Filed 1/8/15 In re V.J. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re V.J. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. GUILLERMO J. et al., Defendants and Appellants. F069429
(Super. Ct. Nos. JJV066118H,

JJV066118J, JJV066118K)



### OPINION

THE COURT * APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo Loza,
Commissioner. Monica Vogelmann, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Guillermo J. Jesse F. Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal , for Defendant and Appellant C.J. Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel, and Carol E. Helding, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P.J., Co rnell, J. and Poochigian, J.2 Appellant Guillermo J. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to his eight-year-old son V. J., seven-year-old daughter C.R.J., and sixyear-old daughter M.J. Guille rmo contends the juvenile cour t erred in not applying the sibling exception to adoption (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)). 1 The children’s mother, C.J. (mot her), joins. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY In March 2011, V.J. and C.R.J., then bot h four years old, and two-year-old M.J. were removed from mother’s custody along w ith their then 15-yea r-old brother G.J., 13-year-old brother Xavier R., 12-year-old brother Isaiah J., 11-year-old sister Dulce J., nine-year-old brother D.J., six-year-old si ster Catalina J., and five-year-old brother C.N.J., because of mother’s drug use a nd the unsafe and unsanita ry condition of the
home. Guillermo is the father of all of the children except Xavier. At the time of the children’s removal, Guillermo was incarcera ted. Guillermo and mother have an extensive history of domestic violence. The children were placed in four differe nt foster homes. Xavier was placed in one; G.J. and Isaiah in a second; Dulce, D.J., Catalina, and C.N.J. (the middle children) in a third; and V.J., C.R.J. and M.J. (the young est children) in a fourth. The children were placed in Dinuba, except the youngest ch ildren who were placed in Visalia. The juvenile court exercised its depe ndency jurisdiction over the children and
ordered reunification services for mother. The court denied Gu illermo and Xavier’s father reunification services but ordered supe rvised visitation for Gu illermo. The court ordered supervised sibling visitation tw ice a month without the parents. In September 2012, at a contested 12-mo nth review hearing, the juvenile court
terminated mother’s reunificati on services and set a section 3 66.26 hearing. By that time, mother was having unsupervised visits with the children. Acco rding to the Tulare

1 All statutory references are to the We lfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.3 County Health and Human Serv ices Agency (agency), mother was allowing Guillermo to participate in her visits despite a no-contac t order. In addition, the agency believed mother and Guillermo were living together. In December 2012, an ad options social worker assessed the children and determined they were not adop table because the foster pare nts were not willing to adopt them. The agency recommende d the juvenile court implem ent a permanent plan living arrangement for them with the goal of legal gua rdianship. The agency informed the court that the children had unsupervis ed visits with mother twice a week for four hours each visit and enjoyed spending time together as a family. In February 2013, at the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found the children were not adoptabl e and ordered them into a planned permanent living arrangement. The court ordered supervised weekly visits for mother and Guillermo and set a permanency plan review hearing (s ection 366.3 hearing) for August 2013. In June 2013, the foster mo ther for the three youngest children told th e agency she wanted to adopt them. She said the children were frustra ted and confused by their frequent contact with their parents when there was no plan to reunify with them. She was willing to maintain their relatio nship with their siblings. In addition, the middle children were asking to be adopted by their foster parents. In August 2013, at the section 366.3 he aring, the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing as to the middle and youngest ch ildren. By that time, G.J. had reached the age of majority. He want ed the court to dismiss its de pendency jurisdiction as to him
but he wanted to continue visiting his siblings. The agency recommended the juvenile court termin ate Guillermo and mother’s parental rights to the three youngest children at the section 366.26 hear ing. Their foster parents planned to move with the children to a new home approximately 147 miles away. The agency also recommended the court orde r legal guardianship for the middle children and dismiss its dependency juri sdiction as to them.4 The agency recommended th e juvenile court disconti nue Guillermo and mother’s
visitation with the middle children. Guillermo and mother told one of the foster mothers she should “give [the children] up” and encouraged th e children to mi sbehave. On May 8, 2014, the juvenile court conve ned a contested 366.26 hearing. V.J.
testified he was close to his si blings and wanted to continue to see them. C.R.J. testified she enjoyed her visits with her siblings and would like to live as a family again. M.J. testified she liked visiting with her siblings. She said she mostly played with Catalina and would like to live with her again. Pauline P., the young est children’s foster mother, testified it was important for the youngest children to maintain their relationships with their siblings and that she would help them maintain those relationships. Pamela M., the middle children’s foster mother, testified she and Pauline were friends and had already discu ssed how to maintain sibling contact between the middle and youngest children. Pame la lived on a ranch and plan ned to have the youngest children ride horses and bicycles and play at th e ranch. They also planned to spend some holidays together and maintain telephone contact between the children. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juve nile court found that though the children had an emotional connection to each other, it was not so strong as to outweigh the benefit the youngest children would receive from adopti on. Consequently, the court terminated Guillermo and mother’s parental rights as to V. J., C.R.J., and M.J. This appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION Guillermo and mother (appellants) contend the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the sibling exception to adoption beca use the children had shared experiences, close relationships and strong bonds. We disagree. Once the juvenile court has terminated reuni fication services, its focus shifts to the children’s need for perm anency and stability. ( In re Marilyn H . (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If, as here, the childre n are likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm. ( In re5 Celine R . (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 ( Celine R. ).) The statutory presumption is that
termination is in the children’s best interests and not detrimental. (§ 366.26, subd. (b); In re Lorenzo C . (1997) 54 Cal.App. 4th 1330, 1342.) The juvenile court must order adoption an d its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances in sec tion 366.26 provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights woul d be detrimental to the child. ( Celine R ., supra , 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) Further, it is an opposing party’s
burden to show that termination would be detrimental under one of the statutory exceptions. ( In re Zachary G . (1999) 77 Cal.Ap p.4th 799, 809.) The sibling relationship exception to term inating parental rights applies when the juvenile court finds there is a compelling reason for determining termination would be
detrimental to the child because it would subs tantially interfere with the child’s sibling relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) F actors to be considered include the nature and extent of the relationship, whether the child ren were raised with a sibling in the same home and whether the children have a strong bond with a sibling. The court must also consider whether ongoing contact is in th e children’s best interests, including the children’s long-term emotional interest, as co mpared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption. ( Ibid .) The purpose of this exceptio n is to preserve long-standing sibling relationships that “serve as anchor s for dependent children whose lives are in turmoil.” ( In re Erik. P . (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 404.) “The sibling relationship exception cont ains strong language creating a heavy burden for the party opposing adoption.” ( In re Daniel H . (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) The parent must first show: (1) the existence of a significant sibling relationship; (2) that terminating parental rights would subs tantially interfere with that relationship; and (3) it would be detrimental to the child if the relationship ended. ( In re L.Y.L . (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952.) After the parent sh ows a sibling relationship is so strong that
its severance would be detrim ental to the adoptive child, th e court then decides whether6 the benefit to the child of continuing the si bling relationship outwei ghs the benefits of adoption. ( Id . at pp. 952-953; In re Naomi P . (2005) 132 Cal.A pp.4th 808, 823.) When a juvenile court rejects a detriment claim and terminates parental rights, the appellate issue is not whether substantial evid ence exists to support the court’s rejection of the detriment claim but whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in so doing. ( In re Jasmine D . (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) For this to occur, the proof offered
would have to be uncontradict ed and unimpeached so that discretion could be exercised only in one way, compelling a finding in favo r of the appellant as a matter of law. ( Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 570-571; In re I.W . (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.) Based on our review of the reco rd, we conclude the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion in rejecting appellants’ argument. Here, V.J., C.R.J. and M.J. were very young in March 20 11 when they were removed from mother’s custody. By the tim e of the May 2014 hearing, they had been separated from their siblings for over three years. Thou gh the children maintained a close and loving relati onship during that time of separa tion, appellants have not shown that severing the sibling relationship would caus e the youngest children detriment. By all accounts they were adjusting well to their adoptive parents and looked to them to meet their needs. The juvenile court’s failure to apply the sibling relationship exception can be affirmed on appellants’ failure to show detriment alone. Further, there is no reason to believe that terminating appellants’ parental rights would substantially interfere with the si bling relationships. Pauline and Pamela understood the value of preser ving the sibling relationships and intended to maintain contact between the siblings. Appellants contend it is improper to c onsider a prospective adoptive parent’s promise to maintain sibling co ntact in deciding whether the sibling relationship exception to adoption exists. Such a prom ise, they argue, is illusory and cannot be enforced, citing
In re C.B . (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102 ( C.B .). However, the pages appellants cite in C.B.7 pertain to the parent-child relationship ex ception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) not the sibling relationship exception. The C.B. court stated: “[T]he court cannot ... terminate parental rights based upon an unenforceabl e expectation that th e prospective adoptive parents will voluntarily permit future contact between the child and a biological
parent ....” ( C.B., supra, at p. 128; italics added.) Further, appellants have not shown that the holding in C.B . has been applied to the sibling relationship exception or that the juvenile court relied on Paulin e and Pamela’s promises to maintain sibling contact in deciding to terminate their parental rights. Most importantly for the purposes of this appeal, appellants failed to show that te rminating their parental rights would be detrimental to V.J., C.R.J. and M.J.
DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.