Filed 8/8/22 Pickpocket v. Pittman CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

PICKPOCKET, LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

MATTHEW PITTMAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

B313086

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 20STCV32071)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Offices of Olaf J. Muller and Olaf J. Muller for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Ivie McNeill Wyatt Purcell & Diggs, Rodney S. Diggs and 

Antonio K. Kizzie for Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________
2

Pickpocket, LLC (Pickpocket) and its members, Michael 

Glasz, Zach Wechter and Misha Kornai, brought this action 

alleging that former member and manager Matthew Pittman 

(Matt)1 misused Pickpocket funds. During his business dealings 

with Pickpocket, Matt had provided a Montana driver’s license 

and an address in Venice, California. Pickpocket’s attorney Olaf 

Muller mailed a copy of the summons and complaint to the 

Montana address on Matt’s driver’s license. Matt moved to quash 

service of summons on the ground that he now lived in Germany. 

The trial court granted the motion on that basis, finding 

compliance with the Hague Convention was required but lacking.

Pickpocket and its members appeal, contending the trial 

court erred in finding that compliance with the Hague 

Convention was required. They further contend they properly 

effectuated service on Matt pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure2

section 415.40, which authorizes service of process by mail on 

persons outside California. We affirm the order quashing service.

BACKGROUND

Pickpocket is a California limited liability company which 

specializes in creating and producing videos for internet-based 

companies. On or about August 10, 2019, Glasz, Wechter and 

Kornai entered into an Operating Agreement for Pickpocket with 

Matt. Pursuant to this agreement, Matt was a member of 

Pickpocket and its manager.

1 Because we also refer to Matt’s father Danny Pittman 

throughout this opinion, we use the men’s first names for clarity.

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code 

of Civil Procedure.
3

On February 10, 2020, Glasz, Wechter and Kornai voted to 

terminate Matt as a member and manager, based on his misuse 

of Pickpocket funds. Among other things, Matt allegedly misused 

funds to “visit” Montana, to ship his personal DJ equipment to 

Germany, and to buy flowers for his girlfriend in Germany. Matt 

apparently paid back some but not all of the funds, and this 

lawsuit followed.

On August 25, 2020, appellants’ attorney Muller sent the 

summons and complaint in this matter to Matt at the Montana 

address shown on his Montana driver’s license by certified mail, 

return receipt requested. The copy of the license attached to 

Pickpocket’s counsel’s declaration shows an issue date of August 

5, 2019. Muller did not explain the source of this copy. On 

appeal, appellants represent that Matt had provided the license 

to Pickpocket “as part of their prior business dealings.” Matt also 

provided Pickpocket with an address in Venice, California.

Muller subsequently received a return receipt, but the 

receipt does not contain Matt’s signature. It contains random 

numbers and letters which appear to be a post office code of some 

sort. The address is in fact the residence of Matt’s father Danny 

Pittman (Danny). Danny stated under penalty of perjury that 

Matt had not lived with him for several years. According to 

Matt’s California lawyer, Antonio Kizzie, Danny sent the 

summons and complaint to Kizzie. After conferring with Matt, 

Kizzie filed a motion to quash. In a declaration supporting the 

motion, Matt stated under penalty of perjury that he currently 

lived in Germany. The trial court granted the motion to quash.
4

DISCUSSION

The court issued a minute order setting forth its ruling on 

the motion. The court first considered the service actually made 

in the United States, finding “Plaintiff served the Summons and 

Complaint (‘Summons’) on Defendant’s father, Danny Pittman 

(‘D. Pittman’), at D. Pittman’s address at 730 S. Orange St. in 

Missoula, Montana 59801 (‘Montana address’). . . . Plaintiffs 

received confirmation that the Summons had been received at the 

Montana Address via certified mail. . . . [¶] The Court notes that 

no proof of service has been filed regarding the Summons.”3

The court briefly summarized the positions of the parties

concerning this service. “Defendant argues that service at the 

Montana Address is defective. The Montana Address is not 

Defendant’s usual mailing address, regular place of business, 

usual place of abode, or usual place of business, and D. Pittman is 

not a member of Defendant’s household or in charge of 

Defendant’s affairs.” “In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that service 

was effectuated. In September 2020, Defendant’s counsel 

emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel stating he received the Summons that 

had been served at the Montana Address . . . . Plaintiffs contend 

that Defendant had actual notice. (In re Marriage of Tusinger

3 Appellants contend the facts in Muller’s declaration in 

opposition to the Motion to Quash constitute proof of service. We 

question whether a pleading which is not labelled a proof of 

service of summons, and which contains (sworn) facts buried 

within the pleading which shows the mailing of the summons and 

complaint, qualifies as proof of service under section 417.20. The 

trial court nevertheless considered the facts showing the delivery 

of summons and complaint to the Orange Street address. We 

discuss the contents of Muller’s declaration later in this opinion.
5

(1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 80, 82 [(Tusinger)].)”4 The court then 

stated: “Plaintiffs’ reliance on In re the Marriage of Tusinger is 

misplaced and inapplicable because it does not involve an 

internationally based party.”5

The trial court then turned to the subject of service in 

Germany. The court found: “Defendant’s domicile at the time he 

was served was in Germany. As such, the Court finds that

service at the Montana Address was improper. Defendant’s 

evidence shows that Defendant has established his own 

household in Germany, and that the Montana Address, which is 

on his driver’s license, does not reflect his dwelling house, usual 

place of abode or usual mailing address.”

The court explained: “Failure to comply with the Hague 

Convention procedures voids the service even though it was made 

in compliance with California law, and even though defendant 

had actual notice of the lawsuit. [Citations.] As such, the 

Defendant has not been properly served.”

4 Appellants accurately quoted Tusinger, which states that a 

plaintiff only has to show a defendant received “actual notice” of 

the summons and complaint for service pursuant to section 

415.40. (Tusinger, supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at p. 82.) As appellants 

now acknowledge on appeal, under Summers v. McClanahan

(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 403, 414, actual notice is not sufficient in 

and of itself.

5 On appeal, appellants complain of the trial court’s use of 

the term “internationally based party” because it is not found in 

any of California’s service statutes. In context, it is clear that the 

trial court simply meant a party who resided outside the United 

States. Use of the alternate wording in no way shows the trial 

court ignored or misconstrued the language of the service 

statutes.
6

Finally, the court ruled “Defendant’s request for an MSC 

that was requested concurrently with the Motion to Quash, did 

not constitute a general appearance. [Citations.]”

Appellants contend the trial court erred in granting the 

motion to quash. Appellants make two primary arguments: 

1) the Hague Convention does not apply because appellant did 

not serve Matt by transmitting documents abroad and 2) service 

on Matt at the Montana address was permissible pursuant to 

section 415.40 and was properly effectuated. Appellants also 

contend that Matt made a general appearance in this action, 

which relinquishes all objections to defective service of process.

“When the evidence of jurisdictional facts is not in dispute, 

the issue whether the defendant is subject to personal 

jurisdiction is a legal question subject to de novo review. 

[Citation.] When evidence of jurisdiction is in dispute, we accept 

the trial court’s resolution of factual issues, draw all reasonable 

inferences in support of the trial court’s order, and review the 

trial court’s determination of factual issues for substantial 

evidence.” (Burdick v. Superior Court (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 

8, 17.)

A. The Hague Convention Applies to Service under the Facts of 

This Case.

Appellants contend the Hague Convention does not apply to 

this action because they did not send the summons and complaint 

abroad, but only to Montana.

Application of the Hague Convention is not left to the 

discretion of a plaintiff. It applies when there is occasion to 

transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad. 

As the California Supreme Court recently explained, 

“whether ‘there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial 
7

document for service abroad’ ([Convention on the Service Abroad 

of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial 

Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, 362, T.I.A.S. No. 6638]) is 

determined by reference to the law of the sending forum, in this 

case California.” (Rockefeller Technology Investments (Asia) VII

v. Changzhou SinoType Technology Co., Ltd. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 

125, 138.)

California’s rules on service of process are based on the 

location of the person to be served and fall into one of three 

categories: 1) a person inside California; 2) a person outside 

California but within the United States; and 3) a person outside 

the United States. (§ 413.10.) When a person is outside the 

United States, California’s rules on service of process “are subject 

to the provisions of the Convention on the “ ‘Service Abroad of 

Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents’ in Civil or Commercial 

Matters (Hague Service Convention).” (§ 413.10, subd. (c).) 

Thus, as we have previously explained, when a defendant is a 

resident of a foreign country at the time service was attempted, 

“plaintiff was required to show that service of process on 

defendant comported with the Hague Convention regarding 

service on an individual in a foreign country, or a proper basis for 

why the Hague Convention did not apply.” (Lebel v. Mai (2012) 

210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160 (Lebel).)

The trial court made a factual finding that Matt’s domicile 

was in Germany. There is substantial evidence to support this 

finding in Danny’s declaration that Matt had not lived with him 

for several years and Matt’s declaration that he currently lives in 

Germany. In addition, documents offered by appellants in 

opposition support Matt’s statement. In a letter sent to Matt’s 

attorney in March 2020, appellants claimed Matt misused 
8

appellant’s funds to “visit” Montana, to ship his personal DJ 

equipment to Germany and to buy flowers for his girlfriend in 

Germany. In a March 2020 letter, Matt’s attorney wrote Matt 

“flew back to the states multiple times attempting to talk with 

you in person to no avail.”6

Appellants did offer evidence that Matt used the Orange 

Street address when he renewed his Montana driver’s license in 

August 2019, before he moved to Germany. Even assuming for 

the sake of argument that Matt should have, but did not, update 

his address with the Montana DMV or relinquish his Montana 

driver’s license when he subsequently moved to Germany, 

appellants did not provide any citations showing Montana law 

treated a person who moved out of state but failed to update or 

relinquish their driver’s licenses as continuing to be a Montana 

resident on the basis of the license address alone.7 At most, such 

failure might have been viewed by the trial court as evidence 

which conflicted with Matt’s statement that he resided in 

Germany. The trial court, however, resolved any such potential 

conflict in favor of Matt’s claim of German residency and since 

the trial court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, we 

uphold it.

Because Matt was a resident of Germany, appellants were 

required to show either compliance with the Hague Convention or 

6 This is consistent with Matt’s attorney’s representation in 

the trial court that Matt had moved to Germany to work and live 

with his fiancée.

7 We use the term resident because, in the trial court, 

appellants contended the address on the driver’s license was 

Matt’s “home address.” Appellants did not argue in the trial 

court that the Montana address was merely a mailing address.
9

“a proper basis for why the Hague Convention did not apply.” 

(Lebel, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.) Appellants contend 

that the Hague Convention does not apply when service under 

the laws of California may properly be effected in the forum 

nation, here, the United States. Appellants cite a number of such 

cases concerning service of process. (Severn v. Adidas 

Sportschuhfabriken (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 754, 763; Wissmiller v.

Lincoln Trail Motosports, Inc. (Ill.Ct.App. 1990) [552 N.E.2d 295]; 

Khachatryan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (C.D.Cal. 2008) 

578 F. Supp.2d 1224; Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.

Schlunk (1988) 486 U.S. 694, 696.) These cases involve personal 

service or service on a foreign corporation’s United States based 

subsidiary, general manager or agent for service of process and so 

do not assist appellants directly.

Appellants argue that section 415.40, which permits service 

on persons outside California “only requires that a plaintiff mail 

a Summons and Complaint to any mailing address for a 

defendant that is located outside of California but within the 

United States. After that, all a plaintiff needs to do is show that 

the defendant got the papers mailed to him.” Thus, appellants 

conclude, if a foreign resident defendant has “any” mailing 

address in the United States, the defendant may properly be 

served there, and compliance with the Hague Convention is not 

required.

The contention that “any” mailing address may be used for 

service under section 415.40 can only be characterized as absurd. 

A phrase this broad would include any address ever used by a 

person to receive mail, even if the person has not used that 

address in a decade or more and does not know any person 
10

currently present at that address.8 Not surprisingly, appellants 

have not cited any provision of California law governing service 

by mail for any purpose which permits the sender to use “any” 

mailing address for a person, and we are not aware of any such 

provision. We note that the broadest permissible range of 

mailing locations in the authorities cited on appeal is found in 

section 415.20, which permits mailing a copy of the summons and 

complaint to the “person's dwelling house, usual place of abode, 

usual place of business, or usual mailing address” as part of 

substitute service. (§ 415.20, subd. (b).)9

We see nothing in the language of section 415.40 which 

would permit the use of “any” mailing address. Section 415.40 

does not use the term “mailing address” at all, let alone the 

phrase “any mailing address.” It provides: “A summons may be 

8 Perhaps appellants believe the term “mailing address” 

itself contains inherent limitations, such as current use by the 

defendant, but they do not identify any such limitations.

9 Appellants contend the mailing requirements of section 

415.20 do not apply to section 415.40, and the trial court erred in 

ruling that appellants had to comply with them. We will assume 

for the sake of argument that this is the law. We agree the trial 

court used language similar to the language found in section 

415.20, but note the trial court did not refer to that section. The 

first use of the language simply involved the court summarizing 

Matt’s arguments. The second use came after the trial court had 

ruled that service at the Montana address was improper because 

Matt’s domicile was in Germany. We view it as mere surplusage. 

We have reviewed the court’s ruling de novo, and reach the same 

conclusion, but for slightly different reasons, that is, we find that 

service on the Montana address was not proper under section 

415.40 because Matt’s place of residence was in Germany.
11

served on a person outside this state . . . by sending a copy of the 

summons and of the complaint to the person to be served by firstclass mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt.” 

(§ 415.40, italics added.) When the person is in a foreign country, 

sending the summons and complaint “to the person” necessarily 

requires sending the summons and complaint to the foreign 

country. The Judicial Council Comment to section 415.40 

reinforces the requirement that the document be sent to the 

person’s physical location, explaining that the section requires 

the documents to be sent “to the person on whom service is 

desired, generally at his place of residence.” (Judicial Council of 

Cal., reprinted at Deering’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2015 ed.) foll. 

§ 415.40, p. 461, italics added.) In some instances, of course, such 

a location may not exist: for example, the person may have no 

fixed place of residence or the defendant may be a business or 

corporation which does not have a “place of residence” as that 

phrase is normally used. Since Matt does have a place of 

residence, and it is in Germany, that is where the summons and 

complaint must be sent.

We also note section 415.40 provides that service is 

“deemed complete on the 10th day after such mailing.” This 

provision is reasonable because California law presumes that a 

letter is received “in the ordinary course of mail” only if the letter 

is “correctly addressed.” (Evid. Code, § 641.) A letter cannot be 

“correctly” addressed to a person if the address is not the place 

where they live or work, or a place where they are currently and 

intentionally receiving mail. Appellants’ interpretation rejecting 

such inquiry into the correctness of the mailing address used for 

service would render the completeness clause unreasonable.
12

Appellants point to another paragraph of the Judicial 

Council Comment, which states: “This method of mail service 

may be used to deliver process only to a person who is outside 

this state. In some cases, however, process may eventually be 

forwarded and in fact delivered to the addressee within this 

state. For example, such person may have given appropriate 

instructions to someone to forward his mail to a place within this 

state, or the plaintiff knows only such person's out-of-state 

address. Regular communication by mail must, of course, exist 

between the place of mailing and the place of delivery. (Cf. [Cal.

Code Civ. Proc.,] § 1012.)”10 (Judicial Council of Cal., reprinted at 

Deering’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2015 ed.) foll. § 415.40, p. 461.) 

We think the focus of the comment is a scenario where a person 

who is outside California and so subject to service pursuant to 

section 415.40 for some reason actually receives the summons 

and complaint within California: the Judicial Council Comment 

makes clear that the person’s presence within California does not 

invalidate the service by mail.

The Judicial Council Comment does offer some support for 

service on a mailing address intentionally used by the person 

which does not reflect his physical location, if the summons and 

complaint is actually delivered to the person where he is 

physically located. Assuming for the sake of argument that is the 

case, appellants have not shown either such intentional use of a 

mailing address or such delivery here.

10 Section 1012 does expressly specify the permissible places 

of delivery under that section: “where the person on whom it is to 

be made resides or has his office.”
13

B. Even Assuming Actual Delivery of Process Is Sufficient to 

Effect Service, Appellants Have Not Shown Actual Delivery.

Appellants repeatedly state throughout their briefs that 

they offered evidence of “actual delivery” to Matt. It is not clear 

what they mean by “actual delivery.” At some points, they 

appear to contend that the receipt of the summons and complaint 

at the Orange Street address constituted “actual delivery” to 

Matt. They contend, for example, that “[n]either the statute nor 

the interpretive case law require the person receiving the mail at 

[Matt’s] mailing address to be [Matt] himself.” They also appear 

to contend that compliance with the procedures of section 415.40, 

together with their “proof of service” was sufficient to show 

“actual delivery of the paper to [Matt] under [section] 417.20.”

We agree there is no requirement that the defendant sign 

the return receipt. (See, e.g.,Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 

146 Cal.App.4th 488, 498.) When the defendant does not sign the 

receipt, “the California statutory scheme (Code Civ. Proc., 

§§ 415.40 and 417.20 read together) permits completion of service 

by mail when the return receipt is signed by a person so 

authorized by the defendant.” (Neadeau v. Foster (1982) 

129 Cal.App.3d 234, 236–237, fn. omitted; Cruz, at p. 498.) 

Appellants, however, did not present evidence that the receipt 

was signed by Matt or by someone authorized by him.11 Muller 

stated in his declaration (which he claimed was the proof of 

service) that the return receipt showed “Pittman had received the 

Summons packet” but this is contradicted by the attached receipt 

itself, which contains the notation “AD35C19” in the “Signature”

11 There is no evidence Danny was authorized by Matt to 

receive or sign for Matt’s mail. The lack of a signature on the 

return receipt suggests the opposite.
14

box and the letters “AD” in the “Received by” box. Section 417.20, 

subdivision (a), provides that “proof of service shall include 

evidence satisfactory to the court establishing actual delivery to 

the person to be served, by a signed return receipt or other 

evidence.” Appellants did not present a receipt “signed” by 

anyone as that term is normally understood.12

Section 417.20 does permit “other evidence” showing actual 

delivery to the person to be served, and at times appellants 

contend they have provided such evidence. They claim it is 

“undisputed that [Matt’s] father ‘forwarded’ the Plaintiffs’ 

Summons and Complaint packet to his son [Matt,]” and then 

later simply state as a fact that Danny “ ‘forwarded’ them to his 

son” Matt They provide no record citations to support this claim.

“ ‘When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by 

bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove

the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts 

requisite to an effective service.’ ” (Lebel, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 1160. (Floveyor Internat., Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 

59 Cal.App.4th 789, 793 (Floveyor).) Specifically, appellants 

must provide “evidence satisfactory to the court establishing 

actual delivery to the person to be served, by a signed return 

receipt or other evidence.” (§ 417.20, subd. (a).) Appellants are 

not entitled to rely on Danny’s failure to deny “forwarding” the 

summons and complaint to Matt, or on Matt’s failure to deny 

actual delivery, as evidence. A defendant may “stand mute” until 

the plaintiff “makes at least a prima facie showing of the validity 

12 Perhaps this was the reason the court found appellants had 

not filed a proof of service.
15

of service.” (Floveyor, at p. 794.)13 Appellants did not make a 

prima facie showing and did not meet their burden.

Appellants did not, as they claim, prove actual delivery to 

Matt through “sworn” admissions by Matt, his father Danny and 

Matt’s attorney in their declarations. The declarations of Matt, 

Danny and Kizzie describe delivery to Matt’s father Danny, and 

Danny’s forwarding of the documents to Kizzie.

Matt stated in his declaration: “It is my understanding that 

Plaintiffs attempted to serve me with a Summons and Complaint 

. . . by serving my father, Mr. Danny Lee Patrick Pittman (‘Mr. D. 

Pittman’) at 730 S. Orange St. in Missoula, Montana 59801.” 

Danny acknowledged receiving the summons and complaint, but 

does not state that he sent the documents to anyone. Matt and 

Danny both declared that Danny was not in charge of any of 

Matt’s affairs. Matt’s lawyer Kizzie stated in his declaration that 

he was attaching a true and correct copy of the “Summons and 

Complaint served upon Mr. Danny Pittman in Missoula, 

Montana.” He does not state that he received a copy from Matt.

Appellants are not correct that Kizzie admitted in an email 

sent on or around September 14, 2020 that Matt had received the 

13 We note that appellants, like the plaintiff in Floveyor, point 

to precedents which “involved circumstances where the 

defendants moving to quash service supported the motion with 

proof of defective service or lack of minimum contacts.” (Floveyor,

supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 793.) The fact that some defendants 

choose to proactively offer evidence in their motion showing 

defective service does not require other defendants to do so. As 

the court in Floveyor explained, the rule is that the plaintiff has 

the burden of proof and a defendant may “stand mute” unless and 

until the plaintiff “makes at least a prima facie showing of the 

validity of service.” (Id. at p. 794.)
16

summons and complaint or that Kizzie had received the 

summons and complaint from Matt. This email, attached as 

Exhibit 6 to Muller’s declaration in opposition to Matt’s motion to 

quash reads: “Please be advised that our firm has just been 

retained to defend Mr. [Matt] Pittman in this action, and received 

the Complaint that was served upon his father in Montana.” 

This is simply a statement that Kizzie’s law firm has “received 

the Complaint.” It cannot reasonably be understood as an 

admission that Matt had received the complaint. Appellants are 

mistaken in equating this email to the one before the court in 

Tusinger. There is no similarity between Kizzie’s email 

statement and the statement of the lawyer in Tusinger that he 

was “writing with reference to the divorce petition which 

[defendant] received a few days ago.” (Tusinger, supra,

170 Cal.App.3d at pp. 82–83.)

It is unclear what appellants mean when they claim that 

“Pittman even attached copies (!) of Plaintiffs’ Summons and 

Complaint . . to his Motion to Quash, which he had relayed to his 

counsel” and “Pittman literally attached copies of the Summons 

and Complaint that he received in the mail from Plaintiffs to his 

Motion to Quash. How can Pittman file a motion with exhibits 

attached that had been mailed to him . . . and then argue that he 

never received those same exhibits?” There is no evidence Matt 

sent the summons and complaint to Kizzie. If by “literally” 

appellants intend to suggest that Matt physically attached the 

documents to the motion, this borders on frivolous. There is 

absolutely no reason to think Matt had any physical involvement 

in the assembly of the motion to quash or Kizzie’s declaration 

which attached the summons and complaint as exhibits. As for 

Matt’s own declaration in support of the motion to quash, Matt 
17

filed a declaration expressly stating he was in Germany when he 

signed his original declaration in support of the motion. Kizzie’s 

possession of the summons and complaint does not show actual 

delivery to Matt.

Finally, appellants rely on Montana law to show that the 

address on the driver’s license was a “proper mailing address.” 

Appellants did not rely on Montana law in its opposition to the 

motion to quash and we question the relevance of this argument 

on appeal. They cite what appears to be a Montana 

administrative regulation pertaining to an original application 

for a driver’s license and a section of Montana statute apparently 

about a requirement to notify the Montana Department of Motor 

Vehicles of any change of address. They have not, however, 

asked us to take judicial notice of those laws, as is required for us 

to consider them. (See Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (a).) Accordingly, 

we do not consider that law.14

14 We note appellants have not offered any legal citation to 

support their contention that “Montana law itself makes clear 

that [Matt’s] Montana address functioned as a proper mailing 

address at which he could and was served with summons,” or its 

contention that “By holding onto his Montana address, [Matt] 

continues to be able to vote in Montana . . . and exercise similar 

Montana-state related rights and privileges.”

We also note that under California law, if appellants were 

relying on the address on Matt’s driver’s license, issued in August 

2019, as being the address on file with the Montana DMV in 

August 2020 when they mailed the summons and complaint to 

that address (and therefore a proper mailing address), the burden 

was on appellants to prove that fact.
18

C. Matt Did Not Make a General Appearance.

Appellants contend that an email which Kizzie sent to 

Muller introducing himself as Matt’s lawyer and indicating an 

intent to file a responsive pleading in the future constituted a 

general appearance and the trial court erred by “disregarding” 

this appearance. Perhaps the court “disregarded” this claim 

because appellants did not make it in the trial court.

Section 1014 provides: “A defendant appears in an action 

when he answers, demurs, . . . gives the plaintiff written notice of 

his appearance, or when an attorney gives notice of appearance 

for him.”

Appellants provide no legal authority or cogent reasoning 

to support their claim that an attorney’s introduction to opposing 

counsel as representing a party could constitute a notice of 

appearance. Generally, “the acts claimed to constitute a general 

appearance must amount to a showing of a ‘purpose of obtaining 

any ruling or order of the court going to the merits of the case.’ ”

(Chilcote v. Pacific Air Transport (1937) 24 Cal.App.2d 32, 35.)

A stipulation between attorneys to extend time is not a 

general appearance. (§418.10, subd. (d).)

Actually filing a responsive pleading does not constitute a 

general appearance unless the pleading is filed before any motion 

to quash. (§ 418.10, subd. (e) [noting this is an exception to 

§ 1014].) There is no basis to find that simply announcing an 

intent to file a responsive pleading constitutes an appearance 

when the filing itself need not.
19

DISPOSITION

The order quashing service of process is affirmed. 

Respondents are entitled to costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

HARUTUNIAN, J.

 Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.