IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, )

)

)

v. ) Cr. ID. Nos. 2106009228

) 2106009261

)

JARED RYAN, )

)

Defendant. )

Submitted: June 6, 2024

Decided: August 30, 2024

COMMISSIONER’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

THAT DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION 

RELIEF SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED

Nicholas Wynn, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 

Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Alana Farber, Assistant Public Defender, Office of Defense Services, Wilmington, 

Delaware.

Jared Ryan, Howard R. Young Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 9561, Wilmington, 

DE 19809, pro se.

O’CONNOR, Commissioner.
2

This 30th day of August, 2024, upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion for 

Postconviction Relief1and the record in this matter, the following is my Report and 

Recommendation.

BACKGROUND

On or about June 17, 2021, Jared Ryan (“Defendant”) was arrested: (a) by the 

Delaware State Police (“DSP”) for two counts of Rape Fourth Degree;

2

and (b) by 

the New Castle County Police for three counts of Rape Fourth Degree.

3

 In the five 

counts of Rape Fourth Degree, Defendant was alleged to have engaged in sexual 

intercourse with two minor victim(s) who had not reached their sixteenth birthday.

4

 

On June 9, 2023, Defendant pled guilty to two counts of Rape Fourth Degree, 

one count involving each minor victim. In the plea agreement, the State indicated 

it would “cap” its Level V incarceration recommendation at two years Level V; the 

Defendant would be ordered to have no contact with the two minor victims, M.S.

and M.D.; and the Defendant would (a) undergo a mental health evaluation and 

follow recommended treatment, and (b) participate in sex offender counseling and 

1

 Docket Item (“D.I.”) 33. For purposes of this Report and Recommendation, all docket item 

references, unless otherwise expressly noted, relate to Superior Court Criminal Case No. 

2106009261.

2

 See State v. Jared Ryan, Case No. 2106009228.

3

 See State v. Jared Ryan, Case No. 2106009261. 

4

 See 11 Del. C. § 770(a). On October 11, 2021, The New Castle County Grand Jury indicted 

Defendant for both cases. See State v. Jared Ryan, Case No. 2106009228, D.I. 8; State v. Jared 

Ryan, Case No. 2106009261, D.I. 7. 
3

treatment.5 At the conclusion of the plea colloquy, the Court ordered a Presentence 

Investigation.6

On June 7, 2023, Defendant’s counsel filed a sentencing memorandum.7 On 

June 9, 2023, this Court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate term of thirty years 

Level V, suspended after serving four years Level V, followed by probation 

supervision.

8

 Conditions of the sentence included: (a) no contact with the minor 

victims, their families or residences; (b) sex offender registration; (c) provide a DNA 

sample as required by Delaware law; (d) no unsupervised contact with any minor 

under the age of 18; (e) complete a sexual disorders counseling treatment program; 

and (f) undergo a mental health evaluation and follow treatment recommendations.9 

On July 3, 2023, the Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence to the 

Delaware Supreme Court. In the appeal, Defendant argued the Superior Court 

violated his right to effective assistance of counsel when it did not sua sponte

continue his sentencing hearing to “allow defense counsel the opportunity to 

evaluate three belatedly provided victim impact statements,” after his counsel failed 

to request a continuance.10 

5

 D.I. 15, Plea Agreement.

6

 Id. 

7

 D.I. 20. 

8

 D.I. 22, Sentence Order.

9

 Id. 

10 Jared Ryan v. State, 2024 WL 1673648, at *2 (Del. Apr. 18, 2024). 
4

In considering, and ultimately rejecting, Defendant’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim on direct appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court opined:

This Court generally will not consider a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel if it was not first decided on the merits 

below. Instead, we require parties to bring these claims by postconviction motion. The rationale for this rule is driven by our need to 

have a complete record “on the question of counsel's alleged 

incompetency” and by the desire to give counsel “an opportunity to be 

heard [and] the chance to defend [themselves].” Furthermore, even 

where the record is sufficient, a collateral proceeding is preferable to 

plain error review because “[a]n opinion by the [sentencing court] is a 

valuable aid to appellate review for many reasons, not the least of which 

is that in most cases the [sentencing court] is familiar with the 

proceedings and has observed counsel's performance in context, 

firsthand.” This does not mean, however, that ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims are completely prohibited on direct appeal. In the 

unusual case, where “the ineffectiveness is so apparent from the record 

that this Court can fully consider obvious deficiencies in 

representation,” we may, in the interests of justice, reach the merits.

There are no such obvious deficiencies here. To prevail on an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant “must show both 

deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.” The “bare record 

from the [sentencing] proceedings” before us, however, does not 

provide a basis for us to conclude that requesting a continuance was 

required and therefore constitutionally deficient, and that Ryan suffered 

prejudice from the lack of a continuance. Accordingly, Ryan's appeal 

is not ripe for review. He may, of course, still seek proper review of his 

claim by postconviction relief.11

On May 17, 2024, Defendant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief

(“Motion”).

12 In the Motion, Defendant raises one claim: trial counsel provided 

11

 Id. at *3.

12 D.I. 33.
5

ineffective assistance because she “failed to request a continuance of Defendant’s 

sentencing hearing after the State provided false and inflammatory victim impact 

statements to Defense Counsel only minutes prior to the start of the Sentencing 

Hearing.”13 Defendant claimed counsel was “unprepared to receive said victim 

impact statements which were, again, according to counsel’s own admission, rife 

with false and inflammatory allegations against Defendant.”14 Defendant argued if 

counsel had requested a continuance of the sentencing hearing, she “could have 

formulated an adequate defense against those statements.”15 Defendant asserts he 

was prejudiced by counsel’s actions because it “exposed the sentencing court to 

inaccurate information about Defendant’s character and behavior which, in turn, 

infected the sentencing court’s mind to the detriment of defendant.”16 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As Defendant’s lone postconviction claim regards a virtually identical issue 

raised on direct appeal, it is important to provide context into the factual 

circumstances of Defendant’s sentencing, as described by the Delaware Supreme 

Court when it rejected Defendant’s appeal and concluded that Defendant failed to 

13

 Id. at 3-4.

14

 Id. at 4. 

15

 Id. 

16

 Id. 
6

demonstrate that requesting a continuance was either required or constitutionally 

deficient.17 

Justice N. Christopher Griffiths, writing on behalf of the Court, summarized 

the sentencing proceeding as follows: 

The Superior Court held Ryan's sentencing hearing on June 9, 

2023. Just before the hearing started, the State presented the court and 

Ryan's counsel with three victim impact statements written by M.D., 

M.D.'s mother, and M.S.'s mother. At a sidebar conference, Ryan's 

counsel requested that the Court disregard “the untrue portions of the 

victim impact statements[,]” and argued that they contained “new” and 

“unproven” allegations. Counsel did not ask for a continuance to 

review the victim impact statements. The Superior Court told counsel 

that it would disregard anything “that [wa]s not supported by evidence[ 

]” and proceeded with the sentencing hearing. 

The prosecution then presented the victim impact statements. 

The prosecutor read M.D.'s statement and M.S.'s mother's statement to 

the court, while M.D.'s mother read her own statement. During her 

reading, M.D.'s mother asked the Superior Court not to “show leniency 

toward ... Ryan” because he was a “predator” who had “basically 

kidnapped” her daughter “while lying multiple times about her 

[daughter's] whereabouts and manipulating [her] family, the police, and 

[her] about his involvement with her daughter.” She also claimed in her 

statement that Ryan had groomed M.D. as well as “many other 

underaged victims[,]” and expressed her belief that if given the chance, 

he “would do it all over again[.]”

In M.D.'s victim impact statement, she referred to Ryan as a 

“pedophile who manipulates and destroys little girls' lives” and asked 

the court to not “let this happen to another girl.” She stated that 

“[t]here's a story that [she] hear[d] from other females about how 

[Ryan] would go to part[ies][,] pick up young girls, let them drive his 

car, then get oral sex[.]” She also detailed how Ryan had “broke[n] two 

17

 Ryan, 2024 WL 1673648, at *3. 
7

of [her] old phones and put his hands on [her] physically[,] from 

punching [her] to pushing [her] into walls.” 

Through her victim impact statement, M.S.'s mother asked the 

court to impose the “maximum sentence” because Ryan “had chosen to 

be on the wrong side of the law for many years and clearly has no desire 

to rehabilitate.” She wrote that “it was [her] understanding that [Ryan] 

was on probation when he abused [her] daughter” and that “even after 

he was arrested and charged again he has since committed rape on a 

young girl ... while out on bail.”

During the defense's presentation, Ryan's counsel summarized a 

lengthy sentencing memorandum that he submitted to the Superior 

Court. Counsel rebutted some of the factual allegations made in the 

newly introduced victim impact letters—including the allegations that 

Ryan was “on the wrong side of the law for many years” and that there 

“were many underage victims”—while noting that she did not intend to 

“undercut or undermine what the victims went through.” Ryan then 

spoke to the court. During his allocution, Ryan expressed remorse for 

his actions and regret for the effects his actions had on M.D. and M.S. 

He also told the court that he would “do whatever it takes to make sure 

this behavior does not repeat in the future.” He did not expressly 

address all of the accounts and allegations in the victim impact 

statements.18

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues counsel provided ineffective assistance because she “failed 

to request a continuance of Defendant’s sentencing hearing after the State provided 

false and inflammatory victim impact statements only minutes prior to the 

sentencing hearing.”19 For the following reasons, I find that Defendant’s Motion is 

meritless and recommend that it be summarily dismissed. 

18

 Id. at *1-2. 

19

 D.I. 33 at 4. 
8

In the context of sentencing, Delaware judges have broad discretion to 

determine what information to rely on from a presentence report and related 

sources.20 In fact, they are entitled to consider “information pertaining to a 

defendant’s personal history and behavior which is not confined exclusively to 

conduct for which that defendant was convicted,”

21 including “information 

regarding other, unproven crimes.”22 A sentencing court will, however, abuse its 

discretion if it sentences a defendant “on the basis of inaccurate or unreliable 

information.”23 If the Court does not sentence a defendant based on inaccurate or 

unreliable information, appellate review of a sentence generally ends upon 

“determination that the sentence is within statutory limits prescribed by the 

legislature.”24 

In the context of Defendant’s Motion, victim impact statements are authorized 

by Delaware law and provide a victim the opportunity to address the judge at 

sentencing. Specifically, 11 Del. C. § 4331(d) creates the right for the victim of a 

felony offense to submit to the sentencing judge a victim impact statement.25 These 

20 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 843 (Del. 1992) (citing State v. Huey, 505 A.2d 1242 (1986)). 

21

 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d at 842 (quoting Lake v. State, Del. Supr., No. 67, 1984 Horsey, J. 

(Oct. 29, 1984)). 

22

 Id. at 843 (internal citations omitted). 

23

 Id. (internal citations omitted). 

24

 Id., citing Ward v. State, 567 A.2d 1296, 1297 (Del. 1989). 

25 11 Del. C. § 4331(d) provides, in pertinent part: 

(d) Except for those offenses where no victim can be ascertained, a victim impact 

statement shall be presented to the court prior to the sentencing of a convicted 

person, where such person has been convicted of:
9

statements allow the victim an opportunity to personally inform the Court the impact 

the crime may have had on their physical, psychological or economic well-being; 

the seriousness or permanence of any injury; changes in the person’s welfare or 

familial relationships which can reasonably be attributed to the offense(s); and “any 

other information relating to the impact of the offense on the victim or other 

person.”26 And here, there were three victim impact statements presented to the 

court. First, the prosecutor read to the Court a victim impact statement written by 

the minor victim, M.D.. Next, the prosecutor read a victim impact statement written 

by the mother of the other minor victim, M.S.. Finally, the mother of the minor 

victim M.D. read a third victim impact statement, addressing the impact Defendant’s 

crime had on her, her minor daughter, M.D., and her family.

27

 

Defendant argues the victim impact statements “infected the sentencing 

court’s mind to the detriment of the Defendant,” but the Defendant provides no 

specific factual support for his conclusory statements that the victim impact 

statements were unreliable or untrue, or that the sentencing judge relied upon the 

aforementioned victim impact statements in making her sentencing decision.

28 And 

(1) A felony....

26

 See generally 11 Del. C. § 4331(e).

27

 The victim impact statements offered to the Court at sentencing by the mothers of the minor 

victims are specifically contemplated by 11 Del. C. § 4331(f).

28

 See Scannapieco v. State, 2016 WL 3450022, at *3 (Del. May 20, 2016) (“Scannapieco provides 

no support for his conclusory statement that this information was unreliable or that the trial court 

even relied upon it in making its determination”); (also see State v. Drake, 2008 WL 5264880, at 

*2 (Del. Super. Dec. 15, 2008) (“[A] movant must support his or her allegations, including claims 
10

here, the sentencing judge, upon learning that Defendant disputed the veracity of 

some elements of the victim impact statements, explained that she would “disregard 

anything that is not supported by evidence and to which the Defendant has not pled 

guilty.”29 She also further framed her sentencing decision as follows:

I’m sentencing the Defendant on two counts of Rape Fourth 

[Degree]. I am not sentencing on the basis of other pending charges; 

nevertheless, the Court is permitted to take into account conduct 

between the time of the plea of guilty and the time of sentencing in the 

same way the Court would take into account positive conduct that 

would have taken place during that time period. 

So, what I’m considering in addition to what everyone else has 

said is that defendant targeted two young girls roughly the same age, 

one of whom he participated in that child leaving the safety and love of 

her own home and causing her family untold pain and anxiety not even 

knowing where she was. Again, I’m not sentencing on any future 

conduct. Those cases will run their course, and this is what I feel is the 

appropriate sentence for the conduct to which the Defendant has pled 

guilty.30

Under these circumstances, the Defendant has provided insufficient factual 

support for his conclusory claim that the victim impact statements were unreliable 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, with ‘concrete allegations of actual prejudice, or risk summary 

dismissal.’”)).

29

 D.I. 28, Sent. Tr. at 3:16-19. 

30 Id. at 18:12 – 19:6. Before the Defendant entered the plea that is the subject of this Motion, he 

was also arrested and charged with Possession with Intent to Deliver Psilocybin and Possession of 

Marijuana (Case No. 2303002953 - arrest date March 5, 2023); two counts of Non-Compliance 

with Bond Conditions (prohibited contact with a minor female R.S.) (Case No. 2303008842 –

arrest date March 16, 2023); and two counts of Rape Fourth Degree and two counts of NonCompliance with Bond Conditions (prohibited contact with minor female M.D. (the same victim 

noted supra in Case No. 2212001907 – arrest date January 5, 2023)). On October 16, 2023, 

Defendant pled guilty to several offenses from these three pending cases – Possession with Intent 

to Deliver Psilocybin and three counts of Non-Compliance with Bond Conditions. See State v. 

Jared Ryan, Case No. 2303002953, D.I. 10, Plea Agreement.
11

and/or untrue, and he has failed to demonstrate the sentencing judge relied on 

inaccurate or unreliable information when imposing his sentence. Therefore, he

cannot demonstrate prejudice from his counsel’s alleged failure to request a 

continuance of the sentencing hearing to address or rebut contested portions of the 

victim impact statements. Moreover, the judge’s sentence was lawful -- Rape 

Fourth Degree is a Class C violent felony, punishable up to fifteen years Level V.31 

The presumptive prison sentence for a conviction for one count of Rape Fourth 

Degree is up to thirty months Level V.

32

 And here, the Court sentenced Defendant 

for two counts of Rape Fourth Degree, each for fifteen years Level V, suspended 

after serving twenty-four months level V, after noting the Defendant “targeted two 

young girls roughly the same age, one of whom he participated in that child leaving 

the safety and love of her own home and causing her family untold pain and anxiety 

31

 2023 SENTAC Benchbook, p. 41.

32

 Id. The SENTAC guidelines reflect a presumptive sentence of thirty months at Level V for a 

conviction for one count of Rape Fourth Degree, and a presumptive sentence of twenty-two months 

at Level V when a defendant is credited for the mitigating factor of “acceptance of responsibility.” 

To the extent Defendant may claim the presumptive sentence applicable to his sentencing is 

twenty-two months Level V, because he pled guilty and “took full responsibility for his actions” 

(D.I. 28 at 17:9-11), the “mere incantation of some words of regret or acknowledgement does not 

by itself equate to ‘acceptance of responsibility.’” See State v Wynn, 2023 WL 4493622, at *2 

(Del. Super. Aug. 20, 2013). To conclude that a Defendant is entitled to “acceptance of 

responsibility” as a mitigating factor at sentencing, this “court must examine the entire record and 

make its own determination whether Defendant has accepted responsibility for his action.” Id. 

And here, the Judge did not explicitly credit Defendant with acceptance of responsibility as a 

mitigating factor at the sentencing hearing, and the Sentence Order is silent as to any mitigating 

factors. See generally D.I. 22, Sentence Order. As such, the mitigating factor of acceptance of 

responsibility is inapplicable.
12

not even knowing where she was.” Defendant’s sentence was lawful, he has failed 

to establish prejudice, and his postconviction claim is meritless. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the aforestated reasons, I recommend the Motion for Postconviction 

Relief be SUMMARILY DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

/S/ Martin B. O’Connor

Commissioner

oc: Prothonotary

Nicholas Wynn, Deputy Attorney General

Alana Farber, Assistant Public Defender

Jared Ryan (SBI # 00822186)