be a living city, not a 

stage set that only has the French Quarter. 
40

Senator JEFFORDS. Thank you. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you. Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Faber, your independent commission to develop a comprehensive plan to quickly assure businesses and folks 

that restoration will take place quickly and competently implies a 

couple of things. But the first thing that it implies is that they 

would actually have the authority to expend the money. 

Mr. FABER. That’s right. 

Senator ISAKSON. Let me ask you a question, then, if that is 

right, what is it about the way that we set our civic works priorities and the way OMB and the Congress function that you find 

faulty? 

Mr. FABER. Any member or Senator, I am sure, shares the frustration with the pace at which we design, plan and construct flood 

control and restoration projects. This is an extraordinary circumstance. It seems to me that we need to find a new way to make 

the resources available to prepare for the next hurricane, which 

could be as soon as next June. 

What we would propose is to have a commission of three national 

experts with a staff taken from the Federal Government, from various Federal agencies, including the corps and other agencies, but 

that would also have the power to reach into the private sector to 

get the best minds from our engineering firms, to reach into our 

universities to get the best minds from our institutions of higher 

learning. Put the best minds to work right away so that we can devise a comprehensive plan that addresses the needs of structural 

infrastructure, that addresses the need of lost barrier islands and 

wetlands. 

I have only positive things to say about the great work of the 

Army Corps of Engineers. I think they would admit that they simply lack the resources and the capability to meet this particular 

task. This is a task that we are undertaking that has been like no 

other in the history of this Agency. It is inconceivable that the 

number of people who are sitting today in the New Orleans district 

or in Vicksburg or in Memphis or even here in Washington on their 

own could solve this problem. 

I am not proposing to replace the corps, but I am proposing that 

we supplement their expertise and their capacity with others within the private sector and the universities to get this job done as 

quickly as humanly possible. 

Senator ISAKSON. Again, that does beg the question that you appropriate a lump sum of money and then tell them to spend it, is 

that correct? 

Mr. FABER. That’s exactly right. In our view, if it were Presidentially appointed and they were people of national reputation 

and integrity, that would I hope provide the assurances that you 

and others would want that this money would be wisely spent. 

Senator ISAKSON. Mr. Ellis, what would your organization think 

about that? 

Mr. ELLIS. We would have concerns about a large lump sum appropriation for this. I think that you could have some controls over 

the process with congressional check-in and Administration checkin. I think that as some have envisioned, that having a large fund 
41

that has been removed from congressional appropriations control, 

from the Administration’s control is of concern to our organization. 

That is not to say that the idea of having some body that drives 

this process, that elevates its level of attention in Congress and in 

the Administration’s eyes it not worthwhile. I think that makes a 

lot of sense, there is precedent in our history. President Coolidge 

tapped Secretary of Commerce Hoover to lead the effort after the 

flood of 1927. I think that is an interesting model at least to try 

and elevate the process so that it is somebody that the President 

pays attention to and that Congress pays attention to. 

Senator ISAKSON. My last thing is more of a comment than a 

question. Mayor Nagin was here a week ago and I brought this up 

to him. I don’t believe I heard any of you reference the local parish 

Government or the city Government. There was an oblique reference to the Governor. 

One of the important things in how we restore is going to be 

what the future land use recommendations are of the local Governments. I am going to keep saying this, David, because I really commend you on what you have done, but there are so many things 

you can do in the future planning for New Orleans and the other 

coastal parishes and Mississippi that would directly impact the 

way in which the corps or any independent commission or any czar 

would redo the infrastructure. 

This is not a chicken or egg question. The first thing is the people of New Orleans and those parishes are going to have to decide 

on what it is they want New Orleans and that area to look like understanding what can happen when a category 3 or 4 storm hits 

with the infrastructure they had. 

I was a developer for years in the real estate business and I get 

very—I know the levee man is nodding his head down there—frustrated when everybody talks about independent commissions and 

quickly responding. I never hear anything about what local decisions are being made on the future redevelopment that would lessen the impact of flooding if it ever happened in a natural disaster. 

So that’s a statement, not a question, but I just had to say that. 

Mr. ELLIS. In our written testimony, I address this issue. I agree. 

All these decisions about local redevelopment need to be local decisions. I completely agree. 

Senator ISAKSON. They need to be the first decisions. 

Mr. ELLIS. Absolutely. I completely agree. I think we need to give 

those local decisionmakers a real choice where there are homes 

that are under 20 feet of water that may not be rebuilt or might 

be relocated or elevated. We are not giving them the resources to 

make those decisions today. 

I think the important thing is how do we integrate, who can integrate. I don’t think today we have created a body that can integrate those local judgments with the broader judgments about 

where to build levees, where to raise levees, where to build new infrastructure, where to restore wetlands, where to build diversions 

to restore wetlands. 

That is a big puzzle that no single Agency that is sort of sitting 

in this picture today can really pull together. I think that is the 

problem we are trying to solve. 
42

Senator ISAKSON. My time is up, but I have to say one thing, and 

this addresses the historic preservation and the levees and everything else. This is a terrible tragedy. Lives were lost, fortunes were 

lost, money was lost, a lot of things like that. 

But if there is a silver lining, with the amount of money that is 

going to be invested, if there is a quality, comprehensive plan, the 

new New Orleans and the new coast can be greater than the old 

New Orleans and the old coast. People are going to come back if 

they have a belief that the problems that were borne out by this 

storm in fact have been corrected for the future redevelopment of 

the city. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to congratulate you for holding this hearing and also for the exceptional leadership that you have provided in light of what was an unprecedented and devastating tragedy in your State and for the light that 

you have shed and the direction that you have provided to us as 

a Congress and steps that we need to be taking to respond. 

I agree with the Senator from Louisiana that more needs to be 

done in New Orleans. I understand that investigations and reviews 

are underway concerning the levee breaches. I support an expedited process for the water resource needs in Louisiana. The question I think that I have and that we need to answer is to ensure 

that we have a full understanding of what went wrong before the 

hard construction begins. I am curious to know if there is a priority 

ranking of projects so that we can ensure that critical projects in 

New Orleans can begin without waiting for a full analysis of other 

projects in the region. Does anybody know if those sorts of things 

have been established? 

Mr. FABER. the corps has, and I am sure if General Riley was 

still here, or the Assistant Secretary could address it. the corps has 

a list of priorities for which levees they are going to repair first. 

They are trying to repair all these levees with great urgency. So 

that is underway. 

I think, and people may disagree about this, but it strikes me 

that there certainly or apparently were design flaws with some of 

the levees. Getting to the bottom of that should not get in the way 

of immediately devising a comprehensive plan to provide a higher 

level of protection. 

Those design flaws, at least according to the ASCE preliminary 

report that you have seen and your staff have seen seem isolated 

in terms of the materials that were used, the assessment of those 

sites, the designs of those particular levees. These are not problems 

associated with the footprint on which you would build a better 

levee system or potentially a tidal barrier or build more wetlands 

and barrier islands. 

I don’t think we need to wait 8 months to devise a plan. I don’t 

think we need to wait 1 month to begin to raise some levees, to 

begin to restore some wetlands, to begin to relocate some vulnerable homes. It terrifies me, I sense your frustration, Senator Vitter, 

that we are going to wait that long to really begin this effort in earnest. 

Mr. CUROLE. If I could make one comment, the focus, if we don’t 

do it while the focus is here, we will lose it. Betsy hit 40 years ago 
43

September 9th. Some of these levees were authorized that year and 

were not completed. If we lose focus, if we do not move quickly and 

at least get the plan set and then try to get some type of funding, 

right now the major press have forgotten. They are Katrina tired. 

Soon this will happen here. If we do not set it right, we are setting 

ourselves up for more problems. 

I am optimistic that New Orleans and the Gulf region can be 

much better than it was. It takes very hard decisions here in 

Washington but also in Baton Rouge and MS. I am trying to work 

both ends, I am missing a couple of meetings right now. It is critical, but it is a great opportunity. New Orleans can be the hottest 

little city in the United States if it is all done correctly. There is 

some optimism on that. 

Senator THUNE. I think, and many of us share the frustration 

that Senator Vitter has articulated in how things are moving and 

the concerns about are we doing the things we can do now. Obviously knowing full well that there are issues that need to be studied so that we do this right. I think that is a concern that taxpayer 

groups and others have voiced and clearly a concern to a lot of us 

as well. 

I want to come back to the discussion that was being held earlier 

here with respect to the independent commission within the Office 

of the Secretary of the Army that you all have suggested. It seems 

to me at least that there is already, you have this what would appear to be an ideally situated commission called the Mississippi 

River Commission that could lead the comprehensive plan. Clearly, 

navigation, flood control programs on the river will have to be coordinated with both hurricane protection and coastal restoration. 

I guess the question is, why would we want to create another 

layer of Government do to what that commission can and should 

be doing? They have a century-long record of outstanding service 

to the Nation. Would you comment on that? 

Mr. FABER. It is an excellent question. I think there are two reasons that the Mississippi River Commission is the wrong body. 

One is that the membership of the Mississippi River Commission 

does not include engineers, hydrologists, scientists of great national 

reputation and great national integrity. I don’t think the MRC 

would provide the level of accountability, quite frankly, that you 

would want, that other Members of Congress would want if you are 

going to provide significant resources to help with this effort to and 

increase flood protection. 

The second reason is that the Mississippi River Commission has 

a very different role. Among the roles that the MRC plays is they 

decide what to do in the event of a major flood on the Mississippi 

River. They are actively involved in the day to day management of 

the Mississippi River. 

The commission we envision would not exist forever. It would be 

a commission that would be term limited or time limited, that 

would have a specific job, which is to figure out how it is we provide a category 5 level of protection to this major urban center and 

to help begin the execution of that plan. I don’t imagine this is a 

body that exists 75 or 100 years from now and is intimately involved in the management of all these decisions. 
44

Mr. ELLIS. The only other thing I would add on the Mississippi 

River Commission, some concerns that I would have, the president 

of the Mississippi River Commission is the division commander of 

the Mississippi Valley Division. The only other Federal Agency that 

is represented on it is NOAA, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. 

So if it was to be the body, it would have to be broader, and I 

would think that you would want to bring in, you would want to 

have a separate head than just having it driven by the corps. I 

think decisions about redeveloping in this area are broader than 

the corps. 

Obviously, flood damage reduction, storm damage reduction is a 

major focus and it is probably the primary focus initially. But all 

the other economic development incentives and activities are going 

to have to be a key part of it. 

Last, I think that it should have a recognizable titular head that 

is at the point of this activity that is the person that can communicate with the President. I think elevating it out of the Department of Homeland Security or DOD is key to really having the attention on the whole Gulf Coast region in this initiative. 

Mr. CUROLE. I think it is critical that we have some body, some 

entity that is going to work just as hard when the sun is shining 

as when there is a threat. That is the problem. We lose focus. 

Things get in the way, everyday business, from the local Government to State Government to the Federal Government. Other business, health care, other things get in the way. You need to have 

someone that can at least tap into the power structure to say, look, 

we need to get this done because it happened to us, it happened 

to us again. 

New Orleans in 1915 flooded, 1947, 1965, there was nothing to 

say that New Orleans wasn’t going to flood again. Yet I guarantee 

you, we were fighting hard to keep that focus. The risk was there 

and it was a difficult battle. I guess you could say we lost. 

Mr. FABER. I don’t think anyone is proposing that the corps 

would not be the central player in the design and execution of this 

comprehensive plan. the corps controls this infrastructure, they 

have jurisdiction over the infrastructure, they have the expertise. 

All we are suggesting is that there is other expertise and other capability that resides outside the corps, and that we need someone 

to pull all of these pieces together. 

That is not the role of the Secretary of the Army. There needs 

to be somebody of national reputation who is thinking about this 

24 hours a day and is making sure that this plan is implemented 

before disaster strikes again. 

Senator THUNE. I appreciate that. My understanding was that 

the Mississippi River Commission is very specialized and does have 

many of the noted experts in the field of water resource protection, 

including engineers. I also understand the importance of having 

someone that is very focused on the issue at hand. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator VITTER. Thank you, Senator. If I can just participate in 

the discussion and wrap it up. I would agree with some of our panelists, I have concerns that the Mississippi River Commission is not 

the precise right group of persons to do this. But I think it is an 
45

extremely important model and precedent. Because basically, it is 

what Congress created after the 1927 flood. 

Senator THUNE. I agree. 

Senator VITTER. Huge flood, huge national event, not just in Louisiana, all up and down the river, catastrophic losses. Congress created this commission and said, look, make sure this never happens 

again. Make sure you come up with a plan and get it done in a 

streamlined way so this sort of loss never happens again. 

They created the commission and basically it has never happened 

again in that way. So in a very general sense but important sense, 

I think it is a precedent and a model that we need to follow in the 

same way, so that we put together a body with the corps at the 

center but with other folks involved and tell them, make sure this 

never happens again, give us a comprehensive, integrated plan. Do 

it on a streamlined basis so this $100 billion event never happens 

again. 

I would also point out, there has been a lot of discussion about 

priorities of Corps projects, for instance, and well, money shouldn’t 

have been spent here, it should have been spent on the levee system. Some of that may be true. But I also point out, all of the 

major breaches that caused the flooding in the city were to elements of the levee system that were complete. It wasn’t ongoing 

construction. It was done. It was clearly inadequate and/or flawed 

design. It is not as if we are waiting on money to finish that 

project. It was done. 

By the way, there are other parts of south Louisiana which 

aren’t done. We were just lucky that the storm didn’t go there. So 

there are plenty of other places that aren’t protected even on paper 

to category 3. 

Mr. FABER. I think that is an excellent point. It is probably 

worth noting that, I think the Congress in 1999 asked the corps to 

figure out, how do we provide a category 5 level of protection for 

New Orleans. To my knowledge, we haven’t begun that study. So 

I think you are right, we have made some wise investments, but 

there are obviously some priorities, this would seem to be a significant priority that is just being put behind the stove. 

Mr. CUROLE. In fact, the study was hurricane protection in Louisiana, and it has been sorely under-funded. You look at authorization for Morganza to the Gulf. In our area, just to the side of 

Terrebonne Parish, we had zero flooding inside the system, two 

storms, zero flooding. They were subject to the same water elevations, they had 10,000 homes flooded. 

Senator VITTER. As I noted to Mr. Ellis, all the activity we have 

done so far and the dollars appropriated, none of that has gone to 

constructing anything beyond the present system. 

However, at least with regard to designing it, the study you are 

talking about, and getting a full design for a higher category 5 system, I am very hopeful that before we leave this year, that is going 

to be fully funded. 

Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that the issue on priorities goes beyond Louisiana, it goes beyond Katrina in that we 

have to, our opinion is that the lack of priorities within the Corps 

of Engineers budget that enables this type of process. It means 

that money that should be going potentially to provide flood protec-
46

tion and storm damage protection in Louisiana isn’t going there because it is going somewhere else in the Country to a lower priority 

project. 

If we don’t establish some sort of system of priorities, we are 

going to have the exact same problem in other parts of the Country. I think the biggest thing that is incumbent on all of us, and 

particularly Congress and the Federal agencies, is to learn from 

this disaster so it doesn’t repeat, not only in New Orleans and Louisiana, but it doesn’t repeat in other places around the Country. 

Shame on us if we don’t put in place those processes. 

Senator VITTER. Great. Do we have any wrap-up questions from 

Senator Jeffords or Senator Thune? 

Senator JEFFORDS. No. 

Senator VITTER. In that case, we want to thank our second panel 

and thank all of our participants today. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:47 a.m., the committee was adjourned.

STATEMENT OF HON. TOM CARPER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

I am pleased that the committee has called this hearing. It is time to start applying what we know went wrong during Hurricane Katrina to the development of a 

rebuilding plan. We also need to explore the implications of the failures in New Orleans on the state of other flood control systems across the Nation. 

In previous hearings with the Corps of Engineers, we have been told that it was 

unclear whether the levees failed to perform as designed or if they were overwhelmed. In other words, we didn’t know if the levees get overwhelmed by a storm 

that was larger than they were designed to withstand—or if they simply failed. 

Last week, at a hearing of the Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, we were told that they simply failed. 

Representatives of the teams researching the floodwall breaches—including experts from Louisiana State University, the National Science Foundation and the 

American Society of Civil Engineers—informed us that the storm surge and winds 

that Hurricane Katrina brought to the Lakefront area of New Orleans were that of 

a category 1 hurricane. Though the levees and floodwalls were designed to handle 

a category 3 storm, many of the floodwalls failed. 

Numerous factors seem to have contributed to these failures. This includes the 

differing floodwall heights and construction materials used in different parishes 

(controlled by different levee boards). It also appears that floodwalls were anchored 

into weak ground and not deep enough. 

Clearly, we need to take a look at the way the corps determines the appropriate 

design for floodwalls. We also must review how the corps prioritizes projects and 

conducts their cost-benefit analysis. 

Moreover, we need to know the impact of dividing the responsibility for maintaining levees and floodwalls within one flood control project between various local levee 

boards. 

From a broader perspective, we must review other flood control projects across the 

region—and the Nation—to ensure that the same problems did not occur elsewhere 

and that we have the flood protection we expect. 

Some responsibility may lie in the way Congress and the Administration authorizes and funds flood control projects. If so, changes will need to be made there as 

well. 

While I know we must spend a little longer looking at the failures that occurred 

in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, I look forward to moving into a more 

proactive mode. Identifying the changes is essential if we are to avoid this kind of 

failure in the future in New Orleans or any place else in the country. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF

NEW YORK

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing, as well as the 

stakeholder meeting that preceded it. 

It is critical that this committee be both expeditious and thoughtful in its approach to these critical issues. 
47

I think this hearing is a key step in that process, and I commend you for holding 

it. 

I want to say at the outset that I hope we don’t waste any time on the mistaken 

point that some have made, in trying to blame environmentalists for the failure of 

the levee system. 

I think that since that charge was initially raised, it has been thoroughly rebutted. I ask consent that a report prepared by the Center for Progressive Reform be 

entered into the record. The report does an excellent job of telling the full story 

about why design changes were made in the 1970s, and truth is that a suit by fisherman and environmental groups one small factor of many. 

Though blaming environmentalists misses the mark, it does attempt to answer 

one of the critical questions: why did the levees fail? 

Until we have an ironclad answer to this question, any solution that we propose 

runs the risk of simply creating new failures. 

So coming to a firm understanding of what went wrong is one critical, if obvious, 

step that we need to take. 

I know that the corps is currently analyzing what went wrong, and this work will 

be reviewed by the National Academy of Sciences as well as a team from the American Society of Civil Engineers. 

I have called for a Katrina Commission to comprehensively analyze what went 

wrong, because I think it is desperately needed. 

But I am pleased that at least in this case of the levee failures, there are outside 

experts who will be involved. 

As for today’s hearing, and the path forward for the committee, it seems that 

there is some degree of consensus on principles that should guide us. 

First, we need a comprehensive approach that considers flood control, ecosystem 

restoration, and navigation. This approach needs to consider the role of coastal wetlands in flood protection, something that our witnesses will discuss today. 

Second, local redevelopment decisions must by integrated into any Federal plans, 

and those decisions should be based on broad input from residents. 

How we answer these questions with respect to flood control and other activities 

within in the jurisdiction of this committee needs to be linked to broader discussions 

about how we guide recovery efforts in the Gulf. 

Mayor Nagin was here last week. He and Governor Blanco both have commissions 

that are looking at how to rebuild. The President has recently asked FDIC Chairman Donald Powell to head Federal recovery efforts down there. 

I look to Senator Landrieu and others for their ideas about how best to try to integrate local, State and Federal recovery decisions. 

But in terms of flood control and the other issues under this committee’s jurisdiction, I think it is important that we seek to provide immediate protection in advance 

of next year’s hurricane season. 

At the same time, we cannot rush to a solution which—like the one in place on 

August 24—is doomed to fail when the next huge storm makes landfall near New 

Orleans. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE DUNLOP, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, CIVIL

WORKS, U.S. ARMY

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am George Dunlop, Principal 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. I am pleased to appear 

today with Major General Don Riley, Director of Civil Works, to discuss the role of 

the Department of the Army and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the recovery 

and rebuilding efforts that lie ahead for the Gulf Coast. 

The Administration stands ready to work with local and State officials as they 

plan for the future of New Orleans, parishes in southern Louisiana, MS and other 

parts of the Gulf Coast. As we know, New Orleans has a particular challenge because much of the city lies below sea level. Thorough analysis, much thoughtful consideration of alternatives and careful attention as to how to best integrate future 

flood and storm damage reduction objectives with one another and with the effort 

to address the needs of the coastal wetlands ecosystem will guide future consideration and decision making, to be sure. The Corps of Engineers will work with the 

State, City, and Parish officials to design and build a flood and storm damage reduction system that is better than before the storm; and these local officials will have 

a large part in the engineering decisions to come. 
48

CORPS ROLE IN CURRENT FEDERAL EFFORTS

The Corps of Engineers, in collaboration with FEMA, will be an integral member 

of the close Federal partnership with the States of Louisiana and Mississippi, the 

city of New Orleans, and other Gulf Coast cities, parishes, and counties. the corps 

stands ready to provide advice to assist their recovery and rebuilding in a way that 

provides full consideration of all relevant factors. 

Federal funds are being made available to help cover the costs of repairing public 

infrastructure in the disaster zones, from roads and bridges to schools and water 

systems. If called upon, the Corps of Engineers stands ready to execute a broad 

array of engineering, construction and contract management services. 

The President has established, by Executive Order, the Gulf Coast Recovery and 

Rebuilding Council to further strengthen Federal support for the recovery and rebuilding effort through effective, integrated, and fiscally responsible support from 

across the Federal Government to State, local, and tribal Governments, the private 

sector, and faith-based and other community humanitarian relief organizations. 

Beyond immediate recovery tasks such as removing debris and providing utilities 

and ‘‘blue roofs’’ for homes and businesses, the corps is currently working on repairs 

to the storm damage reduction system that was in place in the city of New Orleans 

and other parts of the storm-affected area before the storm. Essentially, the corps 

is repairing existing levees and floodwalls before the onset of the next hurricane 

season to reduce the risk of damage in a future storm. 

FORENSIC ANALYSIS

the corps is actively engaged in assessing the performance of the storm damage 

reduction projects that were in place at the time of the Katrina and Rita storm 

events. We will use these findings to ensure that repairs to existing features in the 

New Orleans area are technically sound, will have efficacy, and are accomplished 

in a way that is environmentally sustainable. Lessons learned will be integrated on 

an ongoing basis into the design, engineering and repair of these features, which 

is already underway. 

Indeed, the corps is already hard at work in this regard, having established an 

Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) to collect and assess information that can inform decisions to repair existing authorized structures. Also, an 

independent team from the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is already 

collecting information to apply to the development of design criteria for these features. Other organizations and individuals are doing important work in this regard, 

as well. To the extent practicable, all relevant data will be carefully considered and 

objectively assessed. 

In addition, the Secretary of Defense has directed the Secretary of the Army to 

convene a panel of experts under the auspices of the National Academies to evaluate 

the information collected by the IPET and other parties so as to provide an independent and peer reviewed assessment of the performance of the storm damage reduction system in New Orleans and the surrounding areas. 

The National Academies will assemble an independent multidisciplinary panel of 

acknowledged national and international experts from the public and private sectors 

and academia. This National Academies panel is to be drawn from the membership 

of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. The 

panel will issue a final set of findings based primarily on the forensic data gathered 

by the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force and the American Society 

of Civil Engineers Independent Review Panel, and will draw upon information and 

assessments provided by other sources. 

The National Academies will report directly to the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army (Civil Works). The study is expected to take approximately eight months to 

complete. All reports generated by these panels will be made available to Congress 

and to the public. 

Following the forensic analysis, we will need to evaluate a broad range of options 

before developing recommendations as to the best ways to reduce the risk of future 

storm damages for the City of New Orleans and surrounding parishes. 

COASTAL ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION

The Administration has also recommended the reallocation of $250 million of the 

Emergency Supplemental funds already provided by Congress to fund activities related to the restoration of natural coastal features that will help reduce the risk of 

storm damage in the greater New Orleans metropolitan area. Specifically, barrier 

islands and coastal marshes can provide a natural buffer against some storm 
49

surges, and thus serve as the foundation upon which projects to reduce the risk of 

storm damage to the urban areas of the coast are constructed. 

The Administration is working with Congress and the State of Louisiana to develop an appropriate, generic authorization for the Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Protection and Restoration Program that will expedite the approval process 

for projects and their implementation while providing greater flexibility in setting 

future priorities and increased opportunities for application of adaptive management 

decision making. Such an integrated, programmatic approach to coastal wetlands 

protection and restoration is essential for program efficiency and efficacy. 

SUPPORT TO NAVIGATION

Finally, I mention with pride the great work that the corps has done to restore 

waterways in the region to navigable condition. Although much work is ongoing, 

particularly dredging and repairs to locks and bridges, most of the Gulf Coast’s waterways have already resumed normal operations. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I look forward to working with you 

and the Ranking member and other committee members on matters of mutual interest and concern. Following Major General Riley’s statement, I would be pleased to 

answer any questions you or the other committee members may have. 

RESPONSES OF GEORGE DUNLOP TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. Mr. Dunlop, during the stakeholders meeting we held in this committee, and during last week’s hearing with Mayor Nagin, one of the major points 

was that local redevelopment plans must drive Federal investments. For example, 

it may be possible to redevelop the city in such a manner that the highest levels 

of flood control are not required everywhere. The Mayor and the Governor both have 

planning processes underway. I realize that time is of the essence in rebuilding, but 

you don’t want to spend huge amounts of resources rebuilding flood control in an 

area where no one is going to live. How is the corps participating in the local process to set up a redevelopment plan, and are you coordinating your decisions regarding repair of the existing projects with these groups? 

Response. As MG Riley stated in his response, the corps is repairing the damaged 

hurricane protection system to provide the level of protection authorized by Congress prior to Katrina, as has been directed by Congress and supported by the Administration. the corps is coordinating the repair of the existing system with local 

and State officials, thereby enabling public interest and business investment decisions to be made. Corps of Engineer employees is assigned as liaisons with both the 

City of New Orleans and the State—Louisiana Recovery Authority to ensure full 

communication and awareness in the planning efforts. We have met with representatives of the New Orleans business community and are participating in local planning meetings when we are invited to do so.

Question 2. On November 9, 2005, the NAS released a report on the coastal Louisiana restoration plan. One of its major recommendations echoes themes we have 

heard about local redevelopment plans—they recommend the development of an explicit map of the expected future landscape of coastal Louisiana. Without this, it will 

be difficult to move forward with coastal restoration and flood control in a targeted 

manner. Can you give me your response to this recommendation and your thoughts 

on how it should be implemented in Louisiana? 

Response. the corps’ traditional approach to water resources planning was designed to facilitate problem solving and decision making for specific sites and 

projects. Today, the corps is being asked to use its planning capability to facilitate, 

convene, advise, and work collaboratively with other Federal and State programs in 

developing solutions and integrating programs, policies, and projects across public 

agencies. Collaboration is the keystone of the corps watershed approach. Collaborative planning includes Corps participation as a team member in other Federal, 

State, or local agencies planning activities where there may be no expectation of 

construction or other work by the corps as a result. By bringing together the expertise and programs of all the appropriate Federal agencies, collaborative planning 

will solve problems at the proper scale, integrate solutions across purposes and business programs, and leverage Federal and other funds. Monitoring and adaptive 

management are an essential component of such planning. Adaptive management 

takes into account the uncertainties that exist regarding decisions and allows the 

decision making and implementation process to proceed with the understanding 
50

that progress will be assessed and evaluated and that some structural or operational changes may be necessary to achieve the desired results. As an example, the 

Administration is working with Congress and the State of Louisiana to develop an 

appropriate, generic authorization for the Louisiana Coastal Area Ecosystem Protection and Restoration Program that will expedite the approval process for projects 

and their implementation while providing greater flexibility in setting future priorities and increased opportunities for application of adaptive management decision 

making. Such an integrated, programmatic approach to coastal wetlands protection 

and restoration is essential for program efficiency and efficacy.

Question 3. One of the key themes we have heard is that cost-benefit analysis procedures should be revised—most significantly to account for potential loss of life. 

What are your views on the revision or abandonment of cost-benefit analysis as a 

decision-making tool for the corps? 

Response. The cost-benefit analysis is still an effective decision making tool for 

the corps, but it is the use of the tool that must be monitored and periodically 

adapted to changing socio-economic conditions. the corps has recently released guidance on planning in a collaborative environment which reflects improvements to the 

corps’ approach to water resources planning. It is designed to facilitate problem solving and decision making for specific projects as well as a more collaborative and systems-based approach to working with other Federal and State agencies in developing solutions that integrate programs, policies, and projects across public agencies. All Corps planning studies will evaluate, display, and compare the full range 

of alternative plans’ effects across four accounts (National Economic Development 

(NED), Environmental Quality (EQ), Regional Economic Development (RED) and 

Other Social Effects (OSE)). NED account shows effects on the national economy. 

The EQ account shows effects on ecological, cultural, and aesthetic attributes of significant natural and cultural resources that cannot be measured in monetary terms. 

The RED account shows the regional incidence of NED effects, income transfers, 

and employment effects. The OSE account shows urban and community impacts and 

effects on life, health and safety. The discussion and display of benefits will address 

each of the four accounts and will not be limited to one account. For example, evaluation of inland navigation improvements should not only address effects on transportation savings but also security, safety and environmental advantages or disadvantages with respect to other modes of transport. After considering a plan’s beneficial and adverse effects across all four accounts, the plan may be a candidate for 

selection if it has, on balance, net beneficial effects. 

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL DON T. RILEY, DIRECTOR OF CIVIL WORKS U.S. 

ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am Major General 

Don T. Riley, Director of Civil Works. I am honored to be testifying before your committee today, along with the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army Mr. 

George Dunlop on the involvement of the Corps of Engineers in the Federal recovery 

and rebuilding effort for New Orleans and the surrounding areas. My testimony 

today will provide a brief status of our activities in the storm impacted area, and 

describe how the Corps of Engineers can assist in this effort. 

EMERGENCY RESPONSE SUPPORT TO FEMA

We are continuing to execute the corps FEMA-related missions of debris management and roofing in the impacted area. Through October, we had removed over 14 

million cubic yards of debris from areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama impacted by Hurricane Katrina. We have installed nearly 107,000 temporary roofs. the 

corps has completed over 200 temporary public structures in Mississippi, including 

police and fire stations, city halls, post offices and other governmental buildings. 

Corps employees are also putting children back in classrooms throughout Mississippi, helping to bring towns back to a bit of normalcy. 

REPAIRS TO THE EXISTING SYSTEM

With our contractors, we are working around the clock on the repair of levees and 

floodwalls to reduce the risk of damage through the remainder of this hurricane season, which continues until the end of November, and the rainy season that the city 

normally experiences in December and January. Our goal is to complete this phase 

of the effort before the start of the next hurricane season, which begins in June 
51

2006. Twenty-eight contracts have been, or currently are, advertised (13) or awarded 

(15), with an estimated value of approximately $175 million. Any delays in contract 

awards could impact our ability to complete work by June 2006. We are also actively 

gathering data and information to learn from the recent storms, and have begun 

an after action assessment of the existing storm damage reduction system. 

INVESTIGATING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EXISTING SYSTEM

There is no single answer to the questions as to why there were failures in the 

storm damage reduction system as there were multiple breaches of levees and 

floodwalls at a number of locations. We have not yet determined the failure mechanism or mechanisms, which are likely to vary in each case. The answer to these 

questions will follow from a further investigation and thorough analysis of the data 

we are now collecting. In some cases, e.g. the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal, we 

have observed evidence of overtopping that may have played a role. In other cases, 

e.g. the 17th Street Canal, we have observed evidence of massive soil movement 

that could have been a factor in how these levees failed. There is a need for considerable analysis to answer this question. 

The Chief of Engineers has commissioned an Interagency Performance Evaluation 

Task Force (IPET) to perform the engineering evaluation. The IPET includes engineers and scientists from the Engineering Research and Development Center from 

Vicksburg, MS, as well as from other Federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Reclamation and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The data collection teams have been performing field work in the New Orleans area to obtain 

as much data as possible related to the performance of the levees and floodwalls 

and to ensure that data is collected before it is covered over or lost by cleanup or 

as a result of repair efforts. Over the next eight months, the IPET will examine and 

analyze the data and rationally test various hypotheses about the behavior of the 

infrastructure. The IPET will use collected data, laboratory testing, and modeling 

activities in its analysis. The work currently planned includes assessing the Geodetic Reference Datum; performing storm surge and wave modeling and interior 

drainage/flooding modeling; evaluating hydrodynamic forces, floodwall and levee 

performance, and pumping station performance; and conducting a consequence analysis and a risk and reliability assessment. 

Until we can compare the evidence to an understanding of the hydrodynamic environment that resulted from the storm, the forces generated by the resulting surge 

and waves, how those forces were applied to individual structures and how the 

structures, given their design intent and capacities, should respond to those forces, 

we will only be speculating as to why they failed. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize 

that we will not wait until the study is complete to begin applying what we are 

learning. As we learn, we will immediately act to incorporate those findings into the 

ongoing work in which we are engaged. 

The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) is supporting our efforts with an 

External Review Panel, which will provide an independent oversight of the IPET 

evaluation. The final IPET report will be released in June 2006. However, any important findings will be shared on an ongoing basis before then with those who are 

involved in the design, engineering, and repair of the existing New Orleans levees 

and floodwalls. 

We are making all findings available to the public and invite the public and the 

scientific and engineering community to share any information they may have. On 

October 29th, the corps began publicly releasing available data by posting it on a 

publicly accessible website, https://ipet.wes.army.mil. Additional data will be added 

to the website as it becomes available. The IPET is collecting pre-Katrina documentation (design and construction drawings, soil sample records, etc.), post-Katrina 

documentation (hydrographic surveys, soil samples, concrete cores, etc.) and other 

performance data (eyewitness accounts, photographs, etc.). The data being released 

will include design memorandums dating back to the 1960s, and the associated reports for the Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana and Vicinity High Level Plan, which includes 17th Street Outfall Canal and London Avenue Outfall Canal. This information includes the project plan, hydrology and hydraulics, geology, foundation investigation and design (including the field exploration, soil borings, and laboratory testing) and the structural design. 

In addition to the IPET effort, the Secretary of Defense has directed the Secretary 

of the Army to convene an independent panel of national experts under the direction 

of the National Academies to evaluate the performance of the storm damage reduction system in New Orleans and the surrounding areas. The National Academies 

will assemble a multidisciplinary (e.g., engineering, atmospheric sciences, etc.) panel 

drawn from the public and private sectors and academia. The National Academies 
52

Panel will perform a high-level review and issue findings and recommendations 

based primarily but not solely on the data gathered by the IPET and the ASCE 

Independent Review Panel. The findings of the National Academies Panel will be 

subject to a peer review process before being released under the imprimatur of the 

National Academies. 

This forensic study is to focus on existing levees and/or floodwalls that were overtopped, breached, or failed during Hurricane Katrina, and whether such situations 

were the result of design, construction, or operation and maintenance issues, soil 

and geo-technical conditions, changed assumptions upon which the design or construction were based, the severity of Hurricane Katrina, or other factors. The National Academies Panel is expected to produce its final report by July 2006. All reports generated by these panels will be made available to the public. 

RESPONSES OF DON T. RILEY TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. General Riley, can you articulate more extensively the parameters of 

the current levee inspection regime in this country, describe the role of the Corps 

of Engineers, and describe whether or not national standards exist for levee construction that will ensure performance? 

Response. The Rehabilitation and Inspection Program, through P.L. 84-99, is the 

corps program that provides for inspections of flood control works (FCW), the rehabilitation of damaged FCW, and the rehabilitation of Federally authorized and constructed hurricane or shore protection projects (HSPP). FCW that are eligible for inclusion in the program include: Federally authorized and constructed HSPP’s; Federally constructed, locally maintained levees and floodwalls; non-Federally constructed, locally maintained levees and floodwalls that provide a minimum of a 10-

year level of protection with 2 feet of freeboard to an urban area, or a minimum 

of a 5-year level of protection with 1 foot of freeboard to an agricultural area; Federally constructed, locally maintained flood control channels; non-Federally constructed, locally maintained flood control channels that provide a minimum of a 10-

year level of protection. [NOTE: Interior drainage channels within the protected 

area of a levee system are not flood control channels.]; Pump stations integral to 

FCW; Federally constructed, locally maintained flood control dams; and non-Federally constructed, locally maintained flood control dams. 

An initial eligibility inspection is used to establish the acceptable and minimum 

performance levels for non-Federal FCW to gain an Active status in the Program. 

The inspections are conducted by Corps technical staff experienced in FCW design, 

construction, maintenance, and damage investigations. Initial eligibility inspections 

are not conducted on Federal FCW’s. Federal FCW’s are considered to be in an Active status when the corps turns over the project to the public sponsor for operation 

and maintenance. Within two years of Active status, the first continuing eligibility 

inspection is conducted. Continuing eligibility inspections will normally be conducted biennially for non-Federal FCW. For sponsors of projects with historically 

good ratings, the district may extend the frequency of inspection to a triennial basis. 

The continuing eligibility inspections are conducted at least biennially for Federal 

FCW, unless Corps regulation permits a longer period. The inspection is used to 

verify that the FCW continues to meet minimum acceptable performance levels for 

the Program. The flood control levees in the New Orleans area are inspected by both 

the corps and the local levee district, together and independently. Corps inspections 

are conducted annually by the New Orleans District Engineer and his staff, and representatives of the State of Louisiana and the respective Levee Districts. The local 

levee districts patrol the system between the annual joint inspections. A joint Corps/

Levee District/State inspection of the Orleans area was completed in June 2005. At 

present, national standards do not exist for levee construction.

Question 2. General Riley, in response to my question about notification regarding 

levee failure, you said the following:

‘‘During the flood, again the local levee boards will all be along a flood levee observing and protecting in communications. Of course, during a hurricane you can’t 

do that, you have to evacuate. So in the case, in this particular case, in New Orleans, 

they had the local citizens that were there on the ground that they called into the 

State, I was in the State EOC, the local sheriff’s department and the director of 

homeland security for the city called into the State.’’

Does this mean that whenever a hurricane strikes an area such as New Orleans, 

which is dependent on hurricane protection and flood control provided by Corps of 

Engineers’ levee systems, the corps depends on average citizens who are ordered to 

evacuate but choose not to, to notify the State police that the levee system has 
53

failed? If this is not the case, can you explain again what system the corps has in 

place today to monitor levee integrity and provide notification to local officials and 

citizenry that a breach or failure has in fact occurred? 

Response. Local authorities, not the Corps of Engineers, are responsible for monitoring the levees and their practice is to increase the level of this activity as tropical 

storms approach. We were not asked for assistance with this as Katrina drew near 

on Monday morning and respected their jurisdiction for this activity. Under the restricted mobility and communications following landfall, we did not credibly confirm 

any breach until Monday evening. Once we did, we immediately notified affected 

parties in accordance with established procedures.

Question 3. During the hearing, you also said, ‘‘so there was immediate notification that went out post-levee breach of the levee breaches that went out through 

the city, through that system that they had with the available communications that 

we had. So we were there, Corps, FEMA, Federal agencies right there in the State 

emergency operations center where some initial reports came in and immediate notification went back out.’’ Who provided the ‘‘immediate notification’’? Did that happen as planned? Through what means and to whom did the immediate notification 

go back out?’’ Was news media notified? Through what means did you intend the 

citizens who did not evacuate New Orleans to learn that the levees had failed? Did 

the corps inform the State and local agencies that a renewed evacuation order 

should be issued? 

Response. Who provided the ‘‘immediate notification’’? Once the corps confirmed 

a breach, we immediately notified local and State representatives in the State emergency operations center, which is responsible for the flow of information. 

Did that happen as planned? Yes, but due to the restricted mobility and communications following landfall, we did not credibly confirm any breach until Monday 

evening, August 29th. 

Through what means and to whom did the immediate notification go ‘‘back out’’? 

The State emergency operations center was responsible for the flow of information. 

Was news media notified? The State emergency operations center was responsible 

for the flow of information. 

Through what means did you intend the citizens who did not evacuate New Orleans to learn that the levees had failed? Notification of State officials of flooding was 

provided immediately on confirmation of the compromises in the hurricane protection system. The notification of citizens is the responsibility of State and local Governments. 

Did the corps inform the State and local agencies that a renewed evacuation order 

should be issued? Evacuation of citizens and issuance of evacuation orders are the 

responsibilities of the local jurisdictions, and by mid-afternoon Saturday, August 

28th, officials in Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, Lafourche, Terrebonne and 

Jefferson parishes had called for voluntary or mandatory evacuations. A voluntary 

evacuation was issued for New Orleans early Saturday evening and a mandatory 

evacuation was issued Sunday morning. Post event evacuation orders as a result of 

flooding and other consequences of the hurricane were also issued by local officials.

Question 4. Based on the answers to the above questions, and the experience of 

Hurricane Katrina, have the corps, the city, and the State developed a revised notification plan? If not, what is the timeline for doing so? 

Response. Notification of State officials of flooding was provided immediately on 

confirmation of the compromises in the hurricane protection system. The notification 

of citizens referred to above is the responsibility of State and local Governments. 

The initial actions of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery operations are conducted by local Government. Per the State of Louisiana’s 2005 

Emergency Operations Plan, the Parish and Municipal Governments’ Chief Executive has overall responsibility by law for the direction and control of emergency/disaster operations and is assisted by a Local Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness Director. My understanding is that a revised emergency notification plan 

is under development by the State and will be available in about 1 month.

Question 5. Can you describe the notification plan you have in place at the Waterbury Dam in Vermont? 

Response. The Waterbury Dam is a non-Federal project, and as such, the local authorities, not the Corps of Engineers, are responsible for monitoring the levees and 

for the notification plan.

Question 6. General Riley, there has been much discussion of the Mississippi 

River Gulf Outlet and the effect it had in magnifying the storm surge that reached 

New Orleans. There is very little traffic on this navigation channel, and many have 

urged that we close it immediately to prevent it from causing additional flooding 
54

during another hurricane. Is the corps evaluating this option in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, and if so, what have you found? 

Response. There are four ongoing efforts related to the Mississippi River Gulf 

Outlet (MRGO)—a re-evaluation of the MRGO navigation project, two efforts to address ecosystem restoration needs for the MRGO under the Louisiana Coastal Area 

(LCA) authority, and a storm surge analysis being conducted by an interagency performance taskforce commissioned by the Chief of Engineers. All but the storm surge 

analysis predated Katrina. Preliminary analysis of the flooding in St. Bernard and 

Orleans Parishes do not indicate that the existence of the MRGO caused flooding 

or the compromising of the hurricane protection system. The reevaluation study of 

the MRGO referenced above will be revised to consider the new information. A report will then be available for Congressional consideration as to the future of 

MRGO. Appropriate actions will be taken once Congressional consideration and direction has been provided. Meanwhile, additional initiatives are described below. 

During FY 2005, the corps was preparing a reevaluation of the MRGO to determine whether there is an alternative to the present project that would be more beneficial to the nation. When Hurricane Katrina struck Louisiana, the report was preliminarily updated to note that the with- and without-project conditions in the study 

area were changed by the hurricane. These changes included significant property 

damage to port facilities, loss of coastal wetlands, and disruption to deep-draft navigation due to deposition of sediment in the MRGO. An additional assessment that 

considers current conditions as well as likely future conditions in the study area is 

necessary. the corps plans to conduct a comprehensive analysis of MRGO that would 

include not only economic factors but also environmental measures. 

A feasibility cost sharing agreement is being negotiated for the LCA MRGO Critical Shoreline Stabilization project. This project would address the stabilization of 

the existing land bridge shoreline between Lake Borgne and the MRGO. This wetland feature is a critical element in any future effort to achieve channel closure as 

well as the implementation of a higher level hurricane protection system. 

the corps is also developing a project management plan (PMP) for the longer-term 

MRGO Ecosystem Restoration study. The PMP will outline the range of the alternative analysis, including channel closure or reduction options, as they relate to ecosystem restoration and trade offs with economic activities across the entire study 

area. 

The post-Katrina interagency performance evaluation taskforce is performing 

storm surge and wave modeling and interior drainage/flooding modeling. The results 

of this analysis will indicate what role, if any, the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

(MRGO) played in the flooding. If it is found that the MRGO, or any other physical 

feature in the area, caused or augmented the flooding, the appropriate engineering 

solution will be developed to address the condition. 

An opportunity exists to analyze the effects of storm surges in the channel with 

funding provided in the FY 2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations 

Act for a hurricane study for South Louisiana.

Question 7. General Riley, during the stakeholders meeting we held in this committee, and during last week’s hearing with Mayor Nagin, one of the major points 

was that local redevelopment plans must drive Federal investments. For example, 

it may be possible to redevelop the city in such a manner that the highest levels 

of flood control are not required everywhere. The Mayor and the Governor both have 

planning processes underway. I realize that time is of the essence in rebuilding, but 

you don’t want to spend huge amounts of resources rebuilding flood control in an 

area where no one is going to live. How is the corps participating in the local process to set up a redevelopment plan, and are you coordinating your decisions regarding repair of the existing projects with these groups? 

Response. the corps is repairing the damaged hurricane protection system to provide the level of protection authorized by Congress prior to Katrina, as has been directed by Congress and supported by the Administration. This effort is not dependent on State and local redevelopment plans, nor can it be in view of the mission 

to complete the restoration by 1 June 06. We are coordinating the repair of the existing system with local and State officials, thereby enabling public interest and 

business investment decisions to be made. We are also participating, when invited, 

in local planning meetings and have met with representatives of the New Orleans 

business community, to share the Federal plans for restoration of the hurricane protection system. We have individuals assigned as liaisons with both the City of New 

Orleans and the State—Louisiana Recovery Authority to ensure full communication 

and awareness in the planning efforts.

Question 8. General Riley, we have heard informally from some experts who have 

laid out a specific plan for water resources, post-Katrina. It includes:
55

• replacing barrier islands • restoring wetlands • closing MRGO • fill in canals • move pump stations in New Orleans to higher ground.

Based on your experience and the impact of Hurricane Katrina, is this a reasonable set of actions to take? 

Response. Funds have been provided through the FY 2006 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act to undertake the investigations that would directly 

answer this question. Some options, such as replacing barrier islands and restoring 

wetlands, are universally considered reasonable components of a stronger hurricane 

protection system. Others need to be evaluated in more detail. These detailed analyses will be coordinated with an ongoing investigation of the current hurricane protection system by an interagency performance evaluation taskforce. The taskforce is 

presently examining and analyzing data from the storm and will rationally test various hypotheses about the behavior of the hurricane protection infrastructure. The 

taskforce will use collected data, laboratory testing, and modeling activities in its 

analysis. The work currently planned includes providing an updated and accurate 

vertical geodetic datum, performing storm surge and wave modeling; determining 

the hydrodynamic forces created by the storm, analyzing the floodwall and levee 

performance when subjected to these forces; conducting interior drainage/flooding 

modeling to include pumping station performance; and conducting a consequence 

analysis and a risk and reliability assessment.

Question 9. General Riley, can you give us your reaction to recent findings that 

repeated modes of failure in Katrina were problems at transition sections where two 

different levee systems joined together which would seem to suggest a more consolidated approach to managing levee systems is warranted? 

Response. We did experience compromises at some of the transition sections; however, the compromises were a function of technical considerations (i.e., crossings, 

structure type, etc) not jurisdictional factors. As part of the repair of the existing 

system, we are strengthening transition zones where levees and floodwalls abut via 

longer transition zones and embedment depths, hardened scour zones and deeper 

piles. Most of the transitions referred to are within a single system where specific 

field conditions required transitions between types of construction such as a concrete closure structure for a road crossing in a levee. A consolidated approach to 

management of the system could result in more of a communication benefit than 

a technical benefit

Question 10. General Riley, I understand that you do not intend to have completed your analysis of what happened with the levees until next spring. I also know 

that you are planning to rebuild the existing levee system to category three protections by next June. If design flaws were part of the cause of failure, how can you 

rebuild until you have the ability to define and correct those flaws? Can you describe the design changes you are implementing during the levee repairs based on 

preliminary findings of failure modes of the levees? 

Response. We are rebuilding the system to its congressionally authorized level, 

which is to withstand a hurricane with 100 MPH winds, a barometric pressure of 

27.4 Hg, and a forward speed of 11 MPH. This is not the same as a ‘‘Category 3 

hurricane’’, notwithstanding references to Category 3 for simplicity purposes. We 

must not wait until the performance evaluation is complete to begin applying what 

we learn. As we learn we will immediately act to incorporate those findings into the 

work in which we are engaged. In the interim, results are being shared on an ongoing basis with the team responsible for the repair of the existing levees and 

floodwalls. As the data collection teams have been completing their work, they have 

been convening exit briefings with representatives of the New Orleans District. 

Some of the design changes that we are already implementing include: replacing 

damaged I-walls with T-walls and L-walls and increasing the depth of sheet pile 

seepage barriers in the breached areas; strengthening transition zones where levees 

and floodwalls abut via longer transition zones and embedment depths, hardened 

scour zones and deeper piles; hardening surfaces susceptible to scour; and hardening 

surfaces around points where pipelines or other features penetrate levees.

Question 11. On November 9, 2005, the NAS released a report on the coastal Louisiana restoration plan. One of its major recommendations echoes themes we have 

heard about local redevelopment plans—they recommend the development of an explicit map of the expected future landscape of coastal Louisiana. Without this, it will 

be difficult to move forward with coastal restoration and flood control in a targeted 

manner. Can you give me your response to this recommendation and your thoughts 

on how it should be implemented in Louisiana? 
56

1GAO, Cost, Schedule, And Performance Problems Of The Lake Pontchartrain And Vicinity, 

Louisiana, Hurricane Protection Project, GAO/PSAD-76-161 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 31, 1976); 

GAO, Improved Planning Needed By The Corps Of Engineers To Resolve Environmental, Technical, And Financial Issues On The Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project, GAO/

MASAD-82-39 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 1982); and GAO, Army Corps of Engineers: Lake 

Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, GAO-05-1050T (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 28, 2005). 

Response. the corps’ traditional approach to water resources planning was designed to facilitate problem solving and decision making for specific sites and 

projects. Today, the corps is being asked to use its planning capability to facilitate, 

convene, advise, and work collaboratively with other Federal and State programs in 

developing solutions and integrating programs, policies, and projects across public 

agencies. Collaboration is the keystone of the corps watershed approach. One way 

that a map of the expected future landscape could be created is through shared vision planning. Shared vision planning is a planning process that incorporates collaboration (including public participation), sound technical analysis, and tried and 

true planning principles into a practical forum in which resource management decisions are made. The State of Louisiana is developing a comprehensive plan for 

coastal protection and restoration. the corps is an integral part of this process and 

will be working closely with the State in the development of this plan.

Question 12. GAO noted in 1982 that the corps had experienced local pressure to 

reduce the level of hurricane protection provided. The GAO report States that in 

1982, the Orleans Levee District recommended that the corps lower its design 

standards to provide more realistic hurricane protection to withstand a hurricane 

whose intensity might occur once every 100 years rather than building a project to 

withstand a once in 200-300 year storm. The GAO reported that the Levee District 

believed this would make the project more affordable, provide adequate protection, 

and speed project completion. How did this dynamic affect the design of the canal 

levees? 

Response. the corps did not lower the design standards of the protection system. 

As part of a re-evaluation report completed in July 1984, the corps changed its recommendation from the ‘‘barrier plan’’ which included levees, floodwalls, and three 

barrier structures to a ‘‘high level plan’’ that would include an increased height of 

levees and floodwalls, but no barriers. This addressed environmental concerns with 

the project, reduced the overall project cost, and maintained the 300-year level of 

protection. the corps did not recommend construction of parallel levees along the 

lengths of the 17th St, London St. and Orleans outfall canals. Rather, closure structures known as ‘‘butterfly gates’’, placed at the mouths of the canals were recommended by the corps, thereby tying into the levee systems to be constructed along 

Lake Pontchartrain. The local sponsor preferred plan was the construction of parallel protection along the lengths of the outfall canals. While the cost/benefit ratio 

of the corps and local plans was close, closure structures as proposed by the corps 

were more economical as well as preferred on an engineering basis for both the London Canal (where flooding occurred) and the Orleans Canal (where no flooding occurred). Nevertheless, Congress directed the construction of the parallel protection 

structures in lieu of the closure structures recommended by the corps. Private architecture and engineering firms were hired to design the floodwalls and the designs 

were approved by the corps. 

STATEMENT OF ANU MITTAL, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, 

U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we are pleased to be here today 

to discuss the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Lake Pontchartrain, and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project. This project, first authorized in 1965, 

was designed to protect the lowlands in the Lake Pontchartrain tidal basin within 

the greater New Orleans metropolitan area from flooding by hurricane-induced sea 

surges and rainfall. As you know, the effects of Hurricane Katrina breeched the levees that are part of this project and flooded a large part of New Orleans. In my 

testimony, I will discuss (1) the purpose and history of the project and (2) funding 

of the project. This statement is based on GAO’s past reports on the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project and on the corps’ 

flood control efforts in general, which we updated as necessary.1

In summary, the Lake Pontchartrain hurricane project was designed to protect 

areas around the lake from flooding caused by a storm surge or rainfall associated 

with a standard project hurricane, which is roughly the same as what is now classi-
57

2Pub. L. No. 89-298, δ 204, 79 Stat. 1073, 1077. 

fied as a fast moving Category 3 hurricane. The project, when designed in the mid1960s, was expected to take about 13 years to complete and cost about $85 million. 

Over the years, the project has undergone some significant design changes as a result of a successful court challenge, local opposition to certain aspects of the proposed design, and changed Corps thinking about the most cost-effective approach. 

None of these changes, however, affected the level of protection provided to New Orleans because the alternative design selected was expected to provide the same level 

of protection. As of early 2005, the project was not expected to be completed until 

2015—nearly 50 years after it was first authorized—and cost about $738 million, 

much of the cost increase is due to inflation over the years and changes to the scope 

and design of the project. In recent years, questions have been raised about the ability of the project to protect the New Orleans are from hurricanes greater than Category 3. This issue was only beginning to be studied by the corps when Hurricane 

Katrina hit the area in August 2005. 

BACKGROUND

Since its founding in 1718, the city of New Orleans and its surrounding areas 

have been subject to numerous floods from the Mississippi River and hurricanes. 

The greater New Orleans metropolitan area, composed of Orleans, Jefferson, St. 

Charles, St. Bernard, and St. Tammany parishes, sits in the tidal lowlands of Lake 

Pontchartrain and is bordered generally on its southern side by the Mississippi 

River. Lake Pontchartrain is a tidal basin about 640 square miles in area that connects with the Gulf of Mexico through Lake Borgne and the Mississippi Sound. 

While the area has historically experienced many river floods, a series of levees 

and other flood control structures built over the years were expected to greatly reduce that threat. The greatest natural threat posed to the New Orleans area continues to be from hurricane-induced storm surges, waves, and rainfalls. Several hurricanes have struck the area over the years including Hurricane Betsy in 1965, Hurricane Camille in 1969, and Hurricane Lili in 2002. The hurricane surge that can 

inundate coastal lowlands is the most destructive characteristic of hurricanes and 

accounts for most of the lives lost from hurricanes. Hurricane surge heights along 

the Gulf and Atlantic coasts can range up to 20 feet or more and there is growing 

concern that continuing losses of coastal wetlands and settlement of land in New 

Orleans has made the area more vulnerable to such storms. Because of such 

threats, a series of control structures, concrete floodwalls, and levees, was proposed 

for the area along Lake Pontchartrain in the 1960s. 

PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN AND VICINITY FLOOD CONTROL

PROJECT

Congress first authorized construction of the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity, 

Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project in the Flood Control Act of 19652 to provide 

hurricane protection to areas around the lake in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, 

St. Bernard, and St. Charles. Although Federally authorized, it was a joint Federal, 

State, and local effort with the Federal Government paying 70 percent of the costs 

and the State and local interests paying 30 percent. the corps was responsible for 

project design and construction and local interests were responsible for maintenance 

of levees and flood controls. The original project design, known as the barrier plan, 

included a series of levees along the lakefront, concrete floodwalls along the Inner 

Harbor Navigation Canal, and control structures, including barriers and flood control gates located at the Rigolets and Chef Menteur Pass areas. These structures 

were intended to prevent storm surges from entering Lake Pontchartrain and overflowing the levees along the lakefront. The original lakefront levees were planned 

to be from 9.3 feet to 13.5 feet high depending on the topography of the area directly 

in front of the levees. 

This project plan was selected over another alternative, known as the high-level 

plan, which excluded the barriers and flood control gates at the Rigolets and Chef 

Menteur Pass complexes and instead employed higher levees ranging from 16 feet 

to 18.5 feet high along the lakefront to prevent storm surges from inundating the 

protected areas. In the 1960s, the barrier plan was favored because it was believed 

to be less expensive and quicker to construct. As explained later in my statement, 

this decision was reversed in the mid-1980s. The cost estimate for the original 

project was $85 million (in 1961 dollars) and the estimated completion date was 

1978.
58

The original project designs were developed to combat a hurricane that might 

strike the coastal Louisiana region once in 200-300 years. The basis for this was 

the standard project hurricane developed by the corps with the assistance of the 

United States Weather Bureau (now the National Weather Service). The model was 

intended to represent the most severe meteorological conditions considered reasonably characteristic for that region. The model projected a storm roughly equivalent 

to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane. A Category 3 hurricane has winds of 111-

130 miles per hour and can be expected to cause some structural damage from 

winds and flooding near the coast from the storm surge and inland from rains. 

Even before construction began on the project, it became evident that some 

changes to the project plan were needed. Based on updated Weather Bureau data 

on the severity of hurricanes, the corps determined that the levees along the three 

main drainage canals, that drain water from New Orleans into Lake Pontchartrain, 

would need to be raised to protect against storm surges from the lake. The need 

for this additional work became apparent when Hurricane Betsy flooded portions of 

the city in September 1965. 

During the first 17 years of construction on the barrier plan, the corps continued 

to face project delays and cost increases due to design changes caused by technical 

issues, environmental concerns, legal challenges, and local opposition to various aspects of the project. For example, foundation problems were encountered during construction of levees and floodwalls which increased construction time; delays were 

also encountered in obtaining rights-of-ways from local interests who did not agree 

with all portions of the plan. By 1981, cost estimates had grown to $757 million for 

the barrier plan, not including the cost of any needed work along the drainage canals, and project completion had slipped to 2008. At that time, about $171 million 

had been made available to the project and the project was considered about 50 percent complete, mostly for the lakefront levees which were at least partially constructed in all areas and capable of providing some flood protection although from 

a smaller hurricane than that envisioned in the plan. 

More importantly during the 1970s, some features of the barrier plan were facing 

significant opposition from environmentalists and local groups who were concerned 

about environmental damages to the lake as well as inadequate protection from 

some aspects of the project. The threat of litigation by environmentalists delayed the 

project and local opposition to building the control complexes at Rigolets and Chef 

Menteur had the potential to seriously reduce the overall protection provided by the 
59

3Save Our Wetlands v. Rush, Civ. A. No. 75-3710 (E.D. La. Dec. 30, 1977). 

project. This opposition culminated in a December 1977 court decision3 that enjoined the corps from constructing the barrier complexes, and certain other parts of 

the project until a revised environmental impact statement was prepared and accepted. After the court order, the corps decided to change course and completed a 

project reevaluation report and prepared a draft revised Environmental Impact 

Statement in the mid-1980s that recommended abandoning the barrier plan and 

shifting to the high-level plan originally considered in the early 1960s. Local sponsors executed new agreements to assure their share of the non-Federal contribution 

to the revised project. The level of protection provided to New Orleans was not expected to change because the high-level design was expected to provide the same 

level of protection as the original barrier design. 

As of 2005, the project as constructed or being constructed included about 125 

miles of levees and the following major features:

• New levee north of Highway U.S. 61 from the Bonnet Carr Spillway East Guide 

Levee to the Jefferson-St. Charles Parish boundary 

• Floodwall along the Jefferson-St. Charles Parish boundary 

• Enlarged levee along the Jefferson Parish lakefront 

• Enlarged levee along the Orleans Parish lakefront 

• Levees, floodwalls, and flood proofed bridges along the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue and London Avenue drainage canals 

• Levees from the New Orleans lakefront to the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway 

• Enlarged levees along the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Mississippi 

River-Gulf Outlet 

• New levee around the Chalmette area.

The project also includes a mitigation dike on the west shore of Lake Pontchartrain. 

The pre-Katrina estimated cost of construction for the completed project was $738 

million with the Federal share being $528 million and the local share $210 million. 

The estimated completion date as of May 2005 for the whole project was 2015. Prior 

to Katrina, the project was estimated to be from 60-90 percent complete in different 

areas. The work in Orleans Parish was estimated to be 90 percent complete with 

some work remaining for bridge replacement along the Orleans Avenue and London 

Avenue 

drainage canals. The floodwalls along the canals, where the recent breaches occurred, were complete. Jefferson Parish work was estimated to be 70 percent complete with work continuing on flood proofing the Hammond Highway bridge over 

17th Street and two lakefront levee enlargements. Estimated completion for that 

work was 2010. In the Chalmette area work was estimated to be 90 percent complete with some levee enlargement work and floodwall work remaining. In St. 

Charles Parish work was 60 percent complete with some gaps still remaining in the 

levees. Closure of these gaps had been scheduled to be completed by September 

2005. 

Post Katrina, four investigation teams sponsored by the American Society of Civil 

Engineers, the corps, the State of Louisiana, and the National Science Foundation, 

began gathering forensic data to determine what caused the levee breaches in New 

Orleans. Preliminary reports from these teams indicate that they found a number 

of different mechanisms that caused failures in the levee system, including scour 

erosion caused by overtopping, seepage, soil failure, and internal erosion (also 

known as piping). On November 4, 2005, the corps told us that it was too soon to 

determine whether the change in project design had any impact on the levee 

breaches that occurred in New Orleans, and the Agency is still in the process of assessing whether the change in the project design had any impact on the breaches. 

However, the investigations necessary to address this question are not planned to 

be conducted by the corps as part of its ongoing examination of the performance of 

the existing project. Instead these investigations would be included in future analyses of any modifications to the existing hurricane protection system. 

RECENT FUNDING HISTORY FOR THE PROJECT

Federal allocations for the project totaled $458 million as of the enactment of the 

fiscal year 2005 Federal appropriation. This represents 87 percent of the Federal 

Government’s responsibility of $528 million with about $70 million remaining to 

complete the project in 2015. Over the last 10 fiscal years (1996-2005), Federal appropriations have totaled about $128.6 million and Corps reprogramming actions resulted in another $13 million 
60

being made available to the project. During that time, appropriations have generally declined from about $15-20 million annually in the earlier years to about $5-

7 million in the last three fiscal years. While this may not be unusual given the 

state of completion of the project, the corps’ project fact sheet from May 2005 noted 

that the President’s Budget request for fiscal years 2005 and 2006 and the appropriated amount for fiscal year 2005 were insufficient to fund new construction contracts. Among the construction efforts that could not be funded according to the 

corps were the following:

• Levee enlargements in all four parishes 

• Pumping station flood protection in Orleans Parish 

• Floodgates and a floodwall in St. Charles Parish 

• Bridge replacement in Orleans Parish.

the corps had also stated that it could spend $20 million in fiscal year 2006 on 

the project if the funds were available. the corps noted that several levees had settled and needed to be raised to provide the design-level of protection. For the last 

few years, the project generally received the amount of funds appropriated to it and 

was not adversely affected by any corps reprogramming actions. 

In recent years, questions have been raised about the ability of the project to 

withstand larger hurricanes than it was designed for such as a Category 4 or 5, or 

even a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane that lingered over the area and produced 

higher levels of rainfall. Along this line, the corps completed in 2002 a reconnaissance or pre-feasibility study on whether to strengthen hurricane protection along 

the Louisiana coast. A full feasibility study was estimated to take at least 5 years 

to complete and cost about $8 million. In March 2005, the corps reported that it was 

allocating $79,000 to complete a management plan for the feasibility study and a 

cost-share agreement with local sponsors. The President’s fiscal year 2006 budget 

request did not include any funds for the feasibility project. 

In closing, the Lake Pontchartrain hurricane project has been under construction 

for nearly 40 years, much longer than originally envisioned and at much greater 

cost, although much of that can be attributed to inflation over these years, and the 

project is still not complete. Whether the state of completion of the project or the 

change in design played a role in the flooding of New Orleans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina in August 2005 is still to be determined as are issues related to whether a project designed to protect against Category 4 or 5 hurricanes would or could 

have prevented this catastrophe. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared testimony. We would be happy to respond to any questions that you or members of the subcommittee may have. 

RESPONSES BY ANU MITTAL TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. GAO noted in 1982 that the corps had experienced local pressure to 

reduce the level of hurricane protection provided. The GAO report states that in 

1982, the Orleans Levee District recommended that the corps lower its design 

standards to provide more realistic hurricane protection to withstand a hurricane 

whose intensity might occur once every 100 years rather than building a project to 

withstand a once in 200-300 year storm. The GAO reported that the Levee District 

believed this would make the project more affordable, provide adequate protection, 

and speed project completion. How did this dynamic affect the design of the canal 

levees? 

Response. GAO does not have information on whether the 1982 comments made 

by the Orleans Levee Board had any impact on the design that was ultimately selected for the canal levees. As early as 1965, the corps became aware that the hurricane protection along the drainage canals would have to be strengthened; but in 

1982, we reported that there was wide disparity between the corps and local sponsors about what solution could be provided under the project. In that report, we also 

concluded that the work at the drainage canals would present an additional financial burden to the local sponsors. Although at the time Corps officials believed that 

they could reach agreement with local sponsors by the end of 1982 on a solution 

for the drainage canals, this agreement was not reached until the early 1990s.

Question 2. In the opinion of the lawsuit in question, the judge wrote. The foregoing opinion should in no way be construed as precluding the Lake Pontchartrain 

project as proposed or reflecting on its advisability in any manner. The Court’s opinion is limited strictly to the finding that the EIS of August, 1974 for this project 

was legally inadequate. Upon compliance with the law with regard to the impact 

statement this injunction will be dissolved and any hurricane plan thus properly 
61

presented will be allowed to proceed.’’ Ms. Mittal, can you comment on the speed 

and vigor with which the GAO found the corps proceeding to comply with the law? 

Response. In 1982, 5 years after the court’s decision, we noted that there had been 

no strong effort on the part of the corps to complete this project, and the corps had 

not prepared a suitable revised environmental impact statement to get the injunction lifted. We reported that after the court injunction the corps attempted to revise 

the impact statement using an interdisciplinary approach and conducted hydrologic, 

biologic, and chemical studies of Lake Pontchartrain. At that time, the corps told 

us that the full impact of the plan on the ecological and aquatic composition of the 

lake could not be conclusively determined without additional studies. In 1982, the 

corps suspended several studies being done to analyze the environmental effects 

that the barrier structures would have on Lake Pontchartrain because the high-level 

plan appeared more viable. At the time, the corps told us that studies concerning 

the barrier plan would require considerable additional time and expense to complete, and a resulting impact statement could not be completed until November 

1985. In December 1981, the corps directed its future study efforts to the high-level 

plan because the corps believed that the high-level plan did not have the detrimental impacts of the barrier plan and it provided similar protection from a standard project hurricane by surrounding developed areas with higher levees. 

RESPONSES BY ANU MITTAL TO ADDITIONAL QUESTION TO QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR INHOFE

Question 1. Army Corps Career Staff, Fred Caver, Former Deputy Director of Civil 

Works, Rob Vining, Former Chief of Civil Works Program management Division, 

and Joseph Towers, Former Chief Counsel, New Orleans District—have all made 

statements of the detrimental effect the environmental litigation had on New Orleans. How did the litigation and the persistent threat of litigation influence the corps 

decision? 

Response. As we reported in 1976 and 1982, the threat of litigation and the court 

injunction in 1977, were two of several factors that caused delays in the construction of the Lake Pontchartrain hurricane protection project according to the corps’ 

schedule. In 1982, the corps’ Office of the Chief of Engineers noted that because of 

the environmental litigation, the corps had a general reluctance to proceed with the 

barrier project, because it lacked the in-house capability to determine how to perform the required environmental studies to satisfy the court. In 1982, the corps also 

stated that this had contributed to project delays despite the high priority designation by the Agency. Based on Corps statements, it appears that the court case was 

also a factor that influenced the corps decision to shift from the barrier plan to the 

high-level plan in the mid 1980s. After the corps concluded that the high-level plan 

provided the same level of protection as the barrier plan and was more cost effective 

to build, it shifted to constructing the high-level plan and anticipated completing the 

project by 2015. Construction on the portion of the levee system that failed during 

Hurricane Katrina had been completed.

Question 2. In your testimony before the House you reported a position on behalf 

of the corps about the two different hurricane plans stating that one was better 

than the other. Since then, GAO has changed their position because the evidence 

supporting this was called into question. Is that your understanding? 

Response. GAO’s position about the level of protection provided to New Orleans 

by the two hurricane project alternatives has not changed. Both projects were designed to protect New Orleans from a standard project hurricane, thereby providing 

the same level of protection; this position is reflected in both our September and 

November 2005 statements. In our September statement, we also accurately reported that some Corps district officials believed that the change in hurricane protection design did not cause the levee breaches and that flooding would have occurred with either design. This observation, we believe, was based on the general 

sense within the corps at that time that Hurricane Katrina had resulted in Category 

4 level storm surges, which had caused the levees to be overtopped, and which in 

turn resulted in scouring that caused the levee breaches. However, between September and November, new information became available from the investigative 

teams studying the levee breaches, which indicated that not all of the breaches were 

caused by overtopping, especially those that occurred on the drainage canals, which 

were the breaches that led to most of the flooding in downtown New Orleans. A variety of other potential causes such as construction flaws and failure to fully consider subsoil conditions in the levee design, are now being evaluated as well. In addition, Corps officials in Washington told us that the statements made by the district did not reflect the corps official position and that it was too early to determine 
62

whether the change in design had any impact on the levee breaches. In light of this 

new information, and in an effort to provide the committee with the most current 

and relevant information, GAO slightly modified its statement for the November 9, 

2005 hearing.

Question 3. Is it fair to say that GAO has focused their analysis on the funding 

of the corps projects and not on technical issues? 

Response. For our September and November 2005 statements on the history, current status, and funding for the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection project, 

GAO relied extensively on information contained in issued reports from 1976 and 

1982, as well as information obtained from Corps documents and officials regarding 

the current status and the funding requests and appropriations for the project during the last 10 years. 

STATEMENT OF WINDELL CUROLE, GENERAL MANAGER, SOUTH LAFOURCHE

LEVEE DISTRICT

To adequately discuss what to legislate in order to deal with Louisiana’s water 

resources needs, we should first pause and reflect on the past. The purchase of New 

Orleans, and subsequently Louisiana, was based on the need to trade the goods and 

crops of the Midwest to the rest of the world. It is no less important today. Today 

the goods traded through South Louisiana have become more valuable to the Midwest and other segments of the United States Its importance has increased because 

of energy, seafood, refineries and petro chemical plants. 

In 1849 the Federal Government granted to Louisiana most of the Federal land 

in Louisiana so that revenues from the use and sale of the land would produce an 

economy which could produce income to the Federal Treasury. This proved to be 

beneficial to the Federal Government. 

Again, after the 1927 flood the Federal Government provided legislation which resulted in reduced flooding, which has produced both improved navigation and flood 

protection. This, in turn, has led to one of the most important economic river corridors in the world, that which is located between Baton Rouge and New Orleans. 

These important functions unintentionally led to increased threats from the tidal 

events and hurricanes by depriving the adjacent lands from the overflow of the 

river. Much of these lands, wetlands, marshes and ridges built and sustained by the 

river, have reverted to open water resulting in the loss of 2,000 square miles since 

1930. 

Although the loss of support from the river had been critical, oil exploration, navigation canals and other development have also made South Louisiana more susceptible to tidal events. This loss in the latter half of the last century has been occurring at approximately 25 to 35 square miles a year. Subsidence, the loss of elevation, has also affected South Louisiana. Some estimate a loss of three feet in elevation over the last 100 years. Since most of South Louisiana is below a 10 foot elevation above sea level, this has allowed the Gulf of Mexico closer to our communities. 

Hurricane protection projects have been constructed and have protected communities from the effects of subsidence and coastal erosion. A more comprehensive approach would result in more security not only for South Louisiana, but the goods 

and services that South Louisiana provides for the country. 

The platform which is South Louisiana is a working coast which produces energy, 

seafood, and trade which greatly benefits the United States. Investment by the 

United States should be considered because of what South Louisiana provides for 

the nation. 

Economic justification should again convince Congress that investment in Louisiana will result in a positive return on its investment. 

To invest properly and to insure the best return, the needed projects in flood protection, coastal restoration and navigation should be done in conjunction with each 

other and done quickly. To accomplish this, agencies like the corps must streamline 

its procedures which cause delays, cost increases, and diminished results. 

One of the reasons we have the human part of this natural disaster is loss of 

focus. Projects designed to mitigate the threat were ignored. We must design a position which has the capability on the local, State, and national level to involve the 

political leadership to work on issues which mitigate the risk from reoccurring natural disasters. 

To build the necessary flood protection in a timely fashion, we must devise a system which is true to environmental laws, yet does not cause people to suffer, and 

communities to flood while waiting as the environmental community ponders and 

delays work. We must do better in building environmental projects which are agreed 
63

upon quickly, economically, and built to last. In most instances today, our environmental projects fall short in service to our people. 

I mention money last because I believe changes must be made to reduce cost in 

order to build more protection, more efficiently. We must work as hard as possible 

to insure that as much money as possible reaches contractors who will build well 

designed protection. Over studying, investigating and planning will not stop or reduce flood damage. Only physical barriers, levees, and environmental infrastructure 

will give people and communities a chance of surviving a hurricane. 

We suggest that a funding stream based on a share of offshore oil revenues generated off the Louisiana coast would be the most reasonable approach to fund these 

projects. Some of the problems in South Louisiana have directly resulted from its 

support of the nation’s energy needs. Most Americans would agree with the fairness 

of this approach. Most Americans will benefit from the proper attention to the flood 

problems of South Louisiana. 

RESPONSES BY WINDELL CUROLE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM

SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. Mr. Curole, can you describe what you would anticipate the reaction 

would he by the local communities if the corps rebuilds flood protection to category 

three that is later found to be fatally flawed? 

Response. It would simply be an outrage, The Corp specifications are used as 

standards. Local sponsors are forced to follow and accept Corps recommendations 

or not build a project. 

Some projects are made so expensive that the projects cannot be constructed. the 

corps’ procedure and process adds to the cost and time for construction without improving the safety or performance of a project. 

It is for this reason that to have a flawed project is hard to accept. The weakest 

part of the system is that between the corps inspector and the contractor. As a local 

sponsor to a Corps project, if the contractor was good and the inspector suspect or, 

the inspector was good and the contractor suspect, I had confidence that the job 

would he done well. If both were suspect, I tried to have one of my employees on 

the construction site at least on a daily basis.

Question 2. During the stakeholders meeting we held in this committee, and during last week’s hearing with Mayor Nagin, one of the major points was that local 

redevelopment plans must drive Federal investments. For example, it may be possible to redevelop the city in such a manner that the highest levels of flood control 

are not required everywhere. The Mayor and the Governor both have planning processes underway. I realize that time is of the essence in rebuilding, but you don’t 

want to spend huge amounts of resources rebuilding flood control in an area there 

no one is going to live. Can you give me your impressions of how this process is 

proceeding? 

Response. Replacement and improvement of the levee system for the best economy 

would place that protection in generally the same area, Even if certain neighborhoods are not re-established, major infrastructure, like roadways, will need protection. The question of improved flood protection above category three would apply to 

the areas like St. Bernard. We expect people will move back to areas with category 

three protection., but those communities, without higher protection, will not realize 

full redevelopment.

Question 3. Mr. Curole, can you give us your reaction to recent findings that repeated modes of failure in Katrina were problems at transition sections where two 

different levee systems joined together which would seem to suggest a more consolidated approach to managing levee systems joined together which would seem to suggest a more consolidated approach to managing levee systems is warranted? 

Response. Consolidation or a comprehensive approach has been needed, but some 

problems existed because of planned separations in the systems due to navigation 

canals. A comprehensive hurricane design is an area where the corps has been requested and could, with proper support, have a consolidated plan. The State is 

working toward a consolidated plan which we, the Levee Board Association, have 

been promoting since 1997. The Mississippi River levee system from Cairo, IL to the 

Gulf is an example of a comprehensive hurricane plan executed with local entities.

Question 4. The USG has reported extensive wetlands losses post-Katrina. How 

would you recommend the corps re-evaluate its recommendations for restoration of 

coastal Louisiana in terms feasibility given these wetlands? 

Response. The losers are in areas which already have had losses. The hurricanes 

took away what would be lost over the next 5 to 10 years. The projects which are 
64

proposed for restoration continue to he useful. I believe that more aggressive 

projects may be able to be supported with a reduced need for study.

Question 5. On November 9, 2005, the NAS released a report on the coastal Louisiana restoration plan. One of it major recommendation echoes themes we have 

heard about local redevelopment plans. They recommend the development of an explicit map of the expected future landscape of coastal Louisiana. Without this, it will 

be difficult to move forward with coastal restoration and flood control in a targeted 

manner. Can you give me your response to this recommendation and your thoughts 

on how it should be implemented in Louisiana? 

Response. This is a chicken and egg situation. We can draw a line if support for 

projects is provided. I would look at first protecting the wetlands around our ridges 

and work toward maintaining our barrier islands. Next is to maintain the marsh 

fringe around the bays and lakes. Leadership in Louisiana should prioritize wetlands which protect infrastructure and attempt to maximize the functions of an estuary. This means to have freshwater regime which gradually transform into intermediate brackish and salt water near the Gulf. I believe we can provide a map reflecting the future. I would create teams of scientists who have like beliefs to develop their different images of the future. I would then have the Governor’s Advisory Committee on Coastal Restoration accept one map which reflects the consensus 

of the committee.

Question 6. One of the Key themes we have heard is that cost-benefit analysis 

procedures we should be revised most significantly to account for potential loss of 

life. What are your views on the revision or abandonment of cost-benefit analysis 

as a decision-making tool for the corps? 

Response. The cost-benefit concept is a valid method; the problem is the definition 

of what has value and its determination. Population has a place in benefit. The 

problem is the value of community. I do not know how to make the balance of the 

population, the economical value and the environmental value. It is difficult, but I 

believe that all three should have standing in cost-benefit calculations. Often 

projects for one local produce regional benefits which should also be included.

Question 7. Given the corps’ experience in Hurricane Katrina, can you tell us if 

you believe that the Federal Government should do more to ensure the safety of our 

Nation’s levee program? For example, should safety standards and an inspection regime be established? 

Response. It appears that a need exists to insure that systems are built to specifications. I believe that Corps project managers should be made responsible for the 

performance of the projects of which they are designated. The State is presently 

planning for an inspection system. Previously the State assisted in the corps inspection program.

Question 8. There has been much discussion of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

and the effect it had in magnifying the storm surge that reached New Orleans. Can 

you give me your specific recommendations regarding this Outlet in light of what 

happened during Katrina? 

Response. The intersection of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet with the Gulf Intracoastal Canal at a juncture where two levee systems funnel the water well logically cause higher water levels. 

A closure on the Mississippi River Gulf would reduce water levels, but or the large 

powerful storm, some damage may not be altered. 

A structure across the Intracoastal Canal just east of the intersection of the Mississippi Gulf Outlet would reduce the entry of storm water toward the industrial 

canal. 

I have no personal experience with the storm surges of that location and I base 

my comments on the run up of storm water at the intersection of the levees in my 

area. Please accept my comments on the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet in that perspective. 

STATEMENT OF PETER BRINK, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, PROGRAMS, NATIONAL TRUST

FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Inhofe and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify today on the recovery and rebuilding efforts underway in coastal Louisiana 

as you consider legislation on a comprehensive approach to the water resources 

needs of that area. As the people of the Gulf Coast move forward to restore countless historic homes, buildings and landscapes damaged by Katrina, let me empha-
65

size the role that Congress can and should play in ensuring that historic properties 

in this region are afforded the maximum possible protection against catastrophic 

storms. This part of the country has an enormously rich history with one of the largest concentrations of historic buildings in the United States. 

In addition to fostering the stewardship of our Nation’s heritage, historic preservation is a powerful force in the local and State economy. In Louisiana, culture 

means business and it relies upon the full development of a unique and irreplaceable heritage of historic districts, historic buildings, and places. A recent survey 

shows that 28 percent of those who visit Louisiana typically come to enjoy its distinctive neighborhoods and visit individual historic properties. With regard to New 

Orleans, 10.1 million people visited in 2004 and spent $5.5 billion dollars there; 

75,000 people were directly employed in the travel industry there. As attention 

shifts from rescue to reconstruction in New Orleans and the Gulf Region, we must 

answer the question of how, and in what form, the rebuilding will happen, and how 

its historic fabric will be protected for generations to come. If we get the response 

wrong, Katrina could turn out to be among the greatest cultural disasters the nation 

has ever experienced and a disaster from which Louisiana may never fully recover. 

For more than 50 years, the National Trust for Historic Preservation has been 

helping to protect the nation’s historic resources. The National Trust is a private, 

nonprofit membership organization dedicated to protecting the irreplaceable. Recipient of the National Humanities Medal, the Trust provides leadership, education and 

advocacy to save America’s diverse historic places and revitalize communities. Its 

Washington, D.C. headquarters staff, 6 regional offices and 26 historic sites work 

with the Trust’s quarter-million members and thousands of local community groups 

in all 50 States. As a private nonprofit organization, the National Trust is the leader of a vigorous preservation movement that is saving the best of our past for the 

future. Its mission has expanded since its founding in 1949 just as the need for historic preservation has grown. When historic buildings and neighborhoods are torn 

down or allowed to deteriorate, we not only lose a part of our past forever, we also 

lose a chance to revitalize our communities. 

SAVING OUR HERITAGE

In dealing with the Mississippi River floods of 1993, the Northridge earthquake 

of 1994, and numerous other natural disasters, the National Trust has learned that 

often, the first impulse of local officials is to tear down almost every damaged building in the name of public safety. We have also learned that this first impulse is almost always wrong. Obviously, some historic buildings—perhaps many of them—

will necessarily be lost, but we should not lose more than we have to. Building inspectors in New Orleans are already at work and have evaluated the structural integrity of more than 50,000 of the city’s roughly 110,000 homes damaged by the hurricane. While the inspectors’ findings are not the final word, they indicate that thousands of New Orleans homeowners may face a tough decision between demolishing 

their homes and opting for new construction, or choosing to renovate. 

Some unfortunate demolitions have already taken place, including the hasty 

razing of the Naval Brigade Hall, a significant landmark in the history of New Orleans jazz. This 102-year old Warehouse District building, which the city had declared 

uninhabitable, was a site on the National Park Service’s jazz tour. It was torn down 

on September 26th without permits or permission from the city or owner. This is 

why any building deemed unsalvageable and recommended for demolition must be 

reviewed by the State historic preservation officer in Baton Rouge, who will determine if the property needs a Section 106 review. This is essential for all buildings 

that might be considered historic. 

On the legislative front, the National Trust urges the committee to safeguard 

coastal Louisiana’s historic legacy by following three basic principles: 

1. Provide the best infrastructure for the Nation’s premier historic area.—Congress 

should provide all necessary resources to rebuild a levee system that recognizes the 

need to protect the nation’s richest inventory of historic treasures. This includes the 

city’s levees and completing a system of hurricane protection southward toward the 

Gulf and in the suburbs once and for all. It should anticipate the worst—a category 

5 hurricane or the drenching slow-moving storm. 

2. The restoration and redevelopment of protective wetlands.—Natural water resources must compliment man-made infrastructure to mitigate the damaging effects 

of future catastrophic storms. Erosion along Louisiana’s coast has eliminated over 

1 million acres of wetlands at an ever-quickening pace. As a result, the Army Corps’ 

own hurricane protection levees have become more vulnerable. They were built with 

the understanding that they would be buffered from winds and storm surges by 40 
66

to 50 miles of protective swamp and marsh. The communities these levees protect 

are now constantly vulnerable with higher surges and stronger wind-driven waves. 

3. Full compliance will the National Historic Preservation Act’s (NHPA) Section 

106 requirements.—Thorough Section 106 review must be part of any Army Corps 

of Engineers work and in all Federal Agency actions related to rebuilding Louisiana’s infrastructure. Section 106 provides a process that requires those agencies to 

‘‘take into account’’ the effects of their decisions and their projects on historic properties, and to work with States, tribes, and local communities to seek ways to lessen 

the effects of those projects. It requires a process, not an outcome. The goal is not 

to save every historic site but to make sure that they are considered and that their 

value is weighed against other public values.

Furthermore, the National Trust sees historic preservation as a critical component 

of revitalizing the Gulf Coast Region’s economy and making its neighborhoods whole 

again. We, along with the American Institute of Architects (AIA) are asking Congress to pass a package of tax incentives and grants to restore and rehabilitate historic structures affected by Katrina, and we urge your support. I will provide you 

with details on our proposals, but let me describe the magnitude of the situation 

first. 

BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW

I recently visited southeastern Louisiana; the damage and loss to buildings is catastrophic, affecting Federally, State, and locally designated historic treasures. In 

New Orleans alone the National Trust estimates that Katrina’s devastating winds, 

rain, and subsequent flooding have in some way affected the 38,000 designated 

structures across the city’s historic districts. 

The scope of the crisis is so great because the Gulf Coast Region itself has one 

of the Nation’s largest collections of historic buildings. Since the French crown established settlements to make a permanent presence close to the Mississippi starting with Biloxi Bay in 1699, the area has been home to a blend of cultures, traditions, buildings, and landscapes unlike those found anywhere else in the United 

States. So much of its architectural uniqueness was influenced by the convergence 

of a rich antebellum planter society and a powerful commercial economy driven by 

river, port, and Gulf. Nowhere is this more apparent than New Orleans, once the 

largest city west of the Appalachians and the nation’s third largest by 1830. The 

city contains 20 National Register historic districts encompassing half of its total 

area, the largest concentration of historic districts in the United States. This is why 

we must make every effort to rebuild and restore this area, and why we must acknowledge the special character of this entire region. Failure to do so would compound the devastation that has already occurred. 

What is needed first are conscientious, comprehensive surveys conducted by experts in construction, architecture, engineering and preservation—people who can 

examine an older building’s condition, evaluate its historic and architectural significance, and determine the feasibility or advisability of saving it. With generous funding assistance from the Getty Foundation, American Express Foundation, and other 

sources, the National Trust has already sent survey teams into Mississippi and New 

Orleans. The final decision on what buildings can—and should—be saved will be 

made by property owners, city officials and FEMA, but the work of the survey teams 

will give them the facts they need to make informed decisions and rational recovery 

plans. 

I saw first-hand that the French Quarter and the Garden District are largely intact. That’s good news, certainly, because these areas, with their imposing white columns and lacy cast-iron galleries, constitute the world-renowned public face of New 

Orleans. But the down-home heart of the city beats in lesser-known neighborhoods 

such as Holy Cross, Treme, Broadmoor, and Mid-City, where officially designated 

historic districts showcase the modest Creole cottages, corner stores, and shotgun 

houses (long, narrow houses, usually only one room wide with no hallway) that are 

essential ingredients in the rich architectural mix that is New Orleans. Saving as 

many of them as possible is essential. 

I came away convinced that the vast majority of them can be saved and this conclusion is being confirmed by our survey teams as well. Most homes inspected so 

far, about 60 percent, have been judged to have some structural damage, but few 

are thought to be in danger of collapse. 

Many times in recent years, when communities were devastated by earthquakes, 

floods, tornadoes or hurricanes, we at the National Trust have worked with local 

officials and our preservation partners to determine the communities’ needs and figure out how we could help most effectively whether by providing funds or technical 

assistance. But the unprecedented ferocity of this hurricane season has confronted 
67

us with a disaster like none we have experienced before, and it calls for solutions 

like none we have developed before. The NHPA and Section 106, however, should 

be fundamental in any strategy. 

THE IMPORTANCE OF SECTION 106

Historic preservation is the process of identifying places, sites and resources that 

have survived from our past; evaluating the meaning and value they have for us 

now; and keeping, using and caring for those significant places, sites and resources 

so they will survive into the future. The preamble to the NHPA, as passed by Congress in 1966, reminds us that ‘‘The spirit and direction of the nation are founded 

upon and reflected in its historic heritage;’’ and that ‘‘the historical and cultural 

foundations of the nation should be preserved as a living part of our community life 

and development in order to give a sense of orientation to the American people.’’ 

Congress further clarified in 1980 that ‘‘the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest.’’

The NHPA protects the rights and values of private property owners, local officials, and citizens across the United States, and gives them a place at the table 

when the actions of Federal agencies threaten to affect their historic properties and 

their communities. Section 106 helps governmental agencies protect and cherish our 

American history as Congress intended. 

DISASTER ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION

To make saving historic buildings a reality, I urge Congress to provide targeted 

sources of Federal and State funding for the preservation of storm-damaged structures. A coalition of national preservation organizations led by the National Trust 

and the AIA are supporting a legislative package to direct Federal and State resources for preservation efforts in the disaster area. The immediate goal is to stabilize and repair damaged but savable buildings before weather and the elements 

lead to further erosion of the historic fabric. The first and most urgent part of these 

legislative measures would provide immediate Federal preservation grant assistance 

to historic property owners and supplement any funds from insurance companies, 

FEMA, and other sources. We have asked Congress for a two-year $60 million ‘‘Historic Preservation Disaster Relief Grants Program’’ from the Federal Historic Preservation Fund to be administered by the States with no Federal match. Applicants 

would agree to rehabilitate their properties in accordance with agreed-upon preservation standards and principles. The National Trust is hoping to use a small portion 

of these grants $2 to $5 million to target key designated ‘‘Main Street’’ organizations 

with funds for preservation planning, technical, and business assistance. So much 

of this region’s recovery will depend on making local, neighborhood-serving, commercial districts many of which are already designated ‘‘Main Street’’ communities viable once again. 

Second, the existing tax credit for rehabilitating historic commercial structures 

should be streamlined and adjusted to work vigorously as a targeted incentive for 

restoring damaged historic buildings, especially those that house critical neighborhood-serving retail in ‘‘main street’’ business communities. We have developed a list 

of recommendations that would accomplish this goal. While the existing tax credit 

program is commendable for its success in fostering the restoration of countless historic buildings across America, there are also a number of structural elements surrounding the program that Congress should address to make it more effective in the 

disaster area. National Park Service data show that last year, for example, Federal 

historic tax incentives for commercial properties leveraged over $3.8 billion in private capital into the national economy. Louisiana ranked sixth in approved ‘‘part 

two’’ projects and Mississippi ranked 17th in this activity along with Alabama. 

Last, taking its cue from the existing tax credit program for income-producing, 

commercial properties, Congress should provide a new credit for homeowners of historic owner-occupied residential buildings, which are currently ineligible for any restoration incentives. Our ‘‘Disaster Relief Historic Homeowner Assistance Tax Credit’’ proposal would provide a credit of 30 percent of qualified rehabilitation expenditures made by persons who substantially rehabilitate historic homes located in the 

Hurricane Disaster Area and used as a principal residence. It would be limited to 

$40,000 total per household. 

These longer-term tax incentives to rebuild would infuse private sector dollars in 

a region desperate for reinvestment and encourage property owners to return to 

these devastated places. 

For all these proposed grants and tax incentives, the framework and infrastructure created by the NHPA, the partnerships it establishes between the Federal and 

State Governments, and its reliance on close cooperation with local preservation or-
68

ganizations, can be an excellent mechanism to deliver our historic preservation assistance package that the region needs. What Congress must support, however, are 

these additional resources, adjustments, and innovations to make it work most effectively in responding to the disaster. The good news is that the NHPA has already 

created the core of any response to saving historic resources in the Gulf Coast Region. What began back in 1966 in response to a grassroots movement to protect 

America’s architectural and cultural legacy, has become a strong Federal preservation program administered by the Department of the Interior. Its implementation 

relies on a strong link between the Agency and the State Historic Preservation Officers in every State and the territories. Congress should utilize it as a tool. 

CONCLUSION

The economic role of historic preservation and the Federal, State, and local resources it bears are tantamount to revitalizing the commercial stability of the region 

and preserving it for future generations. Rising out of its past, the Gulf Coast remains one of the nation’s most important centers of economic activity and so many 

historic buildings are where its people actually live and conduct daily business, commerce, and tourism. The goal of rebuilding efforts should be to allow displaced people to come home to communities that are healthy, vibrant, familiar places to live 

and work and Federal, State, and local Governments in the region—provided with 

adequate resources—should make every effort to save those buildings where possible. From the fishing and shrimping industries, to the Port of South Louisiana, 

to the heart of the country’s petrochemical industry, restoring historic structures is 

essential to restoring the well-being of so many communities in the States affected 

by Katrina. Mr. Chairman, ultimately the question of how the Gulf Coast region 

should be rebuilt is one that its residents must answer. Let us hope they get the 

chance to do so before their region’s future is decided for them. This committee’s 

role is critical to influencing that decision. 

RESPONSES BY PETER BRINK TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. Mr. Brink, can you give me your perspective on how we can balance 

the need to preserve historic structures and the need to ensure that the people affected by this disaster are able to meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter? 

Response. The National Trust believes historic structures are a key resource to 

provide shelter to people affected by the disaster. Thus:

• In New Orleans along, there are 37,000 historic homes and other buildings in 

the city’s National Register Historic Districts. These districts cover nearly half of 

the central land area of New Orleans; there are some grand houses, but the overwhelming majority is comprised of cottages, shot gun houses, and other vernacular 

buildings suitable for housing for low, moderate and middle-income families. • The great majority of these houses is savable to become homes again for their 

owners or residents. In Mississippi there are an estimated 1,000 historic homes 

damaged. In New Orleans, though we’re awaiting completion of City inspections, 

work as of November 22 indicated that throughout the city (not just historic areas) 

3,600 of 118,000 structures inspected were given Red Tags, or about 3 percent, as 

prohibiting entry. In addition there are many thousands of Yellow Tag buildings, 

which require work prior to being habitable. • The ULI Expert Team and Advisor Panel (Nov. 12-18) in New Orleans, of which 

I was a member, found a number of structures in the historic areas that were vacant prior to Katrina. A recommendation of their draft report was to quickly refurbish empty existing public housing units and use these for immediate housing for 

displaced persons. (The final ULI report will be submitted to the Mayor’s Bring New 

Orleans Back Commission within the coming few weeks.) • The National Trust with the Preservation Resource Center of New Orleans has 

already begun work on four demonstration houses, and we are seeking 4 additional 

ones at this time. Our goal is to provide models and build momentum for home owners to undertake the necessary mold remediation and rehabilitation to make their 

homes livable again and return to them. This is feasible for most houses with moderate to medium flooding. Similarly in Mississippi, the Trust has partnered with the 

Mississippi Heritage Trust to undertake the structural repair of 4 demonstration 

houses. The Trust is seeking to raise additional private funds to expand the number 

of demonstration houses throughout the disaster area. 

• In addition the Trust, with Gulf Coast partners, has requested a Federal appropriation of $60 million from the Historic Preservation Fund for grants to the Gulf 

Coast State Historic Preservation Offices for them to provide grants up to $40,000 
69

apiece for rehabilitation of damaged homes in the extensive National Register Historic Districts. Such an appropriation would do much to enable savable historic 

homes to provide shelter to thousands of owners and residents in the disaster area. 

(In addition the request includes $2 2 and a half million for the National Trust 

Main Street Center to provide grants to State and local Main Street programs in 

the disaster area.)

Question 2. During the stakeholders meeting we held in this committee, and during last week’s hearing with Mayor Nagin, one of the major points was that local 

redevelopment plans must drive Federal investments. For example, it may be possible to redevelop the city in such a manner that the highest levels of flood control 

are not required everywhere. The Mayor and the Governor both have planning processes underway. I realize that time is of the essence in rebuilding, but you don’t 

want to spend huge amounts of resources rebuilding flood control in an area where 

no one is going to live. Can you give me your impressions of how this process is 

proceeding? 

Response. The pro bono ULI team invited by the Mayor’s Bring Back New Orleans committee made the difficult recommendation that recovery should proceed in 

geographic stages. This was in recognition that the city will have a smaller population in the immediate coming years and that some areas of the city suffered significantly greater flood damage and are at greater risk for future damage than others. Thus the ULI team recommended viewing the city in terms of three major investment zones: Zone A most severely impacted; Zone B medium impact, with large 

numbers of historic houses; and Zone C least impacted and coinciding with the city’s 

early historic development. The team recommended immediate support for property 

owners and City action to support remediation and rehab in Zones B and C. It recommended further study of Zone A regarding flood risk, environmental factors, and 

best future development and uses. 

The Trust concurs that the immediate and urgent goal is to achieve a full and 

absolute compliance with full Category 3 protection for New Orleans by this June 

and the upcoming hurricane season, as well as a longer range plan to enhance this 

protection as additional study shows needed. Following the ULI analysis, this building could be staged to reflect the zones identified. 

The Trust also believes that it is critical to initiate programs to rebuild the wetlands buffer that used to help protect New Orleans. Each 2.7 miles of marshland 

reduces a storm surge by a full foot. (Michael Tidwell, author of the book Bayou 

Farewell in Orion, December, 2005). Reports indicate that since World War II a land 

area the size of Rhode Island has turned into water. (Ibid.) A full-scale program to 

rebuild this important part of New Orleans’ protection is urgently needed. Katrina 

has accelerated projected loss of wetlands. 

Question 3. Mr. Brink, I understand that Louisiana ranks 6th in the nation in 

terms of the amount of historic tax credits granted. Data from 2004 shows that in 

Louisiana, this tax credit produced 15,000 units of housing, 40 percent of which was 

affordable housing. The Senators from Louisiana recognize this and have proposed 

150M in direct grants for historic preservation in Louisiana, including 25 million 

earmarked for the Trust. Can you describe how these types of resources for historic 

preservation could be used in Louisiana to drive economic development in low-income communities impacted by Katrina? 

Response. Last year Louisiana ranked sixth in the Nation in historic tax credit 

activity, but on average it places fourth. This is indicative of the vast inventory of 

historic resources eligible for the credit and the good work of the State Historic 

Preservation Office, the preservation community, and local developers. Actually, in 

2004, the 15,000 units of housing produced through the credit is a nationwide statistic, not specific to Louisiana, though we know that a good deal of housing is created in that State through the historic tax credit, especially when it is twinned with 

the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit to make housing affordable. Specifically, there were 36 projects in Louisiana last year totaling $52.5 million 

in certified expenses. That is a considerable sum in terms of private sector investment. This is why the Trust would like Congress to use historic preservation—in 

the tax credit and grants for historic buildings—to help in rebuilding the Gulf Region. Let me underscore that tax credits and grants are incentives, though. It is 

sometimes more expedient and less costly to tear down and build anew. To the maximum extent practicable, we do not want to see this happen in the Gulf Region, particularly in New Orleans. We want to preserve our historic treasures and at the 

same time, make sure that the economic benefits of preservation, rehabilitation, and 

restoration reach way down into the neediest neighborhoods through incentives like 

these. 

From a general perspective, historic rehabilitation projects create more jobs than 

new construction. Typically, in new construction half of the investment goes to ma-
70

terials and half to labor. In historic rehabilitation, 60 to 70 percent of the investment goes to labor creating more jobs. In comparing $1 million spent on new construction with $1 million spent on rehabilitation: five to nine more construction jobs 

will be created by a rehabilitation project than new construction; and 4.7 more new 

non-construction jobs will be created by a rehabilitation project.

• Plus, rehabilitation will have a multiplier effect on local spending. The skilled 

labor that is needed for a rehabilitation project is often found locally. When jobs are 

created for local electricians, carpenters, painters, etc., they, in turn, will be spending their earnings locally. Local grocery and hardware stores, automobile dealers, 

and clothing stores will see the benefits as well as the county Government, which 

will benefit from the increased tax revenue. In a comparison of $1 million dollars 

of spending on new construction and $1 million dollars of spending in rehabilitation:

—Household incomes in the community will increase by $107,000 more by a rehabilitation project than new construction. —Rehabilitation will cause retail sales to increase $34,000 more than with new 

construction. 

—$120,000 more will initially stay in the community in a rehabilitation project. 

• The existing Federal Historic Rehabilitation Tax Credit for income-producing 

properties has spurred private investment on a 5 to 1 ratio, and it has become a 

powerful tool for job creation. These benefits are critical in rebuilding the communities ravaged by Katrina. Over $28.7 billion in private investment has been leveraged from its inception in 1976 until Fiscal Year 2002. Each project approved by 

the National Park Service creates on average 42 new jobs (principally local). In Fiscal Year 2002, 50,484 jobs were created by rehabilitation projects. • Dollar for dollar, historic rehabilitation creates more jobs than most other investments. According to a 1997 study by the Center for Urban Policy Research at 

Rutgers University on the economic impacts of historic preservation, ‘‘preservation’s 

benefits surpass those yielded by such alternative investments as infrastructure and 

new housing construction.’’

Question 4. On November 9, 2005, the NAS released a report on the coastal Louisiana restoration plan. One of its major recommendations echoes themes we have 

heard about local redevelopment plans they recommend the development of an explicit map of the expected future landscape of coastal Louisiana. Without this, it will 

be difficult to move forward with coastal restoration and flood control in a targeted 

manner. Can you give me your response to this recommendation and your thoughts 

on how it should be implemented in Louisiana? 

Response. The National Trust agrees that Federal, State, and local officials, with 

the public’s involvement, need to take a broader look at where land in coastal Louisiana should and can be restored. It is simply logical that an explicit map of the 

desired future landscape of coastal Louisiana should be developed as soon as possible to guide the selection of more-integrated restoration projects in the future. 

Until more information becomes available, it would be premature to comment on the 

extent to which wetland loss contributed to the devastating effects of hurricanes 

Katrina and Rita. 

It seems that most of the individual projects in a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

proposal to reduce losses of coastal wetlands in Louisiana are scientifically sound, 

but taken together they do not represent the type of integrated, large-scale effort 

needed to accomplish coastal restoration in its most effective sense. 

The Trust looked at the NAS study. The projects in the report are only intended 

to lay a foundation for more aggressive efforts to preserve and restore coastal Louisiana. The study should be the precursor for a much more comprehensive, system 

wide plan for the entire coastal region. That is what is needed to design a clear, 

and articulate roadmap for the future distribution of land and ultimately restore 

coastal wetlands effectively. 

The National Trust’s testimony focused on the economic benefits of historic preservation in a region with tremendous economic potential to the nation. Without a 

comprehensive map of a restored coastal Louisiana, it is difficult to determine how 

wetland renewal efforts may foster this economic potential in the long-term.

Question 5. One of the key themes we have heard is that cost-benefit analysis procedures should be revised—most significantly to account for potential loss of life. 

What are your views on the revision or abandonment of cost-benefit analysis as a 

decision-making tool for the corps? 

Response. The Trust believes that cost benefit analysis is an important tool and 

that it should fully take into account potential loss of life.

Question 6. Given the corps’ experience in Hurricane Katrina, can you tell us if 

you believe that the Federal Government should do more to ensure the safety of our 
71

Nation’s levee program? For example, should safety standards and an inspection regime be established? 

Response. The Trust believes that the Federal Government should set safety 

standards and an inspection regime for all levees built in whole or in part with Federal funds. This should help prevent the type of breakdowns in the performance of 

levees experienced with such disastrous consequences in Katrina.

Question 7. There has been much discussion of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

and the effect it had in magnifying the storm surge that reached New Orleans. Can 

you give me your specific recommendations regarding this Outlet in light of what 

happened during Katrina? 

Response. The Trust has not studied first-hand the role of the Mississippi River 

Gulf Outlet with regard to Katrina. We have heard, especially during the ULI interviews that knowledgeable residents believe that the MRGO acted as a funnel enabling Katrina to shoot through it to reach the city in the shortest distance and time 

possible. We have also heard that the initial cost-benefit analysis by the Army Corps 

of Engineers projected usage of the MRGO well in excess of the reported 1 1/2 ships 

a day that were using the canal just prior to Katrina. These widespread beliefs 

would compel the corps to complete needed analysis of the impact of the MRGO regarding both risks to human life and potential benefits to commercial activity, and 

make a responsible decision prior to the coming hurricane season on whether to 

close the MRGO. In the meantime no funds should be spent on the repair of the 

MRGO. 

STATEMENT OF SCOTT FABER, WATER RESOURCES SPECIALIST, ENVIRONMENTAL

DEFENSE

Hurricane Katrina was a terrible tragedy that has touched the lives of every 

American. As we rebuild, we must rebuild in a fashion that provides devastated 

communities with a higher level of flood protection when the next hurricane strikes. 

In particular, we must quickly engage experts to consider ways to improve existing 

levees and other flood control infrastructure, seek opportunities to move vulnerable 

homes and businesses from harm’s way, and begin the long overdue restoration of 

coastal Louisiana’s vanishing wetlands and barrier islands. 

Nothing less than the future of New Orleans and surrounding parishes is at 

stake. A meaningful rebuilding package must above all provide assurance that people and property will be secure in the future—or there is little hope that business 

and community leaders will invest in the region’s future again. 

To be successful, flood loss reduction efforts must be integrated—efforts to rebuild 

or expand levees must be integrated with decisions to build the diversions and pipelines needed to restore lost wetlands as well as local decisions to redevelop flooded 

neighborhoods. 

Most importantly, Congress and the Corps of Engineers must treat flood protection and wetland restoration efforts with far greater urgency than we have in the 

past. Before Katrina struck, Congress and the corps envisioned that we could replace lost wetlands and barriers islands in decades, not years. Before Katrina, Congress and the corps envisioned we could provide a higher level of structural flood 

protection in decades, not years. 

Today, in the wake of Katrina, every American recognizes the unique vulnerability of New Orleans and it surrounding parishes, and understands the role that 

Federal flood control and navigation projects have played in the loss of costal wetlands. 

Every year, more than 25 square miles of Louisiana’s coastal wetlands are lost 

because Mississippi River sediments that once spread out and replenished the river’s coastal delta are now funneled into the Gulf of Mexico by Federal flood control 

levees and navigation training structures. More than 1 million acres of coastal wetlands—or 1,900 square miles—have been lost since 1930, and more than 300,000 

acres of additional wetlands will be lost by 2050 if nothing is done. These wetlands 

and barrier islands play a critical role in the protection of our homes, businesses 

and critical infrastructure, reducing storm surge and absorbing wave energy. 

One of the lessons reaffirmed by Katrina is that altering the natural movement 

of sediment and water often has severe unintended and unwanted consequences. 

Lining the Mississippi River with levees has reduced the flood threat posed by the 

river—but has, by contributing to the loss of coastal wetlands, made the flood threat 

posed by hurricanes far greater. Destroying 20,000 acres of wetlands that once acted 

as a natural hurricane barrier to create the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet has instead created what local officials call a ‘‘hurricane highway’’ that increased Katrina’s 

storm surge by 20 to 40 percent and velocities more than three-fold. 
72

Katrina also demonstrated that building levees to intentionally encourage development in harm’s way—and using the projected ‘‘benefits’’ of induced development 

in these wetlands to help justify the construction of levees—have catastrophic consequences when these levees fail. To justify the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity 

Hurricane Protection Project, for example, the corps extended levees to the east of 

New Orleans to encourage the development of wetlands, according to a 1974 Corps 

report to Congress. Tragically, many of the homes built in these reclaimed swamps 

were filled to their rooftops when Katrina struck. Because so many Corps flood control projects induce development in harm’s way, flood damages have more than tripled in real dollars in the past 80 years—even as the corps has spent more than 

$120 billion on flood control projects. 

In the wake of Katrina, we also recognize the importance of subjecting costly or 

controversial water projects to independent review. Levee design failures—design 

failures that might have been detected by independent experts—and the ‘‘surge funnel’’ created by the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet contributed to this tragedy. According to Peter Nicholson, a civil engineering professor testifying on behalf of the 

American Society of Civil Engineers before the Government Affairs committee last 

week, the ‘‘funneling of the surge’’ into the MRGO and, ultimately, the Inner Harbor 

Navigation Channel caused widespread overtopping of levees. Other levees, according to Nicholson, experienced a wide range of damage that could be attributed to 

the materials used in their construction, ‘‘transitions’’ between different sections of 

levees, and ‘‘obvious soil failures within the embankment or foundation soils at or 

below the bases of the levees.’’ In particular, three levee failures along the 17th 

Street and London Avenue canals were most likely caused by failures in the foundation soils underlying the levees, according to a preliminary report by the ASCE. 

This is not the first time the Corps of Engineers has relied on faulty science, engineering or economics. The Government Accountability Office has in recent years 

found that Corps studies have overestimated the number of vessels that would use 

an expanded waterway, overestimated the number of vessels that would use an expanded inlet, overestimated the number of homes and businesses protected by an 

expanded levee, and largely failed to mitigate for the environmental impacts of completed projects. The Army’s own Inspector General found that senior Corps leaders 

intentionally exaggerated the benefits of longer Mississippi River locks, and both the 

National Academy of Sciences and the Congressional Research Service concluded 

that Corps studies overestimated expected traffic on the river. Last year, the NAS 

called for sweeping reforms and modernization of the corps’ project planning process, including independent review of many studies. 

Until now, Congress and the corps have largely failed to address the corps’ use 

of faulty science and economics, have largely failed to reform our flood control and 

insurance programs to discourage development in harm’s way, and have largely 

failed to make the protection of population centers and critical infrastructure our 

highest civil works priority. Critical flood protection construction and maintenance 

have been delayed or abandoned so that the corps could build or maintain projects 

that return little benefit to the taxpayers. Projects designed to protect farm fields 

have received no greater priority than projects designed to protect people and critical infrastructure. 

Corps spending in Louisiana illustrates this problem. Congress invested nearly $2 

billion on Louisiana water projects over the past 5 years. But, much of these funds 

were invested in questionable projects that did nothing to avert the destructive impacts of Hurricane Katrina. While nationwide spending on the corps projects grew 

steadily during the past decade, from $3.2 billion in FY 1996 to $4.7 billion in FY 

2005, annual spending on levees designed to protect New Orleans from a Category 

3 storm declined from roughly $15 million a year to roughly $5 million a year, extending the project completion date for the city’s structural hurricane protection 

project to 2015. A $12 million study to evaluate the benefits and costs of protecting 

New Orleans from a Category 5 storm has been delayed for years. This serious lack 

of prioritization is not limited to Louisiana. At the same time that the nation’s civil 

works infrastructure faces a multibillion dollar backlog of critical maintenance 

needs, Congress continues to commit 30 percent of our waterway maintenance funding to waterways that carry approximately 3 percent of Nation’s waterborne commerce. 

OUR ORGANIZATIONS MAKE THE FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS

First, Congress must act quickly to require the development of a comprehensive 

plan to raise existing levees, to relocate vulnerable structures, and to restore lost 

wetlands and barrier islands. This comprehensive plan should be developed by a 

team of hydrologists, scientists, and engineers, led by an independent commission 
73

of three experts of national reputation appointed by the President after consultation 

with the Governor. An independent commission will reassure business leaders that 

efforts to improve our natural and man-made flood protection infrastructure will be 

undertaken quickly and competently. Promises of future funding will not provide 

business and community leaders with appropriate assurances. 

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers must play a central role in the design and construction of flood control and restoration projects, and we recommend that the commission be headquartered in the office of the Secretary of the Army. But, the commission should have the power to contract private engineering firms and institutions to supplement the corps’ capacity and expertise. A task force of State and Federal officials should also be created to guide the commission’s efforts. Second, Congress should appropriate, in the next disaster supplemental, $5.5 bil- lion to begin the restoration of lost coastal wetlands and barrier islands and $5 billion to enhance existing flood control infrastructure to protect New Orleans from a 

Category 5 storm. As you know, the corps and the State of Louisiana have already 

developed an ambitious, peer-reviewed plan to begin the construction of diversions, 

pipelines and other projects that will restore our natural hurricane protection system. Many of these critical restoration projects can be constructed immediately with 

no impact on traditional uses of the Mississippi and Atchafalaya rivers. Indeed, 

some restoration projects offer the chance to dramatically improve navigation on the 

Mississippi River and flood protection. A summary of these and other restoration 

opportunities is attached. 

Third, Congress should immediately close the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. Traffic on the MRGO has fallen by more than 50 percent since 1986. Today, less than 

one oceangoing vessel per day, on average, uses this man-made short cut, which 

costs approximately $13 million annually to maintain. Like many waterways constructed by the corps, the MRGO has failed to attract as much traffic as the corps 

predicted when the project was constructed. In fact, only 2 of 14 waterways constructed since World War II have attracted as much traffic as the corps predicted. 

Rather than rebuilding the levees along the MRGO, the corps should immediately 

close the channel and devise a plan to prevent salt water intrusion and ongoing 

channel erosion. 

Fourth, Congress should reform FEMA mitigation and relocation programs to 

move flood victims from harm’s way. Many flood victims would move their homes 

and business from harm’s way, but current law requires State or local Government 

to share 25 percent of the cost of hazard mitigation—a requirement that no State 

or local agencies can meet in the wake of Katrina. Congress should waive the costsharing requirements for these hazard mitigation programs, and should reinstate 

FEMA’s authority to use up to 15 percent of disaster assistance for these efforts. 

Finally, Congress should reform the civil works planning process to ensure that 

urgent, worthy civil works projects are given the highest priority by the Administration and Congress. 

To meet this goal, Congress should subject costly or controversial Army Corps 

projects to independent review and should require the corps to periodically update 

the Agency’s planning tools to reflect the best available science and economics. Independent reviews could be undertaken at the same time as public review of draft 

studies, thereby ensuring that studies would not be delayed. Both of these reforms 

have been proposed by the National Academy of Sciences. 

Congress should also direct the corps to meet State standards for the replacement 

of wetlands and other habitats destroyed by worthy water projects—that is, Congress should direct the corps to meet the same standards as private developers. The 

GAO recently found that the corps failed to mitigate for nearly 70 percent of the 

civil works projects constructed since 1986, when modern mitigation laws were enacted. Our failure to mitigate for impacts of public and private water projects in the 

past have set the stage for the damage wrought by Katrina. 

Congress should direct an interagency council to establish priorities for the Nation’s civil works spending. Although funds for the construction and maintenance of 

Army Corps water projects have steadily increased over the past decade to $4.7 billion annually, the backlog of authorized projects may soon exceed $70 billion. Many 

of these projects no longer address national priorities. Congress should direct an 

interagency council to set priorities for flood control spending so that scare resources 

are used to meet the nation’s most critical flood damage reduction needs, to protect 

developed areas and critical infrastructure from flooding, to provide net economic 

benefits, and to avoid the needless destruction of wetlands and other environmental 

resources that serve as our first line of defense against hurricanes and floods. Critical flood control projects designed to protect people and public infrastructure should 

no longer take a back seat to projects designed to promote new development in frequently flooded floodplains. 
74

As we rebuild, we must also prepare for the next hurricane. We must restore our 

coastal wetlands and barrier islands, but faster and with more urgency than has 

been proposed in the past. We must enhance our levees and other flood control infrastructure to protect New Orleans from a Category 5 storm. We must ensure that 

the Corps of Engineers uses the best available science and economics, subjected to 

independent review, to plan and prioritize future water projects. And, we must take 

steps to avoid the needless destruction of our natural flood reduction system. 

ATTACHMENT: CRITICAL RESTORATION OPPORTUNITIES

Based on our review of Army Corps and State planning documents and discussion 

with participating scientists, we propose immediate implementation of a series of 

projects and studies to begin the restoration of Louisiana’s natural hurricane protection system. We recommend that Congress appropriate $5.5 billion in the next emergency supplemental appropriations bill for these projects and studies. 

The Final LCA report issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the State 

of Louisiana in November 2004, and the draft PEIS completed in 2003, identified 

likely projects but lacked the sense of urgency Katrina has shown is needed—many 

critical sediment and freshwater diversion and barrier island restoration projects 

and studies were postponed for decades. We believe it is possible to dramatically accelerate the design and construction of potential diversion, pipeline and barrier island restoration projects. 

THE $5.5 BILLION IN NEAR-TERM FUNDING, ACCORDING TO OUR ANALYSIS, WOULD BE

ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS

• $3.1 billion to begin the restoration of coastal wetlands and barrier islands 

through a set of promising sediment pipelines and diversion projects east and west 

of the Mississippi River. These projects are described in more detail below. • $1 billion for land acquisition, easements (including easements on cypress 

swamp forests) and the voluntary relocation of infrastructure, including the voluntary relocation of the service centers and small communities south of Pointe a la 

Hache. The voluntary relocation of some infrastructure will enhance opportunities 

to quickly restore lost coastal wetlands and reduce future flood losses. • $1.115 billion to complete within 2 years the Mississippi River Delta Manage- ment Study proposed in the final LCA plan ($15 million), and to relocate the main 

shipping entrance to the Mississippi River so that this project can be implemented 

quickly if found to be feasible ($1.1 billion). • $300 million to create a Science and Technology Program, a Demonstration Program, and to provide for beneficial use of dredged material, as envisioned in the 

final LCA plan. • $45 million to complete studies of other potential pipelines and diversions that 

are not identified below, to complete large-scale feasibility studies within four years 

of the Atchafalaya River third outlet, the ‘‘Third Delta’’ concept, and the Chenier 

Plain Freshwater and Sediment Management and Allocation Reassessment.

In combination, these sediment and diversion projects and studies would quickly 

restore and nourish significant amounts of coastal wetlands near populated areas 

that need additional protection from storm surges as soon as possible. Construction 

of many diversion projects would also give managers the ability to operate different 

diversions under different flow conditions. We do not envision that all of these diversions would be operated simultaneously; rather, we envision that some diversions 

would be operated in some years and not other years. 

The cost estimates in this memo are based upon the 2003 Draft PEIS and the 

2004 final LCA plan. 

Work at this rate will require engineering and scientific capability that would exceed the corps’ existing resources. We therefore propose that the Administration ask 

Congress to create a three-member independent commission within the Department 

of the Army to oversee and accelerate restoration efforts. This Commission could 

contract not only with the corps and other Federal and State agencies and institutions but could also employ such mechanisms as private design competitions. To 

raise the profile and sense of urgency, we suggest that the Commissioners be appointed by the President following consultation with the Governor of Louisiana. 

A SUMMARY OF PROPOSED PROJECTS FOLLOWS

• Sediment Pipelines—A series of sediment pipelines can be constructed east and 

west of the Mississippi River, including pipelines at Empire ($406M), Bastian Bay 

($440M), American/California Bay ($593M), Myrtle Grove ($127M), and Quarantine 
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1Brennen Jensen and Elizabeth Schwinn. Chronicle of Philanthropy. ‘‘Donations to Hurricane 

Relief Exceed $2 Billion, But Costs Soar.’’ November 3, 2005. Available at http://philanthropy.com/free/update/2005/11/2005110302.htm. 2Senate Budget Committee Republican Staff. Budget Bulletin. October 4, 2005. Available at 

http://budget.senate.gov/republican/analysis/2005/bb08-2005.pdf. 

Bay ($734.9). These projects will rebuild lost wetlands in the shallow coastal bays 

that now abut the lowest reaches of the Mississippi River. 

• Construct Diversions—A series of freshwater diversions of at least 50,000 cfs 

can be constructed to nourish highly degraded fresh to brackish wetlands in shallow 

open water areas east and west of the Mississippi River. These projects include diversions at Myrtle Grove ($143M), Fort Jackson/Boothville ($8M), Empire, Bastian 

Bay, American/California Bay ($15M), Caernarvon ($2M), and White’s Ditch ($35M). 

• Close the MRGO; Construct Sediment Pipelines—the corps should close the 

MRGO. Cost: $12 million. Pipelines and diversion should be constructed to rebuild 

wetlands north and south of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. Cost: $46.9 million 

and $25 million, respectively. the corps should also expand an existing diversion at 

Violet. 

• Improve Freshwater and Sediment Flows Into Maurepas Swamp—Federal and 

State agencies should proceed with several projects to reverse the decline of 

Maurepas Swamp. They should build a diversion at Hope Canal, construct the Convent/Blind River diversion, and construct gaps in the existing dredged material 

banks of the Amite River Diversion Canal to improve water quality and introduce 

nutrients and sediments into western Maurepas Swamp. Cost: $10 million, $28 million, and $2.9 million, respectively. 

• Construct Atchafalaya River Diversion—This project would convey Atchafalaya 

River water to northern Terrebonne Parish via an Avoca Island levee diversion. 

Cost: $132.2 million. Congress and the Administration should also reserve $500 million to move additional water and sediment east from the Atchafalaya River into 

the northern reaches of Terrebonne Bay. 

• Bayou Lafourche Freshwater Diversion—This project would reintroduce flow 

from the Mississippi River into an existing bayou, reducing salinity levels and reducing loss rates between Bayou Lafourche and Terrebonne Bay. EPA, USACE, and 

other agencies should quickly assess whether this diversion project could be expanded to 5,000 cfs capacity or more without impacting infrastructure, and should 

quickly assess whether some infrastructure could be elevated or relocated. Cost: 

$75.2 million. 

• Begin Barataria Barrier Shoreline Restoration—The project would mine offshore sediment source to reestablish barrier islands. The project would create a 

3,000-foot-wide island, would restore critical portions of the original barrier island 

chain, and would aid the littoral movement of sediment to the remainder of the 

chain. Cost: $181 million. 

• Begin Terrebonne Barrier Shoreline Restoration—This project would mine sediment to restore critical element of the barrier island chain, including Timbalier and 

Isles Dernieres barrier island chain. Cost: $84.8 million. 

STATEMENT OF STEVE ELLIS, VICE PRESIDENT, TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE

Good morning, thank you for inviting me here to testify. I am Steve Ellis, Vice 

President of Programs at Taxpayers for Common Sense, a national, non-partisan 

budget watchdog. First, I would like to commend the chairman and the committee 

for holding this series of hearings. I am confident that it will aid the committee as 

it develops the appropriate mix of water resource initiatives for the Gulf Coast and 

begins applying the lessons learned through Katrina and the other storms to our 

nation’s water resource policy as a whole. 

In the Gulf Coast area, we are faced with a significant challenge the need for 

speed, and the need to do it right. As a budget watchdog, I would add that we need 

to do it fiscally responsibly as well. The outpouring of individual support for the relief effort, which has already reached $2 billion, shows just how important this issue 

is to the nation.1 We owe it to the American people to spend their tax dollars wisely 

on the relief effort, and to use that money to rebuild effectively and intelligently. 

Taxpayers have already spent $70 billion on relief to date, and we expect tens of 

billions more in the days to come.2

The fundamental responsibility of Government is to take care of its citizens. In 

the area of flood and storm damage reduction, it is clear that Government has 

failed. We spent $123 billion on flood control projects in the last century, but annual 
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3Taxpayers for Common Sense and National Wildlife Federation. Crossroads: Congress, the 

Corps of Engineers and the Future of America’s Water Resources. March 2004. 20-21. 4 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Hearing. Hurricane Katrina: Why Did 

the Levees Fail? November 2, 2005. 5Jeanne Cummings. The Wall Street Journal. ‘‘Swept Away: How Rhineland, MO, Saved Itself 

but Lost a Sense of Community.’’ July 15, 1999. 6Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee. ‘‘Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain 

Management Into the 21st. Century’’. June 1994. 7Federal Emergency Management Agency. ‘‘Success Stories from the Missouri Buyout Program’’. August 2002. 

costs from flood damage have increased from $2.6 billion annually in the first 50 

years of the 20th century to more than $6 billion per year over the last decade.3

Right after Katrina flooded New Orleans, the airwaves were full of Army Corps 

of Engineers officials stating that the levees and floodwalls performed as expected 

they provided category 3 protection and Katrina was a category 4 storm. But according to recent testimony, Katrina was no longer a category 4 hurricane when it hit 

New Orleans. Engineering panels sponsored by the National Science Foundation 

and the American Society of Civil Engineers found that the levees and floodwalls 

did not perform to design or promise. Additionally, these experts raised concerns 

that there may have been possible malfeasance on the part of individuals constructing flood control structures.4

This initial analysis should send shivers down all of our spines. If it is true that 

the levees were brought down by shoddy craftsmanship, we need to know whether 

this was an isolated case, or whether this is just one of many projects nationwide 

that we should be concerned about. 

We also need to learn more about the assumptions that Corps officials made when 

constructing and maintaining the London Street, 17th Street and Industrial Canal 

flood protection projects, and we should take a good look at how construction was 

supervised. In one of my jobs with the Coast Guard, I served as the Contracting 

Officer’s Technical Representative for a boat construction contract. In that capacity, 

I learned that inspection and oversight is as important as the initial construction 

itself. the corps’ failure to oversee and predict the vulnerabilities in New Orleans 

flood protection is quite possibly the most troubling incident in the Agency’s recent 

history. 

So where do we go from here. Here are a few principles that TCS would urge the 

committee, Congress and the administration to consider regarding rebuilding water 

infrastructure in the Gulf Coast and learning from Katrina.

• Rethink the level of protection-Everyone agrees that we must give New Orleans 

at least the category 3 level of protection that it was supposed to have before 

Katrina. However, we cannot expect any levee to automatically meet all our needs 

just because the corps has deemed it ‘‘category 3,’’ or even ‘‘category 5.’’ Hurricanes 

are extremely dynamic entities. We should endeavor to obtain significant protection 

from a variety of threats, not just a repeat of Katrina. 

• Identify what to rebuild-Although it will be difficult process, we will have to 

identify areas that are too damaged or so vulnerable to future storms that they 

should not be rebuilt. Just like after the Great Midwest Flood of 1993, this is a 

tough task that should be managed and led by Louisianans. But the Federal Government needs to be clear that if individuals want to rebuild in hurricane-ravaged 

areas, they should do it without the aid or encouragement of Uncle Sam. In past 

crises, some affected towns have responded by relocating out of the floodplain.5 After 

the Flood of 1993, the post-event analysis recommended that damaged communities 

should move critical infrastructure out of the floodplain where possible.6 When 

floodwaters returned in 1995, the damage was far less.7 If relocation is not practical, 

infrastructure and densely populated areas should have the highest level of flood 

protection possible. This strategy makes sense, but we also have to realize that 

Mother Nature is very creative, versatile and powerful. We can mitigate the risks 

with levees, floodwalls and constructed wetlands, but the risk of catastrophic flood 

damage will always be there. 

• Reevaluate our policies-The potentially shoddy levee construction in New Orleans should not be all that concerns us regarding levees. Our Nation’s water resource 

policies are antiquated and often fail to adequately protect us. The Principles and 

Guidelines—the rules governing Corps of Engineers project design and selection—

are more than two decades old. We need to update these rules to fully account for 

all costs and benefits of Corps projects, modernize economic procedures and remove 

biases toward large construction projects.

We have a $58 billion backlog of Corps of Engineers projects and the Agency has 

a roughly $5 billion budget. Rather than pumping up the corps budget as some in-
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8David I. Maurstad, Acting Director and Federal Insurance Administrator, Mitigation Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency. Testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services. October 20, 2005. 9Betsy McKay. The Wall Street Journal. ‘‘Moving the Mississippi’’. October 29, 2005

sist, we must establish a system of prioritizing project investment so we don’t 

squander precious tax dollars maintaining waterways with no traffic, rather than 

constructing essential flood damage reduction projects. 

National flood policies also make little sense. Our 35-year experience with flood 

insurance has failed: FEMA estimates that flood insurance claims this year will exceed $22 billion, but the National Flood Insurance Program has the capacity to pay 

about $2 billion per year.8 Further, our policies discourage adequate flood protection. Since the typical homeowner does not have to buy flood insurance if they have 

100-year flood protection, we have essentially dumbed down our flood protection to 

the 100-year level. Remember, there is still a 1 percent chance that these areas 

would flood every year; people buy lottery tickets hoping to win with far worse odds 

than that. The convention of describing the level of protection by assigning it an xyear level, be it 50-, 100-, or 500-year, is confusing and leaves individuals with an 

unrealistic view of their protection. 

• Let the economy help itself-Many private sector industries are now pleading 

with the Government to help them rebuild. Small businesses, the oil and gas industry, fishing industry, the port—all are seeking significant Federal support to get 

them back on their feet. We strongly urge the incentives to be small, targeted and 

short in duration. Katrina was an unthinkable tragedy, but it also provides an opportunity to let the market correct the mistakes of the past. For instance, some 

businesses or infrastructure may have been inappropriately located, at high risk 

from storms. Taxpayers should not subsidize them to be built right back in harm’s 

way. The Federal Government should be trying the rev the Gulf Coast’s economic 

engine, but if the Government’s hand or handout is too heavy it will stifle innovation and economic incentives to reduce exposure to storm risk. 

• Forward thinking-There are a lot of plans on the books for providing adequate 

flood protection for New Orleans and Louisiana. We must resist the urge to simply 

dust them off and get building. Our approach to providing adequate protection must 

be integrated and multi-faceted, and it must be tailored to include the lessons 

learned from this unthinkable tragedy. Our planning must be dynamic and we have 

to think outside the box, because traditional approaches will likely not succeed. We 

should look at ideas like Dr. Sherwood Gagliano’s plan to divert some of the Mississippi River water and sediment to restore coastal marshes. This plan was highlighted in the Wall Street Journal recently.9 Furthermore, we need to make policy 

changes that will help provide the smarter floodplain development and protection 

incentives. 

• Don’t try to do everything-Congress has already been asked to fund the ‘‘do everything for everyone’’ approach. We shouldn’t try to rebuild everything that was 

damaged by Katrina because the regions that were hit were obviously very exposed 

to storm damages. Funding and activity must be targeted to accelerate, but not dictate the rebuilding process. The Federal role in rebuilding will set precedents for 

future natural disaster response, so we must be judicious in our activities. 

That gets me to major concern for Taxpayers for Common Sense-cost. The Nation 

needs to set some investment priorities in the Gulf Coast region. We cannot afford 

to protect everything, everywhere and pay everyone to come back to New Orleans. 

We had a $317 billion budget deficit last year. We are fighting a war. New Orleans 

is an important and valuable investment, but we have to target our funding wisely. 

Thank you very much for inviting me here to today to testify and I’ll be happy 

to answer any questions you might have. 

RESPONSES BY STEVE ELLIS TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FROM SENATOR JEFFORDS

Question 1. Mr. Ellis, can you give me your perspective on how we can balance 

the need to preserve historic structures and the need to ensure that the people affected by this disaster are able to meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter? 

Response. Preserving historic structures in New Orleans is a laudable and important goal. However, meeting citizen’s needs for food, clothing and shelter is obviously of the utmost importance. Part of New Orleans charm and attraction as a 

tourist destination is the architecture and historic buildings. If we are to maintain 

a stable economy in the region we cannot simply raze flood damaged historic structures and replace them with quickly built housing. As we rebuild New Orleans we 
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must endeavor to replicate the character and the style that made this town one of 

the most culturally rich cities in the country. Further, we are going to have help 

citizens and organizations to rebuild and rehabilitate damaged buildings while providing for the displaced citizens.

Question 2. During the stakeholders meeting we held in this committee, and during last week’s hearing with Mayor Nagin, one of the major points was that local 

redevelopment plans must drive Federal investments. For example, it may be possible to redevelop the city in such a manner that the highest levels of flood control 

are not required everywhere. The Mayor and the Governor both have planning processes underway. I realize that time is of the essence in rebuilding, but you don’t 

want to spend huge amounts of resources rebuilding flood control in an area where 

no one is going to live. Can you give me your impressions of how this process is 

proceeding? 

Repsonse. The President and others have supported funding for greater levee protection. We agree. We need to convince the residents that the Federal Government 

will commit to providing greater levee protection in the neighborhoods where it 

makes sense to rebuild. But, we have to recognize that because time is of the essence we could be rebuilding flood protection in some areas where it may not be necessary after full redevelopment plans are enacted. Also, in some places the immediate flood protection that we provide may have to be rebuilt or expanded in the 

future. The rebuilding of flood control and drafting of redevelopment plans is, like 

much of the rebuilding process, stumbling forward. I am not aware of a clear redevelopment plan or a flood protection plan beyond the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

proposal to rebuilding the pre-Katrina flood protection.

Question 3. Mr. Ellis, given the preliminary conclusions of the different groups 

conducting a failure analysis of the flood control projects in New Orleans, can you 

describe your view on how the need to provide flood control for the next hurricane 

season should be balanced against the need to find out exactly what happened so 

that the corps does not rebuild ineffective flood control? 

Response. As quickly and accurately as possible, we need to determine how exactly our flood protection structures performed during Katrina, what failed and why. 

Because initial reviews are suggestion human error and ‘‘negligence’’ is to blame, 

the review process will be integral to inform our rebuilding process as it goes forward. Lessons learned by the engineering teams need to be applied tomorrow; we 

cannot afford to wait until the entire review is signed, sealed and delivered.

Question 4. On November 9, 2005, the NAS released a report on the coastal Louisiana restoration plan. One of its major recommendations echoes themes we have 

heard about local redevelopment plans—they recommend the development of an explicit map of the expected future landscape of coastal Louisiana. Without this, it will 

be difficult to move forward with coastal restoration and flood control in a targeted 

manner. Can you give me your response to this recommendation and your thoughts 

on how it should be implemented in Louisiana. 

Response. We have to have a realistic vision of our future New Orleans and coastal Louisiana if we are to ever build a responsible, integrated system to protect it. 

I said ‘‘realistic’’ vision, because we have to recognize that these areas are always 

going to be vulnerable to Mother Nature and that we must be cognizant that a direct hit from a category five storm will wreak tremendous damage no matter what 

our defenses are. If something—critical infrastructure, dense population center—

doesn’t have to be in harm’s way, we should relocate it. If it has to stay, then we 

should provide it the highest level of protection possible. We cannot afford to simply 

be beholden to development decisions from the past; they may no longer be relevant 

or even dangerous. Led by Louisianans, difficult decisions are ahead in this process 

and will have to be made.

Question 5. One of the key themes we have heard is that cost-benefit analysis procedures should be revised—most significantly to account for potential loss of life. 

What are your views on the revision or abandonment of cost-benefit analysis as a 

decision-making tool for the corps? 

Response. The discussion of abandoning the cost-benefit analysis because of its 

shortcomings is akin to ‘‘throwing the baby out with bath water.’’ It makes little 

sense to not conduct a benefit-cost analysis before investing billions of taxpayer dollars. What we must do is modernize that analysis to include—as best as possible—

all of the costs and benefits associated with Corps projects. In too many cases some 

of the benefits and costs: social and economic, were simply left out the equation. We 

cannot afford to do that. Incorporating the potential cost of loss of life will be difficult. Rather than trying to attach a dollar figure, which would be controversial and 

heavily bias analysis results, we should instead increasingly prioritize projects that 
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significantly protect against loss of life. In the end benefit-cost analysis should be 

a dynamic entity that evolves as economics and the Nation’s needs evolve.

Question 6. Given the corps’ experience in Hurricane Katrina, can you tell us if 

you believe that the Federal Government should do more to ensure the safety of our 

Nation’s levee program? For example, should safety standards and an inspection regime be established? 

Response. We absolutely need to establish a system to a) ascertain the safety of 

existing levees around the country; b) determine whether the levees provide the appropriate level of protection, some levees may be no longer necessary, others may 

need to be strengthened, a benefit-cost analysis should be performed; c) develop national safety and design criteria for levees; and d) create a system to regularly inspect levees and other flood protection.

Question 7. There has been much discussion of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

and the effect it had in magnifying the storm surge that reached New Orleans. Can 

you give me your specific recommendations regarding this Outlet in light of what 

happened during Katrina? 

Response. The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) should be closed immediately. It accommodates very little traffic to justify its existence and clearly creates 

a significant hazard for New Orleans and neighboring parishes. This is a case where 

a fair cost-benefit analysis would reveal the project to be a loser. Enormous potential costs in death and destruction and very little economic benefit. One idea that 

has been offered is to reduce the outlets draft and construct a vessel floodgate and 

storm surge barriers. This makes virtually no sense. We are going to spend an enormous amount of money to keep the outlet open when it has already proven to be 

an economic loser. Furthermore, part of this plan is to deepen, widen and lengthen 

the lock on the Industrial Canal (Inner Harbor Navigational Canal) to allow traffic 

to access the few port facilities served by the MRGO. So, when New Orleans, the 

Gulf Coast and the nation is scrambling for cash we are going to spend more than 

a billion dollars wasteful navigation schemes to keep MRGO open. That makes no 

sense. The outlet should be closed, a restoration project along it should be started 

and the new lock on the Industrial Canal should be deauthorized.
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