i 

NO. 03-14-00386-CR 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS 

AT AUSTIN 

GAYLEEN S. TODD 

Appellant 

v. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS 

Appellee

On Appeal from Trial Court Cause No. 13-08168-3 

In the County Court at Law Number Three, Williamson County, Texas 

Hon. Doug Arnold, Presiding 

STATE’S BRIEF 

THE HONORABLE DEE HOBBS 

WILLIAMSON COUNTY ATTORNEY 

RYAN PALMQUIST 

Assistant County Attorney 

Williamson County, Texas 

State Bar No. 24073307 

405 Martin Luther King, # 7 

Georgetown, Texas 78626 

PHONE: (512) 943-1111 

FAX: (512) 943-1120 

ryanpalmquist@wilco.org 

 

` Attorney on Appeal for the State 

ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 

ACCEPTED

03-14-00386-CR

6433688

THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS

8/10/2015 5:05:48 PM

JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERK

 FILED IN 3rd COURT OF APPEALS AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/10/2015 5:05:48 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE Clerk
ii 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL 

Appellant

GAYLEEN S. TODD 

2116 Juniper Trail 

Round Rock, Texas 78664 

Appellate Counsel for Appellant

Pro Se 

Trial Counsel for Appellant

Pro Se 

Trial Counsel for the State

Charles Falck 

Assistant County Attorney 

Williamson County Attorney’s Office 

405 Martin Luther King Street, #7 

Georgetown, Texas 78626 

Appellate Counsel for the State 

Ryan Palmquist 

Assistant County Attorney 

Williamson County Attorney’s Office 

405 Martin Luther King Street, #7 

Georgetown, Texas 78626 

 
iii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ........................................................... ii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iv 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1 

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 1 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 2 

I. State’s Response to Every Point of Error ..................................................... 3 

II. Standard of Review ....................................................................................... 5 

III. The Statutes Applied to Appellant ................................................................ 6 

IV. The Statutes Did Not Violate Appellant’s Right to Travel ........................... 7 

V. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction .................................................................. 8 

VI. Appellant Received Proper Notice ................................................................ 9 

VII. Statute Required the Trial Court Enter a Plea for Appellant ......................11 

VIII. Appellant Received a Fair Trial ..................................................................12 

IX. Conclusion ..................................................................................................15 

PRAYER ..................................................................................................................15 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................17 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................17 
iv 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 

Cases

Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. Crim App. 2003) ........................................ 5 

Blevins v. State, 672 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.) ...9, 10 

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ........................................ 5 

Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ..................... 3, 7, 12, 13 

Coyle v. State, 775 W.W.2d 843 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1989, no pet.) ......................11 

Ex parte Arnold, 916 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d) ................. 7 

Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 

(1997) ....................................................................................................................13 

Huynh v. State, 901 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ......................................... 8 

Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 307 (1979) .................................................................. 5 

McCloud v. State, 527 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) ...................................14 

McCrory v. State, 643 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ..................................... 4 

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) .............................13 

Riggle v. State, 778 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1989, no pet.) ................ 8 

Runningwolf v. State, 317 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2010), aff’d, 360 

S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ....................................................................11 

Schinzing v. State, 234 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App. Waco 2007) .................................... 9 

Schmutz v. State, 440 16 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ...............................4, 5 

Smith v. State, 907 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) .......................................... 3 

State v. Blakenship, 170 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App. – Austin 2005, pet. ref’d) ............ 8 

Taylor v. State, No. 09-07-00493-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 718 (Tex. App. 

Beaumont Feb. 4, 2009)(not designed for publication) ......................................... 7 

Statutes

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 26.11 .................................................................................11 

TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. 26.12. ...............................................................................11 

TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. 4.08 .................................................................................... 8 

TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. 45.019 ................................................................................ 9 

TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. 45.0426 .............................................................................. 8 

TEX. R. APP. P 34.6 .................................................................................................... 4 

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. .................................................................................................. 3 

TEX. R. APP. P 44.2 .................................................................................................... 4 

TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.002 ..................................................................................... 6 

TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.051 .................................................................................2, 6 

TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.191 ..................................................................................... 6 
1 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

Appellant received a citation for the offense of failure to maintain financial 

responsibility on or about May 15, 2013 (CR: 8). Appellant was convicted by a 

jury in Round Rock municipal court1 on October 1, 2013 and was assessed a fine 

of one hundred and seventy-five dollars ($175.00)(CR: 27). The municipal court 

denied Appellant’s lengthy Special Appearance and Motion for New Trial on 

October 10, 2013 (CR: 73). Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 11, 

2013 (CR: 74). On June 3, 2014, the case went to trial in County Court at Law #3 

and Appellant was found guilty by a jury (CR: 219). The jury assessed fine of two 

hundred and twenty dollars ($220.00)(CR: 222). Appellant filed another lengthy 

Special Appearance and Motion for New Trial on June 9, 2014 (CR: 239-280) 

which was denied by operation of law. Appellant then filed a Notice of Appeal on 

June 13, 2014 (CR: 281). 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

 Appellant did not arrange for the production of a reporter’s record, therefore 

the State cannot give a full and complete State of Facts on record. This limits the 

Court’s consideration of the case to the Clerk’s Record alone.2

 Appellant was 

 

1

 Round Rock Municipal Court is not a court of record. 

2

 The clerk’s record has a “transcript” of sorts from the municipal court level. Appellant filed this document. There 

is no way of confirming the accuracy, veracity or validity of this document. Appellant does not reference this 

document in her brief. 
2 

convicted of the class c offense failing to maintain financial responsibility under 

TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.051. 

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 

Appellant has not demonstrated any error using references to the record or 

relevant case law. The eleven points of error amount to unsubstantiated assertions 

unsupported by the record. Because of this, Appellant has not provided anything 

for this Court’s review and the points of error should be overruled. 

To the extent that Appellant has adequately briefed her points of error, they 

should still be overruled. First, the Texas Transportation Code statutes apply to 

Appellant and it does not matter if she was engaged in commerce at the time of 

committing the offense of failure to maintain financial responsibility. Secondly, the 

statutes are a proper exercise of the State’s police powers as it has an interest in 

maintaining safe roadways. 

A valid complaint was filed in this case, granting the trial court jurisdiction. 

Appellant filed notice of appeal from the municipal court thereby invoking the 

jurisdiction of the trial court. She again filed notice of appeal thus invoking the 

jurisdiction of this Court. 

Appellant received proper notice of the charge against her. The notice 

started with the issuance of a citation on the day of the offense. There was a valid 
3 

complaint filed in the municipal court and in the county court and Appellant had 

multiple court dates in both courts. 

Finally, Appellant received a fair trial. Statue required the trial court to enter 

a plea on Appellant’s behalf. Additionally, Appellant knowingly and voluntarily 

waived her right to counsel. Appellant did nothing to rebut the presumption of 

regularity in proceedings and documents. Appellant has not demonstrated that the 

trial court abused discretion during the admittance of evidence. Furthermore, the 

trial court’s answered the jury question properly. 

None of Appellant’s eleven points of error have any merit and should be 

overruled and the verdict of the trial court upheld. 

I. State’s Response to Every Point of Error 

Appellant’s points of error are inadequately briefed. It is proper for this 

Court to overrule points of error as inadequately briefed when Appellant neglects 

to present proper argument and authorities as required by TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i), 

Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Furthermore, 

points of error can be overruled when arguments and authorities are different in 

character from the error alleged. Smith v. State, 907 S.W.2d 522, 532 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1995). Appellant, in the case at hand, cites a litany of authorities that are 

improper in that the cases are not relevant, the cases do not stand for the stated 

rule, the stated rule comes from dicta, or the cited case itself has been overruled or 
4 

superseded. Furthermore, Appellant’s brief contains no references to the record 

and Appellant has nowhere applied law to facts illustrating reversible error. In each 

of Appellant’s points of error, Appellant fails to cite proper or relevant authority. 

As such, this Court should consider each point as inadequately briefed and overrule 

each one. In the event that the Court concludes Appellant adequately brief one or 

more points of error, the State will address them in turn. 

Appellant’s points of error are all unconfirmed, unproven, and unsupported 

claims. Appellant failed to arrange for the production of a record in this case. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(b). Therefore, without direct support in the record, the claims 

of error are only unsubstantiated assertions. As such, the claims are not appropriate 

appellate argument and should be overruled. See generally, McCrory v. State, 643 

S.W.2d 725, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (noting a court “cannot be expected to 

decide cases solely on the basis of self-serving claims by the [Appellant]”). 

Furthermore, even if the trial court did err in any way, the points of error 

should be overruled, as the alleged error did not affect Appellant’s substantial 

rights. The Court must disregard any non-constitutional error that does not affect 

the Appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is 

affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict. Schmutz v. State, 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2014). In assessing the likelihood that the error adversely affected the jury's 
5 

decision, an appellate court considers everything in the record. Id. This includes 

testimony, physical evidence, jury instructions, the State's theories and any 

defensive theories, closing arguments, and voir dire, if applicable. Id., citing 

Bagheri v. State, 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim App. 2003). As Appellant has 

not produced a record, there is nothing for the Court to consider. Additionally, 

Appellant has not shown how any alleged error would have affected the jury’s 

verdict. The alleged points of error would not have swayed the jury’s verdict at all. 

Therefore, this Court should overrule each of Appellant’s points of error. 

II. Standard of Review 

The standard of review in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence at trial 

was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 433 U.S. 

307 (1979) and followed by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Brooks v. State, 323 

S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In Jackson, the United States Supreme 

Court held that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction, the reviewing court must determine whether any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson, 403 U.S. at 319. It 

appears from Appellant’s brief that the crux of argument stems from the evidence 

not being enough to convict her of failing to maintain financial responsibility. Here 
6 

since there is no record, the Court is left only to consider the Clerk’s Record and 

view it in the light most favorable to the State. 

III.The Statutes Applied to Appellant 

TEX. TRANSP. CODE sections 601.051 and 601.191 apply directly to 

Appellant. According to TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.191(a), a person commits an 

offense if the person operates a motor vehicle in violation of Section 601.051. 

TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.051 sets out that a person may not operate a motor vehicle 

in this state unless financial responsibility is established for that vehicle. To further 

define these two statutes, TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.002(8) defines operator as the 

person in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. Additionally, TEX. TRANSP. 

CODE 601.002(10) defines a person as, amongst other things, an individual. 

Finally, TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.002(5) defines a motor vehicle as, amongst other 

things, a self-propelled vehicle designed for use on a highway. Appellant, an 

individual, operated a 2000 silver Mazda Protégé on Gattis School Road and A.W. 

Grimes Boulevard (CR: 8), both highways under TEX. TRANSP. CODE 601.002(4)

in Round Rock, Williamson County, Texas. Appellant could not and has not to this 

day provided proof through any of the statutorily proscribed means the she 

possessed valid insurance for that vehicle on May 15, 2013. As such, this Court 

should uphold the verdict of the trial court. 
7 

A commercial activity distinction does not exist in the statute at hand. TEX. 

TRANSP. CODE sections 601.051 and 601.191 are not restricted to operators of 

motor vehicles for hire. Taylor v. State, No. 09-07-00493-CR, 2009 Tex. App. 

LEXIS 718, at *7 (Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 4, 2009)(not designed for 

publication). If the Legislature wanted to restrict sections 601.051 and 601.191 to 

commercial motor vehicles, it would have written the term “commercial” into the 

statute. Furthermore, the qualifier “commercial” is also absent from the definition 

of motor vehicle, thus not limited to just vehicles engaged in commerce and 

applicable, in this case, to Appellant. Additionally, Appellant provides no legal or 

factual support anywhere in the brief for the claim that sections 601.051 and 

601.191 apply only to commercial vehicles. The commercial distinction is an 

unsubstantiated assertion made by Appellant. Since the statute applies to Appellant 

and Appellant has not shown through case law or references to the record that it 

does not, this Court should uphold the trial court’s verdict. Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 

393. 

IV. The Statutes Did Not Violate Appellant’s Right to Travel 

The State has an interest in the safety of the public roadways. Driving is a 

privilege, not a constitutionally protected right. Ex parte Arnold, 916 S.W.2d 640, 

642 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d). Requiring financial responsibility as a 

condition of operating a motor vehicle on the state’s highways secures redress for 
8 

injured highway travelers and is a proper subject of the state’s police power. Riggle 

v. State, 778 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1989, no pet.). The exercise 

of police power hinges on the public need for safety, health, security, and 

protection of the general welfare. Id. One of the many conditions of the driving 

privilege in this state is the requirement for established financial responsibility. As 

this was a valid exercise of the state’s police power, Appellant’s right to travel was 

not violated. Finally, Appellant does not demonstrate how her right to travel was 

violated at the trial court level nor how it created reversible error. As such, this 

Court should uphold the judgment of the trial court.

V. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction 

The trial court had proper jurisdiction to conduct the jury trial from which this 

appeals stems. A complaint invokes the original criminal jurisdiction of a 

municipal court. Huynh v. State, 901 S.W.2d 480, 481 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). 

A complaint is the sole charging instrument in a municipal court. Id. A complaint 

is sufficient on its face to invoke the jurisdiction of a municipal court. State v. 

Blakenship, 170 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App. – Austin 2005, pet. ref’d). 

Furthermore, TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. 4.08 provides that county courts shall have 

appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases of which justice courts and other inferior 

courts have original jurisdiction. TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. 45.0426(a) allows for 

the perfecting of this type of appeal upon the filing of an appeal bond not later than 
9 

the tenth day after the date the judgment was entered. Thus, appellate criminal 

jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of an appeal bond, not by filing an indictment 

or information Schinzing v. State, 234 S.W.3d 208, 210 (Tex. App. Waco 2007).

Finally, an information is not required in the county court at law because the 

complaint in the inferior court served as the functional equivalent of an 

information in the county court at law. Blevins v. State, 672 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.). In the case at hand, Appellant was issued 

citation #225631 titled “complaint/affidavit” on May 15, 2013 (CR: 8). A sworn 

complaint that complies with TEX. CODE. CRIM. PROC. 45.019 was signed and 

sworn on June 24, 2013 (CR: 10) thereby invoking the original jurisdiction of the 

Round Rock Municipal Court. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 22, 

2013 (CR: 74-79) exactly ten days after Appellant’s Motion for New Trial was 

denied. As such, the trial court had proper jurisdiction over the matter as an 

information was not needed at the trial court level. The jurisdiction points of error 

should be overruled and the conviction upheld. 

VI. Appellant Received Proper Notice 

Appellant received notice of the charge against her many times throughout the 

course of the criminal process. Notice was originally given on the citation that was 

issued on May 15, 2013 which bears Appellant’s signature (CR: 8). Notice was 

again conferred when the statutorily valid complaint was sworn and signed on June 
10 

24, 2013 (CR: 10). Additionally, at the municipal court level, there was a pretrial 

date on July 15, 2013 (CR: 9) and trial dates on September 10, 2013 (CR: 11) and 

October 1, 2013 (CR: 18) where the charge was discussed. One particular 

illuminating piece comes in the form of Appellant’s hand written request for 

continuance filed on August 29, 2013 (CR: 14). In that request, Appellant states, “I 

planned to procure all documents needed for my case. I need time to receive and 

review such documents in order to present my defense to the court.”(CR: 14). This 

indicates that Appellant was well aware that she would be preparing a defense for 

the failure to maintain financial responsibility charge. 

Appellant also received notice of the charge against her many times at the trial 

court level. Notice was given on the case setting notice from February 11, 2014 

which bears the Appellant’s signature (CR: 149), on the case setting notice from 

April 7, 2014 which bears the Appellant’s signature (CR: 205), and at the pre-trial 

hearing date on March 25, 2015 where the prosecutor handed her the entire appeal 

packet. Finally, the same sworn complaint that was used in the municipal court 

was filed with the County Clerk on October 22, 2013 (CR: 10) long before the trial 

date of June 3, 2014. As stated above, no information was required in the county 

court at law because the complaint in the justice court served as the functional 

equivalent of an information in the county court at law. Blevins, 672 S.W.2d at 

829. Finally, Appellant argues that there was no notice so the case is civil. The 
11 

case at hand is obviously a criminal offense that was tried in a criminal trial court, 

and is now being heard before this Court in a criminal context. A valid complaint 

was a proper charging mechanism, as discussed above, and the clerk’s record 

shows Appellant’s awareness of the charge against her. Furthermore, Appellant’s 

brief does not contain any support in the record that she did not receive notice or 

how this alleged lack of notice was error. Finally, this Court should not allow 

Appellant to remain willfully ignorant as to the charge against her, then turn 

around and claim error, with no support, on appeal. Thus, each notice point error 

should be overruled and the trial court’s verdict upheld. 

VII. Statute Required the Trial Court Enter a Plea for Appellant 

Appellant’s refusal to enter a plea had no effect on the trial court nor does 

Appellant demonstrate how her refusal caused reversible error. TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. 26.11 states, “the indictment shall be read, and the defendant asked whether 

he is guilty or not, as therein charged.” Next, Article 26.12 states that “if [the 

defendant] refuses to answer, the plea of not guilty shall [be entered upon the 

minutes of the court].” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 26.12. Therefore, not only was it 

not error for the trial court to enter a not guilty plea on Appellant’s behalf, it was 

statutorily required to do so. See Runningwolf v. State, 317 S.W.3d 829, 833-34 

(Tex. App. – Amarillo 2010), aff’d, 360 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); 

Coyle v. State, 775 W.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1989, no pet.). Since the 
12 

trial court was obliged to enter a plea for Appellant and since Appellant does not 

assert any error, points one and two should be overruled and the trial court verdict 

upheld. Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393. 

VIII. Appellant Received a Fair Trial 

The number of attorneys used and the access to information is immaterial. 

Appellant voluntarily waived her right to counsel when she filed her “Special 

Appearance and Waiver of Right to Counsel” on January 31, 2014 (CR 124). In 

that motion Appellant asserts that she, “is aware of her right to representation and 

that she intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waives such right” (CR 127). 

Further, Appellant points to TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 45.020(b) as limiting the 

number of attorneys to one. However, Chapter 45 governs only justice and 

municipal courts, not county courts at law. Furthermore, as stated above, Appellant 

waived her right to counsel, but she could have sought legal counsel before 

announcing ready for trial. Appellant also argues that she was prevented from 

using a computer and complains that the prosecutor was allowed computer usage. 

Appellant did not demonstrate how she was prevented from using her own 

materials or own laptop computer. Furthermore, Appellant again fails to 

substantiate these claims or demonstrate how this is error. Accordingly, these 

points should be overruled. Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393. 
13 

The State still had to prove the criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

jury charge submitted to the jury provides, “if you believe beyond a reasonable 

doubt...you will find the defendant ‘Guilty’”. It goes on, “If you do not so believe 

or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by 

your verdict ‘Not Guilty’” (CR: 213). Appellant has not cited any authority, 

referenced the record, or shown any other means how the trial court did not hold 

the State to the burden of beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, Appellant’s points 

of error should be overruled. Cardenas, 30 S.W.3d at 393. 

Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial judge abused his discretion on the 

admission of evidence. A trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence under 

Texas Rule of Evidence 403 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard and 

should not be set aside absent a showing on the record that the trial court abused its 

discretion by acting in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Montgomery v. 

State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). There should be reluctance 

on the part of an appellate court to reverse trial court decisions that admit or 

exclude evidence. Id. at 378. The fact that a trial judge may decide a matter 

within his discretion in a different manner than an appellate judge does not 

demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Id. at 380. The reviewing 

court should not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the “zone of 

reasonable disagreement.” Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92,101-102 (Tex. Crim. 
14 

App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997); Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 391. 

Appellant has not shown through any references to the record that the trial judge 

acted in an arbitrary or reasonable manner. Since the trial court did not abuse his 

discretion, this Court should uphold the judgment. 

The trial court did not prevent Appellant from defending herself as her brief 

claims. Appellate courts are to “indulge every presumption in favor of the 

regularity of the proceedings and documents” in the trial courts. McCloud v. State, 

527 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). The Judgment and Sentence 

provides that a jury of six was selected, empanelled, and sworn. It also specifies 

that the jury heard arguments and received evidence (CR: 225). By extension and 

although there is no record, Appellant was afforded an opportunity for voir dire, to 

give an opening statement, and the ability to cross-examine State’s witnesses. 

Under the presumption of regularity, Appellant received a full and fair trial and the 

judgment of the trial court should be upheld. 

Finally, the trial court properly answered the jury question (CR218). Without a 

record, this Court does not know if Appellant objected to the trial court’s answer, 

thus preserving any error for appeal. In addition, if the trial court answered the jury 

question differently, he would be giving evidence directly to the jury, supporting or 

contradicting testimony, or he would be commenting on the weight or sufficiency 
15 

of the evidence. Since this Court does not know if error was preserved and the fact 

that Appellant did not demonstrate error this point should be overruled. 

IX. Conclusion 

Without a record, this Court does not know what was said, what testimony was 

elicited, what objections were lodged, and what rulings on objections and evidence 

were made. Additionally, this Court does not know what error, if any, Appellant 

preserved at the trial court level. As stated above, Appellant’s brief amounts to 

nothing more than inadequately briefed, improperly sourced, unsupported selfserving claims. Appellant chose to operate a motor vehicle in this State without 

established financial responsibility freely and voluntarily. There is no evidence in 

the record indicating otherwise. As all of Appellant’s eleven points of error have 

no merit and should be overruled, the judgment and sentence of the trial court 

should be upheld. 

PRAYER 

 WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State prays this 

Honorable Court affirm the judgment of the trial court and overrule Appellant’s 

points of error. 

 
16 

 Respectfully submitted, 

 

 /s/ Ryan Palmquist 

RYAN PALMQUIST 

Assistant County Attorney 

Williamson County, Texas 

State Bar No. 24073307 

405 Martin Luther King, # 7 

Georgetown, Texas 78626 

PHONE: (512) 943-1111 

FAX: (512) 943-1120 
17 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

 I certify that a true and correct copy of State’s Brief was served upon 

Gayleen S. Todd, 2116 Juniper Trail Round Rock, Texas 78664, Appellant, by 

certified mail, on this the 10th day of August, 2015 

 /s/ Ryan Palmquist 

 RYAN PALMQUIST 

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 

I certify that this Brief contains a word count of 4,235, and thus complies with the 

requisites of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(2)(C). 

/s/ Ryan Palmquist 

 RYAN PALMQUIST