IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

James J. Prince,

Plaintiff

 v.

Dr. Cha, et al.,

Defendants

:

:

:

:

:

Civil Action 2:13-cv-00035

Judge Watson

Magistrate Judge Abel

Report and Recommendation

Plaintiff James J. Prince, a State prisoner, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that defendants have exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs and have retaliated against him for filing grievances. This matter is before the

Magistrate Judge on defendants Dr. Cha, Dr. Keaton, Dr. Stein, Nurse Shortt-Tucker

and North Central Correctional Complex (“NCCC”)’s February 28, 2014 motion for

summary judgment (doc. 35).

I. Allegations in the Complaint

Plaintiff suffers from a serious medical condition of a damaged left ankle known

as osteomyelitis. He requires a cane to stand and walk, and this condition causes him

significant pain. Prior to his incarceration, plaintiff was treated by Dr. Stahel, a doctor

with Denver Health Care. Initially, Dr. Stahel wanted to amputate plaintiff’s left foot;

but on August 30, 2011, Dr. Stahel recommended that plaintiff follow up on an elective

1

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 1 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
basis with a different provider. Plaintiff maintains that Dr. Stahel’s statement contained

false statements: that plaintiff made an angry outburst; that he could walk without

crutches; and that he was not in significant pain. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dr.

Stahel as a result of his statements. 

Plaintiff was next seen by Dr. John Gehred, a doctor with Park Hill Family

Health Center. Dr. Gehred prescribed morphine sulfate 30 mg six times per day and

Oxycodeine, 10 mg four times a day for breakthrough pain. Dr. Gehred recommended

that plaintiff undergo corrective surgery. 

In February 2012, plaintiff was incarcerated at NCCC. Dr. Cha conducted

plaintiff’s initial medical examination. Plaintiff showed Dr. Cha his damaged left ankle,

which exhibited swelling and discoloration. Plaintiff reported throbbing and stabbing

pain, disrupted sleep and stress due to significant pain. Plaintiff informed Dr. Cha that

he required corrective surgery. Dr. Cha indicated that no corrective surgery was

allowed. Dr. Cha prescribed a minimum amount of Ultram and Neurontin. Plaintiff

maintains that these medications did not alleviate his pain. 

On April 6, 2012, Dr. Cha committed sexual misconduct. Ms. Hensley, the Health

Care Administrator, witnessed the misconduct and issued a written statement

apologizing for Dr. Cha’s conduct. Plaintiff filed an informal complaint and grievance

against Dr. Cha for sexual misconduct. 

Dr. Cha referred plaintiff to a podiatrist, Dr. Tabbert. Dr. Tabbert recommended

that plaintiff stay on his current paid medications and be seen by a pain specialist. 

2

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 2 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
After plaintiff’s grievance against Dr. Cha was found to be untimely, Dr. Cha

retaliated against plaintiff by terminating his pain medications. Dr. Keaton began

treating plaintiff instead of Dr. Cha. Dr. Keaton ignored plaintiff’s reports of serious

pain and indicated that there was no record of a serious medical condition or any need

for corrective surgery. Dr. Keaton stated that he did not want to get involved with the

“politics” between plaintiff and Dr. Cha.

The amended complaint (doc. 7) contains the following additional allegations.

On February 4, 2013, defendants plaintiff received medical records from A.B.Q. Health

Care. After reviewing his records, defendant Shortt-Tucker asked plaintiff about his

current symptoms. Plaintiff reported significant pain in his neck, limited range of

motion, sharp and throbbing pain, migraines, and numbness in his legs. Shortt-Tucker

stated that plaintiff had degenerative discs in his spinal column. She informed plaintiff,

however, that she could not prescribe him any more pain medication because of State

Medical Director Dr. Eddy who had a personal crusade against pain medications.

Plaintiff is not certain whether Shortt-Tucker’s refusal to prescribe him additional pain

medications was the result of deliberate indifference, Dr. Eddy’s crusade, or her

participation in conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s due process and equal protection rights

in conjunction with Dr. Cha and Dr. Keaton. 

3

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 3 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
II. Arguments of the Parties

A. Defendants

Defendants Dr. Cha, Dr. Keaton, Dr. Stein, and Nurse Shortt-Tucker provided

medical care and treatment to plaintiff while he was incarcerated at NCCC. Defendants

maintain that plaintiff’s claims are based on his disagreement with the treatment

defendants provided him based on their refusal to provide him pain medications.

Defendants argue that because plaintiff received numerous examinations, which

included care and treatment, he cannot establish a claim for deliberate indifference.

Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.

Defendants maintains that because the dispute is not over whether plaintiff received

treatment but rather his belief that the care he received was inadequate, his claim is not

actionable. Defendants also argue that plaintiff has failed to produce any expert

testimony to support his assertion that the medical care and treatment defendants

provided fell below the applicable standard of care. Drs. Cha and Keaton provided

affidavits stating that the medical care defendants provided did not proximately cause

plaintiff any injuries in this case. 

Defendants argue that plaintiff is unable to prove either the objective or

subjective component to his deliberate indifference claim. Defendants maintain that

plaintiff’s inability to establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice is fatal to his

claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

4

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 4 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Defendants also argue that plaintiff is unable to prove a retaliatory act. Dr. Cha

stated in his affidavit that he was unaware of any grievances filed against him by

plaintiff. 

Defendants further argue that NCCC cannot be liable based on the theory of

respondeat superior and that defendants are entitled to judgment on plaintiff’s

derivative claims of retaliation and conspiracy. 

B. Plaintiff

Plaintiff argues that he has proven the objective and subjective components of his

deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff maintains that he has demonstrated the objective

component of his claim. Plaintiff’s serious medical conditions include degenerative disc

disease in his neck, debridged calacaneous of the left ankle, neuropathy, and severe

arthritis. Dr. Stahel, a chief surgeon with Denver Health, recommended that plaintiff be

seen by a limb salvage specialist. Dr. Tabbert, a podiatrist, recommended that plaintiff

undergo a left ankle fusion. Dr. Tabbert also recommended that plaintiff stay on pain

medications. Plaintiff reported that he was in significant pain.

Plaintiff argues that defendants were aware of the recommendations of his

medical providers and his complaints of pain, but defendants deliberately ignored their

recommendations and his complaints and left him in significant pain. Plaintiff argues

that frequent examinations do not necessarily preclude a finding of deliberate

indifference when defendants knew the extent of his pain, that the course of treatment

5

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 5 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
was largely ineffective, and refused to do anything more to improve plaintiff’s

condition.

Plaintiff maintains that Dr. Cha’s statement that he was not aware of plaintiff’s

complaint against him is untrue because plaintiff complained directly to Dr. Cha.

Plaintiff also maintains that Dr. Keaton was aware of the alleged misconduct of Dr. Cha

because he wrote a statement in plaintiff’s medical file regarding his desire to not get

involved in the politics between Dr. Cha and plaintiff. 

Plaintiff argues that he has established a claim for retaliation in violation of the

First Amendment by showing that Dr. Cha took away his pain medications based on

plaintiff’s complaints of his sexual misconduct. Plaintiff argues that the threat of

discontinuation of pain medications would deter an inmate from making a complaint.

Plaintiff maintains that if there had been a legitimate reason for discontinuing his

medication, then Dr. Cha would not have reinstated his medication a few months later. 

Plaintiff further argues that he has a claim for humiliation against Dr. Keaton.

According to Prince, Dr. Keaton humiliated him by ordering that plaintiff’s medications

be crushed in order to discourage him from prosecuting this action. Plaintiff maintains

that there was no medical reason or order for crushing his medication, and Health Care

Administrator Mrs. Boblenz admitted that Dr. Keaton’s crush order was illegal. Plaintiff

maintains that defendants claimed he was “cheeking” his medication, which was not

true. Plaintiff also contends that the Food and Drug Administration does not

recommend crushing Tramadol. 

6

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 6 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Plaintiff also asserts a claim for humiliation against Dr. Stein because he had

knowledge of plaintiff’s suit against Dr. Keaton. Dr. Stein discontinued plaintiff’s pain

medication and ordered that his Neurontin be crushed on the false assertion that

plaintiff’s liver enzymes were high and that his medicine level was low. When plaintiff

brought this action, Dr. Stein told plaintiff that pain was a part of life and that his injury

did not warrant narcotics. 

Plaintiff submitted the following documents in support of his memorandum in

opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment:

• An August 26, 2011 treatment note prepared by Dr. Stahel of the Denver

Health Medical Center. Prince was described as aggressive and disruptive.

Prince demanded to be scheduled for surgery. Dr. Stahel opined that

surgical revision remained questionable and that there was no urgent or

emergent indication for surgery in terms of acute threat to limb or life.

Instead, he recommended further diagnostic work-up. Because Dr. Stahel

believed that the patient-physician relationship had been severely

breached, he recommended that plaintiff seek follow up treatment with a

different provider, such as the limb salvage group under the guidance of

Dr. Wilkins. Doc. 68-1.

• An April 13, 2012 letter from Nurse Hensley to plaintiff concerning Dr.

Cha’s inappropriate statements. Nurse Hensley apologized for Dr. Cha’s

comments and stated that appropriate action had been taken regarding

the incident. Doc. 68-2.

• A September 4, 2012 Decision of the Chief Inspector on a Grievance

Appeal. Plaintiff’s allegations related to prior grievances and the chief

inspector would not review them again. Doc. 68-3.

• A December 20, 2013 Decision of the Chief Inspector on a Grievance

Appeal. Plaintiff had filed grievances concerning the crush order for his

medication. The crush order was removed. Doc. 68-4.

7

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 7 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
• A February 5, 2014 Decision of the Chief Inspector on a Grievance Appeal.

The decision noted that his medical file indicated that his liver enzymes

were elevated and that this was why the Ultram was discontinued. The

Neurontin was ordered to be crushed because Prince’s level was lower

than the therapeutic range. The decision further stated that a physician

can approve a crush order based on finding that the level was lower than

it should have been. Doc. 68-5.

• Plaintiff’s handwritten note concerning Dr. Cha’s statements and Nurse

Hensley’s response. Plaintiff asked that the matter be addressed. Nurse

Hensley indicated that she appreciated him bring the matter to her

attention. Doc. 87-1 at PageID # 442.

• An October 15, 2012 Decision of the Chief Inspector on a Grievance

concerning plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the disposition concerning Dr.

Cha’s statement. Plaintiff’s grievance was denied because filing a

grievance directly against the inspector on the same issue that was

previously grieved will not serve as an additional means of grieving or

appealing the earlier grievance. Doc. 87-1 at PageID # 443.

• An April 15, 2013 email from Nurse Shortt-Tucker stating that she is not

going to return to work. In the email she states that she is being sued by

an inmate because he was not given the pain medications he wanted. Doc.

87-1 at PageID # 444.

III. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party asserting the absence or presence of a

genuine dispute must support that assertion by either “(A) citing to particular parts of

materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored

information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes

of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials”; or “(B)

8

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 8 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine

dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the

fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

A party may object that the cited material “cannot be presented in a form that

would be admissible in evidence,” and “[t]he burden is on the proponent to show that

the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is

anticipated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note. If a

party uses an affidavit or declaration to support or oppose a motion, such affidavit or

declaration “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be

admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on

the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).

While the court must consider the cited materials, it may also consider other

materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). However, “[i]n considering a motion for

summary judgment, the district court must construe the evidence and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273,

279 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986)). “The central issue is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party

must prevail as a matter of law.’” Id., 489 F.3d at 279–80 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)).

9

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 9 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
IV. Discussion

A. Deliberate Indifference to a Serious Medical Need

The Eighth Amendment forbids prison officials from “unnecessarily and

wantonly inflicting pain” on an inmate by acting with “deliberate indifference” toward

the inmate’s serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To

demonstrate an Eighth Amendment deprivation, a prisoner must show that a prison

official acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 103-04. Prison officials are liable only if they know of and disregard “an excessive

risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “An official’s failure to

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for

commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”

Id. at 838. Mere negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference. See, Estelle, 429

U.S. at 106. Further, a prisoner does not state a claim merely by pleading that he

disagrees with the diagnosis or treatment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107-08; Westlake v. Lucas,

537 F.2d 857, 860 n. 5 (6th Cir. 1976).

Nonetheless, prison officials may not entirely insulate themselves from liability

under § 1983 simply by providing some measure of treatment. “One way a prison

official can act with deliberate indifference is by ‘consciously exposing the patient to an

excessive risk of serious harm’ while providing medical treatment. LeMarbe v. Wisneski,

10

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 10 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
266 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir.2001).” Quigley, 707 F.3d at 682. Deliberate indifference may

be established in cases where it can be shown that a defendant rendered “grossly

inadequate care” or made a “decision to take an easier but less efficacious course of

treatment.” Terrance v. Northville Reg'l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 843 (6th

Cir.2002)(quoting McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Chance

v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1998). A complaint states a claim when it alleges

that “prison authorities have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the

face of an obvious need for such attention where the inmate is thereby exposed to

undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury.” Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860; Scott

v. Amboina, 577 F.3d at 648. 

Plaintiff argues that defendants knew that he had a serious medical condition

based on Dr. Stahel’s August 27, 2011 medical report in which he recommended that

plaintiff see a limb salvage specialist. Dr. Tabbert noted plaintiff had chronic arthritis

and neuropathy and recommended that plaintiff continue to take Tramadol and

Neurontin. On July 1, 2012, the same day that Dr. Tabbert made this recommendation,

Dr. Cha discontinued plaintiff’s medication without any medical reason. He did so to

retaliate against plaintiff for exercising his First Amendment rights by filing a grievance

against Dr. Cha for engaging in sexual misconduct. Plaintiff maintains that the evidence

demonstrates that Dr. Cha’s affidavit stating that he was unaware of plaintiff’s

complaints is false because plaintiff’s prison medical file had a notation that a grievance

11

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 11 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
was reviewed on June 28, 2012. Plaintiff also argues that he suffered humiliation from

the unlawful crush order. 

Defendants argue that defendants did not refuse to prescribe him any pain

medication; instead, plaintiff did not receive the pain medication he wanted.

Defendants contend that plaintiff, who is a heroin addict, is simply attempting, by his

own admission, to obtain the maximum amount of pain medication. This is supported

by plaintiff’s allegations against Nurse Shortt-Tucker. Plaintiff alleges that ShorttTucker refused to tell him the criteria used by medical staff to determine whether an

individual was entitled to the maximum amount of pain medication in the form of

Ultram and Neurontin. Defendants further argue that plaintiff has not been denied care;

he has seen numerous physicians and had numerous appointments for his medical

conditions. Defendants contend that because plaintiff has received care yet claims that

the care has been inadequate, his Eighth Amendment claims is not actionable. 

Defendants maintains that plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim also fails because

he failed to establish that the care and treatment provided by defendants amounted to

deliberate indifference by failing to support his claim with expert testimony. Citing to

his medical records is not sufficient to demonstrate that his treating physicians found

that defendants’ actions amounted to a breach of the standard of care. 

Here, plaintiff has not come forth with any evidence demonstrating that

defendants have denied reasonable requests for medical treatment in the face of an

obvious need for such attention and thereby exposing him to undue suffering or the

12

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 12 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
threat of tangible residual injury. Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence

demonstrating that he required additional surgery. Although plaintiff relies on the

treatment note of Dr. Stahel, Dr. Stahel opined that surgical revision remained

questionable and that there was no urgent or emergent indication for surgery in terms

of acute threat to limb or life. Dr. Stahel only recommended further diagnostic work-up.

Doc. 68-1. Plaintiff has continued to receive treatment, and he is prescribed pain

medication. Plaintiff has not provided any evidence demonstrating that the treatment

he has received is so inadequate that it constitutes a deliberate indifference to his

serious medical needs. 

B. Retaliation in Violation of the First Amendment

A claim for a First Amendment retaliation has three elements: the plaintiff

engaged in protected conduct, the defendant took an adverse action against the

plaintiff, and this adverse action was taken because of the protected conduct.

Thaddeus-X, et. al. v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). 

Prince easily satisfies the first element because a prisoner has a constitutional

right to file grievances against prison officials. Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037

(2001) (citing Noble v. Schmitt, 87 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1996). 

The second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim is a showing that an

adverse action was taken. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. In order to determine whether

actions of lesser severity merit being deemed “adverse” for purposes of a retaliation

claim, we adopt the standard suggested by Judge Posner in Bart v. Telford, 677 F. 2d 622,

13

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 13 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
625 (7th Cir. 1982), that an adverse action is one that would “deter a person of ordinary

firmness” from the exercise of the right at stake. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. A person

of ordinary firmness would likely be deterred from exercising his rights if he knew he

risked losing his pain medications. 

Finally, Prince must demonstrate that there is a causal connection between the

protected conduct, complaining about Dr. Cha’s alleged sexual misconduct, and the

adverse action. “[T]he plaintiff must show that the decision was motivated, at least in

part, by the plaintiff’s protected activity. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399. Once the plaintiff

has met this burden, if the defendant can show that the same action would have been

taken in the absence of protected activity, the defendant is entitled to prevail on

summary judgment. Id.” Smith, Jr. v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1038 (2001).

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to present any evidence of a causal

connection. Although plaintiff claims that Dr. Cha was aware of the grievance filed

against him, the medical file notation made no reference to Dr. Cha. Plaintiff

acknowledged that he has filed over fifty complaints concerning his medical care, and

there is no evidence to contradict the affidavit of Dr. Cha indicating that he was

unaware that a grievance had been filed against him. Defendants also argue that there is

no evidence that plaintiff suffered an adverse action. Defendants maintain that because

plaintiff cannot establish that any care he received was substandard, he did not suffer

an adverse action.

14

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 14 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Here, plaintiff alleges that he complained about a statement Dr. Cha made to

him. Prince alleges that in retaliation for his complaint, Dr. Cha discontinued his pain

medication. Discontinuing one’s pain medication constitutes an adverse action because

it is an action that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising their

First Amendment right. 

Plaintiff relies on the proximity in time between his complaint and the

discontinuing of his medication to demonstrate a causal connection. Although

inferences drawn from the underlying facts contained in such materials must be

considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, there must be

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the opposing party.

Circumstantial evidence, such as the timing of events, may show motivation. See

Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399. Although timing may be relevant to causation in retaliation

cases, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the time between his complaint and Dr. Cha’s

actions were sufficiently close in time to demonstrate causation. The verified complaint

says that Dr. Cha made an inappropriate statement on April 6, 2012. Compl. at ¶ 16;

Doc. 3 at PageID # 38. The complaint does not identify the date of plaintiff’s informal

complaint and grievance for sexual misconduct. Id. at ¶ 17. On July 3, 2012, Inspector

Mrs. Morris indicated that plaintiff’s grievance was untimely. Id. On July 3, 2012, Dr.

Cha terminated plaintiff’s pain medication. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff has not demonstrated

that his informal complaint and the discontinuation of his medication were sufficiently

15

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 15 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
close in time to demonstrate a causal connection. Temporal proximity alone does not

suffice to demonstrate that Dr. Cha’s motive was retaliatory in nature. 

Those cases that have found temporal proximity to demonstrate causation have

also typically relied on additional evidence from which causation could be inferred. 

See, e.g., Kounelis v. Sherrer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 525, 531 (D. N.J. 2005) (finding that plaintiff

demonstrated a suggestive temporal proximity when only 25 days had elapsed and

charges brought against plaintiff were dismissed on two other occasions) and Rauser v.

Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 334 (3rd Cir. 2001) (finding that plaintiff had demonstrated

suggestive temporal proximity between his exercise of his rights“prior to January 1998"

and his transfer on January 26, 1998, when on the eve of the transfer, he was threatened

that if he continued to disrupt prison programs he would be punished with a denial of

parole). See also Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-274 (2001) (noting

that the use of temporal proximity to demonstrate causation must be very close).

Plaintiff’s remaining claims should also be dismissed. Although Prince argues

that Dr. Keaton humiliated him by ordering that plaintiff’s medications be crushed in

order to discourage him from prosecuting this action, Prince has not produced any

evidence to support this allegation. Plaintiff’s claim for humiliation against Dr. Stein

also fails. These claims appear to be a variation of plaintiff’s retaliation claim, but

plaintiff has not produced any evidence of a causal connection between his protected

activity and any adverse actions taken by Drs. Keaton or Stein. Plaintiff also has not

offered any evidence to support a claim for conspiracy against Drs. Keaton and Cha.

16

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 16 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Plaintiff’s remaining allegations concerning claims of humiliation are not asserted

against any defendants in this matter. See doc. 87 at PageID # 436-37.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that 

defendants Dr. Cha, Dr. Keaton, Dr. Stein, Nurse Shortt-Tucker and North Central

Correctional Complex (“NCCC”)’s February 28, 2014 motion for summary judgment

(doc. 35) be GRANTED.

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within

fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties a motion for reconsideration by the

Court, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part thereof

in question, as well as the basis for objection thereto. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B); Rule 72(b),

Fed. R. Civ. P.

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District

Judge and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Thomas v.

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-152 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981);

United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373,

380 (6th Cir. 1995). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate review of issues not

raised in those objections is waived. Willis v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991).

s/Mark R. Abel 

United States Magistrate Judge

17

Case: 2:13-cv-00035-MHW-NMK Doc #: 93 Filed: 07/11/14 Page: 17 of 17 PAGEID #: <pageID>