1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

VIRGINIA LeFEVER, 

 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 2:11-cv-935 

 JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST 

 v. Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers 

JAMES FERGUSON, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

ALEX LeFEVER, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 2:12-cv-664 

 JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST 

 v. Magistrate Judge E.A. Preston Deavers 

JAMES FERGUSON, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

OPINION AND ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on the following filings: 

(1) The motion for summary judgment of Defendant Franklin County (ECF No. 97),1

the memoranda in opposition of Plaintiffs Virginia LeFever (ECF No. 114) and Alex LeFever 

(ECF No. 75 in Case No. 2:12-cv-664), and Franklin County’s reply memorandum (ECF No. 

131); and 

 

1 All docket references in this Opinion and Order are to the Court’s docket in Case No. 2:11-cv-935 

unless otherwise indicated. 

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(2) Plaintiff Virginia LeFever’s motion for partial judgment on liability against 

Defendant Franklin County (ECF No. 88), Franklin County’s response in opposition (ECF No. 

109), and Virginia’s reply memorandum (ECF No. 123). 

For the reasons set forth in more detail below, the Court GRANTS Defendant Franklin 

County’s motion summary judgment (ECF No. 97) and DENIES Plaintiff Virginia LeFever’s 

motion for summary judgment. As a result of the Court’s ruling, Franklin County is no longer a 

Defendant in this case. 

I. Background 

 This case arises out of Plaintiff Virginia LeFever’s 1990 conviction for the aggravated 

murder of her husband, William LeFever in September 1988. Twenty-two years after being sent 

to prison for the murder, the trial court judge vacated Virginia’s conviction and released her from 

prison. The basis for the trial court’s ruling was the realization that Defendant James Ferguson, 

the forensic toxicologist in the Franklin County Coroner’s Office who examined William 

LeFever’s body in 1988, had lied at Virginia’s trial about his credentials. Following the trial 

court’s ruling ordering Virginia’s release from prison, the Licking County (Ohio) Prosecutor 

dismissed the indictment against Virginia. In the cases before the Court, Plaintiffs sue Ferguson, 

Newark police officers Ken Ballantine and Bill Hatfield, then-Licking County Coroner Robert 

Raker, the City of Newark, Ohio, Licking County, and Franklin County. 

William LeFever’s death occurred while his and Virginia’s divorce case was pending in 

an Ohio domestic relations court. In August 1988, the domestic relations court awarded Virginia 

full custody of the couple’s minor children (Plaintiff Alex LeFever and his siblings) during the 

pendency of the divorce case. Virginia also obtained a restraining order against William. The 

final divorce hearing was scheduled to take place on September 27, 1988, just six days after 

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William’s death. Also during this time period, Virginia was finalizing arrangements to move to 

California with the couple’s children in order to take a new job. (V. LeFever Aff. & 3, ECF No. 

114-1.) 

One week before the final divorce hearing, William came back to the family home to 

have dinner with Alex and the other children, as authorized by an order of the domestic relations 

court. William fell asleep on the couch after dinner and remained at the house overnight. 

According to Virginia, William was scheduled to babysit the children the following day while 

Virginia, a nurse, was at work. (Id.) William acted strangely during the night, similar to the 

manner in which he acted when he had used illegal drugs in the past. (There is no dispute that 

William had problems with substance abuse.) William was roaming around the house naked and 

acting as if he was hallucinating. (Id. at & 4.) The next day, Virginia discovered an old 

prescription bottle of an antidepressant (Elavil) that had been prescribed to her in the past. Only 

a half tablet remained in the bottle even though there were approximately 20 pills left in the 

bottle the last time Virginia opened it. (Id.) 

Later that day, paramedics were called to the house after William became combative. 

William went to the hospital, where he alternated between periods of calmness and lucidity to 

episodes of combativeness and incoherence. William remained at the hospital the next day when 

his behavior worsened. At some point, William admitted to a nurse that he had taken Virginia’s 

prescription anti-depressant medication in an effort to kill himself. Later that day, William went 

into cardio-pulmonary arrest and died. 

