NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0654n.06 Nos. 08-5677, 08-5678 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT No. 08-5677 UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. WI L L I E A. F REEMAN, No. 08-5677 MARI ON RUSSEL L , No. 08-5678 De fe nd ants -A

pp e lla nts
. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PE A L FROM THE UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT CO UR T F OR

TH E E AS TE RN DI STRI CT OF TEN

NESSEE

BEF OR E: NO RRIS, RO G ER S, a nd WH ITE, Ci r c uitJudg e s. ROGERS, Circ uit Jud ge. I n Fe bruar y 2008, co-de fenda

nts W illie A. Fre eman a

nd Marion Russell were eac h convicted by a fede ral jury of possession with the intent to distribut e more than five g rams, but le ss tha

n fifty g rams, of coca ine base; simple posse ssion of a quantity of coc aine; and possession with the i ntent to distribute 369 dosag e unit s of MDMA. L ocal law enfor ceme nt office rs ha d d isc ov e re d $ 20 ,0 00 wo rt h o f d ru g s hidd e n in th e de fe nd ants ’ r e nta l c ar d ur inga ro uti ne tr a ff

ic stop in eastern Te nnessee in January 2007. On appe al, Fr eema n and Russell contend that a uthorities vio la te d th e ir

F ourt h A me ndme nt r ig hts duri ngthe tr a ff ic sto p, and that evi de nc e of an inc ide nt i n J uly 2006, when the de fenda

nts repor ted t he theft of m ore tha

n $14,000 in cash fr om their J ohnson City , T e nn e sse e , h ote l r oo m, s ho uld no t ha ve be e n a dmi tte d to pr ov e the ir int e nt t o d istri bu te

narc otics. I n addition, Fre eman a rg ues that evide nce of

his eleven- y ear -old drug-t ra ff ickingNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 2 - c on vic tio n w a s im

pr op e rl y a dmi tte d to pro ve his int e nt an d to impe a c h h is t ri a l te sti mony . Ru sse ll,

moreove r, cha lleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence to sustain his convictions. Be cause the authorities deve loped re asonable suspicion to detain the def endants duringthe Janu ary 20 07 tr a ff

ic sto p; b e c a

us e e vid e nc e of the July 20 06 inc ide nt is pro bativ e of the de fe nd a nts ’ int e nt, and the y have no t expla ine d how that evi de nc e wa s unf a ir ly pr e jud ic ia l to the m; a

nd be c a us e the Go ve rnme nt p re se nte d suf fi c ie nt ev ide nc e to sup po rt a fi nd ingthat Ru sse ll h a d c on str uc tiv e ly po sse sse d th e na

rc oti c s, we a ff

ir m Russe ll’ s convic tio ns . Ho we ve r, be c a us e the pr ob a tiv e va lue —if any —of F ree man’s prior conviction was substantially outweig hed by a risk of unf

air pre judice, and beca use the a dmission of t hat prior c onviction into evidence w as not harmless, we reve rse F ree man’s convictions and re mand for a new tria l. I. T h i s d ru g-t raf

ficking case orig inated with the January 17, 2007, traff

ic stop of Will ie A. Fr eema n’s re ntal car , in which Marion Russell was a passeng er. A fter la w enf orce ment office rs discovere d coca ine base , coca ine, and MDMA dosa g e unit s conce aled by the re ntal car ’s hea dliner, a fe dera l gr and jury

indicted Fr eema

n and Russell on three counts ea ch of posse ssion with the intent to distribute a controlled substanc e . Fr eema n moved to suppress evidenc e of the narc otics that the Gover nment had seized fr om his rental car, asserting that the officer who had st opped the car , alleg edly for speeding , had deta ined Fr eema n and Russell for longe r t h an necessar y to effe ctuate the purposes of the stop. Rus se ll subsequently

joined in Fre eman’ s motion , which the Gove rnment opposed.Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 3 - At a suppression hearingbefor e a ma g istrate judg e, F ree man moved into evidenc e a videotape of

the eve nts of J anuar

y 17, 2007, as rec orded by

Tenne ssee Hig hway

Patrol Trooper

J oe Luncef ord’s da shboard- mounted came ra. Tr ooper L uncef ord testified for

the Gover

nment that, on t h e a f t e r n o o no f J an u ar y 1 7 , h e h a d

b e e ns t a t i o n e d

a tt h e f i f t y - m i l e m a r

k e r o ne a s t b o u n dI26—approximately five miles f rom the Tenne ssee- North Carolina border

. On that afte rnoon, he ha d clocke d a vehic le g oing 74 miles pe r hour in a 55- mile-p er -hour zone. Troope r L uncef ord turned on his emerg ency

equipment, made a

U-turn, a nd drove up be hind the vehic l e, which had a lrea dy pulled off the r oad. He could see two individuals—whom he identified at the suppression hea ring

a s F re e man a

nd Rus se ll— in t

he ve hic le ’s fr on t se a t and , a s h e app roa c he d, he c ou ld s e e that bo th had put their hands in the air. As Trooper Luncef ord approache d, moreove r, he “noticed a n odor of marijuana coming from the ve hicle.” H e aske d the driver , Fr eema n, for a license, r eg istration, and proof of insurance . Trooper

Luncef ord then re turned to hi s car and ca lled for a

Unicoi County

canine unit, “[j ]ust to verify what [ he] had sm elled.” “ Approxim ately 9, 10 minutes” passed be tween the initiation of the stop and when the c anine unit ar rived; during

that time, Trooper

Luncef ord che cked Fr eema n’s license and wor

ked on issuing a

citation for spe eding

. Trooper Luncef ord testified that he had not y et fini shed writing t he citation when a ca nine office r, Stacy

Wigand of

the Unicoi County

Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment, had arrived. Trooper L uncef ord told Office r Wiga

nd about the mar ijuana odor a nd asked O ffice r Wiga

nd to walk his dog around the

v e h i c l e . A f

t e r t h e d o g h a d

a l e rt e d , t h e o f

f i c e r s s e ar c h e d t h e v e h i c l e an d f o u n d $ 1 8 0 0 i nt w e n t ydollar bills over the drive r’s side sun visor a nd a mar ijuana roa ch in an e m p t y fr u i t -juice bottle. Offic er Wig and’s dog then s niffed the vehicle’ s interior and aler ted on the cash and on the headlinerNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 4 - near the vehicle’ s rea

r window. Trooper

Luncef ord testified that Of

fice r Wiga

nd then discover ed bag s of what ha d appea

red to be drug s conce aled by the vehicle’s rear headliner. A fter the office rs fo un d th e dr

ug s, F re e man a

nd Rus se ll w e re pla c e d und e r a rr e st. On cr oss-examination, Free man’s counse l play ed the first few minutes of the videotape of the sto p a nd Tr oo pe r L

un c e fo rd c on fi rm e d th a t he ha d sai d “ so me thi nga in’ t r ig ht” wi th r e sp e c t to the re ntal car

paper work. Althoug h Fr eema

n had signe d the paper

work, the r ental ag ree ment was in a third party ’s name. F ree man’s counse l t h en asked whether T rooper Luncef ord re membere d telling a nother off

icer on the sce ne that “the renta l agr ee m en t i s what re ally g ot me”; Troope r Luncef ord re sponded, “I

reme mber smelling the marijuana in the vehicle. I ’m very adama nt about that.” Howe ver, Tr ooper L uncef ord had sa id nothing about mar ijuana to Fr eema n or Russell, nor had he me ntioned the odor to dispatch. Rath er , T rooper Luncef ord had f irst mentioned the odor approximately six teen minutes a fter he had initiated the stop. When F ree man’s counsel as ked Trooper Luncef ord whe ther he reme mbere d saying, a pproxi mately

one hour into the stop, that “you didn’t know what y ou wer e smelling , but it didn’t sm ell ri gh t , ” T rooper Luncef ord could not

reme mber having ma de such a statement. I n response to Russell’s counsel’s que stioning, Troope r L uncef ord explained that the odor had “ma de [him] want to call for a dog, [ that] it [ had] give [n] [hi m] rea son to want to investigate that further .” He insisted that he “was already g oing to call for the dog before [ he had] rea liz ed” that the renta l ag ree ment was in a third pa rty ’s name; indee d, “the big g est fac tor” in his decision to call for a dog“wa s what [he had] smelled in the car .”Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 5 - Af te r c ouns e l ha d f

ini sh e d, the ma g istra

te jud g e qu e sti on ed Tr oo pe r L un c e fo rd wh ile revie wing the videotape . This review reve aled that Tr ooper L uncef ord had initiated the stop at 2:46

P . M . and had c alled in the vehic le’s tagnumber a nd requested a c anine unit appr ox imately two minutes later. At ar ound 2:53 P . M ., dispatch advised T rooper Luncef ord that F ree man’s license was

va lid ; ro ug hly tw o min

ute s late r, Tr oo pe r L

un c e fo rd le arn e d th a t th e re we re no ou tst and ingwa rr a nts for F ree man’s ar

rest. Troope r L

uncef ord told the mag istrate judge that he had not re -appr oache d the vehicle until af

ter ba ckup had arrive d beca use F ree man and Russell had a ppear ed ner

vous—it was “not ty pical” f or individuals to put the ir hands up during a routine traff ic stop—and beca

use of the marijuana odor. B ackup a

rrived by 2:58 P . M . and the c anine of fice r ar rived shortly

there afte r. The Gove rnment also called Offic er Wigand, who testified that, afte r his dog had ale rted on the ve hic le ’s e xter ior , h e ha d s e arc he d th e ve hic le and fou nd th e mar iju ana ro a c h. Th e do g a lso aler ted inside the vehic le, on the roof near the re ar w indow. Havingnoticed that the r ear headliner

wa s lo os e , O ff

ic e r Wi g and pu lle d it do wn and a ba g fi lle d w itha

wh ite po wd e ry

su bs tanc e hit

him in the fac e. Of

fice r Wiga

nd testified that the off

icer s had also found c urre ncy in the vehicle’ s cente r console; he did not re call havingfound the money above the driver’ s side sun visor. Fr eema n called a s a witness L ieutenant Da vid Pauley

of the Unic oi County

Sheriff’ s Depa rtment, who had a lso responde d to Trooper Luncef ord’s call for assistance. L ieutenant Pauley testified that, wh en h e had approa ched the vehicle a fter F ree man and Russell’s ar rest, he ha d not smelled marijuana . He e x plained, thoug h, that “[o] f cour se, there was seve ral minutes, seve ral other people done been up the re, [and] doors had bee n opened” befor e he ha d approa ched the vehicle.Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 6 - Following the suppression hea ring , the mag istrate judg e issued a w ritten repor t

rec ommending the denial of the defe ndants’ motions to suppress. The re port notes that Luncef ord emphatically

testi fi ed

. . . that he smelled the strongodor of mar ijuana when he walked up to the driver’s s ide of the car. There so lut ion of t

he de fe nd an ts’ mo tio ns to s up

pr ess d e pe nd s u po n wh e the r Lu nc e

for d is be lie v e d, i.e ., whe the r h e did or did no t sm e ll t

he od or of m ar iju an a wh e n h e fir st w alk e d u p to thec ar . Th e re po rt

c on c lud e s th a t T ro op e r L un c e fo rd ’s a c c ou

nt o f e ve nts is c re dib le : [Tr oo pe r L

un c e fo rd ] une qu ivo c a lly

and e mph a tic a lly te sti fi e d un de r oath b e fo re thi s Court that he did detec t the odor of mar ijuana. The re a re por tions of the tape that s u gges tt h at h e d i d

n o ts m el l m ar i

j u an a; at v ar i o u s t i m es , h e m en t i o n edce rt ai nt h i n gs that cause d him to be suspicious of the defe ndants, and he notably did not mention an odor of m ar ijuana. F or example, at 2:58, he talke d about the def endants a cting n er v o u s l y , and the pe culiarities of the renta l ag ree ment, y et he sa id nothing about smelling marijuana. At 4:24, as events wer e dra wing to a close, L

uncef ord said that it was the renta l ag ree ment that rea lly seized his attention. But on the other ha nd, he does make sporadic r efe renc es to having smelled marijuana , and the fact that he re qu e ste d a

K- 9 o ff ic e r a lmo st immed ia te ly

a ft e r t he sto p te nd s to c or

ro bo ra te his testimony

. At 2:5 8, Lun c e fo rd

sa id, “ the y

mig ht b e tot a lly

le g it, ” wh ic h a

rgua bly sug g ests he had not sme lled marijuana . But at that point all he knew wa s that he had smelled mari jua na . I f t hin g s h a d n e ve r p ro g res sed bey on d th e me re od or , th e se defe ndants would have b ee n s en t on their wa y . But the strongodor of mar ijuana war rante d further

investigation, an d that further investiga tion consisted of a K- 9 office r and a

dog sniff, ultimately

leadingto the discovery

of a c ache of drug s in the head liner of the c ar a

nd over a $1000 in curre ncy . . . .

. . . . Ultimately , the issue is rather straig htforwa

rd: is L uncef ord to be be lieved, or is he not? The only evidenc e is Luncef

ord’s te s timony

and the videota

pe. Re c a lli ngthat th e sta

nd ard of pr oo f i s a

pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e , it pr e p o n d e r a te s in f

a v o r o f Lu n c e f

o r d

. I n s h o rt, Lu n c e f

o r d is b e li e v e d

. I t f

ollows there fore that the lapse of twenty -three minutes from the traf fic stop to the first sniff of the drugdog , and then the la pse of a n additional twen t y -s i x m i n utes for the dis c ov e ry of the ill e g a l dr

ug s, wa s n ot u

nr e a so na ble un de r t

he F ourt h A me ndme nt.Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 7 - F re e man a

nd Rus se ll fi le d ob

je c tio ns to the ma g istra

te jud g e ’s re po rt

and re c omm e nd a tio ns , arguing, pr imarily , that the mag istrate judge had er red in findingTrooper

Luncef ord cr edible. The dis tr ic t c ourt

ov e rr ule d the ir ob

je c tio ns , a do pte d and a

pp ro ve d the re po rt

and re c omm e nd a tio ns in

a sh or t or de r, and

de nie d th e mot ion s to su pp re ss. Other e vide nti ary

issues arose pretria l. For e x ample, the Gove rnment g ave notice of its intent to introduc e evidenc e, pursuant to F eder al Rule of Evidence 404(b), that, in N ovem b er 1996, F r e e m anh a d

p l e a d e d g u i l t y i na W a s h i n g t o n C o u n ty , T e n n e s s e e , c o u rt t o t h e s a l e o f a s c h e d u l e II controlled substanc e. The go v er n ment planned to introduce this evidence , in part, to prove F r e e ma n ’ s in te n t to d is tr ib u te th e n ar c o ti c s f o u n d in th e r e n ta l car

. Fr eema n objected to the Go ve rnme nt’ s p ro po se d u se of his pr ior c on vic tio n b e c a

us e of its a g e , an d b e c a

us e , h e argue d, its probative va lu e wa s substantially outweig hed by

a risk of unf

air pre judice. Fr eema

n, moreove r,

so ug ht aru l i n g a s t o w h e th e r t h e G o v e r n m e n t c o u l d u s e h i s p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n t o i mp e a c h his testimony at trial. The Gove rnment re lated that it did “not intend to use defe ndant’s 1996 conviction during cross-e x amination unless the def endant testifies inc onsistently with his prior conviction.” At a he ari ng jus t da y s b e fo re tr ia l, t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

ru le d that th e Go ve rnme nt c ou ld introduce F ree man’s prior c onviction as evidenc e of his intent to distr ibute narc otics. The c ourt

e xpla ine d th a t, b e c a

us e F re e man w a s c ha

rg e d w ith sp e c if

ic int e nt o ff

e ns e s, “ the [G]ov e rnme nt m us t prove intent” at trial. The c o urt then conc luded that, under Six th Circuit prece dent, in particula r U n i t e d S t a t es v . M a t th e ws , 4 4 0 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 2006), Fre eman’ s prior convic tion is probative of hi s intent. Although the court c hara cter ized the ag e of the prior convic tion as “bothersome ,” the court noted that, under c ontrolling prece dent, “there is no absolute maxim um number of y ear s thatNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 8 - may separ ate a

p ri o r ac t and the ac t char g ed in the indictment.” Acc ording ly , “the only rea l qu e sti on ” fo r t

he c ourt was whe th er the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the pr ior c on vic tio n w a s su

bs tanti a lly outweig hed by a risk of unfair prejudice

. The district c ourt conclude d that “the dang er of pre judice” could “be limit ed conside rably by a ca utionary instruction[ ,] which the court will g ive.” As to the us e of Fr eema

n’s prior conviction t o impeach his trial testimony , the district court’s

c o n s i d e r a t i o no f

t h a t i s s u e w a s l i m i t e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g e x c h an g e w i t h t h e G o v e r n m e n t ’ s a t t o r

n e y: The Court : . . . [A ]s I re c a ll, Ms. He be ts, y ou fi le d a ple a din g in w hic h y ou sa id that if the evide nce is admi ssible as part of y our ca se in chief

, obviously y ou wouldn’t intend to impeach Mr. F ree man if he te stifies if it’s alrea dy

been a dmitted. Ms. Hebets : Correc t. The c ourt did not otherwise a ddress the use of the prior conviction for impea chment purpose s. At the same pr etrial he aring , the di s trict court a lso heard a rg ument on the Gover

nment’s notice of its i ntent to introduce evidence , ag ain pursuant to Rule 404(b), of a J uly 2006 incident that had involved both F ree man and Russell. The Gove rnment’s notice indi cate d that, in J uly 2006, law enfor ceme nt office rs had se ized $14,430 in cash from F re em an and Russell after a drug dog had aler ted on the money

. T h e Gove rnment’s attorney repr esente d that Fr eema n and Russell had repor ted the money stolen from their J ohnson City , Tenne ssee, hotel r oom, and that authorities had

rec overe d the m oney

from a hote l maid’s residenc e. The Gover nment’s attorne y

further repr esente d that a drugdog had ale rted on the de fenda nts’ renta l car , inside of which a uth o ri t i es had found marijuana residue. Fr eema

n and Russell objec ted to the use of this evidence beca use the c ontrolled substance involved—ma

rijuana—w as not a substance ch ar ged in the instant indictment. The Go ve rnme nt’ s atto rn e y

re sp on de d th a t, i n Jan

ua ry 20 07 , a uth or iti e s ha d fo un d F re e man and Rus se llNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

Whe re a s O ff

ic e r Wi g and te sti fi e d a t the su pp re ssi on he ari ng that th e of fi c e rs ha d f

ound c a sh 1 in the renta l car ’s center console, he testi fied at trial that they had found cash a bove the dr iver’s side sun visor . H e e xpla ine d at tri a l tha t, af te r fi nd ing the c a sha

bo ve the sun v iso r, he ha d mo ve d it to t h e c en t er co n s o l e f o r s af ek ee p i n g. - 9 - in p os se ssi on

of mor e tha n o ne c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e and that, a s to the “ $1 4, 00 0 tha t wa s se ize d in J uly of the pre vious y ear , that’s an a wful lot of marijuana

to sell to ge t that kind of money .” Af te r t he pr e tr ia l he ari ng , th e dis tr ic t c ourt iss ue d a wri tt en orde r d e nyingthe de fe nd a nts ’ objections, and ruling that evidenc e of the $14,430 seized in July 2006 would be admissible to prove the defendants’ intent to distribute narc otics. The district c ourt indicated, how ever , that it did not understand the signific ance of t he fact that, in J uly 2006, the def

endants ha d been dr iving a car rente d in a third party ’s name, or the fa ct that marijuana had somehow be en involved in that incident. The district court fur

ther indicated that it would “g ive an a ppropriate limit ing instruc tion” a t tr ia l. Subsequently , in an appa

rent attempt to expand the scope of the admissible evidenc e of the J uly 2006 incident, the Gove rnment prof fer ed the testimony

of two law- enfor ceme nt of fice rs who had investig ated that incide nt. F oll ow ingthe Go ve rnme nt’ s p ro ff e r, the dis tr ic t c ourt

ul ti mate ly

c on c lud e d

t h a te v i d e n c e o f

t h e Ju l y 2 0 0 6 i n c i d e n tw o u l d

b e a d m i s s i b l e t o p r o v e t h e d e f e n d a nts ’ intent to distribute na

rcotics but not to show a plan, sche me, or pattern. The court rea soned that “the events c lear ly

support the infer ence that there was a drug -traf ficking offe nse g oing on” in J uly 2006, and that the Gove rnment had prese nted “a sufficie nt fac tual basis for the testimony about t he re port of the thef

t and the seizure of

the money

and the dr

ug dog hit on the money .” At trial, Troope r L

uncef ord and O ffice r Wiga

nd provided testimony

simil ar to that given at t h e e ar l i er

s u p p re s s i o nh ea ri n g. 1 T h e Go v er nment introduced F ree man’s prior dr ug -traf fickingNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 10 - conviction, which the district cour t instructed the jury

to consider “ only

as i t relates to the [G] overnme nt’s claim that def endant F ree man intended to distribute drug s on J anuary 17, 2007.” As to the J uly 2006 incident, the Gove rnment ca lled Offic ers Rober t McCurry

and Robert Edw ards of the Johnson City Police Depa rtment. Offic er McCurry testified that he had r esponded to a theft call at a J ohnson City

hotel on the af

ternoon of July

16, 2006 ; th a t a

hotel mai d had c on fe sse d to taking the def

endants’ mone y ; and that a c anine of fice r had g one to the maid’s a partment
. Offic er Edwar ds testified that he and his dog ha d done a c onsensual sea rch of the apa rtment ; that his dog ha d aler ted on a trash can, wher e the office rs had found some minor drug para pherna lia, and o n the

corne r of a

mattress—betwe en the mattress and the box spring s—where the office rs had found more tha n $ 14 ,0 00 in c a sh ; and that his dog was tra ined to aler t at t he odor of narcotics but not at the mere prese nce of

curr ency . Offic er Edwar ds further testified that ea ch def

endant ha d claimed ha lf of the

rec overe d sum. The dist rict court instructed the jury that it could consider e vidence of the July 2006 inc ide nt “on ly

a s it re la te s to the [G]ov e rnme nt’ s c la im that th e de fe nd a nts int e nd e d to dis tr ibute

narc otic drug s on or about January 17, 2007[,] . . . but not for any other purpose .” The Gove rnment re ad into evidenc e a stipulation that, during the J anuar y 2007 traff

ic stop,

o ff i cers had seized 98.8 g rams of c ocaine base, 21.5 g rams of c ocaine , and 396 dosag e units of MDMA from the de fenda nts’ renta l car

. A DrugEnforc ement Administration Task F orce Ag ent

conser vatively estimated that the stre et value of those drug s was appr ox imately $20,000. At the close of the Government’s case, Free man and Russell eac h moved for a judg ment of acquittal. The district cour t noted that “the pr oof is less convincing , less overw helming w ith respec t to M r. Rus se ll t han it is to Mr . F re e man, e sp e c ia lly on the iss ue of

wh e the r o r n ot h e kn ow ing lyNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 11 - possessed the, the dr

ug s in que s tion here.” Ne ve rt he le ss, the dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d b oth

mot ion s, f i n d i n g t h a tt h e G o v e r

n m e n th a d

p u tf o rt h e n o u g h e v i d e n c e t o s u b m i tt h e c a s e t o t h e j u r

y. Ea c h d e fe nd ant t

he n tes tif ie d on his ow n be ha lf

. On the sta

nd , F re e man e xpla ine d th a t, i n t h e e ar l y m o r

n i n g h o u r s o f

J an u ar y 1 7 , 2 0 0 7 , h e h a d

dr i v e nf r o m G e o r g i a , t o J o h n s o nC i t y, Tenne ssee, to deliver

some clothes t o Russell, who had rec ently moved. Fr eema

n and Russell had worke d toge ther in the music business for sever al y ear s ; after

Fr eema n g ot to J ohnson City , he and Russell waited to hea

r about a rec ording studio session in Greenville, South Carolina. After waiting awhile without he aring any thing, Fr eema

n started back towa

rd Ge org ia. When Russell heard that they co u l d v i s i t the re cordingstudio after a ll, however , Fr eema n turned a

round and he aded ba ck toward Johnson Ci ty
. Fr eema n rent ed a hotel room in Johns on City beca use, by the time they returne d from Greenville that night, it would be too late for him to drive home to Ge org ia. Fr eema n t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e h a d

m a i n t a i n e d

p o s s e s s i o no f

h i s r e n t a l c ar

t h r o u g h o u tt h e d ay, e x c e p tf o r a t w e n t yfive to thirty minute interval when he had allowed Russell to borrow the car . F re e man a nd Rus se ll

wer e on their w ay to G ree nville w hen Trooper Luncef ord pulled them over

. Fr eema n testified that he had ne ither put drug s in the rental c ar nor known that they

wer e ther e. F re e man f

ur the r t e sti fi e d th a t he ha d p leaded gu ilty to a n o ff e ns e in 1 99 6, ha d s e rv e d h is time, and had “ lear

n[ed] [hi s] l esson.” He explained that the money seized in J uly 2006 “wa s like some money

we ha d for investment in o u r company , money we ha d from wor

king, just save d up

m o n e y; a l l t h e m o n e y w e h a d i nt h e w h o l e w i d e w o r l d

p e r i o d , ” b u tt h a tn o n e o f

i tw a s dr u g m o n e y. On cr oss-examination, the Government que stioned Fre eman at leng th about bo th h is p r io r c o nv ic tionNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 12 - and the July

2006 incident

. Fr ee m an’s counsel neve r objec ted to the Gover nment’s lines of questioning. For his part, Rus sell testified t hat, as of J anuar y 17, 2007, he had lived in Johnson C ity for “a week a nd some day s.” On the morning of J anuar y 17, he met F ree man in the par king lot outside of Russell’s g irlfriend’ s house. Af te r F re e man ha d sta

rt e d b a c k to wa

rd Ge or g ia , Ru sse ll “ca lled Mr. Fr eema n and let him know that it wa s a g o for the studio.” Rus se ll w e nt w ithF re e man to a ho te l, but while Fr eema

n was renting a room, Russell borrowe d the re ntal car to pick up a notebook a

nd some bl an kCDs that he had lef t at his girlf

riend’s house

. Whil e ther e, Russell asked a n acqua intance to take Fr eema n’s ca r “to g o g et a ba g of m ar ijuana and a couple of

beer s.” Rus se ll testified that he ha d borrowe d the ca r for twenty to twenty -five minutes total. He a nd Fr eema

n wer e

o nt h e r o adfo r j u s tt h i rt y

m i n u t es o r s o b ef

o re T ro o p er

Lu n ce fo rds t o p p edt h em fo r s p ee d i n g. At the close of all evidenc e, the district cour t ga ve the pa rties an oppor

tunity to reviewthe jury instructions a n d enter

tained their obje ctions. Most releva nt for purpose s of this appea l, the dis tr ic t c ourt

ins tr uc te d th e jur

y that [y ]ou have hea

rd testimony

that defe ndant Will ie Fr eema n was convicted of

selling a sche dule I Idrug in the Circuit Court o f W as h i n g ton County , Tenne ssee[,] on November

27, 1996. You ca

n consider the evidenc e only as it relate s to the [ G] o v ern m en t ’s cl ai m t h at d ef en d an t Fr ee m an i n t en d ed t o d i s t ri b u t e n ar co t i c d ru gs o no r a b o u t Ja n u ar y 1 7 , 2 0 07, or as o ne way

of h e lpi ng

y ou de c ideho w be lie v ab le his testimony was. You must not consider it for a ny other purpose

. (Emphasis adde d.) F ree man’s counsel objected to this instruction, arguing that the district court had ad dre s s edt h e u s e o f Fre em an ’s p ri o r co n v i ct i o n fo r i mp ea ch m en t p u rp o s es at t h e p re t ri al h ea ri n g. T h e co u rt n oted that, when the Gover nment was impea ching Fr eema n with his prior conviction,Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 13 - Fr eema n’s counse l had “sat there a nd didn’t make a

ny objection.” Th e dis tr ict cou rt ul tim a te ly denied F ree man’s objec tion, reasoningthat “had this matter been c ontested, I would have f

ound that the conviction , ev en thoug h more than te n y ear s old, was more pr obative than pr ejudicial, and I

wo uld have a dmi tte d it ” fo r i mpe a c hme nt p ur po se s. Th e jur y fo un d F re e man a

nd Rus se ll e a c h guil ty

of po sse ssi on wi th the int e nt t o d istri bu te more than f

ive g rams, but less than fifty g rams, of c ocaine base; simple possession of a qua ntity of

coca ine; and possession with the intent t o distribute 369 dosag e units of MDMA. Fr eema n and Rus se ll n owa

pp e a l th e ir

c on vic tio ns . II. A. Stop and Search of the Rental Car . Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y de nie d F re e man a

nd Russe ll’ s mo tio ns to s up pr e ss b e c a us e Tro op er Lun c e fo rd

ha d p ro ba

ble c a us e to s top the ir

re nta l c ar a

nd the n d e ve lop e d th e re qu isi te

re a so na ble su sp ic ion

to c on tin ue the ir de te nti on . Whe n T ro op e r L un c e fo rd sto pp e d th e de fe nd a nts ’ vehicle, he had proba

ble ca use to believe that they had viol ated state law: he had cloc ked F ree man dri v i n g 7 4 m i l es p er h o u r i n a 55 -m i l e- p er -h o u r z o n e an d T en n es s ee l aw p ro h i b i t s s p ee d i n g,

see Un ite d Stat es v . H

ill , 195 F.3d 258, 265 ( 6th Cir. 1999) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 55- 8-152). Thus Tr oo per L

un c e fo rd ’s ini tia l st op of the de fe nd ants ’ v e hic le c omp or te d w iththe F ourt

h Amendment. Un ite d S

tat es v . D av is , 430 F.3d 345, 352 ( 6th Cir. 2005). F re e man a

nd Rus se ll c on te nd , h ow e ve r, that Tr oo pe r Lun c e fo rd la c ke d th e jus tif ic a tio n to de ta in t he m any lon g e r t ha n r e a so na bly re qu ir e d to iss ue a c itatio n fo r sp e e din g . Th is c on te nti on is

un a va ili ng becau se the mari jua na od or pr ov ide d r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

fo r T ro op e r L

un c e fo rd toNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 14 - continue the de fenda

nts’ detention. “‘ Once the purposes of the initial tra ffic stop [are ] completed, the re is n o d ou

bt t ha t th e of fi c e r [c an] no t f

ur the r d e ta in t

he veh icl e or

its oc c up ants un le ss

so me thi ngtha

t oc c ur re d d ur ingthe tr a ff

ic sto p g e ne ra

te d th e ne c e ssa

ry re a so na ble su sp ic ion

to justify a further de tention.’” United States v. Bailey , 302 F.3d 652, 657- 58 (6th Cir. 2002) (a lteration i no ri gi n al ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tat es v . M esa , 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir. 1995)). Trooper L uncef ord

ma int a ine d thro ug ho ut th e su pp re ssi on he ari ngtha

t he ha d s me lle d ma

ri jua na wh e n h e ha d f

ir st approa ched the defe ndants’ vehic le. The ma g istrate judg e conc luded that Troope r L uncef ord wa s

c re dib le and

tha t th e mari jua na sme ll h a d g e ne ra

te d re a so na

ble su sp ic ion to j us tif

y the de fe nd a nts ’ continued dete ntion. See U nited States v. Simpson , 520 F.3d 531, 543 ( 6th Cir. 2008). The mag istrate judg e’s c redibility deter mination, whic h the district court implicitly adopted and appr oved , is not clearly err oneous. Bailey , 302 F.3d at 656 (setting f orth the standar d of re view for f actua l findings) . The magistrate j udg e observed, in his written report and re commendation, that Trooper Luncef

ord had “unequivoc ally and emphatically testified under oath . . . that he did dete ct the odor of ma

rijuana.” “We ar e g ener ally reluc tant to set aside cr edibility deter minations made by the tr ie r o f f

a c t, w ho ha s h a d th e op po rt un ity to vie w the wi tne ss o n th e sta nd and a sse ss h is demea nor.” Pev eler v . United States , 2 69 F .3 d 6 93 , 7 02 (6th Cir . 2 00 1) . F re e man a nd Rus se ll maintain, howeve r, that the videotape belies Trooper Luncef ord’s testimony . They

emphasize that Trooper Luncef ord (1) said nothing about the odor, either to them or in his initial communications with dispatch; (2) stated that Fre eman a nd Russell “might be totally leg it”; (3) made sever al comments about how nervous the m en were and about how “something a in’t rig ht” with the re ntal ag ree ment; and (4) sa id, after the offic ers ha d discovere d the drug s, that he “knew [ he had] smelledNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 15 - something.” Fr eema

n and Russell also rely heavily upon Trooper Luncef ord’s statement that “the renta l ag ree ment is really what g ot me.” They h ighlig ht the fac t that none of the othe r off icer s testified to having smelled marijuana in the vehicle. F re e man a

nd Rus se ll’ s argume nts are un pe rs ua siv e . T he fa c t that Tr oo pe r L un c e fo rd sa id

no thi nga bo ut t he od or do e s n ot m e an th a t he did no t, i n f a c t, s me ll m ari

jua na . E ve n th ou g h h e did not men ti o nth e o d o r

in h is in it ia l c o mm

u n ic a ti o n s w it

h d is p a tc h , h e d id

c a ll f o r a dr u g d o g s oon afte r re tur n i n g to his car, whic h sug g ests that he had sme lled something. Mor eover , Trooper Luncef ord’s voicinghis suspicions with respect to the defe ndants’ nerve s and the third-par ty renta l ag ree ment does not mean that he did not also detec t marijuana. N or is this case c ontroll ed b y the fac t that no one else te stified to the smell: they we re n ot on the scene when Tr ooper L uncef ord initially approa ched the renta l car

. The de fenda

nts’ arguments, sever al of which the magistrate judg e explicitly addre ssed , do not leave one “‘w ith the definite and f irm conviction that a mi stake has been committed.’” Simpson , 5 2 0 F. 3 d at 5 3 5 (q u o t i n g United States v. Navarro-Camac ho , 186 F.3d 701, 705 ( 6th Cir. 1999)). B e c a u s e t h e m a g i s t r a t e j u d g e w a s i nt h e b e s t p o s i t i o n t o e v a l u a t e T r o o p e r Lu n c e f o r d ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y, Hi ll , 1 95 F .3 d at 26 4- 65 , a nd be c a us e the recor d p ro vid e s “ no c omp e lli ngre a so n to se c on d- g ue ss the mag istrate judg e’s de cision,” Pev eler , 269 F.3d at 702, the cre dibilit y deter mination must stand. I t follows, then, that once Trooper Luncef ord had smelled ma

rijuana, he had re asonable suspicion to continue the def

endants’ de tention. See Simpson , 520 F.3d at 543. At tha t po int , T ro op e r L

un c e fo rd “ dil ig e ntl y purs ue d a me ans of inv e sti g a tio n th a t w a s li ke ly to confirm or dispel [his] suspicions quickly .” United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 16 - After returningto his car, he asked for a canine office r, who a rrived on the scene roug hly ten minutes later. A pproxi mately

twenty -three minutes after T r ooper L

uncef ord had initiated the stop, the c anine of fi c e r w a lke d h is d ogaro un d th e re nta l c ar. Th is w a s n ot an un re a so na ble a mou nt o f t ime to d e ta in the def endants in lig ht of Troope r L uncef ord’s re asonable suspicion that they wer e o r had been eng ag ed in criminal activity

. Se e Da v is , 43 0 F .3 d a t 35 5 (c on c lud ing that takin g thi rt y min ute s to locate dr ug dog was re asonable wher e off icer s rea sonably

suspected na

rcotics possession). O nce the dog had aler

ted, the off

icer s had proba

ble ca use to sear ch the ve hicle, bec ause a “positive indication by a prope rly -traine d dogis sufficient to establish proba ble ca use for the pre sence of a c ontrolled substance.” United States v. Diaz , 2 5 F .3 d 3 92 , 3 93 -9 4 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 4) ; se e Hi ll , 195 F.3d at 273. I n sum, Trooper L

uncef ord had pr obable c ause to stop Fr eem an and Russell initi ally for speeding . Once Trooper

Luncef ord had smelled ma

rijuana, he had re asonable suspicion to just ify the de fe nd a nts ’ f

ur the r d e te nti on . T he dr

ugdo g ’s a le rt ul ti mat ely e sta bli sh e d p ro ba

ble c a us e to

se arc h th e ve hic le . T hu s th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y de nie d th e de fe nd ants ’ m oti on s to su pp re ss. B. Admission into Evi dence of Fr eem an’s P rior Convict ion. I t wa s e rr or

to a dmi t F re e man’ s pri or dr ug -t ra ff ic kin g c on vic tio n pur su ant t o F e de ra l Ru le of Evidenc e 404(b)

. That conviction was neither near in time nor substantially simil ar to the c onduct

a t is su e he re , a

nd its pr ob a tive value , if

any , w a s su

bs tanti a lly

ou tw e ig he d b y

a ri sk of un fa ir pr e jud ic e . Ru le 40 4( b) pr ov ide s th a t [e] vidence of other crimes, wrong s, or acts is not admiss ible to prove the c hara cter of a pe rson in order

to show action in confor mity there with. I t may , howeve r, be a dmi ssi ble fo r o the r p ur po se s, su c h a s p ro of

of mot ive , o pp or

tun ity , in te nt, prepa ration, plan, knowle dg e, identity , or abse nce of mistake or ac cident . . . .Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 17 - A district court c onsideringwhether to admit “ other acts” evidenc e pursuant to Rule 404( b) follows

a thr e e -s te p a

na ly sis : The fir st step require s the di strict court to decide whether there is sufficient evide nce that the other act in que stion a ctually occur red. I f so, the district cour t must decide whether the evidenc e of the other a ct is “‘pr obative of a materia l i s s ue other

than char acte r.’” Finally , if the evide nce is probative o f a m at eria l issue other than char acte r, the district cour t must decide whe ther the “probative value of the e vidence is substantially

outweig hed by

its potential prejudicial ef fec t.” United States v. Hay wood , 280 F.3d 715, 719-20 (6th Cir. 2002) (c itations omi tted). F ree man does

no t c ha lle ng e the fi rs t st e p in the a dmi ssi bil ity ana ly sis —th e re is no dis pu te that he wa s p re vio us ly convicted of

a state dr ug -traf ficking offe nse. “ We r e vie w a dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ru lin g s r e g ard ingbo th the s econd and t hird steps of t he Rule 404(b) admissibili ty analy sis to determine whe ther the district court a bused its discretion.” Id. at 7 2 0 (c i t i n g United States v. Mac k , 2 58 F .3 d 5 48 , 5 53 & n. 1 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 1) ); se e als o United States v. Allen , No

. 0 8 -6 3 6 3 , 2 0 1 0 W L 3 4 1 9 5 0 6 , at * 3 (6 t h C i r. Au g. 13, 2010). Howeve r, F ree man’s prior c onviction is not probative of a material is s u e o th e r th a n char acte r. “Other acts” evidenc e satisfies this sec ond step in the admissibili ty analy sis where “(1) the evidenc e is offer ed for

an admissible pur

pose, (2) the purpose for which the evidenc e is of fer ed is materia l or ‘in issue,’ and ( 3) the e vidence is probative with re g ard to the pur pose for which it is offer ed.” Id. (c i t i n g United States v. J

ohnson , 27 F.3d 1186, 1190- 91 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Gover nment offe red Fr eema n’s prior c onviction for an a dmissibl e purpose : to prove his intent to dist ribute the na rcotics found in the re ntal car

. I ndeed, “Rule 404(b) ex plicitly includes i ntent as a pr oper pur pose for which to offer evidenc e of othe r ac ts.” Id. a t 72 1; se e als o U nit e d S tat es v . B e ll , 516 F.3d 432, 442 (6th Cir.Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 18 - 2008). More over, F ree man’s intent is “in issue” be cause he plea ded not g uilty t o t h re e co u nts of possession with the intent to distribute a contr olled substance—a specific intent offense —and the Gover nment t h er ef

o re must prove his intent bey ond a re asonable doubt. See U nited States v. Johnson , 27 F.3d 1186, 1192 ( 6th Cir. 1994)

. I n th e e nd , thou g h, F re e man’ s pri or c on vic tio n wa s not pr ob a tiv e of his int e nt t o d istri bu te he re , e ve n a ssumin g any fa c tua l is su e s to be re so lve d in fa vo r o f a dmi ssi on . “ To de ter min e if evidenc e of othe r ac ts is probative of intent, w e look to whe ther the e vidence relates to conduct that is ‘substantially

s i m i l ar an d rea sonably

near in time’ to the specific intent offense at issue.” Haywood , 2 8 0 F. 3 d

at 7 2 1 (q u o t i n g U

n i t e d S t a t es v . B l a n k

e n s h ip , 7 7 5 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985)). Our

prec edent sug g ests that “[ t ] h er e i s no absolute maxim um number of y ear s that may separ ate a prior ac t and the off

ense c harg ed.” Un ite d S

tat es v . I sm ail , 756 F.2d 1253, 1260 ( 6th Cir. 19 85 ). Ho we ve r, no t on ly wa s Fr e e man’ s pri or c on vic tio n mor e tha n ten y e ars old a t th e tim e of his J anuar y 2007 arr est, but the Gover nment also fai l ed t o show a substantial similarity betwee n the prior convic tion and the conduc t at issue here . The only evident similarities betwee n the two ar e (1) the fa ct that Fr eema

n, a re sident of Geor g ia, was arr ested in e astern Tenne ssee in both instance s, and (2) the fac t that the prior conviction involved cra ck coca ine, which was one of thr ee co ntrolled substances found in the defe ndants’ re ntal car

. There is no additional information i n the re cord a s to the circ umstances unde rly ing F ree man’s ea rlier c onviction. I n Be ll , fac ing a

fac tually analog ous situation, we conc l u d ed t h at a def endant’ s four prior drug -traf ficking convictions wer e not probative of hi s intent to distribute narc otics. 516 F.3d at 444. T he g ov e rnme nt had al le g e d n e ith e r t hat th e pr ior

c on vic tio ns we re “ pa

rt of the same sc he me toNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 19 - d i stribute drug s,” nor that those pr ior convictions had involved a modus operandi s im il ar

to the char g ed conduc t. Id. We theref ore c oncluded that “ [s] uch evide nce o f prior distribution,

un c on ne c te d to the pr e se nt c ha rg e , is no t pr ob ativ e of

wh e the r [the de fe nd ant] i nte nd e d to po sse ss and distribute drug s in the instant case.” Id. L ikewise, he re, be cause the Gover nment provided no evidenc e that F ree man’s prior c onviction was substant i al ly simil ar, or

in any way related, to the char g ed conduc t, his prior conviction is not probative of his intent to di stribute narc otics. I ndeed,

as we exp l ained in Be ll , “[t] he only way to rea ch the c onclusion that the person c urre ntly has the intent to possess and distribute based solely on evidenc e of unrelated prior convic tions for drug d i s t r i b u t i o n i s b y

em p l o y i n g t h e v ery

k i n d o f r ea s o n i n g— i.e. , once a drug deale r, alwa

y s a drug deale r—which 404(b) excludes.” Id. Acc ording ly , it was an a buse of discr etion to find Fre eman’ s prior convic tion probative of his intent to distribute narcotics. This court’s de cision in Un ite d Sta te s v . M att he ws , 440 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 2006), re lied upon by the district court , is disti ng uishable fr om the i nstant case . I n Ma tth e ws , the def endant wa s convicted of possession w ith the intent to distribute mor e than f ive g rams of c ocaine base. Id. at 820. The de fenda

nt had asser

ted, by way of a de fense , that he had pic ked up a c lear plastic bagoff the street without knowingthat the bagcontained c rac k. Id. at 821. B efor e trial, the g overnme nt had filed a notice of its intent to call a witness who had a lleg ed l y p u rc hased c rac k from the de fenda nt some y ear s ear lier. Id. at 821-22. The g overnme nt sought to introduc e this e vidence to prove the defe ndant’s knowledg e and intent, id. a t8 2 1 , an d t h e d i s t r i c t c o u rt u l t i m a t e l y a l l o w e d t h e t e s t i m o n y, id. at 823. On appe al, this court af firmed

. Id. at 830. B eca

use the de fense had bee n “base d on [t he defe ndant’s] claim that he did not know what wa s in the bag ,” the witness’ s testimony as to theNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 20 - ear lier drugsales “obviously had probative value.” Id. I nd e e d, e ve n thou g h the wi tne ss t e sti fi e d to events re mote in time, “[b] eca use one of [t he def endant]’s defe nses was that he simply did not know that the bag contained coca ine, the district c ourt proper ly decide d that even e ight- y ear -old drug sales

we re probative a s to whether [the def endant] could identify

the contents of the bag .” I d. Acc ording ly , the district court ha d “prope rly conclude d that such prior drug sales were pr obative on the issue of whe ther [the defe ndant] knew that the clear plastic bag found in his possession contained

coca ine, as well as on the i ssue of whe ther [the defe ndant] int ended to distribute the dr ug .” Id. The Ma tth e ws panel did not furthe r ana ly ze the probative va lue of the pr ior drugsales vis-a- vis the defe ndant’s intent. B eca

use the g overnme nt in Ma tth e ws us e d the “ oth e r a c ts” e vid e nc e pr ima ri ly to prove knowle dg e a

n d to refute the spec ific def ense pr esente d, the Ma tth e ws c a se is d ist inguis ha ble from the c ase at hand. Ev e n a ssumin g , th ou g h, that F re e man’ s p ri or c on vic tio n is pr ob a tiv e of his sp e c if

ic int e nt, the conviction’s probative value is g reatly oversha dowed by its potential for unf air pre judice. See United States v. J

enkins , 593 F.3d 480, 486 ( 6 t h C i r. 2 0 1 0) (de scribing the pre judicial eff

ect of a prior convic tion as “Kong -like” unde r s im il a r circ umstances) . We rec og nize that “[t ]he district court has broa d discretion in balanc ing probative value ag ainst potential prejudicia l impact” unde r F eder al Rule of Evidenc e 403. Is ma il , 756 F .2 d at 12 59 ; se e Be ll , 516 F.3d at 445. Howeve r, a district c ourt “we ighingthe probative value of other a cts evidenc e” should c onsider “the g overnme nt’s alternative

source s of proving intent.” Be ll , 5 16 F .3 d at 44 5; see J enkins , 593 F.3d at 48 5-86. In the instant

case , the shee r volume and stre et value of the drugs sug g ests that whoeve r possessed the m intendedNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 21 - to distribute them. Se e Be ll , 516 F.3d at 446. T h i s al t ernative evidenc e of intent diminished the Gover nment’s nee d to introduce F ree man’s prior c onviction at trial. See H aywood , 280 F.3d at 723. On the other

side of the sc ale, the pr ior conviction “unq u es tionably ha[d] a powe rful and prejudicia l impac t” on the jury

. Johnson , 27 F.3d at 1193. “When prior ac ts evidence is introduced, reg ardle ss of the stated pur pose, the likelihood is very g reat that the jur ors will use the evide nce prec isely for the pur

pose it may not be conside red[:] to sugg est that the def endant is a ba d person, a convic ted cr imi n al , an d t h at if he ‘did it bef ore he probably

did it aga in.’” Id. I n light of the lim ite d p ro bativ e va lue —if any —o f t he pr ior c on vic tio n, the a va ila

bil ity of oth e r e vid e nc e of int e nt,

and the su bs tanti a l li ke lih oo d th a t th e jur y vie we d th e c on vic tio n a s p ro of of a pr op e ns ity

to distribute drug s, it was an abuse of discre tion to admit t he prior c o n v i ct ion into evidence. See Haywood , 2 80 F .3 d at 72 0, 72 3; Allen , 2010 WL 3419506, at *3 (both setting f orth the standar d of revie w). Eve n though the district court g ave a limit ing instruc tion, that inst ruction wa s not “a sure

fire pa nace a for the pre judice re sulting from the needless admission of such e vidence .” Haywood , 280 F.3d at 724. The improper

admission of Fr eema

n’s prior convic tion, moreover, w as re versible e rror . The dis tr ic t c ourt ’s e rr on e ou s a dmi ssi on of “ oth e r a c ts” e vid e nc e is “ re ve rs ibl e un le ss we c an s ay , ‘ wi th fair a ssuranc e, af

ter ponde ring all that happene d without stripping the e rr o n eous ac tion from the whole, that the judg ment was not subst an t i al l y sway ed by

the er ror.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g Kotteakos v. United States , 3 28 U. S. 7 50 , 7 65 (1 94 6) ). An a sse ssm e nt of “ [w]he the r the jur y wa s ‘ su bs tanti a lly sway ed’ by the improper a dmission of [ ‘other a cts’] evidence . . . g ener ally depends on w hether

the proper ly admissible evidence of t he defenda nt’s g uilt was overwhelming .” Id. Although the sheerNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

The district cour

t, in de ny ing the defe ndants’ motions for judgme nts of acquittal, did note, 2 ho we ve r, that “ the pr oo f i s le ss c on vin c ing , le ss ov e rw he lmi ng wi th re sp e c t to Mr

. Rus se ll tha n it i s t o M r. Fr ee m an , es p ec i al l y o n t h e is s u e of wh et h er o r n o th e k n o wi n gl y p o s s es s edt h e, t h e d ru gs in question here.” One mig ht argue that if the err oneous admission of Fr eema n’s prior c onviction infecte d the 3 jury ’s ver dict as to him, then that same err or also infec ted the jury ’s verdic t a s to Russell. Howeve r, Russell does not advance that argument on appea l and, there fore , we ne ed not dec ide the issue. - 22 - v o l u m e a n d

s t re et v al u e o f t h e d ru gs i nt h i s ca s e p ro v i d edh i gh l y p er s u as i v e, i f n o to v erwh el m i n g,

e vid e nc e of

a n in te nt t o d istri bu te , th e e vid e nc e of F re e man’ s po sse ssi on , r e la tiv e to R us se ll, is f a ir ly

weak. “[T] his was, af

t er al l, a ca se of only

constructive posse ssion.” Jenk ins , 593 F.3d at 486. 2 Absent evide nce of

Fr eema n’s prior c onviction, the jury may have be lieved that he di d not know about the drug s. I nd e e d, it is ce rt a inl y po ssi ble that Ru sse ll p ut t he dr ug s in the c ar d ur ingthe tw e nty or so minutes when he borrowe d it f rom Fr eema

n. I n li g ht o f t

he pr e su mpt ion

that f a vo rs re ve rs a l,

and be c a us e we c ann ot s ay

that th e jur

y wa s n ot s ub sta

nti a lly sw ay e d, it w a s r e ve rs ibl e e rr or to a dmi t Fr eema n’s prior c onviction into evidence. 3 Fr eema n also attac ks the district court’s jury instruction on the use of his pr ior conviction for impeachme nt purposes. Be cause Fr eema n’s convictions are reverse d on other grounds, w e do not

rea ch the impea chment issue. C. Adm ission of E vidence of the July 2006 I ncident. B oth F re e man and Rus se ll c ha lle ng e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on of e vid e nc e , a g a in purs ua nt t o Ru le 40 4( b) , th a t th e y ha d re po rt e d the the ft

of tho us and s o f d oll ars in c a shfr om t he ir J ohnson City , Tenne ssee, hotel r oom roug hly six months before their ar rests in this case. The district court prope rly

admitted the evidenc e, whic h s up ported a n infere nce that the defe ndants hadNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 23 - previously

traff icked in drug s in easte rn Tenne ssee. The district court, moreove r, prope rly instructed the jur y to c on sid e r t

he e vid e nc e on ly

a s it re la te d to the de fe nd ants ’ i nte nt. The district cour

t did not c lear ly err in f

inding that the G overnme nt had pre sented suff icient evidenc e that the July

2006 incident had oc curr ed. Se e Ma tth e ws , 440 F.3d at 828 (setting forth the standard of

revie w). When the g overnme nt seeks the admission of “other acts” evidenc e pursua nt to R ule 40 4( b) , “ the g ov e rnme nt i s n ot r e qu ir e d to de mon str a te [fo r t he c ourt ] that th e oth e r a c ts

occur red by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e.” Be ll , 516 F.3d at 441. Ho we v er , “‘ s imilar act evidenc e is rele vant only if the jury

can r easona

bly conclude that the ac t occur red a nd that the defe ndant was the actor .’” Id. (q u o t i n g Huddleston v. United States , 4 85 U.S

. 68 1, 68 9 (19 88 )). By prese nting the te stimony

of Off icers McCurry

and Edwa

rds, the Gove rnment put forth suff icient evidenc e for

the jury to conclude that the J uly

2006 incident had oc curr ed. Ba sed on evide nce that (1) the de fenda

nts had kept thousands of dollar s in cash in a hotel r oom; (2) a dr ug dog had ale rted on the money , albeit at a dif fer ent location; and ( 3) ea ch def endant ha d claimed ha lf of the r ecove red sum of more than $14,000, the jury could have r easona bly inferr ed that the de fenda

nts, toge ther, ha d

re c e ntl y tr a ff ic ke d in dr ug s. The Gove rnment’s evidence of t he Jul y 2006 incident is probative of a mater ial issue other tha n c ha ra c te r. Th e Go ve rnme nt o ff e re d th is e vidence to pr ov e F re e man a nd Rus se ll’ s in te nt t o distribute narc otics —a proper purpose f or the a dmission of “other ac ts” evidenc e under Rule 404(b). Haywood , 2 80 F .3 d at 72 1; se e als o B e ll , 5 16 F .3 d at 442. Becaus e bo th F re e man a nd Rus se ll pleade d not guilty

to the char g ed off

enses, their

intent is “in issue” and th e Government there fore must prove their intent beyond a re asonable doubt. See J ohnson , 27 F.3d at 1192

. Fi n al l y , theNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 24 - Go ve rnme nt’ s e vid e nc e is p ro bativ e of int e nt b e c a

us e, in July

20 06 , th e de fe nd ants e ng a g e d in “conduc t that [wa]s ‘substantially simil ar and rea sonably near in time’ to the sp ec i fi c i n tent offe nse[s] at issue” he re. Haywood , 2 8 0 F. 3 d at 7 2 1 (q u o t i n g Un ite d S

tat es v . B lan k

e ns hip , 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir. 1985) ). As mentioned, the J uly 2006 incident occ urre d just mont hs befor e, and g e o g r a p h i c a l l y n e ar t o w h e r e , F r e e m an an d R u s s e l l w e r e ar

r e s t e d i nc o n n e c t i o nw i t h t h i s c a s e . In addition, in J uly 2006, a drug dog aler ted on the thousands of dollars in c ash that the de fenda nts had

re po rt e d s tol e n, su g g e sti ngtha t th e mon e y

ha d r e c e ntl y

be e n in c los e pr oximity

to n arc oti c s. Just six mo nth s lat e r, in Janu ary 20 07 , loc a l la w- e nf or c e me nt a

uth or iti e s d isc ov e re d a

sta shof na rc oti c s, worth $20,000, hidden in the defe ndants’ renta l c ar. Most importantly , Fr eema n and Russell were trave ling to get h er b o t h when they repor ted the thef

t from their hotel room in Jul y 2006 and whe n they wer e stopped for

speedingin J an u ar y 2 0 0 7 . Acc ording ly , beca use the July

2006 incident

occur red r easona

bly near in time and invol ved conduct substantially simil ar to the conduct at issue he re , e vid e nc e of the July 20 06 inc ide nt is p ro bativ e of the de fe nd ants ’ i nte nt t o d ist ri bu te na rc oti c s. I ndeed, e vidence sug g esting that Fr eema n and Russell ha d previously collaborated to se ll dr ug s g oes direc tly to the question of whethe r ei t h er d efendant wa s innocently in the prese nce of

the other’ s drug -sale a ctivity

when their

renta l car was stopped in January

2007. Havingproper ly

conclude d that evidenc e of the J uly 2006 incident was pr obative of the defe ndants’ intent to distribute narc otics, the district court fur ther de termined that the e vidence was “not unduly

prejudicia l when y ou do the [ Rule] 403 balanc ing test.” The dist rict cour t, moreover , g ave the jury appropr iate li miting i nstructions as t o the us e of the evidenc e, both immediately afte r the Gover nment h ad prese nted its evidence and af ter the c lose of all evide nce a t trial. See U

nitedNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 25 - States v. Me rriweather , 7 8 F .3 d 107 0, 10 77 (6 th Cir . 199 6) . Be c a us e ne ith e r F re e man n or

Rus se ll

make s a pe rs ua siv e argume nt o n a pp e a l a s to wh y the Jul y 20 06 inc ide nt’ s p ro bativ e va lue is substantially

outweig hed by

a risk of unfair pr ejudice, the re is no basis to conc lude that the district court abused i ts discretion in admitting thi s “other acts” evidenc e. Se e Be ll , 516 F.3d at 445 (noting the “hig hly

discretionar

y nature of th[e] balanc ing pr ocess” ). D. Suffic ie nc y o f the Evi de nc e to Co nvi c t R uss e ll. Although the evidenc e ag ainst Russell is not overwhe lming, it does support a guilty verdic t

on eac h count. Russell’s suf ficienc y of the evidenc e argument appea rs to f ocus on the jury ’s finding that he “knowing ly possessed” the narc otics found in the re ntal car

. The Government, rely ing on a theory of construc tive (ra

ther than a ctual) posse ssion, p u t fo rt h sufficie nt evidence to support the jury ’s finding . “[C] onstructive possession exist s when a person . . . knowing ly has the powe r and the intention at a g iven time to exercise dominion and co n t ro l o v er an object, e ither direc tly or throug h others.” United States v. Hunte r , 5 58 F .3 d 49 5, 50 4 (6 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; see also United States v. Bailey , 553 F.3d 940, 944- 45 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting “that the theor y of construc tive possession

re qu i re s ‘s p ec i fi c i n t en t ’” ). “P h y s i ca l p ro x i m i t y t o dru gs , o r m er e p re s en ce i nan ar eawh er e d ru gs

are found, is not sufficient” to suppor t a finding of possession. Un ite d S tat es v . W hit e , 932 F.2d 588, 589 (6th Cir. 1991). The evidenc e in this ca se allows the infe renc e that Russell was not mere ly phy sically

prese nt in t he re nta l c ar, bu t ra the r k ne w t hat he ha d th e po we r— and , in fa c t, i nte nd e d at so me po int —to exercise dominion and control over the contraba nd. I n decidingclaims such as this one, the c ourt considers “ the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution to determi n e wh et h er anyNos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 26 - ratio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt.” Un ite d S

tat es v . Ca mp be ll , 5 49 F .3 d 3 64 , 3 74 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) ; se e J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). At trial, both Troope r L uncef ord an d Of

fi ce r Wigand testified that the

narc otics had bee n conce aled at the rea r ce nter of the vehicle’ s headliner

. This testimony , viewed in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the Go ve rnme nt, su g g e sts that bo th F re e man, the dr ive r, and Rus se ll, in t he fr ont pa sse ng e r s e a t, h a d a c c e ss t o th e dr ug s. Tr oo pe r L

un c e fo rd fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t bo th F re e man a

nd Rus se ll h a d s po nta

ne ou sly pu t “ the ir

ha nd s u p in the a ir ” wh e n h e ha d s top pe d th e ir vehicle; that g esture is “ nothing [he] see[s] normally on a routine tra ffic stop.” The jury could infer , then, that both Fr eema

n and R u s sell had g uilty

knowledg e of the prese nce of the nar cotics at that time. Russell hi mself testified that he ha d borrowe d the re ntal car for twe nty

to twenty -five minutes to drive t o his g irlfriend’ s house whil e F ree man had r ented a hotel room. This testimony provided a basis for

the jury to infer that Russell, not Fre eman, ha d put the drug s in the vehicle ’s hea dliner. Even if the jury conclude d that Fr eema n had hidden the drug s sometime ear lier in the day , the jury could in f e r f r o m F r e e ma

n ’ s e n tr u s ti n g th e c ar

to Ru s s e ll th a t F r e e ma

nan d Ru s s e ll w e r e w o r

k ing toge ther to possess and distribute the dr ug s. Finally , the Gover

nment prese nted evidenc e that, afte r police had r ecove red more than $14,000 from a hote l maid in J uly 2006, Fr eema

n and Russell had

eac h claimed ha lf of the money

. Th e jur y c ou ld inf

e r fr om thi s e vid e nc e that F re e man a nd Rus se ll had shar ed the pr ocee ds of drugdistribution previously and that they

had intended to do so a g ain, befor e they

wer e appr ehende d. This was sufficient for the jury to find that Russell had develope d the sp e c if ic int e nt t o e xer c ise do min ion and con tr ol o ve r t he c on tr a ba nd , a s r e qu ir e d to e sta

bli sh constructive posse ssion. See B ailey , 553 F.3d at 944-45.Nos. 08-5677/08-5678

Un ite d S tat es v . F re e ma n/R us se ll

- 27 - Th e Go ve rnme nt presen ted a dd iti on a l e vid e nc e that F re e man a nd Rus se ll h a d in te nd e d to distribute the drug s. Most notably , the sh ee r v o l u m e of dr ug s sugg ests an intent to distribute. I ndeed, one of the Gover

nment’s witnesses e stimated that the drug s had a stre et value of $20,000. Al tho ug h th e e vid e nc e a g a ins t Russe ll is cir c ums tanti a l, on the wh ole , an d whe n v ie we d in the light most favor able to the Government, the evidence is sufficie nt to sustain his convictions. See United States v. W

elch , 97 F.3d 142, 150- 51 (6th Cir. 1996). III . Al tho ug h w e a ff

ir m a s to Rus se ll, we re ve rs e F re e man’ s c on vic tio ns be c a us e it w a s e rr or

to

a d mi t e v id e n c e o f

h is p r io r dr u g - tr a f f ic k in g c o n v ic ti o nto p r o v e h is in te n t to d is tr ib u te n ar c o ti c s . We the re fo re va c a te F re e man’ s se nte nc e a nd re mand to t he dis tr ic t cou

rt fo r p ro c e e din g s c on sis te nt w ith this opini on.