*The Honorable J. Garvan Murtha, of the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, sitting by designation.

**The Clerk of Court is respectfully instructed to amend the caption as set forth above. 11-1051-cv Adonna v. Sargent Mfg. Co. **UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 
**SUMMARY ORDER**

**R ULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT**  **. C**  **ITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER J** **ANUARY 1,**  **2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY**  **F EDERAL**  **R ULE OF**  **A PPELLATE**  **P ROCEDURE**  **32.1 AND THIS COURT**  **’ S**  **L OCAL**  **R ULE**  **32.1.1. W** **HEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT ,**  **A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE F**  **EDERAL A** **PPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE**  **( WITH THE NOTATION**  **“ SUMMARY ORDER**  **”). A**  **PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL**  **.** At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 1 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan 2 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of 3 New York, on the 23 rdday of May, two thousand twelve. 4 5 PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, 6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 7 Circuit Judges , 8 J. GARVAN MURTHA, 9 District Judge. * 10 11 12 13 FRANK ADONNA, 14 15 Plaintiff-Appellant , 16 17 -v.- 11-1051-cv 18 19 SARGENT MANUFACTURING COMPANY, UNITED 20 ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF 21 AMERICA LOCAL 243, 22 23 Defendants

- Appellees. ** 24 25 262 FOR APPELLANT: JOHN R. WILLIAMS, New Haven, CT. 1 2 FOR APPELLEE Sargent 3 Manufacturing Company: WARREN L. HOLCOMB (Michael P. 4 Devlin, on the brief ), Berchem, 5 Moses & Devlin, P.C., Milford, CT. 6 7 FOR APPELLEE United 8 Electrical, Radio and 9 Machine Workers of 10 America Local 243: JAMIE L. MILLS, Hartford, CT. 11 12 Appeal from the United States District Court for the 13 District of Connecticut (Bryant, J .). 14 15 **UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED** 16
**AND DECREED**that the judgment of the district court be 17

**AFFIRMED**
. 18 Plaintiff-Appellant Frank Adonna appeals the decision 19 of the United States District Court for the District of 20 Connecticut (Bryant, J. ), dismissing numerous state law 21 claims Adonna asserted against Defendants-Appellees Sargent 22 Manufacturing Company (“Sargent”) and United Electrical, 23 Radio and Machine Workers of America Local 243 (the 24 “Union”). The district court granted Defendants’ motion to 25 dismiss the state law claims on the basis that they were 26 preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 27 U.S.C. § 141, et seq . We assume the parties’ familiarity 28 with the underlying facts and procedural history of the 29

case. 303 Because the district court dismissed the state law 1 claims on the pleadings, we review the district court’s 2 decision de novo , taking the allegations in the complaint as 3 true and making all reasonable inferences in Adonna’s favor. 4 See Sullivan v. Am. Airlines, Inc. , 424 F.3d 267, 270 (2d 5 Cir. 2005). As an initial matter, Adonna explicitly 6 concedes that he has no viable action against the Union. He 7 also explicitly limits his challenge on appeal to only the 8 dismissal of his claims of negligent infliction of emotional 9 distress (“NIED”) and intentional infliction of emotional 10 distress (“IIED”) against Sargent. 11 Adonna contends that his two remaining claims are not 12 preempted by the LMRA. Section 301 of the LMRA confers 13 jurisdiction in the federal district courts for “[s]uits for 14 violation of contracts between an employer and a labor 15 organization representing employees in an industry affecting 16 commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The preemptive effect of 17 this section extends to “suit[s] alleging liability in 18
tort.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck , 471 U.S. 202, 211 19 (1985). “[W]here the resolution of a state-law claim 20 depends on an interpretationof the [collective bargaining 21 agreement], the claim is pre-empted.” Hawaiian Airlines, 224 Inc. v. Norris , 512 U.S. 246, 261 (1994) (emphasis added). 1 But “when the meaning of contract terms is not the subject 2 of dispute, the bare fact that a collective-bargaining 3 agreement will be consulted in the course of state-law 4 litigation plainly does not require the claim to be 5 extinguished.” Livadas v. Bradshaw , 512 U.S. 107, 123 6 (1994). 7 In our view, resolution of certain of Adonna’s claims 8 would require more than mere consultation to the collective 9 bargaining agreement (“CBA”). With respect to the elements 10 of NIED under Connecticut law, the determination of whether 11 Sargent’s conduct created an unreasonable risk of causing 12 Adonna emotional distress, see Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 13 815 A.2d 119, 127 (Conn. 2003), depends on the 14 interpretation of several provisions in the CBA. Adonna’s 15 complaint alleges that Sargent improperly suspended him, 16 reduced his pay, reassigned him, and placed demands upon him 17 that it did not impose upon other employees. Whether this 18 alleged conduct was in any way wrongful, and thus could 19 create an unreasonable risk of causing Adonna emotional 20 distress, cannot be determined without examining the CBA 21 provisions pertaining to the employer’s right to manage, 225 direct, and discipline the workforce, and set employee 1 wages. Because Adonna’s NIED claims concerning his 2 supervision, discipline, reassignment, and pay are 3 “inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of 4 the labor contract,” they are preempted by § 301 of the 5
LMRA. Allis-Chalmers , 471 U.S. at 213. 6 We draw the same conclusion for Adonna’s IIED claims 7 concerning this conduct because they rest on the same 8 factual allegations Adonna relies upon to support his NIED 9 claims. Resolution of the IIED claims, including the 10 inquiry into whether the alleged conduct was extreme and 11 outrageous, see Carrol , 815 A.2d at 126, requires 12 interpretation of the same CBA provisions discussed above. 13 Because Adonna’s state law claims for NIED and IIED based on 14 this conduct are preempted by § 301, the district court’s 15 dismissal of those claims was proper. See Allis-Chalmers , 16 471 U.S. at 220; Anderson v. Aset Corp. , 416 F.3d 170, 171- 17 72 (2d Cir. 2005). 18 Adonna also alleges that Sargent placed Adonna in 19 danger by demanding that he enter enclosed tanks to clean 20 out and remove toxic materials. Counsel for Sargent 21 conceded at oral argument that Adonna’s NIED and IIED claims 226 concerning this grievance depend not on the CBA but on 1 Connecticut tort law. Even if this concession is correct, 2 and we then concluded that these claims are not preempted by 3 § 301, it is quite clear that Adonna pled no facts 4 indicating that by assigning him this task Sargent engaged 5 in extreme and outrageous conduct or created an unreasonable 6 risk of causing emotional distress. See Carrol , 815 A.2d at 7 126, 127. We therefore affirm the district court’s 8 dismissal of these claims on the basis that Adonna failed to 9 state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. 10 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 11 We have considered Adonna’s remaining arguments and 12 find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, 13 the judgment of the district court is hereby **AFFIRMED**
. 14 Defendants-Appellees are awarded costs. 15 16 FOR THE COURT: 17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 18 19 20