[Cite as State v. Majid, 2022-Ohio-189.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 110560 

 v. : 

 

ARIF MAJID, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 27, 2022 

 

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-05-474447-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Arif Majid, pro se. 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, A.J.: 

Appellant Arif Majid (“Majid”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to correct sentence unauthorized by law. Upon review, we affirm the 

decision of the trial court. 
Background

In May 2011, following a retrial, Majid was convicted on one count of 

murder and two counts of attempted murder, each with firearm specifications, and 

one count of having weapons while under disability. Majid was sentenced to 18 

years to life on Count 1 (consisting of 3 years on the firearm specification run prior 

to and consecutive with 15 years to life on the base count), 10 years on each of Counts 

2 and 3, and 5 years on Count 4, with all counts run consecutive to each other for a 

total aggregate term of 43 years to life. In March 2012, on appeal, this court affirmed 

in part but reversed in part because the trial court “neglected to impose sentences 

on each of the firearm specifications for which [Majid] was convicted.” State v. 

Majid, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96855, 2012-Ohio-1192, ¶ 104-108. The case was 

remanded to the trial court “for the limited purpose of resentencing [Majid] as to 

each of the firearm specifications.” Id. at ¶ 107. 

In December 2012, the trial court resentenced Majid. Majid was 

present with counsel. The trial court imposed the same sentence on each count for 

a total aggregate prison term of 43 years to life, which included the three-year prison 

term on the firearm specification in Count 1 to run prior to and consecutive with the 

underlying prison term of 15 years to life on that count. The resentencing was 

limited to merging all firearm specifications into the single three-year firearm 

specification on Count 1. Majid did not appeal his resentencing. 
After filing several unsuccessful postconviction motions, on 

February 26, 2021, Majid filed a motion to correct sentence unauthorized by law. 

The trial court denied the motion on May 4, 2021, and this appeal followed. 

Assignments of Error 

On appeal, Majid raises five assignments of error challenging his 

sentence. Under his assignments of error, Majid argues his constitutional rights 

were violated because (1) he was sentenced outside the statutory range; (2) the court 

failed to provide a de novo sentencing hearing in his presence; (3) he was sentenced 

to prison terms already served; (4) the trial court sentenced him to consecutive 

terms without strictly complying with Ohio sentencing statutes; and (5) the trial 

court applied no legal analysis in considering whether his convictions merge as 

allied offenses of similar import. 

Law and Analysis

Majid’s motion to correct sentence unauthorized by law is a petition 

for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) because it (1) was filed subsequent 

to a direct appeal; (2) claimed a denial of constitutional rights; (3) sought to render 

the judgment void; and (4) asked for a vacation of the judgment and sentence. State 

v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160-161, 1997-Ohio 304, 679 N.E.2d 1131; see also 

State v. Ali, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110624, 2021-Ohio-4303, ¶ 10. Whether the 

trial court possessed subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition 

for postconviction relief is a question of law, which we review de novo. Ali at ¶ 11, 
citing State v. Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351, 

¶ 24. 

In this appeal, Majid raises various constitutional challenges to his 

sentence and claims the trial court disregarded statutory mandates and imposed a 

sentence that is unlawful, contrary to law, and statutorily void. Majid’s claims were 

not timely raised in a direct appeal. 

In State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 

248, and State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, 

the Supreme Court of Ohio realigned its precedent with the traditional 

understanding of what constitutes a void judgment. Harper at ¶ 4; Henderson at 

¶ 34. The court did so to “restore predictability and finality to trial-court judgments 

and criminal sentences.” Henderson at ¶ 33. As explained in Henderson, “[a] void 

judgment is rendered by a court without jurisdiction. * * * A voidable judgment is 

one pronounced by a court with jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 17. If a judgment is void, “[i]t 

is a mere nullity and can be disregarded” and “[i]t can be attacked in collateral 

proceedings.” Id., citing Tari v. State, 117 Ohio St. 481, 494, 159 N.E. 594 (1927). 

In Harper, the Supreme Court of Ohio returned to the traditional 

view and held that “[w]hen a case is within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction and 

the accused is properly before the court, any error in the exercise of that jurisdiction 

in imposing postrelease control renders the court’s judgment voidable, permitting 

the sentence to be set aside if the error has been successfully challenged on direct 

appeal.” Id. at ¶ 4. In Henderson, the court recognized Harper involved the 
imposition of postrelease control and did not involve a case in which a trial court 

deviated from a statutory mandate. Id. at ¶ 27. The court made clear “that sentences 

based on an error are voidable, if the court imposing the sentence has jurisdiction 

over the case and the defendant, including sentences in which a trial court fails to 

impose a statutorily mandated term” and that “[a] sentence is void only if the 

sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case or personal 

jurisdiction over the accused.” Henderson at ¶ 27. 

Recently, in State ex rel. Ogle v. Hocking Cty. Common Pleas Court, 

Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-4453, the Supreme Court of Ohio recognized its 

clarification of what constitutes a void sentence in Henderson, but adhered to the 

Supreme Court of the United States decision in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 

S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), which declared a Sixth Amendment right-tocounsel violation results in the court’s loss of jurisdiction and renders an associated 

conviction void. Ogle at ¶ 12-13. 

In Zerbst, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that 

“[s]ince the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to 

the assistance of counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is an 

essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a federal court’s authority to deprive an 

accused of his life or liberty.” Id. at 467. Therefore, if the accused is not represented 

by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, 

then “the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and 

sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty.” Id. at 468. When the Sixth 
Amendment requirement is not complied with, “the court no longer has jurisdiction 

to proceed” and “[t]he judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without 

jurisdiction is void * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The Supreme Court of the United 

States has limited collateral attacks on prior convictions to the “unique 

constitutional defect” presented in Zerbst that rose “to the level of a jurisdictional 

defect resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all.” Custis v. United States, 

511 U.S. 485, 496, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (holding a violation of the 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the sole exception to the general rule against 

collateral attacks upon state convictions). 

Here, Majid was represented by counsel and the trial court had 

jurisdiction to proceed with resentencing Majid on the firearm specifications. 

Henderson and Harper remain controlling authority. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 

285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776; Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio2913, 159 N.E.3d 248. 

Accordingly, because the sentencing court had subject-matter 

jurisdiction over the case and personal jurisdiction over Majid, any sentencing error 

would render the sentence voidable, not void. See State v. Stansell, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 109023, 2021-Ohio-2036, ¶ 7. Moreover, any error in the imposition 

of sentence rendered the sentence voidable and not subject to collateral attack in a 

postconviction proceeding. See State v. Sailor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109459, 

2021-Ohio-2277, ¶ 23; see also State v. Stewart, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109498, 

2020-Ohio-6743, ¶ 5, citing Henderson at ¶ 43. 
Therefore, Majid was limited to challenging his sentence via a direct 

appeal and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider his untimely petition for 

postconviction relief. See Ali, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110624, 2021-Ohio-4303, at 

¶ 13. The trial court did not err by summarily denying Majid’s motion to correct 

sentence. The assignments of error are overruled. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

____________________________________ 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and 

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCUR