Affirmed and Opinion Filed September 18, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-24-00575-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF R.S., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 470th Judicial District Court

Collin County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 470-51643-2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTION TO REVIEW TRIAL

COURT ORDER SUSTAINING CONTEST

Before Chief Justice Burns and Justices Molberg and Carlyle

Opinion by Chief Justice Burns

Seeking to proceed in this appeal without payment of costs, pro se appellant 

filed a statement of inability to afford payment of court costs or an appeal bond. See 

TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(b). The trial court contested her statement of inability and set a 

hearing for July 18, 2024. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(e)(2). Following the hearing, the 

trial court signed an Order Sustaining Contest. The trial court found that appellant 

did not prove that she would be unable to pay for the record or part of the record and 

that appellant has not made a good faith attempt to do so, and it ordered appellant to 

pay costs. 
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Appellant then filed in this Court a Response to Order Denying Inability to 

Afford Payment of Court Costs, which we have construed as a motion for review of 

the trial court’s order sustaining contest. We affirm the order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

At the rule 145 hearing, appellant, the declarant, had the burden to prove her 

inability to afford payment of court costs. See TEX.R.CIV. P. 145(f)(1). In reviewing 

a trial court’s ruling on a contest to a statement of inability to pay, we apply an abuse 

of discretion standard. Basaldua v. Hadden, 298 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2009, order) (per curiam), disp. on merits, No. 04-08-00758-CV, 2009 WL 

3153501 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam). A trial 

court abuses its discretion if it acts without reference to any guiding rules or 

principles or in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Id. The test for determining 

indigence is whether the record as a whole shows the declarant proved “by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the applicant would be unable to pay the costs, 

or a part thereof, or give security therefor, if [s]he really wanted to and made a goodfaith effort to do so.” In re C.H.C., 331 S.W.3d 426, 429 (Tex. 2011) (per curiam).

No abuse of discretion will be found if the trial court’s ruling is supported by

any theory appearing in the record, even if not mentioned by the trial court or

litigants. See Steele v. UG Nat’l Constructive, No. 05-19-01397-CV, 2020 WL

2519895, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 18, 2020, order) (mem. op.), disp. on

merits, 2020 WL 5248567 (Tex. App.—Dallas Sept. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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As the fact finder, the trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses 

and evidence. Booker v. Mahmoudi, No. 05-19-00048-CV, 2019 WL 2266667, at *2 

(Tex. App.—Dallas May 24, 2019, order) (mem. op.), disp. on merits, 2021 WL 

5410519 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, the trial 

court may not completely disregard the only evidence adduced at the hearing 

concerning the declarant’s ability to pay costs when no evidence is offered in 

rebuttal. Id. at *3.

A trial court can consider a number of factors when determining a contest to 

a statement of inability. Some of those factors include the declarant’s employment 

history, the value of the party’s claim and whether it could afford the basis for 

security of a loan, and whether the party can secure a bona fide loan to pay the costs. 

In re M.M.J., No. 05-22-00356-CV, 2022 WL 2582560, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas 

July 8, 2022, order) (mem. op.), disp. on merits, 2022 WL 3273725 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Aug. 11, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Also, if a declarant owns valuable 

property that she could dispose of and thereby secure the necessary funds without 

depriving herself or her family of the necessities of life, she should be required to 

pay the costs. Id. Failing to use assets that could be used to provide funds for paying 

the record constitutes the opposite of good faith. Id. But the declarant is not required

to show that family or friends are unable to pay the costs, nor is the declarant

expected to secure the necessary funds by depriving herself and her family of the

necessities of life or borrowing money she cannot repay. In re A.R.M., No. 05-17-
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00651-CV, 2017 WL 2962830, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 12, 2017, order)

(mem. op.), disp. on merits, 593 S.W.3d 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 30, 2018, pet.

denied).

DISCUSSION

At the contest hearing, with regard to her employment history, appellant 

testified that she has a bachelor’s degree. She testified that she has a seven-year gap

but has been volunteering with the school district for the last two years. Appellant 

testified that she has been exploring a potential job opportunity with the school 

district and looking for a substitute-teaching position but that she has not received 

any job offer. She testified that she is not able to provide employers with a job start 

date because she’s uncertain about her upcoming travel plans, and she claimed that 

the trial court’s geographical restriction is limiting her employment opportunities. 

She admitted, however, that she did not provide documents evidencing any job 

applications. 

Appellant testified that she applied to work at a Starbucks and at a Chick-filA but that they required a lot of physical activity. She testified that she has a spine 

health issue and cannot participate in anything that requires labor work. Appellant

testified that she was thus forced to decline a job at Starbucks and that Chick-fil-A 

refused to hire her. Appellant, however, did not provide any documentation of her 

physical limitations. She further testified that she has not attempted to drive for Uber, 
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Instacart, or DoorDash, stating that she had just learned to drive during the divorce 

and is not comfortable driving that much. 

Appellant admitted that she was awarded over $200,000 in an account in India 

in the divorce. She testified that there was at least $40,000 in that account after the 

divorce, but she claimed that the money in that account had been recently

confiscated. Appellant admitted, however, that she did not provide evidence 

showing the money in the account had been confiscated after the divorce. 

Regarding loans, appellant testified that she has borrowed $12,000 and $7,000 

from friendsin April 2024; she used $12,000 to pay her attorneys. Appellant testified 

that she has taken out $77,000 in personal loans from family and friends and that she 

has not made any single payment on those loans. 

Appellant testified that her four-bedroom home is 3,425 square feet. She 

testified that she sold some furniture after she filed her notice of appeal in an attempt 

to meet some of her expenses and to pay court costs. But then appellant admitted 

that she did not use that money to pay for court costs and instead paid off loans from 

friends. Appellant testified that she has tried asking friends for loans to pay for court 

costs but that they told her they did not expect her to be able to repay them. 

Regarding her expenses, on appellant’s statement of inability, appellant 

testified under penalty of perjury that she has monthly expenses of $6,184.81. These 

expenses included the following: (1) $1,535.70 for a mortgage, but appellant 

testified that she is not making those payments. (2) $545.97 for utilities, but appellant 
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testified that she is making those payments in installments. And (3) $815.00 in 

school and child care, but appellant testified that the child is in public school and 

that this amount is actually for extracurricular activities (basketball, art classes, and 

vocabulary classes) and that those activities are in addition to the extracurricular 

activities the father pays for. She also testified that she withdrew the child from some 

of these classes.

Appellant also testified that she has a Honda CRV but that she hasn’t been 

making the payments on the vehicle. She listed credit card debts totaling $52,000 on 

her statement of inability, but she did not allocate any funds for payments of those 

debts (or the loans) in her statement of inability.

Appellant admitted that she is being selective about where she spends her 

money and admitted that she is picking and choosing what expenses to pay. 

Appellant further admitted that at a June 21, 2024 hearing, the trial court told 

appellant that she was not traveling to India with the child. And appellant admitted 

that on June 24, 2024, she spent $4,205 on nonrefundable plane tickets to India for 

herself and the child. She explained that her father, who lives in India, has been 

unwell and she borrowed $3,500 from a friend for the plane ticket. Appellant

testified that the trip was cancelled because the child’s father withheld travel 

documents. 

We conclude the evidence at the hearing supports the trial court’s 

determination that appellant has not made a good-faith effort to try to pay for the 
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record. Appellant testified that she sold furniture to pay for court costs after she filed 

her notice of appeal but then instead used that money to pay back loans. At another 

point in her testimony, however, appellant testified that she has not paid back any of 

her loans. The record as a whole does not show that appellant would be unable to 

pay the costs, or a part thereof, or give security therefor, if she really wanted to and 

made a good-faith effort to do so. See C.H.C., 331 S.W.3d at 429; M.M.J., 2022 WL 

2582560, at *1. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s July 18, 2024 Order Sustaining 

Contest. 

240575f.p05 /Robert D. Burns, III//

ROBERT D. BURNS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE