United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Domestic 

Policy, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives

HUMANE METHODS OF 

HANDLING AND 

SLAUGHTER 

Public Reporting on 

Violations Can Identify 

Enforcement Challenges 

and Enhance Transparency 

Statement of Lisa Shames, Director 

Natural Resources and Environment 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT

Thursday, April 17, 2008

 

GAO-08-686T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 17, 2008

HUMANE METHODS OF HANDLING AND 

SLAUGHTER 

Public Reporting on Violations Can Identify 

Enforcement Challenges and Enhance Transparency Highlights of GAO-08-686T, testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Domestic 

Policy, Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform, House of 

Representatives 

In fiscal year 2007, more than 150 

million cattle, sheep, and other 

animals destined for human 

consumption were slaughtered in 

the United States. The U.S.

Department of Agriculture’s 

(USDA) Food Safety and

Inspection Service is responsible

for enforcing the Humane Methods

of Slaughter Act (HMSA), which

mandates that animals are handled

and slaughtered humanely. GAO

reported on USDA’s efforts to 

enforce HMSA in 2004 (Humane 

Methods of Slaughter Act: USDA 

Has Addressed Some Problems but 

Still Faces Enforcement 

Challenges, GAO-04-247). More 

broadly, GAO has also issued many 

reports that address federal 

oversight of the U.S. food safety 

system. 

This testimony focuses on (1)

GAO’s 2004 report on the frequency

and scope of reported HMSA

violations and enforcement actions

by USDA, (2) information on trends 

in staffing and funding for USDA 

food inspections, and (3) 

information on overall federal 

oversight of food safety. To provide 

this new information, GAO

analyzed personnel and funding 

data from USDA and the Office of

Management and Budget, and 

interviewed USDA food safety

inspection officials. 

In January 2004, GAO reported that incomplete and inconsistent inspection 

records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of HMSA 

violations, inspectors did not always document violations of the act, and they 

did not consistently document the scope and severity of each incident. GAO 

also reported that enforcement actions to address noncompliance with the act 

were inconsistent, and that USDA was not using consistent criteria to 

determine when to suspend plant operations in cases of serious or repeated 

violations. The Congress has urged USDA to report annually on trends in 

compliance with humane slaughter methods. Such public reporting can 

enhance transparency, but USDA’s most recent report was in March 2003 and 

relied on incomplete data. For example, that report said very few infractions

were for inhumane treatment, but GAO found that at least one-fourth of the 

infractions were for ineffective stunning which fails to meet humane 

standards. USDA has taken actions to address the recommendations GAO 

made in 2004 about oversight of HMSA. However, GAO has not evaluated the 

effectiveness of these actions. 

USDA faces resource challenges that may make it difficult for it to enforce 

HMSA and ensure the safety of the food supply. Although USDA’s budget for 

food safety-related activities has increased since 1988, staffing for these 

activities has declined from its highest level in 1995. Agency officials noted the 

overall decline is due, in part, to consolidation in the meat industry, resulting 

in fewer facilities. In 2004, GAO found that USDA lacked detailed information 

on how much time its inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter 

activities, making it difficult to determine if the number of inspectors is 

adequate. USDA has taken actions to address most of GAO’s 

recommendations for assessing its resource needs for HMSA, but GAO has not 

evaluated these actions. Although not directly related to HMSA activities, the 

quantity of meat and poultry inspected and passed by USDA has grown, and 

the quantity of meat and poultry recalled has increased. 

USDA has oversight responsibility for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, 

and processed eggs. For example, federal regulations prohibit companies 

from processing and selling meat from disabled cows—which have a higher 

probability of being infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy—

without explicit USDA inspector approval. However, USDA is only 1 of 15 

agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. 

This fragmentation is the key reason GAO added the federal oversight of food 

safety to its High-Risk Series in 2007 and called for a governmentwide 

reexamination of the food safety system. GAO has reported on problems with

this system—including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and 

inefficient use of resources. Going forward, as GAO has recommended, a

governmentwide, results-oriented performance plan and a reconvened 

President’s Council on Food Safety could build a sustained focus on the safety 

of the nation’s food supply. To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-686T. 

For more information, contact Lisa Shames at 

(202) 512-3841 or shamesl@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the U. S. Department of 

Agriculture’s (USDA) implementation of its program to ensure that 

animals destined for human consumption are handled and slaughtered 

humanely. More than 150 million cattle, sheep, hogs, and other animals 

ultimately destined to provide meat for human consumption were 

slaughtered in fiscal year 2007, at some 700 federally inspected slaughter

facilities throughout the United States. The Food Safety and Inspection 

Service (FSIS), within USDA, is responsible for enforcing the Humane 

Methods of Slaughter Act (HMSA), which prohibits the slaughtering of 

animals, or the handling of animals in connection with slaughtering, unless 

it is humane. However, the recently documented inhumane treatment of 

disabled cows slaughtered at the Westland/Hallmark plant in California 

and the entry of their meat into the market calls into question FSIS’s 

enforcement of the act. In particular, federal regulations prohibit 

companies from processing and selling meat from disabled 

(nonambulatory) cows without explicit FSIS inspector approval. 

Nonambulatory cows raise particular concerns because they have a higher 

probability of being infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy,

commonly known as mad cow disease. 

In 2004, we reported that FSIS was not adequately recording instances of 

noncompliance with HMSA, and thus could not assure the Congress that it 

was fully enforcing the act at federally inspected slaughter facilities.1

Specifically, we found the following:

• Incomplete and inconsistent inspection records made it difficult to 

determine the frequency and scope of humane handling and slaughter 

violations. Those inspection records showed that inspectors did not 

always document violations of HMSA and that when they did, the 

inspectors did not consistently document the scope and severity of each

incident. Enforcement actions to address noncompliance with the act and 

regulations were also inconsistent. 

• FSIS officials were not using consistent criteria to suspend plant 

operations. As a result, plants in different FSIS districts were not subject 

to comparable enforcement actions.

 1

GAO, Humane Methods of Slaughter Act: USDA Has Addressed Some Problems but Still 

Faces Enforcement Challenges, GAO-04-247 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004). 

Page 1 GAO-08-686T 
• FSIS lacked detailed information on how much time its inspectors spent 

on humane handling and slaughter activities, making it difficult to 

determine if the number of inspectors is adequate. In general, FSIS 

officials believed that, with the introduction of a District Veterinary 

Medical Specialist (DVMS) in 2002 at each of the agency’s field offices, the 

number of personnel devoted to humane handling and slaughter 

compliance was adequate. 

Our 2004 report did not specifically assess FSIS’s effectiveness in 

enforcing the humane handling and slaughtering provisions of HMSA, such

as those related to the Westland/Hallmark incident. 

In this context, my testimony today focuses on (1) GAO’s 2004 report on

the frequency and scope of reported HMSA violations and enforcement 

actions by USDA, (2) trends in staffing and funding for USDA food 

inspections, and (3) GAO’s designation of federal oversight of food safety 

to its High-Risk Series. 

In summary, I would like to make three observations. First, FSIS has taken 

actions to address the recommendations we made in our 2004 report to 

improve its reporting of humane handling and slaughter methods at 

federally inspected facilities. These recommendations principally dealt 

with weaknesses in FSIS’s internal reporting of the frequency and scope of 

HMSA violations. However, without further evaluation and public 

reporting to enhance transparency and accountability, we do not know the 

effectiveness of these actions. 

Second, although the FSIS budget has increased since 1988, staffing levels 

have declined since 1995, and some districts have experienced high 

vacancy rates among inspectors, possibly impairing enforcement of HMSA 

and food safety regulations generally. Meanwhile, the volume of meat and 

poultry inspected and passed by FSIS has grown, along with the number of 

pounds of recalled meat and poultry. Staff levels are expected to rise 

slightly in 2008 as FSIS fills vacant positions. 

Third, USDA’s FSIS is only 1 of 15 agencies that collectively administer at 

least 30 laws related to food safety. This fragmentation is the key reason

GAO added the federal oversight of food safety to its High-Risk Series in 

2007 and called for a governmentwide reexamination of the food safety 

system.2

 The fragmentation results in federal resources for food safety 

 2

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007). 

Page 2 GAO-08-686T 
being directed to multiple agencies. For example, the majority of federal

expenditures for food safety inspection were directed toward USDA’s 

programs for ensuring the safety of meat, poultry, and egg products, even

though USDA is responsible for regulating only about 20 percent of the 

food supply.

This testimony is based on new and previously issued work. To analyze 

trends in FSIS resources, we examined personnel and funding data from 

FSIS and the Office of Management and Budget for the past 20 years and 

determined they were sufficiently reliable for our analyses. To provide 

updated information on our previously issued reports, we interviewed 

FSIS officials and gathered information on the status of our 

recommendations. We conducted our work from April 2 through April 14, 

2008, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. These standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

The Congress passed the Humane Slaughter Act in 1958 following intense 

and broad-based public concerns about cruelty and abuse of livestock in 

meat-packing plants. At that time, the Congress determined that using 

humane methods of slaughter prevented the needless suffering of 

livestock, resulted in safer and better working conditions for employees, 

and brought about improvements in products and economies of slaughter 

operations, among other benefits. However, the act was limited to federal 

government agencies, which were required to contract for or procure meat 

products only from producers and processors that employed humane 

slaughtering methods in all of their plants. In 1978, the Congress passed 

HMSA, which required that all federally inspected slaughter 

establishments adopt humane handling and slaughter methods. 

FSIS has issued regulations and directives to enforce the act. Important 

requirements of these regulations and guidance include the following: 

Background 

• Animals stunned before slaughter must be rapidly and effectively rendered

insensible before they are slaughtered. Stunning is effective when the 

animal feels no pain, is rendered instantly unconscious, and remains 

unconscious until slaughtered. 

Page 3 GAO-08-686T 
• Dragging of disabled and other animals unable to move while conscious is 

prohibited.

• All holding pens and driveways and ramps must be designed, built, 

and maintained to prevent injury to livestock. 

• Livestock should be provided with access to water in holding pens, and 

food if held for more than 24 hours.

• The use of electrical prods and other devices to move livestock must not 

be excessive. 

FSIS is responsible for ensuring compliance with HMSA. FSIS is also 

responsible for ensuring the safety of most meat, poultry, and processed 

egg products at federally inspected facilities. Currently, FSIS employs inplant about 7,800 inspectors—that is, public health veterinarians, food 

inspectors, and consumer safety inspectors. These inspectors work 

collaboratively, and are responsible for inspecting animals prior to 

slaughter, as well as the carcasses after slaughter, in order to ensure the 

food is safe for human consumption. According to FSIS officials, as 

inspectors carry out their food safety and other activities, they are 

responsible for monitoring compliance with humane handling and 

slaughter requirements at plants that are covered by HMSA. According to

FSIS, while HMSA requires inspectors to observe the entire handling and 

slaughter process, inspectors do not have to observe all animals all the 

time for HMSA compliance. 

When inspectors observe a violation of HMSA or its implementing 

regulations, they are required to notify plant management and document 

the violation.

In response to HMSA noncompliance, FSIS can take a number 

of enforcement actions, which impose restrictions on a facility’s ability to

operate, including the following: 

• For less serious violations of HMSA, inspectors at a facility can issue a 

“reject tag” to quickly respond to violations that are limited in scope. 

Inspectors place these reject tags on a piece of equipment or an area of the

plant, prohibiting use until the violation is corrected. 

• For more serious violations, the district manager can suspend inspection

until violations are addressed. This usually results in suspended 

operations at the facility (or part of the facility) because without federal 

Page 4 GAO-08-686T 
inspections the facility’s products are prevented from entering interstate 

and foreign commerce. 

In the rare cases where a plant fails to respond to FSIS concerns about 

repeated or serious violations, the administrator of FSIS can withdraw 

inspection. This removes the grant of inspection from a facility, preventing

its products from entering interstate and foreign commerce. The facility 

must reapply for and be awarded a grant of inspection before federal 

inspections may resume. 

In 2004, we identified weaknesses in FSIS’s regulations and guidance for 

recording compliance with HMSA in key areas: (1) the frequency and

scope of humane handling and slaughter violations, and (2) actions to 

enforce compliance with humane handling and slaughter provisions. FSIS 

has taken steps to improve its reporting of humane handling and slaughter

violations. However, although the Congress has urged USDA to report 

annually on violations and trends in compliance, USDA has not issued 

such a report since March 2003. Such public reporting can enhance 

transparency. 

In 2004, we reported that incomplete and inconsistent FSIS inspection 

records made it difficult to determine the frequency and scope of humane 

handling and slaughter violations. Available FSIS records showed that 

during the 28 months between January 2001 and March 2003, inspectors 

wrote 553 noncompliance records to document violations of HMSA and 

the implementing regulations at 272 facilities across the United States. 

According to these inspection records, ineffective stunning, which does 

not quickly render animals insensible to pain, and in many cases results in 

a conscious animal reaching slaughter, was the most prevalent type of

noncompliance. To a lesser extent, the records showed incidents of, in 

declining order of prevalence: poor facility conditions, failure to provide 

water to animals awaiting slaughter, excessive force, and excessive use of

electric prods. However, in conducting this analysis, we found internal 

control problems that call into question the reliability of FSIS records 

regarding compliance with the act. First, because the agency had not 

stored its noncompliance records in electronic form, it could not provide 

us with at least 44 of the 553 records from January 2001 through March 

2003. Second, almost half of the DVMSs we interviewed at the time of our 

review reported that inspectors did not always document noncompliance 

when they should have because they were unsure about regulatory 

requirements. Third, the noncompliance records did not consistently 

document the scope and severity of violations. For example, some 

FSIS Has Taken 

Actions Intended to 

Improve Its Records 

on Humane Slaughter 

Violations, but Public 

Reporting Can 

Enhance 

Transparency 

Page 5 GAO-08-686T 
noncompliance records mentioned that ineffective stunning occurred, but 

did not provide the cause of the violation or the number of animals 

affected. 

We also reported FSIS took inconsistent enforcement actions to address 

noncompliance with HMSA. Inspectors stationed in slaughter plants had 

not consistently issued reject tags, which temporarily halt operations in all 

or part of a plant. Several of the DVMSs we interviewed attributed the 

inconsistent enforcement actions to inspectors’ inexperience, lack of 

clarity regarding their authority, or the misperception that certain 

violations were minor. We found similar inconsistencies at the district 

management level. District managers can decide to take the more serious 

enforcement action of withdrawing inspectors from the plant, most likely 

suspending a plant’s operations, when they are notified of serious 

violations. However, they lacked clear criteria on when to do so, which 

can lead to inconsistent enforcement. We found, for example, one case in

which a district manager did not suspend inspections after inspectors had 

issued 16 noncompliance records to a slaughter facility documenting the 

plant’s failure to properly stun animals. In contrast, another 

facility’s failure to provide access to water and to maintain acceptable 

pen conditions led to a suspension of operations. As a result, FSIS could 

not ensure that humane slaughter requirements are consistently 

enforced across districts, a fact that undermines FSIS efforts to enforce 

the act. 

To provide more useful information and to help strengthen oversight of 

HMSA, we recommended in 2004 that the Secretary of Agriculture direct 

FSIS to (1) include in noncompliance records specific information on the 

type and cause of violations, (2) establish additional criteria for when 

districts are to take enforcement actions in cases of repetitive violations, 

and (3) require that district offices and inspectors clearly document the 

basis for enforcement actions that they take in response to 

repetitive violations, among others. In response to these recommendations 

FSIS took steps intended to strengthen its oversight of humane handling 

and slaughter methods at federally inspected facilities. In particular, it has 

issued additional guidance to its district offices and inspectors to assist 

them in determining when to take enforcement actions for repeated 

violations. The guidance includes, among other things: 

• categories for the types and causes of humane handling and slaughter 

violations to be reported on noncompliance records; 

Page 6 GAO-08-686T 
• questions inspection personnel should use to assist them in determining 

when a noncompliance trend exists; and 

• examples of noncompliance activities affecting an animal’s safety or 

constituting inhumane treatment of an egregious nature that would 

warrant immediate enforcement by inspection personnel. 

