FI FTH DI VI SI ON M ERCI ER, C. J.
, M C FA DDEN, P. J.
, and RI CKM A N, J.

N O T IC E : M o tions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be phy s ic a ll y r e ce iv ed i n our c le r k ’s offic e w ithin te n da y s of the da te of de c is ion to be de e m ed tim e ly file d.

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June 17, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 24A 0 556

. LA W H ORN E et al. v

. D OUGLA S.

M C F A D D E N , Presid ing J u d ge.

Tho m as Law ho rne II I and Op tim Ortho p ed ic s, LLC (to gether, “ Law ho rne” )

ap p eal the j u d gment entered o n the $4. 5 m illio n j u ry v erd ic t i n fav o r o f A my E.

D o u glas in this med ic a l malp rac tic e ac t io n. Law ho rne argu es t hat the trial c o urt erred

by instru c ting the j u ro rs that the p resenc e o r absenc e o f insu ranc e benef its sho u ld no t

enter their d eliberatio ns i n d e c id ing the issu e s of liability and d amages. Law ho rne

argu es that no ev id enc e o f insu ranc e had been ad mitted
, so the trial c o urt had no basis

to giv e the instru c tio n, w hic h inj ec ted the issu e o f i n s u r a nc e into the j u ro rs’

c o nsid eratio n.W e ho ld tha t t he trial c o u rt d id no t err. I n v o ir d ire, a p o tential ju ro r stated

bef o re the p anel that, c o n t r a r y to the belief that aw ard ing large verd ic ts in med ic al

malp rac tic e cases “d o esn’ t hu rt anybo d y,” su ch aw a rd s “ c o m e[ ] f ro m the insu ranc e

c o mp a ny. ” A d d itio nally, o ne o f D o u glas’ s d o c t ors testif ied abo u t his a ssisting her in

o btaining “ d isability,” w hic h c ou ld ref er to disability insu ranc e ben e fi t s

. S o we a ffi r m.

1

. Ba ckgro u nd

D o u glas su ed L aw ho r n e , alleging that he had imp ro p erly imp lanted a sp inal

c o rd stimu lato r, c au sing her inj u ry. The c ase p ro ceed ed to trial.

D u ring v o ir d ire, D o u glas’ s atto rney ask ed the p o t e ntial j uro rs w hether any o f

them had a p ro blem aw ard ing as d amages the amo unt o f D o u glas’ s med ic a l b i lls,

w hic h, he said
, w ere almo st $1 m illio n. Law ho rne’ s atto rney o bj ec t e d t o the qu estio n

o n the gro u nd that it ask ed the j ury to p rej u d ge the c ase. The trial c o u rt rep hrased the

qu estio n, ask ing w hether t he p o tent i a l j u ro r s had any co mp unc tio n a b o u t aw ard ing

mo netary d amages if they b e liev ed the ev i d e n c e su p p o rted an aw ard

. One o f the

p o tential j u ro rs resp o nd ed :

I j u st f eel the need to o f

f er so m e t h i n g

. T hat my c a reer w as in the

i n s u r a nc e/reinsu ranc e ind u stry. I was inv o lv ed w ith bo ok s o f med ic al malp rac t i c e i n s u ranc e. I so m etimes hav e a bias w hen p eo ple say, o h,

2w ell, let’ s giv e them a lo t o f mo ney be c a use it d o esn’ t hu rt anybo d y. I t

c o mes f ro m t he insu ranc e c o mp any. So I j u st o ff e r that u p f

o r what it’ s

w o rth.

N either p arty o bj ec t ed o r r aised a ny issu e w ith the trial c ou rt abo u t the p o tential

j u ro r’ s c o mment.

D u ring t he p r esentati o n o f e v id enc e, D o u glas intro du c ed the v id eo r ec o rd ed

d ep o sitio n o f her p ain m anagement d oc to r, w hic h w as p layed f or the ju ry. On d irec t

examinatio n, the d o c t o r t estif i e d t h a t a t o ne o f Do uglas’ s ap p o intments w ith him, they

d isc ussed her p ain and “ j u s t k ind o f help ing her w ith any d isability issu e

. ” Co u nsel

f o r Law ho rne d id no t o bj ec t.

On c ro ss- examinatio n, c o u nsel f o r Law ho rne ask ed the d o c to r qu e stio ns abo u t

the d isability issu e. Co u nsel o bserv ed that, “ [I ] n yo u r no tes there’ s a no te that y o u r

o f f ic e c o mp leted d isability p ap ers f or M s

. D o uglas. ” The d o c to r r e s p o n d ed

af f irmativ ely. Co u nsel then ask ed
, “ D o yo u k no w o r d o yo u rec all w hy d isability

p ap ers w ere being c o mp lete[d ] f o r her?” The d oc to r resp o nd ed that

if the p ain is sev ere eno u gh we hav e no pro blems help ing s o mebo d y ju st

as a temp o riz ing measu re get d isability o r if i t ’ s s o m e t hing that’ s
histo ric ally a fac t w here they’ v e alread y been d isabled then w e try to help

maintain it; o r, if it’ s so mebo d y w ho basic ally might need d isability, then

3w e o bv io u sly try to mo v e f o rw ard in a direc tio n that m ight help them be

ev alu ated f

o r that o ptio n. So any o f tho se p o s sible sc enario s c o u ld exist

then.

N either p arty o bj ec ted

.

Law ho rne’ s a tto rney then ask ed the do c to r, “ A s o f M a rc h 22nd
, 201 7 [, bef o re

the imp lantatio n o f the sp inal c o rd s timu lato r,] based u po n her p resentatio n a nd w hat

w as go ing o n w ith her med ic al c are yo u f elt that M s. D o u glas w a s an eligible p atient

f o r d isability assistanc e?” The d o c to r resp o nd e d
, “ I think it’ s — fo r me it’ s arro gant

to assu me that so mebo d y’ s no t d isabled
, bu t I c ertainly w o uld w ant t o obj ec tiv ely get

so me inf o rmatio n to see if

they are d isabled .”

Law ho rne’ s atto r ney later ask ed t he d oc to r the reaso n f o r o rd ering a f

u nc tio nal

c ap ac ity examinat i o n o f D o u glas, and he exp lained that he o rd ers them to o btain

o bj ec t i v e d a ta “ v ersu s so me su bj ec tiv e u nd erstand ing o f what m ight be their

d isability. ” The atto rney then stated that D o uglas’ s e xamina ti o n “ sho w ed that she

c o u ld no t to lerate sed entary w o rk

. ” The d o c t or resp o nd ed , “ Ok ay. ”

A t the c harge c o nf

e renc e, the trial c o u rt inf

o rmed c o u nsel that he w o u ld giv e

w hat h e c alled “ an anti- co llateral so u rc e c harge,” and read alo u d the c harge he

intend ed to giv e. See generally Den to n v. C o n- W a y S o u thern Ex

pres s , 26 1 Ga. 41 , 42- 43

4(402 SE2d 2 6 9 ) (1 9 9 1 ), o v erru led o n o ther gro und s by Gri s s o m v

. Glea s o n , 26 2 Ga.

37 4, 37 6 (2) (41 8 SE2d 27 ) (1 9 9 2). Co u nsel f o r Law ho rne o bj ec t ed
, argu ing that the

c harge was no t based o n t he ev id enc e presented du ring the trial a nd t h a t i t w o u ld

c au se the j u ro r s to start think ing abo u t insu ranc e . The c o urt d enied the o bj ec tio n.

A f ter c lo sing argu m ents, the c o u r t charged the j u r y and inc lu d ed t he f o llo w ing

c harge:

I n assessing the damages o f the Plaintif f
, t he presenc e or a bsenc e o f any
insu ranc e o r o ther b e nef its o f any typ e , f

o r e ither the Plaintif

f o r the

D ef end ants, a s w ell as the f

inanc ial c irc u mstanc es o f any p erso n listed o n
the v erd ic t fo rm, shall no t be c onsid ered b y yo u in d ec id ing the issu e o f liability o r d amages. The existenc e o r lac k o f insu ranc e o r benef its shall

no t enter into yo u r d isc u ssio ns o r d eliberati o n s i n an y w ay in d ec id ing

the issu es in this c a s e

. Yo u mu s t instead d e c id e this c ase s o lely o n the

basis o f the testimo ny and ev id enc e p resented in the c o u rtro o m, as w ell

as the o ther instru c t io ns giv en to yo u by the Co u rt.

Law ho r ne renew ed his o bj ec tio n.

The j u ry retu rned a v erd ic t in f av o r o f D o u glas f

o r $4. 5 m illio n, the t rial c o urt

entered j u d gment o n t he v erd ic t, and Law ho rne f iled this ap p e al. (The j u d gment w as

su bj ec t to d irec t ap peal ev en tho u gh D o u glas’ s mo tio n f o r atto rney f

e es u nd er OCGA

§ 9

- 1 1

- 68 remained p end i n g a t t h e time o f the filing o f the no tic e o f ap p eal. See

5O’

Lea ry v

. W

hi teha ll C o ns tr ., 288 Ga. 7 90, 7 91 (1 ) (7 08 SE2d 353) (201 1) (mo tio n f o r

f ees u nd er OCGA §§ 9

- 1 1- 6 8 and 9 -1 5- 1 4 d id no t to ll the time f o r f i l i n g a no tic e o f

ap p eal). )

2. An a l ys i s

Law ho rne argu es that the trial c o urt erred in giv ing th e a n t i

- c o llateral so u rc e

c harge bec au se no ev id enc e su p p o r ted it. H e also a rgu es that the timing of the c harge

and its c o ntent requ ire rev ersal. W e d isagree.

I t is no t rev ersible erro r fo r a trial c o u rt “to giv e t he j u r y a c a u tio nary c harge

c o u c hed in ap p ro priate lang u a g e

. ” J o h n s o n v

. S ta te , 128 Ga. 1 02, 1 04 (57 SE 353)

(1 9 07 ). “ I t is a f

ixed ru le that the d eterminatio n o f w hether a c a u tio nary instru c tio n

is to be giv en generally a d d resses itself to t h e s o u nd d isc retio n o f the trial j u d ge. ”

Bea sley v

. S ta te , 1 98 Ga. A p p

. 41 8 (401 S E 2d 6 1 0) (1 9 9 1 ) (c itatio n and p u nc tu atio n

o mitted )

. A nd a trial c o u rt m ay giv e p r o p e r c au tio nary instru c tio ns to erad ic ate the

ad v erse ef

f ec t o f p lac ing the i s s u e o f c o llateral so u rc es b ef o re t he j ury. See Pa rk v

.

N i c ho ls
, 307 G a. A p p

. 841 , 843 (1 ) (7 06 SE2d 6 9 8) (201 1 ). “ The d eterminatio n a s to

w hether these harmf

u l f ac to rs are p resent in a case nec essarily rests in the d isc retio n

6o f the t rial j u d ge. ” Du b o s e v

. R o ss , 222 Ga. Ap p

. 9 9 , 1 00 (47 3 SE2d 1 7 9 ) (1 9 9 6 )

(c itatio ns and p u nc tu atio n o mitted ).

Law ho rne argu es t hat t he p o tential j u ro r’ s c o mment that insu rers p ay med ic al

malp rac tic e aw ard s w a s no t ev id enc e, and so d id no t su p p o rt t he anti- c o llateral so u rc e

c harge. B u t the trial c o u rt has the d isc retio n to giv e a cau tio nary instru c tio n no t o nly

bec au se of imp ro p er ev id e nc e , bu t also if “ a ny imp r op er c irc u mstanc e w a s inj ec ted

into the c ase. ” E mo ry U

n i v

. v

. Lee , 9 7 Ga. Ap p

. 6 80, 6 9 8 (4) (1 04 SE2d 234) (1 9 58)

(c itatio n and p unc t u atio n omitted ). I t w as w ithin the trial c o u rt’ s d isc ret i o n t o g iv e the

anti- c o llater a l so u rc e c harge bec au se o f the j u ro r’ s co mment w hic h squ a rely p lac ed

bef o re the o ther p o tential j u ro rs the issu e o f med ic al malp rac tic e insu ranc e.

L a wh o r n e a r g u e s t h a t t h e t e s t i m o ny o f D o u glas’ s p ain d oc to r a bo u t “d i s a b i l i t y ”

r e f e r s to go v ernment benef its, no t insu ranc e , and so d id no t su p p o rt t he c h a r g e

.

W hether t h e d o ct o r w as ref erring to go v ernment benef its, p riv ate d isability insu ranc e,

So c ial Sec u rity D isability I nsu ranc e benef its, o r so m ething else w as n o t mad e c lear.

W hat w as c l e a r w a s that the d o c to r’ s testimo ny abo u t “ d isability” related to

D o u glas’ s ef

f o rts t o o b t ain so me k ind o f financ ial benef it. So this testimo ny su p p o rted

the trial c o u rt’ s d ec isio n to instru c t the ju ry to disregard “ the presenc e o r absenc e o f

7any insu ranc e or o ther benef its o f any typ e. ” See C

an dler Ho s

p. v

. D en t , 228 Ga. A p p

.

421 (49 1 SE2d 86 8) (1 9 9 7 ) (c o llateral so u rc e ev id e nc e inc lu des d isability inc o me).

Law ho rne a rgu es t hat, in any ev ent, the t e s timo ny abo u t d isability c o nc erned

ev ents that o c c u rred bef

o re th e s u r gery at issu e, so the testimo ny co u ld no t hav e

su ggested c o llateral s o u rc e p ayments related to the inj u ry t hat w as the su bj ec t o f the

ac tio n. See Go

fo rth v

. W

i gley
, 1 7 8 Ga. A p p

. 558, 56 0 (2) ( 3 43 SE2d 7 88) (1 986 )

(ev id enc e o f p laintif

f ’s c o mp e nsatio n f

o r a p rio r v ehic le c o llisio n w a s no t exc lu d able

u nd er the c ollateral so u rc e ru le bec au se it w a s no t ev id enc e o f r e c eip t o f o ther

c o mp e nsatio n f

o r v e h i c l e c o llisio n being tried ). A ltho ugh the testimo ny abo u t

d isability benef

its may no t hav e d irec tly v io lated the c o lla t e ral so u rc e ru le giv en the

timing, it was w ithin the trial c o urt’ s d isc r etio n t o giv e a c au tio nary instru c tio n

bec au se o f the testimo ny’ s “ lik eliho o d to interj ec t the issu e o f third

- party p ayments

o r o ther irrelev ant matters to the j u ry. ” Vo l Repa i rs II v. Kn i

ghten
, 322 Ga. A p p

. 41 6,

420- 421 (3) (7 45 SE2d 6 73) (201 3).

Law ho rne argu es t hat b y w aiting u ntil the end of trial to giv e the a nti- c o llateral

so u rc e c harge, instead o f giv ing any kind of instru c tio n at t h e t i m e o f the p o tential

j u ro r’ s c o mment and the p a in d o c to r’ s testimo ny, the co u rt imp ro p erly resu rrec ted

8the issu e. “ [A ] trial c o u rt d o es no t err by giv ing a c u rativ e instru c tio n in its c lo sing

j u ry c harge rather than c o ntemp o raneo u s w ith t he intro d u c tio n o f t he imp ro p er

testimo ny, w hen there was no requ est f o r su c h an instru c tio n at the time t he testimo ny

w as elic ited

. ” Bi

rds o n g v

. S t a t e , 31 2 Ga. A p p. 345, 349 (7 1 8 SE2d 549 ) (201 1 ). N o

p arty c o n t e m p o raneo u sly obj e c ted to or requ ested an instru c tio n bec au se o f the

j u ro r’ s c o mment o r the p ain d o c to r’ s testimo ny, so the t iming of the instru c tio n d o es

no t amo u nt to an abu se o f d isc retio n.

Law ho rne a lso c hallenges the c o ntent o f the instru c t io n. H e a r gu es that the

instru c tio n imp r o p erly c o nnec ted insu ranc e t o l i ability f o r the f irst time d u ring the

trial. W e d isagree. “ The p rej u dic e [ f r o m ref erenc es to c o llateral so u rc es] lies in the

inf ec tio u s natu re of co llateral so u rc e ev id en c e, c o ntaminating as it d o es the issu e o f

lo ss w ith the issu es o f inj u ry and liability. Su c h ev id enc e is prej u di ci a l b ec au se by its

natu re [ its] e f

f ec t is no t self

-limi t i n g , b u t i t lap s ov er into o ther c o nsid eratio ns. “

C o lli n s v

. D a v i s , 1 86 G a. A p p

. 1 9 2, 1 93 ( 1 ) (36 6 SE2d 76 9 ) (1 9 88) (c i t a tio n o mitted ;

emp hasis in o r iginal). See also D en to n , 26 1 Ga. at 43 (“ [E]v id enc e o f c o llateral so u r c es

is inherently p rej u d ic ial b ec au s e its inf ec tio u s natu re t end s to c o ntaminate the entire

trial. ” )

.

9Finally, L aw ho rne seems to argu e that the t r ial c ou rt erred bec au s e, regard less

o f w hether o r no t c irc u mstanc es existed to su p p o rt the charge to d isregard insu ranc e,

the trial c o u rt d id no t rely o n tho se c irc u mstanc es and instead gav e the instru c tio n in

a n e f f o r t to p reemp t the ju ry f ro m ask ing abo u t insu ranc e

. Regard less of the t r i a l

c o u rt’ s rea s o n fo r giv ing the c au tio nary instru c tio n, w e af f irm u nd er the r ight- f

o r- anyreaso n ru le. See Reyn o l

ds v

. S ta te , 29 9 Ga. 7 81 , 7 85 (2) (7 9 2 SE2d 39 3) (201 6 ) (ev en

if trial c o u rt gav e an erro neo u s reaso n f o r its d ec isio n, “p u rsu ant to t he right f o r any

reaso n ru le, w e su stain the trial c o u rt’ s d e c isio n no t to c harge o n [d ef end ant’ s

requ ested j u ry instru c tio n]” ).

Ju dgmen t a

ffi rmed. Merci

er, C. J.
, a n d Ri

ckma n , J.
, c o n cu r

.

10