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37–304 2008

[H.A.S.C. No. 110–3]

MARINE CORPS FORCE

PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FOR

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

JANUARY 16, 2007

(II)

SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi, Chairman

NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii

RICK LARSEN, Washington

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

KEN CALVERT, California

TERRY EVERETT, Alabama

JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia

JOE WILSON, South Carolina

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member

JASON HAGADORN, Staff Assistant

(III)

C O N T E N T S

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2007

Page

HEARING:

Tuesday, January 16, 2007, Marine Corps Force Protection Equipment for

Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom ........................... 1

APPENDIX:

Tuesday, January 16, 2007 ..................................................................................... 37

TUESDAY, JANUARY 16, 2007

MARINE CORPS FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FOR OPERATION

IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Ranking Member,

Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee .......................................... 2

Taylor, Hon. Gene, a Representative from Mississippi, Chairman, Seapower

and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee ........................................................... 1

WITNESSES

Alles, Brig. Gen. Randolph, Commanding General, Marine Corps Warfighting

Laboratory, Vice Chief of Naval Research ......................................................... 3

Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael M., Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command ..................................................................................................................... 4

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:

Alles, Brig. Gen. Randolph .............................................................................. 41

Brogan, Brig. Gen. Michael M. ........................................................................ 56

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:

Mr. Abercrombie ............................................................................................... 80

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 81

Mr. Courtney ..................................................................................................... 82

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 77

(1)

MARINE CORPS FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT FOR

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE,

Washington, DC, Tuesday, January 16, 2007.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3 p.m. in room 2212,

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gene Taylor (chairman of the

subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GENE TAYLOR, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSISSIPPI, CHAIRMAN, SEAPOWER AND EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. TAYLOR. If the committee would come to order. The purpose

of this hearing is to provide members of the subcommittee with the

most current updates on the status and effectiveness of the Marine

Corps’ force protection equipment in Operation Iraqi Freedom and

Operation Enduring Freedom. The subcommittee expects to hear

how these current force protection initiatives are being produced

and fielded in an expedited manner.

More importantly, this public hearing is an opportunity for the

moms, dads, wives, and husbands of our fighting men and women

to find what their leadership is doing to protect their loved ones

against the unconventional and asymmetric threats that are the reality that our troops face in Afghanistan and Iraq.

This hearing is not a debate on the war in Iraq. This hearing

was called to determine if everything that can possibly be done is

being done to protect our troops. Of predictable interest to the subcommittee is the next generation of armored vehicles, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles commonly referred to as MRAP.

The committee will be very interested to understand the acquisition plans for these vehicles and any roadblocks in their rapid procurement.

I would like to welcome my mentor, my friend, and my fellow

chairman, Roscoe Bartlett, who is just absolutely the best subcommittee chairman I could have been associated with, who has

taught me a heck of a lot about respecting old Members. So if I

ever fail to live up to your expectations, you let me know.

We also are fortunate to have one of the newest Members of Congress, retired Navy Admiral, Admiral Sestak from Pennsylvania,

joining us.

Mr. Courtney, thank you very much for showing up.

But, most of all, Generals, we want to hear from you.

2

It was about a year ago that I had a visit from the former head

of the Army Liaison Office, Colonel Jim Littig; and he explained to

me that, in addition to the steps we have taken to up-armor the

High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV)—better

body armor, the jammers—that a continuing mistake that was

being made in Iraq was the fact that we were sending a flat-bottom

vehicle out that was regularly being hit by mines. And all of the

technology for V-bottom vehicles has been used by the Russians, by

the South Africans and others for decades, that we are falling behind on that.

Particularly, a follow-up conversation that I was fortunate to

have with Lieutenant General Stephen Blum actually said it is

worse than a flat-bottom vehicle taking a blast, that actually the

channel in the bottom of the HMMWV that is designed to protect

the drive shaft actually has the unfortunate effect of shaping the

charge so that much of the force of the blast ends up in the inside

of the HMMWV.

So the HMMWV, the vehicle itself, is doing more than we ever

expected it to do, but it is time to move on on that program for

something that is safer for our Marines.

For the sake of the newer Members, I would hope you would

walk them through all of the acquisitions.

I want to thank both of you for meeting with me last week. I was

impressed with your knowledge. I was impressed with your desire

to get the job done. You set a very ambitious target date to having

these vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now that you have set that

date freely, this committee expects you to—we are going to work

with you to see that target is met.

So, without any further statement, Mr. Ranking Member, we

would welcome your remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SEAPOWER AND

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit my opening

statement for the record.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay.

Testifying before our committee today is Brigadier General Randolph Alles and Brigadier General Michael Brogan, both with the

United States Marine Corps.

General Alles is the Commanding General of the Marine Corps

War Fighting Laboratory. The War Fighting Lab is part of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, And its stated purpose

is to improve current and future expeditionary warfare capabilities

across the full spectrum of conflict.

Brigadier General Alles is also the subject matter expert for improvised explosive devices (IED), IED jammers, and electronic

countermeasures. He also represents the Marine Corps as a member of the Joint IED Defeat Organization.

General Brogan is the Commanding General of the Marine Corps

Systems Command. His organization is the Acquisition Armor of

the Marine Corps. He is responsible for all areas of Marine Corps

3

procurement, including an analysis of contractor performance, an

area I am sure we will examine today.

I want to thank both of you. It is the norm, under the rules proposed by Congressman Skelton, for our witnesses to speak for five

minutes. That will not be necessary today. Please take all the time

that you feel necessary to inform the committee what the Marine

Corps needs to see and is doing.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. RANDOLPH D. ALLES, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING LABORATORY,

VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH

General ALLES. Mr. Chairman, Representative Bartlett, and

members of the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee,

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss

Marine Corps force protection efforts.

The Marine Corps is fighting today’s wars while remaining focused on the challenges that lie ahead. We are mindful that the

struggle against enemies of this Nation and her allies is multifaceted and generational in nature. Challenges to our national security interests in the years ahead will be characterized by a diverse array of emerging and deteriorating nation-states and nonstate actors such as transnational terrorists and criminals. Our

ability to achieve success on a fluid and linear battlefield will require a very agile and highly responsive force that is properly

equipped, well trained, and maintained at a high state of readiness.

A fundamental dictum to our survivability and success in the

current security environment is the need to structure processes

that increase our responsiveness to the warfighter. We have

streamlined the Urgent Universal Needs Statement process, shortening the timelines such that most are approved in under 90 days.

The flexibility and timeliness to reprogram funds toward unanticipated emergency requirements remains a challenge and represents

an area for improved support to increase responsiveness to our forward deployed forces.

We are fighting a thinking enemy who is trying very hard to kill

us. As we modify our force protection measures, our enemies mature in their sophistication and lethality. We continue aggressively

to adapt our training and equipment to this changing threat. Congress has responded rapidly, and generously, to our request for

equipment and increased protection; and we take seriously our responsibility to manage these resources prudently.

The Marine Corps has made great strides in countering two of

the most prominent threats we face: the Improvised Explosive Device and sniper. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is leading a

four-pronged approach to countering the threat from snipers that

focuses on increasing the ability to sense and warn, deny, protect,

and respond. The Lab has leveraged the cooperative efforts of the

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Army,

the Navy, the National Ground Intelligence Center, and numerous

Marine Corps agencies in these efforts. Future sense and warn capabilities include optical, acoustic, and infrared detection and location.

4

We have made tangible progress countering IEDs. My written

statement expands upon programs such as IED Detector Dogs, robotics, and IED neutralizers. These technologies provide a responsive detection and neutralization capability.

The Marine Corps, in coordination with the Office of Naval Research (ONR), is researching and investigating new materials and

designs for integration into improved body armor systems that provide lightweight, modular protection for the individual consistent

with identified requirements, both current and future.

Probably the single most effective item in protecting Marines has

been our various vehicle-armoring efforts; and while we have saved

countless Marine lives by doing so, the enemy is extremely adaptive and responds to our increased protection by making larger and

more lethal types of IEDs. We remain diligent in working with the

Joint IEDDO and supporting their various armor studies and tests,

the results of which will be invaluable in pending and future protection efforts. The Army/Marine Corps Board has proven a valuable forum for coordination of not only requirements but, also,

rapid response to Combatant Commander’s requests such as Mine

Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles.

In addition to material and technology solutions, the Marine

Corps is working diligently to develop and implement training and

education programs that mitigate risk, enhance force protection

and contribute to our ability to accomplish the mission. Our rapid

and effective lessons learned management system promptly captures the complexity of combat situations faced by our marines and

sailors around the globe to enhance our training programs.

Looking ahead to the challenges of the long war, the Marine

Corps has enhanced its counterinsurgency capabilities by completely revamping training and producing a body of publications

that educates and informs our small and large unit leaders alike.

Through innovation, institutional adaptation and congressional

support, your Marine Corps is obtaining the needed resources to

prevail in the new security environment. The challenges we face

are enormous, yet our past is replete with examples of how we

have overcome daunting, seemingly insurmountable barriers that

tested our resolve.

On behalf of all Marines and Sailors, we thank the committee for

your continued support that has enhanced our warfighting capability, saved lives and allowed us to protect this great Nation in an

uncertain world.

[The prepared statement of General Alles can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

Mr. TAYLOR. General Brogan.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. MICHAEL M. BROGAN,

COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND

General BROGAN. Chairman Taylor, Congressman Bartlett, distinguished members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear

before you this afternoon to discuss with you Marine Corps force

protection systems.

First, on behalf of all Marines, Sailors and their families, I want

to thank you for your continued support of our Corps as we fight

the long war on terror.

5

General Alles described for you the technologies that he examines. For my part, I will describe to you our commitment to providing force protection to our Marines to save lives, to reduce casualties and to limit the severity of their injuries.

Our goal is to ensure that our force protection requirements are

quickly met with the best systems available. By partnering with industry and teaming with our sister services, we strive to meet this

goal. We will describe for you several of those systems.

Because the threat changes, we have direct day-to-day communications with our U.S. Army counterparts. We discuss strategies

for changing our armor systems not only for individual warfighters

but also for our ground vehicles. We frequently partner with the

Army to test and procure these armor systems. For example,

through this partnership, we have been able to rapidly test and

modify the armor that we have employed in our wheeled vehicle

fleet.

Another area we are in close cooperation with the Army in benefiting our warfighter is the acquisition and fielding of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, or MRAP, as you described, Mr.

Chairman. These vehicles provide the best available protection for

our warfighters against improvised explosive devices. These vehicles are designed with a V-shaped hull to protect the occupants

from all three primary kill mechanisms of mines and IEDs: fragmentation, blast overpressure and acceleration.

The Marine Corps has already fielded several variances of

MRAPs, the first of which was known at the time as the Cougar

Hardened Engineer Vehicle. Since the start of Operation Iraqi

Freedom, we fielded 27 Cougars in support of disposal teams and

combat engineers. We have also fielded an initial procurement of

122 Joint Explosive Ordinance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicles,

or JERRV, in support of joint EOD teams throughout the theater.

We are on track to complete fielding of a follow-on procurement for

79 additional JERRV vehicles.

Last month, I awarded sole source contract for 200 additional vehicles to a company that is already in production. That is a bridge

to get us in to a full and open competition so that we can expand

the protection base and more rapidly put these vehicles in the

hands of our warfighters. This effort will procure and field up to

an additional 4,060 MRAP vehicles to our Nation’s joint forces.

Another counter ID system that we are fielding is the lightweight

mine roller. These rollers protect convoys from pressure-plate-activated mines or victim-initiated improvised explosive devices.

The need for lightweight rollers originated with Marines in the

theater. Our initial urgent requirement, which we received in June

of 2006, was for 31 systems. A quick query of industry identified

only one company who had these in manufacture and that was in

the United Kingdom.

Subsequently, the Marine Corps developed its own design. Then

the Marine Corps logistics command fabricated 53 of these systems

to support the immediate need. In August, 2006, when requirement

was increased to 407 systems, the Naval Surface Warfare Center,

Panama City, Florida, developed a viable design lightweight mine

roller and provided that concept to U.S. industry.

6

We now have two U.S. prime contractors producing these systems. To date, we have fielded 256 of that 407 requirement with

another 74 in route to theater. These mine rollers have already

proven their value by saving lives and preserving equipment. In effect, they absorb the blasts that were intended for our Marines in

occupied vehicles.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need to

continually evolve our personal protective vest system. Therefore,

beginning next month, we will start transitioning to the newly designed Modular Tactical Vest, or MTV. This vest is now in production, and even though it is virtually the same weight as its predecessor, the Outer Tactical Vest, or OTV, it is more easily integrated

with our other personal protection systems. It also provides greater

comfort through the incorporation of advanced load carriage techniques that distributes the combat load over the torso and onto the

hips.

