alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 31

Certifications

I, Paul
Vanderslice, certify that:

1.    I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and
all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Trust 2016-P3 (the Exchange Act periodic reports);

2.    Based on my
knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

3.    Based on my knowledge, all
of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4.    Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statement(s) required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation
AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and

5.    All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related
attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules
13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in
such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above,
I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties: Wells Fargo Bank, National Association; C-III Asset Management LLC; Park Bridge Lender Services LLC; U.S. Bank
National Association; CoreLogic Commercial Real Estate Services, Inc.; National Tax Search, LLC; Principal Global Investors, LLC; Principal Real Estate Investors, LLC; Walker & Dunlop, LLC; KeyBank National Association; Pentalpha
Surveillance LLC; Trimont Real Estate Advisors, LLC; and Midland Loan Services, a Division of PNC Bank, National Association.

Date: March 29, 2018



|                                                                                                                                       
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ Paul Vanderslice                                                                                                                   
|Paul Vanderslice President, Citigroup
Commercial Mortgage Securities Inc. (senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)

CGCMT 2016-P3 Sarbanes-Oxley Certification (2017)
Exhibit 35.10

OFFICERS CERTIFICATE

I, Karen Montbach, a
Managing Director of Citibank, N.A. (the Company), hereby certify, with respect to the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, dated as of April 1, 2016 (the Agreement), by and among Citigroup Commercial Mortgage Securities
Inc., as depositor, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as master servicer, C-III Asset Management LLC, as special servicer, Park Bridge Lender Services LLC, as operating advisor, Citibank, N.A., as certificate administrator (the
Certificate Administrator), and Wilmington Trust, National Association, as trustee, the following:

1. A review of the
Companys activities as Certificate Administrator during the reporting period ending December 31, 2016 and its performance under the Agreement has been made under my supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, as of and for the reporting period ending December 31, 2016, the Company has
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period.

This statement is given by the undersigned
as an authorized officer of the Company and not in the undersigneds individual capacity.

Date: February 27, 2017



Citibank, N.A.By:

/s/ Karen MontbachName:

Karen MontbachTitle:

Managing Director


CGCMT 2016-P3
```

[106th Congress Public Law 335]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

<DOC>
[DOCID: f:publ335.106]

[[Page 114 STAT. 1309]]

Public Law 106-335
106th Congress

                                 An Act

 
To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 
1908 North Ellamont Street in Baltimore, Maryland, as the ``Dr. Flossie 
 McClain Dedmond Post Office Building''. <<NOTE: Oct. 19, 2000 -  [H.R. 
                                4449]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The facility of the United States Postal Service located at 1908 
North Ellamont Street in Baltimore, Maryland, shall be known and 
designated as the ``Dr. Flossie McClain Dedmond Post Office Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the facility referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Dr. Flossie McClain Dedmond 
Post Office Building''.

    Approved October 19, 2000.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 4449:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 146 (2000):
            Sept. 6, considered and passed House.
            Oct. 6, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
A98A2437.

#### FARRIS v. THE STATE.

(511 SE2d 601)

Blackburn, Judge.

Harold J. Farris, pro se, appeals his conviction by a jury of driving with no proof of insurance and operating a motor vehicle with an expired tag. On appeal, Farris asserts several enumerations of error; however, we are unable to address the merits of his appeal because the record is incomplete. Therefore, we must affirm.

Initially, we note that none of defendant’s enumerations are supported by citations to the record, argument, or citations to authority as required by Court of Appeals Rule 27 (c) (2) and (3), and according to such rule, Farris’s enumerations of error are deemed abandoned. See id. Additionally, Farris has failed to include a transcript of the proceedings below. “It is well-settled law that without a transcript to review, this court must assume as a matter of law that the evidence at trial supported the court’s findings. It is the burden of the complaining party, including pro se appellants, to compile a complete record of what happened at the trial level, and when this is not done, there is nothing for the appellate court to review.” (Punctuation omitted.) *Trevino v. Flanders,*231 Ga. App. 782 (1) (501 SE2d 13) (1998).

*Judgment affirmed.*

*McMurray, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur.*

*242Decided February 4, 1999.

Harold J. Farris, pro *se.*

*Cheryl F. Custer, District Attorney, Robert G. Mikell, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellee.
#### Davis *versus*Nash.

Trespass, *quare clausum, fregit,*may be maintained by the owner of land, for an injury done to the freehold, though the land be in the occupation of his tenant at -will.

Trespass, *quare clausum fregit.*The plaintiff’s farm was in possession of his tenant at will, who, by direction of the plaintiff, and with the plaintiff’s materials, had erected a fence upon it.

The evidence tended to show that the defendant took down a part of the fence. Shepley, C. J. was requested to rule that this action of trespass, *quare*clausum, for taking down the fence, could not be maintained, if, at the time of the injury, there was a tenant in the rightful possession and occupation of the premises. The request was denied, and the jury were instructed that the taking down of a fence would authorize the proprietor to maintain such an action, though the possession was in his tenant at will.

The verdict was for the plaintiff, and exceptions were taken by the defendant.

*Shepley*and Dana, for the defendant.

*Fessenden*and *Willis,*for the plaintiff.

Wells, J.

At the time the trespass was committed, the premises were in the possession of a tenant at will to the plaintiff. The fence, which was taken down, was erected by the direction of the plaintiff, and a portion of the boards was purchased by him. The fence erected by him would become a fixture, and being attached to the freehold was a part of it, as much so as a building upon the land constructed by him, and the taking of it down was an injury to the freehold.

In the case of *Starr*v. *Jackson,*11 Mass. 519, it was decided, that an action of trespass, *quare clausum,*lies for the owner of land in the possession of his tenant at will, where the injury affects the permanent value of the property. That decision was made when the State of Maine was a part of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and is binding upon us *412as an authority in the same manner as our own decisions. And it is not perceived, that any practical inconvenience can arise by adhering to it. The case of *Hingham*v. *Sprague,*15 Pick. 102, was decided upon the same principle.

There is nothing in the case of *Little*v. *Palister,*3 Greenl. 6, opposed to the doctrine contained in *Starr*v. *Jackson,*for the acts done, and which constituted the alleged trespass, were not injurious to the freehold, and did not affect the rights of Little, the landlord.

*The exceptions are overruled, and judgment on the verdict.*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-41115

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff – Appellee

v.

ANGEL GUADALUPE ROJAS-CHARLES,

Defendant – Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(09-CR-31)

Before GARZA, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

IT IS ORDERED that appellant’s unopposed motion to vacate the

judgment of the district court is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s unopposed motion to remand

the case to the district court for reconsideration of the sentence, in light of USA

v. Jeffries, is GRANTED.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 28, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

Case: 09-41115 Document: 00511015240 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/28/2010
No. 09-40115

2

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s unopposed motion to

expedite the ruling on motion to vacate, etc., is MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant’s unopposed motion to issue

the mandate forthwith is GRANTED.

Case: 09-41115 Document: 00511015240 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/28/2010
```

[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 195 (Friday, October 7, 2011)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 62313]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2011-26056]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Parts 71, 77, 78, and 90

[Docket No. APHIS-2009-0091]
RIN 0579-AD24

Traceability for Livestock Moving Interstate

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Proposed rule; extension of comment period.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are extending the comment period for our proposed rule that 
would establish minimum national official identification and 
documentation requirements for the traceability of livestock moving 
interstate. This action will allow interested persons additional time 
to prepare and submit comments.

DATES: We will consider all comments that we receive on or before 
December 9, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by either of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=APHIS-2009-0091-0001.
     Postal Mail/Commercial Delivery: Send your comment to 
Docket No. APHIS-2009-0091, Regulatory Analysis and Development, PPD, 
APHIS, Station 3A-03.8, 4700 River Road Unit 118, Riverdale, MD 20737-
1238.
    Supporting documents and any comments we receive on this docket may 
be viewed at http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=APHIS-2009-
0091 or in our reading room, which is located in room 1141 of the USDA 
South Building, 14th Street and Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, 
DC. Normal reading room hours are 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through 
Friday, except holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, 
please call (202) 690-2817 before coming.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Neil Hammerschmidt, Program 
Manager, Animal Disease Traceability, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 
46, Riverdale, MD 20737-1231; (301) 734-5571.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On August 11, 2011, we published in the 
Federal Register (76 FR 50082-50110, Docket No. APHIS-2009-0091) a 
proposal to establish minimum national official identification and 
documentation requirements for the traceability of livestock moving 
interstate.
    Comments on the proposed rule were required to be received on or 
before November 9, 2011. We are extending the comment period on Docket 
No. APHIS-2009-0091 for an additional 30 days. This action will allow 
interested persons additional time to prepare and submit comments.

    Authority:  7 U.S.C. 8301-8317; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.

    Done in Washington, DC this 3rd day of October 2011.
Kevin Shea,
Acting Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.
[FR Doc. 2011-26056 Filed 10-6-11; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3410-34-P
```
No. 46948.

#### Protests 792692-G, etc., of Chew Yuen Gee et al. (Honolulu, etc.).

Opinion by

Cline, J.

Following the authorities cited in Abstract 15400 the court dismissed the protests.
(Reap. Dec. 8857)

#### Shalom Baby-Wear, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 822571.

(Decided June 20, 1957)

*Lane, Young & Fox*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Doub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

*705Mollison, Judge:

This appeal for reappraisement has been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

> IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between counsel for the parties hereto, subject to the approval of the Court, that the merchandise covered by the above appeal for reappraisement consists of sponge rubber slippers imported from Japan.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the market value or the price, at the time of exportation of the said slippers to the United States, at which such or similar slippers were freely offered for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of Japan, in the usual wholesale quantities and in the ordinary course of trade, for exportation to the United States, including the cost of containers and coverings of whatever nature, and all other costs, charges, and expenses incident to placing the merchandise in condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States, was 27 cents per pair (United States currency); and that there was no higher foreign value for such or similar slippers at the time of exportation thereof.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that at the time of exportation of the said imported slippers, no such or similar slippers were manufactured or produced in the United States.

> IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED AND AGREED that the above appeal for reappraisement may be deemed to be submitted for decision upon this stipulation.

On the agreed facts I find the export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such value was 27 cents per pair (United States currency).

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
# C_2016222EN.01002101.xml

| 20.6.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 222/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

20.6.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 222/21

---

Order of the General Court of 20 April 2016 — Dima v EUIPO (Shape of a box consisting of two open cubes)

(Case T-326/15) (1)

((EU trade mark - Application for a three-dimensional EU trade mark - Form of a box consisting of two open cubes - Absolute ground for refusal - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - Action manifestly lacking any foundation in law))

(2016/C 222/25)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Applicant: Dima Verwaltungs GmbH (Hamburg, Germany) (represented by: T. Kerkhoff, lawyer)

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) (represented by: initially A. Graul and A. Schikfo, then A. Graul and M. Fischer acting as Agents)

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 20 April 2015 (Case R 2567/2014-5) concerning an application for registration of a three-dimensional sign consisting of the shape of a box composed of two open cubes as an EU trade mark.

Operative part of the order

| 1. | The action is dismissed. |
| --- | --- |

1.

The action is dismissed.

| 2. | Dima Verwaltungs GmbH is ordered to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Dima Verwaltungs GmbH is ordered to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 328, 5.10.2015.

---
## COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH
NO. 02
- 17
- 00348
- CR No. 02
- 17
- 00349
- CR

KEVIN BRIAN MORRIS APPELLANT

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

---------- FROM THE 371ST DISTR ICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO S . 1512506D, 1516801W

---------- 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION 1

---------- Appellant Kevin Brian M orris attempts to appeal from two judgment s convicting him of t heft under $2,500 with two or more previous convictions. Each

trial court certification states that this “is a plea

- bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal.” See Tex. R. App. P . 25.2(a)(2). On November 17,

2017 , we notified Morris that the appeal s may be dismissed pursuant to the trial

1 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.2

court’s certification s unless he or any party desiring to conti nue the appeals filed

a response showing grounds for continuing the appeals

. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d), 44.3. Morris filed a response, but it does not show grounds for continuing the appeals

. Therefore, in accordance with the trial court’s

certification s , we dismiss the se appeal s

. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(f).
PER CURIAM

PANEL: MEIER, GABRIEL, and KERR, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 28, 2017
<PAGE>

                                                         Exhibit 10.13
                           CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

        THIS AGREEMENT entered into by and between ________________ having an
address at _____________ ("RECIPIENT") and Edwards Lifescience Corporation, a
Delaware corporation,  having an address at _____________, Irvine, California,
92614 ("EDWARDS").

        EDWARDS is the owner of certain proprietary information related to
_____________ ("INFORMATION") with all right, title and interest vested therein
and has authority to disclose said INFORMATION.  EDWARDS agrees to disclose such
INFORMATION, and RECIPIENT agrees to accept such disclosure to allow RECIPIENT
to evaluate such INFORMATION for the purpose of _____________.

        In consideration of the opportunity to evaluate EDWARDS'S INFORMATION,
RECIPIENT agrees to receive that INFORMATION from EDWARDS and to hold the
INFORMATION in confidence and not to disclose it to any third parties, nor to
use it for any purpose other than to evaluate it for the purpose described
above, for a period of five (5) years from the date of disclosure, unless or
until:

        1) said INFORMATION shall become a matter of public knowledge in a
single publication through no fault of RECIPIENT, or

        2) said INFORMATION shall have in its entirety been known to RECIPIENT
prior to its receipt from EDWARDS, as exhibited by written records to EDWARDS
within ten (10) days of the disclosure, or

        3) said INFORMATION shall be disclosed to RECIPIENT in its entirety by a
third party who is not under any obligation of confidentiality to EDWARDS, or

        4) said INFORMATION is approved in writing by EDWARDS for release by
RECIPIENT.

        It is understood that acceptance of the INFORMATION by RECIPIENT shall
not give the right to use the INFORMATION for other than evaluation purposes
unless or until a formal written agreement for the specified purpose has been
entered into by the parties.
<PAGE>

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this instrument to be executed by
their duly authorized representatives.

EDWARDS LIFESCIENCES CORPORATION

By:                                        By:
      ----------------------------               ----------------------------

Title:                                     Title:
      ----------------------------               ----------------------------

Date:                                      Date:
      ----------------------------               ----------------------------
# C_2015414EN.01004202.xml

| 14.12.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 414/42 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

14.12.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 414/42

---

Action brought on 25 September 2015 — ZZ and Others v Court of Justice

(Case F-126/15)

(2015/C 414/53)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicants: ZZ and Others (represented by: S. Orlandi and T. Martin, lawyers)

Applicants:

Defendant: Court of Justice of the European Union

Defendant:

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Subject-matter and description of the proceedings

Payment of compensation to the applicants for the material harm they have incurred on account of the loss of their pension rights acquired in the national system following the transfer of those rights to the pension scheme of the European Union.

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

The applicants claim that the Tribunal should:

| — | order the Court of Justice to pay the sums referred to in the application to any fund or insurance policy in the applicants’ names; |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Court of Justice to pay the sums referred to in the application to any fund or insurance policy in the applicants’ names;

| — | in the alternative, order the Court of Justice to pay EU 61  121,08 to ZZ, EUR 1 29  440,98 to [another applicant], EUR 76  324,29 to [another applicant] and EUR 99  565,13 to [another applicant], those sums to be paid together with interest calculated at a rate of 3,1 % per annum from the date of the transfer of the applicants’ pension rights to the PSEUI; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the alternative, order the Court of Justice to pay EU 61  121,08 to ZZ, EUR 1 29  440,98 to [another applicant], EUR 76  324,29 to [another applicant] and EUR 99  565,13 to [another applicant], those sums to be paid together with interest calculated at a rate of 3,1 % per annum from the date of the transfer of the applicants’ pension rights to the PSEUI;

| — | in the further alternative, declare that the Court of Justice acted negligently when it transferred the applicants’ pension rights; |
| --- | --- |

—

in the further alternative, declare that the Court of Justice acted negligently when it transferred the applicants’ pension rights;

| — | order the Court of Justice to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order the Court of Justice to pay the costs.

---