Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 57 / Monday, March 24, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 15397 

(e) This amendment becomes effective on 

April 28, 2008. 

Note: The subject of this AD is addressed 

in EASA (France) AD 2006–0079, dated April 

3, 2006. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 10, 

2008. 

Mark R. Schilling, 

Acting Manager, Rotocraft Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–5494 Filed 3–21–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2008–0303; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–047–AD; Amendment 

39–15441; AD 2008–06–29] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Boeing 

Model 737–300, –400, and –500 Series 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Boeing Model 737–300, –400, and –500 

series airplanes. This AD requires 

repetitive inspections of the downstop 

assemblies on the main tracks of the No. 

2, 3, 4, and 5 slats and the inboard track 

of the No. 1 and 6 slats to verify if any 

parts are missing, damaged, or in the 

wrong order. This AD also requires 

other specified actions, and related 

investigative and corrective actions if 

necessary. This AD results from reports 

of fuel leaking from a puncture in the 

slat track housing (referred to as the 

‘‘slat can’’). We are issuing this AD to 

detect and correct loose or missing parts 

from the main slat track downstop 

assemblies, which could puncture the 

slat can and result in a fuel leak and 

consequent fire. 

DATES: This AD is effective April 8, 

2008. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of April 8, 2008. 

We must receive comments on this 

AD by May 23, 2008. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M–

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M–

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 

Washington 98124–2207. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Office (telephone 800–647–

5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Nancy Marsh, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe Branch, ANM–120S, FAA, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 917–6440; fax (425) 917–6590. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION; 

Discussion 

Boeing has notified us that it has 

received numerous reports of fuel 

leaking from the slat track housing 

(referred to as the ‘‘slat can’’) on Boeing 

Model 737–300, –400, and –500 series 

airplanes. In all cases, there were no 

reports of a fire as a result of the fuel 

leaks on these airplane models. In some 

of the reports, the fuel leak was caused 

by loose or broken parts falling off the 

downstop assembly into the slat can, 

which were then subsequently driven 

into the slat can by the retracting slat 

track. This condition, if not corrected, 

could puncture the slat can and result 

in a fuel leak and consequent fire. 

Other Related Rulemaking 

On August 28, 2007, we issued 

emergency AD 2007–18–52, amendment 

39–15197, to address the same unsafe 

condition on all Model 737–600, –700, 

–700C, –800, –900, and –900ER series 

airplanes. That AD was published in the 

Federal Register on September 21, 2007 

(72 FR 53928). That AD requires 

repetitive detailed inspections of the 

slat track downstop assemblies to verify 

that proper hardware is installed, onetime torquing of the nut and bolt, and 

corrective actions if necessary. That AD 

resulted from reports of parts coming off 

the main slat track downstop assemblies 

and a resultant fire. That AD was issued 

to detect and correct loose or missing 

parts from the main slat track downstop 

assemblies, which could result in a fuel 

leak and consequent fire. 

Because the main slat track downstop 

assemblies of Model 737 airplanes are 

similar in design to those of other 

Boeing airplane models, we have been 

working with the manufacturer to 

evaluate its remaining airplane models 

to determine if a similar unsafe 

condition exists on them. As a result, 

we may consider additional rulemaking 

as those evaluations are completed. 

Relevant Service Information 

We reviewed Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–57A1301, dated February 

5, 2008. The service bulletin describes 

procedures for doing repetitive detailed 

inspections of the downstop assemblies 

on the main tracks of the No. 2, 3, 4, and 

5 slats and the inboard track of the No. 

1 and 6 slats to verify if any parts are 

missing, damaged, or in the wrong 

order. The service bulletin specifies that 

the downstop assembly may be 

inspected using a borescope. The 

service bulletin also describes 

procedures for doing other specified 

actions, and doing related investigative 

and corrective actions if necessary. The 

other specified actions include a onetime torquing of the nut of the downstop 

assembly and a detailed inspection of 

the bolt to verify that the entire 

chamfered portion of the bolt protrudes 

beyond the outer surface of the nut. The 

related investigative action is a detailed 

inspection of the inside of the slat can 

for loose parts and damage to the wall 

of the slat can, which is done if any 

downstop assembly part is missing or 

damaged. The corrective actions include 

the following: 

• Removing any loose downstop 

assembly part found in the slat can. 

• Replacing any damaged slat can, or 

contacting Boeing for repair 

information. 

• Replacing any missing or damaged 

downstop assembly part with a new or 

serviceable part. 

• Removing and reinstalling the 

downstop assembly if any downstop 

assembly parts are in the wrong order, 

or if the entire chamfered portion of the 

bolt does not protrude beyond the outer 

surface of the nut after it is torqued. 

The service bulletin specifies doing 

the initial inspection within 90 days 

and repeating the inspection thereafter 

at intervals not to exceed 4,500 flight 


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15398 Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 57 / Monday, March 24, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 

cycles. The service bulletin specifies 

doing the other specified actions within 

90 days. The service bulletin specifies 

doing the related investigative and 

corrective actions before further flight 

after certain findings. 

FAA’s Determination and Requirements 

of This AD 

We are issuing this AD because we 

evaluated all the relevant information 

and determined the unsafe condition 

described previously is likely to exist or 

develop in other products of the(se) 

same type design(s). This AD requires 

accomplishing the actions specified in 

the service information described 

previously, except as discussed under 

‘‘Differences Between the AD and 

Service Bulletin.’’

Differences Between the AD and 

Service Bulletin 

For airplanes on which any downstop 

assembly part is missing or damaged, 

the service bulletin specifies doing a 

related investigative action—i.e., a 

detailed inspection of the inside of the 

slat can for loose parts and damage to 

the wall of the slat can. However, this 

AD allows operators to accomplish a 

borescope inspection of the inside of the 

slat can instead of a detailed inspection. 

We have coordinated this difference 

with Boeing. 

The service bulletin specifies to 

contact the manufacturer for 

instructions on how to repair certain 

conditions, but this AD would require 

repairing those conditions in one of the 

following ways: 

• Using a method that we approve; or 

• Using data that meet the 

certification basis of the airplane, and 

that have been approved by an 

Authorized Representative for the 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes 

Delegation Option Authorization 

Organization whom we have authorized 

to make those findings. 

Clarification of Slat Can Replacement 

Paragraph 3.B.5.a.(2) of the 

Accomplishment Instructions of the 

service bulletin specifies to either 

replace any damaged slat can or contact 

Boeing for repair information if any 

damaged slat can is found. Paragraph 

(f)(3) of this AD specifies, in part, that 

if an operator chooses to replace the 

damaged slat can instead of contacting 

Boeing for repair information, the 

damaged slat can must be replaced with 

a new slat can having the same part 

number. 

Interim Action 

We consider this AD interim action. 

The manufacturer is currently 

developing a modification that will 

address the unsafe condition identified 

in this AD. Once this modification is 

developed, approved, and available, we 

might consider additional rulemaking. 

FAA’s Justification and Determination 

of the Effective Date 

Loose or missing parts from the main 

slat track downstop assemblies could 

puncture the slat can and result in a fuel 

leak and consequent fire. Because of our 

requirement to promote safe flight of 

civil aircraft and thus, the critical need 

to assure the structural integrity of the 

main slat track downstop assemblies 

and the short compliance time involved 

with this action, this AD must be issued 

immediately. 

Because an unsafe condition exists 

that requires the immediate adoption of 

this AD, we find that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

hereon are impracticable and that good 

cause exists for making this amendment 

effective in less than 30 days. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not provide you with notice and 

an opportunity to provide your 

comments before it becomes effective. 

However, we invite you to send any 

written data, views, or arguments about 

this AD. Send your comments to an 

address listed under the ADDRESSES

section. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–

2008–0303; Directorate Identifier 2008–

NM–047–AD’’ at the beginning of your 

comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this AD. We will consider all 

comments received by the closing date 

and may amend this AD because of 

those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this AD. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. ‘‘Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs,’’ describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in ‘‘Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

You can find our regulatory 

evaluation and the estimated costs of 

compliance in the AD Docket. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new AD: 

2008–06–29 Boeing: Amendment 39–15441. 

Docket No. FAA–2008–0303; Directorate 

Identifier 2008–NM–047–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) is 

effective April 8, 2008. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 57 / Monday, March 24, 2008 / Rules and Regulations 15399 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to all Boeing Model 

737–300, –400, and –500 series airplanes, 

certificated in any category. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD results from reports of fuel 

leaking from a puncture in the slat track 

housing (referred to as ‘‘slat can’’). We are 

issuing this AD to detect and correct loose or 

missing parts from the main slat track 

downstop assemblies, which could puncture 

the slat can and result in a fuel leak and 

consequent fire. 

Compliance 

(e) Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

Repetitive Inspections and Corrective 

Actions 

(f) At the applicable time specified in Table 

1 of paragraph 1.E. of Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–57A1301, dated February 5, 

2008, except as provided by paragraph (f)(1) 

of this AD: Do a detailed inspection or 

borescope inspection of the downstop 

assemblies on the main tracks of the No. 2, 

3, 4, and 5 slats and the inboard track of the 

No. 1 and 6 slats to verify if any parts are 

missing, damaged, or in the wrong order; and 

do all the other specified, related 

investigative, and corrective actions as 

applicable; by accomplishing all of the 

applicable actions specified in the 

Accomplishment Instructions of the service 

bulletin, except as provided by paragraphs 

(f)(2) and (f)(3) of this AD. Repeat the 

inspection thereafter at the applicable 

interval specified in Table 1 of paragraph 1.E. 

of the service bulletin. Do all applicable 

related investigative and corrective actions 

before further flight. 

(1) Where the service bulletin specifies 

counting the compliance time from ‘‘* * * 

the date on the service bulletin,’’ this AD 

requires counting the compliance time from 

the effective date of this AD. 

(2) For airplanes on which any downstop 

assembly part is missing or damaged, a 

borescope inspection of the inside of the slat 

can for loose parts and damage to the wall 

of the slat can may be accomplished in lieu 

of the detailed inspection of the inside of the 

slat can that is specified in the service 

bulletin. 

(3) If any damaged slat can is found during 

any inspection required by this AD: Before 

further flight, either replace the slat can with 

a new slat can having the same part number 

or repair the slat can using a method 

approved in accordance with the procedures 

specified in paragraph (g) of this AD. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(g)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Attn: Nancy 

Marsh, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe 

Branch, ANM–120S, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 

Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone 

(425) 917–6440; fax (425) 917–6590; has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. 

(2) To request a different method of 

compliance or a different compliance time 

for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 

39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on 

any airplane to which the AMOC applies, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector 

(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District 

Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local 

FSDO. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair 

required by this AD, if it is approved by an 

Authorized Representative for the Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes Delegation Option 

Authorization Organization who has been 

authorized by the Manager, Seattle ACO, to 

make those findings. For a repair method to 

be approved, the repair must meet the 

certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically refer to this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(h) You must use Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin 737–57A1301, dated February 5, 

2008, to do the actions required by this AD, 

unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 

Washington 98124–2207. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information incorporated by reference at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 

Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at 

the National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal_register/ 

code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

11, 2008. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Assistant Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E8–5702 Filed 3–21–08; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–28370; Directorate 

Identifier 2003–NM–239–AD; Amendment 

39–15439; AD 2008–06–27] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Goodrich 

Evacuation Systems Approved Under 

Technical Standard Orders (TSOs) 

TSO–C69, TSO–C69a, TSO–C69b, and 

TSO–C69c, Installed on Various 

Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and 

Airbus Transport Category Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Goodrich evacuation systems approved 

under Technical Standard Orders 

(TSOs) TSO–C69, TSO–C69a, TSO–

C69b, and TSO–C69c, installed on 

certain Boeing, McDonnell Douglas, and 

Airbus transport category airplanes. For 

certain systems, this AD requires 

replacing the evacuation system’s shearpin restraints with new ones. For certain 

other systems, this AD requires an 

inspection for manufacturing lot 

numbers; and a general visual 

inspection of the shear-pin restraint for 

discrepancies, and corrective actions if 

necessary. This AD results from several 

reports of corroded shear-pin restraints 

that prevented Goodrich evacuation 

systems from deploying properly. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent failure of 

an evacuation system, which could 

impede an emergency evacuation and 

increase the chance of injury to 

passengers and flightcrew during the 

evacuation. 

DATES: This AD is effective April 28, 

2008. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in this AD 

as of April 28, 2008. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain other publication listed in 

this AD as of March 11, 2008 (73 FR 

6586, February 5, 2008). 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Goodrich, 

Aircraft Interior Products, ATTN: 

Technical Publications, 3414 South 

Fifth Street, Phoenix, AZ 85040–1169. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 


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