RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4417-16T6

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

IMANI WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Respondent.

_____________________________

Argued September 14, 2017 - Decided

Before Judges Alvarez, Currier, and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New 

Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, 

Warrant No. W-2017-000508-317.

Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz, Assistant 

Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant 

(Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County 

Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Paszkiewicz, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Philip G. Pagano, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, argued the cause for respondent 

(Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, 

attorney; Jared Dorfman, Assistant Deputy 

Public Defender, on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

CURRIER, J.A.D.

In this appeal, we address whether, in a pretrial detention

hearing, defendant's pregnancy should be given greater 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

September 29, 2017

APPELLATE DIVISION

September 29, 2017
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consideration than any other pretrial detention factor in a 

judge's assessment under the Criminal Justice Reform Act (Act),

N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. Because we conclude that the trial 

judge abused his discretion in giving defendant's pregnancy

greater weight than all other pertinent factors in his 

determination to release her, we reverse. Pregnancy, like any 

other medical condition, is only considered for its impact on 

the risk of a defendant posing a danger to the community, 

obstructing justice or failing to appear in court. N.J.S.A.

2A:162-20.

In June 2017, defendant was charged with second-degree 

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1); second-degree aggravated 

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1); and disorderly persons theft by 

unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). The victim of the crimes 

told police that defendant and another person had "jumped" her 

from behind and thrown her to the ground. She was punched and 

kicked in the head, face, and body while on the ground, 

resulting in several shattered teeth as well as swelling and 

bruising to her eyes and face. Money was stolen from her purse. 

On the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), N.J.S.A. 2A:162-25,

the Pretrial Services Program rated defendant a six for new 

criminal activity and a five for failure to appear. It also 

flagged defendant for an elevated risk of violence. The 
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recommendation was that defendant remain in custody pending 

trial. 

The State filed a notice for pretrial detention, N.J.S.A.

2A:162-19(a), and a hearing was conducted on June 13, 2017. In 

support of its request that defendant be detained pending trial, 

the State noted defendant's extensive juvenile history,

including several violations of probation, two pending

disorderly persons charges, and a 2016 disorderly persons 

conviction for assault by auto resulting in a sixty-day period 

of incarceration. Defendant failed to appear for court six 

times within the previous two years.

Defense counsel informed the court that defendant had a 

full-time job and had recently learned that she was eight weeks 

pregnant. He requested she be released under condition of inperson reporting. Counsel argued that defendant's "employment 

as well as her pregnancy would assure both her appearance in 

court as well as the safety of the community."

After the judge found the State had established probable 

cause, he turned to the request for detention pending trial. 

The judge explained that he had reviewed the PSA and its 

recommendation, and acknowledged the serious second-degree 

charges and defendant's multiple prior failures to appear. The 

judge further stated that he was familiar with defendant's 
4 A-4417-16T6

extensive juvenile history,1 having served as the county's 

juvenile judge during the pertinent timeframe. Nevertheless, 

the judge determined that the State's proofs fell "just slightly 

below clear and convincing evidence" because the PSA did not 

take into account that defendant was eight weeks pregnant or

that her pregnancy "present[ed] issues with regard to care in a 

correctional facility." The judge concluded that defendant's 

pregnancy required the denial of the State's motion for pretrial 

detention. 

The judge explained that he would

impose some very strict pretrial release 

provisions in light of the fact that the 

State was just a tad short of clear and 

convincing evidence and [that his decision] 

was impacted by [defendant's] pregnancy 

. . . and the issues that would pose to the 

correctional facility and correctional staff 

in terms of . . . prenatal care.

He warned defendant that pregnancy was "a card that [she could] 

play once" and if she committed a new offense or violated a 

condition of her release, whether she was "eight weeks pregnant, 

six months pregnant, eight months pregnant, it [would] not make 

any difference whatsoever and the [c]ourt [would] evaluate the 

facts independent[ly] at that time." 

 

1 Defendant was twenty years old at the time of the detention 

hearing.
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As conditions of release, the judge required defendant to 

report in-person weekly to pretrial services. The judge also 

imposed a curfew from 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. daily, permitting 

defendant to leave her residence only to go to work and prenatal 

appointments.2

The court granted the State's request for a stay of 

defendant's release pending appeal. In discussing the 

application for a stay, the judge commented:

in light of the [PSA] and the history of 

[defendant] who is only 20 but who had an 

extensive juvenile history, that . . . the 

State was very close to establishing by 

clear and convincing evidence . . . that 

[defendant] should be detained, but . . . 

the court believes that . . . [defendant's 

pregnancy] justified her release on 

conditions . . . .

The judge further remarked:

but for the pregnancy, . . . the [c]ourt 

would have detained [defendant]. Her scores 

were . . . extremely high on the [PSA]. She 

has a significant history for a person who 

is 20 years old. . . . [A]ll of the 

necessary indicia were there which the 

[c]ourt felt were . . . mitigated by . . . 

the fact that [defendant] is . . . eight 

weeks pregnant.

 

2 Neither defendant nor her counsel made any representation that 

she had seen a doctor for her pregnancy or was receiving 

prenatal care.
6 A-4417-16T6

We granted the State leave to appeal the trial court's 

order on an emergent basis to review the question: whether

defendant's pregnancy is a medical condition sufficient to 

override all other applicable factors, thus requiring pretrial 

release. The State argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying pretrial detention by according undue 

weight to defendant's pregnancy, and speculating that 

defendant's medical needs could not be met while in jail. We 

agree.

The Act took effect on January 1, 2017. It is premised on

"pretrial release by non-monetary means to 

reasonably assure" that a defendant will 

"appear[] in court when required," will not 

endanger "the safety of any other person or 

the community," and "will not obstruct or 

attempt to obstruct the criminal justice 

process." If a court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that "no condition or 

combination of conditions" would achieve 

those goals, the court, upon motion by the 

prosecutor, may order that a defendant be 

held pending trial. 

[State v. Robinson, 229 N.J. 44, 55 (2017)

(quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15)].

Under Section 18 of the Act, the trial court is authorized 

to order pretrial detention if it finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that no conditions of release would reasonably assure a 

defendant's appearance in court, the safety of the community, 

and the integrity of the criminal justice process. N.J.S.A.
7 A-4417-16T6

2A:162-18(a). At the hearing itself, "the court may take into 

account" the following:

a. The nature and circumstances of the 

offense charged;

b. The weight of the evidence against the 

eligible defendant, except that the court 

may consider the admissibility of any 

evidence sought to be excluded;

c. The history and characteristics of the 

eligible defendant, including:

(1) the eligible defendant's 

character, physical and mental 

condition, family ties, 

employment, financial resources, 

length of residence in the 

community, community ties, past 

conduct, history relating to drug 

or alcohol abuse, criminal 

history, and record concerning 

appearance at court proceedings; 

and

(2) whether, at the time of the 

current offense or arrest, the 

eligible defendant was on 

probation, parole, or on other 

release pending trial, sentencing, 

appeal, or completion of sentence 

for an offense under federal law, 

or the law of this or any other 

state;

d. The nature and seriousness of the danger 

to any other person or the community that 

would be posed by the eligible defendant's 

release, if applicable;

e. The nature and seriousness of the risk of 

obstructing or attempting to obstruct the 

criminal justice process that would be posed 
8 A-4417-16T6

by the eligible defendant's release, if 

applicable; and

f. The release recommendation of the 

pretrial services program obtained using a 

risk assessment instrument under [N.J.S.A.

2A:162-25].

[N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20].

Although the trial judge here properly considered several 

of the listed applicable factors, he elevated defendant's 

medical condition of pregnancy above all of the other pertinent 

factors, based on his unfounded speculation that her pregnancy 

might cause "issues" to the correctional facility.3 The judge

determined that defendant's pregnancy compelled her release. We

disagree. In determining whether pretrial detention is 

appropriate, the trial court should consider all of the 

applicable factors noted in the statute, giving appropriate

weight to each.

We do not suggest that there will never be circumstances 

under which a defendant's pregnancy could be a determining 

factor in a judicial decision regarding pretrial detention. A 

trial court could conclude that pregnancy, like any other 

medical condition, may require a defendant's release as the 

 

3 We note that N.J.A.C. 10A:31-13.10 requires county correctional 

facilities to promptly provide pregnant inmates with medical 

services, including prenatal evaluation and care, obstetrical 

services, and postpartum and follow-up medical care.
9 A-4417-16T6

condition itself might affect the risk of the defendant posing a 

danger to the community, obstructing justice or failing to 

appear in court. See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20. Here, however, there 

is no indication that defendant's pregnancy was classified as 

high risk or presented any unusual medical complications 

requiring specialized treatment. Nor is there any indication

that the jail was unable to provide appropriate prenatal medical 

care to defendant. The reasons given by the trial judge for 

defendant's pregnancy warranting her release were speculative, 

unsupported by any facts in the record, and, therefore, 

irrelevant to a pretrial detention determination.

In its orders denying the State's motion for pretrial 

detention, the trial court did not explain in writing its 

reasons for deviating from the recommendation in the PSA. In 

State v. C.W., 449 N.J. Super. 231, 263 (App. Div. 2017), we 

stated that N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2) requires a court to 

"explain in writing specifically why it deviated from the [PSA] 

recommendation advising against [a] defendant's release." While 

ordinarily we would remand the matter to the trial court for 

compliance with the statute, we sufficiently understand the 

reasons for the denial of detention. The trial judge was 

thorough and candid in stating his reasoning for ordering 

defendant's release contrary to the PSA recommendation, and, 
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thus, a remand would be an unnecessary use of stretched 

resources. 

In giving undue weight to defendant's pregnancy over all 

other applicable factors, and failing to consider what import 

the pregnancy might have on her risk of posing a danger to the 

community, obstructing justice or failing to appear in court, 

the judge abused his discretion. See C.W., supra, 449 N.J. 

Super. at 255. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's decision 

and remand for entry of an order of pretrial detention. 

Reversed.