MODIFY and AFFIRM; and Opinion Filed April 25, 2019.

In The 

## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05
- 18
- 00367
- CR No. 05
- 18
- 00368
- CR No. 05
- 18
- 00369
- CR BRANDON V. CARRAWAY , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause Nos. F17
- 75820
- S, F17
- 75821
- S, & F17
- 75822
- S



### MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Myers, Molberg, and Carlyle Opinion by Justice Molberg Brandon V . Carraway was convicted by a jury of compelling prostitution of a person under the age of eighteen, 1 sexual assault of a child, 2 and trafficking a person under the age of eighteen for prostitution. 3 The State sought to enhance the punishment range for each offense with two prior convictions. Carraway pleaded true to the alleged enhancement s . T he jury found the alleged enhancements true and assessed punishment of thirty

- five years’ imprisonment on the compelling

1 Trial court cause number F17

- 75820

- S; appellate case number 05

- 18

- 00367

- CR.
2 Trial court cause number F17

- 75821

- S; appellate case number 05

- 18

- 00368

- CR.
3 Trial court cause number F17

- 75822

- S; appellate case number 05

- 18

- 00369

- CR.– 2

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prostitution o ffense, twenty

- five years’ imprisonment on the sexual assault offense, and thirty years’ imprisonment on the t rafficking offense. In one issue, Carraway contends the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for compelling prostitution of a person under the age of eighteen. 4 We modify the judgment in each

case to reflect the correct name of Carraway’s trial attorney, Carraway pleaded “ true ” to the two alleged enhancements, and the jury found the alleged enhancements were “ true. ” As modified, we

a ffirm all three judgments. Background In April 2017, when she was fourteen years old, R.J. ran away from her home in Fort Worth. R.J. made her way to Dallas where she met Roy, a pimp, and began working for him as a prostitute. On t he first two days that R.J. worked for Roy, he posted advertisements for her services on the internet. For the “last couple days , ” R.J. “walked,” and had sex with “dates” in their cars. As R.J. was walking on Martin Luther King Boulevard, she saw some cars parked at a car wash. Carraway , one of the men at the car wash, stood up and told R.J. to “come.” R.J. went over to Carraway. R.J. knew Carraway was a pimp based on how he was dressed and the jewelry he was wearing

. After a brief conservation with Carraway, R.J. d ecided she want to go with him because he seemed more successful than Roy. After Carraway and Roy had an argument, R.J. left with Carraway. Carraway drove R.J. to a Super 8 Motel at Interstate 635 and Jupiter Road. J.J., a prostitute who worked for Carra way, was in a room at the motel. J.J. had known Carraway for approximately two years and gave him all the mone y she earned as a prostitute

. Carraway refused to allow J.J. to send any of the money to her family. According to J.J., Carraway never forced her to do

4 Although Carraway appealed the convictions for sexual assault of a child and trafficking a person under the age of eighteen for prostitution, he did not raise any issue in his bri ef pe rtaining to those convictions and his counsel confirmed during oral argument that Carraway was not challenging those convictions.– 3

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anything , and i t was her decision to give the money she earned to him . However, s ometimes Carraway would ask J.J. to make more money. She would then contact some of her “regulars .” R.J. did not tell either Carraway or J.J. that she was only fou rteen years old and admitted she may have told them she was eighteen years old. Carraway told J.J. to rent a room for R.J. Carraway then had sexual intercourse with R.J. in her room. According to R.J., J.J. talked to her about using a condom, the amounts to charge the

“ dates, ” and the sexual acts she should not agree to perform. J.J., on the other hand, testified R.J. was a “pro,” used her own prices based on what she charged her “car dates,” and did not have any questions about how to “do it.”
J.J. and R.J. took pictures of R.J. in the motel room. They forwarded these pictures, a s well as pictures R.J. had stored on her tele phone , to C.P., Carraway’s girlfriend. C.P. used the pictures to post advertisements for R.J. in the Dallas section of Backpage.c om. The advertisements contained sexually explicit language and listed a tele phone number at which R.J. could be contacted. R. J. received calls from individuals who saw the advertisement s and engaged in sex ual conduct with three “dates” that evening. R.J. believed her “dates” paid her between $300 and $500 . Carr away later enter ed R.J.’s room using his key and took all of the money. According to R.J., Carraway was the “boss,” was “over everything,” and “got the money.” The following da y , R.J, J.J., Carraway, C.P., and Carraway and C.P.’ s son went to Longview, Texas. Carraway told C.P. to buy R.J. some new clothes

. While R.J. selected shorts and tank tops , C.P. and J.J. selected lingerie for R.J. to wear. C.P. took additional pictures of R.J. wearin g the lingerie

. Over the next several weeks, C.P. posted ad vertisement s for both R.J. and J.J. in the Longview and Tyler section s of Backpage.com. The advertisements included pictures of R.J. in lingerie, contained sexually explicit langua ge, and listed a telephone number at wh ich R.J. could– 4

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be contacted

. R.J. received calls from individuals who saw the advertisement s and engaged in

sex ual conduct with “dates” at motel s in Longview and Tyler

. On May 10, 2017 , Carraway, J.J., R.J., and A.R

. , another prostitute, went to Dallas. C.P. posted advertisements for all three women in the Dallas section of Backpage.com. The advertisements again included pictures of R.J. in lingerie, contained sexually explicit language, and listed a telephone numbe r at which R.J. could be contacted

. R.J. received calls from individuals wh o saw the advertisements and engaged in sex ual conduct with “dates” in Dallas. J.J. confirmed that R.J. committed acts of prostitution in Dallas, Longview, and Tyler. According to R.J., nobody forced her to ha ve sex with any of the “dates” and nobody forced her to do anything she did not want to do. However, in Dallas, she began hiding part of the m oney she received from the “dates” under her mattress. She gave the rest of the money to Carraway. On May 11, 2017, R.J. pretended she was getting out of the shower and left the motel. R.J. did not believe she could have just told Carraway that she was leaving. J.J., however, testified that nobody would have prevent ed R.J. from lea ving. According to J.J., the fee to post the advertisements on Backpage.com was usually paid using a gift card. Facebook messages between C.P. and Carraway showed that C.P. regularly ask ed Carraway to purchas e a gift card to pay for the advertisement s . Carraway would purchase the card and supply the number on the card to C.P. Carraway also instruct ed C.P. to post advertisements for specific girls, including R.J. and to include diffe rent tele phone numbers on R.J.’s advertisements

. J.J. admitted she had been charged with a felony offense that had a punishment range of two to twenty years’ imprisonment. The prosecutor had told J.J. that, in exchange for her testimony, the c harges might be reduced and J.J. might receive only probation.– 5

– Analysis In one is sue, Carraway asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for compelling prostitution of a person u nder eighteen years of age because the State failed to establish that he knowingly caused R.J. to commit prostitution. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, w e consider whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Zuniga v. State , 551 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We must “defer ‘to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Zuniga , 551 S.W.3d at 732 (quoting Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319). When there is conflicting evidence, we presume the factfinder resolved the conflict in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. Id. at 733. We may not substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s determinations of credibility. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319; Nisbett v. State , 552 S.W.3d 244, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“An appellate court cannot act as a thirteenth juror and make its own assessment of th e evidence.”). “Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative,” Zuniga , 551 SW.3d at 733, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to establish guilt, Nisbett , 552 S.W.3d at 262; see also Hooper v. State , 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Te x. Crim. App. 2007). “Each fact need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Nisbett , 552 S.W.3d at 262. A person commits the offense of compellin g prostitution if the person knowingly causes by any means a child younger than eighteen years of age to commit prostitution, regardless of whether the person knows the age of the child at the time of the offense. T EX
. P ENAL C ODE A NN
.– 6

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§ 43.05(a ) (2)

. Pros titution includes knowingly offering or agreeing to receive a fee to engage in sexual conduct with another person

. Id. § 43.02(a)

. Under t he penal code’s general definition of “causation ,” a “person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.” Id. § 6.04(a). In considering whether a
person has caused a minor to engage in prostitution, courts have concluded that a person “who provides opportunity for a willing minor to engage in prostitution and influences, persuades or prevails upon her to do so has . . . caused the prostitution.” Waggoner v. State , 897 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Tex. App.

— Austin 1995, no. pet.); see also Kelly v. State , 453 S.W.3d 634, 6 41

– 42 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2015, pet. ref’d). 5 Carraway argues that R.J. was committing prostitution before she met him and there was insufficient evidence to show she would not have committed prostitution but for his conduct. However, it is irrelevant that R.J. may have engaged in prostitution at locations away from Carraway. See Kelly , 453 S.W.3d at 642 n.3

. 6 Rather, the question is whether the jury could have found that, but for Carraway’s conduct, R.J. would not have engaged in the specific acts of prostitution that occurred at the motel in Dallas. See i d. 7

5 See also Menyweather v. State , No. 05

- 13

- 01108

- CR, 2014 WL 6450826, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Dallas Nov. 18, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding “ by any means ” include s providing opportunity for child, willing or unwilling, to engage in prostitution while influencing, persuading, or prevailing upon the child to do so).
6 See also Smith v. State , No. 05

- 09

- 01331

- CR, 2011 WL 2090256, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Dallas May 27, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Furthermore, [the child’s] willingness to prostitute herself before and after her involvement with appellant does not mean he did n ot cause [the child] , ‘by any means , ’ to commit prostitution. Appellant provided [the child] with the opportunity to engage in prostitution and influenced or persuaded her to do so.”).
7 See Menyweather , 2014 WL 6450826,at *5 (“Absent Menyweather’s conduc t, [the child] would not have engaged in prostitution on the occasions” at issue in the case.).– 7

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T he evidence showed that, as R.J. walked by the carwash, Carraway told her to “come”; after a brief conversation, R.J. decided to leave with Carraway; R.J. knew that Carraway was a pimp; Carraway drove R.J. to a motel in Dallas and provided her with a room; Carraway facilitated the posting of advertisements on Backpage.com that contained p ictures of R.J. and provided a telephone num ber for individuals to call her ; individuals contacted R.J. using the tele phone number in the advertisement; and R.J., a fourteen

- year - old child, engaged in sexual conduct with th ose individuals for a fee

. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’ s verdict, we conclude a

reasona ble jury could have found that but for Carraway’s conduct , R.J. would not have engaged in prostitution at the motel in Dallas. See Kelly , 453 S.W.3d at 643 (concluding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for compelling prostitution because, but for defendant’s making telephone calls to men at the child ’ s request, acting as translator for men who spoke Spanish, and providing bedroom in her house , the child would not hav e engaged in prostitution with those men at defendant’s house )

. 8 We resolve Carraway’s sole issue against him. Modification of Judgments
T he record in each case reflects that Carraway pleaded “true” to two alleged enhancements and the jury found the alle ged enhancements were “true.” However, the judgments incorrectly reflect “N/A” as to Carraway’s pleas to the two alleged enhancements and to the jury’s findings as

8 See also Quillens v. State , No. 01

- 18

- 00056

- CR, 2018 WL 4701580, at *4 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 2, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for compelling prostitution where defendant posted the c hild on website known to be used by traffickers to advertise women, arra nged for his driver to take the child to an “out

- call,” waited while the child had sex with individual, and then took her to a hotel) ; Payne v. State , No. 01

- 16

- 00821

- CR, 2017 WL 55036 50, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding evidence was sufficient to support conviction for compelling prostitution where defendant recruited child through texts and online conve rsations, set up her online advertisement, replied to potential customers’ texts, handed her the phone for vocal conversations with potential customers, and drove her to location where prostitution was set to occur).– 8

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to the enhancements. Further, the judgment in all three cases incorrectly reflects that Da niel Eckstein was Carraway’s attorney. An appellate court has authority to modify a judgment to speak the truth when it has the necessary information to do so. T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27

– 28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). Therefore, on our own motion, we modify the judgment in each case to reflect Calvin Johnson was Carraway’s attorney, Carraway pleaded “ true ” to the two alleged enhancements, and the jury found both enhancements to be “ true. ” As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Do Not Publish T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 47 180367F.U05 /Ken Molberg/ KEN MOLBERG JUSTICE– 9

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## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT
BRANDON V. CARRAWAY, Appellant
No. 05

- 18

- 00367

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F17

- 75820

- S. Opinion delivered by Justice Molberg, Justices Myers and Carlyle participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Attorney for Defendant” is modified to state “Calvi n Johnson.” The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Plea to 1st Enhancement Paragraph” is modified to state “True.” The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Plea to 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to state “True.”
The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Findings on 1st Enhancement Paragraph” is modified to state “True.” The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Findings on 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to state “True.”

As MODIFIED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 25 th day of April, 2019.– 10

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## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT
BRANDON V. CARRAWAY, Appellant
No. 05

- 18

- 00368

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F17

- 75821

- S. Opinion delivered by Justice Molberg, Justices Myers and Carlyle participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Attorney for Defendant” is modified to state “Calvin Johnson.” The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Plea to 1st Enhancement Paragraph” is modified to state “True.”
The s ection of the trial court’s judgment titled “Plea to 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to state “True.” The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Findings on 1st Enhancement Paragraph” is modified to state “True.”
The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Findings on 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to state “True.”

As MODIFIED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

.

Judgment entered this 25 th day of April, 2019.– 11

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## Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

JUDGMENT
BRANDON V. CARRAWAY, Appellant
No. 05

- 18

- 00369

- CR V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F17

- 75822

- S. Opinion delivered by Justice Molberg, Justic es Myers and Carlyle participating. Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows: The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Attorney for Defendant” is modified to state “Calvin Johnson.” The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Plea to 1st Enhancement Paragraph” is modified to state “True.” The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Plea to 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to state “True.”
The section of th e trial court’s judgment titled “Findings on 1st Enhancement Paragraph” is modified to state “True.” The section of the trial court’s judgment titled “Findings on 2nd Enhancement/Habitual Paragraph” is modified to state “True.”

As MODIFIED , the judgment is AFFIRMED

. Judgment entered this 25 th day of April, 2019.