21-6341 

Rokhvadze v. Garland

BIA

Hochul, IJ

A213 314 978

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY 

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL 

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY 

COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 

Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of July, two thousand twentyfour. 

PRESENT: 

JON O. NEWMAN,

GERARD E. LYNCH,

JOSEPH F. BIANCO,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________

GOCHA ROKHVADZE, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 21-6341

NAC

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Sam H. Hasan, Esq., Hasan Law Group, 

PLLC, Falls Church, VA. 
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FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General; Julie M. Iversen, Senior 

Litigation Counsel; Kathryn McKinney, 

Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 

United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED. 

Petitioner Gocha Rokhvadze, a native and citizen of Georgia, seeks review 

of a May 12, 2021 decision of the BIA, affirming a May 21, 2020 decision of an 

Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied his motion to reopen removal 

proceedings. In re Gocha Rokhvadze, No. A213 314 978 (B.I.A. May 12, 2021), aff’g

No. A213 314 978 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo May 21, 2020). We assume the parties’ 

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. 

The only decision before us is the BIA’s decision affirming the IJ’s denial of 

Rokhvadze’s motion to reopen, because his challenges to the underlying decisions 

denying him a continuance and ordering removal are untimely. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(1) (“The petition for review must be filed not later than 30 days after the 

date of the final order of removal.”); Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir. 2005)

(per curiam). A “motion to reopen shall state the new facts that will be proven at 
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a hearing to be held if the motion is granted, and shall be supported by affidavits 

or other evidentiary material.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(B). The agency may deny 

a motion to reopen if the movant fails to establish prima facie eligibility for the 

underlying relief sought or the movant does not submit “previously unavailable, 

material evidence.” INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 

1003.2(c)(1) (“A motion to reopen proceedings shall not be granted unless it 

appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not 

available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former 

hearing[.]”), 1003.23(b)(3) (same as to IJ). “[I]n reviewing the BIA’s determination 

of whether previously unavailable evidence supported the [movant’s] motion to 

reopen, we must inquire whether the evidence could have been presented at the 

hearing before the IJ.” Norani v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 2006) (per 

curiam). 

Rokhvadze does not challenge the agency’s determination that he failed to 

submit new, previously unavailable evidence in support of his motion to reopen. 

Because the agency’s finding that Rokhvadze failed to present new, previously 

unavailable evidence was an independent ground for denying his motion to 

reopen, see Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(1), 1003.23(b)(3), his failure 
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to challenge that finding here is dispositive. See Debique v. Garland, 58 F.4th 676,

684–85 (2d Cir. 2023) (per curiam). Accordingly, we need not reach his challenge 

to the BIA’s alternate finding that he did not establish his prima facie eligibility for 

asylum. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general 

rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision 

of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”). 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending 

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 

Clerk of Court