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IRAQ: DEMOCRACY OR CIVIL WAR?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 13, 2006

Serial No. 109–249

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

TOM DAVIS, Virginia, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

CHRIS CANNON, Utah

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

DARRELL E. ISSA, California

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia

PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio

BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri

DIANE E. WATSON, California

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of

Columbia

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

DAVID MARIN, Staff Director

LAWRENCE HALLORAN, Deputy Staff Director

BENJAMIN CHANCE, Chief Clerk

PHIL BARNETT, Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman

KENNY MARCHANT, Texas

DAN BURTON, Indiana

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio

JON C. PORTER, Nevada

CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

TOM LANTOS, California

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland

LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York

EX OFFICIO

TOM DAVIS, Virginia HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

R. NICHOLAS PALARINO, PH.D., Staff Director

KALEB REDDEN, Professional Staff Member

ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Clerk

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on September 13, 2006 ..................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Al-Hasani, Hajim, member of Parliament (Sunni), former speaker, Iraqi

Parliament 2005; Karim AlMusawi, Washington representative, Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri) (Shia); and

Qubad Talabany, representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government

of Iraq to the United States ......................................................................... 59

Al-Hasani, Hajim ....................................................................................... 59

AlMusawi, Karim ...................................................................................... 64

Talabany, Qubad ....................................................................................... 75

Satterfield, David, senior advisor on Iraq to the Secretary of State ............ 21

Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:

Al-Hasani, Hajim, member of Parliament (Sunni), former speaker, Iraqi

Parliament 2005, prepared statement of .................................................... 62

AlMusawi, Karim, Washington representative, Supreme Council for the

Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri) (Shia), prepared statement of .............. 66

Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State

of Ohio, prepared statement of .................................................................... 10

Satterfield, David, senior advisor on Iraq to the Secretary of State, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 25

Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from the State

of Connecticut, prepared statement of ........................................................ 4

Talabany, Qubad, representative of the Kurdistan Regional Government

of Iraq to the United States, prepared statement of .................................. 79

(1)

IRAQ: DEMOCRACY OR CIVIL WAR?

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING

THREATS, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in room

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Shays, Platts, Duncan, Dent, Kucinich,

Van Hollen, Lynch, and Higgins.

Also present: Representative Waxman.

Staff present: J. Vincent Chase, chief investigator; R. Nicholas

Palarino, Ph.D., staff director; Kaleb Redden, professional staff

member; Robert A. Briggs, analyst; Robert Kelley, chief counsel;

Micheal Girbov, graduate assistant; Phil Barnett, minority staff director/chief counsel; Karen Lightfoot, minority communications director/senior policy advisor; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and

Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.

Mr. SHAYS. A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations entitled ‘‘Iraq, Democracy or Civil War? What Will It Take to Achieve

a National Reconciliation’’ is called back to order.

This is an extremely important topic, and thus, we want the

record to be complete. Today’s hearing is a continuation of Monday’s hearing. At the end of today we will again recess, not adjourn, and we will reconvene on Friday for the hearing’s final day.

At the start of each reconvened session, Members have the opportunity to make opening statements. In all other respects, we

will proceed as usual, without prejudice to the rights and privileges

of any Member.

Today, we continue our 3-day hearing, ‘‘Iraq: Democracy Or Civil

War,’’ examining security force levels; prospects for a national reconciliation; and the consequence of leaving Iraq immediately, later

but still prematurely, or when Iraqis are capable of taking over for

Coalition forces.

The conflict in Iraq finds United States and Coalition forces up

against increasing insurgent, sectarian and terrorist violence.

Thomas Friedman of the New York Times, who has supported the

U.S. objective to foster progressive democracy in the Middle East,

bluntly stated, ‘‘It is now obvious that we are not midwifing democracy in Iraq, we are baby-sitting a civil war.’’ While some may take

issue with Mr. Friedman’s choice of words, the broad contours of

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his point are clear: The violence in Iraq continues, if not increases.

The new Iraqi leadership has not yet shown the political will to

confront it, and its efforts to promote peace and democracy are

stalled.

Iraq security forces are truly improving and growing in number,

but they face an uphill battle if Iraq politicians are not willing to

confront the militias and make peace among themselves.

Our witnesses this past Monday came to different conclusions

about security in Iraq, but one thing was clear from their testimony: Our current baseline for overall security forces is inadequate; we do not have enough Coalition forces in Iraq. In addition,

it is clear to me, based on my 14 visits to Iraq and all our hearings,

that 325,500 projected Iraqi security force level to be reached in

December of this year will be inadequate and not allow us to bring

most of our troops home. Only when we establish credible, realistic

estimates of the number of Coalition forces and competent Iraq security forces will we be able to set the conditions to eventually

withdraw the U.S. troop commitment in Iraq.

We cannot delude ourselves. If we want to be successful, the administration needs to work with the Iraqi Government to reassess

the total number of forces needed to secure Iraq, and this reassessment must be completed as quickly as possible.

Today we investigate what may be the most important issue for

achieving stability in and democracy in Iraq: the political will to

implement national reconciliation. Since January of this year, little

progress has been made. Some of our diplomats and military officers openly question whether Iraq’s leaders have the political will

to make tough decisions required to drive down current violence

and maintain security. Last week when the Iraqi legislators returned from vacation, the Speaker of their Parliament Mahmoud

al-Mashhadani said the Iraqis, ‘‘have 3 to 4 months to reconcile

with each other. If the country doesn’t survive this, it will go

under.’’

Make no mistake. I understand the Iraqi people and the officials

they elected are grappling with daunting issues that have no easy

solutions, amnesty, rollback of de-Ba’athification, federalism, share

the oil wealth, and standing down militias; but their current inaction is alarming and should trouble every American’s concern for

our men and women who are there in harm’s way.

Each of the political milestones achieved in Iraq so far has been

preceded by strong U.S. pressure. They were more than benchmarks, they were specific timelines established to produce specific

results. These timelines were not easy to meet, but they forced

Iraqis to make the difficult choices and compromises to move forward.

It is time for the U.S. Government to be blunt with the Iraqi

leadership. If they are not willing to make peace among themselves, the United States will have no choice but to rethink how

long troops can remain in Iraq. It is time to expect results.

The topics we will discuss today are the prospects, timing, and

conditions for achieving national reconciliation, and a permanent

Constitution. We asked our witnesses to address the following

questions: What are the positions of the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish

political leadership on each issue related to national reconciliation?

3

What are possible ways to bridge the differences among the political leadership? What are prospects for agreement among the political leadership, and when can we expect such agreements to be

reached?

During our first panel we will hear testimony from Ambassador

David Satterfield. Ambassador Satterfield is the senior advisor on

Iraq to the Secretary of State and was formerly Deputy Chief of

Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

Also testifying on panel one will be Mr. Jim Bever, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Near East and Asia, U.S. Agency for

International Development.

On our second panel we are fortunate to hear the perspectives

of three prominent Iraqis, Dr. Hajim Al-Hassani, former Speaker

of the Iraqi Parliament and currently a Sunni member of Parliament; Mr. Karim Al-Musawi, Washington representative of the

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the largest political party in Iraq; and Mr. Qubad Talabani, Washington representative of the Kurdish Regional Government and son of Iraq’s

President Jalal Talabani.

We thank all our witnesses for taking the time to appear before

us today; in fact, we’re very grateful that they’re here.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr. Kucinich,

the ranking member of the committee.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And since the ranking

member of the full committee Mr. Waxman is here, I’d be glad to

yield to him.

Mr. SHAYS. Absolutely.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank Mr. Waxman.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and to the witnesses. I want to

thank you and all the witnesses for being here today.

Today’s hearing asks the question, ‘‘Iraq: Democracy or Civil

War? What Will It Take to Achieve National Reconciliation?’’ the

President’s assertions that Iraq is not in a civil war is not honest.

Over 3 years after the administration’s misguided war of choice,

failed occupation and disastrous reconstruction effort, Iraq today is

mired in a civil war, with U.S. troops and innocent Iraqis caught

in the crossfire. The fact that July was the deadliest month for innocent civilians since the start of the war only further proves that

after 3 years of the administration’s ill-advised and misguided war

and occupation of Iraq, the situation on the ground is getting

worse, not better. The civil war in Iraq cannot and will not be won

by the administration’s military occupation of Iraq.

Today’s hearing asks the question, what will it take to achieve

national reconciliation? That’s a good question. Maybe we could

begin by asking first how that relates to the United States, and

what would it take to achieve national reconciliation in the United

States? Because the truth of the matter is that unless you talk

about national reconciliation in the same breath as truth—South

Africa, truth in reconciliation—Americans will continue to go down

the blind alley in which the President laid another brick in with

his speech the other night by continuing to conflate Iraq and September 11th.

The Bible says, you shall know the truth, and the truth shall set

you free. The only way the people of this country are going to be

free from the lies of September 11th is to have the truth come out.

Iraq had nothing to do with September 11th, it was al Qaeda’s role

in September 11th. Iraq did not have the intention or the capability

of attacking the United States, and therefore the President’s statement the other night that Saddam’s regime posed a risk the world

could not afford to take and that the regime of Saddam Hussein

was a clear threat, there is a mountain of facts to the contrary.

Yes, we need national reconciliation not just in Iraq, we need it

in here in the United States, and the only way we can get to it is

to have the truth. And I’m hopeful these hearings will provide

some semblance of a forum to accomplish that.

Let’s talk about national reconciliation in Iraq today, because

maybe talking about it in the United States in the full committee

might not be within the scope of this particular Congress. But I

think that we need to focus on another question, and that is the

desire to end the U.S. occupation, because ending the U.S. occupation may be the only thing that unifies the various factions in Iraq.

Three years after our so-called liberation of Iraq, a recent public

opinion poll found that nearly half of all Iraqis, 47 percent, approve

of attacks on Americans. Think about that. The policy of this administration has placed 130,000 U.S. troops in the middle of a civil

8

war in a country in which almost half the population supports the

idea of killing our troops. National reconciliation indeed.

In addition, last week a coalition of 300 tribal leaders demanded

the release of Saddam Hussein to possibly reinstate him to his post

as President. While not a majority, it’s certainly a troubling sign.

‘‘When the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.’’ That’s a slogan,

it’s not a plan. When the desire to kill our soldiers may be the most

agreed-upon thing in Iraq, one would have to wonder if sticking to

our guns is a rational thought. Our presence in Iraq is entirely

counterproductive and only fuels the growing insurgency. The disastrous reconstruction of Iraq, conducted with virtually no congressional oversight, has served only to line the pockets of Halliburton

and other defense contractors, while average Iraqis continue to suffer daily without the most basic of services.

American taxpayers have footed the bill for nearly $400 billion

in war costs, but have those dollars actually improved the quality

of life of Iraqis? Iraqis are still without reliable electricity, clean

water or sewage, and garbage piles up in the streets. Schools and

hospitals remain unbuilt. And the oil sector, which was to finance

reconstruction costs and was the lifeblood and economic driver of

the nation, is nowhere near to its previous capacity. By almost any

standard, the quality of life of the average Iraqi is worse off today

than it was before our invasion.

While we tried a military solution, that has failed to bring about

peace and stability to Iraq. We learned this week that all military

intelligence officials have given up on Anbar Province. In addition,

after 3 years of military presence, even Baghdad, Iraq’s capital, is

not safe. Read today’s news. The bodies are just piling up. It would

be interesting to hear in the testimony today from some of the witnesses whom is killing whom there. What is fueling this tremendous increase in murder?

Repeatedly, our own generals have told us that the war in Iraq

cannot be won by military force alone; unfortunately, the policymakers here in Washington have arrogantly refused to listen.

Mr. Chairman, I think a better topic for this hearing would be,

‘‘Three years later, what in the world have we accomplished?’’ it’s

increasingly clear that this administration’s occupation and reconstruction of Iraq have failed. After 31⁄2 years, Iraqi is less safe, not

more. Al Qaeda, which prior to the U.S. invasion had no influence,

has now grown in influence and number of recruits. The fact is,

Mr. Chairman, this administration’s policies have turned Iraq into

a breeding ground and training ground for terrorists and created

the greatest recruiting tool ever for al Qaeda.

Mr. Chairman, the greatest tragedy of this war is the 2,669

American soldiers who have been irrevocably lost, and tens of thousands more injured. Between 100,000 and 200,000 innocent Iraqis

have died as a result of the U.S. invasion. Every day 120 more

Iraqis die at the hands of execution-style death squads,

kidnappings, murders, IEDs and sectarian violence. The war in

Iraq was a great and a tragic mistake, it has cost us in blood and

treasure, it has damaged our once unchallenged reputation in the

world and squandered the goodwill that rained on this Nation after

September 11th, and has been a distraction for our efforts to root

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out terrorism worldwide and bring to justice those responsible for

September 11th.

The President’s promise that we would not leave Iraq until after

his Presidency will only compound past failures and make our Nation less safe. Our continued occupation of Iraq is not only counterproductive, but it fuels a civil war.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it’s time we end this great misadventure

in Iraq, bring our troops home with honor and dignity. Thanks

again, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. The Chair would recognize Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank

you for calling this important hearing. And your 14 trips to Iraq,

I think, surely are more than any other Member of Congress has

been there, and no one has worked harder on this issue than you

have.

This morning on CNN it was reported that a bombing earlier

today killed 14 and injured 67, and that 60 other bodies were found

around which had been—who had been tortured. And I doubt that

anybody in this country was shocked by that report or even surprised by that report because we hear these reports daily.

Almost every article that I ever read says that 100,000 civilians

have been killed in Iraq over the past 31⁄2 years. Is that civil war?

Well, this is a country with one-twelfth the population of our country, so 100,000 civilians would be like 1.2 million people being

killed in this Nation. Would we say we were at civil war if 1.2 million Americans had been killed in the past 31⁄2 years? I think so.

Then on September 1st, the Pentagon released a report that all

the new stories described as grim, saying that attacks on American

soldiers have increased 15 percent over the previous 3 months, and

that civilian deaths were going up averaging 120 a day, equal to

43,000 a year, which in our country would be the equivalent of

516,000 a year. The report also said that marine intelligence report

said—the report on CNN this morning said a marine intelligence

report said al-Anbar Province, which includes Ramadi and Fallujah

and other key areas, have been lost, and that even the addition of

15,000 or 20,000 more troops would just be a temporary fix at best.

This was a war against an evil man, but a man who had a military budget slightly over 2/10 of 1 percent of ours, and he spent

most of that protecting himself and his family. He was absolutely

no threat to us whatsoever.

Fortune Magazine on November 25, 2002, said, before the war,

‘‘Iraq, we win, what then?’’ The article said a military victory could

turn into a strategic defeat, and that an American occupation

would be, ‘‘prolonged and expensive, and could turn U.S. troops

into sitting ducks for Islamic terrorists.’’

A columnist for the National Journal wrote that, ‘‘throughout the

Middle East anti-Americanism has grown along with U.S. influence.’’ He said the lessons of great power breeds great resentment.

William Buckley, Jr., the godfather of conservatism, wrote in

2004 that if he had known in 2002 what he knew in 2004, he would

have opposed the war. Then last year he said something very profound, I think. He wrote that if the killings of Americans continued

at the same rate for the next year—and they have actually, and

they have actually increased—he said we would reach a point, ‘‘at

which to remain would become not steadfastness of purpose, but,

rather, misapplication of pride.’’

In fact, the fact is—and few people realize this because the conservatives with national television audiences or national radio audiences have supported the war, but over half of conservative newspaper columnists have opposed this war since the beginning. Now,

some say that it was a mistake to go in; in fact, more than some,

many have said, I’ve heard many times, many have said it was a

mistake to go in, but now that we’re there, we must stay the course

14

or finish the job or complete the mission, we can’t cut and run. But

I think if you find out that you’re going the wrong way down an

interstate, you don’t just keep on going in that wrong direction, you

get off at the next exit.

And so I’m saddened at what has occurred there. I’m saddened

at the tremendous expense to our taxpayers and our military, the

deaths, the maimings and serious injuries to so many thousands of

young Americans. This is no criticism of the American military,

they do a good job wherever they’re sent, but over half of what

we’ve spent over there has been just pure foreign aid, which conservatives have traditionally been against. Governor Bush, when

he was running for President, criticized President Clinton for nation building and said we need a more humble foreign policy. I

agree with that. And so I thank you for calling this hearing today,

and I yield back.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman very much.

And, Mr. Waxman, you will be recognized—I need to make a

phone call, that’s the only reason I will be relinquishing the chair,

but you have the floor.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you

for holding this hearing, and I want to tell you I was very impressed and moved by the comments of my Republican colleague

Mr. Duncan in his statement that he has just made.

It is difficult to take responsibility; it’s difficult to say that sometimes mistakes are made by those who make them. And we speak

as Americans, not as Democrats or Republicans, as we look at the

tragedy that’s been unfolding before us.

Three and a half years have passed since the invasion of Iraq,

but the situation on the ground today can only be described as dismal. The violence in Iraq is spiraling out of control. In July, 3,000

Iraqis were killed. The number of attacks reached an all time high.

There were more than 1,600 sectarian execution-style killings. By

early August there were almost 800 attacks per week. Death

squads and terrorists are running rampant, and independent observers believe a civil war has already started.

And we know that reconstruction hasn’t gone any better. In

Baghdad they don’t have electricity except for a few hours during

the day, and that’s in Baghdad. Millions of Iraqis don’t have access

to drinkable water, and the oil production in Iraq is below prewar

levels.

Well, there are several ways to approach the reality of what

we’ve seen, repeatedly seen. One could be what the administration

has been saying. They’re saying that Iraq stands as a shining example of great progress. I don’t think there is any basis for this

kind of optimism. It took 4 months to form a government, and the

current Iraqi leaders seem to lack the political will to reach agreement on the issues that divide them.

So how has the President responded to all of this? Over and over

again we get the same kind of talk from this administration: We

are just about to turn the corner. We have a steady stream of optimistic projections, we’re at a key turning point, we’re going to have

a crucial breakthrough.

Before the war began, Vice President Cheney promised the

American people that we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.

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Well, that never happened. About a month after the war, President

Bush stood in front of a giant ‘‘Mission Accomplished’’ sign and

said, we have seen the turning of the tide, and since then we’ve

had that steady stream of nonsense.

On June 28, 2004, when we turned over sovereignty, President

Bush promised that Iraq was at a turning point, but the violence

just intensified. And even at the January 2005 elections, President

Bush explained, tomorrow the world will witness a turning point

in the history of Iraq, a milestone to the advance of freedom. It

sounded good, but it was a complete fantasy.

A few months later Vice President Cheney presented the American people with the ultimate of happy talk. On Larry King Live

he said, ‘‘the level of activity that we see today from a military

standpoint, I think, will clearly decline. I think we’re in the last

throes, if you will, of the insurgency.’’

