alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# C_2016419EN.01004401.xml

| 14.11.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 419/44 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.11.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 419/44

---

Judgment of the General Court of 28 September 2016 — The Art Company B & S v EUIPO — G-Star Raw (THE ART OF RAW)

(Case T-593/15) (1)

1

((EU trade mark - Opposition proceedings - Application for EU word mark THE ART OF RAW - Earlier national and EU figurative marks art and earlier EU figurative mark The Art Company - Relative ground for refusal - No likelihood of confusion - Article 8(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009))

(2016/C 419/58)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Applicant: The Art Company B & S, SA (Quel, Spain) (represented by: J. Villamor Muguerza, lawyer)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Palmero Cabezas, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO: G-Star Raw CV (Amsterdam, Netherlands)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 9 July 2015 (Case R 1980/2014-1), relating to opposition proceedings between The Art Company B & S and G-Star Raw.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders The Art Company B & S, SA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders The Art Company B & S, SA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 414, 14.12.2015.

1

---
# C_2015254EN.01000801.xml

| 3.8.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 254/8 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

3.8.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 254/8

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank Den Haag (Netherlands) lodged on 20 May 2015 — Brite Strike Technologies Inc. v Brite Strike Technologies SA

(Case C-230/15)

(2015/C 254/11)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Referring court

Rechtbank Den Haag

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Brite Strike Technologies Inc.

Applicant:

Defendant: Brite Strike Technologies SA

Defendant:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1) | Must the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (Trademarks and Designs) (BCIP) (whether or not on the grounds set out in paragraphs 28 to 34 of the judgment of the Gerechtshof Den Haag (Regional Court of Appeal, The Hague) of 26 November 2013) be considered to be a subsequent convention, with the result that Article 4.6 of the BCIP cannot be considered to be a special rule for the purposes of Article 71 of Regulation No 44/2001 (1)?
  If that question is answered in the affirmative: |
| --- | --- |

1)

Must the Benelux Convention on Intellectual Property (Trademarks and Designs) (BCIP) (whether or not on the grounds set out in paragraphs 28 to 34 of the judgment of the Gerechtshof Den Haag (Regional Court of Appeal, The Hague) of 26 November 2013) be considered to be a subsequent convention, with the result that Article 4.6 of the BCIP cannot be considered to be a special rule for the purposes of Article 71 of Regulation No 44/2001 (1)?

1

If that question is answered in the affirmative:

| 2) | Does it follow from Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 that the Belgian, Netherlands and Luxembourg courts all have international jurisdiction to take cognisance of the dispute? |
| --- | --- |

2)

Does it follow from Article 22(4) of Regulation No 44/2001 that the Belgian, Netherlands and Luxembourg courts all have international jurisdiction to take cognisance of the dispute?

| 3) | If not, how should it be determined, in a case such as the present, whether the Belgian, Netherlands or Luxembourg courts have international jurisdiction? Can Article 4.6 of the BCIP (nonetheless) be applied with a view to (further) determining international jurisdiction? |
| --- | --- |

3)

If not, how should it be determined, in a case such as the present, whether the Belgian, Netherlands or Luxembourg courts have international jurisdiction? Can Article 4.6 of the BCIP (nonetheless) be applied with a view to (further) determining international jurisdiction?

---

(1)  Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 2001 L 12, p. 1).

1

---
IV 

110TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. CON. RES. 191 

Supporting the goals and ideals of ‘‘National Purple Heart Recognition Day’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JULY 24, 2007 

Mr. HALL of New York submitted the following concurrent resolution; which 

was referred to the Committee on Armed Services 

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 

Supporting the goals and ideals of ‘‘National Purple Heart 

Recognition Day’’. 

Whereas the Purple Heart is the oldest military decoration in 

the world in present use; 

Whereas the Purple Heart is awarded in the name of the 

President of the United States to members of the Armed 

Forces who are wounded in a conflict with an enemy 

force or are wounded while held by an enemy force as 

prisoners of war, and is awarded posthumously to the 

next of kin of members of the Armed Forces who are 

killed in a conflict with an enemy force or who die of 

wounds received in a conflict with an enemy force; 

Whereas the Purple Heart was established on August 7, 

1782, during the Revolutionary War, when General 

George Washington issued an order establishing the HonVerDate Aug 31 2005 22:12 Jul 25, 2007 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\HC191.IH HC191

jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
2 

•HCON 191 IH 

orary Badge of Distinction, otherwise known as the 

Badge of Military Merit; 

Whereas the award of the Purple Heart ceased with the end 

of the Revolutionary War, but was revived in 1932, the 

200th anniversary of George Washington’s birth, out of 

respect for his memory and military achievements; and 

Whereas observing National Purple Heart Recognition Day is 

a fitting tribute to George Washington and to the more 

than 1,535,000 recipients of the Purple Heart, approximately 550,000 of whom are still living: Now, therefore, 

be it 

1 Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 

2 concurring), That Congress— 

3 (1) supports the goals and ideals of ‘‘National 

4 Purple Heart Recognition Day’’; 

5 (2) encourages all people in the United States 

6 to learn about the history of the Purple Heart and 

7 to honor its recipients; and 

8 (3) calls upon the people of the United States 

9 to conduct appropriate ceremonies, activities, and 

10 programs to demonstrate support for members of 

11 the Armed Forces who have been awarded the Pur12 ple Heart. 

Æ 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with BILLS
(Reap. Dec. 9597)

#### Delta Mercantile Corp. *v.*United States

Entry No. 343117.

(Decided February 19, 1960)

Plaintiff not represented by counsel.

*George Ooohran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Lawrence, Judge:

There was no appearance on behalf of plaintiff when the above-enumerated appeal for a reappraisement was called for hearing and the case was ordered submitted by the court.

Rule 5(a) of the rules of the court provides that—

> The submission for decision of any ease shall be made in open court by the parties thereto or their attorneys, or by stipulation, or by written request to ■the .court, or by the court on its own motion. Where the plaintiff, petitioner, or appellant, or his attorney, in a case does not appear when the same is called, and after the opposite party has had opportunity to present evidence on the issues, it may be deemed submitted and may be decided by the court on the record as it appears therein.

Accordingly, I have examined the record in the appeal before the court and find nothing therein which tends in any way to overcome the presumption of correctness which attaches to the decision of the appraiser. I find and hold, therefore, that the proper value of the .merchandise is the value returned by the appraiser.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
No. 44229.

#### Protest 995518-G of Goldfarb Novelty Co.

Application by plaintiff for rehearing granted.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER WITHDRAWING MEDIATION ORDER

Cause number: 01-17-00591-CV

Style: Texas First Investment Management Co., LLP v. Thomas J. Coorsh

Date motion filed: September 14, 2017

Type of Motion: Objection to Mediation

Party filing motion: Appellee

It is ordered that Appellee=s objection to mediation is granted. We withdraw our 

Mediation Order dated September 6, 2017.

Judge's signature: /s/ Laura C. Higley 

 X Acting individually Q Acting for the Court

 Panel consists of 

Date: September 15, 2017

* Absent emergency or a statement that the motion is unopposed, must wait ten days before acting on motion except for 

motion to extend time to file a brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.3(a).

Note: Single justice may grant or deny any request for relief properly sought by motion, except in a civil case a single justice 

should not: (1) act on a petition for an extraordinary writ or (2) dismiss or otherwise determine an appeal or a motion 

for rehearing. TEX. R. APP. P. 10.4(a).
# C_2016068EN.01002201.xml

| 22.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 68/22 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 68/22

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 30 November 2015 — Costin Popescu v Guvernul României, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Direcția Regim Permise de Conducere și Înmatriculare a Vehiculelor, Direcția Rutieră, Serviciul Public Comunitar Regim Permise de Conducere si Inmatriculare a Vehiculelor

(Case C-632/15)

