United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 22-30292

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Darren B. Williams, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 5:20-CR-39-1

Before Stewart, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Darren B. Williams appeals the 74-month, above-guidelines sentence 

imposed on revocation of his four-year term of probation following his guilty 

plea conviction for possession of a firearm not registered to him, in violation 

of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). He argues that the revocation sentence is 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 4, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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substantively unreasonable and greater than necessary to achieve the 

sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Williams specifically complains that 

the district court gave no weight to the guidelines range and erroneously 

based both its decision to vary upwardly and the extent of its variance 

exclusively on the court’s promise at the original sentencing hearing of severe 

repercussions for any future probation violation.

We review probation-revocation sentences under the plainly 

unreasonable standard. United States v. Kippers, 685 F.3d 491, 496–97 (5th 

Cir. 2012). In evaluating whether a sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first 

consider whether the district court committed any significant procedural 

errors, after which we consider the substantive reasonableness of the 

sentence imposed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Kippers, 

685 F.3d at 497. A revocation sentence is substantively unreasonable if it 

(1) does not account for a factor that should have received significant weight, 

(2) gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or 

(3) represents a clear error of judgment in balancing the sentencing factors. 

United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 326 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

Contrary to Williams’s assertion, the record shows that the district 

court considered the applicable guidelines range but relied on several of the 

§ 3553(a) factors to conclude that such a sentence was inadequate and that 

a 74-month sentence, well below the applicable 10-year statutory maximum 

available, was appropriate. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 5871. 

Specifically, the court relied on Williams’s personal history and 

characteristics, the nature of the charged violations, the risk of recidivism, 

and the need to protect the public, citing his history of violent behavior, the 

leniency shown him at his original sentencing, the immediacy and numerosity 

of his probation violations, his refusal to accept responsibility for his actions, 

and the nature of the violations, which included an aggravated assault with 

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a firearm and failure to pay child support despite his professed need to 

provide for his children. See §§ 3553(a)(1), 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C);1 see also 

Kippers, 685 F.3d at 498. 

The record does not reflect that the court failed to account for a factor 

that should have received significant weight, gave significant weight to an 

irrelevant or improper factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in 

balancing the factors. See Warren, 720 F.3d at 326. Williams’s argument that 

the district court improperly relied on its prior warnings of severity should he

fail to take advantage of the leniency being shown him at his original 

sentencing is unavailing as this court has condoned the district court’s 

consideration of prior leniency when imposing a revocation sentence. See, 

e.g., Kippers, 685 F.3d at 500–01. As for the extent of the variance, we have

routinely upheld revocation sentences that exceed the guidelines range by a

similar degree but are within the statutory maximum. See, e.g., id.; United 

States v. Whitelaw, 580 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir. 2009). Williams’s

conclusional statement that his sentence was excessive because it does not 

achieve the sentencing goals of § 3553(a) does not demonstrate an abuse of 

the district court’s wide sentencing discretion. See Kippers, 685 F.3d at 500–

01; United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 843 (5th Cir. 2011). 

The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

 

1 Although a district court may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) when modifying or 

revoking a supervised release term, see United States v. Miller, 634 F.3d 841, 844 (5th Cir. 

2011), no such restriction exists on revocation of probation. See Kippers, 685 F.3d at 497–

98 n.4.

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