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36-214 PDF 2008

WILDFIRE PREPAREDNESS: AN 

OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS 

WORTH A POUND OF CURE

OVERSIGHT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL PARKS, FORESTS 

AND PUBLIC LANDS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

Tuesday, June 19, 2007

Serial No. 110-30

Printed for the use of the Committee on Natural Resources

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html 

or 

Committee address: http://resourcescommittee.house.gov 

(II)

COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES 

NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Ranking Republican Member

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan 

Eni F.H. Faleomavaega, American Samoa 

Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii 

Solomon P. Ortiz, Texas 

Frank Pallone, Jr., New Jersey 

Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Islands 

Grace F. Napolitano, California 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Rau ́l M. Grijalva, Arizona 

Madeleine Z. Bordallo, Guam 

Jim Costa, California 

Dan Boren, Oklahoma 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

George Miller, California 

Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts 

Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon 

Maurice D. Hinchey, New York 

Patrick J. Kennedy, Rhode Island 

Ron Kind, Wisconsin 

Lois Capps, California 

Jay Inslee, Washington 

Mark Udall, Colorado 

Joe Baca, California 

Hilda L. Solis, California 

Stephanie Herseth Sandlin, South Dakota 

Heath Shuler, North Carolina 

Jim Saxton, New Jersey 

Elton Gallegly, California 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Wayne T. Gilchrest, Maryland 

Chris Cannon, Utah 

Thomas G. Tancredo, Colorado 

Jeff Flake, Arizona 

Stevan Pearce, New Mexico 

Henry E. Brown, Jr., South Carolina 

Luis G. Fortun ̃ o, Puerto Rico 

Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Washington 

Bobby Jindal, Louisiana 

Louie Gohmert, Texas 

Tom Cole, Oklahoma 

Rob Bishop, Utah 

Bill Shuster, Pennsylvania 

Dean Heller, Nevada 

Bill Sali, Idaho 

Doug Lamborn, Colorado 

Mary Fallin, Oklahoma 

Kevin McCarthy, California

James H. Zoia, Chief of Staff 

Jeffrey P. Petrich, Chief Counsel 

Lloyd Jones, Republican Staff Director 

Lisa Pittman, Republican Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL PARKS, FORESTS AND PUBLIC LANDS 

RAU ́ L M. GRIJALVA, Arizona, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah, Ranking Republican Member

Dale E. Kildee, Michigan 

Neil Abercrombie, Hawaii 

Donna M. Christensen, Virgin Islands 

Rush D. Holt, New Jersey 

Dan Boren, Oklahoma 

John P. Sarbanes, Maryland 

Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon 

Maurice D. Hinchey, New York 

Ron Kind, Wisconsin 

Lois Capps, California 

Jay Inslee, Washington 

Mark Udall, Colorado 

Stephanie Herseth Sandlin, South Dakota 

Heath Shuler, North Carolina 

Nick J. Rahall II, West Virginia, ex officio 

John J. Duncan, Jr., Tennessee 

Chris Cannon, Utah 

Thomas G. Tancredo, Colorado 

Jeff Flake, Arizona 

Stevan Pearce, New Mexico 

Henry E. Brown, Jr., South Carolina 

Louie Gohmert, Texas 

Tom Cole, Oklahoma 

Dean Heller, Nevada 

Bill Sali, Idaho 

Doug Lamborn, Colorado 

Kevin McCarthy, California 

Don Young, Alaska, ex officio 

(III)

CONTENTS 

Page

Hearing held on Tuesday, June 19, 2007 .............................................................. 1

Statement of Members: 

Bishop, Hon. Rob, a Representative in Congress from the State of Utah ... 3

Letter to the House Committee on the Budget submitted for the 

record ...................................................................................................... 4

Grijalva, Hon. Rau ́l M., a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Arizona ...................................................................................................... 1

Statement of Witnesses: 

Allred, C. Stephen, Assistant Secretary, Land and Mineral Management, 

U.S. Department of the Interior .................................................................. 6

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 9

Archuleta, Hon. Elizabeth C., Supervisor, Coconino County, Arizona ......... 52

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 54

Daugherty, Dr. Peter J., Private Forest Program Director, Oregon 

Department of Forestry, on behalf of The Society of American 

Foresters ........................................................................................................ 84

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 85

DeBonis, Michael, Southwest Region Director, The Forest Guild, 

Santa Fe, New Mexico ................................................................................. 67

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 69

Farris, Robert, Acting State Forester of Georgia ........................................... 62

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 64

Nazzaro, Robin M., Director, Natural Resources and Environment, 

U.S. Government Accountability Office ...................................................... 14

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 16

Rey, Mark, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment, 

U.S. Department of Agriculture .................................................................. 7

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 9

Rowdabaugh, Kirk, Arizona State Forester, on behalf of The Western 

Governors’ Association and the State of Arizona ....................................... 76

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 78

Tighe, Kathleen S., Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of 

Agriculture ..................................................................................................... 21

Prepared statement of ............................................................................... 23

(1)

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON ‘‘WILDFIRE PREPAREDNESS: AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION IS 

WORTH A POUND OF CURE’’

Tuesday, June 19, 2007

U.S. House of Representatives 

Subcommittee on National Parks, Forests and Public Lands 

Committee on Natural Resources 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in Room 

1324, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Rau ́l M. Grijalva 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Grijalva, Bishop, Kildee, Christensen, 

Holt, Sarbanes, DeFazio, Hinchey, Kind, Inslee, Udall, Shuler, 

Duncan, Tancredo, Pearce, Heller, Sali and Lamborn. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. RAU ́ L M. GRIJALVA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Let me call the Committee on National Parks, 

Forests and Public Lands to order. 

This is an oversight hearing on wildfire preparedness. Let me 

welcome everyone to today’s oversight hearing on wildfire preparedness. I look forward to the testimony from today’s witnesses, 

and to a thoughtful discussion and exchange on what I believe and 

many believe is a very, very important topic. 

This year’s wildland fire season is off to an early start, with several large fires, primarily in the southeastern United States. There 

have been especially large fires in Georgia and Florida. Today we 

will be hearing from Robert Farris, State Forester of Georgia, 

about the fires in his state. 

While the fire season is not quite underway in the West, westerners are bracing for it. It could be a dramatic fire season fueled 

by recent drought and climate change. 

Fire is a necessary ecological process that renews the productivity of fire-adapted ecosystems. However, the impacts of large, 

uncharacteristic fires continue to grow. The old saying about an 

ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure is certainly the case 

with wildland fire. It is critical to have an adequate Federal investment in preventive programs that reduce the threat of wildland fire 

in order to lower the fire suppression costs down the road. 

Unfortunately, the President’s Fiscal Year 2008 budget requests 

include a $96 million cut in wildfire preparedness. This included a 

2

proposed cut in state fire assistance, even though an estimated 85 

percent of the lands in wildland-urban interface are state, private, 

or tribal lands. 

I am happy to join my colleague, Chairman Norm Dicks, in calling this cut to wildfire preparedness irresponsible, and I want to 

thank him for proposing to restore the wildfire preparedness funding in the Interior appropriations bill. 

I also believe that we are being penny-wise and pound-foolish by 

underfunding our budget for forest thinning. Internal agency studies have indicated that the need for investment in forest thinning 

is many times more than the funding requested in the President’s 

budget. We all know that the funding requested in the President’s 

budget falls far short of the target set in the Healthy Forest Restoration Act. 

My concern is that this lack of investment in thinning now just 

leads to higher suppression costs in the future. Computer models 

have indicated this repeatedly; and frankly, I think it is just common sense. And so I also thank Chairman Dicks for proposing to 

raise the funding for hazardous fuel treatment above the President’s current budget request. 

Today we will be hearing from the Government Accountability 

Office and the USDA Inspector General. The GAO has found in two 

separate reports that the Forest Service and the Department of the 

Interior still lack an overall cohesive strategy in dealing with 

wildland fire. Under Secretary Rey told this committee two years 

ago that he would submit such a plan with the Fiscal Year 2007 

budget request. We have yet to receive that plan. 

Even with the progress the agencies have made in this area, the 

GAO says that the agencies have not produced a cohesive strategy 

on wildland fire that they have been called to do. 

The USDA Inspector General has also found that the Forest 

Service lacks a process for assessing the level of risk that communities face from wildland fire. The Inspector General further found 

that the Forest Service does not have the ability to ensure that the 

highest priority fuels reduction projects are being funded first. This 

is a major concern. I see this firsthand in my home state of 

Arizona, where we have many hazardous fuels projects that are already NEPA-approved and ready to go, but awaiting Federal investment. That leaves our community at risk, and frankly is unacceptable. 

Today we are joined by the Arizona State Forester, who can give 

us a good picture of the need for Federal investment in thinning 

projects in Arizona. And Arizona is just one state of many which 

is in a similar predicament. 

I am glad to hear that the Federal land management agencies 

are working to address these problems with a hazardous fuel priority list. I hope that any new process they develop will be transparent to all stakeholders. 

I also look forward to hearing from the witness, Mike DeBonis, 

about the role between wildfire and poverty. A study conducted by 

the University of Oregon found that the rural poor often live in the 

most fire-prone areas, and cannot afford to meet their basic economic needs and still pay for the wildfire protection measures that 

are required. 

3

As a former county supervisor, I know this firsthand about the 

influx of development and wildland-urban interface in the West. 

The newspaper USA Today found that since the year 2000, roughly 

450,000 people have moved to rural western areas at most risk 

from wildfire. Insurance companies in many western states are 

now requiring homeowners to protect their homes from wildfire 

risk, or lose their insurance. 

Today we will be hearing from Supervisor Elizabeth Archuleta 

about the efforts of the National Association of Counties on 

wildland-urban interface fire. 

I look forward to hearing from all our witnesses, and thank those 

who have traveled far to be here today. 

I would now like to recognize our Ranking Member, Mr. Bishop, 

for any opening statement he may have. Sir. 

STATEMENT OF THE HON. ROB BISHOP, A REPRESENTATIVE 

IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF UTAH 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the chance 

at being here. I am extremely appreciative of the Chairman for establishing the dress standard for today’s meeting, and invite any 

of our guests, if you would like to do the same thing, as well. 

I really want to know who actually decided to build the Capitol 

in this swamp. Those of us from—and some people want to spend 

six years sweating out here? It is just amazing. 

So those of us in the west, I hate humidity. I want dry. That is 

all there is to it. All the Jergens in the world is fine, just give me 

dry. 

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having this hearing today 

on wildfire preparedness. It cannot be overstated just how important it is that we work together in a bipartisan manner to find solutions to the growing threat of wildfires in our national forests 

and public lands, and that ever-growing costs to our Federal agencies in dealing with these fires. 

I would like to commend Chairman Rahall and Ranking Member 

Young for their March 14 letter to the House Committee on the 

Budget asking them for additional funding for wildfire suppression. 

And I would ask unanimous consent to submit this letter for the 

record. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Without objection. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, sir. 

[The letter to the House Committee on the Budget follows:]

4


36214.009.eps
5

Mr. BISHOP. It is clear that additional funding is needed for the 

Forest Service and BLM in order for them to combat wildfire. The 

cost of fighting wildfires is skyrocketing: 47 percent of the Forest 

Service budget will go to wildland fire management, which is four 

times what it was a decade ago. 

There really are two issues that beg for answers. First, there is 

the immediate issue that the Forest Service budget is being consumed by wildfires—there is a pun intended there—to be at the 

detriment of other vital programs. 

But the second issue that we must deal with—and Dr. Daugherty 

will provide excellent testimony on this—is the need to implement 

widespread hazardous fuel reduction treatments. This makes sense 

environmentally, and it definitely makes sense economically. 

Our national forests are tinderboxes, and, like the movie Groundhog Day, we continually repeat the same scene every Sunday, every 

summer—the rest of the days of the week, as well—every summer, 

especially for those of us who live out west. 

Hazardous fuel reduction will help save our forests and communities from catastrophic wildfires, and with aggressive implementation the percentage of money the Forest Service and BLM must 

spend on fighting fires will decrease. 

I would like to thank our witnesses for coming. I look forward 

to hearing your testimony. 

I yield back. 


36214.010.eps
6

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much, Mr. Bishop. And let me 

begin with our witnesses, and thank them very much. 

Under Secretary Mark Rey will be our first witness. He is the 

Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment at the 

Department of Agriculture, thank you for being with us, Secretary 

Rey, and I look forward to your testimony. Sir. 

Mr. REY. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, Mr. Allred and I 

divided the material so that it would be actually more efficient if 

he went first, and I will follow him. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Mr. Allred. 

STATEMENT OF C. STEPHEN ALLRED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

LAND AND MINERAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

THE INTERIOR 

Mr. ALLRED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. From 

someone who is a recent transplant from the West, I am finding 

the temperature and the humidity to be a real challenge, as well. 

It is my pleasure to appear here today with Mark, because we 

represent the Department of Agriculture and the Department of 

the Interior. 

As you know, multiple factors contribute to our wildland fires, including weather, fuel types, terrain, location and proximity to our 

biggest challenge, the wildland-urban interface, as you had indicated. Certainly changing temperatures, prolonged drought, expansion of the wildlands-urban interface, continued accumulations of 

biomass, and the substantial increase in what leads me to be very 

concerned are highly flammable invasive species on the rangelands 

are converging to increase the risk of catastrophic loss from our 

wildland fires. 

In combination, these trends present continuing challenges in 

our efforts to decrease the number and the cost of those fire incidents. 

One challenge we face is addressing, as I indicated, wildland fire 

in areas such as the wildland-urban interface, where suppression 

efforts are inherently more expensive. The rate of growth in the 

wildlands-urban interface is triple that outside of that area. We estimate there were some 8.4 million new homes constructed in the 

1990s in this area. 

Another one obviously, as you have indicated, is the accumulation of flammable biomass on public lands, and that continues to 

be a risk for major fires. 

The Departments, both Ag and Interior, worked aggressively to 

reduce the amount of hazardous fuels and restore the health of our 

public lands and rangelands. We have used the authorities that 

were provided to us under the President’s Healthy Forest Initiative 

and the Healthy Forest Restoration Act to expedite those actions. 

In 2006, more than half of the total areas treated were inside the 

wildlands-urban interface. We will continue to emphasize that goal 

to treat approximately another 2 million acres in the wildlandsurban interface in 2007. 

A quick look at what the outlook is for this year. Certainly we 

expect the potential in 2007 to be higher than normal across much 

of the Southwest, California, portions of the Great Basin and 

7

Northern Rockies, and smaller portions of the Northwest, Alaska, 

and the Southeast. Critical conditions certainly continue to be 

drought, the low snow pack, and the warmer-than-normal forecast 

temperatures that we believe will result in early snow melt. These 

conditions have already resulted in burning of over 1.2 million 

acres in the southern area, and more than almost 200,000 acres in 

the eastern area. 

To prepare for these natural conditions anticipated in the 2007 

fire season, the Departments are working to improve the effectiveness of our firefighting resources. Our resources are comparable to 

those available in 2006. Permanent and seasonal firefighters, hot 

shot firefighting crews, smoke jumpers type one and type two, incident management teams, and national incident management organizations are ready to respond. 

D.O.I.’s aviation assets include type-one and type-two helicopters, 

single-engine air tankers and water scoopers on exclusive-use contracts, and additional resources on local or regional contracts or on 

an on-call-as-needed basis. 

As we have already demonstrated this year during fires in the 

Southeast, we leverage our firefighting ability by shifting our firefighters and equipment as the season progresses. Assignments are 

made on anticipated fire starts, actual fire occurrence, fire spread 

and severity, with the help of predicting services. 

The initial attack of the fire is handled by the closest available 

local resources, and continues to be our major emphasis. In the 

event of multiple, simultaneous fires, resources are prioritized and 

allocated by a national multi-agency coordinating group. 

Prioritization ensures firefighting forces are positioned where they 

are needed most. 

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, again, I appreciate 

the opportunity to visit with you, and I would be happy to answer 

any questions at the appropriate time. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. 

Under Secretary Rey, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MARK REY, UNDER SECRETARY, NATURAL 

RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

AGRICULTURE 

Mr. REY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now that Assistant Secretary Allred has talked about the fire season outlook for the year 

and our preparedness efforts, I am going to talk a little bit about 

our fuels treatment efforts and our efforts to contain costs on largeincident fires. 

Today we treat more fuels than ever, and we collaborate with our 

local, state, and tribal partners more effectively than ever. Our focused efforts to remove accumulation of fuels in our forests and 

grasslands is having a positive effect on the land, and is helping 

to reduce wildfire risk to communities. 

The Federal land managing agencies will have treated nearly 25 

million acres of Federal at-risk lands, from 2000 through 2007, including approximately 20 million acres treated through the Hazardous Fuel Reduction programs, and about 5 million acres of landscape restoration, accomplished through other land management 

activities. 

8

At 25 million acres, it is a size and an area roughly the size of 

the State of Ohio. We are treating acres at a rate four times the 

average annual treatments during the 1990s. 

The Department of Agriculture, in cooperation with the Department of the Interior, in collaboration with our non-Federal partners, continue to increase the community protection emphasis of 

the hazardous fuels program. Community wildfire protection plans 

are essential for localities to reduce risk and set priorities. Over 

1100 of these plans, covering 3,000 communities, have been completed nationally. An additional 450 plans are progressing toward 

completion. 

The implementation plan of the 10-year comprehensive strategy 

for fuels treatment was updated and released with the Western 

Governors Association and the Western State Foresters in December of 2006. The goals and guiding principles from the 2001 document are constant, but performance measures and implementation 

tasks have been updated to reflect the progress made toward 

national fire plan goals in the past five years, and to build on our 

successes. 

Also, last fall the Administration released its cohesive fuels strategy, the subject of earlier GAO analyses, to assist with 

prioritization of fuels treatment needs. 

In September 2006, the Office of Inspector General conducted an 

audit report on the implementation to the fuels treatment work 

under the Healthy Forest Initiative. The OIG audit recommended 

that the Forest Service implement a consistent analytical process 

for assessing the level of risk the communities face from wildfire; 

strengthen the prioritization of projects; and improve performance 

measures and reporting standards in order to better communicate 

the outcome of treatments. 

The Forest Service concurred with the five recommendations in 

the report, and developed a series of action steps that are summarized in my testimony. 

Let us talk a bit about cost containment. As you indicated, Mr. 

Chairman, suppression costs have escalated in recent years, as 

wildfire seasons have generally lasted longer and the acreage 

burned has grown. The external factors noted by Mr. Allred also 

influence the number and severity of incidents. 

While safety is our primary concern, our departments do share 

concerns about the cost of fires, and are committed to doing all we 

can to contain these costs. 

The Departments of Agriculture and Interior are taking the issue 

of large-fire cost containment very seriously, and are actively moving forward to implement a number of cost-containment adjustments, both summarized in the testimony for the record, as well as 

in materials that I will submit for the record. 

The comprehensive list of management efficiencies has been developed to guide actions over the short, intermediate, and long 

term, and to produce results with the two departments working together. 

That will conclude my summary of the written statement for the 

record. I would like to submit one additional study for the record, 

because this past month the Brookings Institution released a report entitled, ‘‘Towards a Collaborative Cost Management Strategy: 

9

2006 U.S. Forest Service Large Wildfire Cost Review Recommendations.’’ This report is by an independent panel that assessed agency 

performance on the 20 large fires that burned 1.1 million acres 

across 17 national forests during 2006. 

The panel found that the Forest Service exercised appropriate 

and adequate fiscal diligence in suppressing wildfires during the 

record-breaking 2006 season. The panel report also makes a series 

of recommendations for improvement that the Agency will begin to 

act on immediately. 

I will submit a copy of the complete report for the record of this 

hearing, and be happy to respond to any questions. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you. Without objection, that will be part of 

the testimony.[NOTE: The study has been retained in the Committee’s official files.] 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Rey and Mr. Allred follows:]

Statement of Mark Rey, Under Secretary for Natural Resources and 

Environment, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and C. Stephen Allred, 

Assistant Secretary for Land and Minerals Management, U.S. Department 

of the Interior 

INTRODUCTION 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity 

to testify on wildland fire preparedness for the 2007 fire season and hazardous fuel 

reduction activities. Since the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the Department 

of Agriculture (USDA) work closely together in fire management, the two Departments are providing a joint statement. 

WEATHER, WILDLAND URBAN INTERFACE, AND WOOD 

Multiple factors contribute to wildland fire. These factors include weather, fuel 

type, terrain, location with respect to the wildland urban interface (WUI), and other 

highly valued landscapes, and managerial decisions made before and during fire incidents. In addition, changing temperatures and prolonged drought across many portions of the West and Southeast, an expansion of the WUI and an increase in the 

number of people living in the WUI, continued accumulation of wood fiber, and substantial increases in highly flammable invasive species, such as cheatgrass, are converging to increase the risk of catastrophic loss from wildland fires. In combination, 

these trends present continuing challenges in our efforts to decrease the number 

and cost of fire incidents. 

Over the last few years, we have reported regularly to Congress on these challenges. The 2005 Quadrennial Fire and Fuels Review by DOI and USDA examined 

the growth of the WUI, the area where structures and other human developments 

meet or intermingle with undeveloped wildland. The review found that 8.4 million 

new homes were added to the WUI in the 1990s, representing 60 percent of the new 

homes constructed in the United States. The rate of growth is triple the rate of construction outside of the WUI. Also, the recent Audit Report by the Office of Inspector General ‘‘Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs’’ found that the majority 

of Forest Service large fire suppression costs are directly linked to protecting property in the WUI. These reviews illustrate the challenge of addressing wildland fire 

in land areas such as locations in the WUI where fire suppression is inherently 

more expensive. 

Another challenge is addressing the accumulation of flammable biomass on our 

public lands, a major cause of fire risk. The Departments have worked aggressively 

to reduce the amount of hazardous fuels on Federal lands and restore the health 

of our public forests and rangelands, utilizing the authorities provided under the 

President’s Healthy Forests Initiative and the Healthy Forests Restoration Act to 

expedite action. In 2006, more than half of the total acres treated were inside the 

WUI. We will maintain this emphasis with a goal to treat approximately 2 million 

acres in high-risk wildland urban interface areas through the hazardous fuels reduction program in 2007. 

2007 WILDLAND FIRE SEASON OUTLOOK 

Most of the eastern, central and northwestern U.S. has a normal outlook for significant wildland fire potential in 2007. A portion of the Southwest is predicted to 

have a below-normal wildland fire season. This area includes northeastern New 

10

Mexico, and small parts of southeastern Colorado, western Oklahoma, and northern 

Texas, where it borders New Mexico. Wildland fire potential is expected to be higher 

than normal across much of the Southwest, California, portions of the Great Basin, 

the Northern Rockies, a small portion of the Northwest, Alaska, and the Southeast. 

The amount of precipitation many areas receive in the early summer periods is an 

important factor in the severity of the fire season. 

The critical conditions influencing the 2007 wildland fire outlook are: 

• Drought conditions are expanding and intensifying across large portions of the 

West and Southeast, and drought relief is not expected in these areas through 

the season. 

• Low snow pack, warmer-than-normal forecast temperatures, and early snow 

melt over most of the West will likely dry out timber fuels and could cause an 

early onset of fire season in some areas. 

• Abundant new and carry over fine fuels are expected to green-up and cure 

early, leading to an active and prolonged grassland fire season. 

• Another hotter than normal summer is projected for the West. Depending on 

heat levels and timing of higher temperatures, higher elevation fuels could dry 

quickly and be susceptible to ignitions. 

The fire season is already producing incidents that are evidence of our concern 

about the 2007 fire season. Drought and high temperatures have resulted in the 

burning of over 1.1 million acres in the Southern Area, including areas located in 

the Big Turnaround, Sweat Farm Road, Bugaboo Scrub and Florida Bugaboo fire 

complex in Northern Florida and Southeastern Georgia. More than 161,000 acres 

have burned in the Eastern Area, including the Ham Lake fire in Northern Minnesota and in Canada, which burned for over eighteen days, due to drought conditions and winds. 

WILDLAND FIRE PREPAREDNESS 

To prepare for these natural conditions anticipated in 2007 Fire Season, the 

USDA and DOI are working to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our firefighting resources. New management efforts are allowing for increased mobility of 

firefighting forces and aviation assets. 

Firefighting Forces 

For the 2007 fire season, we have secured firefighting forces—firefighters, equipment, and aircraft—comparable to those available in 2006. As has already been 

demonstrated during the fires in the Southeast, we leverage our firefighting ability 

by shifting our firefighters and equipment as the fire season progresses. Fire managers assign local, regional and national firefighting personnel and equipment based 

on anticipated fire starts, actual fire occurrence, fire spread, and severity with the 

help of information from Predictive Services. 

More than 18,000 firefighters will be available, including permanent and seasonal 

Federal and State employees, crews from Tribal and local governments, contract 

crews, and emergency/temporary hires. This figure includes 92 highly-trained Hotshot firefighting crews and about 400 smokejumpers nationwide. There are 17 Type 

1 national interagency incident management teams (the most experienced and 

skilled teams) available for complex fires or incidents. Thirty-eight Type 2 incident 

management teams are available for geographical or national incidents. 

Initial attack of a fire is handled by the closest available local resource regardless 

of agency jurisdiction. Generally this means that the agency with management jurisdiction and protection responsibility for the location of the fire, such as a national 

forest, Tribal lands, Bureau of Land Management unit, wildlife refuge, or national 

park, will handle initial attack. Often, our partners at the local community or county level are the first to respond. 

Two interagency National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) teams were 

staffed in 2006, and are operational with two seven-member full-time Type I Incident Management Teams ready to respond to wildland fire incidents. The teams are 

headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia and Boise, Idaho and will help wildland fire 

agencies improve future fire management programs. Currently, the Atlanta NIMO 

team is assisting the Florida State incident management team on the Florida Bugaboo fire. Last week, the Boise NIMO team concluded nearly 40 days of assisting 

FEMA in its tornado disaster response operation in Greensburg, Kansas. Both 

teams will be called to assist in wildland fire incidents this season, and when they 

are not on assignments, they will implement the NIMO Implementation Plan, which 

calls for improvements in wildland fire program management in the areas of training, fuels management, cost containment, and leadership development, among 

others. 

11

The National Interagency Coordination Center, located at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise coordinates critical firefighting needs throughout the 

nation. In the event of multiple, simultaneous fires, firefighting resources are 

prioritized and allocated by the National Multi-Agency Coordinating group, composed of national fire directors headquartered at NIFC. Prioritization ensures firefighting forces are positioned where they are needed most. Fire managers dispatch 

and track personnel, equipment, aircraft, vehicles, and supplies through an integrated national system. If conditions become extreme, assistance from the Department of Defense is available under our standing agreements, as well as firefighting 

forces from Canada, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand using established agreements and protocols. 

Aviation 

The wildland firefighting agencies continue to employ a mix of fixed and rotor 

wing aircraft. Key components of our 2007 aviation assets include 16 civilian large 

air tankers on federal contracts, along with 41 Type 1 and Type 2, or heavy and 

medium, helicopters on national use exclusive-use contracts; and 84 Type 2 and 3 

helicopters on local or regional contracts. Additionally, there are nearly 300 callwhen-needed Type 1, 2 and 3 helicopters available for fire management support as 

conditions and activity dictate. 

Although both the large and single-engine air tanker programs have evolved in 

recent years, we are confident that we have appropriate and cost-effective assets in 

place or available to respond to the air support needs in the field. Twenty three Single Engine Air Tankers (SEATs) will be on exclusive-use contracts for the 2007 fire 

season and about 80 available on a call-when-needed basis. Some states and local 

areas also contract their own SEATs. 

In addition, there will be two water-scooper airtankers on exclusive-use contracts 

and an additional one available on a call-when-needed basis for the 2007 fire season. 

Additional water-scooper aircraft will be available through agreements with state 

and county firefighting agencies. As in the past, military C-130 aircraft equipped 

with Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems (MAFFS) will be available to supplement our large air tanker fleet as needed. Six MAFFS are available this year. 

MITIGATING WILDLAND FIRE RISK TO COMMUNITIES AND THE 

IMPACTS OF FIRE ON THE ENVIRONMENT 

We have dangerous fire and fuels conditions in areas in the United States and 

the situation is becoming increasingly complex. However, we now treat more fuels 

than ever, and we collaborate with our local, state and tribal partners more than 

ever before. Our focused effort to remove accumulation of hazardous fuels in our forests and grasslands is having a positive effect on the land and is helping to reduce 

wildland fire risk to communities. 

Some of our specific accomplishments in reducing hazardous fuels include: 

• Despite an unprecedented wildfire suppression workload, the Forest Service and 

DOI improved fuel conditions and ecosystem health on 4 million acres of land 

in 2006, of which 2.6 million acres were treated through hazardous fuels reduction programs and 1.4 million acres of land restoration accomplished through 

other land management activities. 

• The Federal land management agencies will have treated nearly 25 million 

acres from 2000 through 2007, including approximately 20 million acres treated 

through the hazardous fuels reduction programs and about 5 million acres of 

landscape restoration accomplished through other land management activities. 

• In 2006, the Administration treated many overstocked Federal forests. Hazardous fuels treatments resulted in qualitative improvements of at least 

994,000 acres in fire regimes classes 1, 2, or 3 that moved to a better condition 

class. In addition, the Administration has begun measuring the percentage of 

total National Forest System land for which fire risk is reduced through movement to a better condition. The Administration is continuing to work on metrics 

for forest health changes that will help demonstrate the outcomes of projects 

that remove fuels. 

• USDA and DOI, in collaboration with our non-federal partners, continue to increase the community protection emphasis of the hazardous fuels program. 

Community Wildfire Protection Plans are essential for localities to reduce risk 

and set priorities. Over 1100 CWPPS covering 3,000 communities have been 

completed nationally and an additional 450 plans are progressing toward completion. 

• The LANDFIRE project has now been completed for the western third of the 

mainland United States. The data are being used in setting hazardous fuel 

treatment priorities by local field units and regionally, and are used in 

12

managing large, long duration wildfires burning across landscapes. USDA and 

DOI are also testing methods of modeling fire risk with LANDFIRE data to 

help better inform hazardous fuel treatment prioritization. • USDA and DOI are developing methods for effectively allocating fuels reduction 

funds and measuring the effectiveness of those treatments in terms of community risk reduction. The agencies will identify national priorities within the 

fuels program and focus funding on those priorities, develop more effective 

measures of risk reduction through the introduction of systematic risk analysis 

tools for fire hazard analysis and fuels treatment implementation, and strengthen the project criteria for WUI fuels treatments. • The ‘‘Implementation Plan’’ of the ‘‘10 Year Comprehensive Strategy’’ was updated and released in December of 2006. The goals and guiding principles from 

the 2001 document are constant, but performance measures and implementation tasks have been updated to reflect the progress made toward National Fire 

Plan goals in the past five years and build upon our success. 

Collaboration among communities and local Forest Service and DOI agencies’ offices has resulted in highly effective and successful hazardous fuels reduction 

projects. One example is the New Harmony (Utah) Community Fire Plan that called 

for coordinated treatments on forested lands managed by the State of Utah, the Bureau of Land Management, Dixie National Forest and individual property owners. 

Between 2002 and 2004 the agencies and landowners completed fuel treatments 

that reduced fire intensity in the treated areas helping fire fighters to more safely 

protect the community during the 2005 Blue Spring Fire. In another example, the 

use of Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA) authorities enabled federal agencies 

and local communities to quickly begin clean-up and fuels reduction in the wake of 

hurricanes that devastated Gulf Coast communities and surrounding forests in 

2005. The Forest Service and DOI worked closely, using HFRA authorities, to facilitate the National Forests of Mississippi to successfully remove over 1.3 million tons 

of hazardous fuel from over 100,000 acres, salvaging over 240 million board feet of 

timber. Nearly 1000 miles of fuel breaks were constructed and another 500 miles 

will be completed this year to protect homes in the wildland urban interface. 

In this challenging fire season, citizens who live or vacation in fire-prone areas 

must take personal responsibility to protect their individual homes. Valuable information about how to increase their safety and protect their homes and property is 

available through the FIREWISE program. Homeowners can learn how to protect 

their homes with a survivable, cleared space and how to build their houses and 

landscape their yard with fire resistant materials. Information about the FIREWISE 

program can be found at www.firewise.org, sponsored by a consortium of wildland 

fire agencies that includes the Forest Service, the DOI, the National Fire Protection 

Association, and the National Association of State Foresters. 

USDA Office of Inspector General—Progress on Implementation of the Healthy 

Forests Initiative 

In September 2006, the USDA Office of Inspector General, Southeast Region, concluded an Audit Report on the Implementation of the Healthy Forests Initiative. 

The OIG audit recommended that the Forest Service implement a consistent analytical process for assessing the level of risk that communities face from wildfire, 

strengthen its prioritization of projects, and improve performance measures and reporting standards in order to better communicate the outcome of treatments. The 

Forest Service concurred with the five recommendations of the report and developed 

an action response and estimated completion date for each. An update on progress 

includes: 

Æ In August 2006, the Forest Service completed development of the Hazardous 

Fuels Prioritization and Allocation Process—a national methodology to assess 

the risk and consequence of wildfire that prioritizes the allocation of hazardous 

fuels funds to the Regional level. The Forest Service applied the Hazardous 

Fuels Prioritization and Allocation Process framework to assist in the allocation 

of fuels funding in the last quarter of FY 2006 and to allocate hazardous fuels 

funds for FY 2007. DOI is working with Forest Service to adapt the Hazardous 

Fuels Prioritization and Allocation Process to meet BLM’s vegetation and landscapes and will begin a pilot implementation process. 

Æ In December 2006, the Forest Service completed work with the DOI and other 

partners in the Wildland Fire Leadership Council to update the 10-Year Implementation Plan. National performance measures were set and Program Assessment and Rating Tool (PART) measures assess performance based on achievement of desired conditions. 

Æ In December 2006, the Forest Service completed accomplishment reporting with 

additional detail (i.e. acres moved to better condition class) in the FY 2006 

13

Forest Service Performance Accountability Report (PAR). The FY 2007 PAR report will incorporate new outcome measures from the 10-Year Implementation 

Plan and will report accomplishments by Region. Æ In February 2007, the Forest Service changed appropriate annual targets to 

multi-year averages and included emphasis on outcomes rather than outputs in 

the agency FY 2007 Program Direction and future President’s Budgets. All accomplishment and budget documents for FY 2008 and beyond reflect the new 

PART performance measures that demonstrate agency performance by focusing 

on risk reduction and restoration outcomes. Æ Due in July 2007, the Forest Service will refine the Hazardous Fuels 

Prioritization and Allocation Process with updated data sources for the FY 2008 

allocation, develop a methodology to determine outcomes of all activities to 

achieve desired condition (i.e. wildfires), and monitor and update severity mapping through the LANDFIRE. Æ Due in October 2007, and still in progress, the Forest Service will require documentation of Regional methodology as part of General Management Reviews 

with seven Regions to be reviewed in FY 2007 and change the National Fire 

Plan Operations and Reporting System and FACTS databases to incorporate 

geospatial information for all hazardous fuel treatments. 

MANAGING THE COST OF FIGHTING WILDLAND FIRE 

Suppression costs have escalated in recent years, as wildfire seasons have generally lasted longer and the acreage burned has grown. The external factors noted 

earlier in this testimony influence the number and severity of incidents. While safety is our primary concern, our Departments do share concerns about the cost of fires 

and are committed to doing all we can to contain these costs. 

Over the last several years, various studies and assessments dedicated to fire suppression costs have been conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration, the Wildland Fire Leadership Council, the Brookings Institution, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO). As a result of the reviews, more than 300 recommendations have been documented to suggest approaches to trim the costs of 

wildland fire suppression. The agencies have taken these reviews seriously, and the 

overall awareness and personal responsibility for cost-containment among the federal fire agencies has never been more acute. 

In 2006, TriData, a Division of System Planning Corporation, under contract with 

the Forest Service, completed a review and analysis of 22 past cost containment reports and made recommendations regarding those which would yield the greatest 

savings. The Tridata report determined there were 203 unique recommendations directed at improving wildfire suppression cost containment. Of those, the report identified 71 recommendations that represented potentially high to extremely high cost 

savings if implemented. As of August 2006, we have taken or are in the process of 

taking action on 57 of these recommendations. We have not implemented corrective 

actions on the remaining recommendations for various reasons, including that the 

recommendation involves actions beyond agency authority, the action must be deferred due to pending court decisions, or that recommendations were directed at isolated events. Both the Forest Service and DOI are working on a comprehensive report on recommendations for large fire cost reviews. We expect that report to be 

available later this year. 

DOI and USDA are taking the issue of large fire cost containment very seriously 

and are actively moving forward to implement these important changes. The comprehensive list of management efficiencies has been developed to guide action over 

the short, intermediate and long-term and to produce results. The Forest Service 

and DOI are working together in collaboration and our staff is committed to action. 

RECENT STUDIES 

Government Accountability Office—Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal 

Agency Efforts to Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Threats: 

In May 2006, the GAO issued a report entitled, ‘‘Wildland Fire Management: Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland 

Fire Threats.’’ The report reiterated its recommendation to develop a cohesive 

wildland fire management strategy. It also acknowledged the Departments’ progress 

on LANDFIRE and Fire Program Analysis, but urged continued vigilance in ensuring that appropriate data is utilized. In response, we have collaborated with our 

partners on the following: 

• Cohesive Fuels Strategy: USDA and DOI issued a Cohesive Fuels Strategy to 

set forth priorities for fuels reduction projects to guide investments in reducing 

risks of catastrophic wildland fires and enhance strategically placed ‘‘defensible 

space’’ in areas at risk. 

14

• LANDFIRE: USDA and DOI are presently completing an operations and maintenance plan for LANDFIRE. This plan includes provisions for ensuring that 

data is updated and maintained and that a stable organization will be available 

to provide such data for the users. The Wildland Fire Leadership Council will 

be reviewing this plan at its June meeting. Implementation of the plan will 

begin in 2008 as the project is completed and will continue uninterrupted into 

the future. • Fire Program Analysis (FPA): One of the principal functions of the LANDFIRE 

program is to provide data to support Fire Program Analysis (FPA). FPA is on 

schedule, with the prototype expected to be delivered this summer and system 

delivery expected in 2008. FPA will enable managers to better evaluate the effectiveness of alternative fire management strategies in order to meet land 

management goals and objectives. 

As we continue to strive aggressively to contain the costs of wildland fire suppression, our primary goal will continue to be the protection of life, property and resources. We share the GAO’s interest in prioritizing fuels treatment work and increasing accountability for cost containment and have taken many steps forward. 

We are hopeful that GAO and this Subcommittee are able to ascertain from the actions that have been taken and planned, that the agencies indeed have established 

strategies, goals and objectives for reducing costs of large wildfire suppression and 

improving hazardous fuels reduction. We believe that the 10-Year Strategy Implementation Plan, Office of Management and Budget PART Improvement Plan, Forest 

Service Strategic Plan, and new DOI Strategic Plan, along with the Management 

Efficiencies initiatives underway, demonstrate a commitment to constantly improve 

performance, efficiency and accountability. 

Secretary of Agriculture’s Independent Panel—Brookings Institution 

On May 22, 2007 the Brookings Institution released a report ‘‘Towards a Collaborative Cost Management Strategy—2006 U.S. Forest Service Large Wildfire Cost 

Review Recommendations.’’ This report is by an independent panel that assessed 

agency performance on 20 large fires that burned 1.1 million acres across 17 

national forests, five regions and six states that exceeded $10 million in cost. The 

Brookings Institution’s Project Director acted as facilitator of the process and author 

of the report. The purpose was to determine if the agency exercised fiscal due 

diligence in managing specific incident suppression activities. The panel found that 

the Forest Service exercised appropriate and adequate fiscal diligence in suppressing wildfires in the record breaking 2006 season. The panel report also makes 

a series of recommendations for improvement that the agency will begin to act on 

immediately. The report is available at the USDA website http://www.usda.gov/wps/

portal. 

CONCLUSION 

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, we are prepared 

for the 2007 fire season. Where local areas experience severe fire risk, firefighters, 

equipment and teams will be assigned. We have a long-term and complex fuels and 

fire situation that will continue to need to be addressed by communities, tribes, 

states, and federal agencies. We appreciate your continued support and work as we 

move forward on these challenges. We are happy to answer any questions you might 

have. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Let me turn now to Ms. Robin Nazzaro, Director 

of Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability 

Office. 

Ms. Nazzaro, thank you. 

STATEMENT OF ROBIN NAZZARO, DIRECTOR OF NATURAL 

RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. NAZZARO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss Federal 

agencies’ efforts to prepare for and respond to wildland fires effectively 

Increasing wildland fire threats to communities and ecosystems, 

combined with the rising costs of addressing those threats, have 

15

not abated. On average, the acreage burned annually by wildland 

fires from 2000 to 2005 was 70 percent greater than the acreage 

burned annually during the 1990s. 

Appropriations for wildland fire preparation and response, including appropriations for reducing fuels, have also increased substantially over the past decade, totally about $3 billion in recent 

years. 

As Mr. Allred mentioned, a number of factors have contributed 

to more severe fires and corresponding increases in expenditures 

for wildland fire management activities. However, in light of the 

Federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, attention has increasingly focused on ways to contain these 

growing expenditures, and to ensure that agencies’ wildland fire activities are appropriate and carried out in a cost-effective and efficient manner. 

My testimony today is based on several of our previous reports 

and testimonies, which identified critical actions the agencies need 

to complete if they are to effectively prepare for and respond to 

wildland fires. 

First, because a substantial investment and decades of work will 

be required to address wildland fire problems that have been decades in the making, the agencies need to develop a cohesive strategy that addresses the full range of wildland fire management activities. Such a strategy would identify the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding to wildland fires. 

We first recommended in 1999 that such a strategy be developed 

to address the problems of excess fuels and their potential to increase the severity of wildland fires and the cost of suppression. By 

2005, the agencies had yet to develop such a strategy, and we reiterated the need for such a strategy and broadened our recommendations focus to better address the inter-related nature of 

fuel reduction efforts and wildland fire response. 

Further, because the agencies said they would be unable to develop such a strategy until they had completed certain key tasks, 

we recommended that the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining 

these tasks, and the timeframes needed for completing each task 

and the cohesive strategy. 

These tasks include finishing data systems that are needed to 

identify the extent, severity, and location of wildland fire threats 

in our national forests and rangelands; updating local fire management plans to better specify the actions needed to effectively address those threats; and assessing the cost effectiveness and affordability of options for reducing fuels and responding to wildland fire 

problems. 

Although the agencies have made progress on these tasks, they 

have yet to complete the joint tactical plan outlining the critical 

steps, together with the related timeframes that it would take to 

complete a cohesive strategy. 

With respect to the agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire 

costs, as we testified before the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee this past January, their efforts lack several key 

elements fundamental to sound program management, such as 

clearly defining cost containment goals, developing a strategy for 

16

1The four agencies are the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and 

Wildlife Service, and National Park Service. 

achieving the goals, and measuring progress toward achieving 

them. 

For their cost containment efforts to be effective, the agencies 

need to integrate cost containment goals with the other goals of the 

wildland fire program, such as protecting life, resources, and property, and to recognize that trade-offs may be needed to meet desired goals within the context of fiscal constraints. 

Further, because cost containment goals need to be considered in 

relation to the other wildland fire goals, it is important that the 

agencies integrate their cost containment goals within an overall 

cohesive strategy. Our forthcoming report on Federal agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire costs includes more detailed findings 

and recommendations to the agencies to improve their management of their cost containment efforts. This report is expected to 

be released at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Energy 

and Natural Resources, scheduled for June 26, 2007. 

In summary, complex conditions have contributed to increasing 

wildland fire severity. These conditions have been decades in the 

making, and will take decades to resolve. 

In light of the large Federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the Nation and our agencies, it is important that the 

agencies develop an effective and affordable strategy for addressing 

these conditions. 

To make informed decisions, such a cohesive strategy needs to 

identify the long-term options and associated funding for reducing 

excess vegetation and responding to wildland fires. Until a cohesive 

strategy can be developed, it is essential that the agencies create 

a tactical plan for developing this strategy, so Congress understands the steps and timeframes involved and can monitor the 

agencies’ progress. 

Further, without clear program goals and objectives and corresponding performance measures, the agencies lack the tools to be 

able to determine the effectiveness of their cost containment efforts. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be 

pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the 

Subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nazzaro follows:]

Statement of Robin M. Nazzaro, Director, Natural Resources and 

Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the key steps that we believe federal 

wildland fire agencies—the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and 

four agencies 1 within the Department of the Interior (Interior)—eed to complete to 

manage their efforts to prepare for and respond to wildland fires effectively. Increasing wildland fire threats to communities and ecosystems, combined with rising costs 

of addressing those threats—trends that we and others have reported on for many 

years—have not abated. On average, the acreage burned annually by wildland fires 

from 2000 to 2005 was 70 percent greater than the acreage burned annually during 

the 1990s. Appropriations to federal agencies to prepare for and respond to wildland 

fires, including appropriations for reducing fuels, have also increased substantially, 

from an average of $1.1 billion annually from fiscal years 1996 through 2000 to an 

average of more than $2.9 billion annually from Fiscal Years 2001 through 2005 

17

2GAO, Wildland Fire Management: Lack of a Cohesive Strategy Hinders Agencies’ Cost-Containment Efforts, GAO-07-427T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30 2007); Wildland Fire Management: 

Update on Federal Agency Efforts to Develop a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire 

Threats, GAO-06-671R (Washington, D.C.: May 1, 2006); and Wildland Fire Management Important Progress Has Been Made, but Challenges Remain to Completing a Cohesive Strategy, GAO05-147 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005). 3GAO, Western National Forests: A Cohesive Strategy Is Needed to Address Catastrophic 

Wildfire Threats, GAO/RCED-99-65 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 1999). 4GAO-05-147. 

(adjusted for inflation, these appropriations increased from $1.3 billion to $3.1 billion). A number of factors have contributed to more-severe fires and corresponding 

increases in expenditures for wildland fire management activities. These factors include an accumulation of fuels due to past fire suppression policies; severe weather 

and drought in some areas of the country; and growing numbers of homes built in 

or near wildlands, an area known as the wildland-urban interface. In light of the 

federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing the nation, attention has 

increasingly focused on ways to contain these growing expenditures and to ensure 

that federal agencies’ wildland fire activities are appropriate and carried out in a 

cost-effective and efficient manner. 

My testimony today is based on several of our previous reports and testimonies, 

which together discuss key issues we have identified over the last 7 years in federal 

agencies’ management of wildland fire and critical actions the agencies need to complete if they are to effectively manage their efforts to prepare for and respond to 

wildland fires. 2 Specifically, my testimony focuses on the Forest Service and Interior 

agencies’ (1) efforts to develop a long-term, cohesive strategy to reduce fuels and address wildland fire problems and (2) management of their efforts to contain the costs 

of preparing for and responding to wildland fires. 

Summary 

In summary, the Forest Service and Interior agencies need to complete several actions to strengthen their overall management of the wildland fire program. Because 

a substantial investment and decades of work will be required to address wildland 

fire problems that have been decades in the making, the agencies need to develop 

a cohesive strategy that addresses the full range of wildland fire management activities. Such a strategy should identify the available long-term options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding to wildland fires if the 

agencies and the Congress are to make informed decisions about an effective and 

affordable long-term approach for addressing problems that have been decades in 

the making. We first recommended in 1999 that such a strategy be developed to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to increase the severity of 

wildland fires and cost of suppression efforts. 3 By 2005, the agencies had yet to develop such a strategy, and we reiterated the need for a cohesive strategy and broadened our recommendation’s focus to better address the interrelated nature of fuel 

reduction efforts and wildland fire response. Further, because the agencies said they 

would be unable to develop a cohesive strategy until they have completed certain 

key tasks, we recommended that the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining these 

tasks and the time frames needed for completing each task and a cohesive strategy. 4 Although the agencies concurred with our recommendations, as of April 2007, 

a tactical plan had yet to be developed. 

Second, as we testified before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources in January 2007, the steps the Forest Service and Interior agencies have 

taken to date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key elements fundamental 

to sound program management, such as clearly defining cost-containment goals, developing a strategy for achieving those goals, and measuring progress toward 

achieving them. For cost-containment efforts to be effective, the agencies need to integrate cost-containment goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program—

such as protecting life, resources, and property—and to recognize that trade-offs will 

be needed to meet desired goals within the context of fiscal constraints. Further, because cost-containment goals need to be considered in relation to other wildland fire 

program goals, it is important that the agencies integrate cost-containment goals 

within an overall cohesive strategy. Our forthcoming report on federal agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire costs includes more-detailed findings and recommendations to the agencies to improve the management of their cost-containment efforts; 

this report is expected to be released at a hearing before the Senate Committee on 

Energy and Natural Resources scheduled for June 26, 2007. 

18

5The National Fire Plan is a joint interagency effort to respond to wildland fires. Its core comprises several strategic documents, including (1) a September 2000 report from the Secretaries 

of Agriculture and the Interior to the President in response to the wildland fires of 2000, (2) 

congressional direction accompanying substantial new appropriations in Fiscal Year 2001, and 

(3) several approved and draft strategies to implement all or parts of the plan. 6The Wildland Fire Leadership Council is composed of senior Agriculture and Interior officials, including the Agriculture Under Secretary for Natural Resources and Environment; the 

Interior Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management, and Budget; the Interior Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Business Management and Wildland Fire; and the heads of the five federal firefighting agencies. Other members include representatives of the Intertribal Timber Council, the 

National Association of State Foresters, and the Western Governors’ Association. 7GAO/RCED-99-65. 

Background 

Over the past decade, the number of acres burned annually by wildland fires in 

the United States has substantially increased. Federal appropriations to prepare for 

and respond to wildland fires, including appropriations for fuel treatments, have almost tripled. Increases in the size and severity of wildland fires, and in the cost of 

preparing for and responding to them, have led federal agencies to fundamentally 

reexamine their approach to wildland fire management. For decades, federal agencies aggressively suppressed wildland fires and were generally successful in decreasing the number of acres burned. In some parts of the country, however, rather than 

eliminating severe wildland fires, decades of suppression contributed to the disruption of ecological cycles and began to change the structure and composition of forests 

and rangelands, thereby making lands more susceptible to fire.Increasingly, federal 

agencies have recognized the role that fire plays in many ecosystems and the role 

that it could play in the agencies’ management of forests and watersheds. The agencies worked together to develop a federal wildland fire management policy in 1995, 

which for the first time formally recognized the essential role of fire in sustaining 

natural systems; this policy was subsequently reaffirmed and updated in 2001. The 

agencies, in conjunction with Congress, also began developing the National Fire 

Plan in 2000. 5 To align their policies and to ensure a consistent and coordinated 

effort to implement the federal wildland fire policy and National Fire Plan, Agriculture and Interior established the Wildland Fire Leadership Council in 2002. 6 In 

addition to noting the negative effects of past successes in suppressing wildland 

fires, the policy and plan also recognized that continued development in the 

wildland-urban interface has placed more structures at risk from wildland fire at 

the same time that it has increased the complexity and cost of wildland fire suppression. Forest Service and university researchers estimated in 2005 that about 44 

million homes in the lower 48 states are located in the wildland-urban interface. 

To help address these trends, current federal policy directs agencies to consider 

land management objectives—identified in land and fire management plans developed by each local unit, such as a national forest or a Bureau of Land Management 

district—and the structures and resources at risk when determining whether or how 

to suppress a wildland fire. When a fire starts, the land manager at the affected 

local unit is responsible for determining the strategy that will be used to respond 

to the fire. A wide spectrum of strategies is available, some of which can be significantly more costly than others. For example, the agencies may fight fires ignited 

close to communities or other high-value areas more aggressively than fires on remote lands or at sites where fire may provide ecological or fuel-reduction benefits. 

In some cases, the agencies may simply monitor a fire, or take only limited suppression actions, to ensure that the fire continues to pose little threat to important resources, a practice known as ‘‘wildland fire use.’’

Agencies Need a Cohesive Strategy to Address Wildland Fire Problems 

Federal firefighting agencies need a cohesive strategy for reducing fuels and addressing wildland fire issues. Such a strategy should identify the available longterm options and associated funding for reducing excess vegetation and responding 

to wildland fires if the agencies and the Congress are to make informed decisions 

about an effective and affordable long-term approach for addressing problems that 

have been decades in the making. We first recommended in 1999 such a strategy 

be developed to address the problem of excess fuels and their potential to increase 

the severity of wildland fires and cost of suppression efforts. 7 By 2005, the agencies 

had yet to develop such a strategy, and we reiterated the need for a cohesive strategy and broadened our recommendation’s focus to better address the interrelated 

nature of fuel reduction efforts and wildland fire response. The agencies said they 

would be unable to develop a cohesive strategy until they have completed certain 

key tasks. We therefore recommended that the agencies develop a tactical plan outlining these tasks and the time frames needed for completing each task and a coheVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
19

8 A fire regime generally classifies the role that wildland fire plays in a particular ecosystem 

on the basis of certain characteristics, such as the average number of years between fires and 

the typical severity of fire under historic conditions. 9Fire management plans are local plans prepared by individual agency management units 

(such as national forests or wildlife refuges) to define each unit’s program to prepare for and 

manage fires; such plans are important for identifying the fuel reduction, preparedness, suppression, and rehabilitation actions needed at the local level to effectively address wildland fire 

threats. 10For major federal actions that significantly affect the quality of the human environment, 

the National Environmental Policy Act requires all federal agencies to analyze the environmental impact of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). 11 Independent Large Wildfire Cost Panel, chartered by the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Towards a Collaborative Cost Management Strategy: 2006 U.S. Forest Service Large Wildfire Cost 

Review Recommendations (Washington, D.C., May 15, 2007). 

sive strategy. These tasks include (1) finishing data systems that are needed to 

identify the extent, severity, and location of wildland fire threats in our national forests and rangelands; (2) updating local fire management plans to better specify the 

actions needed to effectively address these threats; and (3) assessing the cost-effectiveness and affordability of options for reducing fuels and responding to wildland 

fire problems. 

First, federal firefighting agencies have made progress in developing a system to 

help them better identify and set priorities for lands needing treatment to reduce 

accumulated fuels. Many past studies have identified fuel reduction as important for 

containing wildland fire costs because accumulated fuels can contribute to more-severe and more costly fires. The agencies are developing a geospatial data and modeling system, called LANDFIRE, intended to produce consistent and comprehensive 

maps and data describing vegetation, wildland fuels, and fire regimes across the 

United States. 8 The agencies will be able to use this information to help identify 

fuel accumulations and fire hazards across the nation, help set nationwide priorities 

for fuel-reduction projects, and assist in determining an appropriate response when 

wildland fires do occur. LANDFIRE data are nearly complete for most of the western United States, with data for the remainder of the country scheduled to be completed in 2009. The agencies, however, have not yet finalized their plan for ensuring 

that collected data are routinely updated to reflect changes to fuels, including those 

from landscape-altering events, such as hurricanes, disease, or wildland fires themselves. The agencies expect to submit a plan to the Wildland Fire Leadership Council for approval later this month. 

Second, we reported in 2006 that 95 percent of the agencies’ individual land management units had completed fire management plans in accordance with agency direction issued in 2001. 9 As of January 2007, however, the agencies did not require 

regular updates to ensure that new data (from LANDFIRE, for example) were incorporated into the plans. In addition, in the wake of two court decisions—each holding 

that the Forest Service was required to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) 10 to accompany the relevant fire management plan—the Forest Service decided to withdraw the two plans instead of completing them. It is unclear whether 

the agency would withdraw other fire management plans successfully challenged 

under NEPA; nor is it clear whether or to what extent such agency decisions could 

undermine the interagency policy directing that every burnable acre have a fire 

management plan. Without such plans, however, current agency policy does not 

allow use of the entire range of wildland fire response strategies, including less aggressive, and potentially less costly, strategies. Moreover, in examining 17 fire management plans, a May 2007 review of large wildland fires managed by the Forest 

Service in 2006 identified several shortcomings, including that most of the plans examined did not contain current information on fuel conditions, many did not provide 

sufficient guidance on selecting firefighting strategies, and only 1 discussed issues 

related to suppression costs. 11

Third, over the past several years, the agencies have been developing a Fire Program Analysis (FPA) system, which was proposed and funded to help the agencies 

• determine national budget needs by analyzing budget alternatives at the local 

level—using a common, interagency process for fire management planning and 

budgeting—and aggregating the results; 

• determine the relative costs and benefits for the full scope of fire management 

activities, including potential trade-offs among investments in fuel reduction, 

fire preparedness, and fire suppression activities; and 

• identify, for a given budget level, the most cost-effective mix of personnel and 

equipment to carry out these activities. 

20

We have said for several years—and the agencies have concurred—that FPA is 

critical to helping the agencies contain wildland fire costs and plan and budget effectively. Recent design modifications to the system, however, raise questions about the 

agencies’ ability to fully achieve key FPA goals. A midcourse review of the developing system resulted in the Wildland Fire Leadership Council’s approving in December 2006 modifications to the system’s design. FPA and senior Forest Service 

and Interior officials told us they believed the modifications would allow the agencies to meet the key goals. The officials said they expected to have a prototype developed for the council’s review in June 2007 and to substantially complete the system 

by June 2008. We have yet to systematically review the modifications, but after reviewing agency reports on the modifications and interviewing knowledgeable officials, we have concerns that the modifications may not allow the agencies to meet 

FPA’s key goals. For example, under the redesigned system, local land managers 

will use a different method to analyze and select various budget alternatives, and 

it is unclear whether this method will identify the most cost-effective allocation of 

resources. In addition, it is unclear how the budget alternatives for local units will 

be meaningfully aggregated on a nationwide basis, a key FPA goal. 

Although the agencies have made progress on these three primary tasks, as of 

April 2007, they had yet to complete a joint tactical plan outlining the critical steps, 

together with related time frames, that the agencies would take to complete a cohesive strategy, as we recommended in our 2005 report. We continue to believe that, 

until a cohesive strategy can be developed, it is essential that the agencies create 

a tactical plan for developing this strategy, so Congress understands the steps and 

time frames involved in completing the strategy. 

Lack of Clear Goals or a Strategy Hinders Federal Agencies’ Efforts to 

Contain Wildland Fire Costs 

As we testified before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

in January 2007, the steps the Forest Service and Interior agencies have taken to 

date to contain wildland fire costs lack several key elements fundamental to sound 

program management, such as clearly defining cost-containment goals, developing 

a strategy for achieving those goals, and measuring progress toward achieving them. 

First, the agencies have not clearly articulated the goals of their cost-containment 

efforts. For cost-containment efforts to be effective, the agencies need to integrate 

cost-containment goals with the other goals of the wildland fire program—such as 

protecting life, property, and resources. For example, the agencies have established 

the goal of suppressing wildland fires at minimum cost, considering firefighter and 

public safety and values being protected, but they have not defined criteria by which 

these often-competing objectives are to be weighed. Second, although the agencies 

are undertaking a variety of steps designed to help contain wildland fire costs, the 

agencies have not developed a clear plan for how these efforts fit together or the 

extent to which they will assist in containing costs. Finally, the agencies are developing a statistical model of fire suppression costs that they plan to use to identify 

when the cost for an individual fire may have been excessive. The model compares 

a fire’s cost to the costs of suppressing previous fires with similar characteristics. 

However, such comparisons with previous fires’ costs may not fully consider the potential for managers to select less aggressive—and potentially less costly—suppression strategies. In addition, the model is still under development and may take a 

number of years to fully refine. Without clear program goals and objectives, and corresponding performance measures to evaluate progress, the agencies lack the tools 

to be able to determine the effectiveness of their cost-containment efforts. Our forthcoming report on federal agencies’ efforts to contain wildland fire costs includes 

more-detailed findings and recommendations to the agencies to improve the management of their cost-containment efforts; this report is expected to be released at 

a hearing before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources scheduled 

for June 26, 2007. 

Conclusions 

Complex conditions have contributed to increasing wildland fire severity. These 

conditions have been decades in the making, and will take decades to resolve. The 

agencies must develop an effective and affordable strategy for addressing these conditions in light of the large federal deficit and the long-term fiscal challenges facing 

our nation. To make informed decisions about an effective and affordable long-term 

approach to addressing wildland fire problems, the agencies need to develop a cohesive strategy that identifies the available long-term options and associated funding 

for reducing excess vegetation and responding to wildland fires. Because the agencies cannot develop such a strategy until they complete certain key tasks, we continue to believe that in the interim the agencies must create a tactical plan for deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
21

veloping this strategy so that Congress can monitor the agencies’ progress. While 

the agencies continue to work toward developing a cohesive strategy, they have initiated a number of efforts intended to contain wildland fire costs, but the agencies 

cannot demonstrate the effectiveness of these cost containment efforts, in part because the agencies have no clearly defined cost-containment goals and objectives. 

Without clear goals, the agencies cannot develop consistent standards by which to 

measure their performance. Further, without these goals and objectives, federal 

land and fire managers in the field are more likely to select strategies and tactics 

that favor suppressing fires quickly over those that seek to balance the benefits of 

protecting the resources at risk and the costs of protecting them. Perhaps most important, without a clear vision of what they are trying to achieve and a systematic 

approach for achieving it, the agencies—and Congress and the American people—

have little assurance that their cost-containment efforts will lead to substantial improvement. Moreover, because cost-containment goals should be considered in relation to other wildland fire program goals—such as protecting life, resources, and 

property—the agencies must integrate cost-containment goals within the overall cohesive strategy for responding to wildland fires that we have consistently recommended. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have at 

this time. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. We may now turn to Deputy Inspector General, Department of Agriculture, Ms. Kathleen 

Tighe. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN S. TIGHE, DEPUTY INSPECTOR 

GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE 

Ms. TIGHE. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Grijalva, Ranking Member Bishop, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you 

for inviting the Office of Inspector General to testify today concerning our work on wildfire preparedness issues. 

The Office of Inspector General has conducted substantial audit 

and investigative work pertaining to the Forest Service and its 

vital stewardship role to preserve and protect America’s national 

forests. 

My written statement contains my full testimony, so I just plan 

on highlighting a brief few points. 

One of the most extensive and serious problems related to the 

health of our national forests is the over-accumulation of dead 

vegetation that can fuel fires, as noted by Mr. Allred earlier. The 

increase in the amount of hazardous fuels is the result of factors 

such as extended drought conditions, widespread disease, and insect infestations that have killed or affected large areas of forest, 

and past fire suppression practices that have prevented the natural 

use of wildland fire to reduce the accumulation of hazardous fuels. 

Reducing the buildup of hazardous fuels is crucial to reducing 

the severity and cost of wildfires. The Healthy Forest Initiative was 

launched in August 2002, with one of the primary goals being to 

reduce the threat of wildfire by removing hazardous fuels from 

areas in national forests that constitute the greatest threat of catastrophic fire. 

In September 2006, the Office of Inspector General completed an 

audit that evaluated the Forest Service efforts to implement the 

Healthy Forest Initiative. Our audit produced findings and recommendations on three primary issues that I will highlight for you 

this morning. 

22

The first pertains to the agency’s assessment of risk, determining 

the level of risk that communities face from wildfires. At the time 

of our audit, the Forest Service did not have a consistent analytical 

process to assess the comparative level of risk different communities faced. In order to allocate its resources most effectively, the 

Forest Service needs to be able to identify the level of risk for significant wildfires, and what actual benefit would be achieved by 

conducting specific fuel reduction projects. We recommended that 

the agency develop guidance for assessing risks from wildland fires 

that is applied on a consistent basis among regions, forests, and 

districts. 

The second major finding was that the Forest Service did not 

have the ability to ensure that the highest priority fuel reduction 

projects would be funded first. Because projects were not 

prioritized under uniform national criteria, there was no systematic 

way to allocate funds to the most critical projects. 

Funds were allocated based on a region’s historical funding levels, and targets for numbers of acres to be treated. We recommended that the Forest Service ensure that the process to identify and prioritize the most effective fuel reduction projects can be 

utilized at all levels to ensure funds are distributed according to 

the priority of projects. 

The third major recommendation resulting from our review pertained to the Forest Service’s performance measures and reporting 

standards. The agency’s focus has been on achieving annual targets 

that are measured in number of acres treated. We found that the 

Forest Service’s performance measures and reporting standards did 

not provide adequate information to evaluate the effectiveness of a 

fuel treatment practice. 

We recommended that the Forest Service develop and implement 

a more meaningful and outcome-oriented performance measure, 

such as acres with risks reduced. I am pleased to report that the 

Forest Service, as noted by Under Secretary Rey, agreed with our 

audit findings, and committed to take action on them. 

We note that the Forest Service’s budget justification for Fiscal 

Year 2008 placed an emphasis on measures to identify and treat 

wildfire risks. We appreciate the willingness of Under Secretary 

Rey and Forest Service officials to fully consider and respond to our 

review. The management and staff of the Office of Inspector General have a deep respect for the work done by Forest Service personnel to preserve and protect our national forests. 

Before concluding, I would like to mention that additional oversight work that we will conduct regarding the Healthy Forest Initiative, we plan to conduct a follow-up audit in Fiscal Year 2008. 

Our objective will be to look at the Forest Service implementation 

of our recommendations, and whether its responsive actions have 

been effective. 

This concludes my testimony. Thank you very much for affording 

me the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee, and I would 

be happy to answer questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tighe follows:]

23

Statement of Kathleen S. Tighe, Deputy Inspector General,

Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Agriculture 

Good morning, Chairman Grijalva, Ranking Member Bishop, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the 

Department of Agriculture (USDA) to present our views on wildfire preparedness 

issues. OIG has conducted substantial audit and investigative work pertaining to 

the Forest Service (FS) and its vital stewardship role to preserve and protect America’s national forests. As requested by the Subcommittee, my testimony will present 

the findings and recommendations produced by our review of FS’ implementation 

of the Healthy Forests Initiative (HFI). 

USDA, through FS, is responsible for the management of our Nation’s 155 

national forests and 20 grasslands. These lands cover more than 192 million acres. 

FS officials face significant challenges in their important stewardship activities, for 

it is clear that wildfires on FS lands are becoming larger and more expensive to extinguish and suppress. From fiscal year (FY) 2000 to 2006, FS suppression costs 

averaged $900 million annually and exceeded $1 billion in 4 of those 7 years. In 

some years, FS has had to borrow funds from other programs to pay for its wildfire 

suppression activities, and this has adversely affected FS’ ability to accomplish work 

in other areas. 

FS has estimated that the 73 million acres of the land it manages and 59 million 

acres of privately owned forest land are at high risk of ecologically destructive 

wildland fire. One of the most extensive and serious problems related to the health 

of national forests is the over-accumulation of dead vegetation that can fuel fires. 

The increase in the amount of hazardous fuels is the result of several major factors. 

First, extended drought conditions have significantly increased the amount of 

unhealthy or dead forests and vegetation. Second, widespread disease and insect infestations have killed or affected the health of large areas of national and private 

forestland. Third, past fire suppression practices of the Federal, State, and local governments, private companies, and individuals have prevented the natural use of 

wildland fire (Wildland Fire Use—WFU) to reduce the accumulation of hazardous 

fuels. 

It has been estimated by some FS managers that hazardous fuels are accumulating three times as fast as they can be treated. The accumulation of hazardous 

fuels has contributed to an increasing number of large, intense, and catastrophically 

destructive wildfires. Reducing the buildup of hazardous fuels is crucial to reducing 

the extent, severity, and costs of wildfires. 

The Healthy Forests Initiative (HFI) was launched in August 2002 by President 

Bush to reduce the risks severe wildfires pose to people, communities, and the environment. The HFI includes a number of policy, program, and legislative changes to 

help achieve this. One of the primary goals of the HFI is to reduce the threat of 

wildfire by removing hazardous fuels from areas in national forests that constitute 

the greatest threats of catastrophic fire. Catastrophic fires can destroy hundreds of 

thousands of acres at one time, burn entire communities, destroy watersheds that 

are the source of water for millions of people, and take the lives of community residents and firefighters. These fires can burn with such intensity that they change 

the composition of the landscape and soil for generations. A catastrophic wildfire 

can grow to such an extent that it creates its own weather pattern and becomes 

physically impossible to suppress without the assistance of nature (i.e. significant 

amounts of rain). Already in the 2007 fire season, one fire in Georgia and Florida 

has burned approximately 468,000 acres (731 square miles). This is approximately 

2.4 times larger than the entire land area of New York City or about 12 times that 

of Washington, D.C. 

In September of 2006, OIG completed an audit that evaluated FS efforts to implement the HFI. We focused our audit work on the agency’s hazardous fuels reduction 

program because more than half of FS’ funding under the HFI is allocated for this 

purpose. For FY 2005 and 2006, the FS budget for hazardous fuels reduction was 

approximately $262 million and $281 million, respectively. Our review evaluated the 

methods used by FS to identify, select, and fund fuel reduction projects. We also 

evaluated how the agency reported accomplishments. 

At the time of our review, FS’ identification of and funding for fuel reduction 

projects were determined and performed at the discretion of individual field units, 

after they performed various analyses to identify communities at risk. FS did not 

require the use of a specific set of criteria or analytical process to ensure that the 

identification of projects was consistent nationwide, or to justify the selection of one 

project over another. FS allocated hazardous fuels reduction funds to its regions 

based primarily on historical funding levels and established acres as targets. Regional officials were then responsible for making funding allocations to Forest SuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
24

pervisors and final project allocation decisions were made at the local level. Funds 

were not allocated to the regions based upon identified wildfire risks or those fuel 

reduction projects that would be most effective in reducing that risk. 

Specifically, our audit evaluated FS management controls to (1) determine if the 

hazardous fuels reduction projects that were conducted were cost beneficial, (2) how 

FS identified and prioritized such projects, (3) the agency’s process for allocating 

funds among projects in different regions, and (4) the agency’s process to report hazardous fuels reduction accomplishments. I would like to advise the Subcommittee 

of the primary findings and recommendations from our audit. 

Audit Findings and Recommendations 

Assessment of Risk 

At the time of our audit, we found that FS lacked a consistent analytical process 

for assessing the level of risk that communities faced from wildland fire and determining if a hazardous fuels project would be cost beneficial. FS had not developed 

specific national guidance for weighing the risks against the benefits of fuels treatment and restoration projects. 

In order to allocate resources most effectively, it is important for FS to be able 

to identify which communities and what National Forest System (NFS) resources 

are at risk. FS needs to be able to determine the level of risk for significant and 

destructive wildland fires throughout the NFS and what the potential benefit or 

payback would be from conducting a specific fuels reduction project. While we 

agreed with FS that a traditional cost benefit analysis would be impractical, we concluded that FS could develop a set of criteria to compare the relative degrees of exposure and risk to wildland fire that each community faces. The assessment should 

include a measure of the benefits and/or consequences of selecting one project over 

another for treatment. 

Currently, FS’ nine regions each have different ways of identifying priorities. At 

the time of our audit, FS could not adequately compare hazardous fuels reduction 

projects among regions. This affects the ability to identify, on a national basis, those 

projects that should be funded and completed first. While some areas or communities may be at high risk from wildfires, it may not be effective for FS to spend 

large sums of money on hazardous fuels reduction projects if the nearby communities have not enacted and enforced rigorous building and zoning regulations, otherwise known as ‘‘Firewise’’ regulations. A community’s lack of Firewise regulations 

could significantly reduce the effectiveness of any FS efforts to reduce hazardous 

fuels around the community. FS officials believe that the new LANDFIRE system 

being developed will provide more accurate nationwide data so that they can better 

define and identify areas where fuels treatment would be most cost beneficial. 

In the interim while new systems are being developed, FS needs to develop a 

methodology to evaluate the effectiveness of alternative strategies in meeting the 

agency’s hazardous fuels reduction program goals. Without a sound process for assessing the level of risk that communities face from wildland fire, one that agency 

managers can apply consistently, FS will be unable to identify and prioritize the 

most effective fuel reduction projects. 

Prioritizing and Funding Projects 

FS also did not have the ability to ensure that the highest priority fuels reduction 

projects were funded first. Because projects were not prioritized under uniform, 

national criteria, there was no systematic way to allocate funds to the most critical 

projects. Funds were allocated based upon a region’s historical funding levels and 

targets for number of acres to be treated that were set by FS Headquarters office 

in Washington, D.C. There were no controls in place to prevent funds from being 

allocated to projects in order to achieve targets of acres treated instead of reducing 

the most risk. This could lead to less important projects being funded. 

We recommended that FS develop and implement specific national guidance for 

assessing the risks wildland fires present to residents and communities and determining the comparative value and benefit of fuels treatment/restoration projects. We 

also recommended that FS establish controls to ensure that the process and methodology to identify and prioritize the most effective fuels reduction projects can be utilized at all levels to ensure funds are distributed according to the priority of the 

projects. This process should have uniformity (and comparability) from the local 

level (districts) through to the Headquarters office and across geographic boundaries 

(i.e. among regions). 

Performance Measures and Reporting Standards 

We found that FS’ performance measures and reporting standards did not provide 

adequate information to evaluate the effectiveness of a fuel treatment practice. They 

25

1The fire-regime condition class is an expression of the departure of the current condition 

from the historical fire regime resulting in alterations to the ecosystem. A condition class is 

measured as a 1, 2, or 3, with 3 being the most significant departure from the historical fire 

regime. Activities that cause the departure include fire exclusion, timber harvesting, grazing, 

growth of exotic plant species, insects, and disease. 2OIG Report, ‘‘Forest Service Large Fire Suppression Costs.’’ Report No. 08601-44-SF, November 2006. 

did not communicate to either FS managers or other stakeholders whether the 

treatment of an acre of forest had resulted in changing its condition class, 1 or if 

the project reduced the risk from catastrophic wildland fire. The agency’s focus has 

been on achieving firm annual targets (output) that are measured in the number 

of acres treated. However, these acres are not homogenous, meaning that some 

acres of hazardous fuels create much more risk to communities and resources than 

others. Reporting the number of acres treated did not communicate the amount of 

risk that has been reduced. Focusing only on acres treated did not communicate key 

information on the effectiveness of the treatment practice. In addition, hazardous 

fuels accomplishment reports did not provide detailed information to evaluate the 

overall progress of the program; details such as the location of treatments, changes 

in condition class, and initial or maintenance treatments are not reported. 

We recommended that FS develop and implement a more meaningful and outcome-oriented performance measure for reporting metrics, such as acres with ‘‘risk 

reduced’’ or ‘‘area protected.’’ Also, FS should direct that implementing effective integrated treatments are more important than solely meeting acreage targets. We 

also recommended that FS improve accomplishment reporting by including more detailed information, such as breaking down accomplishments by region, noting 

changes in condition class, and differentiating between initial and maintenance 

treatments and multiple treatments on the same acres. 

FS agreed with our audit findings and each of our HFI program recommendations 

and committed to take action on them. 

HFI Activities in FY 2008

FS’ estimated budget for Hazardous Fuel Reduction activities in FY 2007 is $291.8 million and is projected by agency officials to be $292 million for FY 2008. 

While the amounts for FY 2007 and FY 2008 are approximately the same, the proposed FY 2008 amount of $292 million is 25% more than the enacted amount for 

FY 2004 of $233 million. 

OIG plans to conduct a follow-up audit in FY 2008. Our objective will be to determine if FS has implemented the agreed upon recommendations and whether the 

agency’s responsive actions have been effective. FS’ FY 2008 budget justification reflects some of the measurements we recommended in our report, i.e., reporting accomplishments by changes in condition class, reporting accomplishments obtained 

through other land management activities, and distinguishing accomplishments between initial treatments and maintenance treatments. The budget justification’s FY 

2008 plan places an emphasis on identifying and treating risks. 

As part of our evaluation of the key management challenges facing the Department in 2007, we identified large fire suppression cost as a new challenge. This 

challenge encompasses the HFI. During our audit of FS’ Large Fire Suppression 

Costs, 2 we identified the accumulation of hazardous fuels, especially within the 

wildland urban interface, as a major factor in increasing fire suppression costs. We 

believe that improving the health of the National Forests will ultimately help reduce 

agency costs for suppressing wildfires. 

I want to express my sincere thanks to FS officials and employees for the assistance and considerable cooperation they extended to OIG during these two audits. 

FS faces many difficult programmatic issues and natural resource challenges as it 

strives to provide good stewardship of America’s national forests. OIG’s management and staff greatly appreciate the excellent but frequently uncredited work that 

FS employees perform on a daily basis to preserve and enhance our precious 

national forests. 

This concludes my testimony. Thank you again for affording me the opportunity 

to testify before the Subcommittee. I would be pleased to address any questions you 

may have. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. And let me begin with 

some questions. 

And let me begin by asking you, elaborate on one of the points 

in your testimony where you talked about how the agency’s habit 

26

of reporting how many acres has been treated is not helpful in determining how much fire risk has been reduced. If you could elaborate on that point. 

Ms. TIGHE. Absolutely. What we would like to see, I mean, reporting on acres treated is an output measure. What we would like 

to see is a more qualitative measure that looks at whether treatment of those acres has reduced the risk. And so you would look 

at whether a condition class has changed after treatment, and 

areas like that. 

And I believe we have seen some steps in the right direction. As 

I noted in the budget justification for Fiscal Year 2008, Forest 

Service has, in fact, included performance measures along those 

lines. It is simply not, we didn’t think it was sufficient to look simply at acres treated. You have to be more qualitative. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Yes. And let me follow up on that, if I may. The 

common criticism is that the Forest Service fuel reduction work, it 

seems that the agency seems to be more focused on meeting acreage targets than treating acres that will reduce that wildlandurban interface to communities. 

That common criticism correlates or doesn’t correlate with the 

findings of this audit? 

Ms. TIGHE. Yes, it absolutely does. In our opinion, what needs to 

be done is develop criteria that—you can use acres as one measure 

or one criteria to look at. But the criteria ought to be more evaluative and consistently applied throughout the National Forest System, so that you are looking at, you know, what is the risk of, in 

particular locations. And then what are the protection capabilities 

of those locations, and what values in those locations are there to 

be protected. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Which leads me to my final question for you, if I 

may, Ms. Tighe. 

In the opening statement and some of the other comments that 

will be made today, we are going to talk about the funding for that 

hazardous fuel reduction program. And the President’s budget is 

even way below what was authorized in the Healthy Forest Restoration Act. 

Do you think that this underfunding of hazardous fuels is a factor with the problems that we have seemed to encounter with implementing some of the issues that you discovered in the initial 

audit? 

Ms. TIGHE. The Office of Inspector General hasn’t exactly evaluated it in terms of how much funding has gone to the program. I 

think our position is that what funding there is ought to be used 

wisely. And so, you know, the first matter is you have to do it according to priorities. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you. Ms. Nazzaro, if I may, you stated that 

the first recommendation about developing a cohesive strategy on 

wildland fire management was in 1999, as of this April. And we 

still don’t have that strategy. In your communication with the 

agencies, have they indicated why it has taken so long to get to 

that strategy development, or producing a cohesive strategy? 

Ms. NAZZARO. You are correct in that we made the initial recommendation back in 1999, and then we came back in 2005 and 

looked at it again and reiterated that need. 

27

At the time there was a discussion about the need for certain information to be able to develop a cohesive strategy. And we concurred with the agency that there were some key building blocks, 

if you will, to help them get that data, which would be, for example, they have a program called Landfire, which was going to provide key data and modeling data that would be useful in developing such a cohesive strategy. 

At that time, because they needed to complete these building 

blocks, we said then give the Congress a tactical plan as to what 

it is going to take to complete those projects, as well as a timetable 

for when you think you can complete a cohesive strategy. And we 

still haven’t seen the tactical plan nor the cohesive strategy at this 

point. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Yes. And let me follow up, with the time that I 

have left, the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretary have indicated in their testimony that they hope that GAO will ascertain 

from their actions that they have established strategies, goals, and 

objectives dealing with wildland fire. 

Does the work that I referenced in their testimony, does that 

meet what GAO had been requesting in terms of a cohesive strategy on wildland fire? 

Ms. NAZZARO. No, sir. We had key elements that we felt were 

needed in this cohesive strategy. One was certainly that this was 

an investment strategy, if you will, over the long term. So we were 

looking for something that would be decades. 

You know, this problem, as I mentioned, has been decades in the 

making, and it is going to take us a long time to get out from 

under. There are a lot of fuel treatments that are needed, and that 

is going to be very expensive. 

So what we are looking for is that there would be options. You 

know, what would be needed as far as fuel treatments, integrated 

with the other goals and objectives of the organization, including 

what they need to do on preparedness and suppression. And then 

set their priorities, if you will, and to put associated cost estimates, 

so that Congress has some idea what is it going to take us to get 

out from under this problem. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. My time is up. 

Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Grijalva. I first of all would like to 

remind the rest of the committee that you haven’t taken Mr. 

Grijalva’s and my entire standards to heart here. 

When I was Speaker of the House in Utah, we used to have 

sweater day, where no one could speak unless they were in a 

sweater, not in a suit. I don’t think we are allowing anyone in a 

jacket to testify today. 

But Mr. Grijalva, I am going to be here for the long haul. I would 

like to yield to the rest of my committee to go first, so I can go last. 

And I believe, Mr. Tancredo, you have a 10:45 appointment? So if 

I could ask him to start. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Mr. Tancredo. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Oh, thank you. 

Mr. BISHOP. And if you have time left over, yield to some of the 

others. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I shall try. 

28

Mr. Rey, are you concerned about, or do you see, as I do, that 

the agency has really become more of a fire-suppressing agency 

than the forest management agency? I mean, it seems like so much 

of our efforts are spent in that regard. 

To what extent is the analysis paralysis that—I think a former 

director once coined that phrase—to what extent is it still preventing us from doing what is necessary to move quickly to reduce 

that fire hazard? 

Mr. REY. I guess my response to that is that fire management 

and fire ecology are part of forest management. We are in a period 

of extended drought, with decades of fuels treatment work that 

have backed up. We have to get beyond that. 

But we are still doing all of the other multiple-use activities and 

fulfilling the multiple-use mission that the Forest Service has. 

As far as analysis paralysis is concerned, we still have challenges 

through administrative appeals and lawsuits of fuels reduction 

projects that are time-sensitive, but we have accelerated the 

amount of work we have done through the tools in the Healthy 

Forest Initiative and in the Healthy Forest Restoration Act. 

I would note that if you read the budget cross-cuts in our budget 

request for 2005, 2006, 2007, and 2008, the totality of what we requested to implement the Healthy Forest Restoration Act are 

above, not below, the authorized levels of HFRA. So we have requested record budgets in those four cycles to do the fuels treatment work. 

And we do have a cohesive strategy that we released last July. 

We in GAO have a fundamental disagreement about the utility of 

including out-year budget estimates in such a strategy, that being 

the one thing that they believe needs to be in a strategy for it to 

be adequate. We don’t think that is either relevant or useful. Conditions on the ground are going to change significantly as fuels 

treatment work is done and fires burn, and those far-out-year estimates are going to be worth about the paper they are printed on 

five or six years out. So that is not the essence of a good cohesive 

or tactical strategy for this sort of work. 

Mr. TANCREDO. And then just along the lines, don’t you think it 

is a bit perplexing, I guess in a way, disconcerting, that where we 

used to be able to actually make money from the sale of timber, 

we now appropriate huge amounts of money in order to actually 

cut it and treat it? I mean, it is an odd change that has occurred 

as a result of different philosophies. 

Mr. REY. We still make money selling timber, but we don’t make 

enough money to cover our firefighting and other suppression costs, 

because the timber sale program is about a quarter of what it was 

at its peak. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Right. And just a last question. A comment from 

anyone. 

Today in the Washington Times there is an article about the 

number of wildfires that have been started in the Coronado and 

other areas by illegal aliens who have been trespassing there, 

sometimes started for the purpose of burning out the actual Border 

Patrol stations. 

I visited the Coronado, I guess it was the first year I was in Congress, and problems, there were those kinds of problems then. 

29

To what extent, I guess, are we paying attention to that? What 

kind of resources are we applying to that particular problem? It is 

evidently becoming quite serious, where actual—this is according to 

today’s paper—Molotov-cocktail-type explosives are being used to 

burn out these Border Patrol stations. And thousands of acres have 

been damaged by fires started—not just those kind, but started by 

illegal aliens who are coming through in the Coronado, start a fire 

at night for just warmth, move on, fire takes off. 

Mr. REY. There is an incidence of ignitions that are caused by 

people coming across the border. We have been cooperating with 

the Border Patrol to try to secure the borders. The forests are fairly 

remote, so they offer an easy opportunity for border crossing. 

In addition, the flip side of that is that those people are in 

harm’s way if a wildfire ignites and they are in the area. We don’t 

know they are there, obviously, unless we encounter them; and so 

therefore, there is no way to ensure their safety. 

Mr. TANCREDO. Yes. And firefighters that go in have to be protected. As people are coming across, illegal aliens are crossing, they 

are being guarded by people with guns. And the people who we 

send in to fight the fires have to go in also with protection against 

the coyotes. So it is an interesting and very dangerous place down 

there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield to whomever. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you. Mr. Kildee. 

Mr. KILDEE. I will ask any of you, do we dialogue with other nations that have similar wildfire potential as to best practices? 

Mr. REY. We do more than dialogue, Mr. Kildee. We actually 

have cooperative agreements where we exchange firefighting assets 

and personnel, particularly with Australia and New Zealand, since 

their seasons are reversed. 

In very bad fire years, we send personnel, particularly leadership 

personnel, to Australia or New Zealand. In bad years here we will 

bring some of their people in to assist in firefighting. 

The firefighting community is very well organized internationally, so the concept of best practices for both wildland and for 

structural firefighting are pretty well known. And it is, we benefit 

from the insights we get when the New Zealand and Australia firefighters come here. We think they benefit when we go down to assist them during our winter and their summer. 

Mr. KILDEE. Thank you very much. Does anyone else want to 

comment on that? I appreciate your very clear answer, and you are 

on top of the situation. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, sir. Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I yield 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. And I thank the gentleman for yielding. And I 

think this question is best directed to Ms. Nazzaro. 

Are you—let me back up a second. The 302nd Airlift Wing is stationed at Fort Peterson, and they have C-130 cargo planes. And 

they have been outfitted, and in the last five or six years they can 

be used now, although their military assets are used for fire suppression when there is an active fire. 

30

Have you taken into account their role in all this? And are you 

aware of how complicated the training is and the support and 

maintenance that is needed for that kind of airlift capability? 

Ms. NAZZARO. I am not familiar with the specific example that 

you mentioned, but I have been out to a fire camp myself. I mean, 

we take this very seriously. We understand the complexity of what 

the agency has to do. This is not easy, and that is why we really 

feel that this strategy is needed. Because, one, it is costing a lot 

of money. It is a very complex task, and we think it would be in 

everyone’s best interest to lay out what exactly is it going to take 

for us to get a handle on it and maybe get out from these escalating costs, if that is even possible. Maybe it is not even possible. 

So that is why we would like to see laid out, you know, what is 

it going to take us. Is there a break-even point where, if we put 

more money in fuel reduction, that we would be able to get a better 

handle on the cost of suppression. 

So like I say, I am not familiar with that specific example, but 

we certainly appreciate the complexity of the situation, and what 

happens when a fire breaks out, and the concerns of the communities, as well as the Federal agencies responsible. 

Mr. REY. I am familiar with the C-130H wing, if you wanted to 

discuss that. We have six C-130H-class models that the military 

has reconfigured for firefighting use, with mobile aerial firefighting 

tanks. They are a reserve fleet: when things get very difficult and 

our other aviation assets are overstretched, the military makes 

them available for support for firefighting. And they do a good job. 

It is a very good, cooperative relationship that we have with the 

military. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, thank you for that comment, Mr. Rey. I was 

amazed by the amount of training and support and maintenance 

that is needed for that. You know, the chemicals are corrosive, the 

training is the opposite of what you normally trained for in cargo 

use. You fly into little, narrow valleys, instead of away from them. 

I mean, everything is the opposite. 

And one final question for any one of you, maybe Ms. Tighe or 

whoever. But is there any direct method that we are using for the 

destruction and treatment of the pine beetles and the other beetles? Now that the drought has weakened the forests, these beetles 

find it easier to infest, and that is killing trees in my district in 

Colorado and in many other places. That is a very unfortunate 

thing. And that is what will give added fuel to these fires. 

It is a difficult problem. Do we have a direct way of dealing with 

the beetles? 

Ms. TIGHE. I am not aware of a direct way of dealing with the 

pine beetles. I would be happy to defer to Under Secretary Rey. 

We would totally agree with you that that is a problem. It was 

certainly a significant factor in wildfires in California in 2003; the 

destruction wrought by the pine beetle devastated the forests there. 

But as far as a direct solution, I am not aware. 

Mr. REY. But the beetles do most of their damage under the 

bark. In fact, they spend most of their life cycles under the bark, 

with a very short emergence time. That makes the use of pesticides 

basically ineffective on a forest-wide basis. You can treat individual 

trees if you have a favorite tree in your backyard that you want 

31

to try to save, but you have to do that with a tree service. That 

is very time-consuming and resource-intensive, and therefore impractical on a forest-wide basis. 

Therefore, the only way to halt a beetle epidemic is to cut down 

the trees that are infected before the beetles emerge and spread. 

And if they get into an epidemic or a pandemic situation, then even 

that is an unrealistic option because the outbreak is too widespread. And that is what we are seeing in Colorado right now. 

Mr. LAMBORN. I thank you for your answers, and I yield back. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you. Thank you very much. Ms. 

Christensen? 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask this 

question to Mr. Rey. 

You mentioned the Brookings report, and you entered it into the 

record at the end of your testimony. And it is very much in contrast 

to the other reports of the GAO and the Inspector General. 

But does that report only address the efficient use of funds while 

you are fighting fires? Or does it also address the strategy coordination and prioritizing? 

Mr. REY. The Brookings report addresses only the former. The 

Brookings report is the result of a Congressional requirement in 

the Fiscal Year 2005 Appropriations bill. In that requirement, the 

Congress directed us to charge an independent panel with reviewing cost containment strategies and tactics for every fire that exceeds $10 million in expenditures. And so this would be the third 

such independent report. 

The thing that is notable here is that in reviewing the 17 fires 

that exceeded that amount, Brookings felt that the Forest Service 

executed judgment and restraint in containing costs in each of the 

instances. That, to me, suggests that we are proceeding with strategic and tactical developments, at least for fire cost containment, 

in an appropriate fashion. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. OK. But on the prevention side, which is really what this hearing is more about, can you just tell me how you 

prioritize in the fuel, what is it, fuel management? 

Mr. REY. Fuel treatment area. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Fuel treatment area. And also in your answer, 

was the, what are the other areas called, the Okefenokee area in 

Georgia and Florida? Were they prioritized for this fuel management, fuel treatment? 

Mr. REY. Sure. The two things that we use for setting fuels treatment priorities, as laid out in our cohesive strategy, are, first, the 

community wildfire protection plans authorized to be developed 

under the Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003. There are over 

2,000 such plans now out across the landscape. Those plans tell us 

where fuels treatment work should be done. 

Then, in order to prioritize in what order that work is done, we 

look at five factors. First, wildfire potential. How likely is there to 

be an ignition, given fire frequency. 

Second, the negative consequences associated with an ignition; 

what are the values that are at risk. 

Third, the efficiency of the fuels treatment that is being proposed. Fuels treatment work on a per-acre basis costs anywhere 

from $50 an acre to $3,000 an acre, depending on what you have 

32

to do and where you have to do it. So efficiency is one criteria in 

setting priorities. 

The fourth criteria is effectiveness; does the proposed fuels treatment have the prospect of being effective. 

And then the fifth is are there opportunities for ecological restoration that can be accomplished along with the fuels treatment 

work. 

So as laid out in the cohesive strategy, the community wildfire 

protection plans tell you where you are going to treat on a 

community-by-community basis, and these other criteria, our hazardous fuels prioritization and allocation system, tell us in what 

order, based on those five criteria. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. So where do southern Georgia and northern 

Florida fit in in this criteria? 

Mr. REY. We do a substantial amount of fuels treatment in the 

pine areas. We would likely not have done a significant amount of 

fuels treatment work in the Okefenokee Swamp National Wildlife 

Refuge. 

The circumstances that are occurring there today in this fire season are extraordinary by any measure, because we have a record 

drought, and that system will burn with the intensity it is burning 

now about every 100 years. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. In my last couple of seconds, 

would Ms. Nazzaro and Ms. Tighe just comment on the plan and 

the strategy that was outlined, versus what you say doesn’t exist? 

Ms. TIGHE. The strategy that Under Secretary Rey just talked 

about as far as the use of the community wildlife protection plans 

and the five factors, when we did our audit, the community-wide 

protection plans, we looked at as how they related to setting priorities in other ways. And we generally found, and I think we actually looked at a Forest Service study that was done internally, we 

found that yes, they are good at setting priorities, and they are 

very useful for that. But they hadn’t been integrated into determining nationwide where priorities ought to be set. And whether 

that is happening now we will look at when we do our follow-up 

work in Fiscal Year 2008. 

The five factors that Under Secretary Rey outlined sound along 

the lines of what we think they ought to be doing. 

Ms. CHRISTENSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before the Forest Subcommittee was merged into this subcommittee this year, almost 

every year we would have a hearing early in the year in which we 

would be warned about all the millions of acres that were in danger of catastrophic forest fire. One year we were warned that 40 

million acres were in imminent danger. I think one year we had 

7 million acres burned, with $10 billion worth of damage. 

And I was told by Subcommittee staff that in the mid-eighties, 

that Congress passed a law that environmentalists wanted, that we 

wouldn’t cut more than 80 percent of the new growth in the 

national forests. And yet, for several years now we have been cutting I think less than one seventh of the new growth. And the head 

of the Forest Service a few years ago told us that if we want to 

33

really cut down on these forest fires, we simply have to cut more 

trees. 

And six years ago when we were dealing with this issue, I put 

out a newsletter in which I covered 24 or 25 different unrelated 

topics. But I quoted from a column by Robert Nelson, a professor 

at the University of Maryland. And he wrote this. He said, ‘‘In fact, 

over the last decade it was more important to environmental 

groups to promote wilderness values by creating roadless areas and 

taking other actions to exclude a human presence. This aggravated 

last summer’s tinderbox forest conditions, and continues to threaten public land.’’

He said, ‘‘Federal policies have produced an enormous buildup of 

small trees, underbrush, and deadwood that provide excess fuels to 

feed flames.’’ And then he said that in many Federal forests, tree 

density has increased since the 1940s from 50 per acre to 300 to 

500 per acre, and that these forests are ‘‘filled with dense strands 

of small stressed trees and plants that combine with any deadwood 

to provide virtual kindling wood for forest fires.’’

And I know we passed this Healthy Forest initiative, Secretary 

Rey, in 2003. And yet, one of the later witnesses on the next panel 

testifies, in addition to increased fuel densities, past management 

decisions have led to unhealthy forests that are much more susceptible to insect infestation, disease, and catastrophic wildfire. 

Are we cutting enough trees? Do we still have many unhealthy 

forests around the country? 

Mr. REY. We are cutting a lot more trees. We have a lot more 

to cut before we get ahead of this problem. This problem has been 

a century in the making, since the first organized fire suppression 

campaigns occurred at the beginning of the last century. 

If we knew then, a hundred and some years ago, what we know 

now, we might have approached fire suppression differently. But 

you know, that is not, that is hindsight, so it is not terribly helpful. 

I think where we are at today is that we have accelerated the 

work that needs to be done, but there is still a lot left to be done. 

You don’t solve a problem that is 100 years in the making in four 

or five years; you are going to have to commit more like 15 or 20 

years to that task. 

I think we have broad agreement that we need to reduce fuel 

loads in order to restore healthy forests. I think we still have some 

disagreements about what trees should be cut and where they 

should be cut, both environmental disagreements about where they 

should be cut or whether they should be cut in a particular location, as well as disagreements about priorities. 

But I think we have broken through. I think most people understand that we have a program of work ahead of us that will probably extend another decade before we get enough fuels treatment 

work done to affect these fires. 

We have had some successes so far. Over 60 percent of the work 

that we have done since the Healthy Forest Restoration Act passed 

has been in the wildland-urban interface. Last year we had a 

record year, because of drought conditions, in terms of the number 

of acres burned. But we had a relatively successful year in terms 

of saving homes. 

34

In 2002 and 2003, we lost 3,000 and 2,000 homes respectively, 

in far less severe fire years. Last year we only lost about 700 

homes. That is still tragic, but it is a sign that the fuels treatment 

work done in the wildland-urban interface is having some effect. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right, thank you very much. A later witness 

also discusses the relationship between poverty and wildfires in 

these public-lands areas. And I have noticed that in our part of the 

country, any county that is more than 50 percent Federally owned 

seems to be a very lower-income area. And I have noticed that also 

in many other parts of the country, that where there is 75 percent 

or 80 percent Federal ownership of land, that county seems to be 

a lower-income county. 

Ms. Nazzaro, have you all ever done a study of anything like 

that? 

Ms. NAZZARO. No, sir, we have never looked at areas to do any 

relationship between income levels or poverty levels and Federal 

lands. No.. 

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Thank you very much. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, sir. Mr. Udall. 

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank the panel 

again for taking time to come up here and further edify us on this 

important issue. 

Secretary Rey, I wanted to turn to a follow-on my colleague from 

Colorado, Congressman Lamborn, touched on. And that is the longterm plan for the air tanker fleet. You and I had some conversations about this over the last few years. 

Last month Congressman Salazar and I wrote you about the status of the plan. And in response, a Forest Service spokesman was 

quoted in the press as saying the plan won’t be ready for months, 

maybe longer. We followed up with another letter to you asking if 

that was accurate, and urging that this be a priority matter. And 

I had a series of three questions. 

Have you received our letter? If so, when could we expect a response? And can you fill us in on what slowed the progress of developing this long-term plan for the air tanker fleet? 

Mr. REY. The answer to the first question is I will give you a response now, and we will follow with a written response by the end 

of the week. 

That statement was not entirely accurate. The reason for the 

delay is that our planning for the large air tanker fleet has been 

now merged into an overall evaluation of our total aviation force. 

And that evaluation will be completed no later than December of 

this year. It will not effect, negatively or positively, firefighting tactics and resources for the 2007 season. We have a full complement 

of aviation assets that are designed and deployed to continue to 

achieve a 98 percent rate of success at initial attack. And we are 

comfortable that the mix of aviation assets, smaller fixed-wing 

tankers, larger tankers, smaller and larger helitankers, are going 

to be adequate to the task. 

The larger longer-term evaluation involves both the mix of aircraft, as well as, in the case of the larger tankers, what the ideal 

aircraft model for the next generation of air tankers should be. And 

as I said, that will be done no later than December of this year, 

and that will affect what the next generation of large air tankers 

35

looks like. It will also affect the decisions we make for procurement 

for the other aircraft in the 2008 fire season. 

Mr. UDALL. Thank you for that update. What I hear you saying 

to the committee is that we have your assurances that we are prepared with our air fleet to respond to whatever arises this summer. 

Mr. REY. That is correct. 

Mr. UDALL. Ms. Tighe, if I might turn to you. You made the point 

that the number of acres treated doesn’t necessarily translate directly to the amount of risk reduction. But wouldn’t you agree that 

work done in the interface areas has a bigger payoff for risk reduction than work done in more remote areas? 

Ms. TIGHE. I think you could say that generally, but not absolutely. I think work in the WUI, or the wildland-urban interface, 

and the fact that in those areas you would clearly give credit for 

protection of, you know, certain values and structures, and that 

would have to count in your assessment, there may be times at 

which you get bang for your buck in remote locations simply because those would be strategically placed fuel reduction sites that 

could help an overall picture. I just don’t know. 

But I don’t think you can say absolutely, across the board in 

every case it is the WUI over other parts. I think there are also 

areas outside of the WUI that also you should look at. 

Mr. UDALL. Yes. I would offer an observation. I think in terms 

of risk to communities, the urban-wildland interface is probably 

where more emphasis ought to be placed. But I understand there 

may be specific——

Ms. TIGHE. Exactly. 

Mr. UDALL.—unusual circumstances where——

Ms. TIGHE. That is what we would say. 

Mr. UDALL. It would also depend on how you define remote. 

Ms. TIGHE. Yes. 

Mr. UDALL. If it is 50 miles from a community, then I think that 

is truly remote. 

Ms. TIGHE. One can get too remote. I mean, obviously there is, 

you know, inaccessibility is a big factor to whether you can do anything, strategically or otherwise. 

Mr. UDALL. Secretary Rey, I have too many questions today for 

my time, but I wanted to ask you about your statements about 

firewise regulations, and perhaps enforcing some discipline on communities that don’t have those firewise regulations in place. 

But couldn’t that be a little bit counter-productive, in that we 

hold communities hostage in that regard? And then they don’t have 

the opportunity to do the work they need to do to minimize the potential that they have. 

Mr. REY. I don’t think we have ever advocated penalizing communities that don’t have firewise regulations or building codes and 

ordinances. It is more an exercise in encouraging communities to 

move quickly to develop those kinds of codes and ordinances. 

And I think that the more effective mechanism of seeing that 

through to a conclusion is not a Federal government regulation, but 

probably the marketplace. I think you are starting to see a lot of 

insurance companies now refusing to write policies in areas where 

building codes don’t specify construction with more fire-resistant 

materials and the creation of defensible space on private lots. 

36

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. I want to, 

for the record, clarify that I asked Mr. Rey to comment on a GAO 

point in regards to firewise communities, and I think he gave us 

essentially what the Forest Service thinks is the way we ought to 

proceed. So thank you. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, Mr. Udall. Mr. Pearce. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was interested by Mr. 

Lamborn’s comments about the differences that pilots train to, if 

they are flying fires there is a commonality for all pilots. That is, 

take heed the earth lest it rise up and smite thee. So there are 

some similarities for pilots training. 

Mr. Rey, I was fascinated by your discussions. As you know, our 

office and your office have had several discussions. It was our district where the Forest Service escalated the grazing problem into 

one that looked like Ruby Ridge, where you sent them guys, 20 or 

30 armed people to take a guy’s herd away. It was a little bit overresponsive. 

It is my district where a Kopelli fire burned 30 or 40 houses in 

the village of Ruidoso. It is in our district where we got the Lincoln 

National Forest, and we are cleaning about 3,000 acres per year. 

That is in a drought state. And 3,000 acres a year, I was fascinated 

to hear you talk about when we get through with the fuels treatment, because it is going to take us 330 years to get through the 

Lincoln National Forest at this rate. Meanwhile, we have the risk 

of our towns over in the Gila, on the other side of the district, we 

have the Gila has 3 million acres. And we are likewise just cleaning about 3,000 acres a year over there. It is going to take us 1,000 

years to get through this cleaning program. And I was really fascinated to hear your plans for the future, for when we get through 

with that. I don’t think we are ever going to get through with it 

at the rate we are going. 

As you know, we lost about a million trees up around Santa Fe 

to infestations of some sort. And that brings us to the current 

period. 

The Scott Able fire burned there near Cloudcroft in the Lincoln, 

and it burned 12 miles at about 2,000 degrees. And it took about 

five hours. 

Now, when it hit the Mescalero Apaches, who have gone in and 

done tremendous clearing, thousands of acres, the fire simply fell 

to the ground and ran along the ground like it is supposed to. So 

we see the process working; that is, the clearing process has a validity. I just don’t see the acreage happening in our national forests. 

We don’t have timber sales any more. Neither the Lincoln nor 

the Gila have had significant timber sales, and so we are stuck 

here in the current situation, where the village of Cloudcroft is 

simply, all the acreage around and in the village of Cloudcroft is 

dying because of the spruce bud work and the looper. 

Now, these are defoliating insects. And the Forest Service 

watched from 2002 on without taking one treatment, so that now 

the village, just this last, about a month ago, two months ago, declared an emergency, even though the Forest Service would not declare an emergency. And they said, you know, we are afraid for our 

37

lives, we are afraid we are going to see that same 2,000-degree fire 

burn through our town that burned through the Scott Able area. 

And I wonder what it is going to take to get the Forest Service 

to actually do some remedial treatment there. Do you have a plan 

to spray? I know that you have not sprayed; you choose not to 

spray. But is there a plan at which the situation becomes scary 

enough to you all in Washington that you will actually do anything 

to control the infestation of the spruce bud worms and the loopers? 

Mr. REY. We have treatments planned for this summer. We have 

developed some treatments close in, around the community of 

Cloudcroft, using categorical exclusions to preclude the need for 

more detailed environmental analysis under the National Environmental Policy Act. So trees will start to fall late this summer and 

fall in the vicinity of Cloudcroft. 

We are also doing a more detailed environmental assessment for 

a broader array of treatments in infested areas. And those treatments will likely be on line, assuming that the decision is not appealed, which, in Central New Mexico, is not sometimes a reasonable assumption. But assuming the decision is not appealed, those 

broader treatments will begin to take place next——

Mr. PEARCE. Who will be appealing decisions like that? 

Mr. REY. It could be any of a number of groups in that——

Mr. PEARCE. Who in the past have appealed decisions like that? 

Mr. REY. The Southwest Center for Biological Diversity, Forest 

Guardians are probably the two most prominent in New Mexico 

and Arizona. We don’t believe——

Mr. PEARCE. We are going to take treatments in the fall? You are 

going to give treatments in the fall if you get no appeals? 

Mr. REY. Right. 

Mr. PEARCE. In the summertime is when the drought is typically 

the worst in New Mexico. And so it looks like we are going to subject the people of Cloudcroft to the most extreme circumstances 

with dead trees over 30 or 40 or 50 thousand acres. 

The Forest Service made a decision in the Capitan fire about 

three years ago. It was a 12-acre fire burning on a hillside, and the 

Forest Service said I think it will be OK. It burned 100,000 acres, 

and you spent about $6 million before you got it out. 

I just hope that the people on the ground there in the Lincoln 

are not making similar decisions there. By not doing anything back 

in 2002, nothing in 2003, nothing in 2004, nothing in 2005, nothing 

in 2006, and we might start doing something in the fall of 2007, 

I hope, my friend, that we are not putting a whole community at 

risk. You have done that over in the Ruidoso area to the extreme, 

and finally we raised enough pressure there to start cutting trees. 

I hope that we spray to kill the spruce bud worm. I hope that 

we spray to kill the looper. And I hope that you begin to cut trees. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rey, first let us put 

it in perspective. What did we spend on firefighting last year, total? 

Mr. REY. We spent about $1.6 billion. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. $1.6 billion. And was that an anomaly? Or were we 

kind of running——

Mr. REY. That was an all-time record. 

38

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. And what are we projecting this year? 

Mr. REY. This year we are projecting somewhere between $1.1 billion and $1.25 billion. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. So average fire year these days, we would be lucky to get away with $1 billion? 

Mr. REY. Yes. I would say an average fire season has been run- ning about $1 billion. That is pretty fair. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. Well, now we have a little context. So let us 

go to the funding for the Healthy Forest Restoration Act. 

You know, I opposed the first version in the House because it did 

not authorize any money. And we fought very hard over it; worked 

with the Senate, and we got into substantial authorization. But we 

have never come near to that amount of money in either the requested budget from the Administration and/or the appropriated 

budget from Congress consequent to those requests. 

And I guess I am puzzled why we wouldn’t invest more there. 

And I would look at—and I know you gave out some numbers, but 

Dr. Daugherty from Oregon is going to testify subsequently using 

some very conservative analysis, working with some colleagues, 

came up that avoided future costs justifies spending $238 to $601 

an acre for reduction treatments. And they used a very, very conservative methodology, in my opinion. 

So I guess I am wondering why aren’t we asking—I realize we 

are in constrained budget times. But when you look at what we are 

spending to fight the fires, what the risks are, the avoided costs, 

why aren’t we asking for more and spending more money on 

HFRA? That is one question. 

The second is Mr. Pearce was making a point about appeals. But 

I would like to know, we had to do quite a bit of work and did put 

in expedited procedures in HFRA to avoid undue delays for needed 

fuel reduction work. Are you using those procedures? 

Mr. REY. Two questions. The first question is, if you look at the 

authorization of the Healthy Forest Restoration Act, it authorizes 

a number of activities that go to the promotion of healthy forests, 

that go beyond the hazardous fuels account, and include other accounts in the Forest Service budget, and in the Department of the 

Interior’s budget. 

If you aggregate all of those accounts, what you will find is that 

we are asking for and spending in excess of the authorization levels 

in the Healthy Forest Restoration Act. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. I understand. And I see that list every year. But 

I have to say, when I was helping, from my perspective, work on 

the bill, I was thinking about that is what we are going to spend 

on actual fuel reduction, because we had an earlier report from 

GAO. 

I think we are losing ground in terms of where we are at in the 

western U.S., and GAO might, after you finish commenting on 

that, in terms of whether or not we are beginning to deal with the 

backlog, or we are actually seeing the backlog grow. The last testimony we had a couple of years ago was it is growing. We are not 

getting ahead. 

So we may have a different opinion there. I thought, straight up, 

760, we are out there reducing fuels. Those other things are nice 

to do, but—OK. 

39

And then the second part, are you using the expedited procedures? 

Mr. REY. The $900 million-plus is all spent on fuel reduction, just 

from different accounts. We are using the expedited procedures in 

the Healthy Forest Restoration Act and the Healthy Forest Initiative. But those expedited procedures did not eliminate the opportunity for appeals or litigation. That was a decision that the Administration and the Congress made jointly. 

Additionally, some of the expedited procedures have—the effectiveness of some of the expedited procedures have been eroded by 

subsequent court actions. To whit, the Courts have interpreted our 

obligations, under the National Environmental Policy Act, to require notice and comment, as well as a right of appeal, for projects 

that are covered under categorical exclusions from the National Environmental Policy Act. 

That makes the Forest Service the only agency, the only agency 

in the Federal government that has to give notice, comment, and 

a right of appeal for de minimis projects that are covered by a categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act, including fuels reduction projects. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK. But I mean, do we, are you really running up 

against you can’t spend the funds you have on an annual basis on 

productive fuel reduction because of appeals? Or are you managing 

to spend the funds that you have, since there is quite a bit of it 

out there, and some of it——

Mr. REY. We are managing to spend every dollar we invest. But 

there are some priority fuels treatment projects that are going begging because of the impact on appeals. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Well, since you mentioned priorities, I asked back, 

I think it was in 2005 at a hearing, about whether or not there was 

a cohesive strategy for prioritization. And it seems that what I am 

hearing here is that, as of at least the 2006 analysis, we still didn’t 

have that kind of prioritization; we are still using sort of regional 

apportionment, and then out to the local forests at the discretion 

of the regions. 

Is this Project Landfire, is that the solution to that problem? Is 

that what you are talking about, how we are going to finally get 

to really prioritizing the funds into the regions that need them? 

And then within those regions, applying them to the highest-risk, 

highest-benefit areas? 

Mr. REY. Landfire is going to give us additional data to make 

more informed prioritization decisions. But we have released a cohesive fuel strategy during the early fall of last year. 

The debate that we should be having today is not whether we 

have a cohesive fuel strategy; but rather, whether all of the things 

that each of us thinks are necessary are included in that cohesive 

fuel strategy. The debate that we should be having between the 

Forest Service and GAO today are what benefit hard out-year funding predictions really going to provide as part of a cohesive fuel 

strategy, when in fact those funding predictions are going to, by necessity, change year to year, based on what happens on the ground 

over the course of time. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So, Ms. Tighe, when you were speaking earlier 

about the evaluation next year, I mean, so between your 2006 work 

40

and now, do you believe that they have really focused in better on 

the prioritization of the expenditure of the funds? 

Ms. TIGHE. Well, without going in and really looking at it, we 

can’t say. We will be looking at it next year. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. So they say they have addressed, they may have 

addressed your concerns, but you don’t know yet. OK. 

Ms. TIGHE. We don’t know yet. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And, Ms. Nazzaro, on the GAO, I know it has been 

a while since the GAO did an analysis of the backlog and/or the 

magnitude of the fuel reduction work in the West. I mean, are you 

aware that we—are we getting ahead of it, or are we still losing 

ground, holding even? Do you have any idea? 

Ms. NAZZARO. You are correct in that we have not updated our 

data. But based on data from the agencies, it is my understanding 

that we have not kept pace; that there are additional fuels, of 

course, being added every year to that list. So you have a backlog, 

as was mentioned earlier. You may be treating 2 million acres, you 

know, right now, but is that really getting to the problem. 

And that is why we are saying we need this cohesive strategy to 

really understand. What is the problem, what is it going to take 

to address the problem and start a turn-around that is not affecting our fuel suppression costs. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And just one last question. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Mr. DeFazio, we are going to do a second round. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you. Mr. Heller. 

Mr. HELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all of you 

being here, and the discussion that we are having today. I do want 

to tell Secretary Rey, you are spending money up at Lake Tahoe. 

Fuels treatment is critical. A very important discussion that has 

been had up there for many years. I served on the planning committee up there for 12 years, and fire suppression, fuels treatment 

was a critical issue, and I am glad to see that moving forward. 

But I want to talk for a little bit about the rangelands and the 

fires that we have. You are probably familiar with Nevada and the 

amount of acres that we burned every year. Just last year in one 

county we burned over a million acres. And most of these wildfires 

start on Federal lands. And unfortunately, these fires spread to private lands in Nevada, with obviously devastating results. Some of 

those results meaning that multi-generational families that have 

had ranches and farms will be going out of business this year because of these fires, again that are starting on Federal lands. 

I want to raise a question of a bill that was introduced this week 

in the Senate, specifically proposed for rangeland. And it is an incentive program that would pay ranchers or other landowners who 

carry out conservation practices or other activities, including working on lands that are scorched and refueling them or reintroducing 

native vegetation, so that we can get rid of some of the cheek grass 

that is growing instead after some of these burned areas move on. 

I just want to get your feedback on that. Are you familiar with 

this particular piece of legislation? 

Mr. ALLRED. Congressman, I am not sure which it is. Is it the 

cooperative conservation legislation? 

41

Mr. HELLER. The piece of legislation introduced by Senator Reid 

and Senator Enzi. 

Mr. ALLRED. I am not familiar with that. But I would say that 

much of what we do, both on rangelands and obviously on the 

national forests, requires that we work in very close coordination 

with our partners. And the effort we make in initial attack to try 

to stop those, the efforts that we make in coordinating any kind of 

sustained attack really depends upon those local resources. 

The more we can do in coordination with our partners, whether 

they be other Federal agencies, local agencies, or private interests, 

to try to deal with these issues on the front end, is going to benefit 

us all. 

So while I am not familiar with that, I am not sure which legislation you are talking about, you will find, I think, the Administration very much interested in finding ways to leverage the resources 

the Federal government has with those of our partners as we attack these fires. 

Mr. REY. Apropos of that kind of activity, in the Administration’s 

Farm Bill proposal, we propose a significant increase in funding, 

mandatory funding, for the Environmental Quality Improvement 

Program, which is a cost share program with private farmers and 

ranchers. And the Environmental Quality Improvement Program 

pays for a lot of range improvement work, both general range improvement, as well as post-fire range improvement work. So we are 

generally supportive of that kind of cost share activity. 

Mr. HELLER. I think the landowners and the ranchers and the 

cattlemen have a high incentive of reintroducing native species, as 

opposed to the cheek grass that is growing out there, that I believe 

causes more fire concern. And I think this summer isn’t going to 

be any different. 

I am a little concerned also about the shift of funding toward 

some of the local governments. As I mentioned, most of these fires 

occur or are started on Federal lands, and then move over to state 

lands or private lands. And I am hearing more and more about 

shifting the burden. 

And having sat on the Board of Examiners in Nevada for 12 

years, and the millions of dollars that Nevada does spend in fire 

suppression, based on the fact that most of these fires are started 

on Federal lands, I do have some concern and would like some 

feedback on the efforts to lessen the burden on some of these local 

governments and state governments, seeing that the majority of 

these fires are started on Federal lands. 

Mr. REY. Well, the fact that we are the only ones that are responsible for Federal lands goes to the proposition that that is 

where we have suggested most of our suppression resources be concentrated. So we are not trying to shirk our burden for suppression 

work on Federal lands. Rather, we are maintaining that that is 

where we have the greatest responsibility. 

Mr. HELLER. Do you have any programs or efforts to compensate 

some of these private landowners for the damage caused by these 

Federal fires? 

Mr. REY. We have used Emergency Watershed Restoration Program money, through the Natural Resources Conservation Service, 

to stabilize areas that were affected by fires. The Farm Services 

42

Agency has provided some compensation for crop losses, and for 

livestock losses. So in the normal course, if they are agricultural 

producers they are eligible for some of our Farm Bill programs, for 

either compensation for lost crops, or for assistance in restoring 

areas that have been affected by fire. Or flood, for that matter, as 

well. 

Mr. HELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank 

you. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Mr. Sarbanes. 

Mr. SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am still trying to get 

my head around some of the concepts here. And I wanted to ask 

you if the budgeted appropriated amount of dollars to cover the fire 

suppression need is not enough in a given year, so that it is exceeded, which apparently it has been on a fairly regular basis, those 

dollars then come from other parts of the budget, such as from the 

fuel treatment and reduction programs? Is that essentially the formula? 

Mr. REY. The Secretary has the authority to draw funds from 

any other available account if our fire suppression funds fall short 

of need because of a bad fire year. And you are correct, we have 

executed that borrowing authority three out of the last five fire seasons. 

What we try to do when we execute that authority is keep in 

close touch with the Appropriations Committees of the House and 

Senate, and tell them where we think the least destructive places 

to draw the necessary funds are. And we try to put fuels treatment 

work at the very back of the list, for the simple reason that if you 

are borrowing fuels treatment money to fight fires, you really are 

borrowing from Peter to pay Paul. So we try not to borrow fuels 

treatment money for that purpose. 

Mr. SARBANES. What is the pecking order, in terms of where you 

go first to find the dollars? 

Mr. REY. Where we go first are trust funds where we have unobligated balances, so that we are not affecting any program delivery 

in a given year. And then if we exceed the amounts available in 

all existing trust fund balances, then we look at capital projects 

with multi-year contracts, where we can still maintain our contract 

obligations, but maybe take some of the money that won’t be allocated in a multi-year contract until an out year. Because Congress 

then would have the opportunity, as they do, in the next supplemental, to pay those accounts back. 

So the pecking order is first, trust fund balances that are unobligated. Second, balances that are sitting in capital contracts that 

are multi-year in nature. And if we exceed both of those, then the 

rubber really meets the road, and we have to look at non-essential 

working programs that we can reduce in order to keep up with the 

necessary suppression activities. 

Mr. SARBANES. Well, how far into the fuel treatment and reduction programs have you had to reach in recent years? 

Mr. REY. To my knowledge, we have not yet had to borrow from 

fuels treatment work to pay for fire suppression. 

Now, I say that in terms of funding balances. There is a second 

impact, though, as well. And that is that some of the people who 

fight fire are also people who are designing and laying fuels treatVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
43

ment projects. So putting aside the appropriated dollars, there are 

also staff shortages that occur in a very bad fire year, as people 

spend more of their time devoted to firefighting on an incident to 

make sure that they get the fire out, and less of their time designing next year’s fuels treatment projects. 

So it is not so much money as it is manpower in that regard. 

Mr. SARBANES. But certainly it is a distraction of energy and attention, potentially, away from the fuel treatment efforts, that that 

can happen. 

It seems to me that—I mean, it is an unusual kind of budgeting 

environment, because you are never not going to spend the money 

you have to to do the fire suppression, right? I mean, by definition, 

it is not a situation where you say we just won’t spend money on 

that program, so we won’t deliver that program this year. You have 

to put the fires out, you have to suppress the fires. 

So there is a kind of charade-like quality to knowing or being 

able to predict, it seems, that the amounts you are going to need 

for fire suppression are here; and yet, the appropriated dollars are 

consistently here. You are going to have to go rob Peter to pay 

Paul, almost on a consistent basis, it seems. 

Mr. REY. It is not a charade. It is a formula-based allocation. We 

request, and Congress typically appropriates, the 10-year average 

for suppression costs. And what we have been doing is exceeding 

the 10-year average in several of the last fire seasons. 

So, I mean, nobody is playing games with it. The fact is you propose a budget two years out before you are into a fire season, and 

Congress appropriates that budget a year before the fire season. So 

absent any better mechanism to predict the future two years out, 

using a 10-year average is, you know, about as good as you can do. 

Now, in the 2003 budget cycle, the Administration proposed an 

alternative means of funding firefighting activity. And that is we 

proposed a contingency account for emergencies, including wildfire 

suppression. And that would then obviate the need to execute the 

borrowing authority. But for whatever reason, the Appropriations 

Committees weren’t that enthusiastic about that contingency fund 

proposal, so it didn’t go anywhere. 

But we are more than happy—in fact, willing—to work with Congress to look at alternative mechanisms for fighting, for funding 

firefighting. Because you are right; you are not going to stop fighting the fires because you run out of money. 

Mr. SARBANES. Thank you. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, sir. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rey, I noticed in 

your testimony you talked about you have treated 2.6 million acres 

in 2006, about 20 million acres in the last seven years. Do you or 

anyone else there have a handle on the number that would be the 

backlog, or the total need that is out there for treatment as far as 

fuel suppression? 

Mr. REY. In our judgment, there are 180 million Federal acres 

that are at risk to wildfire, based on fuel loads. Not all of those 

acres should be treated. There is probably about 80 million acres 

of high-priority fuels treatment work that needs to be done on Federal lands. 

44

When I say that a lot of that acreage doesn’t need to be treated, 

because a lot of it is very remote, in areas where the fire is going 

to have no appreciable ecological or economic negative consequence. 

You know, we burn a couple million acres in the interior of Alaska 

most summers, and there isn’t a lot of effort spent on suppression 

work there, because you are in the middle of the interior of Alaska. 

Mr. BISHOP. What we are still talking about is, you have 80 million acres you have identified as high priority. We are doing 2 to 

3 million acres a year. 

Mr. REY. And we are doing, both agencies, both departments 

combined, in excess of 4 to 5 million acres a year now. 

Mr. BISHOP. OK. That still doesn’t come close to the total need 

that is there. 

If you had all the money you could want for right now, would 

there still be a problem with manpower in implementation of your 

plan and program? 

Mr. REY. I think there would still be problems with manpower 

and with public acceptance of the program. We have made great inroads at getting the public to accept the proposition that you have 

to cut trees to save the forest, but that is still a debatable proposition in a lot of specific contexts with a number of people who 

want to have the debate over whether that is the right tree to cut, 

in the right place to cut it. 

Mr. BISHOP. Well, as I am looking at just the numbers here, if 

we are dealing with like 5 percent of the total need that is out 

there, is it feasible to say that we can solve this problem without 

using some kind of outsourcing, or without involving the private 

sector, in helping us to deal with forest management? 

Mr. REY. I think the greatest use of the private sector is to make 

greater use of the material that we have to pull off of these forests 

in order to do the thinning. Much of that material is low value; it 

is not suitable for being converted into lumber. It is suitable for 

low-value engineered wood products, biomass energy, or ethanol. 

So our greatest point of focus is to try to get greater utilization 

of that material. Because if we can do that, it will reduce the unit 

costs of pulling it off the forest. Instead of paying somebody $300 

an acre to move it off, maybe we can get them to do it for free in 

exchange for owning the material, to convert it into a useable product. 

Mr. BISHOP. I am just an old schoolteacher. I am assuming the 

answer was yes? 

Mr. REY. You would have to remind me exactly what the question was. 

Mr. BISHOP. That is what I was afraid of. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BISHOP. If we are going to meet the 80 million acres, and we 

are only doing three to five right now a year, we are obviously 

going to in some way, as creative as you wish to be, have to involve 

either outsourcing of this material, or involving the private sector 

in helping us to do this work. 

Mr. REY. We would have to involve the private sector in harvesting this material, or involving the private sector in helping us 

to do this work. 

45

Mr. BISHOP. We would have to involve the private sector in harvesting and utilizing the material. We can fund up the ying-yang, 

and with the manpower problems and the funding problems, we 

are not going to do it unless we involve the private sector. And I 

think that is one of the bottom lines that I am seeing. 

You have talked a great deal already about the problems you are 

having with offering and completing sales. I think we will probably 

have a chance to talk about that later. 

Can I also ask one other question? You know, the OIG has given 

you a report, the recommendations by July 31 of this year to be set, 

to be hit. Is the agency going to meet those deadlines? 

Mr. REY. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. It is a simple enough question. Can I ask some of 

you there—oh, crud. I have 40 seconds. Give me a really brief definition of what a WUI would be. How do you define that? 

Mr. REY. The wildland-urban interface? 

Mr. BISHOP. Yes. 

Mr. REY. It is an area adjacent to a community that treating will 

reduce the risk to the community. Its distance from the most distant house varies, depending on topography, vegetation mix, and a 

lot of other variables. 

Mr. BISHOP. I think I was hearing you saying you don’t have a 

standard definition of size distance or anything like that. We just 

kind of do it on a case-by-case basis. 

Mr. REY. That is correct. 

Mr. BISHOP. All right. My time is up here. Let me let these others have a chance at it, and I will come back, if that is OK. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Mr. Shuler. 

Mr. SHULER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rey, last month we 

lost about nine homes in my home county due to wildfire. What 

emphasis does the Department do in the way of community wildfire 

protection plans? You know, relationship with the states, relationship with each one of the communities. 

Mr. REY. As I indicated in my testimony, since the authorization 

for the development of community-based wildfire protection plans, 

we have cooperated with communities around the country, and 

have developed in excess of 2,000 of those plans. We have another 

450 that will be developed this year. 

And in almost every instance where a group of community leaders, local elected officials for the most part, has indicated they 

wanted to work with us to draw out a community wildfire protection plan, we have made staff available for that purpose. And as 

I indicated earlier, that governs where we do the treatments. 

You know, generally speaking, where there are community wildfire protection plans, those plans lay out on the ground, in a mapbased format, what areas need to be treated. And we don’t deviate 

very much from those once we have them. 

Mr. SHULER. So it is basically left up to the elected officials in 

those communities, or the community itself, to actually get with 

the Department to be able to come up with a plan. 

Isn’t there a way that we can be more proactive and look at some 

of the areas, because of my district’s 53 percent public lands? It 

seems like that would be much more incentive to those commuVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
46

nities that have—every community, all 15 counties, to actually 

have a plan. 

Mr. REY. You know, we could go off and do that ourselves. But 

one of the things we have found since we started working with 

communities to develop these plans is that the effort on the part 

of local elected officials and local community leaders to work with 

us to develop these plans usually results in less environmental appeals over the activities that we conduct in concert with or in conjunction with those plans. Because that local community buy-in 

gets everybody oriented toward the idea that we really have to do 

this work. It is not an abstract question of, you know, whether we 

should hug this tree or cut this tree. It is stuff that needs to be 

done if we are going to protect our own homes and our neighborhoods and our communities. 

Mr. SHULER. Very good. Ms. Nazzaro, the fund for the Forest 

Land Enhancement Program in the last Farm Bill was used for fire 

borrowing. This year, how much do you expect to borrow from that 

particular bill? Those funds from the Forest Land Enhancement 

Program. It is in the Farm Bill. 

Ms. NAZZARO. I don’t have an estimate. I don’t know. Maybe Mr. 

Rey does. 

Mr. REY. The authority for the Forest Land Enhancement Program expires with this Farm Bill, so we won’t be borrowing any 

money from that account. 

Mr. SHULER. This year. 

Mr. REY. This year. We are hoping that Congress reauthorizes 

the Farm Bill, including our proposal for the Forest Land Enhancement Program. If they do, then we will try not to borrow that 

money next year. 

Mr. SHULER. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you. Mr. Pearce, just a question. 

Mr. PEARCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rey, the county of 

Otero and the village of Cloudcroft have expressed alarm that the 

Forest Service has a sense of a lack of urgency on this problem 

around the community. Can you tell me the priority that you have 

established for that particular area? 

Mr. REY. This is going to be one of our highest-priority treatments to get done this year and next. 

Mr. PEARCE. OK. The complaint is that there is no time to develop an EIS. And I guess your office there, the Forest Service, and 

the city, the village of Cloudcroft have gone to the Council on Environmental Quality. I guess it begs the question why we didn’t do 

something last year or the year before on back. 

But forgetting that, what are the chances that we are going to 

get this approval to do this spraying work? You all are going to 

spray, right? 

Mr. REY. We are going to do some spraying, but we are going to 

do mostly harvesting. 

Mr. PEARCE. So what are the chances we are going to get approval to do that, since we have not done the EIS? We let this 

thing drift through six years now, so we have kind of a crisis going. 

What are the chances we are going to get approval to do the work? 

Mr. REY. I think the chances are going to be good, because we 

are going to do it under a categorical exclusion. So we——

47

Mr. PEARCE. OK. You are going to clear, I am reading, a 500-feet 

buffer zone. 

Now, the last vision I have in my mind is driving up to my home 

town, where a fire was burning across New Mexico. And the fire, 

the 50-knot winds were pushing it almost 50 miles an hour. 

Now, when I see a 50-mile-an-hour fire running, and I see a 500-

foot gap, is 500 feet going to be enough to protect the community, 

given the nature of the winds that always blow in New Mexico? 

Mr. REY. We think 500 feet, along with work to remove fuels and 

flammable materials on the private lands, will give us a pretty 

good chance to be able to save those communities, should they be 

confronted with an active fire. 

Mr. PEARCE. OK. Your categorical exclusion you are talking 

about. And that is subject to this appeal by Southwest Center for 

Biological Diversity and Forest Guardian, is it not——

Mr. REY. They have a right of appeal, that is correct. 

Mr. PEARCE. And I think you have adequately stated that it is 

common to assume that they are going to block anything that we 

try to do there. 

Now, you said that one of the problems that we have is getting 

public acceptance. Does the Forest Service give the same weight to 

people who live in the town and are worried about their houses? 

There is one road that goes through Cloudcroft. When the forest 

catches on fire, there is not going to be a way out of town; we are 

going to lose a lot of people. 

Now, public acceptance, do you give the same weight of public acceptance to the people who are at risk of losing their families, their 

homes, their livelihood, than some guy based out of—excuse me, 

Mr. Chairman, but I think the Center for Biological Diversity is out 

in your area, in Arizona somewhere. Do you give the same weight 

to public acceptance, I think was your term? 

Mr. REY. Well, first a clarification. I did not say that we expect 

that these particular categorical exclusions will be appealed. We 

think that we have designed the fuels treatment work that needs 

to be done here in a way that will likely minimize——

Mr. PEARCE. Well, fine. Let me reclaim the words and put them 

in my mouth. I think they will be appealed, because they have 

blocked everything else in the district. So those are people who did 

not want to cut trees for any reason. And I am asking, does public 

acceptance from someone outside the area, whose life is not at risk, 

weigh the same as public acceptance? You said that is the problem, 

that public acceptance of cutting trees or hugging them is the problem. 

There is no problem in the minds of people in Cloudcroft and 

Otero County. So do you weigh it the same, inside and outside the 

county? 

Mr. REY. I think the best way to answer your question is, we give 

the greatest weight to people whose concerns are