alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

RIDING FILMS, INC., 

 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. Civil Action 2:13-cv-46 

 Judge Marbley 

 Magistrate Judge King 

JOHN DOES 129-193, 

 Defendants. 

 ORDER 

On February 10, 2015, the plaintiff and counterclaimants Denham 

and Wintle were ordered to report on the status of their 

claims/counterclaims. Order, ECF 80. These parties were advised that 

their failure to report would be construed as an abandonment of any 

claims asserted by them and would be likely to result in the dismissal 

of such claims. Id. Counterclaimants Denham and Wintle failed to file 

the required report and, on March 6, 2015, the United States 

Magistrate Judge recommended that the counterclaims asserted by them 

be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Order and Report and 

Recommendation, ECF 84. Although the parties were advised of their 

right to object to that recommendation, and of the consequences of 

their failure to do so, there has been no objection. 

The March 6, 2015 recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Order 

and Report and Recommendation, ECF 84, is ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. The 

counterclaims asserted by counterclaimants Denham and Wintle are 

DISMISSED for failure to prosecute. 

Case: 2:13-cv-00046-ALM-NMK Doc #: 85 Filed: 04/17/15 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
2

If plaintiff intends to pursue its claims against defendant 

Glasco,1

 it must file an appropriate motion within seven (7) days of 

the date of this Order. Its failure to do so will result in the 

dismissal of this, the final remaining claim, for failure to 

prosecute. There will be no further extension of this date. 

 s/Algenon L. Marbley 

 Algenon L. Marbley 

 United States District Judge

 

 

1 Plaintiff sought and was granted until March 20, 2015 to file a motion for 

summary judgment against defendant Glasco, Order and Report and 

Recommendation, ECF 84, but has not filed a motion for summary judgment. 

Case: 2:13-cv-00046-ALM-NMK Doc #: 85 Filed: 04/17/15 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
No. 50663.

#### Protest 994706-G of Roethlisberger & Co., Inc. (New York).

Opinion by

Keefe, J.

It was stipulated that certain items of the merchandise consist of cheese similar in all material respects to that the subject of Abstract 48269. In accordance with stipulation and following the decision cited, it was held that an allowance of 2J4 percent should have been made in the weight of the cheese by the collector in computing the duty thereon to compensate for the weight of the inedible coverings on the outside of the cheese. The protest was sustained to this extent.
| (logo)  WELLS FARGO | **Commercial  Mortgage Servicing**D1050-084,  8th Floor  401 South Tryon St.  Charlotte, NC 28202  1-800-326-1334 |
|---------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

**ANNUAL STATEMENT OFCOMPLIANCE**

** **

ReferenceisherebymadetothatcertainTrustandServicingAgreementdatedas of March 1,2016, by and among DEUTSCHE MORTGAGE & ASSET RECEIVING CORPORATION, asDepositor, WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Master Servicer andSpecial Servicer, WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as Trustee, andDEUTSCHE BANK TRUST COMPANY AMERICAS, as Certificate Administrator, PayingAgent and Custodian with respect to Commercial Mortgage Pass-ThroughCertificates, COMM 2016-787S (the "Agreement"). Capitalized termsused herein not otherwise defined shall have the meanings assigned in theAgreement.

 

Pursuant to Section 11.07 of thisAgreement, I, Daniel Marthinsen, Managing Director of Special Servicing dohereby certify that:

 

1.       Areview of the activities of the Special Servicer during the period from January1, 2017 through December 31, 2017 (the “Reporting Period”), and of itsperformance per the Agreement during such period has been made under mysupervision,and

 

2.       Tothe best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer hasfulfilled all of its obligations under the Agreement in all material respectsthroughout the ReportingPeriod.

 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned hasexecuted this Certificate as of the 28th day ofFebruary2018.

 

/s/ Daniel Marthinsen

Daniel Marthinsen, Managing Director 

Wells Fargo Bank

 

 

| Wells  Fargo Bank, N.A. | (logo)  Together we’ll go far |
|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|
##### 



UGI UTILITIES INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES  EXHIBIT 12.1
(Thousands of dollars)
 SixMonthsEndedMarch 31,
    
    
    Year Ended September 30,2007
    
    
    2006
    
    
    2005
    
    
    2004
    
    
    2003Earnings:Earnings before income taxes
    
    $
    106,946
    
    
    $
    80,544
    
    
    $
    84,953
    
    
    $
    83,098
    
    
    $
    100,212Interest expense
    
    
    22,267
    
    
    
    24,102
    
    
    
    18,079
    
    
    
    17,698
    
    
    
    17,412Amortization of debt discount and expense
    
    
    229
    
    
    
    243
    
    
    
    247
    
    
    
    233
    
    
    
    244Estimated interest component of rental expense
    
    
    788
    
    
    
    1,675
    
    
    
    1,568
    
    
    
    1,477
    
    
    
    1,434$
    130,230
    
    
    $
    106,564
    
    
    $
    104,847
    
    
    $
    102,506
    
    
    $
    119,302Fixed Charges:Interest expense
    
    $
    22,267
    
    
    $
    24,102
    
    
    $
    18,079
    
    
    $
    17,698
    
    
    $
    17,412Amortization of debt discount and expense
    
    
    229
    
    
    
    243
    
    
    
    247
    
    
    
    233
    
    
    
    244Allowance for funds used during
construction (capitalized interest)
    
    
    140
    
    
    
    85
    
    
    
    22
    
    
    
    11
    
    
    
    7Estimated interest component of rental expense
    
    
    788
    
    
    
    1,675
    
    
    
    1,568
    
    
    
    1,477
    
    
    
    1,434$
    23,424
    
    
    $
    26,105
    
    
    $
    19,916
    
    
    $
    19,419
    
    
    $
    19,097Ratio of earnings to fixed charges
    
    
    5.56
    
    
    
    4.08
    
    
    
    5.26
    
    
    
    5.28
    
    
    
    6.25
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

TWELVE THOUSAND EIGHT 

HUNDRED TWELVE AND 00/100 

DOLLARS ($12,812.00) IN UNITED 

STATES CURRENCY, 

Defendant. 

Civil Action 2:12-cv-183 

Judge Michael H. Watson 

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

ORDER 

---------

This matter is before the Court for consideration of the September 14, 2012 Report 

and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 15.) The Magistrate Judge 

recommended that the Court grant Plaintiff's unopposed Motion to Strike Claim and 

Answer of Michael Caylen Pursuant to Supplemental Rule G(B)(c). (ECF No. 14.) 

The Report and Recommendation specifically advised the parties that their failure 

to object to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen days of the Report would 

result in a "waiver of the right to de novo review ... by the District Judge and waiver of the 

right to appeal the judgment of the District Court." (Report and Recommendation 3, ECF 

No. 15.) The time period for filing objections to the Report and Recommendation has 

expired. No party or claimant has objected to the Report and Recommendation. 

The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendation. Noting that no 

objections have been filed and that the time for filing such objections has expired, the 

Case: 2:12-cv-00183-MHW-EPD Doc #: 16 Filed: 10/11/12 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 15.) Accordingly, Plaintiff's 

Motion to Strike Claim and Answer of Michael Caylen Pursuant to Supplemental Rule 

G(8)(c) is GRANTED. (ECF No. 14.) The Court STRIKES Michael Caylen's Claim 

Opposing Forfeiture (ECF No. 7) and Answer to Complaint (ECF No. 1 0). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

'MiCHAELH.WATSON, JUDGE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

2 

Case: 2:12-cv-00183-MHW-EPD Doc #: 16 Filed: 10/11/12 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
No. 56130.

protest 169743-K (New York).

#### The Asbury Graphite Mills, Inc. *v.*United States,

Opinion by

Johnson, J.

In accordance with stipulation of counsel that the actual net weight of the four lots of graphite in question was as set forth in said stipulation, the claim of the plaintiff was sustained.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Cardional Anna Vines Carter, :

 Plaintiff, :

 v. : Case No. 2:12-cv-1152

Riverside Methodist Hospital, : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

et al., Magistrate Judge Kemp

 :

Defendants. 

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on a notice of appeal filed by plaintiff Cardional Anna

Vines Carter. The Court will construe this notice of appeal as Ms. Carter’s objection to a Report

and Recommendation issued by the Magistrate Judge on December 19, 2012. The Court, having

reviewed the record de novo, finds for the reasons set out below that the objection to the Report

and Recommendation is without merit. For the following reasons, Petitioner's objection will be

OVERRULED and the Report and Recommendation will be ADOPTED in its entirety. 

I. 

When objections are received to a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on a

dispositive matter, the assigned District Judge "shall make a de novo determination ... of any

portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made

...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After review, the District Judge "may accept, reject, or modify the

recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge

with instructions." Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B). General objections are insufficient to

preserve any issues for review; "[a] general objection to the entirety of the magistrate's report has

the same effects as would a failure to object." Howard v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). 

II. 

In the Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge recommended that this case be

dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) because of the complaint’s failure to address

Case: 2:12-cv-01152-ALM-TPK Doc #: 8 Filed: 03/04/13 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
the basis of this Court’s jurisdiction. The Magistrate Judge concluded that no federal-law based

claim was alleged in the complaint and that no basis for diversity jurisdiction existed. Ms.

Carter’s notice of appeal contains no basis for concluding that the Magistrate Judge erred in

reaching these conclusions. Consequently, the Report and Recommendation will be adopted and

affirmed.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s notice of appeal (#6 ), construed as an objection is

OVERRULED. The Report and Recommendation (#4) is ADOPTED and AFFIRMED. This

action is hereby DISMISSED as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Algenon L. Marbley 

 Algenon L. Marbley

 United States District Judge 

2

Case: 2:12-cv-01152-ALM-TPK Doc #: 8 Filed: 03/04/13 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: <pageID>
III 

109TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 391 

To authorize representation by the Senate Legal Counsel in the case of 

Timothy P. Toms v. Alan Hantman, et al. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 6, 2006 

Mr. FRIST (for himself and Mr. REID) submitted the following resolution; 

which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

To authorize representation by the Senate Legal Counsel 

in the case of Timothy P. Toms v. Alan Hantman, et al. 

Whereas, in the case of Timothy P. Toms v. Alan Hantman, 

et al., No. 1:05–CV–01981, pending in the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia, the plaintiff 

has named as a defendant Carolyn E. Apostolou, Clerk 

of the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch of the 

Senate Committee on Appropriations; and 

Whereas, pursuant to sections 703(a) and 704(a)(1) of the 

Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(a) 

and 288c(a)(1), the Senate may direct its counsel to defend Members, officers, and employees of the Senate in 

civil actions relating to their official responsibilities: Now, 

therefore, be it 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
2 

SRES 391 ATS

1 Resolved, That the Senate Legal Counsel is author2 ized to represent Carolyn E. Apostolou in the case of Tim3 othy P. Toms v. Alan Hantman, et al. 

Æ 


hmoore on PROD1PC68 with HMBILLS
#### Dillingham *& al. versus*Smith *& al.*

In. a case of replevin, submitted for decision on questions of law, without any stipulation as to the allowance of damages, the court, at another term, after judgment of nonsuit and return, has no power to assess the defendants’ damages or to submit that question to a jury.

Replevin for mill logs. This action was withdrawn from the jury and submitted to the decision of the court upon legal questions, no stipulation being made as to the allowance of damages. The case was argued at the last law term and continued *nisi.*During the vacation, judgment of “nonsuit and return” was entered. 30 Maine, 370.

*183*Kelley*and *McCrillis,*for the defendants,

now move that their damages be allowed, contending that the court has power at its election to assess them ; or to frame an issue presenting the question of amount to a jury. R. S. ch. 130, sec. 11; *Mattoon*v. *Pierce,*12 Mass. 406.

*Rowe,*for plaintiffs.

The defendants have laid no foundation for their claim. They had no property in the logs. The nonsuit was ordered, not because defendants owned the logs, but because, by reason of the intermixture with other logs, the plaintiffs failed to identify their own.

The court has no power to assess damages. By the pleadings, the question of defendants’ damages was, at first, put in issue. But by consenting to withdraw the case from the jury, they waived the claim. 24 Pick. 32.

Shepley, C. J.,

orally.—The court has no power to make the assessment. Such matters belong to the jury, to be decided on testimony before them.

No consent has been reserved, that the court shall fix the amount or send the question to a jury. No issue is made up, nor can the court frame one for that purpose. The defendants should have arranged for the damages at an earlier stage. They might have apprized the court that they desired an assessment of damages, so that the judgment should not have been entered, till the assessment was had.

Of the merits of the claim, we'express no opinion. As an individual I consider damages in such a case recoverable in a suit upon the replevin bond. *Motion overruled.*
# C_2015146EN.01001501.xml

| 4.5.2015 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 146/15 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

4.5.2015

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 146/15

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Amministrativo per la Sardegna (Italy) lodged on 12 February 2015 — Mario Melis and Others v Comune di Loiri Porto San Paolo, Provincia di Olbia Tempio

(Case C-67/15)

(2015/C 146/23)

Language of the case: Italian

Referring court

Referring court

Tribunale Amministrativo per la Sardegna

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Mario Melis, Tavolara Beach Sas, Dionigi Piredda, Claudio Del Giudice for Sib Gallura

Applicants:

Defendants: Comune di Loiri Porto San Paolo, Provincia di Olbia Tempio

Defendants:

Questions referred

Questions referred

| 1. | Do the principles of freedom of establishment, non-discrimination and safeguarding competition, as laid down, respectively, in Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and 106 TFEU, preclude national legislation under which the period of validity of concessions of economically significant State-owned maritime property is repeatedly extended through a succession of legislative acts? |
| --- | --- |

1.

Do the principles of freedom of establishment, non-discrimination and safeguarding competition, as laid down, respectively, in Articles 49 TFEU, 56 TFEU and 106 TFEU, preclude national legislation under which the period of validity of concessions of economically significant State-owned maritime property is repeatedly extended through a succession of legislative acts?

| 2. | Does Article 12 of Directive 2006/123 (1) preclude a national provision, such as Article 1(18) of Decree Law No 194 of 30 December 2009, converted into law by Law No 25 of 26 February 2010, as amended and supplemented, which permits the automatic extension of existing concessions of State-owned maritime property for tourist and leisure-oriented business activities to 31 December 2015, or to 31 December 2020, pursuant to Article 34k of Decree Law No 179 of 18 October 2012, inserted by Article 1(1) of Law No 221 of 17 December 2012 converting the aforesaid decree law into law? |
| --- | --- |

2.

Does Article 12 of Directive 2006/123 (1) preclude a national provision, such as Article 1(18) of Decree Law No 194 of 30 December 2009, converted into law by Law No 25 of 26 February 2010, as amended and supplemented, which permits the automatic extension of existing concessions of State-owned maritime property for tourist and leisure-oriented business activities to 31 December 2015, or to 31 December 2020, pursuant to Article 34k of Decree Law No 179 of 18 October 2012, inserted by Article 1(1) of Law No 221 of 17 December 2012 converting the aforesaid decree law into law?

1

---

(1)  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (OJ 2006 L 376, p. 36).

1

---
#### White *& al. versus*Sanders *& al.*

If one wrongfully sell the plaintiffs goods, the receipt of money from Mm by the plaintiff, on account of such goods, would not be a ratification of the sale, provided the plaintiff -would have had a right, *without notifying*the sale, to receive the money.

Exceptions. Trover for a lot of goods.

In 1848, the plaintiffs consigned the goods to one James Getchell, with private verbal orders to sell at retail and for cash only. Before the delivery of the goods to him, Getchell paid the plaintiffs $35 toward them, and promised $15 more, but did not pay it. He gave what was intended for security, by an absolute deed of a store. After retailing fifteen dollars worth of the goods, he sold all the residue to the defendants, at the invoice prices, taking in payment fifty dollars in cash, a horse, wagon and harness, and the defendants’ notes at six and nine months for the balance. He exhibited the plaintiffs’ invoice to the defendants, and receipted his bill of sale to de*189fendants, as agent for plaintiffs. After plaintiffs knew of the sale, they received of Getchell some store furniture, which they immediately sold, and also $13,55 in money, but whether it was a part of the $50 received of defendant, was not shown. The plaintiffs also received about $25 for the rent of the store.

At the time of purchasing, the defendants knew of the private instructions to Getchell to sell for cash only. This action was brought after a demand upon the defendants, of “ the goods which they purchased of James Getchell.”

Shepley, C. J., presiding, instructed the jury that the demand was sufficient, if they were satisfied that defendants purchased the goods of Getchell, and took a bill of them.

The counsel for the defendants requested the Judge to instruct the jury, that if they believed that plaintiffs, since their knowledge of the sale to defendants, had accepted money, property, or security from the agent on account of the goods sold, this might be regarded as a ratification of the sale to defendants, notwithstanding the agent exceeded his authority in making it.

The Judge declined giving said instructions, but did instruct the jury that, if the plaintiffs received of Getchell, after he sold the goods to the defendant, money, or other property, which they would not be entitled to receive unless the sale was regarded as valid, the sale would thereby be ratified *;*but if they would be entitled to' receive the same from Getchell, if the sale were regarded as unauthorized, the sale would not thereby be ratified.

To the instructions and rulings the defendants except, after verdict against them.

Tenney, J.,

orally.—The instruction as to the demand was correct.

The defendants’ counsel requested certain instructions. But the mere knowledge by the plaintiffs of the sale to the defendants, and their receipt from Getchell of money on account of the goods, would not necessarily be a ratification. The modi*190fication of requested instruction was rightfully made by the Judge. *Exceptions overruled.*
# C_2017382EN.01001101.xml

| 13.11.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 382/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

13.11.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 382/11

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 14 September 2017 (request for a preliminary ruling from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) (United Kingdom) — Trustees of the P Panayi Accumulation & Maintenance Settlements v Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

(Case C-646/15) (1)

1

((Reference for a preliminary ruling - Direct taxation - Freedom of establishment - Freedom to provide services - Free movement of capital - Trust - Trustees - Other legal persons - Meaning - Tax on gains in value of assets held in trust by reason of the trustees’ place of residence for tax purposes being transferred to another Member State - Determination of the amount of tax due at the time of that transfer - Tax payable immediately - Justification - Proportionality))

(2017/C 382/12)

Language of the case: English

Referring court

Referring court

First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicant: Trustees of the P Panayi Accumulation & Maintenance Settlements

Applicant:

Defendant: Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

Defendant:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The provisions of the FEU Treaty relating to freedom of establishment preclude, in circumstances, such as those in the main proceedings, where the trustees, under national law, are treated as a single and continuing body of persons, distinct from the persons who may from time to time be the trustees, legislation of a Member State, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides for the taxation of unrealised gains in value of assets held in trust when the majority of the trustees transfer their residence to another Member State, but fails to permit payment of the tax payable to be deferred.

---

(1)  OJ C 48, 8.2.2016.

1

---
**EXHIBIT
      31.3**




**Certification
      of Chief Executive Officer**


**pursuant
      to Rules 13a-14(a) or 15d-14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
      1934,**


**as
      adopted pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
      2002**





I,
      P.
      Howard Edelstein, Chief Executive Officer and President of NYFIX, Inc., certify
      that:




1.
      I have
      reviewed this Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-Q/A of NYFIX, Inc.;




2.
      Based
      on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material
      fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made,
      in
      light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading
      with respect to the period covered by this report.






Dated:
      August 20, 2008


/s/
                P. Howard EdelsteinP.
                Howard EdelsteinPresident
                and Chief Executive Officer