The MTV incorporates our existing Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts, or ESAPI, as well as side SAPI plates. These plates

are provided to every Marine currently in the theater. They will

also be provided to every Marine that deploys to the theater.

ESAPI provides the best protection available against a wide variety

of small armed threats, up to and including 7.62.

Finally, in February, the Marine Corps will begin fielding Flame

Resistant Organizational Gear, sometimes referred to as FROG.

We will provide this gear to all of our deployed Marines and those

preparing to deploy. This life-saving ensemble of clothing items—

gloves, balaclava, long-sleeved fire-resistant shirt, combat shirt,

and combat trouser—is designed to mitigate the potential injuries

our Marines face from flame exposure. These clothing items provide protection that is comparable to that of the Nomex combat vehicle crewman suit or flight suit.

With the mix of body armor undergarment and outerwear we

have provided operational commanders, they can determine what

equipment their Marines will employ based upon the mission requirements and the environmental conditions.

We have positioned ourselves to innovate and modify our equipment so that we can continue to meet the evolving threat. By working with our sister service and our Nation’s manufacturing base,

the Marine Corps continues to provide our Marines the best available equipment against known and anticipated threats. We take seriously our responsibility to protect our Marines, and we want you

to know we are doing everything we can. With your continued support, we will continue to accomplish that mission.

In closing, I would like to introduce to you Sergeant Joseph

Perez. Sergeant Perez is a decorated combat veteran who has two

tours of duty in Iraq. His personal combat declarations include the

Navy Cross, the Navy Marine Corps Combat, the Navy Marine

Corps Commendation Medal with Combat V, the Purple Heart, and

two Combat Action Ribbons.

I invited him along so that you can be provided an expert opinion

of the equipment we are fielding to our warfighters. He has served

in both Operation Iraqi Freedom I and Operation Iraqi Freedom II

as a squad leader in Third Battalion 5 Marines.

7

He has available to him on the table a representative sample of

the infantry combat load, much of which he wore during the assault in Fallujah. Also in that battle he wore the Outer Tactical

Vest. Today, he has available to him the Modular Tactical Vest. It

is designed with a quick-release cutaway system so that a Marine

can rapidly egress from it should he find himself in water or needing to escape a vehicle. It also provides increased coverage particularly in the lower back; and, as I mentioned, it better distributes

the load off of the shoulders onto the torso and hips.

He will remain after the formal hearing for anyone who would

like to come down and take a look at the gear or try any of it on.

Again, I thank you for this opportunity to appear before you and

look forward to providing any additional information that you require.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, General.

[The prepared statement of General Brogan can be found in the

Appendix on page 56.]

Mr. TAYLOR. I would like to, for the record, thank my colleague,

Congressman Neil Abercrombie, who is the chairman for the Air

and Land Subcommittee, for joining. He will be having a hearing

of his own that will be classified on much of the same subjects at

4 o’clock in 2337. Thank you for being here.

We have been joined by Congresswoman Bordallo of Guam, and

Congressman Ellsworth of Ohio.

On the Republican side, thank you, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of the

Tidewater area of Virginia, for joining us.

I would yield to my colleague from Maryland.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Our witnesses were very generous with our time in a classified

briefing. I asked a number of questions, and they answered them.

As you point out, the primary purpose of today’s hearing is to assure our fellow countrymen, particularly our service members’ families, that we are doing all that we can to meet the challenges for

protection in this theater. I am convinced that we could not be

moving more expeditiously. I want to thank our two witnesses for

their service to their country and for really expediting the procurement of these protective systems.

As my custom is, Mr. Chairman, I generally yield my time to the

lowest-ranking member on our side of the aisle. I thought I would

be yielding to your side of the aisle, but Mrs. Davis has joined us,

and I will yield my time to her.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Generals

Alles and Brogan, for being here today. And I apologize that I

missed your testimony, General Alles. I am hoping that I don’t ask

a question that you already answered.

But, General Brogan, I understand that the current theater requirement for the MRAP is 1,022, with 538 Category I, 420 Category II and 64 Category III vehicles. With the approximately

4,000 more Marines that are supposed to deploy to Iraq as part of

the President’s new strategy, do you anticipate a need in an increase of these vehicles; and, if so, will the required funding be

taken from the fiscal year 2007 bridge appropriation?

8

And, before you answer, I also understand that the contractor

has had a problem with meeting the schedule with these vehicles

in the past, and are you confident that the mistakes will not be repeated?

General BROGAN. Ma’am, there is an additional requirement of

vehicles that is making its way through Marine Corps requirement

command. I will expect that will take into account the plus-up

forces that will likely be sent to theater.

As you indicated, there were some initial problems with that

prime contractor when we started up. My experience in acquisition

is that it is not that unusual for a new start production line. They

now are actually producing ahead of schedule, so I am confident

that they will be able to continue to produce vehicles.

As I mentioned, we are conducting a full and open competition

to seek additional sources for the category of vehicles that you

mentioned, Category I and Category II; and because of the Category III vehicles, the Buffalo, the heaviest and largest of these vehicles can be currently met by our contractor. We have not competed any of those, but the large quantities of Category I and Category II vehicles are being competed.

I must temper my comments because we are in the midst of

source selection right now with that.

We did have a large number of potential offers. I met with Secretary Etter this morning, and I now have the approval to go forward and have discussions with those offers, and I expect to be on

contract with a large number before the end of this month.

Our strategy will be to produce two vehicles from each vendor.

We will take those vehicles up to the Aberdeen Test Center in

Maryland and conduct two separate tests. The first will be a survivability test where we blow up the vehicle; the second will be a

limited user evaluation to ensure that the handling characteristics,

maneuverability and things like that meet the requirements our

Marines and the other joint forces needs. And given that the offers

meet those hurdles, then we have the ability to award Follow On

production contracts and so then can follow up in producing these

vehicles.

Mrs. DAVIS. I hope we get everything to our warfighters as soon

as they need it and hopefully you will come back to this committee

if you have any other problems. We want to make sure our Marines

are protected and they have the best—that we have the best that

you have to offer.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, a continual frustration for those of us who

are trying to resolve problems is that we felt—I personally felt

many times during Secretary Rumsfeld’s tenure that we were not

given the whole story, that we were often given a requirement or

told a requirement was filled that was below 100 percent.

It started with body armor. We were told that the requirement

had been filled, only to find out from the moms and dads of

Guardsmen and Reservists they were issued the same body armor

as the regular forces. Then it was the up-armoring of HUMMWVs,

the requirement had been met, only to find out that was a small

proportion of the vehicles operating on the roads of Iraq and Afghanistan.

9

So my question to you is, when you said your requirement, as

Ms. Davis has correctly pointed out, that we have 23,000 Marines

over there, we are getting ready to send an additional 4,000, will

the additional requirement that you are talking about be enough

vehicles so that every Marine who is traveling the roads of Iraq or

Afghanistan is in the best possible vehicle?

General BROGAN. My sense is, sir, that our requirements have

evolved over time. As I indicated in my oral statement, the first

MRAP vehicles, being the JERRV and the Cougars that we procured, were primarily for EOD and combat engineers. Clearly, as

the ossification of the threats increased, it is apparent that we need

these vehicles for all of the forces that are involved in operations

outside of the operating basis; and so that was the genesis of the

1,022 requirement that Congresswoman Davis mentioned.

I also indicated that MASDC is now looking at a larger number.

It has not yet been delivered to me to go procure it. I believe that

MASDC does its validation of this requirement. They will take into

account the additional 4,000 Marines who will be fielded into theater, and that will be calculated into the new requirement.

So did we have it a hundred percent right the first time? No, sir.

I believe we used the best numbers that we had available; and

then, as the need for them increased, the warfighter came back

through the urgent UNS process and JUONS to universal operational needs statement process and sought these additional vehicles.

Mr. TAYLOR. Last week, in a classified briefing, you gave me the

target number of vehicles and you targeted a date of delivery.

General BROGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. To what extent can you inform this committee of

the number of vehicles? Because in my mind’s eye, I have trouble

believing that this number should be classified. I would think the

moms and dads, the loved ones of the Marines would like to know

that you have a substantial number in mind, that you have what

I think is a very realistic but also very aggressive target date in

mind.

General BROGAN. Sir, I believe there is probably two parts. The

first part is the requirement that has currently been levied on me

is to procure 4,060 vehicles. That is for—that includes the 1,022 for

the Marine Corps as well as vehicles for the United States Army

and the United States Navy that is serving alongside of us. For the

Navy, principally they are for EOD teams and Seabees. Now for

the Army, they will be used as their force commanders see best.

The additional number is changing almost daily, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. How about your target delivery date to get in the

Marine Corps’ hands, and then you explained to me that there is

some additional work that is done by the Marine Corps before they

are sent to theater. What is your target date for those vehicles? In

your position, what is your target date to have them fielded in theater?

General BROGAN. As I indicated, I am not buying just for the Marine Corps. So that 4,060 vehicles—I have set a stretch goal for my

team of the end of this year, 31 December, to have those vehicles

delivered to the U.S. Government. It takes me approximately 60

days from that point to incorporate the jammers, the radios, the

10

Blue Force Tractor and, as we start delivering these vehicles in

quantity, surface ship them into theater.

Right now, with the small quantities that we have been dealing

with, we have been flying them into theater as soon as they are

prepared. As these quantities increase, I suspect we will have to

move to sea transportation in order to get the vehicles over there.

So I expect, from the time I get them, in my mind we will do the

integration of the government-furnished equipment and transport

them into theater in an additional 60 days. So my stretch goal, as

I indicated to you last week, sir, is to deliver those 4,000 vehicles

by the end of this year.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, one of the frustrations that this committee

had with the up-arming of the HMMWVs was the length of time

that it took. The goals were originally too small. And, as members

of the staff and as members looked into it, it was disappointment

after disappointment, that the steel manufacturers did not put that

steel at the top of their list, that because the industry is pretty

close to capacity they were just putting the normal routine; and apparently no one at the Department of Defense even bothered to call

up the steel mills and say kids are dying. You can save many peoples lives with putting this at the top of the list.

We heard basically the same thing from the ballistic lab folks. No

one said this is more important than life and death; this is more

important than an office building in downtown Miami or something

else.

To what extent have you researched the pitfalls on the Army acquisition plan and learned from their mistakes so that, when the

first of January rolls around, that those 4,000 vehicles are ready

to go and, quite frankly, in-house? Do you have the manpower and

the crews available so that when the vehicles are delivered to you

that that doesn’t become a delay in getting them fielded?

General BROGAN. Sir, as to the first part of your question, we are

working with Defense Contract Management Agency to go take a

look at all of the subs and the vendors that were included in the

proposals that came from industry. As my folks did, the Source Selection Evaluation Board, they looked at the relationships and

interrelationships not only among the primes but also one tier

below that at some of the vendors.

So there is some concern at overlapping capacity and whether or

not they will all be able to meet what they laid out in their proposals as the quantities, and those quantities are what I base my projection on. We have available to us DX and DS ratings where we

can implement a national security imperative, if you will, on industry and move to the head of the line so that government deliveries

take precedence over anything else that would—that they may be

manufacturing. That is available to us should it be required, and

we have used it in a couple instances in some of the things that

we have been delivering to theater.

So as DCMA takes a look at the capacity of the steel mills to provide the steel that would be required for test vehicles at the vendor

base, at the part suppliers, we will look to determine whether or

not we need to implement these DX and DS ratings. They are

available to us by going up to the Office of Secretary of Defense

and requesting them, sir.

11

Mr. TAYLOR. So, just for clarification, all of the funds that you

need are there. Is there the appropriation? Is there—you know of

no hurdles at this moment that this committee or the full committee or the appropriators need to address in order to make this happen?

General BROGAN. Sir, I have in hand moneys from the Marine

Corps for the first 805 vehicles. The delta between the 805 and the

1,022 is included in our fiscal year 2007 full supplemental request.

I have a portion of the Navy’s money, and I have not yet received

any money from the Army. We are working—the Secretary of the

Navy is working with the Secretary of the Army to get those funds.

They will probably have to come to you all with a reprogramming

action to move money out of a current existing line. I believe they

intended to fund it in their 2007 request, but I am not certain of

that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Okay. I am going to formally request of you that information.

I would also like to remind the committee that Chairman Skelton

has passed a new committee rule that we would get information 48

hours in advance. Because of the gravity of this situation, it was

my call to have this hearing today because the Marines did not get

48 hours’ notice. There was no way that we could have held them

to that account. So we have agreed to provide all of the testimony

by this Friday; and, hopefully, the request I just made of you will

be included in that.

General BROGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. In the order that the members arrived, we will recognize Admiral Sestak from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SESTAK. My questions are really just more relying on what

has already been brought up as you spoke about the asymmetric

type of threat that we face. How many pounds of blasts are we seeing right now out there in Iraq, mine blasts, and what do you expect it to be?

General ALLES. I mean honestly, sir, it varies widely.

Mr. SESTAK. What is the maximum?

General ALLES. An average IED attack would be somewhere

around 250 2-millimeter artillery rounds. They vary dramatically

in size and what they use. Sometimes they are completely improvised explosives, meaning they use accelerants, propane, things

like that. So there is no necessarily—if I were going to say there

was a standard attack, it would be that 152-millimeter round, but

they vary wildly. I have got a report——

Mr. SESTAK. So they are not getting larger? It just varies?

General ALLES. They are—no, as we have armored the vehicles

more heavily, they are increasing the size of the IED so they will

use more artillery rounds, C–4, TNT, whatever they use in that

particular attack. So they have increased the size of the rounds.

But to try to give you a standard IED, that is part of the issue,

sir. They are improvised.

Mr. SESTAK. The up-armor Hummer upgrade is for 12-pound

mine blast. That is what it is good for?

General ALLES. I have to check the number.

Mr. SESTAK. Is the MRAP at least more than that?

General BROGAN. It is, sir.

12

Mr. SESTAK. Do you know what it is up to?

General BROGAN. I do, but I would rather not say in open hearing.

Mr. SESTAK. Is it going to take care of this increasing growth of

what the mine blast—I mean, it is the lead/lag question.

General BROGAN. If your question, sir, is there a mine that can

overcome an MRAP, yes, there is, but the V-shape hull does a great

deal for us to disburse that blast as well as the fact that these vehicles are much higher above the ground. As you know, in an explosion, space is your friend, because it allows that wave to expand

before it makes contact with the vehicle.

I would rather not in open session discuss the specifics of what

those vehicles are designed to protect against.

General ALLES. I would make the comment it is counter-countermeasure. We feel the solution—they develop a countermeasure. We

have to deliver another counter to that.

Mr. SESTAK. My overarching question would be, as you look back

on nearly the last 4 years—and you have worked in groups

throughout DOD, including ones headed by Mr. Wolfowitz, trying

to address this issue—what is it from the warfighting policy side

to the acquisition procurement side is the overarching lesson

learned so that the lead/lag or the countermeasure, you know,

counter-counter-counter can be done in a much more flexible way?

I mean, really watching this, it has always been great efforts, but

you are right. It has always kind of seemed to have been watching

it, watching to see their next step and—to some degree and then

catching up. It is always back and forth. Is there anything for the

speed or the procurement system, the acquisition way, that you

would sit back and say, this is the lesson, we really should take

care of this for the next type of asymmetric threat, General Alles,

that you laid out so well?

General BROGAN. Sir, I would suggest that certainly there have

been a lot of indications or items where we have been responding,

but there are also several instances where, because of our intelligence systems, we were out ahead of them. But you are not going

to read about those in the press because we are not going to publicize those times where we are proactive and out ahead and then

tip our hand. So all that you ever hear about or read about are

those times where we are purely in a reactive mode.

There are some things, sir, that I believe could help speed up

some of the acquisition processes in particular. I believe last year

the Congress provided two special operations command, something

called combat mission needs funds. This was a pot of money provided to the commander and the acquisition executive in Special

Operation Command that we were allowed to use very rapidly to

respond to an emerging threat if something was available to fulfill

it. A similar ability for the services would be very helpful.

Another area that could assist us is the below threshold reprogramming limits. They have not been changed in a number of

years, and in some cases that affects our ability to move money

back and forth into some of the areas of more urgent needs at the

expense of some of our longer-term investment programs. So I

would suggest or offer that you could all take a look at that.

13

General ALLES. Sir, I would offer also that on one important

point is we need to maintain a close alignment with the operating

forces. So one of the initiatives that we took from the warfighting

lab was to put a counter-IED cell in Iraq which is composed of

seven officers that actually work at the warfighting laboratory.

That gives us a closer alignment between the operating forces and

the requirements as they come to pass.

One of the issues that has come to the forefront is the issue of

counter-sniper technology. We have actually been able to be in

front of counter-snipers to a degree because we had money we invested in years past in counter-sniper technology based on what we

were seeing from the operating forces and able to field some nearterm solutions. It is not a panacea. It is helping, but, because of

that close alignment, it has allowed us to respond more rapidly.

Mr. SESTAK. Thanks. I am up just about finished with my five

minutes. I did not mean my comments to be critical. I mean, nobody does it better than the Marines.

General BROGAN. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SESTAK. And I mean that. It is just that it seems to me—

and having watched it from both sides—what you can know on the

inside and what you know on the outside is that there has been

or there is really an effort to step back from this for the next inevitable conflict and what it really is to make sure that we have

drawn the study, the execution for this acquisition system of ours

we all critique and the tie to the warfighters so that some of the—

one little bit of lead/lag is just too much. Has that been done yet?

General BROGAN. General Alles mentioned the lessons learned.

We are attempting to capture those. I don’t believe there has been

a systematic review of the acquisition processes, sir.

He also mentioned the urgent universal needs statement. That is

the method by which the operating forces identify an urgent requirement to the acquisition system. In order to help shorten that

cycle time, I have placed a liaison officer with the MMEF so, as

they begin to look up the urgent UNS, they can begin to let us

know what our project officers and program managers need to

begin looking at, seeing if there is anything available in industry

that can immediately fulfill that need or, unfortunately, we have

to embark upon a development effort, which takes much longer.

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you very much. And, you know, these great

things you do as you go along, if they were institutionalized in the

lessons learned, it would be good. Thank you, sirs, for your time.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Admiral.

Something I should have mentioned, particularly for the newer

members, what we have found, sadly, in Iraq is that a disproportionate legion of the casualties are of mines and IEDs and a disproportionately high number of those have occurred on trucks and

HMMWVs. So, although the HMMWV is the most common vehicle

in the American inventory, there is still a disproportionate percentage of the death in and amputations that have resulted from attacks on them and that purpose of this is to try to solve that problem for our Nation to move on.

Since our enemies talk to each other either face to face or over

the Internet, attacks in Iraq are again to be seen in Afghanistan

or someplace else in the world. So this is an attempt in this comVerDate 22-MAR-2001 08:13 Jan 10, 2008 Jkt 037304 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\110-3\016280.000 HNS1 PsN: HNS1
14

mittee to—we are aware of a problem which we are trying to solve

it.

Having said that, I want to recognize the gentleman—we do this

a little bit of out of order since we don’t have many Republicans.

We want to be fair. Mr. Wilson from South Carolina is recognized.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you for being here today. I am very grateful.

I represent Parris Island; and, General Alles, I noted with interest that you served at the Marine Air Station in Beaufort. We really appreciate the impact of the Navy and Marines to the communities that I represent.

I am particularly interested in the Cougar and Buffalo. And I

apologize that I was late. But I have even had the privilege of visiting the manufacturing sites of these particular vehicles, and—you

touched on it; it may be repetitious—I would like for you to review

what has been the record of these two particular vehicles and, in

particular—I know you touched on it a moment ago, but I would

like to hear it again and the unique V shape and how that has

such a positive impact.

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. The V-shaped hull is designed to force

the blast off to the side, away from the embarked spaces in the vehicle, and the fact that the vehicles sit up high provides space so

that that blast can form and get larger and not have as much impact on the hull of the vehicle.

The two vehicles that you mentioned, the Cougar and the Buffalo, are both serving very well in theater right now. We have not

had a single Marine fatality in either one of those two vehicles.

Against the blast, shrapnel, effects of both IEDs and mines, they

are doing a tremendous job. So that is why we have the imperative

to get these vehicles into theater.

General ALLES. I would just remark, sir, that that vehicle, these

V-shaped vehicles, which goes beyond just the Cougar and Buffalo,

account for 14 percent of our taxes, but only 3 and a half percent

of our casualties. So they are very mine-resistant vehicles which

are behind the impetus to move toward them.

Mr. WILSON. They are also very intimidating to the enemy. To

see the vehicle is awesome, and so it has to be very assuring to

Iraqi allies and intimidating to persons opposed to us.

And I know, again, that this has been mentioned, and I appreciate the question from the chairman a moment ago, but we can

assure family members that the Marines who deployed, the Marines to be deployed, that they do have those in a combat role, have

up-armor vehicles in totality; is that correct?

General BROGAN. They have up-armor vehicles yes, sir. The majority of those are up-armor HMMWVs. This effort is to increase

the density of these V-shaped hull vehicles in the operating forces.

Mr. WILSON. As an indication of my appreciation of what you are

doing, I am wearing a wristband today for a Marine who is serving

on—a Naval academy graduate currently in Iraq, and so I wanted

to thank you for your service. I want to thank the young people

who are protecting our families.

And I yield my time.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Courtney from Connecticut.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15

Thank you for sharing with us your experience and time here

today.

I want to go back to Congresswoman Davis’ question, because I

was trying to follow the answer, General Brogan, in terms of just

the timing, of making sure that this new surge of troops is going

to be protected with the best armor possible.

The Baltimore Sun actually had a story a few days ago which indicated that, in fact, two brigades are being sent over without having these up-armor or strengthened, toughened vehicles available

to them. Senator Dodd from my state, I know, has sent a letter to

Secretary Gates inquiring about whether or not that shortcoming

is, in fact, the situation for the people who are—the new troops

that are being sent over to Baghdad.

And just listening to your description of the sequence of the procurement, I mean, it did sound like if people are moving over there

even today, which most news accounts seem to indicate, it is hard

to see how those vehicles are going to catch up to them.

General BROGAN. Sir, these vehicles will not arrive before the

troops. The need for these vehicles is greater now than it was when

we first received the requirement. As I indicated, requirement has

increased from the first deployments that we made just for EOD

and combat engineers to now a much wider need for these vehicles

for all troops that are involved in patrolling.

It is the policy—it is my understanding it is the policy of the operation by commanders in theater that no Marine goes outside the

wire unless he is in an up-armor vehicle. That could be a HMMWV

or an MTVR, but they are not going outside the wire in those vehicles, and I am fairly confident that that requirement, that structure will remain in place even for these additional troops.

The folks in Installations Logistics at Headquarters Marine

Corps are looking at how we will meet this plus-up troop deployment with the equipment that we have on hand. There will be

some cross-leveling of gear that is currently in theater. There will

be some additional deployment of gear that is at home stations.

But we don’t want to completely strip away our training base because these vehicles handle differently than the unarmored version, and we want to make sure our Marines, as they go through

Mohave Viper out of Twentynine Palms, are familiar with the handling characteristics so we avoid needless accidents in theater that

could injure or kill marines.

It is my understanding that operational commanders are ready

to execute this cross-leveling so that all of the Marines who operate

outside of the forward operating bases (FOBs) will, in fact, have

up-armor vehicles. It is then incumbent upon me and my staff to

deliver as rapidly as possible these MRAP vehicles as they come off

the production lines.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. I didn’t mean to suggest there was

any shortcoming, and it is obvious you are doing everything you

can to make sure our guys are protected and to make sure our men

and women are protected.

Another question I have which is an issue that seemed to be out

there in the public realm over the last couple of years or so which

is about families who are trying to use their own resources to get

their family members body armor that otherwise might not have

16

been available. I know legislation was passed to provide for reimbursement for those families, and it seemed that there was difficulty trying to figure out how to get those payments where they—

I wondered if you could give me a quick sort of update, and I apologize not knowing the latest on that information.

General BROGAN. And I can only speak from a limited knowledge

standpoint from the Marine Corps. What I have been told is that

we had very few cases of that in the Marine Corps that are in fact

providing all of our folks with the ESAPI, with the side SAPI

plates as well as the quad guards and the other pieces of the personal protective ensemble and then the commanders tailor what

they wear to the specifics of the mission. To my knowledge, there

has not been a problem with that in the Marine Corps.

General ALLES. We don’t know the exact numbers of what has

been applied for for reimbursements. We have taken that for the

record, and we can get back to you.

Mr. COURTNEY. I would appreciate that.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 77.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Next in the new order would be Ms. Bordallo from

Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to say it

is a privilege and honor to return to this subcommittee and to

serve under Chairman Taylor and Ranking Member Bartlett.

Generals, thank you for being here today; and I do have a couple

of questions.

The Marine Corps has a special place in Guam’s heart, and I represent Guam. They liberated us, and they are returning, 8 to

10,000 of them from Okinawa to Guam, in the next few years. So

we are all very excited about that.

I have been to Iraq many times, and I appreciate the challenges

that our Marines face in theater, and I also have seen much of the

new upgraded equipment. It has been explained to us while we are

over there in theater. And, as you might suspect, since I represent

Guam, I have seen Marines conducting many training operations

in the Pacific; and I do not want to stray far away from our primary focus today and that is the protection of our Marines serving

in Iraq and Afghanistan.

However, I do, at times, worry about what implications our current actions have on future operations. That is whether we are creating tunnel vision on current operations to the exclusion of potential future operations in other areas, the Pacific, and let us mention

North Korea here. Can you discuss how the existing fielding procedures incorporate the full spectrum of Marine operations, including

amphibious operations, and whether the Marine equipment development procedures have taken into account missions that are

unique to the Marines?

Whichever one of you would like to answer that.

General BROGAN. Yes, ma’am. I believe our focus, main effort,

right now is certainly equipping the troops that are, number one,

in theater and those that are preparing to go next, the ones that

are in the training pipeline. With General Conway becoming the

commandant of the Marine Corps, he has set about institutionally

17

refocusing on all of the challenges that we potentially face and ensuring that we remain relevant as Marine ground task forces, not

just as fighters in the realm of counterinsurgency, the area in

which we find ourselves today.

The urgent UNS process, the joint universal operational re-extending process that we use very frequently to equip our Marines

in theater, has that focus, the Marines in theater. But our ongoing

programs of record are designed to equip the entire Marine Corps

for the entire conflict, not just for counterinsurgency. I don’t think

we have completely taken our eye off the ball, ma’am, but we are

facing one direction more than the other.

Ms. BORDALLO. I know the situation is very serious today in Iraq

and Afghanistan, but it seems that you never know where anything

is going to erupt in the world.

General ALLES. Ma’am, I think you have seen from the commandant’s planning guidance he is concerned about the turnaround

ratios, we call them, for our operating forces. In some cases, they

are low, one-to-one, for certain of our operating forces; and one of

his objectives is to get those turnaround ratios raised to allow us

to keep our focuses on the areas of the world that we need them.

That has been very explicit in his guidance. It is critical how we

do our training in being prepared for where the Nation calls us to

serve.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, and I am pleased to hear

that.

My second question is, in a hypothetical world, if you could pick

a single technology under development today to be completed and

fielded to all Marines in combat tomorrow, what is that single technology and why? In other words, what is the most important technology or item that you have in development that will save lives

in the current combat theaters and in the future?

General BROGAN. I think perhaps, ma’am, for that technology

that we have in our hands right now, getting the MRAPs into theater as rapidly as possible will save lives. But, frankly, if we were

able to develop a system that would pre-detonate an improvised explosive device, blow them up out ahead of our vehicles, blow them

up while they are being planned, then that would go the furthest

in protecting our folks.

General ALLES. I would make the comment that there are a

number of efforts that are under way. They are classified efforts.

I think it would be beneficial for the subcommittee to hear about

those efforts. We gave some to the professional staff members when

we met with Congressman Bartlett and Taylor last week. But, as

with General Brogan, that would be a game-changing technology to

pre-detonate IEDs.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. Thank you for your service to our country.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, in the order that they got here, would be

Congressman Ellsworth from Ohio.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Indiana. We are pretty close.

Mr. TAYLOR. I apologize.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not at all. Ohio is a great state.

Thank you for your service and everything.

18

Mr. TAYLOR. Congressman, can I interrupt? We are going to vary

again, since we did not have—we gave the Marines very short notice, turns out that Sergeant Joseph Perez, who is the recipient of

the Navy Cross, two tours in Iraq, has agreed to make himself

available for questions. We are proud of our Admirals. We are

proud of our Colonels. As a former enlisted guy, I will tell you I

am of the opinion that we appreciate the officer corp, but they do

not have a monopoly on everything.

If you would, we can find you a chair. We are going to put you

up at the panel and make you available for whatever questions

that the members may have and given. Thank you for your service,

and thank you very much for making yourself available to this

committee on such extremely short notice. We are honored to have

you here.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This may be the appropriate time for this, because Mr. Perez might be the appropriate

person to ask this.

In my experience with wearing a vest, I know that a lot of times

my officers would improvise on their own when things were not

comfortable, and when they did not fit exactly right, they would do

things on their own, cut little Vs out here to make them more comfortable. And I was going to ask him, and perhaps you will be the

best one to answer this, what kind of feedback—because short of

sewing somebody into a Kevlar blanket, there are going to be crevices, and I know that you have to be able to move, you know, everything to get around and to do your job.

What is the feeling of the new technology, the new pads, and do

you find your people having to do that? Is that against orders? I

assume that destroying government property and improvising may

be, but are you finding where you can do your job in the new, and

what kind of feedback are you getting with the new equipment,

personal vests, I guess?

Sergeant PEREZ. All of the old gear is mainly the stuff that I

wore whenever I was in Iraq. It put a lot of stress on the shoulders,

and like you said, people would modify their vests to fit them, because if you are out on a 4-hour patrol and your back hurts, you

are not very conscious of what is going on around you.

This new vest that we have, the modular tactical vest, is a lot

more supportive only because it distributes the weight throughout

the body. It is very new, but from what I have seen, I have actually

put it on with the full load on, and it distributes a lot better. I feel

like I can patrol a lot longer. I would be a little bit more happy

with the outcome of a four-hour patrol in the sun in that vest as

opposed to the other.

Some of the upgrades that they have added to it is the side protection is now sewn on the inside, and it is hugging to the body;

whereas, the other one was more out and pushed your arms out.

The mobility in your arm movement was restricted due to the

placement of the vest—or of the side armor. You were not able to

get a proper shooting platform while using the other vest.

So I think, you know, in the short time that I have been in the

Marine Corps, the gear has progressed very rapidly. I came in with

ALICE Packs that were made out of metal and horrible cloth, and

now we have all kinds of stuff that is ergonomically correct, and

19

it is helping. So I do believe that we are taking a step in the right

direction.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Are any of the panels—and I am sorry I was

late. You may have shown this—able to be removed where, if you

do not need the neck pad, you can pull that off of Velcro and replace them depending on the situation you are going into?

Sergeant PEREZ. What I had encountered when I was in the operating force is most of the commanders dictate what you are going

to wear. You know, the mission of whatever you are going out to

accomplish dictates what you are going to wear for that mission.

So, yes, it is removable, but for the most part you are going to wear

most of it all the time due to the IED threat.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you.

And I guess my second and last question, unless I think of something else, would be, General—I think that you may have answered

this and do not want you to go into anything that, you know, would

be classified. Certainly the ability to blow these IEDs up before we

get—especially when they are being planted would be a good time,

in my book, but are there other things that we are doing correctly—and I heard General Alles talk about some of these are

mortar rounds; some are, you know, other materials. Are there

things you can talk about proactively that we are doing—now, I

think back to stopping the war on methamphetamine, that we are

regulating pseudoephedrine.

Are there things that we are doing in theater to control/seize on

end before it becomes a bomb, controlling the fertilizer, controlling

the fuel, whatever it is they are making these bombs out of? And

like I said, if it is classified, just let me know, and I will catch it

later.

General ALLES. Sir, honestly, a lot of it is classified, but there

are efforts to reduce caches when we find them. That is a source

of IED material on the part of insurgents. There are efforts to pattern-analyze how the IEDs occur as we go after bombmakers and

the like. A lot of the details are going to be classified, but we do

want to interrupt the kill chain. In the emphasis to interrupt the

kill chain before the blast occurs, armor and the like is effective,

but it is occurring at the moment of the blast.

So I would agree that we can go after the networks and the materials that they are utilizing in those networks. We are aggressively doing that. There are a number of classified programs

against, which would have to be briefed in a closed session, which

are helpful in those areas. Again, it is not a panacea, but a manypronged effort to get at the IED problem.

General BROGAN. If I might, sir, before we leave the MTV—and

as the Chairman indicated, officers do not have a lock on all of the

good ideas. What we did is interview the marines as they were

coming out of theater in both I MEF and II MEF. What were their

concerns with the OTV? What were the problems they had with it?

And that led directly to the MTV. After we found out what their

issues were, it had to do with weight distribution, with comfort,

with having the side SAPI plates integrated into the system, with

being able to rapidly egress if they find themselves in water.

What we did then is held an industry day. Eighteen vendors participated. We down-selected that to six, and then we took those six

20

vests down to Camp Lejeune and let 30 marines wear all of them.

If I recall correctly, 89 percent of them selected what has become

MTV.

So we do try to take the input of those enlisted marines, the folks

who actually wear the equipment day in and day out, and include

that in our design process.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, my apologies, and I will not make that mistake again.

Sergeant, again, I want to tell you how much I appreciate your

making yourself available for this. The generals have had a few

days to prepare. You have had 20 seconds, and to be in the presence of the recipient of a Navy Cross and someone who has done

as much as you have, I want to tell you I appreciate your making

yourself available.

And before I recognize the gentleman from Hawaii, since the generals have had an opportunity to make an opening statement—and

I know I am putting you on the spot, but it is not every marine

who is going to get a chance to talk to a bunch of Congressmen,

and given this opportunity, if there is something that either the

generals have missed or we have missed as far as the needs of the

individual marines, something that is out there, something that

has been developed or has not been developed that we need to be

looking for, I would welcome your thoughts on that.

Sergeant PEREZ. I think when—you know, a lot of the guys that

are operating on the ground, the infantrymen that are actually patrolling, you know, the cities by foot or by mobile patrols in

HMMWVs or in some of the other vehicles, I think a lot of emphasis is being put on, you know, hey—like they said before, we cannot

wrap ourselves in Kevlar blankets. A lot of this gear is great, a lot

of it is very hindering, and just because you have a piece of Kevlar

on every single inch of your body does not mean that I am more

effective on the battlefield. I need to be able to shoot, move and

communicate, and if I cannot move, all of that protection that you

have given me now just made me a sitting duck, and it is pointless

for me to have it on anyway. So I guess, you know, if you could,

keep in mind that we do like better gear, but it is not necessarily

to be fully protected 100 percent all the time.

Mr. TAYLOR. As a follow-up, is there anything that we, as a Nation, are buying that you think is poorly spent money? Is there

anything that you see out there that we are not buying that you

are aware of that we should be?

Sergeant PEREZ. I am not really aware of those types of things,

sir. The only thing that I see is, you know, on the squad level, hey,

what are my marines needing and what—you know, and for the

most part, the Marine Corps has—as a squad leader, when I came

back from Fallujah, I sat down for three days and did after-action

reports with my fellow squad leaders and platoon commander, and

that was, I am assuming, turned—you know, given to higher, and

they, in turn, turned it in to higher, and it has turned into what

it is now, you know, us getting better gear. So, like I said, in the

short time that I have been in the Marine Corps, the gear progression has been very rapid.

21

Mr. TAYLOR. This could be the ultimate after-action report as far

as getting your desires on the record, and so I want to give you

that opportunity. Again, we are never going to tell you how to take

a hill. We do buy—at the end of the day, we are responsible for

buying the things you need, and that is why I am asking you this

question.

Sergeant PEREZ. I mean, just put more ammo in our pockets,

and, you know, give us enough water to survive for a couple days,

and we are good to roll.

Mr. TAYLOR. I now yield to the Chairman of the Air and Land

Forces Subcommittee, the gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Sergeant, if you happen to think of something or want to comment on something as we go along, please feel free to do so. Can

I ask both generals and perhaps the sergeant, too?

Because some of the phraseology and the acronyms that we use

are familiar to us, they may not be familiar to the audience at

large, and the hearing is being broadcast out there, if it does not

bother you too much, even though it may sound repetitious and

something that takes more time than it should, I think we need to

say what it is we are talking about. If you are talking about a Modular Tactical Vest, I think we need to say it, if it is okay with you

folks. You are not going to hurt our feelings, is what I am driving

at, if you say it out specifically each time because there are literally, probably, thousands of people who may be tuning in who

simply do not know what we are talking about, and they are all

interested. That is why they are tuned in. That is for sure. Is that

okay? You will not hurt anybody’s feelings.

General BROGAN. I will try to remember, sir. It is a bad habit

we get into.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Oh, no. It is a good habit, actually. I mean,

it moves things along, and a lot of times, in discussion, when we

go to the classified hearing, obviously you do not have to keep on

doing that kind of thing, but that is the only thing.

General BROGAN. Aye, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Besides, if you are in front of me in hearings

that I have, I am going to ask everybody to do that anyway.

Most of the questions I have will have to wait, General Alles, for

the classified side of things that you have already mentioned.

There is simply too much to go into that would require us to keep

saying that, but I want to make sure that I understand that some

of the logistics involved with whatever is evolving, including the

rapid progression of useful equipment to the sergeant and to the

people under his command.

When you used the—General Brogan, when you used the term

or used the number 4,060, was that the total number of vehicles;

or when we are talking about not the equipment but, rather, the

up-armor HMMWVs or the V-hull or whatever we are talking

about here, was that the total number, did I understand that correctly, of what you are shooting for in the next year?

General BROGAN. The 4,060, sir, is the total number of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, Vehicles that I intend to procure, that I have authority to procure right now. Yes, sir.

22

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Good. What is that in relation to the Cougar

Vehicles, the Rapid Response Vehicles?

General BROGAN. Sir, the Cougar and the Joint Explosive Ordinance Disposal Team Rapid Response Vehicle, those are examples

of a Category II, which is a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle. So we have broken them into classes. Category I——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does the 4,000 include those kinds of vehicles?

General BROGAN. It does, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is your total number——

General BROGAN. That is correct, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Regardless of the various acronyms and the various vehicles that we are talking about?

General BROGAN. Yes, sir. That is correct.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. We are talking about vehicles that can be

used for like carrying weapons or something, the MTVR, the Medium Tactical Vehicle, right?

General BROGAN. The Medium Tactical Vehicle is primarily——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is that part of the 4,000?

General BROGAN. It is not.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It is not. What are we looking at there?

General BROGAN. I do not know off the top of my head, but the

numbers are on the chromium table, but we have met the acquisition objective for those vehicles.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. The reason I am asking the question

about numbers is not to trap you into numbers, but to try and figure out a clear direction for the Congress. This is for our benefit

to help you.

What is the relationship of the—these are all replacements. That

is what I am trying to get at. Do you have the full complement of

vehicles now in all categories? If you do, what is the relationship

of the 4,060 to that? If you do not have the full complement now

of vehicles in all categories, what does it take to have that to bring

you up to the standards you would have liked to have had and then

relate that to the replacement progression?

General BROGAN. Sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Am I clear?

General BROGAN. I believe so, but let me try to make sure that

I understand your question.

We have a certain number of up-armor HMMWVs in theater

now. A portion of those are theater-provided equipment. They belong to the commander of the land force component. They provide

some of those to the Marine Corps. As I field brand new M1114s,

which is the designation for an up-armor HMMWV, off of the assembly line, that commander in the field can then give back some

of that theater-provided equipment to the joint commander.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Got it.

General BROGAN. So I am still fielding up-armor HMMWVs into

theater.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. But when you are just talking about

the commander in the field, does that include the Army? Are we

talking about the Army and the Marines together in terms of vehicle provision, the provision of vehicles needed for the various missions assigned?

23

General BROGAN. Sir, I would not presume to speak for the

Army, but, yes, both of us are still fielding——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And that is the goal?

General BROGAN. I am sorry, sir?

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The goal is to have that——

General BROGAN. Absolutely.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Complement because the Marines and the Army have to work together in ops especially.

General BROGAN. Absolutely. The Army is the service that is in

charge of the procurement of the HMMWVs.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right.

General BROGAN. I get a portion of the new deliveries to field to

Marine forces.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Right.

General BROGAN. I believe at the heart of your question, though,

is whether or not the MRAP, the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected

Vehicle, is intended to replace on a one-for-one basis all of the

HMMWVs in theater, and the answer to that is no. The unit commanders have indicated to us that there are some places where, because of the imposing size of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected

Vehicles, they just cannot take them, so there will remain a need

for some quantity of up-armor HMMWVs.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does that include—do the numbers you are

speaking of in the process that you are outlining here include

equipment that would have come with the National Guard units or

Reserve units in terms of their being deployed and bringing equipment with them?

General BROGAN. Sir, right now, in the Marine Corps zones in

Multinational Force West, our equipment is remaining in place,

and the troops are rotating in and out, so the troops rotate in and

fall in on that equipment. Whether it is an Active battalion or a

Reserve battalion makes no difference.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And it falls into that equipment whether the

equipment is usable or not, right?

General BROGAN. Sir, we have in place a method by which we replace the gear as it is either destroyed or worn out. The Marine

Corps Logistics Command has placed in theater a pool of assets

that they call Forward In Stores from which commanders can draw

replacement items, and then I alluded to that theater-provided

equipment pool that belongs to the joint commander. So those are

available to ensure that we do not have equipment shortfalls for

the folks that are in the operating forces.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I have seen that, and that is why I am

asking this question. Last year we had been through this. Some of

us had the opportunity to see that, and I am very impressed with

it—do not get me wrong there—but it became very difficult for me

to understand how you could keep that up no matter how good the

sergeant and his folks are at the level of repair and maintenance

in theater and so on. Just the sheer pressure of deployment now

seems to me to be putting a strain there.

General BROGAN. Sir, I think you are absolutely right. There is

no question that the operations in Iraq are using up equipment at

a much higher rate than we would have seen in a peacetime environment.

24

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. The reason then—let me just go a bit further.

Again, I am not trying to lead you into anything. I am trying to

get a clear understanding of what we need to do now, if you would

just indulge me a moment more, Mr. Chairman. Again, I want to

make sure I have it correct, that the committee has it correct. December 31st is, you feel—am I correct that the 4,000 vehicles—

given the explanations you just outlined, December 31st is your

goal for having these vehicles in all categories manufactured or

available up to the up-armoring, if you will, like jammers, et

cetera?

General BROGAN. After they are manufactured so that I, as the

Government, have taken possession of them, and then I need that

additional 60 days to install——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Now, they are not all going to appear at once?

General BROGAN. No, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How many would you say a month are

coming——

General BROGAN. Sir, because I am still in source selection——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Or is that classified?

General BROGAN. It is not classified, but it is competition-sensitive.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It is what?

General BROGAN. Competition-sensitive.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I want to know something, but I will

not get into it with you, but then we are going to have to have a

talk with the Secretary of the Navy or something. I could care less

about that. Now, if that means you have got to pick something—

I put my trust in you. I went over your background here, and, General Alles, you have got the people here. This is your ‘‘kulean,’’ as

we say in Hawaii. This is your area, right——

General ALLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. That you have to deal with.

I will tell you what I am sensitive to. I am sensitive to somebody

who is worried about whether he is going to make more money

than somebody else out of this and that that holds things up. I

could care less. That is a policy question.

General BROGAN. If I may, sir, part of my intent is to use competition as a lever and to encourage them to increase their production capacity.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that. From what I have seen or

from what I am aware of, this competition, especially some of the

things we are talking about—that has been gone through already.

You know what you want.

General BROGAN. I know the characteristics of what it is I want.

Absolutely, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I am very concerned—and the last point

of this: Are you getting enough vehicles in all categories to accommodate whatever is going to take place with this so-called ‘‘surge’’

in terms of the influx of new brigades, new squads as it comes

down to—is that something we can talk about now?

General ALLES. Sir, if I could comment on the requirement, because I think there may be some confusion here. Right now, for

MRAP Vehicles, the Marine Corps’ requirement is 1,022. We expect

that number to triple in the next few weeks.

25

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes.

General ALLES. There is a new requirement being worked that

will triple that amount of vehicles.

Back to Chairman Taylor’s question about HMMWV

replacements——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is why I am asking the question.

General ALLES [continuing]. That would be enough for the

HMMWVs I am aware of that we have in theater. Whether the

commanders choose to use those or not is an operational decision,

not our decision.

The other thing to specify is that—sorry. Right. The other thing

to specify is that they are already working numbers. You mentioned the additional marines for units that will surge into theater

so that we have vehicles for those marines also; MRAP vehicles I

am talking about. They are also including those numbers in that

plus-up that we expect to see in the next few weeks. It is working

its way through our process in the Marine Corps to be validated

by a Marine requirements oversight committee. I should also point

out that additional funding to buy those vehicles will be required.

Now, General Brogan mentioned what he already has funding on

hand for when we increase the amounts of vehicles to these higher

number requirements—triple the amount is the rough number we

are using right now—we will have to work on reprogramming monies to pay for those.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Has that money come out of the previous

supplementals that has not been spent?

General ALLES. Sir, I honestly could not answer that.

General BROGAN. Sir, I would anticipate that that additional requirement will be included in the fiscal year 2008 supplemental request. Because I will be in production of those first 4,000 vehicles,

even if you gave me the money in 2007, I would be unable to spend

it——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I understand that. That is why I am asking

the question. I realize the restrictions of time, but we have to get

through this in order to——

General BROGAN [continuing]. But the beauty, I believe, sir——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. Figure out what to do. Otherwise

we are off in some kind of charade, and both the forces under your

command and the American public are going to be misled as to

what is taking place, and we will not be doing what is required of

us to support you.

General BROGAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. It is easy to talk about supporting the troops.

It is another thing entirely to do it in the context of the legislative

obligations that we have.

General BROGAN. Sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the answer I am getting from you is that

you think you can handle it in terms of the numbers that will be

required over the next 6 weeks to 6 months.

General BROGAN. Yes——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Am I correct, General Alles?

General BROGAN [continuing]. Because I think the beauty is,

once we have that production base established, then we can keep

26

it running and continue to turn out these vehicles to meet the requirements of the operating forces.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So equipment support will not be an issue in

this surge?

General ALLES. For the Marine Corps. It will require some crossleveling of equipment, but I do not see that as an issue. They can

work that, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I presume you are working with the Army on

this, and they are going to be involved in this. It has got to be done

together. I am not quite sure when you say, ‘‘For the Marine

Corps.’’

General ALLES. I am not aware of what the Army requirements

are, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, we have got to start talking to one another about it. I have got—because Chairman Taylor and I have to

make the recommendations together on this.

General BROGAN. I understand, sir. Unfortunately, we do not

have the knowledge available to answer your question about the

Army’s requirements.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, if Representative Taylor and I can talk,

do you suppose you might be able to talk with your Army counterparts?

General BROGAN. Sir, that is being done——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

General BROGAN [continuing]. Just not by the two of us.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Well, you understand where we are

going and what we need to have. We have to have from the Army

and from you whether or not we need to do some changes. And the

final thing I want to say on that, Mr. Chairman, is we need to

think about—I do not know—remobilization, total mobilization. It

is no secret to members of this committee and probably to some of

the folks that I have worked with over the years here, I was opposed to this from the get-go, but what I am more opposed to is

other people letting other people take the responsibility and make

all the sacrifices.

It is impossible for me to understand how you cannot command

mobilization. If you need these vehicles, they have to be built, and

that means if they have to shove some trucks to be sold to some

idiot watching the Super Bowl commercial, then that is what has

to be done. So we need to know what you need to have, and if that

requires us then to even take legislative activity and make sure

you get what you need, then that needs to be done. I do not think

we can fight this thing on the side——

General BROGAN. Sir, I appreciate your——

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. As a side issue.

General BROGAN. And I also appreciate your offer for us to come

back to you if we need your assistance.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Abercrombie, and, Generals, since

the Gentleman from Hawaii used the word ‘‘we’’ in several statements, we want to make it very clear. This is for the troops. If we

get angry, it is going to be at industry and not at you. It is going

to be that you did not challenge us enough.

27

So we want to work with you on this. We want to expedite the

fielding of the equipment that you need. We saw mistakes with the

up-armoring of the HMMWVs. We do not want to see those mistakes made again, and we want to work with you to make sure

that that doesn’t happen.

For the newer Members, what you will find is that, in the good

times and times of feast, you will be scrambling for programs that

are important, some things that may be made in your district that

you think we need for times of war, and we talk about preserving

the industrial base, and all of us have done it from time to time.

I have served in as much, if not more, than most, but the reason

we go to bat for the industrial base in times of peace is so that it

will be there when we need them, and that is why a lot of us get

very disappointed when our industrial base lets us down in times

of war where they do not make the needs of the warfighter a priority, and that mistake was made again repeatedly with the up-armoring of the HMMWVs.

The purpose of this hearing and hopefully of other hearings is

that we do not make that mistake again, that the industrial base

that we have fought to preserve, that have made in America laws

that we have preserved so that we can be self-dependent on our

own weapons serve—that those things are there to serve us in

times of need, and this is a time of need.

I would now like to yield to the Gentleman from Maryland Mr.

Bartlett.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

As I mentioned earlier, within the limits of the system, I am convinced that you are moving as expeditiously as possible to identify

this need and to procure the appropriate equipment. What I would

like to ask you to do with your knowledge of the system is I would

like to ask you to take off your uniform; imagine you have a loved

one in harm’s way over there. What could we have done better?

What do we need to change so that we can speed up the sequence

of events?

General ALLES. I will go first.

Sir, one of the things that is of concern is we have to reprogram

money frequently, and that, you know, is an emergent requirement.

We are facing an adaptive enemy, and that enemy is changing. As

he changes, we have to counter his counters, and that typically requires some form of new programs.

As we have worked with the Joint IED Organization, we have

noticed that they have a tremendous amount of flexibility in their

appropriation. That appropriation allows them basically to put the

money to whether it is acquisition or research at the time they are

going to execute that, and that kind of flexibility would be very

useful to the Marine Corps in the execution of our Title 10 responsibilities.

There are other things that could be done, but that is one that

comes to mind off the top of my head that would be helpful, and

also accelerate the process, because there is always at least somewhat of a time delay as you work through reprogramming actions.

Mr. BARTLETT. What you are telling us is that, at least to some

extent, the availability of funds has limited how rapidly you could

proceed.

28

General ALLES. To some degree, yes, sir, it does. I mean, again,

I would not so much say ‘‘availability’’ as that they are in the correct, you know, program element or correct appropriation line.

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand, but availability to you. They may

be there, but not available to you.

General ALLES. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. Okay.

Mr. Chairman, that is something we ought to be able to change,

I would think.

Mr. TAYLOR. I would hope so, and again, I will reiterate my request for you that, as to any funding needs that you see for this

program to see that your target date of January 1 is met, any messages that we need to pass on to the appropriators for the supplemental, we have made the request. You are off the hook, as far as

I am concerned, that no one on the other side of the river should

be opposed to our making that request, and I would be disappointed if you do not fulfill it.

General BROGAN. Aye, sir.

Mr. BARTLETT. General Brogan, do you have any additional suggestions of how we might have made this go quicker and better?

General BROGAN. I believe, sir, my comments would probably be

more philosophical along the lines of what Congressman Abercrombie indicated.

I am sometimes asked as the acquisition individual in the Marine Corps, if we could build an LST in 8 days in World War II,

why does it take us 8 weeks to get an assembly line started for

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles? My sense is that there

has not been the total commitment by the industrial base to mobilize to fulfill the requirements that we find ourselves facing. So I

am not sure that you all can solve that. I think it is in our national

psyche to enjoy what we enjoy here and continue to provide the

wherewithal for our troops in harm’s way in addition to it rather

than in lieu of it.

Mr. BARTLETT. I appreciate those comments. I am old enough to

have lived through World War II. It was the last war where everybody was involved. We have had wars since then, and families have

loved ones who have been involved, but beyond that, not everyone

was involved. In World War II, everybody that could had a victory

garden. We all saved our household fats and took them to the central repository. You could not buy tires for your car. No new cars

were made for 3 full years because the industrial base was busy

making things for the war effort. And I think we need to have a

greater sense of urgency than we have, and I appreciate the concerns you have with the industrial base and how long it takes to

get something done.

Mr. Chairman, I think that all of us would like to see the sergeant don that vest. I do not know how you do that in a formal

hearing, but if he could don the vest and, just for a couple of moments, tell us of the significant protective features of the vest.

Mr. TAYLOR. Sergeant, we would appreciate your doing that,

please.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You will not be appearing on the Bravo channel, Sergeant, but I expect it will be shown elsewhere. Hang on one

29

second. Can the camera that you are using here get it? Good.

Maybe he could explain the functions of the various parts of it.

General ALLES. Sir, I think it would be helpful also if he tells us

a little bit about the weight of that vest and how much standard

equipment he had to carry in theater. That is very important. That

has been a big concern.

Mr. TAYLOR. General Alles, if you would, please, ask the sergeant

to walk us through the nomenclature, and one of the questions, one

of the follow-up questions, is just to give us some idea of the weight

of the individual parts and the cumulative weight.

General ALLES. So, Sergeant Perez, if you would tell us a little

bit about the gear, and then tell us about the weight, and then tell

us about what you had to carry in Iraq.

Sergeant PEREZ. Okay. I am more used to the different vest, the

Outer Tactical Vest. It is basically front and back protection only.

They added the side SAPI in for—like just recently, probably in the

last year or so, which happened after I got out of theater. I have

worn it with the side SAPI, and it probably had my arms out about

right here, okay? With this one, it goes—you put it on over your

head rather than putting it on—like—kind of like a vest, and the

improvement is this tab, this black tab right here, all I have to do

is pull that and then unclip one of these, and I am out of the vest,

okay?

If you will notice here, this cumberbund that I am wearing that

goes all the way around to the back distributes the weight onto my

torso rather than on my shoulders. Right now I feel almost zero

weight on my shoulders, so I could probably walk around with this

on for 3 or 4 hours and it not be a problem for me to maneuver.

Other things—I mean, just—and also the SAPI plates. Like I

said before, these are now sewn on the inside so they are tighter

to your body. I can now assume a tighter platform, and I can shoot.

And also where the other one did not have the webbing all the way

around to the side where I can attach my other gear, this one does

have that available to it; and as you can see in this one, it has this

little flap right here. It offers a little bit more back protection. A

lot of people were getting shrapnel due to narrow hallways, grenades coming down those narrow hallways, and then turning away

from them, catching shrapnel in the back. This offers a little bit

more protection with the Kevlar on the inside.

Mr. ADAMS. Sir, if I may also add, Sergeant Perez is brand new

to the MTV. One of the other features, if you will turn around,

please, is this quick release up on each of the shoulders. One of the

enhancements we put on this vest came out of Iraq, from the corpsmen, which is that with the old OTV, since it is a front-opening

vest, you have to open everything up in order to perform any kind

of casualty assistance on the torso area. What this vest is designed

to do is, if you unclip, you can unclip either side. That allows the

corpsmen to get up underneath the vest, work on the chest area,

provide life-saving measures while keeping the rest of the body

fully covered. That is one of the other key advancements that came

in from the operating forces, from the corpsmen, particularly what

they needed in order to do their job of saving the marines.

A couple of the other features is we have beefed up the shoulder

area here. Again, we have taken the weight off of the shoulders to

30

integrate and for the marine to wear in their assault pack. Part of

the problem was it drove into the shoulder blade areas, so we increased the amount of protection in the thickness of the pads up

in here.

We also redesigned the throat protector because the old throat

protector kept it very close to the throat area, and it tended to trap

heat, and the marines did not like to use it very often, so they

would just leave it hanging down. This new design brings it further

away from the neck. It is ergonomically designed. It will also increase the level of protection along with the use of a gap sitting in

here along the vest. This collar was designed so it would tuck closer to the vest design area in order to provide more protection to

what previously was exposed area. And also, we redesigned the

yoke and collar assembly here where it sat a little bit further away

from the head because, again, it was trapping heat, and also, when

they wore the light-weight helmet and they were sitting down, the

back of their helmet would hit against the back of the vest.

So the marines were going through the design process. We redesigned the collar to open it up a little bit further and make it more

comfortable for the marines when they are both in a sitting position and also if they are bending down or getting into a prone position for shooting.

And the last enhancement I will point out is we put in a—we

added a rifle bolster because one of the other complaints the marines had was trying to get a good stock weld to their weapon. So

we have a rifle bolster that can be moved to either side—it depends

if the shooter is right-handed or left-handed—and that allows them

to get a good sight picture. As he brings his weapon up, that bolster helps hold the weapon in close to the shoulder where it is supposed to be in order for them to get a good sight picture.

General ALLES. Can you talk about the weights?

Mr. ADAMS. Yes, sir.

The weight of the base vest—equivalent to the OTV, it is approximately 13 pounds with the soft-armored panels in it. The

weight of the E–SAPI plates in both the front and the back vary

by size. For a large size E–SAPI plate, it is approximately six

pounds.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. ‘‘E–SAPI plate’’ means the Small Arms Protective Insert?

Mr. ADAMS. Excuse me, sir. Yes, the Enhanced Small Arms Protective Insert plate that sits in the front and the back. They reach

a little over six pounds each for this vest, for this sized marine, and

then on the side plate, the side Enhanced Small Arms Protective

Insert plate, it sits on the side, a 6-by–8 plate. Its weight is approximately 2.3 pounds each. On top of that is all of the rest of the

gear. Depending on what his mission is, he adds more weight to

the vest with his grenades and whatnot.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes, I have a couple of questions.

Did they design armor with sleeves? I had heard at one time

there were sleeves, and also, if you are a medic or a radio person

out in the combat area, what additional weight is that in addition

to?

31

Sergeant PEREZ. Most of our Navy corpsmen carry a medic bag,

so they will have a combat load similar to what we are wearing.

The only thing is that they usually carry a shotgun, so they are

usually like less——

Ms. BORDALLO. So what is the total weight then with all of that?

Sergeant PEREZ. I would say probably in the realm of like around

50 pounds.

Ms. BORDALLO. Fifty pounds.

General ALLES. Can you talk about the weights you carried when

you were there? How much do you weigh, and how much did you

have to carry?

Sergeant PEREZ. I weigh approximately 200 pounds. I wore—

what you see here was probably another four magazines so a total

of eight magazines with every single one loaded to a 27-round maximum. I carried an M14-- or a PRC–148 radio which attached to

me, which was a smaller version of the manpack radio, and then

I also carried a sledgehammer and a pry bar for gaining entry into

houses.

Ms. BORDALLO. Sergeant, what is the total of all of that?

Sergeant PEREZ. With weapon and everything, I would probably

say in the neighborhood of 70 to 80 pounds.

Mr. ADAMS. Ma’am, we have a chart that we normally carry that

talks about an average personal combat load. It is approximately

90 pounds. Now, that includes—that is everything. That is his uniform, socks, the whole kit that he is wearing. Yes, ma’am.

Ma’am, also, this was the—you asked about the arm protection

and all of that. This is the arm protection part of what is called

QuadGuard, but this is not used by the dismounted marines. This

is used by marines operating at turret to provide the forearms/

upper arms protection, shoulders, and there is also a trouser that

they wear, again, just sitting in a turret. In case of fragmentation,

their legs are protected, but at about 10 pounds, this is way too

heavy for a dismounted marine to be wearing.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Ellsworth.

I’m sorry. Are you finished, Ms. Bordallo?

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Ellsworth.

Mr. ELLSWORTH. What is more liable to compromise the vest,

shrapnel or a direct round? I maybe can guess that. And how is it

rated for what arm fire would penetrate this vest, and is shrapnel

worse or better than a bullet? And I do not know, maybe I am——

General BROGAN. There is not a clear answer to that.

The vests without—the Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts,

the E–SAPI plates, are designed to stop fragments. That was generally the primary purpose of combat vests up until this point. I

mean, from World War II forward, we wanted to stop shrapnel.

With these vests, with the insertion of the plates, we have now

gone to stopping bullets as well. Enhanced Small Arms Protective

Insert plates can stop up to a 7.62 round, but the plate cannot

cover anything, or we would compromise the sergeant’s mobility, as

he indicated. So, in the areas, the large vital organs that are covered by those plates, that is the caliber that we are able to stop.

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, ma’am.

32

Ms. BORDALLO. I have one more question.

Mr. TAYLOR. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. I am just curious. You know, in other wars, we

did not have this sophisticated armor and gear.

Do you have any idea how many lives we have—now, I have visited the hospitals in Germany and Walter Reed and Bethesda, and

I have noticed that most of the injuries are to the limbs, not to the

torso, and I know that must be because of the armor. So do you

have any idea what are the percentages of those during previous

wars, you know, as being—as this war now with the enhanced

armor?

General BROGAN. Ma’am, your instinct is correct.

We have marines, soldiers and sailors surviving incidents that in

the past would have killed them, and unfortunately, the result of

that is we have many more very serious extremity injuries. I do not

have the exact figures. We will have to take that question for the

record and then get that information back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 81.]

Ms. BORDALLO. I know it has to be much better, but I just was

curious as to——

General BROGAN. Ma’am, our personal protective equipment is

saving a lot of lives, and marines who otherwise would have died

are surviving.

General ALLES. I should mention also that this is our state-ofthe-art ensemble. The enemy recognizes where it is vulnerable, and

they shoot. That is why we are concerned about snipers. They shoot

intentionally where they think they know the gaps are from observation and where they think they can inflict the most grievous

wounds on our marines.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, in spite of it all, it is quite fashionable.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, you mentioned snipers and the unfortunate situation where the enemy is getting better at that. I am well

aware of the upgrades to the armor.

A retired Army colonel who has done time in Iraq asked me to

ask you if you felt like the—that our helmets are adequate, or

should we as a Nation be looking at something other than the existing helmet?

General ALLES. I will let General Brogan address the current

helmet we have now.

We do have research efforts underway at the Office of Naval Research both on body armor, on helmet improvements, on modular

designs to try to address some of the deficiencies. Those are longterm efforts. We have put about $3 million a year in those efforts.

It will take us several years before we have an output there.

I will let General Brogan address any—if he has anything on the

current designs.

General BROGAN. I believe those long-term research development

efforts, sir—if they can reduce the weight of the helmet, I think

that would be significant. If you would ask the sergeant what it is

like to wear that helmet for the number of hours that he does on

patrol, I think he would be thrilled to have the same level of protection in a much lighter configuration.

