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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE READ INSTRICTIONS

BEFORP: COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER

ART Research Report 1427

2. GOVT ACCESSION NO RECIPIENT'S CATAi_OG NUMBER

4. TITLE (and Sublllle)

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "PEOPLE RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT" ACTIONS TO IMPROVE ARMY RESERVE

COMPONENT READINESS

TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHORfs;

James A. Bynum and M. A. Fischl

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER'S)

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJ ECT TASK

AREA a WORK UNIT NUMBER:

2Q263743A794

n. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS

U.S. Army Research Institute for the

Behavioral and Social Sciences

5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, VA 22333-5600

12. REPORT DATE

February 1986

13. NUMBER OF PAGti

86

U. MONITORING AGENCY NAME 4 ^DDRESS(lt dlllarent Irom Conlrolling Oltica) 15. SECURITY CLASS, (ol thia report)

UNCLASSIFIED

15a. DECL ASSI FlC ATION DOWNGRADING

SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION ST ATEMEN T Co/ th/» RoportJ

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (ol the abstract entered In Block 30, II dlllerent Irom Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reveree aide it necesaary and identity by blocir number)

Army Reserve Reserve Readiness

Army National Guard Manpower/Personnel Research

Reserve Components Training Research

USAR

20. lk.B&TRIKtZr (X:otitlniia aarvrara* alrta ft n^c^amarj aod idanlitr by block number) /T-.^TIOO^>»N

Oata and documentation published by the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)

Headquarters were reviewed, FORSCOM staff personnel were interviewed, and other

Department of Defense documents were reviewed and personnel interviewed.

MOB qualification and personnel were cited as the most critical Manpower,

Personnel, and Training issues limiting Reserve Component (RC) readiness in

FY83. Manpower strength may be more a function of policy and budget constraint,

but there are indications that recruiting and retention are becoming problems.

Training was not cited as a critical factor impeding readiness m the KC;

DD , '°^yy \m EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE UNCLASSIFIED

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however, the potential profit from training and human factors research and

development is significant.

A planned, systematic, program of research and development in recruiting,

retention, motivation and morale would benefit the RC. The RC would benefit

from a plan that would apply currently available training and human factors

technology to the RC's unique troop and individual ready reserve issues, while

simultaneously providing for testing and applying high technology as it becomes

available.

UNCLASSIFIED

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ii
Research Report-1427

\

\

R^ecommendations for

"People Research and Development" Actions

to Improve Army Reserve Component Readiness

Prepared by

James A. Bynum

M. A. FischI

for

Technical Director

./

U. S. Army

Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences <.

February 1986

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

WM. DARRYL HENDERSON

EDGAR M. JOHNSON COL, IN

Technical Director Commanding

Technical review by

Randall M. Chambers

Glenda Y. Nogami

Robert J. Seidel

NOTICES

DISTRIBUTION: Primary distribution of this report has been made by ARI. Please address correspondence concerning distribution of reports to; U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral

and Social Sciences, ATTN: PERI-POT, 5001 Eisenhower Ave., Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600.

FINAL DISPOSITION: This report may be destroyed when it is no longer needed. Please do not

return it to the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.

NOTE: The findings in this report are not to be construed as an official Department of the Army

position, unless so designated by other authorized documents.
Research Report 1427

Recommendations for

"People Research and Development" Actions

to Improve Army Reserve Component Readiness

Prepared by

James A. Bynum

M. A. FischI

for

Technical Director

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333-5600

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

February 1986

Army Project Number

2Q263743A794

Education and Training

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

Ill
FOREWORD

Since 1970, when the Secretary of Defense articulated the concept of a Total Force, consisting of both

active and reserve components of our military departments, the role of the Army's Reserve Components has

changed from "an adopted child" to that of "joint heir," with significant responsibility for a major role in

the Army's mission. Those responsibilities continue to increase. The level of readiness of the Reserve

Component is therefore critical to the Army's ability to perform its mission.

This report is an expanded briefing, which describes some manpower, personnel, and human performance

issues that affect the readiness of the Army Reserve Component; and it argues for the adoption of some soldier research and development actions that could and should be taken to improve the readiness of this

component.

EDGJ^ M. JOHNSON

Technical Director
"& -^

U z ^ G no i^

^ I 1- (c ") 3 2. ^

5- /M c -^p-3 l^

%

^u
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "PEOPLE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT"

ACTIONS TO IMPROVE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

/ REQUIREMENT:

Review Reserve Component readiness, determine the manpower, personnel, and training issues

which impede readiness, and recommend people-oriented research and development actions which

would lessen the impediment and increase readiness.

PROCEDURE:

Data and documentation published by the US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Headquarters were

reviewed, FORSCOM staff personnel were interviewed, and other Department of Defense documents

and reports were reviewed and personnel interviewed.

vll
FINDINGS:

In terms of Manpower, Personnel and Training issues, MOS qualification and personnel were cited

as the most critical factors limiting Reserve Component readiness in FY83. Manpower strength

appears to be more a function of policy and budget constraint, but there are indications that

recruiting and retention are becoming problems. A planned, systematic program of research and

development in recruiting, retention motivation and morale would benefit the RC. Training was not

cited as a critical factor impeding readiness in the RC, however, the potential profit from

training and human factors research and development is significant. The RC would benefit from a

plan that would apply currently available training and human factors technology to the RC's unique

troop and individual ready reserve issues while simultaneously providing for testing and applying

high technology as it becomes available.

UTILIZATION OF FINDINGS:

These findings have been and will continue to be used by proponents of the Reserve Components

to identify research requirements and to assign priorities to them. These findings can be used by

the Army Research Institute to modify current research programs and to develop new research programs to meet Reserve Component needs and requirements.

VXXl
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "PEOPLE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT" ACTIONS

TO IMPROVE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION 1

BACKGROUND 2

RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS 4

MANPOWER/PERSONNEL FACTORS AND READINESS 9

TRAINING FACTORS AND RFJ^INESS 24

CONCLUSION 58

REFERENCES 62

APPENDIX A, FY83 UNIT ANNUAl, TRAINING PFJIFORMANCE 63

ix
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Selected Reserve: The Reserve Component manpower authorized in the annual

authorization acts. The term includes all Guard or Reserve

members In training categories or on full-time active duty,

whether or not they are planned to mobilize with Reserve

Component units. Selected Reserve accounting also includes

those individuals vraiting in the training pipeline. Those in

the training pipeline cannot be mobilized until training is

completed.

Selected Reserve

Wartime Unit Requirement: The required trained personnel to fully man Reserve Component

units upon mobilization.

Programmed Unit Strength: The trained unit strength immediately available for mobilization. This includes:

a. All members of Selected RC units.

b. Ml Active Component or Active Guard and Reserves

scheduled or designated to mobilize with Selected Reserve

units, excluding those members in the training pipeline.

Programmed unit strength does not include:

a. Individual mobilization augmentees.

b. Inactive National Guard manpower.
INTRODUCTION

In April 1984 a briefing citing the need for training research and development to support Army Reserve

Component readiness was presented at an Army Research Institute planning conference. This briefing was based upon

a cursory review of data available within the Headquarters, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). The limited Information presented was sufficiently compelling that the scope of the data collection was expanded to Include other

areas In which soldier-related R&D might be developed to improve reserve component readiness. This report is the

result of that effort.

The thesis of this report is that Reserve Component readiness can be Increased by applying new developments in personnel performance and training research to current problems, and by planning a program of research

and development for those issues and problems for which longer term budgeting or waiting on emerging technologies

Is required. This thesis is based upon data and documentation published by FORSCOM, the Office of the Secretary

of Defense Reserve Forces Policy Board, and interviews with FORSCOM and OASD(RA) staff personnel.

This report Is patterned after a briefing format rather than the standard research report format. The

various tables, charts, and graphs were Intended to be self-explanatory with minimal supporting discussion. The

data upon which the tables, charts, and graphs are based, by their nature change frequently. Therefore, to have

closure, we elected to present the data available through the end of Fiscal Year 1984. Further, the data and

findings presented are sufficient to indicate, but are not an exhaustive analysis of, R&D opportunities.

More data, and more up-to-date data, are available; and a more detailed analysis is required to construct a

complete research and development program to Improve reserve component readiness.

In this report a problem or Issue which Impedes readiness is discussed and one or more research and development actions is recommended. Recommendations run the gamut from adapting existing research products to planning

research specifically for the Reserve Components. As is the case with the data, these recommendations are not

exhaustive, merely suggestive. The report is not Intended to be a research plan but rather Is intended to

convince the reader that a research and development plan could be prepared and executed to significantly improve

reserve component readiness.
BACKGROUND

In 1970, then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird articulated a Total Force Concept,

directing that the Secretaries of the Military Departments provide for the resources

necessary to permit a balance in the development of Active, Guard, and Reserve Forces.

