Defense Science Board 

2005 Summer Study 

on 

Reducing Vulnerabilities 

to Weapons of Mass 

Destruction 

May 2007 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB). 

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to 

the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions and recommendations in this 

report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense. 

The Defense Science Board 2005 Summer Study on Reducing Vulnerabilities to 

Weapons of Mass Destruction completed its fact finding in August 2005. 

This report is unclassified and releasable to the public.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I iii

Table of Contents 

Volume I. Main Report 

Preface .............................................................................................................. v

Executive Summary ......................................................................................vii

Chapter 1. Introduction ................................................................................. 1

Chapter 2. Analytic Methodology................................................................. 5

Scenario Analysis......................................................................................5

Chapter 3. The Threat ..................................................................................12

Chapter 4. Intelligence..................................................................................15

Improving Collection—The “Dots” ...................................................16

Improving Analysis and Information Management—“Connecting 

The Dots”................................................................................................17

Enabling More Effective Collection and Analysis ............................20

Chapter 5. Prevent Attack—The First Priority ........................................23

Deny Weapon Acquisition....................................................................23

Credible U.S. Policies.............................................................................25

Detection and Interdiction in Transit .................................................29

Chapter 6. Mitigation and Recovery...........................................................30

National Preparedness...........................................................................30

DOD Responsibilities............................................................................39

Chapter 7. Managing the Enterprise ..........................................................46

DOD Organization................................................................................47

Metrics: Readiness..................................................................................47

Chapter 8. Summary of Recommendations ..............................................50

Investment in Reducing the Threat.....................................................50

Bottom Line ............................................................................................56

Appendix A. Terms of Reference...............................................................57

Appendix B. Task Force Membership.......................................................60

Appendix C. Presentations to the Task Force..........................................63

Appendix D. Glossary..................................................................................66
iv I TABLE OF CONTENTS 

Volume II. Supporting Papers 

 

Chapter 1. Scenario and Systems Analysis 

 Chapter 2. Intelligence 

Chapter 3. Defensive Countermeasures against Weapons of Mass 

 Destruction: Assessments and Recommendations 

Chapter 4. Categorizing Federal Investments for Reducing the 

 Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
PREFACE I v

Preface 

This study was completed with an initial reporting of findings and 

recommendations provided in mid-August 2005, about two weeks 

before the devastation of New Orleans, Louisiana by Hurricane 

Katrina. Unfortunately, the findings of this study in the areas of 

"mitigation and recovery" were demonstrated to be almost universally 

valid. The weaknesses in planning and in command, control, and 

communication and lack of clarity in lines of responsibility and 

authority that are discussed herein were quite obvious in the response 

to Katrina. 

Special attention should be given to the discussions in this report 

concerning "truly catastrophic" events and the potential need to rapidly 

bring the active duty military into a dominant, albeit temporary, role. 

Katrina fits the definition intended in this report of truly catastrophic—

state and local responders were overwhelmed and the capabilities, 

discipline, clear line of command and control, and communications that 

the military could have brought to bear would have made a real 

difference in the early stages of response. 
vi I PREFACE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I vii

Executive Summary 

Reducing U.S. vulnerabilities to weapons of mass destruction is a 

topic of great importance to the nation’s security. The technology of 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has proliferated in the past 

decade as information and capabilities have become more accessible. 

Thus, actions to prevent such an attack should have high priority for 

the U.S. government and the Department of Defense. 

Why is the threat from weapons of mass destruction so important 

today? After all, the United States faced the potential of massive 

destruction from nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union for nearly 

half a century during the Cold War. The principle answer lies in the 

uniqueness of the security environment today. The growing spread of 

weapons of mass destruction provides small groups of individuals with 

the ability to deliver devastating harm to the United States. Such power, 

in the past, could only be delivered by nation-states with large economic, 

political, industrial, military, and social resources. Furthermore, these 

resources were valued by nation-states and could be readily held at risk—

making such policies as “mutually assured destruction” effective in 

dealing with the threat. 

In contrast, a loose band of terrorists, with few assets and no 

permanent geographic base, has the potential to deliver massive 

damage. With few tangible physical assets at risk and a willingness to 

“die in the pursuit of their cause,” conventional measures of deterrence 

are at best elusive. It is for this reason that the full spectrum of 

potential responses—including prevention, interdiction, mitigation, and 

recovery responses—needs to be brought to bear on the problem. This 

“full spectrum” theme is the cornerstone of the findings of this study. 

Much of the ongoing dialogue and activity concerning the WMD 

challenge has focused on limited aspects of a single modality—whether 

biological, chemical, nuclear, or radiological. Concerns such as 

detection, defeat, or consequence management tend to be addressed in 

isolation and specific to a single modality. This segmented approach 
viii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

does not lend itself to the development of an integrated system and 

approach for responding to and managing the threat. 

As a result, the Defense Science Board took a fresh approach in 

examining the WMD challenge—one that addresses the problem from 

an end-to-end perspective in order to assess the proper balance of 

requirements and resource allocation. The strategy adopted by the study 

is as follows: 

1. Do everything possible to prevent the worst people from 

acquiring and using the worst weapons. 

2. Increase the urgency of efforts to mitigate the consequences 

and recover from the impact of an attack. 

3. Identify the perpetrators and their supporters and devise clear 

and plan options for response to an attack. 

In the end, the task force concluded that no single approach 

is sufficient. All contribute, but all have limitations. To better position 

the United States against this threat the task force recommends actions 

in the following six areas: 

 Improve intelligence 

 Deny weapon acquisition 

 Develop retaliation policies 

 Improve national mitigation and recovery capabilities 

 Establish DOD pilot programs and develop catastrophe 

response plans 

 Develop and use readiness metrics for enterprise management 

Improve Intelligence 

Improving intelligence is a necessary enabler for all other steps to 

reduce WMD vulnerability. This challenge is beyond the scope of any 

one country or organization to solve alone. Still, DOD can help create a 

truly integrated WMD intelligence community focused on improving 

strategic “knowledge” through innovative collection, dramatically 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I ix

revitalized analysis, and a “war room” mentality for attacking the 

problem and influencing the plans and perspectives of relevant actors. 

Specifically, we believe that the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Intelligence and the Director of National Intelligence should implement 

and go beyond the recommendations of the 9/11 and WMD 

commissions in the following areas: 

 Move to greater emphasis on tracking key individuals and 

entities with WMD expertise and their links to radial states and 

groups. Monitor their financial transactions and transportation 

means and nodes, including across foreign and domestic 

intelligence lines and between federal and state and local entities. 

 Support measures to increase fielding of deep penetration 

intelligence programs. Exploit capabilities for technical 

collection attuned to the WMD threat and establish enhanced 

mechanisms for communication and data processing. 

 Continue to build capabilities for effective persistent 

surveillance, including the contribution made by tagging, 

tracking, and locating capabilities. Implement the 

recommendations of prior Defense Science Board studies to 

bring order and reliable funding to the development and 

deployment of tagging, tracking, and locating systems. 

 Ensure that the efforts to increase collected information in the 

above areas are driven by analysts and the users of 

intelligence and informed by expert target development. 

 Establish federated data bases that focus on individuals and 

their activities and that connect information across agencies and 

across domestic and foreign intelligence sources. 

 Create on-going, broadly-based mechanisms and relationships 

to develop a better understanding of the motives, 

objectives, and values of potential adversaries who might 

use WMD. 

 Establish a mission manager with responsibility to 

coordinate and integrate the intelligence community’s efforts 

with respect to terrorist pursuit of WMD, including 

coordination with domestic law enforcement. 
x I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Deny Weapon Acquisition 

The first priority for the nation is to prevent an attack. Toward that 

end, the United States needs to take actions to make the adversary’s job 

as difficult and dangerous as possible and to minimize the likelihood 

that he will achieve his goals. The worst forms of WMD—nuclear and, 

in some cases, biological—would likely be acquired by terrorists from 

nation-state proliferators. So there is much to gain by reducing the 

stockpiles of these weapons worldwide and securing weapons materials. 

Furthermore, many forms of WMD—chemical, biological, and 

radiological—are available in the United States. It appears that the 

easiest approach for terrorists would be to steal, purchase, produce, or 

exploit weapons materials inside the United States, as the United States 

has excellent infrastructure for scientific and technological development 

and makes this infrastructure readily accessible. 

The task force recommends that the U.S. government 

 Strengthen and broaden international cooperative efforts 

in nonproliferation to include treaties, the Proliferation 

Security Initiative, Nunn-Lugar, and special diplomatic efforts. 

The reach of these efforts should expand to include other 

countries, biological weapons, and “loose expertise.” 

 Remove easy access to WMD material in the United 

States, particularly radiological and chemical. Actions that 

should be taken include increasing physical security around sites 

near major population centers, using transportation routes away 

from major population centers, and, when possible, substituting 

materials that can be easily weaponized for those that are less so 

(many industrial chemicals have less toxic formulations). 

Develop Credible Retaliation Policies 

The President has made clear the nation’s intent to punish anyone 

who uses WMD against the United States or its interests abroad, or in 

any way aids and abets this use. The task force believes this to be the 

right policy. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xi

The credibility of declaratory policies depends on the ability of the 

United States to identify the source of the attack through technical 

forensics combined with intelligence information. Every effort should 

be made to improve these capabilities to provide accuracy and speed 

of attribution. 

Developing response options is the other essential ingredient for 

effective policies of deterrence. Response options should be developed 

prior to an attack and must take advantage of all elements of national 

power including diplomatic, economic, and military responses. Relying 

on ad hoc responses, in the midst of chaos, is not an effective 

approach. Rather, a disciplined and comprehensive process is needed to 

address the subject well in advance, so that, at a minimum, the issues 

and options are identified. 

The task force believes that the following actions are essential to 

improving the nation’s ability to attribute attacks and develop retaliation 

policies. 

 Continue to articulate clear policies for retaliation. 

 Improve tactical forensics capabilities as much as possible in 

order to improve attribution. 

 Extend planning of retaliation options that could punish 

potential attackers and their supporters and suppliers for a wide 

variety of participants and participation in an attack. Create a 

WMD-retaliation planning structure to develop military options 

and the equivalent capability at the national level to bring to 

bear all organs of national power. Subject these plans to 

simulations, gaming, exercises, and red teaming to gain insight 

into options and enhance effectiveness should execution be 

required. Publicize the existence of retaliation plans. 

Improve National Mitigation and Recovery 

Capabilities 

Should prevention fail the next priority for the nation is to 

minimize the impact of an attack on the United States. Mitigation and 

recovery is a national responsibility that involves many federal, state, 
xii I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

and local organizations. Despite the many efforts and programs in 

progress, the nation is still poorly prepared to mitigate the impact of a 

WMD attack. This lack of preparation appears to result from several 

key factors: fuzzy lines of responsibility and authority among local, 

state, regional, and federal agencies involved; a lack of a sense of 

urgency; and a tendency to emphasize physical effects of an attack with 

little regard for the psychological. 

Reducing the nation’s vulnerability to WMD requires a 

comprehensive approach across the spectrum from intelligence and 

prevention to mitigation, recovery, and response. A coherent approach 

must overcome the challenges of coordinating among many layers of 

government responsibility as well as involve the private sector, with 

greater cooperation and collaboration essential. Further, maintaining 

public support and understanding must be recognized as an important 

element of national preparedness. 

In the area of national mitigation and recovery, the task force 

recommends the following: 

 Focus on the highest payoff mitigation and recovery 

efforts to include: 

- Executable planning, exercises, and command, control, 

and communications (C3), including a fully interoperable 

communications and information system across all 

organizations involved. 

- Radically increased medical surge capabilities, such as 

emergency medical technician training for DOD civilian 

employees and telemedicine support. Developing a medical 

surge capability should be a high national priority. 

- Research and development on specific, modalityunique, high-payoff countermeasures. Such 

countermeasures include advanced medical countermeasures, 

advanced decontamination technology and techniques, 

effective detect-to-warn and detect-to-treat capabilities, and 

automated detection and air-flow control for facilities. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xiii

- Publicly articulate the situation regarding terrorist use 

of WMD clearly and honestly, with realistic assessments and 

guidance, to gain and maintain public support and to 

increase the sense of urgency. Participation by the President, 

Secretary of Defense, and senior officials in the Department 

of Homeland Security is essential. 

Establish DOD Pilot Programs and Develop 

Catastrophe Response Plans 

Responsibilities for mitigation and recovery fall on both civil 

departments and the Department of Defense. DOD has clear 

responsibility for protecting its forces both at home and abroad and 

assuring the ability to project force. To accomplish this mission, 

however, DOD depends heavily on civil infrastructure—a gray zone of 

responsibility in which DOD plays a role in mitigation and recovery. 

Thus, a more comprehensive approach to base and local community 

protection is needed, one that takes a systematic look across all 

modalities, is informed by risk assessment, and is implemented with 

standards and best practices. 

As well, DOD has unique capabilities that could contribute to a 

national architecture for mitigation and recovery—capabilities such as 

planning and exercising, extensive experience with C3 and information 

systems, operating in adversarial conditions, and extensive resources 

that can be brought to bear in the event of a truly catastrophic attack. 

The task force believes that the nation should draw on DOD’s 

expertise and experience, in advance of an attack, to help lead and train 

a national mitigation and recovery capability. Furthermore, DOD 

should be prepared to provide all needed capabilities should it be called 

on in response to an attack. Detailed catastrophe planning must be 

undertaken now—planning analogous to classic “war planning” in 

which DOD is so effective. 

The Department of Defense should accelerate action on its 

responsibilities in mitigation and recovery and, at the same time, lead 

the way for the civil community. In this area the task force recommends 

three initial actions as follows: 
xiv I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

 Establish a comprehensive base protection pilot program to 

protect four military installations building on prior pilot 

programs. 

 Design and develop robust, interoperable situation 

awareness and C3 capabilities. Negotiate with the 

Department of Homeland Security to lead in the development 

and prototyping of a national C3 capability. 

 Develop detailed plans—modeled after “war plans”—for 

execution of DOD responsibilities, if directed to provide full 

support of an attacked region for mitigation and recovery 

operations. 

Develop and Use Readiness Metrics for 

Enterprise Management 

A new organizational approach, with requisite staff and budget 

resources, will be required to create an effective counter-WMD effort 

within the U.S. government. The task force believes that one single 

individual must be charged with this responsibility—someone 

who is positioned to see the whole WMD picture and who can 

provide to the President an assessment of the nation’s capabilities 

and readiness to address the threat from WMD. Today, no one 

has that visibility. 

To aid in the development of these regular assessments, the task 

force recommends that the nation develop an enterprise readiness 

process and system that can provide assessment of each of the major 

capabilities required to reduce U.S. vulnerability to WMD and overall 

national preparedness. Such assessments can help to prioritize activities, 

inform resource allocation, and measure progress. Recommended actions 

include the following: 

 Create a small group chartered and empowered to develop a 

readiness process, reporting to the Secretary of Homeland 

Security or the White House. 

 Initially create a special cell in the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation to provide an 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY I xv

objective review and analysis (including metrics) of 

government-wide efforts to reduce vulnerability to WMD. 

 Create red teams and conduct regular simulation exercises

to challenge the assessments and collect data against which to 

evaluate metrics. 

In Conclusion 

In summary, the task force has identified six high-payoff areas of 

recommendations that will greatly reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to weapons 

of mass destruction. These recommendations reflect opportunities for 

the nation that are very high payoff at relatively low cost. Yet, despite the 

high payoff and low cost, the task force found no evidence that these 

efforts are being aggressively pursued. 

Effective implementation of all six recommendations would, in the 

assessment of the task force, significantly reduce the impact of most 

forms of WMD—chemical, biological, radiological. A nuclear attack is 

in a class by itself and remains a serious threat. Campaign attacks also 

remain potentially catastrophic due to the potential for widespread 

destruction. To implement these initial recommendations would require 

about $4 billion of additional investment annually. It is an investment 

that the country should make. 

INTRODUCTION I 1

Chapter 1. Introduction 

Reducing U.S. vulnerabilities to weapons of mass destruction is a 

topic of great importance to the nation’s security. President Bush has 

repeatedly talked about keeping the worst weapons out of the hands of 

the worst people as a national priority. It is the worst people who are 

the most likely to use weapons of mass destruction. And the U.S. 

homeland is a likely place for them to do so. 

The technology of weapons of mass destruction has propagated in 

the past decade as information and capabilities have become more 

accessible. That is not to say that it would be easy to execute an attack 

using weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as many complex tasks 

must be accomplished to do so effectively. But it does mean that 

actions to prevent such an attack should have high priority for the U.S. 

government and the Department of Defense. 

At the request of the Secretary of Defense and under the direction 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics (USD [AT&L]), the Defense Science Board (DSB) conducted 

a study on reducing vulnerabilities to weapons of mass destruction to 

aid the department in addressing this vital concern.1 Much of the 

ongoing dialogue and activity concerning this challenge has focused on 

limited aspects of a single modality—whether biological, chemical, 

nuclear, or radiological. Concerns such as detection, defeat, or 

consequence management tend to be addressed in isolation and specific 

to a single modality. 

While these single-modality approaches are useful, they do not lend 

themselves to the development of an integrated system and approach 

for responding to and managing this threat—one that addresses the 

problem from an end-to-end perspective and would support assessment 

of the proper balance of requirements and resource allocation. The 

current segmented approach does not allow for such assessments. 

Furthermore, the nation must be able to handle the different modalities 

 

1. Appendix A contains the complete terms of reference for this study. 
2 I CHAPTER 1 

singularly or in combination, and must be able to manage the spectrum 

of response from preemption to consequence management. Without a 

systematic approach, it is impossible to properly identify capability gaps, 

changes in priorities, or changes in the threat across this spectrum. An 

integrated approach would better support end-to-end assessment of the 

state of affairs in WMD defense. 

Thus, as directed by the USD (AT&L), this study addresses the 

challenge of reducing vulnerabilities to WMD from a fresh perspective. 

The principles underlying this study include the following: 

 Concentrate on defending the homeland against terrorist use of 

WMD or clandestine use by a nation-state 

 Examine the problem from a broad national perspective, not 

limited to that of the Department of Defense 

 Take a systematic look across all WMD modalities 

 Include civil and military considerations 

 Consider the challenge both at home and abroad 

Because of the breadth of such an effort, the scope of the study was 

limited by the following. WMD is defined as including chemical, 

biological, radiological, and nuclear. The study did not directly examine 

attacks on information systems, multiple conventional attacks, or attacks 

by electromagnetic pulse or other similar events. Yet, in the end, many of 

the recommendations set forth in this study could apply to those types of 

attacks as well. The study did not attempt to assess the details of ongoing 

programs except as they had an impact on broader goals. 

The study drew experts from government, industry, academia, 

research and development centers, laboratories, the medical profession, 

and many others to support its effort to address this topic in a systematic 

way. As such, these experts were not organized in the typical way, by 

individual modalities—chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological. 

Instead the team was organized in panels to address system analysis, 

cross-modalities, mitigation and recovery, intelligence, and investment, 
INTRODUCTION I 3

with ad hoc panels forming as needed to address topics such as 

understanding the adversary and response options.2 

The task force listened to many presentations to gain an understanding 

of current planning, investment, and capability development in DOD and 

across the government at the national, state, and local levels; to understand 

the current state of intelligence regarding the threat; and to learn about the 

efforts underway and organizational structures in place today.3

 This base of 

understanding informed the panel deliberations and contributed to 

formulation of the final recommendations. 

The chapters that follow detail the findings and recommendations 

of the task force.4

 Chapter 2 begins with the analytic methodology, 

followed in Chapter 3 by a brief survey of the threat. The subjects 

covered in Chapters 4 though 7 focus on the primary areas of 

recommendations. They are as follows: 

 Intelligence 

 Preventing an attack 

 Mitigation and recovery 

 Managing the enterprise 

The report concludes with a final chapter summarizing the 

recommendations, including a top-level investment analysis and 

estimate of costs to implement the recommendations. 

Before turning to the next chapter, the strategy adopted by the study 

is this: 

1. Do everything possible to prevent the worst people from 

acquiring and using the worst weapons. 

 

2. Appendix B contains the membership of the task force. 

3. Presentations to the task force—during both plenary and individual panel sessions—are 

listed in Appendix C. 

4. The chapters in this main report provide an overview of the analysis conducted by the task 

force and the findings and recommendations of the task force. Much analytic work and 

detailed assessments underlie these conclusions and are contained in a second volume of 

supporting reports. 
4 I CHAPTER 1 

2. Increase the urgency of efforts to mitigate the consequences 

and recover from the impact of an attack. 

3. Improve the means to identify the perpetrators and their 

supporters and devise clear and more comprehensively expand 

options for response to an attack. 

In the end, the task force concluded that no single approach is 

sufficient. All contribute, but all have limitations. 
ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY I 5

Chapter 2. Analytic Methodology 

This study examined a very long list of potential actions that might 

be taken to respond to the WMD threat. Some of these actions were 

unique to a single modality and others were more broadly applicable. 

One of the major goals for the study, as set by the Secretary of 

Defense, was to find a systematic approach to prioritize these diverse 

options in a disciplined manner. In response, this study developed such 

an approach, described in detail in volume 2 and summarized in this 

chapter. This methodology was used to determine the highest payoff 

items for recommendation by the study. 

Scenario Analysis 

As a basis for its assessment of potential approaches to the WMD 

threat, the task force analyzed 14 scenarios that span the nuclear, 

biological, chemical, and radiological modalities (table 1). These 

scenarios were based on scenarios developed for the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), with some modification, as indicated in 

table 1. 

To provide context for the analysis, we assigned a “class” of 

perpetrator to each scenario in order to understand the extent to which 

this variable might impact our ability to deal with the situation. For this 

purpose, the task force used three characteristic adversaries, as follows: 

 A hostile state actor that was geographically based 

 A major nonstate actor with a large organization but who was 

not geographically based or characterized by a fixed 

infrastructure (e.g., al Qaeda) 

 A splinter group either separate from, or acting independently 

of, a nonstate parent (e.g., Jemaah Islamiyah, Aum Shinrykyo) 
6 I CHAPTER 2 

Table 1. Fourteen Scenarios Analyzed 

1. Improvised nuclear device using highly enriched uranium 

stolen from the former Soviet Union 

2. Nuclear-tipped cruise missile off false flagged freighter into 

Los Angeles*** 

3. Nuclear blackmail of coalition states near end of regime 

change*** 

Nuclear 

4. Volunteer-carried bio attack using stolen flu samples* 

5. Machined anthrax spores dispersed through airborne 

sprayer** 

6. Plague in pressure canisters in airport and sports arena 

7. Foot and mouth disease contamination of feed and 

transport sites 

Biological 

8. Meat and orange juice processing plants contaminated with 

liquid anthrax 

9. Blowing up high pressure chlorine tank in industrial park 

10. Sarin purchased on black market introduced into office 

building heating, ventilating, and air conditioning system 

11. Multi-agent toxic industrial chemical release from 

coordinated attack on refinery and port 

12. WWII Japan blister agent released by small plane on 

sports stadium 

13. Chemical attack on U.S. base in the Middle East*** 

Chemical 

14. Coordinated three-city cesium radiological dispersal device 

attack using truck bombs Radiological 

* Converted from natural disaster in DHS scenario 

** Converted from truck dispersal in DHS scenario 

*** Created for DSB Study 
ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY I 7

For each scenario, the task force evaluated what occurred during 

the event, the terrorist workflow required to carry out the event from 

initial planning through execution and escape, the consequences of an 

unmitigated attack, and the major civil and medical response tasks. 

Using the adversary work flow and today’s mitigation and response 

capabilities, the task force looked for both near- and mid-term 

opportunities for improvements in five principal areas of effectiveness 

used throughout the study—prevention, interdiction, mitigation, 

attribution, and retribution.5 For those improvements that appeared to 

have a significant impact, their relative contribution was measured on a 

zero to one scale, roughly corresponding to the following definitions. In 

addition, the numerical range was evenly divided into a qualitative range 

of poor, fair, good, and excellent. 

 Prevention. The probability that the critical material supply, if any, 

would be shut down to the would-be perpetrator or that the act 

would be uncovered (and therefore prevented) by intelligence 

during the planning stage. 

 Interdiction. The probability that the perpetrators or their weapon 

would be discovered and/or caught while carrying out the act. 

 Mitigation. The degree to which casualties or economic damage 

would be reduced by improved response actions. 

 Attribution. The probability that the United States would be able 

to identify the perpetrators, their supporters, or their suppliers. 

 Retribution. The probability that the United States, given proper 

attribution of the act, could deliver the desired degree of 

retribution in terms that struck at the heart of the adversary’s 

value structure. 

Each of the 14 scenarios was evaluated in this fashion, identifying 

specific opportunities to prevent, interdict, mitigate, attribute, and 

deliver appropriate retribution. The result was a rich set of capabilities 

and defensive and offensive options. To prioritize and identify the most 

 

5. Volume 2 of this report contains a chapter presenting the detailed analysis conducted for each 

of the fourteen scenarios and the methodology used for identifying the most promising actions. 
8 I CHAPTER 2 

promising actions, the options were rated in terms of both impact and 

the degree of devastation that occurred in the scenario. 

The options with the highest rating were those that had a major impact 

on most of the worst scenarios. A somewhat lower rating was assigned to 

those options that had a major impact on many less severe scenarios. Still 

lower were those options that had a minor impact on several scenarios. 

Those options rated the lowest had only a minor impact on only a few 

scenarios that resulted in only a small amount of damage. 

The summary results of this evaluation are shown in table 2. The first 

column describes the scenario, followed by the potential unmitigated 

damage incurred from each—damage in terms of “equivalent” casualties, 

which combined the effects of people killed, people injured, and 

economic damage.6

 Of the many options evaluated, the top 

recommendations, which will be discussed in the following chapters, are 

summarized in the remaining columns, with a rating of the impact of 

those actions on each scenario. 

Table 2. Impact of Primary Study Recommendations on Scenarios 

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Minor

Minor

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

#4

National 

Readiness 

Improvements

Major

Major

Major

Minor

Major

Minor

Major

Major

Major

Minor

Major

Major

Major

#3

Retaliation

Plans

Minor

Minor

Major

Major

Minor

Major

Major

Minor

Major

Minor

Minor

#2

Material 

Control Actions

Major

Minor

Minor

Major

Major

Major

Major

Major

Minor

#5

DOD 

Catastrophe 

Response

CM nuke 700,000

Foot and mouth 1,000

Food contamination 600

600

Chemical in Mid-East

U.S. Base

Flu human spread 1,300

TIC at refinery/port 3,000

Plague in arena 3,200

7,400

Blister agent

in stadium

Sarin in building 8,000

RDD in 3 cities 26,000

Chlorine tank 45,000

Aerosol anthrax 130,000

Improvise nuke 650,000

Nuclear blackmail 850,000

Damage 

(equivalent Scenario casualties)

#1

Intelligence

Improvements

 

6. Further explanation of how this calculation was made can be found in volume 2. 
ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY I 9

Figure 1 offers another view of the impact of these top five 

recommendations. What is plotted in this figure is the risk of each 

scenario to the United States in terms of how likely it is that the attack 

will succeed and the level of casualties that will result after mitigation. It 

is, in effect, a casualty expectation. The risk to the adversary represents 

the degree to which he will be caught or identified and whether the 

United States will be able to retaliate effectively against either the 

adversary or his suppliers and helpers. 

Figure 1. Scenario Assessment 

Figure 1 shows a visualization of risks for both red and blue (which, 

in the classified report, includes data for the 14 scenarios). Note that 

the upper left hand area of the chart is the region in which a potential 

adversary can inflict major damage on the United States with little risk 

to himself—a dangerous and unstable region of high incentive to a 
10 I CHAPTER 2 

potential attacker. In contrast, the lower right hand area on the chart is 

that region in which a potential attacker achieves low impact on the 

United States while exposing himself to a high likelihood of receiving 

an unacceptable level of retribution—a region of credible deterrence. 

In addition to the quantitative and qualitative assessments that 

resulted from these analyses, the work also highlighted a number of 

general observations, including the following: 

 Nuclear terrorism is in a class by itself, particularly for single 

events. Even if the combination of prevention, interdiction, and 

mitigation were to reduce damage expectation by 100X, it 

would still be unacceptable. This expectation underscores the 

need to do everything possible to deter both the use of nuclear 

weapons as well as the supply of critical materials. Since that 

supply is largely available only from nation-states, deterrence of 

supply should be a major objective. 

 All scenarios are characterized by complex attacker workflow. 

This characteristic provides many opportunities for intelligence 

interaction. The three most common signatures are acquisition 

of specialized chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

(CBRN) materials; convergence of technical specialists at 

unusual places (such as a farmhouse); and the repeated presence 

of unaffiliated persons at critical U.S. urban or industrial 

infrastructure sites. 

 The easiest way for terrorists to acquire hazardous chemical 

material is to purchase/steal/use existing material in unsecured 

sites in the United States. Securing the most serious of these 

sites is an obvious option which is being pursued, albeit with 

inadequate urgency. 

 The DHS scenarios underestimate the potential impact of 

WMD attacks. The damage estimates, particularly economic 

damage, tend to be low, the impact of repetition is not fully 

exploited, and delivery mechanisms are often far less than 

optimum from the viewpoint of a potential terrorist attacker. 

 The type of analysis described in this chapter, done more 

completely and supported with an ongoing red-team activity can 
ANALYTIC METHODOLOGY I 11

provide a useful basis for readiness assessment across the entire 

federal, state, and local enterprise. It should include and be 

supported by outside expertise within the enterprise 

management structure of the U.S. counter-WMD effort. 

This overall assessment is indicative of the challenge posed by the 

threat: the task force found no easy solutions to this broad range of 

threats and broad range of weapon choices. Still, there are steps that the 

United States can take to reduce its vulnerability, as the chapters that 

follow will illustrate. 
12 I CHAPTER 3 

Chapter 3. The Threat 

Combating terrorist use of WMD requires foresight and action. 

Today, the nation faces a different kind of threat. It is not possible to 

observe the equivalent of nuclear testing. There aren’t submarines 

slipping quietly below the surface of the ocean. The equivalent of 

nuclear silos is not under construction. Thus, this is a tough challenge 

to address, but one with disastrous consequences if the nation fails to 

do so. 

Figure 2 portrays some interesting survey results—opinions of 

more than 100 national security and nonproliferation experts—that 

serve to highlight the changing nature of today’s threat. The results are 

somewhat surprising, in fact—at least in terms of the severity of the 

threat and how it is characterized. The top left quadrant addresses the 

probability of a nuclear attack in the next ten years. Over half of those 

responding believe the probability will be greater than 30 percent over 

the next decade. That response is 10 or 100 times what we used to 

think the likelihood of a nuclear event might be (often described as 

“high consequence, low probability” a few years ago). 

Nearly 80 percent of those responding believe that terrorists would 

most likely be responsible if a nuclear attack were to occur in the next 

10 years (top right); only 21 percent believe that the government of a 

nation-state would be responsible. Over half of the respondents 

thought that there would be an average of 7 or 8 more nations joining 

the nuclear club during the next two decades (bottom left). And nearly 

half of those responding believed that a dirty weapon would be the 

weapon of choice, were an attack to occur—twice that of any other 

mode of attack (bottom right). This last result most likely reflects the 

relative ease with which a terrorist could acquire a dirty weapon as 

compared to chemical, biological, or nuclear. Thus, securing 

radiological material everywhere in the world should be a high priority 

if one agrees with these experts. 
THE THREAT I 13

If a nuclear attack occurs within 10 years, are terrorists 

or a government more likely to be responsible?

Government

21%

Terrorists

79%

Probability of nuclear attack 

occurring the next 10 years?

Percentage

Respondents

Relative Likelihood of Mode of WMD Attacks

NUC BIO

RAD

CHEM

42%

22% 21%

15%

0

5

10

15

20

0 <10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Probability of a nuclear attack in the next 10 years?

How many nations will join the nuclear 

weapons club during the next 20 years?

Respondents

0 5 10 15 20 0

5

10

15

Number of Nations

Source: The Lugar Survey on Proliferation Threats and Responses, June 2005 

Note: Data shown are responses of 132 national security and nonproliferation experts. 

Figure 2. Responses from the Lugar Survey 

Our examination of the threat highlighted one very important fact: 

more relevant information than we current collect is available and must 

be assimilated. Further, we have far less information on terrorists as 

compared to nation-states and the information that is available is far 

less detailed and specific. What we do know is that there is an 

increasing number of potential perpetrators and proliferators due in 

large measure to the increasing availability of materials, “know how,” 

and weapons. Furthermore, the likelihood of an attack is estimated to 

be substantial in the view of today’s leaders and well-informed experts 

in national security. 

Not only is the threat far more complex than in the past, but the 

ability of the United States to respond is not as straightforward. The 

nation’s cold war WMD strategy was based on deterrence through 

mutual assured destruction. The threat was characterized by an 

established government, monolithic control, clear motivations and 

objectives, a large structured military, a substantial industrial and 
14 I CHAPTER 3 

economic base, and geographic clarity. That characterization reflects 

little of what the United States faces today. Instead the threat has no 

established government; different agendas, motivations, and objectives; 

far less structure; no clear economic base that could be held at risk; and 

even the geography is uncertain. We must refine our strategies to assure 

appropriate response to this threat. 

Despite its complexity and danger, however, this threat is taken 

with varying degrees of seriousness. By our view, the most senior 

leadership is taking this threat very seriously—it is discussed in 

speeches and is identified as the number one threat in national security 

strategy and guidance. However, the sense of urgency at lower levels is 

less palpable. While preliminary steps are evident, and positive steps 

have been taken, far more is needed to turn these actions into a 

comprehensive capability. Our findings and recommendations will 

address this need. 
INTELLIGENCE I 15

Chapter 4. Intelligence 

Improving intelligence is a necessary enabler for all other steps to 

reduce WMD vulnerability. It is beyond the scope of any one country 

or organization to solve alone. Still, DOD can help create a truly 

integrated WMD intelligence community focused on improving 

strategic “knowledge” through innovative collection, dramatically 

revitalized analysis, and a “war room” mentality for attacking the 

problem and influencing the plans and perspectives of relevant actors. 

The task force is aware that this topic enjoys high priority in the 

U.S. Intelligence Community and that considerable effort is being 

exerted to satisfy WMD intelligence needs. There have been impressive 

successes in collection, analysis, covert action, and support to the policy 

community. The task force is also aware, however, that many of the 

successes have been resource intensive and cannot be easily scaled 

across the breadth of the WMD challenges that the United States faces. 

Further, there are competing requirements for available resources and a 

number of programs confronting difficulties and in need of additional 

funds either to achieve operational status or to build upon prior 

successes. Our government’s resources are not infinite and these 

matters of target development, resource allocation, and collection 

strategy demand immediate redress. 

This study had neither the intention nor resources to duplicate the 

work of the many commissions, Congressional inquiries, and studies 

that have offered important findings and recommendations related to 

intelligence. We instead viewed these findings and recommendations 

within the context of our own study and offer the following additional 

observations and recommendations from that more limited perspective. 

The remainder of this chapter discusses, more specifically, the major 

concerns of the task force. First, there is a need for much more 

information. Second, there is a need for an accessible data base that is 

comprehensive—including both domestic and foreign information. 

Analysis of this information needs to be carried out in the context of the 
16 I CHAPTER 4 

best understanding of the adversary that we can achieve. Finally, the lines 

of authority and responsibility must ensure that there are no seams. 

Improving Collection—The “Dots” 

The major intelligence challenge posed by terrorist or covert use of 

WMD is a lack of information. Analysts interviewed by the task force 

reported that there is decidedly less information today on this topic 

than there was five years ago. If the analysts are correct, it is unclear 

why the volume of information is declining. Whatever the reason, 

important decisions about the WMD threat are being made based on 

limited amounts of information. 

The task force agrees with the observations of the WMD 

Commission that “the collection of information is the foundation for 

everything that the Intelligence Community does.” There is good work 

underway to enhance the community’s collection capabilities. This work 

needs to continue and success reinforced across a broad range of 

collection methods. It must also be adequately resourced in order to 

satisfy the nation’s urgent information needs against terrorism and 

WMD. 

Detailed discussion of collection issues is classified an outlined in 

Volumes 1 and 2 of the classified report for this study. 

The task force is aware that considerable effort is being expended in 

this area. Some of the approaches use existing and traditional collection 

means, while others require entirely new concepts in information 

systems intelligence. The limited review conducted for this study 

suggests that the traditional approaches continue to receive the highest 

level of funding and priority in resources. At the same time the most 

important, actionable, and insightful knowledge is being obtained by 

other techniques. 
INTELLIGENCE I 17

Improving Analysis and Information 

Management—“Connecting The Dots” 

The nature of conflict has changed. Where intelligence once 

focused on fixed installations as the target, there is now equal, if not 

more, concern with individuals and groups of individuals. Individuals 

are the new “high value targets.” It is thus useful to update the 20th

century’s approaches to recognize this change. It is equally useful to 

view defense operations from an information perspective—a “datacentric” view of the enterprise. 

Federated Intelligence Data Base 

Two vestiges of the Cold War offer important constructs that can 

be adapted to today’s challenge. The first, the Modernized Integrated 

Data Base (MIDB), is a database of fixed (adversary) installations of 

potential strike interest—a “bomb encyclopedia”, in which every 

potential target has an entry and a bomb encyclopedia number. The 

second, the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), was formed 

to optimize nuclear targeting across the services and delivery systems. 

The JSTPS developed nuclear targeting policies and strategies and were 

premier users of the MIDB. The task force recommends adapting these 

two concepts to the terrorist WMD challenge.7 

Accountability for the integrated data and data structures—the 

updated MIDB—will rest with both the Secretary of Defense and the 

Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The role of provisioning the 

database is clearly the responsibility of the DNI. Oversight of the 

database as a whole should rest with the Secretary of Defense, as the 

principal user. The role as overseer must take into account the various 

stakeholders of interest, which include U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

Strategic Command, the Departments of Homeland Security and 

Justice, the President’s newly appointed principal for information 

 

7. The analogy is that MIDB was a collection of “everything” that was known about each 

target. JSTPS was a user-dominated analysis and planning organization with full access to 

everything in the MIDB. In the modern case, the targets will largely be people (or groups of 

people) and things that are either mobile or fixed. 
18 I CHAPTER 4 

sharing, the chief information officers of the respective departments 

and agencies, and the Defense Information Systems Agency. 

Operation of the database will require much collaboration. While 

the collective set of information must act as a single database, it is 

unlikely to be implemented that way. “Owners” of the component 

databases have legitimate responsibility for data assurance and for 

protecting the sources and methods by which data have been acquired. 

Modern ideas of federation and common-services architecture, coupled 

with data assurance methods such as public key infrastructure, should 

be utilized. The challenge is further exacerbated by the essential need to 

include both foreign and domestic information. Indeed, this is a 

challenge that the Director of National Intelligence and the President’s 

principal for information sharing must manage. 

We thus recommend that the Secretary of Defense, through his 

Under Secretaries for Policy and Intelligence, and through the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, assign responsibilities for the 

immediate push to unify such relevant data within the Department of 

Defense, and to prepare for a more global integration across other 

designated departments and agencies.8

 

Concomitant with the database efforts must be creation of and 

funding for the new doctrine, organization, and forces structure 

associated with the “new JSTPS.” This organization would provide the 

intellectual stimulus for designing response options to a WMD assault 

on the U.S. homeland. Deterrence is the most difficult, but most 

satisfying, answer to the WMD conundrum. It rests on the bedrock of 

attribution and retribution—credibly holding at risk something a 

potential adversary holds of value. With nation-states, there is generally 

a rich set of things to hold at risk; for nonstate actors this set may be 

sparse. The Intelligence Community must harness the intellectual 

horsepower required to address this challenge—at a level equivalent to 

that employed throughout the Cold War. 

 

8. Volume 2 of this report contains a more detailed chapter on the intelligence challenge 

related to the WMD threat. It specifies additional actions to be undertaken in support of 

these recommendations. 
INTELLIGENCE I 19

The task force thus recommends that the Secretary of Defense 

assign his Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD [P]) 

responsibility for overseeing and, through the Chairman and the 

Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, accomplishing the formation 

of a joint strategic WMD operations response organization. This group 

should work closely with and support an equivalent organization under 

the National Security Council. 

Understanding the Adversary 

The 21st century presented the nation with a new genre of 

adversary—the rise of communities and societies significantly different 

than the nation-state. The United States is not yet well equipped to deal 

with this new adversary, in terms of institutions or processes. Without 

deep understanding of an adversary, there is no context for gathering 

intelligence information and little ability to hold his values at risk. 

An understanding is needed of local, communal, and societal views; 

cultural norms and values; historic experience and ethos; and 

contemporary political context. In addition, an understanding of the 

perceived impact on these groups of western culture and U.S. policy is 

also useful when contemplating engagement with or actions against them. 

While increased attention is being place on understanding nonstate 

actors, the task force is concerned that much of this effort is focused 

on tactical information for tactical objectives that are focused on nearterm problems and threats facing the United States. Instead, a deeper, 

more strategic understanding of emerging global trends with respect to 

nonstate actors and their desire for increased legitimacy will better 

inform the formation of more enduring policies, planning, and actions. 

Today, the Intelligence Community does not have the resources to 

support the type of in-depth, strategic intelligence needed. The task 

force therefore recommends that the Secretary of Defense work with 

the Director of National Intelligence to establish a small cell of subject 

matter experts, drawn from a variety of organizations, both inside and 

outside of government, to focus on emerging trends and groups posing 

a threat to U.S. interests. This initiative could be limited in both size 

and time to avoid establishing a new bureaucracy and should be 
20 I CHAPTER 4 

replenished on a periodic basis to avoid stagnation. They should set up 

a forum to draw on all available cultural resources with an aim toward 

creating the best possible understanding of motivations, values, 

objectives, and weaknesses of individual, groups, clans, and ethnic and 

religious groups and members. 

The goal of such a group would be to develop in-depth intelligence 

and knowledge of emerging adversaries to inform strategic and tactical 

intelligence gathering efforts as well as policy and military decision 

making. The group could also serve as a red team and a source of analysis 

alternative to institutional efforts and sensitivities. Intelligence analysts 

who serve in this cell would return to their respective organizations with 

greater expertise, understanding, and knowledge of adversaries. 

The results of the deliberations of this cell should be channeled to 

intelligence analysts as well as those responsible for planning potential 

response options in case of a WMD event. Volume 2 of this report 

offers the provocative views of one leading expert on nonstate actors 

and alternative societies. The paper outlines some of the themes that 

such a forum of experts should explore. 

Enabling More Effective Collection and Analysis 

Integrating activities across the Intelligence Community to support 

both national, battlefield, homeland security, and law enforcement 

missions is a significant challenge. Integration must reach across a 

matrix of intelligence departments and agencies as well as orthogonal 

institutions such as the Nationals Intelligence Council, intelligence 

centers, mission managers, task forces, and other related groups. 

Of particular relevance is addressing the challenge of simultaneously 

acquiring and protecting new and effective sources and methods while 

maximizing information sharing. A new Information Sharing Executive 

has been assigned by the President to focus on this task. Furthermore, 

an environment of risk-taking must be allowed and even encouraged 

within a restructured and transformed intelligence apparatus. Today’s 

class of WMD threats require proactive, preventative, and even 

preemptive and provocative intelligence activities, which require a 
INTELLIGENCE I 21

community that is forward-leaning in the areas discussed previously in 

this chapter—an approach that is strongly supported by this study. 

Coordinating and integrating the nation’s resources against terrorist 

acquisition and unconventional use of WMD—including intelligence 

resources—must be a priority. The recent creation of a National 

Counterterrorism Center and a smaller National Counterproliferation 

Center has potentially introduced simultaneously disconnected and 

duplicative missions. The task force is concerned about whether these 

organizations have been unambiguously tasked with the specific 

responsibility to oversee, coordinate, and direct the Intelligence 

Community’s efforts at the intersection of counterterrorism and 

counterproliferation—efforts that include collection, analysis, 

operational planning, and policy development. 

As a result, the task force believes there is a need to explicitly assign 

responsibility for this coordination role to a WMD mission manager, 

under the Director of National Intelligence. The mission manager would 

be assigned responsibility to coordinate and integrate the Intelligence 

Community’s efforts—including coordination with domestic law 

enforcement—with respect to terrorist acquisition and unconventional 

use of WMD. 

In the past, the Intelligence Community has achieved success in 

such endeavors only when it recognized the imperative to mount a 

coordinated intelligence campaign. Thus, a comprehensive collection 

and analytic strategy for protecting the United States and its allies from 

covert or terrorist use of WMD is necessary. 

These conclusions are not new. But in the view of the task force, 

the need to continue with the effective implementation of these and 

related recommendations from prior studies is imperative. The 

Intelligence Community has an excellent understanding of what needs 

to be done and, in the aggregate, the resources to do so. It needs, in our 

judgment, to advance with a greater sense of urgency, coordination, 

accountability, and leadership. 
22 I CHAPTER 4 

Recommendation 1 __________________________________________________ 

Recommendation #1 summarizes principal task force 

recommendations related to Intelligence.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD [I]) and the 

Director of National Intelligence should implement and go beyond 

the recommendations of the 9/11 and WMD commissions in the 

following areas: 

 Collection and analysis 

- Three recommendations under collection and analysis are 

classified. 

- Create on-going forum and tools to better understand 

potential adversaries and their motives, objectives, and 

values (USD [P]) 

 Federated data base, analysis, and exploitation built on MIDB 

concept (USD[I] and DNI, coordinate with all equities) 

- Single person responsible for development, including 

architecture (President’s Program Manager for Information 

Sharing Environment) 

- Domestic and foreign intelligence 

 Customer support and management (USD [I] and DNI) 

- Appoint a mission manager for terrorist pursuit of WMD 

- Revise security policies to rebalance need-to-share/protect 
PREVENT ATTACK I 23

Chapter 5. Prevent Attack—The First 

Priority 

The first priority for the nation is to prevent an attack. Toward this 

end, we need to make the adversary’s job as difficult and dangerous as 

possible and to minimize the likelihood that he will achieve his goals. 

This chapter covers three topics on which the task force concentrated 

in the area of prevention: 

1. Deny weapon acquisition 

2. Aggressive policies for attribution and response 

3. Detection and interdiction in transit. 

Deny Weapon Acquisition 

International 

The worst forms of WMD—nuclear and in some cases biological—

would likely be acquired by terrorists from nation-state proliferators. So 

there is much to gain by reducing the stockpiles of these weapons 

worldwide and securing weapons materials. Material resources that 

should be protected include assembled nuclear weapons, special nuclear 

materials (SNM), and highly pathogenic biological agents. “Know how” 

is another key ingredient. Thus, tracking expertise in critical areas is 

important. 

There is a lot of work going on in the nonproliferation arena: 

cooperative threat reduction programs, Nunn-Lugar, the Proliferation 

Security Initiative, special diplomatic efforts and other initiatives. These 

efforts should be increased to the highest extent possible. One way to 

extend these programs is to broaden the groups of countries involved. 

National efforts tend to have focused on Russia, but serious efforts 

should be underway to control proliferation in other countries. 

Certainly candidate nations of interest must be willing to cooperate, but 

it should be that willingness that limits our efforts—not funding or 
24 I CHAPTER 5 

initiative on the part of the United States. The objective should be to 

make acquiring weapons material as difficult as possible. 

Furthermore, we should extend nonproliferation efforts beyond the 

traditional nuclear realm, to include the biological arena. International 

protection of those materials will always be imperfect, which results in 

an unwillingness in some quarters to continue the investment. The 

study concluded, however, that we, as a nation, should do everything 

possible to make access as difficult as possible, while at the same time 

recognizing that leakage will remain likely. 

Domestic 

While it is particularly important to prevent terrorist access to 

nuclear materials and the worst forms biological materials in the 

international arena, other forms of WMD (chemical, biological, 

radiological) are available in the United States. The infrastructure to 

develop these forms of WMD exists and is relatively accessible. 

Why is it so easy to develop weapons inside the United States? First, 

the United States has the best infrastructure for scientific and 

technological development. It is difficult to find better, accessible 

equipment than in American universities. Toxic industrial chemicals can 

be used as weapons in situ, either at storage sites in populous areas or in 

transit. Materials to develop chemical weapons are generally available. 

Considerable radiological material is also accessible with limited security. 

The infrastructure to develop biological weapons is also accessible. 

There is general recognition of this problem, but the action to 

secure these sources is not proceeding at a pace consistent with the 

deserved urgency. We must at least make it much more difficult for the 

adversary to use these sources and doing so is not difficult. If we were 

to take only one action toward prevention of a WMD attack, this is 

probably the one with the greatest payoff. 

Until such time as we secure and protect all of these sources of 

materials within the United States, there is little reason for a terrorist to 

import these materials. Why take that added risk? 
PREVENT ATTACK I 25

Recommendation 2 __________________________________________________ 

Recommendation #2 summarizes the actions recommended by the 

task force to Deny Weapons Acquisition. 

 Strengthen and broaden international cooperative efforts in 

nonproliferation (DHS, Department of State [DOS], DNI) 

- Examples include treaties, PSI, Nunn-Lugar, special 

diplomatic efforts (such as Libya) 

- “Broaden” these efforts to include other countries, biological 

materials, “loose expertise” 

 Remove easy access to WMD material in the United States, 

particularly radiological and chemical (DHS) 

- Increase physical security around sites near major population 

centers 

- Use transportation routes away from major population centers 

- Substitute materials to those that are less easily weaponized 

Credible U.S. Policies 

The President has made clear the nation’s intent to punish anyone 

who uses WMD against the United States or its interests abroad or in 

any way aids and abets this use. The task force believes this to be the 

right policy. Terrorists must recognize that their values are at risk or 

their objectives will be denied. Supporters and suppliers, individuals, 

group, or nations must understand that their values are at risk. Those 

who do not provide adequate security for materials in their custody 

must also recognize the risks. 

The most important foundations for this policy are attribution and 

retaliation. 

Attribution 

The credibility of declaratory policies to punish anyone who uses 

WMD against the U.S. or its interests abroad depends upon our ability 
26 I CHAPTER 5 

to attribute the source of the attack. Technical forensics, laboratory 

impurity analysis, and intelligence are combined to provide this 

capability and must be supported by databases and samples that can 

link findings to sources 

For biological attacks, laboratory analyses can identify differences in 

genetic signatures and unique components of the culture medium that 

can point to the source of the organism. A major DHS program, the 

National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, is 

constructing operational facilities that can perform the large volume of 

assays that would be required following a major attack and is pursuing 

underlying research to develop new assays and diagnostics. 

Another pressing need is to accelerate development of international 

databases that assemble agent information from known repositories to 

provide clues regarding the source of an organism used in an attack. 

This effort faces both technical problems and policy issues. 

For nuclear attacks, laboratory analyses that examine the residue 

from an explosion can yield insight regarding the design and source of 

the weapon. A program executed by the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency (DTRA) has developed an initial sample collection capability and 

has reconstituted U.S. national laboratory capabilities first developed in 

the Cold War era to address this mission. Databases are also needed to 

link these results with a priori baseline knowledge. To ensure broad 

sharing of data that might contribute to attribution, prior coordination 

among the technical and intelligence communities regarding future 

collection priorities and joint activities following a nuclear burst is essential. 

Attribution analyses also make use of data generated by national 

technical means, and the requirements on these capabilities must reflect 

the importance of that mission. The needs associated with nuclear 

attribution have received much less national attention and support than 

those for biological attribution. High level policy attention is needed to 

clarify interagency roles and responsibilities and to assure adequate 

support of the critical technical capabilities that provide the foundation 

for nuclear attribution. 
PREVENT ATTACK I 27

In both the biological and nuclear cases, a broader assessment 

should be undertaken to address the likely effectiveness of technical 

attribution measures and the implications for national decision 

processes following an attack. In many cases, large uncertainties could 

remain even after the best available technical attribution analyses are 

completed. These inherent uncertainties should be identified and their 

impact on decision making understood. A net assessment of attribution 

capabilities for scenarios of interest, followed by exercises that consider 

the impact of attribution uncertainties, should be a part of the planning 

for U.S. response operations. 

Credible Response 

Response options are the other essential ingredient for effective 

deterrence policies. If a major WMD attack against U.S. interests occurred, 

and experts were rapidly able to determine who played what part in the 

attack, it is important that the United States be prepared to respond rapidly 

and appropriately. Furthermore, to be credible, the United States must 

advertise that these capabilities exist and that the nation is willing to use 

them. Credibility and a national willingness, together, will serve as a 

deterrent to many would-be attackers or supporters. 

Now is the time to develop a spectrum of response options for all 

potential scenarios. The range of options available must include 

diplomatic, economic, and military responses. Until we can consider 

possible U.S. reactions in a disciplined and comprehensive process, the 

nation could be faced with ad hoc retaliation plans developed in the 

midst of chaos and urgent demands to “do something.” 

The applicable cold war analog was the Joint Strategic Target 

Planning Staff and the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP). 

These, of course, dealt with military options against fairly well defined 

and largely fixed targets. The current situation is much more 

complicated. However, it is important to apply the rigor and discipline 

of these cold war approaches and to understand the entire complex 

subject well in advance. 

An important input to this type of planning is an understanding of 

the values and objectives of adversaries and others who support them. 
28 I CHAPTER 5 

This understanding is fairly straightforward for states but both complex 

and ambiguous for nonstate players. As discussed in chapter 4 (on 

intelligence), it is essential that we do everything possible to gain a 

detailed understanding of our potential adversaries at the religious, 

ethnic, tribal, group, organization, and even individual levels. Chapter 4 

discusses creation of an institutional process to seek this understanding. 

The National Security Council (NSC) must orchestrate this 

planning to consider and apply all of the organs of national power—

economic, diplomatic, military, and other nonmilitary. This process 

should involve multinational partners where possible. 

Developing military options need the rigor and discipline of the 

cold war SIOP process and should result in detailed plans for each 

option. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy should lead the 

development of such a structure with the U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM) responsible for execution. 

Planning cells must develop detailed response options to 

appropriately punish all participants to include perpetrators, organizers, 

enablers, hosts, and sympathizers. Options must account for the possible 

involvement of multiple organizations, countries, or regions. Alternatives 

should be identified and debated before an attack to provide the 

intellectual foundations for retaliation and deterrence and to allow for 

detailed planning. Furthermore, these plans should be subjected to 

simulations, gaming, exercises, and red teaming to gain insight into 

options and enhance effectiveness should execution be require. 

Recommendation 3 __________________________________________________ 

Recommendation #3 summarizes the actions recommended by the 

task force to develop Credible Policies for Attribution and Retaliation. 

 Continue to articulate clear policies for retaliation (Secretary of 

Defense, NSC, DOS, U.S. President) 

 Improve support to these policies 

- Improve technical forensics capabilities as much as possible 

to improve attribution (USD [ATL]) 
PREVENT ATTACK I 29

- Task intelligence community to provide the corresponding 

data bases (USD [I]) 

 Develop and plan detailed retaliation options that could punish 

potential attackers and their supporters, suppliers (USD [P]) 

- Create a WMD retaliation-planning structure to develop 

military options (USD [P], STRATCOM) and the equivalent 

at the national level to bring to bear all organs of national 

power (NSC) 

Detection and Interdiction in Transit 

Preventing terrorist acquisition and use of a nuclear weapon against a 

U.S. city must be one of the nation’s highest security priorities. Extensive 

international efforts have been focused on the protection of the special 

nuclear materials critical to the manufacture of weapons and on the 

security of finished weapons, particularly in the United States and Russia. 

Programs initiated by the United States, such as the Cooperative Threat 

Reduction Program, and multilateral treaties have made significant 

contributions to the security of weapons and SNM worldwide. 

However, their overall cost effectiveness and the level to which they 

can assure the security of foreign nuclear weapons and SNM have been 

controversial. The uncertainty in the performance of foreign safeguards, 

coupled with the lack of effective mitigation options against nuclear 

explosions, has caused a fresh look at systems that can intercept weapons 

or nuclear materials in transit. 

Thus, this task force took a fresh look, in the broader context of the 

overall problem, at current national efforts with the goal of providing 

an updated assessment and recommendations concerning detectionbased defenses of nuclear weapons in transit. Discussion of the current, 

planned, and recommended capabilities for interdiction and 

neutralization of nuclear materials is classified and covered in the 

classified version of this report. 
30 I CHAPTER 6 

Chapter 6. Mitigation and Recovery 

In case prevention fails, the next priority is to minimize the impact 

of attack on the United States. Mitigation and recovery is a national 

responsibility that involves many federal, state, and local organizations. 

This chapter addresses the national challenge first and then turns to 

DOD’s responsibilities in mitigation and recovery. 

National Preparedness 

Despite the many efforts and programs in progress, the nation is still 

poorly prepared to mitigate the impact of a WMD attack. Certainly the 

nation could survive all but the most devastating attacks, but likely 

experiencing many deaths and widespread destruction. In fact, the nation 

could recover from most of the less-violent scenarios evaluated by the 

task force during this study (described in chapter 2), even with little 

preparation—although the lack of preparation will equate to additional 

loss of lives. However, detonation of a stolen nuclear weapon of modest 

yield or a series of distributed biological attacks could well be devastating. 

This lack of preparation appears to result from several key factors. 

First, the nature of our Constitution creates a division of responsibilities 

among local, state, regional, and federal governments that is 

compounded by fuzzy lines of demarcation. Preparation and 

implementation demand crisp, clear lines of authority and responsibility. 

Without unprecedented cooperation, planning, and exercising by all 

organizations and levels of government involved, including joint 

agreement subordinating responsibility and authority to a single chain of 

command, preparation and mitigation are likely to remain poor. 

Second, the nation’s preparedness appears to be lacking a sense of 

urgency—a need to remedy the nation’s vulnerabilities appears largely 

missing except at the most senior levels of government. This sense is 

inconsistent with the potential devastation of the threat. Third, we, as a 

nation, tend to focus on or over emphasize the physical rather than 

psychological effects of an attack. But fear, panic, a loss of confidence in 

government, or erosion of national will could well result from a WMD 
MITIGATION AND RECOVERY I 31

attack and may have been its ultimate goal. Thus, maintaining public 

support and understanding must be an element of national preparedness. 

Reducing the nation’s vulnerability to WMD requires a 

comprehensive approach across the spectrum from intelligence and 

prevention to mitigation, recovery, and response. No one or a few 

preparations are sufficient. A coherent, collaborative approach must 

overcome the challenges of coordinating among federal, state, and local 

governments and of sorting through myriad shared responsibilities. It 

must involve the private sector as well. Today’s piecemeal, ad hoc 

approaches—that have become the norm—must be replaced by 

comprehensive, integrated, and systematic risk-based approaches. 

The task force identified several high-payoff countermeasures among 

the many possibilities evaluated. First are planning, exercises, and 

command, control, and communications (C3)—relatively inexpensive 

and perhaps the highest payoff of all. These countermeasures must 

include fully interoperable communications and information systems 

across and among all organizations involved. Second is medical surge, 

which is widely recognized as a deficiency. We simply do not have the 

medical surge required to respond to a major WMD attack. Finally, while 

our analysis focused primarily on efforts common across the modalities, 

through this process emerged a number of modality-unique efforts that 

could significantly contribute to mitigation or recovery. 

Planning, Exercises, and Command, Control and 

Communications 

Planning, exercises, and C3—including shared situational awareness—

are the foundation of effective mitigation and recovery. But truly 

effective action in this area seems to be limited. The Catastrophic 

Incident Supplement to the National Response Plan reflects thoughtful 

work. It is an excellent summary of all that needs to be done. But it falls 

short of being executable, depending on other agencies and state and 

local authorities to interpret and implement the document. 

There must be one national plan with subordinate regional plans—

all at sufficient level of detail that they can be executed. The regional 

plans must respond to single points of attack and the national plan 
32 I CHAPTER 6 

must seamlessly integrate all regional responses and responses to 

multiple attacks. All organizations and levels of government must “buy 

into” the plan. 

Interoperable communications and information systems are essential, 

based on widely accepted standards, protocols, and data definitions. 

Fragmented systems should lead to an overall system design that 

provides both interoperability and robustness, with minimal replacement 

of existing hardware. In this design, it is important to consider the 

likelihood of adversary active disruption of communication and 

information systems as a part of a WMD attack. 

Communications and information systems designed specifically and 

only for use following an attack, are likely to be ineffective. It is 

important to make these capabilities valuable to all users in the course 

of their regular and routine activities. If the systems are used every day, 

they will be well understood and useful in crisis. 

The best of planning and C3 will be ineffective without regular 

exercises. Exercises will uncover deficiencies in the planning or C3. 

More importantly, they will create personal working relationships 

among the key players and decision makers. Under no circumstances 

should people “meet” for the first time in the chaos following an attack. 

Medical Surge 

A medical surge capability is critical. All high-casualty events will 

overwhelm nearby medical services. This outcome is probably the 

limiting factor in dealing with even moderate WMD attacks. The 

inability to provide medical services quickly will lead to unnecessary 

additional loss of life. It can also have a damaging impact on public 

perception of the government’s ability to function effectively and do its 

most basic job during a time of critical need. Thus the development of 

a national medical surge capability should be a very high priority. 

There is widespread recognition that municipal and regional health 

care systems will be overwhelmed in even a minor WMD attack by 

casualties, the injured, and the “worried well.” An attack involving 

10,000 victims with 10 times the number of “worried well” (a 
MITIGATION AND RECOVERY I 33

conservative multiple based on experience) would require 20,000 

trained medical personnel (as estimated by the Department of 

Homeland Security). The National Response Plan estimates that less 

than 4,500 trained medical personnel can be brought to bear within 72 

hours. So the gap in capability is obvious. 

Though the problem is widely recognized, progress to date has been 

slow. The Health and Human Services Cities Readiness Initiative has 

produced a single, 250-bed deployable hospital and has plans for three 

more without a firm schedule. The Office of the Surgeon General 

Medical Reserve Corps has 30,000 local volunteers from 237 

communities, and is expected to double in size in the next year. In 

contrast, the Department of Defense has deployable assets—far larger 

than any domestic capability currently planned. These assets include 

expert medical personnel, infrastructure, personnel, and equipment 

from mobile Army surgical hospitals, combat support hospitals, and 

field hospitals.9

 

The task force believes that there are unexploited opportunities to 

enhance medical surge capabilities. In a crisis, the immediate need is to 

stabilize the victims until professional medical personnel can treat them. 

Some of this immediate need can be met by rudimentary first aid, 

inoculations, and the type of treatment offered by emergency medical 

technicians (EMTs). 

One opportunity for creating a medical surge capability and 

expanding the nation’s capability for a stabilizing strategy is to train the 

DOD civilian workforce of approximately 650,000 personnel in 

emergency medical training. We recommend a 2-week EMT course be 

mandatory for all DOD civilians, completed by 2007, at a cost of 

approximately $650 per person.10 This initial surge capability could be 

expanded to the rest of the federal work force, focusing on widelydispersed populations such as the National Guard and U.S. Postal 

Service workers—both well represented throughout thousands of 

 

9. DOD has 10s of combat support hospital units with 100s of beds each. 

10. Annual training, of a shorter duration of perhaps a few days, will likely have to follow this 

initial training regime to maintain current capabilities. 
34 I CHAPTER 6 

communities across America.11 This concept has precedence in CPR 

training that is provided throughout the federal workforce or, looking 

back to World War II, training for civil defense personnel. 

In conjunction with this training, the task force recommends recruiting 

10,000 medical doctor volunteers to serve as remote crisis responders. 

Further, telemedicine and automated medical data base networks should 

be extended to WMD response. Trained federal employees and remote 

physicians should participate in exercises using these databases and 

networks to test concepts of operations and readiness. 

There are broader challenges involved in creating a medical surge 

capability, including the ability to get supplies and personnel to victims, 

transportation to the affected area, and communications between 

medical providers and facilities. The task force believes that planning 

and analysis, based on the reference scenarios, should be undertaken to 

understand in advance what problems are likely to arise in each 

circumstance. Gaming and simulation are needed to examine response 

plans and issues and to quantify necessary preparations. 

Modality-Unique Countermeasures 

The task force identified a number of modality-unique 

countermeasures where research and development efforts would have 

high leverage. These countermeasures include the following: 

 Advanced medical countermeasures such as therapeutics, 

vaccines, diagnostics (biological) 

 Advanced decontamination technology and techniques 

(each modality) 

 Effective detect-to-warn or detect-to-treat capabilities 

(biological) 

 Automated detection and air-flow control for facilities 

(chemical, biological, radiological) 

 

11. The total federal civilian workforce comprises 2.7 million employees. DOD represents 24 

percent of that workforce; the U.S. Postal Service, 30 percent; and the Department of 

Homeland Security, 5 percent. Source: Office of Personnel Management, November 2004. 
MITIGATION AND RECOVERY I 35

In addition to these modality-unique research and development 

efforts, there are also a number of non-R&D areas. For example, 

mitigation of a nuclear attack could benefit significantly from “shelter-inplace” and well thought out evacuation strategies. The task force did not 

attempt to prioritize these near term, modality-unique countermeasures. 

Advanced Medical Countermeasures 

The biological terrorism threat is currently viewed as a long list of 

pathogens—bacterial and viral, contagions and not contagious. These 

pathogens are the “conventional threats.” This spectrum of potential 

threats poses serious problems today so there may be limited 

motivation for adversaries to seek more pernicious threats. However, 

the Soviet Union devoted a lot of effort to developing more “advanced 

threats” and it is reasonable to anticipate that some states (and possibly 

nonstate actors) are developing or will develop antibiotic resistant 

strains, genetically modified pathogens, or integrated “cocktails” of 

multiple pathogens. These threats are within the current state of the art 

and would complicate defense efforts immensely. 

Today, countermeasures are available for only a limited set of the 

“conventional” biological threats. In order to cope with the wide range of 

threats and the potential for modified pathogens, the goal of some 

current advanced research is to create broad spectrum therapeutics, 

diagnostics, and vaccines. These would address the generic rather than 

the specific properties of pathogens and, if goals are achieved, would be 

effective against classes of pathogens rather than individual ones. They 

would provide countermeasures against the current (conventional) threats 

and against advanced threats. The applicability is illustrated in table 3. 

Table 3. Applicability of Alternative Medical Countermeasures 

Countermeasure 

Threat Specific Generic 

Conventional X X 

Advanced X 
36 I CHAPTER 6 

It is clear therefore, that such advanced research should be 

encouraged along with the more short-term efforts aimed at specific 

conventional threats. 

There are currently three significant centers of investment for 

developing biological countermeasures. The National Institute of 

Allergy and Infectious Diseases, at the National Institutes of Health 

(NIH), is spending about $1.5 billion per year. The Department of 

Defense’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (OASD [NCB]) and the 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) are each 

spending on the order of $200 million per year. Each of these programs 

is addressing both specific and generic responses to biological attack. 

The task force recommends pursuing these efforts as vigorously as 

possible, to the level limited by good ideas. Whether there are enough 

good ideas to justify a major infusion of additional funds is a question 

beyond the scope of this study. 

It is important that the separate development efforts be coordinated 

effectively, recognizing that each organization has strengths that can be 

brought to bear in developing advanced countermeasure capabilities. 

NIH operates largely with grants for research and with a peer review 

system that tends to make investment broad-based but conservative; 

however, there are obvious public health implications for developing 

broad-spectrum, generic countermeasures, which NIH can best exploit. 

The OASD (NCB) can create focused efforts and DARPA does and 

should concentrate on the high-risk, high-payoff areas. 

Full success in the development of these advanced countermeasures, 

a long term goal, would negate the biological threat, both conventional 

and advanced and would have many positive effects on public health. 

Advanced Decontamination 

Attack by any of the modalities (chemical, biological, radiological, 

or nuclear) is likely to leave a residual contamination of facilities and 

large areas. The contaminated areas can be unusable and uninhabitable 

for extended periods (years or decades in the case of radiological 

weapons) unless effective decontamination technology and techniques 
MITIGATION AND RECOVERY I 37

are available and applied. Current capabilities for decontamination are 

limited, especially for radiological or biological residue. 

An aggressive research and development program to develop these 

capabilities is warranted to mitigate the potential for huge economic costs. 

Detect-to-Warn or Detect-to-Treat Biological Attack 

It would be highly desirable to detect and characterize a biological 

attack early enough to avoid human exposure. This capability is known 

as detect-to-warn (DTW). In principle, people could be moved out of 

the path of the biological agent or buildings could be sealed. However, 

current and currently projected technology is unlikely to provide this 

capability in open air—for example, upwind of a city. In the foreseeable 

future, DTW is likely to be useful only in constrained situations such as 

outlined in the next section. 

However, early detection is still very important. Typically today, we 

anticipate that detection and characterization of a biological attack will 

result from clinical diagnosis of symptoms of infected people. 

Generally, the earlier the detection and treatment, the more likely the 

patient can be saved. Moving that detection timeline to the left is a goal 

of current research and development programs and should be funded 

to the limit of good ideas. 

Automated Detection and Air-Flow Control 

The previous section discussed DTW and concluded that it was not 

applicable in open air. However, DTW can be applied to more 

constrained situations. For example, it could be applied to a modern 

building with sophisticated heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 

systems and generally well-controlled air intakes. Filters at the intakes 

can serve as “concentrators” of air samples and sensitive (that is, high 

false alarm) detectors placed there. These detectors then can be used to 

control air flow throughout the building—the “cost” of false alarms is 

generally tolerable with little impact on operations. 

Another example, closer to the open air case, might be to protect a 

controlled area such as a military base. In this example a ring of detectors 
38 I CHAPTER 6 

at the protected perimeter could be set for high false alarms (and 

therefore high sensitivity). The false alarms in this case will impose a 

greater cost than the building air flow, but these may be tolerable. 

Examples of the reaction to an alarm might be to move personnel to 

sanctuaries (closed buildings), to use individual protection, or to 

administer medical prophylaxis. 

Recommendation 4 __________________________________________________ 

Recommendation #4 summarizes the most important actions 

recommended by the task force in National Mitigation and Recovery. 

 Focus on the highest payoff mitigation and recovery efforts 

- Executable planning, exercises, and C3 (DHS) 

- Radically increased medical surge capabilities 

 EMT training for all DOD civilian employees (Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs and DHS for 

non-DOD) 

 Develop and implement telemedicine support for EMTs 

and medical doctors (DHS) 

 Initiate detailed analysis of surge issues (DHS) 

- Research and development on specific, modality-unique, 

high-payoff countermeasures (Director, Defense Research 

and Engineering; DHS) 

 Advanced medical countermeasures (diagnostics, 

therapeutics, vaccines) [bio] 

 Advanced decontamination technology and techniques 

[each] 

 Effective detect-to-warn or detect-to-treat [bio] 

 Automated detection and air-flow control for facilities 

[chemical, biological, radiological] 

 Publicly articulate the situation regarding terrorist use of WMD 

clearly and honestly, with realistic assessment and guidance, to 

gain and maintain public support and to increase the sense of 

urgency (Secretary of Defense, DHS, U.S. President) 
MITIGATION AND RECOVERY I 39

DOD Responsibilities 

As shown in figure 3, responsibilities for mitigation and recovery 

fall on both civil departments and the Department of Defense. The left 

side of the chart lists responsibilities that fall clearly in the purview of 

civilian departments and where DOD may play a supporting role. On 

the right are areas of clear responsibility for DOD. These areas include 

protecting its forces at home and abroad and assuring the ability to 

project force. But it is important to remember that DOD depends 

heavily on civil infrastructure to accomplish its mission—thus creating a 

gray zone. It is the view of the task force that DOD should lean into 

that gray zone—but we recognize that this is a notion subject to debate. 

Protect military

facilities and

people here and

abroad

Assure ability to 

project force

Protect military

dependents Protect civil population

and infrastructure (e.g.

law enforcement, 

hardening of critical

elements, and likely

targets)

Protect militaryessential civil

infrastructure 

(e.g. trains, national

communications

that underlie military

communications)

DoD: “Supporting” DoD: “Supported”

Clear responsibility

of civil departments

Clear responsibility

of DoD * Gray zone

Protect U.S.

overseas interests

Protect defense industrial 

base

Consequence 

management 

Detect & interdict WMD

in transit or in U.S.

* Strategy for Homeland Defense & Civil Support: “DOD is lead in force protection including family 

members, resources, facilities, and critical information.” Includes mission assurance. Page 18 defines 

critical infrastructure. 

Figure 3. Responsibilities in Mitigation and Recovery 
40 I CHAPTER 6 

In addition to clear responsibilities in mitigation and recovery, 

DOD has unique capabilities that could contribute to the national 

architecture. Examples of such capabilities include the following:: 

 Unparalleled capabilities for planning, exercising, and 

conducting that mission 

 Extensive experience with C3 and information systems 

operating in adversarial conditions 

 Ability to provide the extensive resources and discipline that 

would be required in the event of a truly catastrophic attack 

 Proven technologies and response assets that could be 

effectively used by civilian responders in diverse domestic 

scenarios 

The task force believes that the nation should draw on DOD’s 

expertise and experience in these areas, in advance of an attack, to 

stimulate the environment and help lead and train a national capability 

while, at the same time, supporting DOD’s accomplishment of its own 

mission. We are therefore recommending two areas that would serve as 

a useful beginning—to help create both a set of capabilities and a sense 

of urgency to motivate further action. These two initial actions are: 1) 

base protection and 2) planning for a truly catastrophic attack. Each will 

be discussed in turn below. 

Base Protection Pilot Program 

Today, base protection is being addressed in a number of limited 

pilot programs. Some of the programs underway include portal 

monitors created under the Unconventional Nuclear Warfare Defense 

Program, the Joint Service Installation Pilot Project, BioNet, and 

Guardian. Although built on the experiences of prior programs, each of 

these initiatives was undertaken relatively independently. The more 

recent and most comprehensive is Guardian. Originally intended to use 

available technology to provide base-protection capabilities to 200 

DOD facilities, it was constrained to work entirely within the base 

perimeters, an overly restrictive concept. Guardian provides a level of 

off-the-shelf technology for the foundation of base protection. 
MITIGATION AND RECOVERY I 41

However, the task force concluded that base protection and local 

community protection need to be addressed in a more comprehensive 

manner—an approach based on a systematic look across all modalities 

that is informed by risk assessment and implemented with standards 

and best practices. Base and local community protection are inevitably 

connected because of the need to protect military family members 

living off base and the essential dependence of the base on local 

infrastructure. In addition, it is clear that some measures of base 

protection require a “defended perimeter” which may well be outside 

the base confines and the authority of DOD. Thus, without the 

complete cooperation of the local authorities, base protection is likely 

to be ineffective. 

The task force recommends that DOD initiate a base protection 

pilot program, led by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, with 

support from U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). This program 

would focus on reducing WMD vulnerability in DOD facilities and on 

establishing interoperability between civil and military C3 in those 

communities. The recommended program would provide the basis for 

a comprehensive base protection program that can be extended 

throughout DOD facilities and, through a partnership with DHS, serve 

as a model for civilian communities as well. 

Specifically, the task force recommends that a careful analysis 

identify four bases to participate in the pilot—three in the continental 

United States and one overseas. The selection should be based on a 

number of criteria, but the most important is that the bases have a 

strong presence in the local community. Some of the candidate bases 

and regions discussed included the National Capitol Region and 

Andrews AFB; Fayetteville, North Carolina and Fort Bragg; Tampa, 

Florida and McDill AFB; and San Diego, California and the Coronado 

Naval facilities. There are certainly other possibilities and the task force 

came to no conclusion on which were preferable. 

Each of the pilots should be designed carefully with a comprehensive, 

integrated, systematic approach for defense against WMD attack. The 

first selected base should be assigned to a small team (6–12 members 

plus support) with expertise in system design and engineering. The most 
42 I CHAPTER 6 

logical source of that team appears to be DTRA since that organization 

has the experience in all the relevant disciplines. 

The team would carefully examine the base and environs and the 

potential risks to population, infrastructure, and facilities. Based on this 

assessment, the team would design the elements of the protection 

system and, after appropriate approval, guide the implementation. Prior 

to implementation, an independent red team should be called on to 

critique the design in depth. To the extent possible, the design should 

build on the lessons and experiences of previous programs mentioned 

above but should not be constrained by them in any way. 

Table 4 identifies some (by no means all) of the many factors that 

need to be considered in the design of protective measures appropriate 

to each facility. These factors pertain both to the conduct of the site’s 

military mission and its links to the local community. 

Table 4. Example Elements of a Pilot Program in Base Protection 

Base Concerns Links to the Civilian Community 

Define protected perimeter Public education and information 

Monitor principal portals, external choke 

points (NR) Medical surge plans 

Provide for automated detection and 

characterization of attack (BC) 

Evacuation, sanctuary, and quarantine 

plans 

Protecting water, sewer, power, food 

supplies, etc Protection of critical infrastructure 

Secure hazardous material in region (CR) Support to local community 

Cameras to detect suspicious activity Sanctuary bastions in situ 

Airspace monitor C3; situation awareness 

Automated detection and air-flow control 

systems for selected facilities (BC) Information access as needed 

Staging areas Development of large-scale gaming to 

train and exercise 
MITIGATION AND RECOVERY I 43

After the first pilot is underway, the team would design base protection 

systems for the other three bases in sequence, taking advantage of the 

experience gained in each case. This sequential approach would be 

lengthy in duration; forming four design teams to operate in parallel 

could be considered to implement the program more rapidly. 

An essential element of the process is design critique conducted by 

red teams. Red teams should also “attack” the protected base and city 

realistically to verify not only that the capabilities implemented are 

appropriate and adequate but that the people using them have been 

trained to make them effective. 

The task force believes that DOD should solicit participation from 

the Department of Homeland Security in conducting these pilots. The 

role for DHS is to apply what is learned from the pilots to civil 

protection systems and to propagate these systems across the country 

as appropriate. As well, DOD’s responsibility will be to extend the 

capabilities to other bases as the concepts are effectively demonstrated. 

One additional element that is important to the pilot programs is to 

design, develop, and implement a prototype C3 capability that is robust 

and includes situational awareness. This prototype system should 

provide for each of the four pilot installations and link these to each 

other and to appropriate state and national elements. These C3 and 

information systems must be designed for every day use, but have 

properties that will withstand an attack—including cyber attacks. DOD 

has unique experience in the design and operation of such systems 

under adversarial conditions and should take the lead. The task force 

recommends that DOD approach DHS and negotiate to take the lead 

in developing and prototyping this system for use as the national 

homeland security system. 

In summary, the concept is to take on several sites of manageable 

size as a learning tool, develop a comprehensive plan for WMD defense 

that includes particular emphasis on situation awareness and C3, and 

then extend this to sites throughout DOD and, eventually, the civilian 

community. The task force recognizes that transfer to civilian cities is 

not automatic, as a military base is certainly a more protected, 

“hardened” environment as compared to the softer target of civilian 
44 I CHAPTER 6 

cities. This concern is at least partially mitigated by inclusion of the 

surrounding civil community in the integrated design of the whole. In 

any case, the task force believes that relevant applications exist and 

taking the first step of conducting a comprehensive design in a few 

areas will be instructive for national planning. 

Planning for a Catastrophe 

The task force notion of mitigation and recovery planning for a 

catastrophic attack is intended to push the nation’s thinking beyond that 

of September 11—a scale of attack that many viewed at the time, and still 

do so today, as catastrophic. But the concept here is far beyond that case, 

intending to focus on planning for an event such as a large-scale nuclear 

attack, a campaign of biological attacks that roll across the nation, or an 

attack that combines multiple modalities. Our definition of “truly 

catastrophic” is that the magnitude of the event completely overwhelms 

state, local, and federal civil capabilities and, in fact, that these capabilities 

may be effectively eliminated, at least in the region affected. 

Management of the consequences of such an attack cannot tolerate 

divided responsibilities or ad hoc response without greatly increased 

loss of life and panic. There must be clear command and control and 

clear lines of communication. It must be recognized that, under such 

circumstances, the President may decide to call on DOD to take 

control of the affected region. This decision obviously would apply only 

in extreme situations. However, DOD should be prepared to provide 

all needed capabilities to surviving civil authorities of a region. 

The time for detailed planning is now. Doing so ad hoc, in the 

chaos of attack, will almost certainly cost more lives and result in public 

loss of confidence and panic. The task force likens this type of planning 

to classic “war planning” in which DOD is so effective. Catastrophe 

planning deserves the same level of attention and detail. It must include 

plans for providing resources, medical surge, logistics, forces to 

maintain order, burial capabilities, and other considerations specified in 

the National Response Plan Catastrophic Incident Supplement. The 

plans should incorporate commercial support such as the Civil Reserve 

Air Fleet and its application to trucks, rail, and buses; prearranged and 

organized medical surge; and standing logistics contracts. 
MITIGATION AND RECOVERY I 45

The task force recommends that NORTHCOM take the lead in 

developing these detailed plans—a major undertaking since each major 

metropolitan area is different and will require a specific plan. In 

developing these plans, NORTHCOM should coordinate with DHS 

and the National Security Council because of the obvious collaboration 

that will be required should DOD be called upon to provide full 

support of an attacked region for mitigation and recovery operations. 

Recommendation 5 __________________________________________________ 

Recommendation #5 summarizes the actions specifically 

recommended by the task force for execution of DOD Responsibilities 

in Mitigation and Recovery. 

The Department of Defense should accelerate action on its 

responsibilities in mitigation and recovery and, at the same time, lead 

the way for the civil community (Secretary of Defense): 

 Establish a comprehensive pilot program to protect four 

military installations (DTRA with NORTHCOM) 

- Build on prior pilot programs 

 Design and develop robust situation awareness and C3 (USD 

[AT&L] or Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration, with primary user 

NORTHCOM/National Guard) 

- Negotiate with DHS to lead in development, prototyping of 

national C3 

 Develop detailed plans (modeled after “war plans” for 

execution of DOD responsibilities if directed to provide full 

support of an attacked region for mitigation and recovery 

operations (NORTHCOM) 
46 I CHAPTER 7 

Chapter 7. Managing the Enterprise 

Creating an effective counter-WMD effort will require coordination 

and integration of activities across many organizations, including 

federal, state, and local government agencies, as well as many private 

sector organizations—notably those involved in areas of U.S. critical 

infrastructure. This coordination and integration will require a new 

organizational approach with requisite staff and budget resources. 

We believe that one single individual must be charged with 

this responsibility—someone who is positioned to see the whole 

WMD picture. Today, no one has that visibility. This individual 

should report to the Secretary of Homeland Security and should receive 

guidance and oversight from a subcommittee of the U.S. Homeland 

Security Council with appropriate representation from government and 

industry. Furthermore, every six months this individual should provide 

to the President an assessment of the nation’s capabilities and readiness 

to address the threats from WMD. 

To aid in the development of these regular assessments, we believe 

that cost and performance metrics—readiness metrics—must be 

established to help prioritize activities and measure progress. Regular 

simulation exercises with trained red teams should be performed in 

order to test U.S. readiness and to collect data from which these metrics 

can be evaluated. 

This task requires broad visibility into programs and budgets with 

metrics and tools that link investment and capability. To this end, we 

support the efforts of the Congress and the administration to improve 

the efficiency of our national investments in information technology. 

The leadership of the Office of Management and Budget, the Federal 

Chief Information Officers Council, and the Office of the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Infrastructure in 

developing enterprise technology and processes for integrating 

information systems will help provide the necessary visibility into 

programs and budgets and in collecting and evaluating the readiness 
MANAGING THE ENTERPRISE I 47

metrics described below. We recommend that current technology and 

processes be expanded specifically to address the WMD threats. 

DOD Organization 

Assigning to U.S. Strategic Command the mission of combating 

WMD has created a military advocate that will drive WMD planning in 

the combatant commands, the military services, and the Joint Staff. This 

assignment was a positive step toward coordinating DOD activities. 

However, within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), there is 

no single individual or organization below the level of the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense that sees the WMD problem as a whole. 

The OSD organization for combating WMD has evolved on an ad 

hoc basis for 15 years. There is no de facto clear line of authority and 

responsibility. Roles are distributed across many parts of the 

organization to include the assistant secretaries for homeland defense, 

health affairs, special operations and low intensity conflict, and the 

assistant to the secretary for nuclear, chemical, and biological matters. 

To address this situation, we recommend that a single individual within 

OSD have the responsibility, with appropriate staff and budget 

authority, to provide the necessary leadership in areas of DOD 

responsibility in addressing the WMD threats. 

Currently, DTRA is the single organization in DOD with a 

coherent mission in WMD across all modalities—and it is important to 

maintain that cohesiveness. While DOD undergoes many 

organizational changes to meet evolving threats and missions, we 

believe that DTRA has an enduring mission for WMD issues and 

should continue as a unified DOD agency. 

Metrics: Readiness 

The task force is concerned that top management in the Department 

of Defense may be led to believe that there is more capability than really 

exists. While there are many ongoing efforts and investments, many 

power point presentations and “strategies,” all too frequently it is 

assumed that investments will in fact lead to planned capabilities. 
48 I CHAPTER 7 

However, developing a capability requires active management based on 

well-defined performance metrics—in other words a “readiness” system 

for reducing the vulnerability to WMD. 

The analysis described in chapter 2, and used during the course of 

this study to identify high-payoff recommendations, done more 

completely and supported by an on-going red team activity, could 

provide a useful basis for readiness assessment across the DOD or 

national enterprise. The level of effort contributing to the analysis for 

this study was about two man-months of effort. Accordingly, we 

believe that the necessary readiness assessments can be accomplished 

with a modest and highly cost-effective investment. Whether the 

methods used in this study are adopted by the department or others are 

used, the task force recommends that the DHS and DOD develop an 

enterprise readiness process and system that can provide assessment of 

each of the major capabilities required to reduce U.S. vulnerability to 

WMD and to overall national preparedness. 

To begin, we recommend creating a small cell in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and Evaluation (OSD [PA&E]) 

to provide an objective review and analysis (including metrics) of 

government-wide efforts to reduce vulnerability to WMD. PA&E has 

the capability and the culture to conduct such assessments and would 

therefore be an appropriate organization to initially take on this task. It 

is equally important to create red teams to challenge the assessments. 

This exercise should be repeated annually within DOD so that the 

Secretary of Defense is regularly apprised of DOD activities and 

progress in this area. Ultimately, we believe that a small group needs to 

be chartered and empowered to conduct these assessments on a 

national level, reporting to the Secretary of Homeland Security or the 

White House. 
MANAGING THE ENTERPRISE I 49

Recommendation 6 __________________________________________________ 

Recommendation #6 summarizes suggested action in Managing 

the Enterprise regarding WMD. 

Develop an enterprise readiness process and system that can 

provide assessment of each of the major capabilities required to reduce 

U.S. vulnerability to WMD, and overall national preparedness 

 Create a small group chartered and empowered to do this, 

reporting to Secretary of Homeland Security or the White 

House (DHS) 

 Initially create a special cell in OSD (PA&E) to provide an 

objective review and analysis (including metrics) of governmentwide efforts to reduce vulnerability to WMD (OSD [PA&E]) 

 Create red teams to challenge the assessments 
50 I CHAPTER 8 

Chapter 8. Summary of 

Recommendations 

In summary, the task force has identified six high-payoff 

recommendations that will greatly reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to weapons 

of mass destruction. At the highest level those recommendations are as 

follows: 

 Improve intelligence collection, analysis, and management in 

ways specific to unique aspects of the WMD threat 

 Deny weapon acquisition to the adversary through international 

cooperative efforts and increased emphasis on tracking and 

protecting hazardous materials in the United States 

 Articulate aggressive policies regarding the use of WMD, 

backed by improved attribution and response capabilities 

 Improve national mitigation and recovery capabilities by 

focusing on the highest payoff efforts—planning, exercising, 

C3, and medical surge 

 In DOD, establish pilot programs in base protection and 

undertake planning for catastrophe response 

 Develop and use readiness metrics as a basis for assessing major 

capabilities and national preparedness to reduce U.S. 

vulnerability to WMD 

Investment in Reducing the Threat 

To put the investments needed to implement these recommendations 

in some context, the task force first gathered data on the current federal 

investments in reducing the threat from WMD. This estimate was not 

straightforward to create, as most federal expenditures are not described 

in directly relevant terms. Even the simple availability of data varies 

widely across the federal government. 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS I 51

To establish some consistency, fiscal year 2005 was chosen as a 

baseline, as it is the most recent year for which nearly complete data 

were available. For some of the funding within the Department of 

Homeland Security, data from fiscal year 2004 was used. The reason for 

this adjustment, the sources for all the data, and the details of how the 

funding was then categorized, are described in the investment chapter 

of volume 2. 

Significant uncertainties still remain in these estimates of federal 

funding. Some activities that are relevant to reducing the threat from 

WMD are but a small part of comparatively very large operating 

accounts. The use by customs inspectors of radiation detectors as part 

of their general inspection activity is one such example. The estimates 

here do not attempt to reflect the funding for such activities. 

Additionally, many activities are imperfectly described in the available 

sources, so errors in interpreting the purpose of some activities is likely. 

Some agencies with small investments were not included as the task 

force focused on understanding the larger efforts. Nonetheless, the task 

force believes that the general pattern and scale of the investments 

described here fairly represents the total federal investments. 

The federal investment examined and categorized by the task force 

totaled $10.5 billion. The funding came from five departments, as shown 

in table 5. These data do not include funding for intelligence activities. 

Table 5. Federal Investment in WMD-Related Activities 

Billion 

 Department of Defense 3.1 

 Department of Homeland Security 1.3 

 Department of Health and Human Services 4.1 

 Department of Energy 1.9 

 Department of State 0.1 
52 I CHAPTER 8 

For each agency and activity, the task force used available 

information to categorize the funding as some combination of function 

and modality. Results of this categorization are shown in figure 4. 

The pattern of federal investment seen in the figure has several 

obvious features. First, investments tend to concentrate in just a few 

areas: mitigating biological attacks through either research and 

development for medical countermeasures or grants through the states 

for improving medical preparedness; preventing the acquisition of 

nuclear weapons through international threat reduction programs, 

largely in the former Soviet Union; mitigating a variety of attacks 

through investments such as personal protective suits for the military 

and first-responder equipment funded by grants; and interdicting 

nuclear attacks through improved detection. These areas of emphasis 

are not surprising. 

Prevent Interdict Mitigate Recover

Nuclear

Chemical

Biological

Radiological

Combination

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

4,000

4,500

5,000

Funding ($ Millions)

Functions

Modalities

Intl. 

Threat 

Reduction

Intl. 

Threat 

Reduction

Nuclear 

Detection & 

Interdiction

Nuclear 

Detection & 

Interdiction

1⁄2 Grants to 

states for 

equipment

1⁄2 DoD fight 

through 

attack (e.g. 

MOPP)

1⁄2 Grants to 

states for 

equipment

1⁄2 DoD fight 

through 

attack (e.g. 

MOPP)

Med. 

CM 

R&D

Med. 

CM 

R&D

Figure 4. Investment in Reducing the WMD Threat, Fiscal Year 2005 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS I 53

Second, there are a large number of areas with very little 

investment. Some of these areas—such as prevention of radiological 

attacks (through securing sources), forensics after an attack of any 

modality, and recovery—suggest to the task force missed opportunities. 

Finally, political attention is currently focused on increasing funding 

for one of the already emphasized areas, nuclear detection and 

interdiction within the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in DHS—an 

investment we question, and which was discussed earlier in this report. 

With this pattern of existing federal investment for context, we now 

turn to the additional investments required to implement the task force 

recommendations. Table 6 shows the estimates, made by the task force, 

this additional investment. These estimates, made consciously 

conservative, total only $4.0 billion per year—a manageable level of 

additional investment for the federal government 

Table 6. Additional Cost of Task Force Recommendations

Recommendation ~ Billion Dollars Per Year 

1. Improve intelligence in specific ways 0.7 

2. Deny weapon acquisition 2.0 

3. Improve support to aggressive policies 0.2 

4. Enhance national mitigation and recovery 0.6 

5. Establish DOD pilot programs and 

catastrophic planning 0.3 

6. Develop and use readiness metrics ~0.0 

TOTAL ~$4.0 B 

To generate the cost estimates presented in table 6, the task force 

assessed the requirements for the detailed recommendations presented 

in the earlier chapters of this report and used the expert judgment of its 

members to generate first-order estimates of the annual, recurring costs 

associated with implementation. In all cases, we rounded up to add 

some measure of conservatism to the estimates, although it is important 
54 I CHAPTER 8 

to caveat the assumption that the programs be well managed and well 

run. Using criteria of less than $100 million per year as low cost, $100 

to $500 million per year as medium, and greater than $500 million per 

year as high, the individual recommendations were arrayed on a 

cost/payoff grid as shown in figure 5. The payoff rating is a qualitative 

effectiveness assessment that reflects the task force’s analyses of its 

detailed recommendations within the six areas identified in table 6. 

High

Low

Medium

Medium High

Low

Payoff

Cost

Understand adversary 

Public education 

Planning mitigation and recovery 

Manage enterprise 

Catastrophic mitigation and 

recovery plan 

“MIDB,” “JSTPS”

Pilot programs 

Forensics 

Retaliation options

Medical surge personnel 

Interdict on intelligence

Close-in sensing/TTL 

C3 prototype 

Modality-unique countermeasures

CTR, Nunn Lugar

Secure U.S. HAZMAT 

**

Detect to interdict 

<$2B/yr

total

<$1.3B/yr

total

<$0.5B/yr

total

** Note: Full implementation of mitigation and recovery plans and National C3 in not included. 

Figure 5. Opportunities versus Investment

Examining the six broad recommendation areas and the required 

investments produces an important observation. Many of the individual 

recommendations offer very high payoff at relatively low cost, as the 

number of actions in the bottom right box of figure 5 illustrates. Yet, 

despite the high payoff and low cost, the task force found no evidence 

that these efforts are being aggressively pursued. Consequently, the task 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS I 55

force believes these recommendations identify opportunities where 

modest additional investments (or even shifts of existing funding) 

would produce significant reductions in the threat from WMD. 

The task force felt that it was important to provide some sense of 

how far along the nation is in implementing the detailed 

recommendations—whether 10 or 90 percent, for example. Figure 6 

provides a subjective estimate of this “degree of accomplishment” for 

each of the detailed recommendations. If all of these recommendations 

were implemented, with adequate funding, this chart would be all solid 

bars to the right. Viewed from the “glass half full” perspective, there is 

substantial opportunity to make a real impact. 

FOUO

Recommendation Item 0 % In being or program in place 100%

1 - Intelligence Forum - understanding adversary

Improved collection (1)

Improved collection (2)

Improved collection (3)

Relational database focused on individuals

Revise security policies (share/protect)

Mission manager for WMD

2 - Deny Weapon Broaden International Cooperation efforts

Acquisition Secure/track HAZMAT in US

3- Aggressive & Articulate aggressive policies

Credible Policies Develop improved attribution forensics

Plan realistic response options

JSTP-like structure at STRATCOM

4 - Mitigation and Sense of urgency

Recovery Nat'l Executable planning, exercise, C3

Medical surge trained personnel

R&D advanced medical countermeasures

R&D advanced decontamination

R&D radiation detection

Public education and frankness

5 - Mitigation and Comprehensive pilot programss

Recovery DoD C3 prototype

 Catastrophic mitigation & recovery planning

6 - Readiness Develop and use readiness system

Initial PA&E cell for national assessment

Figure 6. Subjective Estimate of the Percentage of Investment In-Being or 

Programmed 
56 I CHAPTER 8 

Bottom Line 

Effective implementation of all six recommendations would, 

in our assessment, significantly reduce the impact of most forms 

of WMD—chemical, biological, radiological—as represented by the 

DHS scenarios evaluated in this study. A nuclear attack is in a class by 

itself and remains a serious threat, depending heavily on prevention. 

Campaign attacks also remain potentially catastrophic due to the 

potential for widespread destruction. To implement these initial 

recommendations would require about $4 billion of additional 

investment annually. It is an investment that the country must be 

willing to make. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE I 57

Appendix A. Terms of Reference 
60 I APPENDIX B 

Appendix B. Task Force Membership 

CHAIRMEN 

Name Affiliation 

Mr. Larry Lynn Private Consultant 

Mr. Bob Nesbit MITRE 

STEERING GROUP 

Mr. Irv Blickstein RAND 

Dr. Regina Dugan Private Consultant 

Dr. Matt Ganz HRL Laboratories, LLC 

Dr. William Graham National Security Research, Inc. 

Dr. Mim John Sandia National Laboratories 

Mr. John Lauder Areté Associates 

Dr. Ann Skalka Fox Chase Cancer Center 

Mr. Bob Stein Private Consultant 

Dr. Michael Vlahos John Hopkins University, 

Applied Physics Laboratory 

TASK FORCE MEMBERS 

Dr. Steve Balut Institute for Defense Analyses 

Dr. James Bonomo RAND 

Dr. Bob Brammer Northrop Grumman 

Dr. Larry Brandt Sandia National Laboratories 

Mr. Peter Breier National Security Research, Inc. 

Dr. Julie Casani Department of Health, State of Maryland 

Dr. Delores Etter U.S. Naval Academy 

Dr. Craig Fields Private Consultant 

Gen John Gordon, USAF (Ret) Private Consultant 

Mr. Richard Haver Northrop Grumman 

Dr. Robert Hermann Private Consultant 

Maj Gen Ken Isarel, USAF (Ret) Lockheed Martin 
TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP I 61

Mr. Alan Marcus CNA 

Dr. Joe Markowitz Private Consultant 

Dr. Susan Marquis LMI 

Dr. Thom Mayer Best Practices, Inc. 

ADM Donald Pilling, USN (Ret) LMI 

Dr. Brad Roberts Institute for Defense Analyses 

Mr. Jim Shields Draper Laboratory 

Mr. Vince Vitto Draper Laboratory 

Mr. Mark Wagner Batelle 

Mr. Steve Weiner MIT Lincoln Laboratory 

Dr. Obaid Younossi RAND 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 

Mr. Mike Evenson Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE 

LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA Defense Science Board 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS 

Col Don Ahern NGB J-5 

Dr. Parney Albright Department of Homeland Security, Science and 

Technology, Programs 

Ms. Lisa Bronson 

Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 

(Technology Security Policy & 

Counterproliferation) 

Col Mason Carpenter USAF, J-5 

Dr. Michael Carter Department of Homeland Security 

Dr. David Cooper Office of the Secretary of Defense, ISP/NPP 

CAPT John Fraiser U.S. Special Operations Command 

Dr. Richard Gault Defense Intelligence Agency 

Ms. Laura Gross Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, International Security Policy 

Dr. Clifford Hansen U.S. Northern Command 

LTC Mark Holloway U.S. Northern Command 

LTC Thomas Hook NGB J-3 
62 I APPENDIX B 

Mr. Wade Ishimoto Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 

Dr. Randy Long Department of Homeland Security 

COL Richard Marchant Office of Force Transformation 

Dr. Maureen McCarthy Department of Homeland Security, Science and 

Technology, Office of Research and Development 

Col Mike McGauvran U.S. Strategic Command 

Col Don McGonigle Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

International Security Policy 

Ms. Cathy Montie Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

Dr. Maruice Mizrahi Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program 

Analysis and Evaluation 

Mr. Thomas Pagan U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command 

Dr. Lisa Rotz Center for Disease Control 

Dr. Scott Steele Federal Bureau of Investigation 

LTC Robert vonTersch, USA Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Health Affairs 

Mr. Paul Wolfe Defense Intelligence Agency 

Mr. John Wood Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense 

STAFF 

Ms. Barbara Bicksler Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

Ms. Amy Cauffman Strategic Analysis, Inc. 
PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE I 63

Appendix C. Presentations to the Task 

Force 

Name Topic 

JANUARY 31 – FEBRUARY 1, 2005 

Dr. Brad Roberts 

Institute for Defense Analyses

DOD’s Implementation of the 

National Strategy to Combat WMD: A Progress 

Report on Work by a Panel of the Threat 

Reduction Advisory Committee 

MARCH 8–9, 2005 

Col Mason Carpenter 

Joint Staff, J-5 Joint Staff Combating WMD Efforts 

Dr. Len Connell 

Sandia National Laboratories

Analysis of the RDD Threat: 

A Risk-Based Approach 

Dr. Randy Long 

Department of Homeland Security

Chemical Countermeasures Science and 

Technology Program 

Dr. Maurice Mizrahi 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program 

Analysis and Evaluation

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction: 

An Investment Strategy 

Dr. Vayl Oxford 

Department of Homeland Security

Overview of the Domestic Nuclear Detection 

Office 

Mr. Scott Rowell and LtCol Don Leathem 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense

DOD’s Strategy for 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support 

Dr. John Vitko 

Department of Homeland Security An Overview of the Biodefense RDT&E 

APRIL 4–5, 2005 

Bill Bryan 

Director, Critical Infrastructure Protection Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) 

Dr. Julie Casani, Director, Office of Public 

Health Preparedness and Response, 

State of Maryland 

Public Health Preparedness 

Dr. David Cullen 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, Chemical and Biological Defense

Chemical Biological Defense Program and 

Biological Standoff Detection Program 
64 I APPENDIX C 

Dr. Thom Mayer, Best Practices, Inc. 

Dr. Dan Hanfling, Medical Director for 

Disaster Management, Inova

Healthcare Facility Preparedness for WMD 

Response: The Current State of Affairs 

Various Intelligence Agencies Status of Terrorist Threat 

MAY 3–4, 2005 

Dr. Seth Carus 

Center for the Study of WMD, National 

Defense University

What are Weapons of Mass Destruction? 

Historical and Legal Perspectives 

Ms. Ellen Embrey 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Force Health Protection and Readiness

Medical Emergency Preparedness Programs and 

Initiatives: Overview and Status Update 

Dr. Dale Klein 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Nuclear and Chemical and Biological 

Defense Programs

Department of Defense: 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

Mr. Brad Roberts 

Institute for Defense Analyses Calibrating Adversary Intent: State and Non-State 

Ms. Nancy Suski 

Department of Homeland Security

National Incident Management System and 

National Response Plan 

Various Intelligence Agencies Counterproliferation and Counterterrorism 

JUNE 1–2, 2005 

Dr. Jay Albanese 

Chief, International Center, 

National Institute of Justice

Criminal Motivation and Crime Prevention 

Mr. Rudy Cohen and 

LtCol Perry Helton TOPOFF III After Action Comments 

Mr. Mike Evenson 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency DTRA Programs Related to WMD Defense 

Anthony S. Fauci, MD 

Director, National Institute of Allergy and 

Infectious Diseases, 

National Institutes of Health

NIH Biodefense Research: Progress and Priorities 

Col Joseph Palma, USAF, MD 

Medical Director, Office of the Deputy 

Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for 

Chemical and Biological Defense Programs

Biodefense Transformation 

Roy Godson and Richard Shultz 

Consortium for the Study of Intelligence

Requirements for Effective Intelligence Against 

Non-State Armed Groups 

ADM Bill Studeman, USN (Ret) 

Presidential Commission on Intelligence 

Capabilities of the United States Regarding 

WMD

Intelligence Community Transformation: 

Issues and Challenges 
PRESENTATIONS TO THE TASK FORCE I 65

JUNE 28–29, 2005 

COL Neal Anderson, USA 

U.S. Northern Command

NORTHCOM’s Plans and Capabilities for CBRNE 

Response 

CAPT Jim Burans 

Director, National Bioforensic Analysis 

Center 

Overview of the National Bioforensic Analysis 

Center 

Mike Evanson 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency Pilot Program in Base Protection 

CDR Andrew Kuepper, USN 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

Homeland Defense

CBRNE Consequence Management Executive 

Order 

COL Michael McNeely, USAF 

Joint Staff, J-5 Proliferation Security Initiative 

Dr. William Raub 

U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services 

Office of Public Health Emergency Preparedness 

David Wilson 

Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI Laboratory, Chemical Biological Sciences Unit 
66 I APPENDIX C 

Appendix D. Glossary 

C3 Command, Control, and Communications 

CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DNI Director of National Intelligence 

DOS U.S. Department of State 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

DTW Detect-to-Warn 

EMT Emergency Medical Technician 

JSTPS Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff 

MIDB Modernized Integrated Data Base 

NIH National Institutes of Health 

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 

NSC National Security Council 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OSD (PA&E) Office of the Secretary of Defense, Program Analysis and 

Evaluation 

SIOP Single Integrated Operational Plan 

SNM Special Nuclear Materials 

STRATCOM U.S. Strategic Command 

TIC Toxic Industrial Chemical 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics 

USD (I) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence 

USD (P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction