NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

ALLEGRA G., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, G.K., G.K., L.K., C.K., C.K., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0260

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD40644

The Honorable Michael J. Herrod, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Allegra G., Phoenix

Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson

By Dawn R. Williams

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

FILED 4-7-2022
ALLEGRA G. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Peter B. Swann delivered the decision of the court, in which Presiding 

Judge Cynthia J. Bailey and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

S W A N N, Judge:

¶1 Allegra G. (“Mother”), the mother of minor children G.K., 

G.K., L.K., C.K., and C.K. (collectively, “the Children”), appeals the juvenile 

court’s dependency disposition order implementing a case plan of 

severance and adoption.1 She contends that the disposition hearing was 

void because it was untimely, and that she was deprived of constitutional 

rights. We reject those arguments, and therefore affirm.2

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 In March 2021, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took 

custody of the Children after their sibling died and evidence came to light 

that the Children had never received medical or dental care, had never been 

enrolled in school, and were isolated from their extended family members. 

DCS promptly filed a dependency petition alleging that Mother was unable 

to properly and effectively parent the Children due to abuse, neglect, and 

mental health concerns. At a June 22, 2021, hearing, which Mother did not 

attend, the juvenile court found the allegations true and the Children 

dependent as to Mother. Mother appealed the dependency adjudication, 

and we affirmed in Allegra G. v. Department of Child Safety, 1 CA-JV 21-0221, 

2021 WL 5830199 (Ariz. App. Dec. 9, 2021) (mem. decision).

¶3 Upon finding the Children dependent, the juvenile court set 

a disposition hearing for July 30, 2021. Several hours before the disposition 

hearing, Mother filed a “Notice” in which she argued, inter alia, that the 

hearing violated A.R.S. § 8-844(E) because it was scheduled for more than 

thirty days after the dependency adjudication hearing. Mother did not, 

however, appear at the hearing. The court set the case plan as severance 

1 No father is party to this appeal.

2 We deny as moot Mother’s motion for mistrial and disqualification 

filed in this court on March 11, 2022, and her motion to dismiss filed on 

March 22, 2022.
ALLEGRA G. v. DCS et al.

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and adoption, and ordered DCS to expedite a home-study referral for a 

proposed out-of-state relative placement.

¶4 Mother appeals the disposition order. We have jurisdiction 

under A.R.S. §§ 8-235 and 12-120.21. See Lindsey M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. 

Sec., 212 Ariz. 43, 45–46, ¶¶ 8–9, 12 (App. 2006).

DISCUSSION

¶5 Mother raises several arguments on appeal. As an initial 

matter, DCS contends that Mother has waived all arguments based on her 

failure to provide record and legal citations as required by ARCAP 13(a)

and Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. (“Rule”) 106(A). In exercise of our discretion, we 

consider Mother’s arguments on their merits. We do not, however, address 

her arguments concerning the dependency adjudication, including her 

arguments that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction and that certain 

dependency statutes are unconstitutional. Our review is limited to 

Mother’s challenges to the disposition order.

¶6 We first address Mother’s contention that the disposition 

order was void because the hearing was untimely. Section 8-844(E) directs 

the juvenile court to hold the disposition hearing “not more than thirty days 

after the date of the dependency adjudication hearing,” and Rule 56(B) 

similarly provides that “[t]he disposition hearing shall be held within thirty 

(30) days of the dependency adjudication.” Here, the disposition hearing 

was held eight days outside the thirty-day deadline. We do not, however, 

agree with Mother that the tardiness of the hearing rendered the order void.

¶7 Our decision in Joshua J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 

417 (App. 2012), is instructive. In Joshua J., we held that though § 8-842 and 

Rule 55(B) provide that an initial dependency hearing “shall” be held 

within a prescribed period after the petition is filed, non-compliance with 

that deadline is not fatal to the proceedings. 230 Ariz. at 422–23, ¶¶ 18–19. 

We explained that “shall” may be given a directory rather than a mandatory 

meaning when the legislature’s purpose would not be served by a rule that 

noncompliance invalidates the proceedings. Id. at 421, ¶ 11. We construed 

§ 8-842 and Rule 55’s deadline as directory in view of the legislature’s 

failure to identify any consequence for non-compliance, and the potential 

harm to children if hearing delays alone rendered dependency 

adjudications void. Id. at 422–23, ¶¶ 18–19. We held that to obtain relief 

based on a violation of the deadline, a parent must demonstrate prejudice—

i.e., that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different absent 

the delay. Id. at 424, ¶¶ 24–25.
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¶8 Here, as in Joshua J., neither § 8-844 nor Rule 56 identify any 

consequence for a failure to hold the disposition hearing within the thirtyday period. Further, to find the proceedings void based on a tardy hearing 

alone would expose some children to harm. Accordingly, we hold that the 

thirty-day deadline set forth by the statute and rule is directory. And here,

Mother is not entitled to relief because she has demonstrated no prejudice

from the violation of the deadline.

¶9 We next address Mother’s contention that A.R.S. § 8-845 “is 

unconstitutional (‘breathtakingly broad’) as applied” because her parental 

rights were not prioritized. The statute authorizes the court to place 

children “in accordance with [their] best interests,” considering their 

“health and safety . . . as a paramount concern.” A.R.S. § 8-845(A), (B). The 

statute properly reflects the court’s obligation to “consider the best interests 

of the child in every decision.” See Alexander M. v. Abrams, 235 Ariz. 104, 

107, ¶ 15 (2014). Further, the statute does not, as Mother suggests, ignore 

her rights—it specifically provides that the court must consider “[t]he 

services that have been offered to reunite the family,” and it states that “the 

court, insofar as possible, shall seek to reunite the family.” A.R.S. § 8-

845(B)(2), (C).

¶10 Here, Mother knowingly failed to attend the disposition 

hearing, instead filing in advance a “Notice” for the court’s review. 

Contrary to her contention, she was afforded due process—she simply did 

not fully avail herself of it. See Cruz v. Garcia, 240 Ariz. 233, 236, ¶ 11 (App. 

2016) (recognizing that parents whose custodial rights are at issue are 

entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time in a 

meaningful manner); Jessicah C. v. Dept’ of Child Safety, 248 Ariz. 203, 204, 

207, ¶¶ 1, 18–21 (App. 2020) (holding that parent waived right to present 

evidence by explicitly agreeing to resolve on oral argument alone DCS’s 

motion to change physical custody of the dependent child); Rule 56(D) 

(providing that court may consider all relevant evidence at disposition 

hearing, including the parents’ oral or written reports).

¶11 The first seven minutes of the disposition hearing were not 

recorded. Though we informed Mother that she could seek to reconstruct 

the record under ARCAP 11, she did not do so. Nor does she challenge the 

evidence that she neglected the Children’s medical and educational needs 

their entire lives, isolated them, and showed signs of a mental health issues. 

And though Mother contends that she fully participated in visitation, which 

she asserts was the only service offered, DCS’s counsel informed the court 

at the disposition hearing that Mother had “recently declined to participate 

since the visitations switched to clinically supervised.” Counsel further 
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stated that DCS would continue to offer clinically supervised visitation to 

Mother even under the new case plan, and was “asking her to engage in a 

psychological evaluation.” See A.R.S. § 8-845(D) (permitting reasonable 

reunification efforts to continue concurrent with adoption efforts). On this 

record, we detect no error in the superior court’s ruling.

CONCLUSION

¶12 We affirm the disposition order for the reasons set forth 

above.