(2016/C 068/29)

Language of the case: Romanian

Referring court

Referring court

Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Costin Popescu

Applicant:

Defendants: Guvernul României, Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, Direcția Regim Permise de Conducere și Înmatriculare a Vehiculelor, Direcția Rutieră, Serviciul Public Comunitar Regim Permise de Conducere si Inmatriculare a Vehiculelor

Defendants:

Question referred

Question referred

In the case of riders of mopeds in possession of an official document which gave them the right to ride on the public highway before 19 January 2013, do the provisions of Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (1) permit the Romanian State to impose a requirement, for the purpose of being able to continue to ride a moped after that date, to obtain a driving licence by undergoing tests/examinations similar to those required for other motor vehicles?

1

---

(1)  Directive 2006/126/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on driving licences (Recast) (OJ 2006 L 403, p. 18).

1

---
**Clean	Power	Plan Goal	Computation**  **Call	with	the	State	of	Colorado 06**  **/ 23**  **/2014 D**  **iscussion	Questions** Colorado would like to walk through the calculation of their goal and also submitted these specific questions: 1. Colorado went in to the TSD: 2012 Unit
- level Data Using the eGRID Methodology data set and added columns K
- P [CAMD info] so they could compare CAMD CO2 emissions levels for NGCC units to the ones EPA generated that now show up in column U [please see the columns highlighted in ye llow below]. For Fort St. Vrain Unit 2, for example, you can see CAMD has their CO2 emissions at 521,499 tons, and EPA has 298,337 tons. Can you explain this discrepancy, and why CAMD has different values for Units 2, 3 and 4, and EPA has the same number?

2. Can you clarify the definition of affected source? In the Description of 2012 Unit
- level Data Using the eGRID Methodology document, the table below leads one to believe that an affected source is 25MW or larger, but in the TSD: Goal Computation , is says that “a covered EGU is a stationary combustion turbine, steam generating unit or IGCC that is: (1) capable of combusting more than 250 MMBtu/h [which is 73MW?] heat input of fossil fuel and (2) constructed for the purpose of supplying one
- third o r more of its potential net
- electric output capacity and more than 219,000 MWh to any utility power distribution system for sale (that is, to the grid).” The250 MMBtu/h and 73MW is consistent with the NSPS for new power

plants. Was that your intent?
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 20-10233

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 6:16-cr-00175-RBD-LRH

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAMON FRANCISCO CASTILLO, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(August 26, 2020)

Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Case: 20-10233 Date Filed: 08/26/2020 Page: 1 of 2
2

Ryan Thomas Truskoski, counsel for Ramon Francisco Castillo in this direct 

criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the 

appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of 

the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the 

entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is 

GRANTED, and Castillo’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.

Case: 20-10233 Date Filed: 08/26/2020 Page: 2 of 2
(Reap. Dec. 9840)

#### K. Ginsburg et al. *v.*United States

Entry No. 795528, etc.

*554(Decided November 15, 1960)

*Lane, Young & Vow*for tbe plaintiffs.

*George Coehran Loud,*Assistant Attorney General, for tbe defendant.

OliveR, Chief Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement enumerated in schedule “A,” hereto attached and made a part hereof, are before me for decision on a written stipulation of submission, reading as follows:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between counsel for tbe parties hereto, subject to tbe approval of tbe Court, that tbe issues in tbe appeals for reappraisement listed in tbe schedule hereto annexed and made a part hereof are tbe same in all material respects as the issues in *Paramount Import Co., Inc., et al.*v. *United States,*Reap. Dec. 9697 and that tbe record in said case may be incorporated herein.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that tbe appraised values of tbe merchandise involved in tbe appeals listed in tbe schedule hereto annexed less additions made by tbe importer on entry because of advances made by tbe Appraiser in similar cases are equal to tbe market value or tbe price at tbe time of exportation of such merchandise to tbe United States, at which such or similar merchandise was freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of Czechoslovakia in tbe usual wholesale quantities and in tbe ordinary course of trade for exportation to tbe United States, packed ready for delivery, and that the foreign values of such or similar merchandise were no higher.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that said appeals may be deemed to be submitted on tbe foregoing stipulation.

In the incorporated case, I held that a charge of 15 per centum paid by the American importer to a foreign commissionaire for services rendered in connection with the purchase of merchandise in the foreign market was a *tona fide*buying commission, and, as such, did not enter into the dutiable value of the merchandise.

On the agreed facts and following my cited decision on the law, I find that the proper basis for appraisement of the merchandise in question is export value, as defined in section 402(d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, and hold that such statutory value therefor is the appraised values, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances made by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
#### Penson & Co. *v.*United States

No. 7458.

Invoice dated London, England, June 2, 1946.

Certified June 6, 1946.

Entered at New York, N. Y., June 20, 1946.

Entry No. 770023.

(Decided December 2, 1947)

*Mary Rehan*for the plaintiff.

*Paul P. Rao,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Mollison, Judge:

This appeal for reappraisement has been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

(Stipulation omitted.)

On the agreed facts I find the export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such values are the appraised values, less the additions made by the importer on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-7302

DAVID SONNY LYNCH, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

JON P. GALLEY, Warden, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR

THE STATE OF MARYLAND,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Benson Everett Legg, Chief District Judge.

(CA-05-1365-1-BEL)

Submitted: March 23, 2006 Decided: March 28, 2006 

Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

David Sonny Lynch, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. John Joseph Curran, Jr.,

Attorney General, Edward John Kelley, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

David Sonny Lynch, Jr., seeks to appeal the district

court’s order denying his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or

judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)

(2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district

court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable and

that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are

also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

336-38 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v.

Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently

reviewed the record and conclude Lynch has not made the requisite

showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, and

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

DISMISSED
Before the Second Division,

June 14, 1946

No. 51189.

#### Protests 62988-K, etc., of Weil Bros. Textiles, Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Kincheloe, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise is the same in all material respects as that passed upon in *Stephen Rug Mills*v. *United States*(32 C. C. P. A. 110, C. A. D. 293), and by the court’s decision on remand in Abstract 50056. In accordance therewith the protests were sustained as claimed.
ANTHONY JAWORSKI,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES TREASURY,

Defendant.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 13-395 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

(January 31, 2014)

On January 7, 2014, the Defendant filed a [29] Motion to Dismiss this case. The same day,

this Court issued an Order to the Plaintiff, warning him that if he failed to file a response to the

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss by January 25, 2014, the Court would treat the Motion to Dismiss

as conceded and dismiss the case. See Order (Jan. 7, 2014), ECF No. [30]. As of the date of this

Memorandum Opinion, the public docket reflects that the Plaintiff has not filed a response to the

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, it is, this 31st day of January, 2014, hereby 

ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

 /s/ 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY

United States District Judge
October 1, 2013

JUDGMENT

The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

MIAMI BEVERLY, LLC, Appellant

NO. 14-13-00736-CV V.

CHAMPION ENERGY SERVICES, LLC, Appellee

________________________________

Today the Court heard appellant’s motion to dismiss the appeal from the 

summary judgment made final by an order of non-suit signed by the court below 

on March 26, 2013, and amended on May 22, 2013. Having considered the motion 

and found it meritorious, we order the appeal DISMISSED.

We further order that each party shall pay its costs by reason of this appeal.

We further order that mandate be issued immediately.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
No. 50677.

#### Protest 96960-K of F. B. Vandegrift & Co. (New York).

*324Opinion by

Keefe, J.

At the trial it was stipulated that the reliquidation of the entries herein involved is similar in all material respects to that in *Bel Paese Sales Co., Inc.*v. *United States*(15 Cust. Ct. 7, C. D. 932). In accordance with stipulation and following the decision cited, judgment was entered directing the collector to reliquidate the entries herein, refunding the duty established to have been taken in excess, in accordance with the decision and judgment in Abstract 45363.