U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

Research Report 1877 

Winning the War and the Relationships: 

Preparing Military Officers for Negotiations with 

Non-Combatants 

Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel, Brian Wortinger, and Sean Hannah 

United States Military Academy, West Point 

August 2007 

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5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER 

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Winning the War and the Relationships: Preparing Military 

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622785 

5c. PROJECT NUMBER 

A790 

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6. AUTHOR(S): 

Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel, Brian Wortinger, Sean Hannah 

(United States Military Academy, West Point)

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14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words): 

Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan involving counterinsurgency, peace-keeping, stability and support 

missions and nation building have increased interest in cross-cultural negotiation skills as a central component of 

military leadership. This report develops a conceptual framework capturing the unique characteristics of 

negotiations between military personnel and local civilians that can guide the design of negotiation training 

programs for officers preparing to deploy. Interviews were conducted with 20 Lieutenants and 16 Captains who 

returned from deployments to Iraq. Content analysis indicated that negotiations with civilians focused largely on 

rebuilding projects, security, and civil affairs issues. Key challenges reported by officers included 1) the need to 

negotiate and mediate in the face of sectarian loyalties, 2) ethical dilemmas, 3) the development of work 

arrangements in the face of conflicting cultural values and behavioral norms, 4) negotiating in the face of threat 

and determining the appropriate use of power, 5) emotional self-regulation, and 6) adaptive response to a wide 

range of conflicting responsibilities. Iraqi negotiation techniques appeared consistent with non-Western cultural 

expectations of the goals and tactics of negotiation. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS 

 Cultural Awareness, Negotiation, Iraq, Training, Deployment, Influence, Culture, Middle East, Leadership

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 iii 

Research Report 1877 

Winning the War and the Relationships: 

Preparing Military Officers for Negotiations with 

Non-Combatants 

Orly Ben-Yoav Nobel, Brian Wortinger, and Sean Hannah 

United States Military Academy, West Point 

Leader Development Research Unit 

Stanley M. Halpin, Chief 

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3926 

August 2007 

Army Project Number Personnel Performance 

622785A790 and Training Technology 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
 iv 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

This work is part of a joint research collaboration between the United States Army Research 

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences and the Department of Behavioral Science and 

Leadership at West Point designed to advance theory development, organize experience-based 

tacit knowledge, and design and disseminate instructional programs addressing cross-cultural, 

tactical military negotiations. The project aims to enhance the skills of cadets at the United 

States Military Academy and serve as a source of expertise on tactical military negotiations for 

the Army at large. 

Portions of this research were presented at the APA Division 21 & 19 Annual Symposium on 

Applied Experimental Research at George Mason University in 2006 and at the 2006 Military 

Psychology Center meeting in Israel. Special thanks to Michelle Zbylut, Stan Halpin, and 

Allison Abbe of the Army Research Institute and Angie Karrasch of the Center for Army 

Leadership for their thoughtful comments on this work. 
 v 

WINNING THE WAR AND THE RELATIONSHIPS: PREPARING MILITARY OFFICERS 

FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH NON COMBATANTS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Research Requirement: 

Current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan involving counterinsurgency, peace-keeping, 

stability and support missions and nation building have increased interest in cross-cultural 

negotiation skills as a central competency of military leadership. This report develops a 

conceptual framework capturing the unique characteristics of negotiations between military 

personnel and local civilians that can guide the design of negotiation training programs for 

officers preparing to deploy. 

Procedure: 

In depth interviews were conducted with 20 Lieutenants and 16 Captains who had 

returned recently from deployments to Iraq. The interview protocol included a script of 25 

questions presented to officers addressing: (1) the type of context and situations in which 

negotiations took place, (2) the primary types of issues being negotiated, (3) the location and 

safety considerations during negotiations, (4) any language and cultural differences experienced, 

(5) their level of trust in Iraqis and factors contributing to the development of that trust, (6) the 

type and timing of concession-making involved, (7) the degree of openness and information 

exchange experienced, (8) any factors that helped move the two parties toward agreement, (9) 

the types and impacts of advanced preparation, and (10) the type of influence techniques 

employed. Interviews were examined for common content, themes, and issues. 

Findings: 

Content analysis indicated that negotiations with civilians focused on rebuilding projects, 

security, and civil affairs issues. Key challenges reported by officers included (1) the need to 

negotiate and mediate in the face of sectarian loyalties, (2) ethical dilemmas, (3) the development 

of work arrangements in the face of conflicting cultural values and norms, (4) negotiating in the 

face of threat and determining the appropriate use of power, (5) emotional self-regulation, and 

(6) adaptive response to a range of conflicting responsibilities. Iraqi negotiation techniques 

appeared consistent with non-Western assumptions concerning the goals and tactics of 

negotiation. 

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings: 

This research summarizes officer perceptions of Iraqi negotiation strategies and groups 

those perceptions into a conceptual framework. This research can be used to guide negotiation 

and cultural awareness instruction for pre-deployment training. 
 vi 
 vii 

WINNING THE WAR AND THE RELATIONSHIPS: PREPARING MILITARY OFFICERS 

FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH NON COMBATANTS 

CONTENTS 

Page

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 1

THE CURRENT RESEARCH ............................................................................................. 2

METHOD ............................................................................................................................. 3

RESULTS ............................................................................................................................. 4

Issues Involved in Officers’ Negotiations with Iraqi Civilians ............................................ 4

Negotiation Issues Related to Neighborhood and Institutional Projects .................. 4

Negotiation Issues Related to Security Concerns and Operations............................ 6

Negotiation Issues Related to Civil Affairs .............................................................. 6

Negotiation Challenges......................................................................................................... 7

Negotiation and Mediation in the Face of Ethnic Strife ........................................... 7

Ethical Judgment in the Face of Conflicting Cultural Values and Norms................ 8

Negotiating Work Arrangements in the Face of Diverse Cultural Values and 

Norms ................................................................................................................ 9

Negotiating Under Threat and Balancing the Use of Power and Collaborative 

Gestures ............................................................................................................. 11

Self-Management: Emotional Regulation and Adaptability during Negotiations.... 14

Negotiation Challenges Summary ............................................................................ 15

Iraqi Negotiation Techniques: Cultural Norms or Distributive Negotiation Maneuvers?.... 17

Emphasize Personal Status, Power and Influence within the Community ............... 18

Appeal to Emotions................................................................................................... 19

Strong and Persisting Demands Combined with Dismissals of Previous Help........ 19

Expanding the Agenda and Surprise Requests ......................................................... 20

Secrecy, Ambiguity, and Multiple Agendas............................................................. 20

Indirect Expressions of Anger and Frustration ......................................................... 21

Exaggeration, Deception and Inconsistent Messages ............................................... 21

Implicit, Subtle Threats............................................................................................. 22

Meeting Before a Meeting and Turning U.S. Officers against Competing Groups . 22

Collaborating Through Exchange of Offers ............................................................. 22

Iraqi Influence Techniques: Summary...................................................................... 23

CONCLUSION..................................................................................................................... 25

Pre-deployment Negotiation Skills Program for Officers: Key Components .......... 25

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 29
 viii 

CONTENTS (continued) 

LIST OF TABLES 

 Page

 

TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATION CHALLENGES AND TRAINING 

DEVELOPMENT FOCI ................................................................................. 16

 

TABLE 2. IRAQI NEGOTIATION TACTICS AND ASSOCAITED NONWESTERN EXPECTATIONS AND NORMS .............................................. 24

LIST OF FIGURES 

 Page

 

FIGURE 1. SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATION ISSUES ................................................... 5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 
 1

WINNING THE WAR AND THE RELATIONSHIPS: PREPARING MILITARY 

OFFICERS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH NON-COMBATANTS 

INTRODUCTION 

Military missions have grown in complexity in recent years to involve a mix of peace 

building tasks (e.g. peace-keeping or nation building) and warfighting responsibilities (e.g., 

peace enforcement or combating insurgency). This complexity requires Soldiers at all levels to 

integrate tactical proficiency with the leveraging of nonmilitary advantages, including the 

building of trust and alliances with local groups and individuals (Kifner, 2006; Scales 2006; 

Wong 2004). Winning “hearts and minds” and developing collaborative relationships with local 

civilians can be essential for the advancement of peace and stability as well as for the collection 

of information, or to align local support necessary to succeed in both warfighting and low 

intensity operations. 

The growing interest in establishing and maintaining cooperative relationships with local 

civilians has focused primarily on the need to enhance Soldiers’ cultural awareness, including 

basic knowledge of cultural history (e.g. ethnic diversity), manners and traditions (e.g. social 

structure, role of religion and religious leaders), style of communication (e.g. how to avoid 

offensive body language and gestures), and basic language skills (Brown, 2007; Gooren, 2006; 

Kifner, 2006; Scales, 2006). This paper points to the importance of going beyond the 

development of cultural awareness and focuses instead on those negotiation skills required to 

solve conflicts and develop working agreements necessary to foster collaboration with local 

civilians in complex circumstances. To accomplish missions involving both warfighting and 

peace building, Soldiers must utilize a wide spectrum of responses, ranging from situational 

awareness and aggressive warfighting to what may be experienced as the antithetical 

competencies of mediation and cross-cultural negotiation (Goodwin, 2005; Ben-Yoav Nobel et 

al., 2006). 

Negotiation can be thought of as an effort to resolve a perceived conflict of interest by 

means of conversation (Pruitt, 1981, 1998). It represents a unique form of social interaction or 

decision making that involves more than one party, where the parties hold potentially conflicting 

interests; yet enough interdependence and mutual interests to motivate them to remain in the 

relationship and complete the exchange (Bazerman & Lewicki, 1983). In most negotiations, the 

parties first verbalize contradictory demands, and at least one of them attempts to persuade the 

other to change his/her demands or ideas. Successful negotiations occur when the parties move 

towards finding common ground and agreement by a process of exchange and concessionmaking and/or through a search for new alternatives. Negotiations become cross-cultural when 

the parties involved belong to different cultures and, as a result, have culturally-influenced 

differences in the way they interpret and execute the fundamental processes of bargaining 

(Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2006). 

Negotiation theory and research focuses on two central paradigms. The distributive 

framework views negotiation situations as a win-lose, adversarial situation where one party’s 

gain is the other party’s loss. This perspective emphasizes bargaining tactics aimed to claim 
 2

value by lowering the opponent’s aspirations or leveraging one’s power to maximize personal 

gains (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Distributive bargaining is most appropriate when time or 

resources are limited, when the other party adopts distributive tactics, and when future 

interaction with the opponent is not likely to occur (Lewicki et al., 2006). Conversely,

integrative bargaining promotes a win-win approach to negotiation situations and includes a 

variety of techniques aimed to create value; that is, to uncover solutions that are likely to 

maximize the benefit of both parties (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt, 1983). Unlike distributive 

negotiation which is often characterized by suspicion and mistrust, integrative bargaining tactics, 

when adopted bilaterally, are often associated with greater openness and trust. In turn, openness 

and trust facilitates problem-solving behavior and enables the discovery of mutually satisfying 

agreements. Creating agreements that are beneficial for both parties is often accomplished by 

identifying more resources or by developing new ways for sharing or coordinating the use of 

available resources (Lewicki et al., 2006). Notwithstanding the conceptual distinction between 

the two perspectives, most negotiation situations involve some elements of both distributive and 

integrative processes. 

The use of collaborative negotiation processes and the development of integrative 

agreements are likely to create order and stability, foster social harmony and reduce the 

likelihood of future conflict (Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994). This suggests that if permitted by the 

situation, integrative negotiation is preferable to distributive bargaining for U.S. military 

personnel to employ in dealing with local civilians. Such an approach is more likely to satisfy 

both parties’ needs, and as a result, support the U.S. interests to win the support of and build 

long-lasting collaboration with members of the local population. 

THE CURRENT RESEARCH 

Military negotiation has been a subject of limited research and analysis, and has not been 

part of traditional military doctrine (Goodman, 2005). The limited negotiation training that 

characterizes most military pre-deployment preparations (Brown, 2007; Goodman, 2005; 

Gordon, 2006) is likely to encourage Soldiers to rely on familiar and well-rehearsed tactical 

considerations and actions in interpreting and responding to conflict situations (Ben-Yoav Nobel 

et al., 2006). These familiar and habituated behavioral repertoires may be encoded as highlyaccessible mental scripts that when activated, drive future behavior (Gioia & Poole, 1984). 

Since tactical military competencies are rooted in warfighting, it is reasonable to assume that the 

salience of an aggressive, “tactical mind set” may increase Soldiers’ inclination to adopt less 

effective competitive negotiation strategies rather than collaborative approaches when attempting 

to resolve conflicts or negotiate agreements with members of the local population. 

The purpose of this exploratory qualitative investigation was to develop a conceptual 

framework for the analysis of the unique challenges and characteristics associated with 

negotiations between military personnel and local non-combatant civilians during stability and 

support operations. The goal of this conceptual framework was to inform and guide the design 

of pre-deployment negotiation skills programs preparing Soldiers for stability and support 

operations during deployment. 
 3

This research focuses on the identification of 1) negotiation issues commonly faced, 2) 

key challenges connected with negotiations over these issues, and 3) the type of negotiation 

strategies and tactics used by members of the local population in dealing with military officers. 

The discussion of challenges and negotiation strategies employed by local non-combatants is 

followed by suggested areas of theory-based knowledge, skill-building or organizational policies 

that are likely to help prepare officers to perform effectively as Soldier-negotiators. 

It should be noted that the themes discussed in this article are based on U.S. Army 

officers’ perceptions concerning the issues, challenges, cultural manners and expectations, and 

Iraqi negotiation and influence tactics. As cultural values, beliefs and behavioral norms are 

expected to influence basic assumptions about the goals and key aspects of negotiations (Brett & 

Gelfand, 2004), it is likely that these perceptions may not accurately reflect Iraqis’ true motives 

or intentions. An additional goal of this paper, therefore, was to provide an initial analysis of the 

potential impact that differences between Western and non-Western culturally based assumptions 

about negotiations may have on the challenges reported, and on Soldiers’ interpretation of 

influence techniques utilized by their Iraqi counterparts. 

METHOD 

In-depth 30-minute videotaped interviews were conducted in June 2005 with 36 midlevel and junior officers (20 Lieutenants and 16 Captains) who returned from deployment in Iraq 

two to three months earlier. The majority of the officers participating in this investigation (68%) 

were deployed for a period of 12-15 months, 18% were deployed for a longer period, while the 

remaining 14% were deployed for 8-11 months. All participants held roles or responsibilities 

during their deployment that included formal and informal negotiations with members of the 

local Iraqi population. The interview protocol included a script of 25 questions presented to 

participants addressing a series of topics including: 

• The type of context and situations in which negotiations took place 

• The primary types of issues being negotiated 

• The location and safety considerations during negotiations 

• Any language and cultural differences experienced 

• Their level of trust in Iraqis and factors contributing to the development of that trust 

• The type and timing of concession-making involved 

• The degree of openness and information exchange experienced 

• Any factors that helped move the two parties toward agreement 

• The types and impacts of advanced preparation 

• The type of influence techniques employed 

Content analysis was performed on the information collected during the interviews. 

From the responses, researchers identified four key themes that addressed (1) the issues involved 

in military negotiations with Iraqi civilians, (2) key challenges associated with these 

negotiations, (3) cultural and situational factors affecting the process, and (4) major Iraqi 

negotiation tactics used during negotiations with U.S. officers. The findings were later utilized 

in the development of a cross-cultural, pre-deployment military negotiation training program that 
 4

was delivered to officers and non-commission officers of one battalion preparing for deployment 

in Iraq. 

RESULTS 

The findings of this investigation are presented in four major sections. We begin with a 

review of the issues reported to be involved in developing agreements through negotiations 

between Soldiers and Iraqi civilians. Next we review the challenges reported to be associated 

with negotiations over these issues and we discuss key research-based knowledge areas and 

skills that would help prepare officers to address these challenges. In the third section, we 

discuss the negotiation techniques reportedly employed by Iraqis, and include an analysis of the 

potential misleading impacts that differences between Western versus non-Western cultural 

assumptions may have on Soldiers’ interpretation of these techniques. Finally, we conclude with 

an analysis of key knowledge areas and skills that are essential for the design of training 

programs aimed to prepare officers for negotiations with members of the local population in high 

risk areas of operation. 

Issues Involved in Officers’ Negotiations with Iraqi Civilians 

Officers reported utilizing negotiation as a means to develop agreements with local 

leaders or ordinary citizens in three key categories of issues: infrastructure improvement 

projects, personal and neighborhood security matters, and civil affairs issues. A summary of 

negotiation issues reported is discussed below and presented in Figure 1. 

Negotiation Issues Related to Neighborhood and Institutional Improvement Projects 

Issues related to infrastructure improvement projects focused largely on the selection and 

prioritization of projects, assignment of projects to contractors, and adherence to agreed upon 

project specifications. 

 Setting improvement priorities. A significant number of officers participated in 

neighborhood advisory council meetings (NACs) or district advisory councils (DACs) where 

they negotiated agreements with local leaders that focused on setting priorities for infrastructure 

improvement projects funded or implemented by the U.S. military. Officers reported negotiating 

agreements with leaders who seemed focused primarily on promoting the interests of their own 

ethnic group, clan or section of the neighborhood with little or no concern for the needs of other 

groups within the area. 

Similarly, several officers responsible for administering emergency relief to academic or 

other public institutions found their Iraqi counterparts (e.g. key administrators or faculty 

members) to be mostly concerned with satisfying the immediate needs of specific units or 

departments with which they were closely affiliated. This came at the cost of focusing on an 

objective assessment of the institution’s long term needs. 
 5

In addition to loyalty to one’s own clan, neighborhood or religious sect, the demands 

made by Iraqi counterparts appeared to reflect a power struggle over control of resources and 

influence among the three main forces of Iraqis vying for local influence: religious leaders, tribal 

or neighborhood sheiks, and the newly emerging civil authorities representing the central 

government. Officers found negotiation with religious leaders to be especially difficult as they 

tended to be less willing to compromise. Sheiks or other neighborhood leaders were somewhat 

less demanding, but were more demanding than ordinary citizens. 

I. Negotiation issues related to neighborhood and institutional improvement projects 

• Setting improvement priorities 

• Selecting and managing contractors and allocating funds and resources 

• Resolving disagreements concerning adherence to standards and compliance with 

negotiated agreements 

II. Security matters 

• Setting improvement priorities 

• Traffic control checkpoints (e.g. Green Zone) 

• Insufficient documentation to cross into certain restricted areas 

• Addressing human needs when civilians movements were restricted during surveillance or 

other security operations 

• Neighborhood advisory council leaders demanding pay to support their own personal 

protection 

• Permits to carry weapons 

• Local religious leaders demanding stronger security measures (e.g. close off street areas 

around mosques with concertina wire) 

• Negotiating agreements with local sheiks promising to use their influence to ensure security 

• Negotiating regarding compensation or benefits in exchange for information. 

• Utilizing exchange and negotiation techniques in the process of conducting cordon and 

search operations focusing on intelligence gathering 

• Utilizing influence and negotiation techniques in the process of interrogating suspects 

captured immediately after an attack on U.S. military personnel 

III. Civil affairs issues 

• Obtaining information about detainees 

• Requesting release of detainees 

• Compensation for loss of life 

• Compensation for loss of residential or commercial property 

 Figure 1. Summary of negotiation issues.
 6

Selecting and managing contractors and allocating funds and resources. Local leaders 

often exerted pressure on U.S. officers to allow them to determine what local contractors would 

be hired to perform infrastructure improvement projects in their neighborhoods. They often 

pressed U.S. officers to hire contractors with whom they had personal familiarity or connections. 

In monitoring work progress, officers sometimes found that contractors chosen by community 

leaders deviated from agreed upon project specifications or timelines in response to requests 

made by these local leaders. This situation required officers to confront both the contractors and 

the community leaders to ensure the implementation of agreed upon plans. At the same time, 

some officers indicated that when they selected contractors who were not the preferred choice of 

community leaders, projects appeared to get sabotaged or prolonged by complaints concerning 

the quality of the work or the inconveniences caused by it. 

Resolving disagreements concerning adherence to standards and compliance with 

negotiated agreements. Multiple officers found Iraqis to hold a relaxed attitude concerning 

adherence to the terms of negotiated agreements. Contractors often did not meet standards or 

deadlines set for projects and tended to attribute their failures to reasons outside their control. 

Closely related to insufficient commitment to the terms of agreements, many officers 

reported finding Iraqis as a group to not be as detailed-oriented as they were. When developing 

an agreement, Iraqis appeared to focus primarily on the general terms and not as much on details 

concerning project or product specifications or timelines. 

Negotiation Issues Related to Security Concerns and Operations 

 The second primary area of negotiation topics concerned a wide range of security-related 

issues. These issues included negotiating with civilians attempting to cross checkpoints with 

incomplete or inadequate permits, reaching agreements with local residents over their ability to 

satisfy human needs when civilians movements were restricted during surveillance or other 

security operations, dealing with neighborhood advisory council leaders who demanded pay to 

support their own personal protection, negotiating over Iraqis’ desire to receive permits to carry 

weapons, meetings with local religious leaders concerning their demand for greater security 

measures (e.g. close off street areas around mosques), meeting with local sheiks about 

neighborhood security arrangements or intelligence gathering, and developing agreements with 

informants regarding compensation or benefits in exchange for information. Several officers 

indicated that they were engaged in some form of exchange and negotiation even in the midst of 

cordon and search operations focusing on intelligence gathering, or while in the process of 

interrogating suspects captured immediately after an attack on U.S. military personnel. 

Negotiation Issues Related to Civil Affairs 

The third topic area of negotiations concerned civil affairs. Key issues included attempts 

by Iraqis to gain the release of or obtain information about detainees. Iraqis also often demanded 

compensation for damages caused to houses or for loss of commercial property due to 

infrastructure improvement projects, or as a result of security operations. 
 7

In sum, there appears to be a wide range of issues involved in negotiations between 

military personnel and local civilians in stability and support operations within areas 

characterized by immature or weak local civil authority and administration organizations. Most 

officers interviewed for this investigation reported that they faced these negotiation tasks with 

limited or no prior educational or professional training to confront the challenges they 

encountered. 

Negotiation Challenges 

We turn now from outlining the primary topics of negotiations that emerged from the 

interviews to discuss various challenges faced in the context of negotiations. Officers reported a 

wide spectrum of challenges that they faced in trying to accomplish the dual goals of negotiating 

mutually satisfying agreements and fostering collaborative relationships with members of the 

local population. These challenges appeared to fall into five main categories: (1) negotiation and 

mediation in the face of ethnic strife, (2) ethical judgments in the face of conflicting cultural 

values and norms, (3) negotiating work agreements in the face of diverse cultural values and 

norms, (4) negotiating in the face of threat and volatility and balancing the use of power and 

collaborative gestures, and (5) personal self-regulation and adaptability during negotiations. The 

following sections of this paper describe these challenges along with suggested areas of theorybased knowledge and skill building that may be addressed in a training program designed to help 

prepare officers for dealing with these challenges. 

Negotiation and Mediation in the Face of Ethnic Strife 

Officers reported the need to assume an active facilitation and mediation role as 

discussions between rival or competing neighborhood leaders, concerned primarily with the 

welfare of their immediate clan, turned occasionally into heated debates. Officers were forced to 

diffuse disputants’ anger, reinstate calm, and refocus the discussion on broader community and 

institutional goals. Officers reported utilizing primarily self-taught, improvised and trial-anderror based negotiation and mediation techniques as they looked for ways to bridge conflicting 

demands among the neighborhood leaders and to promote a larger more integrated community 

perspective. 

Officers observed that the lack of unity among clans or sectarian groups caused all 

negotiated agreements with Iraqi counterparts to have tactical, operational and political/strategic 

implications. They stressed the need to consider the potential impact of negotiated agreements 

on the relationships among local groups and their attitudes toward U.S. forces. They recognized 

the imperative of maintaining an impartial position and image in their relationships with various 

groups in order to ensure the success of their peace-keeping and nation-building missions. 

Officers also talked about the challenge of assuming an impartial stand in the face of 

pressures from competing groups trying to maximize their benefits. A few noted the need to 

ensure that U.S. forces are not used by competing groups to “settle accounts” and establish 

dominance. This was done on several occasions when members of certain villages or clans 

provided U.S. troops with information that led to security operations of limited or no value, but 

served the desire of the informants to disturb or settle accounts with others. 
 8

Training and development focus: To ensure their success in maintaining impartiality, 

officers emphasized the need for U.S. military personnel to learn to obtain information and 

continually update their knowledge of the key interests and the complex relationships between 

dominant groups as well as leading figures in their areas of operation. 

To address the challenge of developing impartial agreements that emphasize community 

rather than sectarian interests, a military negotiation instructional program would need to 

emphasize the development of effective mediation skills. The program could provide a review 

of specific challenges associated with different phases of mediation processes and teach officers 

the skills to address these challenges (Moore, 1996). Key knowledge areas and skills would 

include the need to secure acceptance despite local perceptions of officers as part of an 

occupation force, enhancing perceived impartiality and expertise in the eyes of the conflicting 

parties (Arnold, 2000; Carnevale & Colon, 1990; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1992). Other important 

targets of training could include how to best sequence the issues to be discussed, determine 

underlying needs of both parties, manage the exchange of proposals between the disputing 

parties, assess areas of common ground, and determine where each party may be willing to make 

concessions (Kelman, 1996; Rubin, 1980; Weiss, 2003; Zubek, Pruitt, Peirce, McGillicuddy, & 

Syna, 1992). Officers must also learn to apply forceful, proactive mediation techniques in the 

face of intense and hostile conflicts and a more relaxed, facilitative role when dealing with less 

intense disputes (Lim & Carnevale, 1990). 

Ethical Judgment in the Face of Conflicting Cultural Values and Norms 

 Officers reported facing several ethical dilemmas focusing on the use of resources by local 

community leaders. A key dilemma resulted from a lack of control over local leaders’ use of 

resources and power derived from contact with U.S. forces. Consistent with earlier research 

addressing the social structure of Middle Eastern communities (Abu Nimer, 1996), officers 

found neighborhoods within cities, towns, or villages to be under the influence of leaders 

representing specific clans or ethnic groups. U.S. Soldiers who provided local leaders with 

valuable resources or special privileges in exchange for their promise to align community 

support for American efforts indicated that they could not be totally sure if these resources were 

distributed fairly or ethically among local residents. They were concerned that these resources 

may be used by at least some leaders to advance their own wealth and position of power. 

A related ethical dilemma focused on the development of agreements in the face of 

cultural norms embracing personal empowerment and nepotism. Officers reported finding that 

nepotism and “Bakshis” (i.e. kickback payments) appeared common and culturally normative in 

Iraqi society. These practices appeared especially likely in the hiring of local contractors to 

perform neighborhood improvement projects. As gaining the support of community leaders 

seemed instrumental to strengthening stability within neighborhoods, officers faced the dilemma 

of deciding to what extent they would let these leaders influence the hiring of contractors. This 

is especially troubling since nepotism contradicts the military rule of hiring contractors who 

provide the highest objective value. 

Training and development focus: Middle Eastern cultural and social norms that 

emphasize the preservation of family, clan or village unity as a way to avoid diluting power and 
 9

solidarity in the face of external threats may explain the custom of awarding contracts and 

benefits to relatives and acquaintances (Abu Nimer, 1996). Social networks marked by strong 

ties, high familiarity between individuals, and difficulty entering and exiting relationships also 

mark non-Western cultures (Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Morris, Podolny, & Ariel, 2000). These 

factors — in addition to a strong emphasis on developing and maintaining relational capital 

including mutual trust, mutual knowledge and commitment to the relationship (Brett & Gelfand, 

2006) — are likely to further contribute to intra-clan loyalties. Officers must be trained to 

understand and recognize the impact these social and cultural forces have on the actions of local 

leaders with regard to the allocation of work contracts. Clear organizational policies concerning 

the extent and circumstances under which officers may deviate, if at all, from Army contracting 

regulations as they attempt to address the culturally bounded preferences of their Iraqi 

counterparts would ease this challenge. 

Negotiating Work Arrangements in the Face of Diverse Cultural Values and Norms 

Officers noted several key challenges resulting from cultural differences between their 

own approach and that of their Iraqi counterparts with respect to project management, managing 

meetings and social interactions, and basic assumptions as to what may become subject for 

negotiation. 

Managing work projects and meetings in the face of a relaxed approach to schedules 

and personal accountability. Officers reported facing the difficulty of promoting a disciplined 

project management approach to work plans within a culture that they perceived to embrace a 

more relaxed approach to time and personal accountability. Officers reported that their Iraqi 

counterparts often expressed hope rather than personal commitment to fulfilling the terms of 

agreements, indicating that their success was primarily in “God’s hands” (“inshallah”) instead of 

their own control. 

When conducting meetings with Iraqi counterparts, officers reported that Iraqis possess a 

different sense of time than individuals from the United States. Meetings seldom started on time, 

and typically lasted well beyond the planned schedule. Officers reported feeling frustrated with 

having to accept the cultural norms and Iraqi approaches to time (e.g., “Drove me crazy in the 

beginning,” “They did not show up on time for a grand opening with a two star General”). Some 

officers attempted to create incentives for Iraqi counterparts to arrive earlier to meetings, such as 

holding one-on-one conversations with Iraqi counterparts who arrived early prior to the 

beginning of a group meetings. 

Training and development focus: Researchers have observed a non-Western cultural 

bias for situational attributions referring to a tendency to explain causes of individual’s actions in 

terms of concrete situations, which refer to a specific constraint or opportunity that the 

individual is facing in their immediate operating environment (e.g. financial troubles); temporal 

occasions representing events occurring in the larger environment that are likely to impact 

individuals or decisions (e.g. oil prices have increased dramatically); and the influence of social 

context (e.g., social norms or roles) (Brett & Gelfand, 2006; Geertz, 1975). This is in contrast to 

a Western bias for dispositional attributions, namely, a tendency to attribute the causes of actions 

or events to individual’s choice and judgment and to underestimate the impact of situational 
 10

factors (Ross, 1977). The former is consistent with Iraqi’s tendency to view their ability to 

succeed as at least somewhat outside of their personal control and the latter can explain U.S. 

officers’ tendency to view Iraqis’ perspective as indicative of low personal accountability. 

Cultural differences in the tolerance of ambiguity and unstructured situations may also 

contribute to differences between Iraqi and U.S. perspectives about work plans, schedules, and 

project completion (Hofstede, 1989). Both U.S. and military cultures are likely to reduce 

officers’ tolerance of uncertainty concerning work and meeting schedules, which might in turn 

contribute to negative perceptions of Iraqis who are comfortable with higher degrees of 

ambiguity about task completion. 

A training program preparing officers for the development of collaborative work 

arrangements with Iraqi counterparts must inform them of these cultural differences and their 

likely impact on their own expectations. Several officers suggested during their interviews that 

teaching officers basic project management skills and providing them with actionable ideas of 

how they may reward and reinforce stronger project management discipline among members of 

the local population with whom they must collaborate may help in facing this challenge. 

Specifically, these officers though that a project management approach which emphasizes the 

development of a timeline for the accomplishment of key project milestones combined with a set 

of rewards to be administered to Iraqis when they meet this preset timeline could encourage the 

latter to adhere more carefully to their commitments and reduce the cultural impact of a relaxed 

approach to time and deadlines. The attachment of rewards to the accomplishments of project 

milestones was thought to counter the cultural tendency to emphasize situational attributions for 

failures and to reinforce personal accountability among the Iraqi counterparts. 

Fostering rapport in the face of unfamiliar nonverbal symbols and a cultural emphasis 

on honor and dignity. To foster rapport with Iraqi counterparts, officers found it necessary to 

allow time for “small talk” and discussions on topics unrelated to the formal agenda in the 

beginning of meetings (e.g. discuss the overall situation or ask about family). They also found it 

important to spend time drinking tea and socializing with their counterparts, as well as to avoid 

expressing anger directly since Iraqis would likely perceive this as a deep insult. 

Officers reported that the head sheik or other local leader tended to do most of the talking 

in negotiations involving teams. The honorable seat around the table was to the right of the head 

leader position, and the second honorable seat was to the left. Officers stressed the importance 

of respecting these nonverbal customs, and others such as avoiding sitting with crossed legs or 

arms, accepting Iraqis’ comfort with little personal space, and their use of touch (e.g. striking the 

shoulders) as a friendly gesture. Other cultural manners found to be important included using the 

right hand when eating from a common plate; speaking to the eldest man in the house when 

entering homes and by following normative grieving customs such as buying and delivering a 

sheep to the family of an Iraqi Soldier killed in action. 

Training and development focus: To prepare officers to foster rapport in managing 

work meetings and developing collaborations with members of the local population, a training 

program should inform officers of the cultural values of social harmony, hierarchy and respect of 

elderly (Abu Nimer, 1996; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994) that are dominant in non-Western 
 11

cultures. Officers would need to understand that in non-Western cultures the development of 

relational capital is often viewed as essential and is used as a criterion to evaluate satisfaction 

with the negotiation process and outcomes (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). 

Differences in perspectives as to what is negotiable. Several officers reported 

encountering surprising demands made by Iraqi civilians, which they attributed to cultural norms 

that encourage negotiation over almost everything and/or to opportunistic acts aimed to 

maximize personal gains. One instance was a mother who demanded compensation for the loss 

of her son killed during an attack against U.S. forces. In another instance, the owner of a small 

workshop requested compensation due to loss of property. The workshop was being used by 

insurgents to manufacture weapons and U.S. forces destroyed the building during a security 

operation. 

Training and development focus: The cultural bias toward situational rather than 

personal attributions in explaining loss may account for what U.S. officers viewed as excessive 

or inappropriate Iraqi demands. Additional research would need to confirm this possibility. 

As part of their preparation to serve in Iraq or other foreign locations officers must be 

informed of the type of demands that may be made by local civilians or security personnel. In 

addition, there is a need to develop clear organizational guidelines that define what may become 

subject for negotiation between U.S. military personnel and members of the local population, as 

well as how to respond to unusual demands. 

Negotiating Under Threat and Balancing the Use of Power and Collaborative Gestures 

Officers reported several situations focusing on the difficulty of negotiating in the face of 

threat to themselves or their Iraqi counterpart. A related set of challenges focused on the need to 

find effective ways to balance the use of power or threat capacity with collaborative gestures in 

dealing with local civilians. Officers also faced concerns over who they could trust in an 

environment where enemy and non-enemy elements are hard to differentiate, as well as what 

concessions to make while maintaining an image of strength. 

Control the inclination to employ military power and threat capacity. Officers often 

described the challenge they felt in having to control their inclination to use their military power 

and threat capacity to resolve disagreements faster and with less concessions rather than through 

more balanced negotiations. Most recognized the likely negative impact of their use of threat 

capacity on the development of mutually satisfying agreements and collaborative relationships. 

Threat of use of force was often seen, however, as necessary to motivate Iraqis resisting 

collaboration with U.S. forces. 

Training and development focus: Officers are likely to benefit from learning about 

research findings addressing the impact of power disparity in negotiations. In particular it is 

important to increase their awareness of the tendency of powerful negotiators to employ higher 

levels of win-lose or pressure tactics, the inclination of weaker parties to resist the influence 

attempts of the stronger party, and the typical impact of these negotiation behaviors on producing 

a more competitive process, higher rate of impasses and less mutually satisfying agreements (de 
 12

Dreu, Giebels, & van de Vliert, 1998; Lawler, 1992; Lawler & Bacharach, 1987; Lawler & 

Yoon, 1993; Mannix, 1993). Such awareness may help officers understand and control more 

effectively their own inclination to use power unproductively. 

 Combining the use of threat and force protection consideration with care and respect. 

Closely related to the challenge of controlling the reliance on threat capacity was the difficulty 

involved in combining the use of threat capacity with collaborative gestures in an attempt to 

avoid damaging the relationship with local civilians. Officers had to confront contractors who 

did not complete work on time or that deviated from specifications, stop civilians without 

adequate permits from crossing checkpoints, or demand that shop owners stop supporting 

insurgents. These situations required Soldiers to find the right balance between the use of threat 

and the demonstration of care and respect as a way to maintain collaborative relationships and 

good will (e.g. threatened shop owners with the closing of the market if they collaborated with 

insurgents and on the same day provided schools and clinics in the neighborhood with supplies). 

Some officers reported looking for methods to conduct security operations in ways that 

would enable them to minimize the damaging impact of necessary security actions on their 

relationship with civilians without excessive risk to Soldiers. For instance, during cordon and 

search operations, if possible, they knocked on the door rather than forcibly entering; treated 

family members, especially women, with respect; minimized damage to the house; and did not 

tie hands of suspected members in front of friends or family to avoid humiliation. 

Training and development focus: Negotiation training focusing on the use of verbal (i.e. 

choice of words) and nonverbal communication (e.g. body position, eye contact) can help 

officers learn to communicate power, confidence and domination with regard to specific issues 

while expressing politeness, deference and respect to the person (Gibbons, Bradak, & Busch, 

1992). Communication training must be informed, however, by cultural differences in verbal 

and nonverbal communication patterns. Soldiers must also be trained to evaluate risk factors 

during security operations and to assess the value of minimizing damage to the relationship 

against force protection considerations. 

Minimize threat to Iraqi counterparts. Several officers referred to the challenge of 

ensuring the security of Iraqi counterparts who were involved in negotiating security or other 

issues with them. Iraqi counterparts reported receiving threats for their safety or the safety of 

their family from (1) members of their own clan, (2) organizations wanting to ensure that 

American resources would be allocated to meet their needs, and (3) from other Iraqis who 

viewed them as traitors for dealing with U.S. forces. For instance, an interviewee discussed how 

academic department heads threatened the head of a college who had negotiated with a U.S. 

officer as a way to pressure him to support their demands for budgets and supplies. As another 

example, members of a neighborhood advisory council reported receiving threats intended to 

influence their votes. Interpreters who played a central role in enabling negotiations also were 

often reported as receiving threats. Iraqi negotiators responded to these threats in different ways, 

ranging from hardening their positions during the negotiation with U.S. officers as a way to 

satisfy the demands of those who threatened them, to expressing serious hesitations, and to 

actually withdrawing from their role as negotiators. 
 13

Training and development focus: Officers must be provided with tactical practices that 

can help them negotiate and collaborate with members of the local population who are 

experiencing threat. For example, Soldiers reported using raids to enter homes as a way to be 

able to speak to residents freely without making them look to others as though they were 

collaborating with U.S. forces. 

Who to trust? The Iraqis’ vague and secretive negotiation style, coupled with the general 

difficulty in distinguishing between hostile and friendly civilians, posed a serious challenge to 

U.S. Soldiers with respect to which Iraqi negotiators could be trusted. Some of the officers 

reported devising ways to test the trustworthiness of their Iraqi counterparts. 

Training and development focus: The decision as to how much to trust the opponent is 

one of the most fundamental dilemmas in negotiation situations (Kelly, 1966). Recent research 

indicated that different levels of closeness in a relationship is likely to be associated with 

different types of trust and suggested actions to increase each type of trust, or to manage distrust. 

“Calculus-based” trust often marks early phases of relationship and is founded on the assumption 

that individuals are likely to act in a trustworthy manner when they expect to gain more from 

preserving than from severing the relationship (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). This form of 

trust appears especially applicable for managing relationships in conflict zones where the mix of 

enemy/non-enemy elements and the prevalence of threat make it hard to develop “identificationbased” trust—trust that is built upon shared objectives and values and involves genuine care and 

concern between individuals (Lewicki & Bunker, 1995, 1996). Teaching officers how to 

increase calculus-based trust (e.g. pointing to the benefits that each party can gain by keeping 

their promises) and how to manage calculus-based distrust appears especially useful in preparing 

Soldiers for negotiations in conflict zone areas (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 1998; Lewicki & 

Stevenson, 1998). 

What to exchange and what concessions to make. Officers pointed to the need to be 

prepared to make some concession in order to strengthen relationships with influential leaders 

(e.g. release to them one weapon from those that were confiscated, promise to check on the 

location of detainees, or release detainees if appropriate). They emphasized the need to consider 

carefully, however, what concessions to make as a way to avoid setting undesirable precedents 

affecting future negotiations with the same Iraqi or different Iraqis and to prevent an impression 

of operating out of weakness. For example, not taking tanks on a certain route as demanded by 

local residents due to noise disturbances may be interpreted as weakness by some Iraqis and 

hinder later negotiations. 

Training and development focus: Negotiation theorists and practitioners make multiple 

recommendations regarding the use of concession-making as a way to increase one’s advantage 

over the other in a competitive negotiation situation or to avoid creating an image of weakness 

(Hendon, Roy, & Ahmed, 2003). Teaching officers concession techniques, such as starting with 

sufficiently high demands to allow room for concessions; being first to concede on a minor issue 

but not the first to concede on a major issue; and avoiding making concessions too soon, too 

often or too much, can help prepare Soldiers to use concessions effectively. 
 14

Self Management: Emotional Regulation and Adaptability during Negotiations 

Several officers pointed to challenges involved in managing one’s emotional reactions 

and adapting to competing demands while negotiating with local civilians. 

Negotiating in the face of personal feelings of loss, anger and frustration. In more 

volatile areas, Soldiers reported finding themselves required to negotiate with Iraqis while 

experiencing anger and grief associated with injury to or loss of fellow Soldiers. Soldiers 

reported that anger often created a desire to seek revenge as a means to correct injustice or to 

deter future attacks. They recognized, however, that these feelings made it even more difficult to 

control the inclination to use their power and threat capacity during negotiations. 

Training and development focus: To prepare Soldiers to negotiate effectively in the face 

of grief and anger, training programs need to inform participants about research findings 

addressing the impact of emotions on negotiation behavior. Research suggests that positive 

affect contributes to cooperative behavior and high joint benefits, while negative affect is 

associated with competitive, win-lose tactics (Barry, Smithey Fulmer, & Goats, 2006; Isen, 

1987). Anger in particular has been found to reduce negotiators’ regard for their opponents’ 

interests, lower joint benefits (Allred, Mallozzi, & Raia, 1997) and reduce desire for future 

interactions with the opponent (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Increasing officer awareness of the 

impact that emotions have on negotiation behavior, negotiation outcomes, and social cognition 

(Albarracin & Kumkale, 2003; Tiedens & Linton, 2001) also should be accompanied by a 

developmental focus on emotional control and self-regulation. 

Complexity, adaptability and simultaneous response to competing demands. U.S. 

Soldiers who negotiate with Iraqis must attend simultaneously to the different and sometimes 

competing demands and mindsets involved in warfighting/force protection on the one hand and 

fostering collaboration with locals on the other hand. Soldiers must maintain high levels of 

situational awareness and be prepared to respond tactically to threats, while at the same time 

engaging in the seemingly antithetical responses of fostering rapport and trust with their Iraq 

counterparts. Officers and Soldiers must, therefore, develop adaptive capacity and mental agility 

(Bennis, 2003; Wong, 2004) that will enable them to respond quickly and intelligently to the 

competing demands resulting from their complex set of roles (e.g. nation building vs. insurgency 

fighting). Performing effectively in a diverse set of roles also requires Soldiers to master a wide 

range of information and skills outside their combat specialty. Moreover, junior officers must 

often perform these roles with limited detailed guidance from superiors because geographical 

dispersion, changing tactical and strategic situations, and volatile environments may prevent 

higher level commanders from formulating detailed plans and directions (Wong, 2004). 

Training and development focus: Adaptability and mental agility involve a diverse 

behavioral repertoire (behavioral complexity) that enables the selection of appropriate responses 

to situational demands. Behavioral complexity requires cognitive complexity, and cognitive 

complexity involves both differentiation and integration. Differentiation refers to the number of 

concepts and dimensions that Soldiers use in the perception of the physical and social 

environment, while integration addresses the Soldiers’ ability to combine these dimensions in 

resolving unfamiliar challenges (Day & Lance, 2004; Hooijberg, Hunt, & Dodge, 1997; Zaccaro, 
 15

1999). Time and resource constraints suggest that formal training programs can have a slow and 

limited effect in developing officers’ behavioral repertoire and the adaptability necessary to meet 

the demands of the complex set of roles they must perform. This suggests that in addition to a 

formal training program, officers must be presented with tools, time, and incentives to engage in 

individual self-reflection and group after action reviews to facilitate their ability to learn fromon-the-job experiences. 

Negotiation Challenges Summary 

The findings of this exploratory investigation indicate that military officers who engage 

in negotiations with members of the local population are likely to encounter a wide variety of 

challenges. Officers face the need to mediate disputes between local leaders and to negotiate 

impartial agreements in the face of pressure from competing leaders and groups. They are 

required to make ethical judgments when negotiating agreements with local leaders whose 

behaviors are sometimes guided by cultural values and norms inconsistent with U.S. military 

rules and regulations. Officers must attend to and consider local customs and traditions in 

negotiating agreements concerning collaborative projects, while participating in meetings with 

local leaders. They must find ways to protect their own safety and that of their local negotiation 

counterparts, develop ways to assess their counterpart’s trustworthiness when enemy and nonenemy elements are hard to distinguish, and balance the threat of use of military force with 

collaborative gestures as they attempt to foster cooperation and minimize damage for their 

relationships with local individuals and groups. Finally, they must negotiate in the face of grief 

or anger and integrate effectively both war-fighting and negotiation skills to ensure that they can 

respond adaptively to the large set of roles and responsibilities associated with their mission. 

Instructional programs aimed to prepare officers to negotiate effectively with members of 

the local population must help officers recognize these challenges and provide them with the 

knowledge and tools to address such challenges. Specifically, we propose that officers preparing 

to manage these negotiation challenges are likely to benefit from learning about negotiation 

theory and research findings addressing the characteristics of effective mediation processes and 

useful third-party conflict resolution techniques; the impact of cross-cultural values and norms 

on negotiators’ assumptions, motives and strategies; the influence of power disparity on 

negotiators’ behaviors and outcomes; key forms of interpersonal trust; and the impact and 

control of emotions on negotiation behavior and outcomes. Officers are also likely to benefit 

from the development of a variety of negotiation and interpersonal skills with special emphasis 

on mediation procedures, integrative and distributive bargaining tactics, cross-cultural interaction 

skills, negotiation communication techniques, calculus-based trust-building tactics, and project 

management strategies. Officers must also learn self-management skills addressing emotional 

regulation and self-reflection techniques as a means to enhance learning from on-the-job 

experiences. 

In addition to knowledge and skills, military organizations must develop a clear set of 

guiding policies and rules affecting cross-cultural military negotiations. These include directions 

concerning potential violation of military rules in the face of cross-cultural differences in ethical 

and behavioral norms, and clear policy guidelines as to what is negotiable. A summary of the 
 16

challenges reported and negotiation research knowledge, skills and organizational policies that 

are likely to facilitate officers efforts’ in managing these challenges is presented in Table 1. 

Table 1 

Summary of Negotiation Challenges and Training Development Foci 

Negotiation Challenges Training and Development Focus

Negotiation and Mediation in the Face of Strife

Mediating disputes and negotiating impartial 

agreements. 

Learn about the characteristics of mediation processes and 

develop effective mediation skills informed by earlier 

military third party interventions (e.g., in the Balkans). 

 

Ethical Judgment in the Face of Conflicting Cultural Values and Norms

Developing agreements with individuals from cultures 

that value personal gains, power and nepotism. 

Inform officers of non-Western and Middle Eastern 

cultural values and norms. Provide clear organizational 

policies and direction concerning the extent and 

circumstances under which officers may deviate, if at all, 

from Army contracting rules. 

Lack of control over Iraqi leaders who wield power and 

status derived from contact with U.S. forces. 

Emphasize the value of building relationships with 

multiple members of specific communities to facilitate 

monitoring. 

 

Negotiating Work Arrangements in the Face of Conflicting Cultural Values and Norms

Instituting project management discipline with cultures 

that adopt a relaxed approach to developing and 

adhering to work schedules and personal 

accountability. 

Teach basic project management skills and provide ideas 

to reinforce project management discipline among local 

civilians. 

Managing meetings in a culture that adopts a relaxed 

approach to time and highlights the importance of 

social customs. 

Increase cross-cultural awareness regarding differences in 

approach to time and causal attributions. 

Expressing respect and developing agreements in a 

culture that adopts unfamiliar nonverbal symbols and 

emphasizes the importance of honor and dignity. 

Increase cross-cultural awareness regarding social 

structure and values of social harmony and hierarchy 

Differences between U.S. and Iraq perspectives as to 

what is negotiable. 

Provide clear organizational guidelines, informed by 

cultural differences, on what may become subject for 

negotiation 

 
 17

Table 1 Continued 

Negotiation Challenges Training and Development Focus

Negotiating in the Face of Threat and Volatility: 

Balancing the Use of Power and Collaborative Gestures

Controlling the inclination to employ military power 

and threat. 

Learn about the impact of power disparity in negotiations. 

Balancing the use of threat with care and respect. Include negotiation communication training focusing on 

the use of verbal and nonverbal communication to project 

power, confidence and domination with regard to specific 

issues while expressing politeness, deference and respect 

to the person. 

Balancing force protection considerations and a 

respectful approach during security operations. 

Train Soldiers to evaluate risk factors and to assess the 

value minimizing damage to the relationship against force 

protection consideration. 

Minimizing threat to Iraqi counterparts. Share tactical techniques (e.g., using raids to enter homes 

as a way to be able to speak to residents freely). 

Identifying who is trustworthy. Share negotiation research regarding different forms of 

interpersonal trust and teach how increase calculus-based 

trust and how to manage calculus-based distrust. 

Determining what to exchange and what concessions to 

make. 

Inform Soldiers of the findings of negotiation research 

addressing concession patterns and teach concession 

strategies. 

 

Personal Growth: Self-Management and Adaptability 

Negotiating while experiencing feelings of loss, anger, 

and grief. 

Inform trainees of research on the impact of negative 

emotions on negotiation behavior and teach selfmanagement and emotional regulation techniques. 

Employing behavioral and cognitive complexity and 

adaptability; responding appropriately to competing 

demands. 

In addition to participation in formal training programs, 

encourage the use of individual self-reflection and group 

After Action Review processes to facilitate officer 

propensity to learn from on-the-job experiences. 

Iraqi Negotiation Techniques: 

Cultural Norms or Distributive Negotiation Maneuvers? 

Overall, U.S. Soldiers perceived most Iraqi leaders or residents that they came into 

contact with as guided by the desire to maximize their benefits with little or no concern for the 

U.S. military needs or goals. Officers reported a long list of negotiation techniques used by the 
 18

Iraqis that they perceived as manipulative distributive tactics aimed to cause U.S. Soldiers to 

give in to Iraqis’ demands. Similar to findings reported in the negotiation literature on the 

effects of pressure tactics, misrepresentation, and deception (Lewicki et al., 2006), several 

officers reported disappointment and frustration by what they believed to be a common Iraqi 

exploitative approach to negotiations. 

The list of individual influence tactics reported by U.S. officers to be employed by Iraqis 

appears to be consistent with basic cultural values and normative behaviors in non-Western 

cultures. One implication of this is that U.S. officers may inadvertently evaluate Iraqi 

negotiators as exploitative and manipulative (i.e., a stable internal attribution about an Iraqi’s 

character), when Iraqi behavior in negotiation situations is largely guided by cultural norms for 

how negotiations should be conducted (i.e., not necessarily a stable personality trait). It also 

points to a key cross-cultural negotiation challenge that U.S. officers confront—discerning the 

extent to which specific negotiation and interaction patterns represent selfish, distributive tactics 

or the normative and appropriate influence techniques endorsed by a culture. 

Several officers appeared to recognize the challenge of discerning individual negotiation 

motives from culturally normative behaviors by pointing to the need to be aware of local 

customs while simultaneously avoiding the tendency to stereotype all Iraqi counterparts as 

having similar motives and expectations. They emphasized the need to judge each person based 

on his or her individual actions and adapt one’s negotiation approach and tactics to their specific 

local counterpart. As suggested by one officer, Soldiers “must realize that at the end of the day 

you are dealing with a single person, not the culture.” 

In this section we describe key Iraqi influence tactics identified by U.S. military officers 

and consider non-Western cultural assumptions and behavioral norms that potentially underlie 

them. We propose that preparing officers for their negotiation roles should include recognition 

of influence techniques likely to be employed by members of the local population and 

understanding the cultural context that guide these techniques. 

Emphasize Personal Status, Power and Influence within the Community 

Officers reported that Iraqi counterparts tended to present themselves as important figures 

with influence over their own village or neighborhood and who could help Americans secure 

community support or find valuable information. Some Iraqis labeled themselves imams or 

sheiks even when they were not recognized as such by others, as discovered later by U.S. 

officers. Actual sheiks often came to meetings with a large entourage, suggesting a prominent 

position. Closely related was a tendency of some Iraqis, especially retired senior military 

officers, to speak about the high-status positions they held in the past within the military. Iraqis 

also made attempts to elevate their status by dropping names of high-level American officers or 

officials they had met. Ordinary residents sometimes attempted to strengthen their influence and 

power in negotiations by bringing sheiks or other dignitaries to advocate their needs. 

Officers perceived these behaviors as influence tactics aimed to maximize satisfaction of 

Iraqis’ demands, and some viewed these negotiation techniques to be manipulative and 

exploitative. However, an examination of Middle Eastern values and norms indicates that 
 19

relying on a dignitary is consistent with the patriarchal and hierarchical values that dominate 

societies where neighborhood leaders and dignitaries are expected to play a central negotiation 

and mediation role in resolving disputes (Abu Nimer, 1996). This suggests that when faced with 

local counterparts who emphasize their personal status during negotiations, officers must discern 

whether this behavior represents an attempt by the counterparts to establish the legitimacy of 

their roles as negotiators in accordance with cultural custom, whether it is a pure distributive 

tactic aimed to motivate officers to concede to self-serving demands, or a combination of both. 

Appeal to Emotions 

Officers reported that Iraqi counterparts often attempted to persuade them to respond 

favorably to their demands by appealing to the officers’ emotions. They talked about the risk 

that they and their families were exposed to, poor living conditions, or their long wait for 

improvements. Women often brought little children along, or cried in meetings with civil affairs 

officers. U.S. officers perceived this to be a distributive maneuver aimed at gaining concessions 

from the Americans. 

In contrast to Western cultures that emphasize rational arguments as a dominant 

persuasive tactic and view emotional appeal as an inappropriate, ethically questionable tactic 

(Barry, 1999), non-Western cultures recognize emotional appeals as normative behaviors. 

Emotional appeals in non-Western societies are often aimed at sending implicit messages to the 

other party, reminding that party of their status and responsibilities within the social order (Brett 

& Gelfand, 2006). High-status parties are expected to respond with some level of concession to 

emotional appeals as part of a social obligation on the part of the stronger party to help lowerstatus parties in need. 

Emotional appeal is also consistent with non-Western high-context communication styles 

(Hall, 1976). A high-context communication style emphasizes indirect and implicit 

communication where meaning is conveyed, not just by words, but also by the context in which 

certain behaviors are observed. Officers confronted by emotional appeals must be able therefore 

be able to discern if these appeals represent normative influence attempts, excessive 

manipulative maneuvers, or a combination of both. That is, officers must determine if the 

behavior is more contextually driven, personality driven, or a mixture of personal goals and 

context in order to be effective in negotiations. 

Strong and Persisting Demands Combined with Dismissals of Previous Help 

Officers reported that most Iraqi counterparts seldom ever acknowledged previous 

support or improvements in civil services or infrastructure made by the American military. 

Instead, they regularly held the Americans responsible for all failures and asked for more help 

and support. U.S. officers perceived the discounting of American efforts as an influence 

technique aimed to create a sense of guilt or obligation in the Americans that may lead to 

increased willingness to satisfy Iraqi demands. 

Holding Americans responsible for failure to satisfy their needs is consistent with nonWestern cultural expectations concerning the obligation of high-status authority to help lower-
 20

status members of society. This expectation is also consistent with a collectivist perspective 

which emphasizes the responsibility of the group or the state to care for the individual. This is in 

contrast to individualistic cultures that encourage independence and personal responsibility for 

the satisfaction of individual needs (Hofstede, 1991). Blaming U.S. Soldiers for any absence of 

progress in their living conditions may also reflect a non-Western tendency to make situational 

(i.e., emphasize situational factors and social context) as compared to dispositional (i.e., 

assuming personal responsibility) attributions in explaining causes of events (Brett & Gelfand, 

2006). High demands and blame may, therefore, reflect cultural expectations, an individual’s 

strategy to exert pressure and maximize gains, or both. In responding to Iraqis’ complaints about 

insufficient progress in security or infrastructure reconstruction, several U.S. officers reported 

having to find ways to express sympathy for difficulties while avoiding making commitments for 

improvements over which they did not have full control. 

Expanding the Agenda and Surprise Requests

Somewhat related to the previously described influence tactics, officers reported a 

tendency of Iraqi counterparts to bring up new issues and demands that were not part of the 

original agenda. As one Soldier noted, “we came to speak about security or express sympathy 

about loss of a family member and they bring up work contracts they would like to have.” Iraqis 

would tend to bring up these demands, often at the last minute, just as the negotiation discussions 

appeared to come to its end. Officers perceived this as an attempt to take advantage of 

Americans’ desire to conclude the already prolonged discussion in hope that they would agree to 

a final demand. 

In Western societies surprising, last minute demands labeled “nibbles” (Cohen, 1980) are 

used as a distributive tactic to create time pressure that will lead to concessions by the surprised 

party. In non-Western societies, however, a more relaxed approach to time and deadlines in a 

polychromic1

 organization of events (Hall & Hall, 1990) suggests that the unexpected expansion 

of the negotiation agenda toward the end of a meeting may reflect normative behavior. That is, 

while Americans find broadening the agenda toward the end of a negotiation to be surprising, 

Iraqis who negotiate with one another might be surprised if broadening the agenda did not occur. 

Officers must learn to discern to what extent any surprising, last minute demands that they 

encounter represent culturally expected behavior, a manipulative pressure tactic, or a 

combination of both. When Iraqis made excessive demands or added issues and demands to the 

agenda unexpectedly, Soldiers reported looking for ways to refocus conversation on key issues, 

politely and firmly. 

Secrecy, Ambiguity, and Multiple Agendas 

Several officers reported that many Iraqis seemed secretive and ambiguous about their 

true needs and motives. Officers remarked that Iraqis make “great poker players,” and “Every 

thing is gray. They never say yes or no. Every thing is open for negotiation.” This made it 

difficult for U.S. officers to recognize underlying interests of their Iraqi counterparts, and 

inhibited the use of integrative tactics to develop agreements that best addressed both sides’ 

needs. 

 

1

 Simultaneous scheduling of multiple activities as opposed to sequential scheduling of multiple activities. 
 21

Officers tended to interpret the secrecy of their Iraqi counterparts as evasiveness aimed to 

cover selfish motives, or as desire to maximize personal control over resources obtained from the 

Americans as a way to enhance leadership status within the community. Several officers thought 

that secrecy was also used as a means to prevent Americans from fully understanding the 

implications of negotiated agreements on the web of relationship and power balance within and 

across neighborhoods or villages. 

Secrecy and ambiguity could also reflect, however, a non-Western emphasis on highcontext, implicit and indirect communication styles, which are in contrast to Western 

communication styles that involve a low-context, direct and explicit exchange of information 

(Brett & Gelfand, 2006). This suggests that officers who encounter secrecy and ambiguity 

during negotiations with members of the local population must look for ways to determine if 

they represent normative behaviors or distributive negotiation tactics. 

Indirect Expressions of Anger and Frustration 

Despite the aggressive nature of some of the influence techniques employed by Iraqis, the 

tone of most conversations with Americans remained non-confrontational and polite. Consistent 

with studies revealing a preference in non-Western cultures for expressing conflict in indirect 

ways, both verbally and behaviorally (Brett, 2001), Iraqi counterparts appeared more likely to 

express their frustration or anger to the interpreter instead of confronting Americans directly. 

Exaggeration, Deception and Inconsistent Messages 

Iraqis appeared to use exaggerations to justify requests (e.g., claim that there was no 

water in the entire village when there only was a problem in a limited area, “use outlandish 

stories”). Many officers felt that deceptions aimed to benefit the welfare of a clan or the local 

communities were culturally acceptable to the Iraqis. 

Officers also encountered situations in which Iraqi counterparts utilized inconsistent, 

“two-faced” messages—one to U.S. forces and one to local groups. One officer noted that Iraqis 

would “tell each group what it wants to hear.” Another officer indicated that Iraqis would “incite 

hostility in sermons and deny it to Americans.” Such inconsistent messages may reflect high 

tolerance for contradictions apparent in non-Western societies. This tolerance results from a 

recognition that each person is part of multiple contexts and expected to fulfill certain roles 

within these contexts that may not be always be totally compatible (Kitayama & Markus, 1999). 

While such behavior and conflicting messages are perceived as inauthentic (Chan, Hannah, & 

Gardner, 2004), manipulative and deceptive in Western contexts, these same behaviors may 

represent a more culturally acceptable activity in Iraq. 

Officers reported learning to use verbal and nonverbal cues to detect misrepresentations. 

Several officers reported that to preserve the relationship and enable the Iraqi counterpart to save 

face (i.e., avoid humiliation and shame), they often avoided direct confrontation of exaggerations 

or misrepresentations, and instead redirected the discussion to substantive matters. 
 22

Implicit, Subtle Threats 

A number of officers indicated that Iraqis made subtle threats about disruptions likely to 

interfere with the U.S. forces’ ability to maintain peace and security if Iraqi demands were not 

met. There were several reports in which threats focused on the safety of American Soldiers 

(e.g., “there will be blood in the streets; a mob may come to the base’s gate, your Soldiers may 

be in danger”). 

Soldiers indicated that all threats were addressed immediately to ensure safety. Although 

it is unclear to what extent threat represents a culturally acceptable influence technique, several 

officers suggested that it is likely that in a country controlled for many years by a dictatorial 

regime and oppressing security organizations that those coercive influence tactics may be more 

culturally acceptable.

Meeting Before a Meeting and Turning U.S. Officers against Competing Groups 

Officers were sometimes invited to neighborhood advisory council (NAC) meetings 

earlier than the actual meeting time as a way for council members to have “private time” with 

officers in an attempt to gain more favor for their group. Occasionally, these meetings were used 

to portray leaders from competing groups as unreliable and to damage their reputation in the 

hope of gaining more for one’s own group. 

Collaborating Through Exchange of Offers 

Officers reported finding collaborative negotiation behaviors on the part of their Iraqi 

counterparts to involve both low levels of trust and minimal disclosure of information 

concerning their underlying needs and interests. Collaborations primarily involved the exchange 

of offers, reciprocal concessions, splitting differences, and the development of compromises 

instead of integrative solutions. Reliance on the exchange of offers coupled with minimal open 

discussion of the parties’ underlying interests is consistent with a non-Western, high-context, 

proposal-based approach to negotiations, where information about negotiators’ priorities is 

shared through the offers each makes rather than through direct discussion of needs and interests 

(Adair, 2004; Adair & Brett, 2005). It should be noted that U.S. officers also were inclined to 

maintain secrecy and avoid open exchange of information about underlying concerns and 

interests. This primarily was due to force protection considerations, as well as having to respond 

and integrate the demands of different sectarian groups. 

Collaboration with Iraqis occurred primarily through exchange of offers concerning 

resources or benefits. Iraqis agreed to fulfill the requests of Americans in exchange for valuable 

resources or opportunities such as: 

• Money 

• Jobs 

• Influence over project assignment to contractors 

• Letters of recommendation from U.S. officers to be used in dealing with other U.S. 

officers or Iraqi officials 
 23

• The opportunity to be present in certain celebrations or ceremonial openings 

• Access to American officers or opportunities to meet with officers 

• Permits for carrying weapons 

• Information about or the release of detainees 

• Medical care for relatives 

• Barbed wire 

Examples of such exchanges included promises by neighborhood leaders to maintain 

order in the streets, and perhaps even prevent attacks, in exchange for financial resources or 

weapon permits. Iraqis also might agree to provide intelligence in exchange for services, 

weapons or money. As one officer noted, “If you want to see in the dark, you need to pay for the 

flashlight.” Often, Iraqi counterparts were more likely to provide security information affecting 

individuals outside their own clan. 

The emphasis on exchange as a means of collaboration suggests that instructional 

programs aimed to prepare military officers for cross-cultural negotiations should focus more on 

developing their ability to infer directly the preferences, needs and interests of their negotiation 

counterparts from their offers, as well as from counterparts’ reactions to offers made by the U.S. 

Iraqi Influence Techniques: Summary 

In sum, multiple Iraqi negotiation techniques appear consistent with non-Western cultural 

norms. This suggests that U.S. perceptions of Iraqi influence techniques as individually driven 

negotiation maneuvers aimed to extract concessions may not be fully accurate. Cultural norms 

that may account for the use of specific influence techniques by Iraqis include (1) relying on 

community dignitaries in resolving conflict, (2) use of emotional appeals as a way of reminding 

and reinforcing role expectations and social obligations, (3) collectivist perspectives which 

emphasize the responsibility of the group to care for the individual, (4) a relaxed and 

polychromic approach to time and scheduling, (5) situational vs. dispositional attributions, (6) 

high-context, implicit and indirect communication approaches, (7) preference for indirect forms 

of confrontation, (8) tolerance of contradictions, and (9) collaboration through the exchange of 

offers rather than direct exchange of information. Awareness of cultural assumptions and norms 

is therefore essential to facilitate U.S. officers’ ability to discern the extent to which specific 

negotiation acts represent a culturally normative response, an individually motivated distributive 

tactic, or both. A summary of key Iraqi negotiation tactics identified by U.S. military officers 

and non-Western cultural norms that could potentially underlie those tactics are presented in 

Table 2. 
 24

Table 2 

Iraqi Negotiation Tactics and Associated Non-Western Expectations and Norms 

Iraqi Negotiation Tactics 

Associated Non-Western 

Expectations, Values, and Norms 

Emphasize personal status, power and influence 

within the community 

Neighborhood leaders and dignitaries are expected to play a 

central negotiation and mediation role in resolving disputes 

within patriarchal, Middle Eastern societies 

Appeal to emotions High-context communication style emphasizes indirect and 

implicit communication where meaning is conveyed not just 

by words but by the context in which certain behaviors are 

observed 

Highly demanding, always ask for more, discount or 

ignore previous help 

Obligation of high status authority to help lower status 

members of society as well as a collectivist perspective 

which emphasizes the role of the group or the state to care 

for the individual. Tendency to make situational as 

compared to dispositional attributions for causes of failure. 

Expand the agenda, surprise A polychromic (simultaneous vs. sequential scheduling of 

multiple activities) approach to time 

Secrecy, ambiguity and multiple agendas Emphasis on high-context, implicit and indirect 

communication approach 

Indirect expression of anger and frustration Anger and conflict are expressed in indirect verbal and 

behavioral ways 

Exaggeration, deception and inconsistent messages High tolerance of contradictions resulting from a recognition 

that each person is part of multiple contexts and expected to 

fulfill multiple roles which may not be always totally 

compatible 

Implicit, subtle threat A common coercive tactic used by dictatorial regime and 

oppressing security organizations 

Meeting before a meeting and turning U.S. officers 

against competing groups 

Cultural importance placed on status and clan loyalty 

Fostering collaboration through exchange of offers 

and limited direct information exchange 

High-context, proposal-based approach to negotiations 
 25

CONCLUSION 

With recent Counterinsurgency Doctrine (2006) serving as a notable exception, 

traditional military leadership doctrine has focused primarily on battlefield tactical proficiency 

and on leadership acts aimed to provide Soldiers with purpose, direction, motivation and 

inspiration necessary to ensure successful mission completion. Current operations in Iraq and 

Afghanistan involving counterinsurgency, peace-keeping, stability and support missions and 

nation building tasks have increased interest in the value of cross-cultural interaction and 

negotiation skills as a central competency of military leadership. The findings of this 

exploratory research and other anecdotal evidence suggest that basic and cross-cultural 

negotiation skills are key elements of this competency. As suggested by interviews with U.S. 

officers, successful military negotiations are critical to ensure effective completion of peaceful 

missions such as nation building as well as for collecting intelligence and building the local 

support necessary to succeed in fighting insurgents. Therefore, recognizing the challenges 

involved in negotiating successfully with members of the local population and learning effective 

behavioral techniques to address them represent key developmental areas necessary to prepare 

U.S. Soldiers to win both the war, and the relationships with local civilians. 

The findings presented in this paper provides a conceptual framework capturing the 

issues that may likely become subject for negotiation between military officers and members of 

the local population, the challenges associated with negotiations over these issues, and the 

various common negotiation techniques employed by local individuals. The goal of this research 

was to begin to identify the characteristics of negotiations between military personnel and 

members of the local population and to guide the design of pre-deployment negotiation skillstraining programs to prepare officers to conduct stability and support operations. 

The current exploratory research involved several limitations that must be noted. These 

include a small convenience sample, qualitative data, and reliance on U.S. Army officers’ 

perceptions that can be expected to be influenced by Western cultural values, beliefs and 

behavioral norms (Brett & Gelfand, 2006). Notwithstanding these caveats, this research 

provides initial insight into the characteristics of negotiations with non-combatants as well as 

areas of negotiation knowledge and skills that must be addressed in pre-deployment negotiation 

skills training programs. 

Pre-deployment Negotiation Skills Program for Officers: Key Components 

We propose that an instructional program aimed to prepare officers for their negotiations 

with noncombatants must address the fundamental principles of negotiation behavior, with added 

emphasis on specific aspects of the negotiation process relevant for military personnel operating 

in high risk, cross-cultural operational areas. We turn now to offer insights on the key principles 

and components of such a training program. 

Fundamental principles of negotiation. Following existing conceptualizations, a 

training program must thoroughly teach the two central paradigms of distributive and integrative 

negotiation behaviors (Pruitt, 1981, 1998). Officers must be introduced to the distributive 

framework, which views negotiation situations as win-lose or adversarial in nature. They need to 
 26

learn to recognize win-lose bargaining tactics employed by their opponents, which are aimed to 

claim value by lowering the focal person’s aspirations (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). They also need 

to understand when distributive bargaining is an appropriate approach for them to adopt, as well 

as learn how to effectively employ specific competitive tactics. 

A training program would also have to teach officers about the benefits of integrative 

bargaining in developing mutually satisfying agreements, generating commitment to agreement 

implementation, and in fostering long term collaboration and stability in the relationship. 

Officers must be introduced to and practice the use of integrative negotiation tactics such as 

searching for information about the opponents’ underlying interests, fostering trust, and 

familiarization with the different types of integrative solutions identified in the literature (Fisher 

& Ury, 1981; Pruitt, 1998). Training programs need to demonstrate to officers the value of 

integrative negotiations for U.S. military personnel as they attempt to build long-lasting 

collaboration with members of the local population. 

Similar to other negotiation course curricula and sources of theoretical and practical 

literature covering the field (e.g., Lewicki et al., 2006; Thompson, 2006), course designers 

should introduce topics that impact negotiation process and outcomes, including power and 

influence, communication techniques, the influence of cognition and emotion on perception, 

ethical considerations, and cross-cultural differences in assumptions affecting negotiation 

behavior. 

Areas of special emphasis relevant for military personnel negotiating in high risk, 

cross cultural operational areas. The findings of this exploratory investigation also point to 

three major categories of issues that are likely to become subject for negotiations between 

officers and members of local populations: 1) issues related to neighborhood and institutional 

improvement projects, 2) security matters, and 3) civil affairs concerns. Officers need to be 

introduced to these issues and the types of agreements typically negotiated by other military 

personnel to resolve them, as well as the effectiveness of these agreements. 

The summary of the interviews presented in this research point to several key challenges 

that officers must be prepared to address in conducting negotiations with local civilians during 

both stability and support and counterinsurgency operations. These challenges and the 

knowledge, skills and organizational policies required to address them must be emphasized in 

military pre-deployment negotiation skills training programs. The challenges reported appear to 

fall into seven major categories including: 

(1) Mediating disputes between local leaders and negotiating impartial agreements in the 

face of social and ethnic strife. 

(2) Making ethical judgments in the face of conflicting cultural values and norms. 

(3) Considering local customs and traditions in negotiating agreements concerning 

collaborative projects while participating in meetings with local leaders. 

(4) Attending to security factors affecting the negotiation, including finding ways to 

protect their own safety and that of their local negotiation counterparts. 

(5) Assessing counterpart trustworthiness when enemy and non-enemy elements are 

hard to distinguish, and balancing the threat of use of military force with 
 27

collaborative gestures in an attempt to foster cooperation with local individuals and 

groups. 

(6) Negotiating in the face of grief or anger. 

(7) Integrating warfighting and negotiation skills to develop the capacity to respond 

adaptively to the large set of responsibilities associated with the officer role during 

deployment. 

The analysis presented in this paper suggests that to effectively address these challenges, 

officers are likely to benefit from instructional programs that inform them of negotiation research 

findings focusing on the characteristics of effective mediation processes and useful third-party 

interventions; and the influence of cross cultural values, assumptions, and norms related to 

causal attributions, relational versus economic capital, hierarchy and social harmony, and 

emotionality versus rationality. Additional research and knowledge areas highly relevant for the 

demands placed on officers include the influence of power disparity on negotiators’ behaviors 

and outcomes; key forms of interpersonal trust; and the impact of emotions on negotiation 

behavior and outcomes. Officers are also likely to benefit from learning a variety of skills 

including effective mediation procedures; verbal and nonverbal communication techniques 

aimed to foster an image of a confident, powerful, yet collaborative negotiator; calculus-based 

trust-building tactics; and project management strategies. Officers must also learn techniques of 

emotional regulation and self-reflection. 

The findings concerning Iraqi negotiation techniques pointed to nine tactics that were 

perceived by U.S. officers to be guided primarily by distributive motives. The analysis provided 

in this paper suggests that most of these tactics are consistent with non-Western negotiation 

assumptions and behaviors and could therefore reflect culturally prescribed negotiation behavior 

rather than individual motives. Officers must be introduced to these tactics and learn to assess 

and discern the extent to which specific behaviors may reflect a strong, selfish distributive 

motivation vs. normative customs. The secrecy and limited direct exchange of information that 

characterize the behaviors of both members of the local population and military personnel 

suggest that officers must also learn to infer information about their counterpart’s interests and 

priorities through the pattern of exchange of offers that evolve during the negotiation. Officers 

must also develop a thorough understanding of the “human terrain” (i.e. the interests of 

influential leaders and key groups) within their area of operation as a way to form an accurate 

assessment of the needs of their counterparts. 

In addition to focusing on providing officers with negotiation knowledge and skills, 

senior military leaders must continuously assess the adequacy and appropriateness of guiding 

policies and rules they impose that affect cross-cultural military negotiations. Officers must be 

provided with clear guidelines concerning what issues may become subject for negotiations and 

how to handle potential violations of Army rules in the face of cross-cultural differences in ethics 

and behavioral norms. 

Most importantly, the findings of this investigation point to the value of developing an 

integrated approach that merges tactical and negotiation training, and points to ways in which 

these two sets of skills can be combined to advance nation-building and security missions. 

Tactical use of force and threat capacity may be utilized as a distributive tactic to motivate 
 28

potential local civilian counterparts to enter negotiations or to secure those who choose to engage 

in negotiation with military officers. At the same time, negotiation techniques may facilitate 

tactical missions requiring collaboration with local civilians, such as the closure of certain areas, 

or in intelligence gathering operations. The design of pre-deployment negotiation programs 

must enable officers to increase their capacity to shift flexibly across a complex set of 

responsibilities involving war fighting, peace building or negotiations by expanding their mental 

conceptualizations of their roles and by increasing their behavioral repertoires. 
 29

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