After William died, the Newark (Ohio) police investigated the incident. Dr. Patrick 

Fardahl of the Franklin County (Ohio) Coroner’s Office performed an autopsy on William’s 

body and found no physiological or pathological cause of death. Dr. Fardahl delayed his 

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conclusion as to the cause of death pending the results of toxicology tests. At that time, 

Defendant Ferguson was the chief toxicologist for the Franklin County Coroner’s Office. 

Plaintiffs allege that Ferguson and the other individual defendants manufactured false evidence 

to support a concocted theory that Virginia murdered William by injecting him with 

amitriptyline, arsenic, and strychnine. A toxicology report prepared by Ferguson, however, 

showed no presence of poisons such as arsenic or strychnine. Ferguson opined at trial that 

Virginia injected William with amitryptiline and that she must have also inserted ant killer and 

rodent bait into William’s rectum. Ferguson’s explanation of the ant killer and rodent bait was, 

according to Virginia, a way to square his theory with the fact that arsenic and strychnine were 

present in William’s colon but not in his blood or urine. (ECF No. 114 at PAGEID# 3931.) 

Virginia was ultimately convicted of aggravated murder and sentenced to life in prison. 

After Virginia’s conviction, Ferguson wrote a “book or screen play” about the trial, portraying 

himself as a hero whose toxicology analysis solved William’s death and proved that Virginia 

murdered him. Virginia contends that Defendants Ferguson, Ballantine, and Raker concealed 

exculpatory evidence and fabricated the theory of poisoning that led to Virginia’s conviction. 

Among Virginia’s contentions: 

 Defendant Ferguson concealed his “countless prior acts of perjury” as well as his own 

conclusion that it was impossible to determine how arsenic got into William’s body; 

 Detective Ballantine concealed a witness statement relating to the lot numbers of 

syringes stocked at the nurse staffing agency where Virginia worked (relevant to 

Ferguson’s theory that Virginia injected William with amitryptiline), as well as notes 

of a conversation with Dr. Fardahl in which Dr. Fardahl said he could not tell how the 

strychnine entered William’s body; 

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 Dr. Raker concealed the fact that he could not conclude how arsenic and strychnine 

entered William’s body. (ECF No. 114 at PAGEID# 3933.) 

Virginia maintained her innocence throughout. In 2005, she brought a civil action to 

have William’s official cause of death changed. It was through this civil action that Virginia was 

able to discover Ferguson’s checkered past. In addition to the “concocted” results of the 

toxicology test, Virginia discovered that Defendant Ferguson lied about his background and 

credentials to be a forensic toxicologist. At Virginia’s murder trial, Ferguson testified that he 

received a degree from The Ohio State University in 1972. In fact, Ferguson did not obtain his 

college degree until December 1987, less than a year before he began investigating William’s 

death. Yet, since the 1960s, Ferguson represented in various courts that he was a qualified 

forensic scientist and was permitted by Defendant Franklin County to testify as an “expert 

witness” at hundreds of criminal trials in which he lied about his qualifications. 

In 2010, Ferguson pleaded no contest to falsification charges and was convicted of lying 

under oath. Armed with evidence of Ferguson’s lies and checkered past, Virginia sought a new 

trial. In November 2010, the same judge who presided over her criminal trial two decades earlier 

granted Virginia’s motion for a new trial and ordered Virginia’s immediate release from prison. 

In April 2011, the Licking County prosecutor dismissed the case against Virginia. At the time of 

Virginia’s release from prison, Alex was 26 years old. Alex’s lawsuit alleges that he was 

wrongly separated from his mother during his formative years and that his mother’s arrest and 

subsequent conviction caused him to be unlawfully seized and taken into custody by Licking 

County Children’s Services. 

