Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 02A04-1704-CR-783 | September 28, 2017 Page 1 of 7

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David L. Joley

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Dori J. West,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

September 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

02A04-1704-CR-783

Appeal from the Allen Superior 

Court

The Honorable Frances Gull, 

Judge

The Honorable Jason Custer, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

02D04-1610-CM-3878

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] Dori J. West appeals from her conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting 

law enforcement. She raises a number of claims on appeal, of which we find 

the following dispositive: Did the State present sufficient evidence to support 

the conviction?

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] During the summer and fall of 2014, the Fort Wayne Police Department and 

the Allen County Drug Task Force were investigating a major drug ring 

involving the sale of synthetic drugs. The investigation included, among other 

things, a number of controlled drug buys in or around West’s neighborhood. 

On September 16, 2014, West’s eighteen-year-old son Brandon Bermingham 

delivered 1.55 grams of spice to a confidential informant. This transaction took 

place on the sidewalk in front of West’s home.

[4] On October 2, 2014, police sought and obtained search warrants for eight 

homes involved in the investigation. No-knock warrants were authorized with 

respect to most of these homes, including West’s home where Bermingham was 

the target. At about 6:10 a.m. on October 6, 2014, Fort Wayne Police Officer 

Kevin Zelt, commander of the Emergency Services Team (EST),1 along with 

ten other EST officers, executed the warrant at West’s home. The officers were 

 

1 The EST is a special operation team commonly referred to as SWAT.
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in police tactical gear and most were armed with shotguns or submachine guns. 

Officer Eric Krull, however, was armed with a non-lethal weapon called a 40-

millimeter foam baton launcher.

[5] As the EST encircled the property and prepared for entry, all was seemingly 

quiet inside West’s home. Her eleven-year-old son was showering for school 

while she cooked breakfast. Her fiancé, Craig Cox, was asleep in a bedroom 

just off of the kitchen with West’s two-year-old grandson. Cox’s young teenage 

daughters were in the living room with their friend, who often came for 

breakfast before school. Bermingham was upstairs asleep. 

[6] Just before the EST was about to force entry, Cox’s thirteen-year-old daughter 

heard something outside and opened the front door. Upon seeing the armed 

individuals outside in the dark, she quickly closed the door and ran for West, 

who emerged from the kitchen. The officer assigned to the battering ram then 

forced the door open into the living room and shouted: “Police! We have a 

warrant! We’re coming in!” Transcript Vol. 1 at 157. At the same time, officers 

broke through the window into the living room. The next several seconds were 

chaotic, as multiple officers shouted commands for the occupants to come out.

[7] West was standing in the hallway between the kitchen and the living room. She 

looked at the EST officers and then turned back toward the kitchen in an effort 

to reach her grandson still sleeping in the bedroom. Officer Krull observed 

West walking toward the dark bedroom and fired a foam baton at her. This 

occurred within about twenty seconds of entry by the EST. West fell to the 
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ground and then quickly exited the home without incident. The three girls and 

Cox also exited and were detained outside. Thereafter, officers went inside and 

removed the two-year-old and eleven-year-old boys, as well as Bermingham.

[8] On November 10, 2014, the State charged West with Class A misdemeanor 

resisting law enforcement by fleeing. After numerous delays and continuances, 

the case was dismissed on July 15, 2016, by motion of the State. Thereafter, on 

October 4, 2016, the State refiled the same charge under a new cause number. 

West filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Ind. Criminal Rule 4(C) on 

February 22, 2017. The trial court denied the motion and the case was tried 

before a jury on March 16, 2017. The jury found West guilty as charged, and 

the trial court subsequently sentenced her to 365 days in jail, with 305 days 

suspended. 

Discussion & Decision

[9] On appeal, West presents a number of colorable claims, each of which were 

preserved below. These include a Crim. Rule 4(C) issue, a challenge to the noknock warrant and the execution of the warrant, an issue regarding the 

exclusion of evidence, and a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Because we find 

the sufficiency claim dispositive, we do not reach the other issues.

[10] When we consider a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither 

reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of the witnesses. Suggs v. State, 

51 N.E.3d 1190, 1193 (Ind. 2016). Instead, we consider only the evidence and 

reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Id. We will affirm the conviction 
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if there is probative evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

[11] Resisting law enforcement, as charged in this case, is defined as “knowingly or 

intentionally...flee[ing] from a law enforcement officer after the officer has, by 

visible or audible means...identified himself or herself and ordered the person 

to stop”. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). West argues that the officers never 

ordered her to stop and that she was not fleeing from law enforcement when 

she walked toward the bedroom to protect her two-year-old grandson.

[12] There is no statutory definition of criminal flight in this context. See Cowans v. 

State, 53 N.E.3d 540, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). This court, however, has 

indicated that flight in the context of the resisting statute “should be understood 

to mean a knowing attempt to escape law enforcement when the defendant is 

aware that a law enforcement officer has ordered him to stop or remain in place 

once there.” Id. (quoting Wellman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1998)). 

[13] The State argues that West’s desire to bring her grandson out of the bedroom as 

the home was being raided by police does not mean that she did not flee after 

being told to stop. Ignoring Cowans, the State baldly asserts: “The reason why 

Defendant turned the other way is irrelevant from the point of view of the 

statute, which, on its face, provides no exceptions for noncompliance with a 
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police officer’s orders.”2 Appellant’s Brief at 36. On the contrary, West’s intent 

when walking away from the officers was relevant to a determination of guilt. 

See Cowans, 53 N.E.3d at 545 (“a person who drives to a location of greater 

safety for her or the officer, intending only to be in a location of greater safety, 

is not ‘fleeing’ from the police”, as she is not “attempting to ‘avoid arrest,’ or 

‘escape law enforcement,’ or ‘prevent apprehension and punishment’”).

[14] From the evidence admitted at trial, a reasonable jury could conclude that West 

was aware that the individuals who had just breached her home were police 

officers and that they wanted all the occupants, including her, to exit the 

residence. But there is no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could 

conclude that West intended to flee, escape, or even unnecessarily prolong her 

exit from the home. Moreover, in the twenty seconds of chaos during which 

West is alleged to have fled from police by walking toward her grandson’s 

bedroom, there is no evidence that West was ordered to stop. Rather, upon

forcing entry into the home, various officers shouted commands and “instructed 

everyone inside to exit.” Appellee’s Brief at 35. Directing West to exit her home 

was not the same thing as ordering her to stop. See Vanzyll v. State, 978 N.E.2d 

511, 516-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing conviction for resisting law 

 

2 The State similarly argued to the jury: “The fundamental thing for you to decide is did the Defendant know 

the law enforcement officers were law enforcement officers when she decided to walk towards the kitchen.” 

Transcript Vol. 2 at 55.
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enforcement by fleeing where defendant was ordered multiple times to exit his 

home but was never commanded to stop).

[15] Under the facts and circumstances presented in this case, we conclude that the 

State’s evidence was not sufficient to prove that West fled from the officers. 

We, therefore, reverse her conviction for resisting law enforcement and remand 

this case with instructions to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence.

[16] Judgment reversed and remanded.

[17] Baker, J. and Bailey, J., concur.