U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

66–788 CC WASHINGTON : 2000

THE CRISIS IN COLOMBIA: WHAT ARE WE

FACING?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 15, 2000

Serial No. 106–151

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house

http://www.house.gov/reform

(II)

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York

STEPHEN HORN, California

JOHN L. MICA, Florida

THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia

DAVID M. MCINTOSH, Indiana

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

MARSHALL ‘‘MARK’’ SANFORD, South

Carolina

BOB BARR, Georgia

DAN MILLER, Florida

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

LEE TERRY, Nebraska

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

GREG WALDEN, Oregon

DOUG OSE, California

PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin

HELEN CHENOWETH-HAGE, Idaho

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

TOM LANTOS, California

ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia

MAJOR R. OWENS, New York

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,

DC

CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine

HAROLD E. FORD, JR., Tennessee

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

———

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont

(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director

DAVID A. KASS, Deputy Counsel and Parliamentarian

LISA SMITH ARAFUNE, Chief Clerk

PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY, AND HUMAN RESOURCES

JOHN L. MICA, Florida, Chairman

BOB BARR, Georgia

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana

STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio

ASA HUTCHINSON, Arkansas

DOUG OSE, California

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana

PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii

EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland

DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio

ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois

JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts

JIM TURNER, Texas

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois

EX OFFICIO

DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California

SHARON PINKERTON, Staff Director and Chief Counsel

GIL MACKLIN, Professional Staff Member

LISA WANDLER, Clerk

CHERRI BRANSON, Minority Counsel

(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page

Hearing held on February 15, 2000 ....................................................................... 1

Statement of:

Busby, Morris, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia and president, B.G.I.

International; Ted McNamara, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia,

Council of the Americas; and Lawrence Meriage, vice president, Occidental Petroleum Corp ................................................................................. 149

McCaffrey, General Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control

Policy .............................................................................................................. 35

Wilhelm, General Charles, Commander, U.S. Southern Command; William Ledwith, Director of International Operations, Drug Enforcement

Administration; Ana Maria Salazar, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Support; and Ambassador Peter Romero,

Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Department of State ................... 87

Letters, statements, et cetera, submitted for the record by:

Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indiana, prepared statement of .......................................................................... 24

Busby, Morris, former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia and president, B.G.I.

International, prepared statement of .......................................................... 153

Ledwith, William, Director of International Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration, followup questions and responses .......................... 127

McCaffrey, General Barry R., Director, Office of National Drug Control

Policy, prepared statement of ...................................................................... 42

Meriage, Lawrence, vice president, Occidental Petroleum Corp., prepared

statement of ................................................................................................... 168

Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Florida, U.S. Support for Plan Colombia and the Andean Region ........... 3

Mink, Hon. Patsy T., a Representative in Congress from the State of

Hawaii, prepared statement of .................................................................... 18

Romero, Ambassador Peter, Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Department of State, prepared statement of .................................................. 118

Salazar, Ana Maria, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug

Policy and Support, prepared statement of ................................................ 107

Schakowsky, Hon. Janice D., a Representative in Congress from the

State of Illinois, article by Robert White .................................................... 73

Wilhelm, General Charles, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, prepared statement of ........................................................................................ 90

(1)

THE CRISIS IN COLOMBIA: WHAT ARE WE

FACING?

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2000

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY,

AND HUMAN RESOURCES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room

2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, Barr, Gilman, Shays, RosLehtinen, Souder, Ose, Mink, Cummings, Kucinich, Tierney, and

Schakowsky.

Also present: Representatives Burton, Ballenger, and Green.

Staff present: Sharon Pinkerton, staff director; Gil Macklin, professional staff member; Charley Diaz, congressional fellow; Lisa

Wandler, clerk; Cherri Branson, minority counsel; and Jean Gosa,

minority assistant clerk.

Mr. MICA. Good morning. I would like to call this hearing of the

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources to order. Today, our topic is the United States’ response to

the crisis in Colombia.

We will start today’s proceeding with opening statements by

Members. We have three witness panels to hear from today, so we

will move forward and hopefully be joined by some of our other colleagues in the next few minutes.

With those comments, let me first make my opening statement.

Today, this House subcommittee will examine the United States’ response to the growing crisis in Colombia. We will take this opportunity to review the administration’s track record of delivering resources, including previously authorized counterdrug aid and

equipment to Colombia, as well as examine the current Colombian

aid proposal.

This hearing will serve as the first real public hearing of the

issue since the administration submitted its billion-dollar-plus

emergency supplemental aid package.

Our hemisphere and the United States are facing one of the

greatest challenges to its national security as the situation in Colombia continues to deteriorate. Left unchecked, the narco-terrorist

threat in Colombia will continue to spiral out of control, threatening Latin America’s oldest democracy and leading to regional instability.

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As the illegal drug trade continues to grow, it fuels narco-terrorism, undermines legitimate government institutions, and leads to

increasing violence in the region. The impact of this destabilization

in the region will have a devastating impact on the U.S. national

security interests.

After years of pleading and pressure by House Members and

Members of Congress, I appreciate that, finally, the administration

has submitted to Congress a Colombian aid proposal, which has

just arrived. It arrived 7 months after General McCaffrey sounded

the alarm, calling the situation in Colombia an emergency, and 4

months after the Pastrana government submitted Plan Colombia,

asking for United States assistance.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Because the United States’ response has been slow to

assist Colombia in combatting narco-terrorism, that country now

supplies 80 percent—some 80 percent of the world’s cocaine. This

explosion in coca cultivation from Peru and Bolivia to Colombia has

occurred in just the past 4 or 5 years.

The explosion in poppy cultivation in Colombia is equally disturbing and even more recent than what we have seen with coca.

Through the DEA’s Heroin Signature program, we know that Colombia, not the Far East, accounts for some 75 percent of the heroin seized on United States streets. We have a chart up here that

denotes that. From the Signature program, they can almost identify the fields where that heroin is coming from, the source of it.

Several years ago, Colombia grew only enough poppies to fill a

flower arrangement. What used to be a supply of hard drugs being

processed and transited through Colombia has turned into a torrent and glut of deadly narcotics pouring across our borders.

Both drugs and the death that accompany drugs are spilling onto

our shores, and American blood also has been spilled on Colombian

soil. Last summer, five American men and women from the United

States Army were killed in the line of duty in Colombia when their

United States’ reconnaissance plane crashed on a mountain in a

counterdrug mission which took place in narco-guerilla territory.

This marks the first time in United States history that American

military personnel have been killed in action in Colombia’s drug

war.

In addition to these five Americans, three United States contract

pilots have been killed in Columbia over the past 2 years. Three

Americans were abducted and brutally murdered by the FARC,

which is Colombia’s largest group of drug trafficking guerrillas, and

that took place earlier this year. Numerous Americans have been

kidnapped by Colombian narco-guerrillas. In fact, the longest held

U.S. hostages are three American missionaries from my district,

who have been unaccounted for since 1993.

In short, despite years of congressional pleas for counterdrug assistance to Colombia, countless hearings and intense congressional

efforts, resources approved by Congress have failed to be provided

to Colombia. Someone must be held accountable for the disaster

that is now at our doorstep.

Time and again, the Clinton administration has ignored the

emerging situation in Colombia, despite congressional oversight

hearings that have tried repeatedly to call attention to the impending crisis.

To borrow a phrase, the record is a ‘‘flipping disaster.’’

First, information sharing was denied—and let’s just take a

quick second to look at how we got in this situation.

First, information sharing was denied in 1994, turning the situation into sheer chaos, as my colleague from California, Steve Horn,

so aptly described. As you will recall, as of May 1, 1994, the Department of Defense decided unilaterally to stop sharing real-time

intelligence regarding aerial traffic and drugs with both Colombia

and Peru. Now, as I understand it, that decision, which hasn’t been

completely resolved, has thrown diplomatic relations with host

countries into chaos.

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That was a comment in a hearing by Congressman Steve Horn,

August 2, 1994. I put that up for the subcommittee to review.

In 1996 and 1997, when this administration decertified Colombia

without a national interest waiver, it severely undermined the legitimate drug-fighting efforts of General Serrano and the Colombia

National Police, cutting off international military education, training, and critical equipment to that country.

Even worse, today, the absence of United States intelligence

sharing, due in part to the reduced air coverage after the forced

closure of Howard Air Force Base in Panama, our drug

counterefforts in the region have been further crippled.

We held a hearing on this GAO report, and I think it was quite

enlightening to see that even pleas by the United States Ambassador from Peru asking that surveillance flights be kept up and

also warning that, if we didn’t participate, we would see more cocaine coming out of Peru and also out of Colombia. In fact, that

prediction in 1998 has come true; because we have not paid attention to the requests even of officials of this administration who are

on the front line.

While very publicly calling for $1.6 billion in emergency aid last

month at the White House, this administration requested only $85

million in State Department INL funding for Colombia in the fiscal

year 2000. The Congress passed a supplemental aid package to increase the funding for counternarcotics work in Colombia. Sadly,

less than half of the equipment Congress funded in that bill has

been delivered in an operational fashion. In fact, we found that up

until just a few weeks ago, the three helicopters which account for

the bulk of aid dollars, when finally delivered, sat idle for lack of

proper armoring or ammunition.

The headline that is posted is interesting because—this is not

the headline from a few weeks ago. This is a headline from 1998,

in the Washington Times, ‘‘Delay of helicopters hobbles Colombia

in stopping drugs.’’ As I said, we have been trying for years to get

this equipment on-line in the real war on drugs. We find ourselves

in the same situation, when we can’t get three helicopters to Colombia with proper armoring and ammunition even in the last few

months.

Another story that appeared in the paper—I haven’t confirmed

this, but I am told that it is certain—that the ammunition we

asked to get to Colombia was delivered during the holidays to the

loading docks of the State Department. It appears that, unfortunately, we have a gang that can’t get the ammunition to shoot

straight to Colombia where it is needed.

This administration, unfortunately, has resisted congressional efforts to ensure that needed drug-fighting equipment makes it to

Colombia in a timely manner. This administration has fought the

Congress for years on Blackhawk utility helicopters for the Colombian National Police and, unfortunately, has a pathetic track

record of delivering the assistance. And I have shown, again, we

are back here looking at trying to get these resources to where we

know they are needed.

Unfortunately, nearly half of the $954 million that is provided in

the supplemental aid package for Colombia is for 30 Blackhawk

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helicopters for the Colombian military, again, which we requested

years ago to be on-line in Colombia to fight this battle.

Given the high costs of these assets and the poor delivery track

record of the State Department, I am concerned about committing

this amount of money to a program that has not worked well in

the past. As chairman of this subcommittee, I want to ensure that

the final aid package contains funds for programs that have a proven track record of success, and guarantees some way to transport

this equipment in a timely fashion.

There are reports of increased activity by the 17,000 Marxist

narco-terrorist guerrillas, also known as the FARC. This army of

insurgents controls nearly 40 percent of the Colombian countryside.

The FARC and the ELN are heavily financed by drug traffickers,

with an estimated $600 million coming directly or indirectly from

illicit drug trade. The FARC army has gone largely unchecked and

is now expanding beyond Colombia’s borders.

I am deeply concerned about reports of FARC incursions into

neighboring countries. The basic tenet of the administration’s aid

package is to use the Colombian military and the police to push

into southern Colombia. I am also concerned that we do not allow

the drug traffickers to simply shift production operations to neighboring countries, especially those with nonsecure borders like Ecuador, which has recently experienced domestic turmoil, and Panama.

With the price of coca leaf rising above the profitability level in

Peru and Bolivia, I am also concerned that drug traffickers are not

allowed to reactivate coca fields in those countries. We cannot afford to roll back years of successful eradication efforts in both Peru

and Bolivia.

One of the points that will be made in today’s hearing is that Colombia matters. It matters both economically and strategically. The

United States can ill afford further instability in that region. With

20 percent of the United States daily supply of crude and refined

oil imports coming from that area and with the vitally important

Panama Canal located just 150 miles to the north, the national security and economic implications of Colombia’s rebel activity spilling over into neighboring countries are enormous.

For all these reasons, I believe the final aid package must have

a balanced regional approach. This subcommittee will continue to

play a key role in ensuring that the United States’ counterdrug aid

to Colombia is both sufficient, appropriate, and also that those resources are delivered in a timely manner.

I am committed to continued congressional oversight of this

issue, because I believe both the influx of illegal drugs to the

United States is our greatest central challenge and also we face an

insidious national security threat from the situation there.

I know that many of my colleagues share this concern. As we

face this serious and growing challenge in Colombia, our vital interests are at stake. The situation in Colombia requires our immediate attention, but the nature and extent of the United States’ aid

needs to be carefully considered, especially in light of this administration’s past track record.

This hearing hopefully will shed light on the situation in Colombia as we help frame the national debate on how to address the

growing crisis.

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I am pleased at this time to yield now to the ranking member

of our subcommittee, the gentlelady from Hawaii, Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for your opening remarks, which I believe sets an appropriate tone for these

hearings and for the congressional discussions to follow.

There is absolutely no doubt that there is a crisis in Colombia

and that the United States has a great responsibility in addressing

this particular crisis, particularly because of the drug issue. Colombia supplies 80 percent of the world’s cocaine, and the DEA administration here in this country estimates that as much as 75 percent

of the heroin that enters the United States originates in Colombia. The aid package proposed by the President is $1.6 billion total

for Colombia, and it is the United States’ response to requests from

the Colombian Government to adopt its plan, which is basically to

support the government’s efforts in its own economic development

or redevelopment, and at the same time answer the tremendous demands that the U.S. Government has with respect to limiting the

production and transport of these dangerous drugs into the United

States.

I believe that it is important, as we consider and deliberate on

this issue of this particular package of assistance to Colombia, that

we understand that there has been, in effect, a 35-year-old civil

war in that country, which has killed 30,000 people and displaced

over a million. We know that 40 percent of Colombia’s territory is

controlled by left-wing rebels. And the U.S. State Department, as

well as human rights groups, have reported that paramilitary

groups murder and kill civilians largely because of their political

beliefs.

I have to note that, in February 1999, one of my constituents,

Lahe’ena’e Gay, from the Big Island, was among three individuals

who were brutally murdered. So I come to this hearing with no

small concern about the situation in Colombia, the takeover by

rebels and guerrillas and other individuals making governance almost impossible.

But, Mr. Chairman, it is unlikely that this long-standing pattern

of civil war within Colombia can be changed by a $1.6 billion insertion of money, certainly not in 2 years. It will probably require continued consideration by the Congress and continued allocation of

funding.

Our primary concern, of course, is the continued enormous increase of the flow of illegal drugs into this country, and that is the

national security issue that we are attempting to address. If we

provide aid primarily in the form of military equipment, military

expertise and military personnel, I believe it is naive to think that

we will not become drawn deeper and deeper into the civil war unrest within their country. Therefore, we must consider the grave

consequences to the United States of the introduction of increased

numbers of U.S. service personnel who may become the next casualties in the Colombian civil unrest.

Americans have a long-standing skepticism about intervention in

other country’s civil wars. There have been notable exceptions in

the interests of enforcing human rights abroad. The doctrine of

nonintervention requires that we must be able to justify military

action in terms of our national security interests. It is true that the

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insurgents are funding their military efforts with the cultivation

and sale of illegal drugs, most of which comes to the United States,

but this does not obscure the fact that the support of the Government of Colombia will, with this type of an aid package, draw us

further and further into the internal political situation of that

country.

I believe it will be more sensible for us to tilt the balance of aid

to direct more funding to nonmilitary purposes. If we were to assist

the Colombian Government in developing its economy and building

a viable infrastructure so that the goods and commodities that are

grown by the people of Colombia can reach the international markets, I believe we would be better able to answer the long-range

problems of that country.

While we, of course, support the Pastrana government, and I do

so, I visited the area earlier in 1999, we have to remember that our

primary interests of intervention in any form is the necessity to

stop the production of cocaine and heroin and to prevent its introduction into the United States. We have to focus on this issue of

interdiction and also with the additional funds enhance our law enforcement activities within the United States.

I am pleased that we have a very important and distinguished

array of witnesses who can add to this debate, and I will be here

to listen to their advice and response to questions which we put to

them. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Patsy T. Mink follows:]

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Mr. MICA. I would now like to recognize the chairman of our full

committee, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton.

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Chairman Mica.

Let me say that a lot of the things that I was going to cover have

been covered, so I would like to submit my statement to the record

and just make some brief comments.

Mr. MICA. Without objection.

Mr. BURTON. First of all, let me just say that the war in Colombia is our war as well as the Colombians’. Every year, 14,000

Americans die from drugs and drug-related violence; and those

drugs are coming mainly from Colombia. So it is not just their war,

it is our war.

In Baltimore, a councilman recently said that one out of eight—

one out of eight of the citizens there is a drug addict. They also

stated that the drug enforcement administration says that Baltimore has 45,000 heroin addicts. Now, this is just one major city in

the United States. So for anybody to say that this is not our war

as well as the Colombians, they are just not reading the statistics

and the facts. People are dying in the United States as a result of

the flood of drugs coming in from that part of the world, and we

haven’t been doing anything about it.

We talked with General McCaffrey back in 1996 about three

Blackhawk helicopters. We wanted to spend $36 million for those

Blackhawks. And he said we shouldn’t be taking that money because a lot of it was supposed to go to Bolivia and Peru; and, as

a result, the Blackhawks weren’t sent.

Congress has been talking about getting these Blackhawks down

there for years. Denny Hastert, the Speaker of the House, Chairman Gilman, Chairman Mica, and myself have all been hollering

to high heaven about the need to get those Blackhawks down there;

and we have run into opposition from the State Department.

I would like to read from a statement before Chairman Gilman’s

committee on February 12, 1998.

Secretary Albright: Mr. Chairman, on that issue, let me say that

I think there is some dispute as to whether those helicopters are

needed or not. General McCaffrey, with whom I spoke just before

I came to have breakfast with you, discussed this issue, and he believes that they are not necessary.

General McCaffrey said February 1998 they are not necessary.

And, as I said, we have this budget of $230 million or so, and $50

million of that would have had to be spent on the helicopters. It

would have a cascading effect on our drug programs throughout the

world.

Well, they are necessary. They were necessary. This was a miscalculation by the administration, and I think history will prove

that.

Now, I welcome the administration to this fight in Colombia. I

appreciate that. I appreciate General McCaffrey stepping up to the

table and saying it is time we did something. I only wish that we

had started doing it earlier. Because we haven’t done it earlier, it

is going to cost more money now than it would have otherwise. And

the surrounding countries are at risk. Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela

are at risk as well.

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Now the State Department and their subsidiary, the Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the INL, are

charged with delivering most of the assistance to Colombia; and the

State Department has not been doing its job.

Just last week, Mr. Beers, who is the INL Assistant Secretary,

informed the committee staff that the standard floor armoring for

the Blackhawk helicopters funded for the CNP did not fit. We sent

three helicopters down there. We actually have six in the pipeline.

Three of them were delivered. They have been sitting there for how

long? 100 days. They have been sitting there for 100 days. They

said they didn’t have the proper armor on them. Well, they finally

got the armor down there. It didn’t fit. So they are still sitting

there. Now they have gone out on some missions and risked the

lives of the people in the CNP without that armor. But that

shouldn’t be necessary.

Once again, it was a screw-up over at the State Department.

50,000 rounds of ammunition were sent down there, 50,000 rounds

of ammunition. Only problem with that ammunition was it was

made in 1952, and it wouldn’t work.

So you have got helicopters that they can’t fly and ammunition

they are sending down there that won’t work. So they said, OK, we

made a mistake. We are going to send them another 50,000 rounds

of ammunition. Where did they send it? As Chairman Mica said,

they sent it over to the State Department over from Washington.

Now, I don’t know how many machine guns they have in the State

Department, but they are not focused on Colombia.

So we have screw-up after screw-up after screw-up, and we have

the State Department saying we don’t need those helicopters. Secretary Albright said: I just talked to General McCaffrey. We don’t

need those helicopters down there.

At the same time, the guerrillas are being well funded by the

drug cartel. They have been getting as much as $100 million a

month, and the estimates of their force is between 17,000 and

30,000, and they are growing every single day.

You know, it has been stated I think here today that we ought

to be dealing with this from an economic standpoint, getting economic assistance down there. Well, I think that is one of the things

that needs to be done. But the fact of the matter is appeasement

is not going to work with those guerrillas.

They started talking about a peace agreement not too long ago,

and all the while they were talking about a peace agreement they

were involved in attacking cities surrounding the area they control.

So you can’t trust those guys. You have to deal with them from a

position of strength. That means we have to get them the military

assistance they need, and we have to get it down there to them as

quickly as possible.

Now, a lot of the things that are supposed to be in the pipeline

have not yet been delivered. I don’t have my figures right here in

front of me. But there are a lot of things that the Defense Department was supposed to get down there that haven’t been sent.

Aid not delivered or operational to Colombia: Three UH–60

Blackhawk helicopters, which I mentioned; funding for operations

and support for Colombia National Police Air Wing, $6 million.

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Funds that are programmed, but not spent: Procurement of mini- gun systems and ammunition for Colombia National Police, $3.2

million.

Things that are partially delivered: Reconstruction of Miraflores counternarcotics base. That was canceled. That was $2 million.

Moneys to be reprogrammed: Security enhancements for forward locating Colombia National Police bases, $6 million.

And I can go on and on and on. There is a whole bunch here.

Podded radar for aircraft reprogrammed, $5 million; DC–3 oper- ating funds, $1 million.

There is a whole list of these things.

We learned at our last hearing here at the subcommittee there

are still items from the 1997, 1998, and 1999 drawdowns which I

was just talking about, excess U.S. military equipment that has not

been delivered to the CNP. Why haven’t they been delivered? Well,

probably because Secretary Albright had been told that it wasn’t

necessary for that stuff to be down there, like the helicopters.

It is necessary. It should have been done previously. I am glad

it is being looked into and done now. Better late than never. But

we need to get on with it.

And one other thing I would like to say. The DANTI forces down

there, the part of the CNP that has been dealing with the drug

problem, have experience in this area. The proposal made by the administration is going to give $1 out of every $17 to the CNP and the rest to other agencies, mainly the

Colombian military which do not have the expertise.

Now General McCaffrey will probably tell us today that the CNP

does not have the ability to get all around the country like the

army does. Well, they would have if we had gotten the materials

down there to them earlier, the Blackhawk and other things; and

that can still be done.

In any event, we welcome the administration to this fight. Congress is not trying to micromanage, we are just trying to make sure

the job gets done before we have to send American young men and

women down there. We don’t want that to happen. We don’t need

a war we are involved in in Central America. But if we don’t do

something about this situation rather quickly, we are going to have

a big problem, and we may have to be involved.

So let me end up by saying I appreciate the administration seeing what needs to finally be done. We appreciate their participation, and I hope we get on with it as quickly as possible.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

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Mr. MICA. I would like to recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.

Mr. TIERNEY. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. But with my voice the

way it is, I think I will wait for the question and answer period.

Thank you.

Mr. MICA. I will go to Mr. Gilman, chairman of the Committee

on International Relations and also a member of our subcommittee.

You are recognized.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to thank you

for today’s hearing and keeping focused on the Nation’s drug policy.

And we welcome our witnesses who will be here, and particularly

General McCaffrey.

These hearings and your continuous interest, Mr. Mica, in the

vital issue of drug trafficking, have helped keep the heat on our

Nation’s policy, which has been notoriously slow to react to the

threat which illicit drugs pose to our Nation’s security.

Colombia, now the source nation for more than 80 percent of the

world’s cocaine and most recently up to 75 percent of the heroin

sold or seized on our streets, is a major national security concern,

not only for our Nation but it should be similarly for the rest of

the world as well.

For years, many of us in the Congress have been urging the administration to pay attention to what is happening to our neighbor

to the south. Colombia is now capable of producing more than 400

tons of deadly cocaine annually. That massive drug production capacity, along with Colombian drug lords’ creative ability to market

and to create demand for heroin here in our own Nation, should

be a wake-up call for both our Nation and for Europe. It should set

off an alarm throughout the globe for everyone truly concerned

about the safety and security of our young people and communities

in the scourge of illicit hard drugs originating in America’s backyard.

We had good testimony the other day when you arranged that

summit of world leaders with regard to narcotics, and I was

pleased that General McCaffrey was able to be there to hear their

concern as well as our own.

The administration, which regrettably fought us tooth and nail

a few short years ago over just a few helicopters for the narco-police to be able to eradicate the growing opium and coca leaf production in Colombia, fortunately is now sounding the alarm by the beleaguered Andean nation. And the Supreme Court Justice Felix

Frankfurter once said, ‘‘Wisdom too often never comes and one

ought not to reject merely because it comes late.’’ Let us hope it

isn’t too late for the case in Colombia.

We now welcome these serious concerns about Colombia and

about our drug policy. Along with many of my colleagues in the

Congress, particularly in this committee, we have raised similar

concerns years ago when Colombia became a major player in the

heroin business and again in 1997 when it first became the world’s

greatest coca leaf producer, exceeding Peru.

We are pleased that General McCaffrey, our Nation’s drug czar,

will be testifying this morning.

General McCaffrey, we want to congratulate you on the new

counternarcotics intelligence sharing plan which you announced

27

yesterday at the White House to improve coordination and information sharing. Hopefully, with the help of this new program, in the

future we can avoid being caught off guard on developments like

the Colombian and heroin crisis we are now facing.

Yesterday, General McCaffrey stated, ‘‘We have a drug emergency in Colombia. Support for the administration’s plan is critical

if we are going to be able to stop increased production in Colombia

from outstripping gains made in the rest of the region.’’ Now that we have admitted that the serious problem exists, we

can start going about treating the cause in Colombia.

The President of Colombia, recently on 60 Minutes, hit the nail

on the head on what the problem is. According to President

Pastrana, the $1 million to $2 million a day which insurgents earns

from drug trafficking now threatens his nation’s survival as a democracy.

Until recently when Congress took the lead, we had averaged less than $100 million to United States counternarcotics aid to Colombia each year. That is equal to 6 weeks’ income from the Colombian narco-guerrillas. These massive amounts of illicit moneys

make them the best-armed, the best-trained, the best-equipped

guerrillas anywhere in the world with their war chest financed

from the sale of drugs. Hopefully, now the administration is getting

serious, and it needs to treat Colombia as a serious national security regional threat.

Several past Presidents have called our drug crisis a national security threat. Only when we get this serious and when we give the

courageous Colombians, like General Jose Serrano, whose antidrug

police is DANTI, the means and sustained support for their fight

against drugs at the source, can we expect to turn this crisis

around.

Regrettably, I am skeptical of the State Department’s performance. Witness that latest mess that Congressman Dan Burton just

mentioned, the delivery of armor flooring which did not fit the

Blackhawks which we had earlier provided to the antidrug police,

causing them to sit on the tarmac for months without the ability

to participate in Colombia’s drug war.

These endless series of failures don’t give us much comfort. It is

essential that we face the reality that there is a narco-based war

raging in Colombia; and the good guys, our friends and neighbors

in Colombia, are losing. Our national security is at stake, and so

is the future of Colombia, and so is the future of many other nations.

It is encouraging that yesterday a high-level United States delegation went to Colombia to meet with their leaders to discuss

Speaker Hastert’s $1.6 billion aid package to Colombia that will escalate Colombia’s war on drugs. We will be taking up that planned

Colombia aid package in early March.

I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony today, Mr. Chairman;

and particularly I am anxious to hear how the administration

reached its decision to heavily tilt this counternarcotics aid package

toward the military over the police. As we all know, the elite antidrug police in Colombia have a proven track record fighting drugs

consistent with the fundamental respect for human rights.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

28

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I would like to recognize now the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.

Kucinich. You are recognized.

Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I want

to compliment you on your sensitivity to these issues. I think your

leadership in the Congress in this area has been important.

I want to say from the outset that the administration has worked

cooperatively, as I understand, with President Pastrana in trying

to create an environment which would be conducive to the maintenance of that democracy. I think that as we review the testimony

today, we are going to see that the quality of the democracy is in

danger because of this narco-terrorism.

I think that General McCaffrey has certainly given us solid leadership in trying to see the U.S. interests are protected. But I hope

that in the hearing today we will be able to determine the extent

to which President Pastrana’s efforts toward trying to achieve a

peaceful negotiation with FARC has been undermined by the rising

narcotics trade in Colombia and that if we can see what the linkages are with not only FARC, but any of the other elements that

are involved in narco-traffic we can perhaps learn a little bit better

why efforts toward peaceful resolution have been frustrated.

I want to again thank the Chair for his leadership, and I look

forward to reviewing this testimony. I have, as I am sure some

Members do, competing claims on my time right now. But I do

want to thank you for pursuing a necessary, important subject.

Thank you.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

I now recognize the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I deeply regret that President Clinton, when he took office in

1993, deemphasized the war on drugs and cut the drug czar’s budget by nearly half in the first 2 years. Colombians have been fighting the drug war for years with their lives.

Over 10 years ago, I went to Bogota with a delegation of Members of Congress to visit with government officials and the victims

of the bombing of their DAS building, which is their FBI building.

700 people were injured; over 70 were killed.

It is true, Colombians export the bulk of drugs to the United

States. But it is equally true that we, the United States, still export the chemicals to make the drugs. We, the United States, still

export the weapons to protect the terrorists and drug lords. And

we, the United States, still export the dollars to pay for the drugs.

We clearly have a practical and deep moral obligation to help our

brothers and sisters in the south fight this drug war.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

The gentlelady from Illinois is recognized.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to raise some serious questions that I raised last August when we had a similar hearing and that I feel still have not

been answered and are now being also raised by other credible

voices, including the New York Times and Chicago Tribune editorial boards and former Ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay,

Robert White.

29

The administration’s $1.3 billion aid package to Colombia, $955

million in security assistance puts the United States at a crossroads. Do we invest in a militaristic drug war that escalates the

regional conflict in the name of fighting drugs, or do we attack the

drug market by investing in prevention and treatment at home and

seek to assist in stabilizing Colombia?

According to the General Accounting Office, ‘‘Despite years of extensive herbicide spraying, United States estimates show there has

not been any net reduction in coca cultivation. Net coca cultivation

actually increased 50 percent.’’ And this 50 percent increase in coca cultivation comes after $625 million in counternarcotics operations

in Colombia between 1990 and 1998.

So, considering that demonstrated failure of militarized eradication efforts to date, why should we believe that investing even

more money in this plan will achieve a different result? And what

will it take to achieve total victory in Colombia? Are we prepared

to make that type of investment in dollars and in lives? How many

lives? And, if not, what is the purpose of this aid?

Considering the fact that more than 100,000 civilians have died

in Colombia’s civil war and five servicemen perished on our reconnaissance flight last year, is it ethical to escalate the war in Colombia in order to prevent Americans from purchasing cocaine? Will

the aid achieve a 10 percent reduction or a 20 percent reduction

or a 50 percent reduction in drugs? What is the target amount? Or

is the purpose to degrade the military capability of the FARC or

bomb them to the negotiating table?

I am mystified that there is nothing in this package aimed at

paramilitary groups, despite their known involvement in the drug

trade. And why are we investing so heavily with so few accountability measures in the Colombian armed forces, which has long

had a history of human rights violations, including support for

military groups?

The New York Times on Sunday warned, ‘‘Washington should

have learned long ago that partnership with an abusive and ineffective Latin American military rarely produces positive results

and often undermines democracy in the region.’’

Exactly what is it that we believe this aid will accomplish? Is it

the first in a series of blank checks for a war with no foreseeable

end game? What is the exit strategy? With the continued failure of

a military solution to drug production in Colombia, why shouldn’t

an innovative alternative development approach be used instead?

Why not spend half or all the money on crop substitution or development?

A landmark study of cocaine markets by the RAND Corp. found

that providing treatment to cocaine users is 10 times more effective

than drug interdiction schemes and 23 times more cost effective

than eradicating coca at its source.

If decreasing drug use in America is the ultimate goal, why

aren’t we putting equal resources into domestic demand reduction

where each dollar spent is 23 times more effective than eradication? Today we are discussing $1 billion plus for Colombia, and

yet we aren’t doing enough for treatment here at home.

A recent study by researchers at SAMHSA, the Substance Abuse

and Mental Health Service Administration, has indicated that 48

30

percent of the need for drug treatment, not including alcohol abuse,

is unmet in the United States. Why is it that we can find funds

for overseas military operations while continuing to ignore the

enormous lack of drug treatment here at home?

Mr. Chairman, before becoming entangled in a foreign war, it

seems to me that the Congress should use its oversight authority

to require the administration to explain how this escalation will reduce illicit drug use at home better than investment in prevention

and treatment in the United States.

The administration should also explain how increasing funds for

a policy will change the result when past increases and support

have not changed the outcome. These troubling strategic issues

need to be resolved in a satisfactory manner before we increase our

involvement in Colombia.

I appreciate your indulgence on the time. I thank you very much.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady. I look forward to General

McCaffrey’s response to some of the points she has raised. This

must be fun, General, to get it from both sides here.

Let me recognize, if I may, the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. RosLehtinen.

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

As you pointed out in your opening statement, Colombia is one

of our oldest democracies; and it is a shame to see this beautiful

country mired in crisis after crisis with the increasing control of

the narco-guerrillas in Colombia and in surrounding areas with the

increase in coca production.

When the U.S. Congress does step in and try to help the Colombian people who have sacrificed so much, as Mr. Shays has pointed

out, with their own blood in this ongoing drug war, the administration looks like the Keystone Kops, sending in the wrong armor kit

to fund the Blackhawk helicopters that especially Mr. Burton and

Mr. Gilman have fought so long to give to the Colombians to fight

the narco-guerillas. We sent them the wrong armor kit to outfit

these Blackhawks. We sent them outdated and useless ammunition

and also sent it to the wrong place.

And while all of this crisis looms over Colombia and law-abiding

Colombians pay the price, the continuing threat of the tentacles of

FARC looms over all the neighboring countries. Because hemispheric stability is very important to United States interests, what

happens in Colombia can have a devastating effect on the very

fragile democracies of Venezuela, of Ecuador and Peru. And to say

nothing, as the gentlewoman from Illinois pointed out, of our ongoing crisis here in the United States, our alarming drug statistics,

the increasing number of young people who are dying from drug

abuse.

So I agree with what Chairman Burton had said, that this is not

a war on drugs just for Colombia, that this is a war that has got

to engage all of us. It is an international war on drugs. It is not

just a domestic war.

And we need to ask some real questions in the coming months

as the debate heats up on this aid package: Will this aid package

work? Is it going to do what we hope that it will do? Are the funds

going to the right organizations? Is it correct to continue to fund

31

the Colombian military? And should we be increasing the role of

organizations such as the CNP?

So we look forward to engaging the administration at long last

on this very important topic, and we hope for the sake of our young

people and for the sake of stability in our southern neighbors that

we will have an end soon to this narco-drug war. And we think

that it will be once we get engaged and once we give the proper

folks the tools they need to get rid of this venom that is increasing

its deadly toll on our young people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentlelady.

I now recognize the vice chairman of our panel, the gentleman

from Georgia, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, you indicated that you look forward to the General perhaps enlightening the gentlelady from Illinois whose hostility to helping Columbia has blinded her to the facts. One doesn’t

even have to wait in order to hear from General McCaffrey. One

simply has to look at the facts and look at what the General released in his written testimony.

Demand reduction activities account for 32.3 percent of the national drug control budget. That is one-third. International efforts

are only 8.4 percent of the budget, and interdiction activities are

only 10.4. So, by any measure, the amount of money that we are

expending for interdiction and international efforts is, in fact, currently far less than that devoted to demand reduction.

Perhaps the gentlelady’s hostility to interdiction in international

efforts might be directed to asking some very tough questions of

the administration as to what is happening to all of that demand

reduction money that is already being placed into treatment, prevention, and research. That might be a little bit more productive.

The gentleman from Indiana, the chairman of the committee,

was very kind, as he usually is, and very soft in his statements.

He used the word—the term ‘‘screw-up’’ several times. I think a

better word is sabotage. Very few things happen at the Department

of State or at any agency of our U.S. Government simply by incompetence or mistakes. In my experience, Mr. Chairman, things happen because they are planned to happen that way. Steps are taken

or not taken because an intended result is sought to be accomplished. Sometimes that intended result can be accomplished by

taking positive action. Sometimes, as in the case of this administration and this Department of State, and frequently, it is accomplished by not doing certain things.

In fact, I believe that the lack of equipment going to the heroic

efforts of General Serrano and the Colombian Government, in fact,

is a calculated effort by the State Department to sabotage our efforts to get the material, to get the resources to the forces in Colombia that are fighting the narco-terrorists and is not the result

of simple incompetence. I hope that this hearing today and the

other hearings that we have in the future will highlight that.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent, at this point, to

have inserted in the record an article that you authored which appeared today in the Washington Times entitled, ‘‘Was war on drugs

sabotaged’’ which, as is par for your writings and your comments,

32

was direct, to the point, substantiated by substantial references to

the record and facts. And I ask unanimous consent to have them

inserted.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. BARR. During the course of these hearings and future hearings—and I know, Mr. Chairman, both you and the two other

chairmen that are with us today, Mr. Gilman and Mr. Burton, intend to have further hearings as well—I do hope that one of the

things we focus on is that we, and our partners in Colombia, learn

from success. Frequently, people don’t learn from their mistakes;

we are refusing to learn from our successes.

When we had a balanced, comprehensive, tough policy against

drugs in the Reagan and Bush years, the success was palpable. We

saw demand reduced. We saw the use of drugs, particularly by

teenagers, drop dramatically when our colleague, President

Fujimori in Peru, took tough, consistent steps. One of his policies

was, ‘‘you fly, you die,’’ his shoot-down policy. Amassing troops in

areas such as the northern border of Peru, bordering the southern

region of Colombia, amassing troops there and taking concrete

steps in Iquitos and the riverine traffic areas has paid tremendous

dividends.

That is why, as General McCaffrey has stated in his written testimony, the production of raw coca and the production of cocaine

in those two Andean countries to the south of Colombia, Peru and

Bolivia, has dropped dramatically.

This didn’t happen by chance or screw-up. It happened because

those countries are taking a tough, consistent, aggressive stance

against these people. They don’t negotiate with them; they fight

them, and the sooner the Colombian Government realizes that, the

sooner we can get people in the administration that realize that,

then we will continue to see the successes that we saw earlier in

the 1990’s and that we are not seeing today.

While I certainly agree with Chairman Burton in saying that to

the administration, we would rather have them here later than not

at all, that is not the end of the game. We have to monitor this

assistance if we can get it through the Congress and the President

signs it, because this administration has a sorry record of not doing

what the law provides.

We even had a United States Ambassador to Colombia appear

before one of our committees a couple of years ago who basically

said, under oath, in response to questions as to why the law was

not being carried out in Colombia by him, he said, well, I work for

the President, and if I’m directed not to do something, then I don’t

do it.

That is the sort of problem that we have here, Mr. Chairman,

and I commend you for holding these hearings and the future hearings, and the other chairmen who are here today, to not only get

to the bottom of this but to constantly draw attention to what is

happening with this administration and why we are losing the

interdiction effort when the success stories are out there. What

works, we know works. It has worked in the past, and let’s use it

now.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

I now recognize the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.

33

Mr. SOUDER. I think it is sad that we are at this point when we

could see many years ago that we were going to get to this point.

And I do believe that we were slow in getting there. But I also

want to thank not only General Serrano and the people in Colombia who have been dying and fighting because of the drug abuse

in this country but to thank General McCaffrey because, I think,

since he has come in, he has aggressively fought inside an administration that had seriously neglected this problem and has been an

advocate internally.

I want to thank General Wilhelm and Randy Beers, who have

been through many battles as we tried to get additional narcotics

funding.

I have been down there for 5 straight years. I have worked to

get the Blackhawk helicopters to the police. We have battled over

every dollar. We argued about the diversion to the Balkans when

I believe that the compelling national interest was in the Southern

Hemisphere.

Clearly, our No. 1 oil supplier is Venezuela. Colombia is our second biggest supplier of oil by-products. We have the Panama Canal

now questionable whether it can be defended with the

narcoterrorists continuing to move up from the Darien peninsula,

in addition to the children dying in Fort Wayne and all over this

country because of this drug program.

Clearly, this is a compelling national interest, and we need to figure out how to best accomplish the goals as fast as possible. As

someone who has been aggressively an advocate of the best equipment possible, and the Blackhawks, I think we need to look at our

mix package to see how much we can get delivered, how fast, what

is the most effective mix.

I think we need to look at the question of—I understand the argument that the national police may not be able to carry out all

this battle without the defense and the military, and I agree with

that basic premise, but we need to make sure that when we are

transferring the funds to the military that, in fact, they change,

which they are committed to trying to change. But I don’t want to

hear about them only having non-high school graduate draftees, as

opposed to volunteer people at adequate numbers that have been

trained who have a long-term commitment to this group, like they

do to the national police, and that this is an elite unit.

Because if we pour these dollars into a defense department that,

in fact, has not developed an elite unit, they will be wasted dollars,

and then the charges will become true in and of themselves. That

suggests that in the phase-in process, we may want to have a little

bit different mix as their defense department and their military

gets up to speed.

We know the human rights record of the national police. I believe

that this administration under President Pastrana and the new defense minister are committed to cleaning up the past problems in

human rights, whether it be with the right-wing terrorist groups

or with the paramilitary or the FARC or the ELN. But, in fact, we

need to make sure of that before we put all of our eggs, or the bulk

of our eggs and dollars, in this one area.

So I hope we will have a fair debate as we work through the specifics of the package. I believe that there are people in this adminVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:04 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66788.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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istration who have been battling, and it is good to see that the

President is now on board, too. We need to figure out how to reduce

this incredible increasing supply coming into our country and work

together to get it done.

I yield back.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

And recognize now the gentleman from California, Mr. Ose.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here. I

came this morning primarily because every time I have the opportunity to visit with General McCaffrey, I learn something new, and

I am grateful for his appearance today.

Of specific interest to me today—and I regret he is not on the

witness list, is I was hopeful of visiting with Mr. Beers about what

intestinal fortitude it took to actually come forward with the news

that we had been so brilliant as to deliver 50-year-old ammunition

to the Colombian National Police and then turn around and replace

that by shipping 50,000 more rounds to the State Department. I

understand Foggy Bottom is not very dangerous this time of year,

but I was hopeful that we would have an adequate explanation

from that.

General McCaffrey, I have the utmost respect for you. You have

the most difficult job possibly in this entire administration, and I

am looking forward to your testimony today.

I yield back.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I think that concludes our opening statements. I want to take

just a moment to thank the members of our subcommittee and also

Mr. Gilman, who chairs the International Relations Committee, the

Speaker of the House, Mr. Hastert, for their cohosting the recent

International Drug Summit that our subcommittee and committee

participated in, and the chairman of our full committee, Mr. Burton, for also helping to sponsor that, and everyone who participated.

We brought together nearly 50 parliamentarians from around the

world, representatives of other congresses, leaders in the international antinarcotics efforts, heads of Europol, Interpol, and also

demand and treatment programs from throughout the world because we know we cannot win this war on drugs fighting it alone.

I also want to pay particular tribute and thanks to General

McCaffrey who was a full participant in those proceedings, and

hopefully they will be productive and fruitful.

With that, I would like to now recognize our first panel, and that

consists of one individual who is well-known to all of us, General

Barry McCaffrey, who is Director of the Office of National Drug

Control Policy.

Welcome back. I think you saw that we have some diversity of

opinion, certainly no loss for words.

And I would like to, again, advise you this is an investigations

and oversight subcommittee of Congress. If you would stand,

please, sir, and be sworn. Raise your right hand.

[Witness sworn.]

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

General, welcome back. This is a very serious topic. To update

members of the panel, the latest statistics we have received is, in

35

1997, 15,973 Americans lost their lives to drug-related causes and

over 100,000 probably since 1992. So this has an incredible impact

on our society.

With those opening comments, General, we will not run any

clock on you; and we appreciate your patience in hearing the diversity of opinion from our panel and welcome your testimony.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL BARRY R. MCCAFFREY, DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY

General MCCAFFREY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, to you and

Congresswoman Mink, the opportunity to meet with you to respond

to your own interests and to try and put some context in what has

been an enormously complex and challenging problem that we have

faced over the last several years. One, which I might add, that I

bring sort of an unusual historical perspective to, having worked

not only for 4 years in the current position as drug policy director

but also 2 years prior to that, happier times I can assure you, as

commander in chief the Southern Command, proceeded by several

years of service on the Joint Staff working for General Powell. And

I would be glad to try and put into perspective what it is we are

trying to achieve and how we’re going about it.

Let me also, if I may, thank you for including the right people

in this hearing: Ambassador Pete Romero, Assistant Secretary of

Defense Ana Maria Salazar, DEA Ops officer William Ledwith and

most particularly, CINC U.S. Southern Command, General Charles

Wilhelm. All have been enormously effective partners in this effort.

Someone who is not here today and has actually been the quarterback of this effort is Tom Pickering, who, with an interagency

team of Randy Beers and others, is now in Colombia dealing with

just this issue.

So I think your timing on the hearing is appropriate, and I welcome the diversity of viewpoints represented in your opening statements.

Let me also take note that you called former Ambassador to Colombia Morris Busby, a figure of enormous courage and dedication

to this issue and currently Council on the America’s President,

former Ambassador Ted McNamara, another extremely knowledgeable and thoughtful person on the issues we face.

I am going to give you five brief sets of comments to show you

where we are, and then I’ll be glad to respond to your own interests.

Let me, if I may though, begin by asking your permission to put

into the record both written comments and copies of the charts I

will show you. We have done a tremendous amount of work to capture the numbers that will allow us to have an adequate policy debate on this issue.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that material will be made part of

the record.

General MCCAFFREY. Chris, if you would go ahead and take

down that first chart.

Let me, if I may, talk generally to this issue. First of all, to say

that we do have an overall strategy, U.S. national drug strategy.

What we are talking about is goal No. 5: How do we reduce the

supply of drugs, both foreign and domestic? And this national stratVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:04 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66788.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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egy has a classified secret annex in which we lay out the supporting symmetrical guidance to overseas intelligence, law enforcement,

the armed forces, et cetera.

It’s working pretty well. The general element of the national

drug strategy on the north-south axis was to build multinational

cooperation, and so we are trying to move from what I would characterize as a series of bilateral confrontations to one of multinational cooperation.

On 4 October, in Montevideo, Uruguay, we signed an enormously

important document. It came from the Santiago Summit of the

Americas. It basically committed all of us in the hemisphere to

building practical ways of cooperation not only in the obvious

ways—intelligence sharing, interdiction, extradition, evidence sharing, precursor chemicals—but also indeed to broaden this discussion to include demand reduction topics, science, and media campaigns targeted to reducing consumption among adolescents. We

think we are moving that general larger concept in the right direction.

The second thing we did was we went to the Andean Ridge. It’s

important for us to understand the overview facts. The supply of

drugs in the world grossly exceeds U.S. demand. We do not consume most of the drugs in the world. We roughly consume, as an

example, around 3 percent of the world’s heroin. We roughly consume a quarter of the world’s cocaine. Our problem is we have too

much money, and so our money fuels international crime and indeed one could argue has a corrosive impact on democratic institutions through violence and corruption.

Having said that, the cocaine in the world comes out of three nations essentially: Peru, Bolivia and Colombia. And, in sum, these

numbers I placed into the record now to give you the CNC’s overview of where we are; we have achieved dramatic successes in two

of those countries. Peru, the dominant cocaine-producing nation on

the face of the Earth, under President Fujimori’s leadership has reduced production by more than 66 percent. Bolivia, under the

Banzer-Quiroga team, has cut down in a very short period of time,

essentially 21⁄2 years, production by more than 55 percent.

I have personally seen this. This comes out of our CIA crop analysis studies. I have flown over the Chapare Huallaga. The coca is

disappearing from the valley floors. They are on the right track.

And we ought to be a little modest in claiming undue credit on

this, because I would argue it was the political will of the Peruvians and the Bolivians and their police forces and democratic institutions that achieved most of it. But we are moving in the right

direction.

The problem is Colombia. We have just published in the last 3

weeks a revised past crop estimates on cocaine production. We

went back and revised our algorithm on alkaloid content in the

plants. They have a new species they are using. We went back and

looked at laboratory effectiveness. They are using new, better industrial techniques. And we looked at, of course, our very solid

data of overhead satellite photography, and we came up with an

analysis that suggests that cocaine production in Colombia has

gone up 140 percent in a little less than 4 years.

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Today—yesterday, we released the crop estimates for this year.

Colombia produced, in our view, 520 metric tons of cocaine. It is

astonishing. We’re talking 70 percent or more of the world total.

And that cocaine, we would argue, is at the heart and soul of the

incredible impact that 26,000 armed people are having on Colombian democratic institutions.

The FARC, the ELN, the AUC, so-called paramilitary terrorist

groups, if they were just using bank robberies, kidnappings, extortion, blowing up the oil pipelines, Colombia would be in mayhem.

But when you add to that total in President Pastrana’s terms a

million or two a day, we’re talking money of $300 million to $1 billion a year.

So when you see the video outtakes of the FARC units in the

field, they are wearing shiny new uniforms. They have more machine guns than the Colombian infantry battalions have. They have

planes and helicopters and wiretap equipment, and they are assassinating mayors and intimidating journalists and corrupting public

officials.

And, oh, by the way, it is not just in Colombia. It has spilled over

in a significant way in the neighboring regional partners of Venezuela and Ecuador and Panama in particular, and it has an enormous impact on the United States.

And if you would allow me to correct the number I am trying to

drive into our public debate, it isn’t 14,000 dead a year. It is 52,000

dead a year.

Your congressional funds went to do a recent study that went

through the autopsy reports across the Nation, and that is our view

of the unmistakable impact of drug abuse by 6 percent of our population on the death rates, along with the $110 billion in damages,

along with the fact that it drives our criminal justice system, our

health care system, and our welfare system.

And as you look at the Andean Ridge, Colombia is now the

nexus, the center of mass of 80 percent of the illegal drugs coming

into America in terms of heroin and cocaine. And we think we need

to stand with democratic partners in the region.

Let me, if I may—go ahead and put up the next chart—again,

show you the numbers and to show the drug problem, which is my

legal responsibility. My portfolio is related unmistakably to two

other problems. One of them is the peace process. And I think

there is no question, the misery of the Colombian people, which has

been caused by decades of endemic violence, almost unimaginable

violence with no apparent outcome, is the top national priority not

only for the President but for the people, the 36 million people that

live in this country.

And yet when you look at it, as long as the FARC, the ELN and

the paramilitaries have this tremendous wealth, if there is no quid

pro quo, if there is no reward and punishment, why would they

talk instead of fight?

Now, the third issue that President Pastrana has to face up to

is the economy. Colombia is a huge country, and I have been trying

to correct ‘‘tiny Colombia’’ to remind us it is probably a third to

part the size of Western Europe. It has got a lot of people. They

are wealthy in terms of natural resources—oil, gas, flowers, coffee

beans, et cetera. They have tremendous economic potential, and

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they have had smart economic leadership. But they are in an economic crisis—20 percent unemployment, enormous impact on the

inflation rate. Why would anyone invest in Colombia with 26,000

people in the field who will abduct you and torture you until you

pay money to get free?

And so Colombia has become a net importer of food. And there

is a strong argument out of our own intelligence system that within

the coming 5 years or so they may actually turn into a net importer

of energy. It is an outrage, and, again, it comes from the drug

issue.

Next chart.

We can’t just deal with Colombia. Several of you made that

point. I think you’re quite correct.

We’ve done an enormously good job in supporting Peruvian and

Bolivian authorities. And as you look around the world, particularly the DEA with their worldwide mission has been skillful in

creating new realities. But, in this region, we have to take into account with the package, the $1.6 billion that we forwarded to Congress, that this is not a Colombian problem. It is regional. So you

will see in there significant assets first for Peru and Bolivia, and

both the Vice President of Bolivia and the Prime Minister of Peru

have been up to see me to express their view that there should be

more. I think the logic is tenuous, but I am not prepared to argue

publicly against it.

There is money in here potentially—we have not made the final

calls on Brazil, Venezuela—we have a problem with overflight—as

well as Panama and other nations. We clearly see Ecuador as involved in the drug issue.

We have got to approach this as a regional problem. And, finally,

we can’t do this if we don’t provide CINC U.S. Southern Command

with the assets they require to support the effort with adequate air

interdiction assets and, second, if we don’t give them the intelligence collection tools and training tools he needs to do its job. And

with the enormous drawdown in the Department of Defense and

with the kind of assets that are being retired out of the force, we

are inadequately supporting our CINC in the U.S. Southern Command. We’re going to have to think through this and sort out how

do we go about it.

Fortunately, we have had U.S. Customs Service step in and provide a tremendous air interdiction and surveillance capabilities as

well as other government agencies. The U.S. Coast Guard has done

a superb job also with FLIR aircraft and direct intelligence collection. A regional problem. Thank you.

Chris, next chart.

We sent over a plan totaling $1.6 billion. We look forward to

hearing your own viewpoints on this plan. It’s not written in concrete. There is something important, though, to understand about

the $1.6 billion. We can’t talk about it unless it’s in the context of

the Colombian devised strategy, ‘‘Plan Colombia.’’ We cannot substitute United States thinking, certainly neither among congressional staffs nor in the administration, for having the President of

Colombia, its Minister of Defense, Foreign Minister, Interior,

PLANTE and others, devise their own approach to this; and that

is what we did.

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They have come up with a document. It’s conceptual in outline.

It needs meat on it. It is not yet a planning document. But it called

for $7.5 billion. That was $4 billion out of the Colombian budget.

That’s where the CNP is getting resourced. It called for $3.5 billion

out of the European Union, international banks, et cetera. And

that’s where an enormous amount of what I think is a very coherent, integrated, alternative economic development, building judicial

systems, et cetera. That’s where the preponderance of that money

will come, from their international loans as well as support from

the European Union, a process in which the administration has actively supported their attempts to gain international support.

And I tell you that because, otherwise, one could make an argument that I think is incorrect, that it doesn’t take into account the

broader requirements in Colombia. Now if you look at $1.6 billion itself, to simplify it, it is a $950 million supplemental, and it is a $350 million add-on in fiscal year

2001 budget to the $300 million we already had in there for the

Andean Ridge.

If you look at the total package, essentially 85 percent of it goes

to Colombia. The rest goes to Peru and Bolivia. They are just about

flatlined, I would argue, at fairly high levels of resources. We have

not decremented them as coca production has plunged.

Of the remainder of the program, if you look at it, half of it is

a mobility package. That’s what that is. It is 63 helicopters, 30

Blackhawks, 33 UH–1Ns rebuilt, with the operational requirements of spare parts, the training package to get the crews. That’s

what it is. And that mobility package, in our view, in the Colombian plan allows Colombian democratic institutions to regain sovereignty over their own terrain, particularly in the south.

And I’ll be in Colombia next Tuesday through Thursday. We are

going to Tres Esquinas. As you land in Putumayo or anywhere

down in that southern zone, essentially a third of the land area is

under coca cultivation. It is unbelievable. And there are five FARC

fronts down there, thousands of them armed to the teeth, and they

are targeting our aircraft going in and out of those fields right now.

This is, in that part of Colombia, an out and out war over drugs.

And I would add to that, if you would allow me, some notion of

are—what’s the debate between supporting the police and the

armed forces? In our view, this should be Colombian strategic

thinking, not United States. But I would tell you straight up, the

Colombian police, who are enormously courageous, this General

Serrano has cleansed their ranks. He fired 3,000 cops when he took

over. By and large, they are doing pretty well as a high integrity,

high courage force. There is 2,500 of these cops that are essentially

assault units.

We do not want to militarize the Colombian police and make

anemic the Colombian armed forces. Those 2,500 DANTI cops are

not going down south and kicking buns on five FARC fronts and

cutting down the coca. We have to allow the Colombians to reassert

control, and that means their navy and marine corps has a firstrate conceptual plan to go get control of the riverine system. Those

are the roads down there. They have got to go down there and do

that. The Colombian army has got to get back into these places on

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trol so that the police can enter in a law enforcement way, provide

alternative economic development as well as crop eradication.

That’s what the Colombians are going to try to achieve. It looks

sensible. I think it is well thought out, and I do believe it is achievable. Thanks.

Finally, just if I may in sort of a conceptual outline of what are

we trying to do down here, what is the deal. I don’t think it is useful to any of us to waste too much time on the history of it. Mr.

Chairman, without question, your leadership and others has been

instrumental in achieving adequate levels of support for this

counterdrug strategy; and I am publicly appreciative of what you

have done, along with many of your colleagues.

I think the history of it is not terribly important to me, but I’m

worried that we not get involved in anemic political theater over

who lost Colombia. Nobody lost Colombia, and we are not going to

save it; 36 million Colombians are.

Now, having said that, we all learned in college in freshman logic

class, you shouldn’t argue about facts. I don’t think we are going

to argue about facts. I think the facts are this is what has happened since 1995 on support to Colombia. These are the facts. We

went up 3,500 percent in the support we provided Colombian authorities, 1995 to 2001. Congress had a great deal to do with that.

But it started at 29.8, went to 62.8, 117.5, 166, 367, and we just

sent down over $1 billion. That’s the facts.

Now, another set of facts. I don’t want us to get too far down in

the details of one helicopter, two or three. I’ve got the details. I

know what they are, and I’d be glad to share them with you. But

I would like you to understand if you start in 1994 and go to 2000

on helicopters to Colombia, you find that we’ve put 28 Blackhawks

in there, 10 Huey 2s, 24 Bell 212s, 22 UH–1N.

What about the CNP? The police? We have got 47 aircraft on the

ground, of which 42 were provided by the United States. Is this

adequate? No. Are there three more to go? Yes. Of the six we authorized, three are there minus armor packages. But you have got

to understand, the Blackhawk, the best helicopter on the face of

the Earth—the next time you see me I’ll probably be peddling

them, I hope—it is an incredible piece of machinery, but it takes

10 months to build one.

The first three went down there in 8 months. Sikorsky has done

a tremendous job supporting us, and there’s three more to go, and

they’re customized to CNP. That is why armor kits don’t automatically fit. And, by the way, there are 30 more in this plan; and, beyond that, the Colombians are going to buy 17 more. So it is clear

to me, with your support, we can finally get an adequate level of

mobility.

