J-A10018-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAMES MICHAEL HERO 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 2169 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 3, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0003332-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 6, 2023

Appellant, James Michael Hero, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, following his jury 

trial convictions for possession of a controlled substance, possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and resisting arrest.

1

 We affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

In September 2020, Sergeant Gregory Huff of the Bethlehem Police 

Department commenced an investigation into drug activity occurring at 2291 

Silver Creek Road in Hellertown. Subsequent investigation revealed that the 

property was occupied by Appellant and his co-defendant, Angela Lorah. 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (32) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, respectively. 
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Sergeant Huff was aware that Appellant and Ms. Lorah had a history of arrests 

for drug offenses. Sergeant Huff also participated in a prior investigation of 

Appellant, which concluded with Appellant resisting arrest. 

During the week of September 21, 2020, Sergeant Huff utilized a 

confidential informant (“CI”) to conduct a controlled purchase of 

methamphetamine at the property. (See Application for Search Warrant,

dated 10/3/20, at ¶9). Over a week later, the CI completed a second purchase

of methamphetamine from Ms. Lorah at the property. After these 

transactions, the CI provided Sergeant Huff with additional information about

the property. Specifically, the CI indicated that the property was surrounded 

by “motion-activated surveillance equipment.” (See N.T. Suppression 

Hearing, 10/21/21, at 8). The CI also stated that Ms. Lorah kept “a firearm 

on her hip or in the small of her back,” and the CI “was confident that there 

were other weapons inside of that home.” (Id. at 7). Further, the CI alerted 

Sergeant Huff about “two pit bulls in the residence, one of which was described 

as being aggressive.” (Id. at 8). Sergeant Huff subsequently conducted 

surveillance that confirmed the presence of “numerous cameras in numerous 

locations.” (Id. at 10). 

Based upon the controlled purchases, Sergeant Huff applied for a 

warrant to search the property. During the predawn hours of October 5, 2020, 

police executed the warrant. Due to the presence of the security cameras at 

the property, Sergeant Huff decided to use an emergency response team to
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execute the warrant. The team consisted of approximately eighteen 

members, as well as “additional personnel including uniformed patrol officers 

and EMS paramedics.” (Id. at 11-12). Upon arriving at the property,

Sergeant Huff “noticed that the first-floor lights were on,” which was 

significant because “that’s the area the drugs were stored.” (Id. at 13). After 

the officers announced their identity and purpose, Sergeant Huff estimated 

that the team waited “14, 15 seconds” before using a battering ram to breach

the front door. (Id. at 14). The officers entered the residence and found 

Appellant and Ms. Lorah in the living room. The officers arrested Appellant, 

and the Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging him with various 

offenses on March 19, 2021. 

On June 9, 2021, Appellant filed a suppression motion arguing that the 

Commonwealth violated the “knock and announce” rule by “violently entering 

the home after having given [Appellant and Ms. Lorah] no opportunity to 

comply with the announcement....” (Suppression Motion, filed 6/9/21, at 

¶12). On October 21, 2021, the court conducted a suppression hearing. 

During this hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence in the form of

testimony from Sergeant Huff, video footage of the warrant execution, and 

photographs of the property. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made 

on-the-record findings of fact and conclusions of law, and it denied the
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suppression motion.

2

 (See N.T. Suppression Hearing at 49-50). 

Appellant proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of simple 

possession, possession of drug paraphernalia, and resisting arrest. On August

3, 2022, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of eighteen (18) 

to sixty (60) months’ imprisonment. Appellant did not file post-sentence 

motions. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on August 18, 2022. On 

August 22, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed 

his Rule 1925(b) statement on September 7, 2022. 

Appellant now raises the following issue for this Court’s review: 

Whether the court erred by denying Appellant’s pretrial 

motion to suppress all evidence of drugs [and]

paraphernalia as fruit of the poisonous tree? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 5). 

The following principles govern our review of an order denying a motion 

to suppress: 

An appellate court’s standard of review in addressing a 

challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether the legal 

conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because 

the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, 

we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth 

and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a 

whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are 

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2 The court entered a formal order denying the suppression motion on

November 24, 2021. 
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supported by the record, the appellate court is bound by 

those findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal 

conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the 

determination of the suppression court turns on allegations 

of legal error, the suppression court’s legal conclusions are 

not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to 

determine if the suppression court properly applied the law 

to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below 

are subject to plenary review. 

Commonwealth v. Ford, 175 A.3d 985, 989 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal 

denied, 647 Pa. 522, 190 A.3d 580 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa.Super. 2015)). 

On appeal, Appellant argues that the police violated the knock and 

announce rule when executing the search warrant, and “there is no evidence 

to conclude that the police at time of entry reasonably believed that exigent 

circumstances would justify” their noncompliance. (Appellant’s Brief at 9). 

Appellant contends that approximately ten seconds elapsed between the 

officers’ announcement and their breach of the front door. Appellant 

maintains that “police had no reasonable reason to suspect that [Appellant] 

and [Ms. Lorah] would not allow entrance, as [the police] never gave them a 

chance to answer the door.” (Id. at 11). Relying on the Commonwealth’s 

evidence from the suppression hearing, Appellant reiterates that his residence 

was “approximately 2,900 square feet,” and ten seconds was not enough time 

for the occupants to open the front door. (Id.) (citing N.T. Suppression 

Hearing at 8). 

Regarding the existence of exigent circumstances, Appellant asserts 
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that the Commonwealth did not present evidence of movement inside the 

residence prior to the breach; thus, there was no reason for the officers to 

believe that the occupants knew the officers’ purpose for being there. 

Appellant insists that police conducted surveillance of the property before 

executing the warrant, and the surveillance did not reveal any hazards that 

would have imperiled officer safety. Finally, Appellant emphasizes that the 

record is devoid of evidence to justify a belief that the occupants might have 

been destroying evidence. Under these circumstances, Appellant concludes

that the police violated the knock and announce rule, and the court erred in

denying his suppression motion. We disagree. 

Our rules of criminal procedure govern manner of entry for law 

enforcement seeking to execute a search warrant:

Rule 207. Manner of Entry Into Premises 

(A) A law enforcement officer executing a search 

warrant shall, before entry, give, or make reasonable effort 

to give, notice of the officer’s identity, authority, and 

purpose to any occupant of the premises specified in the 

warrant, unless exigent circumstances require the officer’s 

immediate forcible entry. 

(B) Such officer shall await a response for a reasonable 

period of time after this announcement of identity, 

authority, and purpose, unless exigent circumstances 

require the officer’s immediate forcible entry. 

(C) If the officer is not admitted after such reasonable 

period, the officer may forcibly enter the premises and may 

use as much physical force to effect entry therein as is 

necessary to execute the search. 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 207. 
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“The purposes of this requirement, known as the ‘knock and announce 

rule,’ are to prevent resistance by an occupant protecting his dwelling, to 

prevent violence and physical injury to the police and occupants, to protect an 

occupant’s privacy expectation against the unauthorized entry, and to prevent 

property damage resulting from forced entry.” Commonwealth v. Goodis, 

2023 PA Super 136, *5 (filed July 28, 2023). “Although this rule is frequently 

referred to as ‘knock and announce,’ the rule actually imposes no specific 

obligation to knock.” Commonwealth v. Bellamy, 252 A.3d 656, 664 

(Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 874 A.2d 667, 671 

(Pa.Super. 2005)). “Nonetheless, the rule requires that police officers 

announce their identity, purpose and authority and then wait a reasonable 

amount of time for the occupants to respond prior to entering any private 

premises.” Id. (internal footnote omitted). 

“When the knock-and-announce rule does apply, it is not easy to 

determine precisely what officers must do. How many seconds’ wait are too 

few? Our ‘reasonable wait time’ standard ... is necessarily vague.” Hudson 

v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590, 126 S.Ct. 2159, 2163, 165 L.Ed.2d 56, ___ 

(2006). 

In determining whether the police properly complied with 

the knock and announce rule, a court must consider the 

amount of time the police wait after knocking and 

announcing prior to gaining entry, as well as the 

circumstances observed upon announcement. See 

Commonwealth v. Parsons, 391 Pa.Super. 273, 570 A.2d 

1328 (1990) (two announcements of presence coupled with 

a 45 second wait prior to entry by officers, where sounds of 
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movement were heard inside residence was sufficient to 

satisfy the knock and announce rule); Commonwealth v. 

Burstin, 259 Pa.Super. 584, 393 A.2d 979 (1978) (police 

who waited twenty seconds after knocking and announcing 

during which time they heard television and telephone 

conversations prior to gaining entry was reasonable under 

the knock and announce rule). Cf. Commonwealth v. 

Means, 531 Pa. 504, 614 A.2d 220 (1992) (forcible entry 

after waiting five to ten seconds after knocking and 

announcing was unreasonable); Commonwealth v. 

Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 240 A.2d 795 (1968) (forcible entry

following twenty seconds of silence after knocking and 

announcing was unreasonable); Commonwealth v. 

Douventzidis, 451 Pa.Super. 280, 679 A.2d 795 (1996) 

(knocking only once and waiting only ten to fifteen seconds 

before entry was unreasonable); Commonwealth v. 

Rudisill, 424 Pa.Super. 313, 622 A.2d 397 (1993) 

(knocking and waiting fifteen seconds prior to entry was 

unreasonable). 

Commonwealth v. Dean, 693 A.2d 1360, 1363 (Pa.Super. 1997), appeal 

denied, 549 Pa. 724, 702 A.2d 1058 (1997). 

“The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove that the police fully 

complied with the knock and announce rule or to prove ... exigent 

circumstances[.]” Goodis, supra at *6. 

Our Supreme Court has recognized only four exigent 

circumstances:

1. the occupants remain silent after repeated 

knocking and announcing; 

2. the police are virtually certain that the 

occupants of the premises already know their 

purpose;

3. the police have reason to believe that an 

announcement prior to entry would imperil their 

safety; [or]
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4. the police have reason to believe that evidence 

is about to be destroyed. 

Bellamy, supra at 665 (Pa.Super. 2021) (internal citations, emphasis, and 

footnote omitted). 

“These exceptions to the ‘knock and announce’ rule fulfill the purpose of 

the rule in that entry is accomplished with a minimum of danger to officers 

and occupants or damage to the premises.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 940 

A.2d 483, 490 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 597 Pa. 713, 951 A.2d 1161 

(2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 97, 534 A.2d 1054, 

1056-57 (1987)). “In order to invoke an exception, police must only possess 

‘a reasonable suspicion that one of these grounds is present.’” Id. at 489

(quoting Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 589 Pa. 43, 63, 907 A.2d 477, 489

(2006)). “[T]he [United States Supreme] Court has indicated that ‘[t]his 

showing is not high.’” Sanchez, supra at 63, 907 A.2d at 489 (quoting 

Hudson, supra at 590, 126 S.Ct. at 2163, 165 L.Ed.2d at ___). 

Instantly, the court evaluated the Commonwealth’s evidence from the 

suppression hearing and issued the following findings of fact and conclusions 

of law:

On the date in question, the officers had obtained a search 

warrant to search [Appellant’s] residence following two 

controlled buys of methamphetamine using a [CI]. The [CI]

had told the police that one of the residents, Angela Lorah, 

was seen with a gun in the residence in the small of her 

back. The police also had evidence from the [CI] that there 

was an aggressive pit bull on the property, and the officer 

testified that in the past [Appellant] had been known to cook 

methamphetamine and, in a prior case, had resisted arrest 
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upon execution of the search warrant. 

On the date in question, the police chose to use the 

emergency response team, which entailed them driving 

slowly down a 50-yard driveway ... when it was barely light 

out and there was a surveillance camera noted not only by 

the [CI] who informed the police about it but was observed 

during surveillance, and on the date in question when the 

police went to search the residence the lights were on in the 

residence where the drug activity was known to have 

occurred. 

Based upon all of this, the officers made a decision—well, 

they did announce over the loudspeaker that they had a 

search warrant. There was a relatively small period of time 

before the door was breached after the knock, but in this 

case the officers had exigent circumstances, including fear 

for their safety and also destruction of evidence. So, based 

upon all of that, there was a reasonable suspicion of the 

exigent circumstances which allowed for the breach of the 

residence. 

(N.T. Suppression Hearing at 49-50). 

Our review of the record confirms the court’s findings.

3

 Here, the 

Commonwealth’s evidence established that the officers possessed a 

reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances. See Kane, supra. We 

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3 The record on appeal included the flash drive containing the body camera 

footage from three (3) officers who participated in the execution of the search 

warrant. This Court reviewed the footage, which confirmed the testimony of 

Sergeant Huff. Specifically, the footage revealed that police announced their 

presence and waited thirteen (13) seconds before breaching the front door.

(See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1-3, Video 1, at 1:56-2:09). Police entered the 

residence and found that the lights were on in the living room, where both 

Appellant and Ms. Lorah were present. (See Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1-3, 

Video 3, at 2:05-2:11). After the officers entered, one of the dogs 

immediately ran into the living room. (Id. at 2:15). Thereafter, Ms. Lorah 

offered to assist police with securing the animal. (See Commonwealth’s 

Exhibit 1-3, Video 1, at 2:32-2:40). 
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emphasize that: 1) the presence of security cameras gave the officers a 

reason to believe that evidence might be destroyed; 2) the CI alerted Sergeant 

Huff to the presence of weapons on the property, which could have imperiled 

officer safety; 3) the CI indicated that an aggressive pit bull lived on the 

property, which created another hazard; and 4) Sergeant Huff knew that 

Appellant had resisted arrest in the past, further compromising officer safety. 

See Bellamy, supra. Under these circumstances, the court did not err in 

denying Appellant’s suppression motion. See Ford, supra. Accordingly, we 

affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/06/2023