United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on

Transportation Security and Infrastructure 

Protection, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

TRANSPORTATION 

SECURITY 

Efforts to Strengthen 

Aviation and Surface 

Transportation Security 

Continue to Progress, but 

More Work Remains 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

 

GAO-08-651T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 15, 2008

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

Efforts to Strengthen Aviation and Surface 

Transportation Security Continue to Progress, but 

Highlights of GAO-08-651T, testimony More Work Remains before the Subcommittee on 

Transportation Security and Infrastructure 

Protection, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

Within the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS), the 

Transportation Security

Administration’s (TSA) mission is 

to protect the nation’s

transportation network. Since its 

inception in 2001, TSA has 

developed and implemented a 

variety of programs and procedures

to secure commercial aviation and 

surface modes of transportation. 

Other DHS components, federal 

agencies, state and local

governments, and the private

sector also play a role in 

transportation security. GAO has 

examined (1) the progress TSA and 

other DHS components have made

in securing the nation’s aviation

and surface transportation systems, 

and the challenges that remain, and 

(2) crosscutting issues that have 

impeded TSA’s efforts in 

strengthening security. This

testimony is based on GAO reports 

and testimonies issued from

February 2004 to February 2008

and ongoing work regarding the 

security of the nation’s aviation and 

surface transportation systems, as

well as selected updates to this 

work conducted in April 2008. To

conduct this work, we reviewed

documents related to TSA security 

efforts and interviewed TSA and 

transportation industry officials. 

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO made a

number of recommendations to 

DHS and TSA to strengthen their 

efforts to secure the transportation

network. DHS and TSA generally 

agreed with the recommendations 

and are making progress on

implementing them. 

DHS, primarily through TSA, has made progress in securing the aviation 

and surface transportation networks, but more work remains. With regard

to commercial aviation, TSA has undertaken efforts to strengthen airport 

security; hire, train, and measure the performance of it screening 

workforce; prescreen passengers against terrorist watch lists; and screen

passengers, baggage, and cargo. With regard to surface transportation 

modes, TSA has taken steps to develop a strategic approach for securing 

mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicles, and 

highways; establish security standards for certain transportation modes; 

and conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface 

transportation assets, particularly passenger and freight rail. TSA also 

hired and deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of 

passenger and freight rail systems. 

While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the 

transportation network, DHS and TSA still face a number of key 

challenges in further securing these systems. For example, regarding 

commercial aviation, although TSA has made significant progress in its 

development of an advanced passenger prescreening system, known as 

Secure Flight, challenges remain, including unreliable program cost and 

schedule estimates, among other things. In addition, TSA’s efforts to 

enhance perimeter security at airports may not be sufficient to provide for 

effective security. For example, TSA has initiated efforts to evaluate the 

effectiveness of security-related technologies, such as biometric 

identification systems, but has not developed a plan for guiding airports 

with respect to future technology enhancements. While TSA is pursuing 

the procurement of several checkpoint technologies to address key 

existing vulnerabilities, it has not deployed technologies on a wide-scale 

basis, and has not yet developed and implemented technologies needed to

screen air cargo. Further, TSA’s efforts to develop security standards for 

surface transportation modes have been limited to passenger and freight

rail, and TSA has not determined what its regulatory role will be with 

respect to commercial vehicles or highway infrastructure. 

A number of crosscutting issues have impeded DHS’s and TSA’s efforts to 

secure the transportation network, including the need to strengthen 

strategic planning and performance measurement, and more fully adopt 

and apply risk-based principles in the pursuit of its security initiatives. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-651T. For 

more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at 

(202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. 
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the 

Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) progress and challenges in 

securing our nation’s transportation systems. The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) is charged with securing the transportation network 

while ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Other DHS 

components, federal agencies, state and local governments, and the 

private sector also play a role in transportation security. In carrying out its 

broader homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the challenge of 

determining how to allocate its finite resources within the transportation 

system and across all sectors to address threats and strengthen security. 

My testimony today focuses on (1) the progress TSA and other DHS 

components have made in securing the nation’s aviation and surface 

transportation systems, and the challenges that remain, and (2) 

crosscutting issues that have impeded TSA’s efforts in strengthening 

security. My comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued 

from February 2004 to February 2008 and selected updates to this work 

obtained in April 2008. In obtaining these updates, we reviewed 

documents related to TSA security efforts and interviewed TSA and 

transportation industry officials. In addition, we included some of our 

preliminary findings from ongoing work regarding the security of the 

nation’s aviation and surface transportation systems. We conducted these 

performance audits in accordance with generally accepted government 

auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the 

audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We 

believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

TSA has undertaken a number of initiatives to strengthen the security of 

the nation’s commercial aviation and surface transportation systems. 

Specifically, TSA has hired and deployed a federal workforce of over 

50,000 passenger and checked baggage screeners, and installed equipment

at the nation’s more than 400 commercial airports to provide the capability 

to screen all checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as 

Summary 

Page 1 GAO-08-651T
mandated by law.1

 TSA has since turned its attention to, among other 

things, strengthening passenger prescreening—in general, the matching of 

passenger information against terrorist watch lists prior to an aircraft’s 

departure; more efficiently allocating, deploying, and managing the 

transportation security officer (TSO)—formerly known as screener—

workforce; strengthening screening procedures; researching and 

developing more effective and efficient screening technologies; and 

strengthening procedures to ensure the security of air cargo. TSA has also 

begun efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of security-related

technologies, such as biometric identification systems, to secure access to 

restricted areas at airports. DHS’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) has also taken steps to strengthen passenger prescreening for 

passengers on international flights operating to or from the United States, 

as well as inspecting inbound air cargo upon its arrival in the United 

States. DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has also taken 

actions to research and develop aviation security technologies. With 

regard to surface transportation modes, TSA has developed a strategic 

approach for securing these systems; established security standards for 

certain transportation modes; and conducted threat, criticality, and 

vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly 

related to passenger and freight rail. TSA has also hired and deployed

compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of passenger and freight 

rail systems. Finally, DHS has developed and administered grant programs 

for various surface transportation modes. 

While these efforts have helped to strengthen the security of the 

transportation network, DHS still faces a number of key challenges that 

should be addressed to meet the goals and requirements set out for them 

by Congress, the administration, and the department itself. For example, 

regarding commercial aviation, although TSA has made much progress in 

developing Secure Flight—a government-run passenger prescreening 

system—in February 2008, we reported that it can further strengthen its 

efforts by developing more-sound cost and schedule estimates, and 

strengthening security controls. In addition, while TSA has taken actions 

to enhance perimeter security and restrict access to secure areas at 

 1

See GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of 

Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2007); GAO, 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and

Management Functions, GAO-07-1081T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2007); and GAO,

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission and

Management Functions, GAO-07-1240T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 18, 2007). 

Page 2 GAO-08-651T
airports, it can further strengthen its efforts to reduce the risks posed by 

airport employees. TSA has also not developed a plan to guide and support 

individual airports and the commercial airport system as a whole with 

respect to future technology enhancements for perimeter security and 

access controls. Further, TSA is only recently beginning to deploy new 

checkpoint technologies to address key existing vulnerabilities, and has 

not yet developed and implemented technologies needed to screen air 

cargo. With regard to surface transportation security, while TSA has 

initiated efforts to develop security standards for surface transportation 

modes, these efforts have been limited to passenger and freight rail. 

Moreover, although TSA has made progress in conducting compliance 

inspections of some surface transportation systems, inspectors’ roles and 

missions have not been fully defined. 

A variety of crosscutting issues have affected DHS’s and, as they relate to

transportation security, TSA’s efforts in implementing its mission and 

management functions. These key issues include strategic planning and 

results management, risk management, and stakeholder coordination. For 

example, TSA has not always implemented effective strategic planning

efforts, fully developed performance measures, or put into place 

structures to help ensure that it is managing for results. In addition, DHS 

and its components can more fully adopt and apply a risk-management 

approach in implementing its security mission and core management 

functions,2

 and more fully coordinate their activities with key 

stakeholders. DHS and TSA have strengthened their efforts in these areas, 

but more work remains. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in 

November 2001, created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all 

modes of transportation.3 TSA’s aviation security mission includes 

strengthening the security of airport perimeters and restricted airport 

areas; hiring and training a screening workforce; prescreening passengers

against terrorist watch lists; and screening passengers, baggage, and cargo

at the over 400 commercial airports nationwide, among other 

responsibilities. While TSA has operational responsibility for physically 

Background 

 2

A risk management approach entails a continuous process of managing risk through a

series of actions, including setting strategic goals and objectives, assessing risk, evaluating

alternatives, selecting initiatives to undertake, and implementing and monitoring those 

initiatives. 

3

Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

Page 3 GAO-08-651T
screening passengers and their baggage at most airports, TSA exercises 

regulatory, or oversight, responsibility for the security of airports and air 

cargo. Specifically, airports, air carriers, and other entities are required to

implement security measures in accordance with TSA security 

requirements, against which TSA evaluates their compliance efforts. 

TSA also oversees air carriers’ efforts to prescreen passengers—in general, 

the matching of passenger information against terrorist watch lists prior to 

an aircraft’s departure—and plans to take over operational responsibility 

for this function with the implementation of its Secure Flight program. 

CBP, which currently has responsibility for prescreening airline 

passengers on international flights departing from and bound for the 

United States, will continue to perform this function until TSA assumes 

this function under Secure Flight. DHS’s S&T is responsible for 

researching and developing technologies to secure the transportation 

sector. 

TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes with 

federal, state, and local governments and the private sector. TSA’s 

security mission includes establishing security standards and conducting

assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes, including

passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and commercial 

vehicles; and pipelines. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

Grant Programs Directorate provides grant funding to surface 

transportation operators and state and local governments, and in 

conjunction with certain grants, the National Protection and Programs 

Directorate conducts risk assessments of surface transportation facilities. 

Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have 

responsibilities for passenger rail safety and security. In addition, public 

and private sector transportation operators are responsible for 

implementing security measures for their systems. 

Page 4 GAO-08-651T
Page 5 GAO-08-651T

DHS, primarily through TSA, has undertaken numerous initiatives to 

strengthen the security of the nation’s aviation and surface transportation 

systems. In large part, these efforts have been guided by legislative 

mandates designed to strengthen the security of commercial aviation 

following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. These efforts have 

also been affected by events external to the department, including the 

alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to blow up commercial aircraft bound 

from London to the United States, and the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London 

train bombings. While progress has been made in many areas with respect 

to securing the transportation network, we found that the department can 

strengthen its efforts in some key areas outlined by Congress, the 

administration, and the department itself, as discussed below. 

DHS Has Made 

Progress in Securing 

the Nation’s Aviation 

and Surface 

Transportation 

Systems, but More 

Work Remains 

Aviation Security Airport Perimeter Security and Access Controls. TSA has taken 

action to strengthen the security of airport perimeters and access to 

restricted airport areas. However, as we reported in June 2004, the agency

can further strengthen its efforts to evaluate the effectiveness of securityrelated technologies and reduce the risks posed by airport employees, 

among other things.4

 In 2006, TSA completed the last project in an access 

control pilot program that included 20 airports, and which was designed to 

test and evaluate new and emerging technologies in an airport setting. TSA 

is also conducting an airport perimeter security pilot at six airports, to test 

technologies such as vehicle inspection systems. However, TSA has not 

developed a plan to guide and support individual airports and the 

commercial airport system as a whole with respect to future technology 

enhancements for perimeter security and access controls. Without such a 

plan, TSA could be limited in assessing and improving the effectiveness of 

its efforts to provide technical support for enhancing security. In addition, 

we reported in September 2006 and October 2007 on the status of the 

development and testing of the Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential program—DHS’s effort to develop biometric access control 

systems to verify the identity of individuals accessing secure 

transportation areas.5

 However, DHS has not yet determined how and 

 4

GAO, Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 

Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls, GAO-04-728 (Washington, D.C.: June

2004). 

5

GAO, Transportation Security: DHS Should Address Key Challenges before

Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program, GAO-06-982

(Washington, D.C.: September 2006) and Transportation Security: TSA Has Made

Progress in Implementing the Transportation Worker Identification Credential Program,

but Challenges Remain, GAO-08-133T (Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007).
when it will implement a biometric identification system for access 

controls at commercial airports. In June 2004, we reported that while 

background checks were not required for all airport workers, TSA 

required most airport workers who perform duties in selected areas to 

undergo a fingerprint-based criminal history records check. TSA further 

required airport operators to compare applicants’ names against TSA’s 

security watch lists. In July 2004, consistent with our previous 

recommendation to determine the need for additional security

requirements to reduce the risks posed by airport employees, TSA 

enhanced requirements for background checks for employees working in 

restricted airport areas. Also consistent with our recommendation, in 2007, 

TSA further expanded the Security Threat Assessment—which

determines, among other things, whether an employee has any terrorist 

affiliations—to require airport employees who receive an airport-issued 

identification badge to undergo a review of citizenship status.

6

 Further, in 

March 2007, TSA implemented a random employee screening initiative—

the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program—that uses TSOs to 

randomly screen airport workers and their property for explosives and 

other threat items. TSA has allocated about 900 full-time equivalent 

positions to the program and has requested $36 million for FY 2009 for an 

additional 750 full-time equivalent positions. As directed by Congress in 

2008, TSA plans to pilot test various employee screening methods at seven

selected airports, including conducting 100 percent employee screening at

three of these airports. 7 TSA plans to begin pilot testing in May and report 

on the results of its efforts—as directed—by September 1, 2008. Finally, 

consistent with our previous recommendation to develop schedules and 

an analytical approach for completing vulnerability assessments, TSA has 

developed criteria for prioritizing vulnerability assessments at commercial 

airports. However, it has not compiled national baseline data to fully 

assess security vulnerabilities across airports. In 2004, TSA said an 

analysis of vulnerabilities on a nationwide basis was essential since it 

would allow the agency to assess the adequacy of security policies and 

help better direct limited resources. GAO is currently reviewing TSA’s 

 6

 TSA began conducting a name-based terrorist link analysis against selected terrorism 

databases in 2002 for workers who performed duties in selected airport areas. 

7

 The Explanatory Statement accompanying Division E of the Consolidated Appropriations

Act, 2008 (Pub. L. No. 110-161, Div. E, 121 Stat. 1844, 2042 (2007), allocates $15,000,000 in

appropriated funds for TSA to pilot-test various forms of employee screening at seven

commercial airports. Among other things, TSA is to collect data on the benefits, costs, and

impacts of 100-percent airport employee screening as well as of the alternative screening 

approaches, and brief the Committees on Appropriations on the progress and results of the

pilot projects no later than September 1, 2008. 

Page 6 GAO-08-651T
efforts to enhance airport perimeter and access control security and will 

report on our results later this year. 

Aviation Security Workforce. TSA has made progress in deploying,

training, and assessing the performance of its federal aviation security 

workforce. For example, TSA has hired and deployed a federal screening

workforce at over 400 commercial airports nationwide, and developed 

standards for determining TSO staffing levels at airports.8

 These standards 

form the basis of TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model, which the agency uses 

to determine TSO staffing levels at airports. In response to our 

recommendation,9

 in December 2007 TSA developed a Staffing Allocation 

Model Rates and Assumptions Validation Plan that identifies the process 

the agency plans to use to review and validate the model’s assumptions on 

a periodic basis. TSA also established numerous programs to train and 

test the performance of its screening workforce. Among other efforts, TSA 

has provided enhanced explosives-detection training, and recently 

reported developing a monthly recurrent (ongoing) training plan for all 

TSOs. In addition, TSA has trained and deployed federal air marshals on 

high-risk flights; established standards for training flight and cabin crews; 

and established a Federal Flight Deck Officer program to select, train, and 

allow authorized flight deck officers to use firearms to defend against any 

terrorist or criminal acts. In April 2006, TSA implemented a performance 

accountability and standards system to assess agency personnel at all

levels on various competencies, including training and development, 

readiness for duty, management skills, and technical proficiency. Finally, 

in April 2007, TSA redesigned its local covert testing program conducted at 

individual airports. This new program, known as the Aviation Screening 

Assessment Program or ASAP, is intended to test the performance of the 

passenger and checked baggage screening systems, to include the TSO 

workforce. During our ongoing review of TSA’s covert testing program, we 

identified that TSA has implemented risk-based national and local covert 

testing programs to identify vulnerabilities in and measure the 

performance of selected aspects of the aviation system. However, we 

found that TSA could strengthen its program by developing a more 

systematic process for (1) recording the causes of covert test failures, and 

 8

 TSA also oversees screening operations at airports utilizing private screeners under TSA’s 

Screening Partnership Program. See 49 U.S.C. § 44920. 

9

GAO, Aviation Security: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for Allocating Staff 

among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). 

Page 7 GAO-08-651T
(2) evaluating the test results and developing approaches for mitigating 

vulnerabilities identified in the commercial aviation security system. We 

will report on the complete results of this review later this year. 

Passenger Prescreening. Over the past several years, TSA has faced a 

number of challenges in developing and implementing an advanced 

prescreening system, known as Secure Flight,10 which will allow TSA to 

assume responsibility from air carriers for comparing domestic passenger 

information against the No Fly List and Selectee List.11 In February 2008, 

we reported that TSA had made substantial progress in instilling more 

discipline and rigor into Secure Flight’s development and implementation, 

including preparing key systems development documentation and 

strengthening privacy protections.12 However, challenges remain that may 

hinder the program’s progress moving forward. Specifically, TSA had not

(1) developed program cost and schedule estimates consistent with best 

practices; (2) fully implemented its risk management plan; (3) planned for 

system end-to-end testing in test plans; and (4) ensured that informationsecurity requirements are fully implemented. To address these challenges, 

we made several recommendations to DHS and TSA to incorporate best 

practices in Secure Flight’s cost and schedule estimates and to fully 

implement the program’s risk-management, testing, and informationsecurity requirements. DHS and TSA officials generally agreed with these 

recommendations. We are continuing to assess TSA’s efforts in 

developing and implementing Secure Flight—which, according to TSA’s 

planned schedule, will allow the agency to fully assume the watch list 

matching function from air carriers in fiscal year 2010. TSA has also taken 

steps to integrate the domestic watch-list matching function with the 

international watch-list matching function currently operated by CBP, 

consistent with our past recommendations. Specifically, TSA and CBP 

have coordinated to develop a strategy called the One DHS Solution, 

which is to align the two agencies’ domestic and international watch-list 

 10GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation 

Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 

14, 2006) and GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide

Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T (Washington, D.C.: Feb.

13, 2007). 

11Passengers identified as being on the No Fly List must be denied boarding passes and 

must not be permitted to fly unless cleared in accordance with TSA security requirements. 

Passengers on the Selectee List are to be issued boarding passes, but they and their 

baggage are to undergo additional security measures. 

12GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened

Planning to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work 

Remains, GAO-08-456T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2008). 

Page 8 GAO-08-651T
matching processes, information technology systems, and regulatory 

procedures to provide a seamless interface between DHS and the airline 

industry. TSA and CBP also agreed that TSA will take over the screening 

of passengers against the watch list for international flights from CBP, 

though CBP will continue to match passenger information to the watch list 

in fulfillment of its border-related functions. Full implementation of an 

integrated system is not planned to take place until after Secure Flight 

acquires the watch-list matching function for domestic flights. 

Checkpoint Screening. TSA has taken steps to strengthen passenger 

checkpoint screening procedures to enhance the detection of prohibited 

items and strengthen security; however, TSA could improve its evaluation

and documentation of proposed procedures. In April 2007, we reported 

that modifications to checkpoint screening standard operating procedures 

(SOP) were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA seniorlevel officials and program-level staff, as well as threat information and the 

results of covert testing.13 We also reported on steps TSA had taken to 

address new and emerging threats, such as establishing the Screening 

Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) program, which provides 

TSOs with a nonintrusive, behavior-based means of identifying potentially

high-risk individuals. For proposed screening modifications deemed 

significant, such as SPOT, TSA operationally tested these proposed 

modifications at selected airports before determining whether they should 

be implemented nationwide. However, we reported that TSA’s data 

collection and analysis of proposed SOP modifications could be improved, 

and recommended that TSA develop sound evaluation methods, when 

possible, to assess whether proposed screening changes would achieve 

their intended purpose. TSA has since reported taking steps to work with 

subject-matter experts to ensure that the agency’s operational testing of 

proposed screening modifications are well designed and executed, and 

produce results that are scientifically valid and reliable. With regard to 

checkpoint screening technologies, TSA and S&T have researched, 

developed, tested, and initiated procurements of various technologies to 

address security vulnerabilities that may be exploited; however, limited 

progress has been made in fielding emerging technologies. For example, of 

the various emerging checkpoint screening projects funded by TSA and 

 13GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to 

Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed

Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007).

Page 9 GAO-08-651T
S&T,14 only the explosives trace portal and a bottled liquids scanning 

device have been deployed for use in day-to-day operations. However, due 

to performance and maintenance issues, TSA halted the acquisition and 

deployment of the portals in June 2006. Also, in February 2008, we 

testified that TSA lacked a strategic plan to guide its efforts to acquire and 

deploy screening technologies, which could limit its ability to deploy 

emerging technologies to airports deemed at highest risk.15 According to 

TSA officials, the agency plans to submit a strategic plan to Congress by 

June 2008. We have ongoing work reviewing S&T and TSA checkpoint 

screening technologies efforts and will report on our results later this year. 

Checked Baggage Screening. TSA has made progress in installing 

explosive detection systems to provide the capability to screen checked 

baggage at the nation’s commercial airports, as mandated by law. From 

November 2001 through June 2006, TSA procured and installed about 

1,600 Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and about 7,200 Explosive Trace 

Detection (ETD) machines to screen checked baggage for explosives at 

over 400 commercial airports.16 In addition, based in part on 

recommendations we made, TSA moved stand-alone EDS machines that 

were located at airports that received new in-line EDS baggage screening 

systems to 32 airports that did not previously have them from May 2004

through December 2007. TSA also replaced ETD machines at 53 airports 

with 158 new EDS machines from March 2005 through December 2007. In 

response to mandates to field the equipment quickly and to account for 

limitations in airport design that made it difficult to quickly install in-line 

EDS systems, TSA generally placed baggage screening equipment in a 

stand-alone mode—usually in airport lobbies—to conduct the primary 

screening of checked baggage for explosives. 17 Based, in part, on our 

 14Examples of projects currently in research and development include the checkpoint

explosives detection system and the whole body imager. Projects that have undergone 

initiated procurements include the cast and prosthesis scanner and the advanced 

technology systems. 

15GAO-07-448T . 

16 Explosive detection systems (EDS) use specialized X-rays to detect characteristics of 

explosives that may be contained in baggage as it moves along a conveyor belt. Explosive 

trace detection (ETD) works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human 

operators collect samples by rubbing swabs along the interior and exterior of an object that

TSOs determine to be suspicious, and place the swabs in the ETD machine, which then 

chemically analyzes the swabs to identify any traces of explosive materials.

17See GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures 

Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: July 2006), GAO, Aviation

Page 10 GAO-08-651T
recommendations, TSA later developed a plan to integrate EDS and ETD 

machines in-line with airport baggage conveyor systems. The installation 

of in-line systems can result in considerable savings to TSA through the 

reduction of personnel needed to operate the equipment, as well as 

increased security. In addition, according to TSA estimates, the number of 

checked bags screened per hour can more than double when EDS 

machines are placed in-line versus being placed in the stand alone mode. 

Despite delays in the widespread deployment of in-line systems due to the 

high upfront capital investment required, TSA is pursuing the installation 

of these systems and is seeking creative financing solutions to fund their 

deployment. However, It is incumbent upon airports of whether or not 

they will pursue the installation of in-line baggage systems. In February 

2008, TSA submitted a legislative proposal to increase the Aviation 

Security Capital Fund (ASCF) through a new surcharge on the passenger 

security fee. According to TSA, this proposal, if adopted, would accelerate 

the deployment of optimal checked baggage screening systems and 

address the need to re-capitalize existing equipment deployed immediately 

after September, 2001. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11

Commission Act reiterates a requirement that DHS submit a cost-sharing 

study for the installation of in-line baggage screening systems, along with a 

plan and schedule for implementing provisions of the study, and requires

TSA to establish a prioritization schedule for airport improvement projects 

related to the installation of in-line or other optimal baggage screening 

systems. 18 As of April 3, 2008, TSA had not completed the prioritization 

schedule, corresponding timeline, and description of the funding 

allocation for these projects. 

Air Cargo Security. TSA has taken steps to secure air cargo, including 

initializing efforts to provide the capability to screen 100 percent of air 

cargo transported on passenger aircraft by 2010, but its efforts are not yet

complete. In April 2007, we reported that TSA’s Air Cargo strategic plan 

contained a strategy for securing domestic air cargo but did not include 

goals and objectives for addressing inbound air cargo, or cargo 

transported into the United States from a foreign country.19 We 

recommended that DHS develop a risk-based strategy for securing 

 Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening, but

Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2006), and GAO-07-448T. 

18 See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 1603-04, 121 Stat. 266, 480-81 (2007). 

19GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the

Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2007).

Page 11 GAO-08-651T
inbound air cargo including defining TSA’s and CBP’s inbound air cargo 

security responsibilities. CBP subsequently issued its International Air 

Cargo Security strategic plan in June 2007, and TSA plans to revise its Air 

Cargo strategic plan during the third quarter of fiscal year 2008 to 

incorporate a strategy for addressing inbound air cargo security, including

how the agency will partner with CBP. We also reported that TSA had not 

conducted vulnerability assessments to identify the range of air cargo 

security weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists, and 

recommended that TSA develop a methodology and schedule for 

completing these assessments.20 In response in part to our 

recommendation, TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability 

Assessment program in November 2006 and, as of April 2008, had 

completed vulnerability assessments at five domestic airports. TSA plans 

to complete assessments of all high-risk airports by 2009. In addition, 

although TSA has established requirements for air carriers to randomly 

screen air cargo, the agency had exempted some domestic and inbound 

cargo from these requirements. While TSA has since revised its screening 

exemptions for domestic air cargo, it has not done so for inbound air 

cargo. TSA is also working with DHS S&T to develop and pilot test a 

number of technologies to assess their applicability to screening and 

securing air cargo.21 However, as of February 2008, TSA had provided a

completion date for only one of its five air cargo technology pilot 

programs. According to TSA officials, the agency will determine whether it 

will require the use of these technologies once it has completed its 

assessments and analyzed the results. We also reported in April 2007 that 

TSA did not systematically compile and analyze information on air cargo 

security practices used abroad to identify those that may strengthen the 

department’s overall air cargo security program, and we recommended 

that it do so.22 TSA has since begun development of a certified cargo 

screening program based in part on its review of screening models used in

two foreign countries that rely on government-certified screeners to 

 20GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo 

Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005) and GAO-07-660. 

21TSA’s air cargo pilot programs include an air cargo explosives detection program; an EDS

pilot program; an air cargo security seals pilot; the testing of hardened unit-loading devices;

and, the testing of pulsed fast neutron analysis technology.

22GAO-07-660. 

Page 12 GAO-08-651T
screen air cargo early in the supply chain.23 According to TSA, the agency 

plans to deploy this program to assist it in meeting the statutory 

requirement to screen 100 percent of air cargo transported on passenger 

aircraft by August 2010 (and to screen 50 percent of such cargo by 

February 2009), as mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act.24 In January 2008, TSA began phase one of the 

program’s pilot tests, and as of April 2008, had completed tests at six 

airports. TSA plans to conduct tests at three additional airports by June 

2008. 

Surface Transportation 

Security 

Strategic Approach for Implementing Security Functions. In 

September 2005, DHS completed the National Strategy for Transportation 

Security. This strategy identified and evaluated transportation assets in the 

United States that could be at risk of a terrorist attack and addressed 

transportation sector security needs. Further, in May 2007, DHS issued a 

strategic plan for securing the transportation sector and supporting 

annexes for each of the surface transportation modes, and reported taking

actions to adopt the strategic approach outlined by the plan. The 

Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security 

framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to make 

effective and appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation 

decisions within the transportation network. TSA has begun to implement 

some of the security initiatives outlined in the sector-specific plan and 

supporting modal plans. Additionally, the Implementing 

Recommendations of the 9/11Commission Act imposes a deadline of May 

2008, for the Secretary of DHS to develop and implement the National 

Strategy for Public Transportation Security. Our work assessing DHS’s 

efforts in implementing its strategy for securing surface transportation 

modes is being conducted as part of our ongoing reviews of mass transit, 

passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and highway infrastructure 

security. We will report on the results of this work later this year. 

Threat, Criticality, and Vulnerability Assessments. TSA has taken 

actions to assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability 

assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly for mass transit, 

passenger rail, and freight rail, but its efforts related to commercial 

 23According to TSA, the program will allow TSA-certified shippers and manufacturers to 

screen air cargo before it leaves the factory. The screened cargo would then be secured 

with a tamper-resistant seal and transported to the airport for shipment. 

24Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602(a), 121 Stat. at 477-480 (2007) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)). 

Page 13 GAO-08-651T
vehicles and highway infrastructure are in the early stages. For example, 

TSA had conducted threat assessments of all surface modes of 

transportation. TSA has also conducted assessments of the vulnerabilities 

associated with some surface transportation assets. For example, 

regarding freight rail, TSA has conducted vulnerability assessments of rail 

corridors in eight High Threat Urban Areas where toxic-inhalation-hazard 

shipments are transported. With respect to commercial vehicles and 

highway infrastructure, TSA’s vulnerability assessment efforts are 

ongoing. According to TSA, the agency performed 113 corporate security 

reviews on highway transportation organizations through fiscal year 2007,

such as trucking companies, state Departments of Transportation, and 

motor coach companies.25 However, TSA does not have a plan or a time 

frame for conducting these reviews on a nationwide basis. Furthermore, 

DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of 

Infrastructure Protection conducts vulnerability assessments of surface 

transportation assets to identify protective measures to reduce or mitigate 

asset vulnerability. With regard to criticality assessments, TSA reported in 

April 2008 that the agency had conducted 1,345 assessments of passenger

rail stations.26 Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11Commission Act has several provisions related to security

assessments. For instance, the act requires DHS to review existing security 

assessments for public transportation systems as well as conduct 

additional assessments as necessary to ensure that all high-risk public 

transportation agencies have security assessments. Moreover, the act also

requires DHS to establish a federal task force to complete a nationwide 

risk assessment of a terrorist attack on rail carriers. We will continue to 

review threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments conducted by TSA 

related to securing surface modes of transportation during our ongoing 

work.27 

 25TSA conducts corporate security reviews in multiple modes of transportation to establish 

baseline data against which to evaluate minimum-security standards and identify coverage

gaps in reviewed systems. 

26According to TSA, the agency completed 945 criticality assessments in fiscal year 2007

and 400 assessments in fiscal year 2008. TSA officials stated that some of these 

assessments may have been conducted to update previously completed ones.

27For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership 

Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-07-225T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 

2007).

Page 14 GAO-08-651T
Issuance of Security Standards. TSA has taken actions to develop and 

issue security standards for mass transit, passenger rail, and freight rail 

transportation modes. However, TSA has not yet developed or issued 

security standards for all surface transportation modes, such as 

commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure, or determined whether 

standards are necessary for these modes of transportation. Specifically, 

TSA has developed and issued both mandatory rail security directives and 

recommended voluntary best practices—known as Security Action 

Items—for transit agencies and passenger rail operators to implement as 

part of their security programs to enhance both security and emergencymanagement preparedness. TSA also issued a notice of proposed rule 

making in December 2006, which if finalized as proposed, would include 

additional security requirements for passenger and freight rail 

transportation operators.

28 For example, the rule would include additional 

security requirements designed to ensure that freight railroads have 

protocols for the secure custody transfers of toxic-inhalation-hazard rail 

cars in High Threat Urban Areas. DHS and other federal partners have also 

been collaborating with the American Public Transportation Association 

(APTA) and public and private security professionals to develop industry 

wide security standards for mass transit systems. APTA officials reported 

that they expect several of the voluntary standards to be released in mid2008. Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 

9/11Commission Act requires DHS to issue regulations establishing 

standards and guidelines for developing and implementing vulnerability 

assessments and security plans for high-risk railroad carriers and over-theroad bus operators. 29 The deadlines for the regulations are August 2008

and February 2009, respectively. With respect to freight rail, TSA is 

developing a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing that high-risk rail 

carriers conduct vulnerability assessments and develop and implement 

security plans. We will continue to assess TSA’s efforts to issue security 

standards for other surface transportation modes during our ongoing 

reviews. 

Compliance Inspections. TSA has hired and deployed surface 

transportation security inspectors who conduct compliance inspections 

for both passenger and freight rail modes of transportation; however, 

questions exist regarding how TSA will employ the inspectors to enforce 

 28See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006). 

29See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 429-33, 454-57. 

Page 15 GAO-08-651T
new regulations proposed in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking and regulations to be developed in accordance with the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.30 TSA 

officials reported having 100 surface transportation inspectors during 

fiscal year 2005 and, as of December 2007, were maintaining an inspector

workforce of about the same number. The agency’s budget request for 

fiscal year 2009 includes $11.6 million to fund 100 surface transportation 

security inspectors—which would maintain its current staffing level. 

Inspectors’ responsibilities include conducting on-site inspections of key 

facilities for freight rail, passenger rail, and transit systems; assessing 

transit systems’ implementation of core transit security fundamentals and 

comprehensive security action items; conducting examinations of 

stakeholder operations, including compliance with security directives; 

identifying security gaps; and developing effective practices. To meet 

these compliance responsibilities, TSA reported in December 2007 that it

had conducted voluntary assessments of 50 of the 100 largest transit 

agencies, including 34 passenger rail and 16 bus-only agencies, and has 

plans to continue these assessments with the next 50 largest transit 

agencies during fiscal year 2008. With respect to freight rail, TSA reported 

visiting, during 2007, almost 300 railroad facilities including terminal and 

railroad yards to assess the railroads’ implementation of 17 DHSrecommended Security Action Items associated with the transportation of 

toxic-inhalation-hazard materials. 

TSA has raised concerns about the agency’s ability to continue to meet 

anticipated inspection responsibilities given the new regulations proposed 

in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and requirements of 

the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. For 

example, the act mandates that high-risk over-the-road bus operators, 

railroad carriers, and public transportation agencies develop and 

implement security plans which must include, among other requirements, 

procedures to be implemented in response to a terrorist attack.31 The act 

further requires the Secretary of DHS to review each plan within 6 months 

of receiving it. TSA officials stated that they believe TSA inspectors will 

likely be tasked to conduct these reviews. The act also requires that the 

Secretary of DHS develop and issue interim final regulations by November 

 30See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1534, 121 Stat at 461-62. 

31See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 1405, 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 402-05, 429-33, 454-57. 

Page 16 GAO-08-651T
2007, for a public transportation security training program.32 As of April 

2008, these interim regulations have not been issued. According to TSA 

officials, TSA inspectors will likely be involved in ensuring compliance 

with these regulations as well. To help address these additional 

requirements, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11Commission

Act authorizes funds to be appropriated for TSA to employ additional 

surface transportation inspectors, and requires that surface transportation 

inspectors have relevant transportation experience and appropriate 

security and inspection qualifications.

33 However, it is not clear how TSA 

will meet these new requirements since the agency has not requested 

funding for additional surface transportation security inspectors for fiscal 

year 2009. We will continue to assess TSA’s inspection efforts during our 

ongoing work.34

Grant Programs. DHS has developed and administered grant programs 

for various surface transportation modes, although stakeholders have 

raised concerns regarding the current grant process. For example, the 

DHS Office of Grants and Training, now called the Grant Programs 

Directorate, has used various programs to fund passenger rail security 

since 2003. Through the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant program, the 

Grant Programs Directorate has provided grants to urban areas to help 

enhance their overall security and preparedness level to prevent, respond 

to, and recover from acts of terrorism. The Grant Programs Directorate 

used fiscal year 2005, 2006, and 2007 appropriations to build on the work 

under way through the Urban Areas Security Initiative program, and create 

and administer new programs focused specifically on transportation 

security, including the Transit Security Grant Program, Intercity Passenger 

Rail Security Grant Program, and the Freight Rail Security Grant Program. 

However, some industry stakeholders have raised concerns regarding 

DHS’s current grant process, including the shifting of funding priorities, 

the lack of program flexibility, and other barriers to the provision of grant 

funding. For example, transit agencies have reported that the lack of 

predictability in how TSA will assess grant projects against funding 

priorities makes it difficult to engage in long-term planning of security 

 32See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1408, 121 Stat. at 409-11 (requiring that the Secretary develop 

and issue final regulations for the training program by August 2008). 

33See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1304, 121 Stat. at 393-94. 

34For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership 

Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-06-181T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 

2005). 

Page 17 GAO-08-651T
initiatives. Specifically, transit agencies have reported receiving funding to

begin projects—such as retrofitting their transit fleet with security 

cameras or installing digital video recording systems—but not being able

to finish these projects in subsequent years because TSA had changed its 

funding priorities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act codifies surface transportation grant programs and 

imposes statutory requirements on the administration of the programs.35

For example, the act lists authorized uses of these grant funds and 

requires DHS to award the grants based on risk.36 It also requires that DHS 

and DOT determine the most effective and efficient way to distribute grant 

funds, authorizing DHS to transfer funds to DOT for the purpose of 

disbursement.37 According to the TSA fiscal year 2009 budget justification, 

to ensure that the selected projects are focused on increasing security, 

DHS grants are to be awarded based on risk. We will continue assessing 

surface transportation related grant programs as part of our ongoing 

work.38 

Our work has identified homeland security challenges that cut across 

DHS’s mission and core management functions. These issues have 

impeded the department’s progress since its inception and will continue to 

confront DHS as it moves forward. These issues include (1) establishing 

baseline performance goals and measures and engaging in effective

strategic planning efforts; (2) applying and strengthening a riskmanagement approach for implementing missions and making resource 

allocation decisions; and, (3) coordinating and partnering with federal, 

state, and local agencies, and the private sector. We have made numerous 

recommendations to DHS and its components, including TSA, to 

strengthen these efforts, and the department has made progress in 

implementing some of these recommendations. 

Crosscutting Issues 

Have Hindered DHS’s 

Efforts in 

Implementing Its 

Mission and 

Management 

Functions 

DHS has not always implemented effective strategic planning efforts and 

has not yet fully developed performance measures or put into place 

structures to help ensure that the agency is managing for results. For 

example, with regard to TSA’s efforts to secure air cargo, we reported in 

October 2005 and April 2007 that TSA completed an Air Cargo Strategic 

 35See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1406, 1513, 1532, 121 Stat. 405-08, 433-35, 457-60. 

36See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1406(b), (c)(2), 121 Stat. at 405-07. 

37See Pub. L. No. 110-53, §§ 1406(d), 1532(e), 121 Stat. at 407, 459. 

38For more information see GAO-06-181T. 

Page 18 GAO-08-651T
Plan in November 2003 that outlined a threat-based risk-management 

approach to securing the nation’s domestic air cargo system, and that this

plan identified strategic objectives and priority actions for enhancing air 

cargo security based on risk, cost, and deadlines.39 However, TSA had not 

developed a similar strategy for addressing the security of inbound air 

cargo—cargo transported into the United States from foreign countries—

including how best to partner with CBP and international air cargo 

stakeholders. In another example, we reported in April 2007 that TSA had 

not yet developed outcome-based performance measures for its foreign 

airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, such as the 

percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as a result of 

TSA’s on-site assistance and recommendations, to identify any aspects of 

these programs that may need attention. We recommended that DHS 

direct TSA and CBP to develop a risk-based strategy, including specific 

goals and objectives, for securing air cargo;40 and develop outcome-based 

performance measures for its foreign airport assessment and air carrier 

inspection programs.41 DHS generally concurred with GAO’s 

recommendations with regard to air cargo, and is taking steps to 

strengthen its efforts in this area. 

Although DHS and TSA have made risk-based decision-making a 

cornerstone of departmental and agency policy, DHS and TSA could 

strengthen their application of risk management in implementing their 

mission functions. Several DHS component agencies and TSA have 

worked towards integrating risk-based decision making into their security 

efforts, but we reported that these efforts can be strengthened. For 

example, TSA has incorporated certain risk-management principles into 

securing air cargo, but has not completed assessments of air cargo 

vulnerabilities or critical assets—two crucial elements of a risk-based 

approach. TSA has also incorporated risk-based decision making when 

making modifications to airport checkpoint screening procedures, to 

include modifying procedures based on intelligence information and 

vulnerabilities identified through covert testing at airport checkpoints. 

However, in April 2007, we reported that TSA’s analyses that supported 

 39GAO-07-660. 

40GAO-07-660. 

41GAO, Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help

Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened, GAO-07-729

(Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2007). 

Page 19 GAO-08-651T
screening procedural changes could be strengthened. For example, TSA 

officials based their decision to revise the prohibited items list to allow 

passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their 

review of threat information—which indicated that these items do not 

pose a high risk to the aviation system—so that TSOs could concentrate 

on higher threat items.42 However, TSA officials did not conduct the 

analysis necessary to help them determine whether this screening change 

would affect TSO’s ability to focus on higher-risk threats.43 As noted earlier 

in this statement, TSA is taking steps to strengthen its efforts in both of 

these areas.

In addition to providing federal leadership with respect to homeland 

security, DHS also plays a large role in coordinating the activities of key 

stakeholders, but has faced challenges in this regard. Although 

improvements are being made, we have found that the appropriate 

homeland security roles and responsibilities within and between the levels

of government, and with the private sector, are evolving and need to be

clarified. For example, we reported that opportunities exist for TSA to 

work with foreign governments and industry to identify best practices for

securing passenger rail and air cargo, and recommended that TSA 

systematically compile and analyze information on practices used abroad

to identify those that may strengthen the department’s overall security 

efforts.44 With regard to air cargo, TSA has subsequently reviewed the 

models used in two foreign countries that rely on government-certified 

screeners to screen air cargo to facilitate the design of the agency’s 

proposed certified-cargo screening program. Further, in September 2005, 

we reported that TSA did not effectively involve private sector

stakeholders in its decision making process for developing security 

standards for passenger rail assets.45 We recommended that DHS develop

security standards that reflect industry best practices and can be 

measured, monitored, and enforced by TSA rail inspectors and, if 

appropriate, rail asset owners. DHS agreed with these recommendations. 

Regarding efforts to respond to in-flight security threats, which, depending

on the nature of the threat, could involve more than 15 federal agencies 

and agency components, in July 2007 we also recommended that DHS and 

 42GAO-07-634. 

43GAO-07-634. 

44See GAO-07-660 and GAO-05-851.

45See GAO-05-851. 

Page 20 GAO-08-651T
other departments document and share their respective coordination and

communication strategies and response procedures, to which DHS 

agreed.46 The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act 

includes provisions designed to improve coordination with stakeholders. 

For example, the act requires DHS and DOT to develop an annex to the 

Memorandum of Understanding between the two departments governing 

the specific roles, responsibilities, resources, and commitments in 

addressing motor carrier transportation security matters, including the 

processes the departments will follow to promote communications and 

efficiency, and avoid duplication of effort.47 The act also requires DHS, in 

consultation with DOT, to establish a program to provide appropriate 

information that DHS has gathered or developed on the performance, use,

and testing of technologies that may be used to enhance surface 

transportation security to surface transportation entities.48 According to 

TSA, the agency has begun to provide transit agencies with information on 

recommended available security technologies through security 

roundtables for the top 50 transit agencies; the posting of an authorized 

equipment list on the Homeland Security Information Network Web site; 

and periodic briefings to other federal agencies. 

 

The magnitude of DHS’s and TSA’s responsibilities in securing the nation’s 

transportation system is significant, and we commend the department on 

the work it has done and is currently doing to secure this network. 

Nevertheless, given the dominant role that TSA plays in securing the 

homeland, it is critical that the agency continually strive to strengthen its 

programs and initiatives to counter emerging threats and improve security. 

In the almost 6-1⁄2 years since its creation, TSA has had to undertake its 

critical mission while also establishing and forming a new agency. At the 

same time, a variety of factors, including threats to and attacks on 

transportation systems around the world, as well as new legislative 

requirements, have led the agency to reassess its priorities and reallocate 

resources to address key events, and to respond to emerging threats. 

Although TSA has made considerable progress in addressing key aspects 

of commercial aviation security, more work remains in some key areas, 

such as the deployment of technologies to detect explosives at 

Concluding 

Observations 

 46GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight Security

Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, GAO-07-891R (Washington,

D.C.: July 31, 2007). 

47See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1541, 121 Stat. at 469.

48See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1305, 121 Stat. at 394-95. 

Page 21 GAO-08-651T
checkpoints and in air cargo. Further, although TSA has more recently 

taken action in a number of areas to help secure surface modes of 

transportation, its efforts are still largely in the early stage, and the nature

of its regulatory role and relationship with transportation operators is still 

being defined. As DHS and TSA move forward, it will be important for the 

department to address the challenges that have affected its operations 

thus far, while continuing to adapt to new threats and needs, and well as 

increase the effectiveness and efficiency of existing programs and 

operations. We will continue to review DHS’s and TSA’s progress in 

securing the transportation network, and will provide information to 

Congress and the public on these efforts. 

Madam Chairwoman this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to 

answer any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may 

have at this time. 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen Berrick 

at (202) 512- 3404 or at berrickc@gao.gov. Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony include Steve D. Morris, Assistant Director; 

Jason Berman; Kristy Brown; Martene Bryan; Tony Cheesebrough; Fatema 

Choudhury; Chris Currie; Joe Dewechter; Dorian Dunbar; Barbara Guffy; 

John Hansen; Dawn Hoff; Daniel Klabunde; Anne Laffoon; Gary 

Malavenda; Sara Margraf; Victoria Miller; Dan Rodriguez; Maria Strudwick; 

Spencer Tacktill; Gabriele A. Tonsil; Margaret A. Ullengren; Margaret Vo; 

and Su Jin Yon. 

(440712) Page 22 GAO-08-651T
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