In 1973, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger elevated that Concept by stating that the

Concept would become Policy," ... integrating the Active, Guard and Reserve Forces into

a homogeneous whole." Thus, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard now comprise

the Reserve Component of the Army's Total Force. Table 1 portrays the various

categories and sub-categories of this Component. Table 2 shows the contribution of the

Reserve Components to the Total Force in terms of the types and numbers of Major

Elements.
TABLE 1

RESERVE COMPONENT CATEGORIES

1 RESERVE COMPONENT CATEGORY

RESERVE

CATEGORY

TRAINING PAY/

RET/CATEGORY COMPRISED OF

MINIMUM NUMBER OF PERIODS

OF IDT RE(^UIRED ANNUALLY

WITH PAY

NUMBER OF DAYS OF ADT

REQUIRED ANNUALLY

WITH PAY REMARKS

R

E

A

D

Y

B

n

S

B

ft

V

E

SELECTED

RESERVE

{Units and

individuals)

CODES:

S-Unit

T-Nonunit

U-Tnq Pipeline

M-Mil Tech

F-FTSAGR

A Units of the Selected Reserve 48 For Reserves: Not less than 14

exclusive of travel time. For

Guard: 15 including travel time.

Individual members of the

Selected Reserve

48 12 to 14 exclusive of travel

B Unit and individual members of

the Selected Reserve

24 12 to 14 exclusive of travel

time.

C Unit and individual members of

the SelecL«d Reserve

12 12 to 14 exclusive of travel

time.

D Unit and individual members of

the Selected Reserve

0 12 to 14 exclusive of travel

time.

T

ROTC Cadets who are members of

Selected Reserve Units 48

For Reserves: Not less than 14

exclusive of travel time. For

Guard: 15 including travel time.

F

Nonprior service personnel

currently on initial active

duty for training

0

Not less than 4 months.

P Nonprior service personnel

awaiting lADT (with pay)

N/A 0

Q

Nonprior service personnel

awaiting the second part of

their Initial Active Duty for

Training

N/A 0

u

Nonprior service personnel

serving on the second part of

their Initial Active Duty for

Training

0 AS REQUIRED

FTJLL-TIKE SUPPORT (FTS) ACTIVE GUARD AND RESERVE (AGR)

PERSONNEL

Unit and individual members of

the Selected Reserve

N/A N/A

INDIVIDUAL

READY

RESERVE

(IRR)

E Individual members of the

Ready Reserve

0 Not more than 30. ADT may be performed with or

without pay.

H Individual members of the

Ready Reserve

0 0

CODE:

R I Inactive Army National Guard 0 0

J

Members of the Ready Reserve

participating in officer

training programs

0

As required by the officer

training program.

K

Members participating in the

Armed Forces Health Scholar- 0 45

L Nonprior service personnel

awaiting lADT (without pay)

0 0 Use Reserve category "U".

S

T

A

N

D

B

y

STANDBY

STATUS

CODE:

V

1

Key employees in the Standby

Reserve (Active Status List) 0 0

May perform voluntarily for r

points and affiliate for this

with units of the Selected Re

tirement

purpose

2

Other members of the Standby

Reserve on the Active Status

List

0 0

3 Members of the Inactive

Standby Reserve

0 0

No training or pay authorized.

R

S

T

I

R

B

D

RETIRED

RESERVE

CODE:

V

1 Drawing Reserve Retired Pay

under 10 USC 1331

N/A N/A

2

Drawing Reserve Retired Pay

under other than 10 USC 1331

or other than reasons of

physical disability

N/A N/A

3 Not drawing Reserve Retired

Pay but eligible at age 60

N/A N/A

<t

Not drawing Reserve Retired

Pay but eligible at age 60

(discharged from the Reserve

forces)

N/A N/A

5

Not drawing Reserve Retired

Pay and not eligible at age 60

(Honorary Retirees) (DoD Directive 1200.15, Section II,

paragraphs C.(3)(a) and C.{4)

N/A N/A

6

Members of the Retired Reserve

retired for reasons of physical disability (include members retiring under 10 USC

1209 in Code "3")

N/A N/A

7

Reserve Officers and Enlisted

members who have retired

after 20 or more years of

active duty.

N/A N/A
TABLE 2

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL ARMY

ARNG USAR

MAJOR ELEMENT

% OF % OF TOTAL

QUANTITY TOTAL QUANTITY TOTAL PERCENT

9 35 0 0 35

19 66 3 10 76

2 25 2 25 50

6 25 6 25 50

71 74 7 7 81

4 100 0 0 100

41 47 2 2 49

5 100 0 0 100

43 43 2 2 45

4 57 0 0 57

105 47 18 8 55

6 100 0 0 100

2 11 2 11 22

5 46 5 46 92

197 43 1 13 25 68

14 17 37 44 61

59 37 48 30 67

94 m 57 28 74

16 11 91 63 74

135 24 220 40 64

16 31 21 40 71

0 0 36 97 97

0 Q 12 100 100

0 0 3 100 100

0 0 33 87 87

3 2 117 98 100

4 17 15 62 79

Combat Divisions

Separate Brigades

Special Forces Groups

Special Forces Bns

Infantry Battalions

TLAT^ Infantry Bns

Mech Inf Bns

Inf Scout Troops

Armored Battalions

Armored Cavalry Bns

Field Artillery Bns

Heavy Helicopter Co

Medium Helicopter Co

Pathfinder Units

Combat Engr Bns/Units

Conventional Ammo Cos

Truck Companies (all)

Maintenance Cos (all)

Army Hospitals (MTOE)

Medical Units (other)

S&S Capability

Civil Affairs Units

Training Divisions

Training Brigades

Psycho Opns Units

JAG Units

Corps Spt Groups HHC
TABLE 2 (continued)

ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT CONTRIBUTION TO THE TOTAL ARMY

MAJOR ELEMENT

ARNG

QUANTITY

Major Log Units

(TAACOM and COSCOM

HHC/MMC Commands)

Engr Bridge Co (non-Div)

QM POL Operating Co

Chemical Units-Smoke Gen

Corps Signal Bns

Public Affairs Units

MP Cos (non-Div)

Railroad Units

Watercraft Companies

10

15

0

0

14

53

91

0

1

"I Does not includes 6th CBAC

^TLAT - Tow Light Anti-Tank

% OF

TOTAL

22

48

0

0

47

65

46

0

7

USAR

QUANTITY

12

6

S

28

3

25

40

7

7

% OF

TOTAL

26

19

45

85

10

30

20

100

50

TOTAL

PERCENT

48

67

45

85

57

95

66

100

57
RESERVE COMPONENT READINESS

Army Regulation 220-1, Field Organizations Unit Status Reporting, establishes a

system for reporting the current status of Selected Active and Reserve Component units.

According to the Regulation, the Unit Status Report (USR) has two objectives. First it

is to provide the current status of US Army units to National Command Authorities (NCA),

the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Headquarters, Department of the Army (DA), and all

chain of command levels. Second, it is to provide indicators to DA which: (a) identify

factors which degrade unit status; (b) assist DA in resource allocation; (c) identify

differences in current assets and wartime requirements; and (d) determine Army-wide

trends and conditions.

While USR data are classified, the Reserve Forces Policy Board submits an

unclassified annual Readiness Assessment of the Reserve Components to the Secretary of

Defense which presents a comprehensive assessment of the status of Department of Defense

reserve component readiness in terms of the USR categories: Personnel Readiness; MOS

Qualification; Equipment-on-Hand: Equipment Readiness; and Training. Table 3, extracted

from the Board's latest published report (Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1984) presents a

comparison of critical factors reported in the USR In fiscal years 1982 and 1983 which

have limited overall readiness of the Army Reserve Components.
TABLE 3

CRITICAL FACTORS LIMITING OVERALL READINESS IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS, FY-1983 AND FY-1982

Component

(type of Unit)

Army National Guard

Overall

Combat

Combat Support

Combat Service Support

Most Critical

FY 1983

Equipment on-hand

Equipment on-hand

Equipment on-hand

Equipment on-hand

FY 1982

Equipment on-hand

Equipment on-hand/

Training

Equipment on-hand

Equipment on-hand

Second Most Critical

FY 1983

MOS Qualification

MOS Qualification

MOS Qualification

MOS Qualification

FY 1982

Personnel

MOS Qualification

Personnel

Personnel

Army Reserve

Overall

Combat

Combat Support

Combat Service Support

Equipment on-hand

Equipment on-hand

Personnel

Equipment on-hand

MOS Qualification

Equipment on-hand

MOS Qualification

MOS Qualification

Personnel

Personnel

MOS Qualification

Personnel

Equipment on-hand

Training

Equipment on-hand

Equipment on-hand

The Policy Board reported that the Army National Guard (ARNG) overall readiness was down 3%^ for FY83 compared with FY82. However, substantial improvement was noted in ARNG Combat Units. This was attributed to

the infusion of new equipment and an emphasis within the Army Directorate on improving ARNG combat unit

readiness. The Board compared FY82 and FY83 readiness on each of the readiness elements and reported the

following:

Overall % Change Combat Unit % Increase

(FY82-FY83) (FY82-FY83)

o Personnel readiness

o MOS qualification

o Equipment on-hand

o Equipment readiness

o Training

+7%

+4%

-4%

-3%

+3%

+30%

+ 12%

+26%

+ 17%

+ 17%

^Actual USR data are classified but the Reserve Policy Board has developed a formula which permits portrayal of data in abstract percentages. The reader is directed to Table 3.2A (c) in the Classified Annex

(Secret) to the Reserve Forces Policy Board's FY84 report for complete readiness data.
Overall readiness of the Army Reserve dropped by 4% from FY82to FY83. Equipment on

hand has replaced MOS qualification as the major limiting factor, according to the Board.

Reported figures show the following:

Personnel readiness;

MOS qualification:

Equipment on-hand

Equipment readiness

Training:

Overall

% Change

(FY82-FY83)

No FY82 data available

+4

-8%

-17%

+2%

"The continued ]ow state of readiness of Army Reserve combat units (17% C-3 or

better) continues to be of major concern to the Board. In addition, the sharp

and significant decline of the level of equipment readiness suggests an inability of the Army Reserve to maintain what equipment they have or,

alternatively, an inability to provide an adequate maintenance support base."

(Reserve Forces Policy Board, 1984. p.26)
MANPOWER/PERSONNEL FACTORS AND READINESS

Current and Projected Strength. The graphs below show the growth trend from FY 78, the

low point following the end of the draft and the start of the All Volunteer Force, and

the difference between the wartime strength requirement and the authorized strength.

SELECTED RESEFUE STRENGTH TRENDS

708080

E

N mmm

D 508000

S

T

408000

R

E

308888

N 208800

T

H

188000

•

1*

ARNG

liSAR

jm Fy82 Fy83

SELECTED PESERUE TRAINED NNIT STRENGTH REQUIREMENT

1000800

iliiililliil

UARTINE

ACTUAL

:J

Ym FV84 FV85 FV86 FV87 Fy88 Fy89
AJthough the data show a slight but steady growth, the difference between the wartime

requirement and the imposed ceiling prompted the Reserve Forces Policy Board to express

concern; and the board stated the difference is more pronounced in the Army than in the

other Services. The Board stated that the difference was due to policy and budget

constraints and that the Army could achieve higher numbers were it permitted to do so.

To make this case they provided the data which are shown graphically below. Since 1980

the Army Guard and Reserve have been running at about 102% of authorized strength.

("Attained" data for FY 84 were not available for this paper.)

SELECTED ARNG AUTHORIZED US. ATTAINED STRENGTH

30eeee

zm^m

m^m

AUTHORIZED

ATTAINED

FV79 FY8B FY81 F'/82 FV83 Fy84

SELECTED USAR AUTHORIZED US. ATTAINED STRENGTH

308000

250000

200000

150000

100000

50000

. Iffl..

nil

Jliiiill Jllll Jill

FY79 Fy80 FY81 FY82 FY83 FV84

Bil

AUTHORIZED

ATTAINED

These figures do show a surplus in the Guard and the Reserve. However, there are

indications that the Active Component is experiencing a shortfall in recruits. The RC

is beginning to experience the same effects, attributed by many to the improvement in

the economy.

10
Recruitment and Retention In the Troop Program Unit (TPU). The TPU is used In the

following cases to Illustrate the types of problems in the RC. The FY84 recruiting

goals were not met for the TPU In any category except recruitment of Prior Service (PS)

members. On the other hand, reenllstment goals were exceeded In both FY83 and FY84.

These results are portrayed in the following graphs.

FV 84 USflR TPU ENLISTED ACCESSIONS

38888

25888

15888

5888

I

I

OBJECTIUE

i

ACCESSIONED

69,496

NFS,MALE

NiPSTFEMftLE

PS(FLD)

PS(ISR)

1

;

USftR FIRST TERM REENLISTNENIS j

17888 (OBJECTIVE = 55%). _.

18888 ,

8888 ..

6888

4888 ..

i ,

illlliil :

ELIGISLE

-

r 1 ;

REEHLISTED :

2888

8

"

ra3 Fy84

1

35888

38888 ~

25888 ..

28888 -

15888 ..

18888 .

5888

8

USAR CAREER REENLISTMENIS

(OBJECTIVE = 00%)

.2% iiliiilH

1

ELIGIBLE

1 1

REENLI^TED ;

Fvsa tm 1

1

11
Attrition In the Reserve Component. The two bar graphs below show attrition, by number

and percent of average strength, for both the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve

for FY83 and FY84, with predicted attrition for FY85.

seeeee

zmm

flPNG ACTUAL « PKOJECIED ENLISTED ATTRITION

-"'

^ 5J 1

iinFii jll

i 1

ill 1 I

1 S

Sr3 S li ! 5J...F'/1

1 ;: 1:5 J il!' ^«' 11 Jtiplll

Ym FV84 FY85

AUG'siii'TH

ETS

NON-ETS

ifOir AIIRIT

250890

150099

189009

59000

9

USAR ACTUAL & PROJECTED ENLISTED AITRITIC

1

•o c-i

r^- S.

li

Slip

IZIiiSlI Jill

FV83

' lull.

Fy84

II

11 ^° R

FV85

flVG SIR' TH

ETS

iMiiilliiiilliiiiiliil

NON-EIS

lOI.ATTRIT

12
Attrition In the USAR Troop Program Unit (TPU). The Army Reserve (USAR) TPU attrition

data can be used to illustrate the nature of attrition in the Reserve Component.

Attrition in the TPU has been running about 30% for several years. The pie chart below

depicts enlisted attrition for FY84, showing numbers and percentages of both losses to

the Total Force and transfers within the Total Force.

IPU ENLISTED flTIRIIION

LOSSES '(N:19815)

r I 71.3:'.

TRflNSFERS (W-iTm)

N:66719

The graph below shows TPU enlisted attrition by grade and is presented to illustrate

the pattern of attrition. According to FORSCOM staff sources the peak at E2 represents

those losses attributable to the trainee discharge program, adverse actions, etc., and

the peak at E4 is attributable in most cases to the end of an initial tour with little

or no opportunity for advancement.

20080

15000

10000

5000

IPU ENLISIEC AIIRIIION BV GRADE

\./

-I I I'-

K'"■■■■:ai.-... , , I :::?=E:=;:a.

FV82

FY83

FV84

El E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9

13
An earlier pie chart showed losses to and transfers within the Total Force. The two

pie charts below show a finer breakdown of losses and transfers for FY84; and it is very

clear that not all losses to a Reserve Component are losses to the Total Force. There

Is a degree of movement both to Active Components and to other Reserve Components.

I lOIAL FORCE LOSSES

N-19015

ETS (Ni7369)

[• ] 24,2/

TRftilEblSCH. PGM (N:4598)

MISC. (NiSlll)

mmi (ICI/BESI INI DISCH. (N:2105)

ffiSISSi ^-^'^

REUOCftllONS (N:157fl)

DECEASED (N=262)

lOIflL FORCE TRANSFERS

Ni47704

IRR (Nr37956)

I I 9,9X

TRANS TO AC (N:4719)

9.3X IIXliflllllBli

TRANS TO OTHER RC (N:4416)

1,3X

RETIRED (Ni613)

14
In a study of Non-ETS attrition McGovern (1983) developed case studies of ten selected reserve

companies, which were used to determine the intrinsic and extrinsic and factors which cause Non-ETS

attrition. McGovern also discussed detailed examlples of specific policies and practices which

significantly reduced losses.

McGovern concluded:

1. Non-ETS losses are manageable.

2. This problem must be handled on a unit-by-unit basis.

3. Applying well established leadership principles will reduce Non-ETS attrition.

H. Squad leaders and platoon sergeants are key players.

5. Effective unit retention personnel focus on Non-ETS attrition as much as they do

reenli stment.

6. Effectiveness depends on paying attention to junior enlisted members.

7. Quality and content of training is a basic factor.

8. Battalion Training Management System has a positive effect on training but junior

members still complain about not having enough to do.

9. Equipment shortages frustrate junior members.

10. Pay is high enough unless a person is seriously dissatisfied; then it is not.

11. There is no evidence that enlistment or reenlistment bonuses have significant impact.

12. The perception that leaders "take care of their troops" can play a major role in

minimizing attrition.

13. A positive social atmosphere is effective.

14. Increased family involvement can influence spouses' attitudes in a positive way.

15. Negative employer attitudes continue to be a serious problem for some units.

16. Local employment conditions can significantly increase Non-ETS losses, even in well-run

uni ts.

15
Attrition data are maintained in a Reserve Personnel Master File Inventory at the

Reserve Component Personnel and Administration Center. When reservists/guardsmen leave

a unit, data are collected which include stated reasons for leaving. These data are

then forwarded to the Master File. Stated reasons for transferring from the Unit to the

Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) usually fall into one of the following categories:

1. Local economic situation.

2. Civilian job transfer.

3. Family dynamics.

4. Employer considerations.

5. Promotion.

6. MOS change.

7. Reorganization.

8. Reserve Center availability.

Returning to ETS attrition, Burrlght, Grissmer, and Doering (1982) conducted a study

to develop a model of reenlistment decisions as a part of the 1978 Bonus Experiment.

Fifteen thousand reservists and guardsmen were sampled. This number included between

two thousand and four thousand members who did not intend to reenlist, and who responded

with their reasons. Table 4 summarizes the results of that survey.

16
Table 4

Reasons for Not Reenlisting

Response Category Percent

Conflict With Family and Leisure Time 31.6

Conflict with Civilian Job 30.8

General Dislike of Military 11.4

Dislike of Unit's Training Practice 7.1

Not Eligible for Reenlistment Bonus ^.5

Moving to Take New Job 2,9

Insufficient Pay 2.0

Disagree With Personnel and Pay Policies 1.9

Moving, Job Transfer to Another Area ,1.9

Distance to Guard/Reserve Unit 1.7

Conflict with Educational Program 1.7

Callups/Mobilization 0,8

Other (Health, Extra Income Not Needed ' 1/7

There appears to be ample evidence that the reasons for attrition are known, at least by category.

17
Turbulence in the Troop Program Unit (TPU). Turbulence is cited, consistently, in

Active and Reserve Component units as a principal distractor to training. The two

charts below show enlisted and officer flow in the TPU for FY84.

OFFICER PERSONNEL FLOW

(IHOUSftNPS)

F¥ 84

ENLISTED PERSONNEL FLOW

(IHOUSflNDS)

FV 84

DIRECT IRF DISCHfiRGE

(IPP'I MftND^IOR^

,BS^ REH3UflL

fiCCEPI , , ^ '

ftPP'T- Li ^-^^-<^ 6

:TPU

HflIION;iL

ftCIIHE

• mi

^HISCELLftNEOUS

EETIREHENI

RESERVE COMP,

OIHER

flCII^E COHP,

HON-PRIOE

SERVICE

ftCIIUE

CCIPONENI,

4,

OIHER

PRIOR

SERVICE

8,4/

SERVICE

mi

DISCHARGE

REIIREHENI

18
Manpower/Personnel R&D to Increase Readiness In the RC. Manpower and personnel R&D can

increase Reserve Component readiness through increasing strength in times when

additional strength is required and funded. Since the supply of military age men and

women is dwindling, and both the Active Component and private industry are competing for

this resource, an organized program of R&D seems needed to address such key issues as:

1. What will motivate technically skilled officers and enlisted

personnel to serve in the RC?

2. Are there particularly fertile areas (Silicon Valley?) for

recruiting hi-tech qualified individuals?

3. What would be expected benefits and losses from separating

RC recruiting from AC recruiting?

4. Given that a larger percentage of military jobs will be high technology,

what impact will high technology have on the RC? In particular:

a. How will hi-tech affect personnel requirements?

b. Will fewer people be needed?

c. Will higher skill levels be needed?

d. Can lateral entry at grades E-5, E-6 or higher for civilian-acquired

skills be accepted?

19
e. Can reduced physical standards be tolerated?

f. Is a larger percentage of women for these jobs feasible? What jobs?

For what kinds of units? With what projected effect on unit cohesion?

Attrition, and its corollary retention, are not static issues. A program of behavioral

science R&D could develop a computer simulation model to forecast RC retention/attrition behavior

under various conditions of such parameters as the state of the local and national economy,

international events, unit equipment status and so forth. What are all of the parameters? How

should they be weighted?

Motivations and morale for the RC is another area of manpower/personnel R&D to increase

readiness. For example, if it is true that RC duty is a welcome source of additional income,

provides welcome "camaraderie" with peers, is admittedly a part-time job, taking second place to

the primary, civilian, job, and assorted other nonmilitary motivations to join and stay, then the

following research questions are posed.

1. What is the projected effect of a call to mobilization?

2. What will be expected troop morale?

3. How can the motivational and morale effects be prepared for?

'i. What programs of attitudinal training can be developed?

5. What is the expected success of these programs?

20
A final readiness/strength factor to be evaluated is the potential RC recruitment disincentive

of travel, and hence absence from the civilian job, for military training. To the extent that

this is significant, the MD program could investigate the magnitude of recruiting offset

provided by:

1. Use of under-utilized colleges in the community as a location to provide military

training (the reduction in numbers of young adults in the country will result in

availability of many educational institutions).

2. Use of educational technology to provide more and more training on-the-job, in the

unit.

5. Technology of training simulators, exportable training programs, and other media

which would not involve travel disruption.

21
Some current or recently completed ART R&D of direct relevance to the above Issues Is

pointed out below.

Econometric Manpower Models. ARI Is currently developing economic equations

and computer programs to estimate the relative Importance of factors such as

pay, bonuses, labor market conditions, and educational benefits, to the

decisions to enlist and reenllst. Population projections are in development,

as are early warning systems for recruiting. This work, at present for the

AC, is readily adaptable to RC needs and issues.

Individual Enlistment Decision Making. Survey methods are in development to

quantify the impact of demographic, socloeconomlc, and individual motives as

variables In the enlistment decision process; and in development is modeling

the process. Again, although directed to AC enlistment, the work is readily

adaptable for RC purposes.

22
Management Techniques to Improve Eecruiting. A recruiter assessment program, to screen

out potentially unsuccessful recruiters and to provide job samples for training those

who qualify, is currently operational. Other techniques, such as artificial

intelligence, various other recruiting management topics are in study or can be in this

program.

Technology to Improve Retention and Career Management. Development of an enlisted life

cycle data base to include data on how personnel policies, individual variables, and

organizational practices and leadership affect soldiers' decisions to serve in the Army

Individual and Family Retention Decision Making. Identification of policies which take

into account Array family needs, identify motivators and detractors in family views of

Army retention; perhaps even more relevance to RC than AC.

Life Cycle Cohesion Technology for Units. Development of methods of integrating

soldiers into, and retaining them in, units to maximize readiness. Unit cohesion data

examined for vertical and horizontal "bonding", various personnel policies and group

management techniques with their effects on cohesion, retention, readiness.

23
TRAINING FACTORS AND READINESS

Training is the principal task of military units in peacetime, according to FORSCOM

Regulation 350-2. There are impediments to training RC units that are not experienced by AC

counterparts. The table below was compiled from comments made by FORSCOM staff personnel in

response to the question: "From your perspective, what is the number one problem facing RC units today?"

Table 5

Significdnt Pioblenis Facing Reserve Component iTliitS

TOPICAL

ISSUE

I. CAPSTONE (name

designating procedure

whereby RC units are

assigned to "round out"

active units upon mobilization)

II. Turbulence

III. Leader Qualification

IV. Training Days

V. Equipment ShortagesEquipment Readiness

VI. Training Methods,

Procedures, Locations

VII. MOS Qualification

VIII. Training Proficiency

1. CAPSTONE is somewhat unstable; unit alignments may change sometimes because of a change in command or at the request of the

RC commander.

2. CAPSTONE has command and control problems; some units may not

know their mission.

1. Turbulence runs about 30% annually.

1. Junior leaders lack technical proficiency.

2. Junior leaders lack tactical proficiency.

1. Most reserve units are limited to 38-39 training days per year.

1. Army Reserve units are short of equipment. (The Army National

Guard has been experiencing stepped-up emphasis on equipment)

2. Force modernization fielding plans are inadequate.

1. No areas suitable for maneuver training.

2. There is no good approach for tying together the initiatives for

regional training sites.

3. Units ate dispersed; training is difficult.

4. Self-paced training is not held in high esteem.

5. Level of training is at something less than company/battery level.

6. People in responsible positions are not trained.

7. Units tend to train for their number one priority only.

1. There needs to be a centralized approach to MOS qualification.

1. Level of proficiency is at something less than company/battery

level.

24
RC Unit Annual Training Performance. Each RC unit that undergoes Annual Training (AT)

Is rated In each of five categories:

• Command and Staff

• Training Management

• Training Performance

• Maintenance Performance

• Overall AT Performance

Performance In each category Is rated on a 5-polnt scale where 1 = Outstanding;

2 = Excellent; 3 = Satisfactory; 4 = Marginal; and 5 = Unsatisfactory.

Experienced observers complete the ratings but no attempt has been made to establish

Inter-rater reliabilities. However, If one assumes that there would be substantial

agreement among raters on ratings of "Marginal" or "Unsatisfactory", then those elements

on which ten percent or more of the units received such ratings, singularly or in

combination, might be indicative of problems. Bar graphs for the "problem" elements are

presented on the following pages. Bar graphs of performance on all 42 elements for all

RC units are at Appendix A.

25
CATEGORY: COMMAND AND STAFF

1 EFFECT IUENESS OF NEXT HIGHER HEADQUARTERS

ELEMENT: 50

p 40 ii

E 1 N = 3620 UNITS

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE I

E

N

I

30

20

i M<

26.2% 1 I

j|Ki;i!! I

ill .

10

0

13.1% II

II ill '

li' h Iw liil III 1 Ijlli

11.0%

1 II'ill

Mil Ml Ill III III y!iiNiii{iiliiiiiii

12 3 4 5

_. .

PERFORHANCE RATING

!

1

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES: How effective was the next higher headquarters:

a. In providing realistic guidance and objectives aimed at

Improving the evaluated units wartime/mobilization

mission capabilities.

In providing necessary support and resources to permit

the unit to achieve annual training objectives?

In providing assistance to the unit, as required, in the

accomplishment of training objectives and in the overall

supervision of annual training?

b.

26
CATEGORY:

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

60

50

40

30

20

10 6.3%

COMMAND STAFF

FIRE SUPPORT PLfiNNING

56.9%

22.4%

12.7%

2 3 4

PERFORMfiNCE RATING

N = 2249 UNITS

1.5%

...iiiiiitiiijiiiiiiiiii...

1. Did the unit's fire support plan include all organic,

attached, or indirect support weapons?

2. To what extent did the fire support plan support the

accomplishment of the unit's mission?

27
CATEGORY: TRAINING MANAGEMENT

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

M

p 30

E

R

C 20

E

N

I 10

0

PRODUCTIUE USE OF FULL TRAINING DfiV FOR EACH SOLDIER

27.87. 29.2%

31.3X

N = A239 UNITS

10.6%

1l!ffl!ll

.9%

.,iiiiitiiit|iiiiiiiiti...

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

1. To what extent was available training time used to maximize

training benefits?

2. Consider the plan to keep each soldier in a

learning/teaching situation throughout each training

period/exercise.

28
"^,

CATEGORY:

ELEMENT:

i

FY83

AT PERFCVRMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

40

30

20

10

0

21.9%

mil

TRAINING MANAGEMENT

IRftlNING SUPERUISION/BIMS

38.6%..

28.3%

liiiil

N = 4181 UNITS

9.9%

1.0%

.. )tllli)tll|lilllltlll...

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

1. Were training tasks and responsibilities properly apportioned

between officers and NCOs?

2. Did commanders set objectives provide resources, coach

subordinates, and measure results?

29
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

60

50

40

30

20

10

8

EHPLOVMENT OF CREH-SERUED WEAPONS

51.8%

23.9%

6.6%

N = 2861 UNITS

15.6%

.8%

12 3 4 5

PERFORMfiNCE RATING

1. Were crew served weapons stored, maintained, moved, and

employed properly?

2. Were weapons systems integrated Into defensive fire plans to

maximize coverage and minimize threat?

3. Consider all crew-served type weapons, not just those

reported in Part II.

r

,**»'

30
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

1 KNOHLEDGE « USE OF TflCTICfiL SOP

p

60

50

52.6%

E

R

C

E

N

40 .

30

20

N = 3470 UNITS

T

10

9

13

1

8%

2.5%

iiiiiiHiiiiiiniiiii

12 3 4 5

PERFORMftNCE RATING

1. Did the unit have a tactical SOP?

2. Were personnel familiar with and did they understand and

comply with the unit tactical SOP?

31
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

50

m

30

20

10

0

ftBILITV TO CONDUCT SUSTAINED OPNS/SUPT HISSIONS

N = 3892 UNITS

19.7%

-.0%

1.07.

...iiiiitiiii|iiiiiiiiii...

2 3 4

PERFORMfiNCE RATING

Did the unit demonstrate the ability to operate in a field

environment over extended periods or "around-the-clock" with

available resources?

32
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

1

50

40

CfiHOUFLAGE TECHNIQUES

p

E

R

C

E

N

I

47.0%

= 3A23 UNITS

30

20

10

11.7%

30. 2%

IT

10 . 3%

0

III .5%

1 2 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

1. Were proper camouflage procedures and techniques used

throughout all tactical operations by all unit personnel,

including proper individual and equipment techniques?

33
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

50

40

20

10

13.3%

OPERATIONS SECURIiy (OPSEC)

48.A%

27.5%

llililillilllllllill

N = 3689 UNITS

10.0%

n„1,.?I„

2 3 4

PERFORHANCE RATING

1. Were correct OPSEC procedures employed Including:

a. TOC security?

b. Document security?

c. Signal security?

d. Emplojonent of deception techniques?

34
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

P

E

R

C

E

N

I

59

40

30

20

10

LOCAL TACTICAL SECURIiy MEASURES

N = 3484 UNITS

10.5% 10 . 3%

12 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

..,:2L.

5

1. Did the unit have and employ effective tactical security

measures as outlined in the unit tactical SOP?

2. Were all personnel familiar with these measures?

35
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

NBC PROCEDURES

40

30

20

10

0

N = 3692 UNITS

23.0%

.6%

5.2%

11.0%

12 3 4 5

PERFORHANCE RATING

Did the unit have a tactical plan for the reaction to

nuclear, chemical, or biological attack, including both

individual and team responsibilities?

Did the unit function effectively while performing its

mission in an NBC environment?

36
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

I INDIU.TRAINING INTEGRftlED 10 COLL, TRAINING BV FIRST-LINE SUPERUISOR

j0

/. O T/

p

40

i

R

c

30 26.4%

lllllllllllltlllKI'l

N = 4067 UNITS

£

N

20 19.0%

1

10

0

1

9. 9%

.8%

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

1. Were individuals training in areas of weaknesses as

diagnosed by first-line supervisors at every opportunity

and when not specifically engaged in collective

training?

37
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

1

60

5e

RADIO COMMO OPERATIONS

p

E

51.5% 11

40 N = 3458 UNITS

R

C

E

N

30 26.8% 1 1

20

T

10 .

0

11.37.

II 1

il l,'^!. 1 .7%

1 2 3 4 5

PERFORHANCE RATING

1. Were proper radio procedures used during tactical operations?

2. Did operators understand and use CEOI?

3. As a whole, did the unit demonstrate full capability to

establish, operate, and maintain authorized communication

systems?

38
CATEGORY: TRAINING PERFORMANCE

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

flPPEftRfiNCE/PHVSICAL FITNESS

50

40

30

20

10

0

16.2%ill

43.9%

29.1%

9.3%

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

N = 4323 UNITS

1.2%

.jiiiiiiiiiiiihiiiiii...

2.

3.

4.

Did all personnel demonstrate proper military bearing

throughout at period. Including personal appearance and

conduct?

Did the unit have an adequate physical fitness program?

Did unit personnel exhibit good physical condition?

Was the unit complying with the Army Weight Control Program?

39
CATEGORY: MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

50

40

30

20

10

17.4%

OPERftTOR HfllNIENflNCE

40.3%

26.0%

N = 3975 UNITS

14.3%

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RftTING

1.7%

^..llllllllll|IIIIDIIII...

EVAI,UATION

GUIDELINES: 1. Were preventive maintenance services performed as required

throughout the AT period?

2. Did unit personnel demonstrate the ability to properly

maintain and effectively operate authorized equipment?

40
CATEGORY: MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

USE OF PUBLICfilIONS/LOG BOOKS

OS

. . --.

49

30 •

26.2%

iiiiiitttmiiiirttii

N = 3851 UNITS

28 . 17.6%III

11.6%

1.2% 9 iiiitiiiii|iiii[)iiii

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RftTING

1. Were required log books, applicable maintenance

publications, and forms on hand and properly used

throughout the AT period?

41
CATEGORY: MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

ELEMENT:

FY83

AT PERFORMANCE

EVALUATION

GUIDELINES:

P

E

R

C

E

N

I

SB

49

30

29

le

e

PREUENTIUE HfllNTENftNCE PROGRAMS

18.4%

11

41 9-

28.1%

IIHIII

ii:

II

mil

N = 3873 UNITS

10.1%

1.2% Pllll . lll>IIIIM|lfl(MIII)...

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

1. Did the unit have and implement an effective preventive

maintenance program for all echelons?

42
Training R&D to increase Readiness in the RC. Readiness ratings of RC units could be increased bychanges in funding to increase equipment and by elevating the Authorized Level of Organization

(ALO) which would shift the priority of the unit. Without the required TO&E equipment it is

obviously difficult to meet readiness requirements. Likewise, it would be rare indeed for units

with ALO 5, 4, or 5 to achieve better than a readiness rating of C3, C4, or 05, respectively,

because the nature of the ALO priority dictates the resources available to the unit and these, in

turn, are an integral part of the readiness equation. Nonetheless, it is our hypothesis that if a

training research and development program is initiated specifically for the RC and the resulting

products are implemented, then performance in recipient units should improve independent from the

unit's priority. The increase in performance should lead, then, to increase in readiness of the RC

unit.

The opinions of FORSCOM staff personnel and the observations of performance during Annual

Training have been cited in this paper as indicative of areas where concentration of R&D efforts

would likely lead to improvements in performance and concomitant increase in readiness. To focus

on the problem areas and to develop a hypothetical (or "strawman") plan, the problems we have

mentioned previously can be conveniently subsumed in three categories: (a) Improving training

quality; (b) Making efficient use of time; and (c) Training dispersed units. The research question

then is: What R&D has been done or should be done that would improve training quality, or help the

unit commander make more efficient use of time, to help the commander train dispersed units? As

43
appropriate answer to the question would be to adapt and apply completed R&D to the immediate

problems; consider RC application of on-going R&D for the intermediate or near future; and plan for

adapting high-technology products and solutions as they become available in the future.

44
Training R&D Goals and Objectives. The goal of this suggested R&D effort Is to Improve

Individual and unit performance In the RC. Attaining this goal can be judged on the basis of

whether or not the objectives listed below are reached.

