An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-382

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 21 January 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v. Wake County

Nos. 12 CRS 5924, 204029, 

206399

JOSEPH DARNELL JOHNSON

Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 18 October 2012

by Judge Paul G. Gessner in Wake County Superior Court. Heard 

in the Court of Appeals 8 October 2013.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 

General David W. Boone, for the State.

David L. Neal for defendant-appellant.

McCULLOUGH, Judge.

Joseph Darnell Johnson (“defendant”) appeals from his 

convictions for common law robbery, conspiracy to commit common 

law robbery, and attaining the status of an habitual felon. For 

the following reasons, we find no error.

I. Background
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This case arises as a result of a robbery at the King’s 

Motel on South Wilmington Street in Raleigh during the early 

morning hours of 22 February 2012.

Prior to the robbery, defendant and Bryan Rydzewski spent 

much of 21 February 2012 together in Raleigh panhandling, 

drinking alcohol, and getting high on crack cocaine. After 

splitting up from Rydzewski at some point during the day, 

defendant met back up with Rydzewski shortly after midnight on 

22 February 2012. At that point, Rydzewski was joined by Tyrone 

Cox on a park bench. There defendant, Rydzewski, and Cox smoked 

crack cocaine for several minutes before deciding to get a motel 

room to get out of the cold.

The three men then walked to the King’s Motel, where Cox 

rented a room. Within approximately an hour of arriving at the 

motel room, the three men finished smoking their crack cocaine 

and defendant left the room in search of more crack cocaine and 

girls. Defendant returned to the motel room alone approximately 

twenty minutes later.

Several minutes after defendant returned, there was a knock 

on the motel room door. Defendant opened the door and two men 

with hoods and bandanas covering their faces barged in. One of 

the men approached Cox, held a gun in Cox’s face, and demanded 
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money. When Cox refused, the man struck Cox in the head with 

the gun and took his wallet. The two men then fled.

As Cox recovered and began to call the police, defendant 

indicated he wanted nothing to do with the situation and also 

left the motel room.

Officers from the Raleigh Police Department arrived within 

minutes. While patrolling the area around the King’s Motel, 

Officer Lane noticed a black male in black clothing matching the 

description of the suspects walking down the street and stopped 

him. That man was later identified as defendant. As Officer 

Lane spoke with defendant, he noticed two additional suspects in 

dark clothing running north and radioed for backup. Responding 

officers arrived and detained the suspects and a female. The 

suspects were later identified as Mark Thompson and Joseph 

Tucker (“co-defendant”).

Officers searching the area where Thompson and co-defendant 

were detained recovered a wallet containing Cox’s identification 

and a gun matching the description of that used in the robbery.

Shortly thereafter, the police brought Rydzewski to where 

defendant, co-defendant, and Thompson were detained. Rydzewski, 

from the back seat of a patrol car, then identified each suspect 

as they were individually brought in front of the patrol car’s 
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headlights. At that time, defendant, co-defendant, and Thompson 

were arrested.

On 2 April 2012, a Wake County Grand Jury indicted 

defendant on two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon and

one count of conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous 

weapon for the King’s Motel robbery. Co-defendant and Thompson 

were indicted on similar charges for the robbery. In addition, 

on 16 April 2012 and 25 June 2012, respectively, defendant was 

indicted on a further count of robbery with a dangerous weapon 

for a separate incident and for attaining the status of an 

habitual felon.

Subsequent to the indictments, Thompson entered a guilty 

plea and agreed to testify against defendant and co-defendant.

On 30 August 2012, the State filed a motion to join 

defendant’s and co-defendant’s cases for trial. In response, 

defendant filed a motion for separate trials on 11 October 2012.