In December 2005, President Bush: ‘‘we’re making an quiet,

steady progress in Iraq.’’ Well, if 2005 was a turning point, it was

definitely a turning point for the worse.

Over and over again the approach of the Republican administration has been to tell us, we need to stay the course, it’s working

out well for the Iraqi people and for the American people. That’s

why I’m so impressed by our Republican colleague making the

statement this morning that we’ve got to face reality, it is not turning out well. It is a mess.

Now, I know that some people on this committee have said in the

past—I’m one person who believes that our involvement in Iraq is

a noble effort. That was stated by one of the members of our committee. They never say, I was wrong. Now we have people saying

what we need to do is have a reassessment of the forces that are

needed to control the security in Iraq. Do we trust this administration to reassess the number of forces that we need to have stability

in Iraq? They weren’t able to even assess the number of troops we

needed from the very beginning to maintain security in Iraq. And

we heard that we ought to be blunt with the Iraqi leadership, we’re

going to give them a deadline. And if they can’t work out their differences, then what? Are we threatening to leave? Well, in the middle of a civil war, if you tell people at this deadline you’ve got to

work out your problems, the aggrieved party in the civil war will

not agree to work out the problems because they would like to see

us leave, and maybe both sides would like to see us leave. But we

have no leverage because we told them we’re going to reconstruct

the country, and we failed. We told them we’re going to bring about

security, and we failed. We told them that they’re at a turning

point, and they turned the wrong way.

So I think it is a mistake to say, for those who thought this was

a noble war, that what we need to do is set some deadlines, tell

them to work it all out, reassess the number of troops, and, well,

that will get us past the election, won’t it? But it’s not an answer.

What we need is honest talk from those who thought this was a

noble war. We need them to admit that they were wrong. We need

to learn that somebody’s got to be held accountable. This administration has to be held accountable; the Republicans and the Congress that supported it have to be held accountable. The Democrats

that never learned after event after event after event should have

16

alerted them to the fact that we’ve made a mistake and we’re getting deeper and deeper in this quagmire need to admit as well. And

after that, you hold people responsible, you move forward, and you

don’t hold on to a noble cause until you lose more and more lives

for that noble cause and face the end of the road. And we already

may be at the end of the road.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Waxman, thank you.

The Chair would recognize Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for

holding these hearings, and I’m looking forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses. But I do think that given the fact that

we’re gathered here just a few days after the solemn 5th anniversary of the September 11th attacks on our country, it is very worth

pointing out that the attacks on our country had nothing to do with

Iraq and had nothing to do with Saddam Hussein.

And I think it’s important that we take a look at the situation

in Afghanistan today because, after all, the attack launched by

Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda came from there because they were

given safe haven by the Taliban Government in a failed state. And

this country was absolutely united in taking action against al

Qaeda and the Taliban, and the international community was

united as well. NATO invoked the article of the Charter that said

an attack on one is an attack on all. The United Nations unanimously passed a resolution condemning the terrorist attack on the

United States and said they would join us on the war on terrorism,

and here we are 5 years later with a world divided and a country

divided.

And in Afghanistan, al Qaeda still remains active. Osama bin

Laden is still at large. We’ve seen in the last many months a resurgence of Taliban activity in southern Afghanistan, and despite that

resurgence, which has been testified to by General Maples, the

head of the DIA, and cleared everybody following events in southern Afghanistan, despite that, we have actually reduced the number of American forces in southern Afghanistan.

We see today that opium production in Afghanistan is at an alltime historic high, and we learned within the last 10 days that the

Pakistani Government has essentially entered into a cease-fire

agreement with the Taliban in the northern part of Afghanistan

and with those in the northwest frontier area, in the Waziristan

area, that they’re backing off.

And so when I think back to President Bush on the aircraft carrier, the USS Lincoln, back in May 2003 declaring mission accomplished, it wasn’t only that we didn’t begin to accomplish any kind

of mission in Iraq, we haven’t come close to accomplishing the chief

mission that we’ve set out to do as a united country uniting the national community of making sure that we totally disabled al Qaeda,

because they’re still there, and they’re still planning, and they’re

still plotting, and we have not begun to accomplish the mission,

and we haven’t provided the resources necessary as a Nation to

complete the job, and we haven’t gotten the cooperation of the

Pakistanis and others to complete the job.

And instead, we took our eye off the ball. We took our eye off the

ball. We invaded a country that had absolutely nothing to do with

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the attacks on this country on September 11th, and we have created a mess there. We now confirmed what we already knew from

the Select Senate Intelligence Committee report, a bipartisan report: There was no collaboration between al Qaeda and Saddam

Hussein; in fact, they were ideological opposites. Saddam Hussein

didn’t want any Islamic extremists in Iraq upsetting the apple cart,

and yet as a result of our activity, we have created a mess there,

we’ve opened Pandora’s box, and now we’re left with trying to deal

with the mess that’s been created.

And as my colleague Mr. Waxman said, we continue to get happy

talk. We had mission accomplished 1 day. We had the plan for victory charts back in November at the Naval Academy—this White

House seems to really like these charts a lot—and then we had

Vice President Cheney saying, as Mr. Waxman said, ‘‘we’re in the

last throes.’’

I think the Vice President should read the Pentagon report that

just came out about a week ago. He said the insurgency was in the

last throes. That report says the insurgency remains, ‘‘potent and

viable.’’ And on top of that, we now understand from the Pentagon

and people above that the insurgency is really the lesser of our

problems. We now also have an incipient civil war. Call it what you

want, read today’s paper, read yesterday’s paper, people are being

brutally killed. They’ve had their hands cuffed, they’ve been shot

through the head, reprisal killing, cycle of violence that continues,

and yet nobody has been held accountable.

Stay the course is a slogan, it’s not a strategy. More of the same.

More of the same of what? Now, there are some people that have

talked about different ways to try to achieve a political settlement,

which is the only way we’re going to be able to resolve this issue.

I’m not sure there is going to be a peaceful political reconciliation,

but certainly that should be our goal. But this constant talk of just

keep doing exactly what we’re doing is a recipe for disaster as well.

We need some real thinking.

And I will close with this, Mr. Chairman: When you have a system that rewards those people who constantly got it wrong, and yet

punishes or marginalizes those in the administration or those,

frankly, in the professional civil service who got it right, whether

it was on weapons of mass destruction, whether it was on the question of no connections between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda,

when you punish or ignore the people who got it right, and you reward the people who get it wrong, you’re going to get a continuation of a failed policy.

And unfortunately, when the President has said he has all the

answers, the Republican leadership certainly in Congress says, yes,

Mr. President, you do have all the answers, and they haven’t asked

all the questions. It’s been a blank check, it’s been a rubber-stamp

Congress, and at the very least, if we’re going to have a national

conversation, which the President says he wants, we shouldn’t say

that 1 day and then point fingers at people who disagree with the

administration on the other day. That is just political partisanship.

And when the President says, let’s have a united conversation, and

then the Vice President otherwise goes out and goes name-calling

everybody else, that is not a two-way conversation.

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I hope that we will begin to have a two-way conversation, but it

doesn’t appear that we’re going to get there. I hope people will

begin to be held accountable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Platts.

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no statement at

this point.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for being here.

Mr. Higgins, welcome. You have the floor.

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate very

much having had the opportunity to travel with Chairman Shays

and other Members of Congress to the Middle East in the month

of August. We spent time in Iraq, we spent time in Lebanon, and

Israel and in the Sudanese region of Darfur, but.

I think the most difficult thing about this issue is that it’s not

one-dimensional, it’s multidimensional. When you talk about Iraq,

you also have to talk about Iran, you also have to talk about the

Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. And I think the one, perhaps only,

clear conclusion about this is that despite all the tough talk, despite all the fake bravado, this administration fails to recognize

that at the source of this problem is our Nation’s addiction to oil.

When you look at the situation in Syria, when you look at the

situation in Iran, they’re not exporting goods to the rest of the

world, they’re exporting hate and intolerance. That stands as the

basis for the conflict that we are now confronting in the Middle

East. Places like Iran and Syria, they use oil money; they use oil

money to insulate themselves from real political and economic reform. And unless and until this Nation, our Nation, gets serious

about developing energy independence, we will always have a conflict that we can’t control and obviously can’t control today.

I look forward to the testimony from this expert panel of witnesses, and look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, moving forward. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

We’ve been joined by Mr. Lynch.

Welcome. You have the floor, sir.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you for coming.

Mr. LYNCH. First of all, I want to thank Chairman Shays and

Ranking Member Kucinich for holding this hearing. I’d also like to

welcome today’s panelists and thank you for your willingness to

help the committee in this work.

Over the past 2 years, we’ve witnessed major events in Iraq,

from the June 2004 transfer of power to the Iraqi Interim Government, and to the December 2005 Council of Representatives elections, to the May 2006 formation of a new Iraqi Government. Regrettably, however, Iraq’s political developments have been accompanied by heightened sectarian violence. It has changed the dynamic in the country where we first faced a resistance among the

Ba’athist regime under—previously under the control of Saddam

Hussein, to one in which on a daily basis we hear of major conflict

between Sunni and Shia tribal leaders within Iraq, and it has

changed the dynamic of our mission there enormously.

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The focus of ethnic and sectarian identity has sharpened as a result of Iraq’s political process, while nationalism and a sense of

Iraqi identity have weakened. And accordingly, the political process

of national reconciliation in Iraq has borne an additional military

obligation for our brave men and women in uniform who are already shouldering enormous burdens of battling a terrorist insurgency.

As noted by the Department of Defense in its August 2006 quarterly report on Iraq to the Congress, rising sectarian strife defines

the emerging nature of violence in mid-2006 in Iraq. And since the

last report, the core conflict in Iraq changed into a struggle between Sunni and Shia extremists seeking to control key areas in

Baghdad, create or protect sectarian enclaves, divert economic resources and impose their own respective political and religious

agendas. That is what is going on in Iraq today, and as a result,

U.S. forces levels in Baghdad have been significantly increased

with an additional 7,000 American troops sent to Baghdad largely

for the purpose of curbing sectarian violence between Iraqis.

And, Mr. Chairman, in light of the deterioration in the security

environment in Iraq, and following my fifth visit to the country, I

believe that Iraq’s strategy is clearly lacking in one clear respect:

It is the absence of an effective mechanism by which to expeditiously and fully transition Iraqi Government operations, including

political tasks of national reconciliation, to the newly elected Iraqi

Government.

I was in Fallujah back in April, and during my visit we got hit

with a sandstorm, so I spent a couple of days there, stayed overnight. And I noticed that when in east Fallujah they had problems

with water and electricity, it was the U.S. Marines, the engineers,

who went out there and put the water back on and tried to get the

electricity back on. Those are functions that should be, by now, in

the hands of the Iraqi Government. They were elected back in December, and yet they still do not handle the basic operations, the

basic day-to-day duties of government.

And we need to make sure that responsibility is shifted over to

the Iraqis not only to reduce our own need for personnel in those

respects, but also because I think it’s common sense that if their

government is elected—and they have been elected since December—and yet for the daily duties and obligations of government,

the Iraqi people continue to look to the United States and Coalition

forces, eventually they will lose credibility. The Iraqi elected government, if they are considered a puppet government and they do

nothing in the main realm of what governments should do, they

will lose credibility among their own people, and we see some of

that happening today. Recent reports in the last few days coming

directly from the Iraqi leadership complain of this point directly.

And the function of moving that governmental responsibility to

the Iraqis is a necessary precondition of any United States withdrawal. That needs to happen, but no one right now is focusing on

that specific job, and we need to establish an organization that

looks at that issue and makes sure that the Iraqis do stand up and

take responsibility for those basic government operations in their

own country.

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Mr. Chairman, I welcome our panel’s thoughts on the suggestions that are put forward, and I look forward to their respective

positions on the progress of the national reconciliation efforts in

Iraq.

I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman very much.

Before recognizing our witnesses, I want to just take care of some

business. I ask unanimous consent that all members of the subcommittee be permitted to place an opening statement in the

record, and that the record remain open for 3 days for that purpose. Without objection, so ordered.

I ask future unanimous consent that all witnesses be permitted

to include their written statement, in the record. Without objection,

so ordered.

We have before us our first panel. And I appreciate our panel understanding that it’s important for Members to put on the record

their concerns about this particular hearing and the issue in general, and hopefully that will help you address some of the questions

and responses. And I say that as well to our second panel, we are

clearly divided on a very important issue facing our country and

the world.

Ambassador David Satterfield is the senior advisor on Iraq to the

Secretary of State. He’s the former Deputy Chief of Mission from

Baghdad. And I will just say that in my interaction with him in

Iraq, I found him to be extraordinarily candid, obviously very

aware of the issues that our country faces, and someone that I

have just unbelievable respect for. And I thank him for his service

in Iraq and his service now.

Mr. James Bever is the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Near

East and Asia, U.S. Agency for International Development. I understand you’ve been assigned to this position in the last few

months. You do not have a statement for us, but you’re here to respond to questions, and I appreciate that very much.

I will say, before swearing the witnesses in, the vote on authorized use of U.S. Air Force—Armed Forces against Iraq passed 296

to 133, with 3 not voting. Mr. Platts voted for this resolution, I did,

Mr. Lynch did, and Mr. Waxman. Mr. Kucinich voted against it,

and Mr. Duncan voted against it, and two of the other Members

here today were not here when we voted on that resolution.

Ambassador, if you will stand up, I will swear you in.

Mr. KUCINICH. Would the Chair yield to a question?

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just swear the witnesses in. Excuse me, Mr.

Bever as well. As you know, we swear in all the witnesses.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I note for the record that our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.

Was there a question?

Mr. KUCINICH. Yeah. I always appreciate the Chair bringing information to the committee to illuminate us in the context of hearings, but could I inquire of the Chair what was the purpose of citing my vote against that resolution?

Mr. SHAYS. The purpose was to help enlighten our witnesses that

some of the Members who have spoken for or against this war, in

fact, voted for the war. I just wanted them to realize that.

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Mr. WAXMAN. Mr. Chairman, since you mentioned my name, I

did vote for that resolution because I was concerned about nuclear

weapons of mass destruction. I didn’t know it was all a fantasy of

this administration’s.

I also hoped that we would do better, and then found that reconstruction was just lining of pockets of Halliburton and the contractors. I saw that the Iraqi people weren’t taking control of things.

I saw that the civil war was coming. I saw the disaster year after

year after year. It was as late as June 13, 2006, that I said, as you

did, I’m one person this on this committee who believes that our

investment in Iraq is a noble effort. I don’t believe it was a noble

effort, and I thought—my vote was a vote that I would certainly

not have cast had we known the facts, and I wouldn’t vote that way

today. And I do not think it’s a noble effort.

I don’t know why you decided to cite something that took place

so long ago when we knew so little of what we know now.

Mr. SHAYS. Just in response to your comments, Mr. Waxman,

since I was the gentleman who said it was a noble effort, I felt that

your comments were directed at me without using my name, and

then you talked about people being honest. And so I would like to

put for the record that I voted for this war. I believe it is an absolutely noble effort with all my heart and soul. I believe it would be

a catastrophe if we were to leave prematurely. I believe the Iraqi—

the terrorists, Islamist terrorists, would win. I believe there would

be an all-out civil war, and I believe Iran would be the dominant

force, and that’s what I believe with regard to that.

And I was noting the Member’s attack against me, and I did

want to make sure that my name is associated with that noble

cause.

Ambassador Satterfield, you have the floor.

STATEMENT OF DAVID SATTERFIELD, SENIOR ADVISOR ON

IRAQ TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I appreciate the

opportunity——

Mr. SHAYS. Let me explain. We do 5 minutes. We will roll over

another 5 minutes. Since you’re the only one with testimony, I

don’t want you to feel rushed to make whatever statement you

want to make. Thank you.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I do appreciate the

opportunity to appear before you today to testify on developments

in Iraq, especially on the urgent critical need for reconciliation

among Iraq’s sectarian groups. And I appreciate the opportunity to

enter into the record my prepared remarks. I would like to make

some brief summary comments before taking questions.

The Iraqi people, as well as Iraqi and Coalition forces, have suffered through a violent summer. While the insurgency and al

Qaeda terror remain challenges, lethal challenges, sustained sectarian violence is perhaps the greatest threat today to a stable,

unified, prosperous Iraq. If sectarian violence cannot be demonstrably, tangibly reduced and sustained, that reduction over the

next several months, an Iraqi Government that represents all of its

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people, is a partner against terror, and is at peace both at home

and with its neighbors will be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.

The challenges facing the citizens in the Government of Iraq are

serious, and they are very difficult, but, I believe, still surmountable. However, it will take a concerted urgent effort to achieve success. Iraq’s future is dependent upon the performance and commitment over a sustained period of time of three basic pillars of actors? first and foremost, the Iraqi Government itself and the Iraqi

people; the Coalition; and the international community, in particular Iraq’s neighbors. If any one of these pillars should fail to fulfill

its responsibilities and to sustain those responsibilities, each will

suffer the consequences of a destabilized and violent Iraq.

For the Iraqis themselves, failure means the reality of a civil conflict that would lead to loss of life, disintegration of a national government, division of the country along sectarian lines.

For the United States, for the Coalition, failure means the possibility that Iraq would either become a permanent haven for terrorists, a satellite of Iranian influence, or both. Either outcome would

pose a direct threat to American national interests and to the security of the American people.

For international actors, especially for Iraq’s neighbors in the region, failure would mean a further destabilized Middle East that

could disrupt national economies, provoke refugee flows, and, in a

worst-case scenario, lead to regional conflict. To avoid these specters of failure, all must do their part.

The U.S. Government, the Coalition have already begun to make

progress, and progress on a changed basis in several critical areas.

We are not engaged in business as usual in Iraq, all is not the

same. We have adapted and we will continue to adapt to changing

dynamics on the ground, to our assessment, which evolves with the

nature of the threat and the manner of dealing with that threat

most effectively. We have responded to criticism from the Congress

and from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to

improve performance.

On security. Multinational and Iraqi security forces reacted to

the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad, which many of the

Members present have commented on, and have launched Operation Together Forward, a strategy to clear Baghdad of armed elements, terrorists, criminal groups and insurgents one key neighborhood at a time.

After clearing armed groups from these neighborhoods, they’re

clearing the streets, they’re restoring basic services. The object here

is to provide a greater sense of normalcy for Baghdad residents in

their daily lives.

Since August 7, almost 50,000 buildings have been cleared, hundreds of weapons seized, dozens of militants, armed elements detained, and we are seeing results. Over the first 5 weeks of this operation, there has been a significant drop in execution-style sectarian killings in Baghdad city. Much work remains, but we appear

to be—we, meaning the Iraqi forces in the lead on the streets, with

support from Coalition elements—turning around the trend line of

violence that followed the bombing of the Samarra Mosque in February.

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I do not want to overstate success in Baghdad. This is an ongoing

proposition, and we assess on a daily basis what is being done and

what needs to be done, but the trend has been positive.

On reconstruction and good governance, critical elements both to

putting Iraq on a sustainable path, a stable future, we have shifted

the focus of our contracting efforts from foreign companies to Iraqi

contractors. We’re helping to support Iraqi businesses, to create

Iraqi jobs, and not just make-work jobs, but sustainable positions.

Both of these are necessary for the economic future of Iraq, and

they’re both necessary to provide a state for those who want to oppose violence, for those who see their future not in struggle, not in

conflict, but in peaceful and normal lives.

We’re working jointly in an unprecedented fashion, in military civilian teams, to stand up and to run provincial reconstruction efforts throughout Iraq as well as in the capital. These are helping

to rebuild critical infrastructure, to train Iraqi officials in democratic best practices so they can indeed take over the lead, because

the lead is what must be handed to Iraqis.

We already have seven provincial reconstruction teams up and

running. Two more are operational and will launch officially very

shortly.

On essential services. We have rehabilitated or maintained more

than twice the electrical capacity now on line in Iraq. We have improved access to fresh water and to sewage treatment for over 5

million Iraqis. And while our focus in the past was on building national capacity in these services, we have moved forward. We are

now focusing on what we call the next mile. It is connecting the

capacity which exists in the system to homes, to the user when

they turn on the light switch or turn on the tap.

Our goal is simple. We want Iraqis, particularly in Baghdad, to

be able to see, feel and touch the accomplishments that U.S. taxpayer money and the effort of committed men and women have

brought in their country. We’re making progress in that direction.

Finally, on oil production. We have worked hard, and we have

successfully increased Iraq’s crude output above prewar levels from

an average of 2 million barrels a day to 2.2 million barrel as day,

with a significant increase in that latter figure by the end of the

year as now wells come on line in the south.

Now, these are all positive developments, but they cannot exist

or be assessed in a vacuum. To have lasting impact, to have strategic impact, the Iraqi Government and the international community

must reinforce them by addressing other critical areas of concern,

and there is no such area that requires more immediate attention

in Iraq right now than reconciliation. On this issue the United

States and the Coalition can only do so much. Only the Iraqis

themselves, their elected leaders, can ultimately resolve the differences that currently divide them, and the clock is very much

ticking.

We are pressing the government of Prime Minister Maliki to

move now to match excellent rhetoric with real action. Prime Minister Maliki made a positive step forward in June when he presented a national reconciliation and dialog project to the Council of

Representatives, but the Iraqi Government now must move forward

to implement this swiftly and comprehensively. As Iraq’s partner,

24

we stand willing to help in any way we can to advance this process,

and we understand the stakes, but only the Iraqis can make the

difficult decisions and compromises that will guarantee for them

and for their people a secure, peaceful future.

Success in Iraq will not be possible unless all extragovernmental

armed groups, terrorists and insurgents are demobilized, and Iraq’s

main sectarian groups, Shia, Sunni and Kurd, resolve their differences peacefully and in a manner that supports a democratic

process.

I’d like to say, Mr. Chairman, a word about the important role

of the international community at this point.

This month the United Nations and the Iraqi Government are

launching an International Compact for Iraq that is loosely based

on the successful International Compact for Afghanistan that was

concluded in January of this year. The goal of the compact is for

the Iraqi Government to demonstrate to the international community, to the region, to the world and to its own people its commitment to implementing needed social, political and economic reforms, to move forward on security, to promote private sector investment and public sector development. The United Nations will

be holding a compact meeting in New York on September 18th, less

than a week from now, after a very successful preparatory meeting

this past week in Abu Dhabi.

Now, as the Iraqis reach out to the international community and

to their neighbors, it’s critical that the international community

and the region reach back. Now, this is especially true for Iraq’s

neighbors, who have for too long sat on the fence and complained

about conditions in Iraq without doing anything about them. We

share the concerns expressed by many of our friends in the region

about Iranian influence, about the growth of Sunni Islamic terror,

al Qaeda in Iraq, but the way to deal with this phenomenon is not

to isolate and exclude Iraq, it is to recognize that a new Iraq exists,

to embrace that change, and to work actively with us, with the Coalition, to support a different, better, stable future for Iraq. It is

time for the region to invest, as we have, in Iraq’s future.

Mr. Chairman, President Bush, Secretary Rice, Ambassador

Khalilzad, everyone in this administration, is committed to completing the mission in Iraq. If all of us, the United States, our Coalition partners, the Iraqi Government and the international community, do our part, we can and I believe we will succeed. And I

would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have.

Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Considering we have so many of my Democratic colleagues, I think I will start with them first, and then I’ll go to Mr.

Duncan.

Mr. Kucinich, you have the floor first.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. And what we are going to do—we are going to do 10

minutes. We’ll do 5 minutes. Then we’ll roll over for another 5 minutes. That way I think we can really get into some issues.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador, thank you for being here.

A recent report by a marine intelligence official in Iraq publicized

in the Washington Post claims that this situation at Anbar Province is almost hopeless. It says there’s nothing the United States

can do to improve the political and social situation there. You read

the report?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yes.

Mr. KUCINICH. Do you agree or disagree with its findings?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We certainly agree.

Mr. KUCINICH. I can’t hear you.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We certainly agree. The situation in

Anbar Province is, indeed, very serious, and we agree that major

measures need to be taken to address the social, the political situation there. We disagree that the situation is hopeless, and we disagree that it is not possible to address the underlying factors which

make the violence in Anbar so untrackable.

Mr. KUCINICH. Have you read any State Department reports that

draw a similar conclusion?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well, Mr. Kucinich, we have many,

many reports from our staff, from military staff in Anbar Province.

All of them confirm the difficult nature of the situation there, and

it’s a situation which through a combination of means outreached

to the Sunni community, not just in Anbar Province, but the exile

community outside Anbar Province in other countries; extension of

government services as best as can be done to provide a better

stake for the residents of that area; but above all——

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Ambassador, thank you. I want to ask you,

if you have read such State Department reports, are you willing to

provide them to this committee?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. That is an issue I will take back to

the Department, Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. If you’ve read such reports, when is the first time

that you read a report saying that the situation at Anbar Province

had deteriorated sharply?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. There are consistent reporting. There

is consistent reporting from Anbar Province underscoring the serious nature of both violence, political situation, essential services

provision in that province. It is not any one report or any one dramatic event. Anbar is a very, very difficult area. It is the most violent province in Iraq. It has been the most violent province since

2004.

Mr. KUCINICH. Is the State Department recommending to the

President that we send more troops there?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. That is not the role of the State Department.

35

Mr. KUCINICH. Does the State Department feel that there is a

military solution in Anbar Province?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The U.S. Government, the mission in

Baghdad, civilian and military, is united in a strategy of approaching the violence in Anbar, the political situation in Anbar as elsewhere in Iraq on a basis of both security steps and political and

assistance steps.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Ambassador, to what do you attribute the

sharp increase in extrajudicial killings in the Baghdad area?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The al-Sadr Hamas bombing in February was the beginning of a shift in tactics by al Qaeda and its

followers in Iraq from broadbrush attacks against civilians to a

specific targeting of Shia holy sites, Shia communities. The object,

as we know from Zarqawi’s own letters, was to prompt Shia responses, Shia violence against Sunnis, and, in his distorted mind,

to then provoke a civil war which he believed would be the prompt

for the creation of a Sunni caliphate in Iraq.

Mr. KUCINICH. Are there State Department reports of rising al

Qaeda influence in Anbar Province?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Again, sir, there is a consistent problem in Anbar Province not just with the insurgency, but also with

the presence of al Qaeda elements.

Mr. KUCINICH. And when were these reports first written?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. These reports have been present for

several years.

Mr. KUCINICH. And what is the position of the State Department

with respect to reports of men in army uniforms arriving in villages, seizing individuals, and then those individuals turn up handcuffed and blindfolded and shot to death?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. There is a consistent occurrence of individuals in the uniform, the garb of Iraqi security forces, usually

police but sometimes army, operating under the color of authority,

taking prisoners, executing individuals. It is for that——

Mr. KUCINICH. Are you saying people connected to the Iraqi

Ministry——

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No, operating under color of authority.

Mr. KUCINICH. What does that mean?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. That means purporting the——

Mr. KUCINICH. Who is killing all these people?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Killing is taking place at the hands of

insurgents. Killing is taking place at the hands of al Qaeda terrorists. Killing is taking place at the hands of extragovernmental

armed groups that have a sectarian color to them and a criminal

color to them.

Mr. KUCINICH. You have victims of extrajudicial killings. There

seems to be some systematic approach here—victims’ hands tied or

handcuffed, blindfolded, shot in the head, people showing up in

military uniforms, gathering the—gathering people before they

take them away, people in white Toyota Land Cruisers with police

markings.

What is the position of the State Department on who is responsible for these murders.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Kucinich, there are two sets of

issues here. One is dealing with the critical need for reform within

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Iraq’s Ministry of Interior, within its police services to ensure that

none of those security officers are operating in a manner that is not

national, appropriate, and it contributes to reconciliation.

The second issue is the presence of armed gangs, armed groups,

some with a militia identity, others with a criminal identity, who

are conducting these targeted executions and killings. Both need

‘‘addressal.’’

Mr. KUCINICH. Are you familiar with reports that kidnappers

have appeared with expensive foreign equipment issued to security

forces such as the Toyota Land Cruisers, Glock 0.9-millimeter pistols? Have you heard those reports?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We’re certainly aware of those reports,

sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. And what is the relationship now between the

State Department and the Iraq Ministry of—Interior Ministry?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well, the mission in Iraq, civilian and

military, is working with the Iraqi Government to undertake reforms of the Ministry of Interior, both its leadership as well as the

police services under the Ministry’s control.

Mr. KUCINICH. What responsibility should the United States

have with respect to a Ministry of Interior of a government that we

helped set up, working, apparently, to provide circumstances that

result in extrajudicial killings?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Sir, our mission is to help the Iraqis

set up credible national institutions and credible means institutions that work and are seen as working on behalf of all Iraqis that

are not engaged in armed activities outside official government

sanction.

Mr. KUCINICH. Has the State Department conducted an investigation of who is responsible for the extrajudicial killings?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The U.S. Government, all of its entities, civilian and military, do, indeed, examine this issue on a continuing basis and have done so for quite some time, and respond

to the results of that investigation both through efforts such as the

Baghdad security plan, our press for reconciliation efforts, as well

as addressal of the specific need for reform within the Ministry of

Interior.

Mr. KUCINICH. So who’s doing the killings? Are these people that

are killing with the United States looking the other way?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No, they are not.

Mr. Kucinich, as I noted previously, the killing is being done by

a number of groups, some who are, indeed, part of Iraqi security

forces, and that’s something that must be stopped. Others are operating wholly outside any official color or sanction. They are insurgents. They are terrorists. They are sectarian groups, militias and

gangs.

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, you’re pretty specific about that. Do you

have incident-by-incident reports that would indicate exactly who

has been doing the kidnapping and the executions and the

extrajudicial killings?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. There is often no such precise, instant-by-instant accounting, but there are patterns of behavior, sir,

which we do, indeed, follow which allows us to give a best estimate

of who is responsible for patterns of events.

37

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, we’re learning now there were 162 bodies

found last night. Maybe 100 people died in a day. We’re talking

about national reconciliation. What is the United States of America

doing with respect to trying to stop the extrajudicial killings?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Sir, we have committed additional

forces to Iraq. Iraqi Government forces have been added to the capital. We, along with the Iraqis, have devised a new security plan

which evolves continuously, and it has achieved over the month of

August significant results. We are working on reform of the Iraqi

security forces, particularly the Ministry of Interior, and we are

promoting a reconciliation process from which must come a DDR

process, disarmament, mobilization and reintegration that ends militia activity.

Mr. KUCINICH. How many Ministry of Interior officials have been

held accountable for their role or support of these extrajudicial

killings and are militias?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Sir, one of the issues which we have

urged Prime Minister Maliki to focus upon is the critical need to

show that there are consequences, real consequences, through the

judicial process for violations of human rights, for actions that involve torture, for corruption, large and small. Consequences need

to be demonstrated.

Establishing the rule of law in Iraq, starting at the level of government officials, is critical. This is a difficult area, and I will not

mince words on this point. It is hard to move this forward. Prime

Minister Maliki has made the right statements. He has pledged his

support for efforts against officials involved in violence, involved in

corruption, but you need two things here, sir. You need a government that provides strong political backing for rule of law, for the

fight against corruption, and you need a judiciary which is able to

stand up free of intimidation, free of threat, and carry forward a

fair and transparent process of bringing these individuals to justice, both present issues in Iraq which we are addressing.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KUCINICH. Are we going to have another round here?

Mr. SHAYS. No, we won’t have another round here because we

have to be out by 2. I can do—let me just explain. We can do 5

minutes and then do a certain amount, or we can do 10 minutes.

Now, I just need 10 minutes, but do you just have a quick followup?

Mr. KUCINICH. Well, I just want the record to show that the Ambassador has essentially said that no one’s right now being held accountable. There’s nobody being charged with anything, and you’ve

got all these extrajudicial killings going on and tied to the Ministry

of the Interior, and we’re supporting them. Hello?

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman.

At this time, Mr. Duncan has the floor.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, you know from my opening statement and also

from the vote that Chairman Shays called out that I have opposed

this war from the start, and I feel it was a very unnecessary war,

and I think it will go down in the history as one of the biggest forVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:15 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\38581.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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eign policy mistakes in this country’s history. However, I will say

this: I have many good friends here and at home that supported

this war and still support it, and certainly I think good people can

disagree in respectful ways. And I certainly have no disrespect for

you or people like you because I think that you’re just trying to do

the best you can in a very difficult situation. But having said that,

I just—really just have two questions, and they boil down to these:

How much and how long? And I’ll make just a few statements to

explain those questions.

When they found out that I was leaning against the war before

we cast our original vote, as Chairman Shays just mentioned,

about 4 days or so before that vote in October 2002, I was called

to the White House for a briefing by Secretary Rice and George

Tenet and John McLaughlin, and I asked—one of the questions

that I asked was Lawrence Lindsey had just lost his job at the

White House because he said the war would cost $100 to $200 billion, and I asked Secretary Rice in that meeting—there were six

members there. I said, how much—I asked her about that estimate

by Lawrence Lindsey, and she said, oh, no. It wouldn’t cost anywhere close to that much, $50 or $60 billion at the most.

Well, now most estimates are higher, it’s cost $300 billion or

more, and I think most Americans, while they don’t want, you

know, Iraq to pull out or some sort of specific exit date, they would

like to see us wind this down at some point. Yet we’re going in the

other direction. We recently increased our troop levels by 13,000 to,

I think, 140,000 roughly is what—the figure that I read.

This is a Nation that Newsweek Magazine said in the year before the war had a gross domestic product, the GDP, of $65 billion total,

so I know they love all of our money coming in there. And at this

same committee a year and a half or 2 years ago, we had David

Walker, who is the head of the GAO. I’m sure you know him. He

was inspector general of the Defense Department at that time. He

had issued a report saying that 35—that he had found $35 billion

that had been just totally misspent in Iraq and another $9 billion

that couldn’t be accounted for at all, $44 billion.

And then just about 3 weeks ago I led a congressional delegation

to Europe, and in one of the countries—and I won’t say the man’s

name because I don’t want to get him in trouble—but one of the

highest-ranking Foreign Service officers that we met said that—in

one of the countries said that he had spent—that he had—not too

long before we finished a year in Iraq, and he said that he saw

SUVs just stuffed full of cash with barely room for the driver, and

that he just saw horrendous waste.

And so I’m wondering, sir, how much? I’ve read a report. I don’t

have it in front of me. Joseph Stiglitz, I think his name is, and another Nobel Prize-winning economist say the ultimate costs of this

war will be well over $1 trillion counting what we—what we have

spent, what we will spend and the medical costs of the troops and

so forth. And then a couple of years ago, before the Armed Services

Committee, Secretary Wolfowitz said we would have to be there at

least 10 years.

So what I’m wondering about is how much do you think this war

is going to cost us in the end, how much; and then, since things

seem to be getting worse rather than better, according to the PenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:15 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\38581.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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tagon report and other reports, what do you think of that original

estimate from a couple of years ago that Secretary Wolfowitz made

that we would have to be there at least 10 years.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well, Congressman, the cost of the

war has been considerable. I am not able at this point to look back

on what has been said, what has been done or the basis for those

assessments. My role is to focus on where we are today and how

best to move forward to a success, a success which, for Americans

as well as for Iraqis and for the world, ensures that the cost of

Iraq, the real cost of Iraq, is not just something that we measure

in dollars or even in the tragic loss of life of American citizens

there, but rather the cost in terms of both the terror, the cost in

terms of instability in the region and elsewhere, and the cost in

terms of our ability to promote a process of democratization not

just in the Middle East, but elsewhere around the world. And that

could be a very high cost, indeed, if there is not a success in Iraq.

With respect to lessons learned, we have learned lessons, sharp

lessons, from the experience of the Coalition Provisional Authority

in terms of accountability. There has been excellent work done and

continuing to be done in Iraq by Stu Bowen, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction, and we have taken to

heart the steps that need to be taken to ensure that there is not

waste or mismanagement of U.S. funds.

Well, when you speak of cost, Congressman, the cost has to be

viewed in the broadest perspective. What is the price for a failure

in Iraq? Now, transition to Iraqi lead is critical. As I underscored

in my remarks, as the Secretary and the President and Ambassador Khalilzad have said, the Iraqis have to take over here. They

have to take over from the standpoint of security. They have to

take over from the standpoint of governance, establishing a rule of

law, moving forward their own reconciliation deal that provides a

new national compact, a basis for living in the country, and we’re

pressing them on these points.

On security we have seen very significant progress made in

terms of the standup of Iraqi forces. This is not just a notional concept. It’s not just rhetoric on our or the Iraqi parts. Iraqi forces are

in the lead in many parts of the country. They have made significant command transfers over the course of the last 60 days, some

within the last 30 days. That process is going to continue.

Now, Baghdad is a special focus. Because of the phenomenon of

sectarian violence, because it is the center of the country and the

heart of its national life, it’s essential that success there come as

quickly as possible, and it is why both we and Iraqis have committed additional elements to that fight. But I would note, sir, the

ability that we have—the Coalition has—and the Iraqis have to

move significant elements from elsewhere in Iraq to Baghdad is a

sign that, in most parts of the country, the security situation has

significantly improved, that those elements can be shifted to areas

where the security situation remains threatening.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, thank you very much. I’ll just simply close

and yield back the balance of my time to the chairman by saying—

after I say this, that, you know, I read a few months ago a column

by Ann McFetters, a columnist for the Scripps Howard news chain,

40

in which she said we’re headed for a financial tsunami when the

baby boomers start retiring in large numbers in 2008.