We are still hung up, Mr. Burton, on the six of them; and did

I flip-flop. And let me just tell you again quite clearly, when the

six helicopter question came up, I am unabashedly in favor of it,

but not at the cost of jerking out of Bolivian and Peruvian INL

funding at the last minute 50 percent of the dollars for a nation

that finally started eradicating cocaine. That was the deal. When

Congress wisely, congressional initiative, provided funds for six

with their spare parts, et cetera, I was glad to support it. And I

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am certainly glad to support the robust package we’ve now placed

in front of you.

Final note, even on the notion of a robust package, I would argue

that the reason to support this package, taking into full account

the legitimate concerns on human rights and the peace process

which need to be answered to your satisfaction, I think when we

do this we need to understand this is a huge national security and

health and educational threat to us. That’s why we are doing it.

By the way, Colombia and the Andean Ridge are important international partners. But the number of aircraft we are talking about

is half the number of aircraft that I had in my division as one of

nine United States military divisions in the Gulf war attack.

So this is a reasonably sized package to let General Wilhelm and

others, the United States Ambassador, support Colombian planning.

I think we sent you something that merits your full consideration. I thank you for the chance to lay out this thinking; and I

look forward, sir, to responding to your own questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you for your comments and your testimony.

[The prepared statement of General McCaffrey follows:]

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Mr. MICA. One of the concerns I’ve had is that it’s common

knowledge, and the press has reported, that Colombia is now the

third largest recipient of United States assistance, after Israel and

Egypt, and that funding took place, I believe, a year ago this past

October, appropriated by the Congress.

I tried to give a full year of time for those funds to be appropriated in their fiscal year up to October 1st, then became concerned that less than half the money was actually in Colombia and

held several closed-door meetings, not to embarrass the administration, but to see if we could work together to get those resources on

line.

It still appears that we have problems in getting that equipment to Colombia, General. And now we have $1 billion-plus package

here. What would you say that you will be able to do to make certain that things that have been promised—the President has made

several pronouncements of surplus material back to 1997, that

haven’t been delivered. How are we going to ensure that this equipment and these resources get there?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think you have put your finger on

an enormously legitimate concern. You know, you look at the management tools we have in place—the United States Embassy in Colombia, the interagency process here in Washington, it is inadequate to handle this workload. We will screw this up seriously if

we don’t put together a mechanism that is adequate for the challenge—assuming Congress passes the program—adequate to the

task.

So I think the fellow who most clearly understands that, besides

Mr. Berger, is—Madeleine Albright’s asked Under Secretary Pickering to be our quarterback. So we are not ready to reveal how exactly we are going to do this. We’re putting together a team, a

high-level team to be a permanent secretariat for the interagency

process. We have got to give our CINC the right guidance. We have

800 people in a headquarters in Miami perfectly prepared to manage heavy lifting, and then we’re going to have to look at the U.S.

Embassy and make sure we have got the right kinds of people.

Mr. MICA. Well, one of the things I did on the short term was

call in every agency. We did this behind closed doors, and we did

it fairly regularly up to just recently. I really would like your assurance that you are doing the same thing. Because somebody has

to be constantly on top of this, General.

The other concern I’d have, and let me say—we have General

Wilhelm who will be here. I must say that the military has been

able to get some of the resources in place rather efficiently, and I

think they’ve got one battalion trained. They had one incursion, I

think, that was successful, as opposed to the Colombians getting

their pants beaten off.

But this report that I ordered from GAO came out in December.

I’m sure you are somewhat familiar with it, and maybe we could

put that one chart up there. That doesn’t match exactly to this,

but, this is DOD’s Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance

Counter Drug Aircraft Support in Central and South America, and

it has what’s requested by the Southern Command and then provided by DOD, and it shows actually a declining from 1998 to

1999—I mean, only a fraction of what was provided.

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There are two ways to go after this. One is stopping it at its

source through eradication and alternative development, et cetera,

and the other is getting it as it’s coming out, but that requires intelligence and information.

Now, we provided in 1998 an unprecedented amount of funds

from the Congress for all aspects of this effort. However, in 1999,

DOD, which I think has been doing a good job with what they have

been given, got very little of what was requested.

What’s happening here?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, we’ve got some force structure problems. The military now, U.S. Armed Forces, is the smallest since

1939, the year my dad was sworn in as an infantry officer. We are

moving some of the more suitable platforms out of the active inventory and into retirement. We have other worldwide assets. I won’t

pretend to speak to those responsibilities. That’s sort of an overview of the challenge that we face on, you know, some very serious

efforts.

Now, having said that, I think one of the biggest single problems

we had was the withdrawal from Panama. When we lost Airfield

Howard, we lost a superb 2,000-airmen, 7-day-a-week, 24-hour-aday operation, providing 2,000 to 3,000 flights a year. That was one

of the biggest problems.

We’ve now reset our assets. We are operating in many locations.

Congress has given us the funds to begin three FOLs: Aruba; Curacao; Manta, Ecuador. We are operating out of Roosevelt Roads. I

believe the Customs Service has stepped up in a major way to support us, as has the Coast Guard. But we have a tremendous decrement based on the loss of Panama, forward basing in Panama.

Mr. MICA. Well, General, finally, probably one of the most difficult parts of my job has been to deal with the parents of children

who have died, the 50,000 and 15,900 direct deaths in my district.

Even more so, I had to write the parents of one of the individuals

who was killed over in Colombia who was from central Florida and

tell them that their young person died in an effort so that thousands of others wouldn’t die with drug overdoses and the ravages

of drugs on our streets.

I think one of the concerns we have heard expressed here is how

many United States troops will be dedicated to this effort, and

maybe you could tell us what you think this will take in Colombia.

Now, I know there will be no fighting, but in training and other

missions—how many individuals we will have at risk? Again, the

toughest part of our job is when something goes wrong and we lose

an American life in this combat.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I don’t know the answer. And I say

that—you know, I was in uniform from age 17, essentially for 35

years. But you are also talking to a guy whose daughter is a captain in the National Guard, and my son is an infantry major. So

I am very keenly aware of the threats to our young people in their

worldwide deployments. I don’t know what the answer is. I think

we ought to tell the CINC to sort this out.

Mr. MICA. Are we going to have double or triple the training

folks?

General MCCAFFREY. I don’t know. You will have to let the CINC

get the mission and do the planning.

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Right now, it runs to between 80 and 200 people in-country. I

can’t imagine that we’re talking a substantial increase. That is

principally a mobility package, and it’s two more battalion training

packages. So I wouldn’t imagine the in-country footprint would be

very large. But I would rather have the CINC design the answer

than me wing it.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I yield to the gentlewoman from Hawaii, our ranking member.

Mrs. MINK. I thank the chairman.

General McCaffrey, your testimony has been very enlightening.

The first chart that you showed the committee at the beginning

had to do with the cocaine production and the very dramatic reductions in both Peru and Bolivia in production as well as in cultivation. My question goes to the remarkable results that have been

achieved by these two countries, and I assume from what I know

about the alternate development programs that were instituted by

both countries that there was not a large infusion of military equipment or military personnel that achieved these results.

Could you explain what the American policy or American participation was, the cost of it which so dramatically changed the situation in both of those two countries?

General MCCAFFREY. Let me, if I can, start by underscoring the

enormous difference among these nations. And I know you’re aware

of it and all of you on the committee are, but they have very different legal traditions, social organizations. The military, police,

and judicial systems are unlike each other throughout these 34 nations. I mean, they don’t even speak the same languages. In these

cases, they do. The historical context is quite different.

Having said that, let me assure you we put a lot of money into Bolivia and Peru. We put $1 billion into Bolivia over the space of

8 years, and it paid off. It didn’t pay off until the last 3 years when

we had the political will, the national conversation Banzer and

Quiroga engineered, which then allowed some very effective use of

police and military who reinserted them in the Chapare and who

then combined with the very intelligent use of alternative economic

aid tied to a reward-punishment system. Up until then, we have

been paying people to not grow cocaine, and that doesn’t work.

In Peru, we had some brilliant leadership by President Fujimori

and his people. They went after the political basis of the Sendero

Luminoso. They did use military and police power with incredible

effectiveness.

We did support them. I was the Commander in Chief, U.S.

Southern Command. We began the air bridge into Peru—Peru, Colombia. We used United States intelligence assets, AWACS, U.S.

Navy, ground training groups to reinforce their police, the Umapar

police, out in the Huallaga Valley; and it paid off much more effectively, to be honest, than I anticipated. I was astonished. And

that’s why I would rather give the credit to the Peruvians necessarily than to us, but we put in a lot of assets.

Now, Colombia is a different thing. Colombia is a giant country

with trackless jungles and rivers for highways, with a huge armed

insurgency of people who, in many of our viewpoints, have walked

from ideology to banditry and who are now fighting over huge flows

of money. And to them that’s worth fighting over. And we’ve got

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a democratic government, a pretty decent democratic government

with great traditions of military subservience to civilian institutions, and they are in an emergency situation.

So this package is our best thinking on how to support Plan Colombia which they put together. That’s the differences, Madam

Congresswoman.

Mrs. MINK. In your printed testimony on page 4, you have a listing of the five strategic issues that President Pastrana has incorporated in his $7.5 billion Plan Colombia.

Now, do you have a monetary distribution of that $7.5 billion in

each of the five areas? For instance, in the peace process, the Colombian economy, the reform of the justice system, and on democratization and social development? What would be the distribution

of that $7.5 billion, putting aside the counterdrug strategy which

is item No. 3?

General MCCAFFREY. Yes, the Colombians, of course, came up

with that plan; and I would call it a conceptual framework as opposed to detailed plans. I don’t think they have an adequate answer. They have got to go get some of that money as an example

in the European Union, in the IADB and the World Bank.

Mrs. MINK. As I understand, they have commitments of loans

from various international groups.

General MCCAFFREY. Pretty good. Right. I think it is $1.3 billion,

if I remember, that they have already got. But they haven’t fleshed

out either the resources for sure, nor the details of their plan.

Having said that, take our piece of it as an example. Of that $1.6

billion, last year the U.S. total, about 5 percent of it, was in noninterdiction, nonintelligence, nonpolice-military activities—5 percent of it.

In this package we sent over to you, it goes up to 20 percent. It’s

got a $240 million package in there for alternative economic development, development of the judicial system, reform of the prison

system, the peace process, et cetera.

So our own U.S. funds are clearly a greatly increased weighting

toward these other areas.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I’d like to recognize now the chairman of our full committee, Mr.

Burton.

Mr. BURTON. General McCaffrey, let me just start off by saying

I have been quite critical in the past of many of the things that

have not been done and some of the things that you have said, but

I want to tell you your presentation today was very impressive. It

sounds like we are on the right track, and I want to compliment

you for what you said today.

Now if we could just follow through, I think it would be great.

I do have a couple of comments I’d like to make for the record, and

I’d like to ask a couple of questions.

First of all, you said that the Blackhawks take 10 months to

produce; and I think that’s probably an accurate statement. The

problem is, to get the Blackhawks that we need down there in a

proper timeframe, Sikorsky probably cannot get them produced

that fast.

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I want to read to you something that was said back in September

1996. This is an exchange before the International Operations

Committee. I was talking to Colonel Colante, and it went like this.

I said, ‘‘I don’t understand this. If new Blackhawks are required

and the drug war is as important to the United States of America

as we all know that it is, why couldn’t we use some of the

Blackhawks that are already in our arsenal to send to Colombia in

lieu of the new ones until they arrive? I mean, don’t we have any

Blackhawks available? If we don’t have any Blackhawks that are

already produced in our arsenal, why not, Colonel?’’ And Colonel Colante said, ‘‘I’m afraid I can’t speak for the Army.

I wear a purple suit working for the DSAA, but the decision to do

that would have to be made by the Chief of Staff of the Army, and

it hasn’t been posed to him.’’ I went on to say, ‘‘I’m posing it right now. If we are talking about

the need for 11 Blackhawks to assist in the war against drugs

against the drug cartel and the communists down there who are

supporting them, why in the world can’t we take the Blackhawks

that are currently in existence in the Army and send them down

there and replace them as new ones come on line? Why should we

wait 6 months to a year? The war is going on right now.’’ And he said he would take that under advisement and work on

it. That was in 1996; and, of course, we haven’t done that.

Also, I’d like to comment on—in 1996, the White House promised

the House International Relations Committee that they would send

12 Huey 2s down there and 6 Blackhawks. As of this year, the

Huey 2s have not been sent; and three of the Blackhawks have

been sent down, which we referred to previously.

So what I’d like to ask you, General, after saying what I said earlier about the plan you have talked about today sounds very good,

why can’t we take out of the military arsenal some of the

Blackhawks that we already have, send them down there, along

with Huey 2s that we probably have, so that they can get started

as quickly as possible, rather than waiting for new ones to be produced by Sikorsky?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I spent all

my life organizing machinery, people, spare parts, et cetera; and

the most important thing you get out of that background is you

have got to do a system. You can’t just send machinery. You have

got to train the crews. The hardest part is getting the maintenance

system up in advance of deploying machinery. You have to build

the hangars, and the lead times on learning to fly a Blackhawk

helicopter is an 18-month proposition.

So when we get ahead of ourselves, when we send six

Blackhawks to the Colombian army, which we did several years

ago, they now have, as you know, 28 total in the force. I flew in

there and looked at them painting over the $100,000-plus radar reflective paint job so they could get Ejercito de Colombia on the tail

boom; borrowing pilots from the Colombian air force to put them

in a Colombian army uniform so they would have their own helicopters.

The program we are now doing, I can assure you we are not

going to do that. So we just got the hangar built for the

Blackhawks. That is a $6 million flying machine. When you do the

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advanced phase maintenance, you have got to have a hangar. And

we are just now getting trained people on line. Some of those UH– 1N aircraft down there have contract pilots. And, by the way, you

can’t just crank these guys out even at 18 months and put a bunch of new kids behind the control of a $6 million plane that flies at

night as effectively as it does in the daytime. That’s the answer.

Now on the drawdown authority, I couldn’t—I wouldn’t substitute my judgment for the Secretary of Defense, but we need to

be very careful. We did a lot of thinking about this hearing, Mr.

Chairman, in the last several days. The drawdown authority as a

tool to support U.S. foreign policy interest is about over. We’re

going to have to be very careful about this entire program.

When the U.S. Armed Forces cut itself by a third in structure or

more, we had plenty of equipment that was available to use for

other purposes. But we are now down at the point where our ability to deter attack in the Korean peninsula, in the Gulf, in the

peacekeeping operations is seriously strained.

So, again, drawdown authority is for the Secretary of Defense to

decide. Do we accept the risk of handing over U.S. Armed Forces

materiel?

Mr. BURTON. Let me just followup on that.

I think this is a problem of military significance to the United

States right now. And I certainly would not want to diminish our

ability to protect the United States in the event we had a problem

in two theaters in other parts of the world, as we are supposed to

be prepared to do. But I do think that since this problem is getting

worse and worse by the day down there and the FARC guerrillas

and others are growing rapidly and getting resources from the drug

cartels, I think it is imperative that we move as rapidly as possible

while at the same time making sure that we have qualified personnel to use this equipment. And if it is possible to get helicopters

down there, Blackhawks and Huey 2s, quicker and get people

trained more quickly, I think that that is something that you and

others ought to take a serious look at. I would just urge to you do

that.

And with that, once again, I thought your presentation was very

good today, and since I’ve been so critical in the past, it’s time I

threw a few accolades at you.

General MCCAFFREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We’ll look very

carefully at your notion of accelerating the delivery of this equipment.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I will yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. TIERNEY. Thank you very much.

I am going to try some questions, General, as long as the voice

holds out. I know you must be beside yourself with joy over being

congratulated by the chairman.

Let me just ask you a question. There are some, including the

former Ambassador to El Salvador and Paraguay, who think that

what we’re doing here is simply having a policy of interfering in

another country’s civil war. And, in fact, I would like to get your

reaction to that. Are we not just saying on the one hand that we

are going after narcotics when in fact we are involving ourselves

in a dispute that is 40 years old?

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General MCCAFFREY. I think not. I think that the responsibility

for sorting these questions out belong in Colombian hands, not

United States. We’ve got a responsible, thoughtful, democratic government we are dealing with, the Colombians. They’re in absolute

misery. I mean, some of these numbers, it astonishes me that the

American people haven’t yet learned of the cost to Colombia of this

drug problem.

And I took into account the comments of one of your committee

members earlier, that it starts with the money we spend on illegal

drugs. But a half million of these poor people have fled the country

in the last several years. We’ve got brain drain going on in Colombia. Maybe that is to the advantage of the United States and Spain

and the other places they are going—and Canada.

Internally, there are as many as a million people in the last decade who have lost their homes because of the savagery that comes

out of this drug issue.

It’s impacted on the economy. It’s imperiled the ability of the

government to have elections. One of the districts in Bogota

couldn’t elect a mayor because they were so intimidated by the

thought of getting murdered by FARC operatives. It is right in the

national capital.

So I think the Colombians have suffered enormously. We, in my

view, and her regional partners, deserve to support them not just

with police and military and intelligence and interdiction and precursor chemicals and arms control for smuggling but also with economic aid and political goodwill.

Your point is a good one.

Mr. TIERNEY. General, it strikes some people as odd, if our intention really is just to focus on narcotics and not to be involved in

a civil war, why it is that we seem to be focused pretty much exclusively on FARC and that entity and to the exclusion of the

paramilitaries?

You talked about displacement, but credible sources indicate that

47 percent of the displacement is created by paramilitaries and 35

percent probability by the guerrillas, about 8 percent from the Colombian armed forces. Human rights and international humanitarian law violations in 1999 were accredited 78 percent to the

paramilitaries and 20 to the guerrillas and 2 percent to state security forces.

The fact is, there is significant evidence that a lot of the Colombians don’t see a great distinction between the Colombian military

and police and the paramilitaries. And if we wanted to have a credible policy that really looked like we were going after narcotics and

not after interference in an internal dispute, wouldn’t we want to

put some condition on this that the government would, in fact, not

just tell us that they are going to do that, as they have done in the

past, but actually do something about the paramilitaries? That, I

think, the evidence is overwhelming that there has been some collusion between the military and the police and the paramilitaries;

and the people in Colombia, frankly, I don’t think are going to have

a lot of faith that you are sending this money down there so heavily lopsided down toward military intervention is going to be much

comfort to them.

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General MCCAFFREY. I think your point on this AUC, quote, selfdefense units, is entirely correct. I mean, these are some of the

most brutal people imaginable. I mean, the level of violence in Colombia is beyond imagination for Americans. The murder rate is up

over 90 per 100,000 per annum. Ours, which is shameful, is around

8 per 100,000 per annum. And a lot of that mayhem does come out

of these so-called paramilitary forces. I think you are quite correct.

It is my own view that the support we are providing to Colombian democratic institutions, to the CNP and the armed forces will

be used to provide the rule of law in southern Colombia.

I think they will use it against AUC, who are clearly involved in

the drug business themselves, to include directly in one occasion at

least running a laboratory. These are criminals. They have attacked the Colombian police and murdered them. They had a death

threat on President Pastrana. That was the paramilitary groups.

Mr. TIERNEY. Ought we not get more of an assurance that they

will, in fact, go after those in an even-handed manner? I don’t see

anything in this package that gives me the comfort that they are

going to take as aggressive a stand against the paramilitaries and

break some of that cooperation that various people have had in the

past. I know there have been isolated incidents where they have

stood up in some progress. But ought we not to have with any of

the aid that we send down there the conditions that make it clear

to us and give us a comfort level that they are in fact going to go

after those paramilitaries.

Because I feel for sure, General, the people that live in that

country, as terrorized as they are, don’t make a distinction right

now between what is going on in the government military and the

police and the paramilitaries. And they are not going to be greatly

comforted if we give them more money.

General MCCAFFREY. Let me if I may, though, your point is a

good one. I essentially agree. We have to fully comply with the

Leahy Act. We have to be observant, not of rhetoric, but watch

what are they doing. We need to vet units. We need to listen to

human rights community. I will report out to them when I come

back from Colombia next week. I think your point is a good one.

Now, having said that, if I may, let me strongly, though, put on

the table an observation. The Colombian people do not have a problem distinguishing between the FARC, the paramilitaries and the

police and the armed forces. There is—by any measure of polling

or knowing these people, overwhelming support for the police, the

Army, the Catholic Church, and democracy. There is—the last poll

I saw was around 6 percent for the paramilitary, and around 3 percent for the FARC.

The FARC and these units are terrorists. They are not going to

win at the ballot box. They are trying to win through savagery. But

the people do not feel that way. There is a tremendous respect for

the police and democratic institutions.

They voted, at risk of their lives, at the last election. And the

FARC did not—does not credibly plan that process. Never mind

these criminal paramilitary units.

Mr. TIERNEY. General, I think there has been a remarkable indication that the people in Colombia have one thing they can do

which is organize and pull together, and they have been unbelievVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:04 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66788.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ably resilient. Ought we not insist that we show some signs to the

reallocation or the different allocation of this money by more support to crop alternatives, to ways to get that crop to market, to

roads, to things of that nature? Shouldn’t we build their confidence

by putting more of the money in that direction than by putting it

to military uses, which I still say, despite your remarks which I

give you due credit for them, but I have other people telling me different things, and they are fairly credible also, that there is a concern by great people down there that, in fact, the government and

the paramilitary still are engaged in supporting one another.

And I think we need to build support and have this package be

conditioned on some of these things like better support for the judicial system, better assurances that there will be civil trials. And as

people will be pursued, that those outstanding warrants will in fact

be enforced. That people will get their crop to market and be able

to safely reclaim some of their lands or at least go out and pioneer

new lands with support on that.

I think that I would like to hear your discussion on why we can’t

condition this aid on those types of situations.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think, fundamentally, the program

we sent down to you doesn’t make sense unless you see $7.5 billion.

There is a, in our view, a coherent, well thought out Colombian

plan to take all these issues into account. And then in addition, even within our $1.6 billion piece, as I

mentioned, there is a massive increase in alternative economic development supports, support for the judicial system, prison reform,

the peace process, et cetera. It is a $240 million package that is in

there. And it has gone up from 5 percent to 20 percent of the total,

notwithstanding, in addition the World Bank loans, et cetera.

Now, finally, I think, going back to what it is we are asking you

to consider, this is a mobility package to reinsert in the coca growing regions of the south democratic control. That is what that is.

And when I find the Tres Esquinas, I can assure you, sir, there is

no democratic control down there. This is five FARC fronts armed

to the teeth, and they are fighting for heroin production and cocaine production, which is killing Americans and Venezuelans and

Colombians all throughout the hemisphere.

That is what we are doing. We are going after the production of

heroin and cocaine in southern Colombia and giving them the mobility and the training they need to do their job.

Mr. TIERNEY. Let me just end then, please, General, by suggesting that when we attack country by country like that, doesn’t it

just move the supply from one country to another, from Southeast

Asia to Peru, from Peru to Colombia, from Colombia to where we

are now if we do this?

General MCCAFFREY. I think your point is a good one. We need

to be concerned about that. There ought to be a regional approach.

You are quite correct. At the same time, we ought to be happy that

Thailand in 15 years with our help has worked itself into a situation where it is 1 percent of Southwest Asian heroin production.

And they have got a tremendous treatment system. Things are better off in the long-standing ally, Thailand, because of our support.

Pakistan has largely eliminated drug production. This is working. In Peru and Bolivia. And we ought to be happy for them.

68

The problem we are now focusing on is Colombia and its spillover

effect. I think you are quite correct. We have to keep our eye on

a regional responsibility to confront this evil. But the same time we

have got to remember what we are doing. This is devastating in its

impact on America. Those are 520 metric tons of cocaine that will

come out of Colombia. By the way, they have a huge drug abuse

problem, and it is growing, to include heroin addiction.

Dr. Nelba Chavez and I went there the last time. We went to a

drug treatment facility for children to underscore our concern for

their kids. Those drugs are all over Western Europe, Spain, Amsterdam, Russia.

Mr. TIERNEY. I guess my only point was it was no less of a concern to this country and other places when it was in Peru or Bolivia. And we still have it with us today. After decreasing the situation in those countries, we now have it in Colombia.

General MCCAFFREY. Yeah.

Mr. TIERNEY. And my concern is, you know, if we go down there

and use the military and all of this in Colombia, we are next if we

don’t deal with the supply and demand.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, your concern is a correct one.

Let me also, if I can, leave on the table, in 3 years there has been

a net reduction in cocaine production in the world of 7 percent. It

was 11 percent last year, and this explosion in Colombia has

changed it. So there is actually a lot less cocaine killing somebody’s

children and destroying the work force than there were 3 years

ago.

This is actually working. We have got to stay at it for 10 years,

I would agree. And we have got to watch the regional total, not just

go to one spot and think we can find the Schweinford ball bearing

factory of the drug business. It doesn’t exist. I think you’re correct.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman. I might just say that one of

the things we did with Mr. Hastert was, when we went down into

Peru and Bolivia several years ago, to help start those programs

for crop eradication and substitution. And they have been very effective. We have done it also with the United Nations, and we cosponsored last week’s summit with the U.N. with Pino Arlacchi,

and they have been very successful in that effort.

The first thing that we needed, though, in Peru was stability. I

remember going to Peru 9 years ago and bombs were going off. You

could not have any crop substitution-eradication program. So they

had to have stability. And there are only so many places you can

produce cocaine. And this summit last week also pledged to participate in the eradication, if you can believe this, of cocaine production in Bolivia within the next year, year and a half. So it can be

done. But you do need the stability, a joint effort. And in this case,

an international effort. I just wanted to interject that.

I will recognize the gentleman who chairs our International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General McCaffrey, I

was looking over your chart, and in support for Plan Colombia, and

I note that Colombian National Police receive only $95 million of

that proposed, out of $1.5 or $1.6 billion proposal. Why are we giving such a small amount to the Colombian National Police, who

have demonstrated an excellent record in achieving a reduction in

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cocaine, a reduction in heroin and have been doing a courageous

effort? And the military apparently is getting close to $600 million

for pushing the southern Colombia. Why is there such an inequitable distribution between the police and the military?

General MCCAFFREY. You’re quite correct in your confidence and

respect for the Colombian police. And General Serrano’s leadership

and these field combat units of the police, the DANTI, some 2,500,

they are equipped with now 47 aircraft. They have got a decent,

pretty decent mobility capability. But there is 2,500 of them. There

is 26,000 people organized with heavy mortars, helicopters, aircraft. They are using essentially chemical weapons. The 30 manned

detachments of the Colombian National Police are not who will intervene at Tres Asquinas and go out and start operating against

the coca division.

Last year, the Colombians had more than 25 aircraft hit by

ground fire. This is incredibly dangerous work. They have got to

get, in our judgment, supporting the Colombian thinking, they

have got to get the riverine forces down there to control the lines

of communication. They have got to get mobility down there. And

they have got to put at least three, if not more, counternarcotic battalions of the Army and then allow the police to go in and time that

with alternative economic developments so we are not just driving

people off the land. That is what we are trying to do. In addition, last year, we put $350 million into Colombia. And

since we did not have the same confidence that we have now in the

General Tapias leadership, Minister of Defense Ramirez, and others, this almost all went to the police. So I think this is a balanced

program that—— Mr. GILMAN. Well, General McCaffrey, General Serrano has been

pleading for Blackhawk helicopters so he can get to the higher altitudes and eradicate the heroin crop, the poppy crop that he has

said that if he is given the wherewithal to do that, he can eliminate

that crop within a 2-year period.

How many Blackhawks have we delivered to General Serrano to

do this work? How many does he now have from our Nation available to do the kind of thing that he wants to do to eradicate the

heroin crop?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, he has got 47 aircraft.

Mr. GILMAN. I’m asking about Blackhawks, General.

General MCCAFFREY. He has got six Blackhawks. He has got

three more en route. Let me just tell you, Mr. Congressman, you

know, I have done this kind of thing my entire life. I would not

substitute my judgment for Minister of Defense Ramirez. There is

240,000 people in the armed forces of Colombia, and they control

the national police also. The same minister has both sides of it.

I sat there with the President of their republic, with their minister of defense, and with their foreign minister. This is their plan.

And by the way, it makes a lot of sense to me. We do not wish to

take the Colombian National Police and turn them into a force capable of engaging in open combat with the FARC front.

Mr. GILMAN. I am not suggesting that, General McCaffrey. I am

just suggesting that we give General Serrano the wherewithal to

do what he wanted to do, and that is to eliminate the heroin crop,

the poppy crop. And we have only given him, to my understanding,

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three Blackhawks that are operable and three that are not operable at the present time.

I am saying let’s give—and I am not saying detract the funding

from the military. Give them what they need to do something in

the southern area of Colombia. But also at the same time, let’s

make certain we are not shortchanging the Colombian antidrug police who have been doing such an outstanding job and can do an

even better job.

And it looks to me like we are concentrating on the military and

forgetting the antidrug police. And I hope that you take another

look at that and make certain there would be a little more equity

in the distribution of those important funds. Both are trying to do

the important work.

Serrano has demonstrated he can do it, and I want to make certain that we are going to not neglect that aspect of the funding. Let

me ask you—— General MCCAFFREY. Let me if I can just say President Pastrana

assured us that the Colombian National Police budget would be

more than adequate to fulfill their task. I think let’s just watch and

see what happens. I think that is the case.

