CRACKS IN THE FOUNDATION: 

LEADERSHIP SCHISMS IN AL-QA’IDA 

FROM 1989-2006 

HARMONY PROJECT 

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 

Lincoln Hall 

West Point, NY 10996 

http://ctc.usma.edu

© Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (September 2007) 

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and not of the U.S. Military 

Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 

Foreword 

 Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its 

goal is remaking the world—and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere.1

President Bush, September 20, 2001 

The near-term goals of al-Qa’ida today are well known: force the US to withdraw from 

the Middle East and establish Islamic states in the region. Its general strategy is similarly 

well known: provoke the US into committing ground forces to the region, thereby 

exhausting its will to remain. But these goals and strategy have evolved over time and 

are as much a product of circumstances and al-Qa’ida infighting as they are of deliberate 

planning. 

Drawing on newly-declassified al-Qa’ida internal communications from the Defense 

Department’s Harmony Database, Vahid Brown and his colleagues at the Combating 

Terrorism Center (CTC) have chronicled the emergence of two factions in al-Qa’ida: the 

planners and the propagandists. Each employed different strategies to achieve their 

common overarching goals. The first faction was committed to building an effective 

guerrilla organization and attacking the West in ways similar to other irregular military 

organizations engaged in asymmetric conflict. In contrast, the second faction wanted to 

establish al-Qa’ida as a global brand, a battle standard that could inspire and unify groups 

around the world engaged in violent Islamist resistance. 

US policy toward al-Qa’ida after 9/11 placed a premium on diminishing the capabilities 

of the first faction. Thus, US-led efforts have achieved notable success capturing and 

killing al-Qa’ida’s leaders and operatives, crippling its organizational structure, and 

degrading its ability to coordinate terrorist attacks worldwide. As this report points out, 

however, al-Qa’ida’s real strength has never been as a guerrilla fighting force; rather its 

strength comes from its ability to transform the local concerns of Islamist activists into 

what this report describes as “a unifying vision of apocalyptic inter-civilizational 

conflict”. Because these capabilities and their proponents are still in place, al-Qa`ida 

continues to achieve success. 

Effective counterterrorism must better address these capabilities. The tools and 

prescriptions needed to do so will fall largely outside the realm of the military options 

that have done so well against the first faction. Eroding al-Qa’ida’s brand appeal—

reducing its share of the ideological marketplace —will require innovative and multilateral approaches with the US hand rarely seen or suspected. Furthermore, greater 

efforts have to be made to degrade its media distribution organs. Finally, aggressive 

targeting of al-Qa’ida’s senior leaders must continue and will complement efforts to limit 

its brand appeal. As this report articulates, Usama Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri are 

 

1

 A transcript of the September 20, 2001 State of the Union Address is available at 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html

i
ii

the incarnation of al-Qa’ida’s brand and each new image of them only serve to reinforce 

the brand’s invincibility. Thus, capturing or killing these iconic senior al-Qa’ida leaders 

will undermine al-Qa’ida’s emblematic appeal and help delegitimize the extremist 

ideology they are selling to the Muslim world. 

LTC Joseph H. Felter, Ph.D 

Director, Combating Terrorism Center 

West Point, New York 
Table of Contents

Foreword............................................................................................... i 

Part I

Introduction........................................................................................... 1 

1990-1996: Al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia ............... 3 

1996-2001: The Taliban Refuge and the War with America ........... 12 

2001-2006: Dispersal, Reconsolidation and Problems in Iraq .......... 18 

Conclusion .......................................................................................... 21 

Part II

Harmony Document List and Summaries .......................................... 25

Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida from 1989-20061

Introduction

 From its beginnings in the wake of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida 

has been at war with itself. In disputes that have largely been invisible to the broader 

public, its leadership has been in a constant battle over what al-Qa’ida should be, what 

strategy it should pursue, even who its real enemies are. Very early in al-Qa’ida’s 

development there emerged two factions, one committed to building an effective guerrilla 

organization and one bent on establishing al-Qa’ida as a global brand, a battle standard 

that could be taken up by any and all engaged in violent Islamist resistance. Conflict 

between these two poles has defined every major leadership schism in al-Qa’ida, with the 

latter camp, led by Usama bin Ladin, victorious nearly every time. In the end, the “brand 

managers” succeeded in converting al-Qa’ida from an allegiance-based paramilitary 

organization, complete with formalized hierarchies of command and control into an 

emblem, an ideological banner capable of inspiring homegrown cells of any size, the 

members of which pledge allegiance not to any particular person, but to the vision of 

jihad that al-Qa’ida embodies. The origins and consequences of this long-running conflict, 

even its existence, remain underappreciated by American policymakers. While the 

efforts of the United States and its allies to target al-Qa’ida’s organizational capacities 

have yielded tangible and hard-won gains, more must be done to degrade al-Qa’ida’s 

ability to control and project its brand – to inspire scattered and isolated Sunni militants 

to kill in its name. 

 These are the key insights that emerge from the following analysis of documents 

declassified from the Harmony Database and made available to the Combating Terrorism 

Center by the Department of Defense. Though it has long been known that al-Qa’ida has 

suffered from disunity at the leadership level, these documents allow us to gain a fresh 

insight into the engine driving those conflicts and illuminate the vulnerabilities that these 

conflicts have created for the organization.2

 In what boils down to a struggle between 

branding and bureaucracy, al-Qa’ida has consistently put its ability to inspire a broader 

movement over the development of its organizational capacities to pursue strategic 

military goals. While its guerrilla strategists have fought for the resources to build an 

effective command-and-control military organization, its two supreme leaders – Usama 

bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri – have preferred press releases over battlefield 

preparedness. Al-Qa’ida’s preference for branding, the military incompetence of its 

autocratic leaders and the unanticipated ferocity of the United States’ response to the 

attacks of 9/11, have together left the brand managers the only ones standing. This is not 

to say that al-Qa’ida has not been able to credibly threaten American interests by carrying 

out isolated but devastating acts of violence; it has. But its real strength has never been 

 

1

 The author of this study is Vahid Brown, a Research Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at West 

Point. 

2

 The most comprehensive study of the open-source information on al-Qa’ida’s internal fault lines is Fawaz 

Gerges’ The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 

2005); as Gerges observes, “The intra-Islamist struggle has not received its share of critical scrutiny and its 

understanding is vital to shedding light on the inner dynamics and complexities of Islamist and jihadist 

networks” (p. 110). 

1
as a fighting force, but rather its ability to transform what have traditionally been the 

local or national concerns of Islamist activism into a vision of apocalyptic intercivilizational conflict. 

 The following analysis, grounded in the data from the Harmony documents, 

charts the history of this transformation and of the internal divisions that surrounded it.3 

The Harmony documents shed light on cohesion problems that have been bedeviling 

Salafi jihadi organizations going back more than thirty years. One of these documents, 

analyzed in the Combating Terrorism Center’s first Harmony report, provides a lengthy 

“after-action report” on the failed jihadi activism in Syria in the 1970s and 1980s; its 

author, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, identifies disunity and disorganization at the leadership level 

as the single most important factor in the failure of that movement.4

 As the evidence 

from the Harmony documents discussed below shows, this has been a constant challenge 

for al-Qa’ida as well. While the branding-versus-bureaucracy crux outlined above has 

consistently been the driving force, at different points in the development of al-Qa’ida the 

scope and consequences of this leadership struggle have changed. 

During the first phase, from the founding of the organization at the close of the 

anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan to the return of the leadership to South Asia after its 

misadventures in Africa, al-Qa’ida had failed in both areas, creating neither an effective 

guerrilla organization nor a consistent jihadi message. 

In the second phase, from al-Qa’ida’s re-establishment in Afghanistan to its 

dispersal from that refuge by American-led attacks, al-Qa’ida was able to exploit the 

relative security provided by its uneasy alliance with the Taliban to develop and begin to 

“market” its anti-American message. Though it was during this period that it was able to 

carry out the large-scale acts of terror for which it is famous – the 1998 bombings of two 

American Embassies in Africa and the attacks of September 11, 2001 – internal divisions 

over the decision to target the United States severely degraded al-Qa’ida’s organizational 

capacity. 

During the third and current phase, which began with the United States’ response 

to 9/11, al-Qa’ida as a centrally-controlled bureaucracy all but disappeared, with most of 

its key military and strategic leaders dispersed, captured or killed. In this period alQa’ida Central has been largely reduced to a media organization, while the Iraq war has 

created a market for its message, a field in which jihadis with little or no connection to 

 

3

 While data on al-Qa’ida’s leadership schisms from other open-source documents have been included in 

the following analysis, no attempt has been made to be comprehensive in this regard, as the primary aim of 

this report is to draw lessons from the material in the Harmony Database. 

4

 “Lessons Learned from the Jihad Ordeal in Syria,” AFGP-2002-600080. For an in-depth analysis of this 

document, see the Combating Terrorism Center, Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting Al-Qa’ida’s 

Organizational Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2006), Part I, available 

online at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq_syria.asp. Abu Mus’ab opines that responsibility for the failure of the 

Syrian jihadi movement “falls squarely on a handful of leaders,” whose “negative contribution ranged from 

treason and criminal behavior against jihad and the mujahidin to failure from jockeying for leadership 

positions....” The al-Qa’ida military strategist Abu’l-Walid makes a similar diagnosis on the reasons for the 

failure of jihad in Syria in AFGP-2002-600970. 

2
the remnants of al-Qa’ida’s central bureaucracy can take up (and thus alter) the al-Qa’ida 

banner.5

 

1990-1996: al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia

 As is well known, al-Qa’ida was born out of a leadership schism. Though they 

co-founded the Maktab al-Khidamat (also known as the Afghan Services Bureau), which 

provided logistical support to the Arab volunteers, by the end of the anti-Soviet conflict 

in Afghanistan ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam and Usama bin Ladin had come to have differing 

views about many things, not least of them being the future direction of the jihad.6 When 

al-Qa’ida went its own way under Bin Ladin’s leadership, things didn’t get any better. 

As author Lawrence Wright notes, “The formation of al-Qaeda gave the Arab Afghans 

something else to fight over.” 

Every enterprise that arose in the sparsely populated cultural landscape was 

contested, and any head that rose above the crowd was a target. The ongoing jihad 

in Afghanistan became an afterthought in the war of words and ideas that was 

being fought in the mosques [of Peshawar]. Even the venerable Services Bureau 

... was slandered as a CIA front and Azzam as an American stooge. 7

The earliest witness in the Harmony documents to al-Qa’ida’s leadership-cohesion 

challenges during this early period comes from an analysis of the Afghan situation in 

1989 by the Egyptian jihadi Mustafa Hamid, also known as Abu’l-Walid, written some 

time after 1996. Abu’l-Walid’s single most important characteristic as it emerges from 

the Harmony documents is his pragmatism. Though a devout Muslim who shared the 

broad outlines of Salafi jihadi ideology with his al-Qa’ida brethren – essentially that there 

is a need for a renewal of Shari’a-dominant political structures in the Muslim world, and 

a concomitant need to fight any perceived interference in this revival – Abu’l-Walid 

approached jihad as, above all else, a military struggle. For Abu’l-Walid, the foremost 

requirement of a jihadi strategy is that it be effective, not that it be ideologically pure or 

symbolically potent. This predilection for a pragmatic approach to jihad would lead 

Abu’l-Walid to repeated conflicts over the years with members of the al-Qa’ida 

leadership who took a more ideological or doctrinaire line. 

 A long-time veteran of the anti-Soviet jihad, during the 1980s Abu’l-Walid 

personally knew many of the Arab mujahidin, especially fellow Egyptians, who would go 

on to take leading roles in al-Qa’ida. Of these he was closest to Abu Hafs al-Misri (aka 

Muhammad Atef), one of the co-founders of al-Qa’ida and perhaps the leading voice of 

what Abu’l-Walid and others have described as the “hawkish wing” in al-Qa’ida’s early 

 

5

 A number of terrorist attacks in Europe since 9/11 – and especially the 7 July 2005 London bombings – 

have been linked to al-Qa’ida, though it is not clear that al-Qa’ida Central has played anything more than a 

supportive role in cases where involvement has been established. 

6

 For a lucid account of their decisive disagreements, as well as of the conflicting opinions of the other 

initial leaders, see Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), pp. 131ff. 7

 Wright, Looming Tower, p. 134. 

3
history.8

 In the early spring of 1989, Bin Ladin had joined with his Arab mujahidin 

followers in the disastrous attempt to attack and seize the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad, 

an attack that had been orchestrated by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Bureau 

(ISI), allegedly with help from the CIA.9

 Though losses were massive and there was 

little sign of progress in the early days of the siege, the international network of 

mujahidin newsletters, itinerant preachers and support organizations touted the battle as 

being on the verge of victory for the mujahidin, and this sparked the greatest influx of 

foreign volunteers into Afghanistan since the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. The 

influential ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam also published accounts glorifying the courageous 

“martyrs” rushing to “liberate” the city from Najibullah’s communist government, 

accelerating the rush to the Jalalabad front. In the midst of this surge of support for the 

attack, a small contingent of prominent mujahidin, including Abu’l-Walid and Abu 

Mus’ab al-Suri,10 were trying to sound the alarm and convince the Arab fighters not to 

join such an ill-prepared and fool-hardy mission, one which Abu’l-Walid likened, in 

articles he wrote for the jihadi newspapers and magazines at the time, to a horde of 

children being led to their doom by the pied piper.11

 Abu’l-Walid was well aware that the attack plan had allegedly been drafted with 

ISI and CIA support, and he warned that the mujahidin were being savagely manipulated 

in the service of geopolitical forces having nothing to do with the jihad.12 Abu’l-Walid 

was very upset with ‘Azzam for writing his glowing portraits of brave martyrs, but 

reserved the bulk of his ire for Usama bin Ladin and his military leaders Abu Hafs and 

Abu ‘Ubayda, who had emerged during the course of the battle as the overall 

commanders of the Arab forces.13 After a number of his old mujahidin colleagues were 

killed in the fruitless attack, Abu’l-Walid let it be known that “had I been in charge, I 

would have court-martialed Abu ‘Abdullah [Usama b. Ladin], Abu ‘Ubayda and Abu 

 

8

 Abu’l-Walid, “The Story of the Afghan Arabs from the Time of the Arrival in Afghanistan until their 

Departure with the Taliban,” part 1, al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 8, 2004; Wright, Looming Tower, p. 131 

(where the hawkish wing is refered to as the takfiri faction). For a profile of Abu Hafs, see the Combating 

Terrorism Center, al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Appendix B II, available online at 

http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Abu_Hafs.pdf. 9

 See Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet 

Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), pp. 190-95. 10 Abu’l-Walid identified Abu Mus’ab al-Suri as having “clashed” with the prevailing opinion in AFGP2002-600088, p. 12 (page numbers refer to the original Arabic documents, and all translations are my own 

unless otherwise noted); he further wrote that the mujahidin commander Jalaladdin Haqqani also 

disapproved of the attack, though the latter did send a few hundred of his men to that front. On Abu Mus’ab 

al-Suri, see the in-depth monograph by Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda 

Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). 11 AFGP-2002-600088, p. 14. Abu’l-Walid is fluent in English and often makes references to Western 

culture; he also frequently cites Western media, such as the New York Times and the BBC. 12 In AFGP-2002-600088, Abu’l-Walid includes the text of some of the articles he published in the UAEbased newspaper al-Ittihad about this at the time, in which he argued that “the battle is being conducted by 

the international powers, as indicated by the American New York Times.” 13 Abu’l-Walid says that he “hated Dr. Abdullah’s rhetoric,” since he was sure that ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam knew 

that “Jalalabad was not a battle of faith” (AFGP-2002-600088, p. 2). In another Harmony document 

written by Abu’l-Walid, he relates that he first met ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam in November of 1984 but that they 

did not get on well even then; the major point of contention was their respective assessments of the Afghan 

leadership of the anti-Soviet mujahidin. ‘Azzam, writes Abu’l-Walid, came eventually to idolize these 

men, especially Sayyaf, Hekmatyar and Rabbani, while Abu’l-Walid’s opinion was constantly moving in 

the opposite direction (AFGP-2002-600087, p. 4). 

4
Hafs and sentenced them to death.”14 Though they’d not met by this point, word of his 

comments made it to Bin Ladin, who, not surprisingly, became very angry. At one point 

Abu’l-Walid met with Abu Hafs and Abu ‘Ubayda and asked them to convey a written 

assessment of the Jalalabad fiasco to Bin Ladin; Abu ‘Ubayda returned with the news that 

“Abu ‘Abdullah wished it torn to pieces and scattered to the wind, since his men were 

achieving victories.”15 Abu’l-Walid’s assessment of the al-Qa’ida leadership formed 

during this experience – that “their limited mentality will always be disastrous to their 

operations”16 – was one that would only be deepened in the following years, as he began 

to work more closely with and ultimately rose to top of the ranks of al-Qa’ida. 

 

In 1998, by which time Abu’l-Walid was a member of the Shura Council of alQa’ida – the umbrella committee of senior leaders that advises Bin Ladin and has 

subcommittees with various portfolios – he edited together a lengthy series of diaries and 

notes that he’d written in 1990 during the siege of Khost, an important series of battles 

that began during the anti-Soviet war and carried over into the 1989-1992 Afghan civil 

war between mujahidin warlords and the Najibullah regime; beseiged for more than eight 

years, this eastern Afghan city finally fell to the mujahidin in the spring of 1991.17 The 

Afghan mujahidin were led by Jalaluddin Haqqani, a skilled commander who operated 

under the aegis of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami until 1995, at which time he 

switched his loyalties to the Taliban.18 Some of the so-called “Arab Afghans,” or 

mujahidin volunteers from Arab countries, fought around Khost under Haqqani’s 

leadership during this period, while many of them formed their own groups, the largest of 

which was led by Abu’l-Harith al-Urduni. Haqqani was widely recognized as one of the 

most effective mujahidin commanders in Afghanistan and he was heavily supported with 

money and arms by the Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies; CIA officers stationed 

in Islamabad at the time viewed Haqqani “as perhaps the most impressive Pashtun field 

commander in the war.”19 Haqqani was also very close to Usama bin Ladin – as he is to 

this day – and it was during this period that Bin Ladin built his cave complex in 

 

14 AFGP-2002-600088, p. 2. 

15 AFGP-2002-600088, p. 14. Despite Bin Ladin’s optimism, the attack on Jalalabad was a total failure; the 

city was not captured and the mujahidin lost more than 10,000 fighters. 

16 AFGP-2002-600088, p. 15. 

17 Leading an attack on Khost in the spring of 1987 was Usama bin Ladin’s first foray into direct military 

involvement in the anti-Soviet jihad; the attack he led was a humiliating failure and earned for the Arab 

volunteers a reputation for incompetence on the battlefield. For full accounts of this disaster see ‘Isam 

Diraz (also spelled Essam Deraz), Usama b. Ladin yarwi ma`arik Masadat al-Ansar al-‘Arab biAfghanistan (Cairo: al-Manar al-Jadid, 1991) and ‘Abd al-Rahim ‘Ali, Hilf al-irhab: tanzim al-Qa’ida min 

‘Abdullah ‘Azzam ila Ayman al-Zawahiri, 1979-2003 (Cairo, 2004), vol. 2, ch. 2; Wright provides a brief 

account in The Looming Tower, pp. 114f. 18 Haqqani went on to become one of the Taliban’s most important military commanders and, as of the 

summer of 2007, is a commander of the Taliban contingent that controls North Waziristan in Pakistan’s 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas (where it is believed Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri may 

be currently hiding); see “Pakistan: Geo News Discussion on Army Operations in Tribal Areas, New Red 

Mosque,” Karachi, Geo News TV, 1 August 2007, OSC translation SAP20070802093001, and Ismail Khan, 

“Forces, militants heading for truce,” Dawn (Karachi), June 23, 2006, available online at 

http://www.dawn.com/2006/06/23/top2.htm. 19 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 202. 

5
Miranshah, North Waziristan, on territory that was then (and is now) under Haqqani’s 

control.20

Abu’l-Walid served as a field commander and propagandist for Haqqani, whom 

he greatly admired, though he worked with Abu’l-Harith’s group at various times as 

well.21 Abu’l-Walid’s pragmatism is evident at the beginning of his Khost memoirs, 

where he writes that he chose to work with Haqqani because he felt the latter was most 

likely of all the mujahidin warlords to decisively end the military crisis and in-fighting 

that followed the Soviet withdrawal and finally put an end to communist rule of 

Afghanistan.22 It was in the course of working with Haqqani in the battle for Khost that 

Abu’l-Walid began his working relationship with al-Qa’ida and its senior leadership. 

 In early 1990, after meeting with his old colleague Abu Hafs, Abu’l-Walid was 

invited to address two of al-Qa’ida’s training camps: the Jihad Wal camp in Khost and 

another across the border in Miranshah, North Waziristan.23 At Jihad Wal he lectured on 

the political situation in Afghanistan with the jihadi ideologue Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who 

would also go on to hold a position in al-Qa’ida’s Shura Council. Their class was a 

disaster; according to Abu’l-Walid, the audience, which included “all of the important 

cadres of the al-Qa’ida organization, including Usama bin Ladin,” broke into arguing 

factions and began declaring different parties infidels (takfir).24 While he doubted that 

their takfiri denunciations extended to him personally, Abu’l-Walid was convinced that 

the enmity that some of the members of al-Qa’ida’s hawkish wing developed for him at 

this time played a role in further problems he would have with al-Qa’ida later that year.25

 During this and subsequent meetings with Abu Hafs, Abu’l-Walid set out a plan 

to stage a continuous month-long rocket attack on the critically important Khost airstrip, 

a three-kilometer long landing area that had been an essential part of the Soviet supply 

line and remained so during the civil war against Najibullah. Surrounded on land by 

mujahidin, the city relied on the airport as its only source of supplies and thus vital to its 

ability to resist the siege. Al-Qa’ida agreed to support Abu’l-Walid’s plan, who would 

serve as the field commander for the operation, but, as he detailed at great length and in 

 

20 Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 157; Miranshah is just across the Pak-Afghan border from Khost and was the 

staging area for the foreign mujahidin involved in the battle of Khost. As Coll notes, Bin Ladin’s heavy 

investments in this and another complex west of Peshawar (called the Parrot’s Beak) were criticized by 

‘Azzam as a waste of money that could have been better spent in Afghanistan. On Haqqani’s leading role in 

the Taliban in North Waziristan, see Ismail Khan, op. cit. 21 The siege of Khost became the stuff of jihadi legend and, as noted by Loretta Napoleoni, “For a mujahed, 

having participated in the battle of Khost is a sign of prestige; this is why some people have claimed that al 

Zarqawi was part of the Arab-Afghan brigade” led by Abu’l-Harith al-Urduni, though in fact Zarqawi 

arrived in Afghanistan after the fall of Khost; Insurgent Iraq: Al Zarqawi and the New Generation (New 

York: Seven Stories Press, 2005), p. 239n. 2. 

22 AFGP-2002-600090, p. 1. 

23 AFGP-2002-600090, pp. 2 and 28. The Jihad Wal course was given in January of 1990; the date of the 

course in Miranshah is not mentioned but was probably during the same month, as Abu Hafs 

communicated Usama bin Ladin’s anger at the content of Abu’l-Walid’s lectures (as well as for Abu’lWalid’s writings about the Jalalabad disaster) during a meeting with Abu’l-Walid in early February. 24 AFGP-2002-600090, p. 2. 

25 Ibid. While he does not elaborate on particular issues discussed by Abu Mus’ab or himself that may have 

ignited the controversy, it is clear in other documents that Abu’l-Walid deeply disagreed with the al-Qa’ida 

leadership at this time over the latter’s assessments of various mujahidin wardlords. Abu’l-Walid had a 

particularly low opinion of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, while the latter was well-liked by Bin Ladin, who 

continually sought various kinds of alliance between al-Qa’ida and Hekmatyar’s group. 

6
daily diary entries during the operation, al-Qa’ida proved to be an utterly incompetent 

collaborator, forcing Abu’l-Walid throughout the airport attack to rely on his longstanding relationships with Haqqani and Abu’l-Harith to obtain needed supplies and 

logistical support.26

 Abu’l-Walid’s attack on the Khost airport lasted from 16 August to 11 September 

1990. Just one week before the operation began, while setting up a network of posts that 

would fire rockets at different points of the airstrip, Abu’l-Walid received a letter from 

Abu Hafs on behalf of Usama bin Ladin asking him to send all his men originating from 

the Arabian Gulf to Peshawar. Bin Ladin was gathering an army of Gulf Arab mujahidin 

that he hoped to send to Saudi Arabia to protect it from Saddam Hussein’s armies, which 

had invaded Kuwait at the beginning of that month.27 All Gulf mujahidin were ordered 

to comply, with the exception of those working as trainers in al-Qa’ida’s camps; in 

addition, Bin Ladin ordered that a distance-determining telescope that had been given t

Abu’l-Walid for the operation be returned to Peshawar. Having already discovered th

al-Qa’ida was “not generous at all in supporting the airport project with its staff” and “di

not provide enough administrative support,” this request made Abu’l-Walid furious and 

he came close to severing his relationship with the organization. Rather than sacrifice the 

operation he sent along the telescope and the personnel, though “once again I was 

astonished by the al-Qa’ida leadership, that they would pull their cadres from an 

operation of such vital importance and yet not recall a single trainer from their military 

camps, full of young tourists from Saudi Arabia and Yemen.”

o 

at 

d 

 

28

 On August 12 Abu’l-Walid wrote in his diary about al-Qa’ida’s “lack of focus 

and interest,” and of his continuing frustration in seeking support for the airport operation. 

He wrote that the organization “was unable to focus on a battle unless Abu ‘Abdullah – 

Usama bin Ladin – were leading it himself,” an autocratic approach that Abu’l-Walid 

thought “unhealthy.”29 Throughout the course of the operation he frequently and angrily 

relates details of various failures on al-Qa’ida’s part; the latter are too slow in responding 

to requests, provide less than a third of the supplies Abu’l-Walid requests, fail to send 

along promised equipment and generally demonstrate complete administrative 

incompetence.30 “The way that al-Qa’ida’s administrative people behaved gave me no 

reason to have any confidence in them whatsoever,” he wrote on August 16.31 When the 

attacks on the airport succeeded in forcing Najibullah’s planes to use an alternate landing 

site, Abu’l-Walid’s plan to shift his attack to that location was unable to proceed, as “alQa’ida was silent as the sphinx” and the men under his command would not act without 

clear orders from Bin Ladin.32 Abu’l-Walid traveled to Peshawar to personally get a 

26 More than eighty pages in length, the account of the Khost airstrip operation consists largely of excerpts 

from Abu’l-Walid’s daily diaries that were compiled by him, with connecting narrative obviously written 

after the operation was over, in March of 1999; AFGP-2002-600092. 

27 AFGP-2002-600092, p. 10; Abu’l-Walid includes the text of the letter from Abu Hafs. The Saudi 

government of course turned down Bin Ladin’s offer of a mujahidin army to protect the Kingdom, and 

instead agreed to a U.S. military presence to deter an invasion from Saddam. 28 Ibid. In a later meeting with Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who by this time was working for al-Qa’ida, al-Suri 

also voiced his criticism for Bin Ladin having pulled the Gulf Arab mujahidin from the battlefields in order 

to send them to Saudi Arabia (AFGP-2002-600092, p. 37). 

29 AFGP-2002-600092, p. 16. 

30 AFGP-2002-600092, pp. 19, 21-2, 25, 40, 55 and passim. 

31 AFGP-2002-600092, p. 22. 

32 AFGP-2002-600092, p. 80. 

7
decision from the al-Qa’ida leadership regarding their willingness to increase their 

participation; “of course,” writes Abu’l-Walid, “I failed in my mission.”33

 During the middle of his operation against the Khost airport, Abu’l-Walid had a 

meeting with al-Qa’ida leaders Abu Hafs and Abu Usama al-Libi, and in his revealing 

account of their conversation one of the recurring themes of al-Qa’ida’s organizational 

vulnerabilities stands out: Arab chauvinism. Many of the Harmony documents provide 

evidence that al-Qa’ida is constantly challenged in its efforts to garner popular support by 

its disdain for non-Arab locals, be they Somalis, Uzbeks or Afghanis.34 In his meeting 

with Abu Hafs and Abu Usama, Abu’l-Walid discussed with them the role the Afghani 

situation was to play in the context of the larger Arab and Islamic jihadi strategy. Abu’lWalid writes that he took the minority view that, with a well-executed military strategy, 

the mujahidin could effectively take control of the country and establish an Islamic state, 

thus thwarting the post-Cold War designs of the United States vis-à-vis the Islamist 

movement.35 Abu Hafs and Abu Usama, however, expressed the view that the Afghani 

people were not qualified for such an undertaking, as they were generally all “thieves and 

liars,” and that the most that could be hoped from Afghanistan at that stage was space in 

which to train some Arab cadres who could bring their skills back to their home countries 

to wage jihad there.36 

 Another Harmony document dating to this period is especially revealing of these 

particular differences at the leadership level over what the next stage of the jihadi 

movement should be. This remarkable document, which explicitly corroborates Abu’lWalid’s just-mentioned account of the views expressed by al-Qa’ida leadership in his 

Khost memoirs, appears to be a survey of a number of leading Arab individuals and 

organizations involved in the Afghan jihad, with a series of questions followed by brief 

answers from each of the respondents. Though garbled with nonsense characters, it 

clearly lists responses from Usama bin Ladin, Abu’l-Walid, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and 

others to a list of questions involving their respective positions on what level of 

participation the Arab jihadi groups should have in Afghanistan following the Soviet 

withdrawal, and toward what end; what they thought about the various Afghan warlords; 

and what their views were of Benazir Bhutto, whose first term as Prime Minister of 

Pakistan began in December of 1988 and ended in August of 1990.37 In each case the 

longest answer is in response to the question of involvement in Afghanistan. Though 

 

33 AFGP-2002-600092, p. 81. 34 Al-Qa’ida has struggled to diminish this aspect of itself in its public presentation, and even in internal 

documents it tries to inculcate a “pan-Islamic” ethos; in a document that outlines the structure and policies 

of the organization, one of the items under the heading “general policies” is the following: “Eliminate 

regionalism and tribalism. We wage jihad anywhere in Muslim lands if the situation calls for it and we have 

the capacity to do so” (AFPG-2002-000080, p. 2). But compare this with “Letters from bin Laden,” AFGP2002-003345, part one, pp. 21-22, where he addresses Saudis as God’s “most preeminent worshippers and 

His most honored followers of Islam,” a rather clear indication of his Arab prejudices. 

35 Throughout his writings Abu’l-Walid refers to his view that, following the defeat of the Soviets, the 

United States had no further use for Islamists and would from then on pursue a foreign policy designed to 

wipe out Islamist movements throughout the world. 

36 AFGP-2002-600092, pp. 61f. 

37 This document can be dated to between August of 1990 and July of 1993, as the latest datable internal 

reference is to Nawaz Sharif taking office as Pakistan’s PM following Bhutto; Sharif’s term ended in July 

1993. The document includes responses from ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam, who died in November of 1989, so it 

likely began to be compiled towards the beginning of this 1990-1993 window. 

8
there were nine respondents, the following are the five responses of those directly 

involved at some point in al-Qa’ida’s leadership, addressing the question of “what is your 

position on battle participation in Afghanistan and for what reasons”38: 

‘Abdullah ‘Azzam: [there should be] token participation for the purpose of raising 

the Afghans’ morale, training the Arabs, and spreading the spirit of jihad among 

the Arabs, with the long-term goal being the waging of jihad against the Jews in 

Palestine.39

 

Usama bin Ladin: deep participation in the battles in accordance with the political 

and strategic vision of the leadership in Peshawar, with the long-term goal being 

the liberation of South Yemen from communism.40

Egyptian Islamic Jihad: participation in battles for the purpose of training 

personnel in a battlefield environment. Nothing is to be hoped for from the war in 

Afghanistan, nor will there arise an Islamic State there, on account of 

doctrinal/ideological defects (khalal al-‘aqa’id) among the leaders and the masses. 

Egypt is the heart of the Islamic world and it is necessary to establish the 

Caliphate there first.41

Abu Mus’ab al-Suri: participation for the purpose of training cadres and for 

forming a jihadi organization or coordinated organizations. Fighting in 

Afghanistan is a religious duty, though it is a lost cause.42 

Abu’l-Walid, Mustafa Hamid: total participation with the Islamic mujahidin 

forces in Afghanistan for the purpose of achieving a military and political victory 

for the sake of Islam and for transforming Afghanistan into a base (qa’ida) of 

support for the Muslim peoples, providing them with military cadres and expertise 

and shelter and support for the needy.43

Abu’l-Walid’s was clearly the minority position, and since the prevailing view of 

the al-Qa’ida leadership was that the jihad in Afghanistan was “a lost cause,” in the 

 

38 This question, as well as the others address by each of the respondents, can be found at AFGP-2002-

600086, pp. 20f. The other four respondents are Jamaat-e Islami Pakistan (pp. 2 and 26), al-Jama’a alIslamiyya in Egypt (pp. 7 and 31), the International Muslim Brotherhood (p. 3) and a certain Abu Usama, 

‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Ali (perhaps the Abu Usama al-Libi mentioned above, but there other possibilities as well; 

this could be the Balluchi al-Qa’ida member ‘Ali ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Ali, and it could also be the Egyptian 

jihadi Ali Mohamed, who used the pseudonym Abu Usama while in Afghanistan during the early 1990s). 

39 AFGP-2002-600086, pp. 1 and 22. 

40 Ibid., pp. 2 and 40. 

41 Ibid., pp. 6 and 29; interestingly, this opinion comes under the heading “Egyptian Islamic Jihad” rather 

than its leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is not named in the document. 

42 AFGP-2002-600086, pp. 9f. and 35. 

43 AFGP-2002-600086, pp. 16 and 39. Abu Usama, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz ‘Ali is cited as having the following 

position: “very limited participation for the purpose of training and then returning to the homeland [Egypt?] 

for waging the necessary jihad there with all available means. There is no hope for Afghanistan and what 

is happening therein is not a jihad – rather, it is simply a war, and not one carried out according to the rules 

and conditions of Islamic law [regarding warfare]” (ibid., pp. 8 and 32). 

9
following year the entire organization moved to Sudan. Abu’l-Walid remained in 

Afghanistan and took charge of the remnants of the al-Qa’ida infrastructure – chiefly the 

network of training camps – and oversaw the training of new jihadi cadres that began at 

this time to come to the camps from the former Soviet Central Asian countries. In 

addition to providing training to the jihadis from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 

(IMU) that began streaming to Jihad Wal and other camps, Abu’l-Walid directed alQa’ida’s largest operation in Afghanistan during this period: the “Furqan Project,” which 

provided military training and support to members of Tajikistan’s Nahda Party (also 

known as the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan), an Islamist political party that 

fought alongside other anti-government groups in the 1992-1997 Tajikistan civil war.44

In a series of five letters addressed to the al-Qa’ida leadership then located in 

Sudan and Somalia, Abu’l-Walid reveals that al-Qa’ida’s house remained divided 

throughout this period.45 In his first letter to the Africa Corps, dated 30 September 1993, 

he bluntly points to “a chronic error regarding political guidance” that plagued alQa’ida’s activities in Afghanistan and continued to do so in Somalia.46 Abu’l-Walid 

writes that military action must proceed according to a plan and in pursuit of specific 

goals, and that “waging jihad like a rhinoceros is stupid and futile.”47 He returns several 

times to the question of al-Qa’ida’s objectives in Somalia, chiding the team that was 

involved in the clash with American forces in Mogadishu (i.e., the “Black Hawk Down” 

incident) with having forgotten why it was there in the first place in the wake of this 

“victory.”48 “Here I remind you yet again,” writes Abu’l-Walid, “of one your fatal 

mistakes, which is the hasty changing of strategic targets, whereby now every action is 

tactical and improvised. Despite whatever success some of these operations may have, 

the general lines of the course of action will vanish, lose their direction, and ultimately all 

of the gains that were made could be forfeited. This is an oppressive burden on our 

already afflicted umma.”49

Abu’l-Walid repeatedly criticizes the ideological hindrances that al-Qa’ida cadres 

impose on their selection of local partnerships, suggesting that “al-Qa’ida’s Salafi 

predilections have led it to seek a political ally in Somalia with the same ideological 

 

44 Jamal al-Fadl also testified to al-Qa’ida’s training and support of the Nahda movement; U.S. v. Usama 

Bin Laden et al., S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, S.D.N.Y., February 7, 2001, pp. 354f. As indicated in one of Abu’lWalid’s letters, the project had a center in the northern Afghan province of Kunduz, which borders 

Tajikistan (AFGP-2002-600053, p. 18). 

45 For an in-depth analysis of al-Qa’ida’s (largely failed) efforts in Africa at this time, see the Combating 

Terrorism Center’s previous Harmony report, al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, available 

online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aqII.asp. 46 AFPG-2002-600053, p. 1. All five of the letters in this Harmony document were unmistakably written 

by Abu’l-Walid, though in four of them he uses the pseudonym Hassan al-Tajiki. He appears not to have 

been too concerned about hiding his identity, however, since in the third letter, which is signed Hassan alTajiki, he encloses a letter addressed to the Nahda leadership which is signed Abu’l-Walid, clearly 

identifying both letters as having one and the same author. In the fifth letter, “Hassan al-Tajiki” refers to 

his age and Egyptian origins as well. (al-Qa’ida operatives not infrequently take on the place-names of 

their current area of activity, e.g., the Egyptian Saif al-Adel used the pseudonym Omar al-Somali while 

directing operations in Somalia.) 

47 AFPG-2002-600053, p. 2. 

48 AFGP-2002-600053, pp. 12-14. 

49 AFGP-2002-600053, p. 14. (The umma is the global Muslim community, irrespective of national 

borders.) 

10
focus,” an approach he labels “a great calamity.”50 He argues that the cadres must seek 

the lesser of various evils, not some hoped-for ideal; the question facing jihadi activism is 

not whether it will have a Salafi, Sufi or Muslim Brotherhood stripe, but whether it will 

survive at all.51 Salafi or not, Abu’l-Walid urges al-Qa’ida in Somalia to find people they 

could effectively work with.52

 The five letters also reveal a lack of commitment on the part of the al-Qa’ida 

leadership in supporting the remaining infrastructure in Afghanistan. Abu’l-Walid 

rebukes the al-Qa’ida leadership for “having washed its hands of the Central Asian 

region,” as this was “a complete contradiction of the founding charter of al-Qa’ida and of 

its very watchword, which is universal jihad.” 

Even though I opposed this policy, as it goes beyond the scope of al-Qa’ida’s 

capabilities, al-Qa’ida committed to it nonetheless and even took steps to realize it. 

But beware the danger of any organization abandoning its foundational objectives, 

for such is the beginning of the end.53

Withdrawing from its birthplace in South Asia to focus on the “heartland” Arab regions 

was a betrayal of al-Qa’ida’s original purpose, and Abu’l-Walid writes that he fears alQa’ida will go the way of the Egyptian Islamist groups, who splintered into organizations 

focused on progressively more trivial matters and smaller theaters of action. “I even 

heard about specific organizations for neighborhoods,” he writes. “These organizations 

would start out around a ‘fatwa section,’ i.e., some genius suffering from juridical 

diarrhea who deemed himself capable of resolving any issue in heaven or earth.” 

As in the Khost operations, Abu’l-Walid refers again and again to insufficient 

allocations of resources to the Furqan Project and the training facilities in general, noting 

in 1994 that he had “appealed constantly to you for very humble human and financial 

support, but it fell on deaf ears.”54 In the latter half of 1994, Usama bin Ladin directed 

most of the remaining al-Qa’ida personnel working on the Furqan Project to relocate to 

Khartoum. In a letter written to the leadership in Sudan by one Abu ‘Ata al-Sharqi from 

the Jihad Wal camp in Khost, the author refers to the happiness of most of the “brothers” 

at this order, as they are weary of the problems facing their work in Afghanistan; in a 

further indication of al-Qa’ida’s chauvinism, the author writes that “I know with certainty 

that the problems will never end so long as we remain among our Tatar brothers.”55 He 

also notes, however, that Abu’l-Walid was “very upset” by this order, as the latter had 

 

50 AFPG-2002-600053, p. 1. On Salafism, see the Combating Terrorism Center’s Militant Ideology Atlas, 

ed. William McCants, pp. 5-6, available online here: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas/AtlasExecutiveReport.pdf. 51 AFPG-2002-600053, p. 2. 

52 AFPG-2002-600053, p. 4. For an analysis of the problems that plagued al-Qa’ida’s attempts to partner 

with Islamist groups in Somalia, see the Somalia case study in al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of 

Africa, available online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq_somaliaII.asp. 53 AFGP-2002-600053, p. 31. 

54 AFGP-2002-600053, p. 31. 

55 AFGP-2002-800581, p. 5. In an earlier letter by this Abu ‘Ata al-Sharqi, written in March of 1994 and 

addressed to Usama bin Ladin and al-Qa’ida’s military leadership, he refers to many of the same problems, 

complaining of lack of coordination and communication in the running of the various training camps in 

Afghanistan and relating Abu’l-Walid’s concerns that the camps lack a single clear chain of command, 

leading to conflicts over the use of resources between the various camps (AFGP-2002-600106). 

11
already sent a messenger to the Uzbeks inviting them to come and receive training. Abu 

‘Ata writes that Abu’l-Walid saw the chance to work with the Uzbeks as a unique 

opportunity that shouldn’t be wasted; several arguments ensued, and ultimately Abu ‘Ata 

and the rest of the cadres agreed to remain until they could finish the training of the 

Uzbeks, and to write a letter to this effect to Bin Ladin giving the latter the option to 

countermand Abu’l-Walid.56 Abu’l-Walid refers to this in a letter of his own, in which 

he asks “that you temporarily freeze your decision to withdraw the cadres until you have 

the opportunity to discuss the entire matter once more with a representative that will 

come to you specifically for this purpose.”57 His entreaty was apparently of no avail, as 

it was not long after this that Abu’l-Walid himself moved to Khartoum, though within

months he had to move back, as the entire al-Qa’ida organization was forced out of 

Sudan and sought refuge with the newly-ascendant Taliban.58

1996-2001: The Taliban Refuge and the War with America

Al-Qa’ida’s return to Afghanistan saw the beginning of a new phase of its activities, 

bringing with it a new set of leadership problems. Organizational dysfunction continued 

to dog its operations, and Bin Ladin’s financial resources had been significantly degraded 

by the fiasco in Sudan.59 As noted by journalist Alan Cullison, who purchased a hard 

drive that had belonged to al-Qa’ida in Kabul in late 2001, “not all Arabs were happy 

with the move.” 

Afghanistan, racked by more than a decade of civil war and Soviet occupation, 

struck many as unfit to be the capital of global jihad. Jihadis complained about 

the food, the bad roads, and the Afghans themselves, who, they said, were 

uneducated, venal, and not to be trusted.60

More importantly, two issues emerged during this period that created an unprecedented 

level of disunity within al-Qa’ida, from the leadership down to the rank and file: alQa’ida’s relationship with the Taliban and Usama bin Ladin’s decision to directly attack 

the United States. 

The Harmony documents from this period continue to reflect widespread 

leadership failures at the administrative level. For example, in a letter that appears to 

have been authored by Sayf al-Islam al-Misri, who had earlier been in charge of certain 

operations in Somalia, the author lays out a series of complaints about organizational 

malfunction at the Jihad Wal training camp, at which he had just completed a term of 

 

56 AFGP-2002-800581, pp. 4-6. 

57 AFGP-2002-600053, p. 31. 

58 On al-Qa’ida’s forced move back to Afghanistan, see Wright, Looming Tower, Chapters 12-13. 

59 The financial losses, coupled with a lack of employment prospects, suitable schools and other perceived 

elements of Afghanistan’s “backwardness” led at this point to a significant degree of personnel attrition; for 

example, according to testimony from L'Houssaine Kherchtou, almost the entire Libyan contingent of alQa’ida members broke from the organization at this time (U.S. v. Usama bin Laden et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, 

S.D.N.Y., February 22, 2001, pp. 1281-82). 

60 “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” The Atlantic Monthly, September, 2004, available online at: 

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200409/cullison. 

12
service as the camp’s amir (leader). Sayf al-Islam writes bitterly that he was made the 

leader of the camp with insufficient prior knowledge of the camp’s inner workings and 

logistics and that there was little overlap time between his term as leader and that of the 

previous amir, making it impossible for him to get up to speed or resolve questions that 

arose in the course of his tenure. He prays to God to not be put through a similar 

experience again, and writes that the whole issue “still pains me immensely.”61 Nor was 

this problem unique to Sayf al-Islam or the Jihad Wal camp. In mid June of 2000, in a 

list of questions submitted by camp trainees to be addressed by Bin Ladin, the latter is 

asked, “We often hear that you are not fully aware of the camp’s organization and some 

people say the instructors act on their own. What is your answer to this accusation?”62

Abu’l-Walid also continued to frankly communicate his assessments of alQa’ida’s persistent organizational failures. In his list of recommendations and questions 

submitted to Usama bin Ladin after having led a series of trainings at one of the al-Qa’ida 

camps in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000, Abu’l-Walid presses Bin Ladin to adhere 

to regularity in holding meetings of al-Qa’ida’s Shura Council, recommending that he 

deputize Abu Hafs to chair such meetings in Bin Ladin’s absence if necessary.63 He also 

notes that most of al-Qa’ida’s operations continue to lack any organization or 

systematization, and appear to be “random chaos.” “Is improving organization 

progressing randomly as well, or according to some sort of system,” he asks.64 He also 

points out that recruitment has aimed at quantity over quality and has not been 

methodically regulated, and complains that there is a lack of coordination between the 

processing of trainees at the camps and the initiation of operations, which leads to a 

reduction in the number of trainees who can immediately be absorbed into operations.65

The decision to ally al-Qa’ida with the Taliban and to give a pledge of allegiance 

to Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad ‘Umar was an especially divisive development 

during this period. There is a great deal of information in the Harmony documents 

reflecting internal divisions over a variety of issues having to do with al-Qa’ida’s 

relationship to the Taliban. A faction that was based in Peshawar, Pakistan, argued that it 

was heretical for al-Qa’ida to put itself at the service of the Taliban, as the latter were 

Islamically deviant and puppets of Pakistan’s ISI. In one letter, the unknown author 

refers derisively to the Taliban as having a mentality “based on fabrications, wrongdoing, 

beating around the bush and running away from reality,” and bemoans their seeking a 

seat at the United Nations, a perfidious act for which they were making “insignificant 

excuses.”66 In a letter written by a certain ‘Abd al-Hamid, who was later identified in the 

 

61 “Saif al-Islam’s Report on the Jihad-Wal Camp,” AFGP-2002-600108. 

