United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, 

Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and 

Integration, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Efforts Are Helping 

to Address Some Challenges 

Faced by State and Local 

Fusion Centers 

Statement of Eileen R. Larence, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Thursday, April 17, 2008

 

GAO-08-636T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 17, 2008

HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Efforts Are Helping to Address Some 

Challenges Faced by State and Local Fusion Centers

Highlights of GAO-08-636T, a testimony 

before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on 

State, Local, and Private Sector 

Preparedness and Integration, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, U.S. Senate 

Following the September 11 

terrorist attacks, state and local 

governments formed fusion

centers, collaborative efforts to

detect, prevent, investigate, and 

respond to criminal or terrorist 

activity. Recognizing that the 

centers are a critical mechanism 

for sharing information, the federal 

government—including the 

Department of Homeland Security

(DHS), Department of Justice 

(DOJ), and the Program Manager 

for the Information Sharing 

Environment (PM-ISE), which has 

primary responsibility for 

governmentwide information 

sharing—is taking steps to partner 

with fusion centers.

This testimony focuses on (1) the

characteristics of fusion centers as 

of September 2007 and (2) federal 

efforts to help alleviate challenges

centers identified. This testimony is 

based on GAO’s October 2007 

report on 58 fusion centers and

related federal efforts to support 

them as well as updated 

information GAO obtained in

March 2008 by reviewing plans 

describing selected federal efforts 

and attending the second annual

national fusion center conference. 

What GAO Recommends

While this testimony contains no 

new recommendations, GAO has 

recommended that the federal

government define and articulate 

its long-term fusion center role and 

whether it expects to provide 

resources to help ensure their 

sustainability. PM-ISE agreed with 

the recommendation and is in the 

process of implementing it.

Almost all states and several local governments have established or are in the 

process of establishing fusion centers that vary in their characteristics. 

Centers were generally established to address gaps in information sharing, 

and the majority of the centers GAO contacted had adopted broad missions 

that could include both counterterrorism and law enforcement–related 

information. While law enforcement entities, such as state police, are the lead

or managing agencies in the majority of the centers GAO contacted, the 

centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies. The 

majority of the operational fusion centers GAO contacted had federal

personnel, including from DHS or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 

assigned to them as of September 2007. 

DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address challenges 

fusion center officials identified. 

• DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers access to their 

information systems, but fusion center officials cited challenges accessing 

and managing multiple information systems. 

• Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and 

local personnel and set timeliness goals for granting clearances. However, 

officials cited challenges obtaining and using clearances. 

• DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have also taken steps to develop guidance and 

provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by issuing 

guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, officials at 21

centers cited challenges with the availability of training for missionspecific issues. DHS and DOJ have continued providing a technical 

assistance program for fusion centers and disseminated a baseline 

capabilities draft in March 2008 that outlines minimum operational 

standards for fusion centers. While this support and guidance is 

promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to which it will address 

challenges identified by officials contacted. 

• Finally, officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing 

challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 centers 

reported challenges with funding, some of which affected these centers’ 

sustainability. To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have 

assigned, and continue to assign, personnel to the centers. To help 

address funding issues, DHS has provided funding for fusion-center 

related activities. 

The National Strategy for Information Sharing, issued in October 2007 by the 

President, states that the federal government will support the establishment of 

fusion centers and help sustain them through grant funding, technical 

assistance, and training. However, some fusion center officials raised 

concerns about how specifically the federal government was planning to 

assist state and local governments to sustain fusion centers as it works to 

incorporate fusion centers into the ISE and to implement the strategy. To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-636T. 

For more information, contact Eileen Larence 

at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today’s hearing on fusion 

centers. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, most states and several

local governments have established fusion centers to address gaps in 

homeland security and law enforcement information sharing by the federal 

government and to provide a conduit of this information within the state. 

While fusion centers vary, reflecting differences in state and local needs, 

the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

(9/11 Commission Act) defines a fusion center as a “collaborative effort of

two or more federal, state, local, or tribal government agencies that 

combine resources, expertise, or information with the goal of maximizing 

the ability of such agencies to detect, prevent, investigate, apprehend, and

respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”1

With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing 

factor in the nation’s lack of preparedness for the September 11 attacks, a 

number of information-sharing initiatives were mandated in the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence 

Reform Act). For example, the Intelligence Reform Act, as amended in 

August 2007 by the 9/11 Commission Act, requires the President to take

action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism-related information by 

establishing an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) to combine 

policies, procedures, and technologies that link people, systems, and 

information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal entities 

and the private sector. 2 To oversee development and implementation of 

the ISE, the act also required the President to appoint a program manager, 

which the President did in April 2005.3

The Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE), the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) are taking steps to 

partner with fusion centers as part of the information sharing 

environment. In November 2006, the PM-ISE issued a plan for 

implementing the ISE that incorporated presidentially approved 

recommendations for federal, state, local, and private-sector information 

 1

Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. 266, 322 (2007). 

2

See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004), amended by Pub. L. No. 110-

53, § 504, 121 Stat. at 313-17. 

3

On June 2, 2005, the President issued a memorandum placing the PM-ISE and its staff 

within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

Page 1 GAO-08-636T 
sharing. The implementation plan acknowledges that the collaboration 

between fusion centers and with the federal government marks a

tremendous increase in the nation’s overall analytic capacity that can be 

used to combat terrorism, and it identifies the creation of an integrated 

nationwide network of fusion centers as a way to promote two-way 

information sharing with the federal government. Under the plan, DHS and 

DOJ are to assume responsibility for technical assistance and training to 

support fusion centers. Both DHS and DOJ have established program 

offices to oversee their relationships with fusion centers. In October 2007, 

the President issued the first National Strategy for Information Sharing: 

Success and Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information 

Sharing (National Strategy), which further highlights the importance of 

state and local fusion centers as valuable information-sharing resources to 

be incorporated into the national information sharing framework. 

In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions related to 

fusion centers.4

 For example, in accordance with the act, DHS established 

a fusion center program office. This office is responsible for providing 

operational and intelligence advice and assistance to fusion centers, 

facilitating coordination and information flow between fusion centers and 

DHS, and deploying DHS personnel to fusion centers. In addition, the act 

requires that the Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the Attorney 

General, establish guidelines for fusion centers that include standards 

related to privacy policies and training. 

My testimony today discusses (1) the characteristics of state and local 

fusion centers as of September 20075

 and (2) the extent to which efforts 

under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ are helping to address some of 

the challenges identified by fusion centers. My statement is based on 

(1) the results of our October 2007 report6 that discusses the status and 

characteristics of 58 state and local fusion centers as well as federal 

efforts underway to help address challenges the centers identified; and 

(2) updated information we obtained in March 2008 about selected federal 

 4

See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110-53 § 511, 121 Stat. at 317-24 (adding section 210A to subtitle A,

title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135). 

5

For purposes of this report, we use “local fusion center” to refer to centers established by 

major urban areas, counties, cities, and intrastate regions. 

6

GAO, Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges

Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers, GAO-08-35 (Washington,

D.C.: Oct. 30, 2007). 

Page 2 GAO-08-636T 
efforts to support fusion centers.7

 To obtain updated information, we 

reviewed plans and documents describing these federal efforts and 

attended the second annual national fusion center conference.8

 We 

conducted this work according to generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Fusion centers, which vary in their characteristics, are operating or being

established in almost all states and several local jurisdictions across the 

country. Specifically, officials in many (43 of 58) of the fusion centers we 

contacted described their centers as operational as of September 2007.9

These centers were generally created by state and local governments to 

improve information sharing across levels of government and to prevent 

terrorism or other threats. While 9 of these operational centers had 

opened within the couple of years after September 11, 2001, 34 had opened 

since January 2004. The majority of the centers had scopes of operations 

and missions that included more than just counterterrorism-related 

activities, such as a focus on all crimes or all hazards. Adopting a broader 

focus helped provide information about all threats and increased the 

center’s sustainability, for instance, by including additional stakeholders 

who could provide staff and support, and is consistent with the definition 

of a fusion center in the 9/11 Commission Act. Law enforcement entities, 

such as state police, were the lead or managing agencies in the majority of 

the operational centers we contacted. While the centers varied in their 

Summary 

 7

Because we selected a non-probability sample of fusion centers to include in our review, 

the results of our work are not generalizable to the population of all fusion centers.

However, because we selected all state-operated fusion centers, as well as local fusion 

centers on the basis of their stage of development and geographic diversity, the 

information we gathered from these centers provided us with an overview of challenges 

encountered and federal efforts to support the centers.

8

Over 900 federal, state, and local law enforcement and homeland security officials 

attended the conference, according to its sponsors, which included the Office of the 

Director of National Intelligence, DOJ, DHS, FBI, PM-ISE, and the Global Justice 

Information Sharing Initiative. 

9

We contacted all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local areas. However, 1 state did 

not plan a fusion center. For that reason, we reported responses from 58 fusion centers—

43 operational and 15 in the planning or early stages of development. 

Page 3 GAO-08-636T 
staff sizes and partnerships with other agencies, as of September 2007, at

least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted reported that 

they had federal personnel assigned to their centers. Twelve of the centers 

were colocated with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) field units. 

Many of the operational centers reported having access to unclassified 

and, to a lesser extent, classified DHS and FBI systems and networks. 

Thus far, products disseminated and services provided varied from daily 

bulletins to in-depth reports or assessments. 

We reported in October 2007 that fusion centers face challenges in several

areas and that—in light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating 

information sharing among levels of government—federal efforts are 

under way that begin to address these challenges.

10 As of March 2008, 

many of these efforts are still ongoing. 

• DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to provide fusion centers 

access to federal information systems, but some fusion center officials 

cited challenges accessing relevant, actionable information and managing 

multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems. For example, 

officials in 30 of the 58 centers we contacted reported challenges related 

to volume of information or managing multiple systems. As a result, these 

center officials said that their ability to receive and share information with 

those who need it may be limited. Ongoing efforts to improve the quality

and flow of information include the Interagency Threat Assessment and 

Coordination Group’s efforts to provide a nonfederal perspective to the 

intelligence community and its products. 

• Both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances to numerous state and 

local officials and have set timeliness goals for the issuance of new 

clearances. However, obtaining and using security clearances represented 

a challenge for 44 of the 58 centers we contacted, which could limit their 

ability to access and use some information. In addition, while law and 

executive order provide that a security clearance granted by one federal

agency should generally be accepted by other agencies, officials in 19 of 

the centers encountered difficulties with federal agencies, particularly 

DHS and the FBI, accepting each others’ clearances. DHS and DOJ 

officials reported that they were not aware of recent fusion center 

challenges with reciprocity of clearances. However, they said that there 

were complications in the clearance process, for instance, because several

 10We presented information about challenges encountered by 58 fusion centers—those in 

all stages of development—as they were establishing and operating their centers. Fusion 

centers may have encountered more than one challenge related to a particular area, for 

example, related to guidance and training. 

Page 4 GAO-08-636T 
federal agencies conduct their own processes without central 

coordination. 

• Fusion center officials also cited challenges obtaining guidance and 

training. In particular, they cited the need for clearer and more specific 

guidance in a variety of areas, including standards for analyst training and 

information-sharing policies and procedures, to help address operational 

challenges. DHS, DOJ, along with the PM-ISE, continue to take steps to 

develop guidance and provide technical assistance and training. For 

instance, DHS and DOJ disseminated a draft baseline capabilities 

document that outlines minimum operational standards for fusion centers

to state and local officials in March 2008 for feedback. 

• Notwithstanding DHS and FBI efforts to deploy personnel to fusion 

centers and DHS’s grant funding to support their establishment and 

enhancement, fusion center officials reported challenges obtaining and 

retaining qualified personnel and ensuring sufficient funding to sustain the 

centers. To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, 

in our October 2007 report we recommended—and DHS and the PM-ISE 

concurred—that the federal government determine and articulate its longterm fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to 

centers to help ensure their sustainability. The National Strategy, issued by 

the President in October 2007, states that the federal government will 

support the establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through 

grant funding, technical assistance, and training. However, some fusion 

center officials raised concerns at the national conference about how 

specifically the federal government plans to assist state and local 

governments to sustain fusion centers as it works to incorporate these 

centers into the ISE and to implement the strategy. 

Almost all states and several local governments have established or are in

the process of establishing a fusion center. Specifically, officials in 43 of 

the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational, 

and officials in 15 centers considered their centers to be in the planning or

early stages of development as of September 2007. Officials cited a variety 

of reasons why their state or local area established a fusion center. To 

improve information sharing—related to homeland security, terrorism, 

and law enforcement—among federal, state, and local entities and to 

prevent terrorism or threats after the attacks of September 11 were the 

most frequently cited reasons for establishing a fusion center. Several

officials cited the need to enhance information sharing within their own 

jurisdictions across disciplines as the reason why they established a 

center. While 9 centers opened in the couple of years after the attacks of 

September 11, 2001, 34 of the 43 operational centers have opened since 

January 2004 as shown in figure 1. 

Most States and 

Several Local 

Jurisdictions Have or 

Are Planning Fusion 

Centers That Vary in 

Their Characteristics 

Page 5 GAO-08-636T 
Figure 1: Number of Operational Fusion Centers GAO Contacted Opened by Year 

Consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act’s definition of a fusion center

and the purpose of a fusion center, as defined in the Fusion Center 

Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers we contacted said 

that their scopes of operations focused on more than just 

counterterrorism. For instance, officials in 22 of these centers described 

their centers’ scope as all crimes or all crimes and counterterrorism, and 

officials in 19 operational centers said that their scopes of operations 

included all-hazards information (such as related to public health and 

safety or emergency response). Further, 23 of the 36 operational fusion 

centers that provided us mission statements had missions that involved

collecting, analyzing, and disseminating criminal as well as terrorismrelated information. Eleven other fusion centers had missions that 

involved enhancing, supporting, or coordinating information and 

intelligence dissemination to both law enforcement and homeland security 

agencies. Officials told us that adopting a broader focus helped provide 

information about all threats because of the link of many crimes to 

terrorist activity and also increased the centers’ sustainability, for 

instance, by including additional stakeholders. Indeed, the National 

Strategy highlights the importance of the centers fostering a culture that 

Page 6 GAO-08-636T 
recognizes the importance of fusing “all crimes with national security 

implications” and “all hazards” information, which often involves 

identifying criminal activity and other information that might be a 

precursor to a terrorist plot. 

Law enforcement entities, such as state police or state bureaus of 

investigation, were the lead or managing agencies in the majority of the 

operational centers we contacted. The centers varied in their staff sizes 

and partnerships with other agencies, ranging from fewer than 5 

employees to over 80. In addition to a variety of state and local law 

enforcement agencies, some centers included personnel detailed from 

emergency management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners. As 

of September 2007, at least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we 

contacted reported that they had personnel from at least one federal 

agency assigned to their centers. For example, DHS had deployed full-time 

intelligence officers to 17 of the 43 operational fusion centers we 

contacted and was in the process of staffing 8 additional centers. About 

three quarters of the operational centers we contacted reported that the 

FBI had assigned personnel, including intelligence analysts and special 

agents, to their centers. Additionally, 12 of the operational centers we 

contacted were colocated in an FBI field office or with an FBI task force, 

such as a Joint Terrorism Task Force or a Field Intelligence Group. 

Further, 19 of the operational centers reported that they had other DHS or 

DOJ components represented in their centers, such as personnel from 

Customs and Border Protection; Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 

Transportation Security Administration; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms; or Drug Enforcement Administration. 

Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS’s and DOJ’s 

unclassified networks or systems, such as the Homeland Security 

Information Network (HSIN) and Law Enforcement Online (LEO), 

containing, among other things, terrorism-related information.11 For 

example, as of September 2007, 40 of the 43 operational centers reported 

they had access to HSIN, and 39 reported having access to LEO. In 

addition, 16 of the 43 centers said they had or were in the process of 

obtaining access to DHS’s classified network of secret-level homeland 

 11HSIN serves as DHS’s primary nationwide information-sharing tool for communicating 

sensitive but unclassified homeland security information. LEO serves as a real-time online 

controlled-access communications and information-sharing data repository for sensitive 

but unclassified information about, among other things, antiterrorism, intelligence, law 

enforcement, and criminal justice. 

Page 7 GAO-08-636T 
security data, and 23 reported they had or were in the process of obtaining

access to the FBI’s classified systems containing, among other things, 

secret-level investigative case files. 

Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also varied. Fusion

centers reported that they issued a variety of products, such as daily and 

weekly bulletins on general criminal or intelligence information and 

assessments that, in general, provided in-depth reporting on an emerging 

threat, group, or crime. 

Fusion center officials identified challenges in establishing and operating 

their centers in several areas, such as accessing and managing multiple 

information systems, obtaining and using security clearances, finding 

sufficient guidance and training, obtaining and retaining personnel, and

obtaining funding. DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion 

centers in information sharing, have efforts under way that begin to 

address many of these challenges. 

Fusion center officials reported challenges accessing and managing 

multiple information systems. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and 

the FBI had provided many operational fusion centers access to their 

primary unclassified information systems (HSIN and LEO) and had 

outlined plans to provide access to their primary classified networks to 

state and local centers that had federal personnel at the center. However, 

officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted reported challenges obtaining

access to federal information systems or networks. For instance, officials 

in some centers cited challenges with DHS and the FBI not providing 

fusion center personnel with direct access to their classified systems. 

Fusion center personnel in these centers had to rely on federal personnel

who were assigned to the center or other state personnel assigned to FBI 

task forces to access these systems, obtain the relevant information, and 

share it with them. Further, officials in 12 fusion centers reported 

challenges meeting system security requirements or establishing the 

technical capabilities necessary to access information systems, and DHS 

and the FBI had taken some steps to address these challenges. For 

example, we reported that DHS reviews the fusion centers’ security status 

and assesses its adequacy in light of its intention to deploy personnel and 

information systems to the center. In March 2008, the DHS Under 

Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis stated that DHS planned to deploy

its secret-level homeland security data network to 41 fusion centers by the 

end of fiscal year 2008. 

Federal Agencies’ 

Efforts to Support 

Fusion Centers Help 

Address Some 

Reported Challenges 

DHS, DOJ, and PM-ISE 

Have Some Actions Under 

Way to Address Fusion 

Center Challenges with 

Accessing and Managing 

Information Systems 

Page 8 GAO-08-636T 
While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining access to 

systems, primarily classified ones, officials in 30 of the 58 fusion centers 

we contacted reported that the heavy volume of information or the 

existence of multiple systems with often redundant information was a 

challenge to manage. Officials in 18 fusion centers said that they had 

difficulty with what they perceived to be the high volume of information 

their center receives, variously describing the flow of information as 

“overwhelming,” “information overload,” and “excessive.” For example, 

officials described how center personnel must sort through the large 

amount of information, much of which is not relevant to the center, to find 

information that is useful or important to them. In addition, officials in 18 

fusion centers found the lack of integration among these multiple, 

competing, or duplicative information systems challenging, or said they 

wanted a single mechanism or system through which to receive or send 

information. 

In October 2007, we reported that officials from the PM-ISE’s office were 

collaborating with other agencies, including DHS and DOJ, to identify 

potential opportunities to streamline system access and improve the 

quality and flow of information. For example, PM-ISE officials reported 

that these entities had completed a review of the most commonly used 

systems, such as HSIN, LEO, and the Regional Information Sharing 

Systems,12 that included an examination of users’ needs to identify 

potential areas to streamline system access. In October 2007, we also 

reported that such a review was in accordance with recommendations that 

fusion centers made during the first annual national fusion center 

conference in March 2007 and with what several officials we contacted

told us. Specifically, officials in 23 of the 58 fusion centers told us that 

DHS and DOJ, to facilitate implementation of a national network of fusion 

centers, should reduce the number of existing systems or develop a 

unified platform or mechanism for information sharing with fusion 

centers. In addition, the PM-ISE, along with DHS, DOJ, and other federal 

agencies, are taking steps to improve the quality and flow of information 

through the establishment of an Interagency Threat Assessment and 

Coordination Group (ITACG), which was made a statutorily mandated 

body by the 9/11 Commission Act.13 This group, which is to include state,

 12The Regional Information Sharing Systems is a nationwide initiative to share sensitive but 

unclassified criminal intelligence among stakeholders in law enforcement, first responders,

and the private sector. 

13See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 521, 121 Stat. at 328-32 (adding section 210D to subtitle A, title II 

of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135). 

Page 9 GAO-08-636T 
local, and tribal representatives detailed to work with the National 

Counterterrorism Center, is to provide advice, counsel, and subject-matter 

expertise to the intelligence community about the types of terrorismrelated information needed by state, local, and tribal governments and 

how these entities use that terrorism-related information to fulfill their 

counterterrorism responsibilities. In doing so, the PM-ISE reported that 

the ITACG is to enable the timely production by the National

Counterterrorism Center of clear, relevant, and federally coordinated 

terrorism-related information products intended for dissemination to state, 

local, and tribal officials. In October 2007, we reported that PM-ISE 

officials indicated that the ITACG had achieved an initial operational 

capability. As of March 2008, four state and local law enforcement 

representatives had been detailed to the ITACG to provide a nonfederal 

perspective to the intelligence community in its situational and threat 

reporting and intelligence products, by, for example, requesting changes to

report language to better address state and local needs. According to one

of the representatives, these changes have involved requesting that 

specific tactical information be included in reports or that, where possible, 

the security classification of a report be lowered so that it could be 

disseminated more broadly to state and local officials. While these efforts 

to improve the quality and flow of information to state and local users are 

promising, it is too soon to determine the extent to which they will 

address the challenges in accessing and managing information reported to 

us by fusion center officials. 

Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for numerous 

state and local personnel in order to access classified information and 

have set goals to reduce the length of time it takes to obtain a security 

clearance. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a Secret

clearance, and the FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a Secret 

clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret clearance. DHS and

the FBI have also provided centers with information about the security 

clearance process and time frames, stating that processing time for 

individual security clearances can vary, depending on complexity. 

However, obtaining and using security clearances represented a challenge 

for many of the fusion centers (44 of 58) we contacted. For instance, 

officials at 32 of the centers cited difficulties with the length of time it 

takes to receive a security clearance from DHS or the FBI. However, some 

fusion center officials acknowledged that that the length of time to 

conduct the required background checks was necessary to ensure that 

clearances were only given to individuals who meet the requirements. 

DHS and the FBI Provide 

Clearances to Fusion 

Center Officials, but 

Officials Cited Some 

Challenges with Obtaining 

and Using Clearances 

Page 10 GAO-08-636T 
In October 2007, we also reported that while law and executive order 

provide that a security clearance granted by one government agency

should generally be accepted by other agencies, officials in 19 of the 

centers we contacted encountered difficulties with federal agencies, 

particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each others’ clearances. This 

reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the centers’ ability to access 

facilities, computer systems, and information from multiple agencies. DHS 

and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion centers 

encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security clearances. 

However, they said that there were complications in the clearance process 

because, for example, multiple federal agencies carry out their own 

processes and grant clearances without central coordination. 

DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE continue to provide fusion centers with 

guidance, technical assistance, and training to help address their 

challenges in these areas. In October 2007, we reported that DHS and DOJ 

had, in August 2006, issued jointly developed Fusion Center Guidelines 

that outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and operating 

fusion centers. Intended to help ensure that fusion centers were set up and 

operated consistently, they cover elements such as ensuring appropriate 

security measures are in place for facility, data, and personnel. Officials in

many (48 of 58) of the fusion centers we contacted said that they found the 

guidelines generally good and useful, however others said they were not 

specific enough to address their challenges. In addition, officials at 19 

fusion centers said that they lacked guidance on specific informationsharing policies and procedures, such as privacy and civil liberties issues. 

Furthermore, officials at 21 of the centers we contacted said that the 

availability of adequate training for mission-related issues, such as training 

on intelligence analysis, was a challenge. Officials in 11 centers, most of 

which were operational centers that had been in existence for more than 2 

years, expressed a need for the federal government to establish standards 

for training fusion center analysts. This could help ensure that analysts are 

trained in a similar way nationwide, thereby facilitating communication 

amongst fusion center analysts. 

DHS and DOJ provide a technical assistance service program for fusion 

centers, which, among other services, includes assistance developing a

DHS and DOJ Continue to 

Provide Guidance, 

Technical Assistance, and 

Training to Fusion Centers 

Page 11 GAO-08-636T 
comprehensive privacy and civil liberties policy,14 and have ongoing efforts 

to provide training to fusion centers. Additionally, along with the PM-ISE 

and others, DHS and DOJ have sponsored regional and national 

conferences, including the second annual national fusion center 

conference in March 2008, which was designed to support fusion centers 

in building capabilities and understanding their roles and responsibilities 

as described in the National Strategy. In addition, DHS and DOJ, in 

collaboration with others, disseminated in March 2008 a draft baseline 

capabilities document.15 Building on the Fusion Center Guidelines, the 

document outlines baseline capabilities and steps that fusion centers 

could take to ensure compliance in 12 topic areas, including management 

and governance, security, intelligence analysis and production, and 

intelligence and information dissemination. The document states that 

when a fusion center achieves all of these standards, it is considered to 

have the standards, structures, and tools in place to support the gathering, 

analysis, and dissemination of terrorism, homeland security, and law 

enforcement information. Such a baseline level of capability is critical to 

establishing a national, integrated network of fusion centers, according to

the National Strategy. DHS and DOJ solicited the feedback of state and 

local officials on this document at the national fusion center conference—

the results of which have yet to be compiled and released. 

Many fusion center officials we contacted reported challenges related to 

obtaining personnel (43 of 58) and obtaining and maintaining funding 

when establishing and operating their centers (54 of 58)—challenges that 

some of these officials also said affected their centers’ sustainability. For 

example, officials in 37 centers said they encountered challenges with 

federal, state, or local agencies not being able to detail personnel to their

fusion center, particularly in the face of resource constraints. Fusion 

centers rely on such details as a means of staffing the centers and 

enhancing information sharing with other state and local agencies. 

Fusion Center Officials 

Cited Challenges with 

Personnel and Funding; 

DHS and the FBI Are 

Helping to Address These 

Issues to Some Extent 

 14The 9/11 Commission Act requires that the guidelines established by DHS for fusion 

centers include standards for centers to develop, publish, and adhere to a privacy and civil 

liberties policy that is consistent with federal, state, and local, law, and standards for 

providing privacy and civil liberties training for all representatives at the fusion center. 

Further, the act requires that DHS employees who are detailed to fusion centers receive 

privacy and civil liberties training. 

15DHS, DOJ, Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Baseline Capabilities for State

and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers, A Companion Document to the Fusion Center

Guidelines (March 2008). 

Page 12 GAO-08-636T 
Furthermore, officials in 20 of the centers we contacted said that they 

faced challenges finding, attracting, and retaining qualified personnel. For 

instance, one official said that it was challenging to find personnel with the 

expertise to understand the concept behind the development of the center 

and to use the tools to build the center. While many of these reported 

challenges were attributed to difficulties at the state and local level, we 

reported that DHS and the FBI had ongoing efforts to assign personnel to 

support centers and facilitate information sharing. Both DHS and the FBI

have continued to support fusion centers by deploying personnel, 

consistent with the 9/11 Commission Act. As of March 2008, DHS had 

deployed 23 officers to fusion centers and has plans to place officers in as

many as 35 centers by the end of fiscal year 2008, and the FBI had assigned 

about 200 personnel to 44 fusion centers, according to DHS and FBI 

officials respectively.16

In terms of funding, officials encountered challenges obtaining both 

federal and state funding. Specifically, officials in 35 of the 58 centers 

encountered challenges with the complexity of the federal grant process, 

uncertainty as to whether they would receive federal funds, or declining 

federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers reported having

difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said that these issues 

created confusion for their centers over the steps needed to secure federal

funds, made it difficult to plan for the future, and created concerns about 

the fusion centers’ abilities to sustain their capabilities for the long term. 

Fusion center officials also identified challenges with restrictions on the 

use of federal grant funds, unclear and changing grant guidance, and a lack

of understanding of how federal funding decisions are made.17 For 

example, officials in 21 fusion centers said that obtaining adequate funding

for personnel was difficult, and officials in 17 fusion centers found federal

time limits on the use of grant funds for personnel challenging.18

 16These deployments may be to fusion centers other than the 58 centers that were included 

in our October 2007 report. 

17A primary federal funding source for fusion centers is DHS’s Homeland Security Grant 

Program, which awards funds to state, local, and tribal governments to enhance their 

ability to prepare for, prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other major disasters.

18According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS homeland security grant program guidance, Urban

Areas Security Initiative and Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program funds could

be used to hire new staff or contractor positions to serve as intelligence analysts to enable 

information and intelligence sharing capabilities. The costs associated with hiring the new 

intelligence analysts were allowable for 2 years, after which states and urban areas shall be

responsible for supporting the costs to sustain those intelligence analysts. 

Page 13 GAO-08-636T 
In October 2007, we reported that DHS had provided grant funding for 

fusion-related activities and had made some changes to ease the grant 

process and adjust some of the restrictions on the timing and use of grant

funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 2006 in the 

area of allowable costs for information sharing and collaborative efforts. 

Funds could be used by states to develop and enhance fusion centers, 

particularly by hiring contract or government employees as intelligence 

analysts; purchasing information-technology equipment; or hiring 

consultants to develop and enhance fusion centers. However, we also 

reported that, despite this funding, fusion center officials were concerned

about the extent of federal support they could expect over the long term, 

especially in relation to the role of their state or local jurisdictions. Given 

that at the time, federal plans or guidance did not articulate the long-term 

role the federal government expected to play in fusion centers, we 

recommended, and the PM-ISE and DHS concurred, that the federal 

government determine and articulate its long-term fusion center role and 

whether it expects to provide resources to help ensure their sustainability. 

Further, we stated that particular emphasis should be placed on how best 

to sustain those fusion center functions that support a national 

information-sharing capability as critical nodes of the ISE. 

In promoting that fusion centers achieve a baseline level of capability, the 

National Strategy states that the federal government will support the 

establishment of fusion centers and help sustain them through grant 

funding, technical assistance, and training to achieve such a baseline level 

of capability. The strategy outlines specific roles and responsibilities for 

federal, state, local, and tribal authorities in five areas that are related to 

the establishment and continued operations of fusion centers and for 

establishing a national integrated network of centers. It notes that these 

roles and responsibilities were developed in partnership with state and 

local officials and represent a collective view. While the strategy 

acknowledges that fusion centers are owned and managed by state and 

local governments, it identifies the objective is to assist state and local

governments in the establishment and sustained operation of these 

centers. However, some fusion center officials raised concerns at the 

national fusion center conference about how specifically the federal 

government was planning to assist state and local governments to sustain 

fusion centers. For example, whether federal funding for fusion centers 

would continue to be available through DHS’s homeland security grant 

program or whether in the future there would be fusion-center specific 

funding has yet to be determined. In addition, some officials raised 

questions about limits on federal funding for personnel. For example, 

according to the fiscal year 2008 homeland security grant program 

Page 14 GAO-08-636T 
guidance, costs associated with hiring new intelligence analysts are still 

allowable for 2 years. After which, the states and urban areas will be 

responsible for supporting the sustainment costs of those intelligence 

analysts (as well as providing a budget plan for doing so) after the 2-year 

federal funding period is over. In our October 2007 report, we reported on 

challenges that officials found with federal time limits on the use of grant 

funds for personnel. In particular, some of these officials expressed 

concerns about maintaining their personnel levels, and one official told us

that the 2-year limit on the use of DHS grant funds for personnel made 

retaining personnel challenging because state and local agencies may lack 

the resources to continue funding the position, which could hinder the 

center’s ability to continue to operate. In discussing the implementation of 

the National Strategy at the fusion center conference, a Homeland Security 

Council official stated that the question of federal versus state and local 

roles in sustaining fusion centers is a very difficult question and one that is 

not yet resolved but is ongoing. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, fusion centers are operating or are being

established in almost all states and several local jurisdictions. Although 

fusion centers were primarily established to meet or enhance information 

sharing within a state or local area, they have become a critical component 

of the federal government’s plans as it works to improve information 

sharing in accordance with law and policy. Indeed, the National Strategy

recognizes fusion centers as vital assets to information sharing and critical 

in the creation of an integrated national network to promote two-way 

sharing of terrorism-related information. Given the federal interest in 

fusion centers and the centers’ interest in supporting such a national 

network, it is important that the federal government continue to provide 

fusion centers with added value as an incentive to facilitate such a 

network. In October 2007 we reported that DHS’s and DOJ’s efforts to 

assist fusion centers, such as providing access to information systems, 

security clearances, guidance and technical assistance, personnel, and 

funding, had begun to address a number of the challenges fusion center 

directors identified to us. Several of those efforts are continuing and 

evolving, including the establishment of ITACG to improve the quality of 

information provided to state and local users and the release of baseline 

capabilities for the operation of fusion centers. These efforts are 

promising; however, it is too soon to determine the extent to which they 

will address all of the challenges reported to us by fusion center officials. 

It is also important for fusion center management to understand the 

federal government’s role with respect to these centers since this affects 

state and local governments’ support to centers. In this regard, we 

recommended in our October 2007 report that the federal government 

Page 15 GAO-08-636T 
define and articulate its long-term fusion center role. The National 

Strategy clearly articulates a vision for the federal government’s role in 

supporting centers—that is by helping to sustain centers through grant 

funding, technical assistance, and training. However, fusion center 

officials raised some concerns about sustainability of funding and 

personnel as the federal government continues work to incorporate fusion 

centers into the information sharing environment and implement the 

National Strategy. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions that you or other members of the subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

For further information on this testimony, please contact Eileen Larence 

at (202) 512-8777 or by e-mail at larencee@gao.gov. Individuals making key 

contributions to this testimony include Mary Catherine Hult, Tom 

Lombardi, and Jeffrey Niblack. 

Contact Information 

Page 16 GAO-08-636T (440708) 
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