Although the agency’s actions were responsive to our recommendations, 

without further evaluation, we do not know the effectiveness of these 

actions. 

Finally, FSIS has not reported annually on trends in compliance with 

humane slaughter methods, as urged by the Congress, and its most recent 

data on violations were incomplete. Public reporting is the means through 

which the federal government communicates the results of its work to the 

Congress and the American people. Such reporting is in the public interest

and promotes transparency in government operations. In 2002, the 

Congress urged the Secretary of Agriculture to fully enforce the Humane 

Methods of Slaughter Act and report annually to the Congress on the 

number of violations and trends recorded by FSIS inspectors.3

 According 

to FSIS officials, in response to the Congress and as part of its annual 

appropriations process, USDA has provided the House and Senate 

appropriations committees information on the number of suspensions as 

well as general information on HMSA activities. However, in recent years, 

USDA has not reported to the Congress on the number of violations and 

trends recorded by its inspectors. In its most recent report, in March 2003, 

USDA indicated to the Congress that during fiscal year 2002, “very few 

infractions were for actual inhumane treatment of the animals.” However, 

we identified shortcomings in the data used to make this finding. At the 

time of our review, officials told us that the statement was based on a 

sample of approximately half of the noncompliance records available. In 

contrast, our analysis of all of the noncompliance records FSIS provided 

for fiscal year 2002 showed that one-fourth of the 366 noncompliance 

incidents documented by inspectors were for incidents of ineffective 

stunning which fails to meet humane standards in USDA regulations. Lack 

of complete and consistent data can make it difficult for FSIS to accurately

assess compliance with the act, and prevents transparency in the reporting 

of violations. 

 3

Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-171, Section 10305 116 Stat. 

134, 493. 

Page 7 GAO-08-686T 
Unlike the budgets of other federal agencies responsible for food safety, 

the budget for FSIS has seen a marked increase since 1988. As shown in 

figure 1, the agency’s budget authority increased from $392 million in fiscal 

year 1988 to $930 million in fiscal year 2008, or 137 percent. When adjusted 

for inflation, the increase is about 47 percent. 

FSIS’s Budget Has 

Increased as Staffing 

Has Declined 

Figure 1: FSIS Budget Authority, Fiscal Years 1988 through 2008 

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1,000

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Dollars in millions

Source: GAO’s analysis of Budget of the U.S. government data.

Fiscal year

Constant dollars

Nominal dollars

The Administration’s proposed fiscal year 2009 budget calls for an increase 

in FSIS’s funding to $952 million. When adjusted for inflation, the 

proposed increase is about $4 million, or 0.5 percent. 

While FSIS’s budget authority has significantly increased since the late

1980s, the number of FSIS employees has declined. As shown in figure 2,

from fiscal year 1995 to fiscal year 2007, the number of full-time employees 

at FSIS fell from about 9,600 to about 9,200, or 4 percent. Vacancy rates 

across FSIS have declined to about 7 percent, and for its inspector 

positions vacancies have declined to about 4 percent. However, 2 of the 

agency’s 15 districts—Boulder and Des Moines—reported vacancy rates

among their inspector positions of about 22 percent and 11 percent, 

Page 8 GAO-08-686T 
respectively. As the figure also shows, staff levels are expected to rise 

slightly in 2008 as FSIS fills vacant positions. Agency officials noted the 

overall decline is due, in part, to consolidation in the meat industry, 

resulting in fewer facilities, and the introduction of the Hazard Analysis 

and Critical Control Point system, which is a risk-based effort to reduce 

food contamination. 

Figure 2: FSIS Staff Levels, Fiscal Years 1988 through 2008 

9,000

0

9,100

9,200

9,300

9,400

9,500

9,600

9,700

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Number of full-time employees

Source: Budget of the U.S. government.

Fiscal year

Note: Data for 2008 are estimated.

Furthermore, in 2004 we reported FSIS did not have data on the number of 

inspectors devoted to compliance with HMSA or on the amount of time 

that inspectors spend on humane handling and slaughter requirements. 

Without such information, FSIS could not determine the appropriate 

number of inspectors for different-sized plants or the number of inspectors 

needed overall to effectively enforce the act.

We recommended that FSIS (1) develop a mechanism for determining the 

level of resources that the agency devotes to humane handling and 

Page 9 GAO-08-686T 
slaughter activities, (2) develop criteria for determining the appropriate 

level of inspection resources, and (3) periodically assess whether that 

level is sufficient to effectively enforce the act. In response to these 

recommendations, FSIS took steps intended to improve its monitoring of 

resources needed to ensure compliance with HMSA. Specifically, FSIS 

• implemented a system that tracks inspectors’ time spent verifying that 

humane handling and slaughter requirements are met, 

• developed policy that instructs FSIS managers to use data on the amount 

of time devoted to humane handling and slaughter activities to assist in 

inspection resource planning, and 

• established performance measures and targets to compare against time 

spent on daily activities to enforce compliance with HMSA. 

Again, these actions were responsive to our recommendations, but 

without further evaluation, we do not know the effectiveness of these 

actions. 

Although not directly pertaining to FSIS’s enforcement of HMSA, the 

quantity of meat and poultry inspected by the agency, as well as the 

quantity of meat and poultry recalled, identifies some of the current 

challenges the agency faces. Meat and poultry consumption in the United

States has increased sharply. As shown in figure 3, the quantity of meat 

and poultry inspected and approved by the agency has increased from 

about 65 billion pounds in 1988 to more than 100 billion pounds in 2007. 

Much of the increase is due to the expanding U.S. poultry market. 

Page 10 GAO-08-686T 
Figure 3: Meat and Poultry Inspected and Passed by FSIS, Fiscal Years 1988 through 2008 

Pounds in billions

Fiscal year

Poultry

Meat

Source: Budget of the U.S. government.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Note: Data for 2008 are estimated.

Although the number of recalls has declined in recent years, the quantity

of meat and poultry recalled has increased sharply. Meat and poultry 

product recalls declined from 125 in 2002 to 58 in 2007. However, 2 of the 6 

biggest meat recalls in U.S. history have occurred in the past 6 months. In 

October 2007, Topps Meat Company LLC announced the recall of 22 

million pounds of ground beef used for frozen hamburgers due to E. coli 

contamination. At the time, the Topps recall was the fifth largest in U.S. 

history. The E. coli-contaminated meat sickened at least 32 people in eight 

states. On February 17, 2008, Westland/Hallmark Meat Company 

announced the recall of more than 143 million pounds of beef, the largest 

recall in U.S. history. The quantity of meat and poultry recalled has 

increased from 5 million pounds in 1994, the first year for which data were

readily available, to 145 million in just the first quarter of March 2008. 

Page 11 GAO-08-686T 
While today’s hearing focuses specifically on FSIS’s responsibilities for the 

oversight of food safety, it is important to note that FSIS is 1 of 15 federal

agencies that collectively administer at least 30 laws related to food safety. 

This fragmentation is a key reason we designated federal oversight of food 

safety as a high-risk area. Primary responsibility for food safety lies with 

USDA—which has oversight responsibility for meat, poultry, and 

processed egg products—and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—

which is responsible for the safety of virtually all other foods. In addition, 

among other agencies, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in 

the Department of Commerce conducts voluntary, fee-for-service 

inspections of seafood safety and quality; the Environmental Protection 

Agency (EPA) regulates the use of pesticides and maximum allowable 

residue levels on food commodities and animal feed; and the Department 

of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating agencies’ food 

security activities. This federal regulatory system for food safety, like 

many other federal programs and policies, evolved piecemeal, typically in 

response to particular health threats or economic crises. 

Federal Oversight of 

Food Safety Is a HighRisk Area that Needs 

Governmentwide 

Reexamination 

In 2007, we added the federal oversight of food safety to our High-Risk 

Series,4

 which is intended to raise the priority and visibility of government 

programs that are in need of broad-based transformation to achieve 

greater economy, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and 

sustainability. Over the past 30 years, we have reported on issues—for 

example, the need to transform the federal oversight framework to reduce 

risks to public health as well as the economy—that suggest that the federal 

oversight of food safety could be designated as a high-risk area. The 

fragmented nature of the federal food oversight system suggests the 

government could plan more strategically to inspect food production 

processes, identify and react more quickly to outbreaks of foodborne 

illnesses, and focus on promoting the safety and integrity of the nation’s 

food supply.

While we have reported on problems with the federal food safety system—

including inconsistent oversight, ineffective coordination, and inefficient

use of resources—most noteworthy for today’s hearing is that federal 

expenditures for the oversight of food safety have not kept pace with the 

volume of foods regulated by the agencies or consumed by the public. We 

have reported that four agencies—USDA, FDA, EPA, and NMFS—spent a 

 4

GAO-07-310. 

Page 12 GAO-08-686T 
total of $1.7 billion on food safety-related activities in fiscal year 2003.5

USDA and FDA were responsible for nearly 90 percent of those federal 

expenditures. However, the majority of federal expenditures for food 

safety inspection were directed toward USDA’s programs for meat, 

poultry, and egg products even though those programs cover only about 20 

percent of the food supply. In contrast, FDA accounted for only 24 percent 

of expenditures even though it is responsible for regulating about 80 

percent of the food supply. 

Others have called for fundamental changes to the federal food safety 

system overall. In 1998, the National Academy of Sciences’ National 

Institute of Medicine concluded that the system is not well equipped to 

meet emerging challenges.

6

 In response to the academy’s report, the 

President established a Council on Food Safety, which released a Food 

Safety Strategic Plan in January 2001. The plan recognized the need for a

comprehensive food safety statute and concluded, “the current

organizational structure makes it more difficult to achieve future 

improvements in efficiency, efficacy, and allocation of resources based on

risk.” 

Taken as a whole, our work indicates that the Congress and the executive 

branch can and should create the environment needed to look across the 

activities of individual programs within specific agencies, including USDA, 

and toward the goals that the federal government is trying to achieve. To 

that end, we have recommended, among other things, that the Congress 

enact comprehensive, uniform, and risk-based food safety legislation and 

commission the National Academy of Sciences or a blue-ribbon panel to 

conduct a detailed analysis of alternative organizational food safety 

structures. We have also recommended that the executive branch 

reconvene the President’s Council on Food Safety to facilitate interagency 

coordination on food safety regulation and programs. According to 

documents on the council’s Web site, the current administration has not 

reconvened the council.

These actions can begin to address the fragmentation in the federal 

oversight of food safety. Going forward, to build a sustained focus on the 

 5

GAO, Overseeing the U.S. Food Supply: Steps Should be Taken to Reduce Overlapping 

Inspections and Related Activities, GAO-05-549T (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005). 

6

National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Ensuring Safe Food from 

Production to Consumption (Washington, D.C.: 1998). 

Page 13 GAO-08-686T 
safety and integrity of the nation’s food supply, the Congress and the 

executive branch can develop expectations for food safety and follow up 

with congressional oversight and strategic planning by agencies, including

USDA. We have previously reported that a governmentwide performance 

plan that is mission based and results oriented would help ensure agency 

goals are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Furthermore, this plan 

would help decision makers balance trade-offs and compare performance 

when making resource allocations and restructuring decisions. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions that you or Members of the subcommittee may 

have. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this testimony. For further 

information about this testimony, please contact Lisa Shames, Director, 

Natural Resources and Environment (202) 512-3841 or shamesl@gao.gov. 

Key contributors to this testimony were Thomas Cook, Assistant Director; 

Kevin Bray; Mary Denigan-Macauley; Leslie Mahagan; Ben Shouse; Carol 

Herrnstadt Shulman; and Tyra Thompson. 

Page 14 GAO-08-686T (360951) 
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