alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Case No. 15,217.

#### UNITED STATES v. GLENN et al.

[1 Woods. 400.] 1

Circuit Court, E. D. Texas.

May Term, 1872.

Collector oe Customs—Action on Bond—Pail-ore to Collect.

In an action on the official bond of a collector of internal revenue, where the breach alleged was his failure to account for or pay over the sum of $64,000, it was *held*that dereliction of duty In not collecting said sum could not be shown in order to establish the breach.

UNITED STATES (GLENN v.). See Case No. 5,481. _

At chambers.

This cause was heard upon a motion for-new trial, the ground for which sufficiently appears in the opinion of the court.

Geo. Flournoy, T. N. Waul, and J. Z. H. Scott, for the motion.

D. J. Baldwin, U. S. Atty., contra.

1

 [Reported by Hon. William B. Woods. Circuit Judge, and here reprinted by permission.]

BRADLEY, Circuit Justice.

This is an action of debt on the official bond of Frank W. Glenn, as collector of internal revenue for this district. The breaches assigned are, that Glenn did not faithfully perform his duties as collector, but received as such the sum of $64,000, which he never accounted for or paid to the United States. To the declaration was attached a copy of the bond, and a particular statement of Glenn’s accounts at the treasury department, showing the balance claimed against him. But it was not pretended, on the trial, that he luul actually collected all the items contained on the debit side of the account, but that, under the 34th section of the act of 1S04 (13 Stat. 223), he had been. charged with the whole amount of the assessor’s list of taxes returned to him, together with the amount of unpaid taxes turned over to him by his predecessor, and it was contended that if he had not collected them, it was dereliction of duty on his part unless he showed a sufficient excuse.

We are of opinion that, under the breach set forth in the declaration, dereliction of duty in not making collections cannot be set up at the trial. It is not the same thing as collecting and failing to pay over. At common law, it is true, any failure of duty, to any amount, involved the forfeiture of the bond and the payment of the penalty. And considerable sums were shown to have been collected by Glenn. This evidence was competent, and would have been sufficient, under the rules of the common law which once prevailed, to make him liable for the whole amount. But the courts have long since adopted a more just rule, and give judgment only for the amount actually due. And, as a very large amount was embraced in the verdict which did not consist of moneys collected and unpaid, we think that the verdict must be set aside, but with leave to the district attorney to amend the declaration. Ordered accordingly.
No. 45189.

#### Protests 832994-G/85682, etc., of Taiyo Trading Co., Inc. (Chicago).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

It was stipulated that the merchandise consists of Rockingham earthenware similar to that the subject of *Butler*v. *United States*(4 Cust. Ct. 120, C. D. 303). The claim at 25 percent under paragraph 210 was therefore sustained.
_________________________________________ 

 

 

Order Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

December 27, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

129465 Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman,

 Justices 

v SC: 129465 

 COA: 260925 

Monroe CC: 03-032747-FC 

MORIAH EDWARD YOUNG, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the July 21, 2005 order 

of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded 

that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p1219 

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

December 27, 2005 

Clerk
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>  5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION
EXTRACTED FROM UNITED AIR LINES, INC.'S STATEMENT OF
CONSOLIDATED OPERATIONS FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDED JUNE 30,
2000 AND CONDENSED STATEMENT OF CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL
POSITION AS OF JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
<MULTIPLIER>  1,000,000

<S>
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                                 DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                                    JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                                      JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                           6-MOS
<CASH>                                                    644
<SECURITIES>                                              496
<RECEIVABLES>                                           1,919
<ALLOWANCES>                                                0
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<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                        4,065
<PP&E>                                                 21,571
<DEPRECIATION>                                          6,092
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<BONDS>                                                 4,756
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                       0
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<COMMON>                                                    0
<OTHER-SE>                                              5,966
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                           23,096
<SALES>                                                     0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                        9,631
<CGS>                                                       0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                           8,752
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                            0
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<CHANGES>                                                 209
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</TABLE>
# L_2008305EN.01S00301.xml

| 14.11.2008 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 305/s3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.11.2008

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 305/s3

---

NOTE TO THE READER

The institutions have decided to no longer quote in their texts the last amendment to cited acts.

Unless otherwise indicated, references to acts in the texts published here are to the version of those acts currently in force.

---
<PAGE>
     FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:

                                                        CONTACT:  Eliezer Becher
                                                                  (914) 271-5361


           STERLING VISION AND RARE MEDIUM TO DEVELOP PREMIER BUSINESS
                           TO BUSINESS OPTICAL PORTAL


     EAST MEADOW, N.Y., February 15, 2000 -- Sterling Vision, Inc. (NASDAQ:
ISEE), today announced that Sterling Vision and Rare Medium, Inc., the Web
consulting services arm of Rare Medium Group, Inc., have signed an agreement
with respect to the Company's development and launching of an extensive network
of state-of-the-art web sites designed to provide information, interaction and
electronic business-to-business commerce exclusively for the optical community.
In addition to a cash payment, Rare Medium will receive an equity interest in
Sterling Vision.

     As part of a joint initiative, Sterling Vision and Rare Medium will seek to
capitalize on the robust growth potential in the business-to-business,
e-commerce market by providing comprehensive e-commerce solutions for the buyers
and suppliers of business goods and services in the optical industry.

     Dr. Robert Cohen, Chairman of Sterling Vision, stated,
"Business-to-business Internet solutions for the optical community are not
currently being adequately provided by Internet companies, which tend to focus
on consumers and not on the business-to-business market. We are committed to
devoting substantial resources and manpower to these efforts; and with Rare
Medium as our partner in the development of these business-to-business,
e-commerce initiatives, we believe that we can develop an e-commerce optical
portal that will set the standards for the industry."

     All statements contained herein (other than historical facts) are based
upon current expectations. These statements are forward looking in nature and
involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Actual results may differ
materially from the anticipated results or other expectations expressed in the
Company's forward looking statements. Generally, the words "anticipate,"
"believe," "estimate," "expects," and similar expressions as they relate to the
Company and/or its management, are intended to identify forward looking
statements.
September 15, 1969

No. 69-42

#### Laurence M. Svirchev, PVT, U. S. Army v BG James T. Hollingsworth as Commanding General of Fort Jackson, South Carolina and MG Willard Pearson as Commanding General of Forth Lewis, Washington.

On consideration of the “Motion to Reconsider” filed in the above-entitled action, it appearing that no facts sufficient to establish a basis for the relief requested are alleged, it is, by the Court, this 15th day of September, 1969,

ORDERED that said “Motion to Reconsider” be, and the same is, hereby denied. United States v Noyd, 18 USCMA 483, 40 CMR 195 and Lee v Pearson, 18 USCMA 545, 40 CMR 257.
# C_2017014EN.01003202.xml

| 16.1.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 14/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.1.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 14/32

---

Order of the Court of 8 November 2016 — Apcoa Parking Holdings v EUIPO (PARKWAY)

(Joined Cases T-268/15 and T-272/15) (1)

((European Union trade mark - Applications for European Union figurative and word marks PARKWAY - Absolute ground for refusal - Descriptive character - Article 7(1)(c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law))

(2017/C 014/39)

Language of the Case: German

Parties

Applicant: Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH (Stuttgart, Germany) (represented by: A. Lohmann, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: H. Kunz, acting as Agent)

Re:

Two actions brought against the decision of the Fourth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 25 March 2015 (Cases R 2063/2014-4 and R 2062/2014-4) concerning applications for registration of the figurative and word signs PARKWAY as European Union trade marks.

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1) | Dismisses the actions; |
| --- | --- |

1)

Dismisses the actions;

| 2) | Orders Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2)

Orders Apcoa Parking Holdings GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  
  OJ C 245, 27.7.2015.

---
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 7
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                        75,185,115
<DEBT-CARRYING-VALUE>                                0
<DEBT-MARKET-VALUE>                                  0
<EQUITIES>                                     930,000
<MORTGAGE>                                           0
<REAL-ESTATE>                                        0
<TOTAL-INVEST>                              79,414,663
<CASH>                                         367,804
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                              95,033
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                       4,615,668
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             101,722,931
<POLICY-LOSSES>                             39,762,333
<UNEARNED-PREMIUMS>                         20,955,161
<POLICY-OTHER>                                       0
<POLICY-HOLDER-FUNDS>                        2,292,054
<NOTES-PAYABLE>                              1,100,001
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     2,836,026
<OTHER-SE>                                  32,368,965
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               101,722,931
<PREMIUMS>                                  17,260,623
<INVESTMENT-INCOME>                          2,102,144
<INVESTMENT-GAINS>                             191,174
<OTHER-INCOME>                               3,569,655
<BENEFITS>                                   9,874,998
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>                  4,518,914
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                         3,818,467
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              4,911,217
<INCOME-TAX>                                 1,488,382
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          3,422,835
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,422,835
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.55
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.55
<RESERVE-OPEN>                                       0
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                                  0
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                                    0
<PAYMENTS-CURRENT>                                   0
<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                                     0
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                                      0
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>                              0
        

</TABLE>
# C_2017277EN.01003202.xml

| 21.8.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 277/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

21.8.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 277/32

---

Judgment of the General Court of 7 July 2017 — Azarov v Council

(Case T-215/15) (1)

1

((Common foreign and security policy - Restrictive measures taken in view of the situation in Ukraine - Freezing of funds - List of persons, entities and bodies subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources - Retention of the applicant’s name on the list - Duty to state reasons - Rights of defence - Right to property - Right to conduct a business - Proportionality - Misuse of power - Principle of sound administration - Manifest error of assessment))

(2017/C 277/47)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Mykola Yanovych Azarov (Kiev, Ukraine) (represented by: G. Lansky and A. Egger, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union (represented by: J.-P. Hix and F. Naert, acting as Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Application under Article 263 TFEU for annulment of Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/364 of 5 March 2015 amending Decision 2014/119/CFSP concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2015 L 62, p. 25) and of Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2015/357 of 5 March 2015 implementing Regulation (EU) No 208/2014 concerning restrictive measures directed against certain persons, entities and bodies in view of the situation in Ukraine (OJ 2015 L 62, p. 1), in so far as those acts maintain the applicant’s name on the list of persons covered by the restrictive measures at issue.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Mr Mykola Yanovych Azarov to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Mr Mykola Yanovych Azarov to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 221, 6.7.2015.

1

---
The State of TexasAppellee



# Fourth Court of Appeals
**San Antonio, Texas**

Tuesday, April 7, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00183

- CR

Richard LARES

, A ppellant

v.

The STATE of Texas, Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2006CR10110 Honorable Juanita A. Vasquez

- Gardner, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

O n August 10, 2009, the trial court imposed sentence on Appellant Richard Lares. Because the judgment incorrec tly recited the date of offense, on J anuary 26, 2015, the trial court signed a Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc correcting the date of offense. On March 5, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment. Contra T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 22 .3 (requiring a motion in arrest of judgment to be filed “no later than 30 days after[] the date when the trial court imposes or

suspe nds sentence in open court” ). On March 19, 2015, Appellant filed a Notice of Intent to Appeal.

A judgment nunc pro tunc is an appealable order. Blanton v. State , 369 S.W.3d 894, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). However, t o perfect an appeal the notice of app eal must be filed within thirty days of the date that the trial court signs the judgment nunc pro tunc. Dewalt v. State , 417 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2013), pet. ref’d , 426 S.W.3d 100 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

Here, the trial court signed the Judg ment Nunc Pro Tunc on January 26, 2015; Appellant’s notice of appeal was due on February 25, 2015. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.2(a)(1);
Dewalt , 417 S.W.3d at 689. A motion for extension of time to file was due on March 12, 2015.
See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 26.3 ( Extension of Time); Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)

. No motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal was filed.

“If a notice of appeal is not timely filed, the court of appeals has no option but to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.” Castillo v. State , 369 S.W.3d 196, 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).W e ORDER A ppellant Richard Lares to show cause in writing within T HIRTY DAYS of
the date of this order why this appeal should not be dismissed for want of jurisdic tion. See
Blanton , 369 S.W.3d at 903

. All other appellate deadlines are SUSPENDED pending further order of this court.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said court on this 7th day of April, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle Clerk of Court
#### Angelete GAUTREAUX v. STATE of Arkansas

CA CR 86-222

736 S.W.2d 23

Court of Appeals of Arkansas Division II

Opinion delivered September 23, 1987

[Rehearing denied October 21, 1987.]

