Prior to the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 on March 1, 2003, Customs 1

was denominated United States Customs Service and fell under the jurisdiction of the United

States Treasury Department. Pursuant to the Act, however, Customs was divided and renamed

Slip-Op. 07-157

UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

____________________________________

:

HEARTLAND BY-PRODUCTS, INC., :

:

Plaintiff, :

: Before: Judith M. Barzilay, Judge

v. : Court No. 03-00307

:

UNITED STATES, :

:

Defendant. :

:

____________________________________:

OPINION

[Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted.]

Serko Simon Gluck & Kane LLP, Daniel J. Gluck and (Jerome L. Hanifin); DLA Piper Rudnick

Gray Cary, (Stanley McDermott) and Sarah J. Storken for Plaintiff.

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Barbara S. Williams, Attorney in Charge,

International Trade Field Office; (Aimee Lee), Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,

United States Department of Justice; Karen P. Binder and Yelena Slepak, Office of Assistant

Chief Counsel, International Trade Litigation, United States Customs and Border Protection, of

counsel, for Defendant United States.

Dated: October 30, 2007

BARZILAY, Judge: This case returns to the court on remand from the Federal Circuit,

and presents a unique opportunity to clarify the scope of the Court’s authority with respect to

judgments issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h). This opinion is the court’s fourth opinion

detailing Plaintiff’s troubled dealings with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) 1
Court No. 03-00307 Page 2

United States Customs and Border Protection and United States Immigration and Customs

Enforcement. Customs is now a part of the United States Department of Homeland Security. 

 For additional background information, see Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United States,

2

23 CIT 754, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (1999) (“Heartland I”); Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United

States, 264 F.3d 1126 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Heartland II”); Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v. United

States, 26 CIT 268, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (2002) (“Heartland III”); Heartland By-Prods., Inc. v.

United States, 28 CIT __, 341 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (2004) (“Heartland IV”); and Heartland ByProds., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Heartland V”). 

 The non-TRQ duty during the relevant period was 0.35 cents per liter compared to the 3

higher TRQ rate of 35.74 cents per kilogram. See Heartland V, 424 F.3d at 1246 n.2.

beginning in 1995 when it sought an advanced ruling regarding its plan to import sugar syrup

from Canada for further refining and ultimate sale to its U.S. customers. Plaintiff Heartland By- 2

Products, Inc. (“Heartland”), has moved for summary judgment to challenge Customs’ authority

to liquidate the subject entries at the Tariff Rate Quota (“TRQ”) rate following the reversal of 3

this court’s favorable pre-importation judgment under § 1581(h). See Heartland II, 264 F.3d at

1126. For the reasons discussed herein, Heartland’s motion for summary judgment is granted. 

I. Background

Heartland had plans to operate a plant that refined sugar syrup imported from Canada for

sale to its U.S. customers. Before entry of the sugar syrup at issue in this case, Heartland sought

an advance ruling from Customs regarding the classification of its prospective imports. See 19

C.F.R. § 177. On May 15, 1995, Customs issued New York Ruling Letter 810328 (“New York

Ruling Letter”), which classified the subject entries under subheading 1702.90.40 of the HTSUS,

one of the subheadings eligible for non-TRQ treatment. See Heartland I, 23 CIT at 760, 74 F.

Supp. 2d at 1332. Having obtained a favorable ruling, Heartland began importation and refining

operations in 1997. 
Court No. 03-00307 Page 3

 The revocation of the New York Ruling Letter would have taken effect on November 8, 4

1999 because 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) provides 60 days for importers to modify their practices

following an interpretive ruling. See § 1625(c).

 As Heartland petitioned this court for review well before November 8, 1999, the 5

Revocation Ruling never took effect. It was essentially suspended during the pre-importation

proceeding before this court. 

In response to a petition filed by domestic trade associations pursuant to 19 U.S.C.

§§ 1516 and 1625 seeking reclassification of Heartland’s entries, Customs published a notice of

proposed revocation of the New York Ruling Letter. See Proposed Revocation of Ruling Letter

& Treatment Relating to Tariff Classification of Certain Sugar Syrups, 33 Cust. Bull. No. 22/23,

at 56-57 (June 9, 1999). On September 8, 1999, Customs issued a final notice that revoked the

New York Ruling Letter and reclassified Heartland’s sugar syrup imports under 1702.90.10/20 of

the HTSUS to which the TRQ rate applied, effective November 8, 1999. See Revocation of 4

Ruling Letter & Treatment Relating to Tariff Classification of Certain Sugar Syrups, 33 Cust.

Bull. No. 35/36, at 41 (Sept. 8, 1999) (“Revocation Ruling”).

On September 20, 1999, Heartland filed a complaint in this court seeking pre-importation

review of the Revocation Ruling pursuant to § 1581(h). See Heartland I, 23 CIT at 754, 74 F.2d 5

at 1326; see discussion infra Part A (quoting text of § 1581(h)). One month later, this court

granted Heartland’s motion for judgment on the agency record. See id. at 777, 74 F. Supp. 2d at

1345. The court declared Custom’s Revocation Ruling unlawful, and concluded that Heartland’s

sugar syrup was properly classified under subheading 1702.90.40 of the HTSUS, as established

by the New York Ruling Letter. See id. at 760, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32. Customs appealed

this court’s ruling but did not request a stay of its judgment. See USCIT R. 62(d) & (e).
Court No. 03-00307 Page 4

Relying on Heartland I, Heartland continued to import sugar syrup into the United

States. On August 30, 2001, after the Supreme Court had decided United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Federal Circuit reversed Heartland I on the grounds that Customs,

while ineligible to receive Chevron deference, was entitled to deference under Skidmore

concerning its classification of sugar syrup. See Heartland II, 264 F.3d at 1133; see also Mead

Corp., 533 U.S. at 235; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,

843-44 (1984); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Heartland stopped importing

sugar syrup the following day. After denying Heartland’s petition for rehearing, the Federal

Circuit issued its mandate on December 4, 2001. “Customs, however, did not wait for the

mandate to issue before commencing full-scale liquidation and reliquidation of Heartland’s sugar

syrup entries at the TRQ rates. Beginning on October 5, 2001, Customs liquidated some 1,225

entries prior to the issuance of the mandate.” Heartland V, 424 F.3d at 1247. Shortly thereafter,

Customs liquidated or reliquidated an additional 3,874 entries made prior to Heartland II at the

TRQ rate. On the basis of Heartland II, Plaintiff then moved for entry of judgment, requesting

this court to determine the effective date of the Heartland I ruling and the propriety of Customs’

actions. 

[The Court] heard oral argument on Heartland’s motion for entry of judgment on

January 23, 2002. At oral argument, counsel for the government represented that

Heartland may establish jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) by protesting the

liquidation or reliquidation of a single entry and that Customs “would likely”

suspend action on Heartland’s other entries pending court proceedings. In view

of this representation, the trial court advised the parties to work together to settle

the jurisdictional issue. . . . On February 15, 2002, two days after Heartland

questioned the necessity of denying three rather than just one entry, Customs

resumed liquidating and reliquidating Heartland’s entries at the TRQ rate.

Heartland V, 424 F.3d at 1247-48 (footnote omitted).
Court No. 03-00307 Page 5

On February 26, 2002, the court denied Heartland’s motion for entry of judgment,

explaining that

“[w]hile the jurisdictional predicate for 1581(h) requires that the entries be

prospective, this must be distinguished from the effect of a judicial decision

which can only be useful if it is applied to real entries.” The court thus ruled that

it continued to have jurisdiction to adjudicate issues pertaining to the actual

entries covered by Heartland I: “To force an importer to seek relief under

1581(h) to establish its rights, and then force it to litigate again when it seeks to

enforce those rights with actual entries, would make 1581(h) superfluous as an

avenue of relief.” The . . . court also observed that because its decision in

Heartland I remained binding and enforceable until the issuance of the appellate

mandate, “[a]ny action by Customs that applies the [Revocation Ruling] prior to

the issuance of the mandate directly flouts the authority of this court over rulings

under 1581(h).”

Nonetheless, the [court] declined to exercise its jurisdiction under

§ 1581(h) to determine the temporal effect of its ruling in Heartland I, stating that

a “better alternative” was available to Heartland in this case, namely, jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). The court reasoned that while it had “the option of

ruling on the applicability of § 1625(c) to some of the entries covered by

[Heartland’s] motion”— specifically, those entered and liquidated prior to

December 11, 2001— it would be unable to consider all of the relief requested by

Heartland, given the unclear factual record and the uncertain status of other

entries in the liquidation process. The protest process, the court explained, would

allow the development of a clear factual record. Hence, the court concluded that

“[i]n this case, to maintain jurisdiction under § 1581(h), or extend it under

§ 1581(i), when another more comprehensive avenue is available is unwise.” 

The [court] thus entered judgment in accordance with the appellate mandate and

dismissed the complaint.

Heartland V, 424 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Heartland III, 26 CIT at 280-81, 285, 223 F. Supp. 2d at

1330-31, 1334-35) (citations omitted).

Heartland did not appeal the court’s dismissal of its complaint, but attempted to work

with Customs to effect what had been suggested at oral argument with regard to arranging denied

protests which would bring the issue back before the Court pursuant to § 1581(a). Unfortunately
Court No. 03-00307 Page 6

 The record reflects letters exchanged between Heartland and Customs, but no 6

agreement on procedure.

for both parties, as it eventually became clear, these arrangements could not be consummated.6

Heartland then sought relief from this court once again, 

challenging Customs’ retroactive imposition of TRQ duties on Heartland’s sugar

syrup entries imported in reliance on Heartland I. Both counts of the complaint,

the first styled under § 1581(h) and the second under § 1625(c), sought

declaratory judgment as well as a preliminary and permanent injunction. On July

28, 2003, the government moved to dismiss Heartland’s complaint for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. 

Id. at 1248-49.

This court then, in a decision that was reversed,

concluded that it could no longer exercise jurisdiction because it “formally

relinquished jurisdiction” under [§ 1581(h)] when it denied Heartland’s motion

for entry of judgment and dismissed the original case in Heartland III. The

present action, the [court] reasoned, “[w]hile involving the same parties, entries

and underlying dispute as Heartland III . . . is an entirely separate, new cause of

action. Therefore, Heartland carries the burden of reestablishing the jurisdiction

of this court to survive the government’s motion to dismiss.” The [court] next

determined that no new basis for § 1581(h) jurisdiction existed. The [court]

found that Heartland could not satisfy the requirements of § 1581(h) anew, as all

of its entries had already been imported, and no prospective entries were in

dispute.

Id. at 1249 (quoting Heartland IV, 28 CIT at __, 341 F. Supp. 2d at 1287) (citations omitted). In 

reversing this court’s ruling, the Court of Appeals explained its reasoning as follows:

The Court of International Trade concluded that because it formally relinquished

jurisdiction over the original action in Heartland III, jurisdiction under § 1581(h)

was no longer available. Indeed, in Heartland III, the trial court declined to

exercise jurisdiction under § 1581(h) despite correctly finding such jurisdiction

did lie. Mindful of the fact that Heartland IV, not Heartland III, is before us on

review, we nonetheless note that the Court of International Trade did not have the

authority to simply decline to exercise jurisdiction conferred by § 1581(h). . . . 
Court No. 03-00307 Page 7

Having assured itself of § 1581(h) jurisdiction over at least some of the entries,

the trial court should have deferred ruling on the government’s motion to dismiss

pending clarification of the factual record as to other entries or dismissed the

action without prejudice pending such clarification, rather than entering judgment

that finally dismissed the action.

Id. at 1250 (quotations omitted). Thus, the Court of Appeals held that “the Court of International 

Trade erred by holding that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the temporal scope of its ruling in 

Heartland I and the effect of the [Federal Circuit’s] ruling in Heartland II.” Id. at 1253. Having 

resolved the jurisdictional issue, the Court of Appeals remanded this case for “further 

proceedings on the merits.” Id. at 1254.

II. Discussion

A. Scope of Heartland I

Plaintiff now claims that because of the extraordinary circumstances necessary to obtain

relief under § 1581(h), any actions by Customs that disturb this court’s judgment in Heartland I

are unlawful. Pl. Br. 8. Plaintiff argues that a judgment rendered under § 1581(h) supercedes

the statutes that normally govern liquidation; therefore, all entries made pursuant to Heartland I

must be liquidated at the non-TRQ rate as a matter of law. Pl. Br. 8-10. On the other hand,

Defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction over Heartland’s actual entries made after

Heartland I because those entries were necessarily speculative and therefore not ripe for review. 

Def. Br. 6. Moreover, Defendant asserts that the liquidation statutes provide Customs with a

valid legal basis to liquidate Heartland’s entries at the TRQ rate. Def. Br. 21.

Accordingly, this case requires the court to define the practical effect of a judgment

issued pursuant to § 1581(h). Section 1581(h) provides:

The Court of International Trade shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil
Court No. 03-00307 Page 8

action commenced to review, prior to the importation of the goods involved, a

ruling issued by the Secretary of the Treasury, or a refusal to issue or change such

a ruling, relating to classification, valuation, rate of duty, marking, restricted

merchandise, entry requirements, drawbacks, vessel repairs, or similar matters,

but only if the party commencing the civil action demonstrates to the court that he

would be irreparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial

review prior to such importation. 

§ 1581(h) (emphasis added). As this court previously explained,

section 1581(h) is an extraordinary instrument, and a significant exception to the

procedural requirements traditionally placed on those challenging a decision by

Customs. Historically, in order to challenge a decision like the [Revocation

Ruling] at issue in this case, it was necessary for a party to exhaust remedies

available through the administrative agency by filing a protest with Customs.

Exhaustion in such a case also requires plaintiffs to pay any duties owed on the

entries in question before filing with this court. Section 1581(h) allows for

bypassing these procedural and monetary burdens in specific and narrow

circumstances, namely, if the importer can demonstrate that it would be

irreparably harmed unless given an opportunity to obtain judicial review prior to

[an] importation.

Heartland III, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1324 (cited approvingly in Heartland V, 424 F.3d at 1253)

(citations omitted) (emphasis added); see Fabil Mfg. Co. v. United States, 237 F.3d 1335, 1340

(Fed. Cir. 2001). This court held in Heartland III that its ruling in Heartland I applies to all of

the entries contemplated by Plaintiff when it sought review under § 1581(h).

While the jurisdictional predicate for § 1581(h) requires that the entries be

prospective, this must be distinguished from the effect of a judicial decision

which can only be useful if it is applied to real entries. The entire rationale for

pre-importation review under § 1581(h) is that Customs will be bound to apply

the court’s decision on the adjudicated ruling to future entries.

Heartland III, 26 CIT at 280, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1330 (emphasis added); see Heartland V, 424

F.3d at 1248. Based on the plain language of the statute and legislative history, Congress clearly
Court No. 03-00307 Page 9

 In relevant part, the legislative history provides: 7

It is not the Committee’s intent to permit judicial review prior to the completion

of the import transaction in such a manner as to negate the traditional method of

obtaining judicial review of import transactions. Such review, however, is

exceptional and is authorized only when the requirements of subsection (h) are

met.

H.R. Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729,

3758.

intended to distinguish § 1581(h) from other jurisdictional bases provided under § 1581. The 7

purpose of pre-importation review is to alleviate the risk of irreparable harm to importers by

ascertaining duties on their entries before the initial importation is made. See Heartland III, 26

CIT at 280, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1330. 

In this case, applying the holding of Heartland II (which re-instated the Revocation

Ruling that classified Heartland’s entries under the TRQ provision) retroactively would

undermine the purpose of pre-importation review. Heartland satisfied the heightened burden of

proof to establish jurisdiction under § 1581(h) and obtained a favorable ruling. See Heartland I,

23 CIT at 757, 777, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1329, 1345; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2639(b). It justifiably

relied on this court’s judgment in Heartland I when it continued to import sugar syrup at the

non-TRQ rate. Since the Government did not request a stay of judgment pending appeal, the

decision in Heartland I took effect on November 18, 1999, 30 days after it was issued. See

§ 1625(c); see also USCIT R. 62(d) & (e); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc.,

897 F.2d 511, 512 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (outlining requirements for granting stay of judgment

pending appeal); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1124, 1129 n.11 (D.C.

Cir. 1978) (“The only consequence of failing to obtain a stay is that the prevailing party may
Court No. 03-00307 Page 10

 Notably, Heartland ceased all imports of sugar syrup the day after the Federal Circuit 8

decided Heartland II.

treat the judgment of the district court as final, notwithstanding that an appeal is pending.”). 

“The law is well settled that the pendency of an appeal has no affect [sic] on the finality or

binding effect of a trial court’s holding.” SSIH Equip. S.A. v. ITC, 718 F.2d 365, 370 (Fed. Cir.

1983). Furthermore, pursuant to Rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, this

court’s decision in Heartland I remained effective until the Federal Circuit issued its mandate. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 41(c); see also Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 886 F.2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir.

1989) (quoting Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 97 (3d Cir. 1988)). After

issuance of the Federal Circuit’s mandate, Heartland could no longer rely on Heartland I. 

8

As the Federal Circuit recognized, this court has the inherent power to “ensure

compliance with its own prior ruling in Heartland I” and “to determine the effect of its

judgments and issue injunctions to protect against attempts to attack or evade those judgments.” 

Heartland V, 424 F.3d at 1251-52 (citing United States v. Hanover Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 1052, 1054

(Fed. Cir. 1996)). In exercising that power, the court holds that Customs must liquidate all of

Heartland’s entries made prior to the issuance of the Federal Circuit’s mandate at the non-TRQ

rate. Any lesser relief would relegate the court’s ruling in Heartland I to an advisory opinion

lacking “practical concrete application.” Heartland III, 26 CIT at 280, 223 F. Supp. 2d at 1331;

Pl. Reply Br. 8. 

Defendant cites International Custom Products, Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. 05-145,

2005 WL 2980587 (Nov. 8, 2005) (not reported in F. Supp.) (“ICP”) as contrary authority to the

court’s position. Def. Br. 8. It cites as pertinent that the case was dismissed on grounds of
Court No. 03-00307 Page 11

 In relevant part, § 152.16(a) provides: 9

The following procedures apply to changes in classification made by decision of

either the United States Court of International Trade or the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit, except to the extent otherwise provided in a

ruling published in the Customs Bulletin pursuant to § 177.10(a) of this chapter:

(a) Identical merchandise under decision favorable to Government. The principles

of any court decision favorable to the Government shall be applied to all

merchandise identical with that passed on by the court which is covered by

unliquidated entries, whether for consumption or warehouse.

§ 152.16(a).

ripeness because the plaintiff requested that the court declare a bond requirement null and void

for all current and future entries. See ICP, 2005 WL 2980587, at *4-5. ICP, however, is

inapposite because it is not a § 1581(h) case. See id. at *2. The heightened burden of having to

demonstrate irreparable harm under § 1581(h) provides grounds for jurisdiction over disputes

that might otherwise be considered speculative or not ripe for review. It is precisely this

distinction that makes jurisdiction under § 1581(h) extraordinary. See St. Paul Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. United States, 6 F.3d 763, 768-69 (Fed. Cir. 1993); H.R. Rep. No. 1235, 96th Cong.,

2d Sess. 47, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3770.

In addition, Defendant claims that the statutes and regulations that normally govern

liquidation divest the court of authority to require that Customs liquidate the subject entries at

the non-TRQ rate. Def. Br. 21-26. For example, the Government relies on 19 C.F.R.

§ 152.16(a) to argue that Heartland’s entries are subject to the TRQ. Def. Br. 20-23. However, 9

§ 152.16(a) was promulgated in 1975 in the light of the then exclusive post-importation protest

jurisdiction, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a). As § 1581(h) was enacted in 1980,
Court No. 03-00307 Page 12

 In pertinent part, § 1504(b) reads:

10

(b) Extension

The Secretary of the Treasury may extend the period in which to liquidate an entry if--

(1) the information needed for the proper appraisement or classification of the imported

or withdrawn merchandise, . . . or for ensuring compliance with applicable law, is not

available to the Customs Service . . . .

§ 1504(b) (1978).

 In Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Agency Record, the Government states

11

that Customs “reliquidated some of Heartland’s entries in the TRQ provision, and extended the

liquidation of those entries which were not yet liquidated” following “the Federal Circuit’s

decision on August 30, 2001.” Def. Mot. J. Agency R. Statement Undisputed Material Facts 3.

As this court’s holding makes clear, Customs did not have authority to extend liquidation

pursuant to § 1504(b) nor reliquidate Heartland’s entries made in reliance of Heartland I and

before issuance of the Federal Circuit’s mandate.

§ 152.16(a) does not address it. Likewise, the enactment of 19 U.S.C. § 1504 also preceded 10

that of § 1581(h), and there is no reason to believe that its general language was meant to deprive

§ 1581(h) of its specific force. See § 1504; see also Fakhri v. United States, Slip Op. 07-126,

2007 WL 2481512, at *3 (Aug. 20, 2007) (“Section 1504 was originally enacted in 1978 to

impose a four-year time limit for liquidation, with the motivation being to increase certainty in

the customs process for importers . . . .”) (quotations & citations omitted). More importantly,

§§ 1504(b) and 152.16(a) do not operate as a limitation on the court’s authority, but rather as a

limitation on Customs’ authority. See §§ 1504(b) & 152.16(a). 11

To repeat, because “[s]ection 1581(h) is an extraordinary instrument, and a significant

exception to the procedural requirements traditionally placed on those challenging a decision by

Customs,” the court rejects Defendant’s argument. Heartland III, 28 CIT at __, 341 F. Supp. 2d

at 1324. For § 1581(h) to have any practical usefulness for importers who validly seek and
Court No. 03-00307 Page 13

 Although the relevant statutory provisions may at first appear confusing, Def. Reply 12

Br. 6, the court believes that the Federal Circuit has settled the issue of injunctive relief in the

context of a litigant seeking to enforce his rights under a prior judgment. 

receive its benefits, it cannot be interpreted as restrictively as Defendant urges. It is clear from

the legislative history that Congress was aware § 1581(h) represented a significant change at the

time it was enacted and intended it to be of benefit to the importing community. See H.R. Rep.

No. 1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3729, 3758; Heartland V,

424 F.3d at 1252, 1253. Accordingly, an importer must be able to rely on a favorable judgment

issued pursuant to § 1581(h), otherwise the judgment is effectively toothless. Therefore, this

court’s judgment in Heartland I, which was not stayed, is not obviated by the statutes and

regulations cited by Defendant that govern the liquidation process in contexts other than that

found here in which the entries are subject to a judgment issued pursuant to § 1581(h). 

B. Injunctive Relief

Defendant next argues that the court may not grant the relief Heartland requests because

any such relief would be injunctive and, thus, prohibited by the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(4). 

Def. Br. 12-13; see § 2643(c)(4). Defendant is correct that in an initial action for adjudication

under § 1581(h) injunctive relief is not available. See id. Here, however, we are presented with

an entirely different matter. After eight years and five separate court proceedings, Heartland

seeks the court’s determination on how its entries should be treated in view of the favorable

judgment it originally received under § 1581(h). This proceeding, therefore, is not part of a preimportation action under § 1581(h). Rather, “[s]uch an inquiry falls squarely within the court’s

inherent power to determine the effect of its prior judgments.” Heartland V, 424 F.3d at 1251.12
Court No. 03-00307 Page 14

 Declaratory relief is defined as “[a] binding adjudication of the rights and status of 13

litigants even though no consequential relief in awarded.” Black’s Law Dictionary 409 (6th ed.

1990). 

 Injunction is defined as “[a] court order prohibiting someone from doing some 14

specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury.” Black’s Law Dictionary

784 (6th ed. 1990). 

As the Federal Circuit recognized, the Supreme Court has “reserved the use of ancillary

jurisdiction in subsequent proceedings for the exercise of a federal court’s inherent power to

enforce its judgments.” Id. at 1251 (quoting Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996)). 

Although § 2643(c)(4) states that in “any civil action described in section 1581(h)” the

Court “may only order the appropriate declaratory relief, ” the Federal Circuit correctly

[13]

recognized that “pre-importation challenges to Customs’ rulings in essence seek injunctive

relief . . . .” Fabil Mfg. Co., 237 F.3d at 1340 (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 6 F.3d [14]

at 768-69). Despite the fact that Heartland I provided only declaratory relief, Customs was

bound by that judgment to liquidate Heartland’s prospective entries of sugar syrup at 1702.90.40

HTSUS, as stated in the judgment. See Heartland I, 23 CIT at 777, 74 F. Supp. 2d at 1345; Def.

Br. 13. Because Customs did not respect Plaintiff’s rights as established under the Heartland I

judgment, the court may invoke ancillary jurisdiction over the matter to “determine the effect of

its [prior] judgments,” which includes the authority to “issue injunctions to protect against

attempts to attack or evade those judgments.” Heartland V, 424 F.3d at 1251. This inherent

authority is independent of that under § 1581(h) and, therefore, not limited by § 2643(c)(4). See

id. at 1253. 
Court No. 03-00307 Page 15

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Dated: October 30, 2007 /s/Judith M. Barzilay

New York, NY Judith M. Barzilay, Judge
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE

____________________________________

:

HEARTLAND BY-PRODUCTS, INC., :

:

Plaintiff, :

: Before: Judith M. Barzilay, Judge

v. : Court No. 03-00307

:

UNITED STATES, :

:

Defendant. :

:

____________________________________:

JUDGMENT

This case having been duly submitted for decision, and the court, reading all briefs

submitted and after due deliberation, having rendered a decision herein;

Now, in conformity with said decision, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

Dated: October 30, 2007 /s/ Judith M. Barzilay

New York, NY Judith M. Barzilay, Judge
ERRATA

Slip Op. 07-157, issued October 30, 2007

Heartland By-Products v. United States

On first page: 

Plaintiff’s law firm has name change from “DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary” to “DLA Piper US

LLP.”

Change Plantiff’s attorney’s name from “Storken” to “Sterken.”