In Case No. 2:11-cv-935, Virginia filed suit against Ferguson, Officer Ken Ballantine, 

Officer Bill Hatfield, Dr. Robert Raker, the City of Newark, Franklin County, and Licking 

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County, alleging federal and state causes of action arising out of her wrongful arrest and 

conviction for her husband’s murder. (ECF No. 2 in Case No. 2:11-cv-935.) In Case No. 2:12-

cv-664, Alex followed suit, asserting federal and state claims against the same Defendants. 

Alex’s amended complaint in this case alleges violation of his constitutional rights and tortious 

conduct by Defendants in connection with the injuries allegedly arising out of his mother’s 

wrongful arrest and conviction for murdering William. Defendant Franklin County moves for 

summary judgment on all claims asserted by both Virginia and Alex; Virginia moves for 

summary judgment on liability as to Franklin County. (ECF Nos. 88, 97.) Those motions are 

now ripe for this Court’s adjudication. 

II. Discussion 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The Court may therefore grant a motion for summary judgment if the nonmoving party 

who has the burden of proof at trial fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 

of an element that is essential to that party’s case. See Muncie Power Prods. v. United Techs. 

Auto., Inc.., 328 F.3d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 

322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). 

In viewing the evidence, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

nonmoving party, which must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of 

material fact for trial. Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 

U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)); Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass’n, 

328 F.3d 224, 234 (6th Cir. 2003). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Muncie, 328 F.3d at 

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873 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 

202 (1986)). Consequently, the central issue is ‘“whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must 

prevail as a matter of law.’” Hamad, 328 F.3d at 234-35 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-

52). 

A. Virginia’s Claims against Franklin County 

Before proceeding to the merits of the claims against Franklin County, the Court must 

first determine what claims Virginia asserted against Franklin County and what claims are left. 

Franklin County contends that Virginia’s Complaint alleges only state-law claims for negligent 

hiring, supervision, and retention (Count XI) and respondeat superior (Count XIV). (ECF No. 97 

at PAGEID# 3469.) Virginia disputes this in her opposition to summary judgment, maintaining 

that she has asserted Section 1983 claims against Franklin County under the authority of Monell 

v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (ECF No. 114 at PAGEID# 3957.) Whether 

Virginia has Monell claims against Franklin County is significant for purposes of this Court’s 

adjudication of the County’s motion for summary judgment: if the County is correct that Virginia 

has asserted only state-law claims against Franklin County, the Court may summarily grant 

summary judgment in favor of the County, as Virginia expressly abandoned all of her state-law 

claims against Franklin County. (ECF No. 114 at PAGEID# 3923.) See Spengler v. 

Worthington Cylinders, 514 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017 (noting that a plaintiff may not defeat 

summary judgment by asserting a claim not pleaded in the complaint). 

1. Did Virginia Plead a Monell Claim Against Franklin County? 

To assess whether Virginia has asserted Section 1983 claims against Franklin County, the 

Court naturally looks to Virginia’s Complaint in this action. Virginia alleges Section 1983 

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claims in Counts I, II, III, IV, and V of the Complaint.2 Each of these counts is structured 

similarly in that the first few paragraphs under each of them describe the alleged misconduct of 

the “Individual Defendants.” (Compl. && 89-93, 98-101, 104-109, 112-115, 118-123, ECF No. 

2 at PAGEID# 20-26.) The final paragraphs under each count then go on to allege “policy” and 

“practice” in such a manner as to give notice that Virginia is asserting a Monell theory of 

liability. In Count I, Virginia alleges: 

95. These widespread practices, so well-settled as to constitute de facto policy 

in the Newark Police Department, were able to exist and thrive because municipal 

policymakers with authority over the Department exhibited deliberate indifference 

to the problem, thereby effectively ratifying it. 

96. The widespread practices described in the preceding paragraphs were 

allowed to flourish because the City of Newark declined to implement sufficient 

training and/or any legitimate mechanism for oversight or punishment. 

(Id. && 95-96 (emphasis added).) 

Counts II through V contain different language regarding “policy” and “practice,” but 

also make clear that Virginia is asserting a Monell claim in those counts. Each of those counts 

alleges verbatim-- 

The misconduct described in this Count was undertaken pursuant to the policy 

and practice of the Newark Police Department in the manner described more fully 

in preceding paragraphs, and was tacitly ratified by policymakers for the 

Defendant City of Newark with final policymaking authority. 

(Id. && 102, 110, 116, 124 (emphasis added).) 

 Notably, the “policy” and “practice” allegations are against the City of Newark or its 

police department only. There is no policy or practice allegation against Franklin County. Thus, 

Franklin County takes the sensible position that there are no Section 1983 Monell claims alleged 

against it in the Complaint, only state-law claims. 

 

2

 Virginia has since abandoned Claim IV, which alleged a Section 1983 “failure to intervene” claim. (ECF No. 114 

at PAGEID# 3923.) 

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 Despite the Complaint being devoid of express Monell liability allegations against 

Franklin County, Virginia contends that there are Section 1983 claims pending against the 

County. (ECF No. 114 at PAGEID# 3957-58.) In support of her contention, Virginia uses the 

calling card of the haphazard pleader: she says she has done enough under the “notice pleading 

standard” to put Franklin County on notice that she has pursued a Monell claim against it all 

along. (Id. at PAGEID# 3958.) Citing Spengler, Virginia says she can “assert a cause of action 

at the summary judgment stage even if the label for that cause of action did not appear in the 

complaint, as long as the allegations in the complaint apprise the defendants of the grounds for 

relief.” (Id. at PAGEID# 3958-59.) Unfortunately for Virginia, the notice pleading standard is 

not as forgiving as she would like it to be in this case. 

 The Court fails to see how the Complaint can give fair notice that Virginia sought to hold 

Franklin County liable under Section 1983. In the factual recitation preceding Counts I through 

V of the Complaint, and then in Counts I through V themselves, the Complaint is meticulous in 

laying out the facts underlying Virginia’s claims. And significantly, Virginia employed language 

in Counts I through V that made it quite clear she was asserting Section 1983 Monell liability. 

That language, however, specified that she was pursuing Monell liability against the City of 

Newark only: she identified neither Franklin County nor Licking County (also named as a 

Defendant) as Defendants being sued in the Section 1983 claims asserted in Counts I though V. 

In light of the glaring omission of Franklin County as a Defendant in Counts I through V—when 

Virginia demonstrated the ability to detail her claims so meticulously—Franklin County could 

not possibly be on notice that Virginia was asserting a Monell claim against it. And it is entirely 

plausible for Franklin County to have viewed its omission from Counts I through V as having 

been deliberate: with Defendant Ferguson having lied about his credentials and Virginia accusing 

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Ferguson of framing her for her husband’s murder, it is entirely reasonable for Franklin County 

(or anyone reading the Complaint for that matter) to have concluded that Virginia chose not to 

pursue entity liability on a theory that Ferguson’s actions were so rogue as to make a “policy” or 

“practice” theory too implausible to pursue. 

Nonetheless, Virginia argues that her Complaint gives fair notice that she is asserting 

constitutional claims against Franklin County because it contains allegations that “she was 

wrongfully convicted” as a result of constitutional violations perpetrated by Defendant Ferguson 

and further alleges that Franklin County is liable “because of Mr. Ferguson’s acts.” (ECF No. 

114 at PAGEID# 3595 (citing Compl. && 9, 42, 160-162).) The Court fails to see, however, 

how these allegations could fairly inform Franklin County that it was being sued on a Section 

1983 claim when it was not identified as one of the defendants being sued in Counts I through V. 

Cf. Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 494-95 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the mere mention of the 

word “train” once in factual allegations was not enough to put defendant on notice of a failureto-train claim under Section 1983). Just because Virginia identified Ferguson (Franklin 

County’s employee) as a principal bad actor and specified respondeat superior liability (a theory 

since abandoned) as to Franklin County does not give notice that Virginia was pursuing a Monell 

claim. Since there is no respondeat superior liability in Section 1983, the recitation that Franklin 

County was liable because of Defendant Ferguson’s acts does not put the County on notice that it 

is being sued on a Monell claim. See Everson, 556 F.3d at 495 (reciting the rule that “Section 

1983 liability must be premised on more than mere respondeat superior”). The more plausible 

interpretation of the respondeat superior allegations is that Virginia was seeking to hold the 

County liable on the state law claims under a respondeat superior theory. For these reasons, the 

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Court finds that Virginia’s Complaint does not give fair notice of a Monell claim against 

Franklin County. 

The cases Virginia relies upon do not change this Court’s view. She cites Spengler as 

support for the proposition that she need not have pleaded the specific legal theory upon which 

she was suing Franklin County so long as she fairly apprised the County of her claim. As set 

forth above, however, her allegations did not fairly apprise Franklin County that Virginia was 

asserting a Section 1983 Monell claim against it. In any event, Spengler is readily 

distinguishable. In Spengler, the plaintiff sued the defendant for age discrimination under the 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), but did not allege his theory of “retaliatory 

discharge” in a separate count of the complaint. Spengler, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 1017. Despite the 

plaintiff’s failure to allege a separate count of retaliatory discharge under the ADEA, the Court 

nonetheless found that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to apprise the defendant of a 

retaliatory discharge claim. Id. 

In Spengler, however, it was readily obvious from the allegations in the Complaint that 

the plaintiff was asserting a retaliatory discharge claim. Indeed, the Court cited a number of 

paragraphs of the plaintiff’s complaint that made it impossible not to discern that plaintiff was 

alleging an ADEA claim under retaliatory discharge theory. Id. at 1017-18. And, significantly, 

the Spengler plaintiff expressly pleaded an ADEA claim against the defendant. These 

circumstances stand in stark contrast to the present case, where Virginia’s Section 1983 Monell 

claims failed to name Franklin County as a defendant being sued under that legal theory. 

Accordingly, Spengler does not help Virginia’s attempt to assert unpleaded Monell claims 

against Franklin County. 

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Virginia also cites Joseph v. Port of New Orleans, No. CIV.A. 99-1622, 1999 WL 

615179 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1999), for the proposition that “pleading negligent hiring and 

supervision against a municipality is sufficient to put the municipality on notice of a Monell

claim.” (ECF No. 114 at PAGEID# 3959.) But Joseph is of even less help to Virginia than 

Spengler. In Joseph, the plaintiff expressly alleged liability against a municipality based on its 

“[f]ailing to hire, train, supervise, and instruct competent police officers for its rounds.” Joseph, 

1999 WL 615179 at *2. This was sufficient under notice pleading standards to be construed as a 

Section 1983 claim based on the “custom or practice” of inadequate training. Id. at *3. In 

contrast, Virginia’s Complaint alleges in Count XI’s “negligent hiring, supervision, and 

retention” claim only that the County “hired and/or employed Defendant James Ferguson despite 

having actual or constructive knowledge of his incompetence to perform the job for which 

Defendant County employed him.” (Compl. & 152, ECF No. 2 at PAGEID# 31-32.) Not only is 

Virginia’s allegation made solely in the context of a state law claim, it does not even describe 

potential Monell liability even if she had made it in reference to a Section 1983 claim. Even 

liberally construed, Count XI alleges negligence only as to the County’s hiring, retention, and 

supervision of Defendant Ferguson; it does not allege a policy, custom, or practice of hiring, 

retaining, and supervising unqualified forensic scientists. 

 Quite simply, Virginia did not plead a Section 1983 Monell claim against Franklin 

County. 

2. Franklin County’s Litigation Conduct 

As a last-ditch effort to inject a Monell claim against Franklin County into this lawsuit, 

Virginia argues that the County’s course of conduct in this lawsuit demonstrates that “it has 

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known it faces a Monell claim all along.” (ECF No. 114 at PAGEID# 3960.) Virginia points to 

the following circumstances: 

 Franklin County’s answer asserted as a defense that “[n]o statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, usage, or policy of Defendants proximately caused any injury to 

Plaintiff,” (Ans. & 14, ECF No. 20 at PAGEID# 99), which is a defense to Monell 

liability; 

 The joint Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) report signed by the parties describes “policies of city 

and county defendants” as subjects of discovery; 

 Virginia’s deposition notice served on Franklin County under Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) 

identified County Coroner “policies and procedures in effect from 1988 through 

1992” as a deposition topic; and 

 Franklin County did not object to the Monell-related topics identified in the Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 30(b)(6) notice, but rather produced a designee who testified on such topics 

and brought documents regarding the policies of the Coroner’s toxicology lab. (Id.) 

By citing these circumstances, Virginia is apparently relying upon the “course of 

proceedings test,” which the Sixth Circuit has applied “to determine whether defendants in a § 

1983 action have received notice of the plaintiff’s claims where the complaint is ambiguous.” 

Cummings v. City of Akron, 418 F.3d 676, 681 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Moore v. City of 

Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). The Court is not persuaded. 

First, the “course of proceedings” test applies, by its terms, when the plaintiff’s complaint 

is ambiguous as to the nature of the Section 1983 claim asserted. Virginia’s Complaint in this 

case, however, is not ambiguous. As described above, the Complaint describes the nature of 

Virginia’s claims, including the Section 1983 claims, in considerable detail. There is no 

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ambiguity concerning the nature of the Monell claims asserted in the Complaint: Virginia alleged 

them as against the City of Newark and no other entity. Thus, the Court rejects Virginia’s 

reliance on the “course of proceedings” test as a basis to keep her nonexistent Monell claims 

against Franklin County alive. 

Even if this Court were to indulge the “course of proceedings” test in this case, the Court 

would not allow Virginia to press a Monell claim against Franklin County. None of the 

circumstances identified above is a convincing indicator that Franklin County was somehow 

defending a Monell claim against Virginia all along. As to the inclusion in the answer of a 

defense that no statute, regulation, custom, usage, or policy caused Virginia’s injury, the Court 

acknowledges that the language has some applicability to a Monell claim. But this defense is 

also arguably pertinent to the state-law claim of negligent hiring that Virginia alleged (and has 

since dismissed) in Count XI. 

With regard to the Rule 26(f) report and the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the Court is also 

not persuaded that Franklin County’s actions necessarily demonstrated an understanding that 

Virginia was pursuing a Monell claim against it. As the County argues, the scope of discovery 

under the civil rules is liberal: simply because Virginia was not asserting a Monell claim does not 

mean the policies and procedures of Franklin County were not discoverable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

26(b)(1) (scope of relevant information in discovery is that which is “reasonably calculated to 

lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”). Moreover, Franklin County had good reason not 

to blink at any discovery regarding Monell issues. Alex LeFever’s complaint, unlike Virginia’s, 

alleged Monell claims against Franklin County. Thus, even if Franklin County knew that 

Virginia did not sue the County under a Section 1983 Monell theory, it also knew that it could 

not evade Monell discovery entirely due to the claims Alex pleaded. 

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For these reasons, the Court rejects Virginia’s course-of-proceedings argument. There is 

simply no basis upon which to conclude that Virginia has any Monell claims pending against 

Franklin County. 

3. State Law Claims 

Having found that there are no federal claims pending against Franklin County, the Court 

would ordinarily proceed to the merits of the County’s motion for summary judgment on the 

state-law claims asserted against it. As noted previously, however, Virginia expressly 

abandoned her state-law claims against Franklin County. (ECF No. 114 at PAGEID# 3923.) 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Franklin County’s motion for summary judgment on Virginia 

LeFever’s Complaint. 

B. Virginia’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

In addition to opposing Franklin County’s motion for summary judgment, Virginia filed 

her own motion for partial summary judgment against the County. (ECF No. 88.) In her motion, 

Virginia argues that she is entitled to partial summary judgment on liability because the record 

establishes the County’s liability under Monell for Defendant Ferguson’s actions in withholding 

exculpatory evidence. 

As set forth above, Virginia did not plead a Monell claim against Franklin County. For 

those same reasons, the Court therefore DENIES Virginia’s motion for partial summary 

judgment. 

C. Alex LeFever’s Claims 

Franklin County also moves for summary judgment on the Amended Complaint filed by 

Plaintiff Alex LeFever. As against Franklin County, Alex alleges in his First Claim a Section 

1983 Monell claim based on the purported violation of his due process right to “family integrity,” 

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or, more specifically, the “fundamental constitutional right to live with and be raised by his 

mother.” (Am. Compl. & 99, ECF No. 38 in Case No. 2:12-cv-664 at PAGEID# 191.) Alex also 

alleges a state-law claim for loss of consortium (Fourth Claim). (Id. && 126-127 at PAGEID# 

197.)3

As to the Section 1983 due process claim based on deprivation of Alex’s right to “family 

integrity,” this Court is not writing on a clean slate. This Court previously granted in part the 

motion to dismiss Alex’s claims brought by Defendants Raker and Licking County. (ECF No. 

80.) In its Order, the Court granted Raker’s and Licking County’s motion to dismiss the Section 

1983 claim based upon the alleged deprivation of “Alex’s right to be raised by his mother.” (Id.

at PAGEID# 1565.) In its decision, the Court found that applicable Sixth Circuit precedent—

namely Foos v. City of Delaware, No. 10-4234, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 14842 (6th Cir. July 16, 

2012) and Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2000)—foreclosed Alex from bringing 

a viable Section 1983 claim for “deprivation of familial association.” (ECF No. 80 at PAGEID# 

1566.) The Court accordingly dismissed Alex’s First Claim as to Raker and Licking County. 

In its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment, Franklin County argues that 

the same analysis dictates summary judgment in its favor on Alex’s “familial association” claim. 

The Court agrees. For the same reasons the Court dismissed the First Claim as to Raker and 

Licking County, the Court likewise grants summary judgment to Franklin County. 

With regard to the state-law claim for loss of consortium, Alex’s only argument in 

opposition to summary judgment is that “[i]if his Court dismissed all of Virginia LeFever’s state 

 

3 Alex’s Amended Complaint also alleges a Section 1983 claim based on the Fourth Amendment and a 

state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). (Am. Compl., ECF No. 38 in 

Case No. 2:12-cv-664, at PAGEID# 193-196.) Franklin County is not a defendant as to either of these 

claims. Alex brings the Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim against the individual defendants and 

Licking County only; he brings the IIED claim against individual defendants only. (Id. && 111-115, 121-

123.) 

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law claims, Alex LeFever’s state law loss of consortium claim cannot proceed independently of 

Virginia’s state law claims.” (ECF No. 75 in Case No. 2:12-cv-664 at PAGEID# 1216.) As 

noted above, Virginia has expressly abandoned her state-law claims asserted against Franklin 

County and the Court granted summary judgment to the County on that basis. Ante at 15. 

Accordingly, by his own admission, Alex cannot proceed independently on his loss of 

consortium claim against Franklin County. 

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS Franklin County’s motion for summary judgment 

on Alex LeFever’s Amended Complaint. 

III. Conclusion 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion for summary judgment of 

Defendant Franklin County (ECF No. 97) and DENIES the motion for partial summary 

judgment of Plaintiff Virginia LeFever (ECF No. 88). Franklin County is no longer a Defendant 

in this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Gregory L. Frost 

 GREGORY L. FROST 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

Case: 2:11-cv-00935-GLF-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 06/21/13 Page: 17 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>