So I just don’t see how this Nation can afford to keep spending $100 billion or more every year in Iraq and do all of the things that

we’ve promised, and I also don’t see how a person can call themselves a fiscal conservative and not be horrified when they hear

David Walker say that $35 billion was misspent in Iraq, and $9 billion—$9 billion with a B—had just been totally lost. And when we

hear these rip-offs by all these contractors, if you’re a fiscal conservative, it seems to me you have to be horrified by that, and at

some point in the very near future, we are going to have to see

some decreases in these costs because, with a national debt of $8.5

trillion, we just simply can’t afford it.

I yield the balance of my time to the chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

The gentleman just has 2 minutes left, and I’ll use those times

just to set up for questions I’ll do later. But Ambassador, you are

a career diplomat; is that true.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. And you clearly didn’t vote to send us into Iraq,

Members of Congress did, and you’re being tasked with the effort

to help us and the Iraqis win this effort. Let me ask you, how long

were you in Iraq as the Deputy?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Fifteen months, sir.

Mr. SHAYS. Yeah, and have you been there—when did you go in,

and when did you leave?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. I arrived in late spring of last year. I

left a little over a month ago.

Mr. SHAYS. So you basically were there a year after the power

had been transferred to the Iraqis in June 2004.

I’m going to want you to react to what is motivating this whole

series of hearings, but I want to say to you, I believe in the beginning we made huge mistakes. We disbanded their army, their police and their border patrol. We allowed the looting. We were part

of a de-Baathification that basically took too many Iraqis out of the

opportunity to be part of this new government. I thought we turned

it around, but having now dug a deep hole when we transferred

power in June 2004—and that was a deadline, and a lot of the critics of the war were angry when we transferred power.

The bottom line is I then saw tremendous success when—for 18

months when we saw an election to create a transitional government. A transitional government was elected. They created the constitutional convention. The constitutional convention created the

Constitution. All of these were deadlines, and then you had the

election, allowed from the case of the Constitution an election of

the new government, and my point will be when I start to question

is what has happened since January of this year to now, and what

do we do to get the Iraqi politicians to do all of the things they

need to do on reconciliation, the Constitution and provisional election?

So that’s where I’m going to be headed, but my time has run out

now. Let me go to Mr. Waxman.

Mr. Waxman, you have 15—10 minutes.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

41

Ambassador Satterfield, I am familiar with your career in the

Foreign Service and your service to our country. You are an expert

in the Middle East. You’ve served in Lebanon and Jeddah, and

you’ve been in Iraq. You’ve been involved in the Arab-Israeli issues,

so you’re very familiar with that part of the world and fully cognizant of the consequences of our actions in that part of the world.

Repeatedly in your testimony, which I very much appreciate, it

was very sobering, you repeatedly say we’ve got to hold the Iraqi

Government accountable. They have to be accountable for torture

and violation of human rights. They’ve got to be accountable for national reconciliation. They’ve got to be accountable for security.

My question is shouldn’t we be holding the U.S. Government accountable as well and the administration that has brought us to

this point?

Things have not gone the way we were told they would go when

we engaged in this whole so-called noble cause. We were told it was

going to be easy; we were going to be greeted as liberators; that

we were going to create a democracy; that it’s going to be a shining

star on the hill; that we would produce further democracies

throughout the Middle East.

Isn’t it the case that we have strengthened Iran’s hand and the

role of the Shiites in what could be something of a civil war

throughout the Arab and Muslim world.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, I do not believe that

our actions in Iraq or elsewhere in the region have contributed to

a strengthening of Iran’s hand, and we specifically reject the concept that there is some threatening Shia, our core Shia crescent,

that extends throughout the region that links all the Shia populations of Lebanon, of Syria, of Iraq, the Gulf in some unified conspiracy which has nefarious ends.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, let me just—I appreciate that answer, but it

seems to me hard to believe that if we are successful in our mission

as we now have redefined it, that we’re going to have anything

other than a government in Iraq that is going to be very dependent

on Iran. And the party that has now taken power in Iraq is a religious Shiite party that has strong ties to Iran; is that true?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Sir, the majority of Iraq’s population

is Shia. In democratic, free and fair elections, representatives, the

majority of whom are Shia, were chosen, and the complex of the

government, including the sectarian identity of the Prime Minister,

reflect that democratic outcome. But we do not believe, very strongly do not believe, that the Shia of Iraq are Iranian, that their allegiance is anything other than to Iraq, or that they are not committed to the concept of nationhood as we would see the best future

for Iraq or other countries in the region.

Mr. WAXMAN. While I appreciate that answer, I would hope

you’re right, but I’m afraid that what you’re expressing is wishful

thinking, and what we’ve had consistently in this noble experiment, this noble cause, is wishful thinking that turned out not to

be accurate.

I don’t know at what point you hold people accountable when we

found out there were no weapons of mass destruction, there was no

tie between Iraq and al Qaeda, that the people didn’t greet us as

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takes in not getting enough. In fact, we penalized the Americans

who gave us warnings, like General Shinseki who said we needed

more troops, or others in the administration who said it was going

to cost more, and we’ve gone step by step by step, and every step

of the way we are told that we’re at a turning point, that things

are really going to get better, and we’re not at a very good point.

I don’t know if it was just hopelessly naive talk, but would you

agree that the insurgency was far from dead in 2005 when we were

told that they’re in their last throes, and would you say now that,

in fact, the insurgency is far from dead at this time.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The insurgency is a very significant

element in Iraq.

Mr. WAXMAN. So we were told that the insurgency was going to

be taken care of, and now we find ourselves hoping this government—and trying to help this government in Iraq—can deal with

the insurgency.

I think we need to ask ourselves when is a noble effort a mistake. In 2000, 672 American soldiers have died in Iraq; 19,000,

close to 20,000, have been wounded. We spent over $300 billion in

taxpayers’ funds, yet the violence is spiraling out of control. Iraq

is in the midst of a civil war, and Iran is far more powerful in the

Middle East than it was 3 years ago.

I think it’s time for the administration to accept responsibility for

this debacle, and I think the American people want accountability.

Mr. Chairman, I didn’t attack you. I did criticize your views, and

I don’t want you to take it personally. We have a difference of opinion on this issue. I don’t think you said all the things this administration has said, but when you tell us that, with all your heart and

your soul, you believe it was—it is a noble cause, that does not impress me, because all you’re telling me is you’re sincere. And I believe that President Bush has been sincere, but I think this war

has been wrong, and the estimates have been wrong, and the

happy assessments and the wishful thinking has turned out not to

be accurate, and now we’re in the very difficult situation that Ambassador Satterfield has described for us.

You said, Ambassador, that we need to complete our mission in

Iraq. Is our mission the same mission that we hoped it would be

in the very beginning, that this would be a democracy, that it

would be an example to the rest of the world, or do we just hope

now our mission is to have this government stable enough to take

over from us.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Sir, our mission is a stable, democratic, prosperous Iraq.

Mr. WAXMAN. Do you think that some of the insurgency and internal strife is due to the fact that the Iraqi people don’t respect

this government because they think we’ve set it up?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No, I do not believe, sir, that is an element, but it is quite true that any government, including the government of Prime Minister Maliki, that is not able to deliver on

basic commitments in terms of provision of essential services, identification with a national program, including the security services

composition and behavior, is not a government which is going to be

able to succeed, and no government that does not establish or significantly strengthen the rule of law can succeed.

43

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I think you’re absolutely correct in that

statement, but they looked at the United States as a country that

occupied Iraq, caused a war against the regime in Iraq, brought it

down, and then tried to occupy the country, and we were not successful in any of those activities either. We didn’t provide security.

We didn’t provide reconstruction. We didn’t provide any credible

thinking on the part of the Iraqi people that they were going to be

better off, at least I think the majority, because we were there.

Now we want a government that we’ve helped set up through a

process, a democratic process, to accomplish that goal as well, and

I hope we get there. I hope we get there, but I just wonder at some

point when the President is going to say, as the chairman of this

committee has said, ‘‘Well, there have been mistakes, and I’m responsible for those mistakes. There are other opinions that I should

have listened to, and there have been consequences for the errors,’’

rather than that whole pattern over and over again of never taking

responsibility and telling us they’re in the last throes. We’re at a

turning point. We’ve got to stay the course. Things are going to get

better. We’re going to redo the Middle East.

As the Secretary of State said during this Lebanon war, we’re

going through the growing pains of a new Middle East. Right now

that new Middle East does not look very encouraging to me, and

I don’t think it would look very encouraging to the people in Iraq

or their neighbors or the international community.

You said we need the role of the international community to be

more involved, but didn’t we take the position that we didn’t care

what the international community had to say, that we were going

to go into this war alone? Didn’t we also take the position after the

first military victory that we wouldn’t even let some of those other

countries bid for contracts in Iraq because they weren’t with us in

the beginning? Do you think that those actions on our part might

lead to some of the other countries we want now to be involved to

feel that we stepped in it, and it’s our responsibility, and they can

sit on the sidelines? Is that a problem still.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, our focus, and indeed,

I think, collectively all of our focus, is on how to deal with the situation today and move forward to a success, because the stakes of

success or failure are so significant for us, for others.

Among the steps needed is to reach out, something we have been

very much engaged in, to a broad community of international and

regional support for Iraq.

Mr. WAXMAN. Well, I agree we have to do what we can do, and

we have to reach out as best we can, but I think we’ve made it a

lot more difficult for that to happen successfully based on our previous actions. Very sincere people running this country were very

arrogant. They told these countries we didn’t need them. We told

the world we could accomplish this easily; we are the power, and

we’re going to throw our weight around. And I think that we have

caused many, many more difficulties for ourselves than otherwise

would have been the case. You agree with that, don’t you?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, we have acknowledged

that the situation is extremely troubled in Iraq and that everything

possible needs to be done to address it from the standpoint of our

own strategies and policies. What the international and the reVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:15 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\38581.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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gional communities do and, above all, what the Iraqi Government

must do and how we urge them to take those steps, that’s the

course, that’s the strategy we’re embarked in.

Mr. WAXMAN. And when did you say we measure whether the set

strategy has failed or succeeded, and is there a timeframe in which

we can make that judgment?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, one of the aspects of

the way we have tried to execute our assessments, our strategy and

policy over the course of the past year in Baghdad and here in

Washington is to constantly assess and to know what the benchmarks are for that assessment of whether or not what we are doing

is working, and, if it isn’t, to know that and to make changes.

Now, whether we’re looking at the security area, the standup of

Iraqi forces, the effectiveness of Iraqi forces, the government’s provisions of essential services, capacity-building on the civilian side,

or the issue of rule of law and corruption, we know what the goals

are. We and the Iraqis talk together about where the hollowness,

the weaknesses are, and we assess what can be done to address

them.

There are some pieces we can’t fill, the Iraqis must; some pieces

we and they cannot address. The international community and the

region have to come to help. But we assess every day what we are

doing, whether it’s succeeding or not, and we do not stay on the

same rigid line. We reassess, reevaluate constantly, and we hold

ourselves up against very real benchmarks of whether what we are

doing is working or not, Baghdad security or civilian issues.

Mr. WAXMAN. Not just staying the course, we may even change

the course as we reevaluate matters.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We assess what is necessary to

achieve success in Iraq.

Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you.

Mr. SHAYS. I thank the gentleman very much, and, Mr. Dent,

you have the floor.

Mr. DENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

About 13 months ago at this time I was in Iraq. I visited Kirkuk.

I was down in the southern areas near Basra and also in Baghdad

within the Green Zone, and at that time the Iraqis were dealing

with the constitutional issues and specifically the allocation of resources, which is a continuing problem there. And I think just last

week one of the Deputy Prime Ministers of Iraq declared that issue

had been resolved, but really gave no details, the issue of distribution or allocation of those resources or oil.

My specific question to you, Ambassador—Mr. Ambassador, is

has that issue of the oil revenue allocation been resolved as indicated by the Deputy Prime Minister—I believe his last name is

Sulih—and if it has been resolved, what are the provisions of that

settlement.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Congressman, there is no resolution to the issue of a national oil and hydrocarbons law. The essence of such a law, which is an urgent priority for Iraq, will be

a distribution both in terms of commercial rights, revenues between the center and provincial and regional authorities. That is

something very much under discussion at a local as well as a national level, but it is not resolved.

45

Mr. DENT. They have not determined where those decisions will

be made, either at the central level or at the provisional level then?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The law itself will set out what the relationship is for development exploitation as well as for profits and

control between local and national authorities, and that remains

very much under debate.

Mr. DENT. OK. On the issue of de-Baathification, Ambassador

Bremer has been very candid that he believed we made a mistake

in allowing Shia politicians to administer much of the deBaathification process. I think it was the Ambassador’s intent to

affect about only 1 percent, the top 1 percent, of the Baathist Party

members.

I guess the question I have for you is, since this is such a key

issue to the Sunni Arabs in Iraq, do you believe that Prime Minister Maliki and the Shia political parties and the parliamentary

bloc agree, and what action is Prime Minister Maliki’s government

taking to reform this whole de-Baathification process, and can we

get the Sunni buy-in.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Congressman, the manner in

which de-Baathification has been applied has indeed been extremely troublesome and divisive for Iraq; it has not been a unifying process, and it has not contributed to reconciliation.

In June, when Prime Minister Maliki made his speech to the

Council of Representatives on the reconciliation issue, he specifically raised reform of de-Baathification as one of the issues that

had to be addressed. This is an issue under the control of the

Council of Representatives, but it is important for the government

and for Iraq’s political leadership both to have a view and to advance that view in a manner that supports national reconciliation.

There cannot be a new national compact, a reconciliation deal for

Iraq, without addressing the issue of how de-Baathification is to

proceed.

Our hope would be that issue moves forward on the basis of punishment for individual criminal action and not some blanket or

class proscription or prohibition as has been applied in the past, or,

worse, the use of de-Baathification as a political or sectarian weapon.

Mr. DENT. On the issue of Kirkuk, I visited Kirkuk last year. I

visited the big power-generating facility. I’ve forgotten the name of

the town now, but I visited that facility, and I was struck by the

ethnic diversity of Kirkuk—the Turkmen, the Sunni Arab, Shiite

Arab, and the Kurds—and there was a very heavy Kurdish population at one time there until Saddam Hussein, I guess, Arabized

Kirkuk.

What is the position, in your view, of the Sunni, Shia and Kurds

respectively on the status of the city of Kirkuk, and what is the

prospect that this issue can be resolved.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Congressman, the Constitution,

as was the case with the preceding transitional administration law

for Iraq, calls for an addressal of the issue of Kirkuk in its future

in a manner that reflects the will of its people. The Constitution

specifically requires a process to be entered into which could include, but does not specifically have to include, a referendum.

46

This is an issue that will need to be addressed, but it needs to

be addressed, if I could say, in the context of national reconciliation. It needs to be addressed in the context of a resolution on

how oil revenues, oil expectation, oil investment will be managed.

It’s not something that can be seen in isolation. It is part of the

national compact, part of the package deal that needs to set forth

a basis for Iraqis, all Iraqis, including in Kirkuk, to live together.

Mr. DENT. And on the issue of Kurdish autonomy, generally, I

believe—I guess the President of the Kurdistan Regional Government barred the Iraqi flag from flying over government buildings

and in the Kurdish regional area. What is the significance of the

Prime Minister’s recent actions barring that Iraqi flag flying and

his talk of independence? What is your sense of what this means?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, the Iraqi Constitution

recognizes the Kurdish Regional Government’s area of responsibility as a Federal region of Iraq, but I would underscore ‘‘region of

Iraq.’’ We were quite concerned at the decision you referred to regarding flying of the Iraqi national flag. We addressed those concerns urgently and directly with very senior Kurdish officials. It

did not contribute to the process of national reconciliation.

Mr. DENT. Has there been any response from the Turkish Government with respect to that action by the Kurds?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. By the Turkish Government, sir?

Mr. DENT. Yeah.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The Turkish Government and we, the

Turkish Government and Kurdish officials, the Turkish Government and officials of the central government in Baghdad, are in

continuing contact on a great many issues, but on this specific

issue there was no significant public reaction.

Mr. DENT. In the event that Iraq were ever to deteriorate into

a full-blown civil war—I don’t believe we’re there today—but if that

were the case, what do you believe the Turkish Government would

do to protect its interests?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Congressman, I don’t want to

comment on hypotheticals because we do not concede that Iraq is

destined for a full-blown civil war.

Mr. DENT. I’m not saying that either, but there is a lot of concern

that, should that occur, the Turkish Government might take actions.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. I would refer you to officials of the

Turkish Government for an assessment of their possible steps.

Mr. DENT. And finally the issue of an—there has been a lot of

talk, of course, about an autonomous region in the south, a Shia

autonomous region. What are the prospects, in your view—just get

right back to this issue of civil war, but what do you think are the

prospects for a civil war if a Shia autonomous region is established

in the south of Iraq as some experts have predicted?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. The Constitution provides for a law to

be passed on how regions may be formed from provinces, and then,

of course, a provision for how provinces could request such a step

to be taken. There is considerable debate, Mr. Congressman, not

just between Shia and the other communities of Iraq, but within

the Shia community, over what should be the shape of governance

in southern Iraq. There is no one position on this issue. There is

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no agreement even within the Shia community on this question,

and our position would be any addressal of an issue as fundamental to the nature of governance and life in Iraq as setting up new

Federal regions should be done in a manner which is transparent,

which reflects clearly the will not only of those individuals in that

region, but also contributes to the cause of a unified, national,

peaceful Iraq, and that is not intrinsically destabilizing.

Mr. DENT. Did I understand that the position of our Government

of the United States is that the issue of a Shia autonomous region

should be left to the Iraqis? Is that our government’s position?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well, sir, it is an Iraqi decision, and

it is provided for in the Constitution. There must be legislation

passed to set up the specific procedures for establishing these regions beyond the Kurdish region. That debate is ongoing, but we

believe the debate should be conducted, and the results of that debate should certainly contribute to national unity, not division.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to yield the balance of my time

back to you.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Ambassador, what is the significance of the statement by the

Iraqi Speaker of the Council of Representatives that reconciliation

must be achieved in 3 to 4 months or Iraq will go under?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Speaker al Mashhadani was reflecting

in that comment the need for urgent action on national reconciliation, on a national compact on a basis for Iraqis to live together,

and the elements of that deal, of that compact, are all of the things

we’ve touched on today, economic, a national oil or hydrocarbons

law, a relationship between the center and provinces or the center

and potential Federal regions, good governance, and the ability to

extend essential services in a sustained manner and a rule of law.

All of those have to be part of that deal, and the clock, as I said

in my remarks, is ticking and in an unforgiving fashion. There does

need to be urgent progress on these issues.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. One of the things that I will be asking you with

the next round of questions is I’m going to want you to rank—

maybe some of your staff can write this down so you can then rank

it—the issue of amnesty, rollback of de-Baathification, federalism,

sharing the oil wealth, and standing down the militias. I want you

to rank them in the ones that are going to be the most difficult to

the most—to the easiest. That’s amnesty, rollback of deBaathification, federalism, sharing the oil wealth, and standing

down the militia.

We have a huge opportunity in our next panel to have a representative from the Sunni community, the Shia community and

the Kurdish community make a case for their country in how they

can work together and where the problems are, and we’re eager,

though, to have your view about that.

At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr. Van Hollen. Thank

you, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank both of you

gentlemen for being here.

Ambassador Satterfield, thank you for your testimony, and thank

you for your service as well. As a Foreign Service brat, I really do

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appreciate all your—all you’ve done for our country and what

you’ve done in the Middle East in your service.

Mr. SHAYS. Note for the record he called himself that, not anyone

else.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. That’s right. And before I turn to sort of looking at the future, I do think it’s important, though, for the American people listening to us as we discuss what’s at stake in Iraq

and, as you’ve described, the potential of al Qaeda and Iraq taking—using Iraq as a base for the export of religious extremism,

that I think you would agree that those consequences that you’ve

talked to emanating from Iraq if we don’t succeed did not exist

coming out of Iraq before we invaded Iraq. I hope you would agree

with that assessment. Iraq before we invaded was not a base of operations for al Qaeda, and there was not a danger of the export of

extremist al Qaeda etiology and terrorism emanating from Iraq in

that form before the invasion of Iraq.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, I will take that question for a considered response.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I appreciate that. If there’s any way you can

get back to that—and I understand the difficulty of the question,

but I think it’s important as we debate this because we’re in the

political season now. The President’s given a series of speeches essentially saying, if you’re not with him on his particular ‘‘stay the

course’’ proposals on Iraq, he sort of questioned those who have

questioned him, and I do think it’s important that, regardless of

what people think of the consequences that might happen if we

don’t succeed by whatever definition in Iraq, that those consequences are a result of us having invaded Iraq. And I don’t need

for you to respond any further to that.

On the question of national reconciliation, clearly that’s the key

to this, and as you pointed out, many of those key decisions are in

the hands of the Iraqis, right? You would agree?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Certainly, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. All of those key decisions are in the

hands——

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. So I think it’s also important for the American

people to understand that in this exchange that we’re having that

when we talk about whether or not we succeed in Iraq, we very

much mean that we’re depending on the Iraqi people to make the

right decisions in order for success to be defined as we would like

it to; isn’t that right?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, I could not state more

clearly that the use of ‘‘we’’ is we, the United States and Coalition;

we, the Iraqi Government and people; and we, the international

community.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Right, but as—I think your point was well

taken that many of their critical decisions that are going to be

made are decisions made by Iraqis with respect to how they see the

future of Iraq; isn’t that right?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. OK. Now, on this question of national reconciliation, I think the real issue here is within the Government of

Iraq, who has made up their mind that the future of Iraq is a uniVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:15 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\38581.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
49

fied Iraq, or whether there are parties that are currently part of

the government that have made up their mind that they see their

future differently, more of an autonomous region either totally separated or with a very weak central government.

And in that regard, let me just ask you, we had the testimony

yesterday of Colonel Alan King, someone who had been on the

ground in Iraq. He wrote a book, and just with respect to the services, to the Ministry of Interior, he pointed out Iraq has formed an

internal security—and I’m quoting from his testimony yesterday—

formed its internal security along sectarian lines with the Shiadominated Ministry of Interior and the existence of the militias imposing strict fundamentalist policies, including death squads, operating what is sequaciously being attributed to the Government’s inaction or complacency. He went on to say, ‘‘The SCIRI’s Badr Corps

domination of the security forces has positioned a nonstate actor in

a state-sponsored position to pursue its objectives independent of

the government’s objectives.’’

Are you persuaded as we’re here today that the Minister of Interior has made a decision to purge itself of those connections to the

Badr Corps?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Prime Minister Maliki and his Minister of Interior, indeed the government as a whole, has made a

pledge both recognizing the problems in the Ministry of Interior

that preceded this government and the problems ongoing in the

Ministry of Interior and its forces to reform both structures and

leadership.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. And are you convinced—as you pointed out in

your earlier testimony, we have rhetoric, and we have action. Have

you seen the actions taken to meet the rhetoric that you just mentioned?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Sir, we have seen some actions taken

already in terms of actions against senior officials of the Ministry

of Interior. We have seen some actions initiated in terms of reform

of the security services under control of the Ministry of Interior,

but much more needs to be done.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Let me get back to this question about the—

Barzani’s decision to fly the Kurdish flag, and I understand that

the United States made known that they didn’t think that was

helpful, but I think the real question is the sentiment underlying

that decision that he made because, as you said, this is a question

for the people in Iraq, whether they’re Kurd or Shia or Sunni or

whatever background they may be. And as we know, at the time

of the January elections, there was a sort of straw poll taken in the

Kurdish area. It wasn’t a legally binding thing, but it did go to the

question of whether there should be an independent Kurdistan,

which has been the aspiration, understandably, of many of the

Kurds in the region, and over 90 percent of the people said they

would like an independent Kurdistan. The Peshmerga, you know,

is already—essentially, that’s an independent militia in many

ways, but we recognize that the Kurds believe that’s necessary for

their own security.

So, given that fact, doesn’t it suggest that many in Iraq have not

made up their mind that they want to live in a united Iraq; that,

in fact, many Iraqis—and I think this is—many Iraqis would prefer

50

to see some form of whether it’s real autonomy for each of the three

regions or some form of partition.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. I would make two general comments.

First, the views of the majority of Iraqis as reflected in the view

of the majority of their political representatives are very much in

favor of an Iraq which is unitary. What ‘‘unitary’’ means, how the

relationship between the center and current provinces or the center

and potential regions should be defined is very much a matter for

debate, and there is the broadest spectrum of views which transcend Sunni, Shia, sectarian identification. There are many, many

Shia who support a strong central government. There are many

Shia who would like to see a different kind of formula followed for

the south.

The important issue here is how is the debate conducted. What

is the outcome of the debate? Does it leave an Iraq which is capable

of being prosperous, secure and stable, or does it threaten those

three goals? And those are not just for us to postulate; although,

we do and must with our colleagues in the Iraqi Government. It’s

an issue for them to debate, and the next weeks and months must

see these issues, whether it’s focusing on oil, the question of federalism, governance as a whole, and de-Baathification and the

other issues the chairman mentioned that are part of the reconciliation, move forward. How does it all work together to create that

stable, prosperous and secure Iraq.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Well, in closing, I thank you, Mr. Chairman,

for the time. I think you’re right in stating the challenge with respect to bringing it all together. I guess the question is what will

the final answer be, and a lot of that answer will come from the

Iraqi people. All we do know is that there does continue to be this

terrible and escalating cycle of violence, large internal migrations

of people who used to live side by side as Sunni and Shia having

to move out of their neighborhoods. And the real fear is, as time

goes on, that the situation doesn’t become even worse, and, you

know, it doesn’t—looking at the situation on the ground in the last

couple weeks doesn’t give you a lot of hope, as much as I hope for

a good result.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much.

Mr. Satterfield, just speak first to the question that I tried to discuss with you, and that is I’ve seen significant progress from June

2004 until January with tremendous expectation, and I understand

that this new government took a while to form because the Kurdish

community and the Sunni community exercised a veto as a minority over the choice of the selected Prime Minister. And so there was

this debate between majority rule, minority rights, majority rule,

minority rights, and minority won, and they got another Prime

Minister; but the majority got to select that Prime Minister in the

name of Mr. Maliki, Prime Minister Maliki, but that took 31⁄2

months. And now I have seen this government operate for over 31⁄2

months now, I’m hearing them say the right thing, and I’m not seeing them do what needs to be done.

Would you agree that there was some significant timelines in

2005 and timelines met that we are not seeing right now?

51

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, let me respond to your

question by telling you about two different issues, one of which is

in direct response to what you just outlined. We certainly did see

during the course of 2005 a series of fixed benchmarks, which laid

in front of the Iraqi people the region, the Coalition-specific goals,

the various referenda and national elections that took place. Holding Iraqis to those deadlines, Iraqis holding themselves to those

deadlines, was an important factor in leveraging or driving

progress, and as each deadline, as each event was reached and successfully held, and, indeed, with increasing success in terms of the

participation particularly from the Sunni community as each referendum and election took place, we saw a burst of confidence, of

support for the concept of governance, sovereignty in Iraq take

place. And you’re right, that momentum faltered with the beginning of 2006.

Mr. SHAYS. I’d like to say, as someone who was there four times

during that year, it was remarkable.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Yes.

Mr. SHAYS. It was remarkable. In just 11 months, a new nation

was created with three elections—one to create this transitional

government. It was remarkable that they were able to agree on a

body to write this Constitution and then invite Sunnis in, because

they didn’t have the legal representation on the transitional government because they didn’t participate, and then to see that ratified and then to see this new government elected.

What troubles me is that there was this huge success, but it

was—they had timelines to basically follow, and they met them.

What will get this new government to act given there aren’t

timelines?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, there needs to be a

clear sense of urgency instilled in the Government of Iraq and, indeed, beyond the government; I would say, in the political leadership of Iraq, representatives in or outside of government, from all

significant political groupings, all ethnic and sectarian groups in

the country, that their future, the future of all of their peoples, the

people of Iraq collectively, depends upon movement, movement on

reconciliation. And I would say, sir, reconciliation includes all of

the elements which you outlined in your remarks.

Mr. SHAYS. Why don’t we get to that, and if you could give me

how you rank them. It’s amnesty, rollback of de-Baathification, federalism, sharing the oil wealth, standing down militia. I’m going to

ask you to rank them in two ways, one in terms of difficulty and

another in terms of the importance.

What is the most important as you would—and maybe some of

them are so equal you have to put them all in the same. But how

would you rank them in terms of importance; amnesty, rollback,

federalism, sharing the oil wealth, staring down the militias.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I don’t think there is

any question that a decisive elimination of the presence of

extragovernmental armed groups, militias, gangs operating as militias, whether with a sectarian or other identification, is the key

challenge, and it is essential to moving Iraq forward to a better future.

Mr. SHAYS. What would you put second?

52

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. When you raise the issue of amnesty,

that is part and parcel of the question of how you strike a reconciliation deal out of which flows a resolution on militias. You can’t

deal with militias, a DDR process, in isolation from a political

package deal on reconciliation in which de-Baathification, amnesty

have to be critical elements.

I have a young man in my office who is an Iraqi; I mean, he’s

now back at school. I asked him about, you know, some issues I

was taking a stand on as it related to this. I asked him to comment

about the militia. And he said, my parents never thought of themselves as Sunnis, they thought of themselves as Iraqis, but when

they started to feel endangered as Sunnis, they then gravitated to

the Sunni militia that could protect them. Which got me to think

about the fact that, do I cut this Prime Minister a little slack in

eliminating the militia, because if you eliminate the militia, is

there going to be a void that no one then can take the place? In

other words, through—in the process of wanting to bring peace, endanger my intern’s parents by eliminating the Sunni militia that

are protecting them.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, three key elements

have to go together here, three very broad elements. Security has

to be advanced. An element of security, a critical one right now,

particularly in Baghdad, is extra governmental armed groups, militia violence. But dealing with the insurgency and the threat it

poses, dealing with al Qaeda terror and the threat it poses must

continue to be addressed. Security is one critical underpinning of

the state. A reconciliation deal that helps drain off support for the

insurgency, that helps turn Iraqis against terror, that’s a critical

element as well.

Mr. SHAYS. I’m sorry to interrupt you. I have 5 minutes left. I’m

so eager to get your expertise here. But one of the points that he

was really making to me that got me to think of it in a different

light is the militia have a huge negative; they were created, in

part, to provide the protection when we limited all security. I

mean, if we eliminated all security in New York State of 19 million

people, all security, you would have banks hiring private police,

you would have local streets hiring protective police, you have—

isn’t part of the militia, the positive part, that they are protecting

communities? The negative is that some are being aggressive and

going beyond that.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Well, we question exactly how much

protection militias truly offer to their communities, as opposed to

their role, which is essentially violent and criminal, in advancing

very particular objectives. So we would challenge the entire legitimacy of the protective——

Mr. SHAYS. If all militias left, I could see your point. The bottom

line is there has to be something that takes their place to protect

them. Which gets me back to the whole issue of whether we have

enough security in Iraq to start with, which is another issue.

Tell me, what is—it seems to me the sharing of oil has to be the

easiest. I had Bunker Hunt come to my office, stretch out a map,

and basically tell me that he thinks Iraq has almost as much oil

as Saudi Arabia, and that it is everywhere, not just in pockets; it’s

53

in pockets now, but he says when full research is done, you will

find it everywhere throughout Iraq.

What is—is the oil, sharing of the oil revenue the most difficult?

Because it seems to me to be one that should be able to bring people together.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. We don’t think it is the most difficult

issue to be addressed, we certainly don’t. We think an equitable,

rational basis for sharing exploitation as well as revenues can be

devised. Our guidelines here would be a process of dealing with

revenues and exploitation that contributes to national unity, that

contributes to the stability of Iraq, and which is not intrinsically

divisive.

Mr. SHAYS. Some of—and this is not everyone—but some who are

most opposed to the war in Iraq spoke out very strongly when

Iraqis started to talk about amnesty and they started to talk about

forgiving acts. And then there was this point that anyone who

killed Americans should not be forgiven. And I’d love to know the

administration’s opinion on this, because I’ll tell you mine. My view

is you need amnesty, you need—unless there were those who did

heinous crimes of cutting off heads and so on. But it seems to me

that you will not get amnesty—you will not have peace unless you

have amnesty. And amnesty will require forgiveness, and forgiveness will mean that you have to forgive not only deaths of Iraqis,

but of Americans. And it seems to me that’s the one way you save

future American lives is if you have amnesty.

Is amnesty, one, important? And, second, are you prepared to address it as it relates to Americans?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Amnesty is critical, Mr. Chairman. It

is an essential element in any reconciliation deal. And without a

comprehensive amnesty, that reconciliation deal cannot be struck.

Now, our point has been made quite clearly to the Iraqi leadership

and its political elites that we cannot accept any amnesty which

differentiates between the legitimacy of killing Iraqis and the socalled legitimacy of killing Americans or Coalition members. But

an amnesty deal will need to be there if this country is to move

forward as part of—not stand alone—as part of a broader reconciliation package.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. In the minute we have thus left, would you just

tell me what gets the Iraqi politicians—and I have tremendous respect for them, but I don’t respect what I’ve seen happen in this

last year—what gets them to move more quickly before, frankly,

the United States pulls the rug out from under them? And I say

that, not that the President will, but you could have a new Congress who may.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I’ll comment on the

first part of what must be done to move the Iraqis forward. It is,

I believe, the clearest possible message that, without movement,

without concrete progress and urgent progress in the weeks and

few months ahead on all of these issues—reconciliation, economic

questions, good governance, security, end to sectarian violence, the

beginnings of a demobilization process for militias—that success for

them as they would define it cannot be achieved, much less success

as we define it.

54

Urgent progress has to be made. And that message is one which

we are passing and will continue to pass at the highest levels. We

do have an interest in this succeeding.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Lynch, you have the floor.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Chairman. And, again, I want to thank

you and the ranking member, Mr. Kucinich, for holding this hearing.

Mr. Ambassador, I want to start my questioning off with a quote

which comes from H.L. Mencken, and he says that—let’s see if I

can get it here—for every problem—for every complicated problem

there is a solution that is simple, neat, and almost always wrong.

And I just want to start out by saying that given the complex nature of the problems that we have in Iraq and the changing nature

of our challenges there, that staying the course may be clear and

simple, but it is most definitely wrong.

And I’ve had an opportunity on five occasions to travel to Iraq

and spend time there. I was there back in the beginning when General Gardner was actually serving in a role as Ambassador. I met

also with Ambassador Bremer, and most recently Ambassador

Khalizad, both in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

One of the things that I want to ask you about is, sitting here

in Congress, the initial mission for our operation in Iraq, Operation

Iraqi Freedom, was to remove Saddam Hussein and basically to

give the Iraqis a chance—give the Iraqis a chance at having a stable democratic state. And when I went there on my earliest trips,

that was definitely the mission. We were fighting Ba’athist loyalists and Fedajin, and we moved on to some of the milestones that

have been cited here about the elections, and had the pleasure of

meeting with President Jalal Talabani. There have been milestones

there in terms of us creating the possibility, the chance, if you will,

for Iraqis to have a stable democracy there.

But now the mission—indeed, the title and subject of this hearing is what do we need to reconcile the differences between the

Shia and the Sunni? Now, I’m no historian, but I believe that

schism between the Sunni and the Shia goes back to the year 632

A.D., the death of Mohammed, and the split over his successor.

That has been a constant battle between Shia and Sunni for 1,400

years. And now we’re trying to figure out a way to reconcile the differences between Shia and Sunni in Iraq?

I have to say that if that was the vote, if that was the vote that

the chairman talked about, if the question on the war was are we

going to commit our troops for the purpose of reconciling the differences between the Shia and the Sunni in Iraq, no votes—no

votes—I don’t think there is a single Member in this body that

would have committed our troops for that purpose——

Mr. SHAYS. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. LYNCH. Sir, I’ve sat here on this quietly for several

hours——

Mr. SHAYS. I’m just asking, as chairman, if you will yield. I am

not going to take away from your time.

Mr. LYNCH. OK, great.

55

Mr. SHAYS. I just have tremendous respect for the gentleman.

I’m only saying that I really hope you’re able to stay for the second

panel when we have Sunnis, Shias and Kurds here.

Mr. LYNCH. Yes, absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I’m sorry.

Mr. SHAYS. And I give the gentleman an extra minute, please.

Mr. LYNCH. I thought you would give me a quick clock, that’s all.

Mr. SHAYS. No, absolutely not.

Mr. LYNCH. And I appreciate Mr. Talabani’s son is here. And I’m

a big fan of his dad—wherever he is. I had a chance to meet with

him on the first session of the Iraqi Parliament in the Convention

Center when the air conditioning went out and it was 125 degrees.

So I remember that day well.

But the mission has shifted here. And I think it requires us, as

responsible leaders of this Nation and trying to be loyal to our sons

and daughters in uniform and the resources of this country, being

preserving of those resources and being mindful of the developments in the Middle East, it is just stunning in my mind that we

have not taken a good hard look at what’s going on there and adjusted our policy to the reality of Iraq today.

I want to say that in my visits to Iraq, one of the things that

I’ve noticed over and over—and it was understandable at first, but

even in my most recent visits back in April—and I talked about

this in my opening statement—was the inability or the unwillingness or the resistance of some in terms of transferring the basic

government operations over to the Iraqi Government, the Iraqi

Government being elected back in December, and the idea that, at

least among the people who went out and voted in those elections,

that their own government was going to take over responsibility for

their country, and that has not happened. And I hear complaints

not only from, you know, average Iraqis when we go into Iraq, but

also from the Iraqi leaders and the Iraqi Parliament that they don’t

have enough responsibility and power in their own country, and

that when people need the services, basic services of government,

they still after 3 years have to go the U.S. forces and the U.S. Marines, the engineering divisions of our Army, in order to get basic

services provided.

And I just want to ask you, do you believe or do you not believe

that in order to create the stable preconditions for U.S. withdrawal,

that basic government operations substantially have to be shifted

over to the Iraqi Government?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, we certainly agree that

Iraqis must take the lead both on security and on governance.

Mr. LYNCH. My question is this: When I travel to Iraq, it’s a very

choppy assessment. As a Member of Congress and someone who is

charged with the responsibility of oversight—and I’m sure the

chairman will agree, he’s been there 14 times, I’ve been there 5—

but it is very difficult to make a clear assessment on where we are

in terms of making that transition over to the Iraqis sector by sector, oil, energy, roads and bridges, security, obviously.

But I have, you know—I came back and I tried to think about

what is the most responsible way of getting our troops home, given

the reality of the situation in Iraq. And as I said before, stay the

course is a simple answer, but it’s wrong. And also I think announcing a date and evacuating is also a very simple answer but

56

may have tremendously disastrous consequences for our troops in

the theater and for the country, as a responsible power.

But I do believe that we need to make that happen, and I don’t

see anyone whose sole responsibility is to make that transition

happen. I see it’s everybody’s job but it’s nobody’s job. And it’s very

difficult to track that transition, to monitor it, to encourage it, facilitate it.

And so what I’ve done is adopted—drafted a bill, with the help

of others, that would establish a national commission to make sure

that transition goes forward, and to track it, to facilitate it, and to

make sure the Iraqis are in a position to assume responsibility for

their own government and let our people get the heck out of there.

We have tens of thousands of our troops whose duties there on a

daily basis are to provide the basic services of civilian government.

And the Iraqis at this point need to pick up that responsibility, and

I just don’t think they’re being pushed hard enough to do that. It’s

understandable under the circumstances that they’re reluctant, but

we have to make them do it nonetheless. As long as we’re paying

for it and as long as we’re doing it, they’re going to let us; that’s

human nature.

And I just don’t see any agency within Iraq that’s pushing hard

on that issue and making that happen. You may have different observations, and I’m happy to hear them.

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Congressman, with all respect, I do

disagree with the thrust of your remarks. There are two individuals—one in uniform, one not—in Iraq who very much have as

their central responsibility ensuring that this transition occurs:

General George Casey and Ambassador Khalizad and the mission

working under them. There is a very, very focused, structured effort with goals, with benchmarks, with monitoring mechanisms in

place to determine what is needed from day to day, from week to

week, to see whether success is being achieved on issues of capacity, on issues of security transition. We’d be happy to provide a

briefing on this process.

This is the focus of our lives as an administration, as a mission,

every day, and it does have a leadership.

Mr. LYNCH. OK. Ambassador, with all due respect to you, look,

I think General Casey is a fine man, and he has seen way too

much of me, I think; every time I go to Iraq I have at least a couple

of hours to spend with him. And I do think that he regards that

as a central responsibility. However, I also know from the situation

on the ground that responsibility is secondary to the military responsibility. He has to address the insurgency and the military

confrontation that’s going on there, and that should be, and is, his

first and by far most dominant concern. And every time that the

transition to Iraqi control gets pushed back because of his military

mission, I just feel that it’s languishing. It is not anybody’s first

job. It’s not General Casey’s first job, it’s not Ambassador

Khalizad’s first job.

And what I’m trying to do is to make sure this happens, because

as long as this doesn’t happen—it’s not going to happen unless it’s

somebody’s responsibility, if somebody is held accountable to making sure the Iraqis are transitioned into a governing role—it’s just

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not happening. And it’s extremely frustrating to watch that process

continue. And I just think we need some transparency there.

My bill draws from an example during the Second World War,

quite frankly, when we found ourselves inadvertently in control of

the Philippines militarily. We had driven the Japanese out and we

controlled the Philippine islands. And the U.S. Government was

fully supportive of their independence. And we set up a national

commission, FDI did, and Truman after him, to create a national

commission basically to transition the control of the Philippines

from the military to the newly forming Philippine Government, and

we did it very effectively.

And I think a similar panel needs to be established here to make

sure that happens. The President—the White House had a role in

it, the Senate and the House of Representatives each had roles in

it, the State Department had a role in it, Defense Department. But

it was a unified effort; it had transparancy, it had accountability,

it had benchmarks, and it got done because it was somebody’s job

and because there would have been hell to pay if nobody did it.

And I just think this bill offers the same framework. It’s proven

to be successful on at least that one occasion. And that’s my assessment of it. I’m no expert. I just spend a lot of time on this, as you

do, and we’ve just got to see some movement here, and I don’t believe that maintaining our current course of action is an answer in

any respect.

Mr. SHAYS. I would just thank the gentleman and say that

maybe after the election, depending on who’s back, we can practice

what we’re preaching with our esteemed colleagues in Iraq. When

we ask Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds to work together, maybe there

will be a way where we can find Republicans and Democrats can

work together on this very important issue and find some common

ground. And I appreciate your efforts to find an initiative and to

move this forward, and I thank you for that.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Van Hollen, you had one little point.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I had one question. Mr. Ambassador, I don’t

want to get into a long dialog on Iran. I happen to think Iran has

been strengthened and emboldened because of the chaos in Iraq,

but Ambassador Khalizad some time ago proposed that we engage

in direct discussions with the Iranians with respect to the situation

in Iraq. And my question is, what has come of that proposal and

have there been discussions?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. There have been no such discussions

conducted. We are interested in addressing issues of Iranian behavior in Iraq in an appropriate forum, at an appropriate time.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. If I could just followup, Mr. Chairman. Have

we had no discussions with the Iranians on the Iraq question because of their lack of interest or of our failure to follow through

with the proposal of Ambassador Khalizad?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. No discussions have been held.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. If you’re saying you don’t want to answer——

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. In this forum.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. All right. I would like to followup on that in

the appropriate forum.

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Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Let me just ask, Ambassador, if there are

any points you want to put on the record before we go to our next

panel. Is there anything that we should have asked you that we

didn’t, that you were prepared to answer, that you think we need

to put on the record?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to

draw together comments made, I think, by every member here, and

by you, Mr. Chairman.

One cannot deal, as you look at success in Iraq, in taking individual issues—amnesty, an oil deal, a demobilization/reintegration

process—in isolation, or federalism. They’re also interlaced, they’re

all interlinked. Success in Iraq, success for the Iraqis will depend

upon an approach that brings these critical issues together, allows

a deal to be struck that has elements taken and given on all of

these points, and that moves the country forward and moves it forward in an urgent manner. The challenge is to find a way to do

that and to do it quickly. All are important. If any one is taken

away, you’ll get failure, or less than success on the others. It is putting together those elements of a national compact that has to be

advanced at this point.

And the only other comment I would make is to note we have

made progress. Our soldiers, our civilians in Iraq, have achieved

significant progress. Iraqis must do their part to continue that

progress. So does the international community and the region. But

on security transition, on capacity, on basic services, the situation

is not what it was a year ago, and in turn, not what it was 3 years

ago.

Mr. SHAYS. Not to leave a false impression, because this panel

will be followed by a panel of Iraqi representatives of this government, I think you would agree there are a number of things we did

that made their job more difficult; is that not true?

Ambassador SATTERFIELD. Mr. Chairman, the job for the Iraqi

government is a very challenging one. We try constantly to do what

we can to contribute to their success—because in the end that is

our success—and not to thwart it.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. Well, then, I’m going to say it for the record, if

you won’t. We attacked them, we disbanded their army, their police, and their border patrol and left them with no security. We allowed huge amounts of looting to go on. And then we basically said,

you know, let’s move forward.

I realize they made decisions that were a mistake, but we made

a number of them as well. And maybe it’s more appropriate that

I say it than you. But I realize that we’ve asked them to do some

very difficult things, made more difficult by some of the decisions

we made early on. So I will say that.

And I will conclude by saying to you, Ambassador, you are an

American hero. You have served your country tremendously, in

some of the most difficult places, and you have done it with a tremendous amount of class and honesty. You have received high

marks from Republicans and Democrats alike, and we are very,

very grateful for your service.

And, Mr. Bever, I want you to know that you have done your job

perfectly, because no one wanted to ask you any questions, and the

Ambassador was able to do what he needed to do. And given that

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you’re fairly new on this job, you must have someone up there who

loves you, who was looking out for you. And so I thank you for your

presence as a back-up if it was needed.

We’re going to just take a 2-minute break, and then I am very

eager to welcome our next witnesses. Thank you very much.

[Recess.]

Mr. SHAYS. I’d like to recognize our second panel. It’s a distinguished panel and we are so grateful that they are participating in

this hearing. We have Dr. Hajim Al-Hasani, a member of Parliament, a former Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament of 2005; and,

something that gives him tremendous credibility with me, I think

he earned his doctorate, but I know he attended school at UCON,

University of Connecticut.

And we have Mr. AlMusawi, the Washington Representative of

the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, SCIRI.

And we welcome him.

And we have Mr. Qubad Talibany, the Representative of

Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq to the United States. And

his father is the President of Iraq and a wonderful man, who I

have had many occasion to visit with.

Gentlemen, as you know, we swear in our witnesses, and we

would like to do that with you as well. We ask you either to swear

or affirm, whatever is appropriate, but if you would stand and raise

your right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SHAYS. I just note for the record we are an investigative committee and all our witnesses are sworn in, every one of them, so

that’s why we do it.

Doctor, we’re going to start with you, and we’ll just go right down

the list. You are a member of the Parliament, and it’s wonderful

to have you here. The mic, you might just tap this to see if it’s on.

OK, thank you, welcome.

STATEMENTS OF HAJIM AL-HASANI, MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT (SUNNI), FORMER SPEAKER, IRAQI PARLIAMENT

2005; KARIM ALMUSAWI, WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE,

SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ

(SCIRI) (SHIA); AND QUBAD TALABANY, REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ TO

THE UNITED STATES

STATEMENT OF HAJIM AL-HASANI

Dr. AL-HASANI. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, almost 31⁄2 years ago the

United States and its allies went to Baghdad and removed

Saddam’s regime, abolished the oil state, and started the process

of nation building in Iraq. However, incorrect policies that were

based on wrong information provided by major Iraqi politicians led

us to flawed fundamentals in building the new state. It is worthwhile here to mention a few major ones without going into details.

The biggest policy mistakes were dividing Iraqis into Shia,

Sunni, Kurd. This is something we can’t see even in this panel.

This is something—I personally didn’t accept it from the beginning,

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and I personally don’t accept it now. I’m Iraqi first, Iraqi second,

Iraqi last.

The second mistake was the Iraqi security forces—disarming the

Iraqi security forces, and then debaathification policy and open border.

Now let’s let bygones be bygones. The issue now is, how can we

overcome those mistakes? Here I would like to make a few points

that are vital for the success of both the Iraqis and the United

States, and could pave the roadmap to resolve Iraq’s major problematic issues. First, the national reconciliation process should be

the cornerstone of present United States and Iraqi policy, and we

should not allow partisan, sectarian, and regional politics to spoil

it. For this to succeed we need to identify the parties that we need

to reconcile with. Some insurgency groups are important ones. Find

a common vision among Iraqis on the new Iraqi state. This is what

reconciliation is about. This vision includes building professional

security forces that are well balanced and loyal to the state and

Iraqi people; building a state based on the rule of law; support

building democratic institutions; help parties reach an agreement

on amending the new Iraqi constitution that will be accepted by all

major groups, Sunni, Shia and Kurds; strengthen the Iraqi economy by stimulating strategic investments; fight and prosecute corruption to the maximum extent; dissolve all militia forces; stop regional meddling in Iraq’s affairs; halt the debaathification process.

Current Ba’athists should be processed by the judicial system. Determine who the real enemies are, al Qaeda and loyal Saddamists,

and fight them together; general amnesty in Iraq.

This cannot be accomplished without strong regional and international pressure. The United States has a major role to play, especially by manipulating its political, economic and military

leverages to compel Iraqi players to abide by any agreement or

progress. The emphasis here is that the United States has the ability to create a stable, economically viable democratic state as long

as it stays engaged.

It must work to implement the aforementioned policies for us to

see real progress in Iraq.

Finally, don’t think about withdrawing U.S. troops now. That is

not and must not be an option. If it happens, it will lead to communal civil war that would give the terrorists a victory and might

lead to regional war, disruption of oil supplies, and will end what

is today a unified Iraq. That will put blame on the United States

and will shake the United States standing in the region and the

world, not to mention the grim reality that terrorists will soon be

knocking on your doors here in the United States. The war in Iraq

is not an Iraq-specific war, it is an international war against terrorism. We are in this together and must fight it together.

It took 3 years to create this mess in Iraq; it is very difficult to

sum up, you know, the solution for it in 5 minutes. Thank you, Mr.

Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Doctor, we will have plenty of time to have a dialog.

There will be no limit to how you respond to questions, and I’ll give

you every opportunity because we don’t want to bring it down to

just 5 minutes. You’re one of the few speakers that’s ever come beVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:15 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\38581.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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fore this committee that’s actually tried to live within the 5-minute

rule, so thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Al-Hasani follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. AlMusawi, thank you, sir. Sir, I’m going to ask

you to move the mic toward you in the middle.

STATEMENT OF KARIM ALMUSAWI

Mr. ALMUSAWI. Chairman Shays, and distinguished members of

the subcommittee, good afternoon.

First, allow me to express the deep appreciation and admiration

for the American men and women, military and civilians, who are

trying hard to make Iraq succeed in partnership with Iraq’s elected

government.

Also, as we are remembering the fifth tragic anniversary of the

September 11th crime, I want to express my sincere condolences to

the American people and the families who lost their loved ones.

Since the day Prime Minister Al-Maliki announced his courageous reconciliation plan, his goals have been clear: to open a dialog with theinsurgents, dismantle the militias, and implement certain measures to defuse the escalating sectarian tension and violence that has increased in the past few months, especially after

the explosion of the Holy Shrine.

Reconciliation is a very immediate and most vital priority, and

it is a collective mission of all Iraqi religious, political, and tribal

leaders. Consequently, the national unity and the building of Iraq

are two key pillars which reinforce all other activities of this new

government.

Also, the cause of dividing Iraq as a part of the solution to get

rid of the current sectarian congestion have been rejected. And the

recent polls and surveys show that most Iraqis are again partitioning the country. By setting the priorities, the Iraqis could easily

control the chaotic situation.

For instance, security isn’t a priority for certain government

aides and consultants in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan. Construction

and investment might be the priority there. On the contrary, security is a priority in Baghdad.

The following terms need to be clarified:

First, the transferring of debaathification from its political category to the judicial security priority authority is good progress to

define debaathification.

The formation of militia outside the framework of the Armed

Forces is prohibited. Dismantling the militias should come through

the legal channels in accordance with the Law 91.

Iraq issue amnesty to all the prisoners who have not committed

any war or terrorist crimes or crimes against humanity. Indeed, it

has become clear, following the killing of Zarqawi, that the

Saddamists have been responsible for fueling violence a lot more

than terrorists.

Accountability is necessary for rebuilding in Iraq, but it should

be part of a system that includes all Iraqi institutions; otherwise,

it will target one party and exclude others.

Second, the real interpretation of Article 3 is that all oil, gas and

natural resources for the current fields or the ones which will be

discovered in the future are all owned by the people of Iraq and

all the regions and Governorates. Revenues will again be distributed fairly among Iraqis.

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Third, the Powers of the Regions and the rights of forming federations are the main contentious issues. We have no major concern regarding any amendment if it would go through a legal process.

Fourth, the relationship between the Coalition forces and the

Iraqi Government represents the focal point bringing security to

success. And in view of this, any talking about the withdrawal of

the Coalition forces unilaterally would definitely lead to the failure

of the Iraqi experience.

Fifth, success will be in the benefit of all Iraqis, Coalition troops,

the region’s stability, and the international community. The original states should start viewing the newly elected Government of

Iraq as a threat to the original systems. It is of utmost importance

of the original states to secure the borders and to dry up the financial resources.

Also, I would like to agree with my brother, Dr. Al-Hasani, about

identifying us as Shia and Sunnis. I would just like to mention that

as well. And it’s very important. This is my sense all my life; there

is no sense that I am Shia, as AlMusawi said, I am first Iraqi and

second Iraqi and last Iraqi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. AlMusawi follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Talabany.

STATEMENT OF QUBAD TALABANY

Mr. TALABANY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m sorry to be the

bad egg that might break the 5-minute rule, but I will try to do

my best to stick within the——

Mr. SHAYS. You do exactly what you want to do. And I apologize

to our first two speakers if we overemphasized the 5-minute rule

because, frankly, I consider it so important that you say whatever

you need to say. So I’ll invite you, before I even ask questions, if

there are any other points that you want to say. But Mr. Talabany,

you have the floor.

Mr. TALABANY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to

testify on the critical topic of national reconciliation in Iraq. I’d also

like to take this opportunity to thank you and the ranking member

for your leadership on this important subcommittee, and the work

of the entire subcommittee on the subject of Iraq.

We are also grateful, Mr. Chairman, for the many visits you have

led to Iraq, including the two individuals recently to Iraqi

Kurdistan.

I’d also like to take this opportunity to thank the brave men and

women of the U.S. Armed Forces who are serving or have served

in Iraq, as well as the diplomats and civilians who labor tirelessly

with Iraqi officials.

Iraq is a country traumatized by its horrific past and at times

its faltering present. To overcome that trauma and to build a robust inclusive political process, Iraq requires national reconciliation. The Iraqi Government has put forth a National Reconciliation Plan that, if carried out, will help to begin to heal the pain

of this country.

There are many aspects of this plan. These include reforming the

debaathification policy and amnesty program, and dealing with the

problems caused by militias. However, before addressing these key

issues, we must understand that national reconciliation means

something very different to each of Iraq’s major communities:

Kurds, Shia and Sunni Arabs. Each regard the national reconciliation through the prism of their political goals because of their profound insecurities about the future.

Iraq was built as a state in which conflict was part of its architecture, a country that many of its inhabitants did not want. Outsiders must recognize that inside Iraq there is no common understanding of what it means to be Iraqi. The lack of a core common

identity has been exacerbated by evolving political and security situations since 2003. Iraqi expectations were high, and many of

these expectations were not met. Instead, the violent and illogical

opposition of a minority within the Sunni Arab community, coupled

with a weak Iraqi state, has led to the further polarization of the

Iraqi society. Insecure about the future, Iraqis have emphasized

their ethnic and sectarian identities. In Iraq, families are being

torn apart by the Sunni-Shia divide. Kurds have mediated between

these two sects. Ironically, the Kurds, once Iraq’s internally displaced, have become hosts to tens of thousands of Arabs who are

becoming displaced by the violence.

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Ethnic and sectarian identities are inescapable and cannot be ignored, even though they did not fit with the vision that some had

for the new Iraq. Instead, we must deal with what we have and

treat the ethnic and sectarian divisions not as the end of Iraq, but,

rather, if addressed properly, our last opportunity to save it. By

embracing Iraqi’s identities as they are and shaping the political

order that accommodates and accepts them, we can achieve true

national reconciliation.

Iraqi’s past and present is defined by a fundamental clash of two

visions. One seeks a unitary state. Many, but not all, of those who

advocate this central autocracy are a minority motivated by

supremist ideology. The second vision, held by most of Iraq’s two

largest communities, the Shia Arabs and the Kurds, by and large

advocate a decentralized government, a democratic federation. This

vision was endorsed in a democratic referendum that ratified the

constitution. Like all democratic constitutions, ours is not a perfect

document. It is, nonetheless, the only democratically ratified constitution in the region, and, if implemented, could lay the foundations for a functioning democracy.

The constitution allows for Iraqis to organize themselves the way

they want. Kurdistan today stands as a Federal region with its

own governance and security. And I’m proud to state that today the

Kurdistan region stands as a success story, in part because of the

support and the protection of the United States and the United

Kingdom over the past 15 years. If others in the country want to

Federalize the rest of the country, providing such steps are taken

democratically and with the support of the people who live in these

regions, then we must stand on the side of the constitution.

The Iraqi Government’s National Reconciliation Plan compliments the democratic federalism of the constitution by seeking

to provide justice for the victims and the perpetrators. To provide

justice, the plan seeks to reform the debaathification process in

order to bring to justice those who committed crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide, while allowing those who want to

participate in rebuilding this country and play a constructive role

the opportunity. We should not punish everyone who joined the

Ba’ath party. Nonetheless, national reconciliation requires that

those with blood on their hands should never hold senior government posts or security posts, or be in the position to harm Iraqi

citizens again. If we allow criminals of the former regime to hold

senior posts in the new political order, we will be building a new

country on rotten foundations.

Bringing elements of the insurgency into the political process will

also be difficult. Again, the Kurds have led the way in this effort.

A major component of the National Reconciliation Plan involves

a potential amnesty for certain elements of the insurgency. Amnesty should not be extended to foreign terrorists or home-grown

extremists who are not willing to cease fighting. What it should do

is allow the mass of the insurgency to know that it can lay down

its arms and be part of the new Iraq that will not exact retribution.

National reconciliation also means tackling the militias. As

CENTCOM Commander General Abizaid said at an Armed Services Committee hearing, there are militia that are benign or that

are working closely in conjunction with the state to provide some

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additional security, and they do not need to be disbanded right

away.

Our goal should be to have security forces that are accountable

to government institutions. We must not tolerate the existence of

death squads and those who abuse the cover of an official uniform

to commit sectarian crimes, as Ambassador Satterfield correctly

stated.

Much has been said regarding the Kurdish security forces known

as the Peshmerga. The Peshmerga are not a militia. It is a professional military force that possesses a transparent chain of command that is always accountable to a government elected by the

people. These fighters have been called upon by civilian leadership

to defend the security of the Kurdistan region. And it is in part due

to their bravery and competency that the Kurdistan region today

is Iraq’s most stable and secure.

Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, many thousands of Peshmergas

have joined the Iraiqi security forces and have led the fight against

the terrorists. What needs to complement the main planks of the

national reconciliation is a national pact on oil and potential constitutional revisions. Oil is Iraq’s greatest asset and its most

abused resource. Many Iraqis, the Kurds in particular, feel that the

oil has been a curse. It was only when Iraq was obliged by the Oilfor-Food Program in 1996 did Kurdistan benefit from the nation’s

oil.

Iraq’s history has engrained in us and others in the country immense insecurities. Given these experiences, Kurds have little confidence that any government in Baghdad, including one that has

many Kurdish ministers, will safeguard our share of the country’s

wealth.

What is needed for a sound oil policy is balance. We need to end

the complete centralization of the country’s resources, while recognizing that Baghdad can play a useful role in ensuring fairness

and imposing checks and balances. Iraq’s regions, including

Kurdistan, must play a key role in the development of the nation’s

oil and gas sectors, as called for in the constitution.

A preliminary agreement on oil has been reached recently, but

more work needs to be done to overcome the insecurities, especially

of the people that live in the non-oil-producing regions.

The final element of the current Iraqi Government policy is to

allow for constitutional revisions. There are, of course, those who

say that there is no need to revise the constitution, as it reflects

the will of the vast majority of Iraqis. Such a view has its logic,

but it is the wrong approach. It is in the spirit of consensus and

cooperation that Iraqi officials have agreed on a 4-month period to

allow for those who were not part of the constitutional drafting

process to recommend textual amendments. Discussions are ongoing on this issue, but have yet to yield results.

Throughout this endeavor, we will require American support.

The American people have, as always, been generous. The United

States must continue to play an important role in our development

politically, economically, and militarily. We all look to the day

when American Armed Forces can return home with their heads

held high, but unfortunately today is not that day. It is critical for

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U.S. forces to continue working side by side with Iraqi forces to

fight those who want to do us both harm.

We are not naive about the political climate in an election year

in the United States. We understand the growing impatience of the

American people. No war is easy to a people. And yet I ask you,

as elected representatives of your great people, to urge patience.

We are trying to lay the groundwork for a democratic society. We

face many challenges; most we hope to win. Victory, however, requires that we stand together. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Talabany follows:]

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Mr. SHAYS. I thank all three of you for your very, very thoughtful

comments. And I regret that, for whatever reason, some of my

Democratic colleagues who feel we shouldn’t be in Iraq aren’t here

to hear your words and to question you and to hear your response

to their questions. But I have more than enough questions to ask.

I view your participation in this congressional hearing as historic, and I believe that what you say will have impact well beyond

this committee. So I thank you more than you can imagine for your

presence.

I’d like to start by saying to you a few things so you kind of know

where I’m coming from and you can react to it. When I ask an Iraqi

if they’re a Shia, they say, sir, I’m a Shia, but I’m married to a

Sunni. I’ll ask a Sunni, are you a Sunni? And they will say I’m a

Sunni, but my daughter is married to a Shia. And then I ask a

Kurd, are you a Kurd? And they said yes, but sir, we’re Sunnis.

And you’re lecturing me about what—how we kind of view you.

My first visit to Iraq was in October 2003—excuse me, in April

2003. And I went in with a nongovernment organization before the

fighting had stopped, and I met a man named Mohammed Abdul

Musaad. And he told me that he got married in his fifties because

he had been in an Iranian prison for many years and missed the

first exchange of prisoners because Iraq didn’t have as many Iranians as Iranians had Iraqis. And I found myself saying, you’ve

had a tough life. And he looked at me in some amazement and

said, sir, no different than any other Iraqi. And it was a huge kind

of message to me that I can’t compare my life with their life. And

he was so excited about the prospect of the newness of a democracy

where he would have an opportunity to participate in its government. And I think he had tremendous overexpectations as well.

I think that what I’ve seen from the Iraqi people is they saw the

United States as such a big and powerful Nation that we can just

do this and everything would be good. At one point I asked him if

there are things that we did that concerned him. He said when you

throw candy on the ground and our kids pick them up like they’re

chickens, he said our kids aren’t chickens. And I thought, well, you

know, back home soldiers in parades, we throw the candy on the

ground, the kids run and pick it up; but again, this told me, wow.

He said to me, when you extend your hand out to a Muslim woman

and she does this, your soldiers are offended—or some—and he

said she is honoring you by saying thank you. But Muslim women

don’t shake hands with strangers.

And then at one point he grabbed my shoulders—which I don’t

know if it’s a very Iraqi thing to do or not—he looked me in the

face and said, you don’t know us and I don’t know you.

I couldn’t wait to get back home to say to our State Department

and Defense, bring back Iraqi Americans to Iraq, bring back Arabic

speakers, because otherwise we’re going to make some huge mistakes.

Now, what I want to first do, I don’t want to dwell on the mistakes I just want to be honest about them. I want to be honest

about—I think you, Mr. Speaker, were—and we call once a Speaker

always a Speaker in this Chamber—you pointed out the mistakes.

I’d like you tell me what you think the mistakes were. I’d like you,

Mr. AlMusawi, to say what you think, Mr. Talabany as well.

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I want to know where there is agreement and disagreement. And

I will say this: You help this committee by having an honest dialog

about your disagreements and not trying to be good soldiers among

all of you to try to cover over those.

So I will go with you first, Mr. Speaker. What were the mistakes,

in your judgment? You alluded to some of them. I just want you

to kind of list them, and what do you think were the most significant mistakes?

Mr. AL HASANI. I wish Democrats were here, you know, to tell

them what changed in Iraq. I think there was a change in U.S. policy in Iraq in the last 6 months or 8 months. And because of the

violence that we are experiencing in Iraq, all three groups right

now probably believe it is essential for the American forces to stay

in Iraq.

Today, if I speak in the terms of Sunnis, they are more comfortable to see U.S. forces patrolling their areas more than seeing

Iraqi security forces patrolling the areas. I think Shia would have

fears if the American troops leave, it could lead to some kind of

civil war in Iraq. Kurds, I think they are very happy. I can’t speak

in the name of all three groups. I think I represent Iraqis.

Mr. SHAYS. I know you say that and I know you believe it and

I know that for you it is true. But for the purposes of discussion

now, it would be helpful for you to tell us what you think many

Sunnis feel, what the Shias feel, and what those who are Kurds

feel. It would help us in understanding the issues. So I’m going to

ask you to take off what you personally believe and tell us what

you hear from a community that is primarily Sunni.

Mr. AL HASANI. I think that the biggest mistakes that the United

States did in Iraq was, as I said, you know, dividing Iraqis into

Shia and Sunni and Kurds. That mistake led that each group started to look into their agendas, rather than looking into comprehensive Iraqi agenda.

Mr. SHAYS. What would be another mistake?

Mr. AL HASANI. Let me add another thing now about this mistake. This mistake also gave the religious parties in Iraq more

power than they should have, because people started to vote for the

parties because they are either Sunni religious party or Shia religious parties. Set aside the Kurds, because the Kurds are a different story when it comes to the Shia and Sunni issue. They are

Sunni, but right now, you know, in this equation that we have,

they are not considered neither Shia or Sunni. There are some Shia

elements within the Kurds too.

The second important mistake, I think, was dissolving the Iraqi

security forces. That was the worst thing that can happen to any

country. I think we should have probably taken out some of the

major generals in the Iraqi Army, the big generals, and some other

people who committed crimes against the Iraqi people. But the rest

of the Iraqi Army should have stayed there. Once we dissolved the

security forces and didn’t even find ways to pay these people so

they can find some dignified life for themselves, we left these people to be, you know, victims; and the terrorists groups started to

take these people and make them part of their insurgency. Today,

the insurgency in Iraq mostly are ex-Iraqi officers. And unless we

deal with the insurgency with the understanding that, because of

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the dissolving of the Iraqi Army, that’s what happened, we cannot

solve a security problem in Iraq.

And the way we proceeded in bringing back some of the Iraqi security officers, it was done in a biased way. I think even today we

have problems to bring some of the ‘‘Sunni officers’’ back to the security forces. I remember that—at least I heard it just recently by

General Nash—when he talked about the components of the Sunni

in the Iraqi Army, said there are probably less than 10 percent.

Where the population of the Sunnis, it is very difficult to determine

who is the majority in Iraq, whether they are the Shia or the

Sunni. There is no census in Iraq that tells anyone that this——

Mr. SHAYS. I will tell you what we think. We think that the

Sunni population is closer to 20 percent. We think the Kurdish

population is closer to 20 percent. And we tend to think of the Shia

population as closer to 60 percent. That’s what we believe.

Mr. AL HASANI. Well, there is no basis for that. And I—I really

don’t like, you know, even dividing the Iraqis, as I said.

Mr. SHAYS. I know that.

Mr. AL HASANI. But once you start, you know, putting numbers

and you don’t have census, because this issue is very delicate issue.

It has to do with the election. When you divide, you know, the people in this way, you give majority to certain people. Then people

start claiming that they are a majority. Are deepening the division

among the Iraqi population when we talk in that sense.

Mr. SHAYS. You have given me two very serious mistakes you

think were made.

Mr. AlMusawi, what do you think were the mistakes?

Mr. ALMUSAWI. One of the most crucial issues that we can consider as a mistake is the security issue.

Mr. SHAYS. Is the what issue?

Mr. ALMUSAWI. The security issue. From the beginning, I think

there is a lack of how to install or how to create security institutions. I believe there is kind of lack of trust between the Americans

and some Iraqi security parties. From the beginning, we—we called

for the security forces must be leaned on the Iraqis. The Iraqis

should take the initiative and should run the security files.

This mistrust, I would like to call it, between the Coalition troops

and some Iraqi—Iraqi parties and the concerns from some militias

and what they called that they have some relations or links with

their original countries. Actually, this one caused a lot of losers for

all Iraqi security forces.

Militias should—as soon as Alawi government, the militias that

from 91—and in 91 there is certain articles of—and if we applied

this law on all militias I think there is no big deal about how to

deal with the militias. Many of the militias, they are recruited.

Most of them, they were in the Iraqi forces. Most of them educated

people. So we can make use of those militias. This is one.

Second, there is many security plans prepared by the Iraqi political parties. And just last year, there is a serious comprehensive security plan prepared by SCIRI, and this security plan contains

many measures to help the security in Iraq. One of these measures

to get the Iraqis themselves participating in their security cases.

And crucial to the people’s committees.

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Mr. SHAYS. What I need to understand, though, is tell me the

mistakes that were made. Did the United States make any mistakes? One of the mistakes was dividing Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds.

The other was dissolving the Iraqi security forces. I believe both of

those were mistakes, particularly the second. I’m not clear with

where you think the mistakes were made. Did the United States

make any mistakes before we transferred power in June 2004?

Mr. ALMUSAWI. I am talking about this time.

Mr. SHAYS. I am talking about the early on, the first year or so.

Is there a point where you think we made some—some big mistakes in that first year?

Mr. ALMUSAWI. After the dissolving of the security forces——

Mr. SHAYS. Do you think that was a mistake?

Mr. ALMUSAWI. Absolutely. I believe so.

Mr. SHAYS. OK. That is helpful, thank you. Mr. Talabany.

Mr. TALABANY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mistakes have been

made. And I think mistakes have been made on both sides, both

on the Coalition side and also on the Iraqi side. To go through a

few, I think first the allowing of the looting to go on hurt us and

America’s credibility considerably in the country.

Mr. SHAYS. Tell me—I don’t want to bias it—tell me how Iraqis

viewed the looting. What did they interpret from the looting?

Mr. TALABANY. Well, it fed into the conspiracy theories. There

were many conspiracy theories floating around the country. The

fact that the oil ministry was one of the few ministries that the Coalition protected fed into many thinking that the Americans are

coming in only for the oil. We know that is not the case, but once

this spreads throughout the tea houses of the country, it spreads

like wildfire.

Mr. SHAYS. Having spent $300 billion, we hardly got a benefit

out of oil. I mean, in other words, you could never repay what the

United States has already spent. But I understand your point.

Your point is the looting made people feel that we were only protecting what we were interested in and the rest of the country be

damned.

Mr. TALABANY. Is a perception.

Mr. SHAYS. I understand. I understand.

Mr. TALABANY. Another major mistake was the political vacuum

that was left open. And I think here what many people actually

don’t know is that when General Garner was heading up the office

of ORHA, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, there was discussions with the then U.S. envoy, Ambassador

Khalilzad, to have an interim government, form an interim government—we are talking April and May 2003—to have an interim government that would step in and run the country. The Iraqis failed

to form this government. And they failed because of the divisions

that have existed in the country along ethnic and sectarian lines

and will continue to exist in this country.

We could not reach an agreement on who, how, and where this

government would take shape. This created the CPA and, ultimately, a year lost with American rule in the country. So.

Mr. SHAYS. Did it give the view that there was an occupational

government?

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Mr. TALABANY. It wasn’t just a perception issue, Mr. Chairman.

The United States and the United Kingdom officially and legally

changed their status from liberators to occupiers by going to the

U.N. and forcibly becoming an occupier in the country.

Mr. SHAYS. Hold your thoughts. I would like to ask the two other

witnesses, do you think that was a mistake? Do you think we could

have transferred power sooner, and do you think it was a mistake

to call it occupiers?

Mr. AL HASANI. I think it would have been very difficult to do

it. Although it would have been also wise to do it, to try to find

ways to form an Iraqi government earlier as possible. But I think

there were some really difficulties to do that at that time too.

So you needed some transitional period, you know, to form an

Iraqi Government, but I think it should have been done much earlier than we did it later on.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Mr. ALMUSAWI. I think we had an opportunity in March, early

March 2003, in Salahadin to form a transitional government. But

unfortunately, there is a kind of contentions between the parties at

that time, the American officials and Salahadin. I think this was

a missed opportunity, unfortunately.

Mr. SHAYS. One of the challenges would have been, whatever

government it was, it would have been set up by the United States

so it would have looked potentially like a puppet government. That

would have been one of the challenges that you would have had.

Should we have reached out—while we are on it, I will come

back to you Mr. Talabany. Should we have looked at Iraq more

from a tribal standpoint than a religious standpoint? Would we

have gotten better results, may I ask you, Mr. Speaker, if we

viewed it more from a tribal standpoint?

Mr. AL HASANI. Well, I think even tribal standpoints are not

good points to look at the Iraqis. I think the way we should have

handled the Iraqi situation, I disagree with probably my fellow

Iraqis that from the beginning we should have not talked about

Sunni and Shia and Kurd issue. This has been done in the opposition before even the troops went to Iraq, there was talks about, you

know, Shia and Kurdish alliance, and Sunnis they were out somewhere else. It is their fault they didn’t participate from the beginning in the opposition the way they should have been, but that’s,

you know, something that they paid a high price for. But that was

planned even long before we went to Iraq. So when you went to

Iraq there was only that formula that people were looking at it.

But I think the United States had the responsibility, you know,

to impose probably another form here. Citizenship in Iraq should

be built on citizenship rather than being built on sectarian differences—oh, you know, tribal differences.

Mr. SHAYS. I am going to just tell you—obviously I have no credibility since I’m not an Iraqi—but I am more sympathetic to the

message that Mr. Talabany said, that basically there are differences. And they’re not as big in my judgment as people in this

country want to make them out to be, but they are probably—I

view them bigger probably than you do in terms of I do think the

Middle East tends to view Sunni, Shias, and Kurds differently.

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Let me just ask you to comment on Mr. Talabany’s comment

about the whole issue of this last point, if you could, and then I’m

going to go back to Mr. Talabany.

Mr. AL HASANI. I differ with Mr. Talabany. I differed with him

even when we were on the governing council.

Mr. TALABANY. That is democracy.

Mr. AL HASANI. This is the new Iraq. We can at this time differ

in Iraq, but I would hope that the difference wouldn’t unleash the

point that we are killing each other. But I differ with Mr. Talabany

that these differences existed a long time ago. And it isn’t the 1,400

years that we’re talking about. This is political differences right

now we are talking about.

And what happened in Iraq, I left Iraq in 1979. Came to the

United States, OK? When I returned back, I didn’t know which of

my friends were Shia or Sunni. I didn’t. It was easy to know which

one is Kurd because the language differences, but it was very difficult to know who is Shia and Sunni. But when I came back, you

know, I found out that, you know, that we—that the Iraqis themselves played a major role in dividing the Iraqi site for political reason, for political gains. And that’s the mistake that we’re paying

the prices for right now. And unless we go back to be Iraqis, it will

be very difficult to resolve the Iraqi problem.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me just have you finish your points. Mr. Van

Hollen is here, and I want to make sure he can join in this discussion which I think is very interesting. Mr. Talabany, what were

some other potential mistakes?

Mr. TALABANY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think—I don’t disagree with the notion that it was wrong to disband the security

force. I agree with my esteemed colleague, Speaker Al Hasani, that

we didn’t do enough to bring people back, because the reality was

there was no Iraqi forces after the United States had rolled in. The

military had itself disbanded. The order by the CPA was just basically a rubber stamp on the facts on the ground that had happened.

The mistake, in my opinion, wasn’t the disbanding of the army;

the mistake actually was not bringing people back into a new security force quick enough. I think the way, when we did start to rebuild the Iraqi security force, the way we just accepted everybody

into the security force was another mistake. There was very little

vetting going into who was actually being recruited. And much of

the insurgency that first started happened from within the security

services by people who had received senior posts in the security

services. Ninety percent of the police stations in Mosul that were

set up with the help of the U.S. military were overrun by the insurgents because of the insurgents from within those police stations.

One other, I think, mistake—and this again is a combined mistake on the Iraqi side—is the economic development strategy. We

haven’t focused enough on developing the country’s economy, improving people’s lives. We focused too much on the political and security developments, but we need that third track to bring stability

to the country; because it is ultimately feeding citizens, giving

them electricity, providing them the basic services and getting

them a job that is going to calm the situation and bring people on

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the side of the government and stop them from acquiescing to the

activities of the insurgents and the terrorists.

Mr. SHAYS. Let me, before turning to Mr. Van Hollen, say that

in my early times in Iraq I literally went outside the umbrella of

the military, and DOD actually discouraged me from coming to

Iraq, which I found outrageous. And I would go with nongovernmental organizations, and I will leave their names anonymous because I don’t want to endanger them. But what they did, they were

given a small amount of economic dollars, but these nongovernment organization were throughout Iraq. They hired Iraqis to be

their office managers and to work in the offices, and then these

nongovernment organizations hired Iraqis to do the work. And instead of bringing, in some some cases, a backhoe, they brought in

a hundred shovels. In some cases it may have been a contractor

who had a backhoe. And I’m told that hardly any of the projects

done by the nongovernmental organizations, which were done by

Iraqis, have been destroyed; that they have all thrived.

Mr. TALABANY. If I can just comment and on that, Mr. Chairman,

I agree with you 100 percent. And I think one of the successes in

Iraq has been what is called the CERP program, the Commodities

Emergency Response Program, where it has again been U.S. military commanders working directly with Iraqis, not through giant

contractors who are hiring very expensive private security companies that are siphoning all the funds out of the country. In order

for these projects to be successful, the Iraqis must take ownership

of these projects.

Mr. SHAYS. Would you agree that we would have been better off

hiring the Iraqis to do the construction work instead of hiring Europeans and Americans and others from outside Iraq to do a lot of

this work?

Mr. AL HASANI. Sure. But we also probably needed to monitor

even the Iraqis. We have, you know, a large number of corrupted

people in Iraq, too. So we should not blame only the people from

the United States, the contractors from the United States being

corrupted. But we have, you know, large corruption in Iraq itself.

And a lot of the billions of dollars that the people are talking about

went to the pockets of the Iraqis, not, you know, Americans. Probably American money went to the pockets of some of the American

contractors, but Iraqi money went definitely into the pockets of

some big Iraqi corrupted people.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Mr. Van Hollen.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of

you gentlemen for being here today to testify. Sorry I had to go out

for a minute, but I had an opportunity to look at your testimony.

And we have talked a lot this morning about the importance of national reconciliation within Iraq in order to move forward.

And my question to each of you would be in order to achieve national reconciliation, will there have to be changes made to the

Constitution? And if that has to happen in order to achieve national reconciliation, what would the timeline be and what are the

key changes that you believe have to happen?

Mr. AL HASANI. Absolutely. I think what this reconciliation is

about is about the fundamentals of building the new State of Iraq.

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As I mentioned, the fundamentals were flawed before when we

went over there. I think the way we built the state was wrong.

We need to change that. And amending the Constitution is one

of the important issues to reach reconciliation.

Right now, I am very worried about this thing, because at the

time when we were writing the Constitution, people agreed from

different groups that they worked together to amend the Constitution. The signals that I am seeing right now worries me. I see that

some of the parties who agreed to amend the Constitution, they are

backing out. That is not good for the country. This Constitution has

not been agreed upon by all major component Iraqi components.

And it isn’t, you know, an issue that you say majority of Iraqis

voted for this Constitution. We have a problem in Iraq that we

need to realize that problem. Iraq is right now divided into three

different societies. It wasn’t our mistake—well, it was our mistake

in the first place because some of our political actors informed

Americans that the Iraqis are, you know, Shia and Sunni and

Kurd.

But anyway, this is what we have right now. And you cannot

pass a Constitution and say the majority of Iraqi people agreed

upon it, Kurds and Shia agreed upon it, and you leave the Sunnis.

You cannot marginalize Sunnis. It is very dangerous to marginalize

the Sunnis. Iraq will not be stabilized if any of its components are

marginalized. Kurds were marginalized for 80 years and they were

an element of destabilization of every Iraqi government, and they

had the right to do that because their rights were taken away from

them. And the same thing applies to Shia or the Sunni in Iraq.

That’s why I think it is very important there are certain important

issues within the current Constitution needs to be amended and we

need to reach some agreement between different political parties in

that regard.

Mr. ALMUSAWI. I differ with my friend Hayim Al Hasani, because I believe that from the beginning we said that amendment

is essential for the reconciliation of the land. And from that we believe that we shouldn’t talk about the majority element. We have

to understand that we believe that the most important issue to rebuild our Iraq, to agree with the equation of one man, one vote.

This is the issue: We shouldn’t talk—Al Hasani has said we are not

Shia and not the Sunnis. So if we do not agree about this, we will

not reach agreement between the Sunnis, the Shia and the Kurds.

This is the issue.

Unfortunately, we have to talk about this directly. The reconciliation means don’t abuse the majority; that democracy, talking

about the majority, should rule the country with respect to the minorities. This is the truth. We shouldn’t focus on the Shia and the

Sunnis. We respect their cause, talking about the amendments,

and SCIRI also agreed on all amendments that should go through

the legal processes.

This is the issue. The reconciliation is a vital issue today in Iraq.

But we have also it is a mutual mission for all Iraqis. All Iraqis

should accept each other. All Iraqis shouldn’t be making the kind

of accusations regarding each other. The Iraqi leadership, political

leadership, should agree on making consensus regarding each

other. And from this point, I would mention that the political curVerDate 11-MAY-2000 15:15 Feb 04, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00096 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\38581.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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rent of the initial Security Council must be activated to take initiative, to make consensus and compromises regarding the contentious issues in the Constitution. All Iraqis believe that there is—

there is an article in the Constitution talking about the amendments so there is no big problem. There is no big deal about making amendment in the Constitution.

We believe we have all Iraqis, and all Iraqi political parties—

there is no exceptions—must backing al-Malaki and his reconciliation of Iraq.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Before we go to Mr. Talabany, let me make

sure I understand your response there. The Constitution has a provision in it for amendment, just like the U.S. Constitution has a

provision for amendment.

Mr. ALMUSAWI. Yes.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I guess my question is, in order to achieve national reconciliation do you believe it has to be amended? And if

so, what amendments would be required? Or do you believe it

doesn’t have to be amended?

Mr. ALMUSAWI. That’s right. Also the Constitution—talking

about forming a reviewing committee for the Constitution. And this

committee should be formed in any time this has belonged to the

Council of Representatives. So after forming this committee, they

should take care of all contentious articles in the Constitution.

Then they should report to the Council of Representatives. This is

the process of the amendment in the Constitution.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Talabany.

Mr. TALABANY. Congressman, I think as Ambassador Satterfield

said, it all has to be part of a package. And in reaching national

reconciliation, certainly making amendments to the Constitution is

a component of it. Now, I think you will probably get different

ideas about what changes need to be made, because these changes

will ultimately reflect the insecurities and concerns of the various

communities in the country. But one thing we have learned all

along from our days in the opposition through the days in the interim governments and now this current government is that all-ornothing policies fail. Nobody can have an all-or-nothing policy on

any subject. And it is only through principles of consensus and

compromise can we actually make progress and start to heal the

pain of this country.

There is a timeline that has been set for any proposed amendments to the Constitution, which was a timeline of 4 months. Now

there is some confusion as to when the 4 months actually begins;

is it from the first day of the forming of the government, or was

it before that? But I think if we haven’t reached that deadline,

we’re almost there. And there has been very little dialog between

Iraqi Parliamentarians and the Iraqi government officials and

those who were seeking to make amendments to the Constitution

on this particular issue. It has only just in the last week or so come

to the fore and is starting to be debated. And the debate is going

slowly.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Well, that is why I asked the question, because

looking from here, it does appear that the process has been going

very slowly. And there appears to be a disagreement as to exactly

what was agreed to, not just on the timeline, but whether or not

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there was an agreement to change certain provisions with respect

to the Constitution and what changes those would be.

And I got caught up, I guess, in this current discussion with respect to the proposals that have been put forth by the SCIRI party,

Mr. Hakim, about creating an autonomous region in the south. It

has drawn a response from the Speaker in Parliament, saying that

is not going to happen, that is a nonstarter. If you could all comment on what is going on right now with respect to the proposal

to move ahead with the legislation now on creating the more autonomous region and what the implications would be.

Mr. ALMUSAWI. I would first say that there is no marginalization

to the Sunnis. The Sunnis are right now heavily participating in

the government and in the Parliament. This is first.

Second, the Hakim call, it is a call like their cause regarding the

federalism. How to form the federalism. The contentious issue right

now in the Council of Representatives is not about federalism itself,

it is about how and when to form these federations. So one of the

calls—one of the calls of for how to form the federations is this is

a call of Hakim. He believes that provinces in the south could help

stability in Iraq and could help improving the situation in the

south. There is many other different calls. Some of the Iraqis

thinking that one government should become a federation. The second call talking about each three government areas should form a

federation, some have said one or more. And the Constitution, the

article talking about one or more government areas could form a

federation. So from that it is get this call, it is within the Constitution, this first.

Second it is the call also a debatable call. This is belong to the

Council of Representatives. If they pass it, that’s fine. This they

don’t, this is another call.

I have here a poll—I have here a poll from Nasarina news agency talking about a poll in the south and in Iraq in general, and

they get a sample from 874 Iraqis. They asked them about the federalism. Do you believe in federalism? The people who refused the

idea, 29.29 percent. The Iraqis who accept the idea for one government to be one federation is 12.01 percentage. The Iraqis who

believe——

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I’m sorry; I don’t mean to interrupt you, but

the bells are ringing, which means that the votes are going to be

soon. And I understand, I think, what you are saying. Let me just

ask this, because, you know, clearly I understand the thrust of the

testimony is that all of you support a one united Iraq, and it would

be better not to have the distinctions between, in some cases, the

different groups in the way we approach it. On the other hand, it

is very clear from your testimony——

Mr. SHAYS. If I could interrupt the gentleman. Mr. Talabany,

from his perspective, said that the reality is we are different and

we have to respect some of those differences. But in essence, Mr.

Talabany, you are not suggesting breaking up Iraq. So you are

right on that basic premise.

Mr. TALABANY. Not at all.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I was going to get to that. The last part of the

question is for Mr. Talabany. But clearly in the testimony you have

95

very important issues in the negotiations to protect minorities

within a majority Shia population.

I guess my question is for you, Mr. Talabany. We have a mutual

friend of you and me and your father, Peter Galbraith, Ambassador

Galbraith, who has just written a book. And the title of the book

is The End of Iraq. Mr. Galbraith has had a long association with

Iraq, and, as you know, what he says is the reality on the ground

today is that the different communities are moving in their own

separate directions. You have internal migrations going on within

Baghdad on a massive basis. And he is not saying that he wants

to split up Iraq as part of what he wants to do. He is more saying

it is a reflection of what has happened on the ground.

And we heard earlier in the testimony about Mr. Barzani’s decision on the flag, and we know that back in January in the referendum in the Kurdish area, people at least on a straw vote basis said

they wanted an independent Kurdistan. So what, I guess, is your

view of Ambassador Galbraith’s analysis, situation in Iraq today?

Mr. TALABANY. I think Ambassador Galbraith highlights the divisions that exist in the country today. And why or how those divisions came about into being, can debate that. But when you have

a lacking of a political order, when the state cannot protect the citizens but being Shia protects him, when a state cannot protect a

Sunni but being a Sunni protects him, it brings forth the identities

that people have. And it is not about what we hoped Iraq would

look like or whether we have a nostalgic view of what Iraq looked

like before Saddam’s regime. It is a reality on the ground that is

clear in this violence going on today. There are Shiites killing

Sunnis and Sunnis killing Shiites and this violence is there for all

to see.

What we are saying is that this can be addressed by coming up

with a political order that takes into consideration the realities on

the ground, the facts on the ground, and by not ignoring them and

hoping that Iraq was a certain way.

I think as far as—if I can address the flag issue, it is a major

issue as far as national reconciliation is concerned. The flag of the

country should represent the country. The ‘‘Old Glory’’ has representation of every State in the flag. The Kurdish people do not

feel that the current Iraqi flag represents the people of Kurdistan

as Iraqis. It was a flag that was used by a regime that tried to kill

us, that tried to exterminate us, that committed genocide against

us. And what we are trying to do is build a new country. Kurds

have proven themselves more than anyone else, Kurds have proven

themselves more than anybody else to be Iraqi. They have sent

their brightest and best to Baghdad in the cause of unity in Iraq.

Mr. SHAYS. I am sure there is no bias here. Just sent my dad

there.

Mr. TALABANY. In all of the discussions where we tried to reach

a compromise—and I don’t want to play our own trumpets here,

but it has been the Kurds who have made the concessions on all

sides.

Mr. VAN HOLLEN. I thank all of you. Unfortunately, we have a

vote. This is a discussion we could pursue. I thank the chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. I am just going to say this. We are going to invite—

in fact, plead that you come back on Friday. I think we warned you

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that might be the case. At 2 o’clock, this committee reverts—at 2

o’clock, this committee reverts to another committee. This room

converts to another committee of—we don’t have this room all day.

But what would make it, I think, advantageous for you to in fact

come back and speak, I am going to ask you to comment before we

leave now, but what would be advantageous is the topic will be as

well—the topic on Friday is Consequences of Leaving: now, prematurely, or after power is transferred and so on.

So it is a nice segue. We would like to have you come back on

Friday to talk about what we haven’t yet talked about the reconciliation, all the things, specifically federalism, you know, the allocation of oil resources, and have you be very clear as to where the

differences lie on all of these issues and which are going to be the

most difficult.

So what I will ask, after our Speaker speaks, is to ask you to

come back. Is that possible for each you to do? On Friday? We

would ask to you come back at 10 o’clock. And then before the

panel—the next panel will speak—it is only one panel, they will

speak after you. And we will then go on to their topic, but you

could then speak on their topic as well. Would you like to close?

Mr. AL HASANI. I just wanted to comment on some of the issues

that the Congressman raised. When I sit here at the beginning, I

say I am Iraqi. Then sometimes I talk about Sunni. It is like when

a white American Congressman sits here and defends a Mexican

American or African Americans. It isn’t like, you know, you are

taking sides with this group or that group. This is how, you know,

I proceed with this issue.

Mr. SHAYS. Exactly.

Mr. AL HASANI. The other issue is that it is amazing that we

agree what the problem is. Problem is, can we form a government

that is going to be loyal to the Iraqi people, can protect the Iraqi

people, whether they are Sunni or Kurd or Shia? And instead of

working on that project, we keep saying that, well, that’s not

achievable, so probably we have to find, you know, different ways

for every one of us to go.

So the issue is that probably we all agree on major things. And

I think the same thing is true back home. But what needs is, you

know, some people to help us to get together and work these differences. I think that party is the United States. The United States

is right now the glue that glues the Iraqis together. And that’s why

I warn if the troops leave Iraq, we will be——

Mr. SHAYS. But we will have that dialog. And I thank you for—

I think we told you this might happen. What we’re doing is we are

recessing. We are going to impanel you first. You are already sworn

in. We don’t need to swear you in again. And we would like to talk

about these very issues that you are talking about. And then we

will get to the full hearing afterwards.

I view the three of you as essential to the dialog that we’re having. This is an important panel. And we don’t want to cut it short.

So thank you so very much. So we will stand recessed. We stand

recessed until 10 o’clock on Friday morning. Thank you all very

very much.

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[Whereupon, at 1:42 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 o’clock a.m., Friday, September 15, 2006.]

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