Mr. GILMAN. I hope we are not going to do more of watching and

less of actual support that is sorely needed.

What is the annual operating rate for the six Army Blackhawks

that have been delivered? Isn’t it less than 40 percent?

General MCCAFFREY. The six Colombian Army?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, six Army Blackhawks.

General MCCAFFREY. I don’t have an answer for you. I will provide it for the record.

Mr. GILMAN. I have less than 40 percent.

How many Blackhawk pilots does the Colombian Army have?

Isn’t it true that they are using civilian pilots to fly the old UH—— General MCCAFFREY. Mr. Gilman, that is precisely what I tried

to walk through. We need a system approach. They don’t have a

maintenance system, a training system, the hangars to rapidly absorb the most modern technology on the face of the Earth.

Mr. GILMAN. And yet they are offering 30 Blackhawks. They

don’t have the maintenance operable.

General MCCAFFREY. We will have a plan over the coming years

that will provide a trained, maintained, balanced force to support

their Army. That is what I—— Mr. GILMAN. How long will it take us to do that, General?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I mean it takes 18 months to get a

Blackhawk pilot. It takes 10 months to build the plane. It takes 2

to 5 years to put together a credible system. I don’t know. We will

be working at it for a long time.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, at the same time, don’t the antinarcotic police

have 150 trained chopper pilots now?

General MCCAFFREY. The Colombian National Police do not have

a system to support a sudden infusion of Blackhawks, period. It

doesn’t exist. As a matter of fact, were I the President of Colombia,

I would not be putting Blackhawks in the Air Force, the Army, the

police, or anywhere else. I wouldn’t do it. They have elected to do

that. And we are going to have to support them in making it happen.

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Were I the President of Colombia, they would all be in the Air

Force in one spot. But we will support their own thinking. We will

have to do it in a very judicious way, and I’ll bet we pull it off if

we get CINC U.S. Southern Command engaged in monitoring this.

Mr. GILMAN. But you’re talking about a 2-year period. In the

meantime—— General MCCAFFREY. It will be longer than that.

Mr. GILMAN. Pardon?

General MCCAFFREY. I think it will be longer than that. You are

looking at 30 Blackhawks, 33 UH–1H. They are going to buy 17

more Blackhawks beyond that.

Mr. GILMAN. How long will that take to make them operable?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I mean, they will have to go in only

when we see a lay down of a system that can absorb them.

Mr. GILMAN. How many years are we talking about to make this

operation useful?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, the part of it that I am here to brief

you on is 2 years.

Mr. GILMAN. In the meantime, though, the drug police are operable and can use a few more Blackhawks put into place. They can

achieve success and not wait 2 or 3 years.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, we will look very carefully at your

own viewpoint, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. I would hope you would.

General MCCAFFREY. Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN. I was quite disturbed, distressed to read in recent

news reports that President Pastrana is quoted as saying that the

fugitive FARC commander who ordered the brutal execution of

three Americans would not be extradited to the United States. Is

our administration going to press Pastrana on that issue? Do you

feel that extradition would interrupt the peace negotiations between the Colombian Government and the FARC?

General MCCAFFREY. I don’t know the status of an extradition

request for that person. I would be glad to provide it for the record.

Each one of these are, by name, two attorney generals. I don’t

know what the status of that extradition.

Mr. GILMAN. That doesn’t come within your purview as our drug

czar.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, the first extradition in 10 years from

Colombia just occurred. We are very encouraged by that. We actually extradited a Colombian citizen charged with drug-related offenses. So it is a tremendous statement of courage on the part of

the Colombians. They finally did that.

And we think there is 30 more targets of the millennium operation that we are now after. We want those 30 people out. And we

are getting very courageous support from the Colombians about

this. You need to talk to Mr. Ledwith. One of the most brilliant law

enforcement operations I know of was Operation Millennium, six

nations. And we are going to try and extradite many of those subjects.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I would hope that you would continue to pressure President Pastrana in that direction. I think it affects our

whole strategy of what we are doing in Colombia and make certain

that we get cooperation from him.

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Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I think we have time for two more Members. There

are two votes coming up, and we are going to run the clock. Ms.

Schakowsky, you’re recognized. We will catch one from the other

side.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to include for the record an article by Robert White that appeared in

the newspaper.

Mr. MICA. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Also, I wanted to ask, because I have so many

questions, if the record could be open so I can submit them in writing.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, we will keep the record open for 2

weeks.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you very much. General McCaffrey, my

unease about this whole plan revolves around three areas. One is

our objective. When I look at the materials that you have presented

and listened to your testimony here today, I have to ask you: What

is our objective in Colombia? What are the specific measurements

of that? And how do we know when we have achieved victory?

Now I hear you talking about a much longer term plan. It seems

to me we only have the most general of overviews. Included in that

are questions: How many lives are we willing to say are worth it?

How much money are we willing to continue to put in? How many

additional people is it satisfactory to have displaced within Colombia?

You said you don’t know how many American troops will be dedicated or even put at risk in this plan. Aren’t those things that need

to be clearly spelled out, our objectives, and how do we know if we

have achieved them. What are the benchmarks?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think you are quite correct. There

is no question. You have just outlined our challenge. By law, 2

years ago, the Congress told me to devise the performance measures of effectiveness. This is it. And there is a classified annex. And

we actually have very specific targets that we are trying to achieve

in the Andean Ridge and in Colombia, and they are measurable.

And we know what we are trying to achieve, and that is to eliminate 520 metric tons of cocaine and 6 metric tons of heroin and a

criminal organization which is causing devastating impact on our

regional partners. And there are ways to go about determining

whether we are achieving our purpose or not.

And as I have tried to suggest, it is achievable. This is not a

hopeless proposition. When we do it, we ought to not just go after

police and military. There ought to be a broader Colombian and regional strategy to take into account the immense suffering of the

people. I think that is exactly what we have to achieve, and we

have to be able to tell Congress that that is what is happening over

the coming years.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I want to ask you about the push into southern Colombia. As you pointed out, this is an enormous country. We

are talking about a region the size of California, 20 times the size

of El Salvador. And by the way, I just wanted to point out that one

of the observations that Robert White made was that we should recall that, ‘‘in El Salvador our bloody divisive 12-year pursuit of

military victory proved fruitless. We finally settled for U.N. broker

accord that granted the guerillas many of their demands,’’ and by

the way, he also points out that the Colombian military has no experience in carrying the war to the insurgents.

So we are talking about a huge area. And we are focusing in on

Putamayo and Caqueta Departments in southern Colombia where

two-thirds of the coca is now grown. But since the Amazon Basin

is so huge, what is to say that, when we focus there, maybe even

succeed there, that it won’t simply move to another part of the

75

Amazon Basin, and that we will be just where we were and even

further now into what has been characterized by some as a Vietnam-like quagmire.

General MCCAFFREY. Yeah. Well, I think those are all legitimate

concerns. I would argue strongly that Colombia is not El Salvador.

Colombia isn’t Mexico. Colombia isn’t Vietnam. These are not useful historical or metaphorical analogies. There are 36 million Colombian people involved in abject misery, much of which is driven

by the massive production of cocaine and heroin which is fueling

an internal struggle that has now devolved into sheer savage banditry.

And it is our view that we should, ‘‘we’’ meaning the regional

partners, stand with elected Colombian democratic officials with a

broad guage support of alternative economic development, support

for judicial systems, as well as support for the police and army.

I basically agree with your concerns. It is not hopeless. They can

push into southern Colombia. There is no shortage of courage in

Colombia. There is no shortage of political will to rid themselves

of something that is unraveling their economy and threatening the

peace process.

Why would you talk if you are a FARC front that is getting hundreds of millions of dollars a year out of the drug cartels, taxation

though it may be. They are taxing them in the growing fields, taxing them in the laboratories, and taxing them down the riverine

systems. The FARC and the despeje are acting with outrageous impunity. I can’t imagine politically where they are doing this. They

are causing the campesinos to begin growing coca.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. So are you saying until there is a demonstrable military victory and control of the south, that then there is

no hope of peace, and that that will be one measure of our

progress.

General MCCAFFREY. I think it’s the viewpoint of the Colombian

leadership that as long as the drug money is fueling the FARC, the

ELN, and these paramilitary criminal organizations—— Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Which are hardly mentioned in this plan.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I am not sure that that is the case.

The Colombian police and the President and the mayors and the

journalists are cognizant of the tremendous threat posed by all

those units as well as somebody that is obviously at the heart and

soul of it, these criminal organizations, these literally hundreds of

criminal groups that are actually producing the drugs and moving

them up into the United States. But that is what that support is

designed to achieve is to knock those people out.

What are they after? They are going to chop down the coca and

chop down the opium poppies. And to get in there, you can’t have

2,500 cops go south and do that. It is worth your life. At El Billar

a couple years ago, they sent one of their elite counterinsurgency

battalions out, and they lost the whole battalion. This is big business down there. This is high threat environment. This is driven

by drug money.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Can I just say, Mr. Chairman, that the questions that I will submit also deal with—you have talked about how

democratic the Colombian Government is, but I wanted to raise

some questions, and I will do that in writing about that.

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Mr. MICA. This is very important. And I am going to impose on

the General. We are going to vote right now, and then we will come

back. I have Mr. Souder and two others that want to—— General MCCAFFREY. I have got to leave for the great State of

Wyoming to address a joint session of the legislature and meet the

Governor and State authorities so.

Mr. MICA. We will be back here in 15 minutes, start promptly,

and I will have you out, 5 minutes a piece, at 5 minutes of 1 p.m.

This meeting stands in recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. MICA. I would like to call the subcommittee back to order.

The Director has limited time. We will go in availability of Members arriving.

Although he is not a member of our subcommittee, he is chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House. Mr.

Ballenger, you are recognized for questions.

Mr. BALLENGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like the opportunity if I may, General McCaffrey, to ask you the question: Is

the administration wedded to the 30 Blackhawks? What I would

like to do is, I think you probably know the numbers, but they cost

about $14 million each. Huey IIs, which are rebuilt Huey, old

Hueys, I have ridden in one, and it seems to have close to the same

capabilities as the Blackhawk, and they only cost $1,400,000. So

somewhere along there, you can get seven or eight of these Huey

IIs for the same price as one Blackhawk.

And not only that, the delivery time of the Blackhawk is 18

months, which the Huey II I think they can start delivering in July

at the present time. I think they also have the maintenance capabilities in Colombia for this. And pilot training is much simpler for

Huey IIs.

And as far as I can tell, you might be able to cut down on the

total number of helicopters and supply something for the peaceful

purposes, shall we say crop alternatives and so forth. Could you

react to that statement?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, of course the Colombian armed forces

and police are trying to control a giant country with 240,000 people. Very few—when you look at the Colombian police probably

have 2,500 people they can move around. The Colombian Army

probably have 20,000 generously. They need range. They need altitude. They need lift capabilities. I can assure you, sir, the Huey II

is not the same as the Blackhawk. I won’t go into my ode to the

Blackhawk, but it is an incredible piece of day-night machinery

with the kind of range I think will be required to get back in the

south.

They will have a mixed fleet, though. There are 33 UH–1Ns in

there, and it will be rebuilt.

Mr. BALLENGER. Is it not true that UH–1Ns are pretty old pieces

of equipment already that was used, and we bought it from Canada? And its capabilities are nowhere near what Huey IIs are.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think you should probably ask the

CINC, who will probably have a more informed viewpoint on this

than I will. The UH–1Ns out of Canada were in pretty good shape.

They will be refurbished. They are going to provide a tremendous

and more immediate responsive capability.

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But at the same time, I think the 28 Blackhawks they already

have, the 30 that we are proposing that they receive, and the 17

additional that they will purchase will give them a modest capability to try and reinsert democratic institutions in the south of Colombia.

Mr. BALLENGER. Well, just in moving the troops, the battalions

that we are speaking of in the south; if it takes 18 months to get

the first Blackhawks, are we sure that the Colombians are still

going to be there 18 months from now; whereas, on the Huey IIs,

you can get delivery in almost a couple of months. And not only

that, the numbers you can get for the taxpayers’ dollar. Can you

get the numbers to be able to move a battalion much more rapidly

than you could with the Blackhawk. I realize there are some differences in lift capabilities, but the numbers that would be available at a rate of 10 to 1 in savings is something worth looking at.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, it has been very carefully analyzed.

I think the program we sent over has a great deal of logic behind

it. We, again, had been working on this for just about a year. We

do have a time space lift notion on what we can do to support

them. There should be a mixed fleet. You are quite correct. We

shouldn’t just have a pure fleet of Blackhawks in Colombia right

now. There won’t be a delay of 18 months before something happens. Blackhawks are there now. More will arrive in a deliberate

fashion, about as rapidly as the maintenance and spare parts.

Mr. BALLENGER. Yeah, but when you say the maintenance and

spare parts, that is your 18 months that you said earlier it will

take that long to train the pilots, the maintenance, and the various

and sundry other parts. So, in reality, even though you have

Blackhawks there and everybody knows, and not only that, but the

maintenance capabilities of a Blackhawk, as I understand, is about

20 percent of the fleet the question was asked earlier. What is the

flying capability of that fleet in operation? And I understood that

20 percent is pretty average for them.

General MCCAFFREY. I wouldn’t think so. I hope not. But that

certainly is a concern. A Blackhawk helicopter properly maintained

under contract is a tremendously robust machine. When these poor

police and Colombian military units are trying to achieve, they get

shot at all the time up through 50 caliber weapons. They take hits.

And the Blackhawk helicopter can absorb multiple hits. We have

seen them take 20, 30 rounds and keep flying. You put armored

kits on it, and we will be able to save lives and achieve our purpose, which really is to destroy cocaine and heroin production affecting our own country.

Mr. BALLENGER. One more question if I may. Before we finally

get to the finish on this product, and considering the number of

votes that would be necessary to pass it, I have noticed a couple

of people on the other side of the aisle speaking about funds for

crop alternatives, more peaceful efforts and so forth to generate

that. Again, the idea that you can get seven Huey IIs for the price

of one Blackhawk, with the same number of helicopters, maybe you

needed a few more because of their lift capabilities, you could generate some money that maybe would get some peaceful donations

vote-wise on the other side of the aisle.

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General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think that we ought to—we have

tried to table a coherent well thought out plan. And we ought to

argue it in my view on its merits, every single subelement of it.

And I think the mobility package looks to be a pretty good one for

this force. And, again, to put it in perspective, the entire package

we are talking about is far less than one of the nine divisions in

the Gulf war. We are a huge country. And for a force, you know,

that is trying to confront a criminal institution that kills 52,000

people a year, that is really what we are after.

Mr. BALLENGER. I can understand that. But again I look at the

viewpoint that it might be the taxpayers of the United States, in

comparing the situation, who might look more at the dollars than

it. In other words, why shouldn’t a Ford be just as good as a Cadillac? Everybody would argue the point that we would rather have

Cadillacs. But if you can get a Ford tomorrow, and you have to

wait 18 months to get a Cadillac, what makes sense?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, of course our collective judgment, I

hope the American people have some confidence in it as well

thought out as we could make it, is that this package represented

a decent way to go about serving our interests.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I recognize now the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairman. I wanted to make a couple

points for the record. I have a few questions, too. One is that there

has been an unfortunate perception here I think that the FARC are

some sort of romantic revolutionaries rather than drug thugs. They

have become funded by the drug movement, provided protection for

the drug movement. And sometimes, I think, as the General pointed out, there is 3 percent or less support in the FARC in the country. Sometimes I think there is more support here in Congress than

there is in Colombia for the FARC, and it is a very disappointing

process.

As far as the right wing paramilitary groups, if they don’t get directly tied to drugs, then we would be intervening in a domestic

conflict if they aren’t tied to drugs. If they are tied to drugs, we

ought to go after them just like we are going after the FARC and

anybody else.

Furthermore, the right wing is not an American concept, it’s a

Neo-Nazi type right wing, which in my opinion is also a left wing

socialist type of approach. Those who are watching this can be very

confused by the rhetoric that is going around.

I wanted to pursue a little, because I take this a little personal,

I know we have had a long-term disagreement about the

Blackhawk helicopter question regarding funds for the CNP versus

Peru and Bolivia.

I offered this amendment, I believe, still when you were at

SouthCom, General McCaffrey, and we then proceeded to argue

this as more senior Members took the amendment, the committee

chairman and so on over the years. But the truth is, in the context

of the drug budget, given the President’s limitations, taking the

helicopters can be seen as taking the money from Peru and Bolivia.

But we asked for the designation to come from unobligated INL

funds which were being transferred to the Balkans. That was not

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the decision of the drug czar or the people even at the lower levels

of the State Department who were dealing with narcotics.

But to act like this was some kind of law that, when we passed

the Blackhawks, it meant that we came from Peru or Bolivia, it

was not my intent or anyone else’s intent in Congress.

There was an administration like decision that the Balkans were

a critical place to put our funds, funds from Latin or—that could

have been devoted to this problem in antidrugs were diverted. The

AWACS were diverted, and that was a systemwide decision, not a

drug policy decision.

And I just want to say for the record, because this has been

thrown around a number of times, implying that my intent in that

amendment was to move it from Bolivia into Colombia, my intent

was to say we had a national interest stake way back in 1985,

which you so eloquently told us in our first visit that I attended

at SouthCom around I think it was early 1996 with Congressman

Zeliff and now Speaker Hastert. And then when General Clark was

at SouthCom, he warned us we were in danger of losing Colombia

and what was happening there. Then he went over to the Balkans

to command that. Now General Wilhelm has been telling us. This

isn’t something new.

What is new is that the President of Colombia is now clean. The

defense minister is committed to reforming the Defense Department. General Tapias in the military is committed to reform. That

is new. But I wanted to clarify that, too.

Now, my two questions relate to, one, you made a reference to

Venezuelan overflights. And Congressman Ballenger, Congressman

Delahunt, Congressman Farr, and I met with President Chavez as

well as our Ambassador. We are hopeful that we can work out

some kind of procedures. It is a very delicate process with Venezuela. But there is no question that if we put this pressure on in

Colombia that Ecuador, which is clearly going through political

transformations as well, that is a kind way to say it, and in Venezuela, that we could push this problem out. And I would like to

hear and we will ask the other panelists, too, how we are going to

deal in particular with Ecuador and Venezuela. We usually talk

about Peru and Bolivia.

And the second thing is you said that we went back and revised

the data that came up with this kind of emergency process in Colombia. Could you explain why we didn’t have that data earlier,

what caused the revisions, and elaborate on that a little bit?

General MCCAFFREY. I think your point on the spillover effect in

Venezuela and Ecuador is quite correct. And Under Secretary Pickering is in Venezuela today, and will consult with the government.

We are concerned. I went into Venezuela and saw President Chavez and presented our worries about what was happening.

I gave him a computer-generated DIA reproduction of airborne

drug flights in and out of the Andean Ridge prior to his change in

air exclusion and since then. And it is unmistakable that Venezuela is being used in a major way by international drug criminals

coming out of southern Colombia and out-dropping, or air dropping

or air landing drugs in Haiti, Dominica Republican, Jamaica, and

to some extent, up into Central America. And we have got to do

something about it. And it is a regional problem. It is not a VenVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:04 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66788.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ezuelan and United States problem. It is one that affects certainly

Colombia’s ability to air and to de-cos. Aircraft are going back in,

loitering in their airspace, in some cases landing and waiting out

the interdiction capability, which is coming out of, of course, out of

Aruba and Roosevelt Road.

So we have got to do something about it, and I hope in a very

respectful and transparent way gain the support of the Venezuelan

authorities for a regional air interdiction solution. And Mr. Pickering will try and continue that dialog.

Mr. SOUDER. Can I ask a direct followup while you’re on that

point, that when we went and met with President Chavez, I think

he understands the nature of it. Clearly, there is a difficult domestic situation. He has made public statements that have made this

very awkward, as we are finding in other Latin American countries

and South American countries of how do we deal with a rising tide

of nationalism in these countries. There seems to be some willingness of looking at, if we help them put in new radar, train people

to operate the radar, working with shared information. But it looks

like we may be heading into some new areas as we deal with some

of these different countries. I am hopeful that we will not drive him

away from us, but rather look how to be inclusive in the process.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think you’re quite correct. I read the

Embassy cable out of your visit. I think your own interventions

were helpful to this process. We will have to see how we can move

ahead. But I think it is a difficult situation right now that is causing problems to regional drug interdiction.

Gosh, I’m trying to think.

Mr. SOUDER. The new data.

General MCCAFFREY. One of the most professional groups I deal

with, and among many in the intelligence collection business is

CNC. And, basically, it’s run by the CIA, a brilliant group of people. They have been using satellite photography for several decades

now to analyze things on the ground. And one of them they have

been following are crops, crop production estimates. And so there—

as I suggested to other people, when you look at this drug issue,

data is a problem. There are islands of hard data. There are islands of decent data, where, if it’s big, you’re happy; if it drops,

you’re sad. Then there are extrapolations in some of these issues.

One of the hard data is hectarage undercultivation. If it is outdoor growth of opium, poppies, or marijuana, or coca bushes, we

are photographing it; and we know essentially in a year-to-year

whether it’s going up or going down and where it is. And we put

it on maps and give it to our allies.

We did go in, and we just finished doing this with Mexico a week

ago. And we did it with Colombia. DEA lead went in and tried to

do a revised analysis of efficiency of laboratory process, an alkaloid

content of the plants. And it was a brilliant piece of work. Colombian intelligence system had to get in there and get crop samples

all over the country. And we have done that very quietly in the last

several months.

Out of that, CNC then did a revised analysis of the 1998 production and came up with over 400 metric tons. And so that we didn’t

have in a historical sense a big discontinuity with a footnote revised algorithm. They then ran it backward for I think 3 or 4 years

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to say—and, again, it was with assumptions, how quickly do these

new, quote, ‘‘industrial processes’’ come into play. From mosh pits

that are now in 55 gallon drums, lacerating the leaves with weed

wackers, packing them tightly, pouring kerosene on them, and getting much increased yields of cocaine.

So that is what they did. Then we did an analysis of the 1999

data, and using the new algorithms as well as the new hectarage

undercultivation and got a 20 percent increase in cultivation and

a matching 20 percent probable output of cocaine out of the growing region. Really first rate work by the CIA.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

General MCCAFFREY. And DEA was very involved also.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Ose from California.

Mr. OSE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to make sure I understand something, General. If I heard correctly, it takes 10

months to build a helicopter, 12 months to build a hangar for the

helicopter, and 18 months to train the pilots, I wasn’t quite sure

if that meant the pilots and the ground crew on maintenance,

which totals up to 40 months if you add it end to end.

Are these—— General MCCAFFREY. That would be one classic stupid way to do

it.

Mr. OSE. You have to understand I am in the Federal Government now, so I am obliged to ask that question.

General MCCAFFREY. I mean, that is the danger, though. You

make a good point. You have to see a system. You have got to start

a pert. diagram process to have it all come together. And the last

thing that happens is you roll Blackhawks off a plane. But you are

quite correct. We have to be very prudent in how we go about this.

Mr. OSE. Do we have the pilots for the Colombian military or the

national police being trained today pending the arrival of these

Blackhawks?

General MCCAFFREY. No.

Mr. OSE. So in effect——

General MCCAFFREY. I mean, there is a training program. First

of all, let me defer if I can. The good answer to this question will

come out of Ambassador Romero and the CINC. They may have to

do it for the record. But there is now—for this package of 63 aircraft, there will be a plan detailed to do all these things. But Congress has got to pass the money.

Mr. OSE. I understand.

General MCCAFFREY. And then we will make sure, though, that

that kind of thinking is implicit in the delivery scheme.

Mr. OSE. OK. Let me revert then to the three helicopters that are

in Colombia right now, the Blackhawks.

General MCCAFFREY. There are actually 28 Blackhawks there.

Mr. OSE. There are three that are being used by the, I can’t remember, the military and national police, that lack the armor or

at least lacked the armor which had to be custom built for installation. Have those three helicopters received the custom armory they

need to fly into the despeje?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, they are not going to fly into the

despeje. They would be used by the CNP probably to operate

against opium production and up in the Andean Ridge, up in the

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northeast. We will provide an answer for the record. I have got a

note that says two out of the three do. But let me just provide it

for the record so you get exact data.

Mr. OSE. All right. Two other questions if I might. I would like

to look downstream and figure what I am being asked to spend versus what the likely outcomes are if I don’t spend the money. This

might be relatively unfair, but I am going to ask it anyway. Could

you speculate on the future in Colombia as it relates to the drug

threat to the United States if we don’t do this.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think, Mr. Congressman, you make

one point that we have got to take into account. This is not North

Korea. This is not Myanmar. This is not far off Afghanistan. The

drug production in Afghanistan is unbelievable. They are the No.

1 heroin producing nation on the face of the Earth. And that heroin

is causing incredible damage in Western Europe and Russia and

the Ukraine and other places.

But these people, the Colombians, are a 3 hour flight from

Miami, and a half million have fled already. And you know maybe

a million of these poor people have lost their homes. And drug production has gone up 140 percent. And violence is endemic. And

they are a very important economic partner to us. And the fact that

they are a democracy is vitally important to us. We don’t want a

narco-state right on our doorsteps of the Gulf Coast and south Florida.

So I think it is vitally important that we stand with their democratic leadership in the coming years. And oh, by the way, there

is a spillover effect. This is directly affecting Panama. There are

more than 1,000 FARC guerrillas up in the Darien now. And the

next thing we know, the paramilitary will follow, and the only losers will be the campesinos, in this case the Panamanians. They are

across the border in safe areas in Ecuador. They are hijacking aircraft out of Venezuela. They are kidnapping ranchers. This is a regional threat to our Latin American neighbors and a direct threat

to the United States.

Mr. OSE. I am trying to make sure I understand from where the

direct threat originates. And when I hear you saying it is coming

from the narco-terrorists who are supporting either the FARC or

the paramilitary units.

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think the threat is the drugs. It is

520 metric tons of cocaine and 6 metric tons of heroin. And it contributes to mayhem in American society: Health costs, social costs,

economic costs, criminal justice system. 52,000 dead a year. We

had 48,000 dead in 7 years of Vietnam. This is a huge deal for

American society. And it is the drugs. And unfortunately, those

drugs generate billions of dollars in profits. And that is causing destruction in democratic institutions throughout the hemisphere.

That is a problem.

Mr. OSE. Last question if I might. Some would suggest that we

need to split our effort, if you will, between say the paramilitary

units, the FARC, teaching new cropping patterns, and what have

you. What is the No. 1 priority in your estimation?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think from a U.S. perspective, it has

been quite straightforward. Our No. 1 objective is the reduction in

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the supply of cocaine and heroin that is destroying the region and

the American people. So that is where our focus is.

And the paramilitary as well as the FARC are heavily involved

with that activity. ELN somewhat less so. ELN makes most of

their money kidnapping people, chopping their ears off, selling

them back this aircraft they have got; they are selling the people

back one at a time. But a bunch of the ELN are, of course, also

involved in drugs. That is the problem, the money that comes out

of the cocaine and heroin producing regions of Colombia.

Now, our principal responsibility ought to be to reduce the consumption of drugs. That is actually the central piece of this national drug control strategy. That is why we sent a $19.2 billion,

fiscal year 2001 budget, over here. For the first time in our country’s history, Donna Shalala has got $3.8 billion in drug treatment

money in there. So we are putting our mouth and our money behind that strategy. But this piece of it we argue has to also be

done. We have got to stand with Colombia, Peru and Bolivia.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly it comes as no

surprise to any of us in this room that we are facing a situation

today, with Colombia being, by far, the largest coca cultivation

country in the world and on the brink of political and financial disaster, and this has been happening over the last several years.

Given the power of the groups that the Colombians are fighting,

the FARC, the ELN, and perhaps other groups as well, and given

the history of dealing with armed groups, that both our Nation has

as well as other nations both in that region and in other parts of

the world, in particular I have in mind recent United States military operations against Mr. Milosevic. We didn’t negotiate with

him, and not surprisingly we beat him. President Fujimori in Peru

doesn’t negotiate with the guerrillas and the drug traffickers in his

country, and not surprisingly he beats them. The Government in

Bolivia does not negotiate with drug traffickers and guerillas in

their country, and not surprisingly they beat them.

Also, unfortunately, but not surprisingly, in Colombia, efforts to

negotiate and appease the guerrillas and the narcotraffickers have

not been successful.

Are there not some lessons here, General McCaffrey? Is there

any reason for anybody to be optimistic that attempting to negotiate with these people or to appease them or to simply make a

show of force will bring them to the negotiating table in any meaningful way?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, Mr. Congressman, I am unalterably

in favor in every case of trying to talk, not fight. In every instance,

if there is some way you can get out of using military power and

police power, you ought to do it.

Now, I think your point, though, has an underlying assumption

that can you just talk, or do we need to strengthen the capabilities

of the state, police, and the armed forces to the judicial system so

that prosecutors can act so that there is a prison system that

works? If those pieces of it aren’t there, clearly there can’t be successful negotiations.

But I would also, if I may, suggest that these decisions fundamentally have to be made by the Colombians. And we can wish

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them well, perhaps advise them. But these should not be U.S.—a

U.S. calculus on how to balance the economy, the peace process,

and the guerillas.

Mr. BARR. Why do we take such a hands off approach vis-a-vis

Colombia when we don’t in other parts of the world? This administration has been very eager to jump the gun and dictate policy in

other parts of the world. I am not saying that is good or bad. But

why is it they are so hesitant and say we can’t do anything here

when we have in other parts of the world and when the type of action that I think you and I and others know actually works against

these guerillas, and that is very clear, strong, consistent, aggressive military might against them. Why don’t we tell them that? I

don’t understand why we can’t tie our assistance to certain types

of policies that we know work that demonstrably have worked in

neighboring countries. Why such a hands off approach in Colombia

in our own backyard when we are more than willing to jump in

with all sorts of military might and dig at a time policy in other

parts of the world?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think we are very heavily involved. I think his plan we sent over, the $1.6 billion, is fundamentally dependent upon some very strong action by the Colombians, the Peruvians, the Bolivians. We are not hands off. We have got enormous United States Embassies, and a very strong robust team in

all three of these Andean Ridge nations.

I think we think they are headed in the right direction, but they

lack adequate energy and resources for the police in the armed

forces, alternative economic—— Mr. BARR. Energy is a matter of will.

General MCCAFFREY. I really—to be blunt, Mr. Congressman, I

think their political will, their courage, is not lacking.

Mr. BARR. Well, it certainly isn’t on the part of General Serrano.

General MCCAFFREY. Remember, there is 240,000 troops down

there, police and armed forces. There is a lot more than General

Serrano. We wouldn’t want to focus on a person. This is a 36 million person nation under internal attack, fueled by drug money. I

am not really disagreeing with your point, I’m just saying the negotiations are always better than fighting if you can make it work.

And in this case, I don’t see any way that the United States can

substitute our own calculus for Colombian thinking.

Mr. BARR. But it’s not just our calculus, it’s the calculus that’s

worked demonstrably very well in Peru and Bolivia. Why can’t we

say, look, if we are going to make this aid available to you, and

hopefully the State Department will finally get the message that

the law of this land is the law of this land and do what they have

been told to do, presuming that happens, and I know that is a big

presumption to make, if we send the assistance down there, and

yet the Colombian Government continues to try and appease the

FARC and to negotiate with them while losing territory and continuing to lose men, aren’t we defeating ourselves and almost guaranteeing the failure of our effort? Why don’t we tie that assistance

to some very tough negotiations and mandates to the Colombians

if we are going to be partners in this effort?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, with the exception of the despeje,

which is part of the negotiation process, there has been no time out

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given by the Colombian Government to the criminal organizations.

The counternarcotics battalion was trained and did deploy and is

now conducting combat operations against the FARC fronts in the

coca growing regions as we sit here. Those helicopters are headed

down to Larendia. There is armored cab units being moved into

place.

So there is no question their strategy is to try and regain government control in the south, reinsert the police, use alternative economic development, and eliminate coca and opium production. To

be blunt, I think it will work if we stay with them over time.

Mr. BARR. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Last for just a couple of minutes, Mr. Mark Green,

Congressman Green from Wisconsin has requested questioning.

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for extending the courtesy to appear briefly.

General McCaffrey, I represent northeastern Wisconsin. Within

northeastern Wisconsin is the Menominee Nation and Menominee

County. One of my constituents, Washina Watalk, was tragically

murdered in Colombia. Late last year, the House of Representatives passed a resolution demanding extradition of those responsible. Unfortunately, of course, we all heard just recently the President in Colombia essentially deny granting us extradition.

What is it that I can say to my constituents back in northeastern

Wisconsin that will give them some reason for hope of justice in

this matter?

General MCCAFFREY. Well, I think the brutal murder of those

three people was a tragedy. And from both a classified and public

source reporting on it, it showed the essential savage nature of the

FARC units that are involved. These people are posing no threats

to them. They were innocent lives that were tragically and brutally

thrown away.

I will be in Colombia next Tuesday. I will certainly learn more

about it and be glad to communicate back to you. I think the public

statement of President Pastrana was that they should be prosecuted under Colombian criminal law.

Mr. GREEN. If I can just follow up, and follow up on what my colleague, Congressman Barr, has been saying about putting some

conditions, expressing some sense of U.S. policy with the money

that we send down there. Certainly I think it would be appropriate

to do so with respect to extradition treaties and how those are implemented. Again, this House passed overwhelmingly I think, with

perhaps one or two negative votes, a demand for extradition. So I

would certainly suggest to you that that should be a very high priority. And as this House considers the package that has been put

together, I certainly hope to make that an important issue in the

debate.

General MCCAFFREY. I understand. I think about the extradition,

and to be honest, I have been astonished at the political courage

of the Colombians, political and physical courage. They have revised the law. President Pastrana from the start said he would

stand behind extradition. We have extradited the first Colombian

citizen for a drug-related crime. We are going after all the 30 Millennium Operation suspects. And they are paying the price for it

86

already. This has already resulted in three major bomb blasts. So

this is not a theoretical proposition.

At the same time, I would urge us, though, when it comes to extradition that we let the Attorney Generals and such go on as a

legal process and not as a political one. We have got to preserve

the rule of law dealing with evidence and extradition.

Mr. GREEN. I guess I would just add to that. I understand what

you are saying. On the other hand, these were United States citizens who were killed down there, and we are forced to rely upon

the Government of Colombia in implementing this aggressive plan.

General MCCAFFREY. Sure.

Mr. GREEN. Certainly that is part of it, our ability to rely upon

them must be justified by action. So again I understand what you

are saying. But, inevitably, this becomes part of the political arena.

And I appreciate your comments and your attention.

Mr. MICA. Well, I thank you for coming. And I also want to

thank General McCaffrey for coming and being such a patient witness today to hear viewpoints of Members of Congress.

General, this is only a sampling of those who wanted to attend

today and participate. I am sure there will be more hearings and

discussion hopefully in the next few weeks. Hopefully we can move

this package together rapidly. I think everyone wants to see something done. I think the results of this package may determine how

many more kids die on our streets. And it is of great importance

and concern to all the Members of Congress. So we thank you for

your efforts to help put this together. We look forward to working

with you.

And there being no further questions at this time, although we

will leave the record open, we will submit those and leave the

record open for 2 weeks. Thank you, sir.

General MCCAFFREY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. I would like to call our second panel this afternoon.

The second panel consists of four witnesses. First is General

Charles Wilhelm, Commander of U.S. Southern Command. Second

is Mr. William Ledwith. He is the Director of International Operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration. The third witness

is Ms. Ana Maria Salazar. She is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Support. The fourth witness is Ambassador Peter Romero. He is the Assistant Secretary for Latin America with the Department of State.

As you may know, this panel is an investigations and oversight

panel of the House of Representatives. We do swear in our witnesses. Also, if you have lengthy statements or additional material

you would like submitted other than what you are presenting verbally, we will be glad to do that. We would like to try to get some

limit on time. But we will try not to be too strict given the importance of this. If we can have all of the witnesses stand please and

be sworn.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. MICA. The witnesses answered in the affirmative. I would

like to welcome back all of these witnesses. First, we are going to

hear from General Charles Wilhelm, Commander of the U.S.

Southern Command. Pleased to have you here and also to hear

your testimony at this time. You are recognized, sir.

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STATEMENTS OF GENERAL CHARLES WILHELM, COMMANDER,

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND; WILLIAM LEDWITH, DIRECTOR

OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT

ADMINISTRATION; ANA MARIA SALAZAR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR DRUG POLICY AND SUPPORT; AND AMBASSADOR PETER ROMERO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LATIN AMERICA, DEPARTMENT OF STATE;

General WILHELM. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the

subcommittee, I welcome this opportunity to appear before you to

discuss the crisis in Colombia and the things we are doing to help

Colombia and its neighbors confront and defeat the threats posed

by narcotics traffickers.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Barr, I had a prepared opening

statement. It was a bit lengthy, and I think most of that ground

has already been covered.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, then, we will make that part of the

record. Thank you. You are recognized.

General WILHELM. Thank you, sir. My distinguished colleagues

on this panel are well qualified to address a broad range of policy

and programmatic issues related to the crisis in the Andean region.

I will focus my opening comments at the operational level, concentrating on the counterdrug assistance that Southern Command

provided to Colombian security forces during the past year and the

future initiatives that we contemplate if supplemental funding is

approved.

Mr. Chairman, during the first week of December, I had the opportunity to go to the Pentagon and to brief Secretary Cohen and

the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on what I termed the way

ahead in Colombia.

In structuring that briefing, I broke it down into three component parts. The first part I described as action plan 1999, the second part action plan 2000, and the third part action plan 2001 and

beyond. I think for the purposes of our hearing this morning, if I

briefly describe what we have accomplished and what we hope to

accomplish with our colleagues in Colombia during this three-phase

plan, it will provide an adequate foundation for the discussion to

follow.

First of all, action plan 1999: these are initiatives that are complete. During 1999, we trained 931 members of the Colombian

Army and effectively stood up the first Colombian counterdrug battalion. That battalion obtained its initial operational capability on

December 15th of last year.

In tandem with that initiative, we created a Colombian Joint Intelligence Center which was co-located with the counterdrug battalion at the base at Tres Esquinas. This Colombian Joint Intelligence

Center contains members of both the armed forces and the Colombia National Police, and we have three United States representatives there who will continue to provide instruction and technical

advice and assistance as the Joint Intelligence Center carries out

its mission of providing fused intelligence and target folders to the

Colombian—the first of the Colombian counterdrug battalions and

later the two remaining battalions and the brigade headquarters,

which will constitute the Colombian Counterdrug Brigade.

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Also, during the past year, we joined forces with our colleagues

at INL at State Department, most notably Mr. Randy Beers, and

we put the first elements of an aviation battalion in place.

Today, there are 18 UH–1N helicopters in Colombia which will

provide tactical mobility initially for the first counterdrug battalion

and subsequently after being augmented by up to 15 more UH–1Ns

for the entire Counterdrug Brigade.

So that takes me to action plan 2000. Now I should footnote my

comments about action plan 1999 by stating that the funding for

this was really carved out of existing programs at Southern Command, at State Department, and at DEP&S, which Mrs. Salazar

represents today. It was a process really of reprioritization of other

initiatives. But the funds were identified, were made available. All

those organizations have been created. And, in fact, they are operating today.

Action plan 2000 is dependent on the passage of a supplemental

funding package. The key aspects of plan 2000 include the creation

of the second and third battalions, which will round out the

Counterdrug Brigade. We will also train a brigade headquarters.

And we will provide a significant range of support to the Colombian armed forces and other elements of the security forces in Colombia to carry out interdiction activities which are essential for

the achievement of our campaign objectives.

The year 2001 and beyond is less certain at this time. We have

contracted MPRI, Military Professional Research Institute, to conduct an analysis and study of Colombia’s armed forces and to develop an operational concept, to force structures and doctrines for

Colombia’s security forces beyond the CD brigade. That would take

us into the out years.

All of these measures support a campaign plan that we have developed to better integrate our counterdrug efforts, not just in Colombia, but throughout the Andean Ridge and, for that matter, on

up through Central America and through the nations of the Caribbean that are in the region that we refer to collectively as the transit zone. This plan has been developed in three phases.

Phase 1 we term regionalization and stabilization. This is a 2-

year program which is designed to give the nations in the region

the capabilities that they need to successfully oppose the drug

threat.

Phase two we term decisive operations. During phase two, which

would also be about 2 years in duration, we would anticipate that

the nations of the region would begin to deliver blows to the drug

trafficking apparatus that would render it ineffective.

Then from year 5 on, we would enter a sustainment phase during which the nations of the region would adapt to the changing

patterns of narcotics trafficking which we have seen before and

would essentially become self-sufficient in confronting these

threats.

So in terms of a long-range strategy and something that really

almost always occurs in these dialogs, that in essence is our exit

strategy from this struggle.

I would like to conclude my opening remarks by identifying one

area that I think merits additional consideration on our parts. I am

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very much in favor of a Colombia centric plan to confront this challenge, but not a Colombia exclusive plan.

Mr. Chairman, you and Congressman Barr and other members

of the panel have already mentioned that there are other stakeholders in there, the surrounding nations. The supplemental as it

is currently framed does contain support for Bolivia and Peru,

though, quite candidly, I think not in the amounts that are necessary for them to sustain the success that they have achieved.

There has also been suggestions that funding be provided for

Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and Panama. I subscribe fully to that

because, in every sense, this cannot be described as a unilateral or

a bilateral undertaking. I think, by every definition, it is a regional

problem that commands a regional solution. As we look at the effects of drugs, I think there can be a reasonable suggestion that

this is also a hemispheric and a global problem as we look at the

transit routes being taken by drugs as they head to Europe and

other parts of the world.

Sir, I look forward to your questions during the Q and A period

that follows.

[The prepared statement of General Wilhelm follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you. And we will suspend questions until we

hear from all the panelists.

The next witness is Mr. William Ledwith, and he is Director of

International Operations with the DEA. Thank you. You are welcome.

Mr. LEDWETH. Good afternoon, Chairman Mica and members of

the subcommittee. It is a pleasure for me to appear here today and

testify in the narcotics crisis in Colombia.

We in DEA believe that the international trafficking organizations based in Colombia who smuggle illegal drugs into our country

pose a formidable challenge to the national security of the United

States.

DEA is proud to play a key role in the United States Government’s long range strategy to assist Colombia in their counterdrug

effort.

There is a wide range of witnesses here today who can, taken together, give you a broad picture of the current situation in Colombia. I am here to comment on the law enforcement aspects of dealing with the international drug trafficking organizations operating

in Colombia today.

DEA’s mission in Colombia, as in other foreign postings, is to target the most powerful international drug syndicates that operate

around the world, supplying drugs to American communities and

employing thousands of individuals to transport and distribute

their drugs.

The international drug syndicates headquartered in Colombia

and operating through Mexico and the Caribbean control both the

sources and the flow of drugs into the United States. Virtually all

of the heroin produced in Colombia is destined for the United

States market. In fact, Colombia has, over the past 5 years, become

the leading sort of heroin in the United States. Recent DEA statistical data indicates as much as 75 percent of the heroin seized and

analyzed by Federal authorities in the United States is of Colombian origin. Over half of the cocaine entering the United States

continues to come from Colombia through Mexico and across

United States border points of entry.

Colombian drug trafficking groups are no longer the monolithic

organizations they were over most of the past two decades. Experienced traffickers who have been active for years but who had

worked in the shadow of the Cali drug lords have proven adept at

seizing opportunities to increase their role in the drug trade. In addition to trafficking their own cocaine, the organizations operating

out of Colombia supply almost all of the cocaine to the Mexican

crime syndicates. The Mexican organizations purchase cocaine as

well as accepting cocaine in payment for services from Colombian

trafficking groups.

This change in the manner in which business is conducted is also

driven by the new trafficking groups arising in Colombia but have

chosen to return to the Caribbean in order to move their cocaine

to the United States.

The Colombians have franchised to criminals from other countries a portion of the mid-level wholesale cocaine and heroin trade

on the East Coast of the United States. The Colombian groups remain, however, in control of the sources of supply. These subordiVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:04 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00106 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66788.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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nates operating in the United States, and not the Colombians, are

now the ones subject to arrest, while the top level Colombians control the organization with increasingly encrypted telephone calls.

Colombia has always been the world’s No. 1 producer of finished

cocaine hydrochloride. Colombia now also has the dubious honor of

also being the world’s largest producer of cocaine base. Over the

past several years, Colombian cocaine cultivation and cocaine production have been increasing dramatically.

Colombian traffickers continue to become more self-sufficient by

increasing cocaine base production within Colombia itself to offset

the decline in base previously brought in from Peru and Bolivia.

There continues to be deep concern in DEA as in the rest of the

administration and in the Congress about the connection between

the FARC and other groups in Colombia and the drug trade.

The presence of the insurgence in Colombia’s eastern lowlands

and southern rain forest, the country’s primary cultivation and cocaine processing regions, hinders the Colombian Government’s ability to conduct counterdrug operations. The frequent ground fire

sustained by Colombian National Police eradication aircraft operating in insurgent and occupied areas shows the extent to which

some insurgent units will go to protect the economic interests of

their local constituency.

Some insurgent units raise funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations. In return for cash payments, or possibly

in exchange for weapons the insurgents protect cocaine laboratories

in southern Colombia.

The most recent DEA reporting indicates that some FARC units

in southern Colombia are indeed directly involved in drug trafficking activities, such as controlling local cocaine base markets.

Some insurgent units have assisted drug trafficking groups in

transporting and storing cocaine and marijuana within Colombia.

In particular, some insurgent units protect clandestine air strips in

southern Colombia.

The Colombian National Police continue to pursue significant

drug investigations in cooperation with the DEA. On October 13,

1999, the Colombian National Police, the Colombian Prosecutor

General’s office, DEA, the United States Attorney’s Office, and the

Department of Justice Criminal Division carried out Operation Millennium, a long-term complex investigation targeting the inner

workings of several of the most important international drug trafficking organizations operating in Colombia and Mexico. This operation resulted in the indictment and arrest of one of the former

leaders of the Medellin drug cartel along with the indictment of 30

other significant defendants from Colombia.

The United States has requested extradition of these 31 defendants. If that extradition is completed, this operation will be one of

the most successful and significant drug enforcement events since

the elimination of the Medellin cartel.

DEA will continue to direct assets and resources at the command

and control structures of the major drug trafficking organizations

operating throughout Colombia. All DEA programs in one form or

another will focus on the identification and immobilization of major

drug trafficking organizations.

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To further augment these objectives, programs such as the Andean initiative, sensitive investigative units, and the intelligence collection programs will be the primary support for DEA’s enforcement efforts.

These units will be encouraged to work simultaneously with DEA

domestic offices in the United States in coordinated transnational

investigations, targeting all aspects of these organizations so as to

maximize both the effect and the return in our investment.

To conclude, we can and should continue to identify and build

cases against the leaders of the new criminal groups from Colombia. A growing number of initiatives hold particular promise for

success. The special program of vetted units funded by the Congress under the vetted unit initiative will make it possible to continue to conduct high level drug investigations in the Colombian region without fear of compromise. This is by far a most important

investigative tool.

We intend to carry out even more of the cutting edge, sophisticated investigations like Millennium as part of a joint DOJ Criminal Division, DEA, and Colombia National Police bilateral case initiative. Such operations benefit from the closest possible cooperation from the DEA and Colombia National Police. These operations

will effectively demonstrate that even the highest level traffickers

based in foreign countries cannot manage drug operations inside

the United States with impunity.

DEA supports Plan Colombia. DEA will continue to work closely

with specially trained and vetted Colombian law enforcements

units, other Colombian law enforcement agencies, and Colombian

prosecutors to initiate joint investigations.

Colombia faces dramatic challenges to the rule of law, many of

which are directly related to drug trafficking. Plan Colombia addresses many of these elements. The support to multilateral investigations, counterdrug units, and money laundering sections of the

Justice initiative portion of Plan Colombia can support DEA, and

Colombia National Police, DOS and Colombian prosecutors’ efforts

to fight drug trafficking in Colombia.

Other sections of the Justice initiative for Plan Colombia can provide more indirect support for DEA, Colombia National Police,

DOS, and Colombian prosecutors’ efforts to investigate major Colombian drug trafficking organizations. These sections include support to money laundering, asset forfeiture, training for police prosecutors and judges, security for victims and witnesses, prison assistance, and procedural and legislative reforms to the Colombian

legal system.

Thank you for the opportunities to testify before the subcommittee today. I am happy to respond to any questions you may have.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Again, we will suspend questions and now

hear from Ana Maria Salazar, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Policy and Support. You are recognized.

Ms. SALAZAR. Thank you. I am pleased to have the opportunity

to testify once again before this committee. And I would like to convey to you that Secretary Cohen is not only aware of some of the

concerns that have been expressed in this committee, but he has

also been in conversations with the Colombian Government. He has

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met with President Pastrana and met various times with the minister of defense.

I want to say that the Department is committed to the congressionally mandated counterdrug mission. And the Department has

been performing this mission with distinction for more than a decade.

I would like to make my remarks short. If you will allow me, I

would like to submit to the record a written statement.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that material is made part of the

record.

Ms. SALAZAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe it would be

helpful for me to start out by enumerating the principles that guide

our support to Colombia.

Our legal authorities limit our assistance to the following areas,

provision of nonlethal equipment, counterdrug training,

counterdrug information sharing, and minor engineering projects.

Second, U.S. military forces have not and will not participate directly in counternarcotics operations in the field.

Third, United States forces have not and will not become involved in the Colombian Government’s counterinsurgency conflict.

Furthermore, the Government of Colombia has not solicited our assistance in their counterinsurgency efforts.

Last, we monitor the activity of our DOD, Department of Defense, presence in Colombia very carefully. We are confident that

we can continue to provide counternarcotics assistance as we have

been doing for the past 10 years without being drawn into this conflict.

Now, in response to the Plan Colombia, I—the programs that the

Department of Defense will be responsible for executing were developed by the CINC and his team and our interagency partners,

including DEA and the Intelligence Community.

And more importantly, the Department of Defense packet part of

the supplemental was in response to what the Colombians asked

us for. The Department of Defense programs in the supplemental

are not new. They are enhancements to the mandated counterdrug

responsibilities in the region.

Now, General Wilhelm gave you a summary of the different programs that the Department of Defense is not only sponsoring or

supporting this moment in Colombia, but would hope to support if

the supplemental was passed. Instead of me going through what

these programs are, I would just like to add two more comments

that, to some of the descriptions of the programs provided by General Wilhelm.

I would just like to emphasize that, as we undertake the training

of these battalions, we will not have a substantial increase in our

footprint; that is, our military presence in Colombia.

Another comment I would like to make, that we plan to enhance

existing intelligence collection efforts in parts in base to some of

the requests we have received from General Wilhelm, but also

based on the requests we have received from the Colombians. We

believe that is an essential element for ensuring the success of

these programs.

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We feel that the supplemental is a balanced and executable plan.

However, we do know that there are challenges, and I would like

to enumerate some of these challenges that we foresee.

Military reform. First, the Colombian military is not optimally

structured to conduct sustained counterdrug operations. And I believe General Wilhelm mentioned some of the issues that he has

encountered and some of the problems that we plan to do and what

we plan to do in order to support them.

Second, human rights. We have expressed to the Colombian government the importance of human rights, the practices and procedures the United States has put in place, such as vetting every single person that receives training from the United States Government is one example. Another example is United States soldiers

who train their Colombian counterparts who serve as examples,

which we also believe have made a difference.

Also important I believe is President Pastrana’s reforms that he

has indicated such as the overhaul of the military justice system,

and General Tapias’ interest in going after high level officials within the Colombian Army who he believes or there is some indications that they have participated in human rights violations. Nonetheless, we must remain vigilant. There is also room for improvement.

Last, I want to make a comment about the counterdrug versus

the counterinsurgency issues. As I alluded to before, the Department of Defense will not step over the line that divides counterdrug

from counterinsurgency. We have safeguards in place to assure

that our existing policy remains inviolate. These safeguards include

extensive reviews of where United States forces will be deployed for

training as well as end use monitoring regime, which includes looking after as to how the assets we provide Colombia will be used.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense fully

supports the supplemental request to support Plan Colombia. We

believe this package represents a sound, responsive, and timely assistance. President Pastrana asked for our help to control the flow

of illegal drugs coming into the United States. It is time to move

forward. And I hope that with your support we can do this soon.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your comments.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Salazar follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you. Our last witness on this panel is Ambassador Peter Romero, Assistance Secretary of State for Latin America. You are welcome, sir.

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, with

your indulgence, I had prepared a statement and I would like to

submit it for the record.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, the entire statement will be made

part of the record.

Mr. ROMERO. What I would like to do with your indulgence, is

to talk a little bit about three issues that were touched upon but

not really delved into by the committee as the panel started and

even before and with Barry McCaffrey.

First of all, let me say, just to give you some political context to

the politics of negotiations with the FARC and others in Colombia,

President Pastrana was in a dead heat back in 1998 with his adversary running for the Presidency, a guy by the name of Horacio

Serpa. And he decided that what the country really wanted more

than anything else was peace. And he leaned into the peace issue,

talked about how to get it done, made contacts with the guerrilla

groups, and won those elections where he was trailing by 6 percent,

and came out ahead by about 6 percent. He visited the FARC headquarters, did some other dramatic gestures, and said that peace

was going to be his highest priority.

Now, he was inaugurated in August 1998, and it is February of

the year 2000. And there is unmistakable evidence that the FARC

didn’t necessarily share his optimism about the peace talks. Quite

to the contrary, their strategy from the very beginning was to talk

and fight, with the emphasis on the latter as opposed to the

former. And 18 months or so later, we are just now beginning to

see some fruit from all of the hopes of the Colombian people.

A couple months ago, the Colombians put about 10 million people

out of a population of about 36 million in the street in support of

peace. There have been a number of other demonstrations. Let me

just sum them up by saying that there is overwhelming and widespread support for continued negotiations with all of the irregular

forces down there.

For our purposes and for the purposes of the Colombian Government, that does not mean that they can’t talk and fight at the

same time. It is obvious that the FARC guerrillas have adopted

that strategy. I think the Colombian Government very much knows

that that is what they need to do.

In terms of the push into the south and to the area called

Putamayo, if I might beg your indulgence, this is the area right

around where the highlighter is. And this is an area east of the

Andes and the plains and jungles. This whole area, encompassing

about 60 percent of the land mass of Colombia only has about 8

percent of the population. And most of that 8 percent is located in

this Putamayo area. It is a population of about 263,000 people,

mostly rural. 31,000—or 65,000 directly get their income from coca

growing. And 60 percent of the economy down there is derived from

illicit crops such as coca.

It is going to be difficult. There were mass demonstrations in the

summer of 1996 when the government tried to stop the introduction of precursor chemicals into the region. There is absolutely no

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doubt that the guerrillas animated the general population to disrupt the police deployments to the area.

So that is the main reason why our Plan Colombia package emphasizes the military. But the emphasis that is on the military

does not end there. It incorporates the police. It incorporates civilian agencies. PLANTE, the alternative development agency, will go

in to provide for alternative crops. There will be microcredits.

There will be human rights observers down there. They will hold

local elections. There will be all of the things that are essential to

the democratic process at the grassroots. If the $145 million that we have identified in our support for

Plan Colombia is not enough, it is only because, in the initial

stages, the emphasis has to be on winning this area back under the

control of the Colombian Government.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Romero follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you. I appreciate all of our witnesses’ statements. Let me get right into some questions.

Ms. Salazar, one of my concerns is that it doesn’t appear that

supporting this anti-narcotics effort has been either a priority of

the administration or DOD. Let me have this chart here. I requested a GAO independent study of what is taking place and got

these results back just a month ago, as you know, and we held a

hearing on this.

But this shows SouthCom requesting—these are the requests

here in the tall order, and the red was actually what was delivered.

You actually see a decrease in what is being provided to SouthCom

in this effort. What is happening?

Ms. SALAZAR. During my, and I appreciate the opportunity I had

to testify about this approximately 2 weeks ago. And what—and,

there is a number of issues here. We are very conscious, the Department of Defense is very, very conscious of the CINC’s request

for more intelligence asset support and also detection and monitoring support. And as we had stated before, a number of these assets

are used not only in counterdrug missions for the Americas but are

used in other missions around the world.

Mr. MICA. So they are being diverted to other nations around the

world.

Ms. SALAZAR. And as we had explained in the prior instance, we

are talking about missions to Kosovo or Iraq. Now, with that said,

sir, I mean, there has been a number of us within the Department

that, and I am probably one of the loudest voices, that we have

fought quite vehemently and underlied the need to provide the

CINC this type of support.

But when you have these other types of missions which are the

main priority for the Department of Defense coming on board, it is

difficult, and I find myself putting myself in the Secretary’s shoes

and having to make the decisions and Generals and the Joint Staff

and how they have to make these decisions with relatively very few

assets in trying to allocate those assets in the best way possible.

Mr. MICA. Well, you know, as a Member of Congress, I am concerned. I cited 15,973 Americans lost their lives in the most recent

statistics I have due to drug related causes. The General corrected

all of us and said 52,000. Did I hear him correct? I think you heard

that. How many Americans died in Kosovo, Ms. Salazar?

Ms. SALAZAR. I couldn’t give you the numbers.

Mr. MICA. Were there any civilian casualties even before we went

in?

But, you know, the situation just got out of hand. And we have

tried repeatedly, I have been on this panel and in this committee

since 1993, and you could almost predict what was going to happen.

To the package, Mr. Ledwith, are there any vetted units that you

spoke about the need for in this package?

Mr. LEDWETH. Are there vetted units asked for in that package,

sir?

Mr. MICA. Yes.

General MCCAFFREY. No, sir, there are not.

Mr. MICA. And you think that is a key element that we need at

least from the enforcement side?

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General MCCAFFREY. Our experience with vetted units, sir, is

they have allowed us to work in investigations at the very, very

highest level without fear of compromise. Operation Millennium

comes to mind. We would not have been able to conduct that operation without the tremendous input of the Department of Justice,

the Colombia National Police, the DEA, and of course the vetted

units.

Mr. MICA. General Wilhelm, in the report that I requested, can

you brief me, during the holidays, you said we can only detect ‘‘15

percent of the activity 15 percent of the time.’’ And with our loss

of the base in Panama today, what is our capability to detect drugs

coming into the country?

General WILHELM. Mr. Chairman, that was a correct recital of

what I told you during our meeting in Miami over the holidays. On

any given day, we can cover about 15 percent of the area 15 percent of the time. You may recall that I mentioned that, to a very

large extent, that is more a statement about the size of the area

than it is the sufficiency of resources.

Mr. MICA. But given the loss of Panama as a base and operating

or forward operating location, what is our capability now say compared to a year ago?

General WILHELM. It is much reduced, sir. We closed the runway

at Howard on May 1st of last year. Prior to that time, during any

given year, we operated 21 different kinds of aircraft in the

counterdrug struggle and conducted about 2,000 missions a year.

To replace Howard, as you know, sir, we have developed the concept of the forward operating locations that General McCaffrey

spoke about. Right now, we have the capacity at the FOLs, Curacao, Aruba, and Manta, Ecuador to run about a third of the missions that we ran out of Howard. The key point there is the need

for expedited funding so that we can develop the capacities and the

capabilities of those FOLs, so we can restore the capabilities that

we had prior to the Howard closing. As I know you are aware, Mr. Chairman, there is $38.6 million

in the supplemental during fiscal year 2000 to do the horizontal

construction at Manta, Ecuador, and I really need to underscore

the importance of Manta. For Manta, we did sign the long-term 10-

year agreement, which was of concern to the Congress. That took

place on January 18th. Manta is the one site that provides coverage of Peru, all of Colombia, and most of Bolivia. So when we are

talking about the deep Source Zone where the majority of cultivation takes place, where we have the majority of the laboratories,

that is precisely the region we can access for Manta. That part of

the supplemental is crucial to us, sir.

Mr. MICA. Manta is the base in Ecuador that needs the most

work; is that correct?

General WILHELM. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MICA. Can you point that out on the map?

General WILHELM. It’s right about here. Thanks, Pete.

Mr. ROMERO. Taking a page out of your book, Charlie.

General WILHELM. On the coast.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. We have seen in the last few weeks the

FARC now going to Europe and looking to negotiate. Now, I cannot

believe that the only reason they are going there is for peace purVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:04 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00127 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66788.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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poses on their own. But I think that even the sheer threat of this

enormous aid package has them inclined to negotiate before some

of this arrives. Is that correct, Mr. Ambassador?

Mr. ROMERO. Mr. Chairman, if you peel away FARC rhetoric

about our package, which basically says things like this will only

militarize the situation, prolong the war, et cetera, and you look at

what has happened over the last couple of weeks, you get a very

clear sense that the aid package is having the desired effect.

I went down to Colombia with the Secretary a couple of weeks

ago, and it was no mistake that when she went down there a few

days after the aid package, our intention to go to you all for such

package was announced here in Washington. The supreme leader

of the FARC came out with a statement basically saying that there

is just a few little minor details, but they are ready to crank up

the negotiations seriously.

I think that there is a causal effect. They did go to Sweden and

Norway, and I’m told that they had a meeting at the Vatican today.

I think all of that is a direct result of the fact that they see the

writing on the wall.

Mr. MICA. Plus, we have one unit—the situation has been a disaster as far as military incursions and operations against the

FARC until just a few weeks ago when our one trained battalion

finally was deployed, and I understand that was successful. So I

think they see the handwriting on the wall.

Finally, Ms. Salazar, I would like on my desk by the close of

business next week the location of every Blackhawk helicopter that

both the DOD and our reserve force have because we’re going to

figure out some way to get some assets down there sooner rather

than later.

With that, I yield to the ranking member.

Mrs. MINK. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ledwith, did I hear you correctly when—in response to the

chairman’s question about vetted units, that there was no addition

in this plan to augment these programs that have been so successful?

Mr. LEDWITH. There is no specific line item that I am aware of

at this time. We have had significant resources over the last few

years, both by the administration and by Congress, to allow us to

establish the vetted unit program. We’ve been able to expand it to

many countries utilizing the congressional funding, and my understanding is there is not any specific language as to more vetted

units in this bill.

Mrs. MINK. In your opinion, would that be one way of strengthening the Colombian law enforcement agencies in doing a more

comprehensive job in reaching out and getting all of these drug

traffickers?

Mr. LEDWITH. We have found the vetted unit program throughout the region—and I speak regionally because it’s regional issue—

we have found the vetted unit program to allow us to target the

highest levels of organizational structures and to work without fear

of compromise. So, yes, the vetted program is a tremendous investigative tool, and it must be taken regionally, of course, because if

the operations in Colombia impact on the——

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Mrs. MINK. How successful have they been up to now in Colombia?

Mr. LEDWITH. Our vetted unit program has resulted in the most

major investigative successes enjoyed with the Colombian National

Police.

Mrs. MINK. Why not would a program like this be increased and

given additional resources if they have been successful, if indeed

one of the five points in the plan in Colombia is a drug strategy,

counterdrug strategy?

Mr. LEDWITH. I can’t answer that directly. I would say that we

have had a significant infusion of resources in the last few years

that have enabled us to project vetted units, at least eight vetted

units in each of the countries in that region.

Mrs. MINK. But the whole justification for the Colombian plan is

that, notwithstanding what we have done up to now, is that there

are these increased production and increased trafficking from Colombia into the United States. So clearly something more than

what currently is in fact in place needs to be done in order for us

to make a significant impact on this increased trafficking.

Mr. LEDWITH. I think anything that can be done to assist the Colombians in this effort is worthwhile, ma’am.

Mrs. MINK. In your testimony, Mr. Ledwith, on page 7 you talk

about the FARC units in southern Colombia and you note there remains, however, no information that any FARC or ELN units have

established international transportation, wholesale distribution or

drug-money-laundering networks in the United States. Would you

expand on that sentence?

Mr. LEDWITH. It is a very dynamic situation. We’re watching it

very closely. As of this date, we have no definitive evidence that

the FARC has expanded their activities outside of Colombia is

what I am saying in that comment. They are very much involved

in drug trafficking in a variety of levels within Colombia, but at

this point we do not have definitive proof that they have taken

those activities outside of Colombia.

Mrs. MINK. Then you go on in that same paragraph to say northern and central Colombia continues to be the primary base of operations for paramilitary groups. Recent reporting indicates paramilitary groups have become more active in southern Colombia.

You want to expand on that?

Mr. LEDWITH. We are also greatly concerned about the activities

of the paramilitary organization, the human rights violations and

a variety of concerns. So we watch them very closely. I meant to

imply that we are not solely focused on the FARC.

Mrs. MINK. And then you go on to explain that they’re not significantly involved in poppy cultivation and marijuana but that, in

the last paragraph you say, several paramilitary groups also raise

funds through extortion or by protecting laboratory operations in

northern and central Colombia. The Carlos Castano organization,

possibly other paramilitary groups, appear to be directly involved

in processing cocaine. Will you comment on that further?

Mr. LEDWITH. Yes. I would be saying that there is not a definitive institutional involvement, but there are limited circumstances

in which there is a more direct managerial role, and that particular

incident is one I would be referring to.

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Mrs. MINK. Which paramilitary groups are involved in drug

trade?

Mr. LEDWITH. I would be happy to respond to you, ma’am, in a

more private opportunity, if we may, with that information.

Mrs. MINK. The reason for my inquiry here is that we did submit

five questions to the DEA for response after the August hearing,

and we have not yet received a reply. So I was going to interject

those same questions into the record so I might get an understanding that those questions which were submitted to you in August

would in fact be responded to me here in the record, for the record

or to my office directly. I would certainly appreciate it.

Mr. LEDWITH. I’m very sorry to hear you were not given an appropriate response. I can assure you that you will be.

[The information referred to follows:]

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Mr. MICA. If may I followup, can you testify before us that there

is any right wing paramilitary efforts being supported by drug trafficking?

Mr. LEDWITH. We have information that would indicate that certain paramilitary elements are deriving income from extortion of

drug trafficking activities, yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mrs. MINK. I’m not through, but I’ll yield my time. I’ll take my

second round.

Mr. MICA. Our vice chairman then, Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

If I could ask Mr. Macklin to put up two pictures, if you could

put them both up, maybe hold the other one.

We talk about negotiating with terrorists, and it’s sort of a theoretical discussion that we’ve had. My view is you negotiate with

terrorists and you lose, and I think that’s the experience of people

that have tried that.

These two pictures are Jorge Briceno Suarez, alias Mono Jojoy,

chief military officer of the FARC, and No. 2 is Henri Castillanos,

alias Remanya, Eastern Bloc commandante for FARC. Would any

of the four of you like to sit down with these gentlemen and think

you would be successful in negotiating with them? I didn’t think so.

With regard to our loss of operational capability out of Howard

Air Force Base and the other facilities we maintained until recently

in Panama, how long has it been that we have known that the capability that previously we maintained at Howard, for example,

would be lost in 1999? Was this something that popped up in 1999

or had we known for quite some time that we would lose that capability?

General WILHELM. Congressman Barr, I will take that question.

As you know, the decision to close the facilities at Howard came

at the end of an extended series of negotiations with the Panamanians which were really oriented toward preserving a post-2000

presence in Panama. Quite frankly, when I assumed command of

Southern Command in September 1997, I did so with about a 95

percent expectation that in the year 2000 I’d have somewhere between 2,500 and 3,500 troops on the ground, that that 8,500 foot

runway would be open and that we would be conducting the

counterdrug operations, the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance support missions that I discussed previously from Howard.

As we all know, I was wrong. The negotiations did not pan out,

and we were left very much short-sheeted. We had a lot to do, not

much time to do it in, and, of course, we had international negotiations.

Mr. BARR. In what agency of our government was the decision

made not to make any contingency plans whatsoever to have that

capability sustained somewhere else?

Basically, it seems what happened is we had these negotiations,

and they didn’t go anywhere. And we could argue, I suppose, over

why they didn’t go anywhere, but apparently we had no contingency plans whatsoever. Where was the decision in our government

made to have no contingency plans? And now we’re basically playing catch-up, trying to both maintain some sort of capability with

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regard to monitoring the air routes, at the same time as we’re engaged in ongoing negotiations with the very basics of how to construct and maintain and pay for those facilities. Was this the Department of State that made the decision to not have contingency

plans, was it Defense, DEA, or was it the military?

General WILHELM. Congressman Barr, again, if I could, let me

just answer for my part of the U.S. Government, U.S. Southern

Command. We did begin to frame contingency plans long before the

negotiations were terminated with Panama; and, in fact, we did an

inspection of the region. We made an assessment based on geography, range, operational reach, capabilities of existing air fields

and probability of successful negotiations as to where——

Mr. BARR. If the military did its job, and I certainly believe that’s

accurate, where was the decision made not to implement any of

that? Was that a policy decision that the Secretary of State made

or the Secretary of Defense or the President?

General WILHELM. Sir, I’ll lead off, and then pass perhaps down

to Ambassador Romero. From my point of view, sir, we actually

started the ball rolling to identify and to start getting dialogs going

on a bilateral basis with the Netherlands for Curacao and Aruba

and with Ecuador for Manta before the talks were terminated with

Panama. I met personally with President Mahuad in Ecuador. I

met with President Fujimori in Peru because we had a couple of

candidate sites there, and I met with the Governor General in the

Netherlands Antilles and with the commander of the Netherlands

forces in the Antilles.

I’d have to pass it on to Ambassador Romero to comment on the

Washington side of that.

Mr. ROMERO. Well, first of all, I think if you’re talking about

Howard Air Force Base you’re talking about an installation whose

geography and infrastructure was just about as optimum as it gets

in terms of counternarcotics flights in the region, and I think Charlie will support me on that. I don’t think that there was a hiccup

between the time that we essentially decided that there was no

way ahead with respect to the Panamanians and the time that we

actually launched people into the field to start talking to those governments where we thought forward operating locations in the alternative would work.

First of all, we got interim agreements almost immediately on

those three locales. We nailed down a permanent agreement with

the Ecuadorians in, I think, record time, and we are scheduled to

sign the agreements with the Netherlands Antilles, with Curacao

and Aruba within the next 21⁄2 weeks. We still need another one

in Central America because the flow, I’m told, is moving west into

the Pacific, and there needs to be better coverage in that area

north of Colombia and up on the western side of the isthmus.

It’s architecture that we’re putting together, but then there’s a

lot of shortfalls in terms of installations and infrastructure that

General Wilhelm was talking about that we will need to put together. It’s just not automatically down there in the places where

we need them.

Mr. BARR. I know it’s clearly not automatically down there, but

it seems to me that there are a few instances in the history of our

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relations with other countries where we have not had more forewarning of something that was going to happen.

This treaty was signed in the late 1970’s, and knowing these

countries, as you all do, having engaged in many, many negotiations with other countries with regard to base rights and landing

rights and so forth, you all know that it takes a long time. It just

seems to me that looking, as the General has said, that even with

all of the 1997, 1998 assets available, SOUTHCOM will be able to

cover 15 percent of key trafficking routes 15 percent of the time,

a very, very small percentage of coverage.

And yet we’re still trying to negotiate—it’s my understanding we

don’t even have, as the General stated in his written testimony, allweather, 24-hour operations. Those aren’t even set to begin for several months. And I’m mystified as to there seems to be a huge gap

here between an anticipated event that we’ve known for 20 years

was going to come, even though there was a possibility at some

point in time that we might have been able to negotiate a continued presence in Panama, that was just a contingency, and here we

are with virtually no capability at all right now except for very

small coverage. I’m just astounded that we have this huge gap

there.

Will we have additional time, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. MICA. Yes, I think we’re going to go around.

Mr. BARR. OK. I would like the record to reflect when I requested

of the four panelists if any of them would like to sit down and negotiate with these two men with any degree of likelihood of success

that nobody raised their hand.

Mr. MICA. I might just say that at this point one of the problems

we have in Manta, I understand the runway is in such bad shape

some of the key aircraft can’t use it. In Aruba, we have limited

take-off capability, particularly now in the tourist seasons when

those planes get priority.

Ms. Schakowsky.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to apologize to the panel that I was not able to hear your

testimony. If my questions have already been answered, just refer

me to your testimony, and I will move on.

It’s my understanding, General—correct me if I’m wrong—that

over 200 U.S. military personnel are in Colombia on any given day

right now on intelligence training and radar missions; is that correct?

General WILHELM. No, ma’am, not entirely. This is a fluid number. It depends on what we happen to be doing on a given day. It

can go from a low of 80 to a high of about 220. I think a good daily

average over the last year as we have been involved in training

these new Colombian army units has been in the range of about

150 to 180. I think that’s a good ballpark average.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I wanted to ask then how the U.S. military

presence will change as a result of this stepped-up program, if at

all?

General WILHELM. I think it will change in some subtle ways,

and I have recommended that it change in some subtle ways. We

have a pretty ambitious training program for the year 2000, assuming that the supplemental is approved, but honestly I believe

135

that we can achieve most of what we need to do at the force levels

that we’ve had during the past year. We’ll train two battalions,

with just a minor overlap, just to make it specific.

We conducted this training in three phases. During the first two

phases we used about 57 soldiers each time from the 7th Special

Forces Group. The third phase, which involved integration training, was a little bit more complex, and we went up to about 65 with

some additional specialists who were conducting intelligence and

other training. I suspect we’re going to stay in the ballpark during

the year 2000. The area that I would like to see some adjustments

is in our management capabilities.

If this supplemental is approved, the military group that works

for me in Bogota right now and supports Ambassador Kamman and

the country team I believe will be far too thin to really do the management tasks that will confront it. Also, we have a colonel right

now who is very well qualified, but I believe that our interests

would be very well served by putting a general officer on the

ground in Colombia. He provides seniority, probably access to some

meetings and conferences where I think our participation would be

indicated. I think we’re just going to need more depth to do the job

the way it needs to be done.

General McCaffrey, during his testimony, commented about the

need to develop an integrated interagency mechanism, here in

Washington, to oversee the same task. They will be asking the

questions. I need enough people with the right seniority and the

right skills to provide the answers from Colombia. Not a big upsurge, but some increase in numbers and some increase in seniority.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

I wanted to ask a couple of questions about the human rights

performance of the Pastrana government and of the security forces.

You know, we could put up a lot of pictures of unsavory people

in Colombia, and I’m sure that none of them would be the kind of

individuals that we would want to sit down with. Nonetheless, we

are engaged in a struggle to find, at some point, a solution that

would stabilize the Government of Colombia, and I’m concerned

about the poor performance according to the State Department that

the Pastrana government has on human rights.

I know that we have the Leahy amendment which says that the

security forces cannot receive U.S. counternarcotics aid if there’s

credible evidence of gross human rights violations. But the State

Department has found that three of the six army brigades that operate in the major drug trafficking areas have not taken effective

measures to bring soldiers responsible for gross human rights violations to justice.

So I’m asking, and I’m not sure to whom, maybe you, Ambassador, what you would recommend that the Colombian Government

do to root out the soldiers that are believed to have engaged in

these human rights violations?

Mr. ROMERO. As someone who was pretty low on the totem pole

back in the early 1980’s and involved in Central America, I have

to tell you that had President Reagan gotten the response from the

Salvadoran Government that we are getting from the Pastrana

government vis-a-vis human rights, President Reagan would have

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been kicking up his heels. President Pastrana has cashiered four

generals. He has removed about two dozen colonels and majors,

some of them are under indictment, others are still being investigated.

We, for our part, are implementing faithfully to the Leahy

amendment. Those units that you were talking about, if they don’t

pass muster they will not get U.S. assistance, whether it be materiel or training.

The counternarcotics unit that Charlie is standing up have all of

their officers vetted for human rights to ensure that they haven’t

engaged in gross violations of human rights. This is not something

that we only insist upon; this is something that President Pastrana

insists upon. That’s not to say that there are no human rights violations or, more accurately, that there aren’t connections between

some officers and paramilitary groups—there are—but I think that

President Pastrana has done a good job and continues to be committed to rooting out those bad officers and getting rid of them.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Are you satisfied that progress has been made

on upgrading the penal code? You say four generals. I know about

three in the information I have.

Mr. ROMERO. I have got the fourth one here that I can give you.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. That they’re not currently under investigation

for their role in human rights abuse and they aren’t going to be

brought to trial, that there’s 500 outstanding arrest warrants

issued by the Attorney General’s office against paramilitary groups

and, as you know, have the security forces really act decisively regarding those outstanding warrants.

The penal code—I understand that some of the provisions—a

provision that crimes against dignity could not be tried in a military court system or was removed so that jurisdiction over cases of

human rights violations will be conducted on the current practice

on a case-by-case basis, and some of the most important, in some

of our views, provisions were not in the penal code. Are they making the progress that is satisfying to you?

Mr. ROMERO. I don’t think any of us are satisfied, but I have to

tell you that I think if there had been this much progress back in

1980 in El Salvador that war would have been a whole lot shorter.

We are firmly convinced that when you have gross violations of

human rights, you’re only politicizing the countryside and forcing

kids to sign up with one side or the other. And I think that President Pastrana, when you look that he’s been in office for 18 months

and what he’s been able to implement within that armed force it’s

pretty spectacular. Are we satisfied? We’re not satisfied.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Do you feel that built into the aid that we’re

giving there are enough accountability measures so that at every

step of the way that we can go back and assess compliance with

standards of human dignity?

Mr. ROMERO. The Leahy amendment in its practice provides that

there has to be followup and there has to be accountability, and

only then will we be able to certify that a unit, even in this particular case, who has had officers who committed gross violations, that

they have taken the steps necessary to correct it and to punish

those responsible. And, in this case, if they don’t take those measVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:04 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00140 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66788.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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ures, then we’ll be pressing the Colombian Government, and we’ll

be cutting off aid to that unit.

Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. Souder, as soon as you get settled, we’re pleased to recognize

you.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

I have, if I could—and I’m sorry I got tied up with arguably one

of the most important groups in your district, that is broadcasting

people from the TV and radio, and I wanted to come back over. But

if I could followup on a couple of the questions that I had raised

earlier, maybe start with General Wilhelm—it’s good to see you

again—as well as Ms. Salazar who, in Santiago, went through

some of our discussions before as we argued about helicopters and

a number of other things.

I raised the question and I would like to hear an official response

on some of the concerns I raised about the military units.

Because, in the Defense Department, they come up with these

new antinarcotics groups, there is a concern about whether they’re

going to use draftees, about whether they’re going to be high school

graduates and about whether there’s going to be pay such that it

becomes an elite division. Defense Secretary Ramirez told me that

was their goal, and they were moving in that direction. But, as I

understand it, draftees only have to serve 1 year, and we’re talking

about having to train pilots, we’re talking about people who need

long-term commitments. What specific guarantees do we have on

behalf of the taxpayers of the United States that if we try to build

a new unit that this is in fact going to be a fully vetted, welltrained, long-term, committed people who will be able to operate

the helicopters and the equipment?

General WILHELM. Congressman Souder, I will lead off on that,

if it’s all right, sir.

First of all, there has really been a high degree of selectivity as

to who is in these units, starting with individual vetting of the officers in the first counterdrug battalion. This battalion was really

formed of soldiers who came from two sources. One were professional career soldiers who volunteered to become members of the

counterdrug battalion. The second were a limited number of

conscripts who changed their status and became professional soldiers and accepted a longer term of service.

And I know you’re aware, sir, that there are two pay scales in

the Colombian military. The professional soldier is paid at one level

and the conscript at another. So those conscripts who volunteered

to join the CD battalion and to become professional soldiers then

immediately went to the higher pay level.

Education in and of itself, with the exception of one category of

soldiers, isn’t treated quite the same in Colombia as it is in the

United States. To my knowledge, sir, there is really no specific criteria on enlistment for high school graduates in the Colombian

Army. The exception are the Bachilleres.

Mr. SOUDER. May I ask you a followup question to that? My understanding is if you have a high school degree you can’t be sent

to a combat zone without your approval.

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General WILHELM. These are the Bachilleres, sir. Somewhere between 35 and 40,000, depending on who you talk about, who, based

on their education level, sign a contract but they’re immediately exempted from combat duties.

You may recall, sir, during one of our first meetings when Minister Rodrigo Lloreda was still the minister of defense that was

really the cardinal vector in his reform of the armed forces program. He wanted to do away with the Bachilleres. Defense Minister Luis Ramirez, who has replaced Minister Lloreda, has continued on that track. He is supported fully by General Tapias and by

General Mora, the commander of the army. They are still very

much committed to ending the Bachilleres program.

What they contemplate, sir, is to reduce the overall end-strength

of the army, not a one-for-one conversion of Bachilleres to professional soldiers, but something less than that. But then whatever

revenues are saved can be devoted to modernization and to including—or to improving force capabilities.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Ms. Salazar, did you have anything to add?

Ms. SALAZAR. I really don’t have any other comment to add except that another area we’re looking at is kind of responding to

some of your concern, is that with any type of program like this,

one of the things we look at is also trying to make sure that we

develop the Colombians, in this case Colombian’s capability, to

train trainers who then would have the responsibility of being able

to support the training capacity that this unit would have as some

of these people are moving out, just out of normal attrition. We

have to expect there’s going to be movement of these people. That’s

an important aspect of the program.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Ledwith, we’re pleased that we finally have

started some of the extradition process which has been bogged

down for a long time in Colombia. What would you say was the

critical thing that moved that forward?

Mr. LEDWITH. I think the process is going forward at an appropriate rate right now. We have some 40 extradition requests pending with the Government of Colombia. The Government of Colombia has been dealing with them in a very forthright nature.

We have seen the first Colombian citizen expedited here some

time ago. Jaime La Hernosa was brought here to face heroin trafficking charges in New York.

I think we’re proceeding in the appropriate direction at this time,

sir. I think we also need to allow the judicial process to work its

way through the Colombian system while we do this.

Mr. SOUDER. If I could make one other brief comment, and General Wilhelm, if you want to comment I invite you to do so, that

General McCaffrey had made a statement. In fact, he made it multiple times, which I agree with in fundamental principle, that we

need to respect the Colombian Government’s systems and that, as

we debate the national police and the Defense Department, we

need to respect the fact that they would like to buildup the Defense

Department.

There’s no question that there are both personal and political rivalries inside Colombia about how to approach this. But I think it’s

important that we don’t overstate that as we get into this package.

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Because, the fact is, I’m very proud from the time I talked to

you—I’m proud of how you behaved in throwing yourself into this

job to try to help Colombia buildup their military and try to save

this country. Because if we can save it, we have some hope of licking the drug problem here. If we lose it, we are in deep trouble.

And you understood firsthand that you were going to go down

there and help them, but the truth is, as we develop the package

and as you have told me personally, as did General Clark and General McCaffrey before that, their military is very backward, and

they’re developing that. But I’m saying as far as what they need

and how to attack this, command and control is a word we’ve

talked about, and there are different systems.

The important variable of that is in talking with their government—and I fully support trying to get a package if in fact we

can—is they depend a lot on our input as to what that package

was, and for us to act like the mix of the package was only their

choice rather than us inputting; it was a mix, and we can continue

to mix it.

Furthermore, the Europeans have chosen in their package not to

help the military. They want to do all the alternative development

stuff. So, that means our package is skewed toward the military

side.

And I also heard General McCaffrey say that the Colombian Government wants to take care of the national police, us putting the

dollars into the military. It’s nice if they want Blackhawks. I mean,

I’m supportive of Blackhawks, too. But the truth is—I want to

make that clear—that we want to figure out, too, and have an

input into the mix. And we have a right as the U.S. Government,

since we’re representing taxpayers and their dollars, to input into

that mix, too. And while we need to be sensitive to their internal

structures and not say buildup the national police solely when

they’re asking for defense, it doesn’t mean that we don’t have some

discretion in our package to talk about that. Nor does it mean that

their package was solely developed by them without input from our

Defense Department, our State Department, and others.

And I felt it was important to say that for the record, and if I

have made any misstatements on that or any clarifications that

you want to add, you can do so.

General WILHELM. Congressman Souder, I think that is a good

and very valid statement.

I tried to get out of the mode of talking about their package and

the package that we developed and talk about our package, more

of a consultative approach to what Colombia’s needs are.

Sir, it’s true that the performance of their armed forces left a

great deal to be desired, certainly from about mid-1998 back to

about 1995 or thereabouts. I probably wouldn’t say they were backward. They suffered a real loss of credibility. Part of it was their

own doing. A lot of it was due to the human rights violations which

Ms. Schakowsky discussed, which plagued the armed forces; and

indeed in 1993 the armed forces were really charged with about 53

percent of the human rights violations.

Today, the breakout is about 70 percent to the paramilitaries,

over 25 percent to the guerrillas, and somewhere between 3 and 5

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percent to the military, which is a way of saying they cleaned up

their act.

They’re proud of that. But I would tell you, if Fernando Tapias,

the commander of the armed forces, were sitting here, he would

contradict me. He would say, ‘‘no, I’m not proud of it’’; 3 percent

is 3 percent too many. I’ve known him for a long time, and I think

he really means that.

Sir, your other statement about the relationship between the

military and the national police I think does deserve perhaps a little bit broader airing. As we’ve gone through the process of developing this expanded assistance package, I, for one, have never suggested that one thin dime be diverted from the support to the national police. There are a lot of admirers of General Jose Serrano

in this room, and I’m one of them. I believe that we should continue to make an investment in a blue chip stock which the Colombian National Police have been.

My contention, and the one we talked about at the very outset,

sir, was that I was afraid that Colombia’s security forces had gotten out of balance. The Colombian National Police had a capability

at this level, the armed forces at this level, and to really win the

struggle therein, I felt they needed to be brought into balance. I

really believed that that’s what the supplemental, as it’s currently

framed, will do or start to do, and I’ve really pushed with both

General Serrano and General Tapias that this really should not be

competitive. They should seek to be complementary, one to the

other. They’re classmates. Personally, they get along well, and I

think they have their two institutions moving on a positive and

productive track.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairman.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Just to wind up a couple of questions, we’ll go through here and

see if anyone has any remaining.

Mr. Ledwith, it’s been testified that 75 percent approximately of

the heroin coming into the United States according to your signature analysis comes from Colombia; is that correct?

Mr. LEDWITH. As much as.

Mr. MICA. As much as. What percentage of cocaine today—60, 70

percent probably?

Mr. LEDWITH. At the very least, sir.

Mr. MICA. At the very least. So this doesn’t appear to be rocket

science to see where this stuff is coming from that’s ending up on

our streets.

We also heard testimony from the drug czar and from our summit last week that 75 percent of the heroin in the world is produced in Afghanistan, which pretty much narrows down the hard

narcotic sources. With that in mind, Mr. Romero, the only—now

this war is a little bit like Jell-O, you push it down one place, it

pops up another. Is there anything in the administration’s plan to

support the U.N. antinarcotics effort?

Mr. ROMERO. I can’t really speak to that effort. I do know that

there is a normal budget for that.

Mr. MICA. You have money in there for Peru and Bolivia. We

know it might pop up back there. We also know, since the surveillance is down, coca production is slightly up, which the General

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told me about when I was in Miami during the holidays, so we

know when we let up it pops up, but there’s nothing in there for

the U.N. right now. We don’t have any program in Afghanistan.

Only the U.N. program that we support through the UNODCP, Office of Drug Control Policy, supports that effort.

Now I don’t think we can pass this package without supporting

that U.N. effort. I’m pretty far to the conservative side, but we just

conducted that seminar with our U.N. partners, our European

union partners, and we know that where 75 percent of the supply

is coming from in the entire world and 75 percent of it is coming

into the United States. We cannot pass this package, Mr. Romero

and others in the administration, without some funds not only for

Peru and Bolivia; 100 percent of the cocaine is produced in those

three countries, right? OK. And there’s not too many places that

have the altitude or capability of production.

Mr. ROMERO. If I might just add, I’m happy to tell you that there

is money—— Mr. MICA. How much?

Mr. ROMERO [continuing]. For UNDP in the existing budget.

Mr. MICA. No, I’m talking about in the supplemental.

Mr. ROMERO. I do know that they are working the microherbicide

issue in Colombia but—— Mr. MICA. We don’t even want to get into that, because we know

we can use chemical and other treatment to do away with the

drugs, and the administration has a horrible record on that, which

I think the money is still sitting there, and I don’t think they have

done a darn thing yet.

Mr. ROMERO. But to answer your question on the regional, there

is a lot of regional money in this package.

Mr. MICA. That is going to pop up, and they will get it from

someplace else. So we need to support that effort.

Finally, I read with dismay that they’re putting a price tag, the Mexican traffickers, on our border agents. DEA has a $200,000

price tag or something which was reported in the media on our border agents. If they touch a hair on our border agents what do we

have in store for them as far as U.S. retaliation? Do we have a

price tag on these guys, the drug traffickers?

Mr. LEDWITH. Well, there certainly is a reward program, but we

are keenly aware of the risks that the brave men and women of

all of law enforcement face working overseas and along the border.

We’re concerned about developing intelligence that there are traffickers putting prices on the heads of law enforcement officials

along the border.

Mr. MICA. Is that going to be a priority of yours and can we also

pay rewards to get these guys if they go after our guys?

Mr. LEDWITH. Sir, the safety of the men and women working for

DEA and in all law enforcement, the military, is of paramount

issue to us. That would be our first priority, sir.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mrs. Mink.

Mrs. MINK. I just have one final question to Deputy Assistant

Secretary of Defense, Ms. Salazar.

In your final page of your testimony you again reiterate the departmental policy regarding deployment of U.S. military personnel

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in counterdrug missions, and you state that the plan that we’re debating here today will not require any change in policy because existing policy will carry over, and you said the supplemental does

not require a change in U.S. policy. Is there a risk to U.S. personnel providing counterdrug support? You responded, yes, there is.

And the final question, is the risk increased as a result of the programs being enhanced by the supplemental; and your answer was

no. Could you explain that no answer?

Ms. SALAZAR. Yes. I guess in part the reason for that comment

was twofold. On the one hand—and I guess you know we had one

very clear example that affected us in the last 8 months. Any

United States personnel, or anyone who’s involved in counternarcotics activities and law enforcement activities, has a very dangerous business, and—but, with that said, we have had programs

in Colombia for the last 10 years, and we have done, I believe, a

very effective job in making sure that force protection issues of

those, not only of DOD personnel, but also of the law enforcement

personnel and the embassy personnel that’s down there, are adequately supported and responded to.

Now, the reason why I made that statement is because, as General Wilhelm had stated, we don’t foresee an increased number of

our footprints in Colombia. So in so much that we continue to provide and and enhance our current programs, which is what the

supplemental does, we don’t foresee any change in policy, although

we will continue to be very, very concerned and make sure that we

support the DOD personnel that is in Colombia at this point.

I know, General Wilhelm, the issue of force protection has been

of prime concern to you.

General WILHELM. Yes. Mr. Ledwith stated the position of the

Department of Defense is essentially identical with that of the Department of Justice. There is no higher priority than the protection

of our people on the ground.

Congresswoman Mink, I was in Tres Esquinas last week, and in

fact I spent a good portion of my time there really walking the

ground and going over each and every element of the force protection plan. We are creating a critical mass, I will tell you that. The

facilities are growing. We’re going to be moving aircraft in there.

By doing that, are we creating a target? As a military person I

would tell you, yes, we are. To compensate for the development of

that target we really need to improve the status of the physical

measures and the procedural measures to secure the force. So we’re

doing all of that.

For example, just one number, 15,000 rolls of concertina barb

wire, the whole cantonment is circled with triple strand right now.

They had built one concrete bunker to support the command post.

I said, wrong answer; build three because you don’t have the capacity that you need. We’re pushing the defense out beyond that. I

have instructed them to build revetments for the aircraft. So we’re

going to have to keep our eye on the ball. There’s no question about

it.

As these facilities grow in size, they grow in attractiveness as

targets. We won’t allow the U.S. presence to get out of control, but

there are other issues. It’s our credibility and the support that

we’ve provided to Colombia.

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I know Pete Romero remembers well a couple of disastrous attacks in El Salvador which really undermined the confidence in

what we are doing. We cannot and will not let that happen in Colombia.

Mr. MICA. Mr. Barr.

Mr. BARR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, where are the Blackhawks going to go? To what units

and services will those be given or are we leaving that up to the

Colombians?

General WILHELM. No, sir. Again, this has been a consultative

thing. There are an awful lot of Blackhawks here.

Let me see if I can walk real quickly through the military array

of airplanes just so that we’re all proceeding from a common baseline.

When this whole enterprise started, the army had seven

Blackhawks. The air force had 18. Recently, the Colombians themselves, executed the unused portion of a former FMS case and got

five additional Blackhawks, which went to the air force. Those airplanes are being armed for armed escort missions. The Colombians

on their own hook, with their own financing, are buying 14 airplanes, Blackhawks, which are to be delivered during the year

2000, during this calendar year. Sikorsky says they can do that.

Seven of those airplanes will go to the air force to be armed as escorts. Seven will go to the army as troop transports.

Then the supplemental package of 30 additional Blackhawks,

which our last liaison with Sikorsky said 14 months after funds are

committed we will start a delivery stream initially with one aircraft, and then their planning estimate was two aircraft per month

thereafter. So they could fill out the buy by the early part of the

year 2002.

As General McCaffrey stated, sir, I think we can sort of confuse

ourselves a little bit when we get overly focused on the airplane.

It may not be the long pole in the tent. The air crew may be the

long pole in the tent.

And I do want to make one thing clear about a progression of

aviation capabilities. We have 18 UH–1Ns, twin engine Hueys, on

the ground right now; and we plan to provide 15 more next year,

for a total of 33. Those are interim aircraft. When the 30

Blackhawks are delivered, the UH–1Ns will be removed from the

inventory. Those are State Department assets. I suspect they will

come back to INL.

Our attempt then is to transition the pilots that we are training

for the UH–1Ns to the Blackhawks. Transition training is a lot different from starting from scratch. So we will use the services of the

Spanish helicopter battalion at Fort Rucker, AL, which does train

on the Blackhawk helicopter, and it really won’t take 18 months to

train a pilot. If he can in fact fly a UH–1N, a much shorter period

will be required to transition him to the Blackhawk. So this thing

may not be as long as it sounded.

Mr. BARR. But eventually Blackhawks will be in both the air

force and the army inventories?

General WILHELM. That is correct, sir, and the national police.

Mr. BARR. How many will be going to the CNP?

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General WILHELM. Sir, I’d have to defer to State on that. Our

target for the armed forces is 44. Let me round that one out. Pete.

Mr. ROMERO. I’m told six.

Mr. BARR. Is there any hesitancy in these Blackhawks going to

the three services—in effect, the army, the air force and the national police—in some mix?

Mr. ROMERO. In a different mix than what we’ve just told you?

Mr. BARR. No, either that mix or some permutation of it.

Mr. ROMERO. I think this is predicated on planning, counternarcotics battalions and that sort of thing, and I’m not enough of

an expert to tell you there should be or could be more here.

Mr. BARR. I’m talking from a policy standpoint.

Mr. ROMERO. No.

General WILHELM. I would agree with that, sir. I think this correctly reflects aviation roles in missions as they’re viewed in the

Colombian armed forces. Transport is an army mission; armed support is an air force mission; and then, of course, the CNP operates

in a law enforcement role. But from a policy standpoint for us, I

don’t see any implications.

Mr. BARR. We heard earlier and we’ve heard a lot, General,

about the training that the Colombian army has received and is receiving. I presume that we can all agree that we want to see the

services down there, particularly the army and the CNP, to operate

jointly and understand each other and have joint missions and so

forth. Why then hasn’t the CNP received the same training we’re

providing to the army? Wouldn’t it be in our best interest to make

sure that they’re both on the same wavelength and on the same

level?

General WILHELM. Sir, the answer to that question is sort of a

yes-and-no answer. We trained the first counterdrug battalion in

three phases. The first phase was one of their maneuver companies

and their specialty platoons, reconnaissance, medical and mortar,

their indirect fire capability. The second phase was the remaining

two maneuver companies and the headquarters. The third phase

was an integration phase, and during that phase the Colombian

National Police did provide policemen from the counternarcotics

units who did train with the first battalion.

Quite frankly, sir, the cops didn’t need the training in the first

two phases. A lot of that was individual training and basic field

craft required by the soldiers. The policemen already had their specialty training. So I agreed with the Colombians, with General

Serrano and General Tapias, that the right time for integration

was phase three.

Congressman Mica has mentioned, though—it’s been quiet on

purpose; we didn’t ballyhoo this—the first battalion has been out

of garrison twice now, a single-company operation, a two-company

operation, in each case with Colombian National Police participation. They’ve taken down labs, identified transit points, captured

base, precursor chemicals, and they’ve plotted active coca fields

which are now targeted for eradication. So, quietly, they got out of

garrison. It was a shakedown cruise of sorts, but it was real-world

operations. The target folders that they were using were developed

in the Colombian Joint Intelligence Center by a combination of soldiers and policemen.

145

Mr. BARR. OK. So both from an operational standpoint as well

and this is basically to all of you, from a policy standpoint, there

will be appropriate training provided so that both the army and the

CNP receive adequate training; and for joint operations, which we

obviously encourage, they will be on the same level eventually?

General WILHELM. Absolutely sir, and really that is one of the

cardinal principles in the training we’re conducting. We want these

forces to be entirely interoperable. We have got a couple of warts

right now—— Mr. BARR. When you say ‘‘we’’, that means DOD and State and

DEA—everybody?

General WILHELM. DOD, State, DEA, Justice and, importantly,

the Colombian Armed Forces and the Colombian National Police.

I mentioned we’ve got a couple of potholes to fill. We ran into some

problems with communications interoperability, and we had dissimilar families of radios that had legacy systems that the police

and the army had. We’re bringing that together now, and we’ll

solve that very soon. They will be using the Tatteran system that’s

been bought from Israel.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. Souder, any final questions?

Mr. SOUDER. Yes, I have a couple.

Mr. Ledwith, earlier General McCaffrey—and, in general, it kind

of seems to be a pitch right now that we found all this new information about the amount of cocaine coming out of Colombia and

that we have revised our past statistics as to the amount of cocaine. Was the DEA surprised?

Mr. LEDWITH. No, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. So you kind of felt that this problem had been

building for the last few years?

Mr. LEDWITH. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. The reason I wondered is because every time I had

gone down to Colombia, I had heard that it had been transferring,

and both the DEA and others had been telling us. And I wonder,

do you have any—want to make any public comments for the

record why you feel all of a sudden we are having this big surprise?

Mr. LEDWITH. Well, sir, what—quite honestly, what needed to be

done was the scientific work to back up the theory. There was a

theory prevalent, as you’re probably well aware of, that the math

simply didn’t work on the amount of seizures versus the availability. This raised certain concerns.

We energized a process by which we tried to evaluate this, and

the basis for it is locked in scientific evidence that, in essence, that

we conduct similar laboratory operations and we utilize local methods and local practices and make cocaine. From this we make a determination as to the amount of cocaine that can be produced from

specific crops, specific areas utilizing certain chemicals and profits

that are currently available. And this process is still under way so

that the final scientific evidence will not come out till April or May,

but clearly the initial indications are that the Colombians have

adopted certain methods to the production of cocaine that allow

them to exceed the production potential that had been previously

decided on.

146

Mr. SOUDER. I thank you.

I have a theory as well, and my theory is this, that not General

McCaffrey, not General Wilhelm or anybody, his predecessors at

SOUTHCOM or, for that matter, internarcotics at the State Department, but the theory was that the administration was focused

on other parts of the world. We have had kids dying in Indiana because of stuff coming from Colombia for a long time, and it wasn’t

too hard for our local law enforcement to figure out on the street

we were getting increased Colombian heroin and increased Colombian cocaine. That the question is, if we have thousands of Americans dying because of drug abuse, why weren’t these scientific

methods used earlier unless there was an overarching concern,

which is what I believe has happened, to our war on narcotics?

About the Balkans, as we went with now Speaker Hastert over

into the Saudi Arabia and Operation Southern Watch and Northern Watch, we heard from the commanders there that they don’t

believe they need to be spending that many dollars on what they’re

doing. They know whenever Iraq goes up in the air and they know

when they come down, and when we go up that we’re spending millions and even billions of dollars annually over there and in the

Balkans diverting from this, and we wanted to kind of look the

other way.

And that now, all of a sudden, we realize we’re about to potentially lose Colombia, and everybody is focusing, and it’s time to get

our resources together. I’m glad everybody is on board, but pardon

some of us for being a little skeptical about—not about the people

who have been involved in it, but about the overarching priority.

Now, Ambassador Romero, I have a couple of questions for you.

One is that I think—and I want to make it clear, I think General

Serrano and the Colombian National Police are heroes. I think it

is the right approach what they’re taking in the military, the defense minister and others, and I support that.

But I also want to take as much as possible at face value the

statements that say we’re not going to undermine what indeed are

the units that are already vetted, that have had a track record,

that have public support.

General Serrano’s book right now on the drug wars is the No. 1

book in Colombia, outselling Marquez and any other author there.

So we have a national hero. We have a process. But my understanding is that on Friday we were told there will be no Buffalo

transport planes for the CNP because the State Department didn’t

feel it wasn’t necessary even though it was in our report language

that 15, not 25, Super Hueys—we appropriated for 25 and only 15

are going, and that our latest report shows that 6 of the 25 CNP

pilot school slots went to the Army. Now, why wouldn’t we increase

the number of slots? Why would we take CNP slots?

And I wondered in fact to some degree this does seems like a

zero sum game, that I’m for building up the defense ministry efforts on antinarcotics but not if we can’t get what even we’ve already said we wanted to get to CNP, and now pilot slots are taken.

Mr. ROMERO. Congressman Souder, I am not responsible for running the operations on our counternarcotics program down in Colombia; and I think it is unfortunate that Randy Beers, who is in

147

Colombia today, and is not here to answer that question, but I will

certainly take it back to him.

Let me just mention one thing and that is that, even before any

idea of a supplemental or anything came to mind, we had been

pushing the military and the police to collaborate. This is something that Charlie Wilhelm has been working on for a couple of

years. We at State mention it every time we’re there.

There’s been good progress, but not enough. There needs to be

a whole lot more. They need to put aside their rivalries and their

traditions and that sort of thing and work together, and hopefully

they will under Plan Colombia.

One last thing is that you can only do what the Colombian Government is ready to accept. And I think before June of this past

year the Colombian Government was not ready to accept that they

needed to make a bold move and to integrate their efforts and integrate their forces and reach out to the international community,

and to do a comprehensive integrated plan like they put together

and like we support.

Finally they have come around to that, and better late than

never.

Mr. SOUDER. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask one more.

Mr. MICA. One more final question.

Mr. SOUDER. Funny you should bring that up, because that was

the other question that I wanted to ask you.

If your—and I apologize for missing your formal statement; all

I have here in front of me is the draft statement which may have

had some changes. But you refer to Colombia must reestablish its

authority over narcotics-producing sanctuaries. In your written testimony, you don’t mention the FARC per se. Partly what President

Pastrana has done, in my opinion is, he’s followed Christ’s admonition: He’s turned his cheek and he’s turned his cheek and he’s negotiated with the FARC and he’s negotiated with the FARC.

Do you believe it’s possible to reestablish its authority over narcotics-producing sanctuaries without defeating the FARC in those

areas?

Mr. ROMERO. Well, I would hope that at some point in time the

FARC would see the writing on the wall and decide that this is the

best time to negotiate before the tide starts to turn and the government starts to reestablish a presence or, in many cases, establish

for the first time a presence in many of these areas. That I think

is the hope of President Pastrana and the Colombian people, but

it remains to be seen.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you believe, if they don’t see the light, they

should be defeated? Are they inextricably intertwined with the narcotics protection?

Mr. ROMERO. I think that that provides about 50 percent of their

financing. The other 50 percent comes from kidnapping and extortion and that sort of thing, war taxes that they exert, even on Venezuelans who happen to live on the Venezuelan side of the border.

I think that the program is designed to take away primary

sources of income at the same time that we cut back not only on

production, but also put a lot of emphasis—we haven’t really discussed this—on interdiction. I think if all of those pieces work with

regaining the control of their territory, not just militarily but using

148

the police, using the civilian entities to come in behind them, I

think it can work. But it is not going to happen tomorrow. This is

a long-term commitment.

Mr. SOUDER. So you think it is, to some degree, more of a lobbying effort than a military effort to defeat them?

Mr. ROMERO. To defeat them militarily would require probably

four—structures and mobility and all of the things that we’re talking about, probably several years to do.

Mr. SOUDER. So do you disagree that only 3 percent of the public

support the FARC?

Mr. ROMERO. I agree with that. I don’t think there’s any more.

I think 3 percent is probably exaggerated. But you’re talking about

a land mass that they operate in that is huge, with no infrastructure. It is not like you can get in the cop car, drive down the street

and find the culprits. These are people whose main way of transportation is through river networks and are in a land mass that

is absolutely huge.

Mr. MICA. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. SOUDER. I want to thank him for his comments. And I also

want to say that I don’t believe there’s anybody more genuinely

committed to trying to negotiate than President Pastrana; and it

hasn’t been working very well, and we need to show some force.

Mr. MICA. I have one final question. Mr. Gilman has left, but he

asked if I could ask this to Ambassador Romero.

Could you please tell this subcommittee if nondrug-related offenses are covered by the United States extradition treaty with Colombia? For example, is murder and kidnapping included in the

treaty as extraditable offenses? Could you comment on this?

Mr. ROMERO. I would have to go back and look at the extradition

treaty. It is fairly new.

But I do know in the case of this—in the latest case of statements made by President Pastrana, I think there is a clause in the

Colombia constitution which prohibits extradition of Colombian nationals for crimes committed in Colombia. Now, I don’t know

whether——

Mr. MICA. I have a copy of the extradition treaty, and murder—

assault with intent to commit murder is included in that. But I

wish you would elaborate for the record. And we’ll provide without

objection a copy of this, provided by Mr. Gilman into the record,

and we’ll wait for your response.

I thank the panel. This is an extremely important topic. You all

play key roles in making certain that whatever package is approved by Congress is effective and does what we intend. As you

see, there’s some difference of opinion, but I think everybody is trying to get to the same point. And we thank you for your participation.

Mr. BARR. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I have no more questions for

the panel. I know they have been very patient and so have you.

I still have some concerns over what seems to be a strong preference for training for the military as opposed to the CMP, based

on some information that we have received. Could we do some followup letters to the witnesses perhaps?

149

Mr. MICA. Absolutely. And I also anticipate, not next week, but

the week after, to ask or subpoena Mr. Pickering and Mr. Beers

and——

Mrs. MINK. Robert White.

Mr. MICA [continuing]. And a witness from the minority, former

Ambassador Robert White to appear before this subcommittee, so

we can get firsthand information about what’s going on there, and

additional background that you’re requesting.

Mr. BARR. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. I thank each of you, again, for your participation and

working with this panel. You’re excused at this time.

I’ll call our third and final panel. Our third panel consists of

three witnesses. The first is Ambassador Morris Busby. He’s the

former United States Ambassador to Colombia, and he’s now president of BGI International. The second witness is Ambassador Ted

McNamara. And Ambassador McNamara was the former United

States Ambassador, also to Colombia, and he’s now with the Council of the Americas. The third witness this afternoon is Mr. Lawrence Meriage, and he is vice president of Occidental Oil and Gas

Corp.

We have all three of our witnesses I believe here. And once again

this is an investigations and oversight subcommittee of the Committee on Government Reform. It is our custom to swear in our

witnesses. We also would ask that any lengthy statements or material, by request, be added to the record.

If you would please stand and be sworn, gentlemen. Raise your

right hands.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Chairman, may I just extend a special welcome

to Ambassador Morris Busby, to this subcommittee. And the reason

for my particular pleasure in extending this individual welcome is

that Ambassador Busby and I worked together in the State Department in the Office of Ocean and International Environmental and

Scientific Affairs—very much apart from what we’re discussing

today.

But it is really a pleasure to have this opportunity, Ambassador

Busby, to welcome you specially.

Mr. MICA. I said, knowing both of you, that’s scary. But I was

just kidding.

Thank you for welcoming the Ambassador, and I’m going to recognize him first. He’s been before our panel before. We appreciate

his insight and knowledge about Colombia and about our

antinarcotics effort in that region.

Ambassador, you’re welcome again and recognized.

STATEMENTS OF MORRIS BUSBY, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR

TO COLOMBIA AND PRESIDENT, B.G.I. INTERNATIONAL; TED

McNAMARA, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO COLOMBIA,

COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS; AND LAWRENCE MERIAGE,

VICE PRESIDENT, OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP.

Mr. BUSBY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and if you’ll

allow me, Congresswoman Mink, thank you very much for your

kind words. One of the things that I was most looking forward to

when I was invited to testify here today was the opportunity to say

150

hello to you. It was a great pleasure to work with you during those

years.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you and the committee for

the opportunity to appear here today. As you know personally, I

have very strong feelings about Colombia. You and I and Congressman Souder and others traveled to Colombia together. I have always been inspired by the enormous bravery of the Colombian people as they’ve struggled against the violence that has engulfed

their country. It is a very special honor for me now, as a private

citizen, to offer you my opinions.

Colombia policy has been a difficult proposition for the United

States for the last two decades. Although the country has always

been violent, the emergence of large-scale narcotics trafficking has

complicated our relationship enormously. Colombia should occupy a

high priority in our foreign policy and national security thinking.

Unfortunately, that’s not always been the case, and it is only recently that the administration seems to have awakened to the real

dangers facing Colombia and the attendant risk to United States

interests.

Over the last 5 to 6 years the security situation in Colombia has

dramatically worsened. The United States and Colombia engaged

for much of this period in an unfortunate political skirmish brought

on by the Presidency of Ernesto Samper. President Pastrana inherited a terrible situation, which has not improved. The guerilla

groups are stronger than they have ever been and the government

seems to have lost the confidence of the people. More importantly,

the Colombian military and police are being challenged directly by

the FARC and the ELN with mixed results, which is a major shift

in power from years past.

Three years ago yesterday I had the honor to testify before this

committee on the same subject. At that time, I urged the administration to support Colombian counternarcotics in spite of our distaste for Mr. Samper. I also warned that if we failed to recognize

the role of the so-called ‘‘insurgent groups’’ in the drug problem, we

would fail in our counternarcotics efforts.

Sadly, the situation in Colombia is worse than ever. The FARC

and the ELN are stronger and better financed than they have ever

been.

Although the situation on the ground has worsened, the policy

dilemma for the United States is no different. The guerillas are an

integral part of the drug problem in Colombia, and it’s naive to

think we can divorce the two issues. There will never be a cessation of drugs coming out of Colombia so long as the insurgency

is viable. You can’t solve the counternarcotics problem in isolation.

I appear here today to once again support increased levels of aid

and assistance to the Government of Colombia. It’s clearly in the

United States’ interest to help Colombia avoid a slide into instability and chaos.

Please don’t misunderstand or think that I am here advocating

war. I am a vigorous proponent of a negotiated solution to the conflict in Colombia. A successful negotiation is the only realistic and

moral outcome to this tragic conflict. But until both sides have a

genuine interest and need for a negotiated solution, or until one

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side is so overwhelmingly strong as to force negotiations, the war

is going to go on.

What is needed in Colombia now is a significant change in the

actual situation on the ground. Only then can real negotiations

take place. The package of aid currently before Congress could

cause that change to take place.

However, I would like to sound some cautionary notes which

temper my support for the administration’s package. For years, the

issues of drugs and guerrillas in Colombia have been so interrelated as to be virtually indistinguishable. The FARC and ELN

are an integral part of the narcotics problem. So long as we refuse

to recognize that fact, our counternarcotics efforts will fail. This

has been self-evident for some years, even though through several

administrations and Congresses we have pretended otherwise.

We have been able to delink the policy issues surrounding drugs

and guerrillas for two reasons. First, the Colombian Government

was capable of keeping the guerrilla problem under control and

coca production was largely outside Colombia. Second, we didn’t

want to admit that we were involved in a situation that had overtones of Vietnam and El Salvador. To do so would have reopened

the painful debates of the past, and in those circumstances, we

didn’t need to do that. The deteriorating situation in Colombia now

dictates that we help that beleaguered government, but we should

be clear as to what we’re doing.

I am very much in favor of bolstering the infrastructure of the

Colombian military police and judicial system in order to reverse

the downward slide in the security situation and force the guerrillas to the negotiating table. But this aid package is not going to

stop the flow of drugs from Colombia to the United States in the

near term, and we shouldn’t pretend that it will. Rather, it will

help stabilize the situation so that counterdrug efforts can again

become effective.

We must avoid the kind of divisive debates that we had in the

past. I urge the Congress and the administration to establish some

agreed-upon measures of effectiveness. Everybody should understand clearly what the desired outcome of this assistance is meant

to be. Not to do so will invite continual debate and misunderstanding as we go forward.

Mr. Chairman, I have studied Plan Colombia. I don’t want to be

harsh, but it seems to be more a justification for receiving aid from

the United States and others than a real prescription for success.

I have known President Pastrana and many of his advisers for a

decade, and I have the greatest admiration for them personally.

However, I am not impressed with the manner in which the Government of Colombia has handled the situation, in particular the

negotiations with the FARC and the ELN.

Real negotiating leverage comes from power, political capital,

and intellectual toughness. It seems to me that the Colombian Government has squandered its negotiating advantage in a futile attempt to simply get negotiations going and without having a real

strategy in place.

I think it will be important for Congress and the administration

to carefully monitor how this aid is used to ensure that it is not

wasted in supporting a peace process that is haphazard.

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I have long believed that a bipartisan approach is necessary if we

are ever to successfully assault the problem of narcotics. I also

strongly believe that the only lasting and true solution to our drug

problem is to raise a generation of Americans who do not have this

terrible taste for drugs. Until that day arrives, we must continue

to fight drug demand in this country while simultaneously attacking drugs at the source.

I consider increased aid to Colombia as a central part of any successful source country strategy in Latin America.

Mr. Chairman, you asked my opinion as to what we are facing

in Colombia. With my previous remarks as a prologue, I’ll tell you

that I am not encouraged. The FARC is a complex blend of terrorists, ideologues, drug lords, and kidnappers that draw support and

manpower from poor farmers as well as hardened criminals. I see

no evidence that the FARC leadership is seriously interested in a

negotiated solution, nor do I believe the United States and Colombia clearly understand what the insurgents really want, if anything. In my worst moments, I wonder whether the Colombian

peace process is really just political theater.

Mr. Chairman, we’re facing a very dangerous and explosive crisis

in our hemisphere, which if not given policy priority and handled

proactively and with intelligence, could degenerate with tragic consequences for the Colombian people and for our interests in this region. I strongly urge the Congress to approve a substantial package

of assistance to Colombia. I strongly urge this committee and the

Congress at large to exercise strenuous and intensive oversight of

Colombia policy. And I strongly urge that you act quickly because

I fear that we are losing one of our best allies in the hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman I want to thank you once again for the opportunity to appear here today. I’ll be more than happy to answer your

questions and those of your colleagues.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. We’ll withhold questions until we have

heard from the other two panelists.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Busby follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Next I’ll recognize Ambassador Ted McNamara, who

is now with the Council of the Americas, and a former Ambassador

of the United States to Colombia.

Welcome, sir, and you’re recognized.

Mr. MCNAMARA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try and summarize the statement if I can.

Mr. MICA. We can put the entire statement in the record, without objection.

Mr. MCNAMARA. First of all, I’m very pleased to appear before

this subcommittee to speak in favor of a more robust United States

policy of assistance to Colombia at a time of great need in that

country. I was privileged to serve as U.S. Ambassador to Colombia

from 1988 to 1991 during an earlier crisis in Colombia. Indeed,

that crisis was at least as severe as the crisis that we’re facing

today there.

Then, Colombia faced a massive narcoterror campaign of bombings, assasinations, kidnappings and both in the cities and in the

countryside. The campaign was designed to terrorize the government and the population into submission to the malevolent dictates

of the Medellin drug mafia. It failed. Colombia defeated the mafia

in Medellin with United States assistance and democracy and

democratic institutions were preserved.

Many people think today that it’s impossible for Colombia to face

up to the challenge it now faces. I didn’t believe back then that it

was impossible to face up to those challenges, and I don’t believe

today that we’re in a crisis that is so dire that Colombia will fail.

Colombia can confront the current narco-guerrilla threat, but as in

1989 it will do so much more successfully if it has the moral, political, economic and other support of the United States and of its

neighbors.

This is not a bilateral problem. This is a regional and hemispheric problem. The media have given much attention to the

strength of the guerrillas, to their control of 40 percent of Colombian territory, supposedly. But let’s be clear. The guerrillas are not

close to taking power in Colombia. In fact, if it were not for the

great wealth accumulated from their criminal activities, the guerrillas would not be the threat that they are today. The areas they

dominate, while large, have few Colombian citizens in them. The

country, as a whole, gives them very little popular support, as

we’ve heard earlier.

I won’t go into the five reasons that I have listed in my statement, why I think it is in United States national interests to assist

Colombia. Let me just say briefly that I think it is in our national

interest because however bad the situation is now, if we don’t assist Colombia, it’s going to get worse.

Second, that Colombia’s borders have already been transgressed

by this crisis and it is no longer just a Colombian crisis, it is spilling over into the neighboring countries.

Third, we should not doubt that these guerrillas and the other

narcos, with whom we’re facing this crisis, have their own interests

in mind and not the best interests of the United States.

The democratically elected Colombian Government is our friend

and our ally in this effort. And we should be under no illusions

that our national goals for strengthening democracy, human rights

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and market economies in Latin America would suffer a serious setback if Colombia were to suffer continued instability.

Let me address the question of the guerrillas for just a moment.

With respect to these guerrillas that have plagued Colombia for

half a century, I believe it is time to call a spade a spade. The destruction of the Medellin and Cali cartels in the late 1980’s and

early 1990’s removed a curtain behind which the guerrillas had

hidden their narcotrafficking. It also opened up new

narcotrafficking opportunities for them.

Since the drying up of Soviet and Cuban funding in the 1980’s,

the FARC and other guerrillas have increasingly raised money by

relying on kidnapping, extortion and narcotrafficking, among other

criminal activities. Colombia’s guerrillas are heavily involved in

narcotics. The FARC leadership traffics in drugs inside Colombia,

they tax other traffickers, they protect the narcotics industry from

the police and military raids. That means they’re narcotraffickers.

Meanwhile, the FARC peasant troops and low-level officials cultivate and process the cocaine for added personal income. And that,

of course, also leads to the wealth and power of the FARC and the

other guerrilla outfits. According to their Marxist logic, there’s

nothing wrong with it. It’s perfectly legitimate since it weakens the

enemy and supports the revolution.

Let me address briefly the paramilitaries which have received

quite a bit of attention at this hearing. The extensive network of

paramilitaries, or self-defense groups, owes much to

narcotrafficking. Many of these bands were created and funded by

narcotrafficking organizations as well as by legitimate farmers and

ranchers who were concerned at the inability of the military to protect them from the guerrillas.

The paramilitaries also engage in narcotrafficking and are deeply

dependent on that as a source of income. As a result, the combination of the guerrillas and the paramilitaries, you have two military

organizations in the country which are richer, better equipped, and

more capable of conducting military operations than the Colombian

military itself. It’s apparent that there’s a very complex set of relationships involving these organizations. In some areas the

narcotrafficking organizations cooperate with the guerrillas, and in

other parts and in other areas of the country they fight them.

And this highlights another aspect of the situation in Colombia

that we need to recognize. Most of the violence, corruption, and

human rights crimes in Colombia stem from the weakness of the

state, not from its excessive strength. The rise of the paramilitaries

demonstrates this. Unlike in Central America where governments

organized supplied and supported the paras, or the paramilitaries,

the Colombian paramilitaries have become powerful because the

military has become weak. The paramilitaries do not depend upon

the government for their source of materiel and for their support.

They are independently organized and they are independently supported. They work sometimes with the government military officials in the regions, but for the most part they have their own

agenda and go about their own activities.

Another example of weak government is the judicial system,

which has been weak for many, many years and tried to improve

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provements. But the impunity that most criminals in Colombia

enjoy leads to a private justice that encourages things like paramilitary organizations to arise.

In the corruption and venality of the Congress of Colombia is another example of a disgracefully weak institution.

I think, as has been said here by many of the witnesses, that we

have to understand that President Pastrana came into the Presidency in a very weak position. Economically, he was weak because

his predecessor, President Samper, practiced disastrous economic

policies. After a rather hesitant start, it looks like President

Pastrana has put in place a very good team, a very solid economic

program, and there is some hope for a very positive outcome in the

course of the next year to 3 years on the economic front.

Unfortunately, on the security side, President Pastrana has also

inherited a very difficult and weak position. The mismanagement

during Samper years, the lack of attention to the proper funding

of military, and even police activities during that period has led to

a weakened position for the Colombian Government as it faces the

narcotics traffickers and the narco-guerrillas.

Under pressure from Washington, President Pastrana announced

a three-legged strategy for peace. One was strengthening the military, the second leg was providing a social welfare program called

Plan Colombia, and the third was negotiating with the guerrillas.

It was a reasonable strategy, but it was never implemented. The

first leg has not received the priority it deserves; the second leg,

Plan Colombia, is virtually moribund. Only the negotiations have

received constant, but not always wise attention and priority.

A three-legged policy in which one leg is weak, the second one

is broken, and the third one is somewhat hesitant is a precarious

base on which to build a peace. Given Colombia’s economic situation, repairing the two legs that are in dire need of repair will require United States resources. In addressing the question of military assistance, I think that the United States needs to understand

once and for all that without a strong professional and effective

military in Colombia there will be no peace in Colombia.

The guerrillas will not negotiate until they’re convinced they will

suffer military losses. Fortunately the Colombian military is capable of modernizing itself and becoming a disciplined force. It did

modernize itself to some extent and it met the challenge in 1989

through about 1993 when Samper came on the scene.

Mr. MICA. Ambassador, if you could, begin to conclude because

I want to give Mr. Meriage about 5 or 6 minutes.

Mr. MCNAMARA. Let me move then to the main points, I think,

where we’re going to have to see some adjustment by President

Pastrana. Some of these were mentioned by Ambassador Busby.

First, I think that the idea of a full peace agreement during the

Presidency of President Pastrana is not a realistic goal, and it will

simply encourage the guerrillas not to negotiate. I think President

Pastrana should attempt to advance the peace process, get a partial peace, if possible, and leave it to his predecessor to come to a

final conclusion. There is not enough time in the 21⁄2 years he has

left to negotiate a full peace.

Second, the domestic political base which is the underpinning for

the government’s peace strategy is very narrow and very weak at

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this point. Even within Pastrana’s own party, that’s the case. The

guerrillas know it and that’s one of the reasons why they’re not negotiating. Pastrana needs to broaden his support to include a wide

spectrum from the country’s political parties. He can get that wide

spectrum support, I believe, and it would give additional strength

and cohesion to his strategy of negotiating with the guerrillas.

Pastrana needs to reach out to the others in the political spectrum. His negotiating team is weak, inward looking and lacking in

strategic vision. It is not like his economic team which is very

strong.

I think the United States needs to state publicly that it understands that in Colombia fighting narcotraffickers means fighting

guerrillas. This would give a great boost to the morale of the population and force the guerrillas to negotiate in good faith.

Finally, I would say that we need to address the paramilitary

problem soon. Americans and Colombians are going to have to face

the fact that these criminal bands must be eliminated from Colombia. At the present time, there is very little attention paid to getting rid of the paramilitary groups.

And with that, I will say that I hope that we will be able to get

a very substantial package of assistance together for Colombia, and

I think that it will mark a turning point in Colombia’s efforts to

face this particular crisis.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Ambassador. We only have about 4 or 5

minutes, maximum. What’s your pleasure? You want to vote and

come back.

Do we have two votes or one? Well, I hate to cut Mr. Meriage

short. We have run over here. Well, I think we’re going to have to

go and come back. I’m sorry. I just don’t see how we can do that.

If you would stand in recess for 15 minutes, we’ll vote. We have

one—we’ll be at the end of the first vote, and then vote and come

back, and there may be some questions. So we’ll stand in recess for

approximately 15 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. MICA. If I could, I would like to call the subcommittee back

to order. And we are on our third panel, on our third witness this

afternoon. I know this has been a lengthy hearing, but it is an important hearing. And we wanted to hear the full testimony of our

last witness, Mr. Lawrence Meriage. And he’s Vice President of Occidental Oil and Gas Corp.

I apologize, sir, for the late hour, but as you can see, there is a

tremendous amount of interest in this subject among Members of

Congress and a great debate about one of the most important packages we’ll be considering this year.

So, with that, I thank you for your patience again and you’re recognized.

Mr. MERIAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to present

a summary of my written testimony.

Mr. MICA. Without objection, that will be made part of the

record.

Mr. MERIAGE. As the only private sector represented at these

hearings today, I want to focus my remarks on four key points relating to United States-Colombia relations: first, the importance of

United States economic interests in Colombia; second, how ColumVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:04 Dec 27, 2000 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00169 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\66788.TXT HGOVREF1 PsN: HGOVREF1
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bia’s increasing narcotics production problem is undermining those

interests; third, the importance of United States investment in Colombia in general and particularly in the energy sector; and finally,

our thoughts on the aid package.

The United States-Colombia relationship is of great importance

from an economic and commercial perspective. Colombia is the fifth

largest economy in Latin America and our fifth largest trading

partner in the region. United States exports reached nearly $5 billion in 1998, accounting for nearly 32 percent of Colombia’s total

imports. This Andean nation is our 26th largest export market

overall.

The United States also is the No. 1 foreign investor in Colombia.

Finally, Colombia is the eighth largest supplier of foreign crude

oil to the United States with more than 330,000 barrels a day

shipped to Gulf Coast refineries in Texas and Louisiana. This factor is an important part of the diversification of our energy supply

away from the Middle East.

In the more than three decades Occidental has operated in Colombia, we have seen a steep rise in the number of armed subversive groups in the country. Much of the attention today and the

testimony has been focused on what is going on in the south. In

the north, where we operate adjacent to the Venezuelan border, the

number of FARC and ELN units have risen dramatically, particularly in the last 5 years. At the same time in the same region there

has been explosive growth in drug trafficking. These two developments are not unrelated.

Along the border regions of North Santander we have observed

lush green terrain on the Venezuelan side and large charred areas

on the Colombia side where native vegetation has been burned to

clear the land for planting coca and poppies. The combination of

drugs and guerrillas has resulted in a sharp increase in the level

of violence in these regions.

Mr. Chairman, economic development and the creation of jobs in

the legitimate economy are essential if Colombia is to break this

cycle of drugs and violence. The economy is mired in its worse recession in recent history and one of the critical factors in the country’s economic recovery is oil development which has been a

linchpin of President Pastrana’s plan for that recovery.

Between 1994 and 1998 Colombia’s oil sector accounted for nearly 23 percent of total foreign investment in Colombia. In 1999

crude oil sales produced nearly $3.2 billion in revenues, or 24 percent of the central government’s total income; but known reserves

of crude oil are being rapidly depleted, and without new oil discoveries, Colombia will become a net importer of oil by 2004, which

would have a devastating impact on the country’s balance of payments, particularly if you’re looking at prices at the current level.

Because oil revenues are so important to the government, Colombia’s oil infrastructure has been a prime target of terrorist tactics

by Marxist guerrillas who control much of the remote countryside

where oil is produced. For example, units of both the FARC and

the ELN have attacked the government-owned pipeline that transports oil to the coast from the country’s second largest oil field,

Cano Limon, which we operate. The pipeline has been struck 700

times since operations began in 1985, 79 times in 1999 alone.

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These attacks have caused cumulative losses totaling in excess of

$100 million.

Mr. Chairman, I share your view that the United States is confronting a crisis of dramatic proportions right in our own back

yard. Indeed, we believe the very survival of Latin America’s oldest

democracy hangs in the balance. That’s why we strongly support a

substantial supplemental aid package for Colombia. Furthermore,

we believe this package must be balanced between support for the

police and the military. The 2,500 men of the Colombia National

Police antinarcotics unit are badly outnumbered and outgunned by

the guerrillas and paramilitaries, both of whom, as we have heard

today, are supported by drug money.

If I might add just parenthetically there’s been some discussion

today about cooperation between the military and the police and

the central components. We have seen this in the regions where we

are operating at the present time. Indeed, before the police can

come into the areas in which we are operating that are controlled

by the guerrillas, the first thing that happens is that units of the

armed forces are deployed and then the police are deployed subsequent to that.

For the counternarcotics activities of these police to be effective,

they need the backing of the armed forces which have their own

shortcomings because they lack mobility, modern equipment and

intelligence gathering capabilities. The counternarcotics battle simply cannot be won without a stronger, better equipped and highly

disciplined military force.

I know human rights practices by the Colombian army have been

a central theme in this debate over United States aid and they

have certainly surfaced during these hearings. President Pastrana

has taken major steps to remedy this problem and our own sponsorship of human rights programs in the areas where we operate

has been an important catalyst.

Finally, we are concerned that counternarcotics support in the

aid package exclusively have target operations in the southern part

of the country. I believe it is important not to overlook the worsening problem in the north along the Venezuelan border where an estimated 35 miles have been converted to drug cultivation in 1999

alone. Counternarcotics activities in the north not only will undermine the growing source of revenue for the enemies of civil society,

but also will provide indirect support for the government’s effort to

stimulate economic growth in the region. Attacking the source of

supply is not the only answer in addressing Colombia’s drug problem, but it is an important part of a larger equation that must be

solved.

Failure to act decisively now virtually assures that we will have

to deal with a worsening regional problem in our hemisphere.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Meriage follows:]

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Mr. MICA. Thank you for your testimony. In fact, I thank all

three of our witnesses on this final panel. I’m going to turn first

to my colleague, the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Souder, for his

questions.

Mr. SOUDER. I thank the chairman.

First, let me say an official hello to Ambassador Busby who had

one of the great lines that I’ve repeated many times since it was

my first trip to Colombia and he was along. I asked him whether

the movie, Clear and Present Danger, was accurate and he said,

‘‘No, I died in the movie,’’ which would also go for Ambassador

McNamara who went through that period too. And I want to say

hi to him as a fellow Domer, honorary Hoosier.

And also I wanted to make sure you knew that Andy Downs is

now chief of staff to the new mayor of Ft. Wayne, which was a

great honor at his young age. Because your roommate and close

friend, Dr. Downs, is his son. They won the mayor race, and all of

a sudden his son is chief of staff to the mayor of Ft. Wayne. It’s

been great. I appreciate your knowledge over the years in sharing

that with me.

I also want to thank Mr. Meriage for your testimony on the oil

crisis and the interrelationship with the drug issue. Because when

you look at whether or not what constitutes compelling national interest for the United States when we look at this, you can argue

about many things that we deal with in the world; but narcotics

alone is enough for a compelling national interest.

But when you talk about our energy, and every American right

now—we had the gasoline prices in Ft. Wayne go up 10 cents in

1 day last week. And everybody is more aware of the questions of

energy, and when we watch our No. 1 source, which is not the Middle East, the No. 1 source is Venezuela, add that to Colombia, and

you have a major amount, probably close to—my guess is around

25 percent from those two countries, because I think Venezuela is

17; and we have an energy question, not to mention Panama.

But I wanted to first ask Ambassador Busby, I know that you

made some fairly strong comments about the FARC. And I wanted

to know what your reaction was to the State Department in December 1998 going down to meet with the FARC in Costa Rica. As

you said, they’re designated terrorist organization. The State Department designated them that way. And do you think it was appropriate for our State Department to negotiate directly with somebody that they had said was a terrorist organization?

Mr. BUSBY. Let me answer the question a little differently.

You should understand that I don’t have any problems in principle, or ideological hang-ups with negotiating or meeting with people on the terrorist list. In fact, I did that myself at one time. If

you can accomplish something and you know what you’re doing,

then I don’t have an ideological problem with it, on that particular

thing; and I really, I hesitate to say it, but—well, let me put it this

way.

I think that if you’re going to do something like that, you ought

to have two or three criteria that you judge its acceptability by.

One, you should have a plan, a strategy, and you should understand what it is you’re trying to do. You should have a clear objective and an end-game before you do it.

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Second, I think you have to be well prepared for a meeting with

a group like that; brief the Congress, think through the risks involved, think it through, and make sure that when you go do it,

you’ve got everybody on board.

And third, it should be well done, well implemented. I don’t have

anything else to say about that particular meeting, except that I

don’t think that it met my three criteria.

Mr. SOUDER. Do you think it met any of the three criteria?

Mr. BUSBY. No, sir.

Mr. SOUDER. Ambassador McNamara, how do you view how our

State Department should approach things with not only the FARC,

but the ELN and the so-called rightist paramilitary groups too? Is

that something we should be involved in, let Pastrana go? Do you

have any further comments on the criteria that Ambassador Busby

laid out?

Mr. MCNAMARA. No, I think those are very sound criteria when

one negotiates, and I have spent almost my whole career negotiating. I started with North Vietnamese and Viet Cong in Paris, went

on to Moscow, negotiated with people from the Arab world as well

as from Latin America and China, finished my career negotiating

with Panama.

The question as to how you go into a negotiation, it seems to me

that you go into a negotiation from a position of strength. The

stronger party will come out of the negotiation better than the

weaker party. And we and President Pastrana, I think, started

down a path without having, as Ambassador Busby just said, a

good, clear strategy. Without the clear strategy you’re going to, A,

make mistakes, and B, the stronger party, particularly if that

stronger party has a good strategy, is probably going to come out

better for it.

I cited in my statement that I thought that President Pastrana

made a mistake in giving the FARC that zone in eastern Colombia

for just coming to the negotiating table. That convinced them, and

I think the negotiating session in Central America probably convinced them even more, that they had the winning hand. They

were the more powerful, and therefore Pastrana had to come to

them; the United States had to come to them. That psychological

perception, I think, in allowing that to accrue to the FARC as both

Pastrana and the administration did, was probably—not probably,

it was certainly a mistake.

There’s only one way to deal with these folks and that is from

a position of strength.

Mr. SOUDER. I wanted to ask one other question Mr. Chairman.

It is—if you want to give some additional in writing because I

know we’ve had a long day, but one of my concerns—and both of

you have been Ambassadors and held multiple other positions, as

well as Ambassador to Colombia—is that I sense that we are fighting a couple of battles down there. One is we’ve seen this huge tide

of nationalism, which you certainly saw in your Panama Canal negotiations, where they probably would have been willing to negotiate, but basically popular will is rising up. Then, when we go to

get another base, we can’t find anybody that will allow our military

base in all of Central and South America, so we negotiate working

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out with multiple use of airports and off islands and all kinds of

stuff.

Clearly a meeting with President Chavez, it is not the kind of— you don’t detect a really anti-American tone, even by him, about

whom many people have concern; but more of how they want to do

their own thing, they want to have pride. It is almost like they feel

one way to assert that is kind of, once of a while, to do something

to spite us.

At the same time, they’re really very strong supporters of the

United States. They understand our importance in this zone and

they kind of think that, so how they relate to us has become a huge

problem. We’re seeing this tide of nationalism occur when we’re

seeing democracy in Colombia battled. Fujimori, President

Fujimori, in Peru is looking at it and saying, hey, it is kind of teetering over there, it gives him quite frankly some questions about,

he’d like to continue as President and endangering democratic principles in Peru.

Ecuador, which is right near the southern part, is certainly not

the most stable democracy right now after their procedure. President Chavez has got to be looking at the north side, as we just

heard about the dangers on the north border and more cultivation

and whether they can control the north border. He’s got to be saying, what’s happening?

This question of Colombia is spreading far more than just Colombia, and I’m wondering, in the rising tide of nationalism, how we’re

going to deal with some of that.

If you could maybe just give us a few insights and then if you

want to submit, because I think this is going to go far past and become more difficult than the Colombia we’re looking at, because

we’re going to see this rise up all around it, which inhibits our ability to battle the drug problem which we’re all having in our streets.

Mr. BUSBY. Well, I would like to comment on that. It is a very

insightful and interesting question. My feeling has always been

that whether you’re dealing bilaterally with a country such as Colombia, or trying to put together a regional program, it is a constant intellectual exercise and struggle to find a meshing of their

interests and ours.

Nobody down there is going to do something just because we ask

them. That was one of the things I always kept preaching when I

was in Colombia: They’re not fighting narcotics for us. They’re

fighting narcotics because our interests mesh, and we were able to

hold that together. And I think that if you look at it that way, then

the onous comes back to our side.

People expect us to lead, and we should. And you’ve got to find

a policy, both bilaterally with the individual countries and regionally, that meshes, and with a good understanding of what they

want.

If you don’t do that, then you are constantly battling both bilaterally and regional trying to get them to do something they don’t

want to do, or can’t do.

Mr. MCNAMARA. I would agree with that and say it’s not unlike

how you put together a political coalition in the congressional district in a State or in the United States. You find out what the interests of the parties involved are, what are the common interests

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and how can your coalition hold together. It may hold together say,

for example, in the NATO context for 40 or 50 years on a wide variety of issues, or it may, as in the Gulf war context, hold together

only for a few months and for a single issue.

In Latin America, I think that through the OAS and other institutions that we have built up, we can in fact have a long-term partnership with most of the major countries in Latin America, not an

alliance, because it wouldn’t quite be an alliance but a long-term

partnership. And they will follow our lead. But they will follow us

if we are a leader. If we are not a leader, if we are not putting out

front the essential elements of our interests and our policies and

asking them and consulting with them on their interest and their

policies, then we are going to find out when the crisis hits we

haven’t done the spade work that is necessary.

You know, you can’t put a coalition together and get elected to

Congress in July and August of the election year. You do that 2 or

3 years before, and then when July and August and November

come around, the coalition holds together. And it is not that much

different in international affairs.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Meriage, you cited in your testimony

some 700 incidents of attacks against your facilities in Colombia

and some 70 people, I guess, or 70 incidents in the last year, was

it?

Mr. MERIAGE. Seventy-nine.

Mr. MICA. Seventy-nine. What’s been the impact on employees of

Occidental?

Mr. MERIAGE. Well, the attack on the pipelines, from an employee perspective, are really the tip of the iceberg. There were discussions this morning about, you know, the economic impact of this

aid package and whether a certain percentage should be put toward jobs. What our employees are confronting, and the work force

out there is exclusively Colombian in the field area, is that they are

regularly shaken down by both the FARC and the ELN. They are

required to pay a war tax to both of the guerilla groups or they are

not able to work. And that is the biggest impact that we are confronting with our employees.

Mr. MICA. Have any of them been kidnapped or killed?

Mr. MERIAGE. Yes. Over the years, we have had a number of instances where people have been both killed and kidnapped. Nothing that has happened in recent—in the last 2 years.

Mr. MICA. It also appears from some tape that we have obtained

from a surveillance company that some of the private sector operations, their oil lines in particular, have been fairly effective in hiring security and also sort of monitoring and policing their pipelines. Is that left up to you, pretty much, to conduct that type of

operation?

Mr. MERIAGE. The pipeline that has been attacked is owned and

operated by Echo Petrol, the state oil company; and they are responsible for its maintenance and for its repair and for its protection. We are assessed a charge for that. So the protection really

comes from the Colombian army that is stationed out in that area.

But the pipeline is 483 miles long, and so there aren’t enough

troops in all of Colombia to protect that pipeline along its corridor.

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Mr. MICA. Has there been any noticeable decrease in oil production as a result of these attacks? I mean, is there a direct effect

on the amount of oil that is available and the market due to these

recent attacks? Or is this something that isn’t really measurable?

Mr. MERIAGE. It is measurable. And over the last 2 years what

we have seen is a dramatic escalation in the increase of attacks.

At one time, Congressman, Mr. Chairman, they had—the ELN was

primarily targeting the pipeline. Within the last 3 years, the FARC

and the ELN together have been attacking the pipeline, and so we

have seen economic disruptions.

For the first time, really, since we have been operating that field

since 1985, over the last 2 years, we have had to shut the field in

completely. We have got about 500,000 barrels of storage at the

field itself. When that storage is filled and the pipeline is still

blocked, then we have to shut in the field. And we have experienced those incidents three times in the last 18 months.

Mr. MICA. Now, the administration has crafted a package after

consultation that has military elements, police elements, and some

crop eradication and alternative development elements. I will just

ask each of you, if you were going to modify the package, where

would you put a little bit more emphasis? Ambassador Busby.

Mr. BUSBY. I haven’t had a chance to study the package. I

haven’t really seen it in any detail. But the preliminary sheet that

I saw——

Mr. MICA. Where would you increase emphasis?

Mr. BUSBY. I question the wisdom of the number of Blackhawk

helicopters that is in that package——

Mr. MICA. OK.

Mr. BUSBY [continuing]. Because of the lack of infrastructure,

training, and logistics. It is a terrific machine. It is very complicated. It’s high tech. But I wonder——

Mr. MICA. And where would you put those resources?

Mr. BUSBY. I would look at some different kinds of lift, different

types of helicopters that could be put on the ground quicker, that

could be just as effective. That is not to say you shouldn’t have

some Blackhawks in there, because you need them for their altitude capabilities and certain other purposes. But it just seems to

me it shouldn’t be the first crack out of the box unless there is a

real justification for that.

The second thing is there has been a lot of discussion here about

human rights. And I think Ambassador McNamara, his phrase that

human rights abuses stem from the weakness of the state is right

on the money. That is exactly right.

I would probably put more emphasis, more money, into infrastructure development, particularly of the judicial system, and increasing the ability, and the investigative capabilities of the state

to really enforce the rule of law. Because I think that part of the

reason for a lot of human rights abuses is that people are so frustrated because they know that nothing will happen to people, so

they take matters into their own hand. So I was—I looked at the

number, and it seemed very, very low to me.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Ambassador McNamara.

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Mr. MCNAMARA. Well, in my opening statement, I did indicate

two areas where I thought more attention needed to be given. One

is, indeed, the system of justice in Colombia. The judicial system

is woefully weak and inadequate to the needs of the country. And

I suggested that the three-legged strategy of Pastrana should be

expanded to a four-legged strategy, and that fourth leg ought to be

the improvement of justice.

I made it a central theme of my years as Ambassador in Colombia to strengthen that judicial system. Substantial efforts were

made and I think some successes. In fact, bad as it is, it is much

better than it was 10 or 15 years ago. It is still, however woefully

inadequate.

The second area, and I am not so sure that in the immediate

short-term that it requires huge resources. It is not something that

you can just throw money at. But I think a strategy for dealing

with the paramilitary organizations has got to be an early part of

overall strategy for dealing with these problems.

The paramilitaries are part of the problem. They are not part of

the solution. And you must strengthen the military. In fact, if you

look historically, each time the military has been beggared in Colombia by one or another President, you have had a spike in the

number of paramilitary forces and the amount of paramilitary activity. Each time the President, whether it was Barco or Gaviria

or now Pastrana, has put resources into the military, you have a

diminution of the paramilitary strength and paramilitary activity.

It’s not coincidental that those two curves are in a sign-cosign relationship. When one goes up, the other goes down. When one goes

down, the other goes up.

I think dealing with the paramilitary problem is something we

have not—we, the United States—nor Colombia has paid enough

attention to.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. MCNAMARA. If I can make one last comment.

Mr. MICA. Go ahead.

Mr. MCNAMARA. And, again, it’s not resources, it’s strategy. This

is not a United States-Colombian problem. It is a hemispheric and

a regional problem. And we really have to spend time, in answer

to Mr. Souder’s question, being the leader in the hemisphere, getting the other countries involved. There are a lot of countries that

would get involved if they saw the leadership and responded to Colombia and United States urgings.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

Mr. Meriage.

Mr. MERIAGE. As I indicate in my previous remarks, we are seeing a serious problem emerging in the north. If you fly up in—over

the area of North Santander in a helicopter, you can see the smoke

flumes from the fires burning where the drug traffickers are burning off jungle. I think looking exclusively to the south and ignoring

what is happening in broader areas of Colombia is a mistake.

There is another problem, too, if I—that relates to the regional

issue that Ambassador McNamara alluded to. We have an operation in Ecuador that is 40 miles from the Colombian border. There

is some concern that, if this push starts in the south, relentless

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push in the south, what impact that would likely have upon areas

close to the Ecuadorian border as well.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

I would like to thank all three of our witnesses, both for their

patience and also for their participation. It has been a long day. I

think we are close to setting one of our hearing records as far as

time. But this is a very important topic. It is going to be probably

one of the most important packages before the Congress in the next

few months here, hopefully even faster than that.

We have heard a little bit today about the history of the situation, and it is unfortunate that some of you who did give us prior

warning to the threat and the potential of the disruption were not

heard, and the situation has dramatically deteriorated in that area.

The important thing is that we learn by those mistakes and that

we also address human rights, not only there, and that has been

a great concern in the hearing today, but also the human rights of

15,973 Americans who lost their lives in drug-related deaths, most

of those drugs coming from this area. That was in 1997. And we

heard the drug czar today say 52,000 in related incidents of death.

The United States has put forces in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and

Kosovo, and we did have a loss of 30 American servicemen in Somalia. But we have never experienced anything domestically like

what we are experiencing from the deadly substance that is pouring out of Colombia at this point.

So it is important we don’t make the mistakes of the past, that

we put together a good, balanced approach, that we help Colombians help themselves in that way, and also help the United States

rid itself of some of the deluge of our drugs on our streets and in

our communities, killing our young people and Americans across

the land.

So, hopefully, this will be the beginning hearing; and we will

have additional hearings with different committees. But we will

leave the record open for additional comments for 2 weeks with

agreement. We will submit, possibly, to you three witnesses and

also additional questions.

I want to, again, thank you for your participation, for your counsel, and again ask for you to work with us in the next few weeks

and months as we finalize and put this package together.

There being no further business to come before this subcommittee at this time, this subcommittee meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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