*Hurst Law Office,*by: *Q. By rum Hurst, Jr.,*for appellant.

*Steve Clark,*Att’y Gen., by: *William F. Knight,*Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellee.

*131James R. Cooper, Judge.

The appellant pled guilty to a charge of theft on July 27,1981 and the trial court sentenced her to five years in prison. However, execution of the sentence was stayed and the appellant was placed on probation for five years. On May 23,1985, a petition was filed alleging that the appellant had violated conditions of her probation. The appellant was arrested on July 14,1985, and after a hearing her probation was revoked on August 26, 1986. The court sentenced her to six months in the Arkansas Department of Correction. On appeal the appellant argues that the trial court was without jurisdiction to revoke her probation because the term of her probation had lapsed. We find that the appellant’s argument has merit and we reverse and dismiss.

The State, citing Ark. Stat. Ann. §41-1208(5) (Repl. 1977), contends that the trial court could revoke the appellant’s probation because the appellant was arrested for violations of the conditions of her probation prior to the expiration of the probationary time period. The State’s contention is correct where a defendant has pled guilty and imposition of sentence was suspended, or where the defendant is simply placed on probation. However, that is not the situation in the case at bar. Here the trial court imposed the sentence and suspended execution of the sentence. Under our criminal code, a sentence is imposed when the court pronounces a fixed term of imprisonment as opposed to simply specifying a definite period of probation. *McGee*v. *State,*271 Ark. 611, 609 S.W.2d 73 (1980); *Jefferson*v. *State,*270 Ark. 909, 606 S.W.2d 592 (1980). According to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2332 (Supp. 1985), if sentence is imposed, then the probationer can only be required to serve the remainder of the time imposed. *Easley*v. *State,*274 Ark. 215, 623 S.W.2d 189 (1981). Therefore, since the revocation did not occur until after the completion of the appellant’s imposed sentence, the trial court could not sentence the appellant to serve additional time in prison.

Because we have reversed and dismissed this case based on the appellant’s first argument, it is unnecessary for us to consider the other issues raised by the appellant on appeal.

Reversed and dismissed.

*132Corbin, C.J., and Coulson, J., agree.
Date: 

California Environmental Protection Agency 

AIR RESOURCES BOARD 

Enclosure A 

Rules that were Adopted, Amended or Repealed by the Following 

Air Pollution Control and Air Quality Management Districts 

and are Submitted as Revisions to the 

District 

Imperial County 

APCD 

San Diego APCD 

San Diego APCD 

Tehama County 

APCD 

Ventura County 

APCD 

Yolo-Solano AQMD 

California State Implementation Plan 

Rule 

Number 

214 

67.0 

67.0.1 

2.3c 

74.15.1 

1.1 

Date Adopted, 

Amended, Title 

or Repealed 

5/12/15 Emission Reduction Credit 

(ERC) Banking (amended) 

6/24/15 Architectural Coatings 

(repealed) 

6/24/15 Architectural Coatings 

(adopted) 

9/1/15 New Source Review, New 

and Major Modified .Sources 

in the Tuscan Buttes 

Nonattainment Area 

(adopted) 

6/23/15 

7/8/15 

Boilers, Steam Generators, 

and Process Heaters 

(amended) 

General Provisions and 

Definitions (amended)
# C_2017038EN.01003201.xml

| 6.2.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 38/32 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

6.2.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 38/32

---

Judgment of the General Court of 15 December 2016 — Intesa Sanpaolo v EUIPO (START UP INITIATIVE)

(Case T-529/15) (1)

1

((EU trade mark - Application for EU figurative mark START UP INITIATIVE - Absolute ground for refusal - No distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - Obligation to state reasons - Article 75 of Regulation No 207/2009))

(2017/C 038/43)

Language of the case: Italian

Parties

Parties

Applicant: Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (Turin, Italy) (represented by: P. Pozzi and F. Braga, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented initially by P. Bullock, and subsequently by L. Rampini, acting Agents)

Defendant:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the First Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 June 2015 (Case R 2777/2014-1), concerning an application for registration of the figurative sign START UP INITIATIVE as a European Union trade mark.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders Intesa Sanpaolo SpA to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Intesa Sanpaolo SpA to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 371, 9.11.2015.

1

---