# C_2016059EN.01000301.xml

| 15.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 59/3 |
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15.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 59/3

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Appeal brought on 14 November 2015 by National Iranian Oil Company PTE Ltd (NIOC) and Others against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 4 September 2015 in Case T-577/12 NIOC and Others v Council of the European Union

(Case C-595/15 P)

(2016/C 059/03)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Appellants:

Appellants:

National Iranian Oil Company PTE Ltd (NIOC), National Iranian Oil Company International Affairs Ltd (NIOC International Affairs), Iran Fuel Conservation Organization (IFCO), Karoon Oil & Gas Production Co., Petroleum Engineering & Development Co. (PEDEC), Khazar Exploration and Production Co. (KEPCO), National Iranian Drilling Co. (NIDC), South Zagros Oil & Gas Production Co., Maroun Oil & Gas Co., Masjed-Soleyman Oil & Gas Co. (MOGC), Gachsaran Oil & Gas Co., Aghajari Oil & Gas Production Co. (AOGPC), Arvandan Oil & Gas Co. (AOGC), West Oil & Gas Production Co., East Oil & Gas Production Co. (EOGPC), Iranian Oil Terminals Co. (IOTC), Pars Special Economic Energy Zone (PSEEZ) (represented by: J.-M. Thouvenin, avocat)

Other party to the proceedings:

Other party to the proceedings:

Council of the European Union

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | Set aside the judgment delivered on 4 September 2015 by the General Court (Seventh Chamber) in Case T-577/12; |
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Set aside the judgment delivered on 4 September 2015 by the General Court (Seventh Chamber) in Case T-577/12;

| — | grant the appellants the form of order sought in the proceedings before the General Court; |
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grant the appellants the form of order sought in the proceedings before the General Court;

| — | order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings. |
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order the Council of the European Union to pay the costs of both sets of proceedings.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

| 1. | By their first ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 44 of the judgment under appeal when it ruled that, by referring to Article 46(2) of Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (1), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012 (2) must be regarded as having clearly stated that its legal basis is constituted by the aforementioned Article 46(2). |
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1.

By their first ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 44 of the judgment under appeal when it ruled that, by referring to Article 46(2) of Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (1), Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012 (2) must be regarded as having clearly stated that its legal basis is constituted by the aforementioned Article 46(2).

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| 2. | By their second ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in paragraphs 55 to 57 of the judgment under appeal, which can be summed up by the statement that ‘it is not apparent from Article 215(2) TFEU that individual restrictive measures taken against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities must be adopted according to the procedure laid down in Article 215(1) TFEU’. First, Article 215(1) TFEU, the only provision of the FEU Treaty dealing with restrictive measures, lays down clearly that the procedure applicable with respect to such measures is that provided for in that article, and does not provide for any other; secondly, Article 291 TFEU is incompatible with Article 215(2) TFEU; alternatively, Article 291(2) TFEU cannot be regarded as being capable of providing the Council with an additional legal basis for the adoption of restrictive measures over and above that constituted by Article 215(2) TFEU; lastly, and alternatively, even if it is held that Article 291(2) TFEU is capable of providing the Council with an additional legal basis for the adoption of restrictive measures over and above that constituted by Article 215(2) TFEU, the recourse to that legal basis is none the less unlawful in the present case. |
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2.

By their second ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in paragraphs 55 to 57 of the judgment under appeal, which can be summed up by the statement that ‘it is not apparent from Article 215(2) TFEU that individual restrictive measures taken against natural or legal persons and groups or non-State entities must be adopted according to the procedure laid down in Article 215(1) TFEU’. First, Article 215(1) TFEU, the only provision of the FEU Treaty dealing with restrictive measures, lays down clearly that the procedure applicable with respect to such measures is that provided for in that article, and does not provide for any other; secondly, Article 291 TFEU is incompatible with Article 215(2) TFEU; alternatively, Article 291(2) TFEU cannot be regarded as being capable of providing the Council with an additional legal basis for the adoption of restrictive measures over and above that constituted by Article 215(2) TFEU; lastly, and alternatively, even if it is held that Article 291(2) TFEU is capable of providing the Council with an additional legal basis for the adoption of restrictive measures over and above that constituted by Article 215(2) TFEU, the recourse to that legal basis is none the less unlawful in the present case.

| 3. | By their third ground of appeal, which is put forward in the alternative in the event that it is held that recourse to Article 291(2) TFEU, as a basis for the adoption of individual restrictive measures, is legally possible in the context of a policy of adopting restrictive measures initially based on Article 215 TFEU, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law when it ruled, in essence, in paragraphs 75 to 83 of its judgment, that the Council of the European Union, in the words of Article 291(2), ‘duly justified’ the recourse to that derogating procedure, which was the only one available in this case. First, the requisite justification must be explicit; secondly, even if an implicit justification is capable of satisfying that requirement, it is not fulfilled in this case, since the General Court misinterpreted the legislation concerned. |
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3.

By their third ground of appeal, which is put forward in the alternative in the event that it is held that recourse to Article 291(2) TFEU, as a basis for the adoption of individual restrictive measures, is legally possible in the context of a policy of adopting restrictive measures initially based on Article 215 TFEU, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law when it ruled, in essence, in paragraphs 75 to 83 of its judgment, that the Council of the European Union, in the words of Article 291(2), ‘duly justified’ the recourse to that derogating procedure, which was the only one available in this case. First, the requisite justification must be explicit; secondly, even if an implicit justification is capable of satisfying that requirement, it is not fulfilled in this case, since the General Court misinterpreted the legislation concerned.

| 4. | By their fourth ground of appeal, which is put forward in the alternative in the event that it is held that recourse to Article 291(2) TFEU, as a basis for the adoption of individual restrictive measures, is legally possible in the context of a policy of adoption of restrictive measures that is based on Article 215 TFEU, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law when it ruled, in paragraph 87 of its judgment, that Article 46(2) of Regulation No 267/2012 reserves to the Council ‘the power to implement Article 23(2) and (3) of that regulation’, which suffices to fulfil the obligation to state reasons concerning the statement of the legal basis of that provision, which is Article 291(2) TFEU. According to the appellants, the General Court came to that conclusion as a result of a legally flawed interpretation of Article 46(2) of Regulation No 267/2012. |
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4.

By their fourth ground of appeal, which is put forward in the alternative in the event that it is held that recourse to Article 291(2) TFEU, as a basis for the adoption of individual restrictive measures, is legally possible in the context of a policy of adoption of restrictive measures that is based on Article 215 TFEU, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law when it ruled, in paragraph 87 of its judgment, that Article 46(2) of Regulation No 267/2012 reserves to the Council ‘the power to implement Article 23(2) and (3) of that regulation’, which suffices to fulfil the obligation to state reasons concerning the statement of the legal basis of that provision, which is Article 291(2) TFEU. According to the appellants, the General Court came to that conclusion as a result of a legally flawed interpretation of Article 46(2) of Regulation No 267/2012.

| 5. | By their fifth ground of appeal, which is put forward in the alternative in the event that it is held that recourse to Article 291(2) TFEU, as a basis for the adoption of individual restrictive measures, is legally possible in the context of a policy of adopting restrictive measures based on Article 215 TFEU, the appellants submit that the General Court erred, in paragraphs 86 to 88 of its judgment, when it found that the obligation to state reasons for legal acts of the European Union did not oblige the Council to state expressly that Regulation No 267/2012 was based on Article 291(2) TFEU, as far as concerns the legal basis of Article 46(2) of Regulation No 267/2012. |
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5.

By their fifth ground of appeal, which is put forward in the alternative in the event that it is held that recourse to Article 291(2) TFEU, as a basis for the adoption of individual restrictive measures, is legally possible in the context of a policy of adopting restrictive measures based on Article 215 TFEU, the appellants submit that the General Court erred, in paragraphs 86 to 88 of its judgment, when it found that the obligation to state reasons for legal acts of the European Union did not oblige the Council to state expressly that Regulation No 267/2012 was based on Article 291(2) TFEU, as far as concerns the legal basis of Article 46(2) of Regulation No 267/2012.

| 6. | By their sixth ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law when it ruled, in paragraphs 100 and 103 and also in paragraphs 108 and 110, that the consistency of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union with the principles of legal certainty and of foreseeability of the law, from which it follows that those measures must be clear and precise, is to be verified in the light of the rules of the case-law as to the uniform interpretation of acts of the European Union, which require that those acts be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages. |
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6.

By their sixth ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law when it ruled, in paragraphs 100 and 103 and also in paragraphs 108 and 110, that the consistency of the restrictive measures adopted by the European Union with the principles of legal certainty and of foreseeability of the law, from which it follows that those measures must be clear and precise, is to be verified in the light of the rules of the case-law as to the uniform interpretation of acts of the European Union, which require that those acts be interpreted and applied in the light of the versions existing in the other official languages.

| 7. | By their seventh ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 134 of its judgment when it ruled that Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 (the criterion at issue) is compatible with the principles of the rule of law and more generally with EU law, since it is ‘neither arbitrary nor discretionary’, and, in paragraph 140 of its judgment, that ‘the criterion at issue limits the Council’s discretion, by establishing objective criteria, and guarantees the degree of foreseeability required by EU law’. In that regard, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law by interpreting the criterion at issue by reference to the judgment of 13 March 2012 in Melli Bank v Council (C-380/09 P). |
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7.

By their seventh ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 134 of its judgment when it ruled that Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 (the criterion at issue) is compatible with the principles of the rule of law and more generally with EU law, since it is ‘neither arbitrary nor discretionary’, and, in paragraph 140 of its judgment, that ‘the criterion at issue limits the Council’s discretion, by establishing objective criteria, and guarantees the degree of foreseeability required by EU law’. In that regard, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law by interpreting the criterion at issue by reference to the judgment of 13 March 2012 in Melli Bank v Council (C-380/09 P).

Melli Bank

Council

| 8. | By their eighth ground of appeal, in the alternative, the appellants submit that, on the assumption that the meaning to be given to the term ‘association’ is that given to it by the General Court, it must be held that it has been applied incorrectly in this case. |
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8.

By their eighth ground of appeal, in the alternative, the appellants submit that, on the assumption that the meaning to be given to the term ‘association’ is that given to it by the General Court, it must be held that it has been applied incorrectly in this case.

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(1)  Council Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 of 23 March 2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1).

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(2)  Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran (OJ 2012 L 282 p. 16).

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