21162 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 82 / Monday, April 30, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

(e)(1) Certain Media 

(e)(1)(i) 

1. Internet advertisements. The exemption 

for advertisements made through broadcast 

or electronic media does not extend to 

[advertisements made by electronic 

communication, such as] advertisements 

posted on the Internet or sent by e-mail. 

* * * * * 

By order of the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System, April 20, 2007. 

Jennifer J. Johnson, 

Secretary of the Board. 

[FR Doc. E7–7873 Filed 4–27–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 6210–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 25 

[Docket No. NM375 Special Conditions No. 

25–07–10–SC] 

Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787–

8 Airplane; Lithium Ion Battery 

Installation 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: This notice proposes special 

conditions for the Boeing Model 787–8 

airplane. This airplane will have novel 

or unusual design features when 

compared to the state of technology 

envisioned in the airworthiness 

standards for transport category 

airplanes. The Boeing Model 787–8 

airplanes will use high capacity lithium 

ion battery technology in on-board 

systems. For this design feature, the 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards. These proposed 

special conditions contain the 

additional safety standards that the 

Administrator considers necessary to 

establish a level of safety equivalent to 

that established by the existing 

airworthiness standards. Additional 

special conditions will be issued for 

other novel or unusual design features 

of the Boeing Model 787–8 airplanes. 

DATES: Comments must be received on 

or before June 14, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: Comments on this proposal 

may be mailed in duplicate to: Federal 

Aviation Administration, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, Attention: Rules 

Docket (ANM–113), Docket No. NM375, 

1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; or delivered in 

duplicate to the Transport Airplane 

Directorate at the above address. All 

comments must be marked Docket No. 

NM375. Comments may be inspected in 

the Rules Docket weekdays, except 

Federal holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 

4 p.m. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Nazih Khaouly, FAA, Airplane & Flight 

Crew Interface Branch, ANM–111, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2432; 

facsimile (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

The FAA invites interested persons to 

participate in this rulemaking by 

submitting written comments, data, or 

views. The most helpful comments 

reference a specific portion of the 

special conditions, explain the reason 

for any recommended change, and 

include supporting data. We ask that 

you send us two copies of written 

comments. 

We will file in the docket all 

comments we receive as well as a report 

summarizing each substantive public 

contact with FAA personnel concerning 

these proposed special conditions. The 

docket is available for public inspection 

before and after the comment closing 

date. If you wish to review the docket 

in person, go to the address in the 

ADDRESSES section of this notice 

between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change the proposed special 

conditions based on comments we 

receive. 

If you want the FAA to acknowledge 

receipt of your comments on this 

proposal, include with your comments 

a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on 

which the docket number appears. We 

will stamp the date on the postcard and 

mail it back to you. 

Background 

On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied 

for an FAA type certificate for its new 

Boeing Model 787–8 passenger airplane. 

The Boeing Model 787–8 airplane will 

be an all-new, two-engine jet transport 

airplane with a two-aisle cabin. The 

maximum takeoff weight will be 

476,000 pounds, with a maximum 

passenger count of 381 passengers. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, 

Boeing must show that Boeing Model 

787–8 airplanes (hereafter referred to as 

‘‘the 787’’) meet the applicable 

provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as 

amended by Amendments 25–1 through 

25–117, except §§ 25.809(a) and 25.812, 

which will remain at Amendment 25–

115. If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations do 

not contain adequate or appropriate 

safety standards for the 787 because of 

a novel or unusual design feature, 

special conditions are prescribed under 

provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the 787 must comply with 

the fuel vent and exhaust emission 

requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the 

noise certification requirements of part 

36. In addition, the FAA must issue a 

finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant 

to section 611 of Public Law 92–574, the 

‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’

Special conditions, as defined in 

§ 11.19, are issued in accordance with 

§ 11.38 and become part of the type 

certification basis in accordance with 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under the provisions of § 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The 787 will incorporate a number of 

novel or unusual design features. 

Because of rapid improvements in 

airplane technology, the applicable 

airworthiness regulations do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for these design features. These 

proposed special conditions for the 787 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

The 787 design includes planned use 

of lithium ion batteries for the following 

applications: 

• Main and Auxiliary Power Unit 

(APU) Battery/Battery Charger System 

• Flight Control Electronics 

• Emergency Lighting System 

• Recorder Independent Power 

Supply 

Large, high capacity, rechargeable 

lithium ion batteries are a novel or 

unusual design feature in transport 

category airplanes. This type of battery 

has certain failure, operational, and 

maintenance characteristics that differ 

significantly from those of the nickelcadmium and lead-acid rechargeable 

batteries currently approved for 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 82 / Monday, April 30, 2007 / Proposed Rules 21163 

installation on large transport category 

airplanes. The FAA is proposing this 

special condition to require that (1) All 

characteristics of the lithium ion battery 

and its installation that could affect safe 

operation of the 787 are addressed, and 

(2) appropriate maintenance 

requirements are established to ensure 

the availability of electrical power from 

the batteries when needed. 

Background 

The current regulations governing 

installation of batteries in large 

transport category airplanes were 

derived from Civil Air Regulations 

(CAR) part 4b.625(d) as part of the recodification of CAR 4b that established 

14 CFR part 25 in February, 1965. The 

new battery requirements, 14 CFR 

25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), basically 

reworded the CAR requirements. 

Increased use of nickel-cadmium 

batteries in small airplanes resulted in 

increased incidents of battery fires and 

failures. This led to additional 

rulemaking affecting large transport 

category airplanes as well as small 

airplanes. On September 1, 1977, and 

March 1, 1978, respectively the FAA 

issued 14 CFR 25.1353c(5) and c(6), 

governing nickel-cadmium battery 

installations on large transport category 

airplanes. 

The proposed use of lithium ion 

batteries for the emergency lighting 

system on the 787 has prompted the 

FAA to review the adequacy of these 

existing regulations. Our review 

indicates that existing regulations do 

not adequately address several failure, 

operational, and maintenance 

characteristics of lithium ion batteries 

that could affect the safety and 

reliability of the 787’s lithium ion 

battery installation. 

At present, there is limited experience 

with use of rechargeable lithium ion 

batteries in applications involving 

commercial aviation. However, other 

users of this technology, ranging from 

wireless telephone manufacturing to the 

electric vehicle industry, have noted 

safety problems with lithium ion 

batteries. These problems include 

overcharging, over-discharging, and 

flammability of cell components. 

1. Overcharging 

In general, lithium ion batteries are 

significantly more susceptible to 

internal failures that can result in selfsustaining increases in temperature and 

pressure (thermal runaway) than their 

nickel-cadmium or lead-acid 

counterparts. This is especially true for 

overcharging, which causes heating and 

destabilization of the components of the 

cell, leading to formation (by plating) of 

highly unstable metallic lithium. The 

metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in 

a self-sustaining fire or explosion. 

Finally, the severity of thermal runaway 

from overcharging increases with 

increasing battery capacity, because of 

the higher amount of electrolytes in 

large batteries. 

2. Over-Discharging 

Discharge of some types of lithium 

ion batteries beyond a certain voltage 

(typically 2.4 volts) can cause corrosion 

of the electrodes of the cell, resulting in 

loss of battery capacity that cannot be 

reversed by recharging. This loss of 

capacity may not be detected by the 

simple voltage measurements 

commonly available to flightcrews as a 

means of checking battery status. This is 

a problem shared with nickel-cadmium 

batteries. 

3. Flammability of Cell Components 

Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid 

batteries, some types of lithium ion 

batteries use liquid electrolytes that are 

flammable. The electrolytes can serve as 

a source of fuel for an external fire, if 

there is a breach of the battery 

container. 

These problems experienced by users 

of lithium ion batteries raise concern 

about use of these batteries in 

commercial aviation. The intent of these 

proposed special conditions is to 

establish appropriate airworthiness 

standards for lithium ion battery 

installations in the 787 and to ensure, as 

required by 14 CFR 25.601, that these 

battery installations are not hazardous 

or unreliable. To address these 

concerns, these proposed special 

conditions adopt the following 

requirements: 

• Those sections of 14 CFR 25.1353 

that are applicable to lithium ion 

batteries. 

• The flammable fluid fire protection 

requirements of 14 CFR 25.863. In the 

past, this rule was not applied to 

batteries of transport category airplanes, 

since the electrolytes used in lead-acid 

and nickel-cadmium batteries are not 

flammable. 

• New requirements to address the 

hazards of overcharging and overdischarging that are unique to lithium 

ion batteries. 

• New maintenance requirements to 

ensure that batteries used as spares are 

maintained in an appropriate state of 

charge. 

These proposed special conditions are 

similar to special conditions adopted for 

the Airbus A380 (71 FR 74755); 

December 13, 2006). 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these proposed 

special conditions are applicable to the 

787. Should Boeing apply at a later date 

for a change to the type certificate to 

include another model incorporating the 

same novel or unusual design features, 

these proposed special conditions 

would apply to that model as well 

under the provisions of § 21.101. 

Conclusion 

This action would affect only certain 

novel or unusual design features of the 

787. It is not a rule of general 

applicability, and it would affect only 

the applicant that applied to the FAA 

for approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting 

and recordkeeping requirements. 

The authority citation for these 

Special Conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Proposed Special Conditions 

Accordingly, the Administrator of the 

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

proposes the following special 

conditions as part of the type 

certification basis for the Boeing Model 

787–8 airplane. 

In lieu of the requirements of 14 CFR 

25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), the following 

special conditions apply. Lithium ion 

batteries on the Boeing Model 787–8 airplane 

must be designed and installed as follows: 

(1) Safe cell temperatures and pressures 

must be maintained during any foreseeable 

charging or discharging condition and during 

any failure of the charging or battery 

monitoring system not shown to be extremely 

remote. The lithium ion battery installation 

must preclude explosion in the event of those 

failures. 

(2) Design of the lithium ion batteries must 

preclude the occurrence of self-sustaining, 

uncontrolled increases in temperature or 

pressure. 

(3) No explosive or toxic gases emitted by 

any lithium ion battery in normal operation, 

or as the result of any failure of the battery 

charging system, monitoring system, or 

battery installation not shown to be 

extremely remote, may accumulate in 

hazardous quantities within the airplane. 

(4) Installations of lithium ion batteries 

must meet the requirements of 14 CFR 

25.863(a) through (d). 

(5) No corrosive fluids or gases that may 

escape from any lithium ion battery may 

damage surrounding structure or any 

adjacent systems, equipment, or electrical 

wiring of the airplane in such a way as to 

cause a major or more severe failure 

condition, in accordance with 14 CFR 

25.1309(b) and applicable regulatory 

guidance. 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL
21164 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 82 / Monday, April 30, 2007 / Proposed Rules 

(6) Each lithium ion battery installation 

must have provisions to prevent any 

hazardous effect on structure or essential 

systems caused by the maximum amount of 

heat the battery can generate during a short 

circuit of the battery or of its individual cells. 

(7) Lithium ion battery installations must 

have a system to control the charging rate of 

the battery automatically, so as to prevent 

battery overheating or overcharging, and, 

(i) A battery temperature sensing and overtemperature warning system with a means for 

automatically disconnecting the battery from 

its charging source in the event of an overtemperature condition, or, 

(ii) A battery failure sensing and warning 

system with a means for automatically 

disconnecting the battery from its charging 

source in the event of battery failure. 

(8) Any lithium ion battery installation 

whose function is required for safe operation 

of the airplane must incorporate a monitoring 

and warning feature that will provide an 

indication to the appropriate flight 

crewmembers whenever the state-of-charge of 

the batteries has fallen below levels 

considered acceptable for dispatch of the 

airplane. 

(9) The Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness required by 14 CFR 25.1529 

must contain maintenance requirements for 

measurements of battery capacity at 

appropriate intervals to ensure that batteries 

whose function is required for safe operation 

of the airplane will perform their intended 

function as long as the battery is installed in 

the airplane. The Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness must also contain procedures 

for the maintenance of lithium ion batteries 

in spares storage to prevent the replacement 

of batteries whose function is required for 

safe operation of the airplane with batteries 

that have experienced degraded charge 

retention ability or other damage due to 

prolonged storage at a low state of charge. 

Note: These special conditions are not 

intended to replace 14 CFR 25.1353(c) in the 

certification basis of the Boeing 787–8 

airplane. These special conditions apply only 

to lithium ion batteries and their 

installations. The requirements of 14 CFR 

25.1353(c) remain in effect for batteries and 

battery installations of the Boeing 787–8 

airplane that do not use lithium ion batteries. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 23, 

2007. 

Stephen P. Boyd, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. E7–8186 Filed 4–27–07; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–28036; Directorate 

Identifier 2006–NM–278–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A330 and A340 Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), Department of 

Transportation (DOT). 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for the 

products listed above. This proposed 

AD results from mandatory continuing 

airworthiness information (MCAI) 

issued by an aviation authority of 

another country to identify and correct 

an unsafe condition on an aviation 

product. The MCAI describes the unsafe 

condition as failure of an evacuation 

slide raft to inflate, which could delay 

the evacuation of passengers in case of 

an emergency. The proposed AD would 

require actions that are intended to 

address the unsafe condition described 

in the MCAI. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by May 30, 2007. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• DOT Docket Web Site: Go to http:// 

dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions 

for sending your comments 

electronically. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 

Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–

0001. 

• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 

400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

• Federal Rulemaking Portal: http:// 

www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://dms.dot.gov; or in 

person at the Docket Management 

Facility between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., 

Monday through Friday, except Federal 

holidays. The AD docket contains this 

proposed AD, the regulatory evaluation, 

any comments received, and other 

information. The street address for the 

Docket Office (telephone (800) 647–

5227) is in the ADDRESSES section. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim 

Backman, Aerospace Engineer, ANM–

116, International Branch, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, FAA, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2797; 

fax (425) 227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Streamlined Issuance of AD 

The FAA is implementing a new 

process for streamlining the issuance of 

ADs related to MCAI. This streamlined 

process will allow us to adopt MCAI 

safety requirements in a more efficient 

manner and will reduce safety risks to 

the public. This process continues to 

follow all FAA AD issuance processes to 

meet legal, economic, Administrative 

Procedure Act, and Federal Register 

requirements. We also continue to meet 

our technical decision-making 

responsibilities to identify and correct 

unsafe conditions on U.S.-certificated 

products. 

This proposed AD references the 

MCAI and related service information 

that we considered in forming the 

engineering basis to correct the unsafe 

condition. The proposed AD contains 

text copied from the MCAI and for this 

reason might not follow our plain 

language principles. 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2007–28036; Directorate Identifier 

2006–NM–278–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

dms.dot.gov, including any personal 

information you provide. We will also 

post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

The European Aviation Safety Agency 

(EASA), which is the Technical Agent 

for the Member States of the European 

Community, has issued EASA 

Airworthiness Directive 2006–0354, 

dated November 28, 2006 (referred to 

after this as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an 


jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL