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# Just because you can't always see childhood disabilities-- doesn't mean they don't exist

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## Description

                    -           Title        
                    -  Just because you can't always see childhood disabilities-- doesn't mean they don't exist 
                    -           Creator        
                    -  United States. Social Security Administration 
                    -           Publisher        
                    -  United States. Social Security Administration 
                    -           Subject: Time        
                    -  1990-2000 
                    -           Physical Description        
                    -  156 × 44 cm 
                    -           Number of Pages        
                    -  1 
                    -           Host institution        
                    -  University of Iowa. Libraries. Government Publications 
                    -           Digitization Specifications        
                    -  Scanned with Ideal Contex Magnum G600 54 Plus at 300 ppi, 24-bit color. Archival tiff image available. 
                    -           Rights Management        
                    -  This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. 
                    -           Contact Information        
                    -  Please contact the Government Publications Department at the University of Iowa Libraries: lib-govpub@uiowa.edu 
                    -           Item Type (AAT)        
                    -  Posters 
                    -           Item Type (IMT)        
                    -  jpeg 
                    -           Identifier        
                    -  025762204.jpg; 025762204.jpg 

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# C_2017357EN.01000901.xml

| 23.10.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 357/9 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.10.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 357/9

---

Judgment of the General Court of 7 September 2017 — VM Vermogens-Management v EUIPO — DAT Vermögensmanagement (Vermögensmanufaktur)

(Case T-374/15) (1)

1

((European Union trade mark - Invalidity proceedings - EU word mark Vermögensmanufaktur - Absolute grounds for refusal - Descriptive character - Lack of distinctive character - Article 7(1)(b) and (c) of Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 - Article 52(1)(a) of Regulation No 207/2009))

(2017/C 357/11)

Language of the case: German

Parties

Parties

Applicant: VM Vermögens-Management GmbH (Düsseldorf, Germany) (represented by: T. Dolde and P. Homann, lawyers)

Applicant:

Defendant: European Union Intellectual Property Office (represented by: S. Hanne, acting as Agent)

Defendant:

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court: DAT Vermögensmanagement GmbH (Baldham, Germany) (represented by: H.-G. Stache, lawyer)

Other party to the proceedings before the Board of Appeal of EUIPO, intervener before the General Court:

Re:

Re:

Action brought against the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO of 29 April 2015 (Case R 418/2014–5), relating to invalidity proceedings between DAT Vermögensmanagement and VM Vermögens-Management.

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the action; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the action;

| 2. | Orders VM Vermögens-Management GmbH to bear its own costs and those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) as well; |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders VM Vermögens-Management GmbH to bear its own costs and those incurred by the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) as well;

| 3. | Orders DAT Vermögensmanagement GmbH to bear its own costs. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders DAT Vermögensmanagement GmbH to bear its own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 302, 14.9.2015.

1

---
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#### Williamson *versus*Dow.

A collector of taxes is liable in trespass, if he sell upon his warrant a greater number of the chattels than sufficient to pay the tax, with the fees and charges.

Trespass for taking the plaintiff’s four cows.

Defendant justified on the same grounds, as in the preceding case of Blanchard against him, ante, page 557. His return upon the warrant stated that the tax was *$58,02;*that the charges were $5,99; that he sold the four cows for $121, and offered to restore the balance, $56,99, to the plaintiff. Neither the return nor the evidence showed that he gave to the plaintiff any “ account in writing of the sale and charges.” Defendant proved *that,*when the first cow was set at auction, one Blanchard bid her off at $65, and immediately offered the pay in American gold; and *that*the defendant declined to receive it until he had sold the other thee cows, one at $20, one at $20-, and one at $16.

The plaintiff called a witness who testified that the cow first sold was worth 15 or 16 dollars ; and the others were respectively worth $25, $20, and $25. Both witnesses testified that the cows had been in the plaintiff’s possession from the time of the sale.

The case was submitted.

*Paine,*for the plaintiff.

*Evans*and *Bradbury,*for the defendant.

Shepley, C. J.

By the collector’s return it appears that he distrained and sold four" cows as the property of the plaintiff. The first was sold for more than sufficient to pay the tax and expenses, and payment for that one was offered to him before he sold the others. He offers evidence to justify his proceedings, that the first one sold for more than fourfold of its actual value. He nevertheless received from the purchaser the amount for which it was sold, and this he might have received as well before as after the sale of the others.

An officer is not authorized to decide that property sold by *560him is bid off for more or less than its value. It is his duty to obtain the best price, he can, for it. When he has sold sufficient property and can have his pay for it, he is not authorized to proceed and sell more. Such a course might subject the owner to unnecessary losses. The residue of the property should be restored to the owner.

There is also the same defect noticed in the case of *Blanchard*v. *Dow,*in the neglect to return, with the overplus, an account of sales and expenses.

The collector therefore fails to make out a justification for the sale of any portion of the property.

It becomes unnecessary to notice the other points presented.

*Defendant defaulted.*
# C_2017309EN.01000501.xml

| 18.9.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 309/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.9.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 309/5

---

Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26 July 2017 — AGC Glass Europe, AGC Automotive Europe, AGC France, AGC Flat Glass Italia Srl, AGC Glass UK Ltd, AGC Glass Germany GmbH v European Commission

(Case C-517/15 P) (1)

1

((Appeal - Competition - Articles 101 and 102 TFEU - Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 - Article 30 - Decision of the European Commission finding an unlawful cartel on the European market for automotive glass - Publication of a non-confidential version of that decision - Rejection of a request for confidential treatment of certain information - Terms of reference of the hearing officer - Decision 2011/695/EU - Article 8 - Confidentiality - Information from a leniency application - Partial rejection of the request for confidential treatment - Legitimate expectations - Equal treatment))

(2017/C 309/05)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Appellants: AGC Glass Europe, AGC Automotive Europe, AGC France, AGC Flat Glass Italia Srl, AGC Glass UK Ltd, AGC Glass Germany GmbH (represented by: L. Garzaniti, F. Hoseinian and A. Burckett St Laurent, avocats)

Appellants:

Other party to the proceedings: European Commission (represented by: G. Meessen, P. Van Nuffel and F. van Schaik, acting as Agents)

Other party to the proceedings:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders AGC Glass Europe SA, AGC Automotive Europe SA, AGC France SAS, AGC Flat Glass Italia Srl, AGC Glass UK Ltd and AGC Glass Germany GmbH to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders AGC Glass Europe SA, AGC Automotive Europe SA, AGC France SAS, AGC Flat Glass Italia Srl, AGC Glass UK Ltd and AGC Glass Germany GmbH to pay the costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 398, 30.11.2015.

1

---
September 11, 1941

No. 46330.

#### Protest 45076-K of Draeger Shipping Co.

Abstract 46087. Plaintiff’s application for rehearing granted.
# C_2015096EN.01000701.xml

| 23.3.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 96/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

23.3.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 96/7

---

Action brought on 14 January 2015 — European Parliament v Council of the European Union

(Case C-14/15)

(2015/C 096/09)

Language of the case: French

Parties

Parties

Applicant: European Parliament (represented by: F. Drexler, A. Caiola, M. Pencheva, acting as Agents)

Applicant:

Defendant: Council of the European Union

Defendant:

Form of order sought

Form of order sought

| — | annul Council Decision 2014/731/EU of 9 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Malta (1), Council Decision 2014/743/EU of 21 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Cyprus (2), and Council Decision 2014/744/EU of 21 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Estonia (3); |
| --- | --- |

—

annul Council Decision 2014/731/EU of 9 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Malta (1), Council Decision 2014/743/EU of 21 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Cyprus (2), and Council Decision 2014/744/EU of 21 October 2014 on the launch of automated data exchange with regard to Vehicle Registration Data (VRD) in Estonia (3);

1

2

3

| — | order Council of the European Union to pay the costs. |
| --- | --- |

—

order Council of the European Union to pay the costs.

Pleas in law and main arguments

Pleas in law and main arguments

The Parliament invokes two pleas in law alleging infringement of the Treaties, first, and infringement of an essential procedural requirement, secondly, in support of its action for annulment.

In the first place, the Parliament considers that the Council used an inappropriate legal basis in order to adopt the contested decisions.

In the second place, the Parliament complains that the Council used a decision-making procedure which is legally incorrect.

---

(1)  OJ 2014 L 302, p. 56.

1

(2)  OJ 2014 L 308, p. 100.

2

(3)  OJ 2014 L 308, p. 102.

3

---
Exhibit 32

Certification Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the undersigned officers of Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (the
company) does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:

The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
September 30, 2009 of the company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the company.

Dated: October 28, 2009



/s/ Fernando AguirreName: Fernando AguirreTitle: Chief Executive Officer


Dated: October 28, 2009



/s/ Michael B. SimsName: Michael B. SimsTitle: Chief Financial Officer
# United States Court of Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 22-1277

___________________________ Nellie A. Baldridge lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v. Kilolo Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security Administration

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________ Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Northern

____________ Submitted: August 2, 3033 Filed: August 5, 2022 [Unpublished]

____________ Before GRUENDER, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

____________ PER CURIAM.Nellie Baldridge appeals the district court’s 1 order affirming the denial of

disability insurance benefits. We agree with the district court that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the adverse decision. See Schwandt v. Berryhill, 926 F.3d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 2019) (standard of review). We find that the administrative law judge (ALJ) adequately considered whether Baldridge’s migraines medically equaled listing 11.02, see Vance v. Berryhill, 860 F.3d 1114, 1118 (8th Cir. 2017) (ALJ’s failure to address specific listing or to elaborate on conclusion that claimant’s impairments do not meet listings is not reversible error if record supports conclusion). We also find that the ALJ properly determined Baldridge’s residual functional capacity (RFC). Specifically, the ALJ properly discounted Baldridge’s subjective complaints, see Bryant v. Colvin, 861 F.3d 779, 782-83 (8th Cir. 2017) (ALJ properly considered claimant’s daily activities and history of working with condition in discounting complaints); Milam v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 978, 985 (8th Cir. 2015) (ALJ properly considered plaintiff’s conservative treatment in discrediting complaints), and her treating physician’s opinions, see Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1089 (8th Cir. 2016) (where ALJ did not credit claimant’s allegations, he was entitled to discount physician’s opinions that relied on those allegations); McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 615 (8th Cir. 2011) (ALJ may discredit physician’s opinion because opinion was not based on all relevant medical evidence); and substantial evidence supported the RFC determination, see Despain v. Berryhill, 926 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (8th Cir. 2019) (ALJ’s evaluation of treatment notes, claimant’s course of treatment, claimant’s daily activities, and consultant’s opinions constituted substantial evidence supporting RFC determination); Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 969 (8th Cir. 2010) (ALJ did not err by declining to include in RFC

1 The Honorable Patricia S. Harris, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom the case was referred for final disposition by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). -2-limitations based on claimant’s allegations that he found not credible, or limitations

from physicians’ opinions he properly disregarded). The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

-3-
(Reap. Dec. 9774)

#### Humphrey & MacGregor, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry No. 1954.

(Decided August 25, 1960)

Plaintiff not represented by counsel.

*George Goehran Dotib,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Laweence, Judge:

The records indicate that there was no appearance on behalf of plaintiff when the appeals for a reappraisement enumerated on the schedule attached to and made part of this decision were called for hearing, and the cases were consequently ordered submitted by the court.

Rule 5 (a) of the rules of the court provides that—

> The submission for decision of any case shall be made in open court by the parties thereto or their attorneys, or by stipulation, or by written request to the court, or by the court on its own motion. Where the plaintiff, petitioner, or appellant, or his attorney, in a case does not appear when the same is called, and after the opposite party has had opportunity to present evidence on the issues, it may be deemed submitted and may be decided by the court on the record as it appears therein.

Accordingly, I have examined the record in the appeals before the court and find nothing therein which tends in any way to overcome the presumption of correctness which attaches to the decision of the appraiser. I find and hold, therefore, that the proper values of the merchandise are the values returned by the appraiser.

Judgment will be entered accordingly.
United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 99-1246

___________

Ahmed Mohamud Isaq, *

*

Petitioner, *

* Petition for Review of an 

v. * Order of the Immigration

* and Naturalization Service.

Immigration and Naturalization *

Service, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Respondent. *

___________

 Submitted: April 7, 2000

 Filed: April 24, 2000

___________

Before LOKEN, FAGG, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

After an Immigration Judge denied Ahmed Mohamud Isaq asylum and

withholding of deportation, he appealed the decision to the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA), which affirmed the decision. Isaq moved for reconsideration, but the

BIA denied his motion. In this petition for review, Isaq argues that the BIA abused its

discretion by failing to consider certain hardship factors.
-2-

Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude the BIA did not err in

refusing to consider the hardship factors, as Isaq has not shown that he applied to the

Attorney General for a suspension of his deportation, and the hardship factors were

thus irrelevant. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (Supp. 1996) (Attorney General may, in her

discretion, suspend deportation of alien who applies to Attorney General for

suspension, has been physically present in United States for continuous period of at

least seven years, is person of good moral character, and deportation of whom would

result in extreme hardship to self, spouse, parent or child); cf. Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d

594, 599-600 (8th Cir. 1997) (appellate court had no jurisdiction to address issue of

alien’s eligibility for suspension of deportation where BIA never took action on issue

and alien first sought to introduce it in motion before appellate court). We conclude

the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. See

Perwolf v. INS, 741 F.2d 1109, 1110 (8th Cir. 1984) (standard of review). 

Accordingly, we deny Isaq’s petition.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.
EXHIBIT 32

Certification by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer

Relating to a Periodic
Report Containing Financial Statements

I, David W. Trego, Chief Executive Officer, and I, John C. Barney, Chief Financial Officer, of
UGI Utilities, Inc., a Pennsylvania corporation (the Company), hereby certify that to our knowledge:



| | (1) | The Companys periodic report on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2006 (the Form 10-Q) fully complies with the requirements of Section 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

*     *     *



|                        |  |  |  |                        
|----------------------- |  |  |  | -----------------------
|CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER |  |  |  | CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
|                        |  | 
|/s/ David W. Trego      |  |  |  | /s/ John C. Barney     
|David W. Trego          |  |  |  | John C. Barney         
|                        |  | 
|Date: August 7, 2006    |  |  |  | Date: August 7, 2006
#### George *versus*Nichols.

In a notice for the taking of a deposition, if there be a defect as to the place of the taking, it is waived by the attendance of the party notified.

In depositions, taken out of the State, it is not essential that the magistrate be a commissioner, appointed by the authorities of Maine.

Exceptions from the District Court, Hathaway, J.

The defendant had been notified to attend the taking of a deposition at the office of *Henry W. Fuller*in Boston. It was in fact taken at the office of *Henry H. Fuller*in Boston.

It was offered by the plaintiff, and objected to by defendant, for the foregoing reason, and also because the magistrate was not a commissioner, appointed by the Governor and Council of Maine, to take depositions. The presiding Judge admitted the deposition, but gave the defendant an election whether to take a continuance or to proceed to trial with the deposition in evidence. The defendant elected to proceed, and the deposition was used by the plaintiff. To its admission the defendant excepts. The caption of the deposition shows that defendant was present by himself and counsel at the taking. The case was submitted without argument.

Tenney, J.,

orally.—The first objection was obviated by the defendant’s attendance at the taking.

It is not requisite that the magistrate should be a commissioner. It does not appear that he was not authorized by *180the laws of his State to take depositions. Depositions taken out of the State may be received at the discretion of the court. R. S. c. 133, § 22. *Exceptions overruled.*
(V.D. 112)

#### E. Leitz, Inc. *v.*United States

Entry Nos. 865418; 21183.

(Decided May 25, 1960)

*Mugene R. PieJcrell*for the plaintiff.

*George Cochran Daub,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Oliver, Chief Judge:

This matter is before me on remand from classification proceedings decided by the first division of this court in *E.*Leitz, *Inc.*v. *United*States, 42 Cust. Ct. 413, Abstract 63176. The conclusion therein, and the judgment issued pursuant thereto, were to> the effect that the protest had been prematurely filed so far as'it related to the merchandise involved herein, as hereinafter identified, and the matter was remanded to a single judge in reappraisement to determine the proper dutiable values in the manner provided by law. (28 U.S.C. § 2636 (d).)

A stipulation of submission, upon which the matter is now before me, establishes that the proper basis for appraisement of the articles in question is export value, as defined in' section 402(d) of the Tariff

Act of 1930, and that such statutory value for each class of merchandise is as follows:

> Entry Item of merchandise Export value

> 865418 22 Enlarger Eocomat Ila complete with lens $228.72 less 39.24% plus cost of packing

> 22 accessory lenses for enlargers $26.40 less 39.24% plus cost of packing

> 21183 6 Enlarger Focomat Ila complete with ■ • one lens $196.56 less 46% plus cost of packing

> 6 accessory lenses for enlargers $26.40 less 46% plus cost of packing

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.