62 AFGP-2002-801138, p. 163, question 3. 

63 AFGP-2002-801138, p. 1, 

64 AFGP-2002-801138, p. 218. 

65 AFGP-2002-801138, p. 218. 

66 “Political Speculation,” AFGP-2002-602181. The identities of neither the author nor the addressee are 

stated in the letter, though the former refers to his having learned about the Taliban’s lame excuses for 

continuing to seek a seat at the UN from Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. This rather contentious letter goes on to 

express disagreement with a number of opinions expressed by the addressee, including the reasons for the 

Taliban’s destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas and the role Iran will play in the future of Islamism and the 

conflict with the West. The issue of the Taliban seeking a seat at the UN comes up repeatedly in internal 

arguments about al-Qa’ida’s Taliban alliance; Abu Qatada al-Filistini devotes an entire chapter to this in 

one of his justifications of this alliance. 

13
London-based Islamist press as Syrian jihadi Baha’ Mustafa Jughl,67 the author writes 

that “We differ with our people here about the Taliban regime; they see them as God’s 

righteous saints, while we view them as heretics and apostates.”68 This author composed 

a treatise to prove the heresy of the Taliban, full of “evidences and proofs,” but when he 

shared it with fellow members of al-Qa’ida, “they only became more recalcitrant and 

estranged.” The treatise and its author were denounced to Abu Qatada al-Filistini, a 

leading al-Qa’ida ideologue operating out of London, and Abu Qatada wrote a book 

refuting ‘Abd al-Hamid’s anti-Taliban treatise, a book which ‘Abd al-Hamid complains 

“was full of lies and false accusations.”69 ‘Abd al-Hamid was also denounced by the 

jihadi ideologue Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, though he says that the latter “was the most wellmannered of [those who denounced me]; just imagine a group in which the most wellmannered is the likes of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri!”70

‘Abd al-Hamid’s opinions are echoed in another Harmony document from this 

period, signed only Abu Mus’ab but likely written by Abu Mus’ab Reuters, the 

pseudonym of Muhammad Najah ‘Abd al-Maqsud, who reportedly was known as 

“Reuters” because he monitored the international media for al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan in 

the early 1990s.71 Abu Mus’ab Reuters was also a member of the Peshawar-based group 

that opposed al-Qa’ida’s alliance with the Taliban and labeled the latter unbelievers. In a 

letter addressed simply to “Abu Muhammad” – likely Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the 

influential jihadi ideologue and one-time mentor of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi72 – Abu 

 

67 Muhammad al-Shafi’i, “Min al-watha’iq al-sirri al-Amirikiyya: ‘Abd al-Hamid yukashif li-qiyadi min alQa’ida ‘Mikiyafiliyya’ Abu Mus’ab al-Suri,” (“In secret American documents, ‘Abd al-Hamid reveals Abu 

Mus’ab al-Suri’s ‘Machiavellianism’ to al-Qa’ida leadership”), al-Sharq al-Awsat, November 17, 2006. 

The “secret American documents” referred to in the title are the Harmony documents hosted on the website 

of the Combating Terrorism Center and publicly accessible here: 

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony_docs.asp. 68 AFGP-2002-601402. 

69 Ibid. Abu Qatada’s lengthy response can be found at various places online, inluding this site: 

http://www.geocities.com/abokatada/books/joena/joena.html. Abu Qatada is currently in prison in the UK, 

having appealed a February 2007 decision by a British court that he could be deported to Jordan. 

70 AFGP-2002-601402, p. 1. Abu Qatada and Abu Mus’ab al-Suri have also had serious ideological 

disputes with each other; see the forthcoming monograph on al-Suri by Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global 

Jihad: The Life of Al Qaeda Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 

pp. 182ff. Thanks to Dr. Lia for generously sharing his research. 

71 Abu Mus’ab Reuters later operated a website called al-Muwahhidun or “The Monotheists,” which was 

often critical of al-Qa’ida and especially of the alliance with the Taliban. He was deported from Pakistan to 

Egypt in 2002. See “Egyptian Lawyer Cited in Detention of al-Qa’ida ‘Media Official’,” OSC translation 

GMP20021215000105. According to an article published in the Cairo daily Al-Ahram, Abu Mus’ab 

Reuters’ relationship with Bin Ladin was soured by a 1992 article in which Abu Mus’ab denounced the 

Muslim Brotherhood, while at the time Bin Ladin was trying to forge links with Brotherhood-connected 

Yemeni tribes (“Bin Ladin’s Press Secretary Interrogated in Egypt,” Al-Ahram, December 14, 2002, OSC 

trans. GMP20021217000116). Abu Mus’ab Reuters and ‘Abd al-Hamid were friends; when reporters from 

al-Sharq al-Awsat visited ‘Abd al-Hamid’s home in Peshawar five months before the U.S.-led attack on 

Afghanistan in 2001, they were met there by Abu Mus’ab Reuters (al-Shafi’i, “Min al-watha’iq al-sirri”). 72 When referring to Zarqawi, the author of the letter calls him “your friend Zarqawi.” Zarqawi is revealed 

in this letter as a takfiri extremist, charging everyone from the mujahidin in Bosnia, Tajikistan and 

Chechnya to the Taliban governor of Jalalabad with infidelity; he also suffers, writes the author, from an 

excessive love of leadership. The author of the letter mentions that at one time Zarqawi told him he would 

not fight under conditions wherein he deemed the leadership to be Islamically deviant, but that Zarqawi 

later changed his mind after reading a lengthy tract by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri which argued for the 

permissibility of fighting jihad under the banner of an infidel group. 

14
Mus’ab Reuters refers to a recent gathering of prominent al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’idaaffiliated individuals in Peshawar that included Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, the abovementioned ‘Abd al-Hamid, and a certain Abu Mujahid. At this gathering the author 

presented arguments for regarding the Taliban as outright infidels, their organization 

“created and controlled by Pakistan.”73 Abu Mus’ab Reuters also refers in this letter to 

Abu Qatada al-Filistini and the latter’s refutation of ‘Abd al-Hamid’s anti-Taliban tract 

(which the author says he co-wrote with ‘Abd al-Hamid), and writes that “I know this 

man [Abu Qatada] well and want to expose him to the world. When everyone was 

fighting the Soviets, he was an advisor to the devil. He came to Peshawar after it was all 

over and issued fatwas in return for Saudi dollars, calling the Sudanese government an 

Islamic Emirate.74 Later he went to Europe and helped Bush’s wishes come true...” 

Finally, the author refers to a previous letter he’d received from Abu Muhammad that 

criticized Ayman al-Zawahiri; the author chides Abu Muhammad for being too hasty in 

his judgment and attempts to explain Zawahiri’s position.75

Another witness to this internal opposition to alignment with the Taliban – and 

perhaps in reference to the same group in Peshawar mentioned above – can be found in a 

report on the state of jihadi affairs in Afghanistan written circa October 1998.76 This 

unsigned report discusses the military successes of the Taliban, the global responses to 

these developments, and the immediate aftermath in Afghanistan following the U.S. 

missile attack on al-Qa’ida camps in 1998 and Mullah ‘Umar’s subsequent refusal to 

extradite Bin Ladin or any of the latter’s followers. The final page of the report addresses 

“controversies surrounding the Taliban and denunciations of them.”77 The author 

identifies the most important misgiving raised by certain “young men” against the 

Taliban as being the latter’s “tomb worship” (‘ibada al-qubur), a broad “crime” in the 

eyes of Salafi jihadis which refers to local religious practices surrounding the tombs of 

Muslims saints or historically-important holy people.78 The author points out that this 

denunciation of the Taliban is based on the assumption that a lack of Taliban efforts to 

eradicate these practices amounts to a Taliban endorsement of them, and further that this 

endorsement is sufficiently serious to warrant takfir, or charging the Taliban as a whole 

with infidelity. The author raises vehement objections to this takfiri tendency among 

some of al-Qa’ida’s ranks, pointing out that the people making these accusations have no 

actual proof that the Taliban has committed any religious deviations and are relying on 

hearsay. Observing that rumor and hearsay are the greatest threat to internal unity, the 

author ends his report by quoting scripture: “The Prophet said, ‘Man sins enough [to earn 

 

73 AFGP-2002-601693. 

74 Abu Mus’ab al-Suri makes a similar criticism of Abu Qatada, charging him with having come to 

Afghanistan too late to have any real jihadi credentials; see Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, p. 185. 75 AFGP-2002-601693. 

76 The author of the letter refers to the August 1998 American cruise missile attacks on al-Qa’ida camps in 

Afghanistan as having taken place “within about the last two months” (AFGP-2002-003472, p. 4; the first 

three pages of the document are not extant). 

77 AFGP-2002-003472, p. 6 

78 As such practices sometimes include the seeking of particular blessings or intercession from a departed 

saint or Sufi mystic, it is common in Salafi discourse to consider these shrine-oriented religious practices as 

violations of absolute monotheism (tawhid), insofar as one is “praying to” a dead person and not to God 

alone. The Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia is notorious for not only denouncing these practices but 

for destroying ancient shrine sites, including many in Arabia associated with the life of the Prophet 

Muhammad. 

15
damnation] by relating everything that he hears.’79 How, then, will it be for one who 

passes judgments of infidelity on the basis of everything that he hears?”80

There was also considerable confusion surrounding the al-Qa’ida-Taliban alliance 

expressed in questionnaires submitted to the leadership by camp trainees. Though 

Zawahiri’s Egyptian Islamic Jihad had by this time joined itself to al-Qa’ida, it appears 

that there was friction in the Egyptian camp about pledging fealty to Mullah ‘Umar. In a 

series of questions submitted to camp leaders in February of 2001, a number of people 

asked for clarifications about these disputes and perceived contradictions; one person 

asked why some of the leaders of Islamic Jihad had refused to pledge allegiance to 

Mullah ‘Umar and the Taliban, and wondered if there were some finer point of Islamic 

law that prevented them from doing so.81 Another asks why the Jihad organization keeps 

splintering, and several people submitted questions about the failure of closed-door 

meetings of Jihad leaders to resolve their differences.82

 The other major fault line within al-Qa’ida during this period surrounded the 

decision of Usama bin Ladin to directly strike at the United States.83 As is well known, 

Bin Ladin’s frequent pre-9/11 media appearances, in which he called for a jihad against 

Americans everywhere, were perceived by the Taliban leadership as breaches of their 

agreements, and Mullah ‘Umar ordered Bin Ladin to relocate from Jalalabad to Kandahar 

in 1997. Bin Ladin’s anti-American rhetoric also endangered al-Qa’ida’s continuing 

operations in the Horn of Africa; in a letter written in August of 1997 by ‘Abdullah 

Muhammad Fazul, a leading operative in the eventually-successful plot to bomb the 

American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Fazul anxiously refers to the new and 

serious risks of capture that had emerged following Bin Ladin’s declaration of war on the 

United States, and complains that he had first heard about this declaration while watching 

CNN.84 Later that same month the FBI raided the Nairobi home of Fazul’s accomplice 

Wadih el-Hage. 

Bin Ladin’s antics also angered al-Qa’ida leaders in Afghanistan. In a 1999 email 

addressed to Bin Ladin from Abu Khalid al-Suri (aka Muhammad Bahayah) and Abu 

Mus’ab al-Suri – the latter having by that time become part of Mullah ‘Umar’s inner 

circle – Bin Ladin is chastised for not abiding by his pledge of allegiance to Mullah 

‘Umar, the “Commander of the Faithful.” They warn that Bin Ladin’s rogue activities 

 

79 This hadith, or reported saying of the Prophet, comes from the Sunan Abu Da’ud, kitab al-adab, no. 

4992, related on the authority of Abu Hurayra. 

80 AFGP-2002-003472, p. 6. 

81 AFGP-2002-801138, p. 199, question 7. 

82 AFGP-2002-801138, pp. 197, 199 and 200. In the same set of questions, one person asks, “Why did 

some people speak against Shaykh Usama bin Ladin when he was in Sudan, while now they fully support 

him?” 

83 Internal division over this issue dates back to at least 1993, when, according to court testimony from 

Jamal al-Fadl, a number of members of al-Qa’ida broke from the organization when Bin Ladin proposed 

bombing the U.S. Embassy in Saudi Arabia in retaliation for arresting the “Blind Sheikh” ‘Umar ‘Abd alRahman (Tom Hayes, “Terror chief’s followers quit over plans to kill civilians, court told,” Associated 

Press, Febraury 21, 2001). 84 Fazul, letter to “Brother Sharif,” dated 7 August 1997, online at 

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/upclose/computer.html. For an in-depth profile of 

Fazul, see the Combating Terrorism Center, al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, Appendix 

B 1, available online at: http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/pdf/Fazul.pdf. 

16
risk getting the Arab jihadis kicked out of Afghanistan, which would play directly into 

the hands of their enemies. At one point the email addresses the al-Qa’ida leader as 

though he were a disobedient child: 

The strangest thing I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah’s saying that he wouldn't 

listen to the Leader of the Faithful when he asked him to stop giving interviews.... 

I think our brother [Bin Ladin] has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans, 

and applause.... Abu Abdullah should go to the Leader of the Faithful with some 

of his brothers and tell them that ... the Leader of the Faithful was right when he 

asked you to refrain from interviews, announcements, and media encounters, and 

that you will help the Taliban as much as you can in their battle, until they 

achieve control over Afghanistan.... You should apologize for any inconvenience 

or pressure you have caused ... and commit to the wishes and orders of the 

Leader of the Faithful on matters that concern his circumstances here....85

Similar opposition to Bin Ladin’s activities is manifest in the questions submitted 

to the al-Qa’ida leadership by trainees in 2000. In a question submitted to Usama bin 

Ladin at an unidentified camp in mid-June of 2000, one trainee asked, “Has the al-Qa’ida 

Organization under your leadership made a pledge of allegiance (mubaya’a) to the 

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan [sc., Mullah ‘Umar’s Taliban], and if so, how is that you 

raise the call to fight America, knowing that the Taliban wouldn’t hear of such a thing, 

for reasons of the safety and security of Afghanistan (may God protect the Taliban)?”86 

In a similar set of questions presented to Abu’l-Walid at the close of a “political course” 

of training he had led in February of 2001, there were more questions about this than any 

other issue. Two people asked whether he expected Mullah ‘Umar to expel Bin Ladin, 

and if so what would become of him; another handful presented anxious questions about 

the likelihood of a U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and what the possible results would be 

for the Arab jihadis.87 On the basis of these questions, Abu’l-Walid submitted a number 

of items for clarification, apparently to Bin Ladin personally. He points out that there is 

confusion about loyalties, some people having understood that pledging their allegiance 

to Mullah ‘Umar meant that they renounced activities against the United States; in a 

separate item he asks whether Bin Ladin’s policy of giving trainees the option of working 

 

85 Email dated July 19, 1999, found on al-Qa’ida computer purchased by the Wall Street Journal in 2001 

and published in Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive.” See also Alan Cullison and Andrew Higgins, 

“Strained Alliance: Al Qaeda’s Sour Days in Afghanistant,” The Wall Street Jounal, August 2, 2002. 

Though he ultimately joined its Shura Council, conflict between Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the al-Qa’ida 

leadership is a recurring theme in the Harmony documents; in a letter dated 7 March 1999 al-Suri 

complains of mistreatment at the hands of members of al-Qa’ida and of his seeking to “open a new chapter 

of brotherhood and cooperation” with Usama bin Ladin and Abu Hafs (AFGP-2002-001111, pp. 5f.). 

86 AFGP-2002-801138, p. 170, question 35. This same document reveals that camp recruits had at least 

some knowledge of al-Qa’ida’s plots to directly attack the United States; in one remarkable question 

(question 8, AFGP-2002-801138-007-0182), the trainee asks, “We have heard about the Oklahoma 

bombing and that it was the largest [ever] bomb attack in America. Was this bombing the one which was 

planned/organized by (dabbarahu) Ramzi Yousef?” The question is circled and marked with two Xs and 

four exclamation marks. 

87 AFGP-2002-801138, ‘The Political Course Questions.’ 

17
either with al-Qa’ida or the Taliban had changed, since “some of the brothers say that 

they only pledged allegiance to you and the fight against the Jewish-Crusader alliance.”88 

As the time of the strikes neared, sustained opposition to the attacks of 9/11 was 

mounted at the highest levels of the al-Qa’ida leadership. A minority “hawkish” wing 

dominated by Abu Hafs al-Misri pushed for going forward and for attempting to gather 

weapons of mass destruction for use in any American response against Afghanistan.89 

According to testimony given by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed after the latter’s capture, 

however, a majority of the members of al-Qa’ida’s Shura Council opposed a direct attack 

on both ideological and strategic grounds.90 This group included Abu’l-Walid, Saif alAdel,91 Abu Hafs al-Muritani and Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid (aka Shaykh Sa’id al-Misri). 

Although their opposition to the attacks turned out to be fruitless, they all appear to have 

broken with the “hawkish” leaders of al-Qa’ida in the wake of the American military 

response to the attacks of 9/11, as the two groups fled in separate directions. Usama bin 

Ladin, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the rest of the “hawkish” leadership – with the exception 

of Abu Hafs al-Misri, who was killed by an American air strike near Kabul in November 

2001 – fled into the mountainous border regions of eastern Afghanistan and western 

Pakistan, while the opposition group from al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership fled south to Iran, 

where it is believed at least three of the above-named leaders are currently under house 

arrest.92

2001-2006: Dispersal, Reconsolidation and Problems in Iraq

While the attacks of 9/11 made al-Qa’ida a household word, it also made the al-Qa’ida 

leadership the most hunted men in the world, many of whom have been captured or killed 

in the years since. The dispersal from its stronghold in Afghanistan seriously degraded 

 

88 AFGP-2002-801138, p. 217 (the pages are often out of order throughout this document). 

89 On this “hawkish” wing and its pursuit of WMDs, see the memoir by Abu’l-Walid that was serially 

published in seven issues of al-Sharq al-Awsat in December of 2004 under the title “Qissatu’l-afghan al-

‘arab min al-dakhul ila afghanistan ila’l-khuruj ma`a taliban” (“The Story of the Afghan Arabs from the 

Time of Arrival in Afghanistan until their Departure with the Taliban”), and Gerges, The Far Enemy, pp. 

192ff. 

90 Gerges, The Far Enemy, p. 19. See also the 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O, 

2004), pp. 250ff. The opposition wasn’t limited to those inside al-Qa’ida or the Taliban. A former leader 

of the jihadi organization known as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group revealed that in 2000 a meeting was 

held in Kandahar with representatives of different jihadi groups to discuss al-Qa’ida’s anti-American 

operations; the Libyans refused to endorse them and urged the al-Qa’ida leadership to pledge that it would 

cease provoking the U.S. (“Libyan Islamist Group Says Jihadist Groups Should Admit Failure of ‘Strategic 

Goals’,” Al-Hayah, OSC trans. GMP20061201825003). 

91 On whom see the profile in al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa, online here: 

http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/Saif.pdf. By this time Saif al-Adel had married Abu’l-Walid’s eldest daughter 

(while in the opposing camp Abu Hafs had given one his daughters in marriage to a son Bin Ladin). 

92 On Saif and Abu’l-Walid’s detention in Iran, see the Saif al-Adel profile in al-Qa’ida’s (Mis)Adventures 

in the Horn of Africa, pp. 124f.; on Abu Hafs al-Muritani’s presence there, see Peter Finn, “Al Qaeda 

Deputies Harbored by Iran,” The Washington Post, August 28, 2002. Various sources have reported on 

Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid’s post-9/11 presence in Iran (see, e.g., “Al-Qa’ida’s Closer Ties with Pasdarans,” 

Intelligence Online, July 19, 2007), though on May 29 of 2007 a video released by al-Qa’ida stated that 

Mustafa Abu’l-Yazid had been appointed the leader of al-Qa’ida in Afghanistan, indicating that at least 

some reconciliation with al-Qa’ida Central had occurred. 

18
the capacities of the central leadership to carry out further operations, and, aside from 

supporting the Taliban forces still fighting in Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida Central has largely 

been reduced to efforts at managing the al-Qa’ida “brand.” The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, 

however, opened up new opportunities for would-be jihadis, and various groups there and 

elsewhere in the world have continued to attack the United States and its allies under the 

banner of al-Qa’ida, often with only the most tenuous of connections to al-Qa’ida Central 

or the original leadership. A number of documents from the Harmony database shed 

light on leadership quarrels that have arisen in response to these latest developments. 

 As mentioned above, the 9/11 attacks on the United States led to a fundamental 

split between two leadership factions within al-Qa’ida. The leadership group that 

opposed the attacks, even as it was forced to flee to Iran, did not remain silent over its 

grievances. In one particularly blunt letter, dated 13 June 2002 and addressed by Saif alAdel to a certain Mukhtar, the former writes bitterly of Usama bin Ladin’s precipitous 

folly having plunged al-Qa’ida “from misfortune to disaster.”93 Echoing a view often 

expressed in the writings of Abu’l-Walid, Saif al-Adel complains of Bin Ladin’s 

autocratic leadership of the organization, whereby “if someone opposes him, he 

immediately puts forward another person to render an opinion in his support, clinging to 

his opinion.” The incompetent leadership, writes Saif, “every time it falters, gets up 

again and rushes headlong with no understanding or awareness.” In an apparent attempt 

to wrest some control over al-Qa’ida from Bin Ladin’s disastrous leadership, Saif urges 

his addressee to “stop all foreign actions, stop sending people to captivity, and stop 

devising new operations, regardless of whether or not orders come from Abu ‘Abdullah.” 

He also indicates that he intends to write to Bin Ladin as well, “so that he will stop his 

onrush in external actions, will discuss the matter appropriately and then start things over 

against the enemies of God.”94 As far as Abu’l-Walid was concerned, as he wrote in a 

number of critical writings that have been published in the Arabic-language press since 

2001, the whole enterprise of al-Qa’ida turned out to be a colossal failure; “It was a tragic 

example of an Islamic movement managed in an alarmingly meaningless way.”95

 The most recent leadership schism reflected in the Harmony documents is that 

which developed between al-Qa’ida Central and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who pledged 

allegiance to al-Qa’ida and agreed to fight in Iraq under its banner in late 2004. Friction 

between him and the al-Qa’ida leadership dated from the beginning of their relationship. 

When Usama bin Ladin invited Zarqawi to join al-Qa’ida in 2000, the latter refused on 

the grounds that he could not support Bin Ladin’s jihad against the United States.96 Saif 

 

93 “Al Adl Letter,” available online at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq/Al%20Adl%20Letter_Original.pdf. 94 Ibid. Saif also recommended that particular people be put in charge of different aspects of the 

organization – that administrative reponsibilities be transferred to him, that Abu’l-Faraj al-Libi be given 

command of al-Qa’ida in Pakistan and southern Afghanistan, and that ‘Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi be put in 

charge in northern Afghanistan. Obviously, Bin Ladin and Zawahiri were able to make it to safety and 

resume control, but al-Libi was eventually given a senior position in Pakistan (until his capture in May of 

2005), and al-Iraqi was given leadership roles in Afghanistan and subsequently Iraq (until his capture in 

late 2006). 

95 Abu’l-Walid, “The Story of the Afghan Arabs from the Time of the Arrival in Afghanistan until their 

Departure with the Taliban,” part 1, al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 8, 2004. 96 Loretta Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, p. 95. The particulars of his objection to targeting the U.S. at that 

time are not given. Some sources also indicate that Zarqawi’s refusal to offer the pledge (bay’a) to Bin 

Ladin was because the latter forbade him from teaching the works of his mentor, Abu Muhammad al19
al-Adel, who later wrote that Zarqawi was “a hardliner when it came to disagreements 

with other groups,”97 brokered an arrangement whereby al-Qa’ida provided material 

support for Zarqawi to set up a training camp in Herat, Afghanistan, though at this time 

Zarqawi remained formally independent from Bin Ladin. After the American-led 

invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001, the Northern Alliance destroyed Zarqawi’s 

camp, though he escaped to Kandahar, and eventually to Iran, from whence he entered 

Iraq.98 Emerging soon after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq as an important Sunni jihadi 

leader, he was eventually convinced to make the pledge to Bin Ladin and change the 

name of his group to al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers. He was not, however, 

willing to play by al-Qa’ida’s rules. 

In “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi,” a document captured in Iraq and released by 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in October of 2005,99 there is 

unmistakable evidence of the significant differences in strategic thinking and priorities 

that existed between al-Qa’ida Central and Zarqawi’s al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Though 

Zawahiri’s tone is warm, he lays out a frank assessment of the various ways in which 

Zarqawi appeared to be alienating the Iraqi populace and the broader Muslim community. 

He warns of repeating the mistake that al-Qa’ida made in allying with the Taliban, who 

were not representative of the Afghan people and met outright opposition from many 

segments of Afghani society, and urges Zarqawi to broaden his links to “all leaders of 

opinion and influence in the Iraqi arena.”100 He criticizes Zarqawi for making 

disparaging statements about Iraqi religious leaders, again highlighting how this works at 

cross purposes with the need to garner popular support. While stopping short of 

opposing it, Zawahiri raises questions about the possible negative consequences of 

Zarqawi’s attacks on the Shi’a and incitement of a Sunni-Shi’a sectarian war.101 

Zawahiri reserves his most pointed criticism for Zarqawi’s practice of beheading captives 

and posting videos of these murders on the Internet. Observing that “more than half of 

this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media,” Zawahiri urges him to desist 

from the repugnant practice which was clearly losing the hearts and minds of the Muslim 

world.102

 While the authenticity of this letter was debated in the Western press and at one 

point denied by Zarqawi himself, a subsequent communication to Zarqawi from al-Qa’ida 

Central discovered after Zarqawi was killed in June of 2006 confirmed that it was 

 Maqdisi, to al-Qa’ida trainees (see Mashari al-Zayidi, “Jordanian Papers on Fundamentalism and Politics,” 

part 4, al-Sharq al-Awsat, October 13, 2005, OSC trans. GMP20051013711005). 97 “Detained Al-Qa’ida Leader Sayf al-Adl Chronicles Al-Zarqawi’s Rise in Organization,” al-Quds al-

‘Arabi, May 21-22, 2005, FBIS trans. GMP20050606637100. 

98 On Zarqawi’s roundabout escape route from Herat to Iraq, see Napoleoni, Insurgent Iraq, pp. 104f. 99 See http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20051011_release.htm. 100 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-Zawahiri-Letter-10-05.pdf, p. 6. 101 Ibid., pp. 8-9. Zarqawi had clearly communicated his position on waging open war against the Shi’a the 

year before, in a letter released by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2004, available online here: 

http://www.cpa-iraq.org/transcripts/20040212_zarqawi_full.html. Zarqawi’s war on the Shi’a was one of 

the main points of contention in the denunciatory letters and interviews given by his former mentor and 

leading jihadi ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Muhammad al-Najjar, “The Estrangement Between 

al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi,” Amman al-Sabil, July 19, 2005, OCS trans. GMP20050719547001). 102 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-Zawahiri-Letter-10-05.pdf, p. 10. 

20
genuine and showed an expansion of the leadership’s criticisms of Zarqawi’s tactics.103 

Written by a senior al-Qa’ida leader using only the name ‘Atiyah, the letter reiterates 

many of Zawahiri’s earlier criticisms and advice, though in a significantly more forceful 

tone.104 Emphasizing that Zarqawi has attained an international prominence and 

influence through his leadership in Iraq, ‘Atiyah focuses on Zarqawi’s unrestrained 

violence and failure to understand how it is alienating the Muslim public. He chides 

Zarqawi for not seeking or obeying guidance from al-Qa’ida Central, warning him that 

military action that does not conform to an over-arching policy will accomplish nothing.

105 He orders him to consult with the al-Qa’ida leadership before proceeding, instructing 

Zarqawi to send a representative to Waziristan, and consult with Iraqi Sunni leaders as 

well. ‘Atiyah also cautions Zarqawi against letting a fawning inner circle cloud his 

judgment or blind him to the fact that he has made grave mistakes and must be “taken to 

task” for “tyranny and oppression upon the people,” committing “corruption within the 

land” and alienating the people from al-Qa’ida, jihad and even Islam.106

 The criticisms leveled at Zarqawi by al-Qa’ida Central clearly have less to do 

with military strategy and more to do with global brand management. To the millions of 

Muslims still forming an opinion of al-Qa’ida’s goals and ideology, it simply does not 

look good when jihadis waving the al-Qa’ida banner systematically and enthusiastically 

kill other Muslims, especially civilians. While attempting to mire the Coalition forces in 

a sectarian conflict that threatens the stability of the whole region may have been a useful 

military tactic in Zarqawi’s mind, it represented one of the greatest threats to the health of 

the al-Qa’ida brand. 

Conclusion

The picture of internal strife that emerges from the Harmony documents highlights not 

only al-Qa’ida’s past failures, but also–and more importantly–it offers insight into its 

present weaknesses. Al-Qa’ida is beset today by challenges that surfaced in leadership 

disputes at the beginning of the organization’s history, and it will likely continue to 

struggle with these issues so long as it survives. In the earliest phase of its development, 

long before it had formulated a coherent ideological platform, al-Qa’ida’s supreme leader 

 

103 A summary of the arguments made against the authenticity of the Zawahiri letter can be seen in the 

sidebar of this site: http://www.iraqfact.com/Zawahiri_letter_to_Zarqawi.html. The second letter was 

discovered during a search of the safehouse in which Zarqawi was killed and was made public in 

September of 2006 by the Iraqi National Security Advisor, Muwaffaq al-Rabi’i. At page 8, the author 

refers to “the Doctor’s [Zawahiri’s] message that the Americans published. It is a genuine letter and it 

represents the thoughts of the brothers, the shaykhs, and all of the intellectual and moral leadership here [in 

Waziristan].” 

104 The precise identity of the author is not known (though some analysts have identified him with the 

Libyan jihadi ‘Atiyah ‘Abd al-Rahman), but from his reference to Zarqawi having visited him from Herat, 

we know that the author’s relationship to Zarqawi dates to at least 1999 or early 2000. 

105 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf, p. 5. This strikingly echoes the repeated 

criticisms of the pre-9/11 al-Qa’ida leadership made by Abu’l-Walid, discussed above. 106 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/CTC-AtiyahLetter.pdf, p. 14. As noted by Washington Post reporter 

Karen DeYoung, the letter “seemed to produce at least temporary results,” but was followed two months 

later by the attack on a Shi’i shrine in Samarra by “Zarqawi-affiliated forces,” an attack that led to a major 

expansion of sectarian violence in Iraq. “Letter Gives Glimpse of al-Qaeda’s Leadership”, The Washington 

Post, October 2, 2006. 

21
proved himself utterly inept as a military commander. Usama bin Ladin’s initial efforts 

to fashion al-Qa’ida into an all-Arab guerrilla army were farcical at best, and a source of 

astonished frustration to the more capable strategists in his orbit. Even when it had a 

clearly defined objective – to defeat the communists in Afghanistan – al-Qa’ida’s 

leadership was unable to muster the organizational competency to function adequately in 

even a supporting role, much less a direct or leading one. In the aftermath of the Soviet 

withdrawal, the leaders of al-Qa’ida were further shackled by disunity over immediate 

and long-term goals, and in their chauvinistic conviction that jihad was properly an Arab 

affair Bin Ladin and his senior deputies led the organization into a Sudanese morass, 

squandering al-Qa’ida’s resources and further demonstrating the extent of its systemic 

failings and strategic miscalculations. Upon its forced return to Afghanistan, al-Qa’ida 

found refuge and a potential ideological partner in the Taliban, a group that was 

(successfully) pursuing the same goal of reestablishing an Islamic Caliphate, but narrow 

extremism and outright bigotry led to further al-Qa’ida in-fighting over the Taliban 

alliance. The al-Qa’ida brand took its decisive shape during this period, but by placing 

the call for war with the United States at the center of that brand, Bin Ladin and the 

hawkish faction among his senior deputies introduced an even greater fissure into their 

organization and critically damaged its relationship with its sole protector, the Taliban. Its 

successful attacks on America, first on the embassies in Africa and then on 9/11, gave alQa’ida’s message an immediate global audience, but the American military response to 

these attacks have so seriously degraded its organizational capacities that management of 

that message has been virtually all that al-Qa’ida Central has subsequently been able to 

muster. 

There has recently been some speculation that al-Qa’ida has been regrouping in 

Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, perhaps even regaining the 

organizational capacity to operationally manage terrorist agents, but there is no evidence 

to suggest that it has overcome the persistent weaknesses identified in this report.107 On 

the contrary, recent events have highlighted al-Qa’ida’s continuing vulnerability to them. 

For example, in 2005, after the capture in Pakistan of senior al-Qa’ida operative Abu 

Faraj al-Libi, it was revealed that Central Asian jihadis, a contingent of whom have 

established a foothold in the Waziristan tribal areas, provided the information to Pakistani 

intelligence that led them to al-Libi. Bad blood generated by the chauvinistic disdain for 

Central Asian jihadis displayed by Arab al-Qa’ida personnel in the region had led 

captured Uzbek, Tajik and Chechen jihadis to provide information on al-Qa’ida’s 

operations, leading to a series of raids and arrests that ultimately led to al-Libi’s 

capture.108 

Despite the continued appeal of al-Qa’ida’s message to certain populations, it 

must not be forgotten that al-Qa’ida’s transition from an extremist cult cloistered in the 

mountains of South Asia to a publicly-debated global movement creates new sets of 

vulnerabilities, open to exploitation by any interested party with the means of delivering 

its message. Lacking a broad command-and-control structure, al-Qa’ida Central finds 

 

107 On the possibility of al-Qa’ida having regrouped in the Tribal Areas see Craig Whitlock, “The New AlQaeda Central,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2007, available online at 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801845.html. 108 “Ethnic Rifts Tearing at al-Qaida, May Have Led to al-Libbi Capture,” The Associated Press, May 11, 

2005. 

22
itself unable to control the uses – and abuses – of its brand by self-starting “affiliate” 

groups. The gory media tactics of Zarqawi’s al-Qa’ida in Iraq did considerable damage 

to the mass popularity of the al-Qa’ida message.109 Letters from al-Qa’ida Central to 

Zarqawi attempted damage control while he was alive, and in a recent video appearance, 

Usama bin Ladin himself has tried to shore up his brand against the effects of Zarqawi’s 

legacy through direct media spin control. For example, he laid blame for the Sunni-Shi`a 

civil war on the United States, even though he was certainly aware of Zarqawi’s role in 

igniting the bloody sectarian conflict in Iraq, as is abundantly clear in the letters from 

Zawahiri and ‘Atiyah discussed above.110 The damage to the al-Qa’ida name wrought by 

Zarqawi’s tactics was seen as so bad by his former associates in Iraq that they, supported 

by al-Qa’ida Central, changed the name of their organization from al-Qa’ida in Iraq to the 

Islamic State of Iraq, hoping by this move to regain traction with Sunni insurgents 

alienated by assassinations of Sunni leaders carried out in al-Qa’ida’s name; thus far they 

have failed.111

The continuing failure of the Islamic State of Iraq is emblematic of a larger theme 

of this report: al-Qa`ida is terrible at state building. As long as Bin Ladin and Zawahiri 

are at the helm, their inability to organize will dash any hopes they have for creating an 

Islamist state. And judging from the documentary evidence, it does not seem that state 

building is more than a slogan in their eyes. Rather, they rely on local grievances and 

instability to market their brand worldwide. 

Bin Ladin and Zawahiri are the incarnation of the al-Qa`ida brand and as long as 

they are able to broadcast new images of themselves their brand will continue to grow. 

At the very least, their media distribution must be degraded; at most, they must be 

eliminated or captured. It is true that capture or death will not stop other jihadis from 

venerating Bin Ladin and Zawahiri or continuing to fight, but neither will it be 

insignificant. On the contrary, it will, over time, greatly reduce the appeal of al-Qa`ida as 

an emblem, which will ultimately reduce the appeal of the ideology they espouse. 

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and not of the U.S. Military 

Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

 

109 A Pew Global Attitudes Project report on Islamic Extremism released in the summer of 2005 found that 

“While support for suicide bombings and other terrorist acts has fallen in most Muslim-majority nations 

surveyed, so too has confidence in Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.” Islamic Extremism: Common 

Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, released July 14, 2005, online at: 

http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=248. This report relied on polling data taken several 

months before the coordinated hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, orchestrated by Zarqawi. The reponses 

to those attacks by the Jordanian public included what were perhaps the first mass demonstrations against 

al-Qa’ida in the Muslim world. 

110 “The Solution,” video message released by al-Qa’ida’s media arm on 7 September 2007; Bin Ladin 

blames the U.S. for the sectarian war on p. 2 of the transcript, available online at 

http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/transcript2.pdf. 111 See the report by Brian Fishman, “The Imaginary Emir: Al-Qa’ida in Iraq’s Strategic Mistake,” 

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 18 July 2007, available online at http://ctc.usma.edu/pdf/ISI--

al-baghdadi%20fictitious2.pdf. 

23
24
HARMONY DOCUMENT LIST 

Letter from bin Laden 

AFGP-2002-003345............................................................................ 27 

Taliban and the State of Things in Afghanistan 

AFGP-2002-003472............................................................................ 39 

Five Letters to the Africa Corps 

AFGP-2002-600053............................................................................ 40 

Lessons Learned from Syria 

AFGP-2002-600080............................................................................ 45 

Meeting Notes 

AFGP-2002-600086............................................................................ 48 

Book by Mustafa Hamid 

AFGP-2002-600087............................................................................ 49 

Mustafa Hamid’s Analysis of Mujahidin Activities 

AFGP-2002-600088............................................................................ 50 

The Airport 1990 

AFGP-2002-600090............................................................................ 53 

A Mother’s Deep Sorrow/The Airport Project 

AFGP-2002-600092............................................................................ 56 

Letter from Abu-Ata al-Sharqi 

AFGP-2002-600106............................................................................ 59 

Mustafa’s History of the Afghan Jihad 

AFGP-2002-600970............................................................................ 60 

Condolence Letter 

AFGP-2002-601402............................................................................ 63 

25
Status of Jihad 

AFGP-2002-601693............................................................................ 64 

Political Speculation 

AFGP-2002-602181............................................................................ 65 

Abu Ata Al-Sharqi Reports from Afghanistan 

AFGP-2002-800581............................................................................ 66 

Various Admin Documents and Questions 

AFGP-2002-801138............................................................................ 67 

Atiyah’s Letter to Zarqawi.................................................................. 68 

Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi .............................................................. 70 

26
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003345 

Date: 2 April 1994 to 7 May 1998 

Author: Osama Bin Laden “The Committee for Advice and Reform” 

Length: 103 pages 

Title: Letters from bin Laden: A Collection of letters from Osama Bin Laden to various persons in 

Saudi Arabia Statements 7 -21 

Notes: Skipped pages indicate repetition of a communiqué 

The translations omit specific Sura and Hadith, as well as the names of scholarly sources that were 

mentioned in the original Arabic texts. 

References: Imam Malik, Imam Ahmad, Ibn Taymiyah, Al-’Izz Ibn ‘Abd-al-Salam 

Synopsis: The following letters were written between 1994 and 1998, and cover a range of topics 

related to Saudi Arabia. The primary theme is the illegitimacy of the Saudi regime, and the 

allegation that they are supporting a Western plot to destroy the Muslim nation. Each letter 

addresses a current event, describing the event and providing the author’s analysis of the context 

and implications of the regime’s actions. Most statements end with a call to action on the part of the 

regime, the scholars, or the citizens of Saudi Arabia. The statements are coherently written and 

well-organized, and they are designed to motivate support through appeals to Muslim’s better 

nature. Bin Laden’s writing demonstrates an ability to communicate with multiple audiences, 

appealing to each group’s pride and specific capabilities 

Statement 7 (sic), pp. 001-003: Our invitation to Give Advice and Reform

To: King Fahd Bin ‘Abd-al ‘Aziz Al-Saud and the people of Saudi Arabian Peninsula

02-11-1414 (12 April 1994) 

King Fahd has asked Osama Bin Laden to return to the country, however this is unlikely as Osama 

Bin Laden’s money was frozen and his passport confiscated. Religious scholars have previously 

asked King Fahd to cease actions against God’s law but he has not done so. A petition signed by 

400 people was sent in 1411 (during the Gulf War), and another in 1413. The people’s rights have 

been abrogated and corruption infests government agencies. The country’s monetary and 

economic situation is worsening, taxes have been raised yet the government wastes money. The 

armed forces are in poor condition, and shari’a law has been suspended. Foreign policy works 

against the interests of Muslims in Gaza, Jericho, and Algeria while supporting infidels. Attempts to 

promote reform have triggered reprisals and the “waging of war against just people who are hunted 

at home and abroad.” To fulfill advisory promises, “we would like to announce the arrival of our 

brothers and scholars into the country.” Osama Bin Laden urges King Fahd to abide by the 

requests of the Committee. End quote: God will not change people unless they do so for 

themselves. 

Statement 3, p. 007: Saudi Arabia Supports the Communists in Yemen

27
27-12-1414 (07 June 1994) 

The Yemeni communists have enslaved the Yemeni people, spreading apostasy and corruption. 

Infidel forces and their agents in the region led a conspiracy to re-establish two Yemeni states to 

promote conflict between them, Prince Sultan led a special committee that funneled support to the 

Yemeni Socialist Party. King Fahd is known to have anti-Islamic policies such as opposing Islamic 

awakening that would expose the artificiality of his rule; supporting anti-Islamic regimes such as the 

USSR, Algeria, Syria, and Christian groups in Sudan. Furthermore, he supported United Nations 

resolutions that cost Muslim lives in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Kashmir, and which 

support the Jews in Palestine, Muslims now realize that the U.N. is an instrument in the hands of 

the Jews and Crusaders, Such behavior encourages divisions in the umma, leads to dispersal of 

wealth away from the Arabian Peninsula, supports socialists and communists who oppress the 

Yemeni people, is likely to provoke punishment from God, and allows for foreign intervention in the 

region. The letter ends with a call to the ulema to declare that these policies are dangerous and evil. 

Statement 4, pp. 009-010: The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula: The 

Episode and the Proof. 

12-2-1415 (11 July 1994) 

Jihad operations had been successful in eliminating socialist camps in Yemen, which is a lesson 

proving that all those who oppose the faith of the amah will fail. The Saudi regime, particularly 

Prince Sultan, supported the communist factions with money and weapons, which is a form of 

apostasy given that communists are atheists. Western powers were too smart to back the losing 

side, showing that Western powers will not “take the risk of intervening in order to protect or assist 

corrupt regimes that do not have the support or endorsement of their people.” The defeat of the 

communists is a rejection of secular and atheist regimes across the region. 

Statement 5, pp. 013-014: Quran Scholars in the Face of Despotism

11-2-1415 (19 July 1994) 

Osama Bin Laden praises scholars who have bravely unveiled the truth about the Saudi 

government. The government has used witchcraft and the media to justify its stands against Islam, 

while supporting the unbelievers. Scholars have raised the head of the ummah high to face the 

despotism and injustices of the regime. In turn, the government has slandered these scholars, 

taking away their freedom and trampling their rights. 

Statement 6, pp. 017-018: Saudi Arabia Unveils its War Against Islam and its Scholars

08-04-1415 (12 September 1994) 

In accordance with instructions from the United States, Saudi intelligence agents are arresting 

prominent anti-government scholars and preachers, including Salman Al-’Awdah and Safar alHawali. Prince Bandar also publicly acknowledged a relationship with the Zionist entity. This 

confirms that the Saudi government is in a war against Islam and is no different from secular 

28
governments. The government has been unable to deal with criticism, and indicates that the King 

and his “gang” obey the mercenary intelligence agents of foreign governments, Christians, and 

Zionists, Osama Bin Laden calls for righteous scholars to be patient and steadfast, for Muslim 

people to stay committed and not be confused by government deception, for silent scholars to take 

a stand, for Muslims in government to remember that they are accomplices unless they act against 

the regime, and to the government to be advised that they are at war with God. 

Statement 7, pp. 21-22: Urgent Letter to Security Officials

11-04-1415 (16 September 1994) 

Security officers are reminded that they were trained to defend the interests of their people and to 

act as their representatives. They must be vigilant guardians, but the government has attempted to 

take this “great and honorable position” away from them and turn them against Islam by forcing 

them to participate in the arrest and detention of scholars. He lists crimes of the Saudi government 

before calling on the security services to refuse to arrest any more scholars. He reminds them that 

God will bear witness to the punishment of those who stand by a tyrant, and reminds them that 

“every Muslim’s blood, wealth, and food are forbidden to other Muslims.” To show other Muslims 

that they are slaves of God alone, they should repent evil, refuse to obey orders to commit 

aggression against ulema, urge others not to obey such orders, help the people remove tyranny, 

not trust the regime, and strive to have the arrested scholars released. 

Statement 8, pp. 25-26: Important Telegram to Our Brothers in the Armed Forces

14-4-1415 (19 September 1994) 

The Saudi government has exposed its hostility to Islam by arresting the best of the ulema. The 

regime also imported Christian women to defend it, thereby placing the army in the highest degree 

of shame, disgrace, and frustration. It allowed American army bases in the peninsula, supported 

communists in Yemen, and has not helped defeat the IDF. Prince Sultan received five billion 

dollars’ worth of commissions on arms sales in one year at the same time that allowances and 

reimbursements for soldiers were stopped. He argues that the regime has lost its legitimacy as a 

result of its friendliness with enemies of Islam and because of its hostility to the feelings of the 

people in a time of need. He predicts that it’s only a matter of time until the regime falls. He 

reminds the “extraordinary men” that they are guardians of the faith, and reminds them that “if a 

man kills a believer intentionally, his recompense is hell, to abide therein forever and wrath and 

curse of God are upon him,” (Quran 4:93) and that “the most despicable to God is he who kills a 

Muslim man” (Hadith). 

Statement 9, pp. 29: Do Not Have Vile Actions in Your Religion

11-04-1415 (16 September 1994) 

Muslim youth are called to action. The time of listlessness and relaxation is over. The Saudi 

government committed a fatal mistake in arresting scholars, as this shows that they are enemies of 

Islam. This not a trial but a blessing, as it reveals the truth about the battle between the regime and 

29
the people and their ulema, The people, who are “exploding with anger” are urged to renew their 

pledge to God by giving as much as they can (to zakat), to be disciplined and avoid taking actions 

that will harm the interests of the whole, to reveal the reality of the struggle to everyone they know, 

and to continue to demand the release of the imprisoned scholars. 

There is a genius way of writing as if his opinions are already accepted and as if it should all be 

intuitive. 

Statement 10, pp. 31-32: Higher Committee for Harm!!

10-05-1415 (15 October 1994) 

After conducting an “insane campaign” against the ulema and scholars in Saudi Arabia, the regime 

created the Higher Committee for Islamic Affairs. This entity is an attempt to polish the regime’s 

image by deceiving the people into believing that its purpose is to promote da’wah. Prince Sultan 

(Minister of Defense) and Prince Naif (Minister of Interior) are head of the council, which “leaves no 

room for doubt” about its intentions: “the destruction of true Islam and its da’wah, support for the 

religion of the king, and preparation for the history of the two black men filled with a malice for 

Islam.” The duties and powers of the council are not defined, showing the arrogance of the regime. 

The creation of this committee shows that the regime is not ready to listen to the good council of 

Sheikh ‘Adb-al ‘Aziz Bin Baz, who had tried to encourage reform. The committee has punished 

Sheikh Bin Baz by absorbing his powers. The strange thing is that the regime is able to find ulema 

that are still willing to back it. 

Statement 11, pp. 35-38: Open Letter for Sheikh Bin Baz

27-07-1415 (29 December 1994) 

Begins with praise and greetings, and a Hadith: “The best jihad is the word of truth in the presence 

of the unjust sultan.” The ulema are heirs to the prophets and represent the good example and 

ideal model for the umma. The true ulema resist tyranny and speak the truth. Osama Bin Laden 

reminds the Sheikh of his great responsibility, and wonders at his silence during a time of liars and 

evil. Osama Bin Laden lists examples where the ulema have acted in error, about which Sheikh Bin 

Baz has not corrected the error. 

1. Corruption has spread, and ulema have been complicit in sanctioning usury (charging interest 

for bank loans, which is considered haram by some Muslims). Osama Bin Laden states that the 

Sheikh has deceived the people by not making a distinction “between rulers who merely tolerate 

usury and rulers who legitimize and legalize usury.” Those who legitimize usury are apostates and 

infidels, but Bin Baz continues to praise the regime. The current economic struggles are a 

punishment from God for allowing usury. 

2. King Fahd wore a cross, and Bin Baz justified this action, although it is clearly apostasy. The 

king’s poor health is clear indication that this was infidelity. 

30
3. Bin Baz issued a fatwa permitting the Crusader-Jewish alliance that occupied the country in the 

name of liberating Kuwait. This was an abominable action that insulted the honor of the umma, 

sullied its dignity, and defiled the holy places. 

4. Bin Baz kept silent when the Saudi regime aided the communists in Yemen, considering them to 

be fellow Muslims. Osama Bin Laden writes, “When were the communists ever Muslims? Aren’t 

you the one who previously issued a fatwa on their apostasy and the necessity of killing them in 

Afghanistan? Or is there a difference between Yemeni communists and Afghan communists?” 

5. Bin Baz wrote a fatwa allowing the “attacks and maltreatment” of the ulema that resulted in eh 

arrest and detention of Salman al-’Awdah and Safar al-Hawali. 

More recently, Bin Baz supplied a fatwa sanctioning peace and normalization with the Jews, 

something that is painful for Muslims as it gives a veneer of legitimacy to the “surrender documents 

that the treacherous and cowardly Arab tyrants signed,” opening Jerusalem to occupation. 

Per Osama Bin Laden, the present Jewish enemy is “not dwelling in his original country,” and 

therefore peace is not allowed (as it is with one who is warred on from outside). Jews have 

usurped sacred Muslim land, and they are an “attacking enemy” that corrupts religion. [The 

formulation that Jews are outside their original country allows any kind of warfare upon them.] Ibn 

Taymiyah is quoted as follows: The attacking enemy who corrupts the religion and the world must, 

in keeping with the faith, be repelled. There are no (limiting) conditions.” Therefore, it is religiously 

required to defend Palestinian people and the “stone-throwing heroes.” 

Osama Bin Laden goes on to argue that even if it were permissible to make peace with the Jews, 

the Arab leaders are illegitimate, and are therefore not allowed to make peace on behalf of the 

umma. Such apostate rulers have neither legitimacy nor sovereignty over Muslims. Bin Baz’ fatwa 

gave legitimacy to secular organizations [the United Nations] and deceived the umma with its 

disgraceful summary and misleading generalization. 

Osama Bin Laden suggests that the opinions of people who have experience in jihad are more 

legitimate than those who have no experience. Quoting Ibn Taymiyah, “Obligation is to be 

considered in matters of jihad according to the opinion of upright men of religion who have 

experience in what people of this world of, rather than those who mainly look at a matter from the 

viewpoint of religion. Do not adopt their opinion – not the opinion of men or religion that have no 

experience in the world.” [This is another key formulation that gives Osama Bin Laden’s opinion 

equal weight to that of religious scholars, and gives him the authority to challenge more learned 

men]. Whoever issued Bin Baz’ fatwas has a “lack of awareness of the true nature of the situation.” 

Osama Bin Laden closes with several paragraphs urging bin Baz to keep his distance from the 

tyrants and wrongdoers. 

Statement 12, pp. 47-50: The Second Letter to Sheikh ‘Abd al’Aziz Bin Baz

29 January 1995 

31
Sheikh Bin Baz’ latest fatwas have “scared Muslims in general, as well as freedom fighters, and 

weaker men/women and children of Palestine.” These fatwas give religious legitimacy to Arab 

leaders’ political treason in that it allowed reconciliation with the [Jewish] enemy. The Advice and 

Reform Foundation had expected Sheikh Bin Baz to take a stand against this, but instead he 

confirmed his earlier fatwas on the same subject. 

The current situation in Palestine cannot be considered a truce, because only the enemy’s terms 

have been met. Additionally, the deal was created by a group of apostate Arab leaders. The 

agreement, which establishes diplomatic representation and economic cooperation, effectively 

indicates Jews’ “eternal ownership of the land – thus permanently calling off jihad” [Entering into 

treaty commitments legitimizes Israel’s existence]. Secularism amounts to atheism, and so this 

agreement is based on “invalidity,” therefore it is invalid itself. 

“This fatwa’s claim of Muslim’s weakness and inability to fight Jews is invalid, because...subject 

experts did not issue it...It does not make sense [that] more than a billion Muslims who own the 

largest natural resources in the world are unable to defeat 5 million Jews in Palestine.” The ailment 

is not the military or financial, but rather the leaders’ betrayal and the scholar’s acceptance of the 

current situation. 

Osama Bin Laden calls for a return to fatwas issued by those who have knowledge of both religion 

and current affairs, urges Bin Baz to distance himself from the regime or resign his position. 

Statement 13, pp. 51-52: Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms

12 February 1995 

The Saudi regime has dissolved charitable organizations that used to deliver donations directly to 

needy people inside and outside the country. These independent organizations have been 

replaced by new institutions that are subservient to Prince Salman, who “has never been known to 

be interested and care for Muslim affairs.” In the past, the Saudi regime used popular donations to 

influence Afghan freedom fighters to conform to Western policy goals. It also gave donations to 

Christian organizations in Bosnia, to Yemeni communists, to the communist Dostum (Rachid 

Dostum, an Afghani warlord), and the Al-Kata’ib party in Lebanon. The Saudi regime supported the 

Algerian regime as it suppressed Muslims, and also provided money to the Soviets to repress 

Muslims in Chechnya. 

The timing of this initiative supports the U.S. presidents’ decision to freeze the assets of groups 

that oppose the [Middle East] peace process. Osama Bin Laden draws the brother’s attention to 

the danger of depositing monies into UD banks, as it may be frozen. Muslims are encouraged to 

avoid giving funds to the government agencies, but rather give them directly to the needy, or those 

“trusted individuals who will deliver them.” 

Statement 14, pp. 55-58: Saudi Arabia Continues Its War Against Islam and Its Scholars

09 March 1995 

32
After Eid a- Fitr, a second group of clerics was detained, including Muhammad bin Sa’id al-Qahtani, 

Dr. Sa’id bin Zu’ayr (Zuhayr) and Dr. Bashar al-Bashar. This confirms the aggression of the Saudi 

regime against Islam and is evidently a “strategy planned by international infidel countries.” These 

Sheikhs, like Salman al-’Awdah and Safar al-Hawali, have been imprisoned for speaking the truth, 

calling for the application of Islamic laws, and calling for reform of the media and administration. 

[Text goes on to list same grievances previously mentioned in preceding letters regarding usury, 

the state of the military, etc]. Reiterates the regimes hostility to Islam and these scholars personally, 

and reminds umma to be wary of fatwas issued on behalf of the regime’s interests. 

Osama Bin Laden notes that these most recent arrests came after NATO’s “call tot eh countries of 

the region to cooperate in order to eliminate the danger that threatens its interests and desires for 

hegemony [referring to ?]. In fact, the Saudi regime has done Muslims a favor by revealing its true 

objective and providing proof to those who still think positively about the regime. He urges fair trials 

for the detainees, who are praised for their courage and reminded that this is a trial from Allah to 

differentiate the righteous from the others. 

Statement 15, pp. 59-68: Scholars are the Prophet’s Successors

16 May 1995 

Scholars are the successors of the prophet and the defenders of religion. Because of their 

importance, it is important to distinguish between those working to further the word of Allah, and 

those who prefer earthly things and materials. Sura and Hadith emphasizing importance of 

scholars. Underestimating scholars, or talking negatively about their knowledge is “associated with 

danger,” yet no one should be impressed with the knowledge of one who memorizes the Quran but 

doesn’t follow its teachings. Bad scholars can be distinguished from good scholars in two ways: 

lack of acting on their knowledge, and changing what Allah said to interpret laws to their own 

benefit. “Disintegration of rulers is caused by scholar’s dissolution, which is caused by love of 

money and material things,” and standing up to bad scholars is a priority in defending Islam. Yet a 

majority of people believes that “obeying scholars had no limits” and this is a mistake, which is why 

religious laws warn against glorifying scholars. Quoting Sheikh Muhammad bin ‘Abd-al Wahab in 

his book Al-Tawhid: those who obey scholars and rulers in forbidding that what Allah allows and 

vice versa, perceive them as gods. [Therefore, anyone who blindly follows any scholar in 

something contrary to Allah is an apostate.] 

Several paragraphs about proper way to correct scholars follow, which show that a harsh response 

is legitimate when a scholar persists in a judgment or action after he is aware that he is “on the 

wrong side.” Some exception is made for scholars who have good intentions but are taken 

advantage of by corrupt sultans. However, fatwas may not be issued by those who are not fully 

informed, and such fatwas are automatically null. 

The requirements for a good scholar are listed. Scholars must be role models in knowledge and 

action, and must be sure of all the conditions of a fatwa. He must be aware of the possibility of 

being led into temptation, and have the courage to speak out. Salman al-’Awhad and Safar alHawali are examples of courageous scholars. Scholars must stay away from the “suspicious ways 

of rulers,” and the Prophet is quoted as saying, “Whoever gets close to rulers will be infatuated, the 

33
closer a person gets to a ruler, the farther he gets away from Allah.” Scholars who abide by these 

guidelines deserve respect and honor. 

Statement 16. p. 69: Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commission

13-2-1415 (11 July 1995) 

The Saudi regime has abandoned the requirements of monotheism and witnessing (there is no 

God but God, and Mohammad is his messenger), and therefore has lost its legitimacy. The 

economy is in terrible condition, due in part to the accumulation of interest debt and the plundering 

of public wealth by the regime. These debts have led to privatization of state assets such as the 

Saudi airline. Clearly, the regime intends to get new money “from the hands of the people.” 

Privatization will get rid of the debts of the airline, but only after it purchases 7.5 billion dollars for 

60 new American-made planes, which are not needed. The French made a much better offer, but 

royal family members (particularly Prince Sultan) made the deal in order to please the Americans. 

This will provide 20,000 jobs to U.S. airline manufacturers, which will keep it operational for five 

years. 

The private sector will probably be forced to buy the Saudi national airline at an unfair price, and 

will have to assume the accumulated debt. As a result, privatization will cost many people their jobs, 

and it is unclear who will then pay for the air travel of the royal family. 

Statement 17, pp. 71-79, 89: An Open Message to King Fahd On the Occasion of the Latest 

Ministerial Shuffle

5-3-1415 (3 August 1995) 

This letter is an attempt to “pierce the veil with which [the king] has surrounded [himself] so that 

[he] does not have to listen to the truth.” Osama Bin Laden hopes to break through the wall that 

[the king] has built around [himself] “that stops the truth from getting to” him. 

The king and his princes have deceived the people, and have tried to “absorb their anger through 

marginal and deceptive reforms,” which were “nothing more than temporary sedatives for the 

people’s anger.” The Advisory council was “born dead” and the recent ministerial shuffle will have 

minimal impact. The king curbed the rights of the religious scholars, and desecrated the nation’s 

holy places while plundering its wealth. He led the nation into an economic decline. The basis for 

these problems is that the king and the regime “strayed from the requisites of monotheism and its 

obligations.” 

Anyone who legislates human laws that are contrary to the laws of Allah is an infidel [Quranic 

citations apparently follow, but these were not included in the translation]. The Saudi regime is 

therefore practicing the arbitration of infidel laws, which are “positive” [can be developed and 

elaborated upon by people]. Trade councils and banking laws that allow interest in transactions are 

one example of such laws. A second example is the Gulf Cooperation Council, which lists as its 

legal basis the laws of the council itself, the principles of international law, the world conventions, 

and the principles of Islamic shari’a. Osama Bin Laden calls this mockery to the religion and 

34
contempt to the shari’a, and continues, “You placed the scum of human positivist thoughts, the 

customs and traditions of the pre-Islamic epoch, and the laws of infidel judicial associations above 

the shari’a.” Several Sheikhs are quoted to establish the authenticity of this argument. 

On the subject of interest, Osama Bin Laden writes that, “the one that was aware that it was 

forbidden to accept interest and goes ahead and does it, he had committed one of the gravest sins, 

Allah protect us; however, the one who legislates the laws that allow interest is an infidel. The bank 

towers themselves rival the towers of the two holy mosques. 

The true motive of the regime is to protect infidel interests. Although the regime sometimes 

supports Islamic causes, it never supports these causes when they conflict with Western interests. 

Somalia, Bosnia, and Palestine, “the mother of Islamic causes” are examples. He relates an 

incident in which President Clinton demanded that the king meet him at the American air base, not 

in Riyadh, as a humiliating example of American dominance, demonstrating that the kingdom is no 

more than an American protectorate subject to American laws. 

The economic situation is dire. At the beginning of the king’s reign, there was an estimated reserve 

of one hundred and forty billion dollars, with average daily oil revenue amounting to one hundred 

million dollars. In spite of this, the country is indebted by more than eighty percent of its national 

gross income, which makes it the most indebted nation in the world [?]. Average citizens suffer 

from high taxes and duties, and the rising cost of water, electricity, and food. Commodity prices are 

rising, and schools are suffering from over crowdedness. Hospitals are no being properly 

maintained or funded, and unemployment is rising. The government has urged people to conserve 

energy while the palaces are well lit, with the air conditioning running day and night. The king has 

built palaces all over the country, and in every major world capital and Western resort. 

The causes of the crisis include falling oil prices, for which the king bears some responsibility as he 

allowed the oil reserves to be tapped in order to prevent price spikes. The king is subordinated to 

Western interests, as demonstrated by his decision to provide $25 billion to Saddam Hussein to 

keep the price of oil down during the Iran-Iraq war in order to hurt Iran. The king has not attempted 

to find alternate sources of income, and spent sixty billion dollars to underwrite the cost of the Gulf 

war. After the war, the regime spent an additional forty billion dollars on American arms, and also 

purchased Tornado aircraft from the British. 

The regime borrowed from local international banks with interest, and the king has “broken every 

statistical record in squandering” public funds. This puts him in a class with the Shah of Iran, 

Marcos of the Philippines, Ceausescu (SP?) of Romania. 

The first economic crisis of Saudi Arabia was in 1964 and 1965, due to the mismanagement of 

King Sa’ud who was removed from the throne to resolve the crisis. There was a second crisis in 

1986 due to collapse of oil prices. 

On judgment day, Allah will not talk to an adulterous sheikh, a lying king, or an arrogant destitute 

(Hadith). The king has limited options, none of which will be politically popular. In a mocking tone, 

Osama Bin Laden asks the king if he will reduce the interest, devalue the riyal, raise taxes, or sell 

government properties (by which he means palace furnishings). Osama Bin Laden tells the king 

35
that his “staying will be the cause of your extinction, and your continuing on will be the cause of 

your end.” 

The military situation: The army has traditionally consumed one third of the national budget, which 

is much more than other countries (France, for example, spends one percent). In spite of this 

spending, the army is just a lot of equipment with no human resources to use it. It has been used 

as a source of income by influential princes. Examples of unnecessary spending include the 

seventy F-15 aircraft purchased “to support George in his election campaign after the war.” There 

was a deal to expand the telephone system for the sake of Clinton, who “lost because of your 

support to his competitor George Bush” (sic). 

During the Gulf war the air force “did not perform anything worth mentioning” while the navy didn’t 

fire a single shot. In order to prepare one brigade of armored cars, the army had to bring in 

technicians from Pakistan. This demonstrates the failure of Prince Sultan as Minister of Defense. 

In 1992 the citizens of the Arabian Peninsula spent more money on defense than Germany, Italy, 

Egypt, Romania, Poland, Spain, Ecuador, Uruguay, Ireland, and the United States combined (sic). 

Much of the money has gone to commissions and bribes, as princes seize between forty and sixty 

percent of the value of every arms deal. Most of the balance of money has been spent on bases 

and facilities that are too large for the national army, and were built to serve the American and 

Western forces. Why are the Americans still on these bases? Is Iraq still an imminent threat? Saudi 

Arabia has been delivered into “a condition of chronic military crippling in [an] effort to tolerate the 

Crusader and Jewish forces that are defiling the holy places.” 

The king and the defense minister are to blame, not the “members of the Army or the Guard, 

whose goodness, gallantry, and bravery have been witnessed by many.” The King has always 

been afraid of allowing coordination between the forces, yet coordination is essential for successful 

military operation. 

Summary: The regime has “committed sins against Islam that negate its guardianship in the eyes 

of Allah.” These sins include corruption, subordination to the infidels and their laws, and failure in 

the areas of defense, economics and economics. These failures demonstrate the king’s inability to 

run the nation, “even if he had not sinned against Islam.” There is a deep struggle between two 

ideologies: a godly system that is whole and places all matters in the hands of Allah versus the 

regime itself. The religious scholars, reformers, merchants and tribal sheikhs will all go against the 

regime. This will not be considered a prohibited abandonment of the rulers because the regime 

lacks legitimacy: “what does not exist legally, does not exist at all.” 

Osama Bin Laden urges the king to accept responsibility and resign. 

Statement 18, pp. 91-92: The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two 

Mosques

15-3-1416 (11 August 1995) 

36
The Saudi government closed charitable organizations that delivered contributions of benefactors 

to deserving recipients. These organizations have been replaced with associations that are 

supervised by members of the ruling family such as Prince Sultan and Prince Salman. This 

revealed a scheme to monopolize charitable contributions to prevent Islam and Muslims from 

reaping any benefit. It has been used to pressure mujahideen and influence their policies. These 

“scandals” have become public, but the regime ignores the growing level of awareness about this 

situation. The government’s involvement is merely a show of support to “raise the value of its 

declining political stock.” 

By way of example, money donated to the Palestinian cause (the mother of all Islamic causes) was 

diverted to the “extortive Jews.” Contributions that were meant for Bosnian Muslims were shared 

with Croats and Serbs. The Saudi regime sponsored a United Nations conference on Bosnia that 

was designed to ensure the destruction of Bosnian Muslims by denying them the means to defend 

themselves. 

When individual citizens tried to intervene to help the Bosnians, the regime prohibited their travel in 

response to Western pressure, and then arrested these individuals when they returned to Saudi 

Arabia. The Bosnians know who their real supporters are, the “cream of youth who have slipped 

away from the grasp of the ruling regime.” 

The following lessons have been learned: Muslim regimes do not represent the will of their own 

people, human rights and equality are dead slogans of the west when it comes to Muslim matters, 

the United Nations is nothing but a tool to implement the Crusader’s plan to kill the nation of Islam, 

and compliance with the United Nations constitutes conspiracy against Muslim causes. 

Therefore, Muslims are urged to bypass the regime-sponsored charitable organizations and donate 

directly to trusted individuals who will ensure that the money is used for Muslim causes, not against 

them. 

Statement 19, pp. 95-96: The Saudi Regime and the Repeated Tragedies of the Pilgrimage

8-12-1417 (16 April 1997) 

Every year there are catastrophes and tragedies during that kill thousands of pilgrims. The Saudi 

regime has not taken the necessary precautions to prevent these tragedies. There are insufficient 

accommodations, which leads to crowdedness. The lack of security procedures, poor handling of 

events, and general negligence contribute to the problem. The number of pilgrims is increasing, yet 

little money is being spent on the problem. A little spending is all that’s needed. 

At the same time, the regime has made a big deal about the killing of a handful of American military 

personnel. “To satisfy the Americans, the regime offered the heads of a group of pure youth who 

are zealous about their belief , their country, and their nation....Since when are a handful of defiled 

Jewish souls and the conquering Americans more precious than thousands of guests of the most 

merciful and the pilgrims of his ancient house?” Adding insult to injury, the regime has kept some of 

the bodies of deceased pilgrims for autopsy materials. 

37
Statement 20, pp. 97-98: (no title)

No date or signature 

The recent arrest of scholars from Pakistan is one more example of the Saudi regime’s “deeprooted hate and animosity toward Islam.” These guests were performing “the rituals of pilgrimage 

when they were arrested by Saudi intelligence services for the following charge: that some of them 

gave a fatwa in which they said that the Americans must be forced out of the land of the two holy 

mosques.” These scholars were only doing their duty in honoring their covenant pledging to show 

the truth to the people. They mentioned nothing negative about the Saudi regime, which has 

demonstrated that it is not satisfied with that it is doing against its own people, but is seeking to 

generalize these rules of repression. 

By its actions, the regime is actually strengthening the message of the scholars that have been 

persecuted. The scholars and influential people that have not condemned the regime’s actions 

cannot be excused, as it is an obligation to help a brother Muslim. 

Statement 21, pp. 103: Supporting the Fatwa by the Afghani Religious Scholars of Ejecting 

the American Forces Form the Land of the Two Holy Mosques

1-1-1419 (7 May 1998) 

The united religious scholars of Afghanistan issued a fatwa that stresses the necessity of ejecting 

the American forces for the Arab peninsula and the land of the holy two mosques. The fatwa 

contained shari’a proofs that the entrance of these forces into this country is forbidden, and that 

their ejection is absolutely necessary. The responsibility of ejecting them and declaring jihad 

against the occupiers rests with the entire nation of Islam. This fatwa was originally issued eight 

years ago by Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-’Awdah, who willingly paid the price for their 

truthfulness. The prophet’s last wish, may Allah’s prayers and peace be upon him, was to drive the 

polytheists out of the peninsula, and he said that “the big countries are the cause of problems and 

instability in the region, and they are the ones that create incidents. They show up every time there 

is an incident under the pretense that they will improve the situation and eliminate the danger, yet 

they are the biggest danger of all. How can the fox be the shepherd for the sheep?” 

38
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-003472 

Title: Taliban and the State of Things in Afghanistan 

Author: Unknown 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 5 pages 

Synopsis 

This document is a fragment of a document that discusses the geopolitical situation surrounding 

Afghanistan and the Taliban some time between 1998 and 2001. The author also defends the 

Taliban against various charges. 

Key Themes 

There is now a great opportunity for Sunnis, and more generally Muslims, to change the balance 

between Muslims and their enemies. The author cryptically takes note of “last week’s local and 

global events,” then argues that the Taliban are moving forward. This has caused the great powers, 

in the form of Iran, Russia, and the US, to threaten to intervene. The domestic opposition to the 

Taliban then rose in prominence to take advantage of the situation. The author hopes the recent 

economic failures in Asia [possibly referring to the Asian financial crisis of 1997] lead to the “final 

fall of Asia forever.” 

Iran has massed its troops on the border with Afghanistan, and Israeli advisers have been sent to 

help the Northern Alliance. The US launched missile attacks against Arab training camps and 

threatened to use nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Despite these attacks, Mullah Omar 

refuses to extradite Osama bin Laden. 

From the military point of view, Iranian deployments have forced the withdrawal of the Taliban from 

some fronts. This has led to gaps in the front lines, which are potential weaknesses in the event of 

a coordinated attack. On September 5th, the Northern Alliance (in the form of the forces of Mas’ud 

and Sayyaf) attacked the Taliban, which led to setbacks, both for the Taliban and Arab fighters. 

There are also allegations by some ‘youths’ that the Taliban support polytheists, and use secular 

laws to levy taxes. There is no evidence these charges are true, and the author warns against 

proceeding on hearsay. He cannot discount heresy in a country where 90% of the population is 

illiterate, but he has not seen it. Rumors are the deadliest weapon among Muslims, and should be 

avoided. 

39
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter One) 

Date: Mid 1990s 

Author: “Your Uncle” 

Length: 32 pages Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps I 

Synopsis: This letter is addressed to “Dear Brother Saif” and signed by “Your Uncle.” The author 

has prepared a lengthy response to issues raised in two previous letters (not included in this 

collection) sent by Saif from Somalia where he is in charge of Al-Qa’ida activity. Uncle gives frank 

observations about the prospects for jihad in Somalia. 

Key Themes: Uncle believes that Somalia is not ready for classic jihad and that Al-Qa’ida will not 

be able to find an ally with an identical intellectual force. The goal is to expel crusader forces from 

Somalia even if a semi-Islamic, semi-democratic government were to gain power. 

Saif is warned that the Somali movement he is working with is in danger of isolating itself from the 

masses, and if the masses become suspicious of a movement it has no prospect for success. 

The U.S. invasion of Somalia presents Saif with a golden opportunity to strike at the “bald eagle” 

now that it has landed unexpectedly in his sights. 

Flexibility is required. If Al-Qa’ida could work with Sayyaf, Hikmatyar, and Burhan to achieve it 

purposes in Afghanistan, then Saif can work with Aideed, Mahdi, and Kharteet in Somalia. The 

Somali leadership, however, must be bolstered since they have even less manhood than Saddam 

Hussein and Arafat. 

Uncle proposes a 5 point strategy to unite Somali forces and create an Islamic national front: 

1. Expulsion of the foreign international presence. 

2. Rebuilding of state institutions. 

3. Establishment of domestic security. 

4. Comprehensive national reconciliation. 

5. Economic reform and combating famine. 

The message ends with encouragement to persevere through financial difficulties and act 

according to the traditions “of our noble Messenger.” Uncle cites God feeding Quraysh and the 

great Badr raid as examples of victories that come through the “confident belief that God will grant 

victory.” 

40
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Two) 

Date: September 30, 1993 

Author: Hassan al-Tajiki 

Length: 11 pages 

Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps II 

Synopsis: The letter provides an update and analysis concerning jihad activity in Tajikistan, 

Afghanistan, Russia, and China. 

Key Themes: Tajikistan is judged to be a challenging but not hopeless area for jihad activity. 

Russia is in chaos and the former republics of the Soviet Union are weak. America is preparing to 

fill the power vacuum in the region. 

In Afghanistan America is supporting warlords and exploiting Civil War to neutralize opposition to 

its control of the region. 

China is a rising power where future relations with the Islamic world will be of great importance. 

The letter concludes with an upbeat assessment for future jihad operations in Tajikistan. 

41
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Three) 

Date: May 24, 1994 

Author: Hassan 

Length: 36 pages 

 Title: The Five Letters to the African Corps III 

Synopsis: Congratulations for the victory in Somalia and a strategic review of worldwide jihad 

operations. Success of the Africa Corps is contrasted with the difficult position of the Asian Corps. 

 

Key Themes: Hassan begins by expressing his congratulations to the Africa Corps for their great 

victory in Somalia. He would like to join them is having difficulties traveling because he is now 

wanted for security reasons in Pakistan. 

He asks the questions: “So how were our amazing Corps and its starving African Muslim allies able 

to be victorious over the greatest power in the world today?” The answer lies in the power of God, 

because “When we are truly fighting in the name and on behalf of God, we have nothing to fear...” 

In Somalia, Islamic forces were able to exploit America’s Vietnam Complex, because the 

American’s fear getting bogged down in a real war. Al-Qa’ida needs to develop a tactical doctrine 

to exploit the weakness of its great enemy, and a Counter-Intelligence strategy to confront the 

power of the American security agencies. 

Victory in Somalia must be followed up to avoid giving the defeated foe time to regroup. The 

strategy of the “Jewish West” is to strike at the periphery of the Muslim lands. The original 

crusaders tried to strike at the center of the Islamic lands, but were defeated. The Crusaders 

adapted, conquered the periphery, and were then able to control the Arabian Peninsula and 

Palestine. 

Somalia represents a victory for Al-Qa’ida on the periphery. The hour for regaining the heartland 

has arrived, but much training is required before this phase can begin. 

While the Africa Corps has been successful, the Asian Corps is very weak with only 5 members. 

Yemen is described as a crucial battlefield, an auspicious location for declaring jihad in the Arabian 

Peninsula. 

More effective radio broadcasts are needed to launch a propaganda campaign in Yemen and 

Somalia. Demands should include: 

Evacuation of the Crusaders, Jews, and infidel forces from the Peninsula. 

Destruction of churches and Jewish and Buddhist temples. 

Hassan observes that radio stations are more powerful than atomic bombs and that several dozen 

committed young believers can bring correct teaching to the whole area. Martyrdom attacks in 

Yemen create an auspicious opportunity to declare jihad in the Arabian Peninsula. 

Next comes a review of lessons learned in Tajikistan. Serious errors have been committed by the 

Nahdha who have relinquished their Islamic identity. Nahdha like Saddam Hussein exploits Islam 

to gain popular support, but by no means expresses true adherence to Islam. 

In Kabul, warlords who pursue their own agendas are weakening the work of jihad. 

42
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Four) 

Date: May 24, 1994 

Author: Hassan 

Length: 14 pages 

Title: The Fourth Letter about Jihad in the Caucasus 

Synopsis: Hassan is writing from an Al-Qa’ida training camp and relates his disappointments 

concerning reverses Al-Qa’ida has experienced in Central Asia. He also seeks to apply lessons 

learned from the arrest of international terrorist Carlos. 

Key Themes: In Tajikistan Al-Qa’ida has been outmaneuvered by the Nahdha movement and 

Ahmad Shah Mas’oud who have been able to extract arms and ammunition from Al-Qa’ida without 

providing training. Demoralized Mujahideen have been leaving the movement. 

Arab fighters in northern Afghanistan are loathed by Mas’oud and his commanders and in Pakistan 

Arab fighters are restricted and harassed by Pakistani authorities. Combating Islam is now both a 

state motto and policy in that country. In Pakistan Islam is a “folkloric” religion. 

Hassan states that Al-Qa’ida in Pakistan is besieged and that “All we have is the beleaguered 

space between our camp and Kabul in which to move with relative freedom.” 

Jews are gaining strength in Russia. Hassan engages in the eschatological speculation that the 

Jewish nuclear project will prepare the way for Armageddon and the rule of King Anti-Christ. He 

proposes bringing the jihad to Moscow with the ultimate objective of bringing jihad to Jerusalem. 

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are essential fronts for fighting to overcome the developing American 

blockade in Central Asia. 

The extradition of Carlos emphasizes the need for preserving strong, secure rear areas in Sudan 

and Afghanistan. 

Hassan says that he is bored in Afghanistan and want to relocate his family to Sudan. 

43
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600053 (Letter Five) 

Date: 1994? 

 Author: Hassan al-Tajiki 

Length: 14 pages 

Title: The Fifth Letter to the Africa Corps 

Synopsis: An analysis evaluating the impact of jihad in the Caucasus. Written while fighting is 

raging in Grozny, Hassan sees this struggle holding great promise for the future of jihad. 

Key Themes: The Soviet Union collapsed as a direct result of the war in Afghanistan. This left the 

U.S. to run the world in an autocratic manner. The U.S. alliance of Western states is fragile, 

however, due to the warfare inherent in the capitalist system. 

The new world order is America against everyone, and everyone against the Muslim. The Jews 

have succeeded in creating a Crusader alliance among Orthodox, Protestant, and Catholic 

churches. Then they added Hindu and Confucian Buddhist power in India, China, and Japan. 

This alliance is fragile and just as the 11th and 12th century Crusaders succumbed to infighting, so 

too will this alliance. Jihadists can look forward to Russian gangs selling nuclear weapons and 

ultimately providing nuclear arms for the jihad. 

The Caucasus is a strategically important zone because it provides access to the West. The U.S. is 

attempting to use Turkey and Pakistan to isolate the region, but the Chechens are rugged warriors. 

Furthermore, harsh Russia violence in the region means only opportunities for martyrdom and 

paradise for Muslims. The Crusader strategy will backfire because the “bloody governing” of the 

Russians will result in a disaster inflicted by Islamic forces. 

Al-Qa’ida can best support Chechen rebels by striking in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Arab fighters 

are at a disadvantage in the area since they do not know the language and culture. 

In an aside, Hassan comments that the jihadi missionary must be patient. Most Muslims will not 

pick up a weapon and declare jihad “unless he has tasted killing and felt the knife as it passed 

across his throat.” 

Therefore the Crusader wars are welcomed, but the” armed missionary must realize that his 

moving amongst Muslims whose Islam exists in Name only.” Apostasy reigns, not only in Turkey 

and Pakistan, but also in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The challenge for Al-Qa’ida is to unite the rising 

jihadi spirit in Arab lands with that in the Caucasus. The regions of Ingushetia, Dagestan, Abkhazia, 

and Azerbaijan are fruitful areas for expansion because of the hostility toward Russia in those 

areas. 

44
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600080 

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 53 pages 

Title: Lessons Learned from the Armed Jihad Ordeal in Syria 

Synopsis: A lengthy document of 20,000 words that examines the jihad waged against the Syrian 

regime of Hafez el Assad from 1976-1982. The document begins with a Chapter 2 entitled “Basics” 

followed by a Chapter 1 “Observations on the experience as a whole. This is followed by another 

Chapter 2 entitled “Lessons learned from the obstacles facing military jihad.” The Syrian militants 

belong to one group called the Attalieaa-the Vanguard and their erstwhile allies in the Muslim 

Brotherhood fought secretly and openly against the Alawite regime in Damascus. Although brutally 

repressed, this campaign taught Islamic militants many valuable lessons. 

Key Themes: Drawing on Islamic tradition and Twentieth Century examples of guerilla and 

information warfare, the study takes a critical look at the many failings of this campaign, and 

develops a strategy for waging jihad successfully. 

Lessons learned can be grouped in these major categories: 

Islamic Tradition: 18 Lessons Learned, of which the most important are: 

Leadership Battles. The leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were more concerned about their 

leadership battles than the struggle. They are accused by the author of treason and criminal 

behavior against jihad. They betrayed the faith and devotion of the young followers. The Vanguard 

while strong in faith and dedication, were weak in leadership and training. Their Islamic devotion 

was blessed by Allah who saved them from deviant thought and deterioration. 

Insufficient religious instruction. Fighters were either not properly taught or not sufficiently 

instructed in Islam. This problem became more acute as the original fighters were killed off and 

replaced by members who lacked proper understanding of Islam. Insufficient number of committed 

Mujahadeen to fill all important positions. 

Lack of study in the Islamic tradition. A myriad of rich experiences were readily available for 

those seeking knowledge, but nobody bothered to study these traditions. 

Failure to develop a public relations campaign to communicate Mujahid Revolutionary 

Theory, The most important element of any revolutionary struggle is to communicate the right 

message. This was not done and the people therefore did not support the struggle. 

Untrustworthy Arab Regimes. While reluctantly willing to support jihad against Syria, the Arab 

neighbors were at best temporary allies. The leaders of the neighboring countries in reality feared 

Islam and imprisoned the faithful. 

45
Excessive Dependence on Outside sources of support. Mujahideen must be self-sufficient, 

otherwise they become dependent on unreliable external benefactors. It is better to depend on 

stealing from the hostile regime, than to develop a dependency on external supporters 

Failure to deter allies of Syria. The lack of a means to strike at the allies of Syria meant that Arab 

regimes suffered no penalty for assisting Damascus. 

Lack of Scholarly Contribution. Islamic scholars in the region failed to contribute their knowledge, 

and the Mujahideen likewise did not make sufficient effort to seek out and develop religious 

scholars. 

Unprepared Islamic Missionary Groups. These groups did not understand the requirements for 

jihad and failed to prepare their followers both spiritually and militarily for the struggle. 

Pan-Arabism Undermining the Islamic Message. When secular, pan-Arab nationalist thinkers 

became involved in the movement, the message of jihad was distorted by an Iraqi Baath message. 

Lack of Operational Security. Groups used open lines of communication which made it easy for 

intelligence services to collect information and control the movement. 

While all of these lessons do not appear directly related to the Islamic tradition, the conclusion to 

this section states that despite the failings of the religious leaders, the Muslim masses 

demonstrated the power of jihad, and Allah honored their sacrifice. “A giving Muslim nation willing 

to sacrifice is the ultimate capital.” 

Lesson Learned in Jihad Operations and Guerrilla Warfare: (Text refers to “gang warfare” but 

the clear sense corresponds to the sense of guerrilla war) 

No comprehensive Plan and strategy. The movement lacked a strategic vision, had no 

understanding of the importance of terrain, and failed to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of 

the Syrian regime. This led to events, not plans, controlling the course of the battle. 

Insufficient screening of recruits. Mujahideen failed to vet carefully recruits. This allowed many 

government informers and moles to join, and betray the movement. 

Improper Command Structure. The movement was too dependent on outside sources and field 

commanders were not given sufficient authority. The organization must be provided with sufficient 

resources instead of depending on raiding the resources of the opponents. Field commanders, 

however, must be in communication with a central command that performs the planning and 

strategy, or the field commanders may be isolated and subsequently destroyed. 

Links to Intelligence Services. By developing relationships with the intelligence services of Arab 

states, the movement yielded its autonomy and came under the control of these groups. 

46
Too Much Time Spent in Training Camps. Much of the time spent in training camps in other 

Arab countries was wasted because no military or spiritual training was pursued. Leaders must 

stay close to their troops to properly instruct, train, and inspire them. 

Concentration of Forces. Too many of the forces were concentrated in Hama, Syria which 

allowed the Syrian military to concentrate its forces, encircle the city, and destroy the Mujahideen. 

Detachment from the Masses. Citing a “gang (guerrilla) warfare theorist, the author repeats 

Mao’s familiar wisdom that “The masses are the sea in which the vanguard organization should 

swim like a fish.” The masses are the source of information, supplies, personnel, and organization. 

Successful examples of revolutionary war, Algeria, China, and Vietnam are contrasted with failures 

like Malaysia, Philippines, and Greece. 

Adequate Supplies. Prior to launching an operation, the movement must have secured an 

adequate supply of arms and ammunition. 

Communications Security. The organization must avoid open transmission of messages and 

develop a command structure that protects information and personnel from disclosure. Capture of 

fighters creates a problem if they are knowledgeable about the organization and its structure. The 

movement is encouraged to emulate the Italian Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and ETA 

to see how organizations can compartmentalize information and still achieve operational 

effectiveness. 

Care for the Wounded. Plans must be made to allow for the evacuation of the wounded to care 

for them and most importantly to prevent them from being captured by the enemy. 

Role of Families. Mujahideen must accept that their families will be involved in the struggle, and 

that family members will be subject to punishment and torture by the regime. Retaliatory attacks 

will raise the morale of civilians and encourage the fighters. An American expert is quoted as 

follows: “...the brutality a regime uses against the civilians in retaliation to acts committed by the 

revolution is the best gift a revolution can receive, even neutral people will end up joining their 

ranks, the regime will be seen as the oppressor and the revolution will be seen as the just and fair 

side.” 

Victory. The war will not be won by defeating the enemy on the battlefield. Using the tools of 

modern communication combined with the power of faith the jihad will ultimately prevail. Victory will 

come in a protracted war in which the enemy is defeated through exhaustion and annoyance. 

Mujahideen must be smart, dedicated, and well trained, and only the fighters with the right 

personality and temperament can make successful mujahideen. Ultimately Allah will provide the 

victory. 

47
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600086 

Title: Meeting Notes 

Author: Unknown 

Date: Unknown 

Length: 11 pages 

Synopsis 

A set of notes covers a variety of themes, including views of the Pakistani government on 

Afghanistan, the goals of participation in Afghanistan’s conflicts, and divergent views on the 

progress of the fight in Afghanistan, as well as the country’s overall utility to global jihad. 

Key Themes 

The document appears to be several copies a set of notes taken from at least one meeting. As a 

result, there are persistent themes, but they are often difficult to parse. The notes appear to be 

talking about at least two ‘projects.’ 

In the first project, the immediate goal of participation is lifting the morale of the Afghans, training 

Arabs, and instilling the spirit of jihad. The long-term is to wage jihad against the Jews in Palestine. 

In the second project, the immediate goal of participation is fighting in battle and following the 

strategy of the Peshawar leader. The long-term goal is the liberation of South Yemen from 

Communism. 

There are a number of recurring themes: 

Sayyaf [probably referring to Abu Sayyaf, a mujahidin leader] is the best leader of the nation, 

based on the recommendation of ‘Abdullah ‘Azzam. Hikmatyar is also mentioned as a good leader. 

It is best to keep silent about their defects. 

Some within the Pakistani government are allies, and some are enemies. The mujahidin have 

apparently done the will of different Pakistani governments on at least one occasion, when they 

joined Hikmatyar in fighting the Rabbani government in Kabul. Benazir Bhutto is against the 

mujahidin. The Indian sub-continent is the greatest enemy of Islam. 

As the heart of the Muslim world, Egypt is the first place that should have the revived Caliphate, not 

Afghanistan. There is no hope for Afghanistan, and fighting there is not jihad. It is a lost cause. 

Instead, people should get training there and go back home. By contrast, the document later says 

that complete participation is required in transforming Afghanistan into a base for jihad, from which 

the mujahidin can support the needy through military elements and supplies. 

48
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600087

Length: 60 pages 

Date: August 7, 1994 

Title: Book by Mustafa Hamid 

Author: Mustafa Hamid 

Synopsis 

A book written by Mustafa Hamid in which he discusses his involvement in the international jihad, 

mainly in Afghanistan as well as his belief in radical Islam and path to involvement in the 

international jihad. 

Key Themes 

The first quarter of the book provides a general history of the Afghan jihad and key actors in the 

conflict including a description of the management and manipulation of the hostilities by the 

Pakistani and American intelligence services. He also comments on the fervor of Arab mujahidin 

fighting with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), which was weaker than those fighting in 

Afghanistan. 

The second quarter of the book begins to discuss his account of his involvement in fighting in 

Lebanon during the 1970’s. Hamid describes how his belief in Islam faltered during this period due 

to the defeat suffered by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the organization’s absence from the 

conflict in Lebanon. Later, having regained his faith, the author became disillusioned with the PLO 

and the outcome of the Lebanese conflict. It was at this time that his Islamic faith began to revive 

and he started thinking about forming his own jihad organization in Abu Dhabi. While in Abu Dhabi 

Hamid had a chance encounter with a delegation of Afghan sheikhs from the Paktia province, who 

told him of the possibilities for jihad in their country. After this meeting the author decided to move 

to Afghanistan to participate in the jihad against the Soviet Union instead of forming his own group. 

Starting on page 23 and continuing to the end of the book Hamid describes his journey to 

Afghanistan through Pakistan, how he acquire weapons and other fighting equipment and his work 

as a journalist for the al-Fajr and al-Ittihad newspapers. Other interesting anecdotes include 

encounters with mujahidin from the Soviet Union, difficulties faced by the mujahidin, such as Soviet 

attacks during Ramadan and Osama bin-Laden’s role in digging cave and tunnel networks in 

preparation for the attack against the Khost airport in 1990-1991. 

49
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600088

Title: Mustafa Hamid’s Analysis of Mujahidin Activities 

Author: Various 

Date: Events take place in 1989, written some time after 1996 

Length: 61 pages 

Synposis 

Mustafa Hamid discusses and analyzes the events surrounding the mujahidin in 1989. Specifically, 

he is interested in the failures of the mujahidin, the failure of attack on Jalalabad, and the wider 

attacks by the US, Israel, Pakistan, and other countries and entities against the Islamist movement 

after the Soviets left Afghanistan. He also compares the overall progress of the campaigns in 

Palestine and Afghanistan. 

Key Themes 

While the document contains a fair amount of narrative that details Hamid's travels in Afghanistan, 

Abu Dhabi, and Pakistan in 1989, the bulk of the document is devoted to a somewhat pessimistic 

analysis of the failures of the mujahidin and the outside forces that were conspiring against them in 

1989. 

The failures of the mujahidin 

After ten years of fighting, the mujahidin formed a provisional government in Rawalpindi, but the 

various mujahidin organizations were still more powerful than the government, which largely 

remained in exile in Pakistan. Hamid assesses that the mujahidin need to form a more powerful 

permanent government. 

The failure and implications of Jalalabad 

The mujahidin staged an attack against the city of Jalalabad, and were beaten back with great 

losses. According to Hamid, Jalalabad was a major defeat for the mujahidin. While the 

government's equipment and training were better, the morale of the mujahidin was better, but they 

were too weak to make a direct attack. Consequently, Jalalabad was a bad choice for an attack. 

Arab jihadis were 'tricked' into going to Jalalabad and dying in droves. Hamid also seems to believe 

that recruitment of many Afghan Arabs was in part a US ploy to get them to die in Afghanistan. 

Hamid had serious misgivings about the continued enthusiasm of the Arabs (by such people as 

'Abu Ubaydah) for dying in Jalalabad. The Western media focused disproportionately on Jalalabad, 

proclaiming it to be the central battle of the war, and thus called the mujahidin a failure when they 

lost the battle. Hamid argues that the Pakistani ISI intervened to make sure that the city would not 

fall: first, the mujahidin advanced along a route that looked to be successful, but the Pakistani ISI 

agent in residence stopped the advance until government forces had moved up and surrounded 

the Arabs, who refused to withdraw, and were destroyed. Although this happened under the watch 

of then-ISI director Hamid Jul, Mustafa Hamid doubts he knew of or approved the operation. 

Nevertheless, the Western media, in a move orchestrated by the US, began blaming Hamid Jul for 

the loss of Jalalabad, and turned against the mujahidin, proclaiming that the new threat after 

Communism was Wahhabi Islam. 

50
The failure of the attack on Malani and Nadad 

Hamid also decribes a trip he took to the front with Haqani's assistant Mawlawzi Nizam-al-Din, 

where the mujahidin were attempting to attack the forts of Malani and Nada. Hamid fell into an 

ambush, but survived. The planned attack against the forts failed, largely because the Jarbiz tribe 

was apparently playing both sides, and took weapons for themselves, calls for mediation 

weakened the jihadists, and the attack was postponed, possibly because some commanders had 

been bribed. 

The role of al-Qa’ida 

In this document, Jalaludin Haqani first conceives of the plan to take Khost (covered later in AFGP2002-600090 and AFGP-2002-600092). Al-Qa’ida assigned people to help Hamid plan the attack, 

however it then pulled them to participate in the failed attack against Jalalabad. Hamid believes 

that the strategy of 'Abu Abdullah (probably Usama bin Laden) is gravely mistaken, but the young 

jihadis follow him blindly. 

Pakistan turns against the mujahidin 

Pakistan's machinations were partly responsible for the failure of the attack on Jalalabad, and more 

generally for the failure of the mujahidin. Hamid argues that once the US put Benazir Bhutto's 

government in power, in order to consolidate her position, she fired Hamid Jul, the director of the 

ISI. The mujahidin thus lost their last major supporter within Pakistan. Some leaders began looking 

into accepting a political solution. 

The al-Qa’ida 'hijacking' and the death of 'Abdullah 'Azzam – Intrigue from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, 

the US, and Israel 

Hamid recounts a conversation he had with 'Abu 'Abdullah (probably Usama bin Laden) after they 

were deported from the Sudan, where 'Abdullah analyzed the events of 1989. He identified two 

important events for the mujahidin in Pakistan. First, Muhtassib, a former member of al-Qa’ida, was 

accused of taking part in a plot to blow up a plane traveling from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia. Second, 

the ideological leader of much of the jihadist movement, 'Abdullah 'Azzam, was assassinated. 

Hamid believes that 'Abdullah al-Mani', the director of the Saudi Red Cresent in Peshawar, and his 

associate, Abu 'Umran, were involved in framing him. Muhtassib wanted to send a suitcase to 

Jeddah, and Abu 'Umran agreed to help him, but at some point put explosives in the suitcase, and 

sent Muhtassib to the airport such that he would be captured and tortured by Pakistani intelligence. 

As for 'Abdullah 'Azzam, who was killed in a bomb attack the next day, Abu 'Abdullah claimed that 

Saudi Arabia and Israel both wanted to kill him because of his opposition to their policies, and the 

Saudis, in the form of 'Abdullah al-Mani and his organization, seem to have carried out the attack. 

Opposition to 'Azzam

In the background, the US and the UK (as well as Israel) ramped up negative international media 

coverage of the mujahidin, and convinced Pakistan through Interpol that there were hijacking 

threats from the mujahidin. 'Azzam's assistant Tamin al-'Ani also died during an operation in the 

US. Under this theory, the plane hijacking plot had to be 'uncovered' before the assassination of 

'Azzam in order for the Pakistanis and the Saudis to justify their crackdowns on the mujahidin, and 

to ruin the worldwide reputation of the mujahidin, and label them as terrorists. Although the US 

51
expected that the Arabs would retaliate for the death of 'Azzam (thus decreasing their reputation 

even further) instead they did nothing for fear of repercussions. 

Hamid himself assesses that 'Azzam was killed due to the Palestinian issue. The war in 

Afghanistan led to the discovery of jihad by thousands of young Muslim men, and to the formation 

of Hamas, an explicitly Islamic movement, in the Palestinian territories. The PLO and Israel both 

considered Hamas to be a threat, and secretly began colluding to defeat Hamas and Islamist 

movements in general. The Muslim Brotherhood also was irritated by the Islamist movement, and 

warned 'Azzam away from Palestine. As a result of all these factors, 'Azzam's enemies decided to 

kill him. Hamid continues later that 'Azzam contradicted himself on US aid, since the mujahidin 

were receiving US aid, even while 'Azzam denied this. This, and his other blunders, such as his 

close public relationship with Hikmatiar even as Hikmatiar's men staged an ambush against 

another Afghan leader (Ahmad Shah Masud) in the Farkhar Massacre, led the jihad movement to 

weaken and lose support. Hamid believes that this was also a plot by the US to keep the mujahidin 

off-balance. 

Comparison of Palestine and Afghanistan 

Hamid also compares the conflicts in Palestine and Afghanistan. In both conflicts there is 

international involvement. In both cases, the US replaced previous powers in the region, although 

the Jews, who secretly control the world, saw their influence increase as a result of establishing a 

state in Palestine. In terms of military strategy, in both cases, the Arabs were weak, and without 

strategy. In Afghanistan, they depended on the ISI. As far as training, in Palestine, the Muslim 

Brotherhood volunteers were the best trained (Hamid is talking in particular about Israel's war of 

independence in 1948), while in Afghanistan, the mujahidin were poorly trained at first, but rectified 

this later on. In the fighting itself, the Arab countries knew Israel was going to win, and allowed 

volunteers to go anyway. In Afghanistan, the West encouraged Arab volunteers, and Arab 

countries facilitated their travel. This was followed, however, by a liquidation of the mujahidin after 

the wars were over. In the case of Palestine, Egypt turned on the Muslim Brotherhood. In the case 

of Afghanistan, the US and the international media smeared the mujahidin, and eventually 

succeeded in getting the mujahidin kicked out of Pakistan, as well as attacked by intelligence 

services back in their home countries. 

 

52
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600090 

Title: "The Airport 1990" 

Author: Mustafa Hamid 

Date: Describes events that took place in 1989 and 1990 

Length: 150 pages 

Summary 

Mustafa Hamid details the Battle of Torghar, and analyzes the importance of Torghar for the fight 

to take Khost as well as the military development of the mujahidin during the campaign. He also 

analyzes the failed March 1990 coup. This document is a prequel to AFGP-2002-600092. 

Key Themes 

Narrative of the Battle of Torghar 

Mustafa Hamid narrates in great detail the process by which the mujahidin took over Torghar 

mountain in February 1990, and acquired a strategic advantage over Communist forces in the 

siege of Khost. 

As a journalist, at the end of 1989, Hamid decides to work with Jalaladin Haqani to produce a jihadi 

magazine, Manba'a al-Jihad. Some parts of the document are essays from the magazine, and as 

such adopt a journalistic tone. While touring the region with Abu al-Hareth (with Hajji Farid serving 

as his interpreter, and Hajji Ibrahim as his assistant), Mustafa Hamid first gets the idea to close the 

Khost airport, which he does successfully later in the year. During this tour he also experiences 

heaving bombing from the Communists. 

Before his trip to Torghar, Hamid sends his wife and children to Islamabad, after they are subject to 

harassment in Peshawar. He also meets with Jalaladin Haqani in January 1990. Haqani is the 

mujahidin leader in charge of attacking Mount Torghar, but up until that time, repeated waves of 

Mujahidin attacks have been unsuccessful in taking it, including a recent attack by Ismail Kheil that 

is coordinated very poorly. Hamid estimates that, with Torghar conquered, 70% of the work for 

taking over Khost will be accomplished. 

After the failed attacks, Haqani formulates a new plan. During the campaign, missiles narrowly 

miss Haqani several times, leading Hamid to be suspicious of how the enemy knows where he is. 

He guesses that the USSR is still involved via air attacks. An attack by Hakam Khan and Hanif 

Shah fails again due to poor coordination and disagreement about the use of tanks. Hamid gets an 

idea to poison the water supply of Khost to sicken enough people to overwhelm the city's hospitals, 

and he requests help from Abu-Hafs, but it does not seem to go anywhere. 

At one point, a British journalist named Tim, embeds himself with Haqani, and Hamid serves as his 

host. He notes Tim's complete neutrality and lack of emotion, but also detests him. Several months 

after the battles, Hamid tells Tim that the mujahidin have not yet taken Khost because of Pakistani 

and US interference. 

The mujahidin finally attack Torghar successfully on 16 February 1990. The attack from the south 

side is the most logical from the enemy's point of view, and although the southern thrust is not the 

53
mujahidin's main attack, the enemy shifts most of their forces to confront them there. This leaves 

the way open for a renewed attack on the western slope, as well as on the eastern slope, where 

the mujahidin have painstakingly worked their way through a mine field, taking the enemy by 

surprise. Hamid notes that the mujahidin suffer only one dead in the final attack, leading him to 

proclaim that they have God's support. In the aftermath, children come up to greet the victorious 

mujahidin, the mujahidin assault and take Little Torghar to clear the mountain completely of enemy 

forces, and Haqani builds a paved road to the summit to cement the mujahidin's control of Torghar. 

After interrogating some captives, the mujahidin confirm that the enemy forces are fractious, and 

morale is low, but the Communists are determined to fight to the end. 

The US and Pakistan versus the mujahidin and al-Qa`ida 

Hamid is suspicious of Pakistan's intentions for the mujahidin, and blames the Pakistani 

intelligence service for the catastrophic loss at Jalalabad. He describes how General Imam of the 

Pakistani intelligence service is present at the Battle of Torghar, up to no good, and how he 

interferes with Haqani's plans. Hamid also assesses that the goal of the US is ultimately to 

encourage a negotiated settlement between Islamists and Communists, so it works to prevent a 

complete victory by the mujahidin, and to keep Najibullah in power. Any mujahidin attacks that fail 

give encouragement to the US and the USSR, especially as the Afghans are (in Hamid's view) 

responsible for the fall of the USSR. Hamid also blames his anti-US views for being the reason his 

articles in al-Itihad were not published. 

The parties in Peshawar are often at odds with Haqani, and accused him of issuing a magazine as 

a step to forming a political party, played other 'dirty games,' and were probably happy that 

Abdallah Azzam was assassinated. At one point, Hamid describes meeting Abu-Hafs, who is under 

pressure from the Pakistani government, and suggests getting a British or European attorney to 

represent him, since Pakistan respects the UK. 

Analysis of the importance of the Battle of Torghar 

Hamid describes these two articles as the first writing on the battles for Khost. One of the reasons 

for success is the appearance of Jalaladin Haqani, who is a rare combination of religiosity and 

competence. The Battle of Torghar was a special siege within the more general siege of Khost. 

Attacks against Torghar failed for years, and the enemy was well dug in. The mujahidin adopted an 

indirect approach, where they worked their way closer to the mountain, and gradually cut it off. 

They then attacked on the seemingly impossible east side, and convinced the enemy that the 

southern thrust was the main attack. In Hamid's opinion, the battle of Torghar also showed that 

tanks, which provided mobile artillery, could be used to great effect in mountainous terrain. In the 

final analysis, the mujahidin enjoyed better morale and command ability than the enemy, but the 

enemy enjoyed a higher quality and quantity of equipment. Following the capture of Torghar, the 

mujahidin were able to cut off the airport and all smuggling routes, thus starving Khost. After 

Torghar fell, the enemy knew Khost was lost. 

The military development of the Mujahidin action in Khost 

Hamid goes over six features of the changes the mujahidin adopted in the battle for Khost that 

ultimately resulted in their victory. First, while the Paktia tribes in particular were enthusiastic and 

54
skillful fighters, the mujahidin needed to transform themselves into a conventional fighting force to 

beat the Communists. They accomplished this by instituting a shura (advisory) council that 

amassed authority and served as a forum for the various tribes to discuss strategy and tactics. The 

shura council was successful in stopping smuggling by the tribes themselves, but was less useful 

for coordinating direct military action, where it was vulnerable to delays. Second, the government 

broadcast constant propaganda, but mujahidin morale was still good. The mujahidin were able to 

boost morale by avoiding human losses in battles. In addition, the long siege lowered the 

government's morale, as did the mujahidin's own loudspeaker propagandists. Government 

defectors received good treatment, which increased defections. Finally, the mujahidin immediately 

used any weapons or ammunition they captured, decreasing the black market value of the spoils. 

Third, Khost's location was good for the mujahidin – supply lines from Pakistan were short, and the 

mountains gave the fighters natural defenses against air attacks. The mujahidin were also able to 

use local fighters who knew the terrain, remembered effective tactics against the British, and, 

because they were more effective in small numbers, were able to concentrate their forces and 

overwhelm the enemy in specific locations. Fourth, the mujahidin greatly increased their mobility 

was the adoption of motorized vehicles that moved along paved roads. Fifth, the mujahidin were 

able to concentrate their tanks for attacks against single targets, and as a result, tanks were 

decisive in the battles of Nadir-Shah-Cout, Dwamindo, Daraji, and Torghar. Sixth, the mujahidin 

used wireless communications systems to coordinate well. 

Analysis of failed coup of March 1990 

In the last section, Hamid analyzes the failed coup against Afghan leader Najibullah on 6 March 

1990, which he sees as emblematic of larger problems. The USSR wanted to continue 

Communism in Afghanistan, but failed, and both the US and Saudi Arabia encouraged the 

mujahidin, then killed them. For instance, Saudi Arabia sent provocateurs to stir up conflicts within 

the mujahidin. Finally, the Afghans themselves killed Arabs who were drawn into their tribal battles. 

The secularists of the Middle East (including Egypt and Turkey's governments) are traitors, as are 

some mujahidin who are working in concert with the US and Russia. Hamid sees the war as one 

between Islam and infidels – politics has no place in it. 

In the face of the coup attempt, Najibullah came down hard, although it is apparent that the USSR 

sold him out long ago. On the positive side, the Communist army was cleansed due to the coup, 

which is good for the mujahidin. On the negative side, the coup revealed the disunity of the 

Peshawar parties, and weakened jihad, especially when some Afghan claimed to be Muslim. The 

ongoing stagnation of the mujahidin is resulting in lost opportunities. 

55
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600092

Title: "A Mother's Deep Sorrow"/"The Airport Project" 

Author: Mustafa Hamid AKA Abu al-Walid 

Date: August – September 1990 

Length: 105 pages 

Synopsis 

Mustafa Hamid keeps a detailed day-by-day account of the Airport Project, which aims to shut 

down the Khost airfield for a month through continuous rocket attacks, thus convincing the enemy 

to stop using the airfield. 

Key Themes 

A Mother's Deep Sorrow 

The first section is a description of the death of Isma'il, the brother of Hakani, a warlord along the 

Aghanistan-Pakistan border, at the hands of an incompetent doctor in Miranshah. His mother, 

whom Mustafa refers to as the Great Mother, dies soon after. Although she does not fight, Mustafa 

waxes at length on how she provides emotional support and hope on the 'internal front', which is 

just as important as the battlefront. The Great Mother dies soon after Isma'il, lamenting that she will 

not live to see the results of jihad in Afghanistan. For Mustafa, the past year has been a time of 

both sorrow and victory. 

The Airport Project 

Most of the rest of the document is dedicated to a highly detailed first-person account of what is 

referred to as the Airport Project. This is an operation, run by Mustafa that aims to deny the use of 

the airfield at Khost to the enemy (the Communists) for long enough that they cease to use it as a 

means of reinforcing their troops in Khost. The mujahidin launch approximately 1200 rockets over 

the course of one month, which is enough to convince the enemy to stop using the airfield. 

The account begins on August 3, 1990, with a confirmation that Iraq has invaded Kuwait. The next 

day, Mustafa, a leader of Camp Abu Al-'Abbas, begins preparations for the operation. The most 

essential material is ammunition, and much of the account describes Mustafa's attempts to find 

enough rockets to carry out the plan. Camp Abu Al-'Abbas is a series of caves dug into a 

mountainside. The other cooperating jihadist centers appear to be close by, or at least within 

several hours drive of each other inside Afghanistan. In preparation for the operation, Mustafa and 

others select sites for a number of different launchers, and have small camps built in those 

locations. 

There appear to be five launchers in operation at any given time, and operations for the most part 

take place at night, when the enemy is attempting to resupply Khost under cover of darkness. The 

launchers are sited such that each one covers a different part of the airfield. The mujahidin 

stationed on the observation points on top of the mountain sight planes landing or taking off. Each 

launcher team then communicates with the other teams by radio (which often fail, or are jammed 

by the enemy), and coordinates firing (continuously if possible). The teams aim to prevent 

airplanes from taking off or landing, or barring that, to destroy the planes on the ground and/or 

56
prevent them from unloading their cargo. The effectiveness of each team is occasionally harmed 

because some of the mujahidin are taking vacations to Miranshah at any given time. 

The enemy adopts a two-pronged strategy in response to the mujahidin attacks. First, it 

continuously adapts its tactics for landing and unloading planes, for example by using helicopters 

to escort transport planes so as to confuse the mujahidin. Second, it regularly targets the mujahidin 

launcher teams with air strikes, and later with cluster bombs, although it is clear the enemy does 

not know exactly where the teams are. The mujahidin suffer almost no casualties from the attacks. 

Lack of ammunition and transportation are consistent problems for the mujahidin. Mustafa has 

difficulty getting some of the teams, particularly that run by Abu Tamim, to fire continuously 

because they are worried about running out of rockets. In fact, at one point approximately halfway 

through the operation, the mujahidin do in fact run out of rockets, and the enemy succeeds in 

landing a number of planes. It is also difficult to transport more rockets and supplies to the launcher 

sites because for much of the operation the mujahidin do not have a working car, and must resort 

at times to donkeys. 

The Arab jihadis and Afghans 

Mustafa is ambivalent about the role of the Arab jihadis. They are often difficult to control because 

they seek to be martyrs on their own terms. The other unit commanders are also often at odds with 

each other about tactics, and even overall strategy. Mustafa becomes quite angry with his allies on 

a number of occasions. There is also tension between the Arab jihadis and the Afghans. The Arabs 

believe the Afghans are content to be trained, and then, once the Communists are removed, to 

steal things and/or to go home, without being mindful of the need to establish an Islamic state in 

Afghanistan. Mustafa is also at times dismayed by the lack of operational security among the 

Afghans, as it is their custom to regale their friends with tales of their battles. For their part, the 

Afghans resent the Arabs for not letting them operate the launchers at times, and for not trusting 

them with the best equipment. 

Interactions with Al-Qa’ida 

Mustafa's interactions with al-Qa’ida are in general not positive. The main (administrative/political) 

wing of al-Qa’ida is too bureaucratic, and not supportive of the Airport Project, although it promises 

support at the beginning. At the outset, al-Qa’ida pulls a number of Arab jihadis who would have 

been useful, and reassigns them to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraq. Only about a third of the 

required rockets that al-Qa’ida promises actually arrive in the beginning. Mustafa further complains 

that al-Qa’ida is focused on its camps rather than actual battles, and that the organization only has 

focus when Usama bin Laden gets involved. Mustafa's discord with al-Qa’ida is slightly alleviated 

when, towards the end of the operation, with the support of Abu Hafs, the military wing of al-Qa’ida 

delivers the balance of promised rockets, and at the end of the document he mentions that he is 

uncomfortable operating against the commands of al-Qa’ida. This is all the more frustrating 

because Mustafa intimates that there are long periods of time when al-Qa’ida is unresponsive to 

the mujahidin's requests for orders and supplies. 

57
Discussion of the political situation and political intrigue

Mustafa has a number of discussions with other mujahidin leaders and with al-Qa’ida about the 

political situation in Afghanistan, and in the Middle East. At first, he seems to believe that the Gulf 

War is actually a joint plan by Iraq and the US to take over the Middle East. Usama bin Laden 

apparently calls for Arabs to return to Saudi Arabia to defend it, and Saudi religious scholars 

support the presence of Americans troops in Saudi Arabia (temporarily), which confuses Mustafa. 

Part of the problem of unclear guidance about the political situation appears to be the lack of 

religious scholars, a void that has not been filled since the death of Abdallah Azzam. Mustafa is 

also suspicious of Arab jihad organizations, especially those under the Salafi banner, and thinks 

they will only come to ruin. 

Mustafa at one point wonders about the future of him and his family after the end of the war. This is 

all the more important because his family begins feeling political pressure due to his activities. 

Mustafa's wife and children live for a time in Peshawar, where the children are enrolled in a Saudi 

school, but they are forced to leave after Saudi intelligence operatives begin interrogating them 

about Mustafa's activities. 

Mustafa also relays his thoughts about US involvement in Afghanistan. In his view, the US was 

nowhere to be found during the actual fight with the Soviets. Once the Soviets decided to withdraw, 

the US sent in Stinger missiles so that it could say that its technology had defeated the Soviets. 

This allows the US to sell more of its weapons around the world. By and large, the US strategy is to 

deny either side a complete victory, and force the mujahidin and the Communists to come to a 

negotiated peace. 

Rise of the new airport 

Finally, in response to the closing of the old airport, the enemy actually begin building a new airport 

out of the range of the launchers. At first, Hakani, the top mujahidin leader, does not believe that 

the new airfield's tarmac is of high enough quality to accept planes, so they do nothing about it. 

Unfortunately for them, this turns out to be untrue, and the enemy begins landing planes at the new 

airfield. Although the mujahidin eventually begin attacking this one as well, Mustafa estimates that 

this mistake cost the mujahidin about six months before they were finally able to take over Khost. 

Conclusion 

Mustafa assesses that the Airport Project is successful because it does close down the old airfield 

and destroy about a dozen enemy planes, even though the enemy builds a new airport. In the latter 

parts of the documents, he begins talking about preparations for new operations, not only against 

the new airport, but also more conventional offensives to take over Khost and other cities held by 

the Communists. 

58
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600106 

Title: Letter from Abu-‘Ata’ al-Sharqi 

Author: Abu-‘Ata’ al-Sharqi 

Date: 21 March 1994 

Length: 2 pages 

Synopsis 

The author discusses various conflicts surrounding al-Faruk camp within and between leaders of 

al-Qaeda and al-Furkan. He suggests moving into Tajikistan for strategic reasons. 

Key Themes 

The document is actually a description of the letter, not the letter itself. 

The author brings up Al-Faruk, a training facility. Al-Furkan Project, owner of the camp, is 

commanded by Abu Walid al-Masri. Al-Qaeda and Al-Furkan have been negotiating over control of 

the facility. There is some concern about a lack of coordination (or even insubordination). Abu 

Kin’an went behind the back of the author, and does not have the ability to run the camp. Al-Qaeda 

is qualified, however. Abu Khabab came to the camp and gave a course, but there was no prior 

agreement with Abu-Kin’an. The author is also upset that he had to provide the land for the camp, 

even though it does not fall under his authority (he is the leader of the Jihadwal area). The camp is 

apparently controlled by the Tajiks. 

The author encourages al-Qaeda and the Furkan Project to work together to figure out why Russia 

collapsed. He also suggests getting into Tajikistan by providing training and financial support to the 

Tajiks. This will harm the Americans and Russians. This is why the Arabs were expelled from 

Bishawir [Peshawar?]: to prevent them from getting into Central Asia. Moving in Tajikistan will also 

strengthen al-Qaeda’s hand as it will gain control over al-Faruk camp. Abu-Walid needs to know 

the author (presumably) is in charge of everything in Jihadwal. 

59
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-600970

Length: 64 pages 

Date: unknown 

Title: Mustafa’s History of the Afghan Jihad 

Author: Mustafa 

 

Synopsis 

An essay chronicling the history of the anti-communist Islamic jihad in Afghanistan. The work 

covers the key political figures and groups and explains their roles in the development of the 

conflict. Key themes include organization of the anti-communist jihad, problems with attracting 

foreign financial assistance and American involvement in the war. 

Key Themes 

The essay covers the history of the anti-communist jihad in Afghanistan beginning during the reign 

of King Zahir Shah and continuing through the reigns of presidents Daub Khan, Muhammad Turaqi, 

ending during the Soviet period. The roles of Muhammad Younis Khalis and Abdul Rasool Sayyaf 

and their attempts to gain financial support from foreign donors are the main topics of the work. 

The American role in the conflict receives significant attention. 

According to the text, the resistance in Afghanistan during the reign of President Turaqi was 

characterized by discord among the various Islamic groups, which prevented any coordinated 

action against the communists. In fact, the only consensus that was reached was to gather money 

and support from various Islamic countries until the opposition could become strong enough to fight 

the Afghan communist army. In the author’s opinion the state of paralysis among the anticommunist mujahidin would have lasted indefinitely had it not been for the initiative and vision of 

Muhammad Younis Khalis, who effectively started the jihad in Afghanistan by declaring war on the 

Afghan communist government through a fatwa and then initiating hostilities from the mountains of 

Nangarhar province with the few men and weapons he could muster. 

The early stages of the jihad are characterized by the Communists’ tenuous hold on power due to 

the threat of an Islamic revolution. To counter this threat the communist government accepted aid 

from the Soviet Union in the form of weapons and military advisors. This support, with which the 

mujahidin could not compete, presented Muhammad Younis Khalis and other leaders of the jihad 

with one of their main challenges: attracting financial support sufficient to counter the Soviet 

influence. 

Khalis and the other leaders saw great potential for assistance from oil-rich countries like Saudi 

Arabia and other Gulf States though little money was actually received. Despite their failure in 

attracting Saudi oil money they were marginally successful in attracting money from Iran and 

support in the form of non-military supplies from Pakistan. However, in the end the mujahidin were 

unable to receive aid in sufficient amounts to counter the Soviet influence. 

The main reason for Khalis’ failure to raise sufficient funds, according to the author, was his relative 

obscurity among foreign donors. In addition to Khalis’ lack of exposure the author cites several 

other reasons for insufficient levels of foreign aid, mainly uninformed donation and American 

involvement in the conflict. Specifically, had the donor’s known who they were donating to they 

would not have given money to corrupt anti-Arab Afghan groups. 

60
The later entry of the United States into the conflict also exacerbated the problem of concentrating 

foreign assistance in the hands of jihad groups favored by Khalis. Specifically, the author argues 

that the United States supported leaders such as Birhan Ad-Din Rabbani and Qalb ad Din 

Hekmyetar, two of the most extreme anti-Arab Afghan leaders who eventually worked to pressure 

Arab mujahidin out of Afghanistan once they gained enough power. 

Abdul Rasool Sayyaf is the other jihad leader who receives considerable attention in the essay. 

His rise to power in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began when a group of 

Islamic countries convened a conference to study possible reactions to the invasion. Though the 

conference did not produce any substantial resolutions or support for the Afghan rebels Sayyaf 

emerged as the leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, an umbrella 

organization uniting a number of factions for the purpose of effectively working with foreign 

governments. 

In the author’s opinion, Sayyaf’s greatest contribution was his successful fundraising for the jihad. 

Upon taking the reigns of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, Sayyaf and other 

leaders embarked on a fundraising trip to Dubai and other parts of the United Arab Emirates. 

Sayyaf is said to have been widely successful in his mission due to his ability to speak fluent Arabic 

and his knowledge of Arab culture. 

While Sayyaf’s Arabic skills were invaluable, his overall fundraising philosophy was also an 

extremely important element of his success. According to the author, Sayyaf’s underlying rejected 

the idea of the “Afghan jihad” as a national undertaking in the Western political understanding. 

Rather, Sayyaf adhered to the idea that all Muslim people are united in one nation and are required 

to support their Muslim brothers. Therefore, the jihad in Afghanistan was considered a pan-Islamic 

undertaking in which all Muslims must lend their support. 

Consequently, Sayyaf’s delegation made every effort to appeal to the Islamic people rather than 

seek support from governments. Further, they avoided public events and locations which would 

have appeared ostentatious and aloof of their targeted donors, the common people. In doing so 

they sought to emphasize the value of individual monetary and physical contributions of average 

Muslims to the jihad. 

In the essay Siyaf’s fundraising approach is contrasted to that taken by the Palestinian Authority 

(PA) when it was raising support against Israel in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Specifically, 

Sayyaf successfully appealed to the Muslim masses, in the end facilitating the mujahidin defeat of 

the Soviet Union, while the PA worked to establish ties with Arab governments but never gained 

significant support and never defeated Israel. 

In addition to chronicling the roles of key individuals, the author provides insight into the mujahidin 

perspectives on American involvement in the conflict including American motivation and the extent 

of American influence. Throughout the text the United States is portrayed as a manipulator of 

events in Afghanistan. The author notes that the Soviet invasion occurred during an American 

transition of presidential power. Consequently, no action could be taken by Islamic countries until 

America diverted its attention from internal politics and granted permission to take action. In effect, 

the United States played the role of puppet master in Afghanistan, orchestrating events and 

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manipulating the actors. Further evidence of American manipulation is the captured American 

intelligence from the Tehran embassy, revealing America’s prior knowledge of Soviet intentions to 

invade Afghanistan. The fact that this was known to the United States proves complicity and 

manipulation of events. 

The main reason for American involvement in the conflict, according to the essay, was the desire to 

improve its image in the Islamic world in relation to the Soviet Union. Specifically, the author 

reasons that the United States saw an easy opportunity to improve its image after the seizure of 

the American embassy in Tehran and being branded “The Great Satan” during the Iranian 

Revolution. By giving the Soviets free reign to invade and occupy Afghanistan the Soviet world 

image would suffer. At the same time, by helping the Afghans against the Soviets the America saw 

a vehicle for improving its own image in the Islamic world. 

Interestingly, many mujahidin accepted American support despite America’s anti-Islamic image 

among the mujahidin. One reason for this acceptance stems from the Sunni-Shi’a division within 

Islam. The author points out that at the time of the conflict many Sunni Muslims believed Shi’a 

Islam to be more dangerous than the Christians or the Jews. Given America’s anti-Iran stance and 

support of Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War they felt that they could justify acceptance of American support 

in Afghanistan. 

In addition to the themes of fundraising and the American role in the conflict the essay touches 

upon a range of other topics in varying detail. These topics include corruption and 

mismanagement of funds within the network of Islamic charitable organizations, the Soviet use of 

the scorched earth policy in reaction to mounting guerilla opposition and the level of support for 

Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Additionally, the author discusses factors influencing the anticommunist jihad such as defections by Islamists in the Afghan army to the mujahidin and the 

support received from Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. 

62
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-601402 

Length: 2 pages 

Date: unknown 

Title: Condolence Letter 

Author: Abd al-Hamid 

Synopsis 

This is a letter expressing condolences and describing the author’s situation in Afghanistan. The 

letter is written by an individual named Abd al-Hamid and is addressed to a man named Abu alQayim. 

Key Themes 

The letter consists of two main parts. The first includes Abd al-Hamid’s expression of condolences 

to Abu al-Qayim although it is unclear what exactly happened. Regardless, al-Hamid urges him to 

keep his faith and maintain his devotion to God and religion. 

The second part consists of Abd al-Hamid’s description of his situation in Afghanistan. He 

characterizes his circumstances as generally bad and identifies strained relations with the local 

people as the main reason. According to the letter, the problem stems from differing opinions of the 

“Taliban government.” Al-Hamid later notes, the people see the Taliban as righteous and devoted 

to God while the he and his colleagues see them as unbelievers and apostates. 

The disagreement appears to have been exacerbated by a letter, written by al-Hamid, on the topic 

of whether or not apostates and unbelievers may participate in fighting. Though the letter was 

intended to bring the Taliban back in line with orthodoxy the unintended result was increased 

“insolence and alienation” among the local population and the launch of a smear campaign by the 

Taliban in a book, written by Sheik Abu Qutada, bearing the title: “Alliance in Exposing the Fighters 

Who Do Not Adhere to the Principles of Religion.” 

Al-Hamid, in the letter, comments that he responded with a reasoned rebuttal in his own book, 

“Verification and Evidence in Refuting the Author of Alliances of the Righteous.” However, at the 

time of writing to al-Qayim the relationship with the people and the Taliban remains strained as 

evidenced by al-Hamid and his followers being branded “passing apostate-dogs and sinners.” 

63
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-601693 

Date: Unknown 

Author: Abu Mus’ab 

Length: 2 pages 

Title: Status of Jihad 

Synopsis: A letter from Abu Mus’ab to Abu Mohammed relating a meeting with Abu Musab 

Zarqawi. The author and Zarqawi agree that the Muslims fighting in Bosnia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, 

and Kashmir are polytheists and supporters of secular democracy, and that the Taliban are a front 

for Pakistan. 

Key Themes: Zarqawi tells Abu Mus’ab that he is branded as takfir because of his views about the 

Musims in Bosnia, Tajikistan, Chechnya, and Kashmir. 

The Muslims in those areas interests are in secular democracy, and they are all too willing to seek 

accommodation with secular power. 

64
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-602181 

Date: Unknown 

Author: Unknown 

Length: 2 pages 

Title: Political Speculation 

Synopsis: This document is a response to issues raised in a previous correspondence. It appears 

to be addressed to Al-Sahal Al-Mumtan’, but this could be the author’s name. The author is 

analyzing the impact of the destruction of the Buddha statues, the fall of the Taliban regime, and 

speculates on future U.S. steps in the Middle East. 

Key Themes: The author concurs with his correspondent in stating a low opinion of the Taliban. 

The Taliban has a “mentality based on fabrications, wrongdoing, beating around the bush and 

running away from reality.” The destruction of the Buddha statues is judged insignificant in 

comparison to the desire of some Taliban to gain respectability by taking a seat in the United 

Nations. 

The author disagrees concerning Iranian leadership of the Islamic movement. He asks: “How can it 

fulfill the leadership role when it is incapable of guiding the Islamic insurgency?” He encourages 

Iran to attack Israel, and speculates that the U.S. is planning to attack Iran to protect Israel. 

The final paragraph expresses a change in tone with admiration expressed for the Taliban for 

destroying the Buddha statues and protecting Osama bin Laden. 

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Doc ID: AFGP-2002-800581 

Author: Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi 

Title: Abu Ata Al-Sharqi Reports from Afghanistan 

Date: September 4, 1994 

Length: 3 pages 

Synopsis 

Abu 'Ata Al-Sharqi reports in a letter the situation before he and other al-Qaeda operatives leave 

Afghanistan. He expresses satisfaction that Fayez Muhammad is experiencing problems after 

causing al-Qaeda hardship in some way, and asks to be allowed to finish the Furqan project by 

training a group of Uzbeks before he leaves Afghanistan for Sudan. 

Key Themes 

Al-Sharqi acknowledges the order to evacuate Afghanistan, and thinks the order is for the best. He 

is sorry to leave, regarding Afghanistan as a paradise, with ample opportunities to see the fruits of 

their labors (comparable to Sudan), but also as a place with difficult conditions. 

Three recent incidents have made Al-Sharqi happy: 

1. The Vice President of Al-Jama't Al-Islamiyah visited Al-Badr Camp, and agreed with AlSharqi and his associates that "such incidents" should not happen, nor is this the way they 

should communicate. He would go to Al-Ghond himself to resolve the situation. 

2. Al-Sharqi and his associates visited Kabul and Hikmetyar's headquarters to deny that alQaeda had given any weapons to Massoud (it had actually gone to Al-Nahda party), and to 

discuss their problem with Al-Ghond. Hikmetyar's people agreed that Fayez Muhammad 

(apparently the person behind the "incident") was corrupt, and might have to be killed. 

3. Fayez Muhammad was protecting fellow Manakel tribe members built houses in violation of 

the government of Khost's regulations, but backed down in the face of the government's 

threats to attack Matoon citadel and kick the party out of Khost. 

Al-Sharqi expresses his satisfaction that Fayez Muhammad is experiencing such misfortune in light 

of what he did to them. 

The Al-Qaeda operatives' mission was to help with the Furqan project. Previously, they had trained 

a class of Tajiks at al-Farouq camp, and had the opportunity to train Uzbeks as well. Abu Walid, an 

associate of Al-Sharqi, is strongly in favor of training the Uzbeks since the opportunity may not 

arise again. Eventually, they agree to do it as long as the Uzbeks arrive within two months, pending 

a decision from the al-Qaeda leadership, which Al-Sharqi asks for. He asks the recipient of the 

leader to prepare a stand or cart for him (for business) in Khartoum in anticipation of his arrival 

there. 

66
Doc ID: AFGP-2002-801138

Length: 332 pages 

Date: various dates in 2000 

Title: Personal Notebook 

Author: Unknown 

Synopsis 

The document appears to be Usama Bin Laden’s personal notebook or that of an individual in 

close contact with Bin Laden. The contents cover a broad range of topics such as meeting notes, 

to-do lists, lecture notes, letter drafts, shopping lists and questions addressed to training camp 

lecturers. 

Key Themes 

While the notebook contains assorted notes on various topics, the bulk of the document records 

approximately 270 different questions posed by mujahidin training camp participants to their 

instructors, covering a wide variety of topics ranging from the jihads in Chechnya and Uzbekistan, 

geographical questions and requests for clarification on theological points. Of special interest is 

the table on page 194 classifying 16 different question topics addressed to Abu al-Waleed, Abu 

Hafs and Abu Abdullah following a course given by Abu Hafs. Each category is rated by the 

number of questions each topic received. The most popular questions from this table address 

political terminology, the United States, the New World Order, the Taliban and Arab Freedom 

Fighters and Yemen. 

Aside from the questions, the notebook contains a seemingly random assortment of notes on a 

wide range of topics. For example, page 25 contains a shopping list of classroom supplies and 

kitchen utensils including mango juice, envelopes, pens and napkins. Page 45 contains the 

minutes of a meeting held in September 2007 including Usama Bin Laden’s speaking points and a 

list of people attending the meeting. 

At other points in the book the author records the following: observing a reconnaissance plane at 

an estimated altitude of 7 kilometers above the compound; a calculation of each Muslim’s share of 

oil based on the amount of oil produced by the Islamic world. The daily share of a family of 8 

people is $30 while the daily individual share is $3.75; and a set of instructions for using an 

audio/video computer program for teaching classes. 

67
Doc ID: -- 

Author: “Atiyah” 

Title: Aityah’s Letter to Zarqawi 

Date: September 26, 2006 

Length: 7 pages 

Synopsis 

The identity of the letter’s author, “`Atiyah,” is unknown, but based on the contents of the letter he 

seems to be a highly placed al-Qa`ida leader who fought in Algeria in the early 1990s. `Atiyah's 

letter echoes many of the themes found in the October 2005 letter written to Zarqawi by al-Qa`ida’s 

deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri; indeed, it goes so far as to explicitly confirm the authenticity of that 

earlier letter. `Atiyah’s admonitions in this letter, like those of Zawahiri in his letter to Zarqawi, also 

dovetail with other publicly available texts by al-Qa`ida strategists. 

Key Themes 

Although `Atiyah praises Zarqawi’s military success against coalition forces in Iraq, he is most 

concerned with Zarqawi’s failure to understand al-Qa`ida’s broader strategic objective: attracting 

mass support among the wider Sunni Muslim community. `Atiyah reminds Zarqawi that military 

actions must be subservient to al-Qa`ida’s long-term political goals. Zarqawi’s use of violence 

against popular Sunni leaders, according to `Atiyah, is undermining al-Qa`ida’s ability to win the 

“hearts of the people.” 

 

According to `Atiyah, Zarqawi’s widening scope of operations, culminating with the November 2005 

hotel bombings in Amman, Jordan, has alienated fellow Sunnis and reduced support for the global 

al-Qa`ida movement. In this vein, `Atiyah instructs Zarqawi to avoid killing popular Iraqi Sunni 

leaders because such actions alienate the very populations that al-Qa`ida seeks to attract to its 

cause. `Atiyah also encourages Zarqawi to forge strategic relationships with moderate Sunnis, 

particularly tribal and religious leaders, even if these leaders do not accept Zarqawi’s religious 

positions. 

`Atiyah instructs Zarqawi to follow orders from Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri on major 

strategic issues, such as initiating a war against Shiites; undertaking large-scale operations; or 

operating outside of Iraq. `Atiyah goes on to criticize Zarqawi’s board of advisors in Iraq for their 

lack of adequate political and religious expertise, and he warns Zarqawi against the sin of 

arrogance. Because al-Qa`ida is in what `Atiyah calls a “stage of weakness,” `Atiyah urges Zarqawi 

to seek counsel from wiser men in Iraq— implying that there might be someone more qualified than 

Zarqawi to command al-Qa`ida operations in Iraq. 

 

`Atiyah closes with a request that Zarqawi send a messenger to “Waziristan” (likely, Waziristan, 

Pakistan) in order to establish a reliable line of communication with Bin Laden and Zawahiri. 

`Atiyah confirms in the letter that al-Qa`ida’s overall communications network has been severely 

disrupted and complains specifically that sending communications to Zarqawi from outside of Iraq 

remains difficult. Interestingly, he explains how Zarqawi might use jihadi discussion forums to 

communicate with al-Qa`ida leadership in Waziristan. 

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`Atiyah’s unequivocal confirmation of the Zawahiri letter’s legitimacy, his authoritative tone, and his 

insider knowledge, indicate that he is among the highest ranking leaders in al-Qa`ida. But unlike 

most of al-Qa`ida’s known senior leadership, who remain isolated in the tribal areas of Pakistan or 

under house arrest in Iran, `Atiyah appears to have remarkable freedom of movement and a 

functional communication network. 

69
Doc ID: - - 

Length: 13 pages 

Date: July 9, 2005 (Jumada al-Thani, 1426) 

Title: Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi 

Author: Ayman al-Zawahiri 

Synopsis 

A letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, written in Afghanistan, to Abu Musam al-Zarqawi, head of alQai’da in Iraq, in which the author presents his strategy of winning the jihad in Iraq. Zawahiri 

emphasizes that achieving al-Qai’da’s main goal in Iraq, establishing a caliphate and extending the 

jihad to the greater Middle East, is as much a political as a military struggle in which all actions, 

military or otherwise, have political significance. Therefore, more attention should be given to the 

political efforts of building unity with the Muslim people (umma), the Muslim scholars (ulema) and 

the mujahidin. Further, any actions, which cause disarray among these groups, should be avoided. 

Key Themes 

The letter addresses the political situation in Iraq and advocates measures, which will foster unity 

among al-Qa’ida’s supporters or attract new followers. Zawahiri presents his argument by first 

listing al-Qai’da’s 4-point goal in Iraq: 

1. Expel the Americans from Iraq. 

2. Establish an Islamic authority and develop it into a caliphate, extending influence over as 

much Iraqi territory as possible. 

3. Extend the jihad to Iraq’s secular neighbors. 

4. Extend the jihad to Israel. 

He explains that the long-term goals (points 3 and 4) are impossible to attain without first achieving 

the short-term goals (points 1 and 2). Zawahiri then explains his conviction that in order to achieve 

the long-term goals al-Qai’da must immediately begin to address the political side of the conflict so 

as not to lose the short-term goals. Only by using their most powerful weapon, namely, the popular 

support of the umma in Iraq and neighboring countries will al-Qa’ida be ready for the inevitable 

withdrawal of American forces. 

According to Zawahiri, the only way to garner popular support is to make every effort to avoid 

actions, which the umma does not understand or approve. In order to avoid such actions Zawahiri 

offers five main strategies: 

1. Consult as many factions as possible in governance and decision making. 

2. Create unity among the mujahidin. 

3. Strive for unity with the ulema. 

4. Do not attack the Shi’a. 

5. Minimize excessive violence. 

Strategy 1

Zawahiri advises Zarqawi to strive for unity with the people of Iraq because he believes the 

American forces may leave Iraq sooner than anticipated. In order not to be marginalized by other 

political elements Zarqawi is advised to begin laying the groundwork so that he may be ready. In 

order to accomplish this goal Zawahiri suggests including tribal and political leaders in al-Qa’ida 

decision making as much as possible. The letter invokes the example of the Taliban regime in 

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71

Afghanistan as a negative example in order to illustrate this point by noting restrictions to 

participation in the government to students and the people of Kandahar. In the end, according to 

Zawahiri, when the Americans invaded, the Afghan people did not have a strong affiliation to the 

Taliban and did not defend the regime. Therefore, if they are to enjoy a broad base of support in 

Iraq al-Qa’ida must strive to include as many political groups as possible in a coalition. 

 

Strategy 2

Zarqawi is instructed to foster unity among the mujahidin. Zawahiri argues that any division among 

the mujahidin will lead to divisions among the umma. Therefore, every effort should be made avoid 

conflict. 

Strategy 3

The umma’s perception of Al-Qa’ida’s relationship to the ulema is also important. Zawahiri calls 

Zarqawi to avoid highlighting doctrinal differences or making disparaging remarks about specific 

scholars, which the general public does not understand. As the ulema are a symbol of Islam, 

people may come to believe that religion and its adherents are unimportant if public denunciations 

and doctrinal differences are highlighted. In Zawahiri’s opinion, the loss of faith is a greater 

detriment to al-Qa’ida’s cause than any benefit gained from criticizing a particular theologian. 

The example of Mullah Muhammad Omar, Taliban leader in Afghanistan, is invoked to illustrate his 

point. He notes that Omar himself is a Hanafi adherent of the Matridi doctrine. Yet he did not draw 

attention to theological distinctions in the time of jihad. Zawahiri also argues that differences 

between religious doctrines will require generations to correct once the caliphate has been 

established. Therefore, the mujahidin should not concern themselves with solving these 

differences but concentrate on accomplishing the fundamental goals for Iraq. 

Strategy 4

Al-Qa’ida’s treatment of the Shi’a is another key element in fostering unity among the umma. 

According to the letter, Zarqawi is justified in attacking the Shi’a given the inevitability of a SunniShi’a clash, the Shi’a’s cooperation with America during the invasion of Afghanistan and the error 

of Shi’a beliefs. However, Zawahiri notes that the majority of Muslims do not understand these 

differences. Thus, the unity with the umma will be preserved by not attacking the Shi’a or 

highlighting doctrinal differences. Additionally, Zawahiri thinks that the threat of Iranian intervention 

on behalf of Iraqi Shi’a is a compelling reason to exercise restraint. 

Strategy 5

Avoidance of unnecessary bloodshed is important for encouraging unity. Zarqawi is reminded that 

he is engaged in a struggle, which is being displayed in the news media and that the umma often 

does not comprehend the reasons for excessive violence seen in the media, though the actions are 

justified. Therefore, Zarqawi must refrain from excessive violence.