The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and

Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems

February 15–17, 1994 Walnut Creek, California

David R. Weise Robert E. Martin Technical Coordinators

Contents

In Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

Memorial Dedication to Dr. Harold H. Biswell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

James K. Agee

Acknowledgments

PLENARY SESSION—ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

The Oakland-Berkeley Hills Fire of 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

P. Lamont Ewell

Dr. Biswell’s Influence on the Development of Prescribed Burning in California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Jan W. van Wagtendonk

“What Do We Do Now, Ollie?” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Robert L. Irwin

Fire History of the Local Wildland-Urban Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Neil R. Honeycutt

PANEL DISCUSSION: Prescribed Fire: Why Aren’t We Doing More? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Local, State, and National Perspectives

Donald A. Pierpont . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Ken Nehoda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Jerry T. Williams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Institutionalizing Fire Safety in Making Land Use and Development Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Marie-Annette Johnson and Marc Mullenix

A Synopsis of Large or Disastrous Wildland Fires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Robert E. Martin and David B. Sapsis

Cooperative Efforts in Fuels Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Gerald L. Adams
ii USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

PANEL DISCUSSION: Barriers to Fuel Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Organizational Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Kenneth S. Blonski

Legal Barriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Anita E. Ruud

Federal Disaster Assistance Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

William J. Patterson

CONCURRENT SESSION I—Wildland Ecosystem Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

Fire in Wildland Ecosystems—Opening Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Tom Nichols

Interagency Wilderness Fire Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Jim Desmond

FARSITE: A Fire Area Simulator for Fire Managers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Mark A. Finney

Funding Fuels Management in the National Park Service: Costs and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

Stephen J. Botti

Ecosystem Management Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Jim Boynton

PANEL DISCUSSION: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Jerry Hurley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Ishmael Messer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Stephen J. Botti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Jay Perkins. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

L. Dean Clark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

CONCURRENT SESSION II—Urban Interface Topics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Use of Class A Foams on Structures and Wildlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Paul Schlobohm

Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

Jack D. Cohen

Strategies for and Barriers to Public Adoption of Fire Safe Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

Ronald W. Hodgson

Neighborhood Organization Activities: Evacuation Drills, Clusters, and Fire Safety Awareness . . . . 99

Dick White

Conflicts Between Natural Resources and Structural Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

Stephen Bakken

PANEL DISCUSSION: Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Moderator’s Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Neil R. Honeycutt

Contents
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995. iii

The East Bay Vegetation Management Consortium:

A Subregional Approach to Resource Management and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

Tony Acosta

East Bay Fire Chiefs’ Consortium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Michael Bradley

The Bay Area Wildfire Forum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Todd E. Bruce

Social and Environmental Issues in Developing Vegetation and Fire Management Plans . . . . . . . . . 117

Leonard Charles

PLENARY SESSION—Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

Working to Make the Clean Air Act and Prescribed Burning Compatible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

Trent Procter

Comprehensive Fire Prevention Legislation Enacted by the California Legislature

in 1992 After the East Bay Firestorm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Rachel Richman

Florida’s Solution to Liability Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

Dale Wade and James Brenner

The Role of Fire in Ecosystem Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Jerry T. Williams

Structural Wildland Intermix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

Ronny J. Coleman

A Balanced Approach: Dr. Biswell’s Solution to Fire Issues

in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Carol Rice

POSTER SESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149

Use of Aerial Photography for Fire Planning and Suppression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

Alan H. Ambacher

Characteristics of Coastal Sage Scrub in Relation to Fire History and Use by

California Gnatcatchers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

Jan L. Beyers and Ginger C. Peña

The Quest for All-Purpose Plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155

Susan L. Frommer and David R. Weise

A High-Resolution Weather Model for Fire Behavior Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Francis M. Fujioka, John O. Roads, Kyozo Ueyoshi, and Shyh-Chin Chen

Using a Geographic Information System (GIS) to Assess Fire Hazard and Monitor Natural

Resources Protection on the Mount Tamalpais Watershed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Thomas H. Gaman and Philip Langley

Homeowner Intervention in Malibu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

Tom Gardner

Contents
iv USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Legacy of Harold Biswell in Southern California: His Teaching Influence

on the Use of Prescribed Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Walter L. Graves and Gary Reece

Helping Wildland-Urban Interface Residents Reduce Wildfire Hazards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

Warren E. Heilman, Jeremy S. Fried, William A. Main, and Donna M. Paananen

Mt. Diablo Park: The Role of Fire in a Controversy About Cattle Grazing at the Urban Fringe . . . . 167

Lynn Huntsinger, Jeremy Fried, and Lita Buttolph

Fire in a Tropical Savanna—a Double-Edged Sword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169

Andrea L. Koonce, Timothy E. Paysen, and Bonni M. Corcoran

People—Fire Managers Must Talk With Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

Arthur W. Magill

The Effects of Forest Fire Smoke on Firefighters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Richard J. Mangan

Burning in Arizona’s Giant Cactus Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

Marcia G. Narog, Andrea L. Koonce, Ruth C. Wilson, and Bonni M. Corcoran

A Computer Program for Evaluating Prescribed Fire Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Philip N. Omi, Douglas B. Rideout, and Stephen J. Botti

Potential Nitrogen Losses due to Fire from Pinus halepensis Stands in the Alicante Province

(Southeastern Spain): Mineralomass Variability.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179

Antonio Pastor-Lopez and Joaquin Martin-Martin

Susceptibility to Potential Erosion After Fire in Mediterranean Ecosystems

in the Alicante Province (Southeastern Spain) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Antonio Pastor-Lopez and Joaquin Martin-Martin

Operational Fire/GIS Dilemmas—The Fire Report Form Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Lucy Anne Salazar and Martha Shea Flattley

 Progression of the Oakland/Berkeley Hills “Tunnel Fire” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187

David B. Sapsis, Donald V. Pearman, and Robert E. Martin

Comparison of Fuel Load, Structural Characteristics and Infrastructure

Before and After the Oakland Hills “Tunnel Fire” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Scott L. Stephens, Domingo M. Molina, Ron Carter, and Robert E. Martin

FireNet—A Forum for International Curriculum Development

in Fire Science and Management? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

A. Chris F. Trevitt, David G. Green, and David B. Sapsis

Lightning Strikes and Natural Fire Regimes in San Diego County, California . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Michael L. Wells and David E. McKinsey

Modern Fire Test Methodologies for Building Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

Robert H. White and Mark A. Dietenberger

Brush Fire Hazard: An Analysis of the Topanga Fire Storm. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

James A. Woods

Contents
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995. v

In Brief...

Weise, David R.; Martin, Robert E., technical

coordinators. 1995. The Biswell symposium: fire issues

and solutions in urban interface and wildland

ecosystems; February 15-17, 1994; Walnut Creek,

California. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. Albany,

CA: Pacific Southwest Research Station, Forest Service,

U.S. Department of Agriculture; 199 p.

Retrieval Terms: community response, ecosystem management, fire ecology, fire management, fuel management,

prescribed burning

Fire has been and continues to be both a threat and benefitto humans and ecosystems. Recent large or costly fires

have occurred in both the wildland-urban interface and in

the wildlands. These phenomena are not new events but

merely recurrences of long-standing challenges. The values

at risk include, but are not limited to, human life and property,

rare or unique cultural and natural resources, and ecosystem

health. Much progress has been made during the past several

decades regarding fire’s role in wildland systems, but many

issues still remain to be resolved.

This volume presents the proceedings of the symposium,

“Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems” held February 15-17, 1994 in Walnut Creek,

California. The primary objective of the symposium was to

describe fire issues and problems currently facing land

managers and to present state of the art solutions that are

currently being implemented by local, State, and Federal

organizations concerned with fire management. The focal

point of the symposium was the 1991 Oakland/Berkeley

Hills “Tunnel Fire”; however, the issues and solutions

described are certainly regional and national in scope.

Several key issues regarding the role of fire in wildlands

and in the urban interface include social barriers, fire safety,

fuel management, legal barriers, multiple jurisdictions,

program cost and benefits, wildland health, conflicts between

wildland resources and residential structures, air quality,

and liability. Social barriers include lack of general knowledge

of fire’s role, as well as recognition of its hazards and

benefits. Legal barriers include laws, ordinances, and

regulations that either restrict fire use or do not provide

incentives for fire use. Implementing fire use on an ecosystem

level requires cooperation between neighbors. The safety of

structures built in urban interface settings or adjacent to

wildland boundaries is an issue the owner faces; the liability

associated with destruction by wildland fire is an issue that

land managers face.

Because of the complexity of the issues regarding fire

and its use, many different solutions have been developed.

Researchers have identified social barriers and concerns that

hinder adoption of fire safe practices by the general public.

Educational efforts to prevent the public from forgetting the

losses associated with catastrophic wildfires have been

developed. Legal solutions to fuel management and fire

hazard reduction have been developed in California and

Florida to address liability issues. Community and

neighborhood-based associations have developed to promote

fire-safe wildland-urban interfaces. Interagency agreements

were developed to apply prescribed fire at ecosystem levels

to mutual benefit. Environmentally safe fire suppression

techniques have also been developed.

Many proactive approaches to solving these and other

fire issues were presented at the symposium. It is our hope

that the symposium attendees as well as readers of these

proceedings benefit from the array of topics discussed, and

that the information gained from the technical sessions and

this proceedings provides a starting point to solving local

fire issues. This symposium presents a snapshot of the

continually evolving dialogue about fire and its role as a

shaper of ecosystems.
vi USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995. vii

Preface

Fire has been and continues to be both a threat and benefitto humans and ecosystems. Recent large or costly fires

have occurred in both the wildland-urban interface and in the

wildlands. These phenomena are not new events but merely

recurrences of long-standing challenges. The values at risk

include, but are not limited to, human life and property, rare

or unique cultural and natural resources, and ecosystem health.

Much progress has been made during the past several decades

regarding the recognition of fire’s role in wildland systems,

but many issues still remain to be resolved.

Dr. Harold “Doc” Biswell was a pioneering advocate

for the study of the ecological role of fire, for the use of

prescribed fire in land management, and for fuels management.

He worked to reduce fire hazard in urban-wildland interface

areas and lived to see one of his most dire predictions come

true in the Oakland/Berkeley Hills “Tunnel Fire” of October

1991. A conference to honor Dr. Harold H. Biswell was

proposed shortly after his death in January 1992. This

symposium was organized to honor Dr. Biswell by addressing

wildland and urban-wildland fire issues and solutions—

subjects dear to his heart. We dedicate this symposium and

proceedings to the memory of Dr. Harold Biswell.

Approximately 350 managers, researchers, planners,

former students of Dr. Biswell and other individuals attended

the symposium in Walnut Creek, California. Because the

wildland and structural fire communities were equally

represented in attendance, the goal to bring both groups

together in a common forum was accomplished. The

symposium consisted of two and one-half days of technical

presentations, a one-half day field trip touring the 1991

Oakland/Berkeley Hills “Tunnel Fire,” a poster session, and

an evening session dedicated to Dr. Biswell’s life and legacies

led by Dr. James K. Agee. The technical presentations were

structured around issues/problems and solutions in both

wildland and urban interface ecosystems. The major topics

were developed by a Steering Committee representing Federal,

State, and local agencies, and university and non-governmental

organizations. Speakers were selected to address the major

topics. Each technical session was chaired by a moderator

and included the following topics:

• History, safety, and legal and social barriers to prescribed

fire (moderator—Sue Husari, USDA Forest Service)

• Wildland topics including funding of fire programs,

ecosystem management, and prescribed fire (moderator—

Tom Nichols, USDI National Park Service)

• Urban-wildland interface topics including use of foams,

neighborhood action groups, and fire safety (moderator—Steve Bakken, California Department of Parks

and Recreation)

• Legislation and ecosystem management solutions

(moderators—Bruce Kilgore, USDI National Park Service;

Carol Rice, Wildland Resource Management, Inc.).

The technical sessions included expert panel discussions.

In addition to the session moderators, the panel moderators

included Dr. Ron Wakimoto, University of Montana; Chief

Neil Honeycutt, California Office of Emergency Services;

and Chief Rich Aronsen (retired), California Office of

Emergency Services.

In addition to the technical sessions, the conference

featured a keynote speech by Chief Lamont Ewell, Oakland

Fire Department, describing the 1991 Oakland/Berkeley Hills

“Tunnel Fire” and a banquet with a memorial dedication to

Dr. Biswell by Dr. James Agee, University of Washington.

The symposium concluded with a summary of the events

and issues by Robert Mutch, USDA Forest Service (retired).

Acknowledgments

A conference and proceedings of this size require a

great deal of effort from many individuals. We thank the

members of the Symposium Steering Committee—Rich

Aronsen, Steve Bakken, Todd Bruce, Neil Honeycutt, Sue

Husari, Ken Nehoda, Tom Nichols, Carol Rice, Joe Rubini—

for putting together a dynamic and interesting symposium

agenda. The Steering Committee was organized using the

Incident Command System as the basic organizational

framework. Robert Martin initiated the idea for the conference,

organized the Steering Committee and served as Incident

Commander (Symposium Chair); Carol Rice (Operations)

was assisted by Ken Nehoda; Joe Rubini (Logistics) was

assisted by Neil Honeycutt and Todd Bruce; Sue Husari

(Finance) was assisted by Tom Nichols and Steve Bakken;

and David Weise (Planning) was assisted by Rich Aronsen.

The efforts of Sandy Cooper and Bruce Winner, University

Extension - University of California, Davis, were key to

providing the logistical support of program materials,

registration, hotel negotiations, bus negotiations, and other

activities too numerous to mention. Joe Rubini and Neil

Honeycutt with the assistance of University of California,

Berkeley graduate students David Sapsis, Scott Stephens,

Robert Schroeder, and Maria Gutierrez developed an

informative tour of the 1991 “Tunnel Fire” and fuel

management activities in the Oakland/Berkeley Hills.

We further acknowledge the efforts of Eugene Hanson

and Bonnie Corcoran, Prescribed Fire Research Unit located

at the Forest Fire Laboratory in Riverside, California in

assembling the proceedings, and the editorial and graphics

assistance of Sandy Young, Laurie Dunn, Kathy Stewart,

and Robert Robinson of the Station’s Research Information

Services. Thanks to all the authors during the long process of

manuscript preparation, editing, and production. Lastly, we

acknowledge the support provided by the following sponsors:

University of California at Berkeley; Bay Area Wildfire

Forum; City of Oakland; East Bay Regional Parks; California

Departments of Forestry and Fire Protection, Parks and

Recreation, Emergency Services, and the Fire Marshall’s

Office; USDI National Park Service; USDA Forest Service,

Region 5; USDA Forest Service, Pacific Southwest Research

Station; and the Society of American Foresters.
Interface and Wildland Ecosystems

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban

Report PSW-GTR-158General TechnicalResearch StationPacific SouthwestForest ServiceAgricultureDepartment ofUnited States

Federal Recycling Program Printed on Recycled Paper
The Biswell Symposium:

Fire Issues and Solutions

in Urban Interface and

Wildland Ecosystems

February 15-17, 1994 Walnut Creek, California

United States

Department of

Agriculture

Forest Service

Pacific Southwest

Research Station

http://www.psw.fs.fed.us

General Technical

Report PSW-GTR-158
Weise, David R.; Martin, Robert E., technical coordinators. 1995. The Biswell symposium: fire issues and solutions in urban

interface and wildland ecosystems; February 15-17, 1994; Walnut Creek, California. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158.

Albany, CA: Pacific Southwest Research Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 199 p.

These proceedings summarize the results of a symposium designed to address current issues about wildfire and prescribed

fire in both the wildland-urban interface and in wildlands. Thirty-eight invited oral papers and 23 poster papers describing the

issues and state-of-the-art solutions to technical, biological, and social challenges currently facing land and fire managers were

presented at The Biswell Symposium held February 15-17, 1994, in Walnut Creek, California.

Retrieval Terms: community response, ecosystem management, fire ecology, fire management, fuel management,

prescribed burning

Technical Coordinators:

David R. Weise is Project Leader—Prescribed Fire Research at the Station’s Forest Fire Laboratory,

4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507. Robert E. Martin is Professor Emeritus, Department

of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, 145 Mulford Hall,

Berkeley, CA 94720.

Publisher:

Pacific Southwest Research Station

Albany, California

(Mailing address: P.O. Box 245, Berkeley, CA 94701-0245

Telephone: 510-559-6300

http://www.pswfs.gov/

August 1995
The Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, is responsible for Federal leadership in forestry.

It carries out this role through four main activities:

 ● Protection and management of resources on 191 million acres of National Forest System lands

 ● Cooperation with State and local governments, forest industries, and private landowners to help 

 protect and manage non-Federal forest and associated range and watershed lands

 ● Participation with other agencies in human resource and community assistance programs to

 improve living conditions in rural areas

 ● Research on all aspects of forestry, rangeland management, and forest resources utilization.

The Pacific Southwest Research Station

 ● Represents the research branch of the Forest Service in California, Hawaii, American Samoa

 and the western Pacific.

The policy of the United States Department of Agriculture, 

Forest Service prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 

color, national origin, age, religion, sex, or disability, familial 

status, or political affiliation. Persons believing they have been 

discriminated against in any Forest Service related activity 

should write to: Chief, Forest Service, USDA, P.O. Box 96090, 

Washington, DC 20090-6090.
 PSWGTR-158 The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems
1 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Memorial Dedication to Dr. Harold H. Biswell1

James K. Agee2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Professor of Forest Resources, University of Washington, Seattle,

WA 98195.

This conference has been named the Biswell Symposiumin honor of Professor Harold H. Biswell, pioneer fire

ecologist. To represent all that Harold stood for to all those

who were touched by this great man is a humbling experience.

The profession of fire management underwent a paradigm

shift in the 1960’s, and the man who, more than any other,

actually shifted the focus of the fire culture was Harold Biswell.

I first met Professor Biswell in the early 1960’s as an

undergraduate forestry student at the University of California,

Berkeley. The idea of underburning forests to prevent more

destructive wildfires was a revolutionary idea in California at

the time, although fire was routinely used in some shrublands.

Despite Dr. Biswell’s contributions to our profession, he was

widely criticized for the same ideas, presented in the same

way, for which he received so much favorable response later

in his career. Because some of his monikers, like “Harry the

Torch” or “Dr. Burnwell,” were acquired during the early

days of controversy, I never felt comfortable with them,

although “Doc” seemed acceptable to him.

Early Controversies

Two particular examples of the controversies of the

early days come to mind. The first was associated with a

public hearing and post-fire analysis after a human-caused

wildfire near Hoberg’s Resort in the early 1960’s. This was

the area where Doc had done some of his early prescribed

burning, with Mr. Hoberg’s blessings. The wildfire came up

to the edge of the resort as a crowning fire, and dropped to

the ground at the edge of Doc’s burn unit, where it was

controlled. I found the transcripts of the hearing while

browsing through the unindexed stacks in the Forestry Library,

University of California, Berkeley. At the hearing, Professor

Biswell noted that in his opinion the fire had stopped because

the fuels had been reduced in the prescribed burn area over

several short-interval burns. Yet personnel from the fire

suppression agency involved testified that the wind stopped

exactly at the edge of the prescribed burn unit, so that a

change in weather was responsible for the change in fire

behavior. They were probably right that the wind slowed,

but it slowed because the prescribed burned area had a

dampening effect on the wildfire behavior. I was able to visit

the site years later and found all the trees dead in the wildfire

area and a healthy forest in the prescribed fire area. An

objective analysis was sorely lacking, continuing a pattern

that had persisted since the 1920’s in a religious zeal to

combat all fires.

At roughly the same time, the University of California

issued a press release concerning Harold’s research, in which

he was quoted as saying the kinds of things he was to repeat

for the next three decades. The press release was a narrative

with quotes from Doc sprinkled throughout the text, portions

of which are presented here: “The pine forests in the Sierra

Nevada were open and parklike, and the most important

agent in maintaining these conditions was frequent light

fires. This forest was truly a product of nature—natural man

and natural environment. Since the white man has suppressed

fires, Biswell pointed out, the forest vegetation and landscape

have undergone profound changes. To reverse these trends,

Biswell recommends adopting a trick from nature and

returning to controlled fire as a tool in forest management.”

All those who knew Doc have heard one or more of his

variations on this theme, but in those days it elicited responses

such as this one from a statewide fire prevention organization:

“We reproduce it here verbatim (the press release) to show

what is being said by opponents of fire prevention. This is

the type of opinionated misinformation being spread by

some people with quotable positions.” Those who knew

Harold also knew he was very much an advocate of fire

prevention, but that he felt that a balance between fire

suppression, prevention, and use was critical. Smokey Bear

just could not say it all in one sentence anymore.

A continual barrage of attacks and accusations followed

Harold Biswell around the State during this period of the late

1950’s and early 1960’s. His colleague Harold Weaver, who

worked for the USDI Bureau of Indian Affairs and had been

spreading a similar message since the mid-1940’s, published

articles that were footnoted with a disclaimer from the agency.

One had to be very courageous in those days, and it is easy

for us to forget those early days. A lesser man might have

retreated, but Harold strode on, focusing on spreading the

message that has been repeated many times, and taking the

high road in terms of his professional demeanor. The logic

of that message attracted many of us, including me, to become

interested in fire science as a career.

The Teacher and His Research

Harold Biswell was a great teacher. I mentioned the

Biswell Symposium to a professional forest consultant, now

working in southern Oregon, who was once a student at the

University of California at Davis, and one evening attended
2 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

a talk by Dr. Biswell on fire and forest management. He told

me it was the best lecture he had ever heard in 4 years of

college, and it profoundly altered his career path. And he is

not alone. Doc was a great wildlife ecologist, a range ecologist,

and a forest ecologist—just a wonderful teacher. He would

interpret the landscape during driving trips throughout

California, with a fantastic ability to recall when a field had

been fertilized, or a forest underburned—and an uncanny

ability to identify plants at a distance that I could not even

see, much less identify. At Altamont Pass, southeast of

Walnut Creek, California, a common practice of farmers

was to fertilize fields using a template of letters, and the

resulting letters, paid for by advertisers, would show up in

visible “words” of different species composition and

productivity of grasses and forbs. He would predict the

species composition from a quarter mile away, and when we

walked over from the highway, he was always right. His

ability to integrate management into multiple facets of forest,

shrubland, and grassland ecosystems gave all of his students

a well-rounded education.

Harold was a true renaissance man. His first emphasis

was in range management, and his work from the 1930’s in

root dynamics of grasses from Nebraska is still widely cited.

Although the picture of Harold on the symposium packet

shows him holding a clump of giant sequoia needles, I

thought at first he was holding a perennial grass and inspecting

its roots, because he was never far from his range “roots.”

By the time he came to California, he had been introduced to

fire in the southeast United States, and began to look at fire

in the ecotones between forest and grassland. Fire was

commonly used in the early 1950’s in the foothills to expand

grazing capacity, and Harold investigated shrub and grass

response. He also worked in wildlife management, on several

deer range problems, particularly in the Tehama and Lake

County regions. This experience enabled him to shift emphasis

to the forest zone, and in particular Hoberg’s Resort in Lake

County, California, where he successfully reduced shrub

invasion and fuel buildups in the pine forests of the resort.

This was one of the first successful wildland-urban interface

fire projects, and was evidence of both his innovative outlook

and practical approach. Later, as he focused on mixed-conifer

forests, he and his colleagues and students investigated soils,

hydrology, fuels, and air quality effects of fire. Harold was

always reminding us of the interactions between all these

components of the ecosystem. When new issues arose, he

was always learning more, teaching those around him, and

always with an enthusiasm and energy that amazed us students.

In 1967, I was one of his research assistants working

with him at Whitaker’s Forest. What energy! He could outwalk

most of us, and at times outrun us. I will never forget that

during one of our “little burns,” as he would call them,

which we conducted with the help of inmate crews, we

burned across a yellowjacket nest. Harold, an inmate, and I

were kneeling around the vicinity of the nest at the time.

Harold yelled and took off sprinting like Carl Lewis, leaving

the inmate and I to greet the bees! I still remember the

inmate and I looking at each other, astounded, as Doc safely

bounded away as if shot from a cannon. The two of us

laggards, of course, provided great sport for the yellowjackets.

In addition, many of the short courses and tours he led in the

1970’s and 1980’s left the attendees gasping for breath as

Doc finished talking at one site, and then would proceed at

an incredible pace to the next stop.

One of the strengths of Harold’s approach was a secular,

rather than a revivalist, approach to prescribed fire. During

the 1950’s and 1960’s, the only place where fire was

commonly used in forests was in the South. At the Tall

Timbers Research Center in Tallahassee, Florida, a series of

conferences were held, beginning in 1962, and the “word”

about fire was disseminated to a wider audience. Harold had

several articles in the early issues of the conference

proceedings, which have become classics since they were

initially published 15 years ago. In 1967, he helped organize

the first western Tall Timbers conference, held appropriately

at Hoberg’s Resort, the site of some of Harold’s early

prescribed burning experiments. Many of the Tall Timbers

staff attended, and the concluding discussions were much

like a fundamentalist revival meeting, with audience members

rising and “testifying” to the benefits of fire in the forest. I

was shocked—I wanted to go into fire ecology, not theology!

I later realized this represented part of the ongoing institutional

change in the South, and was to some extent a reaction to the

earlier fire prevention “Dixie Crusaders.” Harold’s more

secular western approach, focusing on the practicality of

fire integration into forest management, was better received

in California (and relieved me greatly!).

Turning Point

His innovative ideas remained controversial during the

late 1960’s, but his tireless extension efforts attracted a

growing crowd of converts, including the National Parks

Advisory Board, which met at Whitaker’s Forest soon

thereafter. He began to hold occasional extension tours,

which soon grew in frequency and attendance. This period

was a turning point in the profession’s views on fire, but

turning that corner was not easy. Few of us will ever experience

the professional hurdles faced by Harold and his

contemporaries.

I also used to think of him as the Arthur Murray of

fire—he taught many agency people to dance, as they would

visibly fidget while Doc provided his frank analyses of site

conditions and fire hazards, and asked probing questions,

usually in front of a class or tour group. Those of us

accompanying Doc were able to watch these dance lessons

with amusement and often learned a few dance steps

ourselves—an essential part of our education. To be put on

the spot helped us think on our feet.

Publication was an important part of Harold’s

contributions to our profession. He understood the need for

publication in basic science outlets like Ecology, Forest

Ecology and Management, or other scientific journals, and

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Memorial Dedication to Dr. Biswell
3 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

in more extension-oriented publications, too—those that

would reach the public. His book, Prescribed Burning in

California Wildland Vegetation Management, published in

1989, was a classic integration of science and interpretation.

Harold took a complex problem and presented a complex

answer, but in a way that most people could understand. His

emphasis on publication has carried over to many of his

students and colleagues.

By examining the profession’s current status, and the

success of Professor Biswell’s students—all of those he

touched—we can conclude that Harold Biswell has left a

great legacy. Dr. Harold Biswell will always be remembered

as a naturalist, ecologist, scientist, artist, author, innovator,

friend, and teacher. The investment he made in his students

will be repaid for the remainder of our lives. The discipline

of wildland fire will never be the same. Thank you, Professor

Harold Biswell!

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Memorial Dedication to Dr. Biswell

PLENARY SESSION—ISSUES
6 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
7 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Oakland-Berkeley Hills Fire of 19911

P. Lamont Ewell2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire Chief, Oakland Fire Department, 1605 Martin Luther King Jr. Way,

Oakland, CA 94612.

night. Fire crews had returned that morning to check for any

hot spots and to pick up equipment, and were on the scene

for 2 hours before the fire suddenly escaped the area of

origin because of high winds.

Eyewitness accounts testify that a sole ember blew into

a tree just outside the burn area, and the tree exploded into

flames. The resulting fire was quickly out of control—raging

around and over firefighters who were suddenly fighting for

their lives. Over the course of the next several days, the fire

would leave 25 dead, 150 injured, and a total of 3,810

dwelling units destroyed. The fire, which burned over 1,500

acres within an area of 5.25 square miles, would result in

over $1 billion in damages (OFD 1992, FEMA 1992).

Rescue and evacuation efforts were made as firefighters

were forced to fall back to defensible space.

Immediately, calls were placed to request additional fire

units and air drops. Soon, streets were clogged with residents

trying to get out and sightseers and emergency personnel

trying to get in.

The fire quickly established four fronts: west downhill

toward California Highway 24 and the Rockridge district,

north toward the Claremont Hotel, south toward Broadway

Terrace, and east toward Contra Costa County.

The Oakland Fire Department

The Oakland Fire Department is composed of three

geographic districts, known as battalions, that are commanded

by district chiefs 24 hours a day. As the fire progressed, the

on-duty chiefs assumed new roles. Assistant Chief Donald

Matthews was the Incident Commander, Battalion Chief James

Riley was assigned as Division “A” Commander, and Battalion

Chief Ronald Campos responded to Oakland Fire Dispatch

Center to coordinate logistics, recall, and dispatch functions.

Later, Assistant Chief John K. Baker responded from

home and was assigned the role of Incident Commander

when Assistant Chief Matthews became Operations Chief.

At approximately 11:45 a.m. Fire Chief P. Lamont Ewell

arrived on the scene at the Command Post and officially

assumed command.

The Oakland Fire Department uses the Incident Command

System (ICS) to manage all emergency incidents, as was the

case with the Tunnel Fire. The system consists of an Incident

Commander who directly supervises four functional groups:

operations, planning, logistics, and finance.

The operations and planning functions were conducted

at the scene from the Department’s Mobile Command Post,

while logistics and finance functions were conducted from

the Dispatch Center.

Sunday, October 20, 1991, will be remembered as thedate of America’s most costly urban-wildland fire (FEMA

1992) and one of the worst fires involving loss of life and

property since the Great San Francisco Earthquake and Fire

of 1906 (OFD 1992).

The magnitude and range of what is simply referred to

as the “Tunnel Fire” is far beyond the experience of any

living American firefighter. Only those who fought the

Chicago Fire last century and those who battled the Great

Fire in San Francisco would be able to identify with this

conflagration and firestorm.

A firestorm is defined as a fire which creates its own

weather. This was certainly the case in Oakland, California—

the fire itself contributed to its own spread by supplying

wind to an already very windy day. A conflagration has been

described as a fire which exceeds the boundaries of the city

block of origin. The Tunnel Fire did much more than this by

burning neighborhood after neighborhood. Both firestorm

and conflagration are accurate terms when applied to the

Tunnel Fire; neither, however, comes close to adequately

describing what actually transpired.

The origin of the fire was on a steep hillside in what

some refer to as a box canyon, above California State Highway

24, near the entrance to the Caldecott Tunnel. This is a

wooded area with heavy underbrush, narrow streets, and

steep terrain, densely populated with expensive houses. The

unusual weather conditions of that day resulted in:

a foehn wind that, at speeds in excess of 65

miles per hour, raced down from the crest of the

Oakland-Berkeley Hills. Coupled with record

high temperatures well into the nineties, the hot

dry winds gusted and swirled through five years

of drought-dry brush and groves of freezedamaged Monterey Pines and Eucalyptus groves.

All the conditions for a major fire disaster were

present that morning of October 20, 1991.

(FEMA 1992)

Firefighters were on the scene overhauling hot spots

from a fire the previous day. It is important to note that

Saturday’s fire had been completely doused, hose lines had

been left in place surrounding the burn area, and the fire area

had been checked by an Oakland Fire company during the

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
8 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Dispatch Center was the basic structure of initial

management of the Tunnel Fire. This structure remained

intact until late in the evening on October 20 when the

California Department of Forestry and Fire Prevention (CDF)

provided an overhead management team to assist with the

enormous task of managing such a large fire.

At this point a Joint Command was established that

consisted of Oakland, Berkeley, and Piedmont Fire

Departments and the CDF. Oakland firefighters were assisting

with evacuation efforts as they were forced to retreat from

the advancing inferno. Division “A” Battalion Chief James

Riley and Oakland Police Officer John Grubensky were

killed while trying to help citizens escape the fire. Both

Battalion Chief Riley and Officer Grubensky were found

with the remains of those people they were trying to help.

These courageous men were very aware of their risky positions

and had ample opportunities to save themselves, but refused

to leave before the evacuation of residents was complete.

The rapid spread of the fire in four different directions

presented both line firefighters and chief officers with

numerous strategic challenges.

Evacuation

Even though evacuation of residents is a responsibility

assigned to the Oakland Police Department, fire units were

heavily involved with this effort while trying to stop the

advancing flames. It has been estimated that more than

10,000 people were evacuated from the burn area, some by

way of very narrow streets, through blinding smoke and

blowing debris.

The Wind

The wind played a most crucial part in the scenario

which manifested once the fire was established. The wind

blew into the Oakland Hills from the east and over and down

ridge tops. It forced flames to swirl in many different directions

causing the fire to burn downhill as quickly as, and in some

cases more quickly than, uphill.

The strength and speed of the wind prevented firefighters

on the scene from falling back to defensible space because

there was no place to hide. Fire crews were trapped and

forced to protect themselves under umbrellas of water as the

flames roared over and around them. One veteran firefighter

observed the fire progress 100 yards in 15 seconds.

This Santa Ana-type wind pushed the fire along wide

fronts, bypassed firefighters who were making a stand, and

then left them in isolated pockets of unburned areas. The

wind whipped the fire into the Hiller Highlands Development

and consumed all combustibles (homes, vegetation, and

vehicles) in 16 minutes. The wind caused the fire to pre-heat

everything in its path which resulted in structures and contents

exploding into flame almost instantly (OFD 1992).

Pilots flying California Department of Forestry

helicopters complained that their bucket drops were not

effective because the water vaporized as the strong winds

dispersed it over the intensely hot fire.

Communications

The Oakland Fire Department used two operational radio

frequencies to communicate between the Dispatch Center

and the 30 fire companies in the City. Communication with

other jurisdictions is usually accomplished on the state-wide

mutual aid frequency which is referred to as the “White

Fire” channel.

The effectiveness of these frequencies was soon reduced

because of the overwhelming load placed upon them by fire

units requesting assistance, commanders trying to place

resources, and the Dispatch Center’s attempts to send fire

companies into the burn area.

These problems were compounded by additional fire

units from surrounding cities as they began to arrive to assist

with the fire. The steep hilly terrain in the Oakland Hills also

interfered with radio signals, in some cases creating “dead

spots” which drastically reduced radio effectiveness.

Mutual Aid

Requests for mutual aid in the form of air support and fire

suppression units were made during the initial stages of the

fire, and additional requests continued throughout the day.

Mutual aid requests are processed through the California

Office of Emergency Services (OES). Requests were

channeled through Alameda County OES which is divided

into north and south zones, and then from the county level to

the state.

By late afternoon, 370 fire engines from as far away as

the Oregon-California state line in the north, from Bakersfield

in the south, and from Nevada to the east, were in, or on their

way to, Oakland.

Aircraft in the form of helicopters and large air tankers

from hundreds of miles away made hundreds of water drops

on the fire.

This was the largest mutual aid effort ever undertaken,

at that time, in the State of California (OFD 1992).

Water Supply

Fire units lost water at the height of the fire, forcing

them to retreat because the supply tanks and reservoirs which

provide water to the hill area were emptied. Reasons for the

loss of water were :

• Extraordinary fire suppression efforts used a

tremendous amount of water (an estimated 20

million gallons).

• Residents were hosing down their roofs and

vegetation, and many sprinklers were left running

after evacuation.

• As homes were consumed by the fire, the water

service supplying those homes began to flow freely.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
9 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

technology, such as Forward Looking Infrared Radar to find

subterranean hot spots, and testing new products such as

Class “A” foam.

Weather Monitoring

Two “Remote Automated Weather Stations” (RAWS)

have been installed in strategic locations in the Oakland Hills.

These weather stations continuously provide the Fire

Department with updates in weather conditions. The Fire

Department increases its level of response accordingly, as the

wind speed and the temperature rise and the humidity drops.

Initial response to the report of fire varies with the

severity of weather conditions. For example, low hazard

dispatch requires three fire engines and two patrols. Response

on high hazard days requires six fire engines, four patrols,

and a helicopter, as well as the predeployment of engine

companies to locations in and around high fire hazard areas.

Communications Improvements

The Oakland Fire Department has recently converted to

an 800 megahertz radio system which provides a virtually

unlimited number of radio talk groups. It is expected that

this will mitigate much of the overload of tactical channels

that was experienced during the initial stages of the fire.

In addition, proposals have been made to fire departments

surrounding the City of Oakland to permit those jurisdictions

to participate in the 800 megahertz radio system.

Water Supply

Adapters have been purchased and installed on all fire

hydrants within the City of Oakland. These adapters will

change the coupling size on the hydrants to 2.5 inches. This

will standardize Oakland’s hydrants, thus allowing mutual

aid fire departments to hook up to Oakland’s water supply.

Vegetation Management

Approximately 16,000 Oakland Hills area parcels have

been inspected by Oakland Fire Department units. Fire

inspectors are requiring brush to be cleared 30 to 100 feet

away from structures, and at least 10 feet away from property

lines and the street. All chimneys are required to have an

approved spark arrestor with no trees or bushes within 10

feet. Compliance has been for the most part good, and violators

have been cited and forced to abate their hazardous conditions.

Mutual Aid

Oakland has negotiated agreements with the cities of

Berkeley, San Leandro, Alameda, Piedmont, and with the

East Bay Regional Parks District to establish Mutual Response

Area (MRA) Agreements. These agreements provide for an

automatic response when a fire is reported within the MRA.

Hiller Highlands alone accounted for over 400

water services.

• Water supplying the tanks and reservoirs is pumped

from lower parts of Oakland to the higher

elevations. The electrically powered supply pumps

could not replenish depleted tanks once the fire

destroyed power lines to the pumps.

• Some areas, such as the Rockridge district (which

was developed in the 1920’s), were supplied by

4-inch mains that are considered to be insufficient

by today’s standards. They could not supply

enough water to fight a fire of this magnitude.

Many mutual aid fire engine companies could not hook

up to Oakland fire hydrants because their 2.5-inch hose

couplings were not compatible with Oakland’s 3-inch couplings.

Aftermath

The Tunnel Fire will long be remembered for the

magnitude of its destruction. The fire was viewed on prime

time television around the world; it has been documented by

professionals and laymen alike. The origin of the fire has

been and continues to be the focus of investigation.

The Fire Investigation Unit of the Oakland Fire

Department Fire Prevention Bureau has ultimate responsibility

for finding the cause of the fire. Inspectors from the Fire

Investigation Unit have worked with the Governor’s Task

Force which is represented by the California State Fire

Marshal’s Office and the Alameda County Fire Investigation

Team. The Alameda County Fire Investigation Team is

composed of representatives from the District Attorney’s

Office and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire Arms,

along with investigators from the surrounding fire districts.

Fifteen hundred man-hours were spent in the first week

following the fire, most of that time conducting interviews

with survivors and performing overhaul operations by sifting

through debris, searching for evidence.

The origin of the Tunnel Fire is located next to 7151

Buckingham Road. The cause of the fire, however, is still

under investigation.

The Oakland Fire Department, as well as every other fire

department in the state, has learned much about wildland/

urban intermix fires. Much has been accomplished in the past

3 years since the fire. The Oakland Fire Department is

committed to doing everything possible to prevent a repeat of

the 1991 Firestorm. The following is a partial account of

actions taken by the Oakland Fire Department since the

conflagration.

Firefighting Training and Tactics

OFD personnel have received intensive wildland training

from the California Department of Forestry and Fire

Prevention as well as other agencies with wildland expertise.

New tactics include cold trailing (scraping the perimeter of

the burn area to reveal unburned soil), utilizing new

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
10 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

will have a one-hour rating. Additionally, the citizens of

Oakland have passed a $51 million bond to prepare the City

or future disasters.

References

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 1992. Hazard mitigation

report for the East Bay Fire in the Oakland-Berkeley Hills in response

to the October 22, 1991 Federal disaster declaration covering Alameda

County, California. FEMA-919-DR-CA.

Oakland Fire Department. 1992. The Oakland Tunnel Fire, October 20,

1991. A comprehensive report. Available from the Oakland Fire

Department, 1605 Martin Luther King Jr. Way, Oakland, CA 94612.

Borderline residents who report a fire will have a response

from both sides of the City limits, and in many cases they

will receive a faster response.

The Oakland Fire Department is committed to providing

the highest quality of fire protection to the residents of Oakland.

Codes and Ordinances

The City has adopted an ordinance which requires Class

“A” roofs on new structures and replacement roofs within

the high fire hazard area. Further, all siding on new structures

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
11 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

suppression on fuel accumulations. A program to improve

forage for livestock by burning ranch lands was active in the

1940’s and 1950’s, but gradually declined as concern about

the liability for escapes increased. Understory burning,

particularly in ponderosa pine, did not become common until

the late 1950’s and continues today.

Burning by Native Americans

Native Americans have resided in the Sierra Nevada for

at least 3,000 years (Reily 1987). Evidence of their use of

fire has been found in some of the oldest deposits of cultural

material. Fire was used to clear undergrowth, ease food

gathering and hunting, and favor vegetation used for specific

purposes (Reynolds 1959, Wickstrom 1987). Ethnographic

studies have shown that the primary use of fire by Native

Americans in the Sierra Nevada was to manage plants for

basketry materials (Anderson 1993). In addition to fires set

by humans, lightning ignitions ensured that fire was pervasive

on the landscape when European Americans arrived in

California.

Light Burning

European settlers used fire indiscriminately to clear areas

for farming, ranching, and mining. The impacts of such

burning was not a concern because vegetation was thought of

as a nuisance rather than a resource. By the beginning of the

century, timber became more important and attempts were

made to suppress fires (Clar 1959). Some landowners felt

that excluding all fires from the land was not beneficial in the

long run and that light burning could be used to reduce fuel

hazards (Hoxie 1910). Forestry professionals claimed that

any fire in the forest was bad and that public and private

lands should be managed under a policy of systematic fire

protection (DuBois 1914). White (1920) countered with a

critique of the fire protectionist policy. The controversy did

not subside until USDA Forest Service researchers concluded

that light burning was ineffective, impractical, and

economically indefensible (Show and Kotok 1924). Fire

protection became institutionalized in California in 1924

when the State Board of Forestry adopted the policy of fire

exclusion (Pyne 1982).

Ranch and Game Range Burning

In the early 1940’s, ranchers and hunters became

concerned that rangelands used by livestock and wildlife had

declined in value because of increasing brush density (Biswell

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban and Wildland Ecosystems,

February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Research Scientist, Yosemite Field Station, National Biological Service,

U.S. Department of the Interior, P.O. Box 700, El Portal, CA 95318.

Abstract: Prescribed burning in California has evolved from the

original practices of the Native Americans, through years of experimentation and controversy, to finally become an accepted

ecosystem management activity. When Dr. Harold Biswell arrived

in California, he began research on improving game range by

using prescribed fires and on understory burning in ponderosa

pine (Pinus ponderosa Dougl. ex Laws.) stands. Through a series

of field days that included demonstration burns, Dr. Biswell was

able to educate and inform both the public and professional foresters about the benefits of prescribed fires. These field days became

the basis for several university extension courses and were influential in changing the prescribed fire policies of numerous agencies. As the problem of urban encroachment into wildlands continues, the need for safe and effective prescribed burns will increase.

Dr. Biswell’s sound research, presentation of the facts, and patience with people and fire should guide us in the application of

fire in wildland ecosystems.

Although many people have contributed to thedevelopment of prescribed burning in California, Dr.

Harold H. Biswell was a major influence on the acceptance

and application of fire in wildland ecosystems. Acceptance

did not come easily. A history of abuse of fire and the

perception that California’s climate and topography precluded

the use of fire galvanized objections to prescribed burning.

By using his thorough research, enthusiastic teaching, and

field demonstrations, Dr. Biswell was able to gain the respect

of public and professional audiences alike. As a result of his

untiring efforts, agencies began to change their policies to

include the use of fires. His ideas became even more relevant

as urban development thrust its way into wildland ecosystems.

History of Prescribed Burning

in California

Native Americans were the first practitioners of

prescribed burning for managing vegetation. When European

Americans settled the coastal and foothill areas of California,

indiscriminate burning occurred. In response to the destruction

perceived to be a result of burning, some attempted to

exclude all fires from the landscape. A few land owners

began to use light burning to counter the effects of fire

Dr. Biswell’s Influence on the Development of Prescribed

Burning in California1

Jan W. van Wagtendonk2

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
12 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

1989). In addition to reduced grazing capacities, the

accumulation of brush posed a hazard, especially for arson

fires. The California Division of Forestry (which later became

the Department of Forestry and Fire Protection) recognized

these problems and in 1945 began to issue burning permits

to landowners. For the first time in two decades, the use of

fire was officially sanctioned by a government agency.

When Dr. Biswell arrived in California in 1947, he

began working with ranchers on their burning operations,

and he conducted research on improving game range by

using prescribed fires in chaparral. His first efforts were at

Teaford Forest in the Sierra Nevada foothills in Madera

County. There he worked with ranchers and farm advisors to

develop techniques for using fire to kill some of the woody

vegetation and then replace it with grasses to increase the

grazing capacity for livestock (Biswell 1963, 1967). Range

improvement burning reached its peak in 1955 when over

200,000 acres were burned (Biswell 1989). As more homes

were built on adjacent wildlands, range improvement burning

declined primarily because landowners were held liable for

any damage from escaped fires.

Ranchers and public agencies tried to improve wildlife

habitat using type conversion burns. Extensive areas on the

Mendocino National Forest and on lands administered by

the Bureau of Land Management were burned (Burma 1967,

Doman 1967). Dr. Biswell’s research was conducted in

chamise (Adenostoma fasciculatum H.& A.) chaparral in

Lake County in conjunction with the California Department

of Fish and Game (Biswell 1954, 1961). Prescribed burns

were used to create openings in the brush for deer, to encourage

sprouting, and to favor herbaceous species. This resulted in

a three- to four-fold increase in deer populations in the

burned areas. Like range improvement, burning for wildlife

habitat declined because of the economic costs and the liability

for escapes.

Understory Burning in

Ponderosa Pine

Although light burning in the forest had been practiced

for many years before 1924, State and Federal policies required

strict suppression and precluded using fire for forest

management purposes. Prescribed fires were acceptable for

grass and brush lands but not in the pine forests (Biswell

1989). Based on his experience in the southeast, Dr. Biswell

felt that prescribed burns could reduce fuel hazards in pine

stands so that wildfires would be less destructive and easier

to control.

In 1951, Dr. Biswell started research on understory

burning in ponderosa pine stands at Teaford Forest and at

Hoberg’s Resort in Lake County. The purpose of this burning

was to improve timber production by controlling brush in

the understory, reducing fire hazards, and thinning. Burn

plots at Hoberg’s showed that the number of manzanita

(Arctostaphylos viscida Parry) seedlings in second–growth

ponderosa pine stands can be substantially reduced and that

pine seedlings may appear in abundance (Biswell and Schultz

1958). Additional studies showed that prescribed fire could

be used to reduce fuel hazards (Biswell 1959, 1960; Biswell

and Schultz 1956; Sweeney and Biswell 1961).

One of the most dramatic results of Dr. Biswell’s research

at Hoberg’s occurred when a wildfire burned into an area

previously prescribe burned and was easily controlled (Biswell

1963). In the treated area scarcely any needles on the trees

were scorched, while outside of it a majority of the trees

were killed. Thinning stands of ponderosa pine diminished

debris accumulation for at least 20 years, and when

accompanied with fertilization, increased growth by 134

percent (Agee and Biswell 1970a, b).

Burning in Giant Sequoia and Mixed

Conifer Forests

In 1965, Dr. Biswell started his research on fuel reduction

and stand modification in giant sequoia (Sequoiadendron

giganteum [Lindl.] Buchholz) and mixed conifer stands at

Whitaker’s Forest near Sequoia and Kings Canyon National

Parks. There, he and his students started a series of studies

that would contribute greatly to the refinement of the science

of prescribed burning. Litter production studies set the stage

for recognizing that different species had varying fuel

characteristics that would affect fire behavior (Agee and

others 1978, Biswell and others 1966). Costs for cutting,

piling, and broadcast burning giant sequoia stands to reduce

fire hazards ranged from $115 to $146 per acre (Biswell and

others 1968). Giant sequoia seedling survival was studied on

burned and unburned areas that had been manipulated by

Agee and Biswell (1969). They found 100 percent mortality

of giant sequoia seedlings on the unburned plot, while 96 out

of 1,253 survived on the burned plot.

Adjacent to Whitaker’s Forest, in the Redwood Mountain

Grove of Kings Canyon National Park, Hartesvelt and Harvey

(1967) started another study on giant sequoia regeneration

after fire. Harvey and others (1980) synthesized what was

known about giant sequoia ecology in a single volume.

Graduate students took the opportunity to learn from

Dr. Biswell’s experience and wisdom. Bruce Kilgore (1968),

a student of Dr. Starker Leopold, studied the breeding bird

populations in managed and unmanaged stands of giant

sequoia at Whitaker’s Forest. Jim Agee (1968, 1973) did his

masters degree work on fuel conditions at Whitaker’s and

his doctorate on the effects of prescribed fires on forest floor

properties. My work (van Wagtendonk 1972, 1974) on fire

and fuel relationships was conducted in Yosemite National

Park because of insufficient ponderosa pine stands at

Whitaker’s and because the Forest Service was not amenable

to burning on its land.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
13 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

managed as complete ecosystems that include fire (Leopold

and others 1963). The close association with Dr. Biswell

and attendance at his field days undoubtedly influenced Dr.

Leopold. The report was incorporated into National Park

Service policy in 1968.

Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks started a fire

management program in 1968 that included environmental

restoration burns, prescribed natural fires, and research

(Kilgore 1971, Kilgore and Briggs 1972, Parsons 1976).

Yosemite’s prescribed burning program followed in 1970

and its prescribed natural fire program in 1972 (van

Wagtendonk 1978). Dr. Biswell and his former students

played pivotal roles in these programs in both parks.

Similar to the conditions at Hoberg’s Resort, wildfires

have burned into park areas that have been previously burned

by prescribed fires. When the Pierce fire crowned uphill into

the Redwood Mountain Grove in Kings Canyon, it dropped

to the ground in an area that had been burned five years

before (Stephenson and others 1991). The eventual control

of the A-Rock fire in Yosemite in 1990 was attributed, in

part, to the prescribed burns in the area that had greatly

reduced fuels in the understory (Clark 1990).

California Department of Parks and Recreation

Many California State Park rangers and managers have

attended Dr. Biswell’s classes and field days. Their experience

formed the basis for programs to restore fire to the State

Parks. In 1975, fire was carefully applied in Calaveras Big

Trees State Park to allow the ecosystems to operate as naturally

as possible (Biswell 1989). By 1982, prescribed burning

programs were started in several other parks including Mt.

Diablo, Cuyamaca Rancho, Big Basin Redwoods, and

Montana de Oro.

Rangers are required to take intensive courses in fire

ecology and have supervised field experience before they

are certified to burn. Dr. Biswell and some of his former

students have taught in these classes.

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection

(CDF)

The CDF was involved in the range burning program in

the 1950’s, but soon emphasized the protection function of

fire management. Over the intervening years, many personnel

from the agency have attended field days and special “show

me” trips conducted by Dr. Biswell. At one of these field

days, he recalled a CDF ranger stating, “In the fifties we

were all making fun of Harold and fighting him. Now, 30

years later, we are all working for him” (Biswell 1989).

The single biggest impediment to burning on private

lands was removed when Senate Bill 1704 was enacted in

1981. This bill authorized a vegetation management program

for brush-covered lands and the CDF to contract with private

landowners to burn on their properties. The liability issue

was dealt with by requiring insurance and escrow accounts

as well as state assumption of responsibility for the operation.

Field Days and Extension Courses

Beginning with the work at Hoberg’s, Dr. Biswell

conducted field days to discuss prescribed burning and to

demonstrate its use with a small fire. These early

demonstrations were controversial because many people were

still uncomfortable with the idea of burning (Biswell 1989).

The field days were very educational, however, and numerous

resource professionals and members of the public were

enlightened about the use of fire.

My first exposure to prescribed fire was at a field day

sponsored by Dr. Biswell at Whitaker’s Forest. In attendance

were Dr. Leopold, other prominent scientists, several

representatives from the USDI National Park Service and

the USDA Forest Service, and other interested people. Lively

discussions occurred that planted the seed for policy changes

that were yet to come. On the last field day at Whitaker’s

Forest in 1973, 175 people attended. If the field days had

continued, Dr. Biswell felt that the attendance might have

soared to over 250 people (Biswell 1989).

After Dr. Biswell retired in 1973, he taught a class on fire

ecology at the University of California at Davis for 2 years.

For the next 8 years he taught four university extension classes.

Fire ecology of forests was the subject at Yosemite National

Park, while the course at Mt. Diablo State Park covered chaparral

fire ecology. Classes were held on giant sequoia fire ecology

at Calaveras State Park and fire ecology basics in San Diego

County. These courses attracted many students, agency workers,

and the general public. The mix of participants ensured that

there was a good exchange of information and a healthy

reexamination of attitudes about fire. Although retired, Dr.

Biswell was requested by students to be on their dissertation

committees as an emeritus professor. Under his guidance, Ron

Wakimoto (1978) completed his doctorate on the effects of

fires in chaparral in San Diego County.

Prescribed Burning Policies

Dr. Biswell’s influence on agency policies and attitudes

about prescribed fire have been both subtle and profound.

The National Park Service and the California Department of

Parks and Recreation have sought his advice and counsel

and have altered their policies as a result. Less direct, but

just as important, has been his influence on the Forest Service

and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

National Park Service

Although experimental burning had started in Everglades

National Park in 1951 (Robinson 1962), National Park Service

policy did not include the use of fire at that time. Impetus

for a change came from university researchers in California.

In 1962, the Secretary of the Interior asked Dr. Leopold to

head a committee to examine wildlife management concerns

in the National Parks. The committee did not confine its

report to wildlife, but rather recommended that parks be

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
14 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Forest Service

From its inception in 1905, the Forest Service had a

strict policy of fire exclusion. In 1943, an exception to the

policy was allowed on National Forest lands in the longleaf

pine (Pinus palustris Mill.) and slash pine (Pinus elliottii

Engelm) types, where private owners had burned for decades

and Forest Service research had shown beneficial effects

(Schiff 1962). Dr. Biswell conducted some of the early research

while employed by the Forest Service at the Southeastern

Forest Experiment Station. In 1941, he started his work on

the integration of prescribed burning, timber production, and

livestock grazing (Biswell 1958).

The Forest Service began to examine its fire exclusion

policy in the early 1970’s. A retreat for regional fire control

officers in 1974 brought together experts from outside the

Service to share their expertise. Interestingly, Dr. Biswell

was not invited to attend, but several of his former students

gave presentations. It was not until 1978 that the national

policy changed to encompass total fire management including

prevention, suppression, and use. Some of the people who

were instrumental in these changes had first been exposed to

the idea of prescribed burning through Dr. Biswell’s writings

or by attendance at one of his field days.

The Future

In the years to come, Dr. Biswell’s influence will continue

to be felt throughout the fire community. In particular, as the

problem of urban encroachment into wildlands continues,

the need for safe and effective prescribed burns will increase.

His intuitive knowledge of wildland fuels led him to recognize

the real threat of the recent fires in Oakland and Berkeley.

Research into the weather conditions leading up to the

conflagration that destroyed 625 homes in Berkeley in 1923

convinced him that, if fuels were not treated, such an event

could recur (Biswell 1989). And in 1970 it did, when 37

homes were destroyed in the Berkeley and Oakland hills.

Research on fuel hazards guided by him showed that the

potential for even more destructive fires was present (Agee

and others 1973). The 1991 Tunnel fire in Oakland and

Berkeley underscored his alarm.

When Dr. Biswell first started his research on fire in

California, Dean Walter Mulford of the University of

California at Berkeley’s School of Forestry advised him to

“develop sound research, let the chips fall where they may,

and not argue with people but rather listen to them and

present the facts” (Biswell 1989). We would do well to

follow that same advice. His research and, in particular, his

patience with people and fire should guide us in the future

application of fire in wildland ecosystems.

References

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plant communities. Berkeley: University of California; 55 p. M.S. thesis.

Agee, J. K. 1973. Prescribed fire effects on physical and hydrologic properties

of mixed conifer forest floor and soil. Berkeley: University of California;

57 p. Ph.D. dissertation.

Agee, J. K.; Biswell, H. H. 1969. Seedling survival in a giant sequoia forest.

California Agriculture 23(4): 18-19.

Agee, J. K.; Biswell, H. H. 1970a. Debris accumulation in a ponderosa pine

forest. California Agriculture 24(6): 6-7.

Agee, J. K.; Biswell, H. H. 1970b. Some effects of thinning and fertilization

on ponderosa pine understory vegetation. Journal of Forestry 68(11):

709-711.

Agee, J. K.; Wakimoto, R. H.; Darley, E. F.; Biswell, H. H. 1973. Eucalyptus

fuel dynamics and fire hazard in the Oakland hills. California

Agriculture 24(9): 13-15.

Agee, J. K.; Wakimoto, R. H.; Biswell H. H. 1978. Fire and fuel dynamics of

Sierra Nevada conifers. Forest Ecology and Management 1: 255-265.

Anderson, M. K. 1993. Indian fire-based management in the sequoiamixed conifer forests of the central and southern Sierra Nevada.

Berkeley, CA: University of California; 441 p. Ph.D. dissertation.

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of Range Management 7(2): 57-62.

Biswell, H. H. 1958. Prescribed burning in Georgia and California

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13(6): 5.

Biswell, H. H. 1960. Danger of wildfires reduced in ponderosa pine.

California Agriculture 4(10): 5-6.

Biswell, H. H. 1961. Manipulation of chamise brush for deer range

improvement. California Fish and Game 47(2): 125-144.

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2; Tallahassee, FL. Tallahassee: Tall Timbers Research Station; 63-97.

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Timbers fire ecology conference; 1967 November 9-10; Hoberg, CA.

Tallahassee, FL: Tall Timbers Research Station; 43-63.

Biswell, H. H. 1989. Prescribed burning in California wildlands vegetation

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bigtrees and associated species. California Agriculture 20(9): 5-7.

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Magazine 42(262): 16-19.

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California Agriculture 12(2): 12.

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Clark, W. 1990. Report on the fire behavior of the A-Rock fire;

Unpublished report on file in the Fire Management Office, Yosemite

National Park, CA. 4 p.

Doman, E. R. 1967. Prescribed burning and brush type conversion in

California national forests. In: Proceedings 7th Tall Timbers fire

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FL: Tall Timbers Research Station; 225-233.

DuBois, C. 1914. Systematic fire protection in the California forests.

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Research Station; 65-77.

Harvey, H. T.; Shellhammer, H. S.; Stecker, R. E. 1980. Giant sequoia

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Hoxie, G. L. 1910. How fire helps forestry. Sunset 25(7): 145-151.

Kilgore, B. M. 1968. Breeding bird populations in managed and

unmanaged stands of Sequoia gigantea. Berkeley: University of

California; 196 p. Ph.D. dissertation.

Kilgore, B. M. 1971. The role of fire in managing red fir forests. In:

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conference; 1971 May 7-10; Washington, DC. Washington, DC:

Wildlife Management Institute; 405-416.

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forests in California. Journal of Forestry 70(5): 266-271.

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L. 1963. Wildlife management in the national parks. In: Transactions

28th North American wildlife and natural resources conference; 1963

[date unknown]; Washington, DC. Washington, DC: Wildlife

Management Institute; 1-18.

Parsons, D. J. 1976. The role of fire in natural communities: an

example from the southern Sierra Nevada, California. Environmental Conservation 3(2): 91-99.

Pyne, S. J. 1982. Fire in America: a cultural history of wildland and

rural fire. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; 654 p.

Reily, L. M. 1987. Archeological investigations in the Merced River

canyon: report of the 1983 El Portal Archeological Project.

Publications in Anthropology 3. El Portal, CA: U.S.Department of

the Interior, National Park Service, Yosemite National Park; 287 p.

Reynolds, R. D. 1959. Effects upon the forest of natural fires and

aboriginal burning in the Sierra Nevada. Berkeley, CA: University

of California; 262 p. M. S. thesis.

Robinson, W. B. 1962. Fire and vegetation in the Everglades. In:

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2; Tallahassee, FL. Tallahassee, FL: Tall Timbers Research Station;

67-80.

Schiff, A. L. 1962. Fire and water: scientific heresy in the Forest

Service. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 225 p.

Show, S. B.; Kotok, E. I. 1924. The role of fire in the California pine

forests. Agriculture Bulletin 1294. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Agriculture; 80 p.

Stephenson, N. L.; Parsons, D. J.; Swetnam, T. W. 1991. Restoring

natural fire to the sequoia-mixed conifer forest: should intense

fire play a role? In: Proceedings 17th Tall Timbers fire ecology

conference; 1989 May 18-21; Tallahassee, FL. Tallahassee, FL: Tall

Timbers Research Station; 321-337.

Sweeney, J. R.; Biswell, H. H. 1961. Quantitative studies on the removal

of litter and duff by fire under controlled conditions. Ecology

42(3): 572-575.

van Wagtendonk, J. W. 1972. Fire and fuel relationships in Yosemite

National Park. Berkeley, CA: University of California; 163 p.

Ph.D. dissertation.

van Wagtendonk, J. W. 1974. Refined burning prescriptions for Yosemite

National Park. Occasional Paper 2. Washington, DC: U.S. Department

of the Interior, National Park Service; 21 p.

van Wagtendonk, J. W. 1978. Wilderness fire management in Yosemite

National Park. In: Schofield, E. A., ed. EARTHCARE: Global

protection of natural areas: Proceedings of the 14th biennial wilderness

conference; 1975 June 5-8; New York. Boulder, CO: Westview Press;

324-335.

Wakimoto, R. H. 1978. Responses of southern California brushland

vegetation to fuel modification. Berkeley, CA: University of California;

278 p. Ph.D. dissertation.

White, S. E. 1920. Woodsmen, spare those trees. Sunset 44(3): 115.

Wickstrom, C. K. R. 1987. Issues concerning Native American use of

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CA: U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, Yosemite

National Park; 68 p.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
16 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
17 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

“What Do We Do Now, Ollie?”1

Robert L. Irwin2

Abstract: A personal overview of why California is suffering

billion-dollar-per-year costs and losses from wildland fire is presented. Two primary and ten supplemental factors contribute to the

huge losses. The primary factors are lack of planning effectiveness

and lack of adequate fuels management on a sustained basis.

Supplemental factors target organizational and political weaknesses that contribute to the destructive consequences of the primary factors. Correction or elimination of the dozen factors can

significantly reduce costs and losses in the future. Actions to make

the needed corrections are suggested.

“What do we do now, Ollie?” is an expression thatmeans “something has gone wrong”—i.e., plans

have gone awry, a procedure has failed, expected outcomes

are not happening. A classic example is about two piano

movers who are trying to get a heavy piano up to a second–

story apartment on a flight of exterior stairs. They push, pull,

strain, sweat, and get the piano to the top with great difficulty.

As they rest and congratulate each other on a job well done,

the piano begins to slip away. It bumps down the stairs and

rolls into the street where it is struck by a passing truck and

totally destroyed. That is when one mover says to the other,

“What do we do now, Ollie?”

California fire agencies, planners, and others need to

ask that question of themselves in relation to the State’s

wildland-structural fire problems.

Hard Work

California fire agencies have struggled for more than 40

years to develop the best wildland fire suppression capabilities

in the world. When needed, they can activate more aircraft

than many nations have in their military arsenals. The combined

agencies can mobilize 20,000 firefighters with equipment

and support in 72 hours or less. The agencies have a superior

organizational structure in the Incident Command System,

sophisticated communications, and effective multiagency

coordination. And, they have consistently used these

capabilities to achieve a 97 percent success ratio: only about

3 percent of all fires do excessive damage.

California land-use planning law and planning procedures

have also matured over time. Slowly, but surely, the State’s

planning process has gotten more thorough and sophisticated.

In 1971, the State upgraded standards for local governments’

General Plans to improve future growth and development

decisions. Also in the early 1970’s, passage of the Subdivision

Map Act and the California Environmental Quality Act

(CEQA) offered increased opportunities for local control

over project design. In 1980, General Plan Safety Elements

were required to include wildland fire concerns. Since about

1987, a number of counties and some cities have refined

their wildland fire safety requirements to some degree.

Hard Questions

Why then has the State continued to suffer billion dollar

costs and losses annually from wildfire since 1985? Why,

before the Northridge earthquake event of January 17, 1994,

had the total costs and losses from wildland fire exceeded

those of all the earthquakes in the State since 1934? Why has

the problem gotten worse instead of better since 1950? Why

has each fire season since 1987 been declared “the worst” in

California’s history?

Most people’s answers to these questions would focus

on factors such as “weather,” “population growth,”

“development,” or “politics”—which are all valid reasons,

but they are also the easy answers. They only summarize

categories of real causes, they do not define them.

Hard Answers

The hard answers involve fundamental cause-and-effect

relationships and can be divided into two major categories:

(1) lack of effective wildland land-use planning, and (2) lack

of adequate fuels management on a sustained basis. Land

and fire managers, planning experts, and others may argue

that they deserve credit rather than criticism in these endeavors,

especially because of all their positive efforts. The magnitude

and pervasive nature of wildland fire losses, however, clearly

indicate that efforts to date have been inadequate. The land

and the people still suffer beyond acceptable limits. Why?

Lack of Effective Planning

California planning law has not been thoroughly

understood and has never been assertively pursued by fire

agencies. No wonder they are frequently frustrated by local

government approvals of unsafe developments. Local planners

have not assimilated nor institutionalized the fundamentals

of fire behavior and suppression requirements. No wonder

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Retired Fire Management Specialist and former Planning Commissioner, 13771 Mark Trail, Sonora, CA 95370.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
18 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Because comprehensive, area-wide, strategic fire input

that addresses overall fire potential has not been developed,

planning has always been done on a case-by-case basis. A

project is approved here, another there. Fire concerns and

mitigation requirements have been limited to the project

areas. External factors (e.g., fuels, slope, aspect, fire behavior)

have not been considered. Because of 50 years of such

practice, California’s wildlands have become a mix of

flammable vegetation and structures. This case-by-case

process has often been called “ad hoc planning,” meaning

that no coherent overall plan exists, resulting in the failure to

consider a project’s relationship to its whole environment.

Wildland planning has also been negatively influenced

by the urban bias that is ingrained in planners and the planning

process. Although the wildland-structural fire problem began

to surface more than 40 years ago, only recently has

professional curriculum included the wildland issues that

concern California. As late as 1990, no college or university

in the nation offered a degree in wildland planning. Thus,

the planning process has been overseen for decades by people

whose basic training and process orientation was urbanoriented. Compounding this situation is the fact that legislators

who pass laws, judges who interpret those laws, and elected

officials who administer them have also traditionally been

influenced by urban rather than wildland concerns.

The urban bias has resulted in thousands of subdivisions

and major developments with roads on the inside and structures

on the outside of the project (if planning had been more

cognizant of wildland fire, roads would have been placed

around developments to serve as fuel-breaks). The bias has

brought perhaps 50,000 cul-de-sacs in wildland subdivisions,

with only a handful suitable for helicopter operations. Power

and telephone lines have been routinely planned over or

alongside cul-de-sacs, preventing their possible use as

emergency landing sites. Water supply facilities have not

been included in their construction. One half-million miles

of roads may not be capable of carrying emergency response

and evacuation traffic at the same time. And, to add to that

problem, fire hydrants (where feasible) have been placed at

curbside just as they have been since Boston and New York

began installing them in the 1830’s. This requires engines

and water tenders to block the very roads suppression forces

and evacuees need to keep clear.

Retrofitting all of these consequences of urban bias may

not be possible. However, California will continue to

experience significant growth in the wildlands, and it is

imperative that future wildland fire safety needs are

emphasized so that they outrank urban traditions in planning.

Lack of Effective Fuels Management

The current wildland-structural fire situation has been

negatively influenced by the lack of effective fuels

management activities. The most destructive fires in California

history are those characterized by the presence of structures

they have supported project after project in high-risk areas

without adequate mitigation. Although the fire and planning

cultures have increased their interactions over the past decade,

they still have not communicated with each other about the

fundamental requirements of their professions. There has not

been much trading of skills and knowledge in the areas that

could significantly improve fire safety.

Fire Weaknesses

In the past, fire agencies consistently set forth their

requirements for mitigating fires at the end of the planning

process, rather than at the beginning. The power of the

General Plan and its requirements has remained relatively

unknown and drastically underutilized by the fire community.

Thus, instead of promulgating one set of comprehensive

standards in the General Plan that would henceforth be applied

to all projects, the agencies have placed themselves in the

position of trying to achieve mitigation on one project after

another—much work for low rewards.

Perhaps the most damaging omission, and the largest

contributor to ineffective planning on the part of fire agencies,

has been the failure to plan on a strategic basis. Every entrylevel firefighter knows that fire does not distinguish between

project or jurisdictional boundaries, yet that is where protection

planning has stopped. Detailed protection planning has not

been done on a total fire environment basis covering an

entire watershed or jurisdiction. Thus, even relatively wellmitigated developments in high-risk areas have remained

vulnerable. On major fires in the wildland-structural fire

environment, Incident Commanders are constrained by the

past planning failures and omissions of others. Suppression

forces have little, if any, strategic initiatives in developed

areas. The vegetated areas between developments are “second

priority” for force assignments, and the fire moves on, only

to threaten another development. Firefighting is characterized

by one tactical move after another, some of which work, and

some of which do not.

The wildland-structural fire situation that California has

experienced during the past decades will continue to worsen

unless fire agencies regain suppression initiative through

implementation of strategic fire planning.

Planning Weaknesses

Local and State land-use planning in the United States

has always been powerfully influenced by our political system.

Elected officials, not planners, make final decisions about

development. If professional planners had been “masters of

their fate” during the past 40 years, things might be better

today in the wildland-structural fire situation. But planners

only recommend, they only propose, and every action is

subject to approval of at least one elected body. Given that

caveat, the professional planning culture has still shown

weaknesses in wildland fire safety.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
19 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Diffusion of Responsibility

Who is responsible for fuel reduction for fire

protection? The answer varies around the State. CDF is

primarily responsible for about 33 million acres of privately

owned land in 56 of the State’s 58 counties. These are

classified as “State Responsibility Area” lands (SRA). SRA

lands are dotted with more than a thousand rural fire districts,

incorporated areas, and other land classifications described

as “Local Responsibility Area” (LRA). CDF contracts with

a few counties to protect SRA lands within their jurisdictions.

They also contract to manage various levels of dispatch and

supervision of local fire districts in other counties. The

USDA Forest Service contracts with CDF to protect private

lands within National Forests, in return for CDF protection

of more than a million acres of National Forest land in other

areas. (The term “protect” in this context means suppression,

not management.) Most counties assume that their compliance

with Public Resources Code 4290 (the “Defensible Space”

law) fulfills their responsibility for fuel modification. Too

many local fire districts feel that their fire protection

responsibilities are limited to the structural component of

wildland fire, the “protection of life and property,” and that

the vegetative component is CDF’s problem. CDF acceptance

for the responsibility varies, depending largely upon the

orientation of the ranger in charge of the area involved. At

best, the state-wide diffusion of responsibility for fuel

modification has led to confusion in budgets, program actions,

and serious gaps in performance. At worst, it escalates damages

from the conflagrations that are becoming commonplace.

Liability

Liability has hampered attempts at fuel modification for

fire protection. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, CDF had active

prescribed burning programs for range improvement and

brushland conversion. Landowners were an important part

of the programs, providing equipment and work that materially

reduced CDF costs. In the 1970’s several of the burns escaped

and caused minor to moderate damage on adjacent lands.

Lawyers and insurance companies found new career

opportunities. Insurance for the burns became prohibitive

for landowners, and lawsuits became serious burdens to both

CDF and their private cooperators. To a lesser but still

significant level, USDA Forest Service activities were

hampered by the same forces.

Environmental Requirements

The implementation of the California Environmental

Quality Act (CEQA) brought new analytic and administrative

workloads to fuel managers at the State and local levels. In

its first decade of application (1971-81) there were few CEQA

guidelines for fuel modification projects. Preparation of

environmental documents went forward on a trial-and- error

basis. The error rate was high. Lawyers found more career

opportunities, and environmental groups found new crusades.

Fuel managers found no increase in budgets, but much higher

administrative costs and time requirements. In some cases it

intermixed with high volumes of vegetative fuels. From a

simplistic view, it can be argued that “if the fuels were not

there, the fire would not be there.” From a more realistic

view, vegetation exacerbates the problem even in cases

where structures serve as their own fuel supply. With fire

jumping from roof to roof and from house to house,

vegetative combustion creates smoke, radiated heat,

firebrands, and safety hazards that hamper suppression.

Why are the fuels there?

Project Funding

The management of vegetative fuels to achieve fire

protection, wildlife habitat, water production, and esthetic

values has been a “step-child” in Federal, State, and local

agencies for decades.

At all government levels budget allowances for fuels

programs tend to be allocated after supression needs are

satisfied. Sources of funding are fragmented. Some dollars

come from one pocket, some from another. At the local

level, bond issues, ordinances, or other special efforts may

be required to authorize and fund fuel reduction programs.

Many times only the initial projects are funded. Maintenance

financing frequently diminishes over time, and once-effective

fuels modification areas return to high hazard status.

Both the USDA Forest Service and the California

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) have

missed opportunities to improve this situation. Since the

mid-1970’s, it has been possible to utilize General Plan

requirements, the Subdivision Map Act, and CEQA to require

developers to fund fuel treatments. These legal tools could

have, and should have, been used to zone hazardous parts of

private lands for permanent fuel breaks, greenbelts, fuel

reduction, and other mitigation requirements. Some critical

National Forest lands could have been included.

Landowners and developers could have been funding

construction and maintenance of these improvements for the

past 20 years. But that did not happen. Failure to use these

opportunities may have been caused by lack of knowledge,

lack of organizational purpose, or other factors. Whatever

the causes, California now has thousands of developments

that are more vulnerable than they need be. Natural resources

on thousands of acres of National Forest land adjacent to

developed areas are at high risk because the Forest Service

missed opportunities to have fuels reduced by private

enterprise.These conditions can be reversed to a significant

degree if the wildland fire agencies begin to assertively

pursue all the legal options available for fuels management.

Contributing Influences

Low levels of fuels management funding and missed

opportunities are not the only reasons that California is

vulnerable. A more intensive review of fuels management

history shows that other forces were also at work.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
20 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

cost more in time and money to justify a project than it would

to implement it. Frustrations mounted, motivation dropped,

and production declined. Implementation of air quality controls

acted to further reduce production and raise costs.

Easy Money

While it became more difficult to efficiently conduct

fuel treatments, the availability of “emergency funds” did

not diminish. The USDA Forest Service, the CDF, and some

local fire departments had almost unlimited suppression funds.

“You light them, we will fight them” became a popular

firefighter slogan in the 1970’s. Occasionally the United

States Congress or the State legislature would complain

about excessive suppression funds and require the agencies

to repay part of the costs from other programs. But this did

not happen often, it did not hurt very much, and it did not last

very long. Following years usually saw even more emergency

expenditures. Intelligent fire managers began to contrast the

grief of modifying fuels with the glories and recognition of

valiant suppression efforts. Fuels management lost.

Other Dynamics

The State’s wildland-structural fire problem is analogous

to rivers that gather volume and force from tributaries as

they flow: over time, more contributory events added strength

and destructive power to wildland fire. Some of the most

important dynamics that supplemented the increases in

destruction can be identified.

Hands-Off Local Decisions

For at least 40 years, the CDF and Forest Service made

conscious (albeit unwritten) organizational efforts to avoid

influence on local matters. However well intended these

policies were, the result has been the profusion of less-thansafe developments in wildlands. Since about 1980 the agency

comment process has improved, and a level of review on

development proposals is now more routine. This improvement, however, has more to do with CEQA compliance than

with agency commitment to assure fire safety. Federal and

State fire inputs to local governments are still weak. With the

possible exception of Public Resources Code 4290, inputs

have been of a “comment” or “advisory” nature.

Failure to Pursue Legal Avenues for Better Protection

No local decision to allow less-than-safe development

has been legally protested, appealed, or contested in court by

fire agencies. Other Federal and State agencies have used

the courts and the legislature to achieve specific safety

standards at the local government level. The State Seismic

Safety Commission had precise earthquake safety standards

enacted into law. The State Water Resources Board and the

Federal Emergency Management Agency did the same for

flood plain planning and zoning. The State Department of

Fish and Game has taken local governments to court to force

compliance with wildlife habitat needs. Beyond the recent

effort to pass the “defensible space” law, neither CDF nor

the USDA Forest Service has used these avenues to improve

fire protection.

Modified Mandates

The original organizational purpose for the wildland

fire agencies was the protection of watershed lands and

natural resources. Pressures from development, population,

politics, and the honorable humanitarian desires to save

lives and property have forced departures from the original

purpose. The predominately tactical response (priority on

structure protection) that is now commonplace in firefighting

is inefficient. It may actually be contributing to higher losses

in the long run.

Consider Nevada County’s “49’er” fire of 1988. Total

acres burned were 35,300. More than 500 structures were

destroyed. CDF estimates indicate that the fire could have

been controlled at about 7,000 acres (20 percent of the final

total) if structures had not taken suppression priority. Many

of the lost structures would have been saved if historical

wildland suppression strategies had been used. Study of the

“Stanislaus Complex” fires (Tuolumne County, 1987) and

the “Fountain” fire (Shasta County, 1992) support this

conclusion. In those cases, more than 100 million dollars in

natural resources and long-term public revenues were lost

because suppression resources were assigned to protect less

than 1,000 structures.

Real Costs Not Documented

When elected officials approve developments their primary

focus is on economic growth, tax revenues, and maximizing

profit in the development and construction industries.

When fire agencies add up costs and losses they tend to

amount to “negative growth.”

A significant differential exists between hoped-for

revenues, calculated costs, and real costs. Calculated costs

show up in official records and media reports. Citizens and

officials tend to accept that information. The real costs are

not shown, and that leads to invalid assumptions on the part

of all concerned.

A multitude of real costs has been ignored for decades.

Whole towns have been shut down for days, and job holders

have been delayed or prevented from getting to work.

Vacationers have been diverted from their destinations.

Motels, restaurants, and gas stations have lost income. Schools

have been unable to conduct classes. State and local

governments have spent months or years simply trying to

return operations to the point they were at before conflagration

struck. They have lost efficiency and public service

opportunities during recovery. The “Cleveland” fire (El

Dorado County, 1992) shut down the interstate highway

from central California to Reno, Nevada. After several days

of highway closure the Governor of Nevada complained to

California’s Governor that Nevada gambling enterprises were

losing 8 million dollars per day because of travel restrictions.

Commercial timber losses are calculated on stumpage value,

not actual net return possible to local government, primary,

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
21 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

define and publicize the real costs of fire. The

effort should also refine cost-benefit ratios for

fuel management programs.

• The Governor’s Office of Emergency Services

should analyze the relative costs and losses of

tactical versus strategic suppression efforts after

all major fires. Objectives would be to define

social and economic outcomes of current structure

protection practices compared to fuel modification

and strategic alternatives. Results should be

included in all State Hazard Mitigation Reports.

• Finally, the USDA Forest Service, California

Department of Forestry, State Office of Emergency

Services, and the State Fire Marshall should

sponsor a cooperative initiative for a Statewide

“Strategic Fuel Modification Program” with the

primary objective to reduce hazardous fuel

volumes and future fire intensities on critical lands,

regardless of ownership or jurisdictional

boundaries. The secondary objective should be to

provide opportunities for productive work for

currently nonproductive human resources, such

as inmates from overcrowded prisons, homeless,

welfare recipients, and “displaced” timber industry

workers.

New Thinking for a New Century

This paper has shown many of the ways in which old

habits and old thinking have led the State into its present

situation. Policies and practices that continue old thinking

will result only in more of the same. That does not have to

be the case. California does not have to continue suffering

exorbitant costs and losses from wildland fire.

As the year 2000 approaches, fire agencies, planners,

educators and decision-makers at all government levels must

dedicate themselves to making positive change in the

wildland-structural fire situation. Some of that change can

happen by taking corrective action on the weaknesses

addressed in this analysis. Recommendations made here can

be implemented before the turn of the century.

and secondary industry. Soil and erosion costs are estimated,

not validated after the fact; fire’s costs for flood prevention,

control, and recovery are rarely, if ever, fully documented.

These real costs (and others) were not significant 40

years ago. They are today. Full documentation of total losses

could change public and governmental perspectives about

fire safety. It would certainly improve cost-benefit ratios for

fuel modification projects. Local officials would find it harder

to justify reduced mitigation requirements on new

development in the name of “growth.”

The Next Questions

The next questions should be: What is the worth of the

best suppression organization in the world if costs and losses

continue to increase? What is the worth of planning if it

does not reduce billion-dollar-per-year losses? Must

California continue to suffer such unnecessary costs?

We thus return to our original question: “What do we do

now, Ollie?”

Recommendations

• The Governor’s Office of Planning and Research

should arrange a series of “Summit Meetings”

between top-level fire, fuel management, and

planning professionals. Primary goals should be

to increase effective communication between the

disciplines, design safer planning and fire

mitigation procedures, and achieve higher

standards of development in vegetated areas.

• The University of California and State universities

should cooperate to increase the wildland fire

education requirements in all land-use planning

degree programs. Every extension and continuing

education course for planners should include a

wildland fire safety and fuel management

component.

• The University of California should cooperate

with Federal, State, and local fire agencies to

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues
22 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
23 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Fire History of the Local Wildland-Urban Interface1

Neil R. Honeycutt2

Fire activity in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties hasbeen recorded in historical documents. In pre-European

times the Native Americans in the hills above the eastern

shore of San Francisco Bay used fire to remove unwanted

underbrush to improve the wildlife habitat. This type of

“prescribed” burning may have been the earliest fire

management in this region—the characteristic low levels of

lightning activity in northern California resulted in few

naturally occurring fires. In the 20th century, patterns of fire

in this wildland and urban interface have caused much

destruction. The history of fire in the area provides clues to

these patterns.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Chief, Fire and Rescue Branch, State of California Office of Emergency

Services, 2800 Meadowview Road, Sacramento, CA 95832

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Issues

Prescribed fire has been recognized as a potential tool for

land managers for many years. The gradual recognition of

the important role of fire in wildlands has been documented

many times. In the United States, this recognition probably

first occurred in the longleaf pine region of the southern

United States. Various agencies that once focussed on fire

exclusion gradually adopted the use of prescribed fire as a

land management tool. By the late 1970’s, many Federal,

State, and local wildland agencies were actively implementing

prescribed burning programs for purposes such as fuel hazard

reduction and wildlife habitat management.

Even though the use of prescribed burning has increased

during the past 60 years, present use of this tool falls far

short of its potential use given the millions of acres of land in

PANEL DISCUSSION: Prescribed Fire:

Why Aren’t We Doing More?

Local, State, and National Perspectives

fire-adapted or fire-dependent ecosystems in the United States.

This observation begs the question “Why aren’t we doing

more prescribed burning?” In order to provide several different

perspectives on this question, a panel of experts was convened

to discuss the issue from the perspectives of local, State, and

Federal wildland agencies. Battalion Chief Donald Pierpont

of the Los Angeles County Fire Department, Mr. Ken Nehoda

of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection,

and Mr. Jerry Williams of the USDA Forest Service each

provided their views on the topic. Many common factors

affect the prescribed burning programs of each of these

agencies. The following three papers present a summary of

this panel discussion.
26 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
27 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Abstract: The ability of local agencies to mitigate wildfire hazards

through prescribed burning is limited by many internal and external

factors. Environmental regulations, public support, and internal departmental problems continue to limit the effectiveness of prescribed burn programs. These elements are discussed to provide a

better understanding of why we are not doing more at the local level.

The factors that limit prescribed fire programs on thenational and State level naturally affect local agencies

as well. Federal and State environmental, air quality, and

management decisions are implemented at the local level.

The public’s perception of these decisions affects our ability

to produce modified acreage and mitigate the wildfire problem.

The cooperation of all agencies impacted by prescribed

fires is essential to maximizing acreage production. Over the

years we have developed excellent relationships with most

of the agencies involved, and conflicts are rare. When conflicts

do occur, they are usually because of a lack of understanding

of the mutual benefits of prescribed fire.

The objective of prescribed fire managers is to improve

wildland fire protection; environmental issues are addressed,

as necessary, to achieve this objective. When prescribed

fires conflict with environmental laws, we rely on enforcing

agencies to assist us by identifying ways to mitigate the

impact. This assistance is not always available, and developing

mitigation methods is very time consuming and certainly

affects prescribed fire.

The implementation of the prescribed burn program has

required continual public education regarding the benefits

and limitations of the program. With 12 years of experience

and public education behind us, we have developed a high

level of public support. The public’s concern about the

potential impact of our projects has not diminished, but

outright opposition is extremely rare.

While developing a project in Los Angeles County, we

identified one property owner who did not want to cooperate.

I met with the property owner in an effort to educate him

and gain his cooperation. He stated that he was planning to

sell his home and did not want to spoil the view. We

subsequently attempted to continue with the project and

work around his property.

Prescribed Fire: “Why Aren’t We Doing More?”

A Local Perspective1

Donald A. Pierpont2

The property owner then took his opposition to every

public forum he could think of. He contacted County Supervisors,

the City Council, the Town Council, Resource Conservation

District, and the media. The public, the politicians, and the

media supported the project at each of these meetings. Our

long-term efforts in public education had proven successful.

His final effort was litigation. He filed suit, questioning

our environmental documentation. Our response required the

filing of a negative declaration addressing the environmental

issues. The process of public meetings and litigation proved to

be very time consuming.

Contracts with cooperating property owners, for prescribed

burning, are valid for only 3 years. In this case it took more

than 2 years to exhaust this property owner’s avenues of

opposition, and there was not sufficient time left to complete

the project before the 3 year time limit expired. This time limit

has impacted other projects as well.

The climate of Los Angeles County is diverse, ranging

from the desert to coastal plains. Wildfire season starts as the

vegetation dries in the inland valleys, long before the coastal

areas are dry enough to burn. The need for resources to

combat these inland fires limits our ability to conduct burns

along the coast.

The advent of the Paramedic program in 1970, followed

by Emergency Medical Technician, Hazardous Materials, and

Urban Search and Rescue programs, has dramatically changed

fire departments nationwide. Today, only 7 percent of our

responses are fire related and less than 1 percent are brush or

grass fires. Training is naturally directed toward the areas of

greatest demand, and the number of wildland fire experts has

declined proportionately. Chief officers are drawn from this

diverse background and, of course, reflect their experiences.

These changes are also reflected in management and its response

to the prescribed burn program.

Today fire chiefs support prescribed burn programs but

are extremely conservative in their approach. Prescribed fire

managers reflect this conservatism in their selection of

projects, the size of burn units, and the conditions under

which they are burned.

Every time prescribed fire managers light a match, we

are placing our careers on the line.

Conclusion

The public’s understanding and demand for prescribed

fire continue to grow. The ongoing education of the public,

other agencies, and chief officers—combined with the

continued success of prescribed burning—will allow prescribed

fire programs to be more productive.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Battalion Chief, Los Angeles Fire Department, 1320 N. Eastern Ave.,

Los Angeles, CA 90063.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
28 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
29 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Prescribed Fire: Why Aren’t We Doing More?

A State Perspective1

Ken Nehoda2

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Program Manager, Vegetation Management Program, California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, 1416 9th Street, Sacramento, CA

95814.

Before I try to answer the question “Why aren’t we doingmore?” I will provide some basic information on the

Vegetation Management Program (VMP) of the California

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection and what we

have done with it.

Although the title might indicate a broader based function,

the majority of the program’s efforts have been and are

currently focused on the prescribed burning of brush-covered

lands classified as State Responsibility Area. The Handbook

and Field Guide to the Vegetation Management Program

says, “The goal of the Vegetation Management Program is

to reduce the chance of large, damaging wildfires by reducing

fire hazards on wildlands in California. Realizing the best

mix of natural resource benefits from these lands, consistent

with environmental protection and landowner/steward

objectives, is the Department’s intent.”

VMP has been functional since 1981. Here are some

statewide statistics:

• The highest amount of acreage burned in a year is

about 68,000 acres.

• The lowest amount of acreage burned in a year is

about 17,000 acres.

• Average annual acreage burned is about 42,000

acres.

• This year, about 14,000 acres have been burned in

27 projects.

• There are about 100 approved projects waiting to be

burned, with a total project area of approximately

106,000 acres.

Over the years, most of the projects burned under this

program have been located in fairly rural areas. Prescribed

burns have been aimed primarily at fire hazard reduction,

wildlife habitat improvement, and range improvement. As a

result of this general configuration, many of the burns have

been of significant size. More recently, there is a shift away

from this type of project toward the urban interface. With

this shift to more congested, built-up, populated areas, new

issues are showing up. Among these issues are:

• Increased sensitivity toward smoke incidents.

• Significantly higher values at risk in the event of

an escape.

• Smaller urban setting projects require as much, if

not more planning, resources, and operational effort

to conduct.

• Increasing public concern about the risk and

potential adverse impacts of prescribed fire.

However, this type of project has the potential to make a

difference in saving or losing structures in built-up areas.

That, by itself, is enough to merit facing the associated

challenges. Fuels management, as a significant component

of a professional fire protection program in the wildlands

and at the urban interface, is at least a part of the solution to

these major fires with significant structure losses.

The Process

The process is normally initiated by one of the following

actions. Either the California Department of Forestry (CDF),

or its representative, such as a Contract County, contacts a

landowner or group of landowners in an area where they

would like to develop a project, or a landowner contacts us.

Regardless of how it begins, the process must meet all of the

administrative requirements. The completed package will

include the following information:

1. Prescribed Burning Project Standard Agreement—This

is the agreement between CDF and the landowner. If

one of the participants in the project is an agency of the

United States Government, a “Federal Land Management Agency Prescribed Burning Project Standard

Agreement” must be included.

2. The Burn Plan—This is the primary planning document

for the project and includes:

a. General project information, i.e.: landowners’

names, parcel numbers, etc.

b. Burn area description, legal and narrative

description of property, zoning, land use, estimate

of area to be burned, etc.

3. Environmental Setting and Impacts—This includes

general information about the following:

a. Description of project objectives and methods.

b. Project area topography, elevation range, slope

steepness and aspect.

c. Soils description and sensitivity to project

activities.

d. Vegetation community and dominant species.

e. Wildlife/fisheries habitat and sensitivity to project

activities.

f. Cultural resources and sensitivity to project activities.

g. Smoke and potential impacts to communities.

h. Project maps.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
30 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The political issues–and I include “interagency cooperation” as part of this–are also a factor. These issues include

working cooperatively with many agencies to address impacts

of prescribed fire upon archaeological and cultural resources,

fisheries and wildlife habitats, air quality, vegetation

communities, and, last but certainly not least, impacts on rare

and endangered species of both plants and animals. I have

been told by some that agencies with responsibility for managing

or protecting these items are not receptive to prescribed fire.

That may well be true, but a methodical, educational process

that focuses on the benefits that can be provided might change

opinions and is preferable to one that is by nature

confrontational. As a result of this type of controversy during

the southern California fires late last fall, many people are

looking at the use of prescribed fire as well as how to improve

the political climate and interagency cooperation.

What I perceive to be social issues are those that are not

usually founded on the physical impacts of prescribed fire,

but are based upon some individual’s desire to participate in,

and thus influence, the decision-making process. In most of

the cases I have dealt with, the people had their own ideas

about what they wanted done, and more often than not, they

wanted the project stopped. This can complicate the process

and that is what I choose to deal with here. Examples include:

neighbors who do not really believe that there is a significant

risk associated with unmanaged fuels around homes and

developments, people who believe that all fuel treatment

will result in significantly accelerated erosion, and probably

the most common view that wildfires happen “somewhere

else” so we do not really need this here. I see this as a need to

educate people who live adjacent to project areas. In those

cases where individuals cannot be convinced the project is

valid, there are mechanisms to go around them. Unfortunately,

this means more work, not less. Furthermore, we will not

win all of our battles. In most cases, however, the time spent

on developing a project will not be wasted.

It appears to me that the answer to the question “Why

aren’t we doing more?” depends entirely on the experience

of the person who provides the answer. In an effort to

address the issues, the California Department of Forestry

and Fire Protection is exploring ways to simplify the paper

flow, increase program flexibility, and improve our working

relationships with other agencies. The product of this effort

should provide a strong foundation for a dynamic, stable,

and functional Vegetation Management Program.

i. Copies of all letters to other agencies asking for

information or concerns they might have with the

project and any responses.

4. Burn Prescription—This is the synthesis of all the information gathered about dead and live fuels, anticipated

weather, desired effects of the project, and smoke management into a few model inputs so that you may specify

conditions which will achieve project objectives.

5. Project Cost Summary—Vegetation Management Program projects are partially funded by participating landowners. This cost sharing formula is defined in Section

1564, Title 14, California Code of Regulations. In

summary, it says, “The State’s share of such costs shall

bear the same ratio to the total costs of the operation as

the public benefits bear to all public and private benefits from the operation as estimated by the Director.”

Subsequent legislation was passed that allows the Department to pay all of the project costs if there are no

private benefits accrued to the landowner.

6. Environmental Checklist—This document functions as

the initial study for the project. Its completion, according to the California Environmental Quality Act Guidelines and the VMP Handbook, is mandatory.

Why Aren’t We Doing More?

This is a deceptively simple question which requires a

complicated answer. The complications arise not only from

the extremely diverse biological, environmental, and physical

conditions that exist in California, but also from administrative,

political, and social differences.

Most of the administrative complications arise from

program staff within the Department and are differences of

opinion about how program requirements are interpreted.

From the viewpoint of a program manager, whose duties

include trying to ensure that projects meet the requirements

and intent of both law and policy, I offer the following

comments. Frequently those of us who work in the program

at Sacramento Headquarters are perceived to be much too

detail oriented. This description is most frequently applied

soon after additional information or clarification of issues is

requested. I have heard on several occasions that program

staff should be inventing ways to approve projects, not to

stop them. Since I cannot arbitrarily choose to ignore or

modify either the law or CDF policy, I must require

compliance which can sometimes result in delayed implementation: therefore, I am part of the problem.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
31 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

USDA Forest Service and fire and aviation managementdecisions are commonly made in a context of biological,

technological, social, legal, and economic considerations.

These considerations ultimately define the latitude in which

we operate to achieve multiple-use objectives, and they help

us answer the question, “Why aren’t we doing more?”

These factors are also important in the context of

prescribed fire (fig.1). We use prescribed fire to meet specific

resource objectives—despite that, prescribed fire problems

have traditionally focused on prescribed fire practices and

policies, but rarely on the primary objectives.

A good example of means becoming confused with

ends is illustrated by the prescribed natural fire situation

experienced in 1988. After fire problems surfaced, virtually

all of the focus centered on the application of prescribed

natural fire policy. Few scrutinized the objectives on which

the prescribed fire activity was predicated. We did not examine

the larger issues attached to the overarching objectives for

wilderness and the meaning of those objectives in terms of

expected benefits, risks, and consequences.

Underlying the question of “why aren’t we doing more”

is the larger question of “to what purpose?” Fundamentally,

whatever we do must be viewed as worthwhile. The benefits

must be worth the risks. This notion becomes especially

important to the resource manager because potential benefits

may not be clear to the affected public. The risks that inherently

surround prescribed fire and the consequences that can result

make it imperative that the public have a full understanding

of our objectives. If our objective is to sustain short interval

fire-adapted ecosystems, why aren’t we doing more?

Discussion

Biologically, prescribed fire must be included as a

management tool in sustaining fire-adapted ecosystems; fire

regulates the biotic productivity and stability of fire-adapted

ecosystems that cannot be fully emulated by mechanical or

chemical means. Prescribed fire is especially important in

short interval fire-adapted systems in which the absence of

periodic, low-intensity burning causes stands to undergo

relatively rapid changes in species composition and structure,

which in turn often results in predisposing factors to epidemic

Prescribed Fire: Why Aren’t We Doing More?

A National Perspective1

Jerry T. Williams2

insect and disease outbreak and severe stand replacement

wildfire. Among conifers, the long-needle pines are a common

example of short interval fire-adapted species. Notably, these

species account for nearly 30 percent of the suitable timber

base on National Forest lands.

Technologically, in most short interval fire-adapted

ecosystems, and particularly in the long-needle pine types,

the opportunities to use prescribed fire on meaningful scales

is limited by narrow prescription windows. Risk and smoke

are commonly cited as factors that inhibit more prescribed

burning. However, in short interval fire-adapted ecosystems,

in the prolonged absence of fire, high fuel loadings, unnatural

volumes of biomass, and multi-storied canopies are the

fundamental reasons more burning does not take place. These

underlying causal factors significantly impede the ability of

field practitioners to conduct prescribed burns within acceptable

limits of risk. Not to be overlooked, these factors also preclude

burning within ecologically appropriate ranges of fire intensity.

Before we do more prescribed burning in these situations, we

need to give serious consideration to managing understory

vegetation and mechanically reducing fuels.

In the social arena, the public does not always understand

the rationale for prescribed burning. In fact, much of the

country is culturally averse to fire. An exception, of course,

is the south and southeastern United States. There, perhaps

because long-needle pine forests have the shortest fire return

intervals anywhere, cause–and–effect relationships are

manifest most rapidly and, therefore, are most obvious. In

that part of the country, in the absence of fire, undesirable

effects develop quickly. In only a few years, flammability

can increase significantly and the habitat for many game

animals can diminish rapidly.

Figure 1–A variety of considerations surround fire management decisions.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interfaced and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Assistant Director—Fire Operations, Fire and Aviation Management

Staff, USDA Forest Service, Washington DC 20250.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
32 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Misperceptions about fire and culturally imbedded fears

about fire have a significant effect on the prescribed burning

program. People who do not understand the long-term

ecological benefits of fire or are unable to see or somehow

benefit from the positive cause–and–effect relationships that

result from fire are not likely to tolerate the short-term

consequences that invariably accompany prescribed burning.

A compounding obstacle is the very nature of prescribed

burning. We usually do not notice the ones that go well. We

almost always notice the ones that do not. In the planning

stages, proposed prescribed burn projects are typically affected

by the social impacts that may have resulted from remembered

smoke incursions and escapes. Risk is a part of prescribed

burning. Because failures command scrutiny while successes

go unrewarded, most decision-makers, most managers, and

most practitioners are cautious and conservative with the use

of fire. Prescribed burning on the scales and over the

timeframes that are currently under discussion in some circles

will be exceedingly difficult in this social and cultural climate.

The legal arena, however, is perhaps the most contentious.

The Forest Service mission is, in large measure, based on the

Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act (1960). Although a great

deal of focus has historically centered on the multiple-use

aspects of this legislation, sustainability is becoming the

growing concern. Nowhere is the issue more acute than in

short interval fire-adapted ecosystems. Biologically, we know

that a successful management strategy aimed at sustaining

these ecosystems must rely on prescribed fire. However,

whether concern centers on air quality for a community,

cover for large game, critical habitat for endangered species,

or the desire for seclusion among people living in a wildland

subdivision, the growing trend toward single-resource

emphasis will preclude the use of prescribed fire. As long as

we are legally mandated to manage for discrete components

of the ecosystem, we will be unable to manage for the larger

whole ecosystem.

Last but certainly not least, economics will also play a

significant role in our ability to sustain fire-adapted

ecosystems, particularly when we consider the cost of

restoration that now confronts us. We should not think that

dollars will become available to fund these treatments unless

a compelling argument can be made that the cost of restoration

and maintenance is worthwhile. The competition for dollars

is intense and it is getting more intense. Entitlements, health

care, education, and urban infrastructure needs are among

the few that will compete for the dollars available to treat

fire-adapted ecosystems. In the final analysis, restoration

treatments will need to demonstrate a savings, in terms of

the costs that are likely to result in attempting to manage

under existing forest conditions and the losses that are likely

to accrue in the absence of treatment.

Summary

Perhaps the important question is not so much “why

aren’t we doing more,” but rather “what is the reason for

needing to do more?” Before we do more prescribed burning,

we need to develop a better basis from which to operate. If our

objective is to sustain short interval fire-adapted ecosystems,

prescribed fire will be a part of that and so will smoke and

escapes and expense. We can mitigate potential adverse effects

by mechanically pre-treating stands to reduce emissions and

escapes. In some areas, before we use prescribed fire, we must

make preceding mechanical entries in order to burn within

appropriate ecological amplitudes. Treating stands is one thing,

but treating landscapes will be difficult and costly.

Nobody likes the idea of the smoke or the escapes or the

expense that is a part of sustaining fire-adapted ecosystems

with prescribed fire. But, as fire management professionals,

we have realized that our suppression capabilities are limited

and, although consequences come with using fire, opting to

avoid the use of fire carries serious consequences also. In the

past decade, under the influence of drought, catastrophic

wildfires have consumed what prescribed burning was unable

to treat, protect, and sustain.

We are at a crossroads in our ability to sustain fireadapted ecosystems. This may be the single most important

resource issue facing the Forest Service. We are stalled in our

efforts to do more prescribed burning. I believe, at this point—

because we do not have an adequate anchor, a basis from

which to operate—it is less important for our fire managers

to advocate the use of prescribed fire than it is for them to

know and display the biological, technological, social, legal,

and economic tradeoffs and limitations that are involved

from among our alternatives. Ultimately, the public will

determine what latitudes we are allowed in using prescribed

fire. We need to put our energies in providing them with the

knowledge they will need to make informed decisions.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
33 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Institutionalizing Fire Safety in Making Land Use and

Development Decisions1

Marie-Annette Johnson2 and Marc Mullenix2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Long Range Planner, Boulder County Land Use Department, P.O.Box

471, Boulder, CO 80306, and Wildland Fire Mitigation Coordinator, City of

Boulder Fire Department, Boulder, CO 80306

Because of three major wildland fires in the past 5 yearsalong the Front Range of the Boulder County area in

Colorado, current and potential residents should be told of

steps that can reduce the risks of these fire hazards. The

Wildfire Hazard Identification and Mitigation System

(WHIMS) is used by the county and city to assist in the

identification and mitigation of wildfire hazards in their

wildland and urban interface areas. This system combines

available expertise in forestry, wildfire behavior, hazard

assessment, and fire suppression with a geographic

information system (GIS). The county uses WHIMS to

combine all the components of wildfire mitigation (i.e.,

information, education, cooperation, community involvement,

planning, and preparedness), and provides motivation for

homeowners and residents to actively participate. The

development of this system depends entirely on the excellent

interagency and cross-jurisdictional cooperation, experience,

and knowledge of individuals and various agencies. Fire

safety is institutionalized into land use and development

decisions in several ways. They include attempts at

strengthening local zoning and building codes (as well as

state legislation); creating a Natural Hazards Element for the

county’s comprehensive plan; requesting a Wildfire

Mitigation Plan (which operates on a point system) under

the county’s Site Plan Review (which is required for all new

development in the mountains); linking design with the

degree of wildfire hazards for new subdivisions in the city;

examining alternatives to fuel management from a solid

waste perspective; providing information for open space

planners and land managers as more land is acquired; and

distributing brochures and videos to new residents as well as

the builders and designers of new construction in the

mountains. Much has been learned about institutionalizing

fire safety and ensuring that it is an integral part of the

planning process. This includes the critical importance of

interagency cooperation (as well as the involvement of

citizens’ groups and homeowners’ associations), the necessity

of public education and awareness; the importance of using

all available resources, personnel and funding; and the value

of sharing information from other areas. All managers should

be prepared to act immediately after a disaster during the

relatively short “window” of heightened citizen awareness

that is present in the aftermath.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
34 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
35 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Abstract: Wildland fires have occurred for centuries in North

America and other selected countries and can be segregated into

three periods: prehistoric (presuppression) fires, suppression period fires, and fire management period fires. Prehistoric fires varied in size and damage but were probably viewed fatalistically.

Suppression period fires were based on policy that excluded fire

from many ecosystems where it played an important role; the view

of fire as an undesirable wildland disturbance was fostered during

this period. Recognition of fire’s roles led to a managed use of fire;

however, large and disastrous fires still occur because of large fuel

accumulations during the fire suppression period.

Fires burning in vegetation have been termed “forest” fires,or, more recently, “wildland” fires. If these fires also

involve structures, they have been termed “urban,” “interface,”

or “intermix;” i.e., “urban/wildland” fires. Although these

types of fires are not new, in the past 30 years we have begun

to consider these fires as a separate and very important group

of fires—fires that require a great deal of energy to suppress,

and from which property and human lives have been lost.

 Despite these disastrous fires, we must consider that in

natural systems fire is generally neither good nor bad; it just

occurs. We might consider that the extinction of a species

caused by fire would be a bad or disastrous event. However, is

it a disastrous event or merely part of the natural progression of

systems? The decision to term an event “good,” “bad,” or

“disastrous” means that human values have been attached to it.

Our concepts of wildfires as bad or disastrous probably

result from both our association with the loss of structures

to fire, and the Northern European education of the leaders

of the conservation movement in North America. Our

association with urban fires was always that of loss of

values and life. When the conservation movement began in

North America in the late 1800’s, fire was considered the

number-one enemy, and more than 90 percent of the early

forestry practices in the early 1900’s excluded fire from

wildland systems. This approach completely ignored the

role of fire in these systems and the use of fire by Native

Americans to manipulate their environment.

This paper summarizes the history of large and disastrous

fires, in the United States and other nations—from the

prehistoric fire regimes, to the suppression period (1910-1960)

to the fire management period (1960 to the present).

Prehistoric Period

Fires were started primarily by humans and lightning in

the prehistoric period, although other sources such as volcanism

were temporally and spatially important. Friction, sparks, or

refraction were also possible as fire sources. The first fires

probably began shortly after plants first produced terrestrial

biomass, or when aquatic biomass dried and was susceptible

to burning. Ignitions by humans or our predecessors are

relatively recent in geologic time, and especially recent in

locations such as North America.

Ignitions caused by our early predecessors would normally

result in a fire regime modified to a shorter period between,

and reduce the variability of, a fire season and its severity, as

the fires set for any given purpose would better accomplish

this if set for a predetermined prescription. When fires were

ignited by non-human sources, the conditions for spread could

have varied widely.

For California, it has been estimated that prehistoric fires

covered an average of 5.5 to more than 13 percent of the State

every year (Martin and Sapsis 1992). Fires also have covered

substantial areas of other parts of North America, Australia,

and Africa ignited by both lightning and humans.

Settlement Fires

Fires during the settlement period were the largest and

often involved the largest loss of lives of any recorded fires

(table 1). During this period attitudes about wildland fires

were complacent or even fatalistic. Logging created large

areas of undecayed slash, and fires were started indiscreetly

to burn slash or make land attractive to homesteading. Without

any means to control fires, settlers were at the mercy of the

weather once fires began to spread.

Suppression Period Fires

The disastrous fires of the late 1800’s and early 1900’s

led to the feeling of a need to control the fires. Thus, when the

1910 fires of northern Idaho, western Montana, and eastern

Washington occurred, a skeleton force of firefighters attempted

to control them. Tools and equipment were simple, and

knowledge of fire behavior primitive. Nevertheless, this was

the beginning of the fire suppression period that lasted about

50 years (table 2).

Along with the suppression effort was a strong fire

prevention effort. Fire was labeled as evil, and the campaign

against fire often took on the aspects of a religious crusade.

Although some spoke in favor of a moderate policy, and even

the use of fire as a tool in wildland management, they were

A Synopsis of Large or Disastrous Wildland Fires1

Robert E. Martin2 David B. Sapsis3

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Professor Emeritus, Department of Environmental Science and Policy

Management, 145 Mulford Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. 3Graduate Student, Department of Environmental Science and Policy Management, 145 Mulford Hall, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
36 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Table 2—Suppression-period fires, 1910 to 1960.

Fire Name Location Date Size and Losses1 Comments2

Great Idaho northern Idaho, 1910 1.2 MM Ha; 85 killed Hot, dry, windy; spring and

western Montana, summer

eastern Washington

Cloquet Minnesota 1918 551 killed Hot, dry, windy

Victoria Australia 1919 3 killed Fires burned for 6 weeks.

Berkeley Berkeley, California 1923 584 structures destroyed East winds

New South Wales Australia 1926 31 killed, 2,000 homeless

 and Victoria

 Mill Valley N. California 1929 117 homes lost

Tillamook Oregon 1933 126 M Ha Dry, hot summer, east winds

New South Wales Australia 1939 1.37 MM Ha, 71 killed,

 and Victoria over 1,000 homes

destroyed

Marshfield Massachusetts 1941 450 homes lost

Southern California southern California 1943 200 homes lost

 (series)

Maine Forest Fire Maine 1947 1200 homes; 16 lives lost

 Disaster (series)

 New South Wales Australia 1951 3.5 MM Ha; 6 killed

Manchuria China 1956 400 M Ha

1M = 1,000; MM = 1,000,000

 2Sources: Brown and Davis 1973; Trevitt and Cheney 1973.

Table 1—Major-settlement period fires, before 1910.

Fire Name Location Date Size and Losses1 Comments2

Miramichi Maine 1825 1.2 MM Ha; Lives Many fires, undetermined drought; wind

Black Thursday Victoria, Australia 1851 10 killed

Peshtigo/Michigan northeast Wisconsin 1871 1.6 MM Ha; Many fires, drought,wind

Upper Michigan 1,200 to 1,500 killed

Michigan primarily northeast 1881 400 M Ha; 169 killed Many fires, drought, hot

(“thumb”) area of

southern Michigan

Hinckley Minnesota 1894 418 killed Many fires, drought, hot

Far West Yacoult, Washington 1902 >500 M Ha; 38 killed Dry summer; hot, windy,

low relative humidity

Adirondack New York 1903 258 M Ha; none killed Dry winter, strong winds

1M = 1,000; MM = 1,000,000

2 Haines and others (1986) present evidence that many of these fires occurred without drought or severe weather preceding the fire, based on

historical weather records. (Brown and Davis 1973, Forest Fire: Control and Use; Australia, C. Trevitt and P. Cheney 1973).

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
37 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

overruled by those in favor of fire exclusion (Pyne 1984).

Although scientific evidence supported the use of fire, the

political accidents of gaining control in Washington, DC, led

to a policy of fire exclusion.

Urban Interface and

Fire Management Period

During the urban interface and fire management period,

wildland fires began to involve structures again, and the idea

of fire management began to evolve. Wildland fires had not

been involved with structure losses in the United States since

the 1923 Berkeley fire. Suddenly, because of the Harlow and

Bel Air Fires of 1961, wildland fire threats to urban areas

were again a reality. Although many in the fire service and

those in the academic community such as Harold Biswell

recognized the potential threat of wildland fires to urban

areas, many years passed before a broader awareness of the

problem evolved.

Table 3—Fires of the urban interface and fire management period, 1961 to the present.1

Fire Name Location Date Size and Losses2

Harlow central California 1961 106 homes; 2 lives lost

Bel Air southern California 1961 505 homes lost

Dwellingup western Australia 1961 146M Ha; 140 bldgs lost

New Jersey Fires (series) New Jersey 1963 458 homes; 7 lives lost

Staten Island New York 1963 100 homes lost

Parana Brazil 1963 2 MM Ha; 5000 homes;

110 lives lost

Hanley, Nuns Canyon Fires northern California 1964 295 homes lost

Coyote southern California 1964 106 homes lost; 2 lives

lost

Tasmania Australia 1967 263 M Ha; 1246

buildings; 62 lives lost

Wright, Los Angeles southern California 1970 103 homes lost

Laguna, San Diego southern California 1970 382 homes; 5 lives lost

Sycamore, Santa Barbara southern California 1977 234 homes lost

Kanan, Los Angeles southern California 1978 224 homes; 1 life lost

Panorama, San Bernardino southern California 1980 325 homes; 4 lives lost

Ash Wednesday Fires Victoria and South Australia 1983 392M Ha; 2545 bldgs;

75 lives lost

Black Dragon northern China 1988 >2 MM Ha

49er northern California 1988 148 homes lost

Paint, Santa Barbara southern California 1990 479 homes; 1 life lost

Tunnel, Oakland/Berkeley northern California 1991 2103 structures, (2475

living units); 25(26) lives

lost

Fountain, Redding northern California 1992 450 homes lost

Altadena, Los Angeles southern California 1993 118 homes lost

 Laguna, Orange County southern California 1993 366 homes lost

Malibu, Los Angeles southern California 1993 350 homes; 3 lives lost

New South Wales Australia 1994 1.2 MM Ha; 185 homes

plus other bldgs; 3 lives

lost

1Sources: California, Reports of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection; Australian, P.Cheney, and

C.Trevitt ; Brazil, R.Soares. United States fires from Brown and Davis, 1973, Forest Fire: Control and Use; Australia, C.

Trevitt and P. Cheney. Eleven Fires from United States are from Brown and Davis, 1973, Forest Fire: Control and Use;

Australian, C. Trevitt and P. Cheney; California, Reports of the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. 2 M = 1,000; MM = 1,000,000

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
38 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

management period itself, which advocates fuels management,

is not responsible for the increase in acreage and homes lost.

Rather, it is the long-term fuel accumulation from the

suppression period that has contributed to the fire problem.

Today, even with the recognition of the need for fuels

management in both vegetation and structures, the most

ecologically sound tool for managing fuels—prescribed

burning—is severely underused because of human inertia

and air quality constraints. Some local programs are vigorously

attacking vegetation and fuels management, but we can

continue to expect large fires and large losses of structures

because of the immensity of the urban/wildland fire problem.

References

Brown, A. A.; Davis, K. P. 1973. Forest fire: control and use. New

York: McGraw-Hill; 686 p.

Haines, D.A.; Johnson, V. J.; Main, W.A. 1976. An assessment of three

measures of long-term moisture deficiency before critical fire periods.

Res. Paper NC-131. St. Paul, MN: North Central Forest Experiment

Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 13 p.

Martin, R. E.; Sapsis, D. B. 1992. Fires as agents of biodiversity:

pyrodiversity promotes biodiversity. Proceedings of the conference

on biodiversity of northwest California ecosystems. Cooperative

Extension, University of California, Berkeley.

Pyne, S. J. 1984. Fire in America. New York: Wiley and Sons; 520 p.

Schiff. A. L. 1962. Fire and water: scientific heresy in the Forest

Service. Boston, MA: Harvard University Press; 225 p.

Although the list of fires for this period (table 3) is not

complete, it illustrates that large and disastrous wildland or

urban/wildland fires have not diminished; if anything, they

have continued to increase in frequency. Numbers of structures

lost has increased. In California, as many as 3,500 homes

were lost to urban/wildland fires in the 7 decades from 1920

to 1989. In the early 1990’s, about 4,200 homes were lost.

Although the numbers of human lives lost to wildland fires

has decreased since the settlement period, during the last 70

years, loss of life continues because of wildland fires.

Summary

Fire has been part of many terrestrial vegetation

communities, and the use of fire as a powerful tool by many

native peoples around the world was an important factor in

their survival or extinction. Fire was foreign to the land

management philosophy during expansion of the conservation

movement. This fact, in addition to the large fires that had

occurred, led to a policy of fire suppression and exclusion.

Large wildland fires usually are described as “disastrous”

when large losses of human life or property occur, as with

the “disastrous” 1988 Yellowstone fires. Yet in terms of

effects on natural systems, the fires were not disastrous.

Losses of homes or structures increased during the fire

management period. This is probably because of more people

living near vegetation without the advantage of livestock or

other means to manage fuels near structures. The fire

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
39 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Our fire problem is multidimensional, including the

components of responsibility, accountability, economics, and

the environmental consequences of doing something, or in

most cases, nothing. There are major problems in attempting

to deal with the primary issues of reducing the fire risk.

These are the very issues that I believe we must work on the

hardest, to bring about a solution to “our fuel problems.” It

will take a cooperative effort from many agencies and

organizations to finally provide solutions that are drastically

needed, in our wildland urban intermix communities.

We as fire suppression agencies have learned to develop

excellent “Mutual Aid” pacts. We can gather virtual armies

and air forces to attack these notable wildland urban intermix

fires, which we have been dealing with since the early 1970’s,

and so which aptly have been called “the Fires of the Future.”

The question must be asked: “Why have we not been

able to develop a financial commitment to fuels management,

similar to that we have in fire suppression?”

Thomas Watson, the founder of IBM, said, “The way to

succeed is to double the failure rate.” Have we doubled the

failure rate on our wildland urban intermix fires in the past

decade? Must we experience more failures before we begin

to manage our fuels to a level that will allow us to effectively

deal with the wildfire issue? What will it ultimately take to

get us on track?

The Beginnings of a Cooperative Effort

When our fire district began recognizing the reality of

the fuels problem our community faced, my office began a

multi-year project of bringing about a fuels reduction program,

or “risk reduction on the ground” program, called Defensible

Space. No one within my fire agency had the benefit of an

education or background in forestry, biology, or ecology.

We did have a “firefighter’s” knowledge that our community

was at serious risk from any uncontrolled wildfire, and that

our daily resources to deal with the problem would be

extremely limited.

For many decades we had successfully combated all

fires within our community, and had begun to recognize that

our many successes would some day cause our most

devastating failures. We had been excluding the forest’s

natural management process, fire, and had not taken the

responsibility of managing the fuels any other way, such as

reduction or removal.

Our “cooperative effort in fuels management” was based

on the following premise. On a daily basis my fire prevention

office operates in the area of “responsibility”: individual

Cooperative Efforts in Fuels Management1

Gerald L. Adams2

Abstract: Our forests have been neglected or protected to death,

creating an extreme wildfire risk in wildland urban intermix communities. We as agencies and organizations are just now beginning

to understand that the fuel problems we have across the western

states are not a single agency problem, but “our problem.” Wildfires do not respect boundaries, be they political, jurisdictional, or

private. Our fuels problem must be dealt with from a cooperative

effort by all individuals who reside and work in the wildland urban

intermix communities.

Forests in Nevada have suffered the same decline in health

that many forests in the western states are now

experiencing. According to Fire Ecologist Professor Bob

Sweeney: “we have built structures and now live in the

forest. Additionally, we have not allowed nature to manage

itself, primarily through normal fire cycles.”

If we as Europeans had not intervened, would natural

events have produced a healthier forest than we now reside

in? Have we mismanaged or “overprotected” our natural

resources, and, in doing so, placed our communities at extreme

fire risk? I believe so.

Through decades of aggressive fire suppression, the

normal fire regime has been altered, stands of trees and

understories have become overgrown, drought has stressed

the current stands, and now epidemic levels of insects and

diseases have come together to produce extensive forest

mortality. To the wildland urban intermix, or interface

communities, this poses an extreme fire risk.

Because wildfires do not respect political, jurisdictional,

or private boundaries, the fire issue becomes “our problem.”

No one agency or organization can effectively deal with the

magnitude of the problem, pre- or post-fire.

For this reason, we in the North Lake Tahoe Fire

Protection District, at the beginning of the 7-year drought,

began laying the groundwork for an intensive Defensible

Space vegetation management project.

In the major fires in recent history, we as incident

commanders were waiting for either the weather to change, or

the fire to run out of fuel. How successful are we at suppressing

fires in these unmanaged fuel accumulations? If recent history

is an indication, we are failing miserably, in lives lost, property

damaged, and extreme natural resource losses.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire Marshall, North Lake Tahoe Fire Protection District, P.O. Box 385,

Crystal Bay, NV 89402.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
40 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

property owners have an obligation to maintain their property

at a reasonably safe level.

We make sure that when you as the general public meet in

a building, and an emergency occurs, your expectation to “get

out alive” is met. When your next-door neighbor exposes your

home to an unreasonable risk, there is an expectation that we

can reduce that risk through some action on the fire prevention

office’s part. That’s the premise of “individual responsibility.”

When we looked at the fuels problem, we addressed it

from the same standpoint. Each individual property owner

had a shared responsibility to the community as a whole.

We looked at the problem from a worst-case fire behavior

standpoint and recognized that even if all 12,000+ (parcels)

property owners bought into the Defensible Space program,

they would still be at serious risk from larger property owners

like the USDA Forest Service and the Incline Village General

Improvement District (I.V.G.I.D.). The General Improvement

District owned the most hazardous drainages that intersected

our community, and the Forest Service owned steep sensitive

lands (Burton Santini lots) within and surrounding the community.

We additionally have an environmental regulatory agency

called the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (T.R.P.A.) that,

when we began our program, had a reputation for “not

touching anything green.”

As we began to meet with all the political and regulatory

agencies and the regional fire and forestry agencies, we all

found a common ground of concern, which was wildfire.

It was observed by all concerned that uncontrolled

wildfires could, and most likely would, impact all of the

differing agencies and organizations in some way. For

example, T.R.P.A.’s main concern would be the possible

impact to “water quality” following a high intensity wildfire,

and the associated erosion potential from damage to the

forest floor.

From my fire district’s standpoint, the potential losses to

lives and property within the community are the main concern.

The individual property owners are concerned about the

losses of homes and the long-term impact on today’s scenic

beauty, which would not return within their lifetime.

To say that all the agencies and organizations immediately

jumped into a cooperative effort in fuels management would

be an overstatement. We had disagreements, we struggled,

we built bridges and relationships over a long period of time.

We worked through “turf” battles, funding problems, general

apathy, and denial that we did not even have a fuels problem.

Eventually we developed a respect and trust for each other’s

points of view.

What got us to the present was the belief that the fuels

problem was “our problem” and that one agency could not

effectively deal with it alone. Other factors were my personal

commitment and determination to provide a better level of

fire protection to my community. I have been accused of

using a “bull dog approach” to reach that objective.

The cooperative effort began with my office joining

together with the University of Nevada, Reno Cooperative

Extension, in Incline Village. Ed Smith and I recognized a

need for a multi-agency approach. With fuels reduction as a

goal, one concern was how or why could or would the

agencies and organizations keep us from “reducing the fire

risk to our community?”

We had to inform, sell, and educate each agency and

organization that the common fire problem would affect us

all. We eventually were able to accomplish that objective.

Cooperators

Who were the key agencies, organizations, groups,

and individuals that have made our community-based

program a success?

Organizations and Agencies

• University of Nevada, Reno, Cooperative Extension.

• Sierra Front Wildfire Cooperators, Fire Prevention

Committee.

• Lake Tahoe Regional Fire Chiefs’ Association.

• Nevada Division of Forestry.

• USDA Forest Service Lake Tahoe Basin Management

 Unit.

• Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (T.R.P.A.).

• Incline Village General Improvement District.

Groups

• Neighbors for Defensible Space, Our Grass Roots

Community Group.

• Incline Village, Crystal Bay Chamber of Commerce.

• Incline Village Board of Realtors.

• Nevada Forest Stewardship Program.

• South Lake Tahoe Kiwanis (Dick Thomas).

Individuals

• Doug Clifford, and the Neighbors for a Defensible

Space Executive Board.

• Ann Johnson, Executive Director, Chamber of

Commerce, Incline Village.

• Nevada State Legislative Representatives.

• Nevada U.S. Congressional Representatives.

• Many Concerned and Involved Private Property Owners

in the Community.

• And many others, too numerous to mention.

Legal Issues

Cooperative efforts have resulted in adoption of two

important legislative acts that will allow the State of Nevada

to move forward in the area of fuels management. These

submittals were generated by my office, but would not have

been adopted without the cooperation and support of many

individuals and different agencies.

In the 1991 legislative session, the adoption of a “Hazard

Reduction” statute, N.R.S. 474.160, allowed my office to

require private property owners to remove hazards in a

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire
41 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

timely manner, or we could remove the hazards and lien the

property. My primary problem was that under currently

adopted fire codes, I could not issue citations across state

lines. The major problem was that our community has many

out-of-state, absentee property owners.

In the 1993 legislative session, we were successful in

getting “Prescribed Burning” legislation passed. Prior to this

legislation, prescribed burning was not even mentioned in

the State of Nevada fire and forestry laws.

Summary

Cooperative efforts are what have made our community’s

Defensible Space program a regional role model. We would

not have accomplished what we have, to date (and we are not

finished yet), without cooperation from many agencies,

organizations, and individuals.

We at this conference all know and understand the

dangers that we face in the future for having tinkered with

the ecological system that poses the wildfire risk to our

forests and communities.

Each of the guest speakers and all of us at this conference

seem to be like the “preacher, preaching to the choir.” The

main goal of these conferences is to share ideas and methods

in fuels management and the latest technology to manage

them, but in order to do so, we all need to accomplish more

results in the fuels problem area. Each year improvements

are made in the fuels management area in our agencies and

organizations, but they seem very slow when contrasted

with the accumulating losses in lives, property, and natural

resources each heavy fire season.

We as organizations need to make use of all the

tremendous amount of individual knowledge and brilliant

people that I meet at these conferences each year and join

forces to “educate the budgetary, policy and decision makers”

that fuels management is the more cost- efficient way to deal

with the mounting wildfire problem.

Let me close with an example of “recorded total losses”

in the Cleveland Fire, Eldorado National Forest, September

1992. High winds, low humidity, steep terrain, and heavy

concentrations of forest fuels with extremely low fuel moisture

content, contributed to problems with long-range spotting.

The fire’s final size was 24,500 acres.

In 1992, the Cleveland fire caused the nation’s largest

wildland fire loss (Sullivan 1993).The recorded loss totaled

at $245,325,000, which does not include the $16.5 million in

suppression costs and the loss of two lives (air tanker pilots).

The breakdown is as follows:

41 homes and structures $3,500,000

Private/timber stand losses 230,000,000

Marketable bio-mass 1,000,000

Revegetation/slope stabilization 2,000,000

Pacific Gas & Electric, utilities 7,000,000

Sacramento Municipal

 Utilities Dist. (SMUD) 175,000

Caltrans, roads, signs, infrastructure 250,000

D.C. Air Tanker 1,000,000

(missing item) 400,000

Total: $245,325,000

Additionally there were 72 injuries with no recorded

costs associated to them. These losses plus the suppression

costs average out to approximately $10,683 per acre.

In these days of cutbacks, budget reductions, and doing

more for less, can we afford these “fires of the future”?

Should we not be reviewing the past to learn and better

define a strategy for the future, looking for the best approach

for the protection of lives, reducing the escalating costs in

property damage, and attempting to reduce the wildfire impacts

to our natural resources?

 References

Sullivan, Michael J. 1993. Large loss wildland fires in 1992 by listed $

loss: wildland fires. In: The National Fire Protection Association

(N.F.P.A.) Journal, Nov./Dec. 1993: 88.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Fire

PANEL DISCUSSION: Barriers to Fuel Management

One of the traditional roles that prescribed fire has played in

the fire management arena is reduction of hazardous fuel

buildups under controlled, well-defined environmental

conditions. However, our ability to use this tool effectively

is blocked by many barriers. The preceding panel discussion

about the causes of limited success in implementing

prescribed burning programs addressed some of the barriers

encountered by various types of governmental agencies.

This panel discussion focussed on three specific barriers to

implementing fuel management programs incorporating

prescribed burning.

Mr. Kenneth Blonski of the USDA Forest Service

described organizational barriers to implementation. Although

the specific examples are linked to the Forest Service, many

of the same barriers exist in other organizations. Ms. Anita

Ruud of the U.S. Office of the General Counsel described

legal barriers, particularly those related to liability issues.

Federal disaster assistance programs are viewed by some as

disincentives to proactive hazard reduction programs. Mr.

William Patterson addressed this issue and described new

Federal assistance programs. The following three papers

summarize the comments of the panel.
44 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Organizational Barriers to Fuel Management1

Kenneth S. Blonski2

may develop an economic basis for that strategy. Developing

a sustained management strategy that embraces and enhances

the fire-prone wildlands requires protection from the erratic,

political winds of change. The rhetoric of politically correct

environmental policy must be tempered with a realistic

view of the traditional fire suppression mission. Successful

future fuel management strategies must complement

protection needs and provide a smooth transition to sustained

ecosystem management.

Numerous obstacles to fuels management, such as limitedfunding and inadequate staffing, result from

programmatic conflict within the fire management mission

of the USDA Forest Service. Traditional focus on fire

suppression and the political realities of an extremely

competitive climate for available public funds underlie this

situation. As the Forest Service shifts its focus to the holistic

concept of ecosystem management that includes fire and

fuels management, agency leaders and resource managers

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Director of Fuels Management, Pacific Southwest Region, USDA

Forest Service, 630 Sansome St., San Francisco, CA 94111

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Barriers to Fuel Management
45 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Legal Barriers to Fuel Management1

Anita E. Ruud2

The law is a strict master regarding any kind of deliberatelyset fires. The value of natural resources and resource

management is low on the list of priorities for this state’s

lawmakers. BEWARE is the key word for those who dare to

challenge the traditional notion that all fires must be

extinguished immediately, except those within the safe

confines of your fireplace or backyard barbecue. In order for

fuel management with fire to be more easily utilized, the

laws regarding fire management and resource protection

will need to be amended to include the value of fuel

management as a resource protection tool.

Federal Disaster Assistance Programs1

William J. Patterson2

The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and EmergencyAssistance Act—Public Law 93-288, as amended—is

designed to provide support and assistance to citizens, state,

and local government from catastrophic disasters and

emergencies. The law provides support in three distinct

phases, including preparedness in avoiding or minimizing

the effect of a disaster, response support during the disaster,

and recovery from the emergency. This law has several

interesting and unique features relating to fire disasters.

Although most disaster assistance requires a presidential

declaration, fire is recognized as a special type of disaster. If

fire threatens to become a disaster, assistance can be provided

to prevent such a disaster. Special rules relate to these

predisaster fire emergencies. Some provisions of the law

have led to questions regarding its effectiveness in mitigating

fire problems. The hazard mitigation provision of the law

provides the opportunity to raise critical issues and funding

support to address many important areas. Whether the

mitigation provisions of the law are being used most

effectively in meeting the continuing threat of wildfire in

California and the nation as a whole needs to be studied.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Deputy Attorney General in the Office of the Regional Attorney General,

455 Golden Gate Ave., Rm. 6200, California Department of Justice, San

Francisco, CA 94102.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire and Hazardous Materials Program Manager, Region 9, Federal

Emergency Management Agency, San Francisco, CA 94129.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Barriers to Fuel Management

CONCURRENT SESSION I—Wildland Ecosystem Topics
48 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
49 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Tom Nichols2

More than 25 years ago, the pioneering work in fireecology by Harold Biswell and others encouraged the

incorporation of prescribed fire into fire management policies.

However, the use in California of prescribed fire in fuels

treatment, wilderness management, or ecosystem maintenance

programs has not been particularly extensive. Only a fraction

of wilderness areas, for example, have a prescribed natural

fire program. In forests and brushlands around the State,

natural and activity fuels continue to accumulate, and wildfires

are becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible in

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Prescribed Fire Specialist, Western Region, USDI National Park Service, 600 Harrison, Suite 600, San Francisco, CA 94107.

some situations, to suppress. Reasons for the gap between

land management objectives and results with regard to

prescribed fire include lack of interagency planning and

communication, internal agency differences in resource

management objectives, limitations on funding availability,

and estimating the behavior of long-term prescribed fires,

particularly those occurring in wilderness areas. Prescribed

fire remains an important land management tool. The activity,

however, of prescribed fire programs will depend on the

solution of many issues that constrain its application. The

ideas of the various speakers and the discussion that is

stimulated should provide much food for thought.

Fire in Wildland Ecosystems—Opening Comments1

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
50 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
51 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

that encompasses more than one million continuous acres in

the Sierra Nevada.

In the Central Sierra Nevada, National Forest wilderness

areas and National Parks adjoin along common boundaries.

These boundaries were established for a variety of

administrative reasons and may or may not make sense

when managing a prescribed natural fire. In this area, the

National Park Service currently operates with approved Fire

Management Plans allowing for PNF in wilderness areas.

The Forest Service is in the plan development stage. In this

current situation, park fire managers have to manage natural

ignitions according to current agency procedures and

restrictions if the natural ignition is close to the park/forest

boundary. Generally, this includes taking full control actions

before the PNF threatens the boundary.

Once the Forest Service Wilderness Fire Plan is

implemented and the Park Service’s Fire Management Plans

are amended, the ability to manage PNF across administrative

boundaries will be greatly enhanced. Management of

prescribed natural fire across the entire Sierra Nevada

wilderness ecosystem will become a reality.

Principles for Successful Interagency

Planning

There are several important elements in planning for a

successful wilderness prescribed natural fire program that

transcends agency and administrative boundaries. These keys

to success are common to any successful relationship, whether

interagency, interdepartmental, or interpersonal. They work

in a variety of situations, at any level, where people cooperate

to achieve a common goal.

To develop a successful, unified PNF program, a

considerable personal time commitment by the fire manager

is required. This personal commitment requires regular visits

between line officers, staff officers, and fire managers in

both agencies. Successful personal interaction should be

more than just an occasional telephone call or messages sent

via electronic mail. This interaction must be face to face.

Personal visits must be made with consistency, with the goal

of getting to know and understand each other and each

other’s agency policies and procedures. This commitment is

time well spent, with rewards and dividends in successful

interagency coordination in the wilderness fire program.

After establishing a strong professional relationship with

the adjoining agency’s fire staff, the fire manager must make

a concerted effort to learn and understand land management

and fire policies, procedures, and goals of the neighboring

Abstract: Wilderness fire managers are often confronted with

natural fire ignitions that start and/or burn near an adjoining agency’s

wilderness area boundary. Management strategies for prescribed

natural fires (PNF) are often developed using the adjoining agency’s

wilderness boundary as the maximum allowable perimeter (control

line) for the PNF. When this occurs, fire’s natural role in the

wilderness ecosystem may be restricted. The difficulty of burning

near another agency’s jurisdictional boundary can be overcome by

strong planning, close communications, and timely coordination

between the two affected agencies. Communications and coordination can be achieved only through developing and maintaining a

strong working relationship with the fire manager of the adjoining

agency. Keys to good interagency coordination are (1) investing

time, (2) understanding the policies and procedures of the adjoining agency, (3) developing and maintaining open communications,

and (4) having a commitment to see it succeed.

I

nteragency management of prescribed natural fire (PNF)

in federally managed wilderness areas is not new. It has

occurred on a limited basis in several areas of the country

between adjoining agencies for many years, often with very

successful results. But there are many areas where PNF has

not been attempted because of the complexities of planning

and managing a PNF that may cross interagency boundaries.

One of the recommendations of the 1988 Fire Policy review

was that the federal agencies needed to do a much better job

of planning and coordinating their efforts during actual fire

management activities, including prescribed natural fire. This

paper is meant to share some observations on the subject of

interagency cooperation and coordination in the management

of prescribed fire in federally managed wilderness areas. I

acquired experience while serving as team leader for

developing a complex Wilderness Fire Plan, in which a PNF

may be allowed to burn adjacent to administrative boundaries,

and/or in which a PNF may be allowed to cross an

administrative boundary from one agency’s lands to another.

In this paper, I will be addressing my experiences in

planning for PNFs that may occur close to the administrative

boundaries that exist between the USDA Forest Service

(Sierra, Inyo, and Sequoia National Forests) and the USDI

National Park Service (Sequoia-Kings Canyon and Yosemite

National Parks). This is a federally managed wilderness area

Interagency Wilderness Fire Management1

Jim Desmond2

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17,1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire Management Officer, USDI National Park Service, Ozarks National

Scenic Riverways, P.O. Box 490, Van Buren, MO 63965.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
52 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

agency. Not only must fire managers understand written

policy and procedures, they must seek to understand the

management style and philosophy of the adjoining line officers

(i.e., Park Superintendent or Forest Supervisor) and their

fire staff. All line officers and fire managers bring a certain

amount of their own philosophy, values, and ideas into

managing the wilderness resource, and it is very important

to identify these early. Knowing and understanding the

policies, procedures, and personalities of the adjoining agency

is very important to successful interagency coordination.

Another key to success is to establish and maintain strong

communications with the adjoining land management agency.

“Communications” is defined as more than just talking; it is

expressing oneself effectively. Communications must be open,

truthful, and unselfish. An effective communicator is not

only a good speaker, but also a good listener.

Probably the most important key to success in developing

interagency cooperation in PNF is making the personal

commitment to see it succeed. The fire manager has to

eliminate the “us versus them” attitude and establish a

“teamwork” philosophy. The fire manager must be selfless

in his concerns for the success of the overall wilderness

PNF program. The fire manager must give 100 percent

effort. Personal and agency pride and even “agency

arrogance” must be set aside in order for interagency

cooperation to succeed. The fire manager must believe

from the outset that the interagency wilderness fire program

will succeed.

These four keys to success can be easily used in planning

a cooperative interagency PNF program. Planning requires

a time investment, an understanding of each other’s policies,

open communications, and a commitment to success.

Implementing Principles

into PNF Planning

Early on in the development of the Wilderness Fire

Plan for the John Muir, Ansel Adams, Dinkey Lakes, and

Monarch Wilderness areas, it was recognized that adjoining

National Parks (Yosemite and Sequoia-Kings Canyon) had

a vested interest in what the Forest Service was planning in

their wilderness fire plan. A representative from the USDI

National Park Service was invited to become an active

participant and adviser to the USDA Forest Service

Wilderness Fire Planning Team. This Park Service

representative attended all planning sessions and had the

opportunity to review and comment on all proposals to the

plan. This interagency coordination effort was able to spot

potential problems in the plan early in the draft process.

Other small procedural problems, terminology changes, and/

or policy conflicts were addressed during this planning

phase. As a result of this interagency planning team, many

of the following procedures were developed to manage the

complexities of PNF’s that occurred adjacent to or across

administrative boundaries.

During the development of the Forest Wilderness Plan,

it was determined that each central Sierra Nevada forest

(Inyo, Sierra, and Sequoia) and each park (Yosemite and

Sequoia-Kings Canyon) will appoint one person to serve as

a Unit/Agency PNF coordinator. This group of five forest/

park liaison representatives will form the Unit/Agency PNF

coordinators group. These PNF coordinators will be the

primary interagency/intra-agency contacts in all matters

relating to PNFs once the John Muir, Dinkey Lakes, Ansel

Adams, and Monarch Fire Plan has been approved. (Note:

Both parks currently have approved Fire Management Plans

allowing PNF in their Wilderness Fire Zones). Once the plan

is operational, the PNF coordinator will serve as liaison

between ranger units, forests, and parks.

The Unit/Agency PNF coordinators group’s duties and

responsibilities will include attending pre-season planning

and post-evaluation of the area-wide PNF program. The

forest PNF coordinator will coordinate funding needs and

requests before placing natural ignitions in PNF status. The

coordinators may assist individual ranger units in ordering

equipment, crews, and qualified personnel to manage PNF’s.

They will monitor forest-wide PNF activity and may serve

as advisers to the district fire managers. The Unit/Agency

PNF coordinator will serve as the interagency/intra-agency

contact on any boundary fire between either two ranger

units, two forests, or between a forest and a park. The Unit/

Agency PNF coordinator will be the chief adviser to the

appropriate line officer and forest management team.

Interagency coordination is of critical importance in

natural ignitions or fires that are close to administrative

boundaries. Any natural ignition or fire that is within 2 miles

of the administrative boundary will be called a “boundary

fire.” The agency on which the fire is burning is called the

“lead agency.” The agency across the boundary will be

known as the “adjoining agency.” Any potential PNF within

the boundary zone will require the following: (1) “lead

agency” notifies “adjoining agency” of situation, (2) “lead

agency” provides copy of PNF assessment and Burn Plan

including map of maximum allowable perimeter (MAP) to

“adjoining agency,” (3) allows the “adjoining agency” to

provide input to management and strategy of the boundary

PNF. This initial coordination should take place within 24-

36 hours.

A second classification for a “boundary fire” is one in

which the ignition or PNF is of “immediate threat” to the

administrative boundary. This is generally considered within

0.25 mile of the boundary line. When an ignition is within

this zone, both agency coordinators will perform the above

procedures, plus set up the framework for a unified

management team for the PNF, if it crosses the boundary.

At this point, we anticipated that there would be

exceptions to the above policy and procedures. Examples of

these exceptions are: when the ignition or fire is a “single

tree in the rocks,” or when the PNF has little potential to

cross the boundary because of significant natural barriers.

Unit/Agency PNF coordinators are required to come to a

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
53 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

mutual agreement on the strategy and tactics on any ignitions

or fires within the boundary zone. Again, the key is timely

coordination and good communications between the Unit/

Agency PNF coordinators.

Several other procedures concerning “boundary fires”

were adopted by the planning team and incorporated into the

Forest Service Wilderness Fire Plan. The following are

examples of a few.

If any circumstance (i.e., political concerns, lack of

funding, shortage of qualified personnel, etc.) occurs in

which the “adjoining agency” feels uncomfortable in allowing

the PNF to burn within the boundary zone, the “boundary

fire” will be managed in appropriate suppression response

(confine, contain, or control). Both agencies must be unified

in their willingness to proceed in allowing a “boundary fire”

to burn naturally within the confines of the plan.

Boundary PNF’s that burn on both agencies’ lands

simultaneously may require separate documentation and recordkeeping systems. Each unit will maintain its own PNF file.

This file will contain documents that are specific to agency

needs and requirements. Agencies are encouraged to share

maps, observations, and other forms of intelligence gathered.

Daily revalidation of “boundary fires” will require line

officer signatures. If the PNF is burning on both agencies’

lands at once, line officers of both agencies will be required

to sign off each day as agency policy requires. Each agency

will use its own forms and procedures for this daily requirement.

The utilization and coordinated use of aircraft, organized

crews, and miscellaneous resources for monitoring and/or

holding may be negotiated during the preliminary decision

analysis of the PNF. Unit/Agency PNF coordinators will

share in formulating these agreements.

Conclusion

The time investment, an understanding of others’ policies

and procedures, strong communications, and a commitment

to see interagency coordination succeed do not end when the

Fire Management Plan is approved. Planning is a process

that makes land management decisions and outlines how

those decisions are to be implemented. Good planning can

be rendered useless by poor execution.

The wilderness fire manager must maintain a close

relationship with neighbors by continuing a strong commitment

to interagency cooperation and coordination. As stewards of

the wilderness resource we should strive for no less.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
54 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
55 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

FARSITE: A Fire Area Simulator for Fire Managers1

Mark A. Finney2

Abstract: A fire growth model (FARSITE) has been developed

for use on personal computers (PC’s). Because PC’s are commonly used by land and fire managers, this portable platform

would be an accustomed means to bring fire growth modeling

technology to management applications. The FARSITE model is

intended for use in projecting the growth of prescribed natural fires

for wilderness areas. The PC model requires the support of a

geographic information system (GIS) to manage and provide landscape data. FARSITE currently uses a stream of weather and wind

changes along with landscape data downloaded from the GIS to

model fire growth.

Computerized fire growth models have been the subjectof research for about 20 years. Despite numerous

management applications (Andrews 1989), these models still

remain largely in the realm of research. Some obstacles to

implementing a fire growth model for management purposes

have been technological; different approaches to developing

a realistic model for simulating wildland fire spread and

behavior have different technical problems to overcome.

Practical limitations have also created obstacles, mainly with

the availability of computer hardware and software as well

as landscape data. Until recently, computers and geographic

information systems (GIS) with adequate spatial coverage of

the themes necessary for running a fire growth model have

not been widely available to potential users.

Many of these difficulties are no longer limiting. Advances

in computer technology and increasing prevalence of GIS no

longer impede the transfer of fire growth modeling technology

to user applications. Personal computers are now commonplace

and a familiar tool for most managers. These computers are

thus a logical platform for a fire growth model that can be

easily accepted in an accustomed environment.

 This paper briefly describes an implementation of the

FARSITE Fire Area Simulator designed for fire management

uses on a personal computer.

Fire Growth Models

The FARSITE model uses Huygens’ principle of wave

propagation (Richards 1990) to expand fire fronts. This

method, named for the 17th century Dutch mathematician

who studied light waves, treats fire as a wave that spreads

using points on its edge as independent sources of new

wavelets. The approach was first used by Sanderlin and

Sunderson (1975) and Sanderlin and Van Gelder (1977) to

model fire growth (other methods using Huygens’ principle

in fire modeling were described by Anderson and others

1982, Beer 1990, French and others 1990, Richards 1990,

Knight and Coleman 1993, Wallace 1993). The Huygens’

approach differs from models based on “cellular automata”

that spread fire as a contagion process between cells of a

regular grid (Green 1983, Green and others 1983, Kourtz

and O’Reagan 1971, Kourtz and others 1977). The cellular

automata approach has been pursued by many researchers,

too numerous to mention here. Models based on Huygens’

principle are well suited to the relatively limited resources

of personal computers. Huygens’ principle requires

information only from points on the fire edge. This makes

efficient use of computer time and memory compared to

cellular models. In cellular models, distortions to the fire

shape resulting from the grid must be minimized by

calculating fire spread to unburned cells within a wide radius

of each active cell (French 1992).

The applicability of Huygens’ principle to fire growth

modeling has been demonstrated by a number of studies.

Although they have not been comprehensively validated,

fire spread patterns predicted by models using Huygen’s

principle have generally agreed with those observed

(Anderson 1982, Finney 1994, French 1992, Sanderlin and

Sunderson 1975). Many validations will eventually be needed

for defining the strengths and weaknesses of these models.

Features of FARSITE

In general, Huygens’ principle enables a logical

implementation of existing fire behavior models. Each point

on the fire front contains information on the time, direction,

and rate of fire spread. These are essential components of

existing models of surface fire spread, fire acceleration,

crown fire and transition to crown fire, as well as spotting.

FARSITE incorporates models for surface fire spread

(Andrews 1986, Rothermel 1972) as well as transition to

crown fire and crown fire spread (Rothermel 1991, Van

Wagner 1977, 1993 ) and spotting distances.

A user interface for the FARSITE model has been

developed for the Microsoft WINDOWS operating

environment. This graphical interface allows considerable

device independence among the widely varying hardware

capabilities of personal computers. The FARSITE model

requires the user to identify the data files (containing

landscape, weather, and wind data). The mouse control

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Research Scientist, Systems for Environmental Management, P.O. Box

8868, Missoula, MT 59807.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
56 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

References

Anderson, D.H.; Catchpole, E.A.; DeMestre, N.J.; Parkes, T. 1982.

Modeling the spread of grass fires. J. Austal. Math. Soc. (Ser. B.) 23:

451-466.

Andrews, P.L. 1986. BEHAVE: fire behavior prediction and fuel

modeling system-BURN subsystem, Part 1. USDA For. Serv. Gen.

Tech. Rep. INT-194.

Andrews, P.L. 1989. Application of fire growth simulation models in

fire management. Proc. 10th Conf. Fire and Forest Meteorology,

Ottawa Canada; 317-321.

Beer, T. 1990. The Australian National Bushfire Model Project.

Mathematical and Computer Modelling 13(12): 49-56.

Finney, M.A. 1994. Modeling the spread and behavior of prescribed

natural fires. In: Proc. 12th Conf. Fire and Forest Meteorology, Jekyll

Island GA. In press.

French, I.A.; Anderson, D.H.; Catchpole, E.A. 1990. Graphical simulation of

bushfire spread. Mathematical and Computer Modelling 13(12): 67-71.

French, I.A. 1992. Visualisation techniques for the computer simulation

of bushfires in two dimensions. University of New South Wales,

Australian Defence Force Academy. M.S. Thesis.

Green, D.G. 1983. Shapes of simulated fires in discrete fuels. Ecological

Modelling 20: 21-32.

Green, D.G.; Gill, A.M.; Noble, I. R. 1983. Fire shapes and the adequacy

of fire-spread models. Ecological Modelling 20: 33-45.

Knight, I.; Coleman, J. 1993. A fire perimeter expansion algorithm

based on Huygen’s wavelet propagation. International Journal of

Wildland Fire 3(2): 73-84.

Kourtz, P.; O’Reagan, W.G. 1971. A model for a small forest fire to

simulate burned and burning areas for use in a detection model.

Forest Science 17(2): 163-169.

Kourtz, P.; Nozaki, P; O’Regan, W. 1977. Forest fires in the computer–

A model to predict the perimeter location of a forest fire. Fisheries

and Environment Canada. Inf. Rep. FF-X-65.

Richards, G.D. 1990. An elliptical growth model of forest fire fronts

and its numerical solution. Int. J. Numer. Meth. Eng. 30: 1163-1179.

Rothermel, R.C. 1972. A mathematical model for predicting fire spread

in wildland fuels. USDA For. Serv. Res. Pap. INT-115.

Rothermel, R.C. 1991. Predicting behavior and size of crown fires in the

northern Rocky Mountains. USDA For. Serv. Res. Pap. INT-438.

Sanderlin, J.C.; Sunderson, J.M. 1975. A simulation for wildland fire

management planning support (FIREMAN): Volume II. Prototype

models for FIREMAN (PART II): Campaign Fire Evaluation.

Mission Research Corp. Contract No. 231-343, Spec. 222. 249 p.

Sanderlin, J.C.; Van Gelder, R.J. 1977. A simulation of fire behavior

and suppression effectiveness for operation support in wildland

fire management. In: Proc. 1st Int. Conv. on mathematical modeling,

St. Louis, MO; 619-630.

Van Wagner, C.E. 1977. Conditions for the start and spread of crownfire.

Canadian Journal of Forest Research 7: 23-24.

Van Wagner, C.E. 1993. Prediction of crown fire behavior in two stands

of jack pine. Canadian Journal of Forest Research 23: 442-449.

Wallace, G. 1993. A numerical fire simulation model. International

Journal of Wildland Fire 3(2): 111-116.

mechanism is then used to input ignitions on the displayed

landscape. These ignitions can be points, lines, or existing

fire shapes (drawn as a series of line segments). In a similar

fashion, users can make minor modifications to the landscape

including control lines or fuel type changes. The duration of

the simulation is determined by the desired ending date and

time. Fire maps and area and perimeter data and graphs can

be output to files or printed. Current plans are to test the

preliminary version of FARSITE written for 32-bit

WINDOWS (WIN32s) during the 1994 fire season at

Yosemite and Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks in

California. The primary purpose of the test phase will be to

incorporate management suggestions for interface features.

The first general release of FARSITE for the personal

computer is scheduled for 1995.

Although fire growth models will likely make some

aspects of fire management easier, the true limitations of

these models will probably soon become apparent. Weather

forecasts along with the absence of 3-dimensional wind

fields in complex terrain are likely to be a major source of

error for a long time.

Conclusions

The transfer of fire growth modeling to user-applications

has recently been encouraged by new demands for managing

and researching ecosystem processes across landscapes. The

PC version of the FARSITE model should be helpful in

managing fire as a landscape process. When implemented

on other platforms, it may also be useful for simulating fire

as an ecosystem process over larger time and space scales.

Acknowledgments

This research has been funded by the National Interagency

Fire Center of the USDI National Park Service (NPS), through

a cooperative agreement with the USDA Forest Service,

Intermountain Research Station’s Fire Behavior Research

Work Unit, and the Global Change Program, USDI National

Park Service.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
57 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Abstract: Despite a quarter of a century of prescribed burning by

the National Park Service (NPS) in California, there is reason to

believe that the fuels situation is getting worse rather than better.

The area burned in the past 10 years has declined by 42 percent

compared to the previous 10 years. The total area burned per year

from wildfire and prescribed fire is substantially less than that

hypothesized in pre-European settlement times. Fuels within these

fire adapted vegetation types are increasing and creating conditions conducive to more high-intensity wildfires. The NPS is failing to meet its ecosystem management and hazardous fuel reduction goals and objectives. Obtaining the funding to treat these fuels

with prescribed fire has proven difficult. The NPS has developed a

project cost analysis system to ensure the effective use of existing

fuels management funding and is developing a comprehensive

cost/benefit analysis to help demonstrate the wisdom of investing

greater resources in prescribed burning and fuels management.

The National Park Service (NPS) has utilized managementignited prescribed fire (MIPF) in California for 25 years.

During the past 20 years, the NPS has prescribed burned

23,187 hectares (57,271 acres) in California parks, or 2.8

percent of the burnable area in those parks (fig. 1). For the

most part, these fires are ignited either to restore and maintain

natural ecosystems or to reduce hazardous fuels. Hazardous

fuels are defined as:

those which, if ignited, threaten public safety,

structures, facilities, cultural and natural resources,

natural processes, or permit wildfires to spread

across administrative boundaries (USDI National

Park Service 1990).

In reference to ecosystem management burns, NPS

policies state:

where fire is an essential component of the

ecosystem but cannot be allowed to burn as a

natural process because of management constraints,

fire is used as a tool to accomplish resource

management objectives. These objectives include,

but are not limited to, replacing natural fire,

maintaining historic scenes, reducing hazardous

fuels, eliminating exotic/alien species, and

preserving endangered species (USDI National

Park Service 1990).

Funding Fuels Management in the National Park Service:

Costs and Benefits1

Stephen J. Botti2

Figure 1–Management-Ignited Prescribed Fire, National Parks in

California, 1974-1993.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire Program Planning Manager, USDI National Park Service, National

Interagency Fire Center, Branch of Fire and Aviation Management, 3833

Development Ave., Boise, ID 83705.

Many of these burns are multi-purpose. A burn to reduce

hazardous fuels may also produce ecosystem benefits in

vegetative communities adapted to natural fire regimes.

Conversely, a burn to maintain the natural fire process will

prevent unnatural fuels from accumulating and thus avoid

the necessity of a burn to reduce hazardous fuels under more

difficult burning conditions. For this reason, the NPS funds

both types of burns with fire management funds, as part of

an integrated land management program. In an era of declining

budgets, different components of fire management compete

with each other for scarce funds. For this reason, it has

become increasingly important to quantify the relative costs

and benefits of the three components of NPS wildland fire

management: wildfire suppression, prescribed natural fire

(PNF) management, and management-ignited prescribed fire

(MIPF).

Liabilities and Handicaps in Fuels

Management Investments

Most people believe that wildfires should be suppressed

regardless of the cost, and this view has been reflected in

Congressional funding authorizations for many years. Since

society believes that the benefits of protecting lives, property,

and resources from wildfires almost always outweigh the

costs, Congress has placed no theoretical limit on expenditures

for “emergency” wildfire suppression. Even though the

appropriation for Department of Interior and related Federal

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
58 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

agencies contains an amount for emergency wildfire

suppression, additional funds can be transferred from other

appropriations as needed by the Secretary of the Interior. On

the other hand, prescribed burning, whether used for ecosystem

restoration or as a tool for reducing hazardous fuels, has

been faced with a more uncertain funding reality, caused to

some degree by ambivalent feelings toward its risks, costs,

and benefits. Although prescribed burning has broad support

among certain segments of the general population and park

visitors, it has rarely been viewed as equally essential to

wildfire suppression. The ecosystem benefits are somewhat

esoteric to most people and the long-term reduction in wildfire

threat may not be immediately apparent to the public or park

managers. Some people oppose the program because smoke

can affect neighboring communities and park visitors, or

because of fear that prescribed fires will escape.

The prescribed fire program is complicated by inherent

risk of fire escape and associated liability issues. Even if

wildfire suppression efforts fail to save resources and property,

there is a general reluctance among the public and the fire

management community to criticize suppression organizations

and personnel who risk their lives fighting wildfire. The

huge government expenditures for wildfire suppression also

rarely receive close scrutiny or critical analysis. This same

generosity is seldom extended to prescribed burning efforts,

however. If prescribed burns escape or smoke impacts become

intolerable, reputations can be tarnished quickly, and careers

adversely affected. This is one reason that evaluations of the

costs and benefits of wildfire suppression and fuels

management are not conducted on a level playing field.

Prescribed burning and fuels management are planned

investments that may not yield rewards for many years.

They are not emergency actions. Like most investments in

the future, investing in prescribed burning requires discipline,

a willingness to take risks, and a long-term perspective.

Status of Current NPS Fuels

Management

The Department of the Interior and the National Park

Service have invested far more in suppressing destructive

wildfires than in managing the fuels that produce destructive

wildfires. In fiscal year 1994, the Department budgeted $221.5

million for suppression and suppression preparedness

compared to only $12 million for prescribed fire and fuels

management. In California last year, the NPS spent $3 million

to suppress wildfires on 329 hectares (813 acres) compared

to $237,000 to prescribe burn 2,040 hectares (5,039 acres).

The relative costs for wildland fire management are $9,115

per hectare ($3,690 per acre) for wildfire suppression

compared to $116 per hectare ($47 per acre) for prescribed

burning. The total suppression cost was actually considerably

higher than NPS finance records indicate because the NPS

does not track the costs of firefighting resources contributed

by other federal agencies to suppress wildfires on NPS lands.

Although the investment in suppression response may look

out-of-proportion to that in prescribed fire, a true evaluation

of these numbers is not straightforward. It is to be expected

that the cost of mobilizing large numbers of suppression

resources for an unscheduled incident would be much greater

than the cost of staffing a planned and controlled prescribed

burn. What is not clear is whether an increased investment in

prescribed burning and fuels management would produce a

much greater corresponding reduction in suppression costs.

Other, more subtle benefits of prescribed burning, such as

the decreased probability of catastrophic wildfire threatening

resources at risk, remain to be quantified. Managers intuitively

believe that these benefits must exist or they would not take

the risks, but the lack of data or effective cost/benefit models

for prescribed burning diminishes our ability to present a

convincing case for increased support.

Are we achieving our fuels and ecosystem management

goals with the present level of program funding and

accomplishment? The same question can be asked another

way. What are the costs of not burning or of not burning

enough? To answer this question we must document both the

increased costs of wildfire suppression and real property

losses, which can be quantified economically, and the

intangible costs of natural and cultural resource losses. As

stewards of taxpayer dollars, we must also ask, “Is the current

prescribed burning program cost effective, or would a greater

investment in prescribed burning be more cost effective?”

Before answering these questions, it may be helpful to

evaluate the total influence of wildland fire within two

representative California National Parks. Wildfires,

management-ignited prescribed fires, and prescribed natural

fires all contribute to the fuels balance and vegetative

community structure in Yosemite, Sequoia and Kings Canyon

National Parks. These Parks provide good examples to study

because of their long history of prescribed fire management.

The past 20 years of combined wildfire, PNF, and MIPF

data from Yosemite reveal that the total area burned is only

36 percent of that hypothesized under natural fire regimes,

while at Sequoia and Kings Canyon it is only 22 percent

(figs. 2 and 3). The hypothesized pristine average annual fire

occurrence target is extrapolated from current knowledge of

fire return intervals within the vegetative communities in

both parks (Caprio and Swetman, in press, Kilgore 1973,

Kilgore 1981, Kilgore and Taylor 1979, Parsons 1976, Show

and Kotok 1924, Swetnam 1993, USDI National Park Service

1987, Wagener 1961). The continued existence of this gap

between pristine and modern fire regimes in vegetative

communities adapted to or even dependent upon recurring

fires is causing the NPS to drift farther away from its twin

goals of protecting people and property and preserving natural

ecosystems. As a result of this gap, hazardous fuels are

continuing to increase, increasing the costs and difficulty of

future prescribed burning projects, along with the cost and

destructive power of future wildfires. Analyzing the cost of

this gap should be a major focus of future research. The NPS

needs to know whether closing that gap would be a costeffective fire management strategy. At present, parks are

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
59 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

NPS developed three project analysis programs. In the first,

parks define projects through an on-line computer program.

Projects from all parks are compiled in a central database

and assigned priority points by the computer on the basis of

fuel type, fire behavior, values at risk, and legislative and

administrative mandates and complexity. This program also

contains a cost spreadsheet that displays costs stratified by

four cost categories and four phases of project development

and execution (figs.4 and 5). This program produces reports

that list all fuels and ecosystem maintenance prescribed

burning projects in priority order along with the requested

budget for each project. Using these reports, the national

fire program manager can easily allocate funds to the

highest priority projects according to the funds available in

each year.

Under the second program, parks can group projects

into multi-project and multi-year plans. This planning tool

allows fire managers at the park to define, and those at the

regional and national levels to understand, a park’s longterm strategy for fuels management and ecosystem

management prescribed burning. Multi-year plans that are

approved at the regional and national levels receive priority

for funding in future years. This planning strategy encourages

parks to develop comprehensive fuels management plans

and to receive assurance of year-to-year funding continuity

for well-designed programs. It also helps fire budget managers

to allocate scarce funds to those programs which will achieve

the most effective long-term results.

While these programs allow managers in the regional

and national fire offices to allocate funds to the highest

priority projects, they fail to address the issue of whether the

funding requests for high-priority projects are reasonable.

Funding itself is not a priority ranking factor and thus must

be considered separately. Projects of equal size in similar

fuel types with equal values at risk and equal complexity

sometimes vary dramatically in cost per hectare. Projects

vary from $1.20 to $42,000 per hectare, making it difficult

to decide what is reasonable without more detailed knowledge

of the factors causing the variation. Some cost variation

between projects is to be expected because of size, fuel

model, complexity, and other factors, but managers need to

quantify how much variation is acceptable for various types

of projects.

In order to solve this problem, the NPS contracted with

the Department of Forest Sciences at Colorado State

University for the development of a cost analysis system

(Omi and others 1992). They evaluated all project criteria

through a regression analysis to determine which ones

contributed most to cost variability, and used the results to

develop cost target zones for projects. The regression equation

captured 91 percent of the cost variation for hazard fuel

reduction projects and 82 percent of the variation for

ecosystem maintenance burns. The variables include criteria

such as project size, NPS region, fuel model, type of treatment,

natural resource values at risk, and the risk of fire escape.

The findings were incorporated into a PC-based computer

Figure 3–Wildland Fire Occurrence, 1974-1993, Yosemite

National Park

Figure 2–Wildland Fire Occurrence, 1974-1993, Sequoia-Kings

Canyon National Parks

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I

proposing to burn less area than is required to close the gap,

the NPS is funding less than the parks are proposing, and

the parks are carrying out only about half of the projects

that are funded.

Fuels Management Analysis Programs

The NPS has never been able to fund all of the fuels

management work requested by parks each year. In 1994 the

NPS was able to fund only 41 percent of hazard fuel reduction

projects requested by parks. In order to allocate scarce funds

to the highest priority and most cost-effective projects, the
60 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

just inside the upper end of the range or allowing costs for an

otherwise inexpensive project to escalate to the upper end of

a range.

Although these three analysis programs provide useful

tools for screening and ranking fuels management projects,

they do not provide a quantitative evaluation of programmatic

fuels management costs and benefits. A fourth analysis tool

is being developed to model the effectiveness of incremental

increases in prescribed burn funding in protecting resources

at risk, reducing suppression costs, and restoring natural

ecosystems. The model will identify the value of resources

protected, the long-term costs of the various alternative fuels

treatment programs, and the cost of projected suppression

response under various treatment scenarios.

By simulating wildfire suppression scenarios under a

variety of fuels treatment strategies, managers will be able

program used to screen all NPS fuels management and

ecosystem maintenance projects.

This screening program is just one tool for deciding

whether to fund a project. Projects falling within the 95

percent confidence range for costs of similar projects are

considered to be reasonable from a cost standpoint, but may

still be rejected on the basis of ranking score, regional office

recommendation, a park’s track record for project

accomplishment, or for other reasons. Projects rejected by

the screening program can still be funded if a park can

justify why the costs are unusually high.

The existence of the screening program has forced parks

to improve their estimates of project costs and to become

more cost efficient in order to stay within the target ranges.

Since the target ranges are unknown to parks, they cannot

manipulate the system by either reducing their estimates to

Figure 5–National Park Service Hazard Fuel Project Cost Estimate Program

Figure 4–National Park Service Hazard Fuel Project Ranking Program

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
61 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

provide managers with powerful tools for identifying

optimum program funding needs, formulating and defending

a fire management budget request that reflects those needs,

and allocating scarce funds to the highest priority needs.

Although there is ample scientific work identifying the

benefits of prescribed burning within fire adapted ecosystems,

further work is needed to monitor fire effects and model

how well the current and projected burning programs will

achieve goals and objectives. The comprehensive fuels

management analysis system being developed by the NPS

will help quantify the relative costs and benefits of wildfire

suppression and prescribed fire management programs. This

will help define true prescribed fire program needs, and

ensure the most efficient use of scarce taxpayer dollars.

References

Caprio, A.C.; Swetman, Thomas W. Historic fire regimes along an

elevational gradient on the west slope of the Sierra Nevada,

California. In: Proceedings of the symposium on fire in wilderness

and park management: past lessons and future opportunities; 1993

March 30-April 1; The University of Montana, Missoula, Montana.

USDA Forest Service, GTR 000, Intermountain Experiment Station,

Ogden, Utah [In press].

Kilgore, B.M. 1973. The ecological role of fire in Sierran conifer

forests: its application to national park management. Quaternary

Research 3(3): 496-513.

Kilgore, B.M. 1981. Fire in ecosystem distribution and structure:

western forests and scrublands. In: Proceedings of the conference:

Fire regimes and ecosystem properties: 1978 December 11-15;

Honolulu, HI. Gen. Tech. Rep. WO-26. Washington, DC: Forest

Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 55-89.

Kilgore, B.M.; Taylor, Dan. 1979. Fire history of a sequoia mixed

conifer forest. Ecology 60: 129-142.

Omi, P.N.; Rideout, Douglas B.; Stone, Jenna S. 1992. Final report:

cost controls in NPS prescribed fire management. Prepared for the

U.S. National Park Service, Branch of Fire and Aviation Management,

Boise, ID.

Parsons, D.J. 1976. The role of fire in natural communities: an example

from the southern Sierra Nevada. California Environmental

Conservation 3 (2): 91-99.

Show, S.B.; Kotok, E.I. 1924. The role of fire in California pine forests.

USDA Bulletin 1295; 80 p.

Swetnam, T.W. 1993. Fire history and climate change in giant sequoia

groves. Science 262: 813-960.

U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service. 1987. Fire

management plan. Yosemite National Park, National Park Service,

U.S. Department of the Interior; 131 p.

U.S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service. 1990. Wildland

fire management guideline: NPS-18. Washington, DC: National

Park Service; U.S. Department of the Interior.

Wagener, W.W. 1961. Past fire incidence in Sierra Nevada forests.

Journal of Forestry 59 (9): 739-747.

to determine which strategy will be most effective in achieving

the desired reduction in risk to resources and real property.

First managers will establish wildfire risk reduction and

ecosystem protection targets. For example, managers may

be willing to accept a 5 percent probability that wildfires

will destroy a value at risk. By modeling fire spread and

suppression response under alternative fuels treatment

methods, managers will be able to determine which method

will produce a fuels complex in which there is only a 5

percent probability that a wildfire will exceed suppression

capabilities and destroy resources at risk. The prescribed

burning projects necessary to achieve the target fuel complex

will be defined under a preferred alternative for the fire

management program. Subsequently, budget targets for park,

regional, and national hazard fuels treatment can be

determined by aggregating the projects identified in the

preferred alternatives for all programs. The simulation will

also display probable net savings in fire management costs

by comparing wildfire suppression expenditures to hazard

fuels treatment costs under various treatment alternatives.

Although the simulation and cost analysis have yet to be

designed, some of the possible tools they will utilize may

include:

• Data that monitor fire effects, indicating the changes

in the fuels complex and vegetative community structure

from prescribed burns under varying prescriptions. These

data can be used to identify the prescription needed to achieve

ecosystem management objectives and to provide fuel inputs

for a large fire growth model.

• Existing data in the current NPS fire program analysis

software that assess the degree of wildfire risk to natural

and cultural resources and real property in hazard fuel

reduction units.

• Data on wildfires originating inside and adjacent to

National Parks that could burn through hazardous fuels and

destroy values at risk inside a park.

• Programs to simulate the spread of wildfires under a

variety of hazard fuel treatments utilizing geographic information

systems and large fire growth models. These programs will

display the likelihood that such fires can be successfully

suppressed with the current levels of suppression resources.

• Databases on resources outside parks at risk from

wildfires originating inside parks. The decreased risk to

these resources from fuels management programs will need

to be considered in the comparison of total benefits to costs.

Conclusion

The completion of all four phases of the NPS

management-ignited prescribed fire analysis system will

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I
62 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
63 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Although recognized as an important tool for ecosystemmaintenance, fuels management, and a variety of other

purposes, the prescribed fire program in the Pacific Southwest

Region of the USDA Forest Service has been constrained by

several factors. These range from funding availability, to

debates on the effect of fire on the habitat of sensitive

species, to competition for resources with fire suppression

activities, to the lack of awareness at various levels in the

organization of the need for prescribed fire as a land

management tool. The Advisory Group for Fire in Ecosystem

Management (AGFEM) was established in 1992 to facilitate

the use of prescribed fire in the Region. Members of the

group were selected from a variety of backgrounds, such as

wildlife, fuels management, timber, fire management, air

quality, soils, and hydrology. The group has also worked

closely with the California Fuels Committee. The

interdisciplinary approach allows a fuller discussion of the

various concerns about the use of fire. These concerns have

been expanded into a list of action items that have also been

developed into an annual program of work. The work items are

expected to break down barriers to implementing a prescribed

fire program. For 1994, these included the development of a

fire awareness presentation to the Regional Management Team.

If supported by the Team, similar presentations will be made at

line officers’ and specialists’ workshops. Each member on the

AGFEM is a key contact for such presentations within his or

her own professional community. Other topics recommended

by the AGFEM include Minimum Impact Suppression

Guidelines for wilderness, a guide for developing wilderness

fire programs, review of proposed standards for prescribed fire

qualifications and training, and development of an annotated

fire effects bibliography.

Ecosystem Management Issues1

Jim Boynton2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17,1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Forest Supervisor, Sierra National Forest, USDA Forest Service, 1600

Tollhouse Rd., Clovis, CA 93612.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session I

PANEL DISCUSSION: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century

Even though many legal, social, and organizational

constraints affect prescribed fire programs, the ecological

and social benefits of such programs encourage their continued

existence (with or without modification). The form of these

programs in the next 10 to 50 years is pure speculation; but

we must speculate and project the programs, as well as

associated benefits and costs, since the ecosystems we manage

respond to fire on several time scales.

A panel chaired by Dr. Ron Wakimoto of the University

of Montana was convened to discuss projections about the

role and form of prescribed burning in the next century. The

five panelists were Mr. Jerry Hurley, Plumas National Forest,

Mr. Ishmael Messer, Santa Monica Mountains National

Recreation Area, Mr. Stephen Botti, National Interagency

Fire Center, Mr. Jay Perkins, Klamath National Forest, and

Mr. L. Dean Clark, Chiricahua National Monument. Several

current problems associated with prescribed fire as well as

future opportunities were presented, such as prescribed fire

as a landscape phenomenon involving multiple jurisdictions.

The following five papers present a summary of this panel discussion.
66 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
67 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century 1

Jerry Hurley2

more difficult. With more fuel for constructing fireline, higher

fire intensities keeping firefighters further back, and more

fires to contain or control, acres burned will only increase.

Fire modeling projections for areas with the mortality problem

show resistance to suppression will become 3 times greater,

acres per hour burned will increase 25 times, and spotting

distances will be 1.2 times greater (Page and others 1991).

This has been validated with two fires on the Forest in 1989

and 1990 in which both fires burned from 500 to 1,000 acres

per hour during peak periods with extensive crowning and

spotting. Demand for suppression resources is further

compounded by urban-rural interfaces in which suppression

strategies have changed from perimeter control that minimizes

acres burned, to exposure protection focusing on structures.

A Partial Solution

Because of the mortality rates, capturing the merchantable

timber value and reduction potential for catastrophic fire

became the objectives for the Plumas National Forest. The

USDA Forest Service began aggressive salvage actions to

remove the rapidly accumulating fuels and capture a

merchantable product. However, salvage operations alone

would not reduce the potential for catastrophic fire because

not all the dead and dying material would be removed. In

many cases it was less than 30 percent of the boles removed

with salvage. Areas and trees without merchantable sawlog

salvage did not require removal. Complete removal of dead

trees would not occur for reasons of economic viability,

access, equipment limitations, resource constraints, low

volumes per acre, large acre involvement, and rapid

deterioration of wood value. In fact, based on our projections,

fire potential was not reduced when salvage logging was the

only fuel treatment (Page and others 1991).

To treat more of the fuel problem and to reintroduce fire

into ecosystems, we proposed underburning as the preferred

treatment following salvage. Underburning also treats the

most acres for the dollar. We currently have about 80,000

acres covered by environmental documentation, including

surveys for archaeology and wildlife, authorizing salvage

logging and underburning. Of this, we currently have about

20,000 acres with approved burn plans.

In 1991 we began our fire reintroduction program. We

have since burned more than 2,000 acres, getting nearly

1,000 acres per year and working towards a target of 3,000

to 5,000 acres per year. We have burned from the road to

ridgetop on a southwest-facing slope for 7.5 miles along a

road that parallels a major recreational lake. We begin ignition

Abstract: Past experiences in prescribed burning are described, as

well as important factors for the continuation and expansion of

prescribed burning in California. These factors include: a) gaining

public acceptance by better identifying, managing, and communicating risks, especially the risk of attempting to exclude fire from

all ecosystems and the increasing risks associated with fires that

escape initial attack and affect air and water quality, forest health

and sustainability, habitats, costs, and firefighter safety; b) making

operational improvements by learning from past mistakes and

showing that we have learned to recognize and understand factors

that are common to escapes; c) better prioritizing of areas in which

to burn and broadening our views on project scale and focusing on

landscape; and d) more communication, education, training, prioritizing, and burning.

Natural fire is an ecosystem component, and prescribedfire, often emulating natural fire, is a management tool

to meet resource objectives. However, in the current state of

some ecosystems, prescribed fire may be the worst tool to

solve resource problems. Tools used in combination are

best, especially thinning with underburning. Once agreements

are reached on desired future conditions, tool selection

becomes easier. In addition, fire suppression will also become

easier if fire is considered part of the ecosystem, to reduce

the damage from eventual wildfires, thereby allowing better

use of resources.

The Fuel Problem

In 1989, on the east side of the Plumas National Forest,

the cumulative effects of past timber management practices

and fire exclusion policies became apparent, with consecutive

water deficit years, resulting in large areas of insect-created

mortality. Thousands of acres of dense, overstocked, dead,

and dying white fir stands now exist where open pine stands

existed at the turn of the century. Stand examinations showed

mortality varying from 50 to 80 percent in an area that is the

epicenter for lightning caused fires in California (Court 1960).

These dense and dying stands are now highly flammable,

prone to torching and crowning, and the creation and reception

of embers generate more spotfires, making fire suppression

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Zone Fire Management Officer, Quincy Ranger District, Plumas National

Forest, USDA Forest Service, 39696 Highway 70, Quincy, CA 95971-9607.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
68 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

in the spring, as the snow melts off the south slopes, working

from the ridges down slope. On one occasion we were able

to carry 1.5 miles of fire down the hill by using the workforce

of only six people.

Burning Into the Next Century—

Gaining Public Acceptance

So how do we continue to expand prescribed fire programs

into the next century, especially as our society becomes

more pyrophobic and the struggle to clean up California’s

air becomes more difficult? Most importantly we must gain

public acceptance and support. To accomplish this we need

to learn from our mistakes, and initiate a number of concurrent

actions, such as improving operations to reduce risk of

adverse events, working on a larger scale, and better

prioritizing projects for overall fire management effectiveness.

Gaining social acceptance of intensive fuels management

with large scale burning as an alternative is crucial to reducing

the number of catastrophic wildfires. Public perceptions

ultimately drive public land management. This should be

extremely clear to us in forest management after the

controversial clearcutting issue. To help facilitate public

acceptance we need to better identify, manage, and

communicate risks to homeowners, air quality regulators,

and legislators. In particular, we should emphasize the risk

of attempting to exclude all fire from all ecosystems. The

increasing risks associated with fires escaping initial attack

and their effects on air and water quality, forest health and

sustainability, habitats, costs, and firefighter safety must be

emphasized. We can only expect fires to continue escaping

initial attack, burning more acres and causing more damage.

The reasons are clear: higher fuel loads create increased fire

intensities causing more damage and lessening suppression

effectiveness. We need to change the public’s thinking from

acres burned to damage incurred. Are 10 acres of nonrenewable eastside forests equal to 10 acres of fast-growing,

easily-regenerated westside forest, or 10 acres of great basin

grass and sage? Do we care how many acres are burned, or

are we more concerned about how many acres are damaged?

When we overcome the air quality hurdle, major

opportunities will open up. I believe we can affect public

perceptions through information and education. I think the

public is smart enough to accept the differences between

smoke management and smoke prevention. Not only has

smoke been part of the ecosystem, but the volume and duration

can be managed with prescribed fire. Wildfires, on the other

hand, create more unplanned smoke because they burn much

more area and fuel. Toxic pollutants are also generated and

carried into convection columns when structures and their

contents are involved. The public needs to know that wildfire

smoke can be managed through fuels management.

Similarly we need to educate the public about wildfire

effects on water quality, forest health and sustainability,

and wildlife habitats. The public should not have to see

these effects for themselves to make logical choices about

forest health.

The public must understand the total costs of wildfires

and alternatives to suppression and their costs. In 1989, the

Layman Fire, on the Plumas National Forest, burned over

5,800 acres, most of which burned in the first 5 hours. It

cost about $8 million for suppression, emergency

rehabilitation, and reforestation, and about 30 percent of the

timbered land became incapable of regeneration because of

site degradation. For $8 million we could have easily burned

all the high- priority ground on the Beckwourth Ranger

District at least once.

The public should be aware of increased threats to

firefighters. As our forests generate more dead trees and

snags, the potential for loss of life from these silent killers

will only rise. Today there is a higher threat for loss of life

by firefighters from snags than from the threat of burnovers.

Contrary to what we sometimes hear on television, we can

predict fire spread direction and behavior. We can see buildups

and changes in the weather and fire. We cannot predict

where or when a snag will fall. At night we cannot even see

them. In these forests, if you construct line, eat lunch, or take

a drink of water, you may not even see, much less be safe

from a falling snag. There is no black, or safety, zone as

there is in a fire. How many acres will be burned if we cease

to suppress fires at night (usually the most effective time),

because of potential for firefighter fatalities from snags?

Thus, fire suppression—as represented in the figure of

Smokey the Bear—and a driptorch are not mutually exclusive.

They are both fire management tools to reduce loss and

damage of property and forest resources to catastrophic

wildfire. Just as we need Smokey the Bear for the fire

prevention program to reduce ignitions, we need prescribed

fire for the fuel management program to reduce damage

caused by ignitions that escape initial attack and that we

cannot eliminate. I think the public is capable of understanding

“good fire versus bad fire.” We have a responsibility to help

educate them about the options, costs, and effects; and they

should participate in risk decisions, because we cannot forget

that public land managers work for the public.

Operational Improvements

We will have to make operational improvements that

demonstrate we have learned from the past and from our

mistakes. Some indicators common to prescribed burn

escapes include:

• Planning Breakdowns—burn bosses should

participate in burn plan participation and in

planning firelines.

• Target Fixation—the pressure to blacken acres, to

get trees in the ground, or to light because the

crews are anxious, are reasons that burns have

been ignited and have contributed to escapes. We

must develop good resource and burn objectives

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
69 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

occurrence, and potential for catastrophic fire by watersheds

so that the the dollars we are allocated protect the highest

risk ground. My experience in fire management has shown

me that pouring millions of dollars into small timber sale

units for fuel treatment, or building non-strategically placed

fuelbreaks to keep suppression forces funded has done little

to affect large-scale fire. These small units did not alter the

wildfire behavior or reduce fire intensities, and stands still

suffered extensive damage. We need to develop projects that

are cost competitive, allowing us to treat the most acres and

the highest priority land.

Summary

The commemorative video took an important step with

its message for Smokey’s 50th anniversary by mentioning

“that the absence of fire is (sometimes) bad; that fire needs

to be part of the ecosystem.” Smokey and prescribed burning

are not mutually exclusive. Fire and fuel management were

once the street sweeper in the timber volume parade, but

have become the grand marshal of the forest ecosystem

parade, because land management agencies and society are

beginning to accept that fire and its related effects are

components of the ecosystem.

We must better display the alternatives and effects.

Although some air degradation may not be desirable, at least

when it is over we still have a forest or a home. If we do not

use all the fire management tools available to us, can we

continue to accept the increases in costs, damage, and losses—

including loss of firefighters—associated with wildfires?

Can we ignore the dynamics of ecosystems by trying to

manage them as if they were static; or by attempting to

manage for a single species to the extinction of their habitat

or the extinction of other species?

We have the information and the experienced personnel

to learn from our past mistakes. If we are going to affect

large-scale fires, we have to implement large-scale projects

in the right places. Numerous case examples show that

stands have survived loss to catastrophic fire when thinned

and underburned before the wildfire. We must begin

communicating, educating, training, prioritizing and burning.

We have a tool—prescribed fire—that is economically and

ecologically sound, and in some areas the public is demanding

we use it. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said, “the only limit to

our realization of tomorrow will be our doubts of today.”

References

Court, Arnold. 1960. Lightning fire incidence in northeastern California,

 1945-1956. Technical paper No. 47 - May 1960. Berkeley, CA: Pacific

Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station, USDA Forest Service,

U.S. Department of Agriculture; 21 p.

Page, James; Harrell, Dick; Hurley, Jerry; Deeming, John. 1991. Drought

mortality-measuring effects. A 1990 study of drought mortality on

the Plumas National Forest. Unpublished.

USDA Forest Service Smokey’s 50th Commemorative video. 1994.

and good prescriptions and follow them. Just

“black” is not an objective.

• Lack of Weather Information and Knowledge—

We need to maximize use of remote weather

stations and provide that information to our

forecasting services. Burning has been performed

without on-site weather from general forecasts

and no consultation with fire weather forecasters,

or worse, decisions were made by a person with

little fire behavior or weather training.

• Lack of Planning for Wind Events—Although

long-range weather forecasting is still an inexact

science, we know that during certain times of the

year we are prone to undesirable wind events,

including frontal and foehn winds. With some

experience and knowledge, we can generally

predict when and where these events will occur.

We can use that information in planning ignitions

and follow-up actions.

• Complacency—This has been a factor in the

planning, ignition, patrol, and monitoring phases.

When we fail to follow the basics with test burns,

or blacklines, or are complacent about patrolling

or weather monitoring, the potential for escapes

increases. Escapes, like fire fatalities, are not

only the result of one breakdown, but a

combination of events.

The application of prescribed fire is both art and science.

The decision to burn is inherently risky. Agencies must

provide the training, direction, and demonstrated support for

their personnel who have followed that direction, followed

approved burn plans, and made the decision with the best

information they had, even when the undesirable occurs. I

have never met a prescribed fire manager or burn boss who

wants an escape, or undesirable event. Similarly, agency

managers need to give equal emphasis to training and resource

allocations for prescribed burning.

The value of tenure can be very important to lessen

risks—not only tenure on the part of program managers, but

also with agency managers. High turnover is often associated

with a lack of skill, knowledge, or trust. Tenured managers

can provide program continuity. Tenure can provide better

local knowledge of weather and fire problems. Productivity

can increase and costs decrease as personnel become more

comfortable with prescriptions, ecosystems, and weather

patterns. Agency managers may also require fewer constraints

as their comfort and understanding increase with program

personnel. Escapes, undesirable events, and consequential

litigation can be reduced and risks lessened through

information sharing, training, mentoring, and tenure.

Scale

We need to broaden our views on project scale and to

better prioritize areas in which to burn through strategic

planning. We should set priorities based on fire regimes, fire

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
70 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Multijurisdictional prescribed burning programs are thefuture of fuels management for numerous areas. Many

agencies or departments have different mandates and policies.

Burn programs are carried out according to these policies.

These policies are often outdated and do not consider the

current urban/interface mix issues. Without a complete

understanding of the mission of our cooperators and assisting

agencies, fire managers will never be able to burn the acres

that need burning, including both the number of acres and

strategic locations of the burn sites. Why is a particular burn

project important? Will it truly protect natural resources or

downstream values? Will the project make a significant

difference in our protection program? Building resource

data bases, specifically accurate field-based vegetation maps

using satellite imagery, aerial photography, groundtruthing,

and other sources of data should be a priority for any

interagency ecosystem management plan. By combining

resource data, resource management programs, land-use

planning, development practices, and public education,

opportunities exist to promote environmentally sensitive land

use, while protecting resource values. For example, vegetation

information combined with fire history data can be used to

develop a more effective fire management and prescribed

burning program to better meet ecological and property

protection needs.

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2 Fire Program Planning Manager, USDI National Park Service, National

Interagency Fire Center, Branch of Fire and Aviation Management, 3833

Development Ave., Boise, ID 83705.

Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century1

Stephen J. Botti2

Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century1

Ishmael Messer2

Prescribed burning programs are likely to experiencechanges in the next 20 years as revolutionary as those

experienced in the past 20 years. During the initial phase of

developing prescribed burning programs for forested areas,

researchers and managers generally believed that prescribed

burning should be restricted to low-intensity surface fires,

and that such fires could reestablish natural conditions while

also reducing hazardous fuels to acceptable levels. It was

only after managers started implementing long-duration

prescribed burns covering several thousand hectares that

they started to understand the degree of variability in fire

behavior and effects that were both inevitable and desirable

in trying to reestablish natural fire regimes. That variability

increased the risks and potential liability of burning, and has

produced a growing conflict between hazard fuel reduction

goals and ecological prescribed burning goals. How this

conflict is resolved will strongly influence the future course

of prescribed burning programs. It could become increasingly

popular to minimize risks by implementing hazard fuel

reduction programs that do not promote a natural role for

fire in Parks, and may produce permanent, unnatural

ecosystem changes. This can be done by concentrating on

the fuel complex without regard for the ecological

consequences of the treatment. Constraints on prescribed

burning, imposed to minimize smoke impacts, impacts to

cultural resources, impacts to visitor use in wildlands, and

impacts to wildfire suppression readiness, are likely to

continue to increase, especially as the population continues

to move into the wildland-urban interface and parks become

increasingly isolated ecosystem remnants.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban and Wildland Ecosystems,

February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Santa Monica Mountains National Recreation Area, USDI National Park

Service, 30401 Agoura Road, Suite 100, Agoura Hills, CA 91301.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
71 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Abstract: Planning is an essential step in the process of getting fire

“back into the ecosystem.” The public needs to understand that fire

is necessary for a healthy ecosystem and an essential ingredient in

ecosystem management. The hazard of high fuel accumulations

coupled with risk of fire starts must be portrayed so that the public

understands what will happen when the next wildfire burns in our

backyard. Decisions will need to be made so that the hazards will

be mitigated and areas prioritized for treatment, despite limited

budgets. All professionals, and the public, too, who are working to

find the answers to healthy forests must work together to understand the role of the disturbance processes at work. Fire is a key

disturbance that must be considered in practically every landscape.

The future is now. We must plan to obtain funding toimplement the ecosystem management projects.

Conceptually, we have made tremendous progress. Before

ecosystem management became the current management

operating norm for the USDA Forest Service, pioneers in

the use and importance of fire blazed the trail. Those of us

who will carry the ecosystem management torch must give

thanks to the pioneers, such as Dr. Harold Biswell for his

work in the California Sierras and Bob Mutch for his work

on prescribed natural fire in the White Cap Wilderness in the

Bitterroot mountains of Idaho and Montana.

Recently, the Klamath National Forest committed itself to

determining the meaning of ecosystem management and

preparing the Forest for the 21st century. Landscape Analysis

and Design is the process that was developed because fire

analysis fits comfortably within it. The key to fire’s future

success is the incorporation of fire planning processes within

the context of ecosystem management—not as a separate process.

Predicting or projecting the future is a tremendous

challenge. The technology age is expanding rapidly. Current

research in modeling stand dynamics in conjunction with

different fire scenarios will strengthen our ability to understand

complex systems. The fire analysis used by the Klamath is

part of the Landscape Analysis and Design process. The

Klamath is confident that this approach will be useful in the

future and can adapt to changing science.

This paper will discuss the use of the Landscape Analysis

and Design process used on the Klamath National Forest.

Landscape Analysis and Design

The purpose of the Landscape Analysis and Design

(LAD) process is to provide a means by which forest

landscapes can be understood as ecological systems, and to

use this knowledge to help shape the landscape patterns

created through National Forest land management activities.

Fire is recognized as an essential component of the Klamath;

hence, fire is a primary element in the planning process.

The process is intended as a vehicle for implementation

of forest planning direction while ensuring the ecological

health of the resources. It provides the link between the

National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), by providing a method

for defining the desired condition of a landscape and

identifying opportunities to achieve and perpetuate the desired

landscape character as portrayed in the Land Management

Planning (LMP) document.

Summary of the LAD Process Steps

The first two steps in the process are designed so that

the landscape is described in the context of ecological

structures and functions. In the first step, the landscape

elements are described in terms of the vegetative matrix,

patches, corridors, and patterns. In the second step, the

ecological phenomena (referred to as flows) that move across,

or interact with, landscapes are identified. Fire, wildlife,

humans, and water are some examples of flow phenomena

that operate at a landscape scale.

Step three provides a sense of the complexity of the

landscape by describing the interactions of the flows with

the individual landscape elements, as well as the landscape

patterns. Individual flow phenomena have a specific way of

interacting with the landscape elements, and the landscape

pattern in aggregate. This interaction provides insight into

how the landscape functions as an ecological system.

Step four provides a framework for defining sustainability. Landscapes are not static; disturbance processes are

an integral factor in ecosystem sustainability. Characterizing

past conditions, processes that have created the present

conditions, and processes likely to affect future conditions

provides a sense of the range of variability.

In step five the desired condition is defined by first

establishing the landscape patterns and objectives found in

the Forest Plan. The applicable standards and guidelines are

evaluated in the context of the historic range of variability

defined in the previous step. The resulting desired condition

encompasses understanding of ecological processes at work,

as well as management direction.

1

An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire Planning Specialist, Klamath National Forest, USDA Forest Service, 1312 Fairlane Road, Yreka, CA 96097.

Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century:

The Role of Fire Planning1

Jay Perkins2

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
72 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Finally, step six identifies possible management

opportunities, by contrasting the existing condition to the

desired condition. Potential opportunities that achieve desired

condition objectives are delineated. The outcome of the

process provides a purpose and need for implementation of

individual projects designed to achieve, or maintain, the

desired condition of the landscape. This process can serve as

a catalyst to identify a full range of resource opportunities;

by reducing functionalism, planning efforts are better

integrated to provide a balance of resource outputs.

Scale of the Landscape Analysis

Because the analysis process encompasses areas roughly

between 10,000 and 100,000 acres, the level of detail will be

general in nature but considerably more detailed than the analysis

that led up to the Land Management Planning document. This

assessment of the landscape conditions serves to refine the

desired condition from the LMP, while defining management

concerns and issues before initiating the NEPA process.

The analysis record serves as a source document for

general characterization of landscape conditions and

interactions. It can be used during the NEPA process to provide

a framework for the generation of alternatives, and may make

recommendations where additional information and data are

needed to assess environmental consequences. Although a

more detailed analysis may be necessary for NEPA sufficiency,

that analysis can be focused on project- specific issues and

potential effects in subsequent NEPA documents.

Basic Information Needs

For every landscape, baseline information is necessary

to perform the analysis. Additional information that is needed

will depend on the flows, uses, and functions characteristic

of each individual landscape. The baseline information

includes:

• Land Management Plan map—Defines spatially

the management area allocations in each landscape.

General knowledge of land allocations for adjacent

landscapes is also necessary.

• Topographic map with transportation system—

Serves as a point of reference for unique features

or areas of concern, as well as general orientation

of the landscape.

• Aerial photos—Serve as useful aids that show the

latest flight lines as well as earliest photos; also

show obliques, orthophotos, SPOT images, and

flight lines taken just before and after major events.

• Vegetation map—(may be derived from timber

type or ecological type data).

• Fuel Model map—(forest crosswalk based on

timber strata characteristics).

• Fire Risk/Occurrence map—Based on Forest or

District information from fire history atlas.

• Fire Hazard/Fire Behavior map—Developed from

the fuel model map after initial field review;

combines fuel model with topographic features

of slope and aspect to show hazard potential.

Additional maps that will be of use throughout the

process include:

• Geohazard map—An LMP product or district

product in areas where additional field review has

been accomplished.

• Order 2 Soils—Particularly helpful if regenerability or productivity is a concern; LMP

information could be useful in a gross scale for

identifying unsuitable or incapable grounds.

• Plantation map—In landscapes with higher

proportions of managed plantations, silviculture

background information is a useful tool.

The initial planning meeting should identify resource

concerns specific to a landscape; including wildlife use, unique

features or habitats, human use patterns, or sensitive resources

(i.e., sensitive plants, soils, or cultural resources). Additional

needed map layers will be determined from this initial meeting.

This meeting should be scheduled well in advance of the

analysis process to provide sufficient lead time for data and

map preparation. This meeting is crucial also so that the first

steps in validation of map outputs can occur.

Team Composition and Function

The Forest has identified the need to provide consistency

to the process; hence, the formation of a core group. The core

group is composed of five people: a team leader, a writer/

editor, and three writers/specialists. This team goes to all of

the meetings irrespective of the Ranger District/landscape.

Key to the process is the Districts’ involvement. In

brief, they are the owners of the process and need to be

intimately involved in the process. Much of their project

funding will hinge on the outcomes of this process. The

Districts provide the ground specialization and “resource”

area familiarization. They also provide a key District liaison

to ensure the Districts’ needs are being met from the initiation

of NEPA through project implementation.

Fire Analysis

The fundamental information that is needed to analyze

wildfire susceptibility is an understanding of the fire

occurrence and the fuels (vegetation) situation on the

landscape. With these two elements, plus a sense of the

historic role of fire in pre-fire suppression, we can gain

an understanding of the susceptibility of the landscape to

fire and the likelihood of the severity of a wildfire when it

does occur.

The elements of this fire analysis within the Landscape

Analysis and Design process will center around the Klamath’s

most recent project, the Humbug landscape.

The Humbug landscape is situated due west of Yreka,

California and is administered by the Oak Knoll Ranger District.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
73 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Fuel Modeling

The very first step is to characterize the fuels on the

landscape. As mentioned previously, one of the very first

LAD products is the preliminary fuel modeling map. This is

built from the timber strata map from the LMP database

through a geographic information system (GIS). A first

approximation fuel map is created relating timber strata to

fire behavior fuel models. Ground verification is the first

task by the LAD team because the resolution of the timber

strata is not always sufficient for the analysis. The fire

behavior fuel models characterize surface fires. If the fires

reach the forest canopy, then the understory needs to be

analyzed so that surface fires that reach the forest canopy

are better understood.

The dominant fuel models in Humbug include:

• Fuel Model 1 (grass)—Globally changed to fuel

model 2, this model is still one of grass fuel but

with a tree or brush overstory. It mostly occurs

along the ridges of the landscape boundary. Fires

typically burn quickly in late summer.

• Fuel Model 5 (brush)—Globally changed to fuel

model 6, these fuel models are difficult to discern

from the timber strata information. It becomes

imperative to field verify as these two fuel models

burn differently. Overall decadence in the brush

types indicate model 6 would be the best descriptor.

The brush patches would require more detailed

assessment before implementation of a prescribed

burning project. Fire can be fast and intense.

• NCF (non commercial forest)—Without being

given a fuel model from the crosswalk, fuel model

6 best characterizes the NCF lands in this landscape.

• Fuel Model 11 (slash)—Attributed to older

plantations (>30 years), this fuel model has fuel

on the ground—probably from management

activities. These had to be attributed on a polygon

by polygon basis through use of the stand record

card system or field verification.

General assumptions are:

• Thinned stands—Remained as fuel model 11

because thinning slash in untreated stands creates

a slash fuel model.

• Poorly stocked stands—Combined with fuel model

6 because the assumption is the brush component

is the fire carrier. For the most part these stands

are >30 years old, presumed brush with decadence.

• Adequately stocked stands—Combined with fuel

model 9 because we assumed the litter accumulation is the fire carrier. Stands went into fuel

model 9 rather than 8 because the majority of area

had a high component of ponderosa pine.

• Timber fuel models (models 8, 9, and 10)—These

were left unchanged because they are highly

variable and no consistent assumption could be

applied to make changes. Stands will require

further refinement to develop burning prescriptions

that will successfully achieve objectives of cleaning

up ground fuels or understory regeneration without

exceeding acceptable levels of mortality in the

overstory component.

Other Fuels Characteristics

A factor not tracked in Humbug is development of

understory. Presence of an understory component in sufficient

quantities would create ladder fuels that contribute to crown

fire potential. This would place moderate hazard fuels (such

as 8 and 9) into higher hazard classes. This is an essential

piece of information that needs collecting. Many current

systems do not adequately portray the understory situation.

This item must be improved in the future. Crown fires are

the most destructive and have a serious impact on many

wildlife species that are currently protected by the Threatened

and Endangered Species Act.

Fire Hazard/Fire Behavior

Fire hazard/fire behavior is a derived GIS layer that uses

a slope map, fuel model map, and fuel model to crosswalk a

fire hazard. The crosswalk is a way of entering a look-up

table for the GIS database. This crosswalk and subsequent

crosswalks will be used for building GIS layers.

Three slope classes are used, consistent with the slope

classes used in the LMP geologic hazard classification (0 to

34 percent, 35 to 65 percent, and >65 percent). The Digital

Elevation Model (DEM ) information could be used to make

different slope breaks if necessary.

Each fuel model/slope combination found on the

landscape is run through the BEHAVE fire behavior program.

This is a modeling program that uses fuel model, slope, and

weather parameters to predict fire behavior and resistance to

control for suppression purposes. The 90th percentile weather

from district records are used to model late summer afternoons

typical of late August and early September. These late summer

parameters are used because they are the ones that cause the

most intense problems, burn the most acres, and have the

most significant consequences to firefighting capability and

dramatic fire effects to other resources.

The final product is another crosswalk created within

the GIS database in which flame lengths and rate of spread

are evaluated to determine resistance to control. BEHAVE is

used to build this crosswalk outside of the GIS system

because this capability is not yet available. The output is a

rating of low, moderate, or high fire hazard/fire behavior:

• Low—Flame lengths less than 4 feet and capable of

direct attack fire suppression with hand crews.

• Moderate—Flame lengths of 4 to 8 feet and capable of

direct-attack suppression efforts with equipment, dozers or

engines. Hand crews are not effective for direct attack

suppression efforts. Rates of spread greater than those that

the handcrews can contain in the low category.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
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• High—Flame lengths greater than 8 feet and require

air support or an indirect attack method of fire suppression.

Although flame lengths are generally used to define

hazard, some fuel models will have low flame lengths but

extremely rapid rates of spread, which will place them into a

higher hazard class. For example, in Humbug, fuel model 2

is a grass/low brush fuel model that never exceeds 4 feet

flame lengths, but the rate of spread is 114 chains per hour.

This exceeds the ability of hand crews, or equipment, for

direct attack without air support.

The derived layer incorporates the information into a

spatial display of hazard assessment for the landscape

providing the link to risk and the resource values.

Fire Risk/Occurrence

This map is based on Ranger District and National

Forest fire atlas information. We are still working on getting

this fire history process totally automated. The map displays

location of starts over a 60 year period for the Humbug

landscape.

Fire risk is based on the number of fire starts per 1,000

acres. Included in the calculation are the number of fire

starts, number of years of historical information, and number

of acres involved. The value derived corresponds to a

likelihood of fire starts per 1,000 acres. The risk ratings and

range of values used in the assessment include:

• Low Risk = 0 to 0.49—at least one fire expected every

20 or more years per thousand acres.

• Moderate Risk = 0.5 to 0.99—at least one fire expected

in 11to 20 years per thousand acres.

• High Risk = >1.0—at least one fire expected in 0 to 10

years per thousand acres.

Potential Wildfire Susceptibility

This is the end product of the assessment. By

incorporating hazard and risk, a matrix is developed that

displays the likelihood an area will be affected by wildfire.

The output is a tabular report identifying the number of acres

in each category, and a spatial display generated by a GIS:

Potential Wildfire Susceptibility Matrix

Hazard | Risk |

| Low | Moderate | High

Low | 1 | 1 | 2

Moderate | 1 | 2 | 3

High | 2 | 3 | 4

What Is Next

Evaluation of the various resource values and objectives

along with the wildfire susceptibility matrix can be used to

develop a fuels management plan that can best achieve the

desired condition for the landscape. Because all areas cannot

be treated at once, efforts may be focused on areas of greatest

risk to wildfire. The fire maps can also be overlaid with

other resource concern areas for the line officer to evaluate

priority areas.

Other uses of these resources include:

• Budgeting and identifying needs for priority work,

especially those that can meet several objectives in one treatment.

• Using the products of the system for educational

purposes to display the importance of incorporating fire

into the ecosystem.

• Demonstrating that more firefighting resources will

not provide the desired output. Fire needs to be an ally in the

management of ecosystems.

Summary

In addition to the fire planning process, we need to

address other issues as well. For instance, budgeting processes

must align themselves with the task of implementing

ecosystem management. If Forest Service budgets remain

resource-oriented, our publics may not be convinced that we

intend to change our way of doing business.

In addition, dynamic fuel modeling will need to be

integrated with temporal vegetation modeling. Traditional

fuel modeling will have to change concurrently because of

the greater need to study fuels vertically as well as horizontally.

Planning processes must follow the intent of NEPA and

be implemented in an interdisciplinary fashion. Fire planners

must share their knowledge of fire effects and fire dynamics

so that we can have a better understanding of all of the

interrelations that occur on a landscape. The search for

knowledge must continue and that knowledge must be shared.

References

Diaz, Nancy; Apostol, Dean. 1992. Forest landscape analysis and design:

a process for developing and implementing land management

objectives for landscape patterns. USDA Forest Service: Pacific

Northwest Region; R6 ECO-TP-043-92; 94 p.

USDA Forest Service. 1992. Our approach to sustaining ecological

systems. USDA Forest Service: Northern Region; R1-92-23; 26 p.

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on control of the timing and rate of progressive ignitions, or

firing. Fire as a tool is used only as a last resort.

Our transformation of this landscape compels a

redefinition of our prescribed fire strategies. Suppression

alone is a defensive strategy. For fire suppression we must

confine, contain, and control them (NPS 1991a). For

prescribed burning we depend on either management or

natural ignition. If tactics derive from strategy, then how do

we reconcile our actions to our policies?

Fire suppression works most of the time, but does not

work all of the time, particularly during the dry and windy

extremes of a site’s environmental range of conditions. During

these times fire is the enemy; it can become the fire demon.

We often must abandon exterior attacks upon fire flanks and

must defend positions of developed properties. We are dutybound to do so. The reassignment of firefighting resources

to the protection of human life and property further

complicates the control problems by an ever-widening

perimeter of uncontrolled fire. The command and operational

difficulties in these tactics are a recurring problem (Phillips

1971, USDA-USDI Task Force 1989).

We lack unified strategies to focus our uses of fire in

other than suppression modes. General Helmut Von Moltke

defined strategy as “the practical adaptation of the means

placed at a general’s disposal to the attainment of the object

in view.” Our lack is coordinated prescribed fire action on

the offensive end. We can take the initiative and use time to

our advantage. The firefighting tools and equipment we can

buy are stronger, and more powerful than ever before. Our

tools, and therefore our tactics, are evolving. But even with

limited resources we can at least apply a limited aim strategy:

for example, fuels management on key geographic positions

when the weather elements align to our favor. The principle

is to change weak fire defensive positions into strong (or

anchor) points at times of advantage to a site’s fire potential,

such as doing “off-season” controlled burning. As General

Patton used to say, “A good plan in time is better than a

perfect plan that is too late.”

The integrated STRATEGY I propose is a simple

synthesis of three common strategies for prescribed fire

management application. The use of these three strategic

profiles can provide priority and essential flexibility for

any jurisdiction to integrate with the suppression and

prevention programs for more effective wildland fire

management. The strategies serve equally well for

suppression or for prescribed fires.

Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century1

L. Dean Clark2

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2 Chief Ranger, Chiricahua National Monument, USDI National Park

Service, Dos Cabezas Rt., Box 6500, Wilcox, AZ 85643.

Abstract: General Helmut Von Moltke defined strategy as “the

practical adaptation of the means placed at a general’s disposal to

the attainment of the object in view.” Three strategies are needed

for a proactive posture of fire management in the 21st century. The

first is to improve positional defenses of human values at direct

risk of fire loss. This strategy addresses primarily fuels management at the interface. A second strategy is to improve safety and

cost effectiveness of fire management activities on the exterior

lines where rural and resources economics are the human values at

risk. The third strategy involves the dilemna of cost effective

wilderness fire management programs faced by land managers to

improve command, planning, logistics, and financing of interior

line prescribed fires (within administrative boundaries of public

lands).

I

 met Professor Biswell at Pinnacles National Monument

after he had written a USDI National Park Service (NPS)

prescribed fire plan for that unit (Biswell 1976). My job was

to implement that plan. Professor Biswell gave me a little

advice at the Pinnacles before doing the controlled burning

there: “Talk with the local ranchers—listen to what they

have to say.” My attention was turned to the winds (Schroeder

1961).

I presume to speak for those whose tongues are still. For

I have followed their paths and the ancient paths before

them. These words you may regard as an echo. An echo of

what the winds have whispered to me. Because to understand

the essential nature of fire, you must feel the winds. For it is

by such means that fire will return to where you stand and

listen. The “Cat-faced” trees are also a clue in my woods

(Swetnam and others 1989).

Our cultural focus with fields and fire is that we will

stop the fire if we do not want it or prescribe it as a treatment.

We prescribe a fire. An interesting story is the one that the

ancients of this land held, that Fire is in the Wood (Clark

1953). At the right time, by and by, it was let out. It went on

and on that way for a long time. The fires started one way or

another. The fact is fire was here, is here, and so are we.

What should be the form of these fires? Currently, we

have two choices. Our direct defensive strategy (Clar and

Chatten 1966) is to keep to a minimum the number of acres

burned and the extent of property and human losses. The

chances of success for our indirect offensive strategy depend

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
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Positional Defenses

This strategy directly protects life and property from

fire. Tactics for this strategy are the most varied, and by the

topography of most human developments, machineaccessible. The objective is to reduce fire hazards near

properties that are at risk to fire loss. The California Public

Resources Code 4291 specifies a vegetation clearance around

structures in the wildlands. The rule is 30 feet or more and if

uniformly enforced, it would work to reduce wildfire losses.

This tactic can be done by anyone or by any public entity on

owned lands, not just in California.

Many common problems of wildland fire protection

occur on a small scale that can be solved before a wildfire

(Moore 1981). The image of a design of concentric circles,

or ellipses, can be applied to fuel reduction areas around

structures, or developments, as fire protection buffer strips.

This protection concept can apply to timber plantations,

recreation sites, historic, natural or cultural resources as

well. The widest, or deepest, strips of modified vegetation

would be in the upwind, or to the downslope sides of the

values at risk to fire.

The limited aim of this strategy is to turn the most

vulnerable flanks of wildland exposures into positions of

defensible space under the worst case conditions expected

for a site. Use of public labor crews may be an option for

some areas.

Exterior Lines

Perimeter fire control is the basic tenet for effective

wildland fire suppression (Brown and Davis 1973). It is a

lawful assumption for controlled burns. The basic principle

to this direct strategy on the exterior line is to contain a fire.

Wildfire losses will be held to the minimum through timely

and effective suppression action consistent with values at

risk (USDI 1990). This strategy generally protects life and

property indirectly by stopping the spread of a fire.

The defined perimeter of each prescribed burn is the

line of “control” beyond which the fire is no longer controlled.

Currently, therefore, each controlled burn is an exterior line

action with all of the associated expenses.

Cooperation between neighboring agencies to agree upon

joint project areas on mutual boundaries can serve to “dissolve”

administrative boundary lines. An example of this planning

concept is the joint NPS-USDA Forest Service Lassen ParkCaribou Wilderness Fire Management Plan recently reapproved by Lassen National Forest and Lassen National

Park. Others are in development throughout the west.

Convergence of planning for wildfires and prescribed

fires can use existing escaped fire situation analysis (EFSA)

format as a basis for safer, more cost-effective resources

decisions. For multi-jurisdictional situations, the documents

must reflect the unified command structure of the planned

incident, and thereby provide strategic agreement in advance

of the inevitable need. These are “pre-attack” fire

presuppression plans and can be prepared as contingency

for planned or even on-going prescribed fires of concern to

managers. Powerful new tools using remote sensing

technology can help managers identify realistic fire

management planning units based on fuels and projected

fire behavior.

The concept of fuelbreaks as a pre-attack measure for

area fire protection can be beneficial (Green 1977).

Fuelbreaks emplaced upon geographic features such as ridges,

particularly along administrative unit boundaries, serve dual

purposes. The access to fires is at least safer for firefighters,

as well as being a clearly defined edge of a management unit

or a jurisdiction such as at Whiskeytown National Recreation

Area, and on the Stanislaus, Sequoia, and Sierra National

Forests. A successful example of this principle working in

practice was on the “Powerhouse” fire on the Sierra National

Forest in 1989. A flank of that fire was contained when it

burned into Jose Basin, a part of of the “Sugarloaf” typeconversion project from the 1960’s.

Area conflagration control and wildfire reduction on an

area could be improved by treating the areas contained

within the fuelbreak perimeters with controlled burning such

as on the “Grindstone” project on the Mendocino National

Forest. There are a multitude of resource benefits from such

programs on public lands in addition to fire hazard reduction.

Interior Lines

Interior lines as a strategic concept applies primarily to

large blocks of public lands. Areas that have few high-value

economic elements, and have high ecological significance,

such as wildernesses, parks, and monuments, are logical for

applications of large-scale prescribed fires. Indeed, both

Sequoia-Kings Canyon and Yosemite National Parks have

been at the vanguard of the use of fire as a tool in ecosystem

restoration and maintenance. Several Forest Service

wildernesses such as the Selway-Bitterroot, and the White

Cap in Montana are active with prescribed natural fire (PNF).

Wilderness should permit the role of natural processes

to the fullest extent possible without interference from man.

Yet each wilderness fire must be guided by a plan! We

should plan the fires to our capacities, for instance, scheduling

the ignitions in certain areas, at certain times where natural

ignitions and suppression activities have resulted in

unprecedented fuel accumulations. The strategy of the interior

line has a broad scope of application in the medium sized

and smaller units of the public lands. The use of an interior

line strategy will work, but some objectives and procedures

need to be refined. On the interior lines of remote areas, the

ecological processes may be served within the span-ofcontrol of modest-sized forces, by using moderate burning

conditions, with some time allowed to do the job patiently

and carefully.

Formation of mobile tactical teams of specialized fire

management resources able to move from job to job as

reinforcement (but not replacement) to local fire forces

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion: Prescribed Burning in the 21st Century
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could enable this work. Simplified command, operational,

and administrative procedures could empower the field fire

commanders. Most of the NPS areas in the western United

States have comprehensive fire management plans prepared

and on file (NPS 1992). Working strategies are lacking,

however, as well as essential resources and field flexibility.

Many opportunities exist for human-ignited prescribed fire

programs in smaller wildernesses. Thus, many of the present

difficulties with naturally occurring prescribed fires may be

resolved. Smoke management can be a protracted problem

for small areas, too.

Point/Counter-Point

Legal issues surround the use of prescribed fire in the

next century. Guidance in the form of United States Code

(18 USC 1855, 1856) covers issues such as fires kindled, left

unattended, or unextinguished by Federal agencies (U.S.

Code 1982). The internal administrative discussion about

prescribed fires, the external regulatory climate, and

interagency distrust following Yellowstone 88 all combine

to deflect attention from the focus of the IC/burn boss to the

forces that make or break successful fires on the fire ground.

Land managers are well-advised to await a wildfire rather

than bother with all of the prescribed burn risks and headaches.

Individual commitment must be to a shared responsibility

(Mutch 1977) for total fire management.

“Mobile Tactical Teams” that are specially trained and

equipped to initiate and see through prescribed burning

projects (USDA-USDI 1989) may encounter several barriers.

Most are fiscal and administrative concerns.

Dr. Biswell once stated that fire control agencies should

balance the money used in the fire program in thirds:

suppression, prevention, and controlled burning. This idea

did not really work. Perhaps the concept could be applied in

reverse. “Base” fire management funds “saved” by efficient

operations could be designated for prescribed fire operations,

if such operations have been targeted in a plan. This approach

is an incentive to save funds to get more fuels/vegetation

work done.

We do need sensible and sustainable funding sources to

pay for the integrity of natural processes. A potential source

is a percentage of the Land and Water Conservation Fund

(P.L.88-578, September 3, 1964, and as amended) in

proportion to wilderness use for the NPS, the USDI Bureau

of Land Management (BLM), and the USDI Fish and Wildlife

Service (FWS). The Forest Service might assess a special

user fee permit for each wilderness entry.

 My thesis is that tactics derive from strategy and our

strategies are deficient. I have proposed an integrated strategy

for prescribed fire management actions. Interior line actions

await refinements of strategic interagency cooperation, and

our resolve to act. I have the patience to wait, but the

problems are not going away. And the fire is still in the

wood. The decisions must be on the ground and in time to

work well. We must do fire work like we walk, a step at a

time. For the winds will return where I walk. It is not if, but

when, the fire shall return, and return once again.

References

Brown, A.A.; Davis, K.P. 1973 Forest fire: control and use. New York:

McGraw-Hill Book Co.; 686 p.

Biswell, H.H. 1976. A management plan for restoring fire in chaparral

at the Pinnacles National Monument. San Francisco, CA: USDI

National Park Service; 32 p.

Clar, R.C.; Chatten, R.L. 1966. Principles of forest fire management:

Sacramento, CA: State of California; 272 p.

Clark, E.E. 1953. Indian legends of the Pacific Northwest: How coyote

brought fire to the people, and how beaver stole the fire. Berkeley,

CA: University of California Press; 187-192.

 Green, L.R. 1977. Fuelbreaks and other fuel modification for wildland

fire control. Agric. Handb. 499. Washington, DC: U.S Department of

Agriculture; 79 p.

Moore, H. E. 1981. Protecting residences from wildfires: a guide for

homeowners, lawmakers, and planners. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-50.

Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment Station,

Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 44 p.

Mutch, R.W. 1977. Fire management and land use planning today: tradition

and change in the Forest Service. In: Western Wildlands, Vol 4 (1).

Missoula, Mt: School of Forestry, University of Montana; 37-43.

Phillips, C.B. 1971. California aflame! Sacramento, CA: California Division

of Forestry, 1970 September 22-October 4; 73 p.

Schroeder, M.J. 1961. Down-canyon afternoon winds. Bull. Amer. Meteor.

Soc. 42 (8): 527-542.

Swetnam, T.W.; Baisan, C.H.; Brown, P.M.; Caprio, A.C. 1989. Fire

history of rhyolite canyon, Chiricahua National Monument. Final

Report, Chiricahua National Monument; Tucson, AZ: University of

Arizona, Laboratory of Tree-Ring Research; 38 p.

United States Codes. 1982. Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the

House of Representatives Containing the General and Permanent Laws

of the United States, effective January 14, 1983. Title 16 Conservation

and Title 18 Crimes and Criminal Procedure, and Appendix. 679 p.

Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

USDA-USDI Task Force. 1989. Interagency Fire Policy Review Team

Report, Washington Offices, Washington D.C.

USDI Bureau of Land Management. 1990. 910 DM 1 Wildland Fire

Suppression and Management Program; 1990 March 29; Washington,

D.C.: Government Printing Office.

USDI National Park Service. 1991a NPS-18. Guideline: Wildland fire

management. Washington D.C.

USDI National Park Service. 1992 Wildland fire management plan:

Chiricahua National Monument. Wilcox, AZ; 91 p.

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79 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

CONCURRENT SESSION II—Urban Interface Topics
80 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
81 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Abstract: The increase of homes in wildlands indicates a significant change. The build-up of fuels around homes and in wildlands

over time also indicates change. Resistance to change, however,

remains the norm. Fires get worse, but plain water continues to be

used for fire suppression and property protection. With Class A

foam, the objectives of protection are to wet the exposure rapidly,

creating a heat sink, and then leave or apply elsewhere while the

foam remains behind. This foam can be generated in low-, medium-, and high-expansion forms. Class A foam can be applied

from pump-and-roll monitors, large water capacity structure protection engines, small home protection units, aircraft and conventional hose lines. Foam has been successfully applied to save

structures threatened by wildfire and to contain prescribed fires

near valuable resources. As developed at this time, durable foam is

capable of remaining in place as a barrier to fire for 24 to 48 hours.

Class A foam technology offers an effective tool to improve the

use of water for structure and resource protection.

Change is constant. For instance, the landscape haschanged, and in rural areas, homes have been built,

increasing the fire protection problem for these areas.

In suburban and rural areas, canopy trees grow, the

understory and brush grows, limbs and leaves fall, and fuels

continue to build up. Residents prefer the ambiance of thick

vegetation surrounding their property rather than an occasional

blackened slope from a fuels-reducing prescribed fire. Fuel

loading and fuel models continue to change.

In forests and rangelands, prescribed fire is increasingly

restricted by impacts of smoke emissions and resource

protection. Burn opportunities are fewer and, when they

occur, sensitive resources, such as snags, often must be

saved. The regulations by which we conduct prescribed fire

have changed.

Each of these changes has increased the burden on our

fire suppression and protection technologies. Our job keeps

getting more difficult to perform. The only thing that does

not change in the fire service is our resistance to change. For

centuries, plain water has been accepted as the primary fireextinguishing tool for all Class A or natural fuel fires. Perhaps

some time ago this practice was sufficient. Given the annual

parade of wildland-urban interface examples of how the fire

service has not kept up with the fire problem, it is time to reexamine how we do business.

Use of Class A Foams on Structures and Wildlands1

Paul Schlobohm 2

Presuppression measures, such as creating defensible

space and fireproofing exposures, are significant steps to

protecting structures from wildland fire. But, once a fire is

rapidly approaching and embers are flying everywhere, there

is only time for protection activities.

The fact is suppression and protection are relied upon

for every wildland-urban interface fire. Certainly, not every

structure can be safely defended from fire, but we have to do

our job better in the face of ever-worsening situations.

Why Foam?

Possibilities for change begin with that old standard—

plain water. The idea is not to replace it—for water has great

potential for suppression and protection—but rather to improve

it. When a surfactant like liquid dish soap is added to water,

water loses its surface tension and gains an emulsifier, allowing

rapid wetting of Class A fuels. Without the surfactant, water

clings to itself and runs off fuels to the ground. Some fuels,

like cedar shingles, naturally shed plain water. Wetting fuels

with plain water requires time and large quantities of water.

A traditional way to counter this dilemma while protecting

structures is to maintain a stream of water on the exposure

while it is threatened.

The combination of water and a Class A foam surfactant

is called “foam solution” and acts like a high-performance

wet water. All of the water in the solution is immediately

available for wetting. However, most wood fuels are not

able to absorb water all at once. The problem with applications

of foam solution is that they are short-lived. Wetting occurs

at the fuel surface, but no solution is left for further and

continued wetting. And the solution that cannot be absorbed

immediately runs off.

The rapid run-off of foam solution can be slowed by

adding air and creating a foam. Foam can hold the solution

in place until it is absorbed by the treated fuel.

Foam also provides a visual reference for an application.

A specific depth of foam can be applied. With foam solution,

it is difficult to know if any has been applied and if that

amount is sufficient. As long as foam is visible, the fuel

below the foam is not drying out. Fuels wetted by nonaerated foam solution begin to dry immediately.

Structure Protection

The spread of fire from house to house is primarily

because of wind-borne fire brands and radiation. A fire that

starts on a roof begins as one or more very small fires. The

structural protection objective with Class A foam is to

sufficiently wet exposures to withstand these ignition sources.

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire Management Specialist, USDI Bureau of Land Management, National Interagency Fire Center, 3833 S. Development Ave., Boise, ID 83705.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
82 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

A wet house becomes a heat sink, effectively forcing brands

and flames to spend their energy on drying rather than

igniting the house. An application of foam buys time while

the fire front burns around and past the structure. And it does

this without the need for continuous application.

Because foam is effective well after application, the fire

apparatus and crew can move on and treat other structures or

leave the area if necessary. The opportunity for multiplestructure applications has led to the development of apparatus

designed for rapid and continuous foam discharge. These

wildland/urban interface foam engines carry 1,000 to 3,000

gallons of water and at least 40 gallons of foam concentrate.

They are plumbed to deliver compressed air foam through

monitors or side ports. During pump-and-roll they can deliver

the water flow at which the pump is rated. Using the

compressed air foam system this type of engine can discharge

at least 100 gallons per minute of water as foam for exposure

protection a distance of 200 feet. The large water capacity

and the flow-conserving use of compressed air foam means

these engines often will be pumping off the same water load

long after conventional Type 1 engines have run out of water

and hydrants have lost pressure.

Although this type of apparatus has been in great demand

for structure protection over the last few years, such an

engine is not necessary for success with foam. Anything

that can deliver water can also deliver foam. The common

fertilizer canister filled with dish soap and attached to a

garden hose can be effective. Several commercial home

protection units are designed for foam use. On fire apparatus,

foam concentrate can be added from a proportioner plumbed

into the water line or dumped into the engine water tank.

Aspirating nozzles will make foam at the end of the hose.

Compressed air foam systems will pump foam through the

hose and increase discharge distance with the energy from

the air compressor. Rotor- and fixed-wing aircraft create

foam by dropping foam solution through the air.

Extinguishment

For those structures that become involved and for gaining

control over the adjacent wildland fire, foam is again an

improvement over plain water. Water is primarily effective

at suppressing open flame by cooling. Foam solution changes

the structure of water so that water is more completely used

for heat absorption. The thin films of foam solution, which

are the bubbles in foam, expose a greater surface area of

water for absorbing heat than solid streams or drops of

water. The amount of water in the extinguishing foam can be

adjusted to meet the heat output of the fire, also known as the

critical application flow rate. Flame knockdown is often

immediate. The clinging nature of the foam structure works

to suppress vapors and eliminate smoke. Improved penetration

of water reduces hold-over fires. More complete utilization

of water results in reduced water damage inside structures.

Prescribed Fire

Foam is making water a more effective tool for prescribed

fire. Foam is used to create fuel breaks and burn unit

boundaries, to protect important resources within the unit,

and to reduce secondary smoke emissions. The objective of

fuel break and resource protection applications is similar to

that of structure protection: to raise fuel moisture and create

a heat sink until the ignition threat passes. With smoke

reduction, the objective is to turn black to white, to cover the

entire burn area as quickly as possible.

In many fuel types, foam is being used as a fuel break,

sometimes as a “light hand on the land” approach in place of

fire trail cut by machine or hand crew. A single foam trail,

made from a hoselay or during pump-and-roll, becomes an

anchor or boundary from which to ignite a prescribed fire

area. Wide holding lines are created by firing out between

two foam trails. High– (over 200:1) and medium– (20:1 to

200:1) expansion foams are being used to create fire trail

downhill from ridgetop to draw. No long hoselay plumbing

is necessary to create the barrier; a river of foam slides

downslope from the nozzle.

Special resources, such as wildlife corridors, are being

protected from prescribed fire with appropriate foam

applications and ignition techniques. Low-expansion

(compressed air or aspirated) foam is applied to tree trunks,

canopies, and other long-distance exposures. Medium- and

high-expansion foams are applied to the surface and ground

fuels around the exposed resource. Ignition is timed to the

effective lifetime of the foam.

After ignition, foam is being used to suppress smoke

with a tactic called Rapid Mop-up. Rapid Mop-up is the

application of a blanket of foam over the entire burn area as

soon after ignition as possible. The blanket of foam effectively

smothers the residual fire, cutting off secondary smoke

production. Solution draining from the foam works to

extinguish the fire before the fire becomes deep-seated.

Smoke venting through the foam blanket indicates areas of

heat that will require more firefighter attention. This technique

has been effective at reducing smoke emissions, firefighter

smoke exposure, and mop-up costs. The long discharge of

compressed air foam and the long downhill flows of mediumand high-expansion aspirated foam have helped make this

tactic practical.

Durable Foam

Class A foam products in use today are, in part, synthetic

hydrocarbon surfactants. Much like liquid dish soaps, these

components produce the rapid drainage and extinguishment

properties exhibited by Class A foam. These surfactants are

also the reason that Class A foam is short-lived. Relative to

other foam, such as protein foam, Class A foam is a poor

foaming agent. The longest time one can expect it to be

visible in hot, dry conditions is about an hour, and usually

much less. The success of Class A foam in structure and

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
83 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

and each one has a place in a foam use strategy. Lowexpansion foam is needed to reach long distances. Compressed

air foam offers lighter hose weights, and medium- or highexpansion aspirated foam quickly covers ground fuels. Durable

foam holds water in place for a 12-hour shift. The ability to

adapt water into the most appropriate form of foam for the

situation is important to successful foam use.

A flexible air strategy with foam is also possible, but

needs more development.The use of foam from rotor- and

fixed-wing aircraft shares the same advantages as groundapplied foam in comparison to plain water for protection and

suppression in the wildland-urban interface. Development

of tactics to coordinate air and ground foam apparatus/

resources can lead to improved utilization of the technology.

Conclusion

Fire protection responsibilities are growing more difficult.

It may be time to change strategies to keep pace with the

changing fire scenario. One strategy for structure protection

and prescribed fire is the use of Class A foam. In a wide

variety of application schemes, Class A foam technology

unlocks the full potential of plain water for fire suppression

and protection.

resource protection has been largely because of wetting and

good timing, not longevity. Sometimes during structure

protection, foam must be reapplied because the impending

fire has not yet arrived. The limitation for prescribed fire is

that the unit may have to be ignited soon after foam is

applied. If winds aloft change and the burn must be postponed,

the foam applied is wasted.

To address this short-useful-lifetime limitation of Class

A foam, products with longevity, generically called Durable

Foam, are being developed. These foams will be created with

the same equipment currently used to make Class A foam. A

durable foam will be able to hold water as a foam for 24 to 48

hours. Prototypes are already capable of these lifetimes.

Durable Foam will enable one application per structure,

well in advance of the fire. It will allow for one application

as the prescribed fire unit boundary, even if the ignition time

is delayed 1 or 2 days.

A Foam Use Strategy

Foam use can be as simple as buying concentrate, pouring

it into the watertank, and applying foam solution with

conventional water nozzles. This is a good place to start.

However, foam may be formed from a variety of methods

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
84 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
85 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM)1

Jack D. Cohen2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17,1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Research Physical Scientist, Southern Research Station, USDA Forest

Service, Southern Forest Fire Laboratory, Route 1, Box 182A, Dry Branch,

GA 31020.

Abstract: Major wildland/urban interface fire losses, principally

residences, continue to occur. Although the problem is not new,

the specific mechanisms are not well known on how structures

ignite in association with wildland fires. In response to the need for

a better understanding of wildland/urban interface ignition mechanisms and a method of assessing the ignition risk, USDA Forest

Service Fire Research is developing the Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM). SIAM uses an analytical approach that relates the potential for sustained structure ignitions to the location

and characteristics of adjacent fires and the structure’s materials

and design. SIAM’s ignition risk assessment is based on a worst

case estimate of the direct effect of flames leading to ignitions as

well as ignitions from burning embers (firebrands). Initial SIAM

results indicate that the flames of burning vegetation are not greatly

effective in creating sustained ignitions. This suggests that firebrands and adjacent burning structures are significant causes of

structure ignitions. Current experimentation is directed toward

verifying these SIAM results.

Residential losses associated with wildfires first gainednational attention during the 1985 fire season in which

about 1,400 homes were lost. This condition has been called

the wildland/urban interface (WUI) fire problem and was

raised as a critical national issue at the Wildfire Strikes

Home conference in 1986 (Laughlin and Page 1987). Since

then, the WUI fire problem has remained prominent.

“Structures threatened” has typically appeared on fire situation

reports. Since 1990, California alone has suffered over $2.5

billion in residential property losses associated with wildfires.

These property losses principally occurred in residential

areas that were within or adjacent to wildland vegetation.

And the number of people who will live in or adjacent to

wildland areas has continued to increase, thereby further

increasing the WUI problem (Davis 1990). Without mitigation,

the WUI fire losses are likely to continue or increase.

The characteristic property losses during WUI fires are

very different from the average United States residential fire

losses. The 1991 U.S. residential fire loss statistics (including

the Oakland fire losses) illustrate the characteristically higher

fire losses experienced during WUI fires. Of the 1991 U.S.

total fire occurrences, WUI fires account for less than 0.6

percent of the occurrences; however, WUI fire losses account

for 27 percent of the 1991 property losses (Karter 1992).

This reflects the higher fire losses per residence for a WUI

fire than for a typical residential fire. During a WUI fire,

ignited structures typically result in a total loss. Recent

media coverage of the October 1993 WUI fires in the Laguna

Hills of southern California show standing houses adjacent

to complete destruction—a sight typical to any WUI fire.

The increasing frequency of WUI losses and the intense

destruction associated with WUI fires provide compelling

reasons to mitigate the problem.

“Wildfire Strikes Home!” the document of the 1986

WUI meeting (Laughlin and Page 1987), recommends needed

research for WUI fire problem mitigation. Many of the

recommendations continue to be viable:

 • Managing hazards in an esthetically acceptable

manner

 • More knowledge about the relation of building

design and clearance to fire hazards

 • More knowledge about ignitions from wind

transported burning embers

 • Techniques to evaluate and identify fire risk.

The Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) and

its associated research specifically address these issues.

Ignition Assessment for Improving

Structure Survival

After a WUI fire, structure survival is visible in varying

degrees. This outcome can result from a complex, interactive

sequence of events involving the ignition and burning of

vegetation and structures. It is accompanied by varying efforts

on the part of firefighters and homeowners to prevent further

burning and extinguish the existing blaze. The development

of an assessment method requires an explicit description (at

some resolution) of the processes involved.

Structure survival involves factors influencing ignition,

and given an ignition, factors influencing the fire suppression.

Thus, structure survival assessments also require consideration

of the suppression factors. Analysis reveals that the factors

influencing suppression are very dependent on the current

situation at the time of the fire, thus making a prior description

of the suppression factors unrealistic (Cohen 1991). The

general process leading to structure survival or loss must

“pass” through the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an ignition

(fig. 1). Therefore, assessing the ignition factors for the purpose

of improving ignition resistance can result in an improved

chance of survival. SIAM depends on the ability to describe

the general factors that influence the potential for ignition.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
86 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

• Ability of fire agencies to assess wildland/urban

interface fire risks for pre-suppression and

suppression planning.

To achieve these applications, SIAM uses an analytical

approach to establish relationships between the structure

design and the fire exposure that results in the assessment of

potential ignitions. Because actual fire conditions of a future

fire are unknown, worst-case assumptions are used. For

example, it is not known how and in what sequence the

flammables around a structure will burn; therefore, it is

assumed that all flammables adjacent to the structure will

burn at the same time. If conditions are not well understood,

e.g., firebrand (flying embers) exposure and ignition,

judgments based on physical reasoning are used. Because of

the various unknowns, SIAM rates only the potential for

structure ignition; it does not predict ignition.

A better understanding of the model’s processes can be

obtained by examining the components of SIAM from the

input of information to the output of the resulting ignition

risk rating (fig. 2).

The SIAM model consists of six principal processing

steps (items in the brackets refer to fig. 2):

1) [Structure Design, Topography, Fire Weather Severity,

Fuels, Expert Designated Fire Behavior]

SIAM inputs require the description of the structure and

site conditions, including a fire professional’s estimate of

flame lengths that are consistent with the chosen potential

severe fire weather conditions. The Structure Design inputs

relate to the general design, e.g., roof flammability, exterior

materials, windows, nooks and crannies, and exterior dimensions. The Topography input refers to the degree of slope

and whether it is upslope or downslope from the structure.

Also included is the structure/slope set-back, i.e., the horizontal

distance between the structure and the slope. The Fire Weather

Severity is a selected level of weather conditions for planning

WUI fire safety. The inputs explicitly involve windspeed,

The WUI fire problem can be examined on the premise

that structure survival is the essence of the problem, and

that structure ignition is the critical element for survival:

homes that do not ignite do not burn. SIAM addresses the

potential for structure ignitions rather than the potential for

structure survival.

The Structure Ignition Assessment

Model (SIAM)

SIAM is designed for the purpose of assessing potential

structure ignitions during wildfires burning in vegetation

and structures. The model uses general descriptions of the

structure, the topography at the building site, and the potential

fire characteristics around the structure to compute an index

of ignition risk. It is designed to provide a flexible approach

toward achieving residential fire safety by rating the potential

for ignitions based on a structure’s ignition resistance

characteristics and its potential fire exposure. Thus,

homeowners and developers can “trade off” various design

features of a building’s exterior and its surroundings to meet

fire-safe requirements.

SIAM is intended for the facilitation of improved fire

safety as well as to identify potential wildland/urban interface

fire problems. In its basic form, the model can be adapted to

a variety of applications ranging from single home assessments

to planned developments. The basic applications can include:

• Establishment of fire safety requirements based

on potential ignition risk for a mix of factors.

• Integration of a resident’s exterior home design

and landscaping interests with fire safety

requirements.

• Integration of a developer’s home and neighborhood

design interests with fire safety requirements.

Figure 2—The Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) uses the

inputs (double line boxes) to calculate the potential for ignitions from

direct flame exposure (Heat Transfer) and exposure to aerially transported burning embers (Firebrands). SIAM produces a dimensionless

ignition risk rating index, not a prediction of outcomes.

Figure 1—Structure survival depends on factors influencing ignition

and factors influencing effective fire suppression. Regardless of the fire

suppression effectiveness, survival initially depends on ignition.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
87 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

spread are not calculated by SIAM—they are now direct

inputs. Through personal expertise and/or fire behavior

modeling, the user determines the fire behavior that matches

previously chosen fire severity conditions. This change has

occurred because the application is largely out of context for

available operational fire models. The intent is to produce

greater model reliability by involving the user in the

determination of the fire behavior characteristics.

Experiments in Support of Ignition

Assessment Modeling

Several aspects of ignition require a better understanding

before SIAM can reliably rate ignition risk. These issues are

being approached through experimental methods. Currently,

an experimental examination is being done to better understand

the effect of windows (principally window breakage) on

potential ignitions. In conjunction with the window

experiments, the flame radiation heat transfer model and the

ignition model are being examined for their reliability. The

experimental work is not complete, but preliminary results

suggest some important considerations.

Window Breakage Tests

Windows often fracture when exposed to a nearby exterior

fire. The structural fire problem regarding windows involves

the fracture and subsequent collapse, in which an opening is

created. In the wildland/urban interface context, firebrands

are a very important structure ignition source. Experience

indicates that any opening to the interior of the structure

increases the potential for ignition. In the context of SIAM,

windows are an important factor principally if a fire exposure

results in a window fracture and collapse, but without a

concurrent exterior ignition, because the only effect of the

fire exposure is to create an opening, and thus an entry point

for firebrands. The experiments are designed to address the

question of window collapse specific to SIAM needs.

The window breakage experiments have been conducted

in two phases. The first phase uses relatively small windows

exposed to relatively low heat fluxes (heat flux = energy/

time/area). The window pane dimensions measure .61 meters

by .61 meters by 4.8 millimeters thick. A wooden sash holds

the glass panes in a wooden frame. Tests are conducted on

both plate and tempered glass types, and in single pane and

double pane arrangements. The window heat exposures consist

of average total heat fluxes of 9.3 kW/sq m, 13.6 kW/sq m,

and 17.7 kW/sq m for 300 seconds (kW/sq m = kilowatts per

square meter). The experiments use the USDA Forest Service’s

Southern Forest Fire Laboratory’s wind tunnel facility and a

propane fueled flame source.

Phase 1 has been completed. Preliminary results indicate

significant differences between plate and tempered glass,

and the potential integrity of double pane windows compared

with single pane arrangements (table 1). The results show

that for every test of single pane/plate glass, window breakage

temperature, and fine fuel moisture content. Implicitly, the

Fire Weather Severity guides the user in designating, and/or

calculating, the fire behavior characteristics. The Fuels inputs

require the designation of the type of flammable material

(e.g., grass, shrubs, trees, wood piles, structures), the

dimensions of its area, and its distance from the structure.

The Expert Designated Fire Behavior includes flame length

and rate of spread if appropriate. These fire behavior inputs

can be calculated through the BEHAVE Fire Behavior

Prediction System (Andrews 1986, Andrews and Chase

1989) and/or estimated experientially.

2) [Flames]

On the basis of input information of the fuel type, the

fuel locations and the fuel length/width dimensions,

windspeed, topographic slope, and flame lengths, SIAM

calculates flame size, flame angle, burning residence time,

and the structure’s exposure to flame radiant heating and

flame or convection column contact.

3) [Heat transfer]

SIAM uses a physical heat transfer model to relate the

calculated flame characteristics to the radiative and convective

heat transfer. Worst-case assumptions are used for such

items as the flame temperature and the flame/wall geometry.

4) [Firebrands]

The firebrand exposure depends on the amount and size

distribution of the firebrands generated. Using physical

reasoning and experience, a structure’s firebrand exposure

corresponds to the type of fuel in the wildland/urban interface

area and the general fire intensity. The type of fuel (e.g.,

grass, shrubs, trees, buildings) relates to the general size of

the firebrand, while the fire intensity relates to the fire’s

lofting capability.

5) [Ignitions]

An empirical ignition model (Tran and others 1992) is

used to relate heat transfer to the potential for sustained

ignitions of wood. The assessment of the potential for

ignition on exterior wood building materials depends on

the magnitude of the heat transfer, and the burning time.

Using physical reasoning, the potential for ignition by

firebrands is subjectively related to the firebrand exposure

and the structure’s exposed flammable nooks and crannies

and roof material. SIAM calculates the influence of firebrands

on the ignition potential separately from the direct flame

heat transfer influence.

6) [Ignition risk rating]

The assessments for ignition potential from direct flame

heat transfer and firebrand exposure are subjectively combined

for the entire structure. The final risk rating recognizes the

potential interactions between structure heating (without

ignitions from flame heat transfer) and firebrand ignition

effectiveness. The final rating is a dimensionless quantity,

linearly related to potential structure ignition (Cohen and

others 1991).

An important procedural change has occurred with regard

to the determination of the fire behavior characteristics. Fire

behavior characteristics such as flame length and rate of

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
88 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

at its peak burning period, compared to 30 kW/sq m for the

lower intensity profile.

Although the Phase 2 testing has just begun, significant

results have already been observed. The 50 kW/sq m heat

flux tests resulted in glass breakage and virtually complete

window collapse. Immediately following the window collapse,

wall ignition occurred followed by sustained burning. The

30 kW/sq m heat flux test also resulted in glass breakage and

virtually complete window collapse, but without wall ignition.

Thus, these initial experiments showed that windows

can be a significant factor for potential structure ignitions,

by allowing interior firebrand penetration without the

occurrence of an exterior structure ignition. Continued window

experimentation will better define the differences in window

collapse between the Phase 1 and Phase 2 experiments and

extend the range of test conditions beyond Phase 1. Questions

remain as to whether the large windows will break without

collapse, to what extent a double pane arrangement mitigates

window collapse, and whether tempered glass in either a

single pane or double pane arrangement will prevent window

collapse until exterior ignitions occur.

Wall Ignition Tests

It is important to verify that SIAM is consistent with

real situations. An initial step in this verification process is

to measure total heat flux and observe ignition occurrence at

the wall section concurrent to the window breakage tests. By

comparing measured observations with model results, these

experiments provide a physical test under high heat flux

conditions with relatively large flames, and with a heat flux/

time relationship similiar to actual vegetation burning (fig.

3). Ignition observations can be compared with the ignition

model (Tran and others 1992).

Ignition model calculations using heat flux calibration

data provide an estimate of sustained ignition occurrence

(sustained ignition = continued flaming after the initiating

heat source is discontinued). Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the

heat fluxes with the flux-time ignition calculation

superimposed (right axis values). The horizontal line

delineates the flux-time value that corresponds to the piloted

ignition point (piloted ignition = the presence of a hot spark

or small flame that initiates flaming). Inspection of figure 4

indicates that the flux-time exposure (65 cm distance) should

readily result in an ignition. This can be seen by comparing

the flux-time curve with the piloted ignition value. The

lower heat flux shown in figure 5 (100 cm distance) results

in a much lower flux-time magnitude and indicates a marginal

condition for ignition.

The actual tests produced results consistent with the

ignition model calculations. At the higher heat flux (65 cm

distance), the wood siding readily ignited with sustained

flaming. The lower heat flux test (100 cm distance) did not

result in ignition. Figure 6 illustrates the average total heat

flux at a location adjacent to the glass pane in the wood

window frame. At this location, the flux-time calculation

Table 1—Phase 1 window breakage results

 Heat flux (kW/m2)

Glass type and arrangement 9.3 13.6 17.7

Plate glass:

Single pane 4/41 4/4 4/4

Double pane

Outer pane 4/4 4/4 4/4

Inner pane 0/4 3/4 3/4

Tempered glass:

Single pane 0/4 0/4 0/4

Double pane

Outer pane 0/4 0/4 0/4

Inner pane 0/4 0/4 0/4

1 Number of tests in which window pane broke per number of tests.

resulted at each heat flux, yielding a ratio of 4/4. For double

pane/plate glass at the lowest heat flux, 9.3 kW/sq m, only

the outside pane broke in each test (4/4; and 0/4). The higher

heat fluxes resulted in inside pane breakage in 3 of 4 tests.

However, from observation during the experiments, the degree

of fracture to the inside pane, i.e., the number of cracks, was

less than for the outside pane. No breakage occurred to

tempered glass panes due to the fire exposures.

 Although all heat fluxes resulted in plate glass breakage,

none of the windows collapsed leaving an opening. In each

case, the wooden sash held the glass fragments sufficiently

to prevent collapse. This raised the important question if

larger windows and higher heat fluxes of shorter duration

would result in collapse.

Phase 2 of the study used larger windows and higher

heat fluxes. The panes were plate glass, measuring .91 meters

wide by 1.5 meters tall, and 6 millimeters thick. The panes

were held in a wood frame by a wood sash that was part of a

wall section 2.5 meters tall by 3.4 meters wide. Exterior

plywood siding (T-111, unpainted) covered the wall during

the glass breakage experiments.

The tests were conducted in the USDA Forest Service’s

Southern Forest Fire Laboratory’s combustion facility using

precisely constructed, oven-dried wood fuel cribs. The entire

crib was simultaneously ignited, resulting in maximum flame

dimensions of about 1.3 meters wide, 3.1 meters high, and .8

meters deep. Because heat flux sensors could not be placed

at the glass surface, calibration measurements determined

the window heat fluxes instead of real time measurements.

The heat flux sensors were located in a non-flammable panel

that was placed in the window opening. The calibration

measurements generally covered the area of highest total

heat flux for the wall section. The average highest total heat

fluxes were measured during calibration tests performed at

two different intensity levels (fig. 3). These intensity levels

correspond to the different flame-to-wall distances noted in

the figure. The highest intensity level exceeded 50 kW/sq m

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
89 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

does not reach the ignition point, which is consistent with

the no-ignition occurrence.

Preliminary SIAM Results

Although SIAM is not ready for operational assessments, the component models for heat transfer and ignition

can be used. Thus, given constant flame characteristics

and distances, estimates of the time required for ignition

can be calculated. Preliminary SIAM results can be examined

for flame descriptions relevant to burning vegetation and

burning structures.

The ignition model (Tran and others 1992) uses incident

radiant heat flux (not the net heat flux) to calculate an

ignition time. For a given constant heat flux, the ignition

model provides a relationship between radiant heat flux and

the amount of time for the piloted, sustained ignition of

wood (fig. 7). At heat fluxes below 30 kW/sq m, the heat

flux/ignition time relation has a high rate of change; therefore,

small changes in heat flux can result in large changes to

ignition time. Considering that vegetation fuels (without a

continuous bed of large stem wood) have flaming residence

times generally less than 120 seconds, a small change in heat

flux can make the difference between an ignition and no

ignition. Also, people are more sensitive than wood to the

radiant heat fluxes: at 16 kW/sq m, skin blisters form after 5

seconds (Drysdale 1985), but wood takes 1,200 seconds

before piloted ignition.

Because actual fire conditions are not predictable, SIAM

calculates the radiation heat transfer for a worst-case situation.

The flame is assumed to be a constant, 1,200 degrees Kelvin,

gray body emitter over its entire dimensions. And, the radiation

view from the wall to the flame is assumed to be that of two

parallel surfaces with their centers aligned. Based on these

assumptions and given flame dimensions, a relationship exists

between the radiant heat flux and the flame-to-wall distance

(fig. 8). The given flame dimensions represent possible

vegetation fire conditions (e.g., 5 m wide by 2 m high flame

= a low flammable hedge row; 5 m wide by 15 m high flame

= a fully torching tree). SIAM uses the heat fluxes to calculate

the potential for ignition.

The ignition times (fig. 9) for a flat wood surface are

associated with the heat fluxes of figure 8. The ignition time

graph shows the minimum time for ignition related to the

flame-to-wall distance for the given flame dimensions. The

graph is limited to 300 seconds because the burning time of

the flame front in vegetation fires is generally less than 5

minutes. Note that with the exception of the two largest

flame sizes, the flames have virtually no direct significance

beyond 10 meters (33 feet). These preliminary results suggest

that vegetation management activities are most effective in

the areas immediately surrounding the structure. However,

vegetation is not the only potential flame source adjacent to

a residence. The neighbor’s house may also be a fire threat.

 Local agencies often focus on flammable vegetation as

a factor in wildland/urban interface fire safety concerns.

However, depending on the distance between residences

(structure density), neighboring structures can be a very

significant ignition source.

The radiant heat flux is a function of distance between

structures and structure size (worst-case conditions are

assumed) (fig. 10). The calculations assume that the entire

wall is burning and that the flame is a rectangular, black

body emitter at a constant temperature of 1,200 degrees

Kelvin. The walls are assumed to be parallel with their

centers aligned. Importantly, larger structures produce higher

heat fluxes, and thus if burning, larger structures are a greater

threat to neighboring structures (fig. 10).

Figure 3—Total incident heat flux and flame distance comparison for the 65-cm and 100-cm

calibrations from the Phase 2 portion of SIAM experimentation. Calibration tests such as these

indirectly determine the window heat flux exposure.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
90 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Figure 5—Fire test calibration for the 100-cm flame to wall distance.

The flux-time value (right axis reference) is a cumulative quantity that

empirically relates to piloted, sustained wood ignition (Tran and others

1992). The flux-time value begins to increase above the critical incident

radiant heat flux (greater than 13.1 kW/sq m) and ceases when the heat

flux falls below the critical flux. Ignition is expected at a flux-time value

of 11,501, which corresponds to the ignition line. The heavy, S-shaped

curve is the flux-time curve.

Figure 4—Fire test calibration for the 65-cm flame to wall distance. The

flux-time value (right axis reference) is a cumulative quantity that

empirically relates to piloted, sustained wood ignition (Tran and others

1992). The flux-time value begins to increase above the critical incident

radiant heat flux (greater than 13.1 kW/sq m) and ceases when the heat

flux falls below the critical flux. Ignition is expected at a flux-time value

of 11,501, which corresponds to the ignition line. The heavy, S-shaped

curve is the flux-time curve.

Figure 7—Minimum ignition time vs. radiant heat flux. Given a

constant radiant heat flux, the ignition model (SIAM) can be used to

estimate the time required for sustained ignition on a flat wood

surface. The references to pain and blistering relate to exposed skin

at the given radiant heat fluxes.

Figure 6—Wall fire test without ignition for the 100 cm flame to wall

distance. The flux-time curve (right axis reference) is based on measured heat fluxes of the wood wall panel adjacent to the window. The

maximum flux-time quantity did not achieve a value equal to or greater

than the critical ignition level.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II

8 meters (26 feet) for the one-story structure and about 12

meters (39 feet) for the two-story structure. Although these

examples are hypothetical, past wildland/urban interface fires

involving high-density residential neighborhoods (e.g., Oakland,

1991) indicate the importance of structure-to-structure ignition.

Figure 11 provides the minimum ignition times based

on the heat fluxes shown in figure 10. The graph extends to

greater ignition times because structures characteristically

burn longer than vegetation. Inspection of the ignition times

suggests that the clearance between structures should be about
91 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Figure 8—Radiant heat flux vs. distance for burning vegetation. The

amount of radiant heat flux and the rate of decrease depends on the

flame size. The distance refers to the distance from the flame. Based

on these heat fluxes, ignition times are calculated as a function of

distance. As the distance increases, it takes longer for sustained

ignition to occur.

Figure 9—Ignition time vs. distance for burning vegetation. The

amount of radiant heat flux and the rate of decrease depends on the

flame size. The distance refers to the distance from the flame. Based

on these heat fluxes, ignition times are calculated as a function of

distance. As the distance increases, it takes longer for sustained

ignition to occur.

structure ignitions rather than predicts structure ignitions. SIAM

does not address structure survival, but assumes that lowering

a structure’s ignition risk leads to improved chances for survival.

SIAM development involves experimental work to gain

needed understanding and to verify the reliability of SIAM’s

component models. Current experiments involve determining

Conclusions

The Structure Ignition Assessment Model is being

developed as a tool for the purpose of reducing high residential

fire losses associated with wildland fires. In the context of

wildland/urban interface fires, SIAM rates the potential for

Figure 10—Radiant heat flux vs. distance for an adjacent burning

structure. The amount of radiant heat flux and the rate of decrease

depends on the flame size. The distance refers to the distance from

the flame. Based on these heat fluxes, ignition times are calculated

as a function of distance. As the distance increases, it takes longer

for sustained ignition to occur.

Figure 11—Ignition time vs. distance for an adjacent burning structure.

The amount of radiant heat flux and the rate of decrease depends on the

flame size. The distance refers to the distance from the flame. Based on

these heat fluxes, ignition times are calculated as a function of distance.

As the distance increases, it takes longer for sustained ignition to occur.

The radiant heat flux from structures is not necessarily greater than from

vegetation, but the characteristic burning time is longer; thus the ignition

time axis covers a greater range for burning structures.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
92 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

the significance of windows regarding the potential for

structure ignition. Concurrently, these experiments are an

initial effort to verify the reliability of SIAM’s heat transfer

and ignition models. The experimental work is not complete,

but it has generated preliminary results regarding the behavior

of heated windows and the verification of the ignition model.

Preliminary results of the Phase 1 window experiments

produced significant differences between glass types and

pane arrangement. These results suggest that for an exterior

fire exposure, the double pane arrangement improves window

integrity, and significantly, tempered glass is much more

thermally resistant than plate glass.

The Phase 2 experiments (not completed) have

demonstrated that windows can break and collapse from fire

exposure without the occurrence of an exterior structure

ignition. This finding has determined that SIAM requires

window information in the description of significant design

features that contribute to structure ignitions during wildland/

urban interface fires.

Although model verification is just beginning, the

observations from the accomplished tests suggest that the

preliminary SIAM results are reasonable. The 35-cm fire-towall distance change (for the specific fire dimensions) results

in the difference between wall ignition versus no ignition.

Analysis of the measured heat flux data using the ignition

model produces results consistent with the observed ignition

occurrence. This suggests that the SIAM ignition model

reasonably represents the relationship between incident radiant

heat flux and ignition.

Preliminary SIAM results suggest that ignitions from

flames (radiant and convective heat transfer) occur from

fires within the immediate surroundings of the structure.

Except for the case of large flame heights and an extensive

fireline, ignitions result from flames within 15 meters (50

feet) of the structure (fig. 9). But, ignitions on structures and

adjacent vegetation commonly occur while fires burn at

distances considerably greater than 15 meters. This finding

concurs with personal observations that firebrands are a

significant source for structure ignitions.

These results suggest that to reduce ignitions, the distances

from a structure for managing vegetation are much smaller

than the lofting distances for firebrands. Thus, beyond some

relatively short distance from the structure (depending on

the vegetation and topography), vegetation management has

no significant benefit for reducing flame generated ignitions.

Vegetation management, on the other hand, cannot be

extensive enough, in a practical sense, to significantly reduce

firebrand ignitions. Therefore, the structure and its immediate

surroundings should be the focus for activities intended for

improving ignition risk.

Neighboring structures are a significant potential ignition

source. SIAM results suggest that at distances between

structures of less than 5 meters, structures can become the

principal source for ignitions (not including the additional

effect of firebrands from structures). In high-density

residential areas containing highly flammable structures (e.g.,

residences with flammable roofs), vegetation management

may not be sufficient to prevent widespread fire destruction.

References

Andrews, Patricia L. 1986. BEHAVE: fire behavior prediction and fuel

modeling system—BURN subsystem, part 1. Gen. Tech. Rep. INTGTR-94. Ogden, UT: Intermountain Research Station, Forest Service,

U.S. Department of Agriculture; 130 p.

Andrews, Patricia L.; Chase, Carolyn H. 1989. BEHAVE: fire behavior

prediction and fuel modeling system—BURN subsystem, part 2.

Gen. Tech. Rep. INT-GTR-260. Ogden, UT: Intermountain Research

Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 93 p.

Cohen, Jack D. 1991. A site-specific approach for assessing the fire risk

to structures at the wildland/urban interface. In: Nodvin, Stephen

C.; Waldrop, Thomas A., editors. Proceedings of the fire and the

environment: ecological and cultural perspectives international

symposium; 1990 March 20-24; Knoxville, TN. Gen. Tech. Rep. SEGTR-69. Asheville, NC: Southeastern Experiment Station, Forest

Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 381-383.

Cohen, Jack D.; Chase, Richard A.; LeVan, Susan L.; Tran, Hao C. 1991.

A model for assessing potential structure ignitions in the wildland/

urban interface. In: Proceedings of the 11th conference on fire and

forest meteorology; 1991 April 16-19; Missoula, MT. Bethesda, MD:

Soc. of Am. Foresters; 50-57.

Davis, James B. 1990. The wildland-urban interface: paradise or

battleground? Journal of Forestry 88(1): 26-31.

Drysdale, Dougal. 1985. An introduction to fire dynamics. New York:

John Wiley and Sons; 424 p.

Karter, Michael J. 1992. NFPA reports on 1991 U.S. fire loss. National

Fire Protective Association Journal 86(5): 32-43.

Laughlin, Jerry; Page, Cynthia. 1987. Wildfire strikes home. In: Laughlin,

Jerry; Page, Cynthia, editors. Report of the national wildland/urban

fire protection conference; 1986 September; Denver, CO. NFPA No.

SPP-86. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association; 89 p.

Tran, Hao C.; Cohen, Jack D.; Chase, Richard A. 1992. Modeling ignition

of structures in wildland/urban interface fires. In: Proceedings of

the 1st international fire and materials conference; 1992 September

24-25; Arlington, VA. London, UK: Inter Science Communications

Limited; 253-262.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
93 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Strategies for and Barriers to Public Adoption of Fire

Safe Behavior1

Ronald W. Hodgson2

Abstract: A recent survey of people living in wildland-urban

intermix neighborhoods in a portion of the Sierra-Cascade foothills identified perceptions of defensible space that block its rapid

and widespread adoption. A companion survey described communication channels used by residents to acquire information about

landscaping and identified opinion leadership characteristics. Neither lack of awareness of the wildfire threat, lack of basic knowledge of defensible space, nor skepticism about defensible space

effectiveness were a barrier to adoption of wildfire defenses by

property owners. Perceived costs and labor requirements, lack of

specific knowledge about how to do the required work, lack of

time or assistance to do the work, and the difficulty of disposing of

large amounts of brush generated in the initial conversion to defensible space were serious barriers. Biomass harvesting was experimented with to dispose of brush and to cover some of the costs of

initial conversion. Social marketing and community organization

methods were used to promote and carry out the project. The

approach proved effective. Results showed excellent promise for

the use of biomass harvesting in thickly settled subdivisions.

I

n spite of years of effort to encourage the adoption of

defensible space—a safe zone that protects a structure

from fire—only a relatively small proportion of wildlandurban intermix residents have changed their landscapes to

help protect their properties from wildfire. Even more rare

are entire neighborhoods and communities protected by

strategic wildfire defense preparations. The annual drama of

flames, ashes, and despair broadcast on California primetime television and featured on the front pages of newspapers

from the smallest weekly to national circulation giants

regularly alerts residents to the potential danger. Clearly

other barriers must block widespread public adoption of

wildfire defenses.

Investigations to identify these barriers began with

Survival by Design workshops held at Chico and Pomona,

California, in which fire management specialists presented

the problem to selected community leaders who then evaluated

the potential of defensible space as a “product” that wildlandurban intermix residents might adopt. A pair of surveys of

wildland-urban intermix residents in the aftermath of the

“49’er Fire” were administered. The workshops and the two

surveys together generated information needed to create a

neighborhood-based approach to the promotion of wildfire

defense preparations. This approach is now being tested in

neighborhoods in high fire hazard areas in northern California.

The organization and education elements of the approach

were tested on a small scale in Paradise, California with

some success. A study of the potential of biomass harvesting

on small private ownerships to reduce the fire hazard was

proposed in the Shingletown Ridge area. The project was

funded, and during the spring and summer 1992, a successful

effort at neighborhood organization for hazard reduction and

biomass harvesting demonstrated the potential of the

neighborhood based approach, but also revealed the need for

larger scale operations and planning. A proposal is currently

being considered by the California Department of Forestry

and Fire Protection (CDF) to prepare a wildfire defense

preparations plan for an area of about 40,000 acres on the

Shingletown Ridge that can be implemented through

community action with assistance from National Forest

Stewardship funds and other public conservation programs.

Concurrently, a neighborhood-based hazard reduction

program was implemented in the Middle Creek watershed

west of Redding. The approach was similar to the Shingletown

area study but involved more financial commitment from

property owners. The Middle Creek project began as a soil

conservation and erosion reduction project designed, in part,

to protect the endangered winter run salmon spawning beds.

Fire defense preparations for the watershed were undertaken

when it was realized that a repeat of the 1972 Swasey Fire

would destroy erosion protection investments as well as

burn many homes and threaten lives.

These studies showed that strategic defensible space

(wildfire defense preparations) can be successfully promoted

on a large scale if the idea is marketed using the natural

social and communication structure of the communities,

perceived barriers are removed, and neighborhood initiatives

are supported.

This paper describes the barriers revealed by the survey

of residents in wildland-urban intermix neighborhoods, and

other barriers that impede the implementation of defensible

space promotion projects. The most appropriate approach

for marketing community wildfire defense preparations will

also be discussed.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2 Professor, Department of Recreation and Parks Management, California

State University, Chico, CA 95929.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
94 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

From Suppression To Integrated Fire

Management

One central objective of wildfire management is to

minimize the sum of fire losses and costs. That objective

applies to prevention and pre-suppression as much as to fire

fighting. Prevention and fuels management are (or ought to

be) equal partners with suppression in the management of

fires to reduce as much as possible the negative impacts on

people’s lives and their social and economic systems.

However, currently our thinking is dominated by suppression

even in the case of defensible space design and promotion.

As presently conceived, defensible space is a collection

of actions, including vegetation management around

structures, that will provide a safe place to defend the structure

and reduce the vulnerability of the structure to ignition.

Defensible space includes other elements, of course, such as

signing, adequate roads, and water supplies, and all are to be

provided in an effort to defend individual structures easily,

safely, and more effectively. If defensible space were widely

adopted, fewer resources from perimeter control would be

reassigned to structural defense, allowing quicker containment

of the fire.

The unexpressed assumption of this viewpoint is that

the values at risk are contained in the structure and that the

landscape is expendable. The actual facts are very different.

The survey revealed that about one person in five considered

protection of the landscape more important than protection

of the structures. Those who work with urban-wildland

intermix (also known as the “I-zone”) residents have been

told that if the landscape is lost, people will not want to live

in the area anymore. After the 49’er fire, many people whom

interviewers looked for within the fire perimeter had sold or

moved out since the fire, even if the structures were saved.

Other evidence of the importance of the environment is

more obvious. For example, people build expensive homes

in the I-zone and commute longer distances to work, even

when they could live in good suburban neighborhoods closer

to their jobs.

Concern for erosion control and water quality (as

illustrated by the Middle Creek watershed project) also suggest

that the landscape may be more highly valued than the

structure. Those who value wildlife and energy management

(shade and protection from wind) also suggest this. Homes

may be quickly rebuilt, but 100-year-old trees cannot be

replaced by insurance.

If fire destruction does result in the departure of many

residents, the social structure of the neighborhood will be

disrupted. Friends will be separated. Feelings of security and

predictability will decline. Uncertainty will increase, and

distress and anxiety may follow. The quality of life will be

markedly diminished. Recovery from disasters is enhanced

if conditions can be returned to near normal as soon as

possible (Albrect and Adelman 1987, Drabek 1986, Lindell

and Perry 1992). If the setting can be protected or repaired

quickly, the familiar pace and flow of neighborhood life

may be easier to restore. If so, the important human, nonproperty losses associated with wildland-urban intermix fires

can be reduced.

Ultimately, of course, if the landscape does not burn

intensely enough to kill the larger trees and other important

vegetation, it is less likely to destroy structures. If the rate of

spread is slow enough to permit residents to escape easily and

unhurriedly, it will also be easier to bring adequate suppression

forces to the attack. Any vegetation management strategy that

protects the landscape values at risk will also protect structural

values and human life imbedded in that landscape.

A second important, unspoken assumption in our

approach to fire protection for the wildland-urban intermix

is that the wildfire will burn out of the wildlands into the

settlements to threaten lives and destroy homes. Although

that often occurs, these fires usually start in or on the perimeter

of an I-zone settlement. The risk of ignition in the wildlands,

with the exception of lightning, is concentrated in areas of

human activity. Human activity with fire potential is most

concentrated in wildland-urban intermix settlements. There

one finds the greatest potential for children with matches

fires, the greatest opportunity for equipment fires, the greatest

likelihood for escaped debris fires, and the chance that

structure fires will spread to the wildlands.

 I-zone fires that threaten lives and homes are those that

probably start in a settled area and grow to dangerous

proportions because the settlement and its immediate

environments have not been treated to reduce the fuels, alter

the fuels to make them less flammable, eliminate the fire

ladder, and create fuel and fire breaks to contain the risk.

Viewed from this perspective, the usual recommendations

of defensible space with the focus on assisting suppression

forces with individual structure protection are less sensible

than defensible space designed to contain risk by managing

vegetation throughout the settlement and its immediate

environment and to prevent fires that will inevitably start

within the settlement from spreading rapidly, growing to

destructive intensities, and burning into the wildlands and

then into other settlements.

This risk containment strategy, fortunately, works both

ways. It will also reduce the danger from fires burning out of

the wildlands into the settlement.

Finally, this shift in perspective requires that prevention

not be equated only with Smokey Bear programs for kids

and information and education programs for adults. Prevention

is not only posters, state fairs, rodeos, parades, exhibits at

the mall, team teaching, or television, radio, and newspaper

public service announcements (PSA’s) , news stories, and

features. Of course all of that is an important part of a fire

prevention strategy, especially in the wildland-urban intermix.

However, the engineering leg of prevention’s tripod

(engineering - education - enforcement) is just as important.

In the I-zone, engineering means, among other things, largescale vegetation (fuels) management. If prevention seems

not to stand on its own today, it is partly because the

engineering leg has not been as developed as enforcement,

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
95 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Barriers to Implementation

of Defensible Space

Several concepts must be defined to describe how people

perceive technology. Observability is the degree to which

people can “see” the technology and its positive effects

(Rogers 1983). Trialability is the degree to which the

technology can be experimented with on a small scale before

the decision has to be made to invest in it (Rogers 1983).

Plasticity is another important characteristic of new

technology influencing its potential for adoption: it is the

degree to which the technology can be modified to fit

individual innovator’s situations without adversely affecting

its relative advantage. Rogers (1983) does not discuss

“plasticity” per se but does describe the role of “reinvention”

in adoption.

Relative Advantage

Relative advantage is the degree to which a new

technology is perceived to be better than alternatives. Costs,

labor requirements, discomfort, and effectiveness for the

intended purpose are all part of relative advantage (Rogers

1983). Four out of five people surveyed believed that

defensible space would help save their property in the event

of a wildfire. For most people, defensible space is perceived

to be effective for its intended purposes. Still, one in five

does not think it will help save their property. We do not

know whether that is because they do not think it will save

their homes or because they think of their property in a

larger sense to include the landscape.

Lack of defensible space implementation is not because

people are fatalistic. Less than one in ten thought that if a

house burns it is a matter of luck.

About half of the respondents to the survey believed

that defensible space would cost them more money in the

long run than the alternative. Less than one in twenty thought

defensible space would cost less. Clearly, defensible space

is at a relative disadvantage with respect to costs. This is an

important barrier to widespread adoption. Increasing the

number of people who implement defensible space in the

wildland-urban intermix depends heavily on our ability to

bring the perceived initial conversion and long-term

maintenance costs down.

Almost two thirds thought the work required to maintain

defensible space would be about the same as that required by

their current landscape. Nearly 30 percent, however, thought

it would be harder, and less than one in ten said it would be

easier. Defensible space has no labor-saving advantage to

make it attractive to wildland-urban intermix residents.

More than half thought it would be difficult to find the

time to make the landscape more fire safe, while a quarter

thought it would be easy.

Although no question about the perceived discomfort of

creating and maintaining defensible space was asked in the

survey, later focus groups in Paradise raised concerns over

poison oak, snakes, and Lyme disease. Some residents may

information, and education. Even the information and

education leg, although large, is presently weak in its

application of modern communication and marketing theory.

In summary, we need to think more about strategies to

prevent wildland-urban intermix fires from quickly spreading

and growing to destructive power. We must cool the inevitable

fires down, slow them down, and keep them on the ground to

give suppression forces time to arrive and control them and

to limit losses experienced between ignition and mop-up.

Fire intensity and rate of spread are functions of topography,

weather, and fuels. Only fuels are significantly within our

control. We need to shift our thinking from the suppression

perspective. We need to shift the way we think of prevention

from ignition reduction to include reduction of the potential

for fire damage and threat to life through large-scale fuels

management within and surrounding settlements. We need

to work with whole neighborhoods and settlements instead

of targeting only individual property owners to develop and

implement a coordinated set of wildfire defense preparations

that integrate suppression, fuel management, and prevention

in a cost-effective, holistic approach to fire protection.

Landscape for Wildfire Defense

Management

If apathy, lack of knowledge of defensible space, or

skepticism about the effectiveness of defensible space is not

the problem, what has prevented people from protecting

themselves and their property from wildfire? Innovation

diffusion theory suggests that the problem might lie with

public perceptions of defensible space as an innovation.

Research has shown that an innovation will earn acceptance

slowly unless it is thought to have a relative advantage over

alternatives, and is compatible with values and accepted

ways of doing things, relatively simple to understand and

use, observably beneficial, trialable on a small scale before

full scale commitment is required, and adaptable to individual

situations without losing effectiveness (Rogers 1983).

To assess public perception of defensible space, samples

of residents of selected wildland-urban intermix neighborhoods between Grass Valley and Paradise, California were

surveyed. The results make it clear that, at least for these Izone residents, people know about defensible space and

believe that it is effective. They also believe that it is costly,

somewhat complex, and potentially incompatible with

landscape values. Other perceived characteristics are not

entirely positive. It appears that the characteristics of

defensible space itself, as perceived by potential users, create

barriers to its widespread adoption.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
96 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

be reluctant to work on the undeveloped parts of their lots for

these reasons. Because of this perceived barrier, finding ways

to get the initial conversion work done for residents without

requiring them to expose themselves to these perceived dangers

could make defensible space more attractive.

 Although defensible space is believed by four out of

five people surveyed to help protect their property from

wildfire, many remain skeptical. Perceived costs, labor, time

requirements, and perhaps aversion to snakes, poison oak,

and Lyme disease leave defensible space without a clear

relative advantage. This, in part, accounts for the low level

of implementation in the wildland-urban intermix in spite of

sustained promotional efforts. To achieve greater adoption,

costs, labor requirements, and time demands must be lowered.

Complexity

Complexity is the degree to which people find the new

technology difficult to understand and use (Rogers 1983).

Two-thirds of those surveyed believed that they would have

to change their landscape to make it fire safe. About 17

percent thought they would have to make many changes.

More than half of those surveyed understood the different

kinds of landscape features and how they protect property

from wildfire. Only about 15 percent did not understand

those features. In fact, we have found that people in the

neighborhoods where we have worked learn the basic

principles of fire behavior easily and can apply them to their

landscaping decisions pretty well.

Less than two-thirds said they would need to learn new

things about landscaping to make the changes required for

defensible space. The good news is that they would enjoy

learning more about landscaping for the most part.

Considerably less than one in five did not know which

features in a landscape make it more or less fire safe.

About one-third of the respondents said it would be hard

to know which plants grow in a fire safe landscape. Nearly

another quarter were uncertain. Increasing the adoption of

defensible space will require better and more available

information on recommended plant materials and landscape

designs that provide wildfire defense and will survive a

wildfire. Locations that sell the plants seem difficult to find

to about one in five, while another fifth are unsure.

 More than a quarter thought a defensible space landscape

would be more complicated to maintain. Almost two-thirds

thought it would be about the same, and less than one in ten

thought it would be less complicated. Of those who thought

it would be more complicated, few thought it would be much

more complicated. Perceived complexity of maintenance is

a barrier for a few but is not a major barrier to adoption.

Although survey data were not obtained about brush

disposal in neighborhoods in which defensible space has

been promoted, difficulties in disposing of the large amounts

of brush produced in the initial conversion to a fire safe

landscape add significantly to the perceived complexity at

the implementation stage. The amount of brush produced is

dangerous to burn, it is costly and difficult to haul, and

landfills won’t take it anyway. This is a major barrier to

widespread adoption.

Overall, people generally do not find it difficult to

understand defensible space and how it works to protect

their property. The major sources of complexity are the

amount of work needed to make property fire safe, lack of

certain how-to-do-it information, and especially, the difficulty

of disposing of the brush.

Compatibility

Compatibility is the degree to which the new technology

is perceived to fit with existing values and ways of doing

things (Rogers 1983). A little more than 40 percent believed

that natural landscapes are more beautiful than planted

landscapes while an almost equal number disagree.

 More than one-third believed that few changes should

be made in the natural landscape while more than half are

willing to make changes.

Modifying what is seen as the natural landscape and

replacing it with a planted landscape is not compatible with

attitudes of many of the people who responded to the survey.

Defensible space and wildfire defenses in general need to be

understood as compatible with natural landscape values.

Landscaping for wildfire defense will be more attractive if it

can be shown to restore and protect wildlife, watershed,

esthetics, air quality, and other values.

Recommendations

Public perception of defensible space was least acceptable

in terms of its relative advantage and complexity. That is

enough, however, to slow adoption of wildfire defense

preparations among I-zone residents. Promotion strategies

that increase perceived relative advantage and reduce

perceived complexity will accelerate the adoption of defensible

space among residents of the wildland-urban intermix.

The establishment and maintenance of defensible space

should be made less costly in terms of money, labor, time,

and discomfort for the wildland-urban intermix landowner.

Biomass harvesting may be one way to do this in certain

circumstances. Chipping and scattering the material back on

the ground may be another. Use of light under burning after

initial mechanical or hand treatment may also work. Better

information should be provided on costs and more costeffective vegetation management equipment for the wildlandurban intermix.

In addition, the complexity of defensible space as

perceived by land owners should be reduced. Improved

methods of brush disposal and maintenance will help.

Education about fire behavior and landscaping is needed.

Plant materials and landscaping advice should be more

readibly available.

Perceived incompatibility with values for natural

landscapes will be a barrier to some. The best way to handle

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
97 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

things that will burn and the characteristics of those things and

the topography and weather that cause them to burn intensely.

Fires will start in the wildland-urban intermix. They are

most likely to start where human activity is concentrated.

Those concentrations are typically settlements. The fire that

destroys homes in the wildland-urban intermix probably will

start in a settlement and grow to dangerous intensity because

available fuels (and weather and topography) allow it to

grow rapidly. Suppression forces find they must deal with

human safety and structural protection when they arrive and

are unable to take direct action on the fire itself. One solution

is to contain the risk through a settlement-wide effort at

hazard reduction to cool the inevitable fire down, slow it

down, and keep it on the ground.

Risk containment requires a community- or neighborhood-based marketing effort. Neighborhoods are good

market segments to target with fire prevention education and

promotion because the residents are relatively homogeneous

in terms of socio-economic characteristics, tastes and

preferences for home and environmental characteristics, and

they face the same fire threat in the same fuel type. Marketing

is not selling. Marketing attempts to discover the sort of

“product” the consumer wants and then to produce, price,

promote, and deliver the product. With some modification,

the marketing approach has been successfully applied to

public safety and health campaigns similar to fire prevention.

In the areas studied to date, the slow rate of adoption of

wildfire defenses by people living in the wildland-urban

intermix is not the result of lack of knowledge, motivation,

or skepticism about the effectiveness of defensible space.

Instead, a number of barriers have resulted from perceptions

of defensible space. Defensible space does not have a clear

relative advantage compared to alternatives; it is perceived

to be somewhat complex, and has the potential to conflict

with important values or established methodologies. Increasing

the rate of adoption and use of wildfire defenses in the

wildland-urban intermix requires fire prevention officers to

be conscious of perceived barriers and work to remove or

mitigate those barriers.

Acknowledgments

Ray Stewart of the California Department of Forestry

and Fire Protection (CDF) Shasta-Trinity Ranger District

encouraged me to propose a study in the Shingletown Ridge

area. Mike Jones and Cynthia Reese, of the Western Shasta

Resource Conservation District, developed and implemented

the Middle Creek Watershed fire protection project. Survival

by Design workshops were sponsored by the USDA Forest

Service, CDF, and California State Universities at Chico and

Pomona. The surveys of I-zone residents were sponsored by

the Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service,

and the CDF. The Paradise field test was sponsored by the

CDF and California State University, Chico, with the

cooperation of the Paradise Fire Department. The Shingletown

compatibility difficulties is to adopt a marketing perspective.

In marketing, one does not “sell” the idea by trying to

change attitudes and values. Instead, one attempts to modify

the product to fit existing attitudes and values (Kotler 1981,

Solomon 1989). Neighbors and opinion leaders are important

when compatibility is in question (Rogers 1983). Illustrations

of typical neighborhood landscape designs that are fire safe

and provide for wildlife, watershed, esthetics, and other

values identified during marketing research will help.

Defensible space promotion programs should be targeted

at neighborhoods and other relatively homogeneous groups.

Resident input into planning and implementation should be

extensive and their concerns, interests, and suggestions should

be incorporated into the wildfire defense plan. Residents

should be involved in the development and implementation

process as a community to the greatest extent possible.

Marketing is most effective when it is targeted to homogeneous

market segments; neighborhoods tend to be socioeconomically homogeneous and, in the I-zone, share the

same wildfire threat.

Rapid implementation of defensible space in neighborhoods will be facilitated by ensuring that the benefits are

observable. In the Shingletown Ridge project, we encouraged

neighbors to pile brush for chipping at the roadside. The

growing numbers of piles and later, the activity of the chipping

operation to dispose of the brush communicated clearly to

other people in the neighborhood that fire safe work was

being done. Participating lots should be marked with an

emblem of some kind showing that hazards have been reduced.

Not everyone is willing to implement landscaping for

wildfire defense fully without seeing how it will look on

their own property first. By making the neighborhood-based

hazard reduction project an annual event, skeptics have the

opportunity to try it out on a small part of their property.

When they find they like it, they will fully implement firesafe landscaping at the next opportunity.

Defensible space is adaptable to the requirements of

each setting and to the tastes and preferences of most people.

Its attractiveness will be enhanced if that flexibility is

maintained. Attempts to make specific fire-safe rules and

apply those rules to every site will result in less adoption and

less effective wildfire protection. By educating people about

fire behavior and advising them on applications of hazard

management to their particular situation, more people are

likely to accept defensible space.

Summary

Fire prevention is more than information and education

aimed at reducing the numbers of fire starts. That is part of

prevention—a very important part—but fire prevention works

best when supported by three legs: information and education,

enforcement, and engineering, and integrated with suppression

and fuels management. In the wildland-urban intermix,

engineering involves hazard management. Hazards are those

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
98 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

 Kotler, Philip. 1982. Marketing for nonprofit organizations. Englewood

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall; 528 p.

Lindell, Michael K.; Perry, Ronald W. 1992. Behavioral foundations of

community emergency planning. Washington, DC: Hemisphere

Publishing Corp.; 309 p.

Solomon, Douglas S. 1989. A social marketing perspective on

communication campaigns. In: Rice, Ronald E., Atkin, Charles K.,

eds. Public Communication Campaigns. 2nd ed. Newbury Park, CA:

SAGE Publications; 416 p.

Rogers, Everett M. 1983. Diffusion of innovations, 3rd ed. New York:

The Free Press; 453 p.

study was sponsored by the CDF and California State

University, Chico, with the cooperation of the Shasta Forest

Village Property Owners Association and Water Company.

References

Albrect, Terrance L.; Adelman, Mara B. and Associates. 1987.

Communicating social support. Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publications;

317 p.

Drabek, Thomas E. 1986. Human system responses to disaster. New

York: Springer-Verlag; 509 p.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
99 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Neighborhood Organization Activities: Evacuation Drills,

Clusters, and Fire Safety Awareness1

Dick White2

Motivations for Emergency Preparedness

Common sense—and the historical record of major fires

here—contributed to a background level of concern for

engaging in emergency preparations. But most of the activities

described here began after the Loma Prieta earthquake of

1989 and were intensified greatly by the occurrence of the

Oakland/Berkeley Hills Firestorm in October 1991.

Sources of Information and Help

Although the residents may have conceived of a few

novel twists, most of the preparedness actions we have taken

were suggested in publications and courses made available

by many organizations. Here are some that we have used:

• Berkeley Office of Emergency Services: Disaster

First Aid Handbook and Search and Rescue

Handbook, plus courses on these topics.

• Oakland Office of Emergency Services: CORE

Program (Citizens of Oakland Respond to

Emergencies) courses covering individual and

group preparations, medical disaster, light search

and rescue, and light fire suppression, followed

up by a realistic earthquake drill at the Oakland

Fire Department Training Center.

• American Red Cross: Your Family Disaster

Plan (with FEMA co-sponsorship), and other

booklets.

• California Department of Forestry and Fire

Protection: Video “Fire Safe — Inside and

Out,”pamphlet “Fire Safe, California!,” and other

publications.

• East Bay Municipal Water District: Firescape:

Landscaping to Reduce Fire Hazard.

• Others: KTVU Channel 2 Television: Video,

“The Oakland/Berkeley Hills Firestorm, October

20, 1991.” University of California emergency

preparedness fair. Vendor information.

The Three P’s:

Preparations, Plusses, Problems

In the hope that our experience might be useful to

others, here is a summary of what we have done to increase

our readiness for responding to emergencies. The emergencies

we foresee—through a veil of denial—are two. One is a

massive, fast-moving fire coming from any direction of the

compass. The other is a major earthquake that severely

damages many of our dwellings and roads, disrupts electricity

Abstract: Emergency preparedness activities of one BerkeleyOakland Hills neighborhood at the wildland/urban interface include establishing clusters that reduce fire hazards and fuel loads,

setting aside emergency supplies, and identifying evacuation routes;

taking emergency preparedness courses from the Offices of Emergency Services of Berkeley and Oakland (the CERT and CORE

programs); and setting up and exercising a citizen-band radio

network. With the cooperation of the Berkeley and Oakland fire

and police departments, on-foot evacuation and earthquake drills

have been held. Problems discovered relate to liability, absentee

ownership of lots, and response time of the official emergency

radio system.

The Story

This is the story of one neighborhood’s preparations forresponding to a major emergency, whether large fire or

severe earthquake.

The Setting: The neighborhood contains roughly 235

dwellings, sited densely on a hill on the urban/wildland

interface located nearly atop the Hayward earthquake fault.

There is just one road for access to the neighborhood, the

streets are steep and full of tight curves, and no street is

much wider than 15 feet. The utility lines are carried overhead

on old poles. Shrubs and trees abound both inside and just

outside of the neighborhood.

Political Landscape: The neighborhood lies partly in

Berkeley and partly in Oakland. It abuts University of

California land on several sides, and it touches East Bay

Regional Park land. A neighborhood association was founded

in 1926, reportedly in response to the issue of providing

better emergency access for fire-fighting equipment. An

additional access road has not been built, and the idea of

such a road is not popular with residents because it is believed

likely to trigger the development of presently undeveloped

lots in the neighborhood.

Cast of Characters: The neighborhood is populated by

“team-players” and dedicated individualists, homeowners,

landlords, tenants, long-term residents, and absentee owners

of undeveloped lots, plus unknown transients who camp

occasionally in the adjoining woods.

1

An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sciences, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
100 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

(clusters) of five to ten dwellings each to cooperate locally

in preparing for and dealing with an emergency, and

communicating with the neighborhood as a whole; and we

have invested in some means for improving our ability to

deal with an emergency (table 1).

Neighborhood Clusters

 We have approximately 15 clusters of five to ten nearby

dwellings. Each has a cluster representative and an alternate

who help plan activities, such as drills, and communicate to

their neighbors about the preparations one should make, the

and water supplies, cripples telephone communications,

injures many people, and possibly leaves the neighborhood

isolated to take care of itself for at least 72 hours.

While engaging in preparedness activities, we have

experienced many positive side benefits—we will refer to

them here as “plusses.” And we have identified some problems

that we hope can be overcome.

Preparations

We have attempted to learn what needs to be done in

case of emergency; we have set up small local groups

Table 1—Neighborhood preparedness activities

Fire prevention

Awareness through information dissemination.

City inspections and followup (spark arrestors, clear zones, etc.).

Clearing by individuals (city pickup of clippings, chipper, dumpsters).

Roof replacement and tree removal and trimming by individuals.

Neighborhood organization

Cluster formation (use for two-way information transfer):

5-10 households; identify occupant skills and needs; sketch and tag utility

shutoff locations.

Spreadsheet (each address, names, phone numbers, skills, needs)

Neighborhood association

Committees—emergency preparedness, etc.

Entire neighborhood informational meetings.

Communications

Telephone trees (through clusters)

Citizen band radio network

• 40-channel, 5-watt; 24 units purchased by individuals

• Protocols, practice drills, neighborhood maps

• Coverage: “command center” to top and bottom of hill, end-to-end of fire

trails, inside house to inside house, AC-DC on standby.

Courses

Berkeley “CERT”:

Medical disaster (3 hour).

Oakland “CORE”

Module 1: individual preparedness (18 people).

Module 2: group preparedness (18 people).

Module 3: Medical emergency; light search and rescue; light fire suppression;

“final exam” drill—simulated earthquake (OFD Training Center).

Disaster planning and practice

Command center identified, storage building stocked.

Emergency medical location identified.

On-foot escape routes identified and tested.

Medevac site discussed (?)

Emergency police access paths discussed (?).

Practice drills

Mar. ’93: on-foot neighborhood evacuation (emphasis: walking out).

Oct. ’93: on-site earthquake response (emphasis: learn your local area).

Mayday ’94: on-site earthquake response (emphasis: ready for 72 hours?).

Liaison

Interactions throughout with city and university emergency personnel.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
101 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

emergency supplies to store, the marking of utility shutoff

valves and switches, and so on. The cluster representatives

also communicate to the chairmen of the neighborhoodwide emergency preparedness committee relevant local

information, such as current names and phone numbers of

all residents, which residents are usually at home during the

day and are willing to provide timely information about

conditions in case of emergency, and the locations of residents

having special needs that should be promptly dealt with in

case of emergency. This information for the entire

neighborhood is entered in a spreadsheet (Excel) by the

committee chairmen.

Courses

 Some 20 residents completed the three-module CORE

courses and survived the final drill held at the Oakland Fire

Department Training Center, albeit with receipt of withering

but helpful criticism. Others have taken Berkeley CERT

courses. Several took other courses on similar topics.

Citizen-Band (CB) Radios

 About two dozen residents have purchased 5-watt 40-

channel CB radios in order to facilitate communicating over

the neighborhood in case of emergency. Costs ranged from

$60 (on sale) to about $90. A set of protocols has been

prepared, and several drills a year are held to familiarize

people with the use of this tool — “be brief,” “terminate

transmission with ‘over’ even though it seems silly at first,”

“start on channel X and move up to channel Y in case of

interference,” and so on. We have tested the range of the

radio system and located a spot (“Command Central”) to and

from which transmissions can be understood regardless of

their point of origin.

Some residents also purchased AC-DC converters ($12)

and leave their radios always powered (with “Squelch” control

set so they are quiet until a local transmission is made). In

several cases where actual structure fires occurred in the

neighborhood, the network was activated by a call from an

alert CB owner, showing that it is not necessary for a given

individual to be present to get the network going.

Maps

 Residents prepared a number of different kinds of maps,

including the following:

• Map of the streets and the trails in the surrounding

hills.

• Map of all properties, obtained from Assessor’s

office.

• Map showing location and boundaries of all

clusters.

• Detailed map of each cluster showing location of

all utility valves and shutoffs.

• Maps showing preferred escape paths.

• Map for use by CB radio users to identify origins

of transmissions.

Emergency Supply Shed

At a central location, two clusters assembled an 8-foot

by 8-foot prefabricated shed to hold cluster supplies and

certain neighborhood-wide supplies (maps, logsheets for use

in an emergency, etc.). The shed also holds a 12-volt storage

battery, which is trickle-charged by a solar panel, to power

CB radios for an extended period.

Paths

In addition to the obvious escape routes, we have

identified and marked (with inexpensive reflective 2-inch

dots) several additional escape paths. One resident constructed

at personal expense a bridge over a small creek and a set of

steps to create a safe exit from one difficult area.

Drills

 In 1993 two neighborhood-wide drills were held:

March 1993: Commencing at noon on a Sunday, about 120

residents walked out of the neighborhood on streets or trails

to an assembly point (parking lot of the University of

California football stadium). CORE trainees monitored the

event, and the CB network was exercised. At the stadium,

Berkeley and Oakland Fire and Police Departments had

stationed equipment and personnel, providing an instructive

and enjoyable social experience for residents who participated.

October 1993: A supposed earthquake brought residents

out to interact within their clusters (talking about preparedness,

walking from house to house to show where utility valves

and shutoffs were located). Simulated problems had been

distributed among the clusters: several mannequins (loaned

by the Oakland Fire Department Training Center) represented

injured people; portable gas shutoff demonstration units (from

the Berkeley and Oakland Offices of Emergency Services)

were available for practice; and a number of “downed utility

wires” were scattered about for residents to find and report

using the CBs. About 20 residents later attended a street

demonstration and description by an Oakland firefighter of

the emergency supplies that he always carries in his personal

auto. Afterwards, some clusters held a potluck or picnic.

Plusses

While the goals of these activities were serious, the

activities had unexpected positive side benefits. People became

much better acquainted with their neighbors. Several residents

agreed formally to allow parts of their property to be used

for emergency purposes. Residents met emergency personnel

for the first time, in relaxed circumstances.

Cooperation among the constituencies involved has been

notable. The University of California has funded brush

reduction by a herd of 600 goats on land that adjoins the

neighborhood; a grass fire that occurred was reportedly much

less dangerous than it would otherwise have been. The

University also installed two solar-powered emergency call

boxes on its lands quite close to the neighborhood. These

could be used to relay to the 911 emergency system early

warning of a fire, and (being cellular phones) might serve as

a needed communication link for the neighborhood after a

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
102 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

major earthquake. The East Bay Regional Parks and the

University cooperatively used a brush hog to clear fire trails

in the area.

In the courses offered, whether a given resident lived in

the Berkeley or Oakland part of the neighborhood was of no

relevance. Stimulated by prodding from residents, city offices

have taken legal means to encourage various property owners

to reduce fuel loads on their lots. Another example of

cooperation was the completion of one city’s installation of

reflective blue hydrant markers (“Bott’s dots”) by the other

city, when the first city ran out of reflectors.

Problems

Though we are encouraged by what has happened thus

far, we cannot ignore some important problems that we see:

Fuel Loads Remain High

 In spite of more vigorous action by city agencies and

urging by neighbors, the fuel load in the neighborhood and in

the lands immediately adjacent to it remains dangerously high.

Contradictory Advice

Residents have been told that bamboo groves are, and

are not, a fire hazard; only fuel on the ground matters, and

that the limbs are unimportant; and foam is good for fighting

structure fires generally, and that it is not. Most worrisome,

some emergency personnel recommend privately that residents

obtain fire hose and be ready to use it, but official policy

forbids it.

Volunteer Labor Is Not Allowed

Ostensibly because of the fear of legal liability in case of

an on-site injury, residents have been unable as yet to find

persons in authority willing to let them volunteer their labor to

help reduce fuel loads in the lands that surround the

neighborhood. At the same time, budget limitations have severely

restricted fuel reduction programs that use paid laborers.

Slow Response of Official Emergency Radio Station

 The local 1610AM emergency radio station is slow to

mount and remove announcements that residents might need

to rely upon. For example, the March 1993 drill was supposed

to have been started by a broadcast announcement, upon

notification by the Berkeley Police, but the announcement

was first broadcast twenty minutes after the drill started.

Announcement of the October 1993 drill, which was supposed

to have been taken off the air at the end of the drill, was still

being broadcast two days later. And description of a wildland

fire 5 days earlier was still being broadcast 5 days later when

another wildland fire in a nearby area occurred. (Our reason

for concern about having prompt response of the station will

be made clear below.)

Waning Interest

With the fading of memories of Loma Prieta and the

firestorm of 1991, the sensed urgency of making emergency

preparations fades, and some residents lose interest.

Suggested Solutions

Here are some suggestions regarding these problems.

The issue of cost is also discussed below.

Prevention

• To guide residents on what is dangerous, and

particularly what conditions on lots under absentee

ownership should be corrected, ask high-ranking

firefighters from both cities involved to give a 1-

to 2-hour walking tour of the neighborhood. City

offices that issue citations for cleaning up should

also be represented, along with the neighborhood’s

emergency preparedness committee.

• To reduce fuel loads on adjoining lands, organize

a few work parties of volunteers from the

neighborhood. This might also help our problem

of waning interest. In addition, since the estimated

costs of crucial clearing are relatively low (see

below), an effort should be made to fund these

projects from a source other than the University,

in view of their wide benefits.

• The goat brush-clearing program is threatened for

budgetary reasons. Its effectiveness has been

demonstrated, and it should be continued.

• Provision of dumpsters and the visit of a

chipper have convinced many residents to clear

their properties, and both should continue to be

made available.

Emergency Response

Our CB radio network has already proven useful in

emergencies, but we are unable to communicate via that

means with the most relevant emergency service, the Berkeley

Police Department (BPD). Acquisition of a CB base station

for use in BPD headquarters has been requested, but no

money has been allocated. Can this small amount of funding

($250) be found elsewhere if necessary?

Telephone trees have proven useful, but they are clearly

too cumbersome for use in communicating the urgent need

to take a particular emergency action (for example, to evacuate

on foot to the south because an as-yet-unseen major fire is

approaching from the north). A suggested approach that

could provide an early neighborhood-wide warning is outlined

in figure 1. It relies on the ability of the emergency broadcast

station to transmit quickly detailed emergency advice. A

modest amount of equipment is also needed. If we can solve

the “people” problems associated with getting the radio

station to carry really current information and obtain the

modest amount of funding required for equipment (around

$250), this system could be functioning within weeks.

Financial Issues

Here are the estimated costs of the possible solutions

just described:

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
103 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

in taking the other emergency response steps described above,

residents have spent in excess of $5,000 during the past 2

years. In view of this, allocation of public funds for some of

the projects listed above seems equitable in view of the

enormous cost that would be avoided if another major

conflagration were prevented.

Conclusions

We look forward to continuing to work with emergency

organizations in order to reduce the seriousness of the

emergencies that will inevitably arise in the future. We hope

that we can keep our neighborhood actively involved in this

effort, through focussed periodic drills, the stimulation of

volunteer work to reduce surrounding fuel loads, and through

being further trained in emergency procedures.

Acknowledgments

The following neighborhood residents played especially

important roles in the activities summarized above: Lindy

Hahn, Sydney Kennedy, Penny Rink, and Marianne Tanner.

Thanks also go to Debora Reismann, of the CORE Program,

and other individuals too numerous to mention by name in

the Offices of Emergency Services, Fire Departments, and

Police Departments of both Berkeley and Oakland, as well

as emergency personnel and other staff members at the

University of California, Berkeley.

• Acquire and install CB base station at BPD so

residents can communicate with police when

landlines are down: $250.

• For the local police-activated alarm system,

acquire necessary equipment ($200), install at

one location ($150), and pay cost of telephone

service for one year ($150). Non-recurring costs:

$350. Recurring cost: $150 annually.

• Thin the University of California wildland north

of neighborhood, leaving it amenable to periodic

“touch-ups”: $3,000.

• Similarly, thin the University of California

wildland east of neighborhood: $4,000.

We have not been able to estimate the costs of some of

the other items referred to above. In addition to the items

discussed, there are more expensive problems that need

correcting. One is the repair of a washout in one of the fire

access trails near our neighborhood. Another is replacing

old, heavily laden utility poles in neighborhood areas, to

which access during an emergency would be vital, with

underground utilities. (There is a program for gradual

replacement of overhead lines, but the replacement schedule

is reportedly “booked up” through the next decade. Emergency

considerations should be given priority.)

One may well ask, should not individual residents bear

the costs of fire prevention and emergency response? The

answer is, to a large measure they have. Many residents

have replaced wooden roofs with fire-resistant roofs, have

had trees taken down and other growth removed. In addition,

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II

Figure 1– Proposed warning system for neighborhoods: If a specific warning

regarding evacuation or the like is to be made to a given neighborhood (Hill C),

the police would record the message for broadcast on the emergency radio

station, and then dial a telephone located on Hill C. After the phone is

“answered” (by the commercially available device), police personnel use their

push-button phone keypad to send a 3-digit code that triggers sounding of an

audible alarm. The meaning of the alarm is “tune in to the emergency radio

station for instructions.”
104 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
105 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Yet, in moving to the urban-wildland interface, these people

do not wish to give up their lifestyle. Nor do they seem to

accept any inherent risk.

Let’s not kid ourselves; there is risk. Remember all of the

natural disasters this country has experienced recently: fires,

floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, mudslides, etc. Every square

inch of land carries a degree of risk, some more than others.

People can reduce their losses from natural disasters,

but cannot eliminate them completely. For example, they

can avoid living in areas of high risk; they can construct

buildings or modify the site to withstand the hazard by

installing Class A roofing or removing vegetation; they can

construct structures to prevent the hazards, such as sea walls

to protect bluffs from being eroded by ocean wave action;

they can purchase insurance; or they can do nothing and take

their chances.

The urban-wildland interface dwellers try in vain to

bring all the urban amenities and safeguards with them. The

consequences are far more significant than most people realize.

Housing and business developments, at the very most,

demolish all remnants of the native ecosystem. At the very

least, developments subdivide the ecosystem so it will no

longer function as the same system. The effects of these

altered areas stretch beyond their physical boundaries.

Fire Management in the

Urban-Wildland Interface

Let’s put this into a wildfire protection scenario. A

county permitting agency grants a developer the right to

build on vacant property bordering a state park. Permitting

agencies rarely take into consideration that wildfires are an

inherent natural hazard of most sites, so many permits are

not routinely sent to the fire protection agencies for review.

In order to increase the number of units per acre, there is

an incentive for the developer to site buildings close to

property lines.

Frequently the developer will scarify the entire

development for ease of construction and replant with nonnative plants, some of which may invade the adjacent native

ecosystem in the park. Time passes, and the plants within

and adjacent to the development grow, eventually attracting

the attention of the fire protection agencies. The private

homeowner or state parks are then put on notice to clear

vegetation to create defensible space and weed abatement

for the structure.

Either because of this notice, or to reduce his insurance

premium, the private landowner may trespass onto park

property to clear vegetation, demand that Parks clear their

Abstract: Each parcel of government land carries specific land

use constraints and objectives. This is also true of private housing

and business developments. When government land, which was

acquired to protect the natural or cultural resources, borders private land, which was acquired to build and protect houses or

businesses, conflicts arise. The flammable native vegetation on the

agency land is both a threat to the adjacent private landowner and

the primary resource that the agency is sworn to protect. This

paper covers the California Department of Parks and Recreation’s

response to this conflict.

All of the previous presentations in this concurrent sessionon the urban-wildland interface have focused on the

protection of lives and buildings on the urban side of the

fence. I would like to give a different perspective as the

manager of land on the other side of the fence: the wildlands.

Most of you know that all government land is not managed

the same; each Federal, State, county, or city land management

agency has its own missions and objectives for each parcel

of land. However, much of the lay public makes no distinction.

The California State Park System, like the National

Park System, is a conglomeration of properties that were

acquired to protect and manage: historic and archaeologic

features, sensitive species of plants and animals, and

representative examples of California’s spectacular variety

of ecosystems. That is the “Parks” part of our name. Its

employees, including myself, have the responsibility, by

law, to protect these features.

The other part of our name, “Recreation,” indicates our

mission to provide access so that the general public may

enjoy these lands.

All private land is not managed the same, either, yet

private property owners do share one goal with the California

Department of Parks and Recreation—to protect their

investment. Buildings are usually the most important investment

for homeowners and business owners. The natural and cultural

resources are the most important investment for Parks.

Moving Back to Nature

Protecting one’s investment is an illusive concept. People

usually move back to nature to escape the problems of the

city. Parks provide some of the “nature” that people seek.

Conflicts Between Natural Resources and

Structural Protection1

Stephen Bakken2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Forester, California Department of Parks and Recreation, 1416-9th

Street, Sacramento, CA 95814.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
106 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

property, or notify fire protection agency of the dangerous

condition perpetrated by Parks.

The fire protection agency may cite Parks for noncompliance of the ordinances. In some cases, the fire protection

agency may elect to clear the park property and bill the

Department for the work. To add insult to injury, the

Department is asked to pay for a destructive action on its

property that is in direct conflict with its mission to manage

natural ecosystems.

What is the primary purpose in constructing fire and

fuel breaks? According to the newspapers, it is to protect

everyone from wildfire. But look at this from Parks’

perspective. Like everyone else, Parks is concerned with

protection of human life and will evacuate all park visitors

and employees’ families during a wildfire. The Department

has even gone so far as to close a park when the fire danger

rating reaches extreme. And yes, like everyone else, Parks is

concerned with protection of its facilities and performs the

required vegetation clearance around structures. Indeed, some

of these structures are irreplaceable historic buildings.

However, the Department is most concerned with the

protection of its principal investment—the natural and cultural

features. This is why the land was acquired and why each

park unit is unique.

Parks usually does not want its native wildlands protected

from wildfire; indeed, fire is the most important agent in the

management of a dynamic functioning ecosystem in many

areas of California.

Sometimes Parks might prefer that fire occur in a more

planned fashion (i.e., prescribed burning), such as where

long-term fire exclusion has produced an extremely high

biomass, but we are usually not concerned that the plants

and animal species will be irreparably damaged by an

unplanned fire.

Ironically, some of the techniques used to protect lives

and structures from fire can be very damaging to the natural

and archaeologic features. Parks is most concerned with

bulldozer activity, be it for a firebreak made at the beginning

of fire season, or for a fire control line made during a

wildfire. Firelines accelerate erosion, destroy archaeological

artifacts, allow invasive exotic plants to establish, and degrade

the visual esthetics of the park. The vegetation usually recovers

quickly on burned areas regardless of whether the fire was

planned or not, but may not return to dozed firelines for

decades because the organic surface soil and stored seed has

been removed.

The Department is also concerned with tree felling; it

takes a long time to replace an old-growth tree that was

dropped to extinguish a smoldering fire high on its trunk.

Most of the bulldozer lines on native wildlands are not

to protect the park. They are constructed and maintained to

protect the surrounding businesses and homes. This is an

example of an indirect impact that stretches far outside of

the private ownership boundaries.

I am not here to point fingers at the fire suppression

agencies; they are only doing their job—to protect life and

property. Indeed, if they do not diligently carry out that duty,

they may be sued.

A newspaper editorial during the recent southern

California wildfires was entitled “Public Lands Shouldn’t

Be Allowed to Become Lingering Hazards to Lives and

Property.” It would seem that Parks is negligent by

perpetuating a hazardous condition.

What would be considered best management practices

in this simplified example: a 10,000-acre park with one

vegetation community, say chaparral? Parks would be remiss

in its mission if it attempted to manage all of this community

as one homogeneous block. Biological diversity would be

better served if Parks were to maintain a mosaic of different

age classes of the chaparral. The most ecologically suitable

means to accomplish this is to burn scattered plots of the

older aged chaparral each year.

Yet even this management scheme leaves more than half

of the park in a flammable condition. Given hot, dry, windy

conditions, a wildfire could spread in any continuous cover of

chaparral and threaten adjacent property owners. This is a

paradox. Parks can accomplish its mission using the most

suitable ecological tool and successfully reduce wildland fuels,

yet be held liable for maintaining a “hazardous” condition.

The political solution to this hazardous condition is

frequently unilateral: “Parks needs to construct fire breaks

on its land to protect the private landowner,” or, if you have

been following the Mount Diablo State Park controversy,

“Parks needs to put non-native cattle on its land to protect

the private homeowner.”

Do I sound a little defensive? Well, I fail to see why it is

Parks’ responsibility to trash some of its most important

investments—its natural and archeological resources, in order

to protect someone else’s investment. Yes, native vegetation

will propagate a fire, but as the Oakland Hills wildfire reminded

us, so will exotic plants, shake roofs, and redwood decks.

Solutions

It is the coordinators’ wish that this conference initiate

some concrete change in the way society does business at

the urban-wildland interface. From the fire perspective, I

would like to see two changes:

First, eliminate all of the barriers to prescription burning.

Everyone here is probably aware of how difficult it is to

conduct a prescription burn in the urban-wildland interface

area given air quality constraints, burn logistics, potential

liability, and public sentiment. Yet, this is the only tool that

comes close to meeting the needs of my agency in managing

natural resources while providing a reasonable degree of

protection for the adjacent landowner. The greatest barriers

that I see are smoke management constraints and the threat

of litigation against the landowner and fire protection agency.

Second, the scope of liability for wildfire damage against

land management and fire suppression agencies must be

severely limited. As long as managing a native ecosystem

using best management practices is determined by the courts

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II
107 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

to be equivalent to “maintaining a hazardous condition,”

then there can never be a solution.

The current situation is unworkable for my department.

When a wildfire occurs, Parks either accepts significant

resource damage from suppression activities or risks litigation.

The only acceptable tool available to my department,

controlled burning, will never be used to its full extent

because of the gauntlet of constraints. When Parks is able to

conduct a prescription burn, we still face litigation threat. A

prescription burn that escapes is worse from a liability

standpoint than an arson or accidental wildfire. Even a

successful prescription burn can generate lawsuits. For

example, if heavy rainfall, following a controlled burn,

produces a mudslide that destroys a home, Parks will likely

be sued.

In conclusion, without significant change in the

constraints to prescription burning and especially tort liability,

Parks will be unable to accomplish its mission in the urbanwildland interface zone.

I should not close without saying that Harold Biswell,

or “Doc” as we called him, was instrumental in starting the

Department of Parks and Recreation’s Prescribed Burn

Program. I believe that he would smile if this conference in

his honor was instrumental in changing the way society

manages fire in the urban-wildland interface.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Concurrent Session II

PANEL DISCUSSION:

Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems
110 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
111 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems1

Neil R. Honeycutt2

The urban and wildland interface (mix) problem exists inmany communities in the United States. To effectively

deal with these complex issues, cooperative approaches should

be used to solve regional problems. This panel discussed the

unique programs currently at work in Alameda and Contra

Costa Counties in northern California. These programs were

designed after the 1991 Oakland hills firestorm to address

the specific problems in this predominantly urban intermix

locale. The panel discussed the benefits derived from the

formation of regional cooperatives that go beyond traditional

geopolitical boundaries. The East Bay Fire Chiefs’

Consortium and the Vegetation Management Consortium

operate as components of the Hills Emergency Forum. The

public sector Chief Executive Officers are responsible for

ensuring that the lessons from the Firestorm are translated

into public policy. The Bay Area Wildfire Forum is a private,

nonprofit group of northern California firefighters.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Chief, Fire and Rescue Branch, State of California, Office of Emergency

Services, 2800 Meadowview Road, Sacramento, CA 95832.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:...Urban Interface Problems
112 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Formed in response to the October 20, 1991, Oakland/Berkeley hills firestorm, the East Bay Vegetation

Management Consortium (EBVMC) is a voluntary association

of public agencies concerned with vegetation management

and planning related to fire hazard reduction in the Oakland/

Berkeley hills. To date, a total of nine agencies are

participating in the EBVMC, including local cities, park

districts, public utilities, and educational and research

facilities. Each agency owns or is responsible for significant

open-space lands in the East Bay hills. The EBVMC is

preparing a Vegetation Management Plan (VMP) oriented

toward fire hazard reduction; this planning effort is funded

by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, with FEMA

and EBVMC agencies splitting the $330,000 total project

cost. The VMP project was initiated in August 1993 and is

projected to be completed by September 1994. The VMP has

been developed with substantial public input by a team led

by Amphion Environmental, Inc., an Oakland-based planning

firm. The University of California, Berkeley, is also contracted

to the EBVMC to develop a geographic information system

(GIS) for the VMP. A Technical Advisory Committee and

Citizen’s Advisory Committee have been formed to provide

review and comment on the VMP as it is developed. Several

series of public workshops will also be presented to provide

the general public with the opportunity to learn and comment

about the VMP. The basic goal of the VMP is to reduce the

risk and potential loss from future wildfires in the East Bay

hills. This basic goal will be achieved by improving

communication and coordination of work planning and

activities between local agencies, establishing a resourcebased approach to vegetation management (as opposed to a

jurisdictional approach), and developing and implementing

a consistent set of standards for vegetation management

activities (ranging from land management prescriptions to

residential parcel inspection criteria). Ultimate success for

the EBVMC will depend on public support and political will

to change traditional jurisdictional approaches to resource

management and program funding.

The East Bay Vegetation Management Consortium:

A Subregional Approach to Resource Management

and Planning1

Tony Acosta2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Parks Service Manager, Oakland Office of Parks and Recreation, 1520

Lakeside Dr., Oakland, CA 94612.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:...Urban Interface Problems
113 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems:

East Bay Fire Chiefs’ Consortium 1

Michael Bradley2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire Chief, City of Hayward Fire Department, 25151 Clawiter Rd.,

Hayward, CA 94545.

The traditional approach to planning for public fireprotection has been based on independent actions by

each fire department or district. The county fire chiefs’

associations, while providing interagency communication,

were not adequate to deal with the regional nature of the

wildland urban interface problem. The formation of the East

Bay Fire Chiefs’ Consortium grew out of the need to provide

regional solutions to these problems. This group is composed

of representatives from all agencies that provide protection

in Alameda and Contra Costa Counties in a common urban

wildland interface zone more than 30 miles in length. The

East Bay Fire Chiefs’ Consortium serves as a clearinghouse

for issues such as policy development, vegetation

management, public education, fire response planning, and

coordination of interdepartmental training.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:...Urban Interface Problems
114 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
115 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Regional Approaches to Urban Interface Problems:

the Bay Area Wildfire Forum1

Todd E. Bruce2

Abstract: Fire agencies throughout the San Francisco Bay Area

formed a grassroots organization to influence a firesafe environment. The Bay Area Wildfire Forum (BAWF) was organized in

1992 to coordinate wildland fire training while promoting and

encouraging further activities regarding wildland firefighting and

fire prevention.

The Bay Area Wildlife Forum (BAWF) has sponsored,organized, and instructed four live fire training burns in

the last 2 years. Hundreds of student firefighters learned to

control, suppress, and survive a wildland fire. Also, a newsletter

is circulated every other month to provide a valuable means

of interagency communication. This has never before occurred

within Bay Area fire departments. BAWF attributes its success

to regional coordination, cooperation, and participation.

The San Francisco Bay Area has fast developed a fire

history like that of southern California. The problems include

years of drought, an oppressed vegetative fuel load, and the

building of homes in the once undeveloped wildlands. Bay

Area fire departments, already stretched thin by staggering

budget cuts, have recognized that they can no longer handle

these problems alone.

After the Tunnel Road Fire of October 1991, several

Bay Area firefighters discussed the problems they were

facing with today’s wildfires. Most departments were

experiencing problems with staffing levels. Different

equipment, technology, procedures, terminology, and radio

frequencies have created operational nightmares. They

recognized the need for fire departments throughout the Bay

Area to network on a regular basis.

Thus a grassroots organization, the Bay Area Wildfire Forum

(BAWF), was formed. The bi-monthly meetings are hosted by a

different fire agency. An educational presentation is given,

followed by a roundtable discussion, and then the host fire

department presents its agency’s wildland firefighting program.

BAWF has made available to all member departments a

cadre of highly skilled wildland firefighting instructors. In

light of today’s budgetary belt tightening, this is an invaluable

resource. BAWF will also provide assistance to communities

that want to develop a pre-suppression plan by designating

the high-risk areas in the community and developing a written

report. The plan can outline the local streets, fire hydrants,

back-up water supplies, command post locations, staging areas,

designated radio frequencies, helicopter landing zones,

evacuation areas, etc. BAWF has established an excellent

library of educational books, pamphlets, slides, and videos.

Additionally, BAWF has a speakers’ bureau for public speaking

engagements in community organizations and schools.

It is the vision of the Bay Area Wildfire Forum that, one

day, all the Bay Area fire departments will have a working

knowledge of each other’s organization and a sustained

commitment by each organization to educate their community

and enforce a wildfire hazard reduction program.

Mission Statement

The mission of the Bay Area Wildfire Forum is to

provide for a broad base of support for speaking with a

unified voice influencing a firesafe environment throughout

the Bay Area and surrounding communities; to provide,

through cooperation, practical and usable technology on an

outreach basis; to assist the general public, planners, and

governing bodies in implementing firesafe practices; to

coordinate wildland fire training and fire safety activities;

and to provide a model for agency cooperation and leadership

to other areas of the state and country, which are examples

of the progress that can be achieved through local, State,

private, and Federal cooperation.

Goals

• To provide a forum for a group of local, state,

private, and federal fire agencies who all have a

common interest in the advancement and

promotion of wildland fire control, training, and

prevention.

• To promote and encourage standardization in

wildland fire control.

• To promote and sponsor wildland training

throughout the Bay Area.

• To promote enhanced interagency communications.

• To be a resource center for wildland public

education and wildland fire prevention materials.

• To promote pre-fire suppression planning

throughout the Bay Area.

• To remain available to anyone interested in the

promotion of wildfire interagency cooperation

and training.

• To sponsor the construction of a wildland fire simulator.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire Captain, Santa Clara County, Central Fire Protection District,

14700 Winchester Blvd., Los Gatos, CA 95030-1818.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:...Urban Interface Problems
116 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

In June 1993, firefighters from four counties participated

in a 110-acre training burn. Representatives from two other

counties were on hand to observe the exercise, gather information

and report back to their respective agencies. The local media

was invited to participate in the activities. The media attended

a survival course, developed by BAWF, to give the media the

tools needed to survive a wildland fire incident.

Communications

A newsletter is written, published, and circulated by the

members and distributed every other month. This provides

pertinent interagency information regarding training,

prevention, and political and organizational facts. Included

are training tidbits, meeting minutes, and other essential

information. This has proven to be a valuable means of

interagency communications that has never before occurred

within the Bay Area fire departments.

Conclusion

The Bay Area Wildfire Forum is committed to raising

the level of service, increasing efficiency, and maintaining

interagency cooperation. Total support and participation by

its member departments will be the only means by which

goals will be accomplished. It is our hope that egos can be

set aside so agencies will talk and begin to walk side-byside. Many agencies have taken the first step, to endorse

and support our organization. The next step is to get involved,

assist with change, take a chance, and stake ownership so

the same message can be sent to the public, lawmakers, and

our firefighters.

Accomplishments

 BAWF has more than 50 member agencies and a handful

of individuals. BAWF has the full support and endorsement

of the California State Fire Marshall, California State Board

of Fire Services, eight of the nine Bay Area County Fire

Chief and County Training Officers Associations.

Being a grassroots organization, BAWF has recognized

the necessity to bring aboard a group of individuals who,

based on their experience, can assist the command staff in

avoiding “reinventing the wheel” and other common mistakes

that new organizations are prone to make. This advisory

board is composed of Dan Coffman, State Board of Fire

Services (SBFS); Mike Vonada, SBFS; Chief Mike Bradley,

Hayward Fire Department; Battalion Chief Mike Martin,

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection;

Battalion Chief Bobby Dixon, Milpitas Fire Department;

John Ackerman, Publisher, American Fire Journal; and Chief

Douglas Sporleder, Santa Clara County Central Fire District.

Live Fire Training Burns

BAWF is most proud of its success with live fire training

burns. It has sponsored, organized and instructed four live

fire training burns in the past 2 years. Hundreds of students

learned to control, suppress and survive wildland fires while

under controlled live fire situations. Student firefighters were

placed inside a tent shelter, and the fuel around them was

burned. This simulated the heat, smoke, and sounds that one

would encounter if forced to deploy their fire shelter.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:...Urban Interface Problems
117 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Social and Environmental Issues in Developing Vegetation

and Fire Management Plans1

Leonard Charles2

Abstract: To reduce the risk of wildfire in the California urban

interface often requires actions that will be viewed by members of

the public as having adverse effects on such resources as wildlife,

vegetation, views, air quality, and recreational opportunities. These

citizens can substantially delay and even thwart development of

fire management plans. In developing such a plan for an area in

southern Marin County, California, public agency staff and its

consultants encountered significant public opposition. The successful completion and adoption of the plan required an extensive

public participation process. The rationale and format for the

public participation process are described. As important as the

format selected is the mindset of the staff and consultants involved

in the process. The attitude of “care” on the part of staff and

consultants is investigated and found to be a critical attribute in

dealing with the public on controversial plans.

The preparation of a plan for managing vegetation toreduce fire hazard in the urban interface requires not

only the involvement of the necessary scientific and

professional experts but a willingness by the lead agency

staff and any consultants engaged by the lead agency to

thoroughly and objectively comply with environmental review

requirements (e.g., National Environmental Protection Agency

[NEPA] or, in California, possibly California Environmental

Quality Act regulations). This environmental review must

include an open dialogue with environmental and community

groups who may have significant questions and concerns

regarding proposed vegetation manipulation. To ignore these

questions or concerns can significantly delay approval and

implementation, jeopardize eventual implementation of the

plan, and/or foster a future atmosphere of distrust between

the agency and the local community. Active and wholehearted

inclusion of the public, including critics, can result in more

environmentally sensitive plans than might otherwise be the

case. Ultimately, dialogue with the public improves the

chance of plan adoption and implementation, and it can

foster an environment wherein the public is more confident

of agency sensitivity to environmental and social concerns

when making future land use decisions.

Preparing a Plan for Southern Marin

County, California

The Marin Municipal Water District (MMWD) owns

19,000+ acres in southern Marin County, California. This

acreage is the primary watershed that MMWD uses to produce

and store water provided to 57,000+ residential and business

customers (i.e., hookups) in southern Marin County. This

property plus an adjacent 1,200 acres owned by the Marin

County Open Space District (hereafter referred to as the

Study Area) is heavily used for recreational purposes. The

numerous Study Area ridges capped by Mount Tamalpais,

the tallest mountain in the area, provide the undeveloped

visual backdrop for the many urban communities in the area.

The 20,000+ acres that comprise the Study Area are considered

by the public as one of the region’s most important “resources.”

The problem with this splendid resource is that the

Study Area wildland borders residential neighborhoods of

six cities as well as several unincorporated communities.

The urban interface is a classic example of California

development, with extremely expensive homes built on steep

ridges where the trees and chaparral of the wildland

interpenetrate the residential areas. No border separates the

wildland and the developed areas. And wildland vegetation,

or fuels, surround the residences for a considerable distance

from the Study Area boundary. Access to the interface areas

is limited; water storage and delivery systems are inadequate.

The fire hazard is rated very high to extreme throughout the

interface. Marin County is one of the wealthiest counties in

the United States, and many of the most expensive homes in

the County are located in this interface.

The Marin County Fire Department (MCFD) has

responsibility for suppression of wildland fires in the Study

Area. In the early 1980’s, MCFD became concerned about the

buildup of fuels on the Study Area and the consequent threat

to adjacent residential neighborhoods. From 1982 to 1985,

with MMWD approval, MCFD conducted a series of prescribed

burns in the remote northern portion of the Study Area. In the

autumn of 1985, MCFD conducted a prescribed burn on the

south face of Mount Tamalpais that adjoins the community of

Mill Valley. The objective of this burn was to burn off most of

the chaparral on the south face of the mountain and the

adjacent Marin County Open Space District (MCOSD) owned

Northridge property. Soon after this prescribed burn was

initiated, the weather quickly and drastically changed with

the result that only small patches of chaparral rather than the

targeted several hundred acres were burned.

These small burned patches on the mountain were perceived

by a number of individuals as “scars” on the face of a beloved

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:...Urban Interface Problems

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Environmental Analyst and Partner, Leonard Charles and Associates,

Environmental Analysis and Planning, 7 Roble Court, San Anselmo, CA

94960.
118 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

mountain, scars that had no effect on reducing fire hazard.

Concurrent publication of analyses of the botanical effects of

the earlier Study Area burns conducted by an independent

reviewer described how those burns had produced several

adverse effects on chaparral vegetation (Parker 1986, Parker

and Kelly 1984). Given the identified adverse effects on

vegetation and the visual scarring created by prescribed burns,

a number of individuals mobilized opposition to a new (1986)

MCFD proposal to conduct prescribed burns on the south face

of the Mount Tamalpais. The Districts received letters of

opposition from more than 50 individuals including

representatives of most of the major environmental organizations

active in the area. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, among

others, stated that an Environmental Impact Report must be

prepared before any consideration of future burning.

MMWD then contacted our firm, Leonard Charles and

Associates (LCA), about what work would be required to

supplement the State’s Program Environmental Impact Report

(EIR) on chaparral burning in order to meet the California

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requirements.3 After

meeting with our staff, MMWD determined that the State’s

Program EIR was insufficient to meet the stated requests for

additional analyses and information. MMWD and MCOSD

engaged LCA and Wildland Resource Management to conduct

a series of Scoping Meetings with the public to determine

what studies were required. Three meetings were held with

representatives of environmental organizations and

homeowners associations, local fire protection agencies and

other pertinent public agencies, and the general public.

The consensus of these meetings was that before

developing a plan for managing Study Area vegetation, the

resources on the Study Area needed to be identified as well

as the fire hazard probability, and the future state of the

environment under existing management (existing management was primarily “letting nature take its course” and active

fire suppression of all ignitions). LCA and Wildland Resource

Management were engaged to prepare the Baseline Studies

(Leonard Charles and Associates and Wildland Resource

Management 1991). This report included a complete survey

and description of vegetation on the Study Area, an analysis

of fuels, computer gaming of wildfire behavior, mapping of

fire hazards, analysis of future vegetation succession given

current management, and installation of a Geographic

Information System (GIS). The conclusions of these Baseline

Studies were that there was an extreme fire hazard on most

of the Study Area and in the surrounding residential areas. In

addition, a number of threats to existing plant communities

and species given existing management were identified.

The Districts determined that a Vegetation Management

Plan (hereafter called the Plan) was required to address

these concerns. After a competitive bidding process, LCA

was engaged to prepare this Plan and the EIR for that Plan.

The Baseline Studies took nearly 2 years to complete. A

Draft Vegetation Management Plan was completed in 1.5

years and accepted by the Districts in autumn 1993. The

Draft EIR was scheduled to be published in early March

1994. By the time EIR review is completed and the Districts

certify the EIR and act on the Plan, it will have been about 4

years since the planning process began.

Plan Contents

The Draft Plan is a site-specific description of vegetation

manipulation to construct a series of fuel reduction zones on

about 1,100 acres. A description and mapping of the

prescriptions for more than 300 sites (i.e., polygons) are

included with a description of the implementation of each

technique, and monitoring requirements. The techniques

recommended include manual and mechanical cutting of

chaparral and woodland understory, thinning of overstocked

coniferous stands, and prescribed burning of woodland

understory, grasslands, and chaparral.

The Plan also includes programs for controlling and

eliminating invasive, non-native plant populations, restoring

threatened meadows/grasslands and oak woodlands, protecting

and restoring rare plant populations, and upgrading road and

water delivery systems. A complete monitoring format is

included as well as staffing recommendations. Coordinated

Resource Management Plans and Memoranda of Understanding programs are identified for critical areas of the

Study Area perimeter that are owned by other agencies or

individuals. The costs for treating each polygon are estimated,

and a complete fiscal analysis and funding plan are included.

Finally, the Plan includes detailed recommendations for work

required in the urban interface outside the Study Area. The

Draft Plan, including Technical Appendices and the Baseline

Studies, includes over 2,000 pages of text. Prescriptions are

mapped on large format maps. Baseline data and prescriptions

are stored in the GIS.

Plan Preparation

All the time, effort, and costs of preparing these studies

and plans may not have been necessary if the vegetation

management were proposed in an isolated, rural area of the

state or in areas that had recently and/or repeatedly witnessed

the residential destruction implicit in urban interface wildfires.

However, Marin County is an urbanized area, and a major

wildfire has not occurred in the southern half of Marin

County since 1945. Thus, a number of individuals and

organizations had serious doubts about any plans to make

the area “safer” by burning the vegetation on a treasured

mountain and watershed.

Some may believe that MMWD and MCOSD should

have opted to quickly proceed with preparation of a plan to

alter vegetation and invited public participation only to the

degree required by pertinent environmental and planning

laws. From this perspective, planning should be the job only

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:...Urban Interface Problems

3 Since this paper was originally presented, MMWD has certified the Final

EIR for the Plan and has adopted that Plan. The Plan was adopted in October

1994. MMWD is currently implementing the Plan.
119 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

of those who ensure public safety and manage Study Area

resources, such as fire protection and ecological experts.

This perspective ignores the influence of the environmental

organizations. It ignores that the environmental organizations

and other interested parties have already complained about

past management activities. It ignores the request for a full

EIR made by the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and others.

It ignores the independent analyses of Study Area burns that

indicate adverse effects on vegetation. It ignores numerous

articles in the scientific literature that warn against too frequent

burning of chaparral and burning “out of season” (J.E. Keeley

1989, S.C. Keeley 1989, Parker 1987). It ignores the fact that

MMWD and MCOSD are agencies with elected boards who

must maintain a thorough dialogue with the public they serve.

And it ignores that an educated public input can provide data

and perspectives not available to staff and consultants and

potentially improve staff/consultant-prepared plans.

Letters to the Districts opposing any additional burning

on the mountain were not submitted only by local citizens.

Such renowned scientists and authors as G. Ledyard Stebbins

(1986), Peter Raven (Director of the Missouri Botanical

Garden) (1986), H. Thomas Harvey (principal of Harvey

and Stanley Associates, Inc.) (1987), and many other

professors and scientists submitted letters opposing future

prescribed burning or, at least, requesting that an EIR be

prepared prior to consideration of such burning. The California

Department of Fish and Game (1986) recommended no

burning on the south and east faces of Mount Tamalpais and

the Northridge property.

The Districts were cognizant of the problems that might

result if the community was not fully involved in the planning

process. They wisely insisted that the Plan be prepared by a

group that included all necessary areas of expertise including

public participation experts. The 21-member team preparing

the Plan included botanists, fire ecologists, foresters, wildlife

biologists, archaeologists, geologists, hydrologists,

cartographers, land use planners, and public participation

consultants. The EIR was being prepared at the same time as

the Plan which allowed pertinent experts to review preliminary

Plan recommendations to ensure that prescriptions would not

harm sensitive or valuable resources nor result in unacceptable

impacts; this ensured that the eventual EIR would not expose

unforeseen critical impacts or flaws in the Plan.

Public Participation Component

While conducting the earlier scoping meetings and

preparing the Baseline Studies, the opposition to any use of

prescribed burning and, in many cases, to any manipulation

of existing vegetation was evident. From the plan’s inception,

because of past disagreements, the agencies and any

consultants they might hire were considered distrusted. The

stated belief was that staff and consultants were simply

developing a plan “to have something to do,” “to manage for

the sake of management,” and to justify their jobs. Some

believed that the Districts planned to proceed with prescribed

burning no matter what any studies showed, that their minds

were made up, and that the Districts were unwilling to listen

to opposing viewpoints. Many of these same individuals

believed that the Study Area did not need management,

nature would be better off left alone, and any fire hazard

should be addressed by residents making their homes fire

safe, rather than treating wildland vegetation.

Given this opposition and the stated distrust of management

and consultants, the Districts insisted that the consultant team

include experts in public participation. A full public

participation program was conducted. This included:

• Five community meetings/presentations—The

consultants made presentations of goals, objectives,

and preliminary recommendations. Verbal and written

input was obtained from the public. The meetings

were organized, hosted, and supervised by the public

participation consultants.

• An in-depth telephone survey of 400 MMWD

ratepayers—The public’s opinions were obtained

about proposed goals, objectives, techniques, and

financing.

• Presentations were made to the MMWD Board and

MCOSD Parks and Open Space Commission, and

input was received.

• Newsletters.

• Press releases.

• Complete reports prepared as technical appendices

for all public participation efforts.

Informal meetings between MMWD staff and the

consultants with various environmental and community groups

were also important efforts. Robert Badaracco, the MMWD

Land Manager, hosted a number of field trips with interested

organizations and individuals. He leased small buses and

vans and toured the top of Mount Tamalpais to show

individuals some of the hazards that were being addressed in

the Plan. Consultants generally accompanied him, and together

they answered questions and responded to concerns.

MMWD under Mr. Badaracco’s initiative and management hosted a 2-day symposium, “Vegetation Management

in Natural Areas,” on April 3-4, 1992. Symposium speakers

addressed a range of issues regarding fire hazard reduction

in the urban interface. One of the aims of the symposium

was to expose the local community to the points of view of

experts throughout California.

The consulting team and MMWD staff voluntarily made

contacts with most of the major environmental organizations.

They attended informal potlucks, field trips, committee

meetings, and ad hoc meetings where they made presentations,

answered questions, and received input and criticisms. They

made repeated efforts to inform those who expressed the

most concern about the Plan about their timetable, approach,

and intentions.

LCA maintains that this type of public participation was

essential to deal with controversial issues involving vegetation

manipulation in such a sensitive area. The actual participation

format and the mindset of the consultants or staff were

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to admit one is wrong. Equally, one must be able to clearly

argue one’s position in the case if the opposing view is

clearly incorrect.

Although it is incumbent to act in a professional manner

when working with the public, an equally important attribute

is to care—to care about the environment that has been

manipulated and to care about other people’s feelings and

opinions. The care that consultants and staff brought to the

meetings and dialogues with the public was critical in the

planning process. Although all individuals still did and do

not agree with the Draft Plan recommendations nor the data

that were used to develop the recommendations, most people

recognized that every effort had been made to be sensitive to

environmental attributes but to also address the objectives of

reducing the area fire hazard. They could see that staff and

consultants cared about the same environment that they

cared for and that while we might still be misguided, in their

opinion, we were doing our best. This did not stop people

from continuing to oppose certain aspects or to call for

additional research when preparing the EIR. But for the

most part the recriminations and untrusting atmosphere were

eliminated from the final hearings of the Draft Plan.

This care and openness is best expressed in the small,

informal meetings and conversations. By meeting in people’s

homes or when on walks on the Study Area, issues may be

discussed in a way that rarely occurs in formal meetings or

presentations. Opportunities are available for people to see

that staff or consultants are real people who are informed

and care about the environment and the issues. This personal

contact cannot occur in large, formal meetings. Too often,

individuals, especially representatives of organizations, have

a perceived agenda at these larger meetings, and the ability

to actually converse is lost. The time and organizational

constraints of these larger meetings also restrict the possibility

of open dialogue. Staff and consultants should strive to

make themselves available for such informal meetings,

conversations, and field trips. The trust developed in these

dialogues can then influence the more formal dialogue at

larger public meetings and public hearings.

The Draft Plan is based on continual monitoring of

actions so that prescriptions and programs can be amended if

unforeseen adverse effects are realized. This built-in ability

to alter the Plan combined with a trust of staff and consultants’

honesty helped assuage fears that the Districts were “running”

over the public with a Plan that, once adopted, would eliminate

the potential for future review and adjustment.

At the final public hearing where the MMWD Board

heard testimony on the Draft Plan prior to approving it so

that the EIR could be completed and distributed, representatives of most environmental organizations actually

praised the Draft Plan for its sensitivity. Their remaining

primary concern was how they were going to have some

future voice in plan implementation (they sought some form

of Citizens Advisory Committee), which is a political and

not a planning issue. Although environmental organizations

and other individuals remain concerned about the Plan, the

equally important. Many members of the community had

become inured to typical “participation” meetings and

approaches resulting in the common opinion that such

meetings were simply an exercise, a sham, that allowed the

lead agency to claim that it had actively sought public input.

Individuals responsible for Plan preparation must be aware

that he or she does not know everything and that there is

value in divergent opinions. This is easy to say and it seems

self-evident. However, when one has been working on a

project for a long period of time, one begins to feel that one

“knows” what needs to be done, what the effects of the

recommendations are, what the benefits and costs are, etc.

Changing course is difficult to consider once one has invested

considerable time and energy developing a set of

recommendations. To listen to points of view that are often

diametrically opposite is difficult. To be directly or indirectly

accused of bias and callousness towards plants, animals,

views, etc. is difficult. And, to envision that one might

actually be wrong is also difficult.

These critiques of one’s work and one’s self worth are

not simply impassioned outcries. Many of the critics of the

planning efforts for the Mount Tamalpais area are very

familiar with the literature on the effects of prescribed burning

in chaparral. They have reviewed prescribed burns done in

other areas. They know where sensitive wildlife species

occur in or near treatment areas. They are educated in the

literature of ecological succession, restoration, etc. They are

familiar with such alternative techniques as the use of foam

and residential defensible space strategies. They are able to

find the articles in the scientific literature that question or

offer an opposite point of view to that held by most members

of the scientific community. For example, a customized

version of BEHAVE gaming was used to predict wildfire

behavior on the Study Area; the exercise was used to gauge

the efficacy of the recommended fuel reduction zones.

Opponents to prescribed burning criticized the use of

BEHAVE gaming as it was not developed for wildfire behavior

in chaparral and were able to cite articles that likewise cited

the limitations of BEHAVE.

The selective use of scientific articles to prove one’s

point or corroborate one’s position is not a new phenomenon.

Yet it remains a very effective means of blocking

communication. Opponents using data from selected articles

or selected sections of articles make a case that a

recommendation or finding in the Plan is not accurate. They

make these selections available to other individuals, many

of whom are already prone to disbelieve the consultants. The

consultants and staff are then accused of bias, of using only

data that will support their position, and “if they are biased

here, then how can we believe anything in this report.” Thus,

if BEHAVE gaming in chaparral is inappropriate, as some

claim, then the entire exercise is simply a means of frightening

people by using inadequate data. One of the main aims of

public participation is to be able to discuss, even argue,

about these conflicting claims. And the consultant or staff

must engage in these conversations willing to learn, willing

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These people can be quite vicious in their attacks not only on

the data in question but personally. The staff member or

consultant has no need to simply absorb such unwarranted

behavior. However, such individuals must be handled in a

professional manner that addresses the attack without allowing

the discussion or the staff member or consultant to become

simply reactive. When one becomes reactive, the entire

public might be considered as hostile and the possibility of

constructive dialogue might be seen as hopeless. It is too

easy to react and judge a group by one or two obviously

hostile members.

Care provides a long-term view of the situation. One

can be angry, defensive, argumentative at times. However, if

care is present, then one can focus on the fact that most of

the public involved care themselves and are seeking the best

for their environment, and that a solution that is effective

and generally acceptable is possible.

Most importantly, care means to keep an open mind. A

characteristic of many experts is that they become blinded

by the very expertise that is their strength. Expertise should

not be a shield to deflect opposing data or theories. To care

is to recognize that all of us, despite opposing viewpoints,

tend to become defensive about our area of expertise,

especially if considerable time and energy has been expended

to develop a plan or recommendation. To care is to continually

be aware of this defensiveness and to try to remain open to a

differing perspective even when that perspective includes a

personal attack or criticism. It means to be willing to work a

little harder.

Although one cannot necessarily order up care in oneself

or one’s co-workers or subordinates, this attribute should be

recognized when selecting staff members and/or consultants

to work on a controversial project. Expertise in one’s field,

the ability to effectively write and speak, and other attributes

are certainly critical. The propensity to care is an equally

valuable characteristic.

The Benefits of Public Participation

Including full public participation in the planning process

is not meant simply as a method to deflect criticism of that

process. Many real benefits result from involving the public,

especially an educated public like the one involved with this

vegetation management plan.

This plan addresses a controversial situation. The planning

process took about 4 years, and this seems a long time.

During the 4 years no work could occur, and one hoped that

a wildfire did not ignite. But 4 years is not long for “project”

approval in California. Many large development projects

take at least this long from the initial planning stage through

the environmental and project approval stages. If the Districts

had decided not to conduct the Baseline Studies and simply

developed a plan and an EIR on that plan, the EIR might

have been substantially challenged, including a potential

legal challenge. Those familiar with the CEQA process in

California know how difficult it is to prepare a legally adequate

general praise for the consultants, staff, and the Draft Plan is

an indication that, so far, our approach to working with the

public is an effective planning tool.

Currently, the Draft EIR is being completed for the

Draft Plan. The public and reviewing agencies will review

the Draft EIR and submit comments asking for clarification

or additional information. After responding to all comments,

the Final EIR will be submitted to the Districts. Once the

MMWD Board (as Lead Agency) determines that the EIR is

complete, it will certify that document. At that point, the

Board can take action to adopt the Plan, which will probably

occur in May or June 1994.

The Concept of Care

Preparation of a Vegetation or Fire Management Plan

requires the full use of the expertise of various professionals.

This paper has not focused on this expertise, nor the various

approaches and techniques available for reducing fire hazard

in the urban interface. Such approaches are the subjects for

many of the other papers delivered at this symposium. Instead,

this paper has focused on the often critical area of involving

the public in preparing such a plan, because in addition to

the basic professional knowledge, objectivity, and honesty

that each participant in the planning effort must maintain,

the attribute of care is helpful in resolving controversial

planning matters. The American Heritage Dictionary defines

the verb “to care” as: “to be concerned or interested; provide

needed assistance or watchful supervision; have a liking or

attachment; and have a wish, or be inclined.”

These definitions describe the attitude that a staff member

or consultant can bring to controversial planning issues.

Consultants must be concerned and interested in the planning

issues and the target environment. They should also provide

needed assistance and watchful supervision to ensure that

the Plan is workable and that the effects are predictable. One

should “like” the project, the affected environment, and the

people involved.

One cannot fake care. One must possess it; at the very

least, one must have the wish or inclination to see that the

job is done well.

This focus on care is not intended as some “New Age”

suggestion of a technique for improving job performance.

Obviously, if one does not care about a particular planning

effort, then one will proceed on whatever grounds one has

found useful or successful in the past. Rather, it is an

observation that in this particular planning effort, as well as

our firm’s work on several other very contentious projects,

the attitude of care can make the difference in successful

adoption of a plan as well as the creation of an eased

atmosphere for future decision-making.

Neither is this attention to care intended as an invitation

to be nice to everyone. Some individuals purposely misuse

data and public forums to promote their own narrow view.

These individuals may have no desire to listen to opposing

viewpoints, to compromise, or to reach a workable decision.

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EIR that can withstand a vigorous legal challenge even for

discrete development projects. The difficulty of assessing

impacts on vegetation, wildlife, views, air quality, erosion,

etc. for a plan that addresses a wide range of actions in

various habitats over hundreds or thousands of acres is

immense. If a community is unhappy with the planning

process and the plan, they may find many “incomplete”

analyses, omissions, and errors. They are likely to mount a

legal challenge to such an EIR. This challenge adds months,

even years, to the planning process, especially if the challenge

is upheld by the courts, and the EIR must be amended and

recirculated. Cases like these show that the full public

participation approach outlined above is especially warranted.

Some of the other major advantages of public participation

in this Plan included:

 •The Plan preparers were exposed to many scientific

articles and perspectives that they might not

otherwise have known existed. Members of the

public provided the consultants with full

bibliographies of articles on the adverse effects of

burning and re-burning chaparral, especially under

wet season conditions. The California Native Plant

Society and others provided data on the botanical

significance of the chaparral community existing

on the Study Area. The consulting team reviewed

these data and determined that the botanical effects

(as well as visual, hydrologic, and fiscal effects)

of mass burning and re-burning of large areas of

chaparral or other vegetation would have

significant environmental impacts. As such, the

Plan developed a series of discrete fuel reduction

zones on critical ridge lines and other areas where

fire access roads currently exist. Input from the

public was an essential part of the data base used

to develop the Plan. The local community often

has many good ideas and particular knowledge

about their environment.

 •Environmental organizations and other individuals

were willing to become participants in Plan

implementation. For example, the California Native

Plant Society (CNPS) has offered to assist the

Districts in locating sensitive plant populations

on treatment sites and to assist in expanding the

inventory and mapping for sensitive species. The

Plan includes a section on the extensive volunteer

efforts in removing non-native plant populations

and other necessary tasks. Volunteer labor is more

likely from an involved community.

 •Thorough public involvement ensured that the

planners had fully investigated their recommendations and options to those recommendations.

This participation ensured a thorough and objective

analysis.

 •As previously discussed, full participation built

an atmosphere of trust between the public and the

lead agency. This was beneficial in getting a plan

adopted without legal challenges. It may result in

an atmosphere wherein future planning and

decision making is based on dialogue rather than

conflict.

Conclusions

Preparing vegetation and fire management plans may

involve changing vegetation in ways that are unpopular or

unacceptable to certain members of the local community. In

those cases where controversy occurs, the planning effort

must include an open dialogue with the affected community.

The formats for such dialogues are well known to most

public agencies. Particularly controversial projects may require

the inclusion of public participation experts. In either case, it

is critical that staff and consultants who are in contact with

the public remain objective and open in discussions with the

public and that they seek every opportunity of meeting with

members of the community. An open dialogue assists the

planning process, often improves the chance for adoption of

a workable plan, and can foster increasing trust between

agencies and the public.

References

California Department of Fish and Game; [letter to Marin Municipal

Water District]. 1986 August 8. 1 leaf on file with MMWD.

Harvey, H. Thomas. [letter to Marin Municipal Water District]. l987

March 16. 1 leaf on file with MMWD.

Keeley, Jon E. 1989. Resilience in fire does not imply adaptation to fire:

an example from the California chaparral. In: Sharon M. Hermann

and others, ed. Proceedings of the 17th tall timbers ecology conference:

high intensity fire in wildlands. May 18-21, 1989; Roslyn, WA: Fire

Research Institute; 113-119.

Keeley, Sterling C. ed. 1989. The California chaparral—paradigms

revisited. Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County; Number

34, Science Series; 171 p.

Leonard Charles and Associates. 1993. Draft Mount Tamalpais area

vegetation management plan. Report submitted to Marin Municipal

Water District and Marin County Open Space District. 1,326 p.

Leonard Charles and Associates; Wildland Resource Management.1991.

Vegetation and fire management baseline studies. Report submitted

to Marin Municipal Water District and Marin County Open Space

District; 625 p.

Parker, V. Thomas. 1986. Evaluation of the effect of off-season prescribed

burning on chaparral in the Marin Municipal Water District

watershed. Report submitted to Marin Municipal Water District.

Parker, V. Thomas. 1987. Effects of wet-season management burns on

chaparral vegetation: implications for rare species. In: Elias, T.S.,

ed. Conservation and management of rare and endangered plants.

Sacramento: California Native Plant Society; 233-237.

Parker, V. Thomas; Kelley, Victoria R. 1984. The effects of wet season

fires on chaparral vegetation in Marin County, California.

Unpublished report on file with Marin Municipal Water District.

Raven, Peter; [letter to Marin Municipal Water District]. 1986 August 8.

1 leaf on file with MMWD.

Stebbens, G. Ledyard; [letter to Marin Municipal Water District]. 1986

July 7. 1 leaf on file with MMWD.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Panel Discussion:...Urban Interface Problems
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PLENARY SESSION—Solutions
124 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
125 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Forester, Sequoia National Forest, USDA Forest Service, 900 West

Grand Ave., Porterville, CA 92357-2035.

Developing this balance is crucial to ecosystem

management and will be the challenge of managing public

lands in the future. As issues change, managers of public

lands will be presented with the challenge of resolving

conflicts between maintaining healthy ecosystems, people,

and their economics.

Legislative History

Although the Clean Air Act of 1963 established air

quality standards, it did not require State compliance.

Amendments in 1967 required States to establish air quality

standards but did not provide Federal minimums. In 1970,

amendments to the Clean Air Act promulgated Federal

standards for some pollutants as well as criteria for motor

vehicles and fuels. In addition, one of the more critical

components of the 1970 amendments was changing Federal

responsibility for the Clean Air Act from the Department of

Health, Education, and Welfare to the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) (Baggett 1993). In 1970 Congress

required the EPA to establish deadlines for compliance that,

in the following 20 years, became a lesson in understanding

the difficulty in achieving the standards. The 1977 amendments

recognized the futility of a 1975 deadline and allowed States

until 1987 to comply. The 1977 amendments focused on

stationary industrial sources and introduced the Prevention

of Significant Deterioration (PSD), providing the first

opportunity to protect and maintain air quality in areas that

were cleaner than the national standards. The amendments

provided for Federal Implementation Plans (FIPS) if State

Implementation Plans (SIPS) did not achieve compliance.

1990 Clean Air Act and Prescribed Fire

Because the 1987 national air quality goals were not

attained, Congress enacted amendments to the Clean Air Act

in 1990. The 1990 amendments address four broad categories

that may affect the use of prescribed fire in California:

• Federal non-attainment area requirements for

PM10 (particulate matter ≤10 microns diameter,

1 micron = 10-6 m)

• Conformity

• Air Toxics

• Visibility

Federal Non-Attainment Area Requirements for PM10

The 1990 amendments require dates for compliance of

PM10 and other Federal non-attainment pollutants based on

Abstract: The Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 offers a challenge to

the future of prescribed and natural fire programs in the United

States. One aspect of maintaining healthy ecosystems for humans

and natural resources is clean air. In addition, prescribed and

natural fire programs are an important tool in maintaining healthy

ecosystems, as well as satisfying the requirements of Federal and

State legislation concerning home and structure protection, protecting endangered species, maintaining natural wilderness processes, providing for multiple use, and providing healthy forests

and resources for future generations. As legislation to protect the

environment grows deeper and more complex, land management

agencies find themselves in the position of sorting out conflicts

and attempting to manage within legal and publicly acceptable

parameters. Presenting a solution to this issue of conflicting legislative mandates will require: the ability of land management and

air regulatory agencies to move beyond their normal roles and

reach the best position for responsible ecosystem management,

including human health concerns; land management agency cooperation in developing a uniform position and resolution; the development of a technically strong and credible resolution that shows

sensitivity to the public health issue; strong upper management

communication to State and EPA management; and timely regulatory development.

The Federal Clean Air Act of 1963 has been verychallenging to the future of prescribed fire programs in

California. Rules for prescribed fire need to be developed to

meet the requirements of the Clean Air Act of 1990. The

practice of allowing fire to play its natural role in wildland

ecosystems was endorsed in a 1990 General Accounting

Office (GAO) report (GAO/RCED-91-42). The report states

that attempts to exclude fire from these lands could lead to

major unnatural changes in vegetation and wildlife and

contribute to uncontrollable wildfires as the result of an

accumulation of fuels. Fortunately, building compatibility

between the Clean Air Act and prescribed fire is not a

process that needs to begin, but one that needs to continue

and be strengthened.

Understanding the legislative history of the Clean Air

Act and its apparent conflicts with legislation that guides

management of public land is helpful in proposing solutions

that create a balance between air quality, ecosystem health,

and human health.

Working to Make the Clean Air Act and Prescribed

Burning Compatible1

Trent Procter2

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
126 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Visibility

An important visibility-related element in the 1990

amendments is the formation of the Grand Canyon Visibility

Transport Commission. This development reflected a

Congressional desire to protect some of the nation’s most

pristine visibility. Recent research indicates that in addition

to impact from nearby industrial sources, polluted air masses

from California and neighboring western states also impact

visibility (Malm and others 1990, Sisler and others 1989).

Under certain meteorological conditions these air masses

may travel hundreds of miles from large urban areas west of

the Colorado Plateau. The Commission is charged with

developing management options for all pollutants and sources

that contribute to visibility impairment, including forest

management activities. The Commission is expected to have

draft recommendations prepared by June 1995 and a final

report to EPA by November 1995. EPA must act on the final

recommendations by May 1997, and California will be

required to implement the EPA requirements by May 1998.

Working Toward Solutions

Solutions should be balanced. Prescribed fire users need

to recognize air as a resource important to ecosystem function,

visibility, and human health. Regulators need to understand

that air is but one element of ecosystems that require

management to provide for the welfare of the 30 million

citizens of California.

 Solutions to preserve the use of prescribed fire and

reduce the PM10 contribution as a result of prescribed fire

include:

• Prescribed fire user coordination.

• Technically strong resolution.

• Communication.

• Timely interaction.

• Upper management awareness.

• Public awareness.

Prescribed Fire User Coordination

Prescribed fire users should coordinate uniformity in

proposals to reduce emissions, responses to draft regulations,

and communication of the use and benefits of prescribed fire

in California. Regulators will be much more receptive to

incorporating a well coordinated multiple agency position

into planning documents and rules. Well-coordinated input

develops credibility and political strength as opposed to

putting regulators in a position that requires technical

judgments they may not be qualified to make.

A working group is recommended at the State/regional

level to develop a framework for regulatory positions that

ensures continuity of regulations and programs on broad

ecosystem scales. The risk is that prescribed fire management

options might vary dramatically between California’s

numerous air pollution control districts. Although statewide

severity. Areas that are non-attainment for the Federal PM10

standard and able to demonstrate compliance by August

1994 were classified as moderate, and those areas unable to

demonstrate compliance by August 1994 were classified as

serious:

Moderate Areas Serious Areas

Imperial Valley Coachella Valley

Mammoth Lakes Owens Valley

Mono Basin San Joaquin Valley

Sacramento County South Coast

Searles Valley

San Bernardino County

Air Pollution Control Districts classified as serious must

develop revisions to the SIPS by August 1994 and demonstrate

compliance by January 2001. Regulations to achieve

compliance must be in place by August 1997.

The 1990 amendments require air pollution control

districts not meeting Federal PM10 standards to address

fugitive dust, residential wood burning, and prescribed fire.

These elements of PM10 must be incorporated into State

Implementation Plans revisions and subsequent regulations.

Air pollution control districts are required to develop rules

that incorporate Reasonable Available Control Measures

(RACM) for moderate areas and more stringent Best Available

Control Measures (BACM) for serious areas. These measures

must be developed for fugitive dust, residential wood burning,

and prescribed fire following EPA recommendations. The

National Wildfire Coordinating Group participated in the

EPA RACM/BACM guidelines.

Conformity

The conformity portion of the 1990 amendments, as

well as EPA regulations that became effective in January

1994, require Federal agencies in Federal non-attainment

areas to demonstrate that agency activities conform to SIPs.

California’s plan is a compilation of the States’ air pollution

control district plans.

In Federal non-attainment areas users of prescribed fire

must quantify emissions to determine conformity. Projects

may be analyzed in a collective programmatic plan if emissions

are predictable or as a part of individual project plans. De

Minimus levels, below which conformity determinations are

not required, are set at 70 tons annually for serious areas and

100 tons annually for moderate areas.

Air Toxics

Perhaps the most uncertain potential effect of the 1990

amendments on prescribed fire may be the portions of the

legislation that deal with toxics. The amendments require

the EPA to develop standards for about 200 toxics. Some of

these toxics, such as benzene and aldehydes, can be found in

wildland smoke. Little progress has been made on toxic

regulation development, but this is one element in the near

future with potential to impact prescribed fire users.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
127 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

• Produce reliable emission factors for all

vegetation types.

• Quantify emission reduction techniques.

• Model for 24-hour concentration and predict

transport in complex terrain.

Air quality analyses procedures as well as emission

reduction techniques need to be institutionalized in agency

training programs in order to meet expectations of air quality

regulators. Additional research is necessary to resolve

regulatory conflicts associated with emission production,

combustion efficiency, and smoke management (Brown 1990).

Timely Interaction

In 1994, planning efforts and regulatory development

associated with PM10 are moving forward in California at

an extremely fast rate. Programs should not be interrupted,

however, while the issue of conflicting laws and mandates is

debated. Air pollution control districts are thus seeking early

involvement to avoid conflicts with rule implementation.

Air districts will likely be conducting California

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) analysis with planning

effort and/or rule development, providing an opportunity for

evaluation of regulatory impacts on management of public

land and public safety. Prescribed fire users need to understand

the regulatory process. They need to evaluate the timing of

efforts and to whom they should be directed.

Upper Management Awareness

Many Federal, State and county agencies in California

are preparing to increase prescribed fire activities for a variety

of politically sensitive reasons including recent catastrophic

wildfires, spotted owl habitat needs, and a backlog of fire

required to create more natural vegetation age classes. The

relationship to sensitive issues implies a need to keep

management briefed on the status and potential impacts of

impending air quality regulations on prescribed fire programs.

Public Awareness

Most public agencies that utilize prescribed fire have

developed some level of public education designed to explain

the purposes of burning and notify people sensitive to smoke.

In light of current regulatory action public awareness efforts

should be increased in order to provide the public with

enough information to understand the balance between air

quality and prescribed fire. Given the importance of prescribed

fire programs, agencies should review and revise every public

awareness opportunity. In addition to taking advantage of

existing public education programs, agencies should be

prepared to be very visible and look for opportunities to

provide presentations at public meetings associated with air

quality regulatory development.

coordination is important, the vast majority of effort is required

within individual air basins and air pollution control districts.

After all agencies and organizations that may use prescribed

fire are carefully identified, working groups need to be

established. Interagency coordination groups have been

established in the South Coast, San Joaquin, and North

Coast air basins.

Communication

As prescribed fire user coordination groups develop, a

strong communication link with respective air quality

regulators will need to be established. Air regulatory agencies

need to account for the interrelationship of fire with all

ecosystem elements including air (Bagget 1993). This might

be accomplished by establishing contacts or developing

periodic meetings with PM10 planning staff. Communication

should be frequent and strong enough to create an awareness

and appreciation for the needs and objectives associated

with improving air quality as well as prescribed fire. Dialogue

might lead to a memorandum of understanding that clearly

defines expectations in more detail than planning documents

and rules. In addition, this would provide the framework for

continuity, despite changing staff. At the State level, the

recently formed California Air and Smoke Council will

provide an opportunity for information exchange. Those

participating have included the USDI Bureau of Land

Management, USDI National Park Service, USDA Forest

Service, California Division of Forestry, Environmental

Protection Agency, California Air Resources Board, California

Air Pollution Control Offices Association, and representatives

from various air pollution control districts. This group will

propose recommendations to meet regulatory compliance

while maintaining the option for use of prescribed fire.

Technically Strong Resolution

Prescribed fire users need to improve their ability to

quantify and manage emissions (Brown 1990). Although

research needs should be clearly outlined, prescribed fire

users should not hesitate to move forward with professional

judgments and assumptions using the best information

available. For instance, prescribed fire users can:

• Estimate emission factors, if unknown, based

on similar fuel types.

• Estimate total emissions generated.

• Apply techniques to reduce and disperse emissions.

• Monitor concentrations of PM10 at sensitive

receptors.

• Develop an emissions inventory.

The existing limitations must also be distinguished.

Prescribed fire users cannot:

• Qualify natural or pre-European emissions in

California.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
128 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Conclusions

Regulations associated with the requirements of the

Clean Air Act amendments of 1990 are developing rapidly

to satisfy deadlines developed by EPA. The rationale and

process to ensure that the Clean Air Act is compatible with

prescribed fire are available. Solutions and success are rooted

in communication, the ability to compromise, and the

development of a technically credible method for analyzing

and reducing emissions.

References

Baggett, Arthur G. 1993. Only Congress can prevent forest fires: a

comment on prescribed and natural fire programs and the Clean

Air Act. San Joaquin Agricultural Law Review: 3(197): 221-246.

Brown, James K. 1990. The future of prescribed fire: concerns and

knowledge needs. In: Proceedings of the 10th Conference on fire and

forest meteorology; 89-96.

Sisler, J.F.; Malm, W.C.; Gebhart, K.A. 1989. Sources of ions producing

acidic rain and visibility impairment at Grand Canyon, Arizona.

In: Proceedings of the 81st annual meeting of the Air Pollution Control

Association.

Malm, W.C.; Gebhart, K.A.; Henry, R.C. 1990. An investigation of the

dominant source regions of fine sulfur in the western United States

and their areas of influence. Atmospheric Environment 24A: 3047-3060.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
129 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Comprehensive Fire Prevention Legislation Enacted by the

California Legislature in 1992 after the East Bay Firestorm1

Rachel Richman2

other safety requirements. Fire safety personnel and local

government officials all participated in developing these

measures and presenting them to the California Legislature.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solution in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Legislative aide, Office of Assemblyman Tom Bates, 3923 Grand Ave.,

Oakland, CA 94610.

Legislation was enacted by the California Legislature in1992 after the East Bay firestorm on the Oakland/Berkeley

border; it included roofing standards, brush clearance, and

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
130 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
131 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Research Forester, Southern Research Station,USDA Forest Service,

Route 1, Box 182-A, Dry Branch, GA 31020; and Forestry Program Administrator, Fire Control Bureau, Florida Division of Forestry, 3125 Conner

Blvd., Tallahassee, FL 32501.

Florida’s Solution to Liability Issues1

Dale Wade James Brenner2

but to serve as an essential prerequisite to the very survival

of these ecosystems.Virtually all Federal and State natural

resource management agencies and some county agencies

use prescription fire, primarily for hazard reduction, wildlife

habitat improvement, and ecosystem perpetuation. Fire is

used in the private sector by ranchers, forest product

companies, game preserves, farmers, the sugarcane industry,

and numerous other land owners to accomplish a wide variety

of objectives. The 120,000 prescribed burn authorizations

granted in 1994 resulted in the intentional treatment of 8

percent (2.3 million acres) of the 29 million acres under fire

protection. Subtracting the acres burned for sugarcane

production, land clearing, and agricultural stubble removal

leaves, about 1,500,000 acres were treated by prescription

fire during the unusually wet 1994 year—a figure well below

the 10-year average.

Challenges

Superimposed on this fire-maintained landscape is one

of the fastest growing populations in the United States. The

population of Florida increased from 9.7 million in 1980 to

12.9 million in 1990, and is projected to reach 15.6 million

by the year 2000. More than 900 immigrants arrive daily,

and a large proportion are retirees from northern population

centers where ancestral links with wildland fire have been

severed. Of the 141,000 housing starts in 1993, 104,000

were single-family dwellings. Many new residents want to

live along the ever-expanding urban/wildland interface where

they will be directly impacted by fire management activities.

Concomitant increases in the road network and traffic volume

further exacerbate the situation. More effort is required to

safeguard the public and protect homes from both wild and

prescribed fires.

The public has trouble differentiating between these two

types of fires. New arrivals are generally not aware of the

benefits derived from the judicious use of fire, nor of its biological

necessity. They regard a blackened landscape as obviously a

damaged one. They have little tolerance for the temporary

inconveniences often associated with prescribed fire such as

slowed traffic, smokey skies, and fly ash in their swimming

pools. Uninformed individuals intentionally setting fires are an

enigma to them. Many, who question “wasting” their tax dollars

on a practice that seems archaic at best, are retirees who have

the time and inclination to become politically active.

Because of the inherent flammability of many of Florida’s

vegetative types, and the increased potential for catastrophic

fire as fuel loads increase in the absence of periodic lowAbstract: Prescribed fire is used to treat roughly 5 percent (1,500,000

acres) of Florida’s wildland each year. Superimposed on this firemaintained landscape is one of the fastest growing populations in

the United States. Much of this population increase is a result of

immigration from northern states where ancestral ties with fire have

been broken. Many immigrants want to settle along the urban/

wildland interface, exacerbating an already detrimental situation.

These new arrivals generally view fire as a destructive force rather

than as a biological necessity. They have little tolerance for the

temporary inconveniences associated with intentional use of fire

and view the practice as archaic. Furthermore, many are retirees

who have the time and inclination to become politically active.

Recognizing that the public will ultimately decide the future of

prescribed burning, agency and private resource managers have

joined in a cooperative effort to ensure that prescribed fire continues

as a viable resource management option. The three regional prescribed fire councils and the Florida Division of Forestry have taken

the lead in a multi-faceted approach to accomplish this objective,

including: 1) improving the image and competence of prescribed

burners through training and burn-boss certification; 2) educating

the public through speaking engagements, newspaper and television

coverage of prescribed burns, feature stories, videos, and schoolteacher guides; 3) enacting state legislation, agency rules, and county

ordinances; and 4) opening communication with all parties, including prompt and even-handed response to complaints.

Florida is endowed with a mild climate and abundantsunshine and rainfall, conditions conducive to rank

vegetative growth. Florida is also the thunderstorm capital

of North America. These factors, coupled with the ubiquitous

use of fire by Native-Americans during the past several

thousand years, have produced a complex of vegetation

communities, some sustained by chronic low-intensity fire

and some by periodic stand-replacement fires. Fire exclusion,

tried for several decades earlier this century, was found to

be a short-sighted alternative characterized by escalating

costs, decreasing probability of success, and unwanted

ecosystem changes.

Wildfires must be suppressed for numerous reasons, so

resource managers have been forced to learn how to harness

this ambivalent natural force, not only to enhance our lifestyle,

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
132 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

intensity fires, the Division of Forestry (DOF) has

recommended using fire to reduce hazardous fuel accumulations. But all too often, residents do not choose to allow

these recommendations to be followed, and soon thereafter,

firefighters risk their lives in an attempt to save homes in

that subdivision.

Absentee landowners are an even more intractable

problem. Vast tracts of land were subdivided and sold

worldwide, but relatively few owners ever homesteaded.

Again and again, copious plant growth during wet years was

followed by the inevitable dry year resulting in disastrous

wildfires that stretched available resources beyond capacity.

The spread of fire-prone introduced species made the situation

even worse. The Florida legislature addressed the problem

of hazardous fuel buildup on absentee ownerships by passing

the Hawkins Bill in 1977 (Wade and Long 1979). This law

(Section 590.025 of the Florida statutes) gives the DOF

authority to use prescribed fire, at State expense, to reduce

hazardous accumulations of wildland fuels on private property

provided the landowner does not object (appendix A). Under

this law, more than 100,000 acres have been burned.

Disastrous wildfires, however, still plague Florida because

Florida, like other states, cannot afford enough “on-call”

forces to handle worst-case scenarios.

Fires that threaten or destroy large numbers of homes or

cause multi-vehicle accidents make the headlines, alerting

the public to fire management issues. The occasional illtimed prescribed fire with a bad outcome also receives full

media coverage. Individuals and organizations who disagree

with the concept of prescription fire use these incidents to

strengthen their arguments. But even without these events,

people criticize the practice of prescribed burning; and

although criticism may sometimes be justified, many citizens

are uninformed or misinformed. An alarming increase in

smoke-related litigation is also occurring. Many of the

judgments in these cases appear to give generous

compensation for unsupported arguments.

In 1987, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that: 1) setting

a prescribed fire was an inherently dangerous act; 2) the

landowner is liable for damages to others for negligence in

setting or maintaining that fire; 3) this liability cannot be

delegated to an independent contractor actually conducting

the prescribed burn; and 4) a landowner wishing to conduct

a prescribed burn must know what “accepted forestry and

burn standards” are and be certain they are applied.

In an effort to respond to public concerns, the DOF

developed regulations that allowed termination of a prescribed

burn if a complaint was lodged. But the DOF found this

regulation was increasingly abused by callers with a different

agenda. Furthermore, the tourist industry desired clear skies,

while some environmental regulators advocated more stringent

fire and smoke regulations.

Virtually all county, State, and Federal natural resource

agencies in Florida were espousing similar fire messages

and were practicing what they preached. Nonetheless, fire

managers throughout Florida were witnessing a deteriorating

situation. Conducting prescribed fires that met all regulatory

restrictions, had no potential smoke impacts on the public,

and still achieved the burn objectives in an efficient manner

became increasingly difficult. Private individuals who used

prescribed fire found it very difficult to obtain affordable

insurance. The demise of prescribed fire, and along with it,

the management and perpetuation of many of Florida’s

ecosystems, was a very real possibility.

Solutions

Recognizing that the public would ultimately decide the

future of prescribed burning, agency and private resource

managers joined together in an effort to ensure prescribed

fire would continue to be a viable resource management

option in Florida. Fire councils, similar to the one founded in

south Florida in 1974, were formed in central and north

Florida. These prescribed-fire councils are very pro-active,

helping develop posters, publications, and other “handout”

materials. They distribute these materials at schools and

garden and community service club meetings in which they

discuss the advantages and disadvantages of prescribed fire.

They hold workshops to enhance the expertise of prescribed

burners, host “show-me” field trips, sponsor demonstrations

of emerging techniques and equipment, and co-sponsor

meetings that address priority issues, such as the national

conference on “Environmental Regulations and Prescribed

Fire” scheduled for March 14-17, 1995.

The prescribed-fire councils are directing much of their

educational effort toward the younger generation. They are

helping develop a teachers’ manual to introduce the concept

of prescribed fire to school children. The role of Smokey the

Bear, a fire prevention symbol, was expanded to include the

benefits of the judicious use of fire as well. Tall Timbers

Research Station produced two excellent videos on prescribed

fire in the south, as well as a number of 20-second public

service announcements for a Tallahassee television station.

Efforts to educate the public also include writing articles

for local newspapers that provide a full discussion of potential

deleterious side effects as well as the benefits of prescribed

fire. Inviting the news media, especially local television

stations, to prescribed burns has proven very successful. To

help ensure the safety of the television crew on the burn, a

knowledgeable spokesperson is assigned to be with them at

all times. Another tactic is to involve local fire departments

in prescribed burns. This gives department personnel an

appreciation for prescribed fire and provides them with some

first-hand experience in wildland fire behavior.

When necessary, peer pressure is applied to encourage

prescribed burners to become better trained and to present a

professional image. A good professional image is fostered by

using personal protective items, maintaining equipment and

tools, using “smoke ahead” signs to warn traffic, notifying

appropriate law enforcement agencies and adjacent landowners

before ignition, and taking the time to explain prescribed fire

to anyone who stops to ask about a burn in progress.

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133 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

burner from liability for damage or injury caused by fire or

resulting smoke unless negligence is proven.

To become a certified Prescribed Burn Manager in Florida,

you have to serve in a leadership role on three prescribed

fires, and either pass a comprehensive test designed for

experience burners, or successfully complete the 6-day Florida

Interagency Basic Prescribed Fire Course. Begun in 1989,

this course is held several times a year at various locations

throughout Florida. Each class is limited to about 30 students

and must be sponsored by an organization. Sponsorship

involves securing cadre from a short list of “approved”

instructors, providing classroom facilities and areas to burn,

and arranging for food. Within a region, a sponsor who can

provide student housing is preferred because this facilitates

evening trainee-instructor interaction and helps keep costs

down. In return the sponsor is given 10 of the 30 student

slots; the remainder are allocated on a first-come first-served

basis. Hillsborough Community College (HCC) handles

registration, distribution of pre-class study materials, and

other administrative tasks. The only formal advertising needed

to date is a flier HCC mails out each year with class dates and

locations for the year and a registration form. The prime

reason many graduates list for attending the course and

becoming certified is the liability benefits associated with the

certification law. Certified burn managers are currently

attempting to convince insurance companies to offer them

prescribed fire liability coverage at an affordable cost.

Florida continues to set aside numerous relatively small

(10- to 100-acre) tracts of land to protect and perpetuate,

particularly areas containing diminishing plant communities—

virtually all plant communities that can be maintained only

through periodic fire. As lands adjacent to these parks are

subdivided and sold for home sites, agency resource managers

are eventually left with no place to vent the smoke from

prescribed fires. One solution involves passage of a countywide local ordinance creating smoke corridors for the parks

within its jurisdiction. Basically, such an ordinance establishes

and delineates a smoke transport and dispersion trajectory

for prescribed burns within a park. Developers are required

to give potential lot buyers a copy of the ordinance, stating

that the lot is located in a smoke corridor and will occasionally

be impacted by smoke from prescribed fires (appendix C).

Other solutions with similar results are being achieved through

deed restrictions and conservation easements.

The Future

To date, more than 3,000 prescribed burners have become

certified. This number is expected to increase rapidly when

the prescribed-burn certification correspondence course

becomes available. Over 900 burners, many from outside

Florida, have graduated from the Interagency Basic Prescribed

Fire School. Thirty sessions, including seven scheduled in

1994, have been conducted since its inception in 1989. The

Florida Prescribed Burning Act has had a positive impact

The Division of Forestry has made several changes in

its administrative rules and regulations. It developed a set of

Best Management Practices (BMP’S) for prescribed fire

use, tightened the criteria for issuing nighttime burning

authorizations (smoke from these fires was a major source of

complaints), and developed new training courses and safety

requirements for its fire management personnel. One of the

changes occurred in 1987 when a voluntary statewide program

to certify experienced prescribed burners was implemented.

As an incentive, the DOF was more flexible when issuing

nighttime burning authorizations to certified burn-managers.

When the certification program was begun, a person had to

have served in a leadership role on at least three prescribed

fires, attend an 8-hour review session, and pass a written test

given at one of the 17 district DOF offices. The demand for

certification was great, and it soon became obvious that a

standardized certification process was needed. To standardize

the certification process, a correspondence course has been

developed which is administered by Hillsborough Community

College in Tampa. Now, appplicants who pass the final

exam must prepare a written fire prescription for approval

by the DOF, and then have the results of the burn reviewed

by the DOF as the final step to becoming a Certified Prescribed

Burn Manager.

The DOF also developed an “official agency statement”

about prescription fire. A draft of this statement was sent to

selected people and agencies for review. The Forestry Forum,

a statewide group of natural resource leaders representing

public, private, and academic sectors, received a copy. Each

year this group selects one critical natural resource issue,

then develops and implements a strategy to address it. In

1987 it selected prescribed fire and asked the DOF to rewrite

the statement in the form of a bill for submission to the state

legislature. When introduced in 1989, this bill was not given

much chance of enactment, but a dedicated lobbying effort

resulted in its passage without serious opposition (appendix

B). Legislators strongly supported the bill because they said

it was the first time representatives of industry, conservation

organizations, and state agencies had been in their offices at

the same time promoting the same legislation. Legislators

concluded that the bill must be vitally important to the

management of Florida’s natural resources.

The law, called the Florida Prescribed Burning Act

(Florida Statute 590.026), is intentionally general so the DOF

can use the administrative rule-making process rather than

the legislative process to make changes (Brenner and Wade

1992). It includes a preamble that describes the necessity of

prescribed fire and promotes its continued use for ecological,

silvicultural, wildlife management, and range management

purposes, and charges the DOF with promulgating rules for

the use of prescribed fire. It also states that prescribed burns

conducted under the auspices of this Act: 1) require a written

prescription that must be on site during the burn; 2) be

conducted only when at least one certified burner is on site;

3) are a landowner right; 4) are in the public interest and shall

not constitute a public or private nuisance; and 5) protect the

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
134 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

on prescribed burning but has not been tested in court yet.

Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi have passed similar

legislation, and a similar bill is currently before the

Alabama legislature. Planning has begun to teach three of

the new prescribed (Rx) fire effects courses approved by

the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) in

Florida in 1994-95.

But we cannot rest on our laurels. Because fire is a twoedged sword that can be easily misapplied, fire management

activities will continue to be closely monitored by regulatory

agencies and critics. We must demonstrate that we are

constantly striving to improve. Maintaining a good image

and educating the public are continual challenges. And we

must not falter in our effort to convince other lay and

professional natural resource organizations to demonstrate

their commitment to the need for and use of prescribed fire.

For example, the Southeastern Section of The Wildlife Society

recently passed a resolution recognizing the importance of

prescribed burning in land management. As more organizations

publicly support prescribed fire as a viable requirement to

sustain certain ecosystems, our defense will strengthen against

both those who think all fire management activities not related

to suppression are ill-conceived, and those who simply believe

we should not interfere with natural forces.

To date, Florida’s multi-faceted approach to prescribed

burning and smoke management issues has been a success.

Whether this success is a result of rear-guard actions or a

harbinger of an increased understanding of the need for and

use of prescribed fire remains to be seen. As our population

continues to swell, increased conflict between people and

the environment should be expected. Hard decisions will

have to be made. It is incumbent upon fire managers to

initiate dialogue on emerging fire issues, respond to questions

openly and honestly, show a willingness to correct mistakes,

consistently strive to improve fire management activities,

and support and conduct research to increase the database

showing the necessity of fire to sustain healthy ecosystems.

Then, whatever society ultimately decides, fire managers

will have done their part to ensure the decision is based on

knowledge, and not an emotional reaction to temporarily

blackened landscapes or smokey skies.

References

Brenner, Jim; Wade, Dale D. 1992. Florida’s 1990 Prescribed Burning

Act. Journal of Forestry 90(5):27-30.

Wade, Dale D.; Long, Michael C. 1979. New legislation aids hazard

reduction burning in Florida. Journal of Forestry 77(11):725-726.

Appendix A–Hawkins Bill (Florida Statute 590.025).

590.025 Control burning of wild land; authorization; conditions.

(1) As used in this section, “wild land” means:

(a) Uncultivated land other than fallow. Such land may be neglected altogether or

 maintained for such purposes as wood or forage production, wildlife,

 recreation, or protective plant cover.

(b) Land virtually uninfluenced by human activity.

(2) At the request of the governing body of a county, the Division of Forestry of the

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services is authorized and empowered, subject to

the provisions and qualifications contained in subsection (3), and provided the owner of the

land does not object, to control burn any area of wild land within the county which is

reasonably determined to be in danger of conflagration if any open and uncontrolled fire

were to occur in the area.

(3) No area of wild land shall be control burned under the provisions of this section unless

notice of intent to control burn, describing particularly the area to be burned and the tentative

date or dates of the burning, is published in a conspicuous manner in one or more newspapers

of general circulation in the area of the burn not less than 10 days prior to the burn.

(4) In addition, the Division of Forestry shall prepare, and the county tax collector shall

include with the annual tax statement, a notice to be sent to all landowners in each township

designated by the Division of Forestry as a high fire hazard area. Such notice shall describe

particularly the area to be burned and the tentative date or dates of the burning and shall list

the reasons for, and the benefits expected to result from, control burning.

History § s. 1, ch. 77-17.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
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Appendix B–Florida Prescribed Burning Act (Florida Statute 590.026).

590.026 Prescribed burning; requirements; liability.

(1) Short Title § This section may be cited as the “Florida Prescribed Burning Act.”

(2) Legislative Findings and Purpose.

(a) The application of prescribed burning is a land management tool that benefits the safety

of the public, the environment, and the economy of Florida. Pursuant thereto, the

Legislature finds that:

1. Prescribed burning reduces naturally occurring vegetative fuels within wild land

areas. Reduction of the fuel load reduces the risk and severity of major

catastrophic wildfire, thereby reducing the threat of loss of life and property,

particularly in urbanizing areas.

2. Most of Florida’s natural communities require periodic fire for maintenance of

their ecological integrity. Prescribed burning is essential to the perpetuation,

restoration, and management of many plant and animal communities. Significant

loss of the state’s biological diversity will occur if fire is excluded from firedependent systems.

3. Forest land and range land constitute significant economic, biological, and

aesthetic resources of statewide importance. Prescribed burning on forest land

prepares sites for reforestation, removes undesirable competing vegetation,

expedites nutrient cycling, and controls or eliminates certain forest pathogens. On

range land, prescribed burning improves the quality and quantity of herbaceous

vegetation necessary for livestock production.

4. The state purchased hundreds of thousands of acres of land for parks, preserves,

wildlife management areas, forests, and other public purposes. The use of prescribed burning for management of public lands is essential to maintain the

specific resource values for which these lands were acquired.

5. A public education program is necessary to make citizens and visitors aware of the

public safety, resource, and economic benefits of prescribed burning.

6. Proper training in the use of prescribed burning is necessary to ensure maximum

benefits and protection for the public.

7. As Florida’s population continues to grow, pressures from liability issues and

nuisance complaints inhibit the use of prescribed burning.

(b) It is the purpose of this section to authorize and to promote the continued use of prescribed

burning for ecological, silvicultural, wildlife management, and range

management purposes.

(3) Definitions.§ As used in this section:

(a) “Prescribed burning” means the controlled application of fire to naturally occurring

vegetative fuels under specified environmental conditions and following appropriate

precautionary measures, which causes the fire to be confined to a predetermined area and

accomplish the planned land management objectives.

(b) “Certified prescribed burn manager” means an individual who successfully completes the

certification program of the Division of Forestry of the Department of Agriculture

and Consumer Services.

(c) “Prescription” means a written plan for starting and controlling a prescribed burn.

(4) Rules.§ The Division of Forestry of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services

shall promulgate rules for the use of prescribed burning.

(5) Requirements; Liability.

(a) Prescribed burning conducted under the provisions of this section shall:

1. Be accomplished only when at least one certified prescribed burn manager is present on

site while the burn is being conducted.

2. Require that a written prescription be prepared prior to receiving authorization to burn

from the Division of Forestry.

3. Be considered in the public interest and shall not constitute a public or private nuisance

when conducted pursuant to state air pollution statutes and rules applicable to prescribed

burning.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
136 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

4. Be considered a property right of the property owner if naturally occurring

vegetativefuels are used and when conducted pursuant to the requirements of this

subsection.

(b) No property owner or his agent, conducting a prescribed burn pursuant to the requirements of

this subsection, shall be liable for damage or injury caused by fire or resulting smoke, unless

negligence is proven.

(6) Duties of Agencies.

(a) The Department of Community Affairs, the Division of Forestry of the Department of

Agriculture and Consumer Services, and the Office of the State Fire Marshal shall prepare

a report to be submitted to appropriate legislative committees by February 1, 1991, that

shall identify actions required to minimize the threat of wildfire in areas where new

development is proposed in or adjacent to wild lands.

(b) The Office of Environmental Education of the Department of Education shall incorporate,

where feasible and appropriate, the issues of prescribed burning into their educational

materials.

History § s. 2, ch. 90-234; s. 1, ch. 90-296.

Appendix C–Sarasota County Smoke Corridor Ordinance.

Sarasota County Planning Staff Report and Recommendation Reanalysis.

U.S. 41/Blackburn Point Road Villade Activity Center Sector Plan No. 89-02-SP

Attachment A

Conditions for Development Approval:

Section A:

V. The respective property owner/developer, their successors or assigns of all parcels east of

U.S. 41 contained within the attached Recommended Future Land Use Plan labeled Figure

13, shall cause to be recorded to the Public Records of Sarasota County, Florida, a Notice of

Proximity to the existence of the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area. Said Notice shall be

in substantially the same form as attached hereto as Exhibit A. Said Notice shall contain

metes and bounds descriptions of the entire Parcels D, E, F, G, and H which will have been

prepared by a licensed Florida Land Surveyor. Said Notice shall be recorded at the time of

the recording of a final plat or condominium plat survey and which O.R. Book and Page shall

be set forth within such plat. Said Notice shall also be required as a part of all Deed

Restrictions and Condominium Documents. Said Notice shall indicate the Oscar Scherer

State Recreation Area’s right to the following: continuing current resource management

practices to include but not be limited to ecological burning, exotic plant and animal

removal, usage of heavy equipment and machinery and other practices as may be deemed

necessary for the proper management of the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area. Also

included shall be a reference that Department of Natural Resources regulations and policies

substantially restrict mosquito control in the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area. Said

Notice shall also be referred to in all deed and or property restrictions within Parcels D, E, F,

G, & H in the Sector Plan, and said Notice shall be subject to review by Florida Department

of Natural Resources legal staff.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
137 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Attachment B

NOTICE OF PROXIMITY TO OSCAR SCHERER STATE RECREATION AREA/

CONSERVATION EASEMENT

This Notice date this ______ day of , 199 , and entered into the public record by

and , as owners of the property described as:

SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT I

(Insert description of subject property owned within U.S. 41/Blackburn Point Road Sector Plan

No. 89-02-SP)

WHEREAS, it is the intent of this Notice to make known to the public-at-large that the

property described in Exhibit “I” attached hereto is located in close proximity to the property

known as the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area/Conservation Easement

WHEREAS, it is further the intent of this notice to advise potential tenants and

purchasers of subdivision property located within the boundaries of the property described in

Exhibit “I” attached hereto, that said property is in close proximity to the Oscar Scherer State

Recreation Area/Conservation Easement.

NOW, THEREFORE, the general public and those parties specifically purchasing or

leasing property within the area described in Exhibit “I” attached hereto are hereby notified that:

1. The subject property described in Exhibit “I” attached hereto is located in close

proximity to the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area/Conservation Easement.

2. This Notice is to further advise potential purchasers or tenants of property described

in Exhibit “I” attached hereto that the proximity to the Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area/

Conservation Easement may result in said purchasers or tenants being affected by: continuing

current resource management practices to include but not be limited to ecological burning,

pesticide usage, exotic plant and animal removal, usage of heavy equipment and machinery and

other practices as may be deemed necessary for the proper management of the Oscar Scherer

State Recreation Area/Conservation Easement.

3. The nature and extent of the effects of the operations of the Oscar Scherer State

Recreation Area which shall include: All management practices as contained within the document

entitled “Ecological Burn Plan Oscar Scherer State Recreation Area” adopted on April 3, 1990,

and which may be amended from time to time.

4. All property owners which take title to property within the boundaries as described in

Exhibit “I” attached hereto, or tenants who may occupy the premises within the boundaries

described in Exhibit “I” attached hereto, shall be deemed to have constructive knowledge of this

Notice due to its recordation in the Public Records of Sarasota County, Florida, and further shall

be deemed to have consented to said resource practices, including ecological burning, pesticide

usage, exotic plant and animal removal, usage of heavy equipment and machinery and other

practices as may be deemed necessary for the proper management of the Oscar Scherer State

Recreation Area/Conservation Easement by the recording of a Warranty Deed or other instrument

of conveyance, conveying the property within the boundaries in Exhibit “I” attached hereto, or

by executing an occupancy agreement and delivering same to the owner of property contained

within the boundaries of the property described in Exhibit “I”, their successors or assigns.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
138 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the owners have hereunto set their hands and seals this _____ day

of _______, 199 __.

STATE OF FLORIDA

COUNTY OF SARASOTA

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day before me, an office duly qualified to take

acknowledgements, personally appeared

and ___________________, to me known to be the persons described in and who executed the

foregoing instrument and acknowledged before me that they executed same.

WITNESS my hand and official seal in the County and State last aforesaid this ______ day of

________, 199 .

NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission Expires: (Notary Seal)
139 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Role of Fire in Ecosystem Management1

Jerry T. Williams2

Abstract: USDA Forest Service management practices have significantly changed. Past practices were predicated on a strong public expectation for commodity production and protection from the

forces of nature that were perceived to threaten that goal. Fire

suppression, selective logging, intensive grazing, constrained prescribed burning, and a general emphasis on wood fiber production

have, in part or collectively, changed many forests. However wellmeaning at the time, in some ecosystems, these changes have adversely affected the health and resiliency of the resource to the point

where sustainability may be impeded. Currently the Forest Service

has modified its focus and its management practices. These changes

have important implications for the agency’s wildland fire managers. This paper describes the role of fire in ecosystem management

and it answers these three questions: 1) what is ecosystem management? 2) why should fire be considered in ecosystem management?

and 3) what role do fire managers have in ecosystem management?

What is Ecosystem Management?

Ecosystem management emphasizes an ecological approachto resource stewardship. It is a holistic approach to natural

resource management that attempts to manage the forest, not

just the trees. It focuses on long-term landscape management

of basins and provinces, not just stands within 10-year planning

cycles. The premise is that, in managing for whole, healthy

ecosystems, we are better able to sustain resource outputs for

the future. Instead of emphasizing short-term resource

extraction, ecosystem management attempts to manage for

the healthy, long-term functioning of the entire system, with

the expectation that, in doing so, commodity and amenity

outputs will follow on a sustainable basis.

In some forests, ecosystem management will require

that essential ecological processes, such as fire, become

more widely included. In these forests, the condition of the

resource will ultimately be influenced by the ecosystem’s

ability to function within natural ecological amplitudes.

Certainly, ecosystem management is more a journey

than it is a destination. More than 70 years ago, Aldo Leopold

recognized the inextricable webs that define the science of

ecology and our understanding of ecosystems: “we [must

learn to] realize the indivisibility of the earth—its soil,

mountains, rivers, forests, climate, plants, and animals, and

respect it collectively” (Meine 1988).

Ecosystem management can also appear to be a

contradiction in terms, as Frank Egler remarked, “Ecosystems

are not only more complex than we think, they are more

complex than we can think” (Egler 1977).

Despite much information about this type of management,

we are not yet always able to manage for whole ecosystems.

In our attempts to provide for public expectations today—

whether clean air or rare owls or big trees—we need to ask

ourselves if we might be managing for one thing at the

expense of another. In managing for discrete components of

the ecosystem, might we be inadvertently jeopardizing the

health of a larger whole?

The concern may be most acute in fire-adapted

ecosystems. Sustaining these systems in a healthy condition

will require the use of prescribed burning. The smoke and

risk and cost of those treatments are almost always socially

intolerable. However, avoiding treatment promises to result

in consequences far worse. In some areas of the United

States, we may be glimpsing some of those consequences.

To understand and manage ecosystems we must

remember a cornerstone to the concept of ecosystem

management: the adaptation of our practices in response to

acquired knowledge. In that respect, the development of our

thinking and our management practices remain evolutionary.

Why Should Fire be Considered in

Ecosystem Management?

The biological effects of fire have a profound influence

on composition, structure, and function of forest, brush, and

grassland ecosystems on National Forests. The effects of fire

are particularly apparent in short interval fire-adapted

ecosystems in which fires resulting from lightning or burning

by Native Americans, for example, were the most frequent,

generally occurring at 5- to 25-year intervals. These ecosystems

were the first to manifest adverse biological consequences

because of fire exclusion. Fire-related ecological problems

are most immediate in short interval fire-adapted ecosystems.

In the prolonged absence of periodic, low-intensity

surface fire, stands undergo relatively rapid changes in species

composition and structure that often become predisposing

factors to epidemic insect and disease outbreak and severe

stand replacement wildfire.

Significant forest health problems appear to be most

concentrated in short interval fire-adapted types, commonly

represented by long-needle pine species (e.g. ponderosa,

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interfaced and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2 Assistant Director—Fire Operations, Fire and Aviation Management

Staff, USDA Forest Service, Washington DC 20250.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
140 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Jeffrey, eastern and western white, red, loblolly, short-leaf,

long-leaf, and slash pine). These pine types, as either

dominants or in association with other species, are estimated

to occur on nearly 30 percent of the suitable timber base on

National Forest lands.

The Blue Mountains in northeastern Oregon and

southeastern Washington, the mountains in south-central

Idaho, the Colorado Front Range west of Denver, and the

central Sierra in California—all conifer-dominated short

interval fire-adapted ecosystems—are areas plagued by serious

forest health problems. They are also areas where severe

wildfires have recently occurred and, inevitably, will recur.

What Is the Role of Fire Managers in

Ecosystem Management?

Sustaining short interval fire-adapted ecosystems is

expected to be a difficult challenge. In order to better prepare

the Forest Service for the issues that are likely to emerge,

the USDA Forest Service’s Fire and Aviation Management

Staff directed development of staffing paper Fire-Related

Considerations and Strategies in Support of Ecosystem

Management (Williams and others 1993). This paper made

five recommendations that were recently adopted as fire and

aviation management goals:

• Communicate the ecological roles of fire to our

decision-makers and the public. In short interval fire-adapted

ecosystems, complex issues are inherent and the risks that

surround wildfire threats and prescribed fire applications

sharpen the potential for conflict in the social arena. The

Forest Service will more completely develop and

communicate the scientific rationale behind management of

fire-adapted ecosystems.

• Display the long-term effects of prescribed fire and

wildfire suppression options. The land management planning

process affords the means to display trade-offs, assess benefits

and consequences, and determine costs among a full range

of alternatives. In order for the public and our decisionmakers to benefit from the information required to make

informed judgments, fire and aviation management will

better display the long-term effects of prescribed fire and

wildfire suppression options.

• Maintain strong wildfire suppression capability and

continue to strengthen prescribed fire expertise. Fire

suppression capability will remain a vital cornerstone of the

Forest Service mission as fire-adapted ecosystems continue

to approach high-risk conditions and as private development

continues to expand at the wildland/urban interface. Prescribed

fire, despite the concerns that surround its use, remains an

important, ecologically appropriate management tool. Fire

and aviation management will develop practitioners that

have the skills to use fire safely and effectively.

• Manage prescribed fire risk: assess it, mitigate it, and

seek partners to share it. Risk management will become a

fundamentally important component of the prescribed fire

program. A risk assessment process will become the basis

for ignition decisions. Managers will be better apprised of

high-risk prescribed burning treatments and avoid them,

unless they can be adequately mitigated or risks can be

shared among partners. Fair, timely reimbursement will be

provided the public in the event of loss resulting from

prescribed burning escapes.

• Align fire management programs to better complement

one another. Although fire policies are sound, program areas

(prevention, pre-suppression, suppression, fuel management,

and prescribed fire use) will be fully integrated, better reflect

a common purpose, and complement one another toward an

ecosystem management objective.

These goals and actions signal important changes for

Forest Service fire and aviation management. They require

that managers take a proactive role in explaining the

consequences of both the presence and absence of prescribed

burning and wildfire suppression and fully integrate these

considerations into the decision-making process. They also

require an improved, more balanced fire management

approach to land and resource management.

References

Egler, Frank E. 1977. The nature of vegetation: its management and

mismanagement: an introduction to vegetation science. Norfolk, CT.

Meine, Curt. 1988. Aldo Leopold: his life and work. Madison, WI:

University of Wisconsin Press.

Williams, Jerry T; Schmidt, R. Gordon; Norum, Rodney A.; Omi, Phillip

N.; Robert G. 1993. Fire-related considerations and strategies in

support of ecosystem management, USDA Forest Service, Washington

Office Service Staffing Paper.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
141 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Structural Wildland Intermix1

Ronny J. Coleman2

According to the California Fire Census, more than 390

of about 1,000 separate fire departments currently claim to

have an urban wildland interface problem. These communities

range in size from small fire districts to metropolitan fire

departments. The census contains numerous data elements

that reflect both the prevention and suppression capacity of

the California Fire Service. This document clearly illustrates

that the jurisdiction and structure of the fire service in

California is quite complex, thus contributing to the lack of

a uniform approach to prevention efforts.

The spiraling losses are partially the result of the denial

of the fire problem by both individual property owners and,

to some degree, local government officials. The mistaken

assumption that larger and larger mobilization efforts are

needed to limit losses is also a factor. Although the media

responds with major coverage to the scenes of these events

when in progress, the follow-up coverage and resolution of

specific mitigation efforts is of relatively insignificant media

interest. The California urban/wildland fire problem is not

perceived as a major policy consideration by local or State

government when compared to other issues. When the fires

are in progress, everyone is interested. As soon as the fires

are over, the issue becomes secondary to daily concerns.

Written documentation from the last 10 years of these

fires suggests that the specific findings from each successive

fire is consistent with the findings of the previous ones. The

more common factors that lead to catastrophic losses are

well-defined and repeated in report after report. The mitigation

efforts that are fairly effective are also well-defined. However,

cohesive action that would result in comprehensive changes

is lacking. For example, some mitigation efforts apply only

to the burned area. In actuality, the mitigation efforts must be

applied in areas that have not burned or the effort is wasted.

Fires in the recent past have resulted in a significant

economic impact on the State. Fire losses are only one

factor. The impact on the tax base and the costs of suppression

are equally important. For example, the Oakland fire of

1989 removed over $100 million of assessed valuation from

the tax rolls of that city alone (in accordance with Revenue

and Taxation Code, Article 70 and Article 74). These last

fires will probably result in significant reduction in the

assessor’s tax rolls in Orange, Los Angeles, and Ventura

Counties. During the period of rebuilding, property taxes are

not paid by the affected property owners. In addition, after

rebuilding, the property owners are protected from incremental

tax increases based on Proposition 13 provisions.

Fire suppression costs are severely impacted by the

need for overtime to provide adequate personnel resources.

Initially, responding engines are taken from on-duty

Abstract: Because many major population centers are located in

wildland areas, many structures have been destroyed by increasingly more costly wildland fires. The structure and jurisdiction of

the fire service in California are complex, and a uniform approach

to fire prevention is lacking. A description of many of the fire

issues in the wildland-urban intermix is provided. The relationship

between State and local governments is at the heart of many of the

issues. Cooperation between State and local governments coupled

with public education and enforcement of current standards and

regulations should reduce the occurrence of catastrophic wildlandurban intermix fires.

Wildland fire has been a recurring component ofCalifornia history. Native-Americans intentionally set

fires to the same areas that have currently suffered from

major fires. Researchers have determined that about 12 percent

of the State of California was burned every year by various

Native-American tribes.

In the early 1920’s, at about the same time development

began in the foothills, firefighting agencies became active in

trying to prevent fires from occurring in these areas. Fuel

loads became extraordinary after about 20 years with no

fire. A major catastrophe (the Berkeley fire) occurred in

Berkeley as early as 1923.

Major population centers are now located on formerly

uninhabited wildland areas. Fuel loads are of such a magnitude

that the fires have increased in frequency and severity, are

destroying large numbers of structures, and are becoming

extremely costly to combat. They are a major factor in what

is now classified as the urban wildland interface or “intermix.”

Frequency of Loss

In the past, Californians suffered a major fire loss about

every 7 to 10 years. Catastrophic fires have now occurred

each year from 1990 to 1993. In each of the last three afteraction reports, one benchmark statement reflects the increasing

severity of these fires: “this is the largest single mobilization

in the history of California.” The costs to suppress these

fires are substantial and the trend is likely to continue. We

can reasonably expect another fire of significant loss in the

next 12 to 18 months.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17,1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2State Fire Marshall, California Fire Marshall Office, 7171 Bowling

Drive, Sacramento, CA 95823.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
142 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

companies. But, when the engine company leaves the

community, it must be backfilled to maintain coverage in the

community. This means bringing in personnel on an overtime

basis. Because of Federal Fair Labor Standard Act

requirements, overtime compensation is almost always at a

time-and-one-half rate. (Responding agencies usually leave

fire engines on the scene of major fires past their original

24-hour shift.) A single engine company on a fire is

actually two companies at a rate of about $2,000 per day. A

significant amount of the staffing costs are involved in the

time it takes to demobilize an incident. Some documented

cases show that strike teams can take more than 12 hours to

get out of demobilization areas. We are paying the costs

portal to portal.

Personnel costs also include workers’ compensation costs

that are inordinately high compared to other types of fires.

According to 10 years of firefighter fatality data, 30 percent

of all firefighter deaths are attributed to only two types of

fire: grass and wildland. The death of a firefighter has a price

tag to the taxpayer of about a million dollars per death in

workers’ compensation costs.

The Causes of Property Losses

We are losing more structures in these types of fires

because of (1) the speed of the initial fire; (2) stressed

environmental conditions; and (3) fire intrusion into a structure

because of lack of an integrated system for fire resistance.

Speed of the initial fire merely means that many of these

fires are entering into intermix zones and destroying structures

before enough resources can be mobilized to make a significant

difference. Although we ultimately deploy hundreds of

apparatuses and thousands of firefighters, resources in these

numbers are usually not available until after major damage

has already occurred. The rate of heat release in areas with

limited fuel modification is vastly greater than the suppression

capability available to most fire scenes within the first 4

hours of the fire. The Oakland fire scenario, for example,

demonstrated that the majority of losses occurred in the first

2 hours of the fire. The first 4 to 8 hours of these fires are

more critical now than the next 48 hours. This phenomenon

places much more priority upon initial attack capability.

Extraordinary losses can also be explained by the

phenomena that many structures are lost after the first wave

of fire hits. This is because resources are often removed

from one neighborhood and sent to another area of the active

fire front. When the fire front is moving at a faster rate than

the rate at which resources are arriving, secondary fires are

often left unfought in evacuated neighborhoods. The fires

rekindle and destroy structures that could have been saved if

fire apparatus had not been redeployed. Although we are

proud of our mobilization efforts, the driving of a strike

team from northern California to a fire in Laguna Beach

looks good, but does not reduce actual losses.

Stressed environmental conditions mean that in high

wind, high temperature, low humidity weather conditions

coupled with steep topography and dense fuel conditions, no

amount of conventional fire suppression can adequately protect

structures that lack defensible space or structural integrity.

Structural intrusion means that structures are not inherently

safe because of the presence of one feature. For example, in

the recent fire experience, structures with Class A and Class

B roofs were lost because of the lack of design features that

prevent the fire’s intrusion into windows, doors, attics and

eaves. Glazing failure, exposed siding, and underpinning of

wooden structures are also a problem. Yet, existing state

building standards do not require universal structural integrity

features for structures located on hillside sites. A situational

formula demonstrates the potential for losses:

Risk Demand

+ = Potential Loss

Mitigation Response

 Mitigation Response

By assessing risk levels, taking appropriate mitigation

efforts (prevention), and adding to them actual demands

upon the system and the response of firefighter (suppression)

forces, the net result is a loss ratio. High risk plus high

demand equals maximum loss. Maximum mitigation plus

strong response reduces potential loss. All mitigation with

no response results in significant loss. No mitigation and

maximum responses result in significant loss, also. As risk

and demand levels go up, so should mitigation and response.

Lastly, risk is not an issue unless it is calculated economically.

Maximum response is not a factor unless it is timely.

The economics of the formula are that risk is primarily

personal and private. Mitigation and response have always

been considered a responsibility of government. The lack of

accountability for mitigation by individual property owners

literally means that the more they are willing to risk, the

more it is going to cost the public sector to protect the risk.

The formula is dynamic. It represents the current situation

throughout California. The formula also reveals that if a

community does not have a mitigation plan, then deploying

enough fire apparatus quickly enough to control losses is

physically impossible.

The political vulnerability in this formula is that frequently

incumbent leadership is criticized for conditions they did not

create. At the technical level, fire officials understand the

relationship of these elements but, at a political level, the

issues are often obscured by other considerations. At the

time of a specific emergency, the formula is totally disregarded

except to evaluate the adequacy of the response and to try to

blame the lack of resources.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
143 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

4290 cannot be enforced by local governments unless they

are contracted with or under State Responsibility Area (SRA).

PRC 4291 can be enforced by local governments, but routinely

is not.

Second, State and Federal agencies constantly debate

the issue of fire clearances and vegetation management.

Even in CDF’s primary jurisdictions, vegetation management

and prescribed burning are difficult to enforce because of

local resistance and disputes with environmental agencies.

The “kangaroo rat” discussion in Riverside County is one

example of this debate. The problem is that frequently State

and Federal environmental agencies will not say “no” to

vegetation management activities. They just say “maybe”

for so long that eventually no action is taken.

In addition, land-use patterns in portions of the state

have resulted in allowing development in high fuel loads

areas and enforcement efforts have become limited or nonexistent. Classic examples of this can be found in Marin

County, the Tahoe Basin, and all across the Sierra Nevada.

The issue of fuels and fuel modification is probably the

most critical question to be resolved in creating defensible

space. The conflict between the need to retain ground cover

for wildlife habitat contradicts the need to control fuel levels

to protect human habitat. This affects our risk management

efforts to a large degree.

Why Have We Not Solved the Problem?

The current situation creates a complex problem without

a simple solution: a significant portion of our state has a

“growing” fire problem that is under the jurisdiction of both

State and local government. Local governments are often

reluctant to deal with the issues and State government is

often restricted in its efforts because of conflicting special

interest from environmental groups.

The problems of adopting specific solutions are further

complicated by the political volatility and economic

considerations inherent in mitigation efforts. All fire protection

mitigation efforts cost money. An increase in roof

classification increases a homeowner’s costs. Interestingly,

adding new fire protection levels actually penalizes a property

owner by raising the assessed valuation of the property by

the value of the improvements. The Revenue and Taxation

Code exempts certain enhancements in fire protection

improvements (Revenue and Taxation Code, Section 74):

§ 74. Exclusions from definitions of “newly constructed”

or “new construction” of certain fire protection

devices and improvements

(a) For purposes of subdivision (a) of Section 2 of

Article XIII A of the Constitution, “newly

constructed” does not include the construction or

installation of any fire sprinkler system, other fire

extinguishing system, fire detection system, or firerelated egress improvement which is constructed

or installed on or after November 7, 1984.

Jurisdictional Conflict

The body of knowledge regarding mitigation requirements

that have been proven to work, and fire suppression

deployment methods are fairly well-defined. The response

component is well-structured through the California Office

of Emergency Services (OES) Master Mutual Aid System,

but it lacks a uniform comprehensive approach to the

application of site mitigation methods. This would involve

the use of adequate standards, an active code enforcement

program, inspection, and penalties for violations. There is

no equivalent to OES-type coordination system in the

regulatory process, especially as it relates to defensible space

and structural integrity.

Consistency is absent because the laws, regulations, and

standards to remedy the exposure problems are scattered among

Federal, State and local jurisdictions. After-action fire records

identify the same lack of regulatory controls on specific fires,

i.e., roof coverings, defensible space, vegetation management,

access and infrastructure problems, and water supply.

The Building Codes and Fire Codes

The California Building Code (CBC) Title 24 was adopted

from a model code, with amendments made by the State. The

CBC must be enforced by all local governments after the

State adopts the most recent edition of the Building Code;

local government has 6 months to prepare findings of fact

that allow them to make Title 24’s minimum requirements

more strict based on local conditions. A major portion of

municipalities have adopted local amendments to the Building

Code. Yet, very few of these amendments deal with the

urban-wildland interface. The Building Code itself does not

distinguish the requirements for structural features based on

location in the interface. The basic requirements are keyed to

the type occupancy, not to the exposure to a specific hazard.

Have We Learned the Lessons?

The lesson that we should have learned from a past fire

is that fire behavior is not exclusive to that fire. The common

thread among past fires is that local action to remedy the

situation did not occur before the fire, and, moreover, many

local communities have failed to exercise reasonable

mitigation strategies in the aftermath of the fire. This has

already occurred in Oakland. In effect, they are rebuilding

the same fire condition for the future. Further, the fact that

the average period of ownership of a California dwelling is

only 5 years results in a turnover that creates an information

gap between generations of homeowners in impacted areas.

Two mutually contradictory examples can be highlighted:

positive and negative. The first is the success of the California

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CDF) in creating

reasonable site safety conditions by enforcing the Public

Resource Code (PRC) Sections 4290 and 4291. PRC 4290 is

the basis for the Fire Safe California program. PRC 4291 is

an excellent approach to the business of mitigation. PRC

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
144 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

stage. Yet, the issue of urban wildland fire is conspicuously

absent from planning concerns in most communities. A

review of the Office of Public Resources (OPR) report on

strategic growth indicates that discussions of the California

Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) requirements do not

address the issue of the urban wildland interface at all.

The second point of mitigation is at the site construction

phase. However, unless the community has adopted a code

or ordinance similar to PRC 4291, there are no requirements

for site analysis. One of the biggest problems is the lack of

training of fire and building department inspectors. This

results in a wide variety of interpretations of even the simplest

of requirements such as clearance distances, glazing

requirements, and attic or eave protection.

Another influence in the mitigation effort is at the property

owner and community-based action group level. The

deficiency here is the lack of effective educational efforts to

obtain and maintain public support. The CDF and Los Angeles

City Fire Department have two of the most successful efforts,

but they are not typical. In some cases, these activities have

actually been rejected by community-based groups who use

Codes, Covenants and Restrictions (CCR’s) to promote

“ambience” at the expense of safety.

Existing Regulations

We already have a great deal of statutes and regulations.

Roofing requirements can be divided into two distinctly

different levels: Assembly Bill 337 (Bates 1992), requiring

Class B roofing and defensible space in Very High Fire Risk

Severity Zones (VHFRSZ); and Assembly Bill 2131

(O’Connell 1992) requiring Class C roofing in all other

parts of the state. Both of these bills were signed into law

last year. Because of post-enactment implementation dates,

neither has been implemented and thus has not produced

tangible results. The key point is that the exposure to urban/

wildland fire situations is a statewide problem. But it is not a

uniform problem. Attempts at statewide mandates to deal

with the problem almost always face strong resistance from

those agencies and property owners who will not benefit

from the new requirements.

However, significant gaps in the Bates bill involve the

areas mapped by CDF as VHFRSZ—these can be rejected

by a non-rebuttal response from the local governing body.

This does not result in any consequence if they suffer a

subsequent fire in that area. If CDF applies the Class B

requirement in an area with a common boundary to a city

identified as VHFRSZ, and the city does not adopt it for

themselves, we have an exposure problem. If CDF has the

authority to require Class B in their area, and a local

community rejects it for other reasons, what has been

accomplished?

The Public Resource Code provisions used by the CDF

are probably the best overall mitigation approaches in the

code system. However, to be used by local government,

PRC 4291 requires it to be adopted by each one independently.

Model ordinances achieve this, such as the City of La Verne

and Napa’s “Hillside Overlay Zone,” but historically very

This concept could be considered for expansion to other

fire protection features because they help control costs of

State and local government.

Access and infrastructure are both expensive to create

and to maintain. As a result, local government often lacks

the will to impose more stringent infrastructure requirements

upon specific developers. The public perception of this

problem is not helpful either. The general public considers

most mitigation efforts unnecessary and an abuse of their

quest for privacy. For those individual property owners who

reject recommendations for improving fire defensibility, there

are few penalties.

The perception that insurance exists to repay people for

lost property is based on the notion that compensation is

available for all property losses. The California Fair Plan,

which was created to serve homeowners in high-risk situations,

is intended to ensure coverage is available. For the first time

in the recent past, even the Fair Plan has asked for

supplemental funds from the contributing companies because

of the severe losses.

Unfortunately, insurance does not address the problem

that these catastrophic fires result in hundreds of millions of

dollars of public expenditures that are a direct burden to the

taxpayer at both the State or Federal level.

The financial liability to both State and Federal

government has grown because of the increased frequency

of catastrophic fires. Local government does not see this as a

liability because, after a state of emergency is declared,

everyone gets reimbursed for their extraordinary costs. Some

communities have even indicated these fires are financial

windfalls. The reimbursement is sometimes in excess of

actual expenditures, so there is no reason to complain or

remedy the situation. The deep pockets that continue to

accrue liability are the State and the Federal governments. If

the trend towards more frequent and wider spread losses

continues, the costs to government will continue to escalate.

Therefore, fire is of statewide concern.

Risk Management

Risk can be categorized at three separate levels: site

risks, neighborhood risks, and community risks. Site risk is a

factor of evaluating building sites and structural integrity,

specifically slope and aspect orientation and fuel loading

relationships. The tool available to accomplish this evaluation

is a “Wildland Risk Calculation.” Neighborhood risk is a

factor of density, structural conditions, topographical layout,

and vegetation management, evaluated by using a “Field

Evaluation Form.” And finally, the community risk level is a

factor of infrastructure, community emergency planning,

and the level of policy commitment to mitigation gauged by

using the form of OES Disaster Plans.

Mitigation Efforts

The most effective stage for mitigation against urban

wildland fires for all these levels is during the development

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
145 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Distribution of Existing Information

Knowledge of the appropriate mitigation efforts is not

evenly distributed. In fact, the methods and techniques for

controlling the problem are not taught in any of the recognized

fire science curricula at community colleges or universities.

We do have a fire suppression course on wildland operations,

but no fire prevention course is focused on this area. A

tremendous amount of information is available, but it has

not been widely used by local government. The distribution

matrix of proposed state regulations, and the mailing lists to

provide updates on this topic do not currently serve to keep

communities well informed of appropriate authority, or how

to implement more comprehensive regulations.

Summary

The problems will not be significantly reduced unless

we motivate local government into action, supported by a

coordinated state response to the issue of vegetation

management and a comprehensive training and education

program. Because these types of fires will be difficult to

eliminate, all forms of government must be proactive to

limit losses. The issues will focus on costs for solutions and

the ability to avoid conflict with local government.

And finally, the public needs to understand that this is a

serious social issue that can be addressed only by cooperation

between State and local government and that a combination

of education, partnering processes, technology transfer and

improved enforcement of current standards and regulations

will ultimately impact the potential to reverse the trend

towards more catastrophic fires.

References

Bates, Tom. 1992. Assembly Bill 337. California Health and Safety Code,

Chapter 6.8.

O’Connell, Jack. 1992. Assembly Bill 2131. California Health and Safety

Code, Section 13132.7. California Revenue and Taxation Code; State

of California.

Rice, Curt; Dave, James. 1989. A discussion of the County General Plan and

the role of Strategic Fire Protection Planning; prepared for the California

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection by Robert L. Irwin, Tuolomne

County Planning Commissioner; 1989 September 30; 35 p.

Appendix

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection

(CDF).

California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).

California Office of Emergency Services (OES).

California State Fire Marshall (CSFM).

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).

Office of Public Resources (OPR).

Public Resource Code (PRC).

State Responsibility Area (SRA).

Very High Fire Risk Severity Zone (VHFRSZ).

few have such ordinances. Three other documents in existence

could be used as a basis for adopting local ordinances. They

are the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 299,

the Western Fire Chiefs’ Urban Wildland Interface text, and

the CDF’s Fire Safe Guides for Residential Development.

What Needs to be Regulated?

Roof covering is frequently considered as the ultimate

villain in these types of fires, but this is entirely too simplistic

and is one of the reasons we are not making progress on

resolving the problem. Roofs are an issue, but there are

many other factors that must be considered in the regulatory

scheme, such as:

• Structural integrity—the ability of the structure

to withstand intrusion by fire.

• Defensible space—the use of fuel and vegetative

management techniques to reduce fire exposure

to a vulnerable structure.

• Infrastructure reliability—the ability for fire

suppression forces to have access to structures

and for the water supply to remain in service for

the duration of the fire attack.

None of these issues is independently addressed in the

current model code, and they are absent from planning

requirements in CEQA. (The Uniform Fire Code currently

has a proposed amendment to create a set of requirements for

model code, which will probably be adopted in about a year.)

 Current Action

The political environment regarding imposing new

regulations is not favorable in spite of the fact that almost

everyone agrees that we have a serious problem. Although

most local governments readily agree on the consequences

of these fires, many disagree about the preferred solution.

To propose more mandated duties on local government is

volatile; yet, at the same time, these same officials are looking

for leadership in the area. They are under a great deal of

pressure to define activities that get results, and they also

recognize the need to reevaluate priorities.

The CDF has followed through in its commitment to

map the VHFRSZs. The California State Fire Marshall

(CSFM) is in the process of preparing a model ordinance for

adoption of the VHFRSZ by local government. Both efforts

are on schedule, but are unlikely to make any significant

difference in this problem for a period of 7 to 10 years. The

reason is fairly simple; they apply only to a limited area of

growth. They are not retroactive, and they are dependent

upon political action by local government.

The major obstacles to significantly reduce the current

potential for large-loss fires include: (1) lack of knowledge

by local officials as to how to take action; (2) confusion and

ambiguity about the imposition of structure requirements in

building codes based on local conditions; and (3) funding

reduction in the fire prevention capacity of many agencies.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
146 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
147 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

A Balanced Approach: Dr. Biswell’s Solution to Fire Issues

in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems1

Carol Rice2

Abstract: Dr. Biswell’s approach to fire management balanced

fire prevention, suppression, and fuel management. Dr. Biswell

maintained that with increased support for fire prevention and fuel

management, several profound changes would be anticipated, including a decrease in the number of wildfires, as well as a decrease

in requirements for suppression. Interested persons can help shift

the current emphasis in fire management to increased support for

fuel management (and particularly prescribed burning) by repeatedly informing the public of the benefits of prescribed burning in

terms the lay public understands and demonstrating the advantages with successful local projects.

On February 15-17, 1994, the Biswell Symposium, FireIssues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, was intended, in part, to memorialize Dr. Harold

Biswell (or “Doc” as he was affectionately known), a

fervent proponent of prescribed fire to manage fuels in both

the wildlands and in the wildland/urban interface.

Many have heard his message about resource management

in wildland ecosystems, and fire hazard reduction in the

urban interface. But Dr. Biswell also considered fire a tool

for resource management in the urban interface and for

hazard reduction in wildland ecosystems. The mixing of the

two areas of interest therefore seemed appropriate for a

meeting commemorating Dr. Harold Biswell.

A Balanced Approach

 Many types of actions and mixes of approaches can be

engaged to solve the “fire problem.” Throughout this

Symposium, solutions have been offered for both specific

circumstances and national situations. The solutions have

encompassed new legislation, revised policies, technological

improvements, increased participation in land use planning,

and public education. Speakers in the introductory session

addressed a city solution and a state solution. Dr. Biswell

advocated a balanced approach as a solution to fire

management issues where, ideally, fire prevention, fire

suppression, and fuel management received an equal level

of support. Of course, to Dr. Biswell, fuel management was

nearly synonymous with prescribed burning.

Currently the world of fire management is not ideal if

judged by this criteria. Many in fire management recognize

that the mix of prevention, fuel management, and suppression

is not optimum. In a national survey by the Wildland Fire

Management Section of the National Fire Protection

Association in 1989, both prevention and prescribed burning

programs were identified as top issues facing fire management

nationwide. In this same survey, an increase in prescribed

burning programs was by far the most frequent suggestion

for desired change in fire management policy, and prevention

was listed almost twice as many times as an activity most in

need of funds.

Dr. Biswell maintained that by using the balanced

approach, the number of unwanted fires would decrease as a

consequence of the heightened prevention efforts. Suppression

requirements would likewise decrease because more of the

fuels would be transitioned into a managed condition.

Opportunities for successful suppression would become more

plentiful because fuels would become less continuous. In

addition, a greater percentage of the land would become less

resistant to control as the amount of available fuel (especially

heavier fuels) decreased on any one piece of land.

A Fuels Management Shift

There are several ways to shift the current mix of fire

management programs to one with a greater proportion of

effort allocated to fuels management and fire prevention.

 The first way is to explain to the public, the media, and

opinion leaders the benefits of fuel management, and

specifically, the benefits of prescribed fire. References abound

about the benefits of and even the necessity for fuel

management, especially prescribed burning. Because the

public appears to be more convinced by specifics than general

observations, these references are a useful resource for

describing the advantages of fuel management. The public

has been especially receptive to explanations of the fire

ecology of specific sites. A fire manager might use written

fire histories and fire-scarred trees to explain the natural role

of fire and its inevitability. Local vegetation usually provides

numerous examples of adaptations to fire; “reading the

landscape” makes a great story.

Recently, the public has been responsive to proposals

for fire hazard reduction with prescribed fire. Resource

managers or other interested persons might explain how

prescribed burning reduces the biomass left to burn, changes

the structure of the fuel so that it is less likely to burn

intensely, and how it can even change the vegetation type to

one less resistant to control. Cost comparisons of techniques,

or of damage scenarios without action can be persuasive

points for highlighting the value of prescribed burning. The

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Proprietor, Wildland Resource Management, 134 Journey’s End, Walnut Creek, CA 94595.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
148 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

benefits to fire personnel provided by the training and

communication opportunities afforded during prescribed

burning may likewise be important to a public who depends

on a well-trained fire suppression organization. A prescribed

burn is often a media event that should be capitalized upon

as an opportunity to contact thousands with a message about

the value of such actions and programs.

Research has shown that a message needs to be heard

400 times before a person’s opinion will be changed or

altered. The message about the benefits of prescribed burning

needs to be told many times and in many ways simply to

reach many people. By the end of any outing, field trip or

workshop, Dr. Biswell had told the story of prescribed

burning’s benefits repeatedly, but not redundantly.

Telling the story about prescribed burning clearly, stated

for an intelligent but currently uninformed audience, is very

important. Dr. Biswell often quoted Albert Einstein, who

suggested that a person did not really understand a concept

if he could not explain it to his gardener. Fire managers need

to be able to explain the process of fire, its application, and

the value of fire’s controlled use in terms that mean something

to the audience.

A successful local project can illustrate the benefits of

fuel management. Fire managers are able to show the

applicability of fuel management and prescribed burning in

a wide range of circumstances when many successful projects

are nearby. Some audiences would prefer to believe fires did

and should occur someplace else; thus, the applicability of

fire’s use in their particular circumstance is best argued by

examples of successful local burns in a variety of conditions.

Conclusion

Those responsible for planning and conducting prescribed

burns must persevere to achieve successful projects.

Conducting a prescribed burn is not an easy task. Each burn

entails challenges regarding scheduling, logistics, communications (to the public and between agencies), air quality

management, finances, and many more. However, these

projects are nearly always well worth the effort. For example,

according to John McMillan (personal communication with

author, September 9, 1993), the site of a prescribed burn

conducted by staff on the USDA Forest Service’s Pacific

Ranger District in California was the only green area visible

within miles after the Cleveland Fire of 1992. Although its

advantages to this site are obvious, the illustration of prescribed

burning’s benefits are also very powerful for potential

application elsewhere.

Dr. Biswell believed in a balanced approach to fire issues

in urban interface and wildland ecosystems, and he worked

with a passion to make it so. He did this by repeatedly

explaining the benefits of prescribed burning to all those who

would listen and many who would not. He told the message

about fire’s use in terms all could understand. He always

encouraged the wise use of fire and illustrated this with

demonstrations. By mimicking Doc’s actions and approach,

we will be able to move closer to garnering the support

necessary to create that balance Doc was so eager to attain.

Reference

Rice, Carol L. 1989. Personnel, equipment, budget, costs and issues of

Federal fire management programs. Unpublished paper presented to

the Wildland Fire Management section of the National Fire Protection

Association; 1989 May 19; Boston, Massachussetts.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Plenary Session—Solutions
149 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

POSTER SESSION
150 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
151 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Use of Aerial Photography for Fire Planning

and Suppression1

Alan H. Ambacher2

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Vice President, Pacific Aerial Surveys, Hammon-Jensen-Wallen &

Associates, 8407 Edgewater Drive, Oakland, CA 94621.

Abstract: Aerial photography has long been considered a valuable tool for wildland fire suppression activities. The Fire Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) mapping program introduced the use of aerial

photography as a critical component of an integrated mapping

program for daily emergency response for the community of

southern California map users. The Oakland fire storm and the

recent southern California fires are examples of multi-agency

involvement that demonstrate the importance for current information of existing ground conditions. Aerial photography is one

source for obtaining current information.

Western Federal agencies involved in fire protection,such as the USDA Forest Service, USDI Bureau of

Land Management, and the National Park Service, use aerial

photography as an information base to support fire planning

and suppression in wildland areas. As Federal agencies

became involved in the multi-agency effort through Fire

Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential

Emergencies (FIRESCOPE) to improve coordination and

communication, the use of aerial photography as an

information base was expanded into interface and urban fire

response areas.

The FIRESCOPE mapping program was designed to

provide fire service agencies with a consistent, standardized

set of cartographic products derived primarily from National,

State, and local government mapping programs. The value

of the FIRESCOPE mapping program to partner agencies

depended upon timely maintenance of operational data layers.

Current aerial photography to create orthophoto bases for

ensuring positional accuracy of data collected by the fire

services, or used directly as an information layer, was deemed

critical to the success of the mapping program. The

FIRESCOPE program concluded that Federal or State aerial

photo sources were not adequate to meet this critical demand

for updated aerial photography. Other sources for aerial

photography had to be developed, including the private

sector companies. Fire service agencies now use geographic

information systems, electronic vehicle maps, and other

technology to supplement their mapping programs. Yet, the

need for consistent current map information to support onsite multi-agency emergency management continues,

evidenced during the Oakland fire storm as fire crews from

areas throughout the West arrived to support the City of

Oakland Fire Department. Aerial photography from a private

photo company, such as Pacific Aerial Surveys, can be used

to create a range of photo products to quickly update existing

operational data; as record keeping documents; for strategic

planning, fuel assessment, structure locations, and evaluation

hazard potential; and to familiarize emergency personnel on

existing ground conditions before entering an area.

Current and historical high resolution aerial photography

is available at various scales and film emulsions from private

companies. The photography is remarkably detailed, allowing

for easy interpretation of ground features such as street

patterns, access roads, drainage patterns, tank locations, water

sources, buildings, parking lots, light and telephone poles,

and vegetation characteristics and types. Historical aerial

photography is an excellent source to evaluate land use

change that has occurred over large areas or individual sites.

Photo Laboratories

Aerial photo negatives for Federal agencies are stored at

the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service

(ASCS) Aerial Photography Field Office in Salt Lake City,

Utah, and the Earth Remote Observing Satellite (EROS)

Data Center in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Although these

laboratories have emergency response plans to create aerial

photo products, the currency and scale of the photography is

not acceptable for information needs by fire personnel during

or after a major interface incident. Also, it is impractical to

expect these laboratories to respond within the first few

hours of an incident to deliver aerial products to fire personnel.

Private laboratories, such as Pacific Aerial Surveys,

located within or near the immediate area of concern can

provide digital or hard copy aerial products from their library

stock of aerial photography. By using the information network

with other aerial photo firms and the government photo labs,

Pacific Aerial Surveys can coordinate deliveries of aerial

photo products within hours after receiving the initial request.

Photo Libraries

Pacific Aerial Surveys maintains in its photo libraries

current aerial photos of the greater Bay Area, Monterey,

Sacramento, Redding, and selected Los Angeles area counties.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
152 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Pacific Aerial Surveys’ corporate office is located in Oakland,

California, where all Company film is stored. Sales offices

are located in Van Nuys, Redding, and Monterey, California.

Private aerial photo companies have photo-equipped

planes and calibrated aerial camera systems with 3.5-inch,

6-inch, 8.25-inch, or 12-inch lens ready for immediate mission

mobilization. Other sensors can also be flown in these

airplanes. Most companies now use Global Positioning

Systems (GPS) technology to control photo exposure stations

so coordinate information and not maps need only be

transmitted to a company from a fire command center for a

flight to occur.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
153 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Characteristics of Coastal Sage Scrub in Relation to Fire

History and Use by California Gnatcatchers1

Jan L. Beyers Ginger C. Peña2

Abstract: Plant cover and vegetation structure were examined at

two inland coastal sage scrub sites differing in fire history and use

by California gnatcatchers. Salvia mellifera and Eriogonum

fasciculatum dominated one site; shrub cover on gnatcatcher–

occupied plots averaged 50 percent greater than on unoccupied

plots. At the other site, gnatcatcher-occupied plots had high cover

of Artemisia californica and Encelia farinosa while unoccupied

plots were dominated by E. farinosa alone and had half as much

total shrub cover. Gnatcatcher territories at both sites had taller

shrubs than unoccupied plots. Recently burned areas and areas

with little regrowth were not used by gnatcatchers.

Coastal sage scrub is a fire-dominated vegetation typethat has been largely converted to agricultural and urban

uses in southern California. Less than 20 percent of the

original area of this vegetation type probably remains

(Westman 1981). The California gnatcatcher (Polioptila

californica) lives only in coastal sage scrub in California and

Baja California (Atwood 1993); because habitat loss

jeopardizes its survival, it has been federally listed as

“threatened.”

Inland Riverside County contains numerous remnant

areas of sage scrub. Studies of gnatcatcher habitat have been

conducted in coastal Orange and San Diego counties, often

by biological consultants working for developers (e.g.,

Bontrager 1991, Ogden Environmental and Energy Services

Co., Inc. 1992), but relatively little is known about gnatcatcher

requirements in inland areas (Atwood 1993). In conjunction

with two ornithologists studying gnatcatcher nesting success,

we undertook this study to help clarify the relationship between

California gnatcatchers, coastal sage scrub, and fire history.

Methods

Two study sites were chosen in western Riverside County:

the University of California, Riverside’s Motte Rimrock

Reserve, located in the hills near Perris, California, and

Lake Mathews, a Metropolitan Water District storage reservoir

near Riverside, California. Almost half of the Motte Reserve

was burned in a fire in September 1979; much of the rest

burned in June 1981. California gnatcatcher territories are

found only in the 1979 burn area. We sampled four plots

each in known gnatcatcher territories, in 1979 burn areas

without gnatcatchers, and in 1981 burn areas. Plots without

gnatcatchers were randomly selected; plots in territories

were chosen so as not to interfere with gnatcatcher breeding

activity. On each plot, four line-point transects were randomly

chosen perpendicular to a baseline. Vegetation cover was

measured every 0.5 m along each 25-m transect by dropping

a vertical pointer and recording the identity and height of

each species touched by the pointer. Sampling was done in

late spring. At Lake Mathews, plots were located in unburned

vegetation occupied by gnatcatchers, unburned vegetation

without gnatcatchers, and in an area burned in 1990. Sampling

procedures were the same as at Motte.

Results

At Motte, plots in the 1979 burn area used by gnatcatchers

averaged 50 percent greater shrub cover than 1979 burn plots

not in active use. Plots in the area burned in 1981 had little

live shrub cover and were not used by gnatcatchers (table 1).

At Lake Mathews, unburned plots used by gnatcatchers had

almost twice as much cover as those not used, and Artemisia

californica was an important component of the cover. Shrub

cover was very low in the 1990 burn plots (table 1). Plots in

bird territories had taller shrubs than unoccupied plots at

both sites as well (data not shown).

Discussion

California gnatcatchers do not rely exclusively on

California sagebrush (Artemisia californica) in inland sage

scrub, as they appear to do near the coast (Bontrager 1991).

Gnatcatcher plots at Motte were dominated by black sage

(Salvia mellifera) and California buckwheat (Eriogonum

fasciculatum); those at Lake Mathews had about equal cover

of California sagebrush and brittlebush (Encelia farinosa).

Sites used by gnatcatchers averaged more than 50 percent

shrub cover, similar to results tabulated by Atwood (1993).

Recently burned sites were not used by gnatcatchers.

Conditions that inhibit shrub recovery after fire, as apparently

occurred with the 1981 fire at Motte, could reduce the

amount of usable habitat available for California gnatcatchers.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2

Research Plant Ecologist and Biological Technician, respectively, Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, 4955 Canyon Crest

Dr., Riverside, CA 92507.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
154 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Acknowledgments

Permission to work at the Motte Rimrock Reserve was

granted by Reserve Director Barbara Carlson, University of

California, Riverside; she also provided information on

gnatcatcher territories and safe sampling times. Metropolitan

Water District allowed us to work at Lake Mathews. Dr.

William O. Wirtz II and Audrey Mayer of Pomona College

identified gnatcatcher territories at Lake Mathews. Carla

Wakeman, Michael Oxford, and Peter Coy assisted with the

vegetation sampling.

References

Atwood, Jonathan L. 1993. California gnatcatchers and coastal sage

scrub: the biological basis for endangered species listing. In: Keeley,

J. E., ed. Interface between ecology and land development in California.

Los Angeles: Southern California Academy of Sciences; 149-169.

Bontrager, David R. 1991. Habitat requirements, home range and

breeding biology of the California gnatcatcher (Polioptila californica)

in south Orange County, California. Unpublished report prepared

for Santa Margarita Company, Rancho Santa Margarita, California.

Ogden Environmental and Energy Services Co., Inc. 1992. Ecology of the

California gnatcatcher at Rancho San Diego. Unpublished report

prepared for Home Capital Development Corp., San Diego, California.

Westman, Walter E. 1981. Diversity relations and succession in

Californian coastal sage scrub. Ecology 62: 170-184.

Table 1—Average percent shrub cover (standard deviation) of plots at Motte Rimrock Reserve and Lake Mathews. “Total”

may not equal the sum of each column because shrubs often overlapped.

------------------------------------------ Motte Site ----------------------------------------------

Bird Plots1 Non-bird Plots Non-bird Plots

Species 1979 Burn 1979 Burn 1981 Burn

Artemisia californica 4.3 (4.0) 6.1 (10.) 0

Encelia farinosa 7.9 (10.2) 0.5 (0.9) 0

Eriogonum fasciculatum 19.3 (16.3) 9.5 (8.2) 4.8 (2.0)

Salvia mellifera 31.5 (18.1) 24.3 (10.8) 0

Total 62.9 (24.3) 40.4 (12.3) 4.8 (2.0)

---------------------------------------- Mathews Site --------------------------------------------

Unburned Unburned 1990 Burn

Artemisia californica 33.6 (19.0) 1.3 (1.6) 0

Encelia farinosa 28.2 (10.6) 31.1 (12.7) 2.5 (2.9)

Eriogonum fasciculatum 0.4 (0.4) 1.4 (1.4) 0.3 (0.5)

Bebbia juncea 0.7 (1.2) 0.1 (0.2) 2.5 (3.5)

Lotus scoparius 0 0 5.2 (7.3)

Total 62.9 (11.3) 33.9 (13.5) 10.5 (9.8)

1 Bird plot denotes use by California gnatcatchers; non-bird plot denotes no use by California gnatcatchers in spring 1993.

N=4 plots per category at Motte site; n=3 for burned plots at Mathews, n=4 for unburned plots at Mathews.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
155 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Quest for All-Purpose Plants1

Susan L. Frommer David R. Weise2

The Problem

The fire safety of a home in the wildland/urban interfaceis influenced by several factors—one of which is the

presence and proximity of vegetation to the home.

Landscaping may either provide a significant barrier to fire

spread and thus potentially increase a home’s fire safety or

favor fire spread and reduce a home’s fire safety. However,

fire safety of vegetation is not the only criterion a homeowner

or landscape designer uses when selecting plants for use in a

yard. Other criteria include drought resistance, erosion

prevention, and esthetics.

Many lists of “fire retardant” plants are available in

trade magazines, newspapers, and from various public

agencies like water districts and resource conservation

districts. The bases of these lists are often unknown; fire

safety ratings for a particular plant may vary appreciably

from list to list, only the genus of the plant may be given

with no species name, or the same species names keep

appearing from list to list including even misidentifications

and misspellings. For example, Cupressus sp is listed in one

publication as being highly flammable (Baptiste 1992);

however, Cupressus arizonica was rated as weakly flammable

in France for the months of May, June, and October; not

very flammable for July, August, and September; and

moderately flammable in November (Valette n.d.).

Plant lists often fail to consider the fact that plants may

be reasonably fire retardant (however it is defined) when

watered but become more flammable when dry. Some plants

have a natural ability to retain a higher fuel moisture content

longer than others after the onset of the dry months, which

prolongs their fire-retardant characteristics later into the dry

season on unirrigated sites.

Furthermore, relying on only one attribute, flammability,

as a guide to plant selection ignores the many other functions

we expect from our landscape plants such as the abilities to

control erosion on slopes, to shade our homes during the

hot summers, to provide food for us and for wildlife, to

conserve water, and to be esthetically pleasing. Some lists

of “fire-retardant” plants have information about other

desirable attributes, but there are enormous gaps in this

information as well.

A Possible Solution

We propose to develop a preliminary set of techniques

based on flammability tests for building materials to determine

flammability and total heat release rates of intact vegetation,

both green and dried. This information can then be used to

devise a rating scale for relative “fire retardance” which then

can be coupled with another series of ratings for water

consumption, frost tolerance, climate modification, erosion

control, wildlife habitat, etc. Table 1 lists possible candidate

species that meet criteria other than flammability. Information

on fire retardance is often missing. This information will

help homeowners, planners, plan checkers, and others to

make intelligent and economical landscaping decisions based

on the particular hierarchy of needs of each site. Once such a

system exists, fire-safe landscaping decisions will have a

stronger scientific basis.

1 An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2 Partner, Plants 4 Dry Places, Menifee Valley, CA; Supervisory Research

Forester, Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, 4955

Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
156 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Table 1– Candidates for fire retardance tests with ratings for other desirable characteristics for

landscape plants.

Plant Fr 1 Wtr Aes Er Oth

Oenothera berlandieri ?2 x x xx

Cistus crispus ?x x x?

Olea europa ?x x ?x

Rhus ovata ?x x xx

Correa ‘Carmine Bells’ ?x x x?

Muhlenbergia rigens ?x x x?

Rhagodia spinescens ?x x x?

Rosmarinus officinalis ?x x xx

Melia azedarach ?x x ?x

Cistus salviifolius xx x x?

Baccharis pilularis ?x ? x?

Salvia microphylla ?x x xx

Myoporum ‘Putah Creek’ ?x x x?

Heteromeles arbutifolia ?x x xx

Verbena tenuisecta ?x x x?

Westringia rosmariniformis ?x x ??

Salvia greggii ?x x ?x

Acacia redolens ?x x x?

Calystegia macrostegia ?x x xx

Cistus purpureus ?x x x?

Prunus ilicifolia ?x x xx

Sophora japonica ?x x ?x

1 Fr = fire resistant, Wtr = drought resistant, Er = erosion resistant, Aes = esthetically pleasing,

Oth = other (wildlife habitat, food production, climate modification) 2 x = suitable application, ? = information not available

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session

References

Baptiste, L. 1992. FIRESCAPE—Landscaping to reduce fire hazard.

Oakland, CA: East Bay Municipal Utility District; 16 p.

Valette, Jean-Charles. n.d. Flammabilities of Mediterranean species—

I.N.R.A.’s methodology. Document PIF 9328. Avignon, France:

Laboratoire de Recherches Forestieres Mediterraneennes; 15 p.
157 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Abstract: The typical computer fire model requires much greater

spatial detail than current weather forecast models provide. One

way to obtain more spatially descriptive weather simulations is to

nest a fine model grid within a coarse one. This paper briefly

describes a nested grid model with a fine grid interval of 2 km to

simulate weather over Maui, Hawaii.

Wildland fire scientists today strive for greater detail,with the aid of computers. The computer is a virtual

laboratory in which simulated fires burn through spatially

complex fuel matrices, in response to weather and terrain

conditions. The fire model sees the world as points on a

regular grid. In one study of 2,000 ha on the Los Padres

National Forest, California, grid points were spaced 50 m

apart (Kalabokidis and others 1991). It is practically

impossible to obtain vegetation, terrain and weather conditions

for a grid this size by direct sampling. The vegetation grid

was digitized from cover type maps and the terrain grid was

obtained from a digital elevation model. But the study lacked

the means to describe weather methodically on a fine grid.

In fact, a fire weather model for the Los Padres study grid is

theoretically possible, but computationally impractical.

Computer models are used to describe weather worldwide

every day. The National Weather Service Medium-Range

Forecast model (MRF) runs on a 160 km grid (approximately).

At this resolution, the model hardly sees the Sierra Nevada

Range. The spatial resolution is much better in the Nested

Spectral Model (NSM), an as yet experimental model with a

grid interval of 25 km (Juang and Kanamitsu 1994). The

NSM is much more descriptive than the MRF (fig. 1), but it

still lacks the detail needed for a fire simulation. We are

developing a fire weather model for Maui, Hawaii that

employs a 2 km grid interval. To our knowledge, it is one of

the most spatially descriptive fire weather models of its kind.

A High-Resolution Weather Model for Fire

Behavior Simulations1

Francis M. Fujioka2 John O. Roads Kyozo Ueyoshi Shyh-Chin Chen 3

An application of the Colorado State University RAMS

code (Walko and Tremback 1991), the Maui weather model

simulates dynamical changes in temperature, humidity, wind

and precipitation fields, among others. Snapshots of the

model fields every few minutes can provide weather

information for fire simulations. The model grid is

hierarchical. A National Meteorological Center coarse grid

analysis describes the large-scale weather pattern over the

state of Hawaii. Nested within this grid is a finer grid over

the main islands of Hawaii. The densest grid is a 2 km grid

centered on Maui (fig. 2).

We are just beginning the Maui modeling study.

Preliminary results show tantalizing detail of the wind

circulation over Maui. In one case, the model described

locally stagnant winds where smoke dispersion tends to be a

problem. We plan to verify the model to the extent possible,

with a mesoscale network of automatic weather stations in

Maui’s central valley. We produced computer visualizations

of the model output that show the motions of simulated air

particles released at the 2 km grid points. Each particle is

color-coded according to the wind speed at its location. The

particles also leave streaks, similarly color-coded, that

accentuate the flow field.

The model calculations are not trivial. It takes about 12

hours of computer time to produce a 12 hour simulation on a

100 Mhz workstation. The model physics and the number of

grid points require a powerful number cruncher. But computers

no doubt will run faster, and spatially detailed fire weather

information is needed.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosyystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Research Meteorologist, Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA

Forest Service, Riverside, CA 92507. 3Research Meteorologists, Climate Research Division, University of

California Scripps Institution of Oceanography, La Jolla, CA 92093.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
158 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Figure 1–A comparison of the Medium-Range Forecast (MRF; left) and Nested Spectral Model (NSM; right) forecasts.

The gray scale depicts topographic elevation bands, and the vectors represent the wind field.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session

References

Juang, H.-M. H.; Kanamitsu, Masao. 1994. The NMC nested regional

spectral model. Monthly Weather Review 122: 3-26.

Kalabokidis, Kostas D.; Hay, Claire M.; Hussin, Yousif A. 1991. Spatially

resolved fire growth simulation. In: Andrews, Patricia L.; Potts, Donald

F., editors. Proceedings, 11th conference on fire and forest meteorology;

1991 April 16-19; Missoula, Montana. Bethesda, Maryland: Society of

American Foresters; 188-195.

Walko, Robert L.; Tremback, Craig J. 1991. RAMS, the Regional

Atmospheric Modeling System, Version 2c, user’s guide. ASTeR,

Inc. Ft. Collins, Colorado; 89 p.

Figure 2–An average of the flow patterns at lower levels in July 1988

clearly shows an eddy on the lower northwestern flanks of Haleakala, Maui.
159 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Using a Geographic Information System (GIS) to Assess

Fire Hazard and Monitor Natural Resources Protection on

the Mount Tamalpais Watershed1

Thomas H. Gaman Philip Langley2

A natural resource management geographic informationsystem (GIS) was developed that has proven useful in

urban interface fire hazard mitigation planning and natural

resource protection. A consultant team, selected to prepare

the Vegetation Baseline Studies and Management Plan for

the Mount Tamalpais Watershed in Marin County, California,

obtained data from a variety of sources to create 25 data

layers using BASEMAP 2000 GIS. The system provided a

practical means for spatial data analysis and storage. It was

also used extensively for graphic map production for the

20,000-acre watershed of the Marin Municipal Water District

and the Marin County Open Space District.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Foresters, Forest Data, PO Box 276, Inverness, CA 94937.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
160 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
161 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Old Topanga Fire arrived in the Malibu neighborhoodof upper Las Flores Canyon after 3 p.m. on Tuesday,

November 2, 1993. Virtually every home survived the initial

10-minute passage of the flame front, but nearly all

experienced a rain of hot embers that continued past dawn

on Wednesday. One surviving home was protected by pool

water, Class A foam concentrate, and a fire pump designed

for home-owners living in the wildland/urban interface (fig.

1). This Malibu resident is the first known civilian to save a

structure from wildfire using Class A foam technology. The

fire pump, a Defender Foam System model #501 manufactured by Brushfire Hydrant Co. in Walnut Creek,

California, was delivered in March 1991 (fig. 2). The system

sustained extensive damage by the fire, but never failed

during 6 hours of operation. The original design was awarded

United States patent 4,671,315 in 1987 as the portable

brushfire hydrant. When the patent expires in 2004, the

surviving system will be offered to the Smithsonian Institution.

Homeowner Intervention in Malibu1

Tom Gardner2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Project Engineer, Brushfire Hydrant Company, Walnut Creek, CA

94596.

Figure 2–Portable fire pump used by a homeowner to protect his

residence with pool water and Class A foam concentrate.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session

Figure 1–A home located in upper Las Flores Canyon, Malibu,

California, that survived the Old Topanga Fire because of homeowner

preparations.
162 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
163 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Historical accounts from early Spanish explorers whocame to California looking for gold indicate that often

they saw many columns of smoke rising from distant

mountains. Little did these explorers know that what they

were witnessing was a time-tested demonstration of natural

lightning fires and/or “controlled burning,” a technique

practiced by Native Americans to prevent wildfires in the

area’s wildlands. Today we know this early fire ecology

philosophy helped shape California’s ecological history.

But in the years that followed the Spanish explorers,

controlled burning by new migrations of settlers colonizing

the West was thought to be destructive to our wildlands until

a modern-day pioneer in fire ecology training came along.

That man was Harold Biswell. His teaching and training

activities in fire ecology, especially in southern California’s

San Diego County, during the 1970’s and 80’s continue to

influence today’s ecologist working to restore fire to the

forests, chaparral, and grasslands in this region. Biswell was

able to “transcend” the barrier between scientist and classroom.

His “hands-on” concept of training and applying prescribed

fire techniques is considered by many observers to be a

unique approach to California’s wildlands management.

Harold brought his wisdom and experience to southern

California during the middle 1970’s, when fire suppression

philosophy and policy had become entrenched in government

and public agencies responsible for wildlands fire control.

Agency leaders were convinced that prescribed fire was of

no value in chaparral and forest vegetation management.

They believed it would adversely affect too many people

and increase the threat of liability. In fact, during this period,

the idea of prescribed fire technology and training was

practically non-existent. But Harold Biswell, on the other

hand, firmly believed in the importance of fire and its role in

nature’s plan. He based his beliefs on extensive research

that examined not only the thousands of years of “natural

fires” that had occurred in California, but also how Native

Americans used fire in shaping the state’s landscape. The

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Area Farm Advisor Emeritus for Natural Resources Management, University of California Cooperative Extension, San Bernardino County, 777 E.

Rialto Ave., San Bernardino, CA 92415 3Prescribed Fire Specialist and Chief of Agricultural Services, San Diego

County Department of Agriculture, Building 3, 5555 Overland Ave., San

Diego, CA.

The Legacy of Harold Biswell in Southern California:

His Teaching Influence on the Use of Prescribed Fire1

 Walter L. Graves2 Gary Reece 3

message was long overdue when “Doc” Biswell began his

educational and training programs in San Diego County

nearly 20 years ago. His persistent and tireless efforts at

promoting the restoration of fire to its evolutionary role in

this region eventually influenced and encouraged state

government leaders and others to lay aside the “myths” of

fire exclusion in southern California.

Summary

We believe our videotape showing the following field

day and workshop at the William Heise County Park in San

Diego County in May 1983 illustrates Harold Biswell’s teaching

and training methodology in fire ecology and the importance

of restoring (controlled) fire to our wildlands. Truly,

California’s history was born of fire, and this video captures

Professor Harold Biswell’s teaching emphasis on fire as a

natural component of wildland ecosystems, Native Americans’

use of fire in wildland ecosystems, smoke management, the

importance of prescribed fire in fire management, the

importance of training in fire management, and the education

of the public about fire’s role in ecosystem management.

Acknowledgments

We thank the Cooperative Extension Visual Media staff

at the University of California, Davis–Harry Stoble, Steven

Lock, and Robert Singleton–for helping us, with extreme

patience, to produce this video. We especially appreciate the

willingness of Visual Media’s Coordinator, Rosalind Rickard,

to allow these video production specialists to participate in

this venture. We also want to applaud San Diego County’s

Department of Parks and Recreation for their courage in

implementing a prescribed fire program at a time in our

history when this concept was not considered popular.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
164 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
165 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

residents in fire-prone ecosystems about reducing risk. The

unit is also developing studies to address the relationship

between awareness of fire risk and hazard reduction activities

among wildland-urban interface homeowners. As part of

this research, four categories of these homeowners will be

identified, on the basis of their hazard assessment rating and

wildfire risk awareness:

• Low hazard rating and Aware of fire risk (L/A)

• Low hazard rating and Unaware of fire risk (L/U)

• High hazard rating and Aware of fire risk (H/A)

• High hazard rating and Unaware of fire risk (H/U)

Conceptual Approaches

The success of these studies will depend on conducting

personal interviews. In addition to demographic questions

(Bureau of the Census-type questions), open-ended questions

will be designed to ascertain the homeowners’ perception of

wildfire risk around their homes, such as:

• How long have you lived at your current residence?

• If a fire occurred, how would firefighters locate your

property?

• Have you experienced a wildfire at or near your home?

• Before that fire, were you concerned that a wildfire

might occur?

• How often do wildfires occur in your neighborhood?

• If your home burned down tomorrow, what would you

miss most?

Using a “wildfire hazard rating form” (Great Lakes

Forest Fire Compact 1992), the interviewer and homeowner

could rate site hazards (e.g., surrounding trees, type of ground

cover, fuel storage), structural hazards (roofing materials,

decks, and overhangs), and existing hazard reduction (trees

pruned, leaves raked, roof cleaned outbuildings hazard-free).

A “property hazard value” could be calculated by adding the

total site hazard to the total structural hazard and subtracting

the total hazard reduction.

In conjunction with these studies, geographic information

system (GIS) databases could be built and maintained to

store: (1) the information obtained during the interviews, (2)

the owner’s perception of risk, and (3) the “property hazard

value.” This information would facilitate queries like “how

many” and “location of” the homesites with a given property

hazard, owner risk-perception strata, or a combination of

attributes. A GIS would also support tests for differences in

demographic and site characteristics between homesites

with low/high hazard ratings and homeowners with low/

high risk awareness.

Abstract: Researchers in Michigan are designing and supporting

studies to facilitate the identification of fire hazards on homesites

in the wildland-urban interface, to elicit homeowners’ perceptions

of the wildfire risk where they live, and to assess the values that

residents in fire-prone ecosystems place on reducing wildfire risk.

A better understanding of the attitudes and values of interface

residents will aid prevention specialists in targeting programs to

help these residents mitigate wildfire hazards and reduce potential

losses on their properties.

To help homeowners in the wildland-urban interface

improve the chance that their homes will survive a

wildfire, prevention specialists need to understand the many

and varied reasons why homeowners choose to live where

they do. They need to know which wildfire hazards are

present on the homeowners’ property that would increase

losses to wildland fire. They also need to assess the

homeowners’ perception of wildfire risk (the probability

that a wildfire will threaten their property).

Typically, prevention programs have been focused on

the segment of the wildland-urban interface population that

is most aware of wildfire risk and is most willing to remove

or mitigate hazards on their property to reduce risk of property

damage. A better understanding of risk perception and

attitudes toward hazard reduction could help prevention

specialists assess the understanding, values, and needs of all

homeowners residing in the wildland-urban interface.

Morgan (1993) asserts that “the public can be very

sensible about risk when companies, regulators, and other

institutions give it the opportunity.” He further states that

risk communication is simple: “Learn what people already

believe, tailor the communication to this knowledge and to

the decisions people face and then subject the resulting

message to careful empirical evaluation.”

The USDA Forest Service’s Atmospheric and

Socioeconomic Relationships with Wildland Fire Work Unit,

North Central Forest Experiment Station, is supporting

cooperative research at Michigan State University (Fried

1993) that will increase the knowledge of homeowners’

perceptions of wildfire risk and will assess the values of

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Project Leader—Wildland Fire Research, retired Computer Specialist,

and Technical Publications Writer, respectively, North Central Forest Experiment Station, USDA Forest Service, 1407 S. Harrison Road, Rm. 220,

East Lansing, MI 48823-5290. 3Assistant Professor, Department of Forestry, Michigan State University, 110 Natural Resources Bldg., East Lansing, MI 48824-1222

Helping Wildland-Urban Interface Residents Reduce

Wildfire Hazards1

Warren E. Heilman2 Jeremy S. Fried3 William A. Main2 Donna M. Paananen2

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
166 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Anticipated Benefits

Depending on how the database is sorted and analyzed,

researchers can obtain a variety of information ranging

from whether fire hazards are associated with income to

the number of homeowners in each of the identified

categories. Results can aid the wildfire prevention

community’s understanding of the knowledge, attitudes,

and needs of homeowners who reside in the wildlandurban interface. Prevention specialists can use this

information to select specific prevention programs for

specific groups of homeowners and provide policymakers

with information that can help them in developing costefficient programs to reduce the risks associated with fire

in wildland-urban interfaces.

Acknowledgments

 We thank Donald Johnson, fire prevention specialist at

the Michigan Department of Natural Resources, Forest

Management Division, Lansing, Michigan, for providing

background information about wildfire hazard rating.

References

Fried, J.S. 1993. Valuing social and economic impacts of fire at the

urban-wildland interface: a proposal. Unpublished study, USDA

Forest Service Cooperative Agreement #23-93-32.

Great Lakes Forest Fire Compact. 1992. Wildfire: are you and your

home prepared? Ontario: Great Lakes Forest Fire Compact; 30 p.

Morgan, M. Granger. 1993. Risk analysis and management. Scientific

American 269 (1): 32-41.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
167 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Mt. Diablo Park: The Role of Fire in a Controversy

about Cattle Grazing at the Urban Fringe1

Lynn Huntsinger Jeremy Fried Lita Buttolph2

Mt. Diablo State Park is in rapidly urbanizing CentralContra Costa County, a few miles inland from the

eastern San Francisco Bay. The Park encompasses 18,000

acres of mountainous and rolling oak woodlands, chaparral,

and grasslands, increasingly surrounded by San Francisco

Bay Area suburbs. Easily accessible to millions of nearby

urban dwellers, Mt. Diablo is among the most frequented of

the California State Park System’s 300 units, with more than

500,000 visits annually. The 1989 Park General Plan set

goals for the park that included managing to restore natural

processes. The Plan called for removal of livestock grazing

from most of the park. Controversy over the elimination of

grazing was of surprising vehemence and has lasted years. As

a result, the General Plan process consumed more State Park

time and resources than any previous Plan—even though this

was not the first time grazing was phased out of a State Park.

Livestock grazing has been a component of the Mt.

Diablo landscape since about 1834, when the mountain’s

slopes were part of a Mexican land grant. Founded in 1921,

the Park has expanded from its original few hundred acres.

In 1979, 2,000 acres of Mt. Diablo Ranch were sold and 281

acres donated to the State Park System by the owner, Angel

Kerley. In exchange, a 10-year grazing lease was signed, but

participants in the controversy disagreed about the nature of

the lease. Some argued that the intention was for grazing to

continue in perpetuity as an exhibit of ranching for local

residents, while grazing opponents contended that there is

no written evidence supporting this claim. During the last

decade, Mt. Diablo Ranch, now a small in-holding, leased

about 7,500 of the Park’s acres for grazing. The 1989 Park

General Plan decision was to not renew the lease, but to

instead graze a few hundred acres for interpretive purposes.

Ecologically and socially, the grazing controversy echoed

those on Federal lands. Plan proponents pointed to the

“scientific evidence” that grazing benefits the environment.

For example, grazing proponents argued that cattle refill the

ecological niche left vacant by the absence of native tule elk

and pronghorn antelope. Opponents argued that livestock

grazing is significantly different in distribution and diet,

injuring native plants and encouraging the spread of nonnative weeds. But the Park’s location on the urban fringe

introduced a third, less typical viewpoint into the argument:

local residents who believed that cattle grazing reduced the

threat of wildfire.

The Cow as Symbol

This public lands grazing controversy had all the usual

players: a remnant rural community for whom the cow

symbolized “wise use” of natural resources to improve human

life, and grazing opponents, for whom the cow symbolized

human exploitation and abuse of natural resources. A new

element was added because of the Park’s suburban-fringe

locale: a suburban public concerned about the hazard of

wildland fires spreading to nearby residences. As a result,

active participants in the Mt. Diablo debate included owners

of high-priced homes near the Park. This wealthy, welleducated group strongly supported continued grazing in the

Park and had the support of many local business interests.

Left ungrazed, the annual grasses of Mt. Diablo’s slopes

often reach 5 feet tall. Tinder-dry in summer and fall, they

pose a considerable fire hazard. In Mediterranean climate

zones worldwide, wildfire is a normal part of ecosystem

function, as it is at Mt. Diablo. Grazing advocates, including

some local Fire Chiefs, believe that grazing reduces fire

hazard by removing biomass, and perhaps more importantly,

preventing brush encroachment into grasslands. Opponents

of grazing believe that only overgrazing reduces fire hazard,

and believe that prescribed burning, mowing, and other

techniques should be used instead of grazing. Unfortunately,

in rapidly growing Contra Costa County, increasing

development of wildlands and air quality restrictions can

make extensive vegetation management practices, such as

prescribed burning, costly and sometimes controversial.

Letters from a local homeowner’s association, for example,

complained of unsightly blackened earth after a burn.

An Urban Fringe Controversy

The wildfire threat lent unusual power and financing to

the pro-grazing side of the issue, contrary to the usual pattern

of an “anti-grazing” block composed of people without rural

roots. With homes near the Park commonly priced at more

than $300,000, residents pay a premium for living near

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Assistant Professor of Environmental Science, University of California,

Berkeley, CA 94720; Assistant Professor of Forestry, Michigan State University, 110 Natural Resources Bldg., East Lansing, MI 48824-1222; Graduate Student Researcher, Utah State University, Logan, UT 84322.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
168 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

nature. They expect nature to be a “good neighbor.” This

expectation affects their view of land management policy

and practice. In some places, urban residents dislike living

near grazing operations. Livestock owners complain about

trespass problems and depredation by pet dogs. At Mt.

Diablo, a vocal portion of the local residents believed that

the benefits of fire hazard reduction outweighed any

inconvenience caused by the proximity of cattle. The livestock

owner allied himself with these interests, and the controversy

became a divisive and drawn-out one.

Suburbanites often move to the suburbs to escape urban

dangers, and to make a long-term, secure investment in a

home. For many in this controversy, the cow symbolizes a

safe relationship with nature. By consuming flammable

biomass, the cow seems to make the mountain a less capricious

neighbor. This vision of the Park as a good neighbor makes

restoration of natural processes difficult, particularly when

one of the most important natural processes at Mt. Diablo is

fire. Allowing development to border parks in which the

goal is to restore natural processes makes achieving that

goal nearly impossible. Ranch lands might be a valuable

buffer between urban/suburban areas and protected or

preserved natural systems. Ranches can provide an income

to private landowners, yet connect preserved areas for wildlife

and buffer developed areas from wildfire, prescribed burning,

and other management activities. At the same time, they

may buffer preserved areas from pets, vandals, and other

intensive human impacts. Unfortunately, although those

concerned with the protection of wildland systems and

restoration of natural processes are distracted by their

extremely polarized view of that ubiquitous rural resident,

the cow, the prospects of achieving effective conservation of

natural systems have become ever more remote because of

urban sprawl.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
169 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Since the early 1960’s, Caribbean pine (Pinus caribaeavar. hondurensis) has been used for reforestation in

northeastern Nicaragua. Caribbean pine is a species that

grows naturally in the area, but its occurrence has increased

because of its use, almost exclusively, as a reforestation

species. It is thought to rely on the introduction of fire to

successfully regenerate in tropical broadleaf zones (Perry

1991). Stands in northeastern Nicaragua, however, have been

subject to an intolerably high fire frequency in recent years.

In the area under study, 90 percent of the pine stands burn

every year (fig. 1). Whether resource managers can turn

around a self-perpetuating, downward spiral in resource

production is an issue of critical importance for future rural

economic development in the Miskito region. The current

pathological fire frequency in the Caribbean pine savannas

results from a combination of high levels of fire risk from

human sources, and extremely flammable savanna fuels that

thrive on fire. These pines are highly resistant to fire and are

rarely killed, although they suffer severe setbacks in wood

production and vigor for a number of years after a fire (fig.

2). The severe fire regime of the last 10 years has reduced

the volume increment for the pines to 60 percent of its

potential (Koonce and others 1993). Even if the introduction

of fire into Caribbean pine stands is necessary, the stands of

the Miskito Coast region of Nicaragua are examples of “too

much, too often.” Current and planned research in the

region has the general goal of determining fire regimes that

will optimize the vitality of northeastern Nicaragua’s natural

resources. Current studies are geared toward mitigation of

unwanted fire effects, and understanding stand dynamics

under the current fire regime.

References

Koonce, Andrea L.; Paysen, Timothy E.; Taylor, Edwin. 1993. Fire

protection and restoration of forests in Nicaragua. OICD Proposal

for joint research with Nicaragua. USDA Forest Service, Pacific

Southwest Research Station, Riverside Forest Fire Laboratory, Riverside,

California. 4 p.

Perry, Jessy P. 1991. Pines of Mexico and Central America. Portland,

OR: Timber Press; 231 p.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2 Research Forester, Research Forester, and Ecologist, respectively,

Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, 4955 Canyon

Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507.

Fire in a Tropical Savanna—a Double-Edged Sword1

Andrea L. Koonce, Timothy E. Paysen, and Bonni M. Corcoran2

Figure 1–Area under study in northeastern Nicaragua. The boggy

lowlands of the Miskito coast region are predominately covered

with Caribbean pine savannas.

Figure 2–A typical stand of Caribbean pine in the study area. The

understory sedges are highly flammable.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
170 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.
171 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Abstract: Fire managers know the wildland-urban interface fire

problem is a people problem, but recognizing and addressing it are

not the same. Managers have repeatedly stressed the need to avoid

building with flammable materials and landscaping with fire-prone

vegetation. Yet, residents continually fail to heed their warnings.

Apparently, people not only respond poorly to warnings but tend

to be oblivious to events that disastrously influence their property

and lives. Also, the building trades build to satisfy people’s desires, community plans do not address the interface fire issue, and

governments have been unwilling to enact ordinances that control

construction. Above all, fire managers would rather “talk” about

public involvement than be immersed in it. These barriers may be

removed, if fire managers overcome their reluctance to public

involvement and become leaders in two-way communication with

the people they wish to influence. These goals may be achieved if

fire managers will seek training in the social sciences that emphasizes interpersonal relations, multicultural relations, and communication strategies.

Fire managers know the wildland-urban interface fireproblem is a people problem, but recognizing the problem

and addressing it in ways that are apt to cause interface

residents to change their behavior are two different things.

Fire managers recommend to people who move into the

wildland-urban interface that they build fire-safe homes and

protect them with defensible space. Yet, they are continually

frustrated by residents who apparently do not hear or heed

their warnings and recommendations to fireproof their homes

and yards. Why, when taking action to protect their home

from a wildfire seems obvious, do a majority of people fail

to comply with fire-safe procedures?

Difficulties in Communication

Managers are quite comfortable dealing with “things,”

such as equipment, planning strategies, and fire behavior,

but they gladly will let somebody else deal with people. Yet,

the interface fire problem mandates that managers deal with

people, like it or not. So, fire prevention managers need to

become directly involved with their intended audience and

to emphasize that building fire-safe communities can be

profitable for business as well as environmentally pleasing

to residents. However, accomplishing the task will require

that managers reduce their concern with the technical and

functional aspects of interface fires and become personally

involved in two-way communication with homeowners,

business people, and community leaders.

Communicating with homeowners is not easy, because

people not only tend to respond poorly to warnings but tend to

be oblivious to events that can have a disastrous influence on

their property and lives. People tend to have varying awareness

of environmental hazards. They tend to believe that various

events “can’t happen to them” whereas others’ behavior

demonstrates coping with or denial of hazardous events.

People in the building trades are aware that people want

nice homes in attractive locations, so they have constructed

attractive homes in the urban-wildland interface—homes

that satisfy the locational, architectural, and landscape dreams

of potential buyers, but contribute to the interface fire problem.

If fire managers are to achieve their goals, they must confront

and convince home building professionals to use fire-safe

materials and designs.

Community plans frequently do not address the interface

fire issue, and local governments have been unable or

unwilling to enact ordinances that control development and

construction. The unwillingness of governments to enact

fire legislation may be related to an avoidance by politicians

to be associated with actions that may be viewed unfavorably

by their constituency (Sampson 1991). Regardless, fire

managers must contact and encourage planners, local officials,

and legislators to develop effective zoning ordinances.

In addition, managers should work with insurance

companies to develop policy incentives that support local

plans and ordinances. Overall, premiums for homes built in

fire prone areas should reflect the higher costs associated

with the greater risks, but they might be somewhat reduced

for those homeowners who adapt to fire-safe road designs,

architectural designs, and building materials.

Manager attitudes also bear on the communication

problem as a consequence of their preference for working

with “things” rather than people. They tend to “talk” more

about public involvement rather than immersing themselves

in it. For the most part, evidence of this preference by

managers is rather subtle and is depicted by actual behavior

as contrasted with professed behavior.

Recommendations and Conclusions

People—whether homeowners, design and construction

professionals, or public officials—may be enticed to

participate in fire safety programs provided they are given

People—Fire Managers Must Talk With Them1

Arthur W. Magill2

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Principal Resource Analyst (retired), Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest Service, 4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
172 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Fire managers, like other resource professionals, tend to

be disinclined to initiate social interaction and to avoid

situations involving abstract concepts and alternative

solutions. The barriers may be removed, however, if fire

managers overcome their reluctance to be directly involved

with citizen involvement programs and establish two-way

communication with the people they wish to influence. These

goals may be achieved if fire managers pursue continuing

education in the social sciences that emphasizes interpersonal

and multicultural relations, and communication strategies.

References

Sampson, R. Neil. 1991. The politics of the environment. Journal of Soil

and Water Conservation 46(6):398-400.

clear messages, presented by credible individuals who specify

necessary actions, and provided the messages are reinforced

locally. Fire managers should be considered the credible

authorities on interface wildfires. They are especially effective

as authorities if they have established themselves in a

community through direct involvement with public education

and involvement programs, and by soliciting the help of

community leaders through dialogue to fortify the meaning

and importance of their messages. The factors proven effective

for warning of imminent hazards suggest that warnings be

clear, specific for the desired response, derived from a credible

source, reinforced locally, and conveyed by a positive message

on prime-time television.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
173 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

The Effects of Forest Fire Smoke on Firefighters1

Richard J. Mangan2

Abstract: Each fire season, 20,000 to 30,000 firefighters are engaged in suppressing wildfires and conducting prescribed burns on

federal lands, and many more are employed in fire suppression on

State and private lands. Studies of firefighter exposure to smoke

and carbon monoxide indicated only occasional exposure until the

1987-1988 fire seasons in the West. During the 1988 Yellowstone

fires, 12,000 respiratory problems were reported to medical personnel. To address this problem, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) assigned the USDA Forest Service’s Missoula

Technology and Development Center (MTDC) the responsibility

to coordinate the national effort looking at the health effects of

smoke on wildland firefighters. An interagency Technical Panel

has been formed to provide direction and set priorities, and semiannual newsletters (“Health Hazards of Smoke”) are distributed to

more than 7,000 firefighters nationally and internationally.

Each year, tens of thousands of wildland firefighters areinvolved in wildfire suppression and prescribed burning

on millions of acres in the United States. For many years, the

effects of exposure to smoke and carbon monoxide has been

a minor concern, but has never emerged as a high priority.

But, in 1987 and 1988, serious smoke inversions lasting

many days and weeks caused significant respiratory problems

in large numbers of wildland firefighters.

In 1989, the National Wildfire Coordinating Group

(NWCG) assigned the USDA Forest Service’s Missoula

Technology and Development Center to coordinate the national

effort and serve as the focal point for ongoing and future

studies on the effects of wildland fire smoke on firefighters.

Study Areas

At a 1989 workshop in San Diego sponsored by NWCG

and Johns Hopkins University, participants representing

firefighters, union leaders, fire management specialists,

occupational medicine, toxicology, industrial hygiene, fire

chemistry, and protective equipment identified eight major

areas of study that would encompass the concerns about the

health effects of smoke:

• Retrospective Cohort Mortality Study—to determine if

the long-range health of a firefighter is adversely affected

as a result of past exposures to smoke;

• Prospective Injury and Illness Study—to develop a current

system of data collection regarding wildland firefighter

injury and illness to prospectively assess the role of

smoke in the etiology of acute and long-term injury and

illness;

• Chronic Pulmonary Function Study—to determine if

wildland firefighters experience a chronic, accelerated

loss of lung function during multiple fire seasons;

• Integrated Field Study—to establish a mobile team of

industrial hygienists, wildland fire experts and occupational

medicine specialists to conduct an intensive, integrated 3-

year field study;

• Combustion Product Characterization and Toxicity Study—

to develop sampling techniques, study combustion

conditions and test diverse fuel conditions;

• Expanded Field Exposure Study—to provide firefighters

with efficient methods for monitoring exposure and

detecting cumulative effects;

• Integrated Risk Assessment—to assess the risk of exposure

among firefighters;

• Risk Management—to develop an interactive program

for use by fire management personnel to select risk

management options based upon local conditions.

Completed Studies

As of this time, completed studies of breathing zone air

samples collected from wildland firefighters and prescribed

burners indicated some potential for hazardous exposure

(respirable particulates, carbon monoxide, formaldehyde,

acrolein). While these exposures have occasionally exceeded

short-term exposure limits, very few cases have approached

or exceeded allowable time-weighted averages. Smoke

exposure from wildfires is not considered immediately

dangerous to life and health.

Studies on the respiratory effects of smoke exposure on

wildland firefighters indicate that exposure during a fire

season may result in small changes in lung function. The

health implications of short-term exposure and the potential

health effects of long-term exposures have not been quantified.

Laboratory and field studies of respiratory protective

devices have been conducted. Laboratory studies have focused

on the effects of air-purifying respirators on work performance

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in the Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Fire and Aviation Program Leader, Missoula Technology

and Development Center, USDA Forest Service, Missoula, MT 59801.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
174 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

and on ways to predict the ability of firefighters to work

while wearing a respirator. Field studies have included a

survey to determine the field use of respirators, other methods

of risk management, and field trial to evaluate a wide range

of respirators in actual working conditions.

Current Studies

Current projects under the NWCG study include

continued efforts to characterize the hazards of smoke, and

to determine the health effects of repeated exposures;

laboratory studies of the use of respirators and their effects

on upper body work performance; field trials of existing and

prototype respirators, smoke monitoring devices, medical

evaluation and surveillance; and risk management strategies.

Acknowledgments

Brian J. Sharkey, Project Leader at Missoula Technology

and Development Center (MTDC) and Professor of Human

Physiology at the University of Montana, has been primarily

responsible for initiating and guiding the “Health Hazards of

Smoke” effort sponsored by the National Wildfire

Coordinating Group (NWCG).

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
175 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Ecologists, USDA Forest Service, 4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside,

CA 92507. 3Research Forester, Pacific Southwest Research Station, USDA Forest

Service, 4955 Canyon Crest Drive, Riverside, CA 92507. 4Professor, Biology Department, California State University, San Bernardino, 5500 University Way, San Bernardino, CA 92407.

Abstract: Giant saguaro cacti (Carnegiea gigantea) and associated vegetation are being burned by numerous wildfires, especially

in areas of high public use. Specific fire effects on affected plant

species and ecosystem resilence need to be defined, and management techniques for restoration of burned areas need to be developed. A research effort was initiated at the Saguaro Natural Scenic

Area, Tonto National Forest, Arizona to determine how fire impacts saguaro community structure and species composition; to

monitor fire ignition and spread patterns; and to analyze saguaro

survival, vitality and abundance, and genome variabilty. Results

from this study should improve our understanding of fire in the

saguaro community and facilitate implementation of a pro-active

fire management program.

Saguaro cacti (Carnegiea gigantea) and associatedvegetation attract national and international tourists to

the Sonoran desert in Arizona. Saguaros are an integral

component of the biodiversity of both flora and fauna in this

desert. Unfortunately, numerous wildfires concentrated in

areas of high public use are destroying the saguaro and

severely degrading many popular vistas, especially along the

Saguaro Natural Scenic Area, Tonto National Forest, Arizona.

Fire History

Although a historical fire regime for this vegetation

type is not presently known, natural fires have probably not

been a major selecting force for much of the vegetation in

the Sonoran desert. However, anthropogenic impacts include

the introduction and expansion of alien plant species,

especially grasses. Their growth has been accompanied by

an increase in fire frequency, intensity, and extent. This

change in fire regime may now threaten many non-fire adapted

species. Of particular concern is the tropically evolved saguaro.

In many locations on the Tonto National Forest, the

combination of herbaceous and shrub layers, including the

many introduced species, form nearly contiguous and highly

flammable fuels in the saguaros’ range. Increased growth is

especially common during years with heavy precipitation.

On the Tonto National Forest, precipitation averages 7.66

inches. Rainfall was recorded at 14.24 inches and 13.34

inches for 1992 and 1993 respectively. In 1993, after these 2

years of above normal rainfall, 104 fires (twice the yearly

average) were recorded on the Mesa Ranger District, Tonto

National Forest. These fires included both accidental and

deliberate fire ignitions. One arsonist is believed to have

been responsible for setting multiple fires that burned hundreds

of acres. These acres included prime tourist attraction areas

such as the Desert Vista View Observation Point on the

popular Bee-Line Highway.

Saguaro and Fire

Saguaro can grow to heights of 18 m, weigh more than 2

tons, and is estimated to live about 200 years (Holden and

Farrell 1991). Wildfire may kill significant numbers of cacti

and succulents that characterize the saguaro communities

(Thomas 1991, Rogers 1985, Mclaughlin and Bowers 1982).

Specific fire effects on plant species and ecosystem resilience

have yet to be defined (Ahlstrand 1982).

Fire affects saguaro reproduction and survival. Generally,

only one seed in 1,000 may germinate; less than 1 percent of

these will survive more than 6 weeks (Holden and Farrell

1991). Fire may contribute to an increase in juvenile mortality.

Saguaro growth is slow, especially during the first few years.

In nature, approximate size/age relationships for saguaro are

1 cm in height after 5 years, 1 m after 30 yr, and 10 m after

100 years (Holden and Farrell 1991). Fire injury may also

lead to increased mortality of mature saguaro (Thomas 1991).

Nurse plants, such as the palo verde, are reported to be

necessary for saguaro reproduction and survival (Gibson

and Nobel 1986, McAuliffe 1984, Vandermeer 1980).

Ironically, nurse plants may contribute to higher saguaro

mortality from fire because of increased local fuel loading.

Fire Management

Rogers (1986) compared fire occurrence in desert and

nondesert vegetation on the Tonto National Forest from

1955 to 1983; desert fires were fewer, larger, and

unsuppressed, compared to the more numerous but smaller

nondesert fires. A recent update of the fire frequency and

acreage burned during the last recorded decade (1983 to

1992) showed similar trends (figs. 1 and 2). Ninety percent

Burning in Arizona’s Giant Cactus Community1

Marcia G. Narog2 Andrea L. Koonce3 Ruth C. Wilson4 Bonni M. Corcoran2

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
176 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Figure 1–Total acreage burned on the Tonto National Forest, Arizona

from 1973 to 1992.

Figure 2–Total number of fires recorded on the Tonto National Forest,

Arizona from 1973 to 1992.

of this desert vegetation class is composed of the saguaro

plant association. Cave and Patton (1984) evaluated wildfire

versus controlled burning in the Sonoran desert. They provide

evidence that fire alters species composition and dramatically

reduces cacti presence. They concluded “that any efforts to

use prescribed burning should remain experimental until a

long-term data base exists on which to make more reliable

predictions.” Apparently, hundreds of fire ignitions occur

and thousands of acres are burned in saguaro habitats.

Although this fire problem continues, this vegetation type

still has low priority for fire suppression resources, such as

equipment, personnel, and dollars.

Current Research

To justify greater expenditures of fire suppression

resources on the saguaro community, the Tonto National

Forest requested that the Prescribed Fire Research Unit of

the Pacific Southwest Research Station develop strategies

that would be effective for the Tonto’s fire management

program. In order to evaluate alternatives, some basic research

must first be conducted.

Our study area is located in the northeast section of the

saguaro’s range on the Mesa Ranger District, Tonto National

Forest. For our preliminary investigations, we have defined

four major objectives: examining fire effects on saguaro

community structure and composition, including different

plant strategies such as germination or resprouting after fire;

monitoring fire ignition and spread patterns during prescribed

burns; analyzing the impact of fire on saguaro survival,

vitality and abundance; and studying fire effects on saguaro

genome variability. We are currently designing study

parameters and will be implementing a 5-year study evaluating

prescription burning and areas previously burned by wildfire

in the saguaro community.

Summary

We believe that fire suppression strategies need to be

implemented to limit fire spread with minimal habitat

disturbance. Currently, we need more information on factors

that contribute to flammability and fire damage in this

ecosystem. After our objectives in this study are met,

management strategies and techniques need to be developed

for aggressive restoration of fire degraded areas.

References

Ahlstrand, Gary M. 1982. Response of Chihuahuan desert mountain shrub

vegetation to burning. Journal of Range Management 35(1): 62-65.

Cave, George H.; Patten, Duncan T. 1984. Short-term vegetation responses

to fire in the upper Sonoran Desert. Journal of Range Management

37(6): 491-496.

Gibson, Arthur C.; Nobel, Park S. 1986. The cactus primer. Cambridge,

MA: Harvard Univ. Press; 153-160.

Holden, Wesley; Farrell, Robert J., eds. 1991. All about saguaros: Arizona

highways book. Phoenix: Arizona Department of Transportation; 6 p.

McAuliffe, Joseph R. 1984. Sahuaro-nurse tree associations in the

Sonoran Desert: competitive effects of sahuaros. Oecologia 64:

319-321.

McLaughlin, Steven P.; Bowers, Janice E. 1982. Effects of wildfire on a

sonoran desert plant community. Ecology 63(1): 246-248.

Rogers, Garry F. 1985. Mortality of burned Cereus gigantus. Ecology

66(2): 630-632.

Rogers, Garry F. 1986. Comparison of fire occurrence in desert and

nondesert vegetation in Tonto National Forest, Arizona. Madrono

33(4): 278-283.

Thomas, P.A. 1991. Response of succulents to fire: a review. International

Journal of Wildland Fire 1(1):11-22.

Vandermeer, John. 1980. Saguaros and nurse trees: a new hypothesis to

account for population fluctuations. The Southwestern Naturalist

25(3): 357-360.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
177 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

A Computer Program for Evaluating Prescribed Fire Costs1

Philip N. Omi Douglas B. Rideout Stephen J. Botti2

Abstract: How much should prescribed fires cost? What are reasonable cost estimates for conducting a burn, in terms of site

preparation, ignition, and containment? How might a manager

ascertain if proposed costs are reasonable? Similar questions arise

for any prescribed fire program that involves a large geographic

area. A computer program was developed to answer such questions, based on regression analysis of historical records within

regions of the USDI National Park Service (NPS). Although restricted to the NPS, we discovered a cost structure for fuel treatments that should apply generally. Cost estimates were found to be

sensitive to management objectives, geographic region, project

size, complexity of burn, and potential for escape. The computer

program is written in PASCAL and designed to address the entire

range of environmental, ecological, and economic factors considered in the NPS prescribed fire data base. This information is

useful to land managers, but also should be of general interest for

comparing fire with other alternatives for managing fuels in wildland and urban interface areas.

The USDI National Park Service (NPS) Hazard FuelSystem was developed to aid prescribed fire management

within the agency, particularly with respect to budgeting and

tracking costs for reducing fuel combustibles on NPS lands.

Before the development of this system, the NPS (or any

agency) did not have a standardized procedure for assessing

the accuracy of cost requests from field units for proposed

prescribed fire projects.

This paper highlights one approach to assess the range

of reasonable cost requests; this method can be applied

regardless of public agency jurisdiction, geographic location

and management situation.

Objective

Our goal was to develop cost target zones (i.e., ranges of

reasonable costs) for fuel treatment projects, based on

important predictors of cost variability. The computer program

was designed to display these zones in an interactive format.

Methods

We obtained electronic data files maintained by the

NPS Branch of Fire Management for recent and future hazard

fuels projects submitted by park units. The Hazard Fuels

data set contains specific information on project size, fuel

model, project type, ranking score, administrative or legislative

mandate, complexity score, and descriptive remarks. Hazard

fuel projects are meant to lower the impacts of wildland

ignitions that might originate in wildland vegetation types

and pose a threat to public safety, structures, improvements,

or cultural and natural resources.

Based on historical funding requests from field units,

cost target zones were constructed for Hazard Fuel projects

(Omi and others 1994) using standard regression procedures.

The regression equation and 95 percent confidence interval

were used in a computer program (written in PASCAL) to

display the range of acceptable costs for Hazard Fuel projects.

The program queries the user about relevant inputs related to

the entire range of environmental, ecological, and economic

factors considered in the NPS data base. This information is

useful to land managers, but also should be of general interest

for comparing fire with other alternatives for managing fuels

in wildland and urban interface areas.

Results

Regression coefficients were derived from a step-wise

procedure in which all variables in the Hazard Fuels data set

were initially considered in terms of their contribution to

explaining variation in cost requests. The regression

coefficients explained 91 percent of the variation in (logtransformed) cost. All coefficients were significant (p <

0.01), as explained in Omi and others (1994).

A typical screen from the computer program (RXCOST)

was developed from our regression analysis (fig. 1) (Stone

and others 1992). Upon entering the program, a user is

queried about size of project (ac), the National Fire Danger

Rating System (NFDRS) fuel model, management type (fire,

mechanical, biological, or chemical treatment), natural

resource rank (1 to 9), and potential for escape (1 to 9). The

cost per acre target and range correspond, respectively, to

the regression prediction and upper (lower) 95 percent

confidence limits. The user may also request a wider or

narrower target zone than the 95 percent confidence interval

by specifying a range greater or less than one. Future cost

requests outside the range of acceptability are not necessarily

invalid; rather, such requests may indicate the need for

additional rationale.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Professors of Forest Science, Colorado State University. Ft. Collins, CO

80523; Fire Program Budget Manager, National Interagency Fire Center,

USDI National Park Service, Boise, ID.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
178 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Figure 1–Representative screen from program RXCOST showing average (target)

cost per acre of $74.45 for a 250-acre proposed prescribed burn (management type

F) in NFDRS fuel model C, with natural resource rank 8 (high) and moderate potential

for escape (7) in the Rocky Mountain region. The range specification of 1.00 uses the

95 percent confidence interval to set the upper and lower limit for the target. Proposed

projects which exceed $98.62/acre or fall short of $56.20 (i.e., outside upper and lower

limits) deserve additional scrutiny.

Acknowledgments

Submitted in fulfillment of project objectives for contract

CA 1268-1-1-9002, TO#9, Project BIFC-R91-0163, USDI

National Park Service. Additional support for this project

was provided by the McIntire-Stennis Cooperative Forestry

Research Program.

References

Omi, P. N.; Rideout, D. B.; Stone, J.S.; Botti, S. J. 1994. Controlling fuel

treatment costs in the National Park Service. In: Proceedings of the

12th conference on fire and forest meteorology; 1993 October 26-28,

Jekyll Island, Georgia; Bethesda, Maryland: Society of American Foresters.

Stone, J. S.; Omi, P. N.; Rideout, D. B. 1992. RXCOST ver 1.01. USDI

National Park Service, National Interagency Fire Center, Boise, ID.

Conclusions

The cost target zones identified by the computer program

RXCOST (Stone and others 1992) are those projects whose

cost requests are either excessive or under-financed, that is,

outside the range of historic acceptability. We believe the

estimates from the computer program are applicable to a

wide range of situations, including different geographic

regions, fuel conditions, or other project descriptors.These

cost ranges from the program should be considered as

providing guidance for improved decision-making, but not

as the sole criterion for assessing treatment cost. A cost

request that falls outside the range of acceptability (based on

the computer program) should not be rejected without further

investigation. The resulting analysis might reveal that

projected costs are justifiable because of extenuating

circumstances associated with a proposed project, for example.

Thus, the zones should be applied with the usual discretion

and good judgment associated with crucial decisions.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
179 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Potential Nitrogen Losses due to Fire from Pinus halepensis

Stands in the Alicante Province (Southeastern Spain):

Mineralomass Variability1

Antonio Pastor-Lopez Joaquin Martin-Martin 2

Study Area and Methods

The study was conducted in Aleppo pine stands located

in Alicante province. Alicante is located in the western coastal

Mediterranean Basin in southeastern Spain (37o 50' to 38o 55'

N and 1o 05' to 0o 10' E). The sites were selected out of a

general survey for the province during 1985. A total of 120

stands were sampled in a range of age, climate, and site

quality conditions. The age of the stands considered is

representative of that of the plantations started during the

national afforestation program for soil conservation purposes

between 1945 and 1985. The silvicultural treatments that the

stands have undergone include pruning of the lowest branch

whorl 5 years after planting and a later pruning of 1 or 2

whorls in the following 10 years. The existing variability of

the Aleppo pine stands in the Allicante province is

representative of that in the Mediterranean Basin as to the

range in climate between subhumid and semiarid Mediterranean

conditions (Nahal 1981). From the 120 stands considered, 4

master stands were selected, along a site quality range, to

elaborate equations describing destructive biomass sampling,

as well as detailed nutrient contents analysis. Ten trees were

cut down to obtain biomass equations in each one of the four

stands selected. The stands were representative of the range

of site qualities that can be commonly expected in the Alicante

province (Pastor-Lopez 1992).

To determine the nitrogen pool that could be lost in a

fire event, the biomass for four fractions was considered:

leaves, shoots (stems holding leaves, always smaller than 1

centimeter in diameter), fine branches (stems not holding

leaves and larger than 1 centimeter in diameter) and the rest

of the aboveground structures. The first three constituted

fraction I and the last fraction II. The reason for defining 1

centimeter in diameter as the limit is based on the statement

by Wells and others (1979) that the plant stems remaining

after a moderately intense burn or a severe fire are greater

than 0.6 or 1.3 centimeters in diameter. All determinations

of nitrogen contents were done by the Kjeldahl procedure.

To better define the limits of nitrogen available on a

more extensive sample, 32 stands more than 25 years old

were selected out of the above-mentioned sample of 120.

Each fraction biomass for these 32 stands was determined by

applying the equations from the master stands to the sample

plot measurements obtained for every stand. Each stand was

assigned a set of the four groups of biomass equations. The

Abstract: Potential nitrogen volatilization during fire was calculated for Pinus halepensis plantations. The stands located in the

Alicante province (southeastern Spain) represent a range of site

qualities and are more than 25 years old. Biomass and nitrogen

content for fractions smaller than 1 centimeter in diameter and for

the total were determined. A 70 percent volatilization of the nitrogen in the biomass represents a loss of 8.2 to 116.5 kilograms per

hectare for stands with total aboveground biomass of 5.06 and

151.12 tons per hectare. The percentage of nitrogen lost from the

total biomass is larger in sites of lower site quality.

The effects of fire regimes on the sustainablility ofecosystems constitute one of the main aspects to consider.

Nitrogen is a fundamental element for soil productivity even

in drought-prone ecosystems where water has a dominant

role. Nitrogen outputs through volatilization during fire events

is very significant. During this century large extensions in

the Mediterranean Basin were planted with different conifers

after fire or other perturbation events. In Spain, Aleppo pine

(Pinus halepensis) was used in most of these plantations.

The modification of the fire regime, with an increase in fire

events, caused by the nature of these monocultures and

human actions, has completely modified the temporal scale

and potentiality of recovery in many areas. These factors are

fundamental in the sustainability of the long-term productivity

of these systems. This paper characterizes the nitrogen pool

available in the biomass in stands more than 25 years old

along a range of site qualities. It estimates the potential

nitrogen lost by applying the trends of volatization shown in

the literature. This paper is directed toward defining the

magnitude of nitrogen lost in these stands as an indication of

the amount that would need to be restored in order to avoid

a reduction in its total pool and therefore productivity of

these ecosystems.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Professors, T.E.U. (Titular de Escuela Universitaria) and T.U. (Titular

de Universidad), respectively, Departamento de Ecología, Universidad de

Alicante, Alicante, Spain. Ap. 99, Alicante-03080 (Spain).

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
180 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

matching criterion was similarity in site index with one of

the four master stands. Nitrogen content of leaf and shoot

fractions was determined, using the Kjeldahl procedure, from

a sample of 1-year-old leaves and shoots for each of the 32

stands. The nitrogen contents fine branch and fraction II

were assigned by averaging from the master stands the different

replicates analyzed by fraction (Pastor-Lopez 1992). Each

stand was assigned the same master stand as for the biomass

equations. Out of the 32 stands considered, those representing

the limits of nitrogen accumulation on an age and site index

spectrum are included in the following section.

Results and Discussion

The four stations where destructive biomass sampling

was completed were also studied for nitrogen mineralomass

as well as other nutrients (Pastor-Lopez 1992). The results

obtained illustrate how nitrogen accumulated in different

structures. Table 1 gathers the information on the dendrometric

and stand structure characteristics of these four master stands.

Nitrogen mineralomass and the percentage of it in the

different structures included in the fraction smaller than 1

centimeter in diameter are included in table 2.

From the 32 stands considered for the more extensive

and representative sample, 7 stands were selected as

representative of the limits of variability for age and site

index. Table 3 includes the dendrometric characteristics of

these stands.

Nitrogen contents for these stands and the potential

maximum mineralomass available for fraction I and others

are included in table 4. The percentage of the total aboveground nitrogen mineralomass, represented by the amount of

nitrogen accumulated in fraction I, represents the potential

maximum amount to be lost in a fire event. Nevertheless,

there are different factors that influence this loss.

Woodmansee and Wallach (1981) indicated that two of

the factors that determine the amounts of elements lost during

a fire include the biomass and the elemental composition of

the vegetation. This information has been shown already and

would reflect a maximum to be lost; nevertheless, intensity

and duration of the fire play a very important role in determining

the limit. White and others (1973) determined that complete

volatilization occurs at temperatures above 500 degrees Celsius

and almost none below 200 degrees. Rundel (1981) pointed

out with several examples the importance of the temperature

of the fire in relation to the amount of nitrogen volatilization

expected. The range given by him varies between 58 and 85

percent under laboratory conditions. Lobert and others (1990)

give a value of 90 percent.

 Bernard and Nimour (1993) determined, for Pinus

halepensis in laboratory conditions, ignition temperatures

between 235 and 330 degrees Celsius. They indicated that

lignin, lipids, some or all the holocellulose and the ashes

were the residues from combustion at these temperatures.

On the other hand, they pointed out that volatization of the

substances depended on the water content and chemical

Table 1—Dendrometric characteristics of the four master stands

Stand codes

Characteristics1 8601 6502 3702 1701

Age (years) 28 36 27 32

Density (trees/ha) 1550 1600 1682 1350

Site index (height 4.8 3.2 1.4 1.5

 in meters at 20 years)

Basal area (m2/ha)1 34.86 23.61 3.45 9.77

1Measured at 0.5 m.

Table 3—Dendrometric characteristics of sample stands.

Stand Age Density Site index1 Total Aboveground

Biomass

yr trees/ha m tons/ha

191 25 2600 1.8 13.306

43 28 2700 0.6 5.060

211 39 2350 0.5 5.613

141 42 1289 2.7 38.554

551 42 1079 4.7 92.403

901 35 969 5.8 116.562

811 32 2720 5.4 151.120

1Site index (height in meters at 20 years).

Table 2—Nitrogen mineralomass and relative percentage by fractions

Stands 8601 6502 3702 1701

Nitrogen mineralomass (kg/ha)

Fraction I 161.4 61.4 14.9 30.0

Total 311.4 96.5 19.7 40.6

Percentage of total nitrogen

mineralomass by fraction

Leaves 28.83 38.71 45.23 47.92

Shoot1 8.26 5.44 6.30 7.87

Fine Branches2 14.74 19.49 23.95 17.99

Fraction II3 48.17 36.36 24.52 26.22

1“Shoot” refers to those holding leaves.

2“Fine branches” refers to stems with diameter smaller than one centimeter.

3Fraction II includes rest of the above-ground structures of the tree.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
181 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

composition of the structures burned, for which the

phenological state had important consequences. No

measurements had been done, in natural conditions, of the

temperature reached during ignition for these stands, nor for

Aleppo pine. The dense crown characteristic of the species

and the low height (2 to 8 meters) due to limitations in soil

productivity ensure that most fires in these stands will behave

like crown fires. For the interval of 300 to 400 degrees

Celsius the percentage of nitrogen volatilized represents 50

to 75 percent of the total amount in the biomass, according

to White and others (1973). Rundel (1981) indicated losses

of 70 percent for Pinus.

 If we consider 70 percent as a compromise between the

high levels obtained in the laboratory and the lower ones

observed in natural conditions, the range of nitrogen lost for

Aleppo pine in the plantations studied would be between

8.18 and 116.47 kilograms per hectare for stands with

respective total aboveground biomass of 5.060 and 151.120

tons per hectare. Although not validated, this paper gives the

first estimates on the potential losses of nitrogen in a broad

range of site qualities. The frequent use of the species around

the Mediterranean Sea and the new European economic

community policy for afforestation of abandoned agricultural

lands will increase the extension of these stands. The high

incidence of fire along these areas, caused by arson or

accidents, could be considered the most important source of

atmospheric emissions in these areas. On the other hand, as

Debano and others (1979) indicated, the total amount of

nitrogen on an area basis is always reduced after a fire, in

relation to the prefire status. The need to determine the

agents that restore the original nitrogen levels and their rate

is fundamental for maintaining the productivity of these

sites. Ulex parviflorus is a typical leguminous evergreen

species that responds with a prominent increase in cover

after fire events. Its nitrogen-fixing capacity should be

determined in order to define the magnitude and timing of its

input. The magnitude and timing in the input of nitrogen fix

that is mentioned in the previous sentence must define which

are the potential management procedures to deal with Ulex

parviflorus. The extended belief is that this Ulex, because of

its high flammability and large accumulation of dead material,

must be eliminated. This action could represent a depletion

of the greatest input of nitrogen to the system during the

growth periods following the fire.

The percentage of nitrogen lost from the total in the

biomass is clearly larger in the sites with a lower site quality.

These sites should show more efficient mechanisms to restore

nitrogen or they will be much more susceptible to degradation

by future fire events. In other words, under a similar fire

perturbation regime, low-site-quality stands will be more

susceptible to losses in long-term site productivity than other

stands with higher site quality.

Table 4—Nitrogen contents, mineralomass and percentage of nitrogen from aboveground total for

plantations representing the limits of age and site index.

Nitrogen content Nitrogen mineralomass

Stand Shoots Leaves Shoots Leaves Fraction I Fraction II Total N in

Fraction I

---------- pct ---------- ------------------------- kg/ha ------------------------- pct

191 0.410 1.020 1.79 19.76 29.28 17.55 62.5

43 0.265 0.615 0.50 6.27 11.68 3.63 76.3

211 0.330 1.990 0.69 21.64 27.58 4.17 86.9

141 0.587 0.868 6.27 44.24 72.63 34.61 67.7

551 0.746 1.113 14.87 86.16 110.64 157.45 41.3

901 0.742 1.456 17.82 135.04 164.36 200.15 45.1

811 0.628 1.095 21.77 130.06 166.39 259.28 39.1

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
182 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Nahal, I. 1981. The Mediterranean climate from a biological viewpoint.

In: Di Castri, F.; Goodall, D.W.; Specht, R.L., eds. Mediterraneantype shrublands. Ecosystems of the world. Volume 11. Amsterdam:

Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company; 63-86.

Pastor-López, A. 1992. Biomasa, Producción primaria y Flujo de Materia

orgánica en Repoblaciones Forestales de la provincia de Alicante.

Aplicaciones a la Géstion Forestal. PhD Thesis. University of Alicante,

Alicante, Spain; 309 p.

Rundel, P.W. 1981. Fire as an ecological factor. In: Lange, O.L.; Nobel,

P.S; Osmond, C.B.; Ziegler, H., eds., Physiological plant ecology I.

Responses to the physical environment. Encyclopedia of plant physiology.

New Series Vol.12A. Berlin, Germany: Springer Verlag; 501-538.

Wells, C.G.; Campbell, R.E.; DeBano, L.F.; Lewis, C.E.; Fredricksen, R.L.;

Carlyle Franklin, E.; Froelich, R.C.; Dunn, P.H. 1979. Effects of fire on

soil. A state-of-knowledge review. General Technical Report WO7.Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service; 34

p.

White, E.M.; Thompson, W.W.; Gartner F.R. 1973. Heat effects on nutrient

release from soils under ponderosa pine. Journal of Range Management

26: 22-24.

Woodmansee, R. G.; Wallach, L. S. 1981. Effects of fire regimes on

biogeochemical cycles. In: Clark, F.E.; Rosswall, T., eds. Terrestrial

nitrogen cycles. Ecological Bulletin (Stockholm) 33: 649-669.

Acknowledgments

 Funding for this research was provided by the Ministerio

de Educacion y Ciencia, Conselleria de Agricultura y Pesca

de la Comunidad Valenciana y Diputacion Provincial de

Alicante. The Unidad Forestal de Alicante and his Agentes

Forestales have played a fundamental role in site location

and field sampling. We thank D. Juan Giner for his continued

support. In particular, we thank Nicolas Gimenez, Silvia

Ivars, M.C. Martinez, Manuel Valera for their contributions,

and Edelmiro Zafra for his assistance in the chemical analysis.

References

Bernard, M.; Nimour, N. 1993. Inflammabilité des végéteaux

mediterranéens et feux de fôrets. (1ère partie): Rôle de l’eau sur

l’exothermicité de leur reaction. Science Technique Technologie 26.

Debano, L.F.; Rice, R.M.; Conrad, E. 1979. Soil heating in chaparral

fires: effects on soil properties, plant nutrients, erosion, and runoff.

Research Paper PSW-RP-145. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Forest

and Experiment Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture;

21 p.

Lobert, J.M.; Scharffe, W.M.; Hao, W.M.; Crutzen, P.J. 1990. Importance

of biomass burning in the atmospheric budgets of nitrogencontaining gases. Nature 346 (6284): 552-554.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
183 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Susceptibility to Potential Erosion after Fire in Mediterranean

Ecosystems in the Alicante Province (Southeastern Spain)1

Antonio Pastor-Lopez Joaquin Martin-Martin2

percent of the naturally vegetated area. Sixty-eight

municipalities were affected at least once (48.6 percent). For

these municipalities, the area burned added up to 28.8 percent

and 55.8 percent of their total and natural vegetation areas,

respectively. Although information was not available on

areas that suffered recurrent fires, it was evident that fire

was an important perturbation in these ecosystems.

We studied fires 100 hectares or greater in area. Date of

occurrence, area of extent, and location were used to

characterize the fire regime. To define the precipitation regime,

15 climatological stations available from the area were used.

The burned areas were assigned the climatological data from

the closest station for the first year after fires, which is when

the highest susceptibility to erosion occurs (Debano and

others 1979), and we then evaluated four variables. First,

total precipitation was examined for 1 year after the fire. In

Mediterranean-type ecosystems in southern California,

erosion during the first year can be as much as 35 times

greater than normal (Wells 1982). Next we examined

precipitation that had been measured between the fire and

the beginning of the next growing season, which, unlike

southern California, begins in March for most higher plants

because of the cooler winters in the Alicante province. This

information was used to evaluate both the possibility of high

precipitation when the vegetation cover was minimal as well

as the potential availability of water for plant regrowth and

thus soil protection. We also evaluated precipitation during

the first October after fire. Sanchez (1989) conducted a 5-

year study in Alicante and found that 57 percent of the

erosion events and 54 percent of the sediment accumulation

occurred in October. And lastly, precipitation during the

September-October-November period after the fire was

examined because this season tends to have the greatest

amount of precipitation, according to more than 30 years of

observations collected by the network from the Centro

Meteorologico de Levante.

 Results and Discussion

During the 20-year period, two main peaks of the area

burned (over 8,000 hectares per year), which were separated

by 12 years with values below 4,000 hectares per year. The

two maxima occurred in 1978 and 1990. On a monthly basis,

42.5 percent of the area burned in August, followed by 25.3,

15.1 and 10 percent in July, September and October

respectively. The number of fires was 10 percent greater in

September than in July, indicating larger fires in the latter.

Fires did not occur in January and March, and no more than

Abstract: Postfire precipitation regimes are important to the dynamics of the physical and biological processes occurring after

fire. From 1972 through 1991, 143 fire events of at least 100

hectares occurred in Alicante province, Spain; 42.5 percent of the

area burned in August. The trends for total, pregrowth season,

October, and September through November precipitation for 1

year after each fire are shown. Half of the burned areas received

more than 349 (and up to 880) millimeters of rainfall before the

growing season and between 44 and 325 millimeters during the

first October after fire. Erosion events before the beginning of the

growing season and spatial relocation of ash layer materials on a

watershed basis are major factors expected to contribute to postfire erosion.

Fire has been an active agent in the evolution and shapingof the structure of vegetation in the Mediterranean Basin.

Nevertheless, the increase in fire frequency by arson or

management actions has modified disturbance regimes to a

level that might exceed the resilience of the system.

Despite the difficulty of quantitatively linking

precipitation and erosion, the frequency of erosion events

has been clearly related to specific macroclimatic conditions.

In the Alicante province in southeastern Spain, the highest

erosion frequency has been observed in October. Fire may

affect soil fertility via the export of large quantities of nutrients

through debris flows and run-off. Identifying the rainfall

regimes experienced by burned areas after a fire can help

define the framework in which these ecosystems develop.

This paper addresses the problem of susceptibility to erosion

in postfire conditions.

Study Area and Methods

The province of Alicante is located in the western coastal

Mediterranean Basin on the southeastern Iberian Peninsula

(37o 50' to 38o 55' N and 1o 05’W to 0o 10' E), with 581,901

hectares and 140 municipalities. The province has an important

wildfire problem. In 20 years (1972-1991), 62,074 hectares

burned in 143 fires of at least 100 hectares each. This area

represents 10.7 percent of the whole province and 26.7

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Professors, T.E.U. (Titular de Escuela Universitaria) and T.U. (Titular

de Universidad), respectively, Departamento de Ecología, Universidad de

Alicante, Alicante, Spain. Ap. 99, Alicante-03080 (Spain).

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
184 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

2.1 percent of the area burned in any other month. The

median fire size was 225 hectares. Seventy-eight percent of

the fires were smaller than 500 hectares and 8.4 percent were

greater than 1,000 hectares. The largest fire was 6,800 hectares.

Total precipitation during the first year postfire ranged

between 126 and 1,210 millimeters. Half of the fire areas

received less than 523 millimeters and 25 percent received

more than 775 millimeters. Most of the values in the lower

quartile fell between 200 and 390 millimeters. This pattern

is typical of the subhumid mediterranean climate of the area.

The amount of rain falling between the fire and the start of

the growing season (March) ranged between 6.4 and 880

millimeters with 75 percent of the fires receiving less than

478 millimeters. The upper limit of the lower quartile was

188 millimeters and 50 percent of the sites received more

than 349 millimeters. The first October after a fire had

precipitation totals between 0 and 325 millimeters, although

50 percent of the stands received less than 44 millimeters.

Only 8 percent of the cases received no precipitation at all

during this month, while just 5 percent received more than

200 millimeters. Fire events followed by zero precipitation

did not occur during the September-October-November

period, and just 5.6 percent received less than 50 millimeters.

Although rainfall ranged between 9.6 and 761 millimeters,

75 percent of the cases had less than 210 millimeters and just

1.3 percent had more than 400 millimeters.

The amount of precipitation that fell before any vegetation

covered the soils could be as high as the mean annual

precipitation in the semiarid areas of the province. The rates

of erosion during the pregrowth periods should be studied; if

significant erosion occurs before plant growth begins,

revegetation efforts would be ineffective because of

phenological constraints. Some type of physical intervention

would be the only way to reduce erosion. That 25 percent of

the stands received more than 134 millimeters of rain in

October should not be considered proof of high susceptibility

to erosion—we found no evidence in the literature connecting

higher precipitation with higher erosion. The erosion events

recorded by Sanchez (1989) indicated that neither total

precipitation nor maximum intensity explained the amount

of sediment produced. A rainfall of 25 millimeters with a

maximum intensity of 68 millimeters per hour produced

352.4 grams per square meter of sediment, while another

event with a total of 45.4 millimeters and an intensity of 130

millimeters per hour produced 63.1 grams per square meter.

This first postfire rainfall will determine the state and

distribution of the ash layer. The importance of this layer

due to the accumulation of nutrients is important for the

microbial and plant postfire communities. The total nutrient

status of the ecosystem could be largely modified depending

on what happened with this layer. Movement of the ash

layer by rainfall events should be studied to determine whether

nutrients are actually lost from the system or simply relocated.

The problem indicated by Debano and Dunn (1982)—that

erosional losses of nutrients from on-site movement may

differ considerably from those for the entire watershed—

must be considered given the high amount of nutrients

contained in the ash layer.

 Acknowledgments

We thank Angel Mediavilla from the Unidad Forestal

de Alicante; Carmen Elvira, Mavi Flor, Macu Gonzaga,

Jesus Lara and Pepa Ibanez for data entry; the staff of the

Centro Meteorologico de Levante, Valencia for help with

the climatological data and Jan Beyers and Susan Conard

for their comments and English revision that further improved

the original version.

References

Debano, L. F., Dunn, P.H. 1982. Soil and nutrient cycling in

Mediterranean-type ecosystems: a summary and synthesis. In:

Conrad, E.; Oechel, W. Symposium on dynamics and management of

Mediterranean-type ecosystems; 1981 June 22-26; San Diego, CA.

Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-58. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Research

Station, Forest Service,U.S. Department of Agriculture; 358-364.

Debano, L.F.; Rice, R.M.; Conrad, E. 1979. Soil heating in chaparral

fires: effects on soil properties, plant nutrients, erosion, and runoff.

Research Paper PSW-RP-145. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Research

Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 21 p.

Sanchez, J.R. 1989. Estimacion de perdidas erosivas producidas por

las tecnicas de reforestacion en la Comunidad Valenciana. Dep.

C.A.R.N. (Ciencias Ambientales y Recursos Naturales), Univ. Alicante.

Informe Conselleria de Agricultura,G.V.(Generlitat Valenciana).

Wells, W.G. 1982. Hydrology of Mediterranean-type ecosystems: a

summary and synthesis. In: Conrad, E.; Oechel, W. Symposium on

dynamics and management of Mediterranean-type ecosystems; 1981

June 22-26; San Diego, CA. Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-58. Berkeley, CA:

Pacific Southwest Research Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department

of Agriculture; 358-364.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
185 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Operational Fire/GIS Dilemmas—The Fire Report

Form Example1

Lucy Anne Salazar2 Martha Shea Flattley3

Operational applications of geographic information system(GIS) technology for fire management sometimes

develop into dilemmas regarding data acquisition,

compatibility, and accuracy. One major component of a

Fire/GIS database is recorded fire history, such as the

information contained in USDA Forest Service records

collected since 1910. These fire report forms were revised

approximately every decade and included different formats,

entry items, naming conventions, and level of detail for

maps (if maps were even included). To accommodate GIS

needs, the challenge is to find, decipher, compare, and coalesce

these fire data into a database that will be useful for

incorporating into ecosystem management.

The Six Rivers National Forest was formed from the

Shasta-Trinity, Klamath, and Siskiyou National Forests in

1947. After extensive searching, limited fire records have

been found for the pre-1947 period. Fire summaries recorded

general information such as origin date, fire size class,

township, range and section, vegetation type, and general

cause. Original fire report forms were found for portions of

the Forest, and gaps in the data are obvious. For one Ranger

District, fire history is recorded for over 80 years, in 12

different fire report forms. Fire atlases also exist for some

Ranger Districts since 1936 and for others since 1910.

Differences in format and naming conventions exist among

the eight decades of fire reporting. These differences need to

be resolved so that the data, and issues such as ground

truthing and ancillary information (e.g., weather records and

narratives), can be incorporated into a GIS format.

Data Consistency

Forest management and activities have changed

dramatically over the years; these changes are often also

reflected in the fire report form entries. Representations of

vegetation ignited or burned through by fires is one example

of an entry item that has gone through several revisions.

Entries for “character of cover” in the 1910’s were very

general, including rocks, brush, timber (needles), reproduction,

and oak leaves. Descriptions in the early 1920’s became

more specific, splitting up cover types into timber, brush,

ground cover under timber, and ground cover under brush.

Later in the 1920’s and throughout the 1930’s the emphasis

changed to entries of general categories, such as timber,

brush, leaves, and needles. The 1940’s through the 1970’s

focused on entries by species. The codes for the 1980’s

returned to more general cover descriptions (e.g., over-mature

timber, long needle plantations) and included age groupings

for slash categories.

The National Interagency Fire Management Integrated

Database (NIFMID) is currently being developed as a

corporate fire database. This GIS compatible database will

allow fire data to be shared, analyzed, and integrated into

ecosystem analysis and management. NIFMID includes Forest

Service fire report form entries back to 1970. Pre-1970 fire

report form entries also need to be brought into NIFMID to

include in the analysis. NIFMID currently has 667 possible

entries for the principal vegetation cover at or near the point

of origin of a fire. This list should accommodate the vast

majority of historic entries, but descriptions such as needles

or leaves will have to be included as valid data.

Ground Truthing

During the early 1900’s fire managers took great care in

filling out fire report forms. This was reflected in the detail

of their fire maps and the extent of their narratives. This

detail has dramatically decreased so that, currently, a map is

not even required for the fire report forms. In a GIS mode

this can create problems, especially when the only locational

data now recorded is the latitude and longitude of the fire’s

origin. Maps are part of the documentation for large fires,

but they are often stored in boxes in warehouses that never

become part of a map database. Perimeters have become of

little consequence for fire reporting, while for ecosystem

analysis they are of utmost importance.

Ground truthing of fires can help determine the conditions

under which certain areas did or did not burn. This is important

information for large area natural fuel treatments and

prescribed natural fires. Technologies such as global

positioning systems (GPS) allow for fire perimeters to be

easily mapped, including islands and different intensities

within the perimeter. Aerial photos can also sometimes be

used as a substitute for ground truthing, but timing and

quality of the aerial photos can have an effect on their usefulness.

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Forester, Six Rivers National Forest, USDA Forest Service, Eureka, CA

95501. 3Forestry Technician, Six Rivers National Forest, USDA Forest Service,

Eureka, CA 95501.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
186 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Ancillary Data

Early fire report forms are filled with interesting anecdotes

and narratives. For example, some provide descriptions of

forest guards who would leave for fires with four men and

travel 28 miles by horseback to battle a 500-acre fire. These

early fires might appear to have become large because of a

lack of sufficient resources. Monthly precipitation records

exist for many weather stations in California back to 1880.

By combining these data with fire occurrence records, we

see that often times the large fall fires occurred after periods

with below-normal summer rains or above-normal spring

rains. Currently, these same weather patterns combined with

unnaturally high fuel loadings and the urban wildland intermix

could result in catastrophic fire events. Knowledge of Native

American historical uses of the forest can also provide an

important component in determining how the ecosystem

evolved into its current state. Thus, fire report forms contain

a wealth of knowledge to assist us in our objectives of

determining and managing fire’s natural role in the ecosystem.

Recommendations

To analyze fire’s natural role in the ecosystem, fire

records and maps must be found and preserved as a vital part

of the history of each National Forest, community, and local

ecosystem. We also need to resolve differences in fire report

form entries, and develop a method to incorporate fire

occurrence data into the analysis. And fire managers must

encourage detailed narratives and mapping of fires, including

the use of global positioning systems (GPS) technologies.

These data can be incorporated in a GIS for analysis of fire’s

natural role in the environment.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
187 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

On the morning of October 20, 1991, a fire originated inthe Oakland/Berkeley Hills from rekindling materials

of a 2-hectare brushfire that had occurred the previous day.

The ensuing “Tunnel Fire” resulted in the greatest modernera loss of life and property on record for North American

urban-interface fires: 25 people died, 2,475 dwelling units

were completely destroyed, an additional 302 units were

badly damaged. Losses have been estimated in excess of 1.7

billion dollars.

This paper describes the spatial dynamics of the “Tunnel

Fire” and provides insights into the interaction of

environmental factors contributing to the catastrophic behavior

of the fire.

Methods

All available direct physical evidence (e.g., photography,

video, communication transcripts) were systematically

reviewed to ascertain the position of the fire and apparent

mechanisms of spread. These data were then corroborated

by interviews with witnesses and public service personnel,

as well as reviews of agency incident reports documenting

the fire. Particular attention was placed on cross-referencing

known timed events (e.g., phone calls, transformer explosions)

with the position of the fire. From these data, points of

maximal extent were spatially defined, and lines of common

time were estimated by interpolating between known points,

using general knowledge of factors affecting fire behavior.

These “isochrons,” or time lines of spread, reflect both

spreading wave front advance and spot fire spread resulting

from burning brand deposition. Particularly during the initial

“blow-up” period, much of the fire’s growth was attributable

to spot ignitions, indicating significant unburned areas within

a given time-step.

The positions of the fire’s maximal extent at a given

time and known locations of spot fires were then digitized

into a geographic information system (GIS) over base layers

reflecting the fire zone’s topography and infrastructure (roads,

parcel ownership, etc.). These spatial features were then

used to help spatially define the fire’s spread. This effort

resulted in two maps of the fire: a map documenting the

early spread period covering the first hour after escape (10-

minute isochrons), and a complete spread map showing the

entire spread period (1-hour isochrons).

Results and Discussion

The topography of the origin area can be described as

very steep (30 to 70 percent slope), with a mixture of fuels of

both wildland and domesticated vegetation types. Understory

vegetation resulted in a well developed surface fuel layer,

with added fuel continuity in both horizontal and vertical

dimensions coming from an abundance of intermediate and

mature Monterey pine (Pinus radiata). Significant areas of

blue gum Eucalyptus (Eucalyptus globulus) were in the fire

area, although not within the immediate (200 m) area of the

fire origin. Interspersed throughout the fire area on all sides

except the east were residential structures, contributing

significantly to the total fuel load. We have estimated that

the forested/residential areas where the fire started had in

excess of 100 mg/ha of available vegetation fuels, with at

least an equal mass of structural fuels in discrete, isolated

areas (Sapsis and Martin 1994). Finally, the weather patterns

on the morning of the fire showed classic extreme high

hazard conditions associated with easterly “Diablo” winds.

This meso-scale induced weather pattern resulted in high

temperatures (>80o F), very low relative humidity (<15

percent), and strong, gusty winds, with average sustained

ridgetop winds of 20 mph, and gusts likely at 30 to 40 mph.

Also, a relatively strong inversion layer at 600 m is thought

to have contributed both to accelerated downslope winds

and complex local wind patterns (Pagni 1993). Thus, all

three sets of fire environment variables (fuels, weather,

topography) could be characterized as being in extreme

conditions.

After numerous hot spots became evident during the

morning of October 20, active flaming fire escaped from the

original burn perimeter at 10:58 a.m., with escape fronts

occurring from both the lower south and middle west areas

of the fire perimeter. The east flank fire expanded both south

and east into a mixture of north coastal scrub and intermediate

pine, causing the latter to partially crown and drive shortscale spotting to the southwest. The east flank expanded

toward Grizzly Peak Boulevard fairly rapidly, indicating

complex surface wind patterns, with significant eddying

generating upslope (westerly) surface winds that drove surface

fire spread, and overstory ambient winds determining direction

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Graduate Assistants and Professor Emeritus, Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.

Progression of the Oakland/Berkeley Hills “Tunnel Fire”1

David B. Sapsis2 Donald V. Pearman2 Robert E. Martin2

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
188 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

by clusters of homes, then returning some hours later. By

about 10 p.m., the final perimeter was determined, covering

about 520 ha.

Conclusions

The Tunnel Fire showed extreme fire behavior due to

complex interactions amongst fuels, topography, and weather,

with early expansion or “blow-up” driven by a diffuse set of

mass fires resulting from abundant deposition of burning

brands into unburned areas. Later spread in more dense

residential areas was slower and more discontinuous because

of differences in fuel structure, suppression efforts, reduced

weather severity, and more moderate topography. Further

research is required to investigate specific relationships

between fuel, terrain, and weather on extreme fire behavior.

Specifically, the intermix of wildland and structural fuels

across complex landscapes subjected to periods of extreme

fire weather presents a challenge for fuel/fire behavior

modeling. In particular, investigations of crown fires, and

associated spotting and rapid fire expansion, should not be

restricted to purely wildland settings (Anderson 1968,

Rothermel 1991).

Acknowledgments

We thank all the many individuals and agencies who

contributed time and data to this study. Partial funding for

this work was provided by the National Science Foundation

mini-grant program for mitigation of natural and human

hazards.

References

Anderson, H.E. 1968. Sundance fire: an analysis of fire phenomena.

Gen. Tech. Rep. INT-122. Ogden, UT: Intermountain Forest and

Range Experiment Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of

Agriculture; 39 p.

Pagni, P.J. 1993. Causes of the 20 October 1991 Oakland hills

conflagration. Fire Safety Journal 21:331-339.

Rothermel, R.C. 1991. Predicting behavior and size of crown fires in

the Northern Rocky Mountains. Res. Paper. INT-RP-438. Ogden,

UT: Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station, Forest Service,

U.S. Department of Agriculture; 46 p.

Sapsis, D.B.; Martin, R.E. [In press]. Fire, the landscape, and diversity: a

theoretical framework for managing wildlands. In: Proceedings of

the 12th conference on fire and forest meteorology; 1993 October 26-28;

Jekyll Island, GA. Bethesda, Maryland: Society of American Foresters.

of spotting materials. The west flank escape appears to have

moved slower and to the west before getting into a ravine

and working upslope toward Marlborough Drive at

approximately 11:25 a.m. By this time, the fire had closed in

around itself on the south flank and had spotted across

Buckingham Drive into the area between Buckingham and

Tunnel Road. Thus, at about 30 minutes after escape, the fire

had moved significantly to the east, crossing over Grizzly

Peak Boulevard; however, it was relatively contained on its

westerly front, with isolated short-scale spotting and winddriven frontal advance causing the ignition of a few houses

along Buckingham.

During the ensuing 30 minutes (11:30 to 12:00) , the fire

was to show an extreme “blow-up” phase, with long-range

spotting coming initially from crowning trees, and later from

structural fuels as houses became fully involved. During the

11:30 to 11:40 period, pines crowning on the east flank

contributed to rapid spot development on the southwest area

near Highway 24, while pine and eucalyptus crowning dictated

the ridge spotting that eventually resulted in fire crossing

Hwy 24 near the Lake Temescal parking lot, and the rapid

ignition of the Hiller Highlands subdivision. We estimate

that, by 12:00, in excess of 700 homes were burning, and the

fire was spreading as three discrete fronts: flanking to the

south toward Horse Ridge, backing to the north into upper

Vicente Canyon, and moving directly with the overstory

winds into the Rockridge area behind Lake Temescal.

During the next 2 hours, the fire continued to grow

rapidly in size, both in wildland-dominated areas on the

eastern and northern flanks, as well as in residential areas

toward the west and south. Particularly in the dense residential

areas, with relatively poor surface fuel continuity, individual

homes ignited because of spot deposition, and then fire

would spread to adjacent homes because of radiation and

direct flame contact. In many instances, spot fires formed

well downslope of an unburned area, then grew upslope

during periods of favorable winds. The complexity of the

wind pattern cannot be underestimated; strong evidence

indicated surface winds varied in all directions, because of

fire-induced winds, as more and more areas became involved

and energy release rates increased (Pagni 1993).

By 2:00 p.m. most of the pure wildland areas had been

consumed, and fire spread slowed considerably, owing to

the discontinuous and coarse nature of the residential fuel

complexes, and somewhat flatter terrain. By 5:00 p.m. the

northern perimeter of the fire was determined, but spread

continued in residential areas on the southern flanks, despite

reduced winds. The Upper Broadway Terrace area showed a

remarkably discontinuous spread pattern, with fire advancing

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
189 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Comparison of Fuel Load, Structural Characteristics and

Infrastructure Before and After the Oakland Hills “Tunnel Fire”1

Scott L. Stephens Domingo M. Molina Ron Carter Robert E. Martin2

 Abstract: Structures rebuilt after the Oakland Hills “Tunnel Fire”

in 1991 are different in many aspects when compared to their

predecessors. Data obtained from the city of Oakland indicate

homes have been rebuilt 28 percent larger (square feet). About 50

percent of the homes destroyed have been rebuilt, and building

permits have been issued for an additional 16 percent. New construction mandates facilitated by local and State laws have resulted

in the following requirements: class A roofs, chimney spark arrestors, 1-hour siding for exterior walls, 30-foot clearance of wildland

vegetation. Domestic vegetation is not regulated. Average structural fuel load consumed in the fire was 11.5 kg/m2. Larger homes

built after the fire will produce higher structural fuel loads. Improvements in infrastructure such as roads and water supplies have

not occurred. Improvements have occurred in communication systems. Increases in structural fuel load accompanied by modest

improvements in infrastructure may increase the fire risk in this

urban/wildland intermix.

Vegetation is a critical fuel component in urban/wildlandintermix fires. Without an active fuel management

program, vegetative fuels will accumulate. Many vegetative

fuels also have a large amount of fine fuels with a high

degree of horizontal and vertical continuity; fuels of this type

can produce extreme fire behavior when conditions are dry.

The structural fuel component of the urban/wildland intermix

is often neglected. In many cases the structural fuel load can be

larger than the adjoining wildland fuel load. Combustion

characteristics are much different in structural and wildland

fuels but both can affect fire behavior of intermix fires.

Changes in infrastructure, building materials and

vegetation management have been slow or non-existent

following most urban/wildland intermix fires. The public as

well as local and State agencies have short memories after

such events. Several positive steps have been taken after the

Oakland Hills “Tunnel Fire” in northern California that will

reduce the probability of such an event occurring again, but

many other problems remain.

 This paper will review the changes which have occurred

and will summarize the structural and wildland fuel consumed

in the Tunnel Fire.

Methods

Wildland vegetation inventory was accomplished by

using NASA false infrared aerial slides (1:6,000 and 1:12,000)

taken after the Tunnel Fire. The slides were projected over a

1.0 by 1.3 meter map of the fire area and perimeters were

drawn around each vegetation type. Numerous trips were

then taken to the burned area to improve the map. This

information was used to create a second map that was further

improved by the use of a set of 32 aerial color prints (1:6,000)

taken after the fire by Pacific Aerial Surveys. The final map

was digitized, and areas of each polygon were calculated, by

using the geographical information system ATLAS.

Structural fuel load was calculated by using the average

amount of lumber used to build a home in the western

United States (American Forest and Paper Association 1990).

The land area occupied by structures was determined using

the geographical information system. Structural fuel load

was assumed to be homogeneous over the area occupied by

the structures.

Information was obtained on post-fire construction from

the City of Oakland. Local fire officials were contacted to

determine concerns in this post-fire urban/wildland intermix.

Results

The fire perimeter enclosed 615.2 hectares and was

divided into categories:

Vegetation Category Area (ha)

Eucalyptus (Eucalyptus globulus) 132.1

Monterey pine (Pinus radiata) 56.3

Northern California coastal scrub 109.7

Grassland 2.9

Coastal scrub and grassland mosaic 28.5

Monterey pine and coastal scrub mosaic 2.3

Coast live oak (Quercus agrifolia) and

coastal scrub mosaic 19.2

Structures 246.2

Highways 18.0

The number of structures totally destroyed by the fire

was 2,305 (Gordon 1994). Assuming the average home uses

13,000 board feet of lumber to construct (American Forest

and Paper Association 1990), this results in a structural fuel

load of 11.5 kg/m2 (50.8 tons/acre). This value of structural

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994. Walnut Creek, California. 2Graduate Research Assistant, Department of Environmental Science,

Policy, and Management, University of California, 145 Mulford Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720; Department of Plant Production and Forest Science,

University of Lerida, 25006 Lerida, Spain; Battalion Chief, Oakland Fire

Department, 1605 Martin Luther King Jr. Way, Oakland, CA 94612; Professor, Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California,145 Mulford Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
190 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

materials, but increases in the size of the structures will

increase structural fuel load. Infrastructure such as water

supply and road systems has not been improved, increasing

the fire risk in this urban/wildland intermix.

 Wildland and structural fuels must be managed to reduce

risk in the urban/wildland intermix. Domestic vegetation

must also be managed to reduce risk in the intermix.

Emergency infrastructure must be improved to reduce the

loss of life and property from these fires. Firefighting

helicopters could be used for initial attack on urban/wildland

intermix fires. Early detection and response would be required

for effective fire suppression using helicopters.

References

American Forest and Paper Association. 1990. Housing affordability and

timber supply. Unpublished.

Bush, B., Anno, R; McCoy, R.; Gaj, R; Small, R.D. 1991. Fuel loads in

U.S. cities. Fire Technology 27(2): 5-32.

Gordon, D.A. 1994. Categorical data analysis of the Oakland hills fire.

Berkeley: University of California, Department of Environmental

Science, Policy and Management. M. S. Thesis; unpublished draft

supplied by author.

Stephens, Scott L.; Gordon, D.A.; Martin, R. E.; 1993. Combustibility of

selected domestic vegetation subjected to desiccation. In: Proceedings

of the 12th conference on fire and forest meteorology; 1993 October

26-28; Jekyll Island, Georgia. SAF publication 94-02. Bethesda, MD:

Society of American Foresters; 796 p.

fuel load is conservative because it does not include any of

the interior components of a structure, although it is in

accord with the average United States structural fuel load of

14 to 21 kg/m2 (Bush and others 1991).

Examination of post-fire construction permits indicates

homes have been rebuilt on average 28 percent larger.

Local requirements of new construction include class A

roofs, chimney spark arrestors and 1-hour siding for all

exterior walls. State and local requirements of a 30-foot

clearance between structures and wildland vegetation are

also enforced.

Domestic vegetation is not regulated by local or state

agencies. Some domestic vegetation is highly flammable.

The heat released from one mature tam juniper (Juniperus

sabina var. tamariscifolia) surpassed 2 megawatts within

1 minute of ignition (Stephens and others 1993). In that

study mature junipers were harvested and burned at different

moisture contents. Results from that study (Stephens and

others 1993) along with videotape of the Oakland Hills

fire demonstrate that domestic vegetation can provide an

efficient vector for transmitting fire into a structure.

Conclusion

Structures in the post-fire urban/wildland intermix in

the Oakland Hills will be built with more flame-resistant

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
191 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

FireNet —A Forum for International Curriculum

Development in Fire Science and Management?1

A. Chris F. Trevitt2 David G. Green3 David B. Sapsis4

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Syposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994. Walnut Creek, California. 2Senior Lecturer, Department of Forestry, School of Resource and Environmental Management, Australian National University, Canberra ACT

0200, Australia. 3Professor of Information Technology, School of Environmental and

Information Science, Charles Short University, PO Box 789, Albury, NSW

2640, Australia. 4Graduate Assistant, Department of Environmental Science Policy, and

Management, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720.

I

nternet, a world-wide information technology network,

provides the opportunity to set up the exchange and retrieval

of problem-oriented information. FireNet, an international

information retrieval and exchange network for those

interested in landscape fires, is one such forum, among

many hundreds now in operation (Green and others 1993).

Anyone with access to a networked computer system, or

with a desktop computer and modem, can subscribe to FireNet.

The network allows free correspondence among all subscribers

on the list—land managers, researchers, educators—wherever

they are located. In April 1994, FireNet maintained 200

subscribers from a number of countries around the world. In

December 1994, there were 370 subscribers.

In addition to real-time communication possibilities,

FireNet is also potentially a valuable educational tool,

particularly as more organizations outside the university

sector gain access to Internet. This expanded access implies

that individual faculty or professional trainers take on the

role of “education moderator,” filtering material so that it is

customized to their particular need or context (Green and

others 1993). Thus, FireNet not only complements the role

of the textbook by providing a window on current issues

under debate—thereby affording access to more up-to-date

supplementary material and ideas—but also encourages

feedback to help ascertain the value of this information in

the workplace. Further, it provides an enticing medium for

fostering the cooperative development of computer-based

curriculum materials in fire science and management.

Background

The development of computer assisted learning

applications has been ongoing for the last few years, many

taking advantage of new technologies for dispersal and

presentation of information. For example, in Canada, Thorburn

(1990) and Hirsch and others (1993) have pioneered firerelated developments using videodisk and hypermedia

technologies for education and training purposes. In the

United States, a new training development group

(Cooperative Program for Operational Meteorology,

Education, and Training), affiliated with the National Weather

Service, has been charged with the responsibility for

developing new computer-based distance education modules

for in-service training, and they hope to begin work on a

new fire-weather module in 1994 (Lamos 1993, personal

communication). At the Australian National University, we

have recently acquired experience in the design, development

and implementation of a computer-based graphical analysis

package for use by students in analyzing fire weather histories

(Trevitt and others 1993), and fire management planning

within a problem-based learning context (Trevitt and SachseÅkerlind 1994).

At the same time as these separate developments have

been underway, increasing financial constraints have been

experienced at public educational institutions and other

principal national research and management organizations.

Training sections in operational groups concerned with fire

science and management are often highly understaffed, and

updated course material development is frequently lacking.

In the future, we need to exploit opportunities to work

together more closely, pooling development efforts where

appropriate, and saving on overheads incurred during ongoing curriculum development. FireNet provides a unique

opportunity to realize these gains by facilitating the transfer

of digital materials over the Internet and thereby achieving

savings for everyone.

Implications of Developing a Digital

“Fire” Curriculum

As computer hardware becomes more and more

economical, it makes inroads into more and more

organizations. Simultaneously, the software that is now

becoming available allows more and more sophisticated and

cost-effective data and information storage, transfer and

manipulation. FireNet provides a practical demonstration of

some of the emerging ways to facilitate text and image

retrieval and interchange between organizations and

individuals. Hypermedia links via Internet are now also

becoming feasible using the Hyper Text Markup Language

(HTML) protocol implemented, for example, by the public

domain browser application “mosaic,” and this facility is

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
192 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

also provided on FireNet (Green and others, 1993). This

means that digital curriculum resources (e.g. text, images,

video, sound) resident in the public domain on a computer

node connected to the Internet in, for example, Victoria,

Canada, can be accessed by managers, researchers, academics,

or others with access to a similar networked computer

environment in Canberra, Australia, and vice-versa.

What form could these “digital curriculum resources”

take? Currently, some examples on FireNet are essentially

text-only student reading materials used in the undergraduate

unit “Fire Science and Management” at the Australian National

University. Text is the simplest form to deal with. However,

line diagrams and photos are urgently needed to supplement

this text. A range of text, black-and-white images, and linedrawings are already available at Australian National

University on a local Macintosh network, and these have

been used for study purposes by undergraduate students

since 1993. Copies of personal lecture notes as well as

supplementary material have also become available (Trevitt

and Sachse-Åkerlind 1994). Eventually, a library of relevant

color slides, video, and sound segments is envisaged as well.

Animated graphics, in a true multimedia environment, hold

considerable promise for communicating particularly

challenging abstract concepts such as those associated with

diurnal variations in fuel moisture and fuel moisture changes

at different depths below the fuel and soil surface.

Developments of this sort have no real book-based analogs,

and, like the work by Hirsh and others (1993), represent

some of the new ways in which information technology can

expand and extend the educational process.

In a subject-area such as “Fire Science and Management,”

an extraordinarily wide range of relevant material can serve

as an information base for training and education. This

breadth of material alone is good reason for institutions to

share the burden of collation, synthesis, preparation of

overheads for lectures, images, development of problembased tutorials, etc. Most of us with similar professional

interests and shared educational goals work in geographic

isolation from one another and can benefit enormously from

exposure to the ideas and experiences of others working

with common educational objectives.

For those of us who are in academics, it also makes

considerable sense to work closer to our operational

counterparts, and learn about, and from, some of the

frustrations and joys experienced in ongoing programs of

professional training. Relevant contacts can be found across

the board in forest and land management agencies, as well as

in groups such as National Parks and National Weather

services. Shared responsibility in developing relatively small

(e.g., two to five pages of text plus a few diagrams) modules,

dealing with one specific science topic or management aspect,

or a case study of a past fire means that, together, we would

quickly build up a repertoire of relevant resources that each

of us could access. Provided these materials conform to

certain recognized and established international standards,

there should be minimal difficulty in ensuring that they are

transferable by digital, computer-based means.

Conclusions

FireNet provides an opportunity for much cross-disciplinary, cross-institutional and international collaboration.

The curriculum development effort required to comprehensively address all of the relevant science and management

issues for training and education in “fire” exceeds the

capacity of a single individual operating in isolation. By

using digital media as a default standard, and the

communication and information-exchange afforded by new

computer networks, new opportunities are created for

cooperative curriculum development.

 References

Green, D.G.; Gill, A.M.; Trevitt, A.C.F. 1993. FIRENET—an international

network for landscape fire information. Wildfire: Quarterly Journal

of the International Association of Wildland Fire 2: 2-30.

Hirsch, K.G.; Hoskins, J. A.; Hoskins, W.D. 1993. A hypermedia system

for interactive fire behavior training. Paper presented at the 12th

conference on fire and forest meteorology; 1993 October 26-28; Jekyll

Island, Georgia. SAF publication 94.02. Bethesda, MD: Society of

American Foresters.

Thorburn, R.W. 1990. Videodisc/microcomputer technology in wildland

fire training. In: Alexander, M. E.; Bisgrove, G.F., eds. The art and

science of fire management. Forestry Canada Northwest. Information

report NOR-X-309; 100-101.

Trevitt, A.C.F.; Sachse-Åkerlind, G. 1994. A District Fire Committee

Simulation in the professional forestry curriculum: a case study of

computer-facilitated problem-based learning. In: Chen, S.E.;

Cowdroy, R.; Kingsland, A.; Ostwald, M., eds., Reflections on problembased learning, Sydney: Australian Problem Based Learning Network;

347-369.

Trevitt, A.C.F.; Stals, L.; Sachse-Åkerlind, G. 1993. Education and training

in fire meteorology and climate: a role for computer-assisted

learning? In: Proceedings of the 12th conference on fire and forest

meteorology; 1993 October 26-28; Jekyll Island, Georgia; Bethesda,

Maryland: Society of American Foresters; 399-408.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
193 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Analysis

 An Arc/Info geographic information system (GIS) was

used to analyze the temporal and spatial distribution of

ALDS recorded strikes. Density of lightning strikes was

found to be positively correlated with elevation (Pearson’s

r = +0.902). The mean annual densities of strikes were

calculated for 305-meter (1,000-foot) increments in elevation:

Elevation (Meters) Strikes per Square Kilometer

0 - 305 0.228

305 - 610 0.297

610 - 915 0.313

915 - 1220 0.860

1220 - 1525 1.063

1525 - 1830 1.367

1830 - 2135 2.767

The temporal analysis revealed that lightning activity is

concentrated in the late summer. August alone accounts for

approximately 42 percent of the mean annual total of strikes.

The strikes recorded for the months of July, August, and

September account for 85 percent of the mean annual total.

No other month accounts for more than 5 percent of the

mean annual total. This high activity period precedes the

season of most extreme fire weather, which is frequently

coincident with hot, dry Santa Ana winds.

Studies of the occurrence of Santa Ana winds in southern

California from 1951 to 1960 (Schroeder 1964) and in San

Diego County from 1970 to 1979 (Latham 1981) reveal the

following frequencies of Santa Ana winds:

Month Schroeder and others Latham (1981)

(1964) 1951-60 1970-79

July 2 0

August 0 0

September 11 4

October 19 13

November 26 15

December 18 13

The three peak months of Santa Ana wind occurrence

are October, November, and December. July and August,

which are the peak months for lightning activity, have the

lowest frequency of Santa Ana winds.

Lightning Strikes and Natural Fire Regimes

in San Diego County, California1

Michael L. Wells2 David E. McKinsey3

Abstract: Data from the Automated Lightning Detection System

were analyzed for the years 1985-1990 for San Diego County,

California. The density of lightning strikes was found to be

positively correlated with elevation. Temporal analysis revealed

that lightning occurs most frequently in the months of July,

August, and September preceding the peak of Santa Ana wind

activity in October, November, and December. This suggests

that a natural fire regime for this region would be typified by

frequent, low-intensity fires and that large, high-intensity fires

would be relatively rare.

Lightning is the only significant natural source of wildfireignition in southern California (Keeley 1981, Krausmann

1981, CDF 1986-1991, USFS 1985-1990). Therefore, in order

to understand the characteristics of wildfire occurrence in the

absence of human influences (i.e., natural fire regimes), it is

necessary to determine the distribution and frequency of

lightning strikes. Researchers have used meteorological records

and reports of lightning-caused fires to estimate the distribution

of lightning and its importance to regional fire regimes.

However, weather reports tend to underestimate lightning

activity (Wells and McKinsey 1993), and artificial structures

interfere with the establishment of lightning ignitions (Minnich

1987). Reliance on these methods leads to underestimation

of lightning activity and lightning-caused ignitions.

 The advent of the Automated Lightning Detection System

(ALDS) in 1985 by the Bureau of Land Management has

given researchers a new source of information to evaluate

the distribution of lightning strikes. ALDS uses a network of

radar lightning detectors to triangulate the location of lightning

strikes (German 1990). Studies utilizing ALDS data have

been made for northern Baja California, Mexico (Minnich

and others 1993) and Yosemite National Park (Van

Wangtendonk 1991).

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Associate State Park Resource Ecologist, California Department of

Parks and Recreation, San Diego Coast District, 3990 Old Town Ave., Ste.

300C, San Diego, CA 92110; Doctoral student, Department of Geography,

San Diego State University, San Diego, CA; and Research Associate,

Department of Biology, University of San Diego, CA. 3Technical Manager, The Mary and Steven Birch Center for Earth

Systems Analysis Research, Department of Geography, San Diego State

University, San Diego, CA.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
194 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Conclusions

The following conclusions summarize the findings of

this study:

• The density of lightning strikes is positively

correlated with elevation.

•The period of maximum lightning activity is during

 the late summer months of July, August, and

 September.

• Lightning is much less frequent during the months

of October, November, and December when the

frequency of Santa Ana winds peaks.

From these conclusions, we can infer the characteristics

of hypothesized natural fire regimes in San Diego County

and how those characteristics have been altered by human

influences. Fire records from San Diego County demonstrate

that current fire regimes are dominated by human-caused

ignitions (Krausmann 1981, CDF 1985-1990, USFS 1985-

1990). Data collected by Krausmann (1981) and Keeley

(1981) reveal that frequency of ignition in the current humandominated fire regime peaks at between 300 and 900 meters

elevation (1,000 and 3,000 feet). This alteration is due to

human influences such as destruction of wildland habitats at

low elevations, increases in human-caused ignitions near the

urban interface, and the placement of electrically grounded

artificial structures at high elevations (Minnich 1987).

Additional inferences can be drawn relating natural fire

regimes to climatic variables. Lightning activity peaks during

the months of July, August, and September when wildland

fuels are usually dry enough to burn. Santa Ana winds occur

infrequently during these months. This suggests that a

lightning-dominated natural fire regime would be characterized

by frequent, summer season fires of relatively low intensity.

Less frequent, late season lightning storms could be followed

by Santa Ana winds resulting in larger and more intense

fires. In the recent past, the coincidence of human-caused

ignitions and Santa Ana events has resulted in large, highly

destructive fires. In a natural, lightning-dominated fire regime

such episodes would be rare.

References

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. 1986-1991. Wildfire

Activity Statistics (1985-1990). Sacramento, California: California

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection.

German, S.C. 1990. Initial attack management system (IAMS), information

package. Boise, Idaho: Boise Interagency Fire Center; 21 p.

Keeley, J.E. 1981. Distribution of lightning- and man-caused wildfires

in California. In: Conrad, C.; Oechel, W., technical coordinators.

Proceedings of the symposium on dynamics and management of

Mediterranean-type ecosystems; 1981 June 22-26; San Diego, California.

Gen. Tech. Report PSW-58. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Forest

and Range Experiment Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of

Agriculture; 431-436.

Krausmann, W.K. 1981. An analysis of several variables affecting fire

occurrence and size in San Diego County, California: San Diego

State University. Master’s thesis.

Latham, V.O. 1981. 500 millibar circulation patterns related to Santa

Ana weather in San Diego County, California: San Diego State

University. Master’s thesis.

Minnich, R.A. 1987. Fire behavior in southern California chaparral

before fire control: the Mount Wilson burns at the turn of the

century. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 77:

599-618.

Minnich, R.A.; Franco-Vizcaino, E.; Sousa-Ramirez, J.; Chou, Y. 1993.

Lightning detection rates and wildland fire in the mountains of

northern Baja California, Mexico. Atmosfera 6: 235-253.

Schroeder, M.J. 1964. Synoptic weather types associated with critical fire

weather. Berkeley, CA: Pacific Southwest Forest and Range Experiment

Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; 421 p.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service. 1985-1990. Fire records,

Cleveland National Forest. On file. San Diego Ranger Unit, Monte

Vista, California.

Van Wangtendonk, J.W. 1991. Spatial analysis of lightning strikes in

Yosemite National Park. In: Andrews, P.; Potts, D., eds. Proceedings

of the 11th conference on fire and forest meteorology. Bethesda,

Maryland: Society of American Foresters, 11: 605-611.

Wells, M.L.; McKinsey, D.E. 1993. The spatial and temporal distribution

of lightning strikes in San Diego County, Calif. In: Proceedings GIS/

LIS, volume 2; 1993 Nov. 2-4; Minneapolis, Minnesota. Bethesda,

Maryland: American, Congress on Surveying and Mapping; 768-777.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
195 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

consumption (Tran 1990). Reduced heat release rate is an

important characteristic of fire-retardant-treated wood (LeVan

and Tran 1990, Sweet and others 1993). We have used heat

release data to predict test results (Tran 1992) for ASTM E

84 (ASTM 1991). Because of its small specimen size, the

cone calorimeter can provide data only for materials. With

its 1-m2 specimen, the ICAL provides the ability to test

assemblies (Urbas and Shaw 1993) and specimens that include

joints and other nonhomogeneous characteristics of building

materials in the field. The ICAL is being developed at the

Weyerhaeuser Fire Technology Laboratory in cooperation

with the American Forest and Paper Association. The method

is currently being considered by ASTM Committee E-5 on

Fire Standards.

Concluding Remarks

 Modern fire test methodologies provide data suitable

for theoretical models and a range of fire exposures. As a

result, we are better able to develop fire hazard assessments

for a variety of situations, including structures in the wildlandurban interface. Better fire hazard assessment methodologies

and specific design objectives will lead to code requirements

that provide a high level of fire safety and design flexibility.

References

ASTM. 1991. Standard test method for surface burning characteristics

of building materials. Designation E 84-91a. Philadelphia, PA:

American Society for Testing and Materials.

ASTM. 1992. Standard test method for heat and visible smoke release

rates for materials and products using an oxygen consumption

calorimeter. Designation E 1354-92. Philadelphia, PA: American

Society for Testing and Materials.

ASTM. 1993a. Standard test method for determining material ignition

and flame spread properties. Designation E 1317-93. Philadelphia,

PA: American Society for Testing and Materials.

ASTM. 1993b. Standard test method for heat and visible smoke release

rates for materials and products. Designation E 906-83 (Reapproved

1993). Philadelphia, PA: American Society for Testing and Materials.

Cohen, Jack. 1995. Structural ignition assessment model (SIAM). In:

Proceedings of the Biswell symposium: fire issues and solutions; 1994

February 15-17; Walnut Creek, CA.

DiNenno, P.J.; Beyler, C.L. 1992. Fire hazard assessment of composite

materials: The use and limitations of current hazard analysis

methodology. In: Hirschler, Marcelo M., ed. Fire hazard and fire risk

assessment, ASTM STP 1150, Philadelphia, PA: American Society for

Testing and Materials; 87-99.

LeVan, Susan L.; Tran, Hao C. 1990. The role of boron in flameretardant treatments. In: Hamel, Magaret, ed. Proceedings of the 1st

international conference on wood protection with diffusible preservatives,

Proceedings 47355; 1990 November 28-30; Nashville, TN. Madison,

WI: Forest Products Research Society; 39-41.

Modern Fire Test Methodologies for Building Materials1

 Robert H. White Mark A. Dietenberger2

Abstract: New fire test methodologies for building materials and

related theoretical models are leading to improved fire hazard

methodologies for a variety of situations, including structures in

the wildland/urban interface.

Traditional fire test methods have represented the firststep toward replacing material-specific code requirements

with performance-based requirements for building materials.

These traditional methods have provided data for only one

specific exposure (White and Nordheim 1992). By testing

materials at various external heat fluxes (Tran and White

1992), the data obtained are more useful in fire models and

hazard assessments. The parallel developments of theoretical

fire models and state-of-the-art test methodologies have

made it possible to improve fire hazard assessments (DiNenno

and Beyler 1992). The development of performance-based

fire safety requirements that specify design objectives was a

major topic at a recent conference (Worcester Polytechnic

Institute 1991).

Fire Test Methodologies

Three modern fire test methodologies are: the lateral

ignition and flame spread test (LIFT), the American Society

for Testing and Materials (ASTM 1993a); the cone calorimeter

(ASTM 1992); and the intermediate scale calorimeter (ICAL)

(Shaw and Urbas 1993). At the USDA Forest Service’s

Forest Products Laboratory (FPL) in Madison, WI, we are

using a LIFT apparatus to develop ignition criteria for the

Structure Ignition Assessment Model (SIAM) (Cohen 1995,

Tran and others 1992). SIAM is being developed jointly by

the FPL and two USDA Forest Service Research Stations:

Southern and Pacific Southwest. Test results from the LIFT

include minimum external heat flux for and surface

temperature at piloted ignition, and minimum surface

temperature and flame heating parameter for lateral flame

spread. Oxygen consumption technique provides a convenient

way to obtain heat release data. The best known apparatus

using this technology is the cone calorimeter. At FPL, we

have modified our Ohio State University (OSU) apparatus

(ASTM 1993b) to obtain heat release rates using oxygen

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented as a poster at the

Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and

Wildland Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, Walnut Creek, California. 2Supervisory Wood Scientist and Research General Engineer, respectively, Forest Products Laboratory, USDA Forest Service, One Gifford

Pinchot Drive, Madison, WI 53705-2398.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
196 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Shaw, James R.; Urbas, Joe. 1993. An intermediate-scale calorimeter for

building materials and assemblies. Fire and Materials 17: 259-263.

Sweet, Mitchell S.; LeVan, Susan L.; White, Robert H.; Tran, Hao C.;

DeGroot, Rodney. 1993. Fire performance of wood treated with a

combined fire retardant and preservative system. Unpublished draft

supplied by senior author.

Tran, Hao C. 1990. Modifications to an Ohio State University apparatus

and comparison with cone calorimeter results. In: Quintiere, J.G.;

L.Y. Cooper, eds. Heat and mass transfer in forest: Proceedings of the

AAIA/ASME thermophysics and heat transfer conference; 1990 June

18-20; Seattle, WA. New York. The American Society of Mechanical

Engineers: 141: 131-139.

Tran, Hao C. 1992. Experimental data on wood materials. In: Babrauskas,

V.; S. J. Grayson, eds. Heat release in fires. New York: Elsevier

Applied Sciences, chapter 11, part b. Tran, Hao; Cohen, Jack D.;

Chase, Richard A. 1992. Modeling ignition of structures in wildland/

urban interface fires. In: Proceedings of the first international fire and

materials conference; 1992 September 24-25; Arlington, VA. London,

UK: Inter Science Communications Limited: 253-262.

Tran, Hao C.; White, Robert H. 1992. Burning rate of solid wood measured

in a heat release rate calorimeter. Fire and Materials 16: 97-206.

Urbas, Joe; Shaw, James R. 1993. Testing wall assemblies on an

intermediate-scale calorimeter. Fire Technology 29(4): 332-349.

White, R.H.; Nordheim, E.V. 1992. Charring rate of wood for ASTM E

119 exposure. Fire Technology 28(1): 5-30. Worcester Polytechnic

Institute. 1991. Proceedings of the conference on fire safety design in

the 21st century; 1991 May 8-10; Worcester, MA: Worcester Polytechnic

Institute; 382 p.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
197 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Brush Fire Hazard: An Analysis of the Topanga Fire Storm1

James A. Woods2

I

n the fall, the annual Santa Ana winds blow from the high

deserts of the Western United States, over the San Gabriel

Mountains and through the greater Los Angeles Basin. When

fire is introduced into the chaparral ecosystem of southern

California, these hot, dry, nearly hurricane force winds can

generate immense fire storms. This is precisely what happened

for a 2-week period starting in late October and ending in

early November 1993. More than 20 major brush fires burned

during this time. One devastating fire, in particular, was the

Topanga Fire Storm. This fire was started by an arsonist

around 10:40 a.m. on November 2, and over the course of

the next 5 days, burned over 16,500 acres, destroying or

damaging nearly 350 homes.

Fire is an integral part of the chaparral environment of

California, and as urban areas expand and encroach into

wilderness regions, the need to establish the level of fire

hazard in a region increases. Geographic information system

(GIS) technology is a valuable tool in fire management

(Gronlund and others 1994, Salazar 1989). One application

of GIS technology to the wildland/urban interface problem

has been the replication of fire hazard models (Woods 1992).

GIS Technology

Woods (1992) used two different GIS’s—IDRISI, a

raster-based GIS, and Atlas GIS, a vector-based system—to

replicate several fire hazard models. He showed that the

distribution of fire hazard can be vastly different for a given

area, depending on which methodology is used. The three

models used were: the Burning Index model, used by the

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (Phillips

1983); Schmidt’s Fireline Intensity model (Schmidt 1978);

and the Los Angeles County Fire Department’s Brush Fire

History Hazard model (Pierpont 1991).

A portion of the Santa Monica Mountains, in Los Angeles

County, was used as the study area. The geographic variables

which each model used (topography, vegetation, brush fire

history, etc.) were digitized and stored as separate images

and layers in both IDRISI and Atlas GIS, respectively. These

images and layers were then analyzed, combined, and

compared on the basis of each hazard model’s guidelines, to

replicate the hazard models. The final models were then

stored as images and layers.

Because the Topanga Fire Storm was located wholly

within the confines of the study area used by Woods (1992),

all of the data necessary for an analysis was pre-existing in

his data base. The only operation necessary was for the

perimeter of the Topanga Fire Storm to be digitized and

stored in both GIS’s. That portion of each fire hazard

model which fell within the confines of the Topanga fire

could then be extracted to create new images and layers.

These new images and layers represent what the level of

fire hazard was, per each original fire hazard model, within

the fire zone.

Comparison of Fire Hazard Models

The three models use different criteria for determining

the level of hazard, but each of them divides fire hazard into

three categories, making a comparison relatively easy. Though

each model uses different terms to describe their level of

hazard, for this paper, the terminology will be: Low, Medium,

and High.

Analysis of each of the models indicates that the Fireline

Intensity model and the Brush Fire History model are much

closer to each other in the percent of land in each hazard

category, while the Burning Index model was quite dissimilar

to each of the other two. The Fireline Intensity model places

38.2 percent of the land in the Low hazard category, 25.1

percent in the Medium, and 36.7 percent in the High, while

the Fire History model places 21.9 percent of the land in the

Low hazard level, 37.4 percent in the Medium, and 40.7

percent in the High. The Burning Index model, on the other

hand, places only 2.7 percent of the land in the Low hazard

level, 50.2 percent in the Medium, and 47.1 percent in the

High fire hazard level.

However, a visual analysis of each of the maps indicates

that there is great disparity between all three models. The

Fireline Intensity model (fig. 1) and the Burning Index model

(fig. 2) have a similar underlying pattern, since vegetation is

one of the most important factors in each model. The Burning

Index model also incorporates slope, which accounts for the

discontinuity of hazardous areas. Since the Fire History

model (fig. 3) is based solely on the fire history of the region,

there is no influence from either vegetation or topography.

The Low category, in the original model, represents 1-10

years since the last brush fire. Medium represents 11 to 29

years, and High represents areas which have not burned in

1An abbreviated version of this paper was presented at the Biswell

Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland

Ecosystems, February 15-17, 1994, at Walnut Creek, California. 2Geographer, Geo-Cart Systems, 3014 Nipomo Avenue, Long Beach, CA

90808-4225.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
198 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Figure 2– Burning Index fire hazard model of the 1993 Topanga Fire Storm.

Figure 1– Fireline Intensity fire hazard model of the 1993 Topanga Fire Storm.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session
199 USDA Forest Service Gen. Tech. Rep. PSW-GTR-158. 1995.

Figure 3– Brush Fire History fire hazard model of the 1993 Topanga Fire Storm.

more than 30 years. As a result, the fire history map becomes

a vegetation age map.

None of these models are designed for use as a predictive

tool. The Burning Index model is designed to define where

the potential fire hazard is so that building codes can be

implemented, whereas both the Fireline Intensity and Fire

History models are designed to help with fire response

planning. Further research would be to implement a fire

simulation model, such as FIREMAP (Ball and Gurtin 1991),

and then make a comparison between the actual fire and the

computer-simulated fire.

References

Ball, George L.; Gurtin, D. Phillip. 1991. FIREMAP. In: Nodvin, Stephen

C.; Waldrop, Thomas A., eds. Fire and the environment: ecological and

cultural perspectives. Proceedings of an international symposium; 1990

March 20-24; Knoxville, TN. Gen Tech. Rep. SE-69. Asheville, NC:

Southeast Forest Experiment Station, Forest Service, U.S. Department

of Agriculture; 215-218.

Gronlund, Amy Goulstone; Xiang, Wei-Ning; Sox, Joseph. 1994. GIS,

expert system technologies improve forest fire management

techniques. GIS World 7(2): 32-36.

Phillips, Clinton B. 1983. Instructions for zoning fire hazard severity in

state responsibility area in California. Sacramento, California:

Resources Agency, California Department of Forestry.

Pierpont, Don. 1991. Captain, Vegetation Management Division. Los Angeles

County Fire Department. Personal conversations and phone calls.

Salazar, Lucy A. 1989. Fire management on the frontier of GIS technology.

In: Forestry on the frontier. Proceedings of the 1989 Society of American

Foresters Convention; 1989 September 24-27; Spokane, WA. Bethesda,

Maryland: Society of American Foresters; 64-69.

Schmidt, R. Gordon. 1978. An approach to hazard classification. Fire

Management Notes 39(3): 9-11,19.

Woods, James A. 1992. A geographic information system for brush fire

hazard mapping and analysis. Long Beach: California State University;

65 p. Master’s Thesis.

The Biswell Symposium: Fire Issues and Solutions in Urban Interface and Wildland Ecosystems Poster Session