Filed 9/3/14 In re M.Z. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re M.Z., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. B254121 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. DK00746)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff, Respondent and Crossappellant.

v.
R.P.,
Objector, Appellant and Crossrespondent.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, Stephen Marpet, Commissioner. Affirmed. David A. Hamilton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal for Objector, Appellant and Cross-respondent. John F. Krattli, County Counsel, Daw yn Harrison, Assistant County Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Deputy Count y Counsel for Plaintiff, Resp ondent and Cross-appellant.2 INTRODUCTION

Objector, appellant and cross-respondent R.P. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and dispos ition orders finding his minor daughter, M.Z., a dependent child of the juvenile court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), 1 and removing M.Z. from his custody. Father contends that the juvenile court violated his trial rights and that there is not substantial evid ence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order based on father’s violent con duct toward mother on July 12, 2011, or the dispositional order rem oving M.Z. from father’s custody. On its cross-appeal, plaintiff, res pondent and cross-appellant Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department) contends that the juvenile court erred in dismissing a count under section 300 subdivision (b) rega rding father’s driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On August 29, 2013, three year old M.Z and her family came to the attention of the Department when the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Depa rtment arrested mother for an outstanding methamphetamine possession warrant. Mother admitted she had been using methamphetamine for the past year. She said she had been livin g with the maternal grandparents and denied any presen t or past domestic violence. A September 4, 2013, detention report pr ovided that a childre n’s social worker (CSW) advised father that M.Z. had been deta ined from mother. Fath er said that he had had a relationship with the mother for severa l years until he learned mother “cheated on” him. When M.Z. was about five months old, mother left M.Z. in father’s care, and M.Z. would visit mother about every two weeks.

1 All statutory references are to the We lfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.3 According to the Department’s Septem ber 4, 2013, detention report, father
informed the CSW that on August 1, 2013, he had been ar rested for a DUI; said M.Z. and
father’s two other children were in the ca r when he was arrested; and admitted he consumed about 48 ounces of beer prior to driv ing. Father said th at although he passed all of the field sobriety tests, he failed a breath test; and he will “fight” the “DUI case” because he believed “it was not a legal a rrest.” According to the Department’s September 4, 2013, detention report, during th e DUI incident, father “almost hit a huge truck,” his alcohol level was .09 and .10 percent, and he was driving on a suspended
driver’s license. The detention report also provided that father stated he would smoke medical marijuana “for back, arm and leg pain due to numerous car accidents,” but he had not smoked marijuana since his arrest for DUI earlie r that month. He also admitted that he
and mother were involved in a July 2011 incident of domestic violence. According to the detention report, the mate rnal grandmother stated that M.Z. spent substantial time with father, but he would not be an appropriate caretaker for M.Z. because he had recently been stopped for DU I. M.Z. indicated she knew both mother and father had been arrested. The Department deta ined M.Z. and placed her with the paternal grandparents. On September 4, 2013, the Department filed a section 300 petition alleging M.Z.
was at risk due to mother’s abuse of metham phetamine and father’s DUI incident. Also on September 4, 2013, father filed a statement regarding parentage in which he stated that from May 2010 to the date of M.Z.’s detention, M.Z. had liv ed with him and he provided
her with care for all her basic needs. At the September 4, 2013, detention h earing, the juvenile court ordered M.Z. detained and placed with the pa ternal grandparents. On Sept ember 11, 2013, the juvenile court ordered the Department to assist with setting an appropriate visitation schedule for the parents, to be monitore d by M.Z.’s caregivers. A November 19, 2013, jurisdiction/dispos ition report attached a copy of a notice of a November 19, 2013, “Jurisdiction/Dispos ition Hearing” served on father, stating that4 father “has the right to be present at the hearing, to present evidence, and to be represented by an attorney.” The report provided that mother and father stated they never married, and mother stated that until M.Z. had been detained by the Department in August 2013, mother and father arranged a mutually agreeable visitation schedule for M.Z. Regarding the DUI incident, father st ated that he believe d he was pulled over by the police because he took “ev asive action to avoid hitting a semi-truck.” The peace officer asked him, “Why did you cut that guy o ff?” Father stated he made his displeasure known about that comment, which father beli eved caused the peace officer to believe
father was under the influence of alcohol. Father stated he succe ssfully completed the field sobriety tests, but the peace officer made him repeat the tests and then arrested him. Father was transported to the Sheriff’s Statio n where he took a breathalyzer test. Father said he “found the [breathalyze r test] process to be suspicious .” Father said he did not believe he placed the children at risk of injury on August 1, 2013, and he believed the peace officer only arrested him for a DUI becaus e father’s attitude angered him. Father stated that after the DUI incident, he conti nues to drink alcohol dur ing social occasions.
Mother stated that while sh e lived with father, his daily routine included drinking a 24- ounce container of beer every day or every other day. Father said that he smoked marijuana a “couple of weeks ago,” but he ha d never done so while M.Z. or any of her siblings were in his care. Fath er had a medical marijuana card. According to the Department’s Nove mber 19, 2013, jurisdiction/disposition report, father said there had been one physical altercation between him and mother. It
occurred in 2011 in M.Z.’s presence. Father stated he believed mother was “on something” at the time as she suddenly showed up at his hom e to return his truck after borrowing it. He said mother exited the truck and began scratching the vehicle’s hood and rims with a razor blade, then struck the back window with a baseball bat, shattering the window. Police were called, but no one was arrested. The Department’s jurisdicti on/disposition report stated that mother’s report of the 2011 incident of domestic violence “was ge nerally opposite father’s” report. Mother stated that father was the ag gressor throughout the incident, father threw a shoe at her,5 and the incident was not reso lved until mother called her br other and her brother called
law enforcement. The jurisdiction/disposition report provided that mother said father had been a good father to M.Z. whenever she was in his care, and for the past year, father had custody of M.Z. every other we ekend but whenever father want ed “extra time” with M.Z.
she was fine with it. There were never “hassles” between her and father. In the Department’s November 19, 2013 , jurisdiction/disposition report, the CSW stated that “[f]ather is very involved in each of his three children’s day-to-day routines and activities . . . .” According to the patern al grandfather, the visi ts between M.Z. and her parents were going well. According to the November 19, 2013, jurisdiction/disposition report, father said he was attending parenting classes voluntarily, was no longer in an intimate relationship with mother, and he and mother generally “get along well with one another.” Father said he and mother wanted to regain custody of M.Z. and then address custody and visitation
issues between themselves with out third party assistance. He stated such an arrangement had worked well in the past so there was no r eason he and mother could not do it again. The CSW stated, “Due to the children and th e children’s caregivers ‘being on the go’ almost 24/7, this CSW sees nothing wron g with allowing mother, father, [M.Z.’s] caregivers[,] and [the mother of father’s other children] from making arrangements for the required amount of visits between all the involved parties however they see fit, with [the Department] being kept abreast of stat us of the visits on a regular and frequent
basis.” In the Department’s November 19, 2013, jurisdiction/disposition report,
the CSW worker stated that “this CSW felt fath er wasn’t being entirely truthful regarding the physical altercation between father and mother on 07/12/11 and the actions by father
that led to his arrest for ‘ DUI’ on 08/10/13.” The CSW stated that the police reports of the two incidents confirmed that suspicion. In particular, the domestic violence report described multiple injuries on mother’s body , and blood both on mo ther and at various places on the sidewalk. The CSW noted that “m other had suffered inju ries on her mouth,6 neck, arms, chest and legs,” and “even if mother did provoke father into an altercation of some kind and kept hara ssing him as the confrontation cont inued, 6ft, 245 lb father . . . surely knew that he could inflict serious phys ical harm upon 5’6”, 180lb mother . . . and yet the evidence indicates father chos e to do exactly th at . . . .” The CSW also stated that the police report of father’s DUI incident “paints a far different picture of what occurred th at night” than father’s de scription of the incident. The police report regarding the July 12, 20 11, physical altercation between father
and mother was attached to the November 19, 20 13, jurisdiction/disposition report. The police report stated that mother said on July 12, 2011, she drove father’s vehicle to his house to pick up M.Z. Father was angry that mother did not answer her telephone. They began to argue outside father’s house about mother’s family and mother not answering her telephone. During the argument, mother started to say hello to M.Z. and father became angry because mother wa s not paying attention to him. At father’s direction,
mother reentered the driver’s si de of father’s vehicle. Fath er and M.Z. entered the front passenger seat of the vehicle and M.Z. began jumping on the seat while between mother
and father. Father and mother continued to argue in M.Z.’s presence. During different phases of the altercation, father continually took M.Z. in and out of his vehicle and his house. At one point, M.Z. was in mother’s arms, and father grabbed and pulled her away from mother. Mother at first held M.Z. tight ly, but then let go of her so M.Z. would not be injured. The police report provided th at mother said father pu lled mother angrily by her legs while she was in father’s vehicle, but father’s father, who appeared during the incident along with father’s si ster and friends, separated M.Z .’s parents and then left the scene. Father also pulled mother by her arms and hair. While mother, father and M.Z. were in father’ s vehicle, father twice punche d mother’s face with hi s fist. Mother told the police that she felt blood coming fr om her nose and was spitting blood on the
sidewalk. Father also choked mother, and hit her on the head with keys and on her face with a shoe. As mother started to run away from father and yelled for father’s father, father “caught” mother and began to choke her ag ain. Father’s father yelled at father to7 stop choking mother, and father complied. Fa ther then drove away in his vehicle with M.Z. Photographs were taken of injuries to mother’s mouth, neck, arms, chest and legs, and of apparent blood located on the sidewalk in the front of the residence. M.Z. was present throughout much of the incident and witnessed a large part of the physical
violence between father and mother. The police report of the July 12, 2011, incident stated also that father’s father said as he walked up to the house, he saw moth er and father in the driveway. Mother was “holding a blade” and sitting next to father’s vehicle. Father’s father saw that the vehicle
had scratches and he believed mother vandalized it and that caused the argument. Father wanted to leave “to defuse the argument,” but mother forced herself into the vehicle and
did not allow father to leave. Father tried to remove mother from the vehicle, but father’s father told father to stop, an d told mother she sh ould exit the vehicle. Mother complied.
Several minutes later father’s father saw mo ther and father arguing again, and mother was slapping father. He saw father grab mo ther by the arms to prevent her from slapping him. Father’s father separated mother and fath er, and father left the scene in his vehicle.
Father’s father did not witness fa ther hitting or punching mother. The police report regarding father’s Au gust 1, 2013, DUI incident also was
attached to the November 19 , 2013, jurisdiction/disposition report. According to the police report, a California highway patrol o fficer saw a big rig truck making a lane change, which was almost complete. Father’s vehicle “came up fast on the big rig” and passed the truck using the section of the road di viding the two directions of traffic. The
truck made an evasive turn b ack to the right to avoid colliding with father’s vehicle and sounded its horn. The peace offi cer stopped father’s vehicle. The police report stated that the peace officer approached father’s vehicle and immediately noticed a strong odor of alcoho l and marijuana coming from inside. The peace officer saw three young chil dren in the car, and father sa id they were his children. The peace officer informed father of the reason for the stop, and father stated he thought the truck was going the other way.8 According to the police report, the peace o fficer asked father to exit the vehicle. The peace officer detected a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage and marijuana emitting from father’s breath and person. Father’s ey es were red and wate ry, and his speech was
slurred. The police report stated that father told the peace officer he had not consumed any alcoholic beverages that day, but he smoked ma rijuana earlier that day. The peace officer found that father was driving on a suspended license. Acco rding to the police report, the peace officer asked father to perform a series of field sobriety tests. Father was not able to correctly perform field sobriety tests. Du e to father’s objective signs and symptoms of intoxication and his poor performance on the fiel d sobriety tests, the peace officer formed the opinion that father was driv ing with a suspended license while under the influence of
alcohol. The police report stated that the peace officer transported father to the police station for a breathalyzer test, and it was dete rmined father’s blood alcohol concentration was .10 and .09 percent. Father was book ed and the children we re released to the paternal grandmother. A Multidisciplinary Assessment Team (MAT ) report stated that although M.Z. did not report any traumas while sh e lived with mother or father, the paternal grandparents believed M.Z. may have witnessed or experien ced some type of physical aggression in the past. The paternal grandparents stated th at M.Z. had temper ta ntrums, threatened to have mother beat up the paternal grandmother, and talked and screamed in her sleep. The paternal grandmother believed that M.Z. had nightmares once a week. On November 19, 2013, the Department filed a fi rst amended pe tition adding allegations that M.Z. was at risk due to viol ent altercations betwee n mother and father. The Department filed a last minute information for the cour t for the initial jurisdiction hearing scheduled for that day. It stated that concerning the Ju ly 12, 2011, physical
altercation between father a nd mother, father said mother threw a shoe at him which
struck him in the face. He picked up the shoe and threw it at mother, striking her in the face, resulting in mother suffering a bloody nose.9 According to the last minute information for the court, mother told the CSW that on July 12, 2011, she drove to father’s residence because she wanted to take M.Z. to a birthday party. She and father began to ar gue and father struck her on the face with a shoe. Father drove off with M.Z., a nd mother’s brother called the police.
The last minute information for the court stated that “although this incident [of domestic violence] took place over 2 years ago, no charges were filed as a result of what took place that night between mother and father and according to mother and father [the July 2011 incident] was the only time during th eir relationship they e ngaged in a physical
altercation.” The CSW said that nonethele ss father’s physical assault of mother was “especially violent” based mother’s report at the time, her injuri es as documented in photographs the Department attached to its re port, and the blood fou nd on mother and on
the sidewalk.
The last minute information for the court st ated that “the fact [that] father became so explosive for no apparent re ason other than mother wanted to pick up [M.Z.] and take her to a birthday party, continue d his assault of mother for wh at seems to be more than a
few minutes . . . and did so even after at least twice being urged to stop his assault of mother by [M.Z.’s] paternal grandfather, sugg est father had a lot of anger/rage he manages to keep under control much of the tim e, but apparently there are triggers that cause father to completely lo se control of his emotions, ev en when a smal l child ([M.Z.] was not yet 2 yrs. old on 07/12/11) is clearly in harm’s way.” Father told the CSW that he had not undergone counseling. At the November 19, 2013, jurisdiction hearing, the ju venile court dismissed the original petition, stated that the first amende d petition was filed on that day, stated that “[r]eading of the petition as ame nded is waived,” ordered that “the case shall proceed to the existing trial date on 12-1 6-13,” and ordered that “[a]ll pa rties present are ordered to return to court for the next hearing wit hout further order, notice or subpoena.” The Department filed a last minute in formation for the court for a hearing scheduled for December 16, 2013, attaching fa ther’s criminal history, which included
several arrests and one conviction. The crimin al history provided that father was arrested10 in 2001 for assault with a d eadly weapon, in 2 004 for vehicle thef t and possession of a stolen vehicle, twice in 2006 for inflicting co rporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant, in 2008 for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger —for which he was convicted in 2009, and on August 1, 2013, for a DUI. On December 16, 20 13, the juvenile court held an adjudication and disposition hearing. The minute order of that hearing stat es that the juvenile court found that notice of the proceedings had been given to all appr opriate parties as required by law. At the hearing, the juvenile court dismissed the co unts contained in th e first amended petition under section 300, subdivisio n (a) concerning the July 12, 2011, physical altercation between father and mother, and under sectio n 300, subdivision (b) concerning father’s August 1, 2013, DUI incident endangered M.Z. The juvenile court sustained the other allegations contained in the first amended petition. Specif ically, the sustained first amended petition stated, “b-l: [Mother] has a history of illic it drug use and is a current abuser of methamphetamine, which renders th e mother incapable of providing regular care for [M.Z.] On 08/26/2013 and on prior occasions in 2013 , . . . mother was under the influence of illicit drugs while [M.Z.] was in . . . mother’s care and supervision. On 08/29/2013, . . . mother was arrested fo r an outstanding warrant for Possession of
Controlled Substance. Such illic it drug use by the mother e ndangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child at risk of physical harm, damage and danger. [¶] b-3: [Mother] placed [M.Z.] in a detrimental and en dangering situation in that on 08/29/2013, a glass methamphetamine pipe was found in [M .Z.’s] home, within access of [M.Z.] [Mother] allowed an unrela ted adult male, a registered gang member and parolee, to reside in [M.Z.’s] home and have unlimited access to [M.Z .] [¶] b-4: On or about 07/12/2011, and on prior occasions, [mother and fa ther] engaged in a violent altercation in the presence of [M.Z.] On 07/12/2011, . . . fa ther punched . . . mother in
the face three times with . . . fa ther’s fists, causing . . . mo ther to bleed from the nose and mouth. [Father] dragged . . . mother by th e arms. [Father] threw . . . mother’s keys at . . . mother, the keys striking . . . mother in the head. [Father] choked . . . mother. [Father] hit . . . mother in the face with a shoe. Such violent conduct on the part11 of . . . father against . . . mother endangers [M.Z.’s] physical health and safety, and places M.Z.] at risk of physical harm, damage and danger. As to disposition, the juvenile cour t ordered M.Z. removed from mother and father, and provided them with reunification services. Fath er was ordered to submit to weekly random drug and alcohol testing. Th e juvenile court asked father whether he had engaged in a domestic violence pr ogram since the July 2011 inci dent. Father said that he
enrolled in classes “a fe w weeks ago.” The juvenile court ordered father to participate in a 52-week domestic violence class, and in pare nting classes and individual counseling. The juvenile court ordered reasonable monito red visits for the parents at least twice a week for two hours, to be monitored by the fa mily members, with mo ther and father not to visit together. Father timely appeal ed, and the Department cross-appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Waiver of Trial Rights Father contends that the juvenile cour t violated his constitutional due process rights because it did not ensure father knowi ngly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a contested jurisdiction and disposition. We disagree.

1. Background Facts At the December 16, 2013, adjudicati on and disposition hear ing, the following exchange occurred in father’s presence: “[Juvenile court:] [A]re we ready to proceed on the adjudication? [¶] [The Department’s counsel:] Uh—huh. [¶] [Mother’s counsel:] Mother is submitting to the court’s recomme ndation . . . regarding the allegations and submitting on the case plan. [¶] [Juvenile court:] W ith regard to the allegations in the petition, the court is— [¶] [The Department ’s counsel:] We need to mark and admit documents. [¶] [Juvenile court:] Yes.” After photographs of mothe r’s injuries and of the blo od located on the sidewalk taken following the July 2011 incident of domestic violence, and the Department’s12 reports, were marked as exhibits and introduc ed into evidence, the exchange continued as follows: “[Juvenile court:] All right. Those will all be marked and introduced into evidence. And the Department rests? [¶ ] [The Department’s counsel:] Yes. [¶] [Juvenile court:] And an y witnesses, [M.Z.’s counsel]? [¶] [M.Z.’s counsel:] No, Your Honor. [¶] [Juvenile c ourt:] [Mother’s counsel]? [¶ ] [Mother’s counsel:] I am sorry. What was that? [¶] [Juvenile court:] Any witne sses? [¶] [Mother’s counsel:] No, Your Honor. [¶] [Father’s counsel:] No, Your Honor. [¶ ] [Juvenile co urt:] Do you wish to be heard, [the Depart ment’s counsel]? [¶] [The Department’s counsel:] Your Honor, I believe, as counsel indicated, mother is submitting, I guess, on (b)(1) and (b)(3). So the primary issues then are the father. [¶] [Juvenile court:] Yes.” The Department’s counsel then argued that the juvenile court should sustain all three counts alleged in the first amended petition concerning father—the two counts concerning father’s violent conduct toward mo ther during the July 12, 2011, incident of domestic violence, and one count concerning fa ther having driven under the influence of alcohol. As to the counts relating to fathe r’s violent conduct toward mother during the July 12, 2011, incident of domestic violen ce, the Department’s counsel argued that the incident was “very serious,” and father di d not undergo domestic violence counseling. As to the count regarding father’s DUI inci dent, the Department’s counsel argued this incident too was “very serious,” and father’s “story” of what had occurred conflicted with the facts as reported in the police report. M.Z.’s counsel argued that the juvenile court should sustain the count concerning
father’s DUI incident because the incident oc curred recently, the child ren were in the car when the incident occurred, and father’s vers ion of what had occurre d conflicted with the facts as reported in the police report. M.Z .’s counsel argued that the juvenile court should dismiss the counts concerning father’s violent conduct toward mother during the July 12, 2011, incident of domestic violence , because the incident was remote in time, it was the only incident of domestic violence, a nd it does not appear at that time of the hearing that mother and father were residing together or that ther e was a risk of the incident reoccurring.13 Father’s counsel argued, in what is transc ribed in over three pages of the reporter’s transcript of the hearing, that the juve nile court should dismiss all three counts concerning father’s conduct counts alleged in the first amended petition because there was “no nexus between what [was] pled in th e allegations and [any] risk to the child today.” As to the counts relating to fathe r’s violent conduct toward mother during the July 12, 2011, incident of domestic violence, father’s counsel argued that the allegations were “simply an afterthought” by the Department, and the incident was remote in time. As to the count regarding father’s DUI inci dent, father’s counsel argued that it was only one instance of parental misconduct, the de pendency investigator said she was uncertain whether the allegation was sufficient for the judi cial court to find jurisdiction, and father had not been criminally convi cted regarding the incident. After further argument by the Department’s counsel, the juvenile court stated, “In reviewing all of the paperwork, it appears as if the domestic violence incident occurring in July of 2011 was extremely serious. The physical injuries that mother sustained were obvious and pretty severe, and a lot of the co nduct that occurred on that evening occurred
with the child in the car. Th e child was in the car at the time, and the car was off, and their daughter was jumping arou nd in the front seat between the victim [and father] when this incident happened. [¶] I can’t believe for a moment that this child did not and has not sustained extremely emotiona l injuries as a result of seei ng her mother and the father
involved in this kind of conduc t. [¶] I can’t for the life of me after reading this report, viewing these injuries that mo ther sustained and in the pres ence of her child, that this child didn’t sustain some emotional damage.” The juvenile court sustained count b-4 (c oncerning father’s vi olent conduct toward mother during the July 12, 2011, incident of domestic violence), 2 and dismissed from the first amended petition count a-1 (concerning father’s violent conduct toward mother) and

2 The juvenile court also sustained count b-1 (concerning mother’s illicit drug use) and count b-3 (concerning mother’s allowance of a unrelated registered gang member and parolee to reside in M.Z.’s home, and a methamphetamine pipe having been found in M.Z.’s home).14 count b-2 (concerning father’s DUI). The ju venile court found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial danger to M.Z.’s physical and mental well-being, and reasonable efforts had been made to prev ent removal. The juvenile court ordered that M.Z. be removed from her parents’ cu stody. Father’s counsel stated, “Your Honor, on behalf of my client, [father ], based on all of the reasons I previously gave, he is objecting to the counts that th e court sustained and also rem oval.” The juvenile court’s minute order of the jurisdiction and dispositio n hearing states that as to father the “[m]atter is adjudicated.”

2. Analysis “If the parent or guardian denies the alle gations of the petition, the court must hold a contested hearing and determin e whether the allegations in the petition are true.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.684(a ).) “[T]he right to a conteste d hearing contemplates that a parent ‘has the right to te stify and otherwise submit evidence, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and argue his [or her] case.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Josiah S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 403, 417.) The hearing here was contested. The ju venile court admitted into evidence the photographs of mother following the July 2 011 incident of domestic violence incident and the Department’s reports. After father chose not to present any witness testimony, the hearing continued. Father’s counsel, along with counsel for the Department and M.Z., then made extensive ar guments on the three counts re lating to father. Following argument of counsel, the juvenile court dism issed two of the counts regarding father’s conduct, and sustained one of th e counts regarding his conduct. As noted above, “[T]he right to a contested hearing contemplates that a parent . . . argue his [or her] case.’ [Citation.]” ( In re Josiah S., supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 417.) Father characterizes the hearing as a “ Malinda S. hearing,” and states there was a “submission pursuant to” In re Malinda S. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 368. Fath er contends that
when a Malinda S. hearing is held the juvenile cour t is required to advise and take a waiver of a parent’s trial rights. At the ju risdictional hearing in that case, testimony was15 introduced and, over father’s objection, the juvenile court admitted into evidence reports prepared by a so cial worker. ( Id . at pp. 372-373, 375.) The Supreme Court held that hearsay contained in a social worker's report is admissible, provided the social worker is available to be cross-examined on the request of a parent. ( Id . at p. 375, 382-386.) Although in In re Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d 368, the court di scussed that due process includes the right to a trial on the issues rais ed by the petition, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to co mpel the attendance of witnesses ( Id . at pp. 383-384; In re Monique T. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1377), it was in the context of the parent’s right and ability to cross-examine the social worker concerning th e hearsay statements contained in the social worker’s report. In re Malinda S., supra, 51 Cal.3d 368 did not
hold in that case that a juvenile court should have advise d the parents of their trial rights and take their waiver of those rights. In support of father’s contention that the juvenile court was required to advise father of his trial rights and take a waiver of those rights, he cites California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(f)(3), In re Monique T., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, and In re Patricia
T. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 400. Th ese authorities are not applicable. In lieu of a contested hearing, “The parent or guardian may elect to admit the allegations of the petition, plead no contest, or submit the jurisdictional determination to the court based on the information provided to the court and waive further jurisdictional hearing.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.682(e).) 3 California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(f)(3) provides that if a parent so elects, the juvenile court is re quired to find that the parent “has knowingly and intelligently waived the right to a trial on the issues by the court, the right to assert the privilege agains t self-incrimination, and the right to confront
and to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to use the process of the court to compel the

3 California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(e) also provides that a “Waiver of Rights— Juvenile Dependency form (JV-190) may be co mpleted by the parent . . . and counsel and submitted to the court.” The form states, inte r alia, that the parent is “giving up . . . [¶] [the] right to a trial or hearing.” (W aiver of Rights—Juvenile Dependency form (JV190).)16 attendance of witnesses on the parent or guardian ’s behalf[.]” California Rules of Court, rule 5.682(f)(3) is not applicable because fa ther did not “admit the allegations of the petition, plead no contest, or submit the jurisdictional determination to the court based the information provided to the court and waive furthe r jurisdictional hearing.” In In re Monique T. , supra , 2 Cal.App.4th 1372, the mother’s counsel “submit[ted] the matter on the petition with the knowledge that the Court will almost undoubtedly find jurisdiction in this case.” Mother’s counse l stated that she “explained to [mother] and [was] satisfied that [mother] underst[ood] she’s giving up her rights to have other evidence presented an d have a contested matter.” ( Id . at p. 1376.) The court held that the juvenile court committed error in not explaining mother’s trial rights to her and obtain her personal wa iver of those rights, ( id. at p. 1377) but that it was harmless error. ( Id. at pp. 1378-1379.) Unlike here, the mother in In re Monique T. , supra , 2 Cal.App.4th 1372 gave up her rights to “have a contested matter.” There is no indication in that case that the mother engaged in a contested hearing by arguing why the juvenile c ourt should find that there was no jurisdiction. Here, father’s counsel argued extensively that the juvenile court
should dismiss all three counts c oncerning father’s conduct counts. It is not accurate to say that the juvenile court would “almost und oubtedly find jurisdiction in this case” ( id

. at p 1376) as to father’s conduct. Indeed, following father’s argumen t, the juvenile court
dismissed two of the three co unts regarding his conduct.
In In re Patricia T. , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th 400, afte r the Department submitted a report recommending that the juvenile court gr ant reunification serv ices, mother pleaded
no contest at the combined ad judication and dispos itional hearing and initialed a waiver of rights form. ( Id . at p. 403.) There is no indication in that case that the mother engaged in a contested hearing, including argui ng why the juvenile court should grant
reunification services. Followi ng the no-contest plea, the juvenile court rejected the Department’s recommendation and de nied reunification services. ( Id . at p. 403.) On appeal, the mother contended that “she did no t understand that her wa iver of a contested dispositional hearing would result in the denial of reunification services.” ( Id . at p. 402.)17 The court affirmed the juvenile court’s orders , holding that the mother was advised by the waiver form that the j uvenile court could deny re unification services. ( Id . at p. 407.) In
re Patricia T. , supra , 91 Cal.App.4th 400 is not applic able because father here did not plead no contest and a contested hearing was conducted.
Father also contends that we should re verse the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order because the juvenile court never advi sed him of his rights pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(k). Pursuant to that rule, “The court must advise the child, parent, and guardian in section 300 cases . . . of the following rights: [¶] (A) Any right to assert the privilege against self-incriminati on; [¶] (B) The right to confront and crossexamine the persons who prep ared reports or documents submitted to the court by the petitioner and the witnesses called to testify at the hearing; [¶] (C ) The right to use the process of the court to bring in witnesses; a nd [¶] (D) The right to present evidence to the court.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5. 534(k)(1).) Father, however, has not cited any case authority, nor are we aware of any, that hol ds it is reversible error for juvenile court not to advise a parent under California Rules of Court, rule 5.534(k)(1) of the parent’s right to present evidence when the parent’s counsel, in the parent’s presence, decided not to present additional evidence at the jurisdictional and dispositional h earings, argued extensively why jurisdiction should not be fo und based on the conduct of that parent, and argued why the minor should not be removed from parent’s from custody Even if the juvenile court erred in not advising father of his right to present evidence and obtaining a person al waiver of those rights, father has forfeited this contention. Father was represented by coun sel, and neither father nor his counsel objected to the manner in which the juvenile court conducted the hearing. Father was present at the hearing when his counsel said he would not introduce any additional evidence. “A party forfeits th e right to claim error as gr ounds for reversal on appeal
when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court. [Citations.] Forfeiture, also referred to as ‘waiver,’ applies in juven ile dependency litigation and is intended to prevent a party from standing by silently until the conclusion of the proceedings. [Citations.]” ( In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221-222; also, In re Levi U.18 (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 201 [rejecting due process claim not raised below]; see also
In re Seaton (2004) 34 Cal.4th 193, 198 [forfeiture applies to claims of statutory error
and to claims of violation of fundamental constitutional rights].)
Even if father did not forfeit his claim of error, he failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the error. Error in failing to advise a parent of his or her trial rights and to obtain a personal waiver of t hose rights is subject to ha rmless error analysis. ( In re Monique T., supra, 2 Ca1.App.4th at pp. 1377-1378.) The court in In re Monique T.,

supra, 2 Ca1.App.4th 1372, declined to decide which standard applied to determine
harmless error: that of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 ( Chapman ) [harmless beyond a reasonable doubt], or of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Ca1.2d 818 ( Watson ) [reasonable probability of more favorable result]. ( Id . at pp. 1378.) Any error here was
harmless under either the Chapman or Watson standard.
Father was served with a notice of th e November 19, 2013 jurisdiction hearing stating, inter alia, that, “You have the right to be presen t at the hearing, to present evidence, and to be represented by an attorney.” At that No vember 19, 2013, hearing, the juvenile ordered that the parties were to “ret urn to court for the next hearing,” scheduled for December 16, 2013, “without further . . . notice.” The minute order of the December 16, 2013, adjudication and dis position hearing states that th e juvenile court found that notice of the proceedings had been given to all appropriate parties as required by law. At that December 16, 2013, adjudication and dis position hearing, defendant was represented by an attorney. Father makes no claim that hi s attorney did not explain his rights to him or that father did not consent to proceed. Af ter the social worker’s reports were admitted in evidence without objection a nd the Department rested, fath er’s counsel, in father’s presence, stated father ha d no evidence to present. Father contends that he was prejudiced by not having been advised of his trial rights because “he could have proceeded wi th witnesses to show M.Z.’s emotional condition in regards to the July 2011 incident and whet her there was in fact any emotional damage requiring the petition to be found true or M.Z. removed from her father.” Father, however, does not state speci fically how the juvenile court’s failure to19 advise him of his trial right affected the ou tcome. He does not state that had he been properly advised of his trial rights he “would have” called witnesses. He also fails to identify the witnesses he would have called, st ate the witnesses’ likely testimony, or state what other evidence might have been presented.

B. Substantial Evidence
Father contends substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order based on father’s violen t conduct toward mother during the July 12, 2011, incident of domestic violence; or the dispositional order removing M.Z. from father’s custody. Father argues that there is insufficient evidence that father’s violent conduct on July 12, 20 11, placed M.Z. at risk of future harm.

1. Standard of Review “‘In reviewing a challenge to the suffi ciency of the evid ence supporting the jurisdictional findings and dispos ition, we determine if substa ntial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable
inferences from the evid ence to support the findings and or ders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favor able to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are th e province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the eviden ce or exercise independent judgment, but merely
determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘“[T]he [appellate] court must re view the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to de termine whether it discloses substantial
evidence . . . such that a reasona ble trier of fact could find [that the order is appropriate]”’ [Citation.]” ( In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315 , 321 [247 Cal.Rptr. 100].)’ [Citation.]” ( In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)20 2. Jurisdiction The juvenile court found that M.Z. is a dependent child of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) an d sustained count b-1 (concerning mother’s illicit drug use) and count b-3 (c oncerning mother’s allowance of an unrelated registered gang member and parolee to reside in M.Z .’s home, and a methamphetamine pipe having been found in M.Z.’s home). “‘When a depende ncy petition alleges multiple grou nds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s ju risdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over th e minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not cons ider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supp orted by the evidence .’ [Citation.]” ( In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) “‘[A] jurisdicti onal finding good against one parent is good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [him] within one of the statutory definitions of a depe ndent. [Citations.] This accords with the purpose of a de pendency proceeding, which is to protect the child, rather than prosecute the parent.’ [Citations.] The child thus remain s a dependent of the juvenile court.” ( In re X.S. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) Under that line of cases, the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction based on the jurisdictional findings related to mother, regardless of the outcom e on father’s jurisdictional challenges.
We nevertheless have the discretion to hear the appeal as to jurisdiction based on father’s conduct. “[W]e generally will exerci se our discretion and reach the merits of a challenge to any jurisdictional finding when the finding (1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal [citation]; (2) could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings [citations]; or (3) ‘could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction’ [citation].” ( In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762-763.) The finding that father’s violent conduct toward mother during the July 12, 2011,
incident of domestic violence was not only a basis for jurisdiction over M.Z., it was also21 a basis for the dispositional order that fath er challenges on appeal. Thus, although dependency jurisdic tion over M.Z. will remain in place because the findings based on
mother's conduct are uncha llenged, we will review fath er’s appeal on the merits. The juvenile court found that M.Z. is a dependent child of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) and sustained count b- 4, which concerned
father’s violent conduct toward mother on July 12, 2011. Section 300, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent par t: “Any child who comes with in any of the following descriptions is within the ju risdiction of the juvenile cour t which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: [¶] . . . [¶] (b) The child has suffered, or there is a
substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of . . . the failure or inability of the parent or guardian to adequa tely supervise or protect the
child . . . .” “A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires ‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the minor, or a “substantial risk ” of such harm or illness.’ [Citation.] ‘Subdivision (b) m eans what it says. Before c ourts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.’ [Citations.]” ( In re John M. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 410, 418.) Th e Department “has the burden of showing specifically how [the child has] been or will be harmed. ( In re Matthew S

. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318.) “‘[C]ases finding a substantial physical danger tend to fall into two factual patterns. One group involves an identified, specific hazard in the child’s environment— typically an adult with a prov en record of abusiv eness. [Citations.] The second group
involves children of such tende r years that the absence of adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to their physical hea lth and safety. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 767.) A curre nt risk of harm can be shown by evidence of past conduct, if there is a reason to believe the conduct will recur. ( In re
Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1394; In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th22 453, 461-462.) “Juvenile dependency law in general does not require a child to be actually harmed before [the Department] and the courts may interven e. [Citation.]” ( In
re Leticia S. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 378 , 383, fn. 3.) “‘The purpose of dependency proceedings is to prevent risk, not ignore it.’ [Citation.]” ( Jonathan L. v. Superior Court (2008) 165 Cal.App. 4th 1074, 1104.) Father contends that the July 12, 2011 , incident of domestic violence, without more, does not support jurisdiction over M.Z ., reasoning a “single episode of parental misconduct is insufficient to bring the minor w ithin the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.” ( In
re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1023-1024, 1026.) Substantial evidence however supports the juvenile court’s fi nding of jurisdiction over M.Z. “In evaluating risk based upon a single ep isode of endangering conduct, a juvenile
court should consider the nature of the co nduct and all surrounding circumstances. It should also consider the present circumst ances, which might include, among other things, evidence of the parent’s curre nt understanding of and attit ude toward the past conduct that endangered a child, or participation in e ducational programs, or other steps taken, by the parent to address the problematic conduc t in the interim, and probationary support and supervision already being provided through the criminal courts that would help a parent avoid a recurrence of such an incident . The nature and circumstances of a single incident of harmful or potentially harmful cond uct may be sufficient, in a particular case, to establish current risk dependin g upon present circumstances.” ( In re J.N. , supra , 181 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1025-1026; In re John M
., supra , 217 Cal.App.4th at pp. 418-419.) At the time of the July 12, 2011, incident of domestic violence, M.Z. was about one and one-half years old. There was eviden ce that during the incident father became physically violent with mothe r. At one point, father pulle d M.Z. forcibly from mother’s arms. Family members interv ened multiple times, but father and mother continued to fight. Mother sustained substantial injuries, and blood was located on the sidewalk in the
front of father’s residence. M.Z. witnessed a large part of the physical violence between
father and mother.23 The juvenile court found the July 2011 do mestic violence incident between father and mother was “extremely serious” and that mo ther’s injuries were “obvious and pretty severe.” It was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer that M.Z. suffered emotional distress. In addition, father was convicte d in 2009 for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, arrested for domestic violence twice in 2006, and arrested for assault with a deadly weapon in 2001.
Father’s attitude about hi s acts of violence provided further evidence that M.Z. remained at risk. Father did not engage in any counseling or other treatment program to address his violence, except, according to father, having enrolled in domestic violence classes “a few weeks” before the disposition h earing. Father had minimized his incident of domestic violence, stating that mother wa s the instigator and describing his actions as merely responding to mothe r’s aggression. He did not admit to punching or choking mother, and said that he threw a shoe at mother in response to her first throwing the shoe at him, hitting him in the face. The juvenile court did not believe mother’s injuries and the blood on the ground were c onsistent with father’s version of the events. Accordingly,
father did not demonstrate that he understood how his past ac tions placed M.Z. at risk.
He did not seem to have l earned from those actions, or committed himself to behaving differently in the future. Th ere was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order based on father’s violen t conduct toward mother during the July 12, 2011, incident of domestic violence and his reaction to the incident.

3. Disposition As relevant here, section 361, subdivis ion (c) prohibits the juvenile court from removing a child from his or her parents’ cu stody “unless the juvenile court finds clear and convincing evidence [that] . . .: [¶] (1) There is or w ould be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or phys ical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there ar e no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected with out removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.695(d).) “A24 removal order is proper if it is based on proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and proof of a potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate . The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.]” ( In re Diamond H . (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on another point in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.) For the reasons described above regardi ng the juvenile court’s sustaining the petition under section 30 0, subdivision (b) concerning fa ther’s violent conduct toward mother on July 12, 2011, substa ntial evidence showed M.Z. would be at risk of harm if she were released to father. The juvenile co urt described the July 2011 domestic violence incident between father and mother, which oc curred largely in M.Z.’s presence, to be “extremely serious,” with mothe r’s injuries being “obvious a nd pretty severe.” Father
had minimized his incident of domestic violence. Father had a history of being arrested for domestic violence and for committing an assault with a deadly weapon, and father was convicted in 2009 for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger. Father had not completed counseling addressing the underl ying causes of his violent be havior. This evidence is sufficient to support a reasonabl e inference that at the time of the disposition order father still did not fully appreciate the risk his conduc t posed to M.Z. When this evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the disposition order, indul ging all reasonable inferences and resolving all factual conflicts in favor of that order as we are required to do, it supports the juvenile court’s finding th at returning M.Z. to father’s custody would be contrary to M.Z.’s best interests.

C. Dismissal of Count Regarding Father’s DUI In its cross-appeal, the Department cont ends that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s order dismissing the count regarding father’s DUI. There is
no need to reach the merits of the Department’s challeng e on its cross-appeal, however, because the juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction over M.Z. based on illicit drug25 use, her allowance of an unrelated register ed gang member and parolee to reside in M.Z.’s home, and a methamphetamine pipe havi ng been found in M. Z.’s home. We have also affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdic tion order concerning father’s violent conduct
toward mother on July 12, 2011. As noted above, a “‘reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grou nds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.]” ( In re I.J. , supra , 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) “‘[T]h e minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring [the minor] wi thin one of the statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.]’” ( In re X.S. , supra , 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.) The juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding s against both mother and father were sufficient to support the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction over M.Z. The Department has not provided any reasons for addressing the mer its concerning the dismissed count. Both parents are offending parents. There would be no effect on the disposition, and there is no indication the findings could have co nsequences beyond dependency jurisdiction. We therefore elect not to address the propriety of the dismissal of the count regarding father’s DUI.26 DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

MOSK, J.

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

MINK, J. 

 Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superi or Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.