Defendant’s and co-defendant’s cases were called for jury 

trial in Wake County Superior Court on 15 October 2012, the 

Honorable Paul G. Gessner, Judge Presiding. After hearing

arguments regarding the joinder of the cases, the trial court 

joined defendant’s and co-defendant’s cases for trial.
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At trial, Thompson was called as a witness by the State and 

testified that he and co-defendant were out looking for someone 

to rob when they bumped into defendant in the early morning

hours of 22 February 2012. Thompson further testified that he, 

co-defendant, and defendant then devised the plan to rob 

Rydzewski and Cox in the motel room. Following the State’s 

case, defendant took the stand in his own defense. Although 

defendant acknowledged that he bumped into Thompson and codefendant while out searching for crack cocaine and girls, 

defendant denied any role in planning or committing the robbery. 

Defendant instead testified that he simply arranged to purchase 

crack cocaine from Thompson and co-defendant and informed them 

of the room where he, Rydzewski, and Cox were staying at the

King’s Motel.

Upon the close of all the evidence, defendant moved to 

dismiss the charges. The trial court allowed defendant’s motion 

in part and denied it in part, dismissing the charges of robbery 

with a dangerous weapon and conspiracy to commit robbery with a 

dangerous weapon but allowing the case to proceed to the jury on 

charges of common law robbery and conspiracy to commit common 

law robbery.
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On 18 October 2012, the jury returned verdicts finding 

defendant guilty of the two counts of common law robbery and 

conspiracy to commit common law robbery stemming from the 

initial indictment. Defendant then entered an Alford plea to 

the additional charge of common law robbery and pled guilty to 

attaining the status of an habitual felon.

Defendant’s convictions from the jury trial were 

consolidated with defendant’s plea to having obtained the status 

of an habitual felon and defendant was sentenced to a term of 

144 to 185 months imprisonment. A separate judgment was entered 

sentencing defendant to a concurrent term of 25 to 39 months 

imprisonment for defendant’s Alford plea to common law robbery. 

Defendant gave oral notice of appeal following sentencing.

II. Discussion

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in 

granting the State’s motion for joinder over his objection and 

denying his motion for separate trials. We disagree.

“The question of whether defendants should be tried jointly 

or separately is within the sound discretion of the trial judge, 

and the trial judge's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a showing that joinder has deprived a defendant of a fair 

trial.” State v. Evans, 346 N.C. 221, 232, 485 S.E.2d 271, 277 
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(1997), cert. denied, Gillis v. North Carolina, 522 U.S. 1057, 

139 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1998).

The law is clear in stating that the 

presence of antagonistic defenses does not, 

standing alone, warrant severance. Rather, 

the test is whether the conflict in 

defendants' respective positions at trial is 

of such a nature that, considering all of 

the other evidence in the case, defendants 

were denied a fair trial.

State v. Love, 177 N.C. App. 614, 621, 630 S.E.2d 234, 239-40 

(2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the present case, the trial court joined defendant’s and 

co-defendant’s cases for trial over objection on the basis that 

both were charged with accountability for each offense. Not 

only is joinder permitted in such a case, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

15A-926(b)(2)(a) (2011) (Permitting the cases of two or more 

defendants to be joined for trial “when each of the defendants 

is charged with accountability for each offense[.]”), “[p]ublic 

policy supports consolidation of trials where defendants are 

alleged to be responsible for the same behavior.” State v. 

Tirado, 358 N.C. 551, 564, 599 S.E.2d 515, 526 (2004) (citing 

State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573, 586, 260 S.E.2d 629, 639 (1979), 

cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929, 64 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1980)).

Nevertheless, on appeal defendant argues the trial court 

erred in joining the cases for trial because the joinder
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interfered with his right to a fair trial. Specifically, 

defendant contends he and co-defendant had antagonistic defenses 

and the joinder of the cases severely prejudiced his defense

because he was prohibited from introducing police testimony 

regarding his statements to police at the time of his arrest. 

Where his case came down to the credibility of the testimony at 

trial, defendant asserts these prior consistent statements, in 

which he denied involvement in the robbery committed by Thompson 

and co-defendant, were critical to bolster the credibility of 

his testimony at trial. See State v. Gell, 351 N.C. 192, 204, 

524 S.E.2d 332, 340 (2000) (“It is well established that a 

witness' prior consistent statements may be admitted to 

corroborate the witness' sworn trial testimony but prior 

statements admitted for corroborative purposes may not be used 

as substantive evidence.”).

As defendant points out, co-defendant filed a motion in 

limine to exclude inculpating statements of defendant at trial

citing Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968) 

(holding inculpating statements of a co-defendant must be 

excluded from evidence unless the co-defendant testifies and is 

subject to cross-examination). Although the State acknowledged 

it would not go into defendant’s prior statements, co-defendant 
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argued defendant would likely attempt to elicit the statements 

on cross-examination. Upon consideration of co-defendant’s 

argument, the trial court granted co-defendant’s motion in 

limine. Thereafter, during defendant’s cross-examination of 

Officer Lane during the presentation of the State’s case, 

defendant was prohibited from eliciting testimony from Officer

Lane regarding the substance of his statements to police at the 

time of his apprehension.

At the outset of our analysis, we emphasize defendant does 

not allege the trial court erred in applying Bruton to exclude

testimony regarding defendant’s prior statements to police.

Instead, defendant argues his otherwise admissible prior 

consistent statements were excluded pursuant to Bruton as a 

result of the improper joinder of his case with co-defendant’s 

case for trial, resulting in an unfair trial.

Upon review of the record, we are unpersuaded by 

defendant’s arguments and hold defendant received a fair trial.

Although Bruton controlled when defendant first had the 

opportunity to question Officer Lane on cross-examination during 

the presentation of the State’s case, defendant later took the 

stand in his own defense. While testifying defendant denied any 

involvement in planning and executing the robbery and testified
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regarding the substance of his statements to police immediately 

following his apprehension. At the point defendant took the 

stand and was subject to cross-examination by co-defendant, 

Bruton no longer prevented defendant from eliciting testimony of 

his prior consistent statements. Defendant’s decision not to

recall those prior witnesses to elicit previously excluded

testimony following his own testimony was a choice he elected to 

make. Yet, defendant was not denied a fair trial where he had 

the opportunity to do so.

In addition to arguing he was prevented from introducing 

his prior consistent statements, defendant further contends that 

there was inherent confusion in the jury instructions as a 

result of the joinder of the cases. Specifically, defendant 

argues the jury instructions prejudiced his case because they

only allowed the jury to find co-defendant guilty of common law 

robbery on the basis that co-defendant acted either alone or 

together with Thompson and defendant. Similarly, the trial 

court’s instruction for conspiracy to commit common law robbery 

only allowed the jury to find co-defendant guilty if codefendant conspired with Johnson and defendant. Defendant 

contends that, because the trial court did not provide the jury 

with the option of finding co-defendant guilty on the basis that 
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he acted solely with Thompson, the jury instruction was 

susceptible to the construction that the jury must convict him 

if they determined co-defendant was guilty.

We acknowledge that our Supreme Court “has repeatedly held 

that, when two or more defendants are jointly tried for the same 

offense, a charge which is susceptible to the construction that 

the jury should convict all if it finds one guilty is reversible 

error.” State v. Tomblin, 276 N.C. 273, 276, 171 S.E.2d 901, 

903 (1970). This, however, is not one of those cases.

In charging the jury, the trial court issued separate 

instructions for each defendant on each charge. A review of the 

instructions reveals the instructions were clear that in order 

to convict defendant the jury must find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that defendant had a role in the robbery or conspiracy. 

Thus, we hold the jury instructions adequately separated 

defendant’s and co-defendant’s cases for determination by the 

jury and we find no merit to defendant’s argument.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, we hold the trial court 

did not err in joining defendant’s and co-defendant’s cases for 

trial.

No error.
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Judges McGEE and DILLON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).