The following objectives are recommended:

1. Improved Training Quality

2. Efficient Use of Time

3. Trained dispersed Personnel

To be effective these objectives must be reachable and to determine this the objectives

must be measurable. For example, time is rather easily quantified. Improvement in training

quality can be more easily measured if it is operationally defined in such terms as relative

levels of knowledges and skills of soldiers, levels of retention of knowledges and skills,

standardization of instruction, SQT performance, ARTEP performance and the like. Therefore,

R&D and the resultant products should be tested in RC units and adopted for use only when

there is quantitative evidence that one or more objectives have been reached.

45
In the following paragraphs we cite some on-going and recently completed ARI R&D

actions whose products are good candidates for trial as immediate and near-immediate

actions to reach one or more of the objectives above.

Maintenance Performance System; Direct Support is a computer based

reporting system which measures daily, on-the-job individual technical

performance and maintenance shop operation. The system is designed for

use of unit level supervisors for unit level training. It can

identify/describe technical performance practices, strengths, and

deficiencies. The system collects and reports measures such as job

completion time, job status time, manhours per job , and on-the-job

training occurrences.

Maintenance Performance System: Organizational is a computer based

maintenance system designed to support decision-making at the battalion

level. There are four components: a Management Information System

(MIS); action meetings, skill development; and mechanic certification.

The MIS tracks maintenance performance. Action meetings use the MIS data

and mechanics receive skill training and certification based on the MIS

data.

46
Skill Retention Research was conducted to develop a technique that permits estimation

of skill decay based on task characteristics. Infantry and artillery soldier tasks

were measured. This research could be validated In RC units, to determine whether

reliable differences exist between data obtained In the AC and RC, then used by unit

training managers.

Skill Training Methods Research Is being defined to determine which training methods

and strategies result in the best acquisition and transfer for varying types of military skills and how technology can be used to increase effectiveness of training

systems. Comparisons of skill training methods on like RC units could make a valuable contribution to the knowledge of skill training.

Portable Electronic Aid for Maintenance (PEAM) is a compact, hand-portable, device

that presents maintenance information at the field site. The PEAM design integrates

flatpanel thin-film electroluminescent displays, speech synthesis, speech recognition,

sold-state mass memory and microprocessor technologies. This device is presently in

prototype development. If it performs as designed it should minimize supervisor

training requirements, help circumvent soldier reading problms and improve the quality

of maintenance because it will supply on-the-spot guidance for technicians.

47
Multipurpose Arcade Combat Simulator (MACS) Is a low cost part-task

simulator/trainer for light infantry weapons. Different targets and

backgrounds are presented on a TV monitor by computer graphics and a

specially designed long distance light pen and trigger switch "shoot" the

targets. Software permits effects of wind and gravity for different

wind/distance combinations. Other programs train target engagement by

video replay of polnt-of-aim prior to firing and feedback on shot

location. Night firing can be simulated using black, white, and gray

graphics viewed through light attenuating goggles; a bright

white light and voice synthesizer provide feedback. Any MACS program can

be fired with NBC MOPP gear. Software have been developed for the M16A1

rifle, M203 grenade launcher, and the M72A2 LAW. Research on the utility

of MACS to transfer and retain light Infantry weapons skills in RC units

would be valuable. "

48
Model Training Program for Reserve Component Units is a computer-based

training program for training Ml Tank maintenance personnel at the

organizational, direct support and general support levels in the RC.

This program is in development and courseware for MOS 45K, 63H, 45E, and

63E will be available soon. Sixty hours of courseware for each MOS are

being developed. Courses stress simulation of trouble-shooting and

repair actions based on use of appropriate technical documents.

Videodisc computer graphics are used extensively. In addition,

supervisor, trainer, and student guides are being developed to support a

management system designed for the RC training environment.

49
Rapid Train-Up for Force Mobilization is a development whose purpose is to shorten

small-unit mobilization training time by developing methods for quickly training MOS

qualified and non-qaalified soldiers in combat-critical tasks. Initial efforts center

on armor crewmen tasks. In this program trainers are assumed to be subject matter

experts so information is presented on "how to train"; "how to perform" tasks is

omitted. The tank commander and platoon sergeant are the targets and materials consider

the time and resource constraints operating in a mobilizing TO&E unit. Training and

program management materials will be evaluated in Active Component and Reserve Component

units.

Simulation in Combined Arms Training (SIMCAT) is a lowcost tank platoon training

simulation program, extendable to combined arms operations no higher than company team,

using state-of-the-art training technologies and techniques. The program involves four

player stations and one instructor station and features live communication among the

stations; programmed command, control, and comrnanications from a tactical operations

center; and positive and negative consequences of actions taken. This R&D effort could

be used to increase skill levels of junior leaders and improve command and control

performance in RC units.

50
Advanced Technology Unjt Training and Management System (ATUTMS) is a prototype distributed

computer system designed for location in a battalion. It is specifically constructed to test the

concept of a single, integrated computer system, with a Relational Data Base Management System

employed as its foundation, which could function as an automated unit management information

system. It can serve the batallion staff and companies in a variety of functions, some of which

are listed below.

Preparation of training program/calendar

Maintenance of training records

Maintenance of files

Preparation/maintenance of vehicle status reports

Maintenance of inventory

Analysis of vehicle maintenance problems

Analysis of trends for supply requisitioning

SIDPERS data entry/retrieval

Personnel management

Files management

Word processing

Army National Guard (ARNG) Aviator Training Requirements Evaluation is a project to determine

whether or not the current training time available for aviators in the ARNG is sufficient to

complete the established training requirements.

51
Aviator Skill Decay and Refresher Training Is a project to determine the conditions and

course of loss of Individual aviator skills, the relations among original aviator skill

level, amount of skill loss, and amount of re-training required. Research will emphasize

expanding the skills sampling to Include Instrument and night flight conditions and

investigating the use of flight simulators for skill sustalnment and re-training. The

ultimate product will be an RC IRR aviator training program.

Computer Operated and Managed Battlefield Tactical Training System (COMBATTS)

is a program to design and develop prototype training programs for light infantry units.

Some of its products are:

Basis unit training program (ARTEPS with battle drill guidebooks)

A taxonomy of tactical principles (decision making model, process analysis and

rules)

A tactical simulation model computer program (individual soldier through

platoon)

A tactical training simulation system (breadboard hardware/software)

An Integrated unit training program (simulation and on-the-ground)

52
Target Acquisition and Analysis Training System (TAATS) is a series of interrelated combat vehicle

identification programs which have been developed and adopted for use on an Army-wide basis. Both basic

and advanced programs have been developed. Programs provide learning in minimal training time, require

minimal support, train soldiers to recognize at realistic combat ranges, measure recognition training

skills, permit simulation of realistic engagement ranges with all optics, and provide for recognition

and identification of masked vehicles and vehicles viewed through thermal sights. Current research,

which could be conducted for RC units, includes self-pacing via interactive videodisc technology,

multiple target arrays, image enhancement training programs, and special thermal CVI programs for the

TOW and Bradley vehicles.

Investigation of Methodologies and Techniques for Intelligence Analysis is a recently completed

four-year research project. Descriptive models of intelligence analysis processes were developed,

concentrating on the cognitive activity of the analyst and how this activity could be supported with

automation. Decision aids pertaining to different types of Intelligence were developed. One such aid,

ENCOA--Enemy Courses of Actlon--was recently made available. ENCOA exists in two forms: a paper-andpencil manual accompanied by a hand-held calculator, and a computerized version. ENCOA divides the

53
decision problem into tactical components, with each division more specific than the previous one. Two

additional projects are underway. The integrated Tactical Analyst Training (INTACT) project is aimed

at tactical all-source analysis. The Handbook for Strategic Intelligence Analysis (HASTIA) project

focuses on strategic intelligence analysis.

54
Many of the on-going or completed projects cited above have proposed or incorporated the

latest technological advances such as the use of computers for assisting and managing

Instruction, the networking of computers to share training data, and development and use

of data banks for data storage and retrieval. PEAM is an example of a job performance aid

with the latest in technology. As other technological advances become reality, their

application to the problems of training and maintaining RC readiness must be tested. The

following is a partial list of applicable technologies and their possible contributions.

Technology

Teleconferencing

Random Access Memory

Chips (RAM)

Intelligent Videodisc

Satellite Communication

Integrated Self-Instructive

Equipment (ISITE)

Speech Input Systems

Robotics

Holography

Application

Interactive audio and

video instruction

Information storage and

access

Interactive video

instruction

Interactive instruction,

digital data transmission

Combined test and

training devices

Speech recognition

Manipulative skills

training

Three-dimensional

images, training devices

55
In the following Training R&D Matrix we have listed the proposed objectives and

potential payoffs. These payoffs have circular quality about them in that they may also

serve to operationally define the objectives. That is, some payoffs of improved training

quality are improvements in skill levels, improvements in knowledge, improved performance,

etc. On the other hand, if improvement in skill, knowledge, or performance can be

demonstrated as a result of applying one or more of the R&D products then we can state

that the quality of training improved. The matrix also lists products and technologies

according to an imprecise time schedule and we estimate possible payoffs of the

R&D.

56
TRAINING R&D MATRIX

OBJECTIVES

Improved Training

Quality

Efficient Use

of Time

3. Trained Dispersed

People

PAYOFFS

o Improved skill.

o Improved knowledge.

o Improved retention.

o Increased standardization of instruction.

o Improved performance.

o Better training for

junior leaders.

o Improved training for

people in responsible

positions.

o Increased training

productivity,

o Instant retrieval of

data,

o Reduced requirement for

reading levels,

o Reduced training time

for proficiency level,

o Reduced need for training

(Job Aids).

o Reduced travel time,

o Minimal dislocation,

o Improved instructor use.

o Improved communication

and coordination.

IM14EDIATE/NEAR-TERM FUTURE

57
CONCLUSION

This paper has argued for the application of "people-related" research and development

as one important way to increase readiness of the Army's Reserve Component. Several

points merit highlighting.

In 1970 the Secretary of Defense established the concept as the Reserve Component of the

Total Force. Because the Reserve Component makes a significant contribution to the combat,

combat support, and combat service support components of the Total Force, the personnel,

training, and equipment readiness of the RC is paramount. Although budget and policy

dictate in large measure the end strength and equipment status of the RC, the Army should

develop an R£eD program whose target is increased readiness through adapting on-going and

recently completed behavioral research to the unique RC environment. This program should

be designed to monitor, obtain, test, and develop emerging technologies, also. Personnel

management and its attendant problems are not unlike those experienced in the Active

Component but there are some unusual circumstances. Recruiting, retention, and personnel

turbulence problems are still a concern in the RC. Much is known about the problems but

more needs to be learned. In addition, data that are being collected and added to a

"bank" need to be extracted and solutions to the problems need to be derived and tested in

specific units. An attrition rate of approximately 30 percent has been the trend for

58
several years In the selected reserve and, while not all soldiers who are lost to a unit

are lost to the RC, hypotheses for reducing this rate need to be tested in specific units.

More data need to he collected on the relationship of monetary factors to attrition. Data

are needed on differential reenlistment rates according to sex. Guard versus Reserve, etc.

Data have been compiled which explain, at least categorically, why soldiers transfer from

the units to the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), but data need to be compiled to show "who

is \fhere". Reservists who possess critical MOS have left units because of job moves. Data

have shown this migration to be westward where there is a less likely match of MOS with

unit availability. A data bank that would identify individuals by location and MOS is

important to the RC's ability to train and use these soldiers. As strength of the RC

continues to rise, research is called for to determine whether or not it is feasible to

alter physical, age, and sex requirements to ensure needed strength figures in the RC. In

short, more data are needed and more actual testing of hypotheses are called for to

determine how the application of the research findings will change the RC.

Training problems in the RC are, again, not unlike those In the Active Component.

But, again there are some unique differences. The single most prevalent problem is lack

of MOS qualification at any one time in the RC. CAPSTONE has caused some unique situations

with respect to alignment. Junior leaders and those in responsible positions often lack

59
the technical and tactical training necessary for the proper functioning of the unit.

Training performance, as measured during annual training shows typical trends. A number

of units are deficient in the areas of command and staff, training management, training

performance, and maintenance management. It is the environment in which the RC unit must

exist that is unique. The limited training days, the fact that battalion sized units are

often dispersed to opposite ends of a state, or may be in other states, and the fact that

soldiers must divide time between their unit and their career or job makes for a challenging training environment. Research needs to be adapted and applied that will increase the

quality of performance, make efficient use of the time available, and train dispersed

personnel while holding physical movement to a minimum. Increasing skills and knowledges,

increasing retention, standardizing Instruction, and improving the training of leaders can

make a difference in training quality Research needs to be adapted and applied that will

Increase the quality of performance, make efficient use of the time available, and train

dispersed personnel while holding physical movement to a minimum. Increasing skills and

knowledges, increasing retention, standardizing instruction, and improving and training of

leaders can make a difference in training quality. Developing and adapting ways to

retrieve data, reduce training time, use job aids, automate records keeping, and reduce

reading level requirements can save time. Improving communication and coordination.

60
capitalizing on Innovative technology in satellite communications, videodiscs, simulations

and training devices can reduce dislocation and provide adequate training to dispersed

soldiers.

Personnel, training,and equipment are the three key elements in readiness. Current

behavioral research on equipment has been concerned with acquisition of nev7 systems.

Some of this research might be of value in addressing the RC readiness issues, but it is

more likely that researching, developing, adapting, and testing personnel and training

research will have the more immediate return on the Investment.

61
REFERENCES

Burright, B.K., Grissmer, D.W., Doering, Z.D. (1982).

A model of reenllstment decisions of Army National Guardsmen.

R-2866 MRAL. The Rand Corporation.

Department of the Air Force (April 1983). Air Reserve Forces 2000: The

Total Force Entering the 21st Century. Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief

of Staff, Air Force.

Department of the Army, (1981). Army Regulation 220-1, Field organizations

unit status reporting. Washington, D.C: Department of the Army.

Department of the Army. (1983). FORSCOM Regulation 350-2, Reserve

Component (US Army) training. Fort McPherson, GA.: United States Army

Forces Command.

McGovern, J.M. (1983). Non-ETS attrition: Case studies of ten Army

selected reserve companies. Report RA-202. Washington, D.C.: Office of

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs).

Reserve Forces Policy Board. (1984). Fiscal year 1983 readiness assessment

of the reserve components. Washington, D.C: Office of the Secretary of

Defense.

62
APPENDIX A

FY83 UNIT ANNUAL TRAINING PERFORMANCE

63
COMMAND & STAFF

50

p

40

E

R 30

C

E m.. N

T

10

0

EFFECTIVENESS OF NEXT HIGHER HEADQUfiRIERS

47.8%

ill

I 111

llu|iili

1

Ilii

26.24

"ill

' ^11

N = 3620 UNITS

11.0*

:;:llliiii|llliiii

2 3 4

PERFORMftNCE RftlING

1 .6*

1 EMPLOVMENI S CONTROL OF SUBORDINATE UNITS

50

43.2%

p 40. "'!!'i!llif

E

.„.•.:, N = 3416 UNITS

31 .0% R 30 :::;I|»E J. ;i;;- 1;

C '^^ii:- =!

E ?.Vl .. 19-9* m'-i N ^':!|i|!S!Ji -.W v'iil M'illi

I

10 , ''I i

"'^ •'Jir';.;!; i

5.3%

0 .sliiililililii ;:„iiiii;-.;!in

;=j!!:Sii

i;;:5iiii!

;!i

iiili :';! „„::»!

1 2 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

P

£

R

C

E

N

I

50

40

30

20

10

0

13.1%

TACTICAL PLANNING

47.7%

31.5%

llllF'

I ii

N = 3406 UNITS

6.9%

2 3

PERFORMANCE RATING

iiiiniiijiiiioii

4

.6%

P

E

R

C

E

N

I

50 ..

40

30

20

10

0 .

6.3%

i''i^i!niii

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING

56.9%

N = 2249 UNITS

igi ii

*

i|!l|| iill

12.7%

1.5%

...iiiiiiiiiijii'iiiiiii....

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

A-1
COMMAND & STAFF

48

30

20

10

DEUELOPMENT « UIILIZftllON OF JUNIOR LEADERS

27.5*

pi!

33.0*

29.6% III N = 4107 UNITS

8.9%

llllli

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RfilING

.7%

.,..iiiiiiiiii|iiiiiiiiii,.„

1 LOGISTICAL PLANNING

50

43.0%

p

40..

E

R

C

E

N

T

30

20..

10

31.3% N = 2249 UNITS

8

2%

Pllllllll..., .3%

12 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

1 STAFF COORDINATION

40 38.3%

P 30.. 28.8% 28.2%

E

R

C

E

N

T

N = 3241 UNITS

20 ..

.10..

4.0%

0 liliilllii,.,. .4%

1 2 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

A-2
TRAINING MANAGEMENT

40

P 30

E

R

C

E

N

I 10

20

IRftlNING PLfiNNING/fll OBJECT IUES

31.4* 31.7% 31.0% 1 "W N = 4226 UNITS

5.2%

2 3 4

PERFORHflNCE RfllING

30

20

10

PRODUCTIVE USE OF FULL IRftlNING DflV FOR EACH SOLDIER

27.8% 29.2% a

]i!iifl

31 .3%

I

N = 4239 UNITS

10.6%

!

.9%

...illlljilimiililllll....

2 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

40

P 30

E

R

C

E

N

I 10

20

21 .9%

TRAINING SUPERyiSION/BIHS

38.6%

Iflli!

28.3%

N = 4181 UNITS

9.9%

iiaiiiiiii

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

1 .0%

illill iiiiiimi{i<iiiiitit.

A-3
TRAINING MANAGEMENT

30

20

10

PERFORMANCE ORIENTED TRAINING

34.1%

\

N = 4220 UNITS

3.6%

12 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

30

20

10

28.7%

!lH|II!|'!ijli

Hi

f

TRAINING REALISM

35.8%

30-5 IBiiiail

N = 4203 UNITS

4.5*

t^l:ll'l!lllli|IWII

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

.4%

I

40

30

20

38.8*

PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY

30.9%

11

28.9%

N = 4237 UNITS

llilll,. ,JIIIIIIIII|ltll|[1lll„..

2 3

PERFORMANCE RATING

A-4
TRAINING PERFORMANCE

1 SQUflD/CREH/SECTION-LEUEL TRAINING

58

43.2*

p

40 . K ~~ '" N = 3833 UNITS

R 30-

C

E

N

20 . T 10.. 6.8%

R

ililliili!! ,t

... iiiiiiii liii :J2.

12 3 4 5

PERFORHflNCE RATING

I INDIU,TRAINING INTEGRATED TO COLL, TRAINING BV FIRST-LINE SUPERVISOR

4*^ .74

N = 4067 UNITS

26.4%

p

3t)

40.

E

R 30-

C

E 20 19.

N

T

10

0

1 1

ill

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

.8%

..,IIIIIJ))II|IIIHIMII....

1 EMPLOYMENT OF CREW-SERUED WEAPONS 1 KNOWLEDGE « USE OF TACTICAL SOP i

p

E

v

68

50.

51.8%

60

50

52.6%

40 .

N = 2861 UNITS P

E

R

C

E

N

I

40 . N = 3470 UNITS

C

E

N

I

30..

20.

10 ..

0

6.6%

ill ill

23.9%

1

il

iiiiiiii

.8%

30 .

20..

10

e

22.4%

2.5%

1 2 3 4 5

, , , , Illllllllipilllllll

.12 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING PERFORMANCE RATING

A-5
TRAINING PERFORMANCE

50

48

30

20

10

13.5%

liiaaiiiii

lliliil

TftCTICflL FIELD IRfllNING

34.0%

lil

44.6%

Wsi

i

l

i|illlll Ililiii|illl

2 3

N = 3495 UNITS

7.1%

PERFORHftNCE RATING

.5%

Ain<|inmri'

50

40

30

20

10

13.7%

liViliii

CP SECURIIV/ORGftNIZftTION

- 47.8%

N = 3365 UNITS

7.3%

I, Iliijii

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

1 .0%

...iiiiiiiiii|iiiniiiii....

1 NIGHT TRAINING/OPERATIONS 1 fiCUICE/SUPT TO PARENT/SUPTED UNIT (CSS ONLV)

50 46.3%

50 47.0%

40 P

40 ..

p

E 31.3% 3404 UNITS ER 30

32.2%

B II 11 11 N = 3404 UNITS

R 30 C 1

C 111 K ?0 ! 19.2%

E

N

20

14.7% 1

N

I

1 1

T

10

0

!?| ill .5%

10

0 lill III 11 1 ^ • 3* III III iiiiiiiiiiminiiiii ..,|

1

IIIIIIIIHIIIIIIIIIII , .

2 3 4 5 12 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING PERFORMANCE RATING

A-6
TRAINING PERFORMANCE

60

50

40

30

20 ^

10

0

PERFORMANCE OF TECHNICAL TOE MISSION (CSS ONLV)

51 .6%

IHIiiil

In

liill

.jiiillliii

1

N = 1 180 UNITS

32.3\

15.0%

'l^l'"''t|llll['lll

i"i""i iiiiiiiiii|yiiiiiiii iii[iiti't|initiiiii....

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

50

p 40

E

R 30

C

N ''"

I

10

0

INDEPENDENT SUPT OPERATIONS m TEAMS/SECTIONS (CSS OHW

III

lllllliiill

33.3%

lliii

If!

iji

2

N = 1042 UNITS

16.7%

.9%

I'lillljlll'lll'li itlilliln[iitiiiiiil [,.„

3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

50

40

30

20

10

0

ABILITY TO CONDOCT SOSTAINED OPNS/SUPT MISSIONS

19.7%

.jiiiiljlilil.

1

40.9%

26.2% 1

'111

I

N = 3892 UNITS

12.0%

miiqiiiHiii

3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

1 .0%

...lltlltllM|lllillllll....

50

40

P

R 30

C

E

20

10

0

16.0%

ilHI

TACTICAL MARCHES

37.7%

IIIIUII

..llllillllllllllll

41 .4%

N = 3299 UNITS

4.3%

A-7
TRAINING PERFORMANCE

1 DISPERSION/POSIIION ORGftNIZftTION 1 CfiMOUFLAGE TECHNIQUES

50 i^c -,^

50 47.0%

p

40

1

13.3% 1

3483 UNITS P

E

40 . N == 3423 UNITS

E iMiniiiiinin R WVi ■■ R 30 i ' c C 1 E ?P E 20. 1 N

N

I

10

1 2.6%

1 i II 7.3%

T

10

1 1 .7%

'^i III

10.3%

e

1 iiill .3% 0 III 1 1 1 I 1 .5%

IIIIII«II{IIIINIIII I»n|i»ii«ni , 1 '""

12 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

PERFORHftNCE RATING PERFORMANCE RATING

1

48

P 30 .. 27.6%

E

R

C 20 ■■

£

N

T 10.

0

1

SAFETV PROCEDURES

32.6%

I ill

III

36.1%

illilliiiiii

ill

N = 4194 UNITS

'IIIHI ||lfill

l|l||j||| 3-5*

i|yiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiil|ll'

2 3

PERFORMANCE RATING

50

40

30

20

10

0 iilli|lllliillll

1

OPERATIONS SECURITV (OPSEC)

48.4%

N = 3689 UNITS

10.0%

llilllll

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

.5%

11111111III III 11.•!,

A-E
TRAINING PERFORMANCE

50

40 .

30

20..

10

0 1

LOCAL IftCIICflL SECUPIIV MEASURES

48.9%

iliiiiliii

li

iiiiiiilip

1

29.4% llaill

llllllli

3

N = 3484 UNITS

10.3%

4

PERFORMANCE RATING

.7%

" I'"—

5

40

30

20

10

NBC PROCEDURES

39.9%

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

3692 UNITS

5.2%

50

30

20

10

17.3%

1

MIRE COMMO OPERATIONS

33.5% N = 3394 UNITS

2 3

PERFORMANCE RATING

iiiiiii.

4

.5*

T "

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

11.3%

RADIO COMMO OPERATIONS

N = 3458 UNITS

9.4%

.7%

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

A-9
TRAINING PERFORMANCE

1 flPPEflRflNCE/PHySICflL FITNESS 1 FOOD SERUICE OPERATIONS/SftNIIflllON

p

E

c

58

40

30

43.9*

N - 4323 UNITS p

E

R

C

40

30..

20..

■■ 26

|lf|:j

.9^

32.2%

iiii

35.7%

N - 3610 UNITS

E

N

I

20

10

0

16.2%

9.

IIill 1.2%

E

N

T. 10..

a

■■

ii

i|

il 4.4%

iiil 1 .6.

1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5

PERFORMflNCE RATING PERFORMftNCE RATING

P

40 . .

E

R 30 . C

E 20 . N

T

10

0

21 .6%

31 .3%

''PlIIIIR

SUPPLV OPERATIONS

43.7%

m

! Iliilli N - 3917 UNITS

2.9%

llilll.. iLlillllfil

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

.3%

""T"

A-10
MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

ORGftNIZftllONflL HftlNTENANCE

38.

20..

24.2

m II

k

10 i

0 ill

37.8%

N « 3654 UNITS

3.8%

2 3 4

PERFORHflNCE RftlING

.4%

1 OPERftlOR MAINTENANCE

50

p

40 40.3%

£ N = 3975 UNITS

R

C

30 26.0^

' li E

N

I

20.

10

17.4%

mil III II1

! 11 li

' IP

liiiiii

Hi 3%

1.7%

e

1 2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

5

50

30

20

10

USE OF PUBLICATIONS/LOG BOOKS

43.2%

N = 3851 UNITS

1 1 .6%

2 3 4

PERFORMANCE RATING

1 .2%

...llDlllllljllilMIIII....

A-11
MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

1

58

PREUENIIUE MfllNIENflNCE PROGRAHS

p

E

40 .

41 .9%

3873 UNITS

R

C

E

N

T

38

28 .

18

18.4%

IJIiji

1

28 .1*

!!

1 10.1*

aiiiii

8 III ll II 1 ill 1.2%

1 2 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

1 PROPER USE & OPERATION OF EQUIPMENT

58 1

P

£

R

C

E

N

I

48 ..

38

28..

18

41 .6%

32.0% N = 4048 UNITS

8

1.6% .1%

iiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiii 1

1 2 3 4 5 "

PERFORMANCE RATING

A-12
OVERALL PERFORMANCE

1 fli EFFECTIUENESS

48 38.2% ^

p 30..

E

R

C

E

N

I

N = 4335 UNITS

20..

10 ..

20.3%

5.4%

0 ,„. Illllllll .2%

1 2 3 4 5

PERFORMANCE RATING

860926

A-13
U826l9a