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[House Report 110-665]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

110th Congress                                                   Report
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
 2d Session                                                     110-665

======================================================================
 
          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009

                                _______
                                

  May 21, 2008.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
              State of the Union and ordered to be printed

                                _______
                                

    Mr. Reyes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 
                        submitted the following

                              R E P O R T

                             together with

                             MINORITY VIEWS

                        [To accompany H.R. 5959]

      [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

    The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was 
referred the bill (H.R. 5959) to authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2009 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an 
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page
H.R. 5959, as reported to House..................................     1
Purpose..........................................................    30
Overall Perspective on the Classified Annex and Committee Intent.    31
Scope of Committee Review........................................    31
Committee Statement and Views....................................    31
    Overview.....................................................    31
    Committee Review.............................................    32
    The Legislation..............................................    32
    Areas of Special Interest....................................    34
        Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative..........    34
        Overreliance on Supplemental Funding.....................    35
        Human Intelligence Capability Throughout the World.......    35
        Issues Regarding Committee Notification of Syria's 
          Nuclear Program........................................    36
        Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947..........    36
        Diversity in the Intelligence Community..................    37
        Committee Investigation into the Destruction of 
          Interrogation Videotapes by the Central Intelligence 
          Agency.................................................    37
        Creation of a National Applications Office in the 
          Department of Homeland Security........................    38
        Major Systems Acquisitions...............................    38
        Acquisition Program Performance Notification.............    39
        Advanced Research and Development........................    39
        Future Course for Overhead Architecture..................    40
        Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity 
          into the Defense Intelligence Agency...................    40
        FBI's Use of National Security Letters...................    41
        Global Climate Change....................................    42
Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes......................    42
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment.....    46
    Title I--Intelligence........................................    46
        Section 101--Authorization of appropriations.............    46
        Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations.......    46
        Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments...............    46
        Section 104--Intelligence Community Management Account...    46
        Section 105--Limitation on the use of covert action funds    47
        Section 106--Prohibition on use of funds to implement 
          ``Five and Out'' program of the Federal Bureau of 
          Investigation..........................................    47
    Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
      Disability System..........................................    47
        Section 201--Authorization of appropriations.............    47
        Section 202--Technical modification to mandatory 
          retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency 
          Retirement Act.........................................    47
    Title III--General Provisions................................    47
        Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and 
          benefits authorized by law.............................    47
        Section 302--Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable 
          details to elements of the Intelligence Community......    47
        Section 303--Multi-level security clearances.............    48
        Section 304--Delegation of authority for travel on common 
          carriers for intelligence collection personnel.........    48
        Section 305--Annual personnel level assessments for the 
          Intelligence Community.................................    48
        Section 306--Comprehensive report on intelligence 
          community contractors..................................    49
        Section 307--Report on proposed pay-for-performance 
          intelligence community personnel management system.....    50
        Section 308--Report on plan to increase diversity within 
          the Intelligence Community.............................    50
        Section 309--Report on security clearance determinations.    51
        Section 311--Restriction on conduct of intelligence 
          activities.............................................    51
        Section 312--Clarification of definition of Intelligence 
          Community under the National Security Act of 1947......    51
        Section 313--Modification of availability of funds for 
          different intelligence activities......................    51
        Section 314--Protection of certain national security 
          information............................................    52
        Section 315--Extension of authority to delete information 
          about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and 
          decorations............................................    52
        Section 316--Report on compliance with the Detainee 
          Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the 
          Military Commissions Act of 2006.......................    53
        Section 317--Incorporation of reporting requirements.....    54
        Section 318--Repeal of certain reporting requirements....    54
        Section 319--Enhancement of critical skills training 
          program................................................    54
        Section 320--Comprehensive national cybersecurity 
          initiative advisory panel..............................    54
    Title IV--Matters Relating To Elements of the Intelligence 
      Community..................................................    54
        Section 401--Clarification of limitation on co-location 
          of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.    54
        Section 402--Membership of the Director of National 
          Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight 
          Board..................................................    55
        Section 403--Additional duties of the Director of Science 
          and Technology.........................................    55
        Section 404--Leadership and location of certain offices 
          and officials..........................................    55
        Section 405--Plan to implement recommendations of the 
          data center energy efficiency reports..................    55
        Section 406--Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs 
          of Iran, Syria, and North Korea........................    56
        Section 407--Title of Chief Information Officer of the 
          Intelligence Community.................................    56
        Section 408--Inspector General of the Intelligence 
          Community..............................................    56
        Section 409--Annual report on foreign language 
          proficiency in the Intelligence Community..............    58
        Section 410--Repeal of certain authorities relating to 
          the office of the National Counterintelligence 
          Executive..............................................    58
        Section 411--National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of 
          mass destruction in Syria..............................    58
        Section 412--Annual report on intelligence resources 
          dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan......................    59
        Section 413--Ombudsman for intelligence community 
          security clearances....................................    59
        Section 414--Security clearance reciprocity..............    59
        Section 415--Report on international traffic in arms 
          regulations............................................    59
        Section 416--Report on nuclear trafficking...............    59
        Section 417--Study on revoking pensions of persons who 
          commit unauthorized disclosures of classified 
          information............................................    60
        Section 421--Review of covert action programs by 
          Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency...    60
        Section 422--Inapplicability to the Director of the 
          Central Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual 
          report on progress in auditable financial statements...    60
        Section 423--Technical amendments relating to titles of 
          certain CIA positions..................................    61
        Section 424--Clarifying amendments relating to Section 
          105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
          Year 2004..............................................    61
        Section 425--Prohibition on the use of private 
          contractors for interrogations involving person in the 
          custody or control of the Central Intelligence Agency..    61
        Section 431--Integration of the Counterintelligence Field 
          Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency..........    61
        Section 441--Clarification of inclusion of the Coast 
          Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as elements 
          of the Intelligence Community..........................    62
        Section 442--Report on transformation of the intelligence 
          capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation....    62
    Title V--Other Matters.......................................    63
        Section 501--Extension of National Commission for Review 
          of Research and Development Programs of the United 
          States Intelligence Community..........................    63
        Section 502--Amendments to the National Security Act of 
          1947...................................................    63
        Section 503--Report on financial intelligence on 
          terrorist assets.......................................    63
        Section 504--Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea 
          and China..............................................    63
        Section 505--Sense of Congress regarding use of 
          intelligence resources.................................    64
        Section 511--Technical amendments to the Central 
          Intelligence Agency Act of 1949........................    64
        Section 512--Technical amendments to the multi-year 
          National Intelligence Program..........................    64
        Section 513--Technical clarifications of certain 
          references to Joint Military Intelligence Program and 
          Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities...........    64
        Section 514--Technical Amendments to the National 
          Security Act of 1947...................................    64
        Section 515--Technical amendments to the Intelligence 
          Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004............    64
        Section 516--Technical amendments to the Executive 
          Schedule...............................................    64
        Section 517--Technical amendments relating to the 
          National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency................    65
Correspondence with Other Committees Regarding Particular 
  Provisions.....................................................    65
    Letter from Chairman Berman to Chairman Reyes................    65
    Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Berman................    65
    Letter from Chairman Skelton to Chairman Reyes...............    66
    Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Skelton...............    67
    Letter from Chairman Thompson to Chairman Reyes..............    67
    Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Thompson..............    68
    Letter from Chairman Conyers to Chairman Reyes...............    68
    Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Conyers...............    69
    Letter from Chairman Waxman to Chairman Reyes................    69
    Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Waxman................    70
Correspondence with Congressional Budget Office..................    71
    Letter from Chairman Reyes to Mr. Peter Orszag, Director.....    71
    Letter from Mr. Orszag to Chairman Reyes.....................    71
    Congressional Budget Office Estimate.........................    71
Changes to Existing Law..........................................    73
Minority Views...................................................   114

  The amendment is as follows:
  Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
following:

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

  (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009''.
  (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds.
Sec. 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement ``5 and out'' 
program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by 
law.
Sec. 302. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements 
of the intelligence community.
Sec. 303. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence 
community.
Sec. 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community 
personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence 
community.
Sec. 309. Report on security clearance determinations.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

Sec. 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 312. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under 
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 313. Modification of availability of funds for different 
intelligence activities.
Sec. 314. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt 
and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
Sec. 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program.
Sec. 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory 
panel.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of 
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy 
efficiency reports.
Sec. 406. Semiannual reports on nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and 
North Korea.
Sec. 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
Community.
Sec. 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
intelligence community.
Sec. 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 411. National intelligence estimate on weapons of mass destruction 
in Syria.
Sec. 412. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
Sec. 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
Sec. 414. Security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 416. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information.

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

Sec. 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. Inapplicability to Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in auditable 
financial statements.
Sec. 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain Central 
Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 424. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for 
interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of the 
Central Intelligence Agency.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

Sec. 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into 
the Defense Intelligence Agency.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug 
Enforcement Administration as elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the 
Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
Community.
Sec. 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China.
Sec. 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

Sec. 511. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National 
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 513. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint 
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related 
Activities.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

  In this Act:
          (1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term 
        ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
                  (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
                Senate; and
                  (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of 
                the House of Representatives.
          (2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence 
        community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of 
        the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

              TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS

SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2009 
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities 
of the following elements of the United States Government:
          (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
          (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
          (3) The Department of Defense.
          (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
          (5) The National Security Agency.
          (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, 
        and the Department of the Air Force.
          (7) The Coast Guard.
          (8) The Department of State.
          (9) The Department of the Treasury.
          (10) The Department of Energy.
          (11) The Department of Justice.
          (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
          (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
          (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
          (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
          (16) The Department of Homeland Security.

SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.

  (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section 
103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2009, for 
the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in 
paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the 
conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred Tenth 
Congress.
  (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The 
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) 
shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the 
Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 
Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for 
suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of 
the Schedule, within the executive branch.
  (c) Earmarks.--
          (1) In general.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of 
        Authorizations, the joint explanatory statement to accompany 
        the conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred 
        Tenth Congress, or the classified annex to this Act, shall be 
        construed to authorize or require the expenditure of funds for 
        an earmarked purpose.
          (2) Earmarked purpose defined.--In this subsection, the term 
        ``earmarked purpose'' means a provision or report language 
        included primarily at the request of a Member, Delegate, 
        Resident Commissioner of the House of Representatives or a 
        Senator providing, authorizing, or recommending a specific 
        amount of discretionary budget authority, credit authority, or 
        other spending authority for a contract, loan, loan guarantee, 
        grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to an 
        entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality, or 
        Congressional district, other than through a statutory or 
        administrative formula-driven or competitive award process.

SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.

  (a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National 
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess 
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2009 by the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the 
Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is 
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions, 
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number 
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the 
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian 
personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element.
  (b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of 
National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence 
committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an 
authority described in subsection (a).

SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.

  (a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the 
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2009 the sum of 
$648,842,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced 
research and development shall remain available until September 30, 
2010.
  (b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the 
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National 
Intelligence are authorized 772 full-time or full-time equivalent 
personnel as of September 30, 2009. Personnel serving in such elements 
may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United 
States Government.
  (c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the 
Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available 
to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the 
Intelligence Community Management Account.
  (d) Classified Authorizations.--
          (1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts 
        authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community 
        Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to 
        be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal 
        year 2009 such additional amounts as are specified in the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
        102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and 
        development shall remain available until September 30, 2010.
          (2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel 
        authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence 
        Community Management Account as of September 30, 2009, there 
        are authorized such additional personnel for the Community 
        Management Account as of that date as are specified in the 
        classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 
        102(a).

SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON THE USE OF COVERT ACTION FUNDS.

  (a) In General.--Not more than 25 percent of the funds authorized to 
be appropriated by this Act for the National Intelligence Program for 
covert actions may be obligated or expended until the date on which 
each member of the congressional intelligence committees has been fully 
and currently briefed on all authorizations for covert actions in 
effect on April 24, 2008.
  (b) Covert Action Defined.--In this section, the term ``covert 
action'' has the meaning given the term in section 503(g) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(e)).

SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT ``5 AND OUT'' 
                    PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in this Act may be 
used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau 
after such supervisor serves in a management position for 5 years 
(commonly known as the ``5 and out'' program).

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

  There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2009 the sum of 
$279,200,000.

SEC. 202. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION OF 
                    THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.

  Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central Intelligence 
Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is amended by striking 
``receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service pay 
schedule at the rate'' and inserting ``who is at the Senior 
Intelligence Service rank''.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     Subtitle A--Personnel Matters

SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY 
                    LAW.

  Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, 
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in 
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.

SEC. 302. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO ELEMENTS 
                    OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the Counterintelligence 
Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 
402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, in any 
fiscal year after fiscal year 2008 an officer or employee of the United 
States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to the staff of an 
element of the intelligence community funded through the Community 
Management Account from another element of the United States Government 
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, as jointly agreed to by the 
Director of National Intelligence and the head of the detailing element 
(or the designees of such officials), for a period not to exceed 2 
years.

SEC. 303. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  (a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
subsection:
  ``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that the elements of the 
intelligence community adopt a multi-level security clearance approach 
in order to enable the intelligence community to make more effective 
and efficient use of persons proficient in foreign languages or with 
cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is 
critical to national security.''.
  (b) Implementation.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
issue guidelines to the intelligence community on the implementation of 
subsection (s) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947, as 
added by subsection (a), not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act.

SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR 
                    INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.

  (a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended--
          (1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
          (2) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of this 
        subsection, by striking ``may only delegate'' and all that 
        follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in 
        subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the 
        intelligence community.''; and
          (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom 
the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1) 
may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such 
element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of 
National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
  (b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than 6 months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 
Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of 
section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
subsection (a).

SEC. 305. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506A the 
following new section:
   ``annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community
  ``Sec. 506B.  (a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of the element of the 
intelligence community concerned, prepare an annual personnel level 
assessment for such element of the intelligence community that assesses 
the personnel levels for each such element for the fiscal year 
following the fiscal year in which the assessment is submitted.
  ``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall be 
submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each year along 
with the budget submitted by the President under section 1105 of title 
31, United States Code.
  ``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) submitted 
during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum, the following 
information for the element of the intelligence community concerned:
          ``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the 
        upcoming fiscal year.
          ``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such 
        costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal 
        year.
          ``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such 
        costs as compared to the personnel costs during the prior 5 
        fiscal years.
          ``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for the 
        upcoming fiscal year.
          ``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such number as compared to the number of personnel positions of 
        the current fiscal year.
          ``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such number as compared to the number of personnel positions 
        during the prior 5 fiscal years.
          ``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of 
        contractors to be funded by the element for the upcoming fiscal 
        year.
          ``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of 
        the costs of contractors of the current fiscal year.
          ``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of 
        contractors, and the number of contractors, during the prior 5 
        fiscal years.
          ``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel 
        and contractor levels.
          ``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts 
        employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence 
        community.
          ``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject 
        of an investigation completed by the Inspector General of any 
        element of the intelligence community during the preceding 
        fiscal year, or are or have been the subject of an 
        investigation by such an Inspector General during the current 
        fiscal year.
          ``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence 
        that, based on current and projected funding, the element 
        concerned will have sufficient--
                  ``(A) internal infrastructure to support the 
                requested personnel and contractor levels;
                  ``(B) training resources to support the requested 
                personnel levels; and
                  ``(C) funding to support the administrative and 
                operational activities of the requested personnel 
                levels.''.
  (b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 
506A the following new item:

``Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence 
community.''.

SEC. 306. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.

  (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report describing the use of personal 
services contracts across the intelligence community, the impact of 
such contractors on the intelligence community workforce, plans for 
conversion of contractor employment into government employment, and the 
accountability mechanisms that govern the performance of such 
contractors.
  (b) Content.--
          (1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a) 
        shall include--
                  (A) a description of any relevant regulations or 
                guidance issued by the Director of National 
                Intelligence or the head of an element of the 
                intelligence community relating to minimum standards 
                required regarding the hiring, training, security 
                clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how 
                those standards may differ from those for government 
                employees performing substantially similar functions;
                  (B) an identification of contracts where the 
                contractor is performing a substantially similar 
                functions to a government employee;
                  (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings 
                achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of 
                such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead 
                of using full-time employees of the elements of the 
                intelligence community to perform such functions;
                  (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using 
                contractors to perform the activities described in 
                paragraph (2);
                  (E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the 
                number of personnel working under such contracts, 
                related to the performance of activities described in 
                paragraph (2);
                  (F) a comparison of the compensation of contract 
                employees and government employees performing 
                substantially similar functions;
                  (G) an analysis of the attrition of government 
                personnel for contractor positions that provide 
                substantially similar functions;
                  (H) a description of positions that will be converted 
                from contractor employment to government employment;
                  (I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability 
                mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts 
                awarded for intelligence activities by each element of 
                the intelligence community during fiscal years 2006 and 
                2007;
                  (J) an analysis of procedures in use in the 
                intelligence community for conducting oversight of 
                contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of 
                criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other 
                abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel; 
                and
                  (K) an identification of best practices for oversight 
                and accountability mechanisms applicable to personal 
                services contracts.
          (2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are 
        the following:
                  (A) Intelligence collection.
                  (B) Intelligence analysis.
                  (C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, 
                and interrogation activities.

SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
                    PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.

  (a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The Director of 
National Intelligence and the head of an element of the intelligence 
community may not implement a plan that provides compensation to 
personnel of that element of the intelligence community based on 
performance until the date that is 45 days after the date on which the 
Director of National Intelligence submits a report for that element 
under subsection (b).
  (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
Congress a report on performance-based compensation for each element of 
the intelligence community, including, with respect to each such 
element--
          (1) a description of a proposed employee advisory group to 
        advise management on the implementation and management of a pay 
        for performance system in that element, including the scope of 
        responsibility of the group and the plan for the element for 
        ensuring diversity in the selection of members of the advisory 
        group;
          (2) a certification that all managers who will participate in 
        setting performance standards and pay pool administration have 
        been trained on the implementing guidance of the system and the 
        criteria upon which the certification is granted; and
          (3) a description of an external appeals mechanism for 
        employees who wish to appeal pay decisions to someone outside 
        the management chain of the element employing such employee.

SEC. 308. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  (a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the 
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of 
the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each 
element to increase diversity within the intelligence community.
  (b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element 
of the intelligence community, including--
          (1) specific implementation plans for each such element 
        designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan 
        of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment 
        opportunity and diversity;
          (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
        increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
          (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to 
        improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior, 
        midgrade, senior, and management levels;
          (4) a description of specific diversity awareness training 
        and education programs for senior officials and managers of 
        each such element; and
          (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the 
        success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs 
        described in paragraphs (1) through (4).

SEC. 309. REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS.

  (a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new 
section:
             ``report on security clearance determinations
  ``Sec. 508.  Not later than February 1 of each year, the Director of 
the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to Congress a report 
on security clearance determinations completed or ongoing during the 
preceding fiscal year that have taken longer than one year to complete. 
Such report shall include--
          ``(1) the number of security clearance determinations for 
        positions as employees of the Federal Government that required 
        more than one year to complete;
          ``(2) the number of security clearance determinations for 
        contractors that required more than one year to complete;
          ``(3) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such 
        determinations; and
          ``(4) the cause of significant delays in such 
        determinations.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is further 
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 507 the 
following new item:

``Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.''.

                       Subtitle B--Other Matters

SEC. 311. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed 
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity 
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of 
the United States.

SEC. 312. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER 
                    THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

  Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place 
it appears.

SEC. 313. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT 
                    INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

  Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows:
          ``(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports an 
        emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases 
        efficiency; and''.

SEC. 314. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION.

  (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence 
Officers and Agents.--
          (1) Disclosure of agent after access to information 
        identifying agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the 
        National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by 
        striking ``ten years'' and inserting ``15 years''.
          (2) Disclosure of agent after access to classified 
        information.--Subsection (b) of such section is amended by 
        striking ``five years'' and inserting ``10 years''.
  (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence 
Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting 
``including an assessment of the need for any modification of this 
title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert 
agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert 
agents,''.

SEC. 315. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT 
                    AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS.

  Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is 
amended to read as follows:
  ``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the 
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the 
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in 
subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element 
certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of 
such information could adversely affect United States intelligence 
sources or methods.
  ``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant 
to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the 
Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such 
information.
  ``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' has the 
meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.

SEC. 316. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DETAINEE TREATMENT ACT OF 2005 
                    AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS 
                    ACT OF 2006.

  (a) Report Required.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Director 
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a comprehensive report on all measures taken by the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence and by each element, if any, 
of the intelligence community with relevant responsibilities to comply 
with the provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of 
division A of Public Law 109-148; 119 Stat. 2739) and related 
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-366; 
120 Stat. 2600).
  (b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include 
the following:
          (1) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, 
        if any, that have been determined to comply with section 1003 
        of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2739; 42 
        U.S.C. 2000dd) and section 6 of the Military Commissions Act of 
        2006 (120 Stat. 2632; 18 U.S.C. 2441 note) (including the 
        amendments made by such section 6), and, with respect to each 
        such method--
                  (A) an identification of the official making such 
                determination; and
                  (B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
          (2) A description of the detention or interrogation methods, 
        if any, the use of which has been discontinued pursuant to the 
        Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or the Military Commission Act 
        of 2006, and, with respect to each such method--
                  (A) an identification of the official making the 
                determination to discontinue such method; and
                  (B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
          (3) A description of any actions that have been taken to 
        implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
        (119 Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to each 
        such action--
                  (A) an identification of the official taking such 
                action; and
                  (B) a statement of the basis for such action.
          (4) Any other matters that the Director considers necessary 
        to fully and currently inform the congressional intelligence 
        committees about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment 
        Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions 
        Act of 2006.
          (5) An appendix containing--
                  (A) all guidelines for the application of the 
                Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions 
                of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to the 
                detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any 
                element of the intelligence community; and
                  (B) all legal justifications of the Department of 
                Justice, including any office thereof, about the 
                meaning or application of the Detainee Treatment Act of 
                2005 or related provisions of the Military Commissions 
                Act of 2006 with respect to the detention or 
                interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the 
                intelligence community.
  (c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted 
in classified form.
  (d) Submission to the Congressional Armed Services Committees.--To 
the extent that the report required by subsection (a) addresses an 
element of the intelligence community within the Department of Defense, 
that portion of the report, and any associated material that is 
necessary to make that portion understandable, shall also be submitted 
by the Director of National Intelligence to the congressional armed 
services committees.
  (e) Congressional Armed Services Committee Defined.--In this section, 
the term ``congressional armed services committees'' means--
          (1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
          (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives.

SEC. 317. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence 
committees that is included in the classified annex to this Act is 
hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in 
law.

SEC. 318. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

  (a) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section 
1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is 
amended--
          (1) by striking ``(1)''; and
          (2) by striking paragraph (2).
  (b) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification 
Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsection (d); and
          (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as 
        subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
  (c) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.--Section 826 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed.
  (d) Conforming Amendments.--Section 507(a)(2) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(2)) is amended by striking 
subparagraph (D).

SEC. 319. ENHANCEMENT OF CRITICAL SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM.

  (a) National Security Agency.--Subsection (e) of section 16 of the 
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by 
striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) 
Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''.
  (b) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
          (1) In general.--The National Security Act of 1947 is amended 
        by inserting after section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 441m) the following 
        new section:
        ``intelligence community acquisition of critical skills
  ``Sec. 1022.  (a) In General.--The head of an appropriate department 
may assign civilian employees of an element of the intelligence 
community that is a component of such appropriate department as 
students at accredited professional, technical, and other institutions 
of higher learning for training at the undergraduate level in skills 
critical to effective performance of the mission of such element of the 
intelligence community.
  ``(b) Payment of Expenses.--The head of an appropriate department may 
pay, directly or by reimbursement to employees, expenses incident to 
assignments under subsection (a), in any fiscal year only to the extent 
that appropriated funds are available for such purpose.
  ``(c) Eligibility.--
          ``(1) In general.--To be eligible for assignment under 
        subsection (a), an employee of an element of the intelligence 
        community must agree in writing--
                  ``(A) to continue in the service of such element for 
                the period of the assignment and to complete the 
                educational course of training for which the employee 
                is assigned;
                  ``(B) to continue in the service of such element 
                following completion of the assignment for a period of 
                one-and-a-half years for each year of the assignment or 
                part thereof;
                  ``(C) to reimburse the United States for the total 
                cost of education (excluding the employee's pay and 
                allowances) provided under this section to the employee 
                if, prior to the employee's completing the educational 
                course of training for which the employee is assigned, 
                the assignment or the employee's employment with such 
                element is terminated either by such element due to 
                misconduct by the employee or by the employee 
                voluntarily; and
                  ``(D) to reimburse the United States if, after 
                completing the educational course of training for which 
                the employee is assigned, the employee's employment 
                with such element is terminated either by such element 
                due to misconduct by the employee or by the employee 
                voluntarily, prior to the employee's completion of the 
                service obligation period described in subparagraph 
                (B), in an amount that bears the same ratio to the 
                total cost of the education (excluding the employee's 
                pay and allowances) provided to the employee as the 
                unserved portion of the service obligation period 
                described in subparagraph (B) bears to the total period 
                of the service obligation described in subparagraph 
                (B).
          ``(2) Debt owing the united states.--Subject to paragraph 
        (3), the obligation to reimburse the United States under an 
        agreement described in paragraph (1), including interest due on 
        such obligation, is for all purposes a debt owing the United 
        States.
          ``(3) Reimbursement.--
                  ``(A) Bankruptcy.--A discharge in bankruptcy under 
                title 11, United States Code, shall not release a 
                person from an obligation to reimburse the United 
                States required under an agreement described in 
                paragraph (1) if the final decree of the discharge in 
                bankruptcy is issued within five years after the last 
                day of the combined period of service obligation 
                described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph 
                (1).
                  ``(B) Release.--The head of an appropriate department 
                may release a person, in whole or in part, from the 
                obligation to reimburse the United States under an 
                agreement described in paragraph (1) when, in the 
                discretion of such head of an appropriate department, 
                such head of an appropriate department determines that 
                equity or the interests of the United States so 
                require.
                  ``(C) Monthly payments.--The head of an appropriate 
                department shall permit an employee assigned under this 
                section who, prior to commencing a second academic year 
                of such assignment, voluntarily terminates the 
                assignment or the employee's employment with the 
                element of the intelligence community that is a 
                component of such appropriate department, to satisfy 
                the employee's obligation under an agreement described 
                in paragraph (1) to reimburse the United States by 
                reimbursement according to a schedule of monthly 
                payments which results in completion of reimbursement 
                by a date five years after the date of termination of 
                the assignment or employment or earlier at the option 
                of the employee.
  ``(d) Recruitment.--Efforts by an element of the intelligence 
community to recruit individuals at educational institutions for 
participation in the undergraduate training program established by this 
section shall be made openly and according to the common practices of 
universities and employers recruiting at such institutions.
  ``(e) Inapplication of Provisions on Training.--Chapter 41 of title 5 
and subsections (a) and (b) of section 3324 of title 31, United States 
Code, shall not apply with respect to this section.
  ``(f) Regulations.--A head of the appropriate department assigning 
employees in accordance with this section may issue such regulations as 
such head of the appropriate department considers necessary to carry 
out this section.
  ``(g) Rules of Construction.--
          ``(1) Component.--For purposes of this section--
                  ``(A) the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence shall be considered a component of such 
                Office; and
                  ``(B) the Central Intelligence Agency shall be 
                considered a component of such Agency.
          ``(2) Required education programs.--Nothing in this section 
        shall be construed to modify, affect, or supercede any 
        provision of law requiring or otherwise authorizing or 
        providing for a training program described in this section.
  ``(h) Appropriate Department Defined.--In this section, the term 
`appropriate department' means--
          ``(1) with respect to the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence, the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence;
          ``(2) with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency, 
        Central Intelligence Agency; and
          ``(3) with respect to an element of the intelligence 
        community other than the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
        department of the Federal Government of which such element of 
        the intelligence community is a component.''.
          (2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et 
        seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to 
        section 1021 the following new item:

``Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.''.

SEC. 320. COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE ADVISORY 
                    PANEL.

  Not later than February 1, 2009, the President shall submit to 
Congress a report on options for creating an advisory panel comprised 
of representatives of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the private 
sector to make policy and procedural recommendations for--
          (1) information security for the Federal Government;
          (2) critical infrastructure;
          (3) the authorities, roles, responsibilities of the 
        intelligence community, Department of Homeland Security, and 
        Department of Defense for purposes of supporting the 
        Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative as described in 
        National Security Policy Directive 54/Homeland Security Policy 
        Directive 23 entitled ``Cybersecurity Policy'' signed by the 
        President on January 8, 2008; and
          (4) other matters related to paragraphs (1) through (3) as 
        the President considers appropriate.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence

SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF 
                    THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.

  Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(e)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of Headquarters With 
        Headquarters of'';
          (2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the 
        Office''; and
          (3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the 
        headquarters of any other element''.

SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE 
                    TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.

  Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States 
Code, is amended to read as follows:
                  ``(F) The Director of National Intelligence.''.

SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

  Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) 
is amended--
          (1) in subsection (c)--
                  (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
                  (B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end; 
                and
                  (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
          ``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for basic, 
        applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs of 
        the intelligence community;
          ``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an 
        annual report on the science and technology strategy of the 
        Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the 
        intelligence community; and''; and
          (2) in subsection (d)(3)--
                  (A) in subparagraph (A)--
                          (i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after 
                        ``coordinate''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting 
                        ``;'';
                  (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph 
                (C); and
                  (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following 
                new subparagraph:
                  ``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research 
                programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence 
                community; and''.

SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS.

  (a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 
        months after the date of the enactment of the National Security 
        Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting the 
        following:
  ``(a) In General.--
          ``(1) Establishment.--The''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
          ``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter 
        Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National 
        Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the 
        Director of National Intelligence.
          ``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center 
        shall be located within the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence.''.
  (b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is 
amended--
          (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
          (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new 
        paragraphs:
          ``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
        Community.
          ``(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
          ``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
          ``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation 
        Center.''.

SEC. 405. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER ENERGY 
                    EFFICIENCY REPORTS.

  (a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan 
to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress 
under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the 
use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public 
Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
  (b) Report.--
          (1) In general.--Not later then November 1, 2008, the 
        Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report containing the 
        plan developed under subsection (a).
          (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted 
        in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 406. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND 
                    NORTH KOREA.

  (a) Reports.--
          (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by title III, is further 
        amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of iran, syria, and north 
                                 korea
  ``Sec. 509.  (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently than 
every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to 
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the intentions 
and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to 
the nuclear programs of each such country.
  ``(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab 
Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
          ``(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each such 
        country;
          ``(2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting 
        standards and practices, of the sources upon which the 
        intelligence used to prepare the assessment described in 
        paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources 
        and an assessment of the reliability of each such source;
          ``(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such 
        program gathered or developed since the previous report was 
        submitted under subsection (a), including intelligence 
        collected from both open and clandestine sources for each such 
        country; and
          ``(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
        knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in 
        the assessment described in paragraph (1).
  ``(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National 
Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the 
intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian 
Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in lieu of 
a report required by subsection (a) for that country.
  ``(d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form.''.
          (2) Applicability date.--The first report required to be 
        submitted under section 509 of the National Security Act of 
        1947, as added by paragraph (1), shall be submitted not later 
        than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended 
by inserting after the item relating to section 508 the following new 
item:

``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, 
and North Korea.''.

SEC. 407. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE 
                    COMMUNITY.

  Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) 
is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
          (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
          (3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and
          (4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence 
        Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.

SEC. 408. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Establishment.--
          (1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
        103G the following new section:
           ``inspector general of the intelligence community
  ``Sec. 103H.  (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence 
Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community.
  ``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community is to--
          ``(1) create an objective and effective office, appropriately 
        accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct independently 
        investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
        Intelligence;
          ``(2) recommend policies designed--
                  ``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and 
                effectiveness in the administration and implementation 
                of matters within the responsibility and authority of 
                the Director of National Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such 
                matters;
          ``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National 
        Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
                  ``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters 
                within the responsibility and authority of the Director 
                of National Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions; and
          ``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that 
        the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly 
        informed of--
                  ``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating 
                to matters within the responsibility and authority of 
                the Director of National Intelligence; and
                  ``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions.
  ``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There is an 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the head 
of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, 
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.
  ``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector 
General shall be made--
          ``(A) without regard to political affiliation;
          ``(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with the 
        security standards of the intelligence community, and prior 
        experience in the field of intelligence or national security; 
        and
          ``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting, 
        financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
        administration, or auditing.
  ``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be under the 
general supervision of the Director of National Intelligence.
  ``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the 
President. The President shall immediately communicate in writing to 
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal 
of any individual from the position of Inspector General.
  ``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g) and 
(h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community--
          ``(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, conduct, 
        supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations, 
        inspections, and audits relating to matters within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director of National 
        Intelligence to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in 
        accordance with applicable law and regulations;
          ``(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence fully and 
        currently informed concerning violations of law and 
        regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud 
        and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may 
        occur in matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
        Director, and to report the progress made in implementing 
        corrective action;
          ``(3) to take due regard for the protection of intelligence 
        sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by 
        the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the 
        purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as 
        may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence 
        sources and methods described in such reports; and
          ``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities 
        under this section, to comply with generally accepted 
        government auditing standards.
  ``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community from initiating, carrying out, or completing any 
investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that 
such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security 
interests of the United States.
  ``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1), 
the Director shall submit an appropriately classified statement of the 
reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7 days to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
  ``(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the time a 
report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent 
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the 
Inspector General with a copy of such report.
  ``(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector 
General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General 
considers appropriate.
  ``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community shall have direct and prompt access to the Director of 
National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the 
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
  ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or 
any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence 
community whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General.
  ``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records, 
reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other 
material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to 
which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section.
  ``(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of information 
shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale for denying 
the Inspector General access to any materials under subparagraph (B).
  ``(D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee of a 
contractor, of any element of the intelligence community to cooperate 
with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate 
administrative actions by the Director or, on the recommendation of the 
Director, other appropriate officials of the intelligence community, 
including loss of employment or the termination of an existing 
contractual relationship.
  ``(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and investigate 
complaints or information from any person concerning the existence of 
an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or 
mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a 
substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety. Once 
such complaint or information has been received from an employee of the 
Federal Government--
          ``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity 
        of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the 
        Inspector General determines that such disclosure is 
        unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the 
        disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice 
        responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be 
        undertaken; and
          ``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
        reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
        employee in a position to take such actions, unless the 
        complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the 
        knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its 
        truth or falsity.
  ``(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer to or 
take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever 
necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector General, 
which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or 
before an employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community designated by the Inspector General shall have 
the same force and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an 
officer having a seal.
  ``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector 
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of all 
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, 
and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of 
the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
  ``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the 
United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain 
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, 
and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph 
(A) using procedures other than by subpoenas.
  ``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on 
behalf of, any other element of the intelligence community, including 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
  ``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued 
under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any 
appropriate district court of the United States.
  ``(g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence 
Community.--(1)(A) In the event of a matter within the jurisdiction of 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject 
to an investigation, inspection, or audit by both the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General, whether 
statutory or administrative, with oversight responsibility for an 
element or elements of the intelligence community, the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community and such other Inspector or 
Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve the question of which 
Inspector General shall conduct such investigation, inspection, or 
audit.
  ``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph (A), the 
Inspectors General concerned may request the assistance of the 
Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established under 
subparagraph (C). In the event of a dispute between an Inspector 
General within an agency or department of the United States Government 
and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that has not 
been resolved with the assistance of the Forum, the Inspectors General 
shall submit the question to the Director of National Intelligence and 
the head of the agency or department for resolution.
  ``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community Inspectors 
General Forum which shall consist of all statutory or administrative 
Inspectors General with oversight responsibility for an element or 
elements of the intelligence community. The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum 
shall have no administrative authority over any Inspector General, but 
shall serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of 
individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest and 
discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to employees, 
employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews, documents, 
recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be of 
assistance to more than 1 of its members.
  ``(2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation, inspection, 
or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the results of such 
investigation, inspection, or audit to any other Inspector General, 
including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with 
jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit who 
did not conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit.
  ``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall be provided with appropriate and adequate 
office space at central and field office locations, together with such 
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and communications 
facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such 
offices.
  ``(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the Director 
of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select, appoint, 
and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out 
the functions of the Inspector General. The Inspector General shall 
ensure that any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or employed 
has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such 
officer or employee.
  ``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector 
General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the 
requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to 
carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively.
  ``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector 
General shall create within the Office of the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide 
appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective 
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
  ``(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the Inspector 
General may request such information or assistance as may be necessary 
for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector 
General from any department, agency, or other element of the United 
States Government.
  ``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or 
assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency, 
or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not in 
contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of 
the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General, 
or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
  ``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon 
reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence 
community, conduct, as authorized by this section, an investigation, 
inspection, or audit of such element and may enter into any place 
occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General.
  ``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of each year, 
prepare and submit to the Director of National Intelligence a 
classified, and, as appropriate, unclassified semiannual report 
summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community during the immediately preceding 6-month 
period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, 
respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department 
of the United States Government to the head of that department 
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  ``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, 
the following:
          ``(i) A list of the title or subject of each investigation, 
        inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered by 
        such report, including a summary of the progress of each 
        particular investigation, inspection, or audit since the 
        preceding report of the Inspector General under this paragraph.
          ``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and 
        deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation 
        of programs and operations of the intelligence community, and 
        in the relationships between elements of the intelligence 
        community, identified by the Inspector General during the 
        period covered by such report.
          ``(iii) A description of the recommendations for corrective 
        or disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during the 
        period covered by such report with respect to significant 
        problems, abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
          ``(iv) A statement whether or not corrective or disciplinary 
        action has been completed on each significant recommendation 
        described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case where 
        corrective action has been completed, a description of such 
        corrective action.
          ``(v) A certification whether or not the Inspector General 
        has had full and direct access to all information relevant to 
        the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
          ``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
        authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General 
        during the period covered by such report.
          ``(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General 
        considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, 
        efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and 
        implementation of matters within the responsibility and 
        authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to 
        detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters.
  ``(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a 
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the report 
to the congressional intelligence committees together with any comments 
the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the 
committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with 
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any 
portion of the report involving a component of such department 
simultaneously with submission of the report to the congressional 
intelligence committees.
  ``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly 
serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to 
matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence.
  ``(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional intelligence 
committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7 calendar days of 
receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director 
considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the committees of 
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
department of the United States Government any portion of each report 
under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency 
related to a component of such department simultaneously with 
transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  ``(3) In the event that--
          ``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
        differences with the Director affecting the execution of the 
        duties or responsibilities of the Inspector General;
          ``(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out by 
        the Inspector General focuses on any current or former 
        intelligence community official who--
                  ``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the 
                intelligence community that is subject to appointment 
                by the President, whether or not by and with the advice 
                and consent of the Senate, including such a position 
                held on an acting basis;
                  ``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the 
                intelligence community, including a position held on an 
                acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of 
                National Intelligence; or
                  ``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an 
                element of the intelligence community or a position 
                covered by subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
          ``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to 
        the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a 
        current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
          ``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
        Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of 
        possible criminal conduct of any current or former official 
        described in subparagraph (B); or
          ``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible 
        alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary 
        information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or 
        audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a report on 
such matter to the congressional intelligence committees.
  ``(4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees any report or findings and 
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit conducted by 
the office which has been requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman or 
Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
  ``(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an 
employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence 
community, or an employee of a contractor to the intelligence community 
who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with 
respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information 
to the Inspector General.
  ``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period beginning 
on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information 
under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether 
the complaint or information appears credible. Upon making such a 
determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a 
notice of that determination, together with the complaint or 
information.
  ``(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General under 
subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar days of such 
receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence 
committees, together with any comments the Director considers 
appropriate.
  ``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under 
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under 
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to 
the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee 
(subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to 
Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence 
committees directly.
  ``(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees directly 
as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
          ``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
        Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the 
        employee's complaint or information and notice of the 
        employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence 
        committees directly; and
          ``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the 
        Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence 
        committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.
  ``(iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional intelligence 
committees who receives a complaint or information under clause (i) 
does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or 
employee of such committee.
  ``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a 
complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph 
of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint 
or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days 
after any such action is taken.
  ``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under 
this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
  ``(G) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means any of the 
following:
          ``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law 
        or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding, 
        administration, or operation of an intelligence activity 
        involving classified information, but does not include 
        differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.
          ``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
        withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
        relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an 
        intelligence activity.
          ``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described in 
        section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code, 
        constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under 
        subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an 
        employee's reporting an urgent concern in accordance with this 
        paragraph.
  ``(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the findings set 
forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of the 
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (title VII 
of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 8H note).
  ``(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States Code, 
the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney General any 
information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector General 
relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves a program 
or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in the 
relationships between the elements of the intelligence community, 
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney 
General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each 
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
  ``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by the Director in 
consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, include in 
the National Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the 
Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
  ``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the 
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of 
any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the 
intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or effect the 
duties and responsibilities of any other Inspector General, whether 
statutory or administrative, having duties and responsibilities 
relating to such element.''.
          (2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first 
        section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by 
        inserting after the item relating to section 103G the following 
        new item:

``Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
  (b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.--Section 8K 
of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is repealed.
  (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
          ``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.

SEC. 409. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Report.--
          (1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 
        (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 406 of this Act, 
        is further amended by adding at the end the following new 
        section:
 ``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community
  ``Sec. 510.  Not later than February 1 of each year, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, if 
appropriate, in foreign dialects of each element of the intelligence 
community, including--
          ``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element 
        that require foreign language proficiency and the level of 
        proficiency required;
          ``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each 
        element will require during the 5-year period beginning on the 
        date of the submission of the report;
          ``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element 
        that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by--
                  ``(A) military personnel; and
                  ``(B) civilian personnel;
          ``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such element 
        in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language 
        proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the 
        proficiency level;
          ``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language 
        and proficiency level;
          ``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently 
        attending foreign language training, including the provider of 
        such training;
          ``(7) a description of such element's efforts to recruit, 
        hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a 
        foreign language;
          ``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
        advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
          ``(9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate, 
        dialect of a foreign language--
                  ``(A) the number of positions of such element that 
                require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
                  ``(B) the number of personnel of such element that 
                are serving in a position that requires proficiency in 
                the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary 
                duty of the position;
                  ``(C) the number of personnel of such element that 
                are serving in a position that does not require 
                proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to 
                perform the primary duty of the position;
                  ``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated 
                at each level of proficiency of the Interagency 
                Language Roundtable;
                  ``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level 
                of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable 
                meets the requirements of such element;
                  ``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to 
                serve as linguists for such element that are not 
                qualified as linguists under the standards of the 
                Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  ``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as 
                linguists for such element during the preceding 
                calendar year;
                  ``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists 
                that discontinued serving such element during the 
                preceding calendar year;
                  ``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic 
                skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United 
                States; and
                  ``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic 
                skills that is fulfilled by contractors;
          ``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and 
        capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
          ``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
        relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of 
        National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer 
        relevant.''.
          (2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 
        415b(a)(1)) is amended--
                  (A) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph 
                (J); and
                  (B) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
          ``(K) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in 
        the intelligence community required by section 510.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of such Act is further amended by inserting after the item relating to 
section 509 the following new item:

``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
community.''.

SEC. 410. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE 
                    NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

  (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the 
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law 
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
          (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
          (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and 
        (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i), 
        respectively; and
          (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by 
        striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended--
          (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2) 
        of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it 
        appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection 
        (e)''; and
          (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
                  (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection 
                (e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection 
                (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.

SEC. 411. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
                    IN SYRIA.

  (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall 
submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate on the history, 
status, and projected development of any weapons of mass destruction 
development program undertaken by the Government of Syria, or by any 
person on behalf of the Government of Syria.
  (b) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate required under 
subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.

SEC. 412. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ AND 
                    AFGHANISTAN.

  Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report on intelligence collection resources 
dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal years 2007 and 2008. 
Such report shall include detailed information on fiscal, human, 
technical, and other intelligence collection resources.

SEC. 413. OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES.

  (a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103H, as 
added by section 409 of this Act, the following new section:
       ``ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
  ``Sec. 103I.  (a) Appointment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security 
clearances.
  ``(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of the 
intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a security 
clearance through or in coordination with such element with contact 
information for the ombudsman appointed under subsection (a).
  ``(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the ombudsman 
appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report containing--
          ``(1) the number of persons applying for a security clearance 
        who have contacted the ombudsman during the preceding 12 
        months; and
          ``(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and questions 
        received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security 
        clearances.''.
  (b) Appointment Date.--The Director of National Intelligence shall 
appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances 
under section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by 
subsection (a), not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section 
of the National Security Act of 1947 is further amended by inserting 
after the item relating to section 103H the following new item:

``Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security 
clearances.''.

SEC. 414. SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.

  (a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
conduct an audit of the reciprocity of security clearances in the 
intelligence community.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall 
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing 
the results of the audit conducted under subsection (a). Such report 
shall include an assessment of the time required to obtain a reciprocal 
security clearance for--
          (1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
        detailed to another element of the intelligence community;
          (2) an employee of an element of the intelligence community 
        seeking permanent employment with another element of the 
        intelligence community and;
          (3) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an element 
        of the intelligence community.

SEC. 415. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS.

  (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report assessing--
          (1) the threat to national security presented by the efforts 
        of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage, diversion, 
        or other means, sensitive equipment and technology, and the 
        degree to which United States export controls (including the 
        International Traffic in Arms Regulations) are adequate to 
        defeat such efforts; and
          (2) the extent to which United States export controls are 
        well matched to the scope of the foreign threat such controls 
        are designed to defeat and whether other means could more 
        successfully defeat such threats.
  (b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in 
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
  (c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The term 
``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means those regulations 
contained in parts 120 through 130 of title 22, Code of Federal 
Regulations (or successor regulations).

SEC. 416. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.

  (a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director of 
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on 
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a 
report on the illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and 
equipment.
  (b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall 
include, for a period of time including at least the preceding three 
years--
          (1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit 
        sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of nuclear or 
        radiological material or equipment useful for the production of 
        nuclear or radiological material or nuclear explosive devices;
          (2) an assessment of the countries that represent the 
        greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
          (3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in knowledge, 
        or other information that would reduce confidence in the 
        assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
  (c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in 
classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary.

SEC. 417. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED 
                    DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

  (a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a 
study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the 
intelligence community who commit unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information, including whether revoking such pensions is 
feasible under existing law or under the administrative authority of 
the Director of National Intelligence or any other head of an element 
of the intelligence community.
  (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results 
of the study conducted under subsection (a).

                Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency

SEC. 421. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE 
                    CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--
          (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and 
        transferring such subsection to the end; and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
          ``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an 
        audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits 
        shall be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3) 
        and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
          ``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct 
        an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been 
        terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or 
        suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action 
        conducted by the Inspector General and has not been restarted 
        after the date on which such audit was completed.
          ``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of 
        an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the 
        congressional intelligence committees a report containing the 
        results of such audit.''.
  (b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
          (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)'';
          (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and
          (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking 
        ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''.

SEC. 422. INAPPLICABILITY TO DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 
                    AGENCY OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRESS 
                    IN AUDITABLE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.

  Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) 
is amended by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency,''.

SEC. 423. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CERTAIN CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.

  Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
          (1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and 
        inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
          (2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
        Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National 
        Clandestine Service'';
          (3) in subclause (III), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
        Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of Intelligence'';
          (4) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
        Administration'' and inserting ``Director of Support''; and
          (5) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy Director for 
        Science and Technology'' and inserting ``Director of Science 
        and Technology''.

SEC. 424. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                    2004.

  Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is 
amended--
          (1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and 
        inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
          (2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after 
        ``subsection (a)),''.

SEC. 425. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR 
                    INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OR 
                    CONTROL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall not expend or 
obligate funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the 
interrogation of a detainee or prisoner in custody or under the 
effective control of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  (b) Exception.--
          (1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence 
        may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under subsection 
        (a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency 
        determines that--
                  (A) no employee of the Federal Government is--
                          (i) capable of performing such interrogation; 
                        and
                          (ii) available to perform such interrogation; 
                        and
                  (B) such interrogation is in the national interest of 
                the United States and requires the use of a contractor.
          (2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any 
        contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver 
        under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the conduct 
        of interrogations that would apply if an employee of the 
        Federal Government were conducting the interrogation.

              Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components

SEC. 431. INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY INTO 
                    THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Report.--Not later than November 1, 2008, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
and armed services committees a report outlining the process by which 
the Counterintelligence Field Activity is to be integrated into the 
Defense Intelligence Agency. Such report shall include--
          (1) a description of the nature of any law enforcement 
        authorities to be delegated to the Defense Intelligence Agency;
          (2) the authority under which the delegation of authority 
        referred to in paragraph (1) would occur; and
          (3) the guidelines for the implementation of such law 
        enforcement authorities.
  (b) Congressional Intelligence and Armed Services Committees.--In 
this section, the term ``congressional intelligence and armed services 
committees'' means--
          (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
        House of Representatives;
          (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
          (3) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate.

                       Subtitle D--Other Elements

SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG 
                    ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS ELEMENTS OF THE 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
is amended--
          (1) in subparagraph (H)--
                  (A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the 
                Marine Corps,''; and
                  (B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement 
                Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation,''; and
          (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office 
        of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.

SEC. 442. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF 
                    THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report describing the 
Director's long term vision for transforming the intelligence 
capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms of 
the Bureau intended to achieve that vision. Such report shall include--
          (1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the 
        intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
          (2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence 
        and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
          (3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms at 
        the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau 
        towards achieving the goals of the Director for the 
        intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau; and
          (4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks that 
        are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau as an 
        intelligence agency, including--
                  (A) identifying new intelligence targets within the 
                scope of the national security functions of the Bureau, 
                outside the parameters of an existing case file or 
                ongoing investigation;
                  (B) collecting intelligence domestically, including 
                collection through human and technical sources;
                  (C) recruiting human sources;
                  (D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit, 
                and handle human sources;
                  (E) working collaboratively with other Federal 
                departments and agencies to jointly collect 
                intelligence on domestic counterterrorism and 
                counterintelligence targets;
                  (F) producing a common intelligence picture of 
                domestic threats to the national security of the United 
                States;
                  (G) producing high quality and timely intelligence 
                analysis;
                  (H) integrating intelligence analysts into its 
                intelligence collection operations; and
                  (I) sharing intelligence information with 
                intelligence community partners.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters

SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE 
                    RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED 
                    STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a) Extension.--
          (1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
        107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1, 
        2004'' and inserting ``December 31, 2009''.
          (2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the amendment 
        made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the 
        enactment of such section 1007.
          (3) Commission membership.--
                  (A) In general.--The membership of the National 
                Commission for the Review of the Research and 
                Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
                Community established under subsection (a) of section 
                1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2438) 
                (referred to in this section as the ``Commission'') 
                shall be considered vacant and new members shall be 
                appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as 
                amended by subparagraph (B).
                  (B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section 
                1002(b) of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy 
                Director of Central Intelligence for Community 
                Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy 
                Director of National Intelligence.''.
          (4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act is 
        amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking 
        ``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research and 
        development programs and activities. Such review shall 
        include--''.
  (b) Funding.--
          (1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated 
        by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
        the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000 
        available to the Commission to carry out title X of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
        107-306; 116 Stat. 2437).
          (2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission 
        pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until 
        expended.

SEC. 502. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

  (a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended by adding at the end 
the following new paragraph:
  ``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall provide to 
the congressional intelligence committees all information necessary to 
assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, 
budgetary authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including--
          ``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence 
        activity is being or was conducted;
          ``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in 
        carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including 
        dissenting legal views;
          ``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the 
        intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing 
        intelligence sources or methods;
          ``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will 
        exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or other 
        resources; and
          ``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will 
        fail.''.
  (b) Reporting on Activities Other Than Covert Actions.--Section 502 
of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection:
  ``(d) Distribution of Information.--
          ``(1) Request.--Information or material provided in 
        accordance with subsection (a) shall be made available to each 
        member of the congressional intelligence committees, unless the 
        President requests that access to the information or material 
        be limited after determining that limiting such access is 
        essential to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital 
        interests of the United States. A request under this paragraph 
        and the extraordinary circumstances referred to in this 
        paragraph shall be detailed in writing to the Chair and ranking 
        minority member of the congressional intelligence committees.
          ``(2) Distribution.--If the President submits a request under 
        paragraph (1), the Chair and ranking minority member of each 
        congressional intelligence committee may jointly determine 
        whether and how to limit access to the information or material 
        within such committee. If the Chair and ranking minority member 
        of such committee are unable to agree on whether or how to 
        limit such access, access to the information or material will 
        be limited. Any information or material to which access is 
        limited shall subsequently be made available to each member of 
        the congressional intelligence communities at the earliest 
        possible time and shall include a detailed statement of the 
        reasons for not providing prior access.''.
  (c) Approval of Covert Actions.--Section 503(d) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(d)) is amended--
          (1) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting ``(d)(1) 
        The President''; and
          (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
  ``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall constitute a 
`significant undertaking' if the activity--
          ``(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
          ``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, 
        including authorities relating to research, development, or 
        operations;
          ``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or 
        other resources;
          ``(D) requires notification under section 504;
          ``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing 
        intelligence sources or methods; or
          ``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic relations 
        of the United States if such activity were disclosed without 
        authorization.''.

SEC. 503. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS.

  (a) Annual Reports.--Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and inserting 
        ``annual''; and
          (2) in subsection (a)--
                  (A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and 
                inserting ``Annual'';
                  (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
                          (i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and 
                        inserting ``annual basis''; and
                          (ii) by striking ``preceding six-month 
                        period'' and inserting ``preceding year'';
                  (C) by striking paragraph (2); and
                  (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as 
                paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively.
  (b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 507 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
          (1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end the following 
        new subparagraph:
          ``(L) The annual report on financial intelligence on 
        terrorist assets required by section 118.''; and
          (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).

SEC. 504. NOTICE OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING NORTH KOREA AND CHINA.

  Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) is 
amended--
          (1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
          (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new 
        subsection:
  ``(f) A notification to the congressional intelligence committees 
regarding intelligence information relating to North Korea or China 
after all or part of the information has been communicated to the 
governments of North Korea or China, respectively, shall not be 
construed to fulfill the duty under this title to keep the 
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of 
the intelligence activities of the United States.''.

SEC. 505. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING USE OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES.

  It is the sense of Congress that the resources authorized under this 
Act should not be diverted from human intelligence collection and other 
intelligence programs designed to combat al Qaeda in order to study 
global climate change.

                    Subtitle B--Technical Amendments

SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 
                    1949.

  Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs 
(2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 
103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the 
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), 
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 
104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''.

SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

  (a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is 
amended--
          (1) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
          (2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
  (b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence.--That 
section is further amended--
          (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of 
        Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National 
        Intelligence''; and
          (2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National 
        Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
  (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to 
read as follows:

``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.

SEC. 513. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT 
                    MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.

  Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) 
is amended--
          (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for 
        the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical 
        Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual 
        budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
        program or programs''; and
          (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military 
        Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence 
        Program or any successor program or programs''.

SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

  The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended 
as follows:
          (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
                  (A) in subsection (d)--
                          (i) in paragraph (3), by striking 
                        ``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding 
                        subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph 
                        (1)(A)'';
                          (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or 
                        personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i); 
                        and
                          (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking ``or 
                        agency involved'' in the second sentence and 
                        inserting ``involved or the Director of the 
                        Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the 
                        Central Intelligence Agency)'';
                  (B) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' 
                and inserting ``paragraph''; and
                  (C) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other'' 
                after ``Acquisition''.
          (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by 
        striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
          (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), 
        by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''.

SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM 
                    PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.

  (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 
2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I 
of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is amended as follows:
          (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by 
        striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and 
        inserting ``Department of Justice''.
          (2) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
          (3) In section 1072(b), in the subsection heading by 
        inserting ``Agency'' after ``Intelligence''.
  (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended as follows:
          (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
                  (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before 
                ``an institutional culture'';
                  (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National 
                Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with 
                section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of 
                National Intelligence in a manner consistent with 
                applicable law''; and
                  (C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the 
                matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
          (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
                  (A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and 
                inserting ``Federal''; and
                  (B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' 
                and inserting ``specific''.

SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.

  (a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director 
of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
          
        ``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
  (b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy 
Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
          
        ``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
  (c) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United 
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General 
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and 
inserting the following new item:
          
        ``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National 
        Intelligence.''.

SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) Title 5.--Title 5, United States Code, is amended by striking 
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears and 
inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
  (b) Title 44.--Title 44, United States Code, is amended--
          (1) in section 1336--
                  (A) in the heading, by striking ``National Imagery 
                and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''; and
                  (B) by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping 
                Agency'' each place it appears and inserting ``National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''; and
          (2) in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13, 
        by striking the item relating to section 1336 and inserting the 
        following new item:

``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special 
publications.''.
  (c) Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 
201(f)(2)(E) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121) is 
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and 
inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.

                                Purpose

    The purpose of H.R. 5959 is to authorize the intelligence 
and intelligence-related activities of the United States 
Government for fiscal year 2009 in order to enhance the 
national security of the United States, to support and assist 
the armed forces of the United States, and to facilitate and 
oversee the execution of the foreign policy of the United 
States. The bill also clarifies certain intelligence community 
authorities and makes technical corrections to existing 
statutes.

                 Classified Annex and Committee Intent

    The classified annex to this report includes the classified 
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory 
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an 
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex 
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the 
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends 
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified 
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the 
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language 
therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is 
incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of 
Section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for 
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject 
to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of 
Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence. In addition, Section 317 of the bill incorporates 
reporting requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint 
Explanatory Statement into the Act.

                       Scope of Committee Review

    The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee, 
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Military 
Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information System Security 
Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central 
Intelligence Agency, as well as intelligence and intelligence-
related activities conducted by: (1) the Department of Defense; 
(2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security 
Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; 
(5) the Coast Guard; (6) the Department of State; (7) the 
Department of the Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9) 
the Department of Justice; (10) the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation; (11) the Drug Enforcement Administration; (12) 
the National Reconnaissance Office; (13) the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (14) the Department of 
Homeland Security. The Committee has legislative, authorizing, 
and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.

                     Committee Statement and Views

                              A. OVERVIEW

    In an era of asymmetric threats, intelligence continues to 
be one of the nation's most fundamental national security 
tools. A well-resourced, well-managed, and well-trained 
Intelligence Community is the nation's first line of defense 
against terrorists, proliferators of weapons of mass 
destruction, and other global actors who would do America harm.
    The Committee strongly supports the brave women and men of 
America's intelligence agencies and appreciates the personal 
sacrifices, overseas deployments, and enormous risks they and 
their families undertake to preserve our freedom.
    Most of the nation's intelligence successes, of which there 
are many, cannot be discussed in an unclassified report. So, 
too, some of the biggest intelligence gaps cannot be written 
about publicly. The Committee has conducted dozens of 
classified hearings, briefings, and site visits to understand 
the threats, assess our capabilities, and realign resources to 
match the threats properly.
    The Committee's principal concern continues to be that al-
Qaeda is stronger today than at any time since September 11, 
2001. Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large, 
likely in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. 
Al-Qaeda is not the only terrorist group to grow in strength 
over the past seven years. Hezbollah and Hamas have become more 
capable and more determined. Dangerous states, including Syria, 
continue to pursue nuclear capabilities. There is the 
possibility that one of these states could transfer fissile 
material to a terrorist group. The Committee is convinced that 
this must remain our foremost worry.

                        B. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW

    The Committee completed its review of the President's 
fiscal year 2009 budget request, carrying out its annual 
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close 
examination of the U.S. Government's intelligence programs and 
proposed expenditures.
    Over the past two months, the Committee conducted 14 full 
committee-level budget hearings and briefings on numerous 
topics, including the following:
     National Intelligence Program
     Military Intelligence Program
     Advanced Research and Development
     Overhead Architecture
     Human Intelligence
     Covert Action
     Human Capital
     Cybersecurity
    In addition to these events, committee members and staff 
have taken numerous budget-related briefings covering all 
intelligence programs within the National Intelligence Program, 
the Military Intelligence Program, and the Information System 
Security Program.
    As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary 
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings 
and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of 
the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community throughout the year. This oversight 
activity includes scores of committee and subcommittee hearings 
and briefings; site visits and fact-finding trips; reviews of 
congressionally-directed reports; and studies of intelligence 
capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges.

                           C. THE LEGISLATION

    The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of 
Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended 
authorizations for the Intelligence Community for fiscal year 
2009. This includes an authorization for the intelligence 
portion of the fiscal year 2009 bridge supplemental request to 
fund counterterrorism operations as well as operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. At the time of consideration of H.R. 5959, the 
Committee had not received the Administration's full emergency 
supplemental funding request for fiscal year 2009. The 
Committee will consider that proposal at a later time.
    H.R. 5959 improves U.S. intelligence capabilities in 
several important respects.
    First, the bill invests in people, our most important 
resource. It adds funding to enhance human intelligence 
(HUMINT) collection and provides much-needed funds for other 
enduring and emerging global security issues, such as 
challenges faced in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
    The bill continues the Committee's longstanding commitment 
to improving language capabilities in the Intelligence 
Community, adding both funding and reporting requirements in 
order to improve oversight of this perennial problem area.
    The bill mandates implementation of security clearance 
reform to allow first and second generation Americans, many of 
whom may have critical language skills, to serve in the 
Intelligence Community with proper clearances. In many 
instances, the cumbersome security clearance process has 
delayed the entry of highly-skilled applicants, or dissuaded 
them from even seeking employment in the Intelligence 
Community. The Committee has addressed a number of these 
concerns to encourage the Community to hire the most qualified 
people.
    Second, the bill enhances congressional oversight by 
ensuring that the Committee receives the information it needs 
to conduct its inherent oversight function. The Committee has 
borne witness to repeated failures by the Administration to 
comply with the National Security Act of 1947, which mandates 
that the Committee be ``fully and currently informed'' of all 
intelligence activities. These failures prompted the Committee 
to adopt two provisions to enhance reporting on intelligence 
activities to the full membership of the congressional 
intelligence committees. One provision would limit the use of 
covert action funds until the full membership of the 
intelligence committees are briefed on all covert actions in 
effect as of April 24, 2008. Another provision would restrict 
the Administration's attempts to limit information to only the 
Chairman and Ranking Member, and clarifies the information that 
must be reported to the full Committee.
    Third, the bill authorizes much of the request for the 
foundational activities of the Comprehensive National 
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), while expressing the 
Committee's concern about potential policy, implementation, and 
governance issues. To that end, the bill also includes a 
legislative provision requesting a presidential report on 
creating a senior advisory panel composed of representatives 
from the executive branch, the legislative branch, and the 
private sector for the purposes of providing a vehicle to 
address issues of concern. The Committee has performed an 
extensive review of the proposed CNCI, which included holding 
three hearings and numerous briefings and roundtables.
    Fourth, the Committee is also concerned that Congress does 
not have a full understanding of the magnitude of human and 
fiscal intelligence resources that have been devoted to Iraq, 
the expenditure of which often comes at the expense of fighting 
the war on terror. H.R. 5959 requires a detailed report to the 
Committee on this topic.
    Fifth, the bill addresses a number of long-term technical 
challenges in the Intelligence Community. It does so by adding 
significant resources in both the National Intelligence Program 
and the Military Intelligence Program to modernize signals 
intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities and integrate them into a 
global SIGINT Enterprise.
    Finally, despite the size of the budget request, the 
Administration did not include funds adequate to keep the U.S. 
Intelligence Community competitive in advanced technologies. 
Research and development funding is the nation's investment in 
retaining state of the art technologies. The bill adds funds to 
four agencies specifically for that purpose; and the Committee 
urges the executive branch to sustain, if not increase, this 
level of funding in future year requests.
    The Committee adopted a number of amendments to H.R. 5959 
offered by majority and minority members. The Committee is 
pleased that this bill passed with bipartisan support.

                      D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative

    The single largest request and the most important 
initiative of the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request 
was the CNCI. Since the announcement of the CNCI and the 
issuance of the National Security Presidential Directive 54/
Homeland SecurityPresidential Directive 23 in January 2008, the 
Committee has focused much time and effort on understanding the CNCI 
and its components.
    At present, it would be fair to characterize the 
Committee's response to the CNCI as one of conditional support. 
The Committee finds a cybersecurity initiative worthwhile in 
principle, but the details of the CNCI remain vague and, thus, 
open to question. Until some of the governance, implementation, 
and policy issues are identified, debated, and resolved, the 
Committee believes that the funding request is excessive. Our 
conclusions are summarized in the following five points:
           A comprehensive, national initiative is long 
        overdue. The threat has continued to grow in scale and 
        sophistication, and our countermeasures have stagnated;
           The Administration's near-term approach of 
        securing federal government systems appears reasonable, 
        although the Committee remains concerned about program 
        management and systems engineering capabilities;
           There is consensus that an effective 
        cybersecurity initiative should be based on a ``defense 
        in depth'' approach that synchronizes the activities of 
        different elements of the government. However, the 
        various components of the CNCI do not seem very well-
        connected, nor is it clear there are adequate 
        governance mechanisms to achieve the necessary 
        coordination;
           The Committee understands the prudence of 
        delaying debate on major policy issues until the next 
        Administration, given the limited time remaining in the 
        current one. Nevertheless, the Administration has 
        addressed some important issues, and we must consider 
        how best to deal with those issues in order to achieve 
        progress; and
           For the CNCI to work as described in the 
        Presidential Directive, it will require a partnership 
        with industry unlike any model that currently exists. 
        The excessive classification of the CNCI, however, 
        militates against the collaboration necessary to 
        achieve that partnership.
    The Committee also notes that the federal government is not 
presently organized or equipped to negotiate the myriad issues 
and challenges presented by the implementation of the CNCI, 
especially those that cross organizational and jurisdictional 
boundaries. As the CNCI develops, it will be imperative that 
the government also take into account the interests and 
concerns of private citizens, the U.S. information technology 
industry, and other elements of the private sector. Indeed, the 
success of the CNCI will depend on the ability to develop and 
implement a well-defined, comprehensive model for public sector 
and private sector cooperation.
    Many of the details of the CNCI are still evolving, and an 
endeavor of this magnitude will need to be undertaken over the 
course of many years. The Committee believes a mechanism should 
be created to review the Intelligence Community's progress 
toward refining and implementing the CNCI, as well as make 
policy recommendations to the executive and legislative 
branches in the areas of governance, privacy and civil 
liberties, and regulatory issues. As a result, the Committee 
has included a legislative provision requiring a report from 
the President on options for creating a high-level advisory 
body.

Overreliance on supplemental funding

    The Committee wishes to express once again its unequivocal 
disapproval of the recurring practice of funding intelligence 
activities through emergency supplemental requests rather than 
within the parameters of the standard budgeting process. The 
supplemental funding process ensures significantly less 
scrutiny of funding requests, both within the executive branch 
and in Congress, and invites waste. It prevents authorizing 
committees from performing their functions of oversight and 
evaluation, often resulting in investment in ill-advised and 
unvetted programs. Many of these programs have out-year funding 
``tails'' that, in an era of declining budgets, will 
necessitate funding within base appropriations once 
supplemental requests cease.
    The practice of budgeting by supplemental is particularly 
egregious in the arena of intelligence activities, which by 
statute are supposed to receive a higher level of scrutiny than 
other federal funding. The Committee hopes that one of the 
first orders of business for the new Administration is to stop 
this fiscally irresponsible practice and to work with Congress 
to find funding solutions that do not bring the Department of 
Defense and the Intelligence Community to a stand-still.

Human intelligence capability throughout the world

    The maintenance of a robust HUMINT capability on a global 
basis is as much a mission priority as countering terrorism and 
supporting activity in the war theater. As world events 
continue to demonstrate, some of the greatest threats to the 
strategic interests of the United States emanate from sovereign 
nations, not from terrorist organizations or other non-state 
actors. The need for the National HUMINT Manager and other 
senior leadership in the Intelligence Community to devote 
sufficient personnel and financial resources to fulfill the 
global HUMINT mission has been a significant priority of 
Congress for many years.
    The Committee remains concerned that identified, 
meritorious HUMINT initiatives are not being funded or 
adequately supported by the Administration. Accordingly, this 
bill provides additional, targeted HUMINT funding to enhance 
the nation's capability to ascertain the plans and intentions 
of those seeking to undermine the interests and security of the 
United States.

Issues regarding Committee notification of Syria's nuclear program

    In April 2008, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) 
briefed the Committee on the construction of a covert nuclear 
facility in Syria and its subsequent destruction in September 
2007.
    Over the course of the preceding eight months, the Chairman 
and Ranking Minority Member had requested that the President 
brief the full membership of the Committee about these 
developments, which significantly impact U.S. foreign policy 
toward the Middle East and North Korea.
    Just hours before a highly-orchestrated public roll-out of 
the previously classified intelligence, the President finally 
sent briefers to the Committee. The delay was inexcusable and 
violated the National Security Act of 1947, which requires that 
the executive branch keep Congress ``fully and currently 
informed'' of all intelligence activities. Congress should be 
briefed on the threats to the United States in a timely manner, 
not simply when it is politically expedient.
    The world is more dangerous today than at any time since 9/
11. There are serious challenges to U.S. national and 
international security that require the Administration and 
Congress to work together. The Administration's clear disdain 
for the legitimate oversight role of Congress makes it 
difficult for Congress to do its part in meeting these 
challenges and keeping America secure.

Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    The National Security Act of 1947 is the principal 
legislative source for the executive's requirement to keep the 
congressional intelligence committees informed of the nation's 
intelligence activities. As the Committee has noted, this 
obligation is absolutely critical to sound congressional 
oversight, which in turn is central to a well-functioning and 
effective Intelligence Community.
    In recent years, the Administration has, on several 
occasions, ignored the plain language of the Act. In one case, 
the Administration refused, for an extended period of time, to 
brief the full Committee membership on the President's 
warrantless surveillance program, notwithstanding that it was 
not a covert action program. In another case, the 
Administration ignored months of requests for a briefing on 
Syria's nuclear program, despite the fact that the 
Administration was preparing to brief reporters on the same 
issue and had already briefed foreign nations on the issue.
    This is unacceptable. For this reason, the Committee has 
included several amendments to the reporting requirements of 
the Act. These amendments are intended to clarify that the 
obligation to report to the committees is not negotiable. It is 
not an obligation that the President can ignore at his 
discretion. It is not an obligation that can be evaded by 
claiming that briefing the congressional intelligence 
committees will require other committees to be briefed. It is 
not an obligation that can be evaded by broad assertions of 
executive power.

Diversity in the intelligence community

    The Committee is committed to increasing diversity in the 
Intelligence Community and notes with approval that the DNI 
identified treating ``diversity as a strategic mission 
imperative'' in his 100-day and 500-day plans. In particular, 
the DNI has stated that one of his goals is to improve the 
recruiting, hiring, and retention of first and second 
generation Americans. Indeed, across the community, minority 
hiring is at a five-year high. Despite this progress, the 
Intelligence Community overall is still substantially behind 
the civilian labor force and the federal workforce in minority 
and female representation. This gap is even more apparent in 
core mission areas and management positions, especially at the 
highest levels.
    The Committee believes that the DNI's stated commitment 
should show measurable results. Unfortunately, several 
indicators within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) show a lack of attention and commitment to 
diversity. For example, the ODNI is below average in the 
Intelligence Community for minority representation, and is 
significantly below average in the Intelligence Community in 
its hiring of minorities. In particular, the DNI's Office of 
Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity has suffered 
significant budget cuts over the past three years, despite 
taking on new mandates. The DNI's commitment to diversity can 
be most clearly shown in the composition of his own office. The 
Committee hopes that the ODNI will show an improvement in 
minority representation in the future, and urges the DNI to 
hold his office to the same standards that he expects from the 
rest of the Intelligence Community.

Committee investigation into the destruction of interrogation 
        videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency

    On December 10, 2007, the Committee announced an 
investigation into the making, retention, and destruction of 
interrogation videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA). That investigation, initiated as part of the Committee's 
oversight of the CIA, is intended to ascertain the facts 
regarding the destruction of the videotapes and failure to 
notify the Committee regarding the destruction.
    The Committee's investigation is ongoing and has made 
substantial progress. The Committee has received hundreds of 
pages of documents in response to its document requests. The 
Committee has also held two hearings to take sworn testimony 
and has conducted several staff-level interviews.
    While the sensitive nature of the investigation prevents 
extensive public discussion of the investigation, the Committee 
believes that it is critical to its oversight work. The 
Committee looks forward to completion of its investigation and 
plans to issue a report documenting its findings.

Creation of a National Applications Office in the Department of 
        Homeland Security

    Last year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
announced the creation of the National Applications Office 
(NAO) under the Office of Intelligence and Analysis to 
facilitate access by non-traditional users to national 
technical means-derived intelligence. This new office currently 
has the authority to process imagery, measurement 
andsignatures, and electronic intelligence requests for civil 
applications and homeland security purposes.
    The Committee notes the apparent care with which the DHS is 
approaching the establishment of the NAO. Pursuant to 
congressional mandate, the Committee has received several 
documents outlining the legal authorities under which NAO will 
operate. The Committee, however, remains concerned with the 
planned use of national technical means for law enforcement 
purposes, as opposed to homeland security purposes. Such use is 
unprecedented and raises significant constitutional issues. 
Therefore, the Committee looks forward to reviewing the results 
of the statutorily-mandated Government Accountability Office 
review of the Secretary's certification that NAO activities 
comply with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy 
and civil liberties standards.
    The NAO charter also requires an interagency legal working 
group to resolve any privacy, civil liberties, and policy 
issues surrounding the use of national technical means for the 
purposes of law enforcement. The Committee expects to be kept 
apprised of the group's work on these issues and on the 
development of legal parameters and guidance on the functioning 
of the law enforcement domain within the NAO.

Major systems acquisitions

    The Committee notes with concern the continued cost 
overruns and schedule delays affecting the acquisition of many 
major intelligence community systems. At the same time, the 
Committee acknowledges the effort entailed in preparing the 
DNI's 2007 Annual Report to Congress on Intelligence Community 
Program Management Plans, which compares the performance of all 
National Intelligence Program acquisition programs against a 
DNI-established baseline. The Committee is also pleased that 
one goal of the DNI's 500 Day Plan is to build acquisition 
excellence within the Intelligence Community. With Intelligence 
Community Directive 105 and Intelligence Community Program 
Guidance 105.1, the DNI is requiring practices that will 
increase the likelihood of successful acquisitions. Finally, 
the Committee applauds the DNI's recommended greater use of 
experienced systems engineers during the acquisition process.
    The Committee encourages the DNI to issue a formal policy 
establishing a procedure by which the Intelligence Community 
would be empowered to withhold incentives from companies with 
poor contract performance. Such a policy would forcefully 
demonstrate the expectations for contractor performance. 
Despite coverage of this topic in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, practices are not standard across the Intelligence 
Community, even within directorates of individual agencies. The 
Committee believes that standardization of policy would restore 
meaning to the use of award incentives and benefit the entire 
Intelligence Community.
    The Committee notes that the continuing consolidation of 
industry is impacting the government's ability to contract with 
independent companies when conducting major systems 
acquisitions. Specifically, the Committee is concerned about 
cases in which a single parent company has a contract for 
engineering technical assistance in support of a source 
selection and also intends to compete for the system 
development contract. The Committee urges the Deputy DNI for 
Acquisition to consider whether established firewalls are 
sufficient to prevent any potential conflict of interest in 
such cases.

Acquisition program performance notification

    The Committee is concerned that delays in informing 
Congress that major acquisition programs for the Intelligence 
Community are over cost, behind schedule, or failing to adhere 
to milestones serves to undermine good oversight. In many 
cases, the Committee has learned of a program failure only 
after millions of dollars have been wasted.
    To remedy this problem, the Committee urges the DNI to 
develop, in consultation with the Committee, a standard for 
program notification to keep the Committee fully informed of 
program issues. The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment to the Department of 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982 provides an 
example of such a standard. The guidance should, for example, 
ensure congressional notification at the end of each quarter of 
total acquisition costs per unit for each major intelligence 
program. It should also require notification if an agency head 
has reason to believe a program will exceed the authorized 
funding by a specific percentage.

Advanced research and development

    Advanced Research and Development (R&D) is critical to the 
ability of the Intelligence Community to accomplish its 
missions. Intelligence officers must remain several steps ahead 
of their targets and adversaries. Technical innovation is often 
the key to accomplishing this goal. The Committee believes that 
the Intelligence Community's investment in R&D is insufficient 
to enable the elements of the Intelligence Community to keep up 
with both current and future challenges. The elements of the 
Intelligence Community must be encouraged and allowed to invest 
more resources in Advanced R&D.
    The fiscal year 2009 budget presents an example of the R&D 
challenge. As often happens in the Intelligence Community, the 
research budgets were held steady, or cut, to fund the higher, 
near-term priorities of Intelligence Community. The Committee 
feels that these decisions were short-sighted. For this reason, 
the Committee has increased funding for Advanced R&D above the 
Administration's request. In the future, the Committee 
encourages the DNI to ensure the allocation of necessary 
funding and personnel resources to enhance the Intelligence 
Community's R&D efforts.
    The DNI must also provide adequate resources for the newly-
created Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity 
(IARPA). IARPA was created to address long-term research 
challenges from the perspective of the greater Intelligence 
Community, rather than from an individual agency's more 
operationally-focused vantage point. While the Committee had 
initial concerns about IARPA's creation and the impact it would 
haveon the research programs of the individual elements of the 
Intelligence Community, the Committee is pleased that the ODNI has 
taken the first required steps for success. IARPA will benefit greatly 
from the selection of a Director and the stability of a dedicated 
location for its activities. The Committee looks forward to observing 
how the ODNI nurtures this organization as it develops new and 
innovative long-term research programs.

Future course for overhead architecture

    The Committee remains concerned that neither the DNI nor 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)] is 
showing an appropriate sense of urgency in charting a viable 
future course for the overhead constellation. The classified 
annex to the bill contains guidance to the Intelligence 
Community to focus on lower-risk and presumably less-expensive 
solutions to current architectural problems. The Committee 
urges the Intelligence Community to pursue evolutionary 
upgrades to existing designs as a way to reduce near-term risk, 
while at the same time exhorting the DNI to make more progress 
in defining the next-generation designs. The Committee does not 
prescribe specific technical solutions, but it does seek to 
ensure that all available technologies and existing 
capabilities are being given full and careful consideration 
before the executive branch embarks on formal acquisitions. The 
Committee also seeks to ensure that any acquisition undertaken 
is part of a clear path towards a future capability or 
architecture.
    While there is no clear consensus on the specifics of the 
way ahead, there is widespread agreement that the DNI and 
USD(I) have yet to deliver an architecture sufficiently 
compelling to win the support of Congress. The Committee urges 
the DNI and the USD(I) to develop a cohesive and comprehensive 
strategy prior to the submission of the fiscal year 2010 budget 
request.

Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency

    The Committee has recently learned that the Secretary of 
Defense approved the dissolution of the Counterintelligence 
Field Activity (CIFA) and the integration of its functional 
elements into the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). As part of 
this integration, the USD(I) is seeking to amend DIA's charter 
in order to, among other things, designate DIA as a law 
enforcement activity.
    The Committee is concerned about DIA's suitability to 
engage in law enforcement activities that are designed to 
investigate non-DIA personnel. DIA's stated mission is to 
collect, analyze, and manage foreign military intelligence for 
war fighters. The Agency has no experience with managing, 
overseeing, and leading criminal investigations of non-DIA 
personnel, even investigations that have a counterintelligence 
nexus.
    The Committee will continue to follow this issue closely, 
including through reports required elsewhere in this Act.

FBI's use of national security letters

    The Committee has been, and remains, extremely concerned by 
the reports from the Department of Justice Inspector General 
(DOJ/IG), which found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) abused its statutory authority with respect to National 
Security Letters (NSLs) from 2003 through 2006.
    An NSL is a demand letter used by the FBI to obtain, 
usually from businesses, the records and data related to 
telephone and electronic communications, financial 
transactions, and credit reports. Unlike search warrants, they 
require no probable cause and involve no judicial oversight 
unless challenged, which is difficult to do, as 97 percent of 
NSLs impose non-disclosure and confidentiality restraints on 
the recipients.
    In a March 2007 report examining FBI activities from 2003 
through 2005 and a March 2008 report examining activities in 
2006, the DOJ/IG detailed a complete breakdown in FBI oversight 
and internal controls over these intrusive investigative tools, 
including:
           inaccurate reporting to Congress of the 
        number of NSLs issued;
           poor training on Attorney General guidelines 
        on the balance of privacy interests and legitimate 
        investigative requirements;
           the use of more than 700 ``exigent letters'' 
        that circumvented the requirements of the NSL statute;
           an absence of FBI guidelines, reliable 
        record-keeping, or effective management controls 
        regarding the use of NSLs; and
           significant problems with the FBI's process 
        for identifying and reporting to the President's 
        Intelligence Oversight Board known statutory violations 
        and policy with regard to its use of NSLs, as required 
        by law.
    These abuses are made more worrisome because of the 
enormous growth in the FBI's requests to use NSLs, including 
those which seek information related to U.S. persons.
    Committee members and staff have been provided information 
about a series of corrective measures that the FBI has put in 
place since the release of the March 2007 report. The Committee 
agrees with the DOJ/IG that the FBI has made significant 
progress toward rectifying its many failures; and the Committee 
commends the Bureau's senior leaders for their personal 
involvement in these improvements. Among the changes are (1) 
new comprehensive guidance on the proper use of NSLs, 
accompanied by detailed training for agents nationwide; (2) the 
establishment of a new Office of Integrity and Compliance; and 
(3) the establishment of an NSL-tracking database to ensure 
proper authorizations are received and accurate reports are 
provided to Congress.
    In spite of these measures, the Committee is concerned that 
no one has been held accountable for the myriad failures of 
leadership, oversight, training, or quality control, 
particularly regarding the egregious issuance of ``exigent 
letters'' that demanded information by inaccurately promising 
that an NSL or grand jury subpoena would be forthcoming.
    Furthermore, the Committee agrees with the DOJ/IG's 
conclusion that it is too early to see if these corrective 
measures will mitigate the full range of problems and abuses. 
In particular, the Committee notes the DOJ/IG's finding that 
mechanisms established by the FBI still inadequately guarantee 
appropriate privacy safeguards or minimize the FBI's retention 
of NSL-derived information. The Committee urges the FBI to 
ensure that a proper balance is reached between protecting the 
privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons and the FBI's 
genuine investigative needs. The Committee intends to remain 
fully engaged in future NSL-related developments and attentive 
to any accountability reviews conducted by the Department of 
Justice.

Global climate change

    The Committee continues to acknowledge the critical impact 
of climate change on our national security and the inherent 
intelligence challenges of developing analytically-sound 
indicators with which to gauge the rates and types of global 
change and the likely impact on migrations, ethnic and 
international tensions, and the capacities and intentions of 
nations.
    Several reports in 2007 and 2008 projected the security 
implications of various rates of climate change, and some also 
called for more robust intelligence capacities to address these 
scenarios. For example, a report by eleven retired U.S. 
generals and admirals, published by the Center for Naval 
Analysis in April 2007, found that ``projected climate change 
poses a serious threat to America's national security'' and 
recommended that ``the national security consequences of 
climate change should be fully integrated into national 
security and national defense strategies.''
    In the near term, the prospect of a catastrophic climate-
related national security crisis may seem remote. However, the 
Committee recalls a time when people thought that the prospect 
of a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil was remote.
    To better ensure that the nation is well-positioned to deal 
with such a crisis, the Committee has authorized additional 
funds for the purpose of enhancing the Intelligence Community's 
collaboration efforts with the scientific community to address 
these challenges and to build relationships with international 
and national sources of expertise. The Committee urges the 
executive branch to use these resources as a catalyst for 
innovative, forward-looking efforts to build the capacity of 
the Intelligence Community to provide warning and strategic 
analysis in the context of global climate change.
    The Committee is pleased that the National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) is addressing the security implications of 
climate change through a National Intelligence Assessment 
(NIA). The Committee is optimistic that publication of the NIA 
and its associated research will encourage intelligence 
analysts and managers to take climate change-related factors 
into account in their ongoing assessment of many intelligence 
issues.

               Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes

    On May 8, 2008, the Committee met in open and closed 
session and ordered the bill H.R. 5959 favorably reported, as 
amended.

                              OPEN SESSION

    In open session, the Committee considered the text of the 
bill H.R. 5959.
    Chairman Reyes offered an amendment in the nature of a 
substitute to H.R. 5959. The contents of the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute, as amended, are described in the 
Section-by-Section analysis and the Explanation of Amendment. 
The Committee considered the following amendments to the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute:
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to limit the use of funds 
authorized by the bill for purposes of prohibiting or 
discouraging the use of certain words or phrases within the 
Intelligence Community or the Federal Government. It was not 
agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 12 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. 
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. 
Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the DNI to 
produce a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the 
Iranian nuclear program, to include a reassessment of past 
intelligence relating to the program. Mr. Hoekstra's amendment 
failed on voice vote.
    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to prohibit the use of 
private contractors for interrogation of persons in the custody 
or control of the Federal Government. Mr. Rogers offered a 
second degree amendment to Ms. Schakowsky's amendment, 
authorizing the DNI to issue waivers to the prohibition. Ms. 
Schakowsky withdrew her amendment.
    Mr. Holt offered an amendment to require the video 
recording of interrogations of persons in the custody of or 
under the effective control of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Mr. Holt withdrew his amendment.
    Mr. Hoekstra requested unanimous consent to offer three 
amendments en bloc: (1) an amendment to require the Director of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to complete a report on 
transformation of the Agency; (2) an amendment to require 
theDirector of National Intelligence to complete a feasibility study on 
revoking the pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information; and (3) an amendment stating that it is the 
sense of Congress that resources authorized by the bill should not be 
diverted from human intelligence collection or other intelligence 
programs designed to combat al-Qaeda in order to study global climate 
change.
    Each amendment en bloc was agreed to by voice vote.
    The Committee then recessed for House floor votes and 
reconvened in open session for business two hours later.

                              OPEN SESSION

    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to prohibit the use of 
private contractors for interrogations involving persons in the 
custody or control of the CIA unless a written waiver is 
granted by the DNI. It was agreed to by voice vote.
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to eliminate all earmarks 
from H.R. 5959 and to strike the provision authorizing the 
transfer of $39 million to the Department of Justice for the 
operation of the National Drug Intelligence Center. The 
amendment was agreed to by a record vote of 17 ayes to 4 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, 
Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Cramer, Mr. Holt, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Tiahrt.
    Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to eliminate the 
provision establishing an independent Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community within the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence. The amendment was not agreed to by voice 
vote.
    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to limit interrogation 
techniques to those proscribed by the United States Army Field 
Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. Discussion 
of the amendment was deferred because national security would 
be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed. 
Later, the amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 
ayes to 12 noes.
    Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney, 
Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. 
Schiff.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. 
Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. 
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Ms. Wilson of New Mexico offered an amendment to amend the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The amendment was not 
agreed to by a record vote of 10 ayes to 11 noes.
    Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. 
Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, 
Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
    Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to prohibit the 
use of funds authorized in the bill for purposes of 
implementing the FBI's mandatory reassignment of a supervisor 
after serving in a management position for 5 years. The 
amendment was agreed to by a record vote of 21 ayes to 0 noes.
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, 
Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: None.
    Mr. McHugh offered an amendment to the National Security 
Act of 1947 to clarify that reporting regarding North Korea and 
China must be provided to the Committee before being provided 
to those nations. The amendment was agreed to by a record vote 
of 17 ayes and 4 noes.
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Mr. 
Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, 
Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. 
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. 
Tierney.
    Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to establish rules for 
rendition by elements of the Intelligence Community in order to 
prevent harsh treatment by third nations, and to encourage 
timely legal proceedings against the rendered party.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Mr. Everett moved to close the meeting because national 
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered 
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 19 
ayes to 0 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Everett, Mr. 
Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, 
Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: None.

                              OPEN SESSION

    After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The 
Schakowsky amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 10 
ayes to 11 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. 
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. 
Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, 
Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    By voice vote, the Committee then adopted the Chairman's 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.

                             CLOSED SESSION

    Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national 
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered 
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 21 
ayes to 0 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, 
Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. 
McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
    Voting no: None.
    Ms. Wilson offered an amendment to modify the classified 
annex to accompany the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
    Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to reduce the 
number of positions and funding for the Community Management 
Account.

                              OPEN SESSION

    After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The 
Wilson amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes 
to 12 noes:
    Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. 
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. 
Issa.
    Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, 
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. 
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
    The Rogers amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted the Schedule of 
Authorizations, as amended.
    By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the 
Chairman to favorably report the bill to the House, as amended, 
including by reference the classified schedule of 
authorizations.

      Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment

                    TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Section 101. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 101 of the Committee report authorizes 
appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for the intelligence and 
intelligence-related activities of a list of United States 
Government departments, agencies, and other elements.

Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations

    Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts 
authorized to be appropriated under Section 101 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities for fiscal 
year 2009, and (subject to Section 103) the personnel ceilings 
authorized for fiscal year 2009, are contained in the 
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Schedule of 
Authorizations will be made available to the committees on 
appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, and 
to the President.
    Section 102 also contains language indicating that no 
earmarks are authorized in this Act.

Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments

    Section 103 provides procedures to enhance the flexibility 
of the DNI to manage the personnel levels of the Intelligence 
Community.
    This section allows the DNI, with the approval of the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to 
authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the 
number authorized under Section 102 by an amount not to exceed 
three percent of the total limit applicable to each element of 
the Intelligence Community. The DNI must determine that the 
action is necessary to the performance of important 
intelligence functions and must notify the congressional 
intelligence committees prior to the increase.
    It also requires the DNI to notify the congressional 
intelligence committees of the exercise of authority under this 
section.

Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account

    Section 104 authorizes the sum of $648,842,000 in fiscal 
year 2009 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of 
the DNI. The Intelligence Community Management Account is part 
of the Community Management Account. The section authorizes 772 
full-time, or full-time equivalent, personnel for the 
Intelligence Community Management Account, who may be either 
permanent employees or individuals detailed from other elements 
of the United States Government. Section 104 also authorizes 
additional funds and personnel in the classified Schedule of 
Authorizations for the Community Management Account.
    Under Section 104, the DNI may use the authorities in 
Section 103 to adjust personnel levels in elements within the 
Intelligence Community Management Account, subject to the 
limitations in that section.

Section 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds

    Section 105 limits the obligation or expenditure of covert 
action funds to no more than 25 percent until such time as each 
member of the congressional intelligence committees has been 
briefed on all authorizations for covert actions in effect on 
April 24, 2008.

Section 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement ``Five and Out'' 
        program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Section 106 bars the use of funds authorized under the Act 
to implement a program (commonly referred to as the ``Five and 
Out'' program) requiring the mandatory reassignment of a 
supervisor of the FBI after such supervisor serves in a 
management position for five years.

 TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM

Section 201. Authorization of appropriations

    Section 201 authorizes appropriations of $279,200,000 for 
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.

Section 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision 
        of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act

    Section 202 updates the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the 
Senior Intelligence Service program, rather than pay grades, by 
the CIA.

           TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS

                     SUBTITLE A--PERSONNEL MATTERS

Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized 
        by law

    Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be 
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other 
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such 
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for 
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.

Section 302. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to 
        elements of the Intelligence Community

    Section 302 expands from one year to two years the maximum 
length of time that United States Government personnel may be 
detailed to the ODNI on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable 
basis, in which case, the employee continues to be paid by the 
home agency. To utilize this authority, the joint agreement of 
the DNI and head of the detailing element is required. The DNI 
had requested authority to expand the permitted duration of 
details from one year to three years. The Committee believes 
that two years strikes an appropriate balance between the needs 
of the DNI and the needs of the elements of the Intelligence 
Community.

Section 303. Multi-level security clearances

    Section 303 amends section 102A of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), which sets forth the 
responsibilities and authorities of the DNI, to require the DNI 
to ensure that the elements of the Intelligence Community adopt 
a multi-level approach to security clearances. This approach 
will help ensure that the security clearance system is flexible 
enough to allow the elements of the Intelligence Community to 
leverage the skills and expertise of persons with cultural, 
linguistic or other subject matter expertise critical to 
national security.
    Section 303 also requires the DNI to establish guidelines 
implementing the requirements of this section.

Section 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for 
        intelligence collection personnel

    Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
404k(b)) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common 
carrier when it is consistent with Intelligence Community 
mission requirements or, more specifically, is required for 
cover purposes, operational needs, or other exceptional 
circumstances. Currently, the DNI may only delegate this 
authority to the Principal Deputy DNI or, with respect to CIA 
employees, to the Director of the CIA.
    Section 304 provides that the DNI may delegate the 
authority in section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 
1947 to the head of any element. This expansion is consistent 
with the view that the DNI should be able to delegate authority 
throughout the Intelligence Community when such delegation 
serves the overall interests of the Intelligence Community.
    Section 304 also provides that the head of an element of 
the Intelligence Community, to which travel authority has been 
delegated, is empowered to assign such authority to senior 
officials within the element, as specified in guidelines issued 
by the DNI. This allows for administrative flexibility 
consistent with the guidance of the DNIfor the entire 
Intelligence Community. To facilitate oversight, the DNI shall submit 
the guidelines to the congressional intelligence committees.

Section 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence 
        Community.

    Section 305 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head 
of the element of the Intelligence Community concerned, to 
prepare an annual assessment of the personnel and contractor 
levels for each element of the Intelligence Community for the 
subsequent fiscal year. Section 305 is a new mechanism to allow 
both the executive branch and Congress to oversee personnel 
growth in the Intelligence Community.
    The assessment required by Section 305 seeks information 
about budgeted personnel and contractor costs and levels, a 
comparison of this information to current fiscal year data and 
data from the previous five fiscal years, and a justification 
for the requested personnel and contractor levels. The 
assessment also requires the DNI to state that, based on 
current and projected funding, the element will have sufficient 
internal infrastructure and training resources to support the 
requested personnel and contractor levels, and sufficient 
funding to support the administrative and operational 
activities of the requested personnel levels.
    Section 305 also requires that the assessment contain 
information about intelligence collectors and analysts employed 
or contracted by each element of the Intelligence Community and 
contractors who are the subjects of any Inspector General 
investigations. The assessment must be submitted to 
congressional intelligence committees concurrent with the 
submission of the President's budget request.
    The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment 
required by Section 305 will provide information necessary for 
the executive branch and Congress to understand the 
consequences of modifying the Intelligence Community's 
personnel levels. Section 305, therefore, recognizes that 
personnel growth must be better planned in the future to 
accomplish the goals of strengthening intelligence collection, 
analysis, and dissemination. In addition, the Administration 
must adequately fund its personnel growth plan and structure 
its resources to ensure that personnel growth does not 
compromise the implementation and execution of other programs.
    With regard to historical contractor levels to be included 
in the annual assessments, the DNI has expressed concern that 
there was no comprehensive effort, prior to the ODNI's 
contractor inventory initiated in June 2006, to capture 
information on the number and costs of contractors throughout 
the Intelligence Community. In light of the concerns outlined 
by the DNI, the Committee understands that information about 
contractor levels prior to June 2006 may need to be reported as 
a best estimate.
    The Committee is also concerned about the Intelligence 
Community's increasing reliance on contractors to meet mission 
requirements. The Intelligence Community employs a significant 
number of ``core'' contractors who provide direct support to 
intelligence mission areas and are generally indistinguishable 
from the U.S. Government personnel whose mission they support. 
Given the cost disparity between employing a civilian federal 
government employee, estimated at an average of $126,500 
annually in fiscal year 2006, and a core contractor, estimated 
at an average of over $250,000 annually in fiscal year 2006, 
the Committee believes that the Intelligence Community should 
strive to reduce its dependence on contractors. The personnel 
assessment required in Section 305 should assist the DNI and 
the congressional intelligence committees in determining the 
appropriate balance of contractors and permanent government 
employees.

Section 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community 
        contractors.

    Section 306 requires the DNI to provide a one-time report 
by November 1, 2008, describing the personnel services 
activities performed by contractors across the Intelligence 
Community, the impact of contractors on the Intelligence 
Community, and the accountability mechanisms governing 
contractors.
    The reporting requirements of this section are designed to 
address three primary concerns. First, leaders in the 
Intelligence Community do not have sufficient factual 
documentation regarding the size and use of its large 
contractor workforce. Second, the Intelligence Community lacks 
a clear definition of the functions that may be appropriately 
performed by contractors and, as a result, whether contractors 
and government employees are duplicating similar functions. 
Third, the Intelligence Community does not have procedures for 
overseeing contractors and ensuring the recognition of criminal 
violations or the prevention and redress of financial waste, 
fraud, or other abuses by contractors. The report is intended 
to aid both the Intelligence Community and the congressional 
intelligence committees in conducting oversight and devising 
appropriate policy solutions.

Section 307. Report on proposed pay-for-performance Intelligence 
        Community personnel management system.

    Section 307 prohibits the implementation of pay-for-
performance compensation reform within an element of the 
Intelligence Community until 45 days after the DNI submits to 
the Congress a report for each element of the Intelligence 
Community, that describes, for each element, a proposed 
employee advisory group, a plan for ensuring diversity in that 
employee advisory group, a certification that all managers 
involved in a pay-for-performance system have been sufficiently 
trained on the implementing guidance for that system, and a 
description of a mechanism for employees to appeal pay 
decisions to someone outside the management chain of each 
element.
    The Committee remains concerned that the DNI is moving 
forward with a major overhaul of compensation reform without 
seeking sufficient employee input. The employees in the 
Intelligence Community should be able to make recommendations 
and advise senior managers on the creation and implementation 
of such a program. Such advisory groups should also represent 
racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. In addition, the 
transition to this new system will require greater attention 
and effort on the part of managers in the intelligence 
community. Managers should be trained on the new systemso that 
they know what will be expected of them, and how to implement the 
system fairly. Finally, because this new system leaves much more to the 
discretion of managers in setting performance expectations and rating 
their employees than ever before, the system is potentially vulnerable 
to arbitrariness, discrimination or abuse. The Committee seeks to 
ensure employees are adequately protected from such inappropriate 
actions and have adequate mechanisms to contest or appeal adverse 
decisions.

Section 308. Report on plan to increase diversity within the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 308 requires the DNI, in coordination with the 
heads of the elements of the Intelligence Community, to submit 
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
plans of each element of the Intelligence Community, including 
the ODNI, to increase diversity within that element. The report 
shall include the specific implementation plans to increase 
diversity.
    To ensure that the report is submitted in a timely fashion, 
Section 308 requires the DNI to submit the report by no later 
than November 1, 2008.

Section 309. Report on security clearance determinations

    Section 309 requires the Director of the OMB to submit to 
Congress a report on those security clearance determinations 
that have taken longer than one year to complete, including the 
agencies requesting such determinations and reasons for the 
delay. The Committee welcomes improvements that have been made 
in improving the timeliness of security clearance processing, 
but is concerned that the processing of some security 
clearances, particularly for industry, continue to take far too 
long. The report will contribute needed data for ongoing 
management by the executive branch as well as for congressional 
oversight.

                       SUBTITLE B--OTHER MATTERS

Section 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities

    Section 311 provides that the authorization of 
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute 
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that is 
not otherwise authorized by the Constitution and the laws of 
the United States.

Section 312. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community 
        under the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 312 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as 
``element of the Intelligence Community'' of elements of 
departments and agencies of the United States Government 
whether or not those departments and agencies are listed in 
Section 3(4).

Section 313. Modification of availability of funds for different 
        intelligence activities

    Section 313 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of 
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) 
(governing the funding of intelligence activities)) with the 
text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as amended by Section 1011(a) of the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004) (``IRTPA'') (governing the 
transfer and reprogramming by the DNI of certain intelligence 
funding).
    This amendment to the National Security Act replaces the 
``unforeseen requirements'' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) 
with a more flexible standard to govern reprogramming and 
transfers of funds authorized for a different intelligence or 
intelligence-related activity. Under the new standard, 
reprogramming or transfer authority may be sought if, in 
addition to the other requirements of Section 504(a)(3), the 
new use of funds ``supports an emergent need, improves program 
effectiveness, or increases efficiency.'' This modification 
brings the standard for reprogramming and transfers of 
intelligence funding into conformity with the standards 
applicable to reprogramming and transfers under Section 102A of 
the National Security Act of 1947. The modification preserves 
congressional oversight of proposed reprogramming and transfers 
while enhancing the Intelligence Community's ability to carry 
out missions and functions vital to national security.

Section 314. Protection of certain national security information

    Section 314 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act 
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for 
an individual with authorized access to classified information 
who intentionally discloses any information identifying a 
covert agent, if that individual knows the United States is 
taking affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's 
intelligence relationship to the United States.
    Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone 
who has had ``authorized access to classified information that 
identifies a covert agent'' is ten years. This provision 
increases that maximum sentence to 15 years. Currently, the 
maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who ``as a result of 
having authorized access to classified information, learns the 
identity of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any 
information identifying such covert agent'' is five years. This 
provision increases that maximum sentence to ten years.
    Section 314amends Section 603(a) of the National Security 
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide that the annual 
report from the President on the protection of identities of 
certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, 
informants, and sources, also include an assessment of the need 
for any modification for the purpose of improving legal 
protections for covert agents.

Section 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt 
        and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations

    Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires certain federal 
employees, spouses, dependents, and others, to file reports 
with their employing agency regarding receipt of gifts or 
decorations from foreign governments. Following compilation of 
these reports, the employing agency is required to file 
annually with the Secretary of State detailed information about 
the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations by its employees, 
including the source of the gift. The Secretary of State is 
required to publish a comprehensive list of such agency reports 
in the Federal Register.
    With respect to intelligence activities, the public 
disclosure of gifts or decorations for personnel and certain 
contractors in the Intelligence Community has the potential to 
compromise intelligence sources or confirm intelligence 
relationships with foreign governments and, consequently, 
undermine national security. Recognizing this concern, the 
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted a limited 
exemption from reporting certain information about such foreign 
gifts or decorations where the publication of the information 
could adversely affect United States intelligence sources. 
Section 1079 of the IRTPA extended a similar exemption to the 
DNI and applied the existing exemption to the Director of the 
CIA.
    Section 315 provides to the heads of each element of the 
Intelligence Community the same limited exemption from the 
specified public reporting requirements currently authorized 
for the DNI and Director of the CIA. The national security 
concerns that prompt those exemptions apply equally to other 
elements of the Intelligence Community. Section 315 mandates 
that information not provided to the Secretary of State be 
provided to the DNI to ensure continued independent oversight 
of the receipt of foreign gifts or decorations by personnel of 
the elements of the Intelligence Community.
    Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between 
senior officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and 
their foreign counterparts should not be excluded under the 
provisions of Section 315 unless there is a serious concern 
that such contacts and gifts would adversely affect United 
States intelligence sources or methods.

Section 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 
        2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 
        2006

    Section 316 requires the DNI to submit a classified, 
comprehensive report to the congressional intelligence 
committees on all measures taken by the ODNI, and by any other 
element of the Intelligence Community with relevant 
responsibilities, on compliance with the detention and 
interrogation provisions of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
and of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The report is to 
be submitted no later than 45 days after enactment of this Act.
    The Detainee Treatment Act provides that no individual in 
the custody or under the physical control of the United States, 
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be 
subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. Congress 
reaffirmed this mandate in Section 6 of the Military 
Commissions Act, adding an implementation mechanism that 
requires the President to take action to ensure compliance, 
including through administrative rules and procedures. Section 
6 provides not only that grave breaches of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions are war crimes under Title 18 of the 
United States Code, but also that the President has authority 
for the United States to promulgate higher standards and 
administrative regulations for violations of U.S. treaty 
obligations. It requires the President to issue those 
interpretations by Executive Order published in the Federal 
Register.
    The report required by Section 316 must include a 
description of the detention or interrogation methods that have 
been determined to comply with the prohibitions of the Detainee 
Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act or have been 
discontinued pursuant to them.
    The Detainee Treatment Act also provides for the protection 
against civil or criminal liability for United States 
Government personnel who engaged in officially authorized 
interrogations that were determined to be lawful at the time. 
Section 316 requires the DNI to report on actions taken to 
implement that provision.
    The report shall also include an appendix containing all 
guidelines on the application of the Detainee Treatment Act and 
the Military Commissions Act to the detention or interrogation 
activities, if any, of all elements of the Intelligence 
Community engaging in such activities. The appendix shall also 
include the legal justifications of any office of the 
Department of Justice about the meaning of the Acts, with 
respect to detention or interrogation activities, if any, of 
any element of the Intelligence Community.
    To the extent that the report required by Section 316 
addresses an element of the Intelligence Community within the 
DOD, that portion of the report, and associated material that 
is necessary to make that portion understandable, shall also be 
submitted by the DNI to the congressional armed services 
committees.

Section 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements

    Section 317 incorporates into the Act, by reference, each 
requirement contained in the classified annex of this Act to 
submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees.
    Because the classified information in the annex cannot be 
included in the text of the bill, incorporating the reporting 
provisions of the classified annex is the only available 
mechanism to give these reporting requirements the force of 
law. The Committee, therefore, chooses to include Section 317 
to reflect the importance of the reporting requirements in the 
classified annex.

Section 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements

    Section 318 eliminates certain reporting requirements that 
were considered particularly burdensome to the Intelligence 
Community in cases where the usefulness ofthe report, or 
section thereof, has diminished either because of changing events or 
because the information contained in those reports is duplicative of 
information already obtained through other avenues.

Section 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program

    Section 319 allows the head of any element of the 
Intelligence Community to establish an undergraduate training 
program for civilian employees. This is an authority similar to 
that granted to the Secretary of Defense under section 16 of 
the National Security Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for 
civilian employees of the National Security Agency (NSA).

Section 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory 
        panel

    Section 320 requires the President to submit a report to 
Congress outlining options for the creation of an advisory 
panel to make policy recommendations on the development of the 
CNCI. The report is to be submitted to Congress not later than 
February 1, 2009.

  TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

      SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Section 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office 
        of the Director of National Intelligence

    Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 403-3(e)), as added by the IRTPA, provides that 
commencing on October 1, 2008, the ODNI may not be co-located 
with any other element of the Intelligence Community. Section 
401 clarifies that this ban applies only to the co-location of 
the headquarters of the ODNI with the headquarters of any other 
element of the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, the ODNI 
may be co-located with non-headquarters units of elements of 
the Intelligence Community.

Section 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the 
        Transportation Security Oversight Board

    Section 402 substitutes the DNI as a member of the 
Transportation Security Oversight Board established under 
section 115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States Code, in place of 
the Director of the CIA or the Director's designee. The 
Transportation Security Oversight Board is responsible for, 
among other things, coordinating intelligence, security, and 
law enforcement activities relating to transportation and 
facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security, and law 
enforcement information relating to transportation among 
federal agencies.

Section 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and 
        Technology

    Section 403 clarifies the responsibilities and duties of 
the Director of Science and Technology within the ODNI and the 
DNI's Science and Technology Committee to ensure that, across 
the Intelligence Community, there is uniformity in the 
definitions of basic, applied, and advanced research goals and 
improved prioritization and coordination of science and 
technology. This section further requires the DNI to submit to 
Congress an annual report outlining the strategy for the 
development and use of technology in the Intelligence 
Community, demonstrating how applied resources map to the 
outlined goals.

Section 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials

    Section 404 confirms in statute that certain officers in 
the Intelligence Community are established within the ODNI. 
These are (1) the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
Community (as renamed by Section 407); (2) the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community (as created by Section 
408); (3) the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center 
(NCTC); and (4) the Director of the National Counter 
Proliferation Center (NCPC). Section 404 also expressly 
provides that the DNI shall appoint the Director of the NCPC. 
Section 119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 
404o-1) previously provided that the President could establish 
the NCPC. In doing so, the President delegated to the DNI the 
authority to name the Director. Section 404 codifies that 
delegation.

Section 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center 
        energy efficiency reports

    Section 405 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement 
the recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(``EPA'') report on data center energy efficiency submitted to 
Congress under Section 1 of P.L. 109-431. A brief report 
submitted by the DNI in February 2008 failed to address the 
recommendations of the EPA report and did not constitute an 
actual plan. This requirement is intended to encourage the 
Intelligence Community to develop a plan to reduce consumption 
of resources such as power and water by community data centers.

Section 406. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, 
        and North Korea

    Section 406 provides that not less than once during the 
remainder of this fiscal year and semiannually thereafter, the 
DNI shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees 
individual classified reports on the nuclear intentions and 
capabilities of Iran, Syria, and North Korea. An NIE may count 
as one such report for each country. The Committee encourages 
the DNI to make these reports available to other congressional 
committees with oversight jurisdiction to the extent consistent 
with the protection of sources and methods.

Section 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 407 expressly designates the position of Chief 
Information Officer of the ODNI as Chief Information Officer of 
the Intelligence Community. The modification to the title is 
consistent with the position's overall responsibilities as 
outlined in section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 403-3g).

Section 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

    Section 1078 of the IRTPA authorized the DNI to establish 
an Office of Inspector General if the DNI determined that an 
Inspector General would be beneficial to improving the 
operations and effectiveness of the ODNI. It further provided 
that the DNI could grant to the Inspector General any of the 
duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in the 
Inspector General Act of 1978. The DNI has appointed an 
Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC/IG) and has 
granted certain authorities pursuant to DNI Instruction No. 
2005-10 (Sept. 7, 2005).
    A strong IC/IG is vital to achieving the goal, set forth in 
the IRTPA, of improving the operations and effectiveness of the 
Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the 
broader goal of identifying problems and deficiencies wherever 
they may be found in the Intelligence Community with respect to 
matters within the responsibility and authority of the DNI, 
especially the manner in which elements of the Intelligence 
Community interact with each other in providing access to 
information and undertaking joint or cooperative activities. 
This section establishes an IC/IG in order to provide to the 
DNI and, through reports, to Congress, the benefits of an 
Inspector General with full statutory authorities and the 
requisite independence.
    The IC/IG will keep both the DNI and the congressional 
intelligence committees fully and currently informed about 
problems and deficiencies in programs and operations in the 
Intelligence Community and the need for corrective actions. The 
IC/IG will be appointed by the President, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, and will report directly to the DNI. To 
bolster the IC/IG's independence within the Intelligence 
Community, the IC/IG may be removed only by the President, who 
must communicate the reasons for the removal to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
    The DNI may prohibit the IC/IG from conducting an 
investigation, inspection, or audit if the DNI determines that 
it is necessary to protect vital national security interests. 
If the DNI exercises the authority to prohibit an 
investigation, the DNI must provide the reasons to the 
congressional intelligence committees within seven days. The 
IC/IG may provide a response to the committees, including views 
on the denied investigation.
    The IC/IG will have direct and prompt access to the DNI and 
any employee of the Intelligence Community or employee of a 
contractor whose testimony is needed. The IC/IG will also have 
direct and prompt access to all records that relate to programs 
and activities for which the IC/IG has oversight 
responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be grounds for 
appropriate administrative action.
    The IC/IG will have subpoena authority. However, 
information within the possession of the United States 
Government must be obtained through other procedures. Subject 
to the DNI's concurrence, the IC/IG may request information 
from any department, agency, or element of the U.S. Government. 
Such information must be provided to the IC/IG insofar as 
practicable and not in violation of law or regulation.
    The IC/IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that 
include a description of significant problems relating to the 
programs and operations of the Intelligence Community and to 
the relationships between the elements of the Intelligence 
Community. The reports must include a description of IC/IG 
recommendations and a statement as to whether corrective action 
has been completed. The IC/IG shall provide any portion of the 
report involving a component of a department of the U.S. 
Government to the head of that department simultaneously with 
submission of the report to the DNI. Within 30 days of receipt, 
the DNI must submit each semiannual report to Congress as 
transmitted by the IC/IG.
    The IC/IG must report immediately to the DNI particularly 
serious or flagrant violations of law. Within seven days, the 
DNI must transmit those reports to the congressional 
intelligence committees together with any comments. In the 
event the IC/IG is unable to resolve differences with the DNI, 
the IC/IG is authorized to report a serious or flagrant 
violation of law directly to the congressional intelligence 
committees. Reports to the congressional intelligence 
committees are also required with respect to investigations 
concerning high-ranking officials in the Intelligence 
Community.
    Employees of the Intelligence Community or employees of 
contractors who intend to report to Congress an ``urgent 
concern,'' such as a violation of law or Executive Order, a 
false statement to Congress, or a willful withholding from 
Congress, may report such complaints and supporting information 
to the IC/IG. Following a review by the IC/IG to determine the 
credibility of the complaint or information, the IC/IG must 
transmit such complaint and information to the DNI. On 
receiving the complaints or information from the IC/IG together 
with the IC/IG's credibility determination, the DNI must 
transmit the complaint or information to the congressional 
intelligence committees. If the IC/IG does not find a complaint 
or information to be credible, the reporting individual may 
submit the matter directly to the congressional intelligence 
committees by following appropriate security practices outlined 
by the DNI. Reprisals or threats of reprisal against reporting 
individuals constitute reportable ``urgent concerns.''
    In providing this channel for whistleblower communications 
to Congress, Section 408 does not disturb, and the Committee 
intends to retain, the authoritative guidance for analogous 
provisions of the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272 (October 20, 1998) as set forth in 
the findings in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of 
that Act, the Senate committee report for the legislation, S. 
Rep. No. 105-185, at 25-27, and particularly the conference 
report, H.R. Rep. 105-780, at 33-34, which emphasized that a 
disclosure to the Inspector General ``is not the exclusive 
process by which an intelligence community employee may make a 
report to Congress.''
    For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IC/IG and 
an Inspector General for another intelligence community 
element, the Inspectors General (IGs) shall resolve, 
expeditiously, who will undertake an investigation, inspection, 
or audit. In resolving that question, under an extensive 
subsection entitled ``Coordination Among Inspectors General of 
Intelligence Community,'' the IGs may request the assistance of 
the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, a 
presently existing informal body whose existence is codified by 
this section. In the event that the IGs are still unable to 
resolve the question, they shall submit it for resolution to 
the DNI and the head of the department in which an Inspector 
General with jurisdiction concurrent to that of the IC/IG is 
located. This basic limitation addresses the concern raised by 
the DNI about the preservation of the authority of heads of 
departments and agencies over their respective departments.
    Within Congress, mutuality of oversight is assured by the 
requirement that Inspector General reports concerning 
intelligence committee elements within departments are shared 
with committees that have jurisdiction over those departments.

Section 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the 
        Intelligence Community

    Section 409 provides for an annual report by the DNI on the 
proficiency of each element of the Intelligence Community in 
foreign languages and, if appropriate, in foreign dialects. The 
section also requires the DNI to report on foreign language 
training. The Intelligence Community has an increasing need for 
fluency in difficult-to-master languages and for expertise in 
foreign cultures. The information required by the report will 
allow the congressional intelligence committees to better 
assess the Intelligence Community's ability to manage language 
resources.

Section 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the office of 
        the National Counterintelligence Executive

    Section 410 amends the authorities and structures of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to eliminate 
certain independent administrative authorities that had been 
vested in the NCIX when that official was appointed by and 
reported to the President. Those authorities are unnecessary 
now that the NCIX is appointed by and under the authority of 
the DNI.

Section 411. National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of mass 
        destruction in Syria

    Section 411 provides that the DNI shall submit to Congress 
an NIE on the history, status, and projected development of any 
weapons of mass destruction program undertaken by Syria. This 
requirement is intended to encourage the Intelligence Community 
to focus attention on Syria's efforts to develop nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Section 411 also 
provides that the NIE be submitted within 180 days after the 
enactment of this Act and that it may be submitted in 
classified form.

Section 412. Annual report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq 
        and Afghanistan

    Section 412 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees an annual report on the intelligence 
resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during the 
preceding year.

Section 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances

    Section 413 requires the DNI to appoint an ombudsman for 
security clearances in the Intelligence Community. The 
Committee has learned that persons experiencing delays in their 
security clearances typically do not know where to turn for 
information or help. The lack of communication is especially 
frustrating for applicants who may seek other employment in the 
absence of notice about the process. A security clearance 
ombudsman will ensure that cases such as these will receive 
timely attention, and serve as a clearinghouse for customer 
concerns in the security clearance process.
    The provision requires the heads of each element of the 
Intelligence Community to provide contact information for the 
ombudsman to those applying for security clearances, and 
requires the ombudsman to make an annual report to the 
congressional intelligence committees addressing the concerns, 
complaints, and questions received over the preceding 12 
months. Nothing in the Section 413 prevents the ombudsman from 
having other duties.

Section 414. Security clearance reciprocity

    Section 414 requires the IC/IG to conduct an audit of the 
reciprocity of security clearances in the Intelligence 
Community and to report to the congressional intelligence 
committees on the results of that audit. The Committee is 
concerned that lack of full reciprocity among agencies is an 
indicator of concern within the Intelligence Community about 
the quality of security clearances. The delay resulting from 
``re-clearing'' previously-cleared personnel is disruptive to 
the operations of the Intelligence Community, costly to 
contractors, and a source of great frustration for the 
individuals and organizations involved. In creating a joint, 
collaborative, efficient Intelligence Community, people must be 
able to transition efficiently between agencies and from 
industry to government.

Section 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations

    Section 415 requires the DNI to report to the congressional 
intelligence committees assessing the threat to national 
security presented by the efforts of foreign countries to 
acquire sensitive equipment and technology and the sufficiency 
of U.S. export controls in preventing such acquisitions.

Section 416. Report on nuclear trafficking

    Section 416 requires the DNI to report to certain 
congressional committees on the illicit trade of nuclear and 
radiological material and equipment. The report must include 
details of all cases of illicit sale, transfer, brokering or 
transport of nuclear material or nuclear explosive devices, an 
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of 
nuclear trafficking, and a discussion of any dissents, caveats, 
gaps, or other information that would reduce confidence in the 
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of 
nuclear trafficking.

Section 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit 
        unauthorized disclosures of classified information

    Section 417 requires the DNI to conduct a study on the 
feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the 
Intelligence Community who commit unauthorized disclosures of 
classified information and to report the results of that study 
to the congressional intelligence committees.

                SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Section 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, entitled 
``Accountability for Intelligence Activities,'' sets forth the 
Act's basic requirements on executive branch obligations to 
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed 
about intelligence activities. Section 503 of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is specifically devoted 
to presidential findings and congressional notification on 
covert actions. Section 421 of this bill augments the oversight 
of covert actions by requiring that the CIA Inspector General 
(CIA/IG) conduct an audit of each covert action at least once 
every three years and submit to the congressional intelligence 
committees a report containing the audit results within 60 days 
of completing the audit. To a considerable extent, this 
requirement confirms in statute existing practice and assures 
its regularity.
    The DNI has expressed concern that this audit requirement, 
and several other provisions on intelligence community reports, 
raises concerns with respect to the President's authority to 
control access to national security information. To allay any 
such concern regarding the covert action audit requirement, the 
Committee has drafted Section 421 to state that the requirement 
is subject to the longstanding provisions of section 17(b)(3) 
and (4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 
U.S.C. 403q(b)(3) and (4)) that empower the Director of the CIA 
to prohibit the CIA/IG from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing an audit if the Director determines that the 
prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security 
interests of the United States, provided that the Director 
report the reasons to the congressional intelligence 
committees.

Section 422. Inapplicability to the Director of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on 
        progress in auditable financial statements

    Section 422 relieves the Director of the CIA from the 
requirement in section 114A of the National Security Act of 
1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1) to submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees an annual report describing the 
activities being taken to ensure that financial statements of 
the CIA can be audited in accordance with applicable law and 
the requirements of OMB. Although the Committee remains 
concerned that CIA does not expect to be auditable until 2011, 
two years later than previously projected, the report required 
by Section 114A is unnecessary as CIA is now submitting audited 
financial statements. The requirements of Section 114A continue 
to apply to the Directors of NSA, DIA, and NGA.

Section 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain CIA 
        positions

    Section 423 replaces out-of-date titles for CIA positions 
with the current titles of the successors of those positions in 
a provision in section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency 
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q) that establishes the obligation of 
the CIA/IG to notify the congressional intelligence committees 
about investigations, inspections, or audits concerning high-
ranking CIA officials.

Section 424. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the 
        Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004

    Section 424 changes the reference to the Director of 
Central Intelligence to the Director of National Intelligence 
to clarify that the establishment of the Office of Intelligence 
and Analysis within the Department of the Treasury (section 105 
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 
(Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13, 2003)), and its reorganization 
within the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
(section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury, Independent 
Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2005 
(Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004)), do not affect 
the authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to 
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis as an element of the 
Intelligence Community.

Section 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for 
        interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of 
        the Central Intelligence Agency

    Section 425 prohibits the obligation or expenditure of any 
funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the 
interrogation of a detainee in the custody of the CIA. The DNI 
may, however, grant a waiver if the Director of the CIA 
determines that no employee of the federal government is 
capable and available to conduct the interrogation, and that 
the interrogation is in the national interest of the United 
States. Section 425 also provides that contractors conducting 
interrogations pursuant to a waiver by the DNI shall be 
governed by the same laws that would apply if the interrogation 
were conducted by an employee of the federal government.

              SUBTITLE C--DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS

Section 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into 
        the Defense Intelligence Agency

    Section 431 requires the USD(I) to submit to the 
congressional intelligence and defense committees a report 
describing the nature of any law enforcement authorities to be 
delegated to the DIA; the legal authority under which the 
Secretary of Defense is empowered to delegate a law enforcement 
function to the DIA; and the guidelines for the implementation 
of any law enforcement authorities delegated to the DIA should 
such a delegation occur.
    The Secretary of Defense recently approved the integration 
of CIFA into the DIA. CIFA is, in part, a law enforcement 
organization with certain law enforcement authorities. As a 
result of this impending integration, the DIA is now 
considering a change to its charter in order to absorb CIFA's 
law enforcement role. The change would designate the DIA as a 
law enforcement agency. Unlike CIFA, which is headed by a 
civilian director, the DIA is directed by a military officer.
    The Committee has several concerns regarding the Department 
of Defense's pursuit of this course of action. First, the DIA's 
stated mission is to collect, analyze, and manage foreign 
military intelligence for war fighters; it has no experience 
with managing, overseeing, and leading criminal investigations, 
even those investigations that have a counterintelligence 
nexus. Second, while there are operational efficiencies 
associated with absorbing CIFA's law enforcement capabilities 
into the DIA, those operational efficiencies must be balanced 
properly against the concerns associated with military services 
conducting law enforcement activities that could implicate 
civilians. The Committee seeks to ensure that the decision to 
absorb CIFA's law enforcement authorities into the DIA 
undergoes a thorough and exhaustive legal review and that, 
should the DIA's charter be amended to absorb the authorities, 
the amendments include important boundaries to ensure that 
civil liberties are adequately protected.

                       SUBTITLE D--OTHER ELEMENTS

Section 441. Clarification of inclusion of the Coast Guard and Drug 
        Enforcement Administration as elements of the Intelligence 
        Community

    Section 441 restores, with respect to the United States 
Coast Guard, the prior definition of ``intelligence community'' 
in the National Security Act of 1947 applicable to that 
service, See (50 U.S.C. 401a). Section 1073 of the IRTPA 
modified the definition of ``intelligence community,'' 
inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion in the 
Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or those 
portions of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis of 
intelligence. Section 441 clarifies that all of the Coast 
Guard's intelligence elements are included within the 
definition of the ``intelligence community.''
    Section 441 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and 
Attorney General that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
should be within the Intelligence Community.

Section 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities 
        of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

    Section 442 requires the Director of the FBI to report to 
the congressional intelligence committees on the Director's 
long-term vision for transforming the intelligence capabilities 
of the Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms of the 
Bureau intended to achieve that vision.

                         TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS

                SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS

Section 501. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research 
        and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
        Community

    The National Commission for Review of Research and 
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence 
Community was authorized in the Intelligence Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2003 and lapsed on September 1, 2004. Section 
501 renews authority for this Commission by extending the 
reporting deadline to December 31, 2009, and requiring that new 
members be appointed to the Commission. This section also 
authorizes $2 million for the Commission from the Intelligence 
Community Management Account.

Section 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 502 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413) in three ways to clarify the executive branch's 
obligations to notify Congress of intelligence activities.
    First, Section 502 requires that, in meeting the 
President's statutory obligation to keep the congressional 
intelligence committees fully and currently informed of all 
intelligence activities of the United States, the President 
must provide to the congressional intelligence committees all 
information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, 
cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk 
of intelligence activities.
    Second, Section 502 clarifies that for all intelligence 
activities other than covert actions, the DNI's obligation to 
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and 
currently informed is an obligation to keep the entire 
membership of the congressional intelligence committees 
informed, rather than a subset of members of the committees. 
Section 502 allows reporting to less than the full membership 
of the congressional intelligence committees where the Chair 
and Ranking Minority Member of acongressional intelligence 
committee jointly determine to agree to a written request by the 
President for reporting to less than the full membership of the 
committees.
    Third, Section 502 defines ``significant undertaking,'' as 
that term is used in 50 U.S.C. 413b(d) to clarify when the 
President is required to ensure that the congressional 
intelligence committees are notified with respect to covert 
action.

Section 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets

    Section 503 amends a reporting requirement for the United 
States Department of the Treasury. Section 503 makes annual a 
report which had previously been required semiannually and 
eliminates certain data requirements from that report.

Section 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China

    Section 504 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
U.S.C. 413) to clarify that notification to the congressional 
intelligence committees of intelligence information relating to 
North Korea or China after all or part of the information has 
been communicated to the governments of North Korea or China 
does not fulfill the National Security Act's requirement to 
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully and 
currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United 
States.

Section 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources

    Section 505 expresses the sense of Congress that resources 
under the Act shall not be directed from human intelligence 
collection and other programs intended to combat al-Qaeda to 
study global climate change.

                    SUBTITLE B--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS

Section 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency 
        Act of 1949

    Section 511 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 
1949 by updating references to the National Security Act of 
1947 to reflect amendments made by the IRTPA.

Section 512. Technical amendments to the multi-year National 
        Intelligence Program

    Section 512 updates the ``multiyear national intelligence 
program'' to incorporate organizational and nomenclatural 
changes made by the IRTPA.

Section 513. Technical clarifications of certain references to Joint 
        Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and 
        Related Activities

    Section 513 makes technical clarifications to the National 
Security Act of 1947 to reflect the consolidation of the Joint 
Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and 
Related Activities program into the Military Intelligence 
Program. This section preserves the requirement that the DNI 
participate in the development of the annual budget and be 
consulted prior to the transfer or reprogramming of funds for 
the Military Intelligence Program.

Section 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947

    Section 514 makes a number of technical corrections to the 
National Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the 
IRTPA.

Section 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and 
        Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

    Section 515 makes a number of technical and conforming 
amendments to the IRTPA.

Section 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule

    Section 516 makes technical amendments to the Executive 
Schedule to correct outdated and incorrect references to 
``Director of Central Intelligence,'' ``Deputy Directors of 
Central Intelligence,'' and ``General Counsel to the National 
Intelligence Director.''

Section 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-
        Intelligence Agency

    Section 517 makes technical amendments to Titles 5 and 44 
of the United States Code, and Section 201 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, by replacing references to ``National 
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' with ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.''

  Correspondence With Other Committees Regarding Particular Provisions

                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                  House of Representatives,
                                      Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to you concerning the bill 
H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2009. There are certain provisions in the legislation which 
fall within the Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs.
    In the interest of permitting your committee to proceed 
expeditiously to floor consideration of this important bill, I 
am willing to waive this committee's right to sequential 
referral. I do so with the understanding that, by waiving 
consideration of the bill, the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
does not waive any future jurisdictional claim over the subject 
matters contained in the bill which fall within its Rule X 
jurisdiction. I request that you urge the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives to appoint members of this committee to any 
conference committee which is named to consider such 
provisions.
    Please place this letter into the committee report on H.R. 
5959 and into the Congressional Record during consideration of 
the measure on the House floor. Thank you for the cooperative 
spirit in which you have worked regarding this matter and 
others between our respective committees.
            Sincerely,
                                          Howard L. Berman,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Howard L. Berman,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
    I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this 
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to 
provisions of law related to matters that tall within the Title 
X jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In 
addition. I acknowledge that the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and 
that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill 
does not waive any future jurisdictional claim of the subject 
matters which fall under your committee's Rule X jurisdiction.
    Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right 
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions 
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to 
support such a request.
    I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in 
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional 
Record during floor consideration of this measure on the House 
floor. I look forward to working with you on this legislation 
and other matters of great importance to this nation.
            Sincerely,
                                           Silvestre Reyes,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                 House Committee on Armed Services,
                                  House of Representatives,
                                       Washington, DC, May 8, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
United States Capitol, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: I write to confirm our mutual 
understanding regarding H.R. 5959, authorizing appropriations 
for fiscal year 2009 for intelligence and intelligence-related 
activities of the United States Government, the Community 
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. This 
legislation contains subject matter within the jurisdiction of 
the House Committee on Armed Services.
    Our Committee recognizes the importance of H.R. 5959 and 
the need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, 
while we have a valid claim to jurisdiction over this 
legislation, the Committee on Armed Services will waive further 
consideration of H.R. 5959. I do so with the understanding that 
by waiving further consideration of the bill, the Committee 
does not waive any future jurisdictional claims over similar 
measures. In the event of a conference with the Senate on this 
bill, the Committee on Armed Services reserves the right to 
seek the appointment of conferees.
    I would appreciate the inclusion of this letter and a copy 
of the response in your Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in 
the Congressional Record during consideration of the measure on 
the House floor.
            Very truly yours,
                                               Ike Skelton,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Ike Skelton, 
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
    I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this 
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to 
provisions of law related to matters that fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on Armed Services. In addition. I 
acknowledge that the Committee on Armed Services will not seek 
a sequential referral of this legislation and that your 
decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not 
waive, alter, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on Armed Services.
    Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right 
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions 
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to 
support such a request.
    I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in 
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional 
Record during floor consideration of H.R. 5959. I look forward 
to working with you on this legislation and other matters of 
great importance to this nation.
            Sincerely,
                                           Silvestre Reyes,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                            Committee on Homeland Security,
                                      Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, House Select Committee on Intelligence,
The Capitol, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Reyes: I am writing to you regarding H.R. 
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, 
a bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for 
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United 
States Government.
    H.R. 5959 contains provisions that fall within the House 
Rule X jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. I 
recognize and appreciate your desire to bring this bill to the 
full House expeditiously. Accordingly, I will not seek a 
sequential referral of the bill. However, this decision to 
waive consideration of H.R. 5959 should not be construed as the 
Committee on Homeland Security waiving, altering, or 
diminishing its jurisdiction over this or similar legislation.
    Additionally, the Committee on Homeland Security reserves 
the right to seek the appointment of conferees during any 
House-Senate conference convened on this legislation or on 
similar legislation that is within the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on Homeland Security. I ask for your commitment to 
support any such request by the Committee on Homeland Security 
for the appointment of conferees on H.R. 5959 or similar 
legislation. Finally, I respectfully ask that you place a copy 
of your letter and this letter in the Committee Report on H.R. 
5959 and in the Congressional Record during floor consideration 
of H.R. 5959.
    Thank you for your timely consideration of my request. I 
look forward to working with you as we prepare to pass this 
important national security legislation.
            Sincerely,
                                        Bennie G. Thompson,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
    I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this 
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to 
provisions of law related to matters that fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. In 
addition, I acknowledge that the Committee on Homeland Security 
will not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and 
that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill 
does not waive, alter, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction of 
the Committee on Homeland Security.
    Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right 
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions 
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction. and I agree to 
support such a request.
    I will ensure that this exchange of letters is included in 
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional 
Record during floor consideration of H.R. 5959. I look forward 
to working with you on this legislation and other matters of 
great importance to this nation.
            Sincerely,
                                           Silvestre Reyes,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                                Committee on the Judiciary,
                                      Washington, DC, May 19, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Reyes: In recognition of the desire to 
expedite consideration of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, the Committee on the 
Judiciary agrees to waive formal consideration of the bill as 
to provisions that fall within the Committee's rule X 
jurisdiction.
    The Committee takes this action with the mutual 
understanding that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 5959 at 
this time, the Committee on the Judiciary does not waive any 
jurisdiction over subject matter contained in this or similar 
legislation. The Committee also reserves the right to seek 
appointment of an appropriate number of conferees to any House-
Senate conference involving this legislation, and requests your 
support if such a request is made.
    I would appreciate your including this letter in the 
committee report on the bill, or in the Congressional Record 
during consideration of the bill on the House floor.
    Thank you for your attention to this matter.
            Sincerely,
                                         John Conyers, Jr.,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, May 20, 2008.
Hon. John Conyers, Jr.,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act tier Fiscal Year 2009.
    I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this 
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to 
provisions of law related to matters that fall within the rule 
X jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. In addition, 
I acknowledge that the Committee on the Judiciary will not seek 
a sequential referral of this legislation and that your 
decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not 
waive any future jurisdictional claim of the subject matters 
which fall under your committee's rule X jurisdiction.
    Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right 
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions 
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to 
support such a request.
    I will ensure that this exchange of letters is included in 
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional 
Record during floor consideration of this measure on the House 
floor. I look forward to working with you on this legislation 
and other matters of great importance to this nation.
            Sincerely,
                                           Silvestre Reyes,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
              Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
                                      Washington, DC, May 13, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Chairman Reyes: I am writing about H.R. 5959, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which the 
Select Committee on Intelligence plans to markup on May 15, 
2008.
    I appreciate your effort to consult with the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform regarding those provisions of 
H.R. 5959 that fall within the Oversight Committee's 
jurisdiction. These provisions include Inspectors General, 
federal civil service and personnel matters, and the disclosure 
of certain information regarding the receipt and disposition of 
foreign gifts and decorations.
    In the interest of expediting consideration of H.R. 5959, 
the Oversight Committee will not request a sequential referral 
of this bill. I would, however, request your support for the 
appointment of conferees from the Oversight Committee should 
H.R. 5959 or a similar Senate bill be considered in conference 
with the Senate.
    This letter should not be construed as a waiver of the 
Oversight Committee's legislative jurisdiction over subjects 
addressed in H.R. 5959 that fall within the jurisdiction of the 
Oversight Committee.
    Finally, I request that you include our exchange of letters 
on this matter in the Intelligence Committee Report on H.R. 
5959 and in the Congressional Record during consideration of 
this legislation on the House floor.
    Thank you for your attention to these matters.
            Sincerely,
                                           Henry A. Waxman,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                      Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
    I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this 
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to 
provisions of law related to matters that fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on Oversight and Government 
Reform. In addition, I acknowledge that the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform will not seek a sequential 
referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo a 
sequential referral on this bill does not waive any future 
jurisdictional claim over the subjects which fall under your 
committee's jurisdiction.
    Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right 
to seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions 
of the bill that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to 
support such a request.
    I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in 
the Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional 
Record during consideration of this measure on the House floor. 
I look forward to working with you on this legislation and 
other matters of great importance to this nation.
            Sincerely,
                                           Silvestre Reyes,
                                                          Chairman.

            Correspondence With Congressional Budget Office

                          House of Representatives,
                Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
                                       Washington, DC, May 8, 2008.
Mr. Peter R. Orszag,
Director, Congressional Budget Office,
Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Orszag: In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII 
of the Rules of the House of Representatives, I am writing to 
request a cost estimate of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, pursuant to sections 
308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. I have 
attached a copy of the bill as approved by the House Permanent 
Select Committee on Intelligence.
    I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor as soon 
as possible, and I would very much appreciate an expedited 
response to this request. Should you have any questions related 
to this request, please contact Caryn Wagner, the Committee's 
Budget Director, at 202-225-7690.
    Thank you in advance for your assistance.
            Sincerely,
                                           Silvestre Reyes,
                                                          Chairman.
                              ----------                              

                                     U.S. Congress,
                               Congressional Budget Office,
                                      Washington, DC, May 19, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has 
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5959, the 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
    If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be 
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason 
Wheelock.
            Sincerely,
                                           Peter R. Orszag,
                                                          Director.
    Enclosure.

H.R. 5959--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009

    Summary: H.R. 5959 would authorize appropriations for 
fiscal year 2009 for intelligence activities of the U.S. 
government, for the Intelligence Community Management Account, 
and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and 
Disability System (CIARDS).
    This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of 
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that 
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $325 
million in 2009 and $642 million over the 2009-2013 period, 
assuming appropriation of the authorized funds. Enacting H.R. 
5959 would not affect direct spending or revenues.
    The bill includes new subpoena authority that would impose 
intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as defined in the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO expects the cost 
of complying with those mandates would be small and well below 
the annual thresholds established in that act ($68 million for 
intergovernmental mandates and $136 million for private-sector 
mandates in 2008, adjusted annually for inflation.)
    Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated 
budgetary impact of H.R. 5959 is shown in the following table. 
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050 
(national defense).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                       By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
                                                                    --------------------------------------------
                                                                       2009     2010     2011     2012     2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION

Intelligence Community Management Account:
    Authorization Level............................................      649        0        0        0        0
    Estimated Outlays..............................................      325      292       19        6        0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Basis of estimate: Section 104 would authorize the 
appropriation of $649 million for the Intelligence Community 
Management Account, which provides the principal source of 
funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
and provides resources for coordination of programs, budget 
oversight, and management of the intelligence agencies. CBO 
estimates that implementing this provision would cost $325 
million in 2009 and $642 million over the 2009-2013 period, 
assuming appropriation of the specified amount.
    Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $279 
million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to 
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The 
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the 
authorization under this bill would be the same as the amount 
assumed in the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not 
ascribe any additional cost to that provision.
    Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The bill 
contains intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as 
defined in UMRA. Section 408 would establish an Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community with subpoena authority. 
Section 501 would extend the National Commission for the Review 
of Research and Development Programs of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, and the subpoena authority of that commission. 
Entities in the public and private sectors, if subpoenaed, 
would be required to provide testimony, documents, or other 
evidence. CBO expects that the Inspector General and the 
commission would likely issue subpoenas sparingly, and that the 
costs to comply with a subpoena would not be significant. Thus, 
CBO estimates that the total costs of the mandates would be 
small and well below the annual thresholds established in UMRA 
($68 million for intergovernmental mandates and $136 million 
for private-sector mandates in 2008, adjusted annual for 
inflation).
    The remaining unclassified provisions of the bill contain 
no mandates as defined in UMRA.
    Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jason Wheelock; Impact 
on state, local, and tribal governments: Neil Hood; Impact on 
the private sector: Dan Frisk.
    Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Assistant Director 
for Budget Analysis.

         Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported

  In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of 
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by 
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law 
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new 
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is 
proposed is shown in roman):

               CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
  TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY 
SYSTEM

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 235. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Mandatory Retirement for Age.--
          (1) In general.--A participant in the system shall be 
        automatically retired from the Agency--
                  (A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a 
                participant in the system [receiving 
                compensation under the Senior Intelligence 
                Service pay schedule at the rate] who is at the 
                Senior Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or 
                above; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

                     NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947

                              short title

  That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 
1947''.

                            TABLE OF CONTENTS

Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
     * * * * * * *

               Title I--Coordination for National Security

Sec. 101. National Security Council.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
     * * * * * * *

           Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence 
          community.
     * * * * * * *
Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.
Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and 
          North Korea.
Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence 
          community.
     * * * * * * *

         TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

     * * * * * * *

               Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

     * * * * * * *
Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              DEFINITIONS

  Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the 
        following:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, 
                the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the 
                Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of 
                Investigation, the Drug Enforcement 
                Administration, and the Department of Energy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (K) The elements of the Department of 
                Homeland Security concerned with the analysis 
                of intelligence information[, including the 
                Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard].
                  (L) Such other elements of any [other] 
                department or agency as may be designated by 
                the President, or designated jointly by the 
                Director of National Intelligence and the head 
                of the department or agency concerned, as an 
                element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

     RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
                              INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 102A. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Budget Authorities.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall 
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of 
the [annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program 
and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities] annual 
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor 
program or programs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and 
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) * * *
  (B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director 
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming 
funds made available under the [Joint Military Intelligence 
Program] Military Intelligence Program or any successor program 
or programs.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer 
or reprogram funds referred to in [subparagraph (A)] paragraph 
(1)(A)--
          (A)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds [or personnel] 
may be made under this subsection only if--
          (i) the funds are being transferred to an activity 
        that is a higher priority intelligence activity;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to 
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph 
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the 
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The 
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by 
the head of the department [or agency involved] involved or the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the 
Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1) * * *
  (2)(A) * * *
  (B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this 
[section] paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of 
National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that 
the elements of the intelligence community adopt a multi-level 
security clearance approach in order to enable the intelligence 
community to make more effective and efficient use of persons 
proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic, 
or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national 
security.

            OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

  Sec. 103. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence is composed of the following:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence 
        Community.
          (10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
        Community.
          (11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism 
        Center.
          (12) The Director of the National Counter 
        Proliferation Center.
          [(9)] (13) Such other offices and officials as may be 
        established by law or the Director may establish or 
        designate in the Office, including national 
        intelligence centers.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Limitation on Co-Location [With] of Headquarters with 
Headquarters of Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--
Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the headquarters of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-
located with [any other element] the headquarters of any other 
element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                   DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

  Sec. 103E. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (4) assist the Director on the science and technology 
        elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence; [and]
          (5) assist the Director in establishing goals for 
        basic, applied, and advanced research to meet the 
        technology needs of the intelligence community;
          (6) submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees an annual report on the science and 
        technology strategy of the Director that shows 
        resources mapped to the goals of the intelligence 
        community; and
          [(5)] (7) perform other such duties as may be 
        prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or 
        specified by law.
  (d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology 
Committee.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) The Committee shall--
          (A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research 
        and development related to intelligence[; and];
          (B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research 
        programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence 
        community; and
          [(B)] (C) perform such other functions as the 
        Director of Science and Technology shall prescribe.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                       CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

  Sec. 103G. (a) Chief Information Officer.--To assist the 
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the 
responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other 
applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information 
Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by 
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.
  (b) Chief Information Officer of Intelligence Community.--The 
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall 
serve as the chief information officer of the intelligence 
community.
  (c) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of 
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information 
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief 
Information Officer.--An individual serving in the position of 
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may 
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer 
of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the 
United States Government.-

            INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence 
Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community.
  (b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community is to--
          (1) create an objective and effective office, 
        appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and 
        conduct independently investigations, inspections, and 
        audits on matters within the responsibility and 
        authority of the Director of National Intelligence;
          (2) recommend policies designed--
                  (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and 
                effectiveness in the administration and 
                implementation of matters within the 
                responsibility and authority of the Director of 
                National Intelligence; and
                  (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in 
                such matters;
          (3) provide a means for keeping the Director of 
        National Intelligence fully and currently informed 
        about--
                  (A) problems and deficiencies relating to 
                matters within the responsibility and authority 
                of the Director of National Intelligence; and
                  (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions; and
          (4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure 
        that the congressional intelligence committees are kept 
        similarly informed of--
                  (A) significant problems and deficiencies 
                relating to matters within the responsibility 
                and authority of the Director of National 
                Intelligence; and
                  (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, 
                corrective actions.
  (c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There 
is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who 
shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the 
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
  (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as 
Inspector General shall be made--
          (A) without regard to political affiliation;
          (B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with 
        the security standards of the intelligence community, 
        and prior experience in the field of intelligence or 
        national security; and
          (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in 
        accounting, financial analysis, law, management 
        analysis, public administration, or auditing.
  (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be 
under the general supervision of the Director of National 
Intelligence.
  (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by 
the President. The President shall immediately communicate in 
writing to the congressional intelligence committees the 
reasons for the removal of any individual from the position of 
Inspector General.
  (d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g) 
and (h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community--
          (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan, 
        conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the 
        investigations, inspections, and audits relating to 
        matters within the responsibility and authority of the 
        Director of National Intelligence to ensure they are 
        conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable 
        law and regulations;
          (2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence 
        fully and currently informed concerning violations of 
        law and regulations, violations of civil liberties and 
        privacy, fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and 
        deficiencies that may occur in matters within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director, and to 
        report the progress made in implementing corrective 
        action;
          (3) to take due regard for the protection of 
        intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of 
        all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to 
        the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of 
        such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate 
        to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and 
        methods described in such reports; and
          (4) in the execution of the duties and 
        responsibilities under this section, to comply with 
        generally accepted government auditing standards.
  (e) Limitations on Activities.--(1) The Director of National 
Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or 
completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the 
Director determines that such prohibition is necessary to 
protect vital national security interests of the United States.
  (2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph 
(1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified 
statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority 
within 7 days to the congressional intelligence committees.
  (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the 
time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the 
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources 
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such 
report.
  (4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the 
Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the 
Inspector General considers appropriate.
  (f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to 
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any 
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the 
Inspector General.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any 
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of 
the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the 
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
  (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all 
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, 
recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs 
and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has 
responsibilities under this section.
  (C) The level of classification or compartmentation of 
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient 
rationale for denying the Inspector General access to any 
materials under subparagraph (B).
  (D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee of a 
contractor, of any element of the intelligence community to 
cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for 
appropriate administrative actions by the Director or, on the 
recommendation of the Director, other appropriate officials of 
the intelligence community, including loss of employment or the 
termination of an existing contractual relationship.
  (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and 
investigate complaints or information from any person 
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a 
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, 
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and 
specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such 
complaint or information has been received from an employee of 
the Federal Government--
          (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the 
        identity of the employee without the consent of the 
        employee, unless the Inspector General determines that 
        such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the 
        investigation or the disclosure is made to an official 
        of the Department of Justice responsible for 
        determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken; 
        and
          (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of 
        reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any 
        employee in a position to take such actions, unless the 
        complaint was made or the information was disclosed 
        with the knowledge that it was false or with willful 
        disregard for its truth or falsity.
  (4) The Inspector General shall have authority to administer 
to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, 
whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the 
Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when 
administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of 
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated 
by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect 
as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a 
seal.
  (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector 
General is authorized to require by subpoena the production of 
all information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence 
necessary in the performance of the duties and responsibilities 
of the Inspector General.
  (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements 
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall 
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, 
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose 
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by 
subpoenas.
  (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on 
behalf of, any other element of the intelligence community, 
including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
  (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena 
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable 
by order of any appropriate district court of the United 
States.
  (g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence 
Community.--(1)(A) In the event of a matter within the 
jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community that may be subject to an investigation, inspection, 
or audit by both the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community and an Inspector General, whether statutory or 
administrative, with oversight responsibility for an element or 
elements of the intelligence community, the Inspector General 
of the Intelligence Community and such other Inspector or 
Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve the question of 
which Inspector General shall conduct such investigation, 
inspection, or audit.
  (B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph 
(A), the Inspectors General concerned may request the 
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General 
Forum established under subparagraph (C). In the event of a 
dispute between an Inspector General within an agency or 
department of the United States Government and the Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community that has not been 
resolved with the assistance of the Forum, the Inspectors 
General shall submit the question to the Director of National 
Intelligence and the head of the agency or department for 
resolution.
  (C) There is established the Intelligence Community 
Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory 
or administrative Inspectors General with oversight 
responsibility for an element or elements of the intelligence 
community. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community 
shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have no 
administrative authority over any Inspector General, but shall 
serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of 
individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest 
and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to 
employees, employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews, 
documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve 
or be of assistance to more than 1 of its members.
  (2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation, 
inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the 
results of such investigation, inspection, or audit to any 
other Inspector General, including the Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community, with jurisdiction to conduct such 
investigation, inspection, or audit who did not conduct such 
investigation, inspection, or audit.
  (h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Inspector General of 
the Intelligence Community shall be provided with appropriate 
and adequate office space at central and field office 
locations, together with such equipment, office supplies, 
maintenance services, and communications facilities and 
services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices.
  (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall 
select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may 
be necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector 
General. The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or 
employee so selected, appointed, or employed has security 
clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer 
or employee.
  (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the 
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees 
have the requisite training and experience to enable the 
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector 
General effectively.
  (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the 
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the 
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre 
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and 
objectivity needed for the effective performance of the duties 
of the Inspector General.
  (3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the 
Inspector General may request such information or assistance as 
may be necessary for carrying out the duties and 
responsibilities of the Inspector General from any department, 
agency, or other element of the United States Government.
  (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or 
assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, 
agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable 
and not in contravention of any existing statutory restriction 
or regulation of the department, agency, or element, furnish to 
the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such 
information or assistance.
  (C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, 
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the 
intelligence community, conduct, as authorized by this section, 
an investigation, inspection, or audit of such element and may 
enter into any place occupied by such element for purposes of 
the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
  (i) Reports.--(1)(A) The Inspector General of the 
Intelligence Community shall, not later than January 31 and 
July 31 of each year, prepare and submit to the Director of 
National Intelligence a classified, and, as appropriate, 
unclassified semiannual report summarizing the activities of 
the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community during the immediately preceding 6-month period 
ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30, 
respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community shall provide any portion of the report involving a 
component of a department of the United States Government to 
the head of that department simultaneously with submission of 
the report to the Director of National Intelligence.
  (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a 
minimum, the following:
          (i) A list of the title or subject of each 
        investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during 
        the period covered by such report, including a summary 
        of the progress of each particular investigation, 
        inspection, or audit since the preceding report of the 
        Inspector General under this paragraph.
          (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, 
        and deficiencies relating to the administration and 
        implementation of programs and operations of the 
        intelligence community, and in the relationships 
        between elements of the intelligence community, 
        identified by the Inspector General during the period 
        covered by such report.
          (iii) A description of the recommendations for 
        corrective or disciplinary action made by the Inspector 
        General during the period covered by such report with 
        respect to significant problems, abuses, or 
        deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
          (iv) A statement whether or not corrective or 
        disciplinary action has been completed on each 
        significant recommendation described in previous 
        semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective 
        action has been completed, a description of such 
        corrective action.
          (v) A certification whether or not the Inspector 
        General has had full and direct access to all 
        information relevant to the performance of the 
        functions of the Inspector General.
          (vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena 
        authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector 
        General during the period covered by such report.
          (vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General 
        considers appropriate for legislation to promote 
        economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
        administration and implementation of matters within the 
        responsibility and authority of the Director of 
        National Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate 
        fraud and abuse in such matters.
  (C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt of a 
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the 
report to the congressional intelligence committees together 
with any comments the Director considers appropriate. The 
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of 
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
department of the United States Government any portion of the 
report involving a component of such department simultaneously 
with submission of the report to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the 
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of 
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or 
deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility and 
authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
  (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional 
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) 
within 7 calendar days of receipt of such report, together with 
such comments as the Director considers appropriate. The 
Director shall transmit to the committees of the Senate and of 
the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a 
department of the United States Government any portion of each 
report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, 
or deficiency related to a component of such department 
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the 
congressional intelligence committees.
  (3) In the event that--
          (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any 
        differences with the Director affecting the execution 
        of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector 
        General;
          (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried 
        out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or 
        former intelligence community official who--
                  (i) holds or held a position in an element of 
                the intelligence community that is subject to 
                appointment by the President, whether or not by 
                and with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
                including such a position held on an acting 
                basis;
                  (ii) holds or held a position in an element 
                of the intelligence community, including a 
                position held on an acting basis, that is 
                appointed by the Director of National 
                Intelligence; or
                  (iii) holds or held a position as head of an 
                element of the intelligence community or a 
                position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of 
                section 106;
          (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector 
        General to the Department of Justice on possible 
        criminal conduct by a current or former official 
        described in subparagraph (B);
          (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the 
        Department of Justice declining or approving 
        prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current 
        or former official described in subparagraph (B); or
          (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all 
        possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant 
        documentary information in the course of an 
        investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a 
report on such matter to the congressional intelligence 
committees.
  (4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees any report or findings 
and recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit 
conducted by the office which has been requested by the 
Chairman or Vice Chairman or Ranking Minority Member of either 
committee.
  (5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence 
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of 
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to 
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a 
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may 
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
  (B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period 
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a 
complaint or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector 
General shall determine whether the complaint or information 
appears credible. Upon making such a determination, the 
Inspector General shall transmit to the Director a notice of 
that determination, together with the complaint or information.
  (C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector General 
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar 
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the 
congressional intelligence committees, together with any 
comments the Director considers appropriate.
  (D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under 
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under 
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or 
information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph 
(B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the 
complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or 
both of the congressional intelligence committees directly.
  (ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees 
directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
          (I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the 
        Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of 
        the employee's complaint or information and notice of 
        the employee's intent to contact the congressional 
        intelligence committees directly; and
          (II) obtains and follows from the Director, through 
        the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the 
        intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate 
        security practices.
  (iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional 
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information 
under clause (i) does so in that member or employee's official 
capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
  (E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who 
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General 
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph 
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall 
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is 
taken.
  (F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General 
under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
  (G) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means any 
of the following:
          (i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation 
        of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to 
        the funding, administration, or operation of an 
        intelligence activity involving classified information, 
        but does not include differences of opinions concerning 
        public policy matters.
          (ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful 
        withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact 
        relating to the funding, administration, or operation 
        of an intelligence activity.
          (iii) An action, including a personnel action 
        described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United 
        States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of 
        reprisal prohibited under subsection (f)(3)(B) of this 
        section in response to an employee's reporting an 
        urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
  (H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the findings 
set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of 
the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 
(title VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 8H note).
  (6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States 
Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney 
General any information, allegation, or complaint received by 
the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal 
criminal law that involves a program or operation of an element 
of the intelligence community, or in the relationships between 
the elements of the intelligence community, consistent with 
such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General 
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each 
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
  (j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued 
by the Director in consultation with the congressional 
intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence 
Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector 
General of the Intelligence Community.
  (k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence 
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the 
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an 
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to 
modify or effect the duties and responsibilities of any other 
Inspector General, whether statutory or administrative, having 
duties and responsibilities relating to such element.

        OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES

  Sec. 103I.  (a) Appointment.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence 
community security clearances.
  (b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of the 
intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a 
security clearance through or in coordination with such element 
with contact information for the ombudsman appointed under 
subsection (a).
  (c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the 
ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
          (1) the number of persons applying for a security 
        clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the 
        preceding 12 months; and
          (2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and 
        questions received by the ombudsman from persons 
        applying for security clearances.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

   ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING 
                                PURPOSES

  Sec. 114A. Not later each year than the date provided in 
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence, [the 
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,] the Director of 
the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery 
and Mapping Agency shall each submit to the congressional 
intelligence committees a report describing the activities 
being undertaken by such official to ensure that the financial 
statements of such agency can be audited in accordance with 
applicable law and requirements of the Office of Management and 
Budget.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

   TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 
                               PERSONNEL

  Sec. 116. (a) * * *
  (b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--(1) The Director of 
National Intelligence [may only delegate the authority granted 
by this section to the Principal Deputy Director of National 
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency.] may delegate the authority in subsection 
(a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence 
community.
  (2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to 
whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to 
paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such 
senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines 
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for 
purposes of this paragraph.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

   [SEMIANNUAL] ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST 
                                 ASSETS

  Sec. 118. (a) [Semiannual] Annual Report.--On a [semiannual 
basis] annual basis, the Secretary of the Treasury (acting 
through the head of the Office of Intelligence Support) shall 
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 
that fully informs the committees concerning operations against 
terrorist financial networks. Each such report shall include 
with respect to the preceding [six-month period] year--
          (1) * * *
          [(2) the total number of applications for asset 
        seizure and designations of individuals or entities 
        suspected of having engaged in financial support of 
        terrorist activities that were granted, modified, or 
        denied;]
          [(3)] (2) the total number of physical searches of 
        offices, residences, or financial records of 
        individuals or entities suspected of having engaged in 
        financial support for terrorist activity; and
          [(4)] (3) whether the financial intelligence 
        information seized in these cases has been shared on a 
        full and timely basis with the all departments, 
        agencies, and other entities of the United States 
        Government involved in intelligence activities 
        participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking 
        Center.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER

  Sec. 119. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) Reporting.--(1) * * *
  (2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
          (A) * * *
          (B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence 
        of the National Counterterrorism Center under 
        [subsection (h)] subsection (i).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                 NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER

  Sec. 119A. [(a) Establishment.--Not later than 18 months 
after the date of the enactment of the National Security 
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the]
  (a) In General.--
          (1) Establishment.--The President shall establish a 
        National Counter Proliferation Center, taking into 
        account all appropriate government tools to prevent and 
        halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
        their delivery systems, and related materials and 
        technologies.
          (2) Director.--The head of the National Counter 
        Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the 
        National Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be 
        appointed by the Director of National Intelligence.
          (3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation 
        Center shall be located within the Office of the 
        Director of National Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

               GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS

  Sec. 501. (a)(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall 
provide to the congressional intelligence committees all 
information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, 
cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk 
of an intelligence activity, including--
          (A) the legal authority under which the intelligence 
        activity is being or was conducted;
          (B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought 
        in carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, 
        including dissenting legal views;
          (C) any specific operational concerns arising from 
        the intelligence activity, including the risk of 
        disclosing intelligence sources or methods;
          (D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity 
        will exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of 
        funds or other resources; and
          (E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity 
        will fail.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) A notification to the congressional intelligence 
committees regarding intelligence information relating to North 
Korea or China after all or part of the information has been 
communicated to the governments of North Korea or China, 
respectively, shall not be construed to fulfill the duty under 
this title to keep the congressional intelligence committees 
fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of 
the United States.
  [(f)] (g) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence 
activities'' includes covert actions as defined in section 
[503(e)] 503(g), and includes financial intelligence 
activities.

     REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS

  Sec. 502. (a) In General.--To the extent consistent with due 
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence 
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, 
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all 
departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States 
Government involved in intelligence activities shall--
          (1) keep the congressional intelligence committees 
        fully and currently informed of all intelligence 
        activities, other than a covert action (as defined in 
        section [503(e)] 503(g)), which are the responsibility 
        of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on 
        behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the 
        United States Government, including any significant 
        anticipated intelligence activity and any significant 
        intelligence failure; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Distribution of Information.--
          (1) Request.--Information or material provided in 
        accordance with subsection (a) shall be made available 
        to each member of the congressional intelligence 
        committees, unless the President requests that access 
        to the information or material be limited after 
        determining that limiting such access is essential to 
        meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital 
        interests of the United States. A request under this 
        paragraph and the extraordinary circumstances referred 
        to in this paragraph shall be detailed in writing to 
        the Chair and ranking minority member of the 
        congressional intelligence committees.
          (2) Distribution.--If the President submits a request 
        under paragraph (1), the Chair and ranking minority 
        member of each congressional intelligence committee may 
        jointly determine whether and how to limit access to 
        the information or material within such committee. If 
        the Chair and ranking minority member of such committee 
        are unable to agree on whether or how to limit such 
        access, access to the information or material will be 
        limited. Any information or material to which access is 
        limited shall subsequently be made available to each 
        member of the congressional intelligence communities at 
        the earliest possible time and shall include a detailed 
        statement of the reasons for not providing prior 
        access.

         PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS

  Sec. 503. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(d) The President] (d)(1) The President shall ensure that 
the congressional intelligence committees, or, if applicable, 
the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(2), are 
notified of any significant change in a previously approved 
covert action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a 
previously approved finding, in the same manner as findings are 
reported pursuant to subsection (c).
  (2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall 
constitute a ``significant undertaking'' if the activity--
          (A) involves the potential for loss of life;
          (B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, 
        including authorities relating to research, 
        development, or operations;
          (C) results in the expenditure of significant funds 
        or other resources;
          (D) requires notification under section 504;
          (E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing 
        intelligence sources or methods; or
          (F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic 
        relations of the United States if such activity were 
        disclosed without authorization.
  (e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
          (1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the 
        Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency 
        shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least 
        every 3 years. Such audits shall be conducted subject 
        to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of 
        subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central 
        Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
          (2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector 
        General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not 
        required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a 
        covert action that has been terminated or suspended if 
        such covert action was terminated or suspended prior to 
        the last audit of such covert action conducted by the 
        Inspector General and has not been restarted after the 
        date on which such audit was completed.
          (3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the 
        completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph 
        (1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence 
        Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence 
        committees a report containing the results of such 
        audit.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(e)] (g) As used in this title, the term ``covert action'' 
means an activity or activities of the United States Government 
to influence political, economic, or military conditions 
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States 
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but 
does not include--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                   FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

  Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence 
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or 
intelligence-related activity only if--
  (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by the 
Congress for a different activity--
          (A) * * *
          [(B) the need for funds for such activity is based on 
        unforseen requirements; and]
          (B) the use of such funds for such activity supports 
        an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or 
        increases efficiency; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any 
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government 
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any 
covert action, as defined in section [503(e)] 503(g), unless 
and until a Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of 
section 503 has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance 
with that subsection.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

    ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 506B.  (a) Requirement To Provide.--The Director of 
National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of 
the element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare an 
annual personnel level assessment for such element of the 
intelligence community that assesses the personnel levels for 
each such element for the fiscal year following the fiscal year 
in which the assessment is submitted.
  (b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) 
shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees 
each year along with the budget submitted by the President 
under section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.
  (c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) 
submitted during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum, the 
following information for the element of the intelligence 
community concerned:
          (1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the 
        upcoming fiscal year.
          (2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the 
        current fiscal year.
          (3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of 
        such costs as compared to the personnel costs during 
        the prior 5 fiscal years.
          (4) The number of personnel positions requested for 
        the upcoming fiscal year.
          (5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease 
        of such number as compared to the number of personnel 
        positions of the current fiscal year.
          (6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease 
        of such number as compared to the number of personnel 
        positions during the prior 5 fiscal years.
          (7) The best estimate of the number and costs of 
        contractors to be funded by the element for the 
        upcoming fiscal year.
          (8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease 
        of such costs of contractors as compared to the best 
        estimate of the costs of contractors of the current 
        fiscal year.
          (9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease 
        of such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of 
        contractors, and the number of contractors, during the 
        prior 5 fiscal years.
          (10) A written justification for the requested 
        personnel and contractor levels.
          (11) The number of intelligence collectors and 
        analysts employed or contracted by each element of the 
        intelligence community.
          (12) A list of all contractors that have been the 
        subject of an investigation completed by the Inspector 
        General of any element of the intelligence community 
        during the preceding fiscal year, or are or have been 
        the subject of an investigation by such an Inspector 
        General during the current fiscal year.
          (13) A statement by the Director of National 
        Intelligence that, based on current and projected 
        funding, the element concerned will have sufficient--
                  (A) internal infrastructure to support the 
                requested personnel and contractor levels;
                  (B) training resources to support the 
                requested personnel levels; and
                  (C) funding to support the administrative and 
                operational activities of the requested 
                personnel levels.

  DATES FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS ANNUAL AND SEMIANNUAL REPORTS TO THE 
                 CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES

  Sec. 507. (a) Annual Reports.--(1) The date for the submittal 
to the congressional intelligence committees of the following 
annual reports shall be the date each year provided in 
subsection (c)(1)(A):
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(N)] (J) The annual report on hiring and retention 
        of minority employees in the intelligence community 
        required by section 114(c).
          (K) The annual report on foreign language proficiency 
        in the intelligence community required by section 510.
          (L) The annual report on financial intelligence on 
        terrorist assets required by section 118.
  (2) The date for the submittal to the congressional 
intelligence committees of the following annual reports shall 
be the date each year provided in subsection (c)(1)(B):
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(D) The annual report on counterdrug intelligence 
        matters required by section 826 of the Intelligence 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.]
  (b) Semiannual Reports.--The dates for the submittal to the 
congressional intelligence committees of the following 
semiannual reports shall be the dates each year provided in 
subsection (c)(2):
          (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          [(6) The semiannual report on financial intelligence 
        on terrorist assets required by section 118.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
-

              REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS

  Sec. 508. Not later than February 1 of each year, the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to 
Congress a report on security clearance determinations 
completed or ongoing during the preceding fiscal year that have 
taken longer than one year to complete. Such report shall 
include--
          (1) the number of security clearance determinations 
        for positions as employees of the Federal Government 
        that required more than one year to complete;
          (2) the number of security clearance determinations 
        for contractors that required more than one year to 
        complete;
          (3) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated 
        such determinations; and
          (4) the cause of significant delays in such 
        determinations.-

 SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH 
                                 KOREA

  Sec. 509. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently 
than every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence 
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a 
report on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the nuclear programs 
of each such country.
  (b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) 
shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea--
          (1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each 
        such country;
          (2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting 
        standards and practices, of the sources upon which the 
        intelligence used to prepare the assessment described 
        in paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such 
        sources and an assessment of the reliability of each 
        such source;
          (3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such 
        program gathered or developed since the previous report 
        was submitted under subsection (a), including 
        intelligence collected from both open and clandestine 
        sources for each such country; and
          (4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in 
        knowledge, or other information that would reduce 
        confidence in the assessment described in paragraph 
        (1).
  (c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National 
Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the 
intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
the Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea in lieu of a report required by subsection (a) for 
that country.
  (d) Form.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be 
submitted in classified form.-

  REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

  Sec. 510. Not later than February 1 of each year, the 
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees a report on the 
proficiency in foreign languages and, if appropriate, in 
foreign dialects of each element of the intelligence community, 
including--
          (1) the number of positions authorized for such 
        element that require foreign language proficiency and 
        the level of proficiency required;
          (2) an estimate of the number of such positions that 
        each element will require during the 5-year period 
        beginning on the date of the submission of the report;
          (3) the number of positions authorized for such 
        element that require foreign language proficiency that 
        are filled by--
                  (A) military personnel; and
                  (B) civilian personnel;
          (4) the number of applicants for positions in such 
        element in the previous fiscal year that indicated 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign 
        language indicated and the proficiency level;
          (5) the number of persons hired by such element with 
        foreign language proficiency, including the foreign 
        language and proficiency level;
          (6) the number of personnel of such element currently 
        attending foreign language training, including the 
        provider of such training;
          (7) a description of such element's efforts to 
        recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are 
        proficient in a foreign language;
          (8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, 
        advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
          (9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate, 
        dialect of a foreign language--
                  (A) the number of positions of such element 
                that require proficiency in the foreign 
                language or dialect;
                  (B) the number of personnel of such element 
                that are serving in a position that requires 
                proficiency in the foreign language or dialect 
                to perform the primary duty of the position;
                  (C) the number of personnel of such element 
                that are serving in a position that does not 
                require proficiency in the foreign language or 
                dialect to perform the primary duty of the 
                position;
                  (D) the number of personnel of such element 
                rated at each level of proficiency of the 
                Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  (E) whether the number of personnel at each 
                level of proficiency of the Interagency 
                Language Roundtable meets the requirements of 
                such element;
                  (F) the number of personnel serving or hired 
                to serve as linguists for such element that are 
                not qualified as linguists under the standards 
                of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
                  (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as 
                linguists for such element during the preceding 
                calendar year;
                  (H) the number of personnel serving as 
                linguists that discontinued serving such 
                element during the preceding calendar year;
                  (I) the percentage of work requiring 
                linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally 
                of the United States; and
                  (J) the percentage of work requiring 
                linguistic skills that is fulfilled by 
                contractors;
          (10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity 
        and capabilities of the intelligence community as a 
        whole; and
          (11) recommendations for eliminating required reports 
        relating to foreign-language proficiency that the 
        Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or 
        no longer relevant.-

     TITLE VI--PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

     PROTECTION OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES UNDERCOVER 
         INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES

  Sec. 601. (a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access 
to classified information that identifies a covert agent, 
intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert 
agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified 
information, knowing that the information disclosed so 
identifies such covert agent and that the United States is 
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's 
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 
[ten years] 15 years, or both.
  (b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to 
classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent 
and intentionally discloses any information identifying such 
covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive 
classified information, knowing that the information disclosed 
so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is 
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's 
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined 
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than 
[five years] 10 years, or both.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                                 REPORT

  Sec. 603. (a) The President, after receiving information from 
the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on 
measures to protect the identities of covert agents, including 
an assessment of the need for any modification of this title 
for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert 
agents, and on any other matter relevant to the protection of 
the identities of covert agents. The date for the submittal of 
the report shall be the date provided in section 507.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

  Sec. 705. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Allegation; Improper Withholding of Records; Judicial 
Review.--(1) * * *
  (2) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner 
provided under paragraph (1) as follows:
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (D)(i) When a complainant alleges that requested 
        records were improperly withheld because of improper 
        exemption of operational files, the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency shall meet its burden under section 
        552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by 
        demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission 
        that exempted operational files likely to contain 
        [responsible] responsive records currently perform the 
        functions set forth in subsection (b).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

         INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACQUISITION OF CRITICAL SKILLS

  Sec. 1022.  (a) In General.--The head of an appropriate 
department may assign civilian employees of an element of the 
intelligence community that is a component of such appropriate 
department as students at accredited professional, technical, 
and other institutions of higher learning for training at the 
undergraduate level in skills critical to effective performance 
of the mission of such element of the intelligence community.
  (b) Payment of Expenses.--The head of an appropriate 
department may pay, directly or by reimbursement to employees, 
expenses incident to assignments under subsection (a), in any 
fiscal year only to the extent that appropriated funds are 
available for such purpose.
  (c) Eligibility.--
          (1) In general.--To be eligible for assignment under 
        subsection (a), an employee of an element of the 
        intelligence community must agree in writing--
                  (A) to continue in the service of such 
                element for the period of the assignment and to 
                complete the educational course of training for 
                which the employee is assigned;
                  (B) to continue in the service of such 
                element following completion of the assignment 
                for a period of one-and-a-half years for each 
                year of the assignment or part thereof;
                  (C) to reimburse the United States for the 
                total cost of education (excluding the 
                employee's pay and allowances) provided under 
                this section to the employee if, prior to the 
                employee's completing the educational course of 
                training for which the employee is assigned, 
                the assignment or the employee's employment 
                with such element is terminated either by such 
                element due to misconduct by the employee or by 
                the employee voluntarily; and
                  (D) to reimburse the United States if, after 
                completing the educational course of training 
                for which the employee is assigned, the 
                employee's employment with such element is 
                terminated either by such element due to 
                misconduct by the employee or by the employee 
                voluntarily, prior to the employee's completion 
                of the service obligation period described in 
                subparagraph (B), in an amount that bears the 
                same ratio to the total cost of the education 
                (excluding the employee's pay and allowances) 
                provided to the employee as the unserved 
                portion of the service obligation period 
                described in subparagraph (B) bears to the 
                total period of the service obligation 
                described in subparagraph (B).
          (2) Debt owing the united states.--Subject to 
        paragraph (3), the obligation to reimburse the United 
        States under an agreement described in paragraph (1), 
        including interest due on such obligation, is for all 
        purposes a debt owing the United States.
          (3) Reimbursement.--
                  (A) Bankruptcy.--A discharge in bankruptcy 
                under title 11, United States Code, shall not 
                release a person from an obligation to 
                reimburse the United States required under an 
                agreement described in paragraph (1) if the 
                final decree of the discharge in bankruptcy is 
                issued within five years after the last day of 
                the combined period of service obligation 
                described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 
                paragraph (1).
                  (B) Release.--The head of an appropriate 
                department may release a person, in whole or in 
                part, from the obligation to reimburse the 
                United States under an agreement described in 
                paragraph (1) when, in the discretion of such 
                head of an appropriate department, such head of 
                an appropriate department determines that 
                equity or the interests of the United States so 
                require.
                  (C) Monthly payments.--The head of an 
                appropriate department shall permit an employee 
                assigned under this section who, prior to 
                commencing a second academic year of such 
                assignment, voluntarily terminates the 
                assignment or the employee's employment with 
                the element of the intelligence community that 
                is a component of such appropriate department, 
                to satisfy the employee's obligation under an 
                agreement described in paragraph (1) to 
                reimburse the United States by reimbursement 
                according to a schedule of monthly payments 
                which results in completion of reimbursement by 
                a date five years after the date of termination 
                of the assignment or employment or earlier at 
                the option of the employee.
  (d) Recruitment.--Efforts by an element of the intelligence 
community to recruit individuals at educational institutions 
for participation in the undergraduate training program 
established by this section shall be made openly and according 
to the common practices of universities and employers 
recruiting at such institutions.
  (e) Inapplication of Provisions on Training.--Chapter 41 of 
title 5 and subsections (a) and (b) of section 3324 of title 
31, United States Code, shall not apply with respect to this 
section.
  (f) Regulations.--A head of the appropriate department 
assigning employees in accordance with this section may issue 
such regulations as such head of the appropriate department 
considers necessary to carry out this section.
  (g) Rules of Construction.--
          (1) Component.--For purposes of this section--
                  (A) the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence shall be considered a component of 
                such Office; and
                  (B) the Central Intelligence Agency shall be 
                considered a component of such Agency.
          (2) Required education programs.--Nothing in this 
        section shall be construed to modify, affect, or 
        supercede any provision of law requiring or otherwise 
        authorizing or providing for a training program 
        described in this section.
  (h) Appropriate Department Defined.--In this section, the 
term ``appropriate department'' means--
          (1) with respect to the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence, the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence;
          (2) with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency, 
        Central Intelligence Agency; and
          (3) with respect to an element of the intelligence 
        community other than the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence and the Central Intelligence 
        Agency, the department of the Federal Government of 
        which such element of the intelligence community is a 
        component.

TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES

  Sec. 1102. (a) * * *
  (b) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--[(1)] The Director 
of National Intelligence shall establish and implement a 
process for all elements of the intelligence community to 
review, on an annual basis, individuals included on 
distribution lists for access to classified information. Such 
process shall ensure that only individuals who have a 
particularized ``need to know'' (as determined by the Director) 
are continued on such distribution lists.
  [(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director 
shall certify to the congressional intelligence committees that 
the review required under paragraph (1) has been conducted in 
all elements of the intelligence community during the preceding 
fiscal year.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

                      TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
PART III--EMPLOYEES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBPART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 23--MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 2302. Prohibited personnel practices

  (a)(1) * * *
  (2) For the purpose of this section--
          (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (C) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the 
        Government Printing Office, but does not include--
                  (i)  * * *
                  (ii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
                Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
                Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
                Agency, and, as determined by the President, 
                any Executive agency or unit thereof the 
                principal function of which is the conduct of 
                foreign intelligence or counterintelligence 
                activities; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBPART C--EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 43--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                    SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS

Sec. 4301. Definitions

  For the purpose of this subchapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *
        but does not include--
                  (i) a Government corporation;
                  (ii) the Central Intelligence Agency, the 
                Defense Intelligence Agency, the [National 
                Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National 
                Security Agency, or any Executive agency or 
                unit thereof which is designated by the 
                President and the principal function of which 
                is the conduct of foreign intelligence or 
                counterintelligence activities; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 47--PERSONNEL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 4701. Definitions

  (a) For the purpose of this chapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the 
        Government Printing Office, but does not include--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
                Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense 
                Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency, the National Security 
                Agency, and, as determined by the President, 
                any Executive agency or unit thereof which is 
                designated by the President and which has as 
                its principal function the conduct of foreign 
                intelligence or counterintelligence activities; 
                or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                     SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES

CHAPTER 51--CLASSIFICATION

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 5102. Definitions; application

  (a) For the purpose of this chapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (F) the government of the District of 
                Columbia;
        but does not include--
                          (i) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                          (x) the [National Imagery and Mapping 
                        Agency] National Geospatial-
                        Intelligence Agency, Department of 
                        Defense.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 5313. Positions at level II

  Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
        Deputy Secretary of Defense.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        [Director of Central Intelligence.]
        Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 5314. Positions at level III

  Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
        Solicitor General of the United States.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        [Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (2).]
        Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV

  Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following 
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the 
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of 
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
        Deputy Administrator of General Services.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        [General Counsel of the Office of the National 
        Intelligence Director.]
        General Counsel of the Office of the Director of 
        National Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

        Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBCHAPTER IV--PREVAILING RATE SYSTEMS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 5342. Definitions; application

  (a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
          (1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency; but does 
        not include--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (K) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, 
                Department of Defense;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBPART E--ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 63--LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs

  (a) For the purpose of this section--
          (1) the term ``excepted agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (2) the term ``head of an excepted agency'' means--
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) with respect to the [National Imagery and 
                Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
                Intelligence Agency, the Director of the 
                [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National 
                Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBCHAPTER III--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 7323. Political activity authorized; prohibitions

  (a) * * *
  (b)(1) * * *
  (2)(A) * * *
  (B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to--
          (i) an employee of--
                  (I) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (XIII) the [National Imagery and Mapping 
                Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence 
                Agency; or

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SUBCHAPTER IV--FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 7342. Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f)(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency may delete the information described in subparagraphs 
(A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies 
in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of 
such information could adversely affect United States 
intelligence sources.
  [(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National 
Intelligence may delete the information described in 
subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the 
Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that 
the publication of such information could adversely affect 
United States intelligence sources.]
  (4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the 
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the 
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph 
(2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head 
of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State 
that the publication of such information could adversely affect 
United States intelligence sources or methods.
  (B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State 
pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be 
transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall 
keep a record of such information.
  (C) In this paragraph, the term ``intelligence community'' 
has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Subtitle E--Terrorism

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 343. TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(d) Reporting and Certification.--(1) The Director shall 
review on an annual basis the information provided by various 
departments and agencies for purposes of the list under 
subsection (a) in order to determine whether or not the 
information so provided is derived from the widest possible 
range of intelligence available to such departments and 
agencies.
  [(2) The Director shall, as a result of each review under 
paragraph (1), certify whether or not the elements of the 
intelligence community responsible for the collection of 
intelligence related to the list have provided information for 
purposes of the list that is derived from the widest possible 
range of intelligence available to such department and 
agencies.]
  [(e)] (d) Report on Criteria for Information Sharing.--(1) * 
* *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(f)] (e) System Administration Requirements.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(g)] (f) Report on Status of System.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(h)] (g) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In 
this section, the term ``congressional intelligence 
committees'' means--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

[SEC. 826. ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.

  [(a) Annual Report.--The Counterdrug Intelligence 
Coordinating Group shall submit to the appropriate committees 
of Congress each year a report on current counterdrug 
intelligence matters. The report shall include the 
recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating 
Group on the appropriate number of permanent staff, and of 
detailed personnel, for the staff of the Counterdrug 
Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
  [(b) Submittal Date.--The date of the submittal each year of 
the report required by subsection (a) shall be the date 
provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947, 
as added by section 811 of this Act.
  [(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' 
means--
          [(1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate 
        and House of Representatives; and
          [(2) the congressional intelligence committees (as 
        defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 
        1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)).]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 1002. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND 
                    DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES 
                    INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

  (a)  * * *
  (b) Composition.--The Commission shall be composed of 12 
members, as follows:
          (1) [The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for 
        Community Management.] The Principal Deputy Director of 
        National Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (i) Review.--The Commission shall review the status of 
research and development programs and activities within the 
intelligence community, [including--] including advanced 
research and development programs and activities. Such review 
shall include--
          (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.

  (a) Final Report.--Not later than [September 1, 2004] 
December 31, 2009, the Commission shall submit to the 
congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as 
required by section 1002(h)(2).

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

                  NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
  Sec. 16. (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e)[(1) When an employee is assigned under this section to an 
institution, the Agency shall disclose to the institution to 
which the employee is assigned that the Agency employs the 
employee and that the Agency funds the employee's education.
  [(2) Agency efforts] Agency efforts to recruit individuals at 
educational institutions for participation in the undergraduate 
training program established by this section shall be made 
openly and according to the common practices of universities 
and employers recruiting at such institutions.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

              SECTION 115 OF TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE

Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board

  (a) * * *
  (b) Membership.--
          (1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be 
        composed of 7 members as follows:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  [(F) The Director of the Central Intelligence 
                Agency, or the Director's designee.]
                  (F) The Director of National Intelligence.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

                     INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
[AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 
                        OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

  [Sec. 8K. If the Director of National Intelligence determines 
that an Office of Inspector General would be beneficial to 
improving the operations and effectiveness of the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National 
Intelligence is authorized to establish, with any of the 
duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in this 
Act, an Office of Inspector General.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

              COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE IX--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel 
who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National 
Counterintelligence Executive.
  [(2) The general counsel shall--
          [(A) provide legal advice and counsel to the 
        Executive on matters relating to functions of the 
        Office;
          [(B) ensure that the Office complies with all 
        applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and 
        guidelines; and
          [(C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may 
        specify.]
  [(e)] (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall 
be as follows:
          (1) National threat identification and prioritization 
        assessment.--Subject to [subsection (f)] subsection 
        (e), in consultation with appropriate department and 
        agencies of the United States Government, and private 
        sector entities, to produce on an annual basis a 
        strategic planning assessment of the 
        counterintelligence requirements of the United States 
        to be known as the National Threat Identification and 
        Prioritization Assessment.
          (2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject 
        to [subsection (f)] subsection (e), in consultation 
        with appropriate department and agencies of the United 
        States Government, and private sector entities, and 
        based on the most current National Threat 
        Identification and Prioritization Assessment under 
        paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy 
        for the counterintelligence programs and activities of 
        the United States Government to be known as the 
        National Counterintelligence Strategy.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(f)] (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat 
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National 
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) A National Threat 
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under [subsection 
(e)(1)] subsection (d)(1), and any modification of such 
assessment, shall not go into effect until approved by the 
President.
  (2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under [subsection 
(e)(2)] subsection (d)(2), and any modification of such 
strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the 
President.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(g)] (f) Personnel.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the 
appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and 
separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the 
provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel 
of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes 
of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of 
the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be 
treated as the head of the Office.
  [(4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service 
positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code.]

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of 
Defense, and Director of National Intelligence may each provide 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such 
support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out 
its functions under this section.
  [(2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide 
administrative and contract support to the Office as if the 
Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency.
  [(3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided 
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of 
the official providing such support.
  [(i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National 
Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for 
the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing 
personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under 
subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to 
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such 
personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be.
  [(j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National 
Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract, 
lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the 
Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of 
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under 
this section.
  [(2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into 
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other 
transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and 
limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under 
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative 
agreements, and other transactions.]
  [(k)] (g) Treatment of Activities Under Certain 
Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated 
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for 
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947 
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under 
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as 
operational files of an element of the Agency.
  [(l)] (h) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office 
of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed 
as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress, 
to--
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  [(m)] (i) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be 
construed as affecting the authority of the Director of 
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the 
National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

                CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
                          GENERAL AUTHORITIES

  Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions, 
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
          (1) Transfer to and receive from other Government 
        agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of 
        Management and Budget, for the performance of any of 
        the functions or activities [authorized under 
        paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections 
        (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) 
        of section 104, and section 303 of the National 
        Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-
        3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)] authorized under 
        section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
        U.S.C. 403-4a), and any other Government agency is 
        authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency 
        such sums without regard to any provisions of law 
        limiting or prohibiting transfers between 
        appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in 
        accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the 
        purposes and under the authority of this Act without 
        regard to limitations of appropriations from which 
        transferred;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or 
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to 
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (3) In the event that--
          (A) * * *
          (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried 
        out by the Inspector General should focus on any 
        current or former Agency official who--
                  (i) * * *
                  (ii) holds or held the position in the 
                Agency, including such a position held on an 
                acting basis, of--
                          (I) [Executive Director] Associate 
                        Deputy Director;
                          (II) [Deputy Director for Operations] 
                        Director of the National Clandestine 
                        Service;
                          (III) [Deputy Director for 
                        Intelligence] Director of Intelligence;
                          (IV) [Deputy Director for 
                        Administration] Director of Support; or
                          (V) [Deputy Director for Science and 
                        Technology] Director of Science and 
                        Technology;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

          INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE 
                    TREASURY.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Construction of Authority.--Nothing in section 311 of 
title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or 
in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the 
authorities and responsibilities of the [Director of Central 
Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence with respect to 
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of 
the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 
                                  1991

[SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM]

SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.

  (a) Annual Submission of Multiyear National [Foreign] 
Intelligence Program.--The Director of [Central Intelligence] 
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional 
committees specified in subsection (d) each year a multiyear 
national [foreign] intelligence program plan reflecting the 
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations required to 
support that program. Any such multiyear national [foreign] 
intelligence program plan shall cover the fiscal year with 
respect to which the budget is submitted and at least four 
succeeding fiscal years.
  (b) Time of Submission.--The Director of National 
Intelligence shall submit the report required by subsection (a) 
each year at or about the same time that the budget is 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code.
  (c) Consistency With Budget Estimates.--The Director of 
[Central Intelligence] National Intelligence and the Secretary 
of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred to in 
subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates 
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, 
United States Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the 
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the 
multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a of 
title 10, United States Code.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

           NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Subtitle A--Establishment of Director of National Intelligence

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to 
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the 
ISE. The report shall include the following:
          (1) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

          (10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal 
        departments and agencies that will participate in the 
        ISE, including an identification of the agencies that 
        will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and 
        manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department 
        or agency components that are part of the ISE), with 
        such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
                  (A) * * *
                  (B) the authority of the Secretary of 
                Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and 
                the role of the Department of Homeland Security 
                and the [Attorney General] Department of 
                Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and 
                tribal officials and the private sector.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

              Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments

SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF DIRECTOR OF 
                    NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL 
                    INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--[(1)] The 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 
et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central 
Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director 
of National Intelligence''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

  (a) * * *
  (b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of 
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is 
amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National 
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting 
``section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947''.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

        INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
               TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL 
                    BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and 
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection 
(b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, 
develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national 
intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts, 
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited, 
trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence 
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an institutional 
culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the 
intelligence mission of the Bureau.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) * * *
  (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall 
carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance 
of the Attorney General and [the National Intelligence Director 
in a manner consistent with section 112(e)] the Director of 
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable 
law.
  (f) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation [shall,] shall establish a budget structure of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four 
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
          (1)  * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.

  Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the 
United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of 
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives a report that contains, with respect to each 
preceding 12-month period--
          (1) * * *
          (2) any legal or practical impediments to using 
        translators employed by [the Federal] Federal, State, 
        or local agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared 
        basis;
          (3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
        for [the specific] specific translation services in 
        certain languages, and recommendations for meeting 
        those needs;

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

               CHAPTER 13 OF TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE

              CHAPTER 13--PARTICULAR REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Sec.
1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary.
     * * * * * * *
[1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications.]
1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Sec. 1336. [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
                    Intelligence Agency: special publications

  The Director of the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may authorize the 
printing of notices to mariners, light lists, sailing 
directions, bulletins, and other special publications of the 
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in editions the interests of the Government 
and of the public may require.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                              ----------                              

                     HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *
      TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

  Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; 
                         Access to Information

SEC. 201. INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.

  (a) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

  (f) Detail of Personnel.--
          (1) * * *
          (2) Covered agencies.--The agencies referred to in 
        this paragraph are as follows:
                  (A) * * *

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                  (E) The [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] 
                National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

           *       *       *       *       *       *       *

                             MINORITY VIEWS

    The annual Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the 
most important bills that the House passes each year. It 
provides and allocates resources to critical national security 
programs that are the front lines of America's defense and 
foreign policies and, most critically, work to detect, prevent, 
and disrupt potential terrorist attacks on the American people. 
The bill also is essential to ensure close and effective 
congressional oversight of the intelligence community.
    Although we have concerns with issues that we believe must 
continue to be addressed and resolved as the legislative 
process continues, we are encouraged that this bill avoids many 
of the contentious items that have recently prevented the 
enactment of an intelligence authorization bill and that it 
reflects areas of bipartisan consensus on critical national 
security issues. We also believe that the bill was 
significantly improved by seven Republican amendments that were 
adopted on a bipartisan basis to address important issues 
facing the intelligence community.
    Our views follow with respect to a number of important 
issues. We are pleased that many of them have been addressed in 
the bill, and disappointed that others remain unresolved. We 
look forward to continuing the Committee's efforts to move a 
bipartisan, consensus bill to enactment.

          FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT MODERNIZATION

    This bill is still missing the most significant and most 
critically needed consensus legislation on intelligence 
currently pending before Congress--the bipartisan compromise 
legislation to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act that passed the Senate by a vote of 68-29 and is supported 
by a majority of the House. With the expiration of the Protect 
America Act on February 17, 2008, the Intelligence Community 
lost critical authorities to react with speed and agility to 
potential terrorist threats around the world. The problem will 
soon be even further compounded when authority under existing 
certifications expires.
    It is irresponsible for the Democratic leadership of the 
House to continue to abuse its power to block vital national 
security legislation that the Senate passed on an overwhelming 
bipartisan basis, that a majority of the House has indicated 
that it will support on a bipartisan basis, and that the 
President has indicated that he will sign. Congresswoman 
Heather Wilson offered an amendment to include this vitally 
needed legislation in the bill. The amendment received 
bipartisan support but was not adopted by a vote of 10-11.
    The remarks of two Democratic members of the Committee 
during the markup recognizing the importance of FISA 
modernization to our national security and the urgency of 
completing action only reinforce the consensus that this issue 
must be dealt with immediately. We will continue to work with 
our colleagues on a bipartisan basis to enact the compromise 
legislation passed by the Senate at the earliest opportunity.

                                EARMARKS

    Last year, the House adopted a motion by Ranking Republican 
Pete Hoekstra to instruct House conferees on the Fiscal Year 
2008 Intelligence Authorization to remove all earmarks from the 
bill by a bipartisan vote of 249-160. Those instructions were 
nonetheless disregarded by House conferees. This year, the 
Committee--by a bipartisan vote of 17-4--adopted an amendment 
by Congressman Hoekstra to remove all earmarks, including an 
earmark in the bill text for the National Drug Intelligence 
Center.
    As a number of incidents have illustrated in previous years 
up to last year, our intelligence programs should be based on 
only one primary consideration--what best ensures that the 
intelligence community is able to do its job in the interest of 
the national security of the United States. Our priority should 
be those programs that the members of this Committee have 
collectively taken a careful look at, debated, and determined 
where money should be spent with input from the intelligence 
community--not member projects which all too often can be 
directed to parochial interests or wasteful spending rather 
than the national interest.
    The Committee's bipartisan vote to remove earmarks from 
this year's bill is an unprecedented step that we hope will set 
an example for this Committee as well as other legislation 
moving forward.

                    NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS

    It is likely that there is no single current issue on which 
there is a stronger bipartisan consensus than our shared deep 
concern that the Administration is not fulfilling its statutory 
duty to keep each member of the Committee fully and currently 
informed with respect to certain intelligence matters. In the 
past year alone, Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra 
jointly called on the President to brief the Members of the 
Committee with respect to intelligence regarding the al Kibar 
facility in Syria, which was subsequently disclosed to the 
public on the same afternoon that Committee members were 
finally briefed, several months later. With respect to another 
matter, the Administration refuses to brief all Members of the 
Committee even though it has briefed five members of the 
Committee staff. This follows other incidents in which no 
member of the Committee was briefed in a timely fashion, if at 
all, with respect to critical and sensitive matters within the 
scope of the statutory duty to report. It is clear that reforms 
are necessary.
    Section 502 of the bill makes amendments to certain 
congressional notification procedures of the National Security 
Act of 1947. It is the product of bipartisan discussion and 
agreement between Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra 
and includes language suggested by both. The provision 
expressly provides that information briefed to the Committee 
reporting on activities other than covert actions shall be made 
available toeach member of the Committee, unless the President 
requests in writing that access to the information be limited and 
details extraordinary circumstances justifying the request. In the 
event of such a request to limit access, the Chairman and Ranking 
Member of the Committee may jointly determine whether and how to limit 
access to the material within the Committee. Absent such an agreement, 
access to the information or material will be limited.
    In our view, this provision does two critical things. 
First, it sets forth a statutory presumption that information 
briefed to the Committee should be made available to each 
member of the Committee rather than restricted to the Chairman 
and Ranking Member. Second, it provides a mechanism to permit 
exceptions when legitimate extraordinary circumstances arise 
impacting national security. We believe that this provision 
reflects a better balance than the current practice. It 
respects the Constitutional duty of the President to protect 
national security information by providing a mechanism to 
request that access to the information be limited. It also 
respects the Constitutional authority of the House to organize 
itself and to determine how to share information within the 
Committee. Ultimately, these interests are balanced and 
resolved by requiring a clear bipartisan consensus to override 
any request by the President to limit access to information.
    We are concerned that the new enhanced reporting 
requirements provided for in paragraph (a) of Section 502 of 
the bill are too prescriptive and burdensome and may not be 
practically workable. We hope that these provisions can be 
perfected as the bill moves forward in the legislative process. 
On the whole, however, this provision is a significant step 
forward to strengthen congressional oversight of intelligence 
activities in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
    Additionally, the Committee adopted by a bipartisan vote of 
17-4 an amendment by Congressman John McHugh clarifying that 
the statutory duty to ``fully and currently'' inform the 
intelligence committees with respect to intelligence 
information relating to North Korea or China is not fulfilled 
if a Committee is briefed after the information has been 
communicated to the governments of those countries. We are 
extremely disappointed that this clarification is necessary.
    It should be emphasized that this amendment is not intended 
to apply outside the scope of notifications understood to be 
required under Section 501 of the National Security Act of 
1947, and is not intended to preclude communicating information 
to the Governments of North Korea or China in emergency or 
exigent circumstances.

                    NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE SYSTEMS

    We are disappointed with certain provisions of the 
classified annex with respect to national security space 
systems. National security space systems have been and will 
continue to be a cornerstone of the nation's intelligence 
collection capability. However, the current bill lacks a sense 
of urgency with regard to making decisions on overhead 
architecture and fails to address critical architectural 
shortfalls. It does not adequately fund critical national 
security space systems and is overly prescriptive in certain 
areas mandating technical solutions without complete analysis. 
Despite these shortcomings, however, we believe the bill 
authorizes a minimally acceptable level of funding for these 
systems.

                FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION MATTERS

    The Intelligence Community continues to move forward with a 
number of reform initiatives in the wake of the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Perhaps none of 
these initiatives is more important than the transformation of 
the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation from a culture of law enforcement and prosecution 
to one directed at detecting and preventing potential terrorist 
attacks in the United States. While the FBI has a number of 
initiatives in place underway with respect to its intelligence 
components, we remain significantly concerned at the Bureau's 
failure to communicate a high-level strategic vision for its 
transformation, and that the process simply isn't moving fast 
enough to implement fundamental change. In addition, the 
Committee remains concerned--without determining 
responsibility--with respect to specific instances where the 
working relationship between the Bureau, other elements of the 
intelligence community, and state and local governments has 
been strained. At the same time, however, the Committee's 
oversight efforts have repeatedly suggested that the FBI is the 
most appropriate federal agency to lead domestic 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters, and that the 
Bureau should be given time to make its reforms work before 
more radical alternatives are considered.
    The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by 
Congressman Mike Rogers to require the Director of the FBI to 
submit a report to the congressional intelligence committees 
describing his long term, strategic, vision for transforming 
the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of 
the internal reforms intended to achieve that vision. It is 
important to stress that this report is intended to be a high-
level strategic report in which the Director describes the 
fundamental principles underlying his view of the 
transformation, the desired FBI capabilities and doctrinal 
approach at the end of the transformation, and the way to get 
there. The Committee has already received numerous reports and 
briefings detailing specific organizational changes and 
initiatives, but none have satisfactorily communicated a 
comprehensive, cohesive strategic vision for the overall 
transformation.
    In addition, the Committee adopted, by a unanimous vote of 
21-0, an amendment by Congressman Rogers to prohibit any funds 
authorized in the bill from being used to implement the 
mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau after five 
years of service in a management position, commonly known as 
the ``five and out'' policy. We believe that this policy has 
hampered optimum counterterrorism capability, just as similar 
mandatory reassignment and rotation policies have adversely 
impacted other elements of the Intelligence Community. A 
substantial portion of FBI funding is authorized in this bill. 
We believe this personnel policy is counterproductive and 
unwise and do not support authorizing funds to further 
implement it.

        SIZE OF THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

    The Committee shares a bipartisan consensus that the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence, just three years old, 
has already grown in size and scope well beyond the intentions 
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that 
created it. By voice vote, the Committee adopted an amendment 
to the classified Schedule of Authorizations by Congressman 
Mike Rogers to stop further growth and limit the size of the 
ODNI. In particular, we are dismayed at efforts by the ODNI to 
justify further growth by attempting to omit personnel from the 
National Counterterrorism Center from its personnel count, 
despite the express statutory provision that the NCTC is part 
of the ODNI.
    The Committee on a bipartisan basis had made clear that it 
views the ODNI as a coordinator, not a doer of functions. Our 
effort is about making ODNI an effective coordinator, not 
another layer of bureaucracy that stifles the speed, agility 
and creativity necessary in today's intelligence environment. 
During the Committee's oversight efforts, intelligence 
community personnel have indicated that they are spending 
increasing amounts of time responding to taskings and requests 
from the ODNI bureaucracy with little apparent benefit. Rather 
than attempt to rationalize further bureaucratic growth, we 
hope that the ODNI will carefully revisit how to accomplish its 
core coordinating goals within the authorized personnel 
strength.

           UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

    As we have emphasized repeatedly in the past, the problem 
of unauthorized disclosure remains a grave one. Such 
disclosures harm national security, place American citizens and 
intelligence community personnel at increased risk, and 
inevitably result in substantial consequences to the United 
States--both tangible and intangible. We are disappointed that 
the Committee has held no hearings and conducted little to no 
substantial oversight on this issue during this Congress. In 
addition, we are concerned that the issue is becoming 
increasingly politicized, sometimes under the false premise 
that there are ``good leaks'' and ``bad leaks''. The Committee 
should take a firm and clear position that no unauthorized 
disclosures of classified information should be tolerated.
    Oversight efforts during the previous Congress clearly 
established that prosecution under current laws relating to 
unauthorized disclosure has not been an effective deterrent 
tool. The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered 
by Congressman Mac Thornberry that requires the DNI to review 
whether current law or administrative authorities enable the 
revocation of pensions of intelligence community personnel who 
commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information. This 
provision is identical to one included by the House in the 
Fiscal Year 2007 Intelligence Authorization Act. We hope that 
it will be enacted and that the DNI will carefully review this 
matter and other options in an effort to provide a more 
effective deterrent to unauthorized disclosures of classified 
information.

            INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

    We have significant concerns with Section 408 of the bill, 
which would create a new Inspector General of the Intelligence 
Community. While we do not oppose either enhanced oversight of 
the Intelligence Community or a capability to review cross-
cutting issues within the Intelligence Community, we are 
concerned that this provision--which is almost a quarter of the 
entire bill--duplicates efforts of Department and Agency 
inspectors general, is unnecessarily complex and unwieldy, and 
threatens to further grow the size and bureaucracy of the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Committee 
Republicans offered an amendment to strike this provision, 
which failed by a voice vote. We hope to work with our 
colleagues toward a more limited and rational resolution of 
this issue.

                               JIHADISTS

    Over the last few months, the National Counterterrorism 
Center, the State Department, and the Department of Homeland 
Security issued memos instructing their employees to not use 
several terms related to Islam and radical Jihadism, including 
``jihadist,'' ``jihad,'' ``Mujahadeen,'' ``caliphate,'' 
``Islamist,'' ``Islamo-fascist,'' and ``Wahhabi.'' These memos 
also recommend using the term ``mainstream Muslims'' instead of 
``moderate Muslims.'' This new policy reportedly reflected 
advice from unnamed American Muslim leaders on avoiding 
rhetoric that could offend Muslim audiences or bolster the 
cause of radical Jihadist groups like al Qaeda.
    During Committee consideration of the bill, Ranking Member 
Hoekstra offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any funds 
authorized by the bill from being used to prohibit or 
discourage the use of those terms. The amendment should not 
have been controversial, yet it was defeated by a party-line 
vote. We do not believe that free speech should be 
controversial, nor should candid, accurate, and fair discussion 
of the self-professed nature and goals of enemies who have 
attacked the United States, sworn to kill more Americans, and 
regularly seek to violently stifle the slightest criticism of 
their activities and intentions. It is more than ironic that 
some who have complained about alleged politicization of the 
Intelligence Community opposed this amendment, which simply 
would have ensured free speech and open, objective analysis, 
and it is unfortunate that they refuse to acknowledge the 
nature of the threats posed by our enemies.
    It is important to emphasize that we do not support any 
form of religious discrimination, bigotry, or hatred, or U.S. 
officials making statements that insult Muslims or any other 
religious or ethnic group. However, this new ``speech code'' is 
in line with other efforts by U.S. Muslim leaders sympathetic 
to radical Jihadist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah to stifle 
open debate about radical Islam by banning important terms that 
describe their efforts. For example, since Hizballah, Hamas, 
and al Qaeda routinely describe their terrorist activities as a 
``Jihad'' against the West, one cannot sensibly discuss their 
activities without using this word. Similarly, Osama bin Ladin 
claims his terrorist efforts are intended to recreate a 
``caliphate,'' in an area stretching from Moroccoto Indonesia 
that was under Muslim rule in medieval times. It is impossible to have 
an honest discussion of bin Laden's philosophy without using the word 
caliphate.
    We hope that common sense and free speech will prevail with 
respect to this issue, and will continue to pursue solutions 
through close and continuing oversight efforts.

                 NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN

    Recent revelations with respect to the al Kibar facility in 
Syria have suggested the need for close and careful 
reassessment of previous intelligence and assessments with 
respect to other nations. Ranking Member Hoekstra offered an 
amendment to require a revised and updated National 
Intelligence Estimate with regard to the Iranian nuclear 
program, which would have specifically required a reassessment 
of prior estimates in light of the experience with al Kibar, as 
well as a review of how that incident affects the confidence 
level of the Director of National Intelligence in current 
assessments of the Iran nuclear program. The amendment failed 
by voice vote.
    We continue to believe, however, that the November 2007 
National Intelligence Estimate on Iran was so poorly drafted 
and so seriously undermined by subsequent developments and 
intelligence--especially the Syrian nuclear facility--that it 
is necessary for the DNI to go back to the drawing board and 
start over. We will continue to monitor this issue closely and 
seek the necessary review and reassessment through the 
oversight process.

 DIVERSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESOURCES TO STUDY GLOBAL CLIMATE 
                                 CHANGE

    The Committee adopted by voice vote a Republican amendment 
making clear the sense of Congress that resources should not be 
diverted from human intelligence collection and other 
intelligence programs designed to combat al Qaeda in order to 
study global climate change. Despite the existence of numerous 
more appropriate government programs and initiatives to study 
this issue, pressure to use intelligence resources in 
inappropriate and nonproductive ways relative to global climate 
change continues. This provision makes clear that intelligence 
resources should not be diverted from al Qaeda for this 
purpose.

                 LIMITATION ON INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

    The Committee defeated--by a bipartisan vote of 9-12--an 
amendment that would have limited all elements of the 
intelligence community to the interrogation techniques 
authorized by the United States Army Field Manual on Human 
Intelligence Collector Operations. We think it is important to 
highlight this vote by the Committee. Despite vigorous debate 
and comment by other Members of Congress and the public at 
large (often based on inaccurate information or supposition) we 
want to reiterate our strong view that the congressional 
intelligence committees continue to be in the best position to 
review this issue.
    The Committee's bipartisan vote emphasizes some critical 
points. First, the United States does not torture, and the 
intelligence community conducts itself in accordance with the 
law, including the treaty obligations of the United States. The 
Committee has been briefed on the interrogation techniques 
currently being used by the Intelligence Community, and has 
conducted intensive oversight of both the underlying policy and 
its application. Second, it is critical not to provide al Qaeda 
or other potential adversaries with an enumeration and 
explanation of those techniques. To do so would severely 
undermine the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to 
collect information, sometimes in critical circumstances, and 
accordingly the security of the United States.
    While we fully recognize the importance of the underlying 
issues, we believe the better solution for the substantially 
more limited programs of the intelligence community is 
continued close and careful oversight, as provided for in the 
amendment adopted by the Committee on a bipartisan basis to 
prohibit the use of contractors in interrogations by the 
intelligence community, and several provisions of the 
classified annex to the bill.
                                   Peter Hoekstra.
                                   Terry Everett.
                                   Elton Gallegly.
                                   Mac Thornberry.
                                   John M. McHugh.
                                   Todd Tiahrt.
                                   Mike Rogers.
                                   Darrell Issa.

                                  
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