Filed 1/8/15 In re V.J. CA5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re V.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES AGENCY, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

GUILLERMO J. et al., 

Defendants and Appellants. 

F069429 

(Super. Ct. Nos. JJV066118H, 

JJV066118J, JJV066118K) 

OPINION

THE COURT* 

 APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo Loza, 

Commissioner. 

 Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant Guillermo J. 

 Jesse F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant C.J. 

 Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel, and Carol E. Helding, Deputy County 

Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

-ooOoo- 

 

* Before Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Poochigian, J. 
2 

 Appellant Guillermo J. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his 

parental rights to his eight-year-old son V.J., seven-year-old daughter C.R.J., and sixyear-old daughter M.J. Guillermo contends the juvenile court erred in not applying the 

sibling exception to adoption (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)).1 The 

children’s mother, C.J. (mother), joins. We affirm. 

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY 

 In March 2011, V.J. and C.R.J., then both four years old, and two-year-old M.J. 

were removed from mother’s custody along with their then 15-year-old brother G.J., 

13-year-old brother Xavier R., 12-year-old brother Isaiah J., 11-year-old sister Dulce J., 

nine-year-old brother D.J., six-year-old sister Catalina J., and five-year-old brother 

C.N.J., because of mother’s drug use and the unsafe and unsanitary condition of the 

home. Guillermo is the father of all of the children except Xavier. At the time of the 

children’s removal, Guillermo was incarcerated. Guillermo and mother have an 

extensive history of domestic violence. 

 The children were placed in four different foster homes. Xavier was placed in 

one; G.J. and Isaiah in a second; Dulce, D.J., Catalina, and C.N.J. (the middle children) in 

a third; and V.J., C.R.J. and M.J. (the youngest children) in a fourth. The children were 

placed in Dinuba, except the youngest children who were placed in Visalia. 

 The juvenile court exercised its dependency jurisdiction over the children and 

ordered reunification services for mother. The court denied Guillermo and Xavier’s 

father reunification services but ordered supervised visitation for Guillermo. The court 

ordered supervised sibling visitation twice a month without the parents. 

 In September 2012, at a contested 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court 

terminated mother’s reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing. By that time, 

mother was having unsupervised visits with the children. According to the Tulare 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise 

indicated. 
3 

County Health and Human Services Agency (agency), mother was allowing Guillermo to 

participate in her visits despite a no-contact order. In addition, the agency believed 

mother and Guillermo were living together. 

 In December 2012, an adoptions social worker assessed the children and 

determined they were not adoptable because the foster parents were not willing to adopt 

them. The agency recommended the juvenile court implement a permanent plan living 

arrangement for them with the goal of legal guardianship. The agency informed the court 

that the children had unsupervised visits with mother twice a week for four hours each 

visit and enjoyed spending time together as a family. 

 In February 2013, at the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found the 

children were not adoptable and ordered them into a planned permanent living 

arrangement. The court ordered supervised weekly visits for mother and Guillermo and 

set a permanency plan review hearing (section 366.3 hearing) for August 2013. 

 In June 2013, the foster mother for the three youngest children told the agency she 

wanted to adopt them. She said the children were frustrated and confused by their 

frequent contact with their parents when there was no plan to reunify with them. She was 

willing to maintain their relationship with their siblings. In addition, the middle children 

were asking to be adopted by their foster parents. 

 In August 2013, at the section 366.3 hearing, the juvenile court set a section 

366.26 hearing as to the middle and youngest children. By that time, G.J. had reached 

the age of majority. He wanted the court to dismiss its dependency jurisdiction as to him 

but he wanted to continue visiting his siblings. 

 The agency recommended the juvenile court terminate Guillermo and mother’s 

parental rights to the three youngest children at the section 366.26 hearing. Their foster 

parents planned to move with the children to a new home approximately 147 miles away. 

The agency also recommended the court order legal guardianship for the middle children 

and dismiss its dependency jurisdiction as to them. 
4 

 The agency recommended the juvenile court discontinue Guillermo and mother’s 

visitation with the middle children. Guillermo and mother told one of the foster mothers 

she should “give [the children] up” and encouraged the children to misbehave. 

 On May 8, 2014, the juvenile court convened a contested 366.26 hearing. V.J. 

testified he was close to his siblings and wanted to continue to see them. C.R.J. testified 

she enjoyed her visits with her siblings and would like to live as a family again. M.J. 

testified she liked visiting with her siblings. She said she mostly played with Catalina 

and would like to live with her again. 

 Pauline P., the youngest children’s foster mother, testified it was important for the 

youngest children to maintain their relationships with their siblings and that she would 

help them maintain those relationships. 

 Pamela M., the middle children’s foster mother, testified she and Pauline were 

friends and had already discussed how to maintain sibling contact between the middle 

and youngest children. Pamela lived on a ranch and planned to have the youngest 

children ride horses and bicycles and play at the ranch. They also planned to spend some 

holidays together and maintain telephone contact between the children. 

 At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that though the children 

had an emotional connection to each other, it was not so strong as to outweigh the benefit 

the youngest children would receive from adoption. Consequently, the court terminated 

Guillermo and mother’s parental rights as to V.J., C.R.J., and M.J. This appeal ensued. 

DISCUSSION 

 Guillermo and mother (appellants) contend the juvenile court erred in failing to 

apply the sibling exception to adoption because the children had shared experiences, 

close relationships and strong bonds. We disagree. 

 Once the juvenile court has terminated reunification services, its focus shifts to the 

children’s need for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 

309.) If, as here, the children are likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. (In re 
5 

Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 (Celine R.).) The statutory presumption is that 

termination is in the children’s best interests and not detrimental. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); In 

re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342.) 

 The juvenile court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination 

of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances in section 366.26 provides a 

compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to 

the child. (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) Further, it is an opposing party’s 

burden to show that termination would be detrimental under one of the statutory 

exceptions. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809.) 

 The sibling relationship exception to terminating parental rights applies when the 

juvenile court finds there is a compelling reason for determining termination would be 

detrimental to the child because it would substantially interfere with the child’s sibling 

relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Factors to be considered include the nature 

and extent of the relationship, whether the children were raised with a sibling in the same 

home and whether the children have a strong bond with a sibling. The court must also 

consider whether ongoing contact is in the children’s best interests, including the 

children’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence 

through adoption. (Ibid.) The purpose of this exception is to preserve long-standing 

sibling relationships that “serve as anchors for dependent children whose lives are in 

turmoil.” (In re Erik. P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404.) 

 “The sibling relationship exception contains strong language creating a heavy 

burden for the party opposing adoption.” (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 

813.) The parent must first show: (1) the existence of a significant sibling relationship; 

(2) that terminating parental rights would substantially interfere with that relationship; 

and (3) it would be detrimental to the child if the relationship ended. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 

101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952.) After the parent shows a sibling relationship is so strong that 

its severance would be detrimental to the adoptive child, the court then decides whether 
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the benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship outweighs the benefits of 

adoption. (Id. at pp. 952-953; In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, 823.) 

 When a juvenile court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the 

appellate issue is not whether substantial evidence exists to support the court’s rejection 

of the detriment claim but whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in so doing. 

(In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) For this to occur, the proof offered 

would have to be uncontradicted and unimpeached so that discretion could be exercised 

only in one way, compelling a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. 

(Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 570-571; In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 

1517, 1528.) Based on our review of the record, we conclude the juvenile court properly 

exercised its discretion in rejecting appellants’ argument. 

 Here, V.J., C.R.J. and M.J. were very young in March 2011 when they were 

removed from mother’s custody. By the time of the May 2014 hearing, they had been 

separated from their siblings for over three years. Though the children maintained a 

close and loving relationship during that time of separation, appellants have not shown 

that severing the sibling relationship would cause the youngest children detriment. By all 

accounts they were adjusting well to their adoptive parents and looked to them to meet 

their needs. The juvenile court’s failure to apply the sibling relationship exception can be 

affirmed on appellants’ failure to show detriment alone. 

 Further, there is no reason to believe that terminating appellants’ parental rights 

would substantially interfere with the sibling relationships. Pauline and Pamela 

understood the value of preserving the sibling relationships and intended to maintain 

contact between the siblings. 

 Appellants contend it is improper to consider a prospective adoptive parent’s 

promise to maintain sibling contact in deciding whether the sibling relationship exception 

to adoption exists. Such a promise, they argue, is illusory and cannot be enforced, citing 

In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102 (C.B.). However, the pages appellants cite in C.B.
7 

pertain to the parent-child relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) not the 

sibling relationship exception. The C.B. court stated: “[T]he court cannot ... terminate 

parental rights based upon an unenforceable expectation that the prospective adoptive 

parents will voluntarily permit future contact between the child and a biological

parent ....” (C.B., supra, at p. 128; italics added.) Further, appellants have not shown 

that the holding in C.B. has been applied to the sibling relationship exception or that the 

juvenile court relied on Pauline and Pamela’s promises to maintain sibling contact in 

deciding to terminate their parental rights. Most importantly for the purposes of this 

appeal, appellants failed to show that terminating their parental rights would be 

detrimental to V.J., C.R.J. and M.J. 

DISPOSITION 

 The judgment is affirmed.