Interim Decision 401498 

MATTER or Mumtaz 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A.-7908074 

Decided by Board July 28, 1965 

Conviction of lewd and lascivious conduct (by public and indecent exposure) 

in violation of section 944.20(2) of the Wisconsin Statutes not conviction 

of a crime involving moral tnrpiture. 

CHARGE: 

Order: 

This case Comes forward • on appeal by the trial attorney from 

the order of the special inquiry officer entered May•19, 1965 ordering that proceedings be terminated.. 

The record relates to a native and citizen of Germany, 84 years 

old, male, divorced, who last entered the United States at New 

York, New York on or about December 6, 1950 for peimanent residence. The respondent admittad,..and the evidence establishes that 

the respondent was convicted on August 30) 1959, September 17, 

1959, October 9, 1959, May 11, 1964, and July. 24, 1964 for the offense of lewd and lascivious conduct by unlawfully, publicly and 

indecently exposing his sex organ in violation of section 944.20(2) 

of the Wisconsin Statutes which provides as follows: 

.whoeirer does any of the folloiving may be lined not more than $500 or imprisoned -not more than one year in the_ county jail or both: ' 

. (1) Commits an indecent act of sexual gratification—with another with knowledge that they are in the presence of others; or 

(2) 'Publicly and• indecently exposes a sex organ; or 

(8) Openly cohabits and associates with a person he knows is not his 

spouse. under circumstances that imply sexual intercourse. 

' The respondent admitted that these offenses did not arise out of a 

pinesscheme of criminal misconduct. 

Act of 1852—Section 241(a) (4) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4).1--Convicted 

after entry for two crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of criminal 

misconduct, to lewd and lascivious conduct, 

' committed On live .occasions. 

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Section 939.23, Wisconsin Statutes, provides that when criminal 

intent is an element of a crime in the Criminal Code, such intent 

is indicated by the term "intentionally", the phrase "with intent 

to," the phrase "with intent that," or some form of the verbs 

"know" or "believe". Paragraph (2) of section 944.20, Wisconsin 

Statutes, does not contain any of these words or phrases. 

Most statutory crimes require criminal intent. But because of 

the complicated nature of modern society, the legislatures of the 

states have found it necessary in order to protect the public safety 

and welfare, to pass laws which make the mere performances of 

certain prohibited acts, or the failure to perform other commanded 

acts, unlawful, regardless of the actor's intention. The acts defined 

as public welfare offenses are usually not makum in, as but are 

wrong merely because they are prohibited by statute' 

The term "moral turpitude" within the deportation statute is an 

act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social 

duties owing to fellow men, or society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rules.' Moral turpitude is dependent upon 

the depraved or vicious motive of the alien. It is in the intent that 

moral turpitude inheres.' A crime, committed without contemplating death, without malice, and without intent, and ordinarily committed while engaged in a lawful act but committed through carelessness or because of the absence of due caution or circumspection 

does not include an evil intent and therefore does not invoke 

moral turpitude.4 

The crime under consideration, section 942.20(2), Wisconsin 

Statutes, does not require a specific intent and it does not appear 

that it is essential that the defendant have a vicious motive or corrupt mind. All that appears to be necessary for conviction under 

the statute is that the act be done consciously. There is nothing in 

the complaint indicating the circumstances under which the indecent exposure was made. The special inquiry officer has stated that 

a person who does the forbidden act through physical necessity 

could be convicted under the statute, even though he had no lewd 

or lascivious intent. 

The trial attorney suggests that section 939.47, Wisconsin Statutes, which provides that the presence of the natural physical 

forces which causes the actor reasonably to believe his act is the 

Sloane, W.J. 26 Marquette Law Review 92 (1942). 

27A. Words and Phrases 192. 

25renth71/ Review. L a N. 8sruiee, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, p. 5 

(march 1944) ; eo red Meyer v. Day, 54 P.25 335 (2nd Gin) 1931. 

' Mongiovi v. Harnuth, 80 F.2d 825 (W.D.N.Y. 1929). 

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only means of pfeventing imminent-public disaster or imminent 

death or great bodily harm to himself, or another and which causes 

him. soto act, is a defense to prosecution for nny crime based upon 

that act. It is believed that the trial attorney's application of this 

Elation to the crime is' erroneous and that the section in question , 

refers to emergency or reflex. actions to counteract or avoid the 

events set forth in that section. 

It is not believed that the specification in the Wisconsin Statute 

of the particular organ is a significant departure from other statutes which' d6 not- so' specify, inasmuch as generally the wives 

parts or organs are Involved. The attempt to distinguish this case 

from Matter of H —, 7 I. & N. Dec. 301, which involved a knowing 

open or indecent exposure of the person, appears to be a distinction 

without a difference. 5 

The statute in question, section 944.20(2), Wisconsin 'Statutes, 

does not require a specific intent, a criminal intent or any intent 

whatsoever. The mere perforinanee of the act is prohibited and 

made unlawful iegarAlless 'of the actor's intention. A person may 

be convicted under the statute even though' the act was done carelessly, or with absence of due caution or circumspection: The offense is not one which is nuguut in, se. It is concluded that the offense involved herein. does' 'not hivolve moral turpitude' . The-appeal of the trial attorney will be dismiSted and the order of the 

special inquiry officer will be affirmed. 

ORDER:.It is ordered that the aipeal of the trial attorney be 

and the same is hereby dismissed. 

It is further ordered -that the order of the special inquiry officer 

entered May 19, 1965 that the proceedings be terminated be and the 

seine is hereby affirmed. 

'Of Matter of P—, 2 L & N. Dec. 117; Matter of 8 L & N. Dee. 272, p. 

274, where a differentiation was made between an act merely accompanied by 

negligence or carelessness and one done maliciously and wantonly. 

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