33

The current helmets provide a significant level of protection

against shrapnel and against projectiles. Now that we have

switched to the pad suspension system, we are also providing increased levels of protection against blunt force trauma. I believe

that the helmets are certainly the best that we can provide today.

Mr. TAYLOR. Do you know if anything being used by our allies

or even the former Warsaw Pact is superior that we should be looking at?

General BROGAN. Sir, none of our former enemies are close, and

our allies generally use the same sort of technologies that we are.

My program manager for an expeditionary rifle squad interacts

routinely with our allies to look at their infantry ensemble and ensure that there is nothing out there that is better than what we

are currently fielding.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To follow up—thank you, Mr. Chairman. I

want to follow up on that because that was going to be the second

round of questions that I wanted to ask. Again, setting aside any

classified activity, I am very concerned about what it means in this

increased activity that you are going to be facing in the next 6

weeks to 6 months with respect to the Ministry of Defense and the

Ministry of the Interior.

General Pace indicated at the full committee hearing last week

that the allies you will have in conducting your activities include

National Police, Baghdad Police, National Army units, and now I

am told that the politicians—well, I am not—okay. I have got to

be careful about this—that they are even considering taking Kurdish units and bringing them into Baghdad. Presumably they are

aware that the Kurds are not Arabs and that you are now mixing

ethnicity in with religious divisions, all of which Sergeant Perez

and others are apparently going to be able to figure out on the

spot.

But if that is, in fact, going to take place—you have got Kurds,

at least two different sections of the Ministry of the Interior Police,

the Ministry of Defense Army working with you—will they be using

this equipment, or will we be operating—and if they are using the

equipment, how is it going to be utilized in terms of intercommunication—intrasquad, intraforce communication—and if not, how are

you going to conduct the issuing and carrying out of orders?

General BROGAN. Sir, I am not able to tell you how the other

forces are going to be equipped.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, let’s let that aside for the moment.

What about the equipment side here then?

General ALLES. Sir, I think that would be a question better taken

for the record. I cannot answer the equipment requirements for the

Iraqi police forces and the Iraqi Army.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So there is not an issue. When we are talking

about the equipment here, we are talking strictly the Marines and

the Army. We are not talking about equipping the Iraqi forces of

various origins?

General BROGAN. No, sir. I only equip U.S. Forces.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, then how are you going to work together? I am not quite sure how this is supposed to work then out

of these police stations—I am not trying to trick you—because this

is happening now.

34

General BROGAN. I understand, sir. I am not qualified to speak.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am being told as a Member of Congress that

I am supposed to stand around and watch while this takes place

because executive authority has decided to move you guys in there

and do it, and I am trying to figure out, okay, you know, if Members of Congress cannot stop people from doing things—again, it is

easy to talk. It is another thing to find out what the practical reality is, the kind of thing that Mr. Bartlett was talking about.

What we are about on this committee, I can assure you, and what

the committee as a whole is trying to figure out is how to actually

support you. Now, that is why I am asking the question.

How does what you are planning to do right now work into what

is expected of you in the next six weeks to six months in terms of

the logistics, or is that yet to be determined?

General BROGAN. Sir, I would expect that that will be determined by the joint force commander in theater, and I am unable

to speak to that for you.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay. Can we begin to take a look at that if

you can carry that back across the river and say—you know, we

are going to have to have this answered real quick.

General BROGAN. Sir.

General ALLES. Yes, sir, we will take that for the record, but we

are not—I am not qualified to answer that.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 80.]

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you know whether the supplemental budget has anything in it for equipping Iraqi allies?

General BROGAN. I do not know.

General ALLES. Sir, again, I cannot answer that question.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does the 2007 budget have anything in there

with respect to up-armoring or providing armor or providing vehicles or equipment of any kind for the Iraqis?

General ALLES. Sir, again, that is one we would have to take for

the record. It is not—I mean, we are aware of the Marine Corps’

programs and Marine Corps’ budgeting actions, not for the Iraqi

Army, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. For the record then, the question that I am

asking is what is the relationship of them in terms of budget and

the kinds of things we are talking about here, what is the relationship to equipping and working with Iraqi allies or Iraqi cooperating

forces, and do we need to cover that while we are covering what

you are doing?

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 80.]

General BROGAN. I understand the question, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Okay.

General BROGAN. I do not have an answer, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you very much.

Mr. TAYLOR. Any further questions?

Again, Sergeant Perez, thank you for your service. We want to

thank all of the marines present and enlisting for their service and

all of the men and women who have chosen to serve our country.

Generals, I very much appreciate your being here.

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General Brogan in particular, I want to appreciate your setting

what I think is a very realistic but also ambitious goal. What I

would ask of you are some milestones by month that you expect to

be met for the record so that we can help you in tracking this, and

should anything occur in the private sector that is keeping those

milestones from being met, I would hope that you would come sooner rather than later to this committee to see what we can do to

help you to get these vehicles fielded and the other things that the

Marines need.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 77.]

General BROGAN. Sir, thank you for that offer.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. One last thing just on a happier note. General

Brogan, have you had an opportunity to visit Kaneohe since your

original sojourns out there in the early 1980’s?

General BROGAN. I have not, sir. I have not been back to Hawaii

since I left. I would be glad to come.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, then, perhaps we can arrange to have

you come with us then when we go out there because I would like

you to see Kaneohe Bay now——

General BROGAN. I understand.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE [continuing]. And the housing that is

there——

General BROGAN. There are significant infrastructure improvements at Kaneohe Bay.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Including for the single marine, not just the

families.

General ALLES. I have been out there, sir, and it looks wonderful.

I would like another assignment there.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Yes. I remember General Krulak, before he

became Commandant, was commander out at Kaneohe, and then

after he became Commandant and we had worked on the qualityof-life issues on housing out there, he said he was not sure that

Kaneohe should remain a Marine Corps base.

Are you aware, Sergeant, of why the Commandant thought that?

Sergeant PEREZ. I am not, sir.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is just a trick question. Good for you.

The reason, he said, is it looked too much like a college campus.

He was not sure the Marines did not need something a little more

austere, but I do not notice anybody turning down any of the housing.

Anyway, I would like you to come out and see it now some—

what? It will be 20, 25 years later, right?

General BROGAN. It certainly would.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Bartlett, anything?

Okay. General Alles, the smart folks who work with me have

asked me to ask you. Your opening statement noted the urgent

need for rapid response, emerging requirements, and then, third,

existing reprogramming actions limited your flexibility.

For the record, could you expand on this if you choose to do so

now? And the other follow-up question was has your flexibility been

limited?

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General ALLES. Sir, we can expand on that in the record. It goes

back to what Mr. Bartlett asked me, which is we understand that

the Joint IED Defeat Organization’s appropriation allows a maximum flexibility because they can determine the purpose of the

funding at the point of execution. Each year the Marine Corps reprograms monies or funding to meet our emergent requirements

because we have an enemy that is constantly changing, and that

there are always inherent delays when you do those reprogramming actions.

Our mission, including our Title 10 mission, would be greatly enhanced by the ability to—or the kind of appropriation that the

Joint IED Defeat Organization receives. A similar type of appropriation would be very beneficial to us and would help us meet

these unforeseen requirements and necessitate new funding

streams.

Now, the front end of this, the science and technology part of

this, I can take care of with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab because we can, as necessary, redistribute monies inside of my program element to meet whatever the emergent requirement is. And

we do that, but when it comes to the larger dollars required to do

procurement on General Brogan’s side, that is not something that

can be met inside science and technology funding; that is not what

it is made for, and plus, there is not enough of that money to do

that kind of work anyway, and that is what causes us to go

through these reprogramming actions.

So receiving appropriation authority similar to what the Joint

IED Organization has would be very helpful to us as a service.

Mr. TAYLOR. Would you like to follow up on that, General?

General BROGAN. Sir, as I mentioned, something similar to the

Combat Mission Needs Fund that was established for Special Operations Command available to the services would be helpful, and in

looking at the below threshold with programming limits for both

the RDT—research, development, testing—evaluations and procurement dollars, neither of those have changed in a fairly significant time, so some consideration could be given to changing those

thresholds, which would provide a little bit more of the flexibility

that General Alles mentioned.

Mr. TAYLOR. If you would provide that request in writing, I

promise you we will get it in the hands of Mr. Murtha and the appropriators.

General BROGAN. Aye, sir.

General ALLES. Sir.

Mr. TAYLOR. I want to thank you very much for your service.

Thank you very much for being here today. This committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JANUARY 16, 2007

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE

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JANUARY 16, 2007

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR

Mr. TAYLOR. What I would ask of you are some milestones by month that you expect to be met?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. What novel armor solutions are currently out there? Are the best options still aluminum and steel?

General BROGAN. There no armor technological breakthroughs in the near term

that will defeat the full spectrum of the threat environment. All armor design packages necessitate compromises between tactical mobility, survivability and specific

mission requirements. However, the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) is

funding the Army Research Laboratory’s effort to improve the ability of armor to

mitigate threats faced today in theater. Current avenues of investigation include

armor composition, composite packaging and vehicle shape. Additionally, The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is currently conducting the

Armor Challenge to identify revolutionary and promising new armor systems for

military vehicles. In conjunction with the Army and Marine Corps, DARPA is developing the Hardwire DARPA Armor Program to provide a composite armor door kit

for the current generation HMMWV.

Current and forecasted armor solutions require a combination of technologies including armors made from Rolled Homogenous Steel, aluminum, ceramics and composite materials.

Mr. TAYLOR. Are any MAK HMMWVs with high back/troop box being used outside

the wire?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. What vehicles are currently used to transport troops outside secure

forward operating bases?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Could you use the MTVR in a ‘‘gun truck’’ capacity to serve as interim vehicle while MRAP is being procured?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Do these theater requirements take into account the recent ‘‘surge’’

of an additional 4,000 marines to Iraq?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. What are the advantages of V-shaped hulls and what other concepts

have been developed that offer improvements over the UAH (include assessments

of foreign vehicles if they can make them)?

General BROGAN. V-shaped hulls mitigate the blast effects of an underbody mine.

Other factors which complement the shape of the hull include ground clearance,

armor composition, and vehicle weight.

When designing vehicles to counter IEDs, tactical mobility and survivability are

the primary factors that must be addressed. Both industry and Government are exploring all technologies which improve crew survivability while maintaining tactical

mobility to develop the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) as the replacement for the HMMWV. This technology requires significant research and development.

Mr. TAYLOR. What is the current theater policy for vehicle use outside secure operating areas? What types of vehicles are allowed these areas?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. How are you planning on getting the MRAP vehicles to theater? Airlift or by sea? Have you established contact with TRANSCOM? Do you have enough

lift assets available?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

78

Mr. TAYLOR. How long will it take to ship MRAPs by sea?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. How much confidence do you have in the industrial base’s ability to

rapidly produce Cougar/Joint EOD Rapid Response Vehicles (JERRV)? There have

been problems in the past, how have these problems been solved?

General BROGAN. The potential for the industrial base to meet our growing requirement is encouraging.

With respect to Force Protection, Incorporated (FPI) and the delivery of Cougar/

JERRV MRAP vehicles, the production rates have indeed been limiting. The recent

teaming between FPI, is helping to deliver the desired vehicles on or ahead of schedule.

Mr. TAYLOR. In terms of providing additional wheel well protection to Up-Armor

HMMWVs. How can we speed up this production and installation process? Why not

provide this armor to every Up-Armor HMMWV?

General BROGAN. Our Fragmentation Kit 2 effort is on schedule and with installs

projected to be finished during March. The kit is a unit level install based on the

local commander’s priority of effort. All Fragmentation Kit 5s have been fielded intheater with installs expected to be completed during March. The HMMWVA2 with

MAK already have the 3/8 RHA wheel well shield installed.

Mr. TAYLOR. Can you briefly discuss Distributed Operations and the rationale behind this concept? How will this impact force protection equipment requirements in

theater?

General BROGAN. Distributed Operations (DO) is an additive capability that enhances application of the Marine Corps’ fundamental war fighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. It is a technique applied to appropriate situations wherein units are

separated beyond the limits of traditional direct fire mutual support. The decision

to employ DO techniques rests with the commander and is based on his assessment

of the mission, threat, terrain/weather, and troops/fires support available. DO is

practiced by general purpose forces, operating with deliberate dispersion, when necessary and tactically prudent. It requires decentralized decision-making and, therefore, relies on the ability and judgment of Marines at every level. DO has already

had a positive impact on small unit leader training and education, making Marine

tactical units more effective on the modern combined arms battlefield, Phase 0

through Phase 5.

The rationale behind DO rests with an emerging security environment that demands multipurpose Marine forces capable of operating with greater autonomy

across an expanded battle space, in all six phases of a joint or coalition operation.

Our adversaries’ ever-increasing gravitation toward irregular warfare and the continually increasing lethality of modern weapons have resulted in a greater need for

dispersion. Commanders are faced with larger frontages and complex areas of operation, with potentially fewer forces. Our enemies have demonstrated a propensity

to disperse, fight in complex terrain (urban, mountain, jungle), and complicate our

operations by engaging in war among innocents. DO provides Marine Corps forces

an additional means to effectively operate in this emerging environment.

The Marine Corps views DO as evolutionary, Marine units past and present have

employed the dispersion espoused by DO to gain tactical or operational advantage

in specific situations. Circumstances now dictate that this capability be institutionalized across the Marine Corps to allow for even wider application. The Marine

Corps Combat Development Process continues to identify the necessary enhancements in manning, training, and equipping to reduce or eliminate the barriers that

prevent current commanders from employing the level of unit dispersion the modern

battlefield often requires. To facilitate DO, enhancements will be required across the

battlefield functions of maneuver, fires, intelligence, command and control, logistics,

and force protection.

DO has already enhanced the most essential ingredient of individual force protection, small unit leadership, by requiring an increased level of training for the Corps’

infantry non-commissioned officers. In addition, dispersion on the battlefield will enhance overall force protection by complicating our enemies’ ability to target large

bodies of troops and likely routes of movement. From an equipment perspective,

there will be little impact on force protection equipment requirements in theater,

as DO does not alter the basic organization of tactical units. While DO enhancements will result in an increase in tactical vehicles for our infantry battalions, these

vehicles will be armored versions of the Marine Corps enhanced HMMWV. Ultimately, the fielding of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle will supersede this requirement.

Mr. TAYLOR. How are you going to resource the surge increase?

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General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. Will MRAP vehicles be rated for off-road use?

General BROGAN. Yes, MRAP vehicles will be rated for off-road use.

Mr. TAYLOR. What’s the process in validating joint urgent operational need statements in theater? What’s the average timeline for validation, production, and fielding.

General BROGAN. The Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS) is the

process that provides a mechanism for Joint Commands to elevate their urgent

needs to the Joint Staff.

Validation process: The JUONS must originate in a joint command in theater. For

Marines, this command is typically Multinational Forces—West (MNF–W). MNF–W

validates and approves the request for the capability need and forwards the request

to Multinational Coalition—Iraq (MNC–I). MNC–I validates and approves the request and forwards the capability need to the Central Command (CENTCOM) staff.

CENTCOM validates and approves the request and forwards the capability need to

the Joint Staff. The Joint Staff uses the Functional Capabilities Boards and Joint

Rapid Acquisition Cell to facilitate the funding, procurement, and fielding of the

validated capability.

Average timeline: The timeline associated with the validation, production, and

fielding of JUONS varies with each individual requirement based on cost, availability (commercial of the shelf, government off the shelf, yet to be developed), and complexity of the validated materiel solution. The notional timeline for the staffing process once the JUONS arrives at the Joint Staff requires 10-39 days. At the end of

this time period, the JUONS is handed to the lead Service for procurement. Procurement timelines vary according to the amount of development, integration and production capability that a solution requires.

Mr. TAYLOR. When do you expect to achieve the theater requirement for the Modular Tactical Vest? How many vendors will produce this vest?

General BROGAN. The Modular Tactical Vest will achieve the theater requirement

of 60,000 by September 2007. One vendor, Protective Products International, manufacturers this vest.

Mr. TAYLOR. What has been the feedback from theater regarding the pad suspension systems for the Lightweight Combat Helmet (LWH)? Do Marines like the system?

General BROGAN. The Program Manager for Infantry Combat Equipment (PM–

ICE) has a helmet survey that is still being developed/revised and expects to post

to the PM–ICE website in mid-March. At that time, PM–ICE will have the capability to gather feedback from theater regarding the pad suspension systems for the

Lightweight Combat Helmet (LWH) and to further determine acceptance by Marines.

Mr. TAYLOR. Does the Marine Corps have a requirement for a vehicle mounted

active protection system?

General BROGAN and General ALLES. Yes. The Marine Corps has identified a requirement for Active Protection Systems (APS) to enhance force protection and vehicle survivability capabilities of vehicles in the 14 to 35 ton weight class against

Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and Anti-Tank Guided Munitions (ATGMs). Specifically, Operating Forces have expressed a need to defeat or reduce the effects of

RPGs through two Urgent Universal Need Statements. Additionally, the Light Armored Vehicle and Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle operational requirements documents identify RPG and ATGM defeat as Objective requirements; and system threat

assessments for the vehicles in the specified weight class point to RPGs and ATGMs

as significant threats. In support of the identified requirement, Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) conducted an APS Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) to address this force protection/vehicle survivability gap. MCCDC developed and assessed all feasible Non-Materiel Approaches capable of mitigating the

gap. As part of the FSA, the team also conducted an Analysis of Materiel Alternatives (AMA) to assess the capabilities of candidate materiel solutions. This analysis, conducted in the spring and summer of 2006, developed the following categories

of gap mitigation:

• Detection Avoidance

Æ Mobile camouflage systems

Æ Thermal signature management

• Hit Avoidance (Soft-Kill Systems)

Æ Soft Kill Systems do not physically intercept the threat (e.g., electronic warfare)

• Hit Avoidance (Hard-Kill Extended Intercept)

Æ Integrated Army Active Protection System

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Æ Trophy Æ Iron Fist • Hit Avoidance (Hard-Kill Close In Intercept)

Æ Close-In Active Protection System Æ Full-Spectrum Close-In Layered Active Protection Shield Æ Close-In Counter Munition Æ Quick Kill • Hit Avoidance (Hard-Kill Novel Approaches)

Æ Novel Approaches intercept the threat by means other than missle-tomissle defeat (e.g., Linear Shaped Charge or Nets)

Additionally, the AMA evaluated Passive Penetration Avoidance (e.g., slat/bar

armor, ceramic armor, composite armor), Active Penetration Avoidance (e.g., Explosive Reactive Armor, Non-explosive Reactive Armor, Electromagnetic Reactive

Armor), and Kill Avoidance (spall liners, fire suppression systems, ammunition

compartmentalization) alternatives to gap mitigation.

The output of the FSA and AMA was a draft APS Initial Capabilities Document

waiver letter in August 2006. The FSA concluded that no single system possessed

all the required capabilities, but recommended further study of the following categories of RPG and ATGM defeat mechanisms: Soft-Kill/Novel Approach Combination, Hard-Kill (Novel Approach), Hard-Kill (Extended Intercept), Hard-Kill (CloseIn Intercept), and Active Penetration Avoidance. Of particular note, the analysis

and participating subject matter experts identified significant concerns with the

fratricide threat from Hard-Kill APS solutions. The Marine Corps intends to further

refine the future APS requirement in the specified class of vehicles and will seek

funding to support this effort through upcoming budget cycles.

Mr. TAYLOR. What is the Marine Corps official position regarding the Trophy active protection system?

General BROGAN and General ALLES. The Trophy Active Protection System was

one of four Hard-Kill (Extended Intercept) systems assessed during the Marine

Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) sponsored APS Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA) and Analysis of Materiel Alternatives (AMA) in the spring and

summer of 2006. The APS FSA resulted in a draft Initial Capabilities Document

(ICD) Waiver Letter and recommended further study of the following categories of

RPG and ATGM defeat mechanisms: Soft-Kill/Novel Approach Combination, HardKill (Novel Approach), Hard-Kill (Extended Intercept), Hard-Kill (Close-In Intercept), and Active Penetration Avoidance. The inherent risk of fratricide with all of

the Hard-Kill APS solutions will be a critical component of future analysis. The Trophy Active Protection System will remain one of the candidate materiel solutions

as the Marine Corps continues to refine the APS requirement for tactical vehicles.

Mr. TAYLOR. Is the Marine Corps experiencing high numbers of rocket propelled

grenade attacks in their respective area of responsibility in Iraq?

General BROGAN and General ALLES. [The information referred to is classified and

retained in the committee files.]

Mr. TAYLOR. What is the situation in regards to equipping Iraqi forces and what

will the US provide?

General BROGAN. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the

committee files.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ABERCROMBIE

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So there is not an issue. When we are talking about the equipment here, we are talking strictly the Marines and the Army. We are not talking

about equipping the Iraqi forces of various origins? Then how are you going to work

together? I am not quite sure how this is supposed to work then out of these police

stations—I am not trying to trick you—because this is happening now. How does

what you are planning to do right now work into what is expected of you in the

next six weeks to six months in terms of the logistics, or is that yet to be determined?

General BROGAN and General ALLES. The Marine Corps conducts combined Coalition and Iraqi Security Force (ISF) operations throughout the Al Anbar province.

We employ embedded Transition Teams (TT) who serve alongside the ISF in an advisory and training capacity. Over 700 of the nearly 28,000 Marines deployed in

support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom are part of the

security TT in Iraq and Afghanistan working to increase the proficiency, combat effectiveness, and internal security capacity of these countries. The Marine Corps will

prepare over 80 teams during the current Fiscal Year for tasks as military, border

security and national police transition teams.

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While the USMC Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental provides funding for Marines

based on plans to support the training teams, it does not include any requests for

equipment for Iraqi or coalition forces. The Department of Defense ISF Fund received $1.7B for procurement and fielding of equipment as well as to fund training

needs of Iraqi forces.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What is the relationship of them in terms of budget and the

kinds of things we are talking about here, what is the relationship to equipping and

working with Iraqi allies or Iraqi cooperating forces, and do we need to cover that

while we are covering what you are doing? (page 82)

General ALLES. The Marine Corps budget does not contain any funding for the

Iraqis.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. Do you have any idea how many lives we have—now, I have visited the hospitals in Germany and Walter Reed and Bethesda, and I have noticed

that most of the injuries are to the limbs, not to the torso, and I know that must

be because of the armor. So do you have any idea what the percentages are of those

during previous wars, you know, as being—as this war now with the enhanced

armor?

General BROGAN. Navy-Marine Corps CTR Deployment Health Database Naval

Health Research Center

The anatomical distribution of combat wounds during major U.S. conflicts is

shown in Table 1. Extremity injuries comprised the majority of wounds in all conflicts and are relatively stable. There are a reduced proportion of wounds to the

chest and abdomen in the current conflict compared to previous conflicts.

Although injury severity was not objectively measured during WWII, Korea or

Vietnam, during OIF patients with extremity wounds were more severely injured

overall compared to wounded combatants without extremity injuries.1 It is also important to note that head, face and neck wounds are higher in OIF compared to

other major U.S. conflicts.2 This increase may be because of new injury patterns resulting from improvised explosive devices and lack of protection for the facial region.

Table 1. Percent wounds (fatal and nonfatal) by body region.

BODY REGION

War Head/Neck Thorax Abdomen Extremities

WWII 1 25% 13% 9% 53%

Korea 2 19% 8% 7% 53%

Vietnam 3 15% 8% 5% 55%

OIF4, 5 29% 5% 6% 51%

References

1. Mohrle CR, Wade AL, Galarneau MR, et al. Extremity injuries among U.S. combat casualties during Operation Iraqi Freedom: a report from the Navy-Marine

Corps Combat Trauma Registry. Naval Health Research Center Report (under review).

2. Wade AL, Dye JL, Mohrle CR, Galarneau MR. Head, face, and neck injuries during Operation Iraqi Freedom: results from the U.S. Navy-Marine Corps Combat

Trauma Registry. J Trauma, 2007;63:836-40.

3. Beebe GW, DeBakey ME. Battle Casualties, Springfield, Ill. Charles C Thomas,

1952, Chapter 5, pp. 165-205.

4. Reister FA. Battle Casualties and Medical Statistics: US Army Experience in the

Korean War, Washington DC, The Surgeon General, Department of the Army, 1973,

Chapter 1, pp 35-54.

5. Whelan TJ, Burkhalter WE, Gomez A. Management of wars wounds, edited by

Welch CE, Advances in Surgery, Vol 3, Chicago, Ill, Year Book Medical Publishers

Inc, 1968, p 249.

6. Unpublished data, US Navy-Marine Corps Combat Trauma Registry, 1 March

2004 to 28 February 2005.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY

Mr. COURTNEY. Another question I have which is an issue that seemed to be out

there in the public realm over the last couple of years or so which is about families

who are trying to use their own resources to get their family members body armor

that otherwise might not have been available. I know legislation was passed to provide for reimbursement for those families, and it seemed that there was difficulty

trying to figure out how to get those payments where they—I wondered if you could

give me a quick sort of update, and I apologize not knowing the latest on that information.

General BROGAN. The Marine Corps has received nine claims for reimbursement.

Six of these claims were approved and paid. Two of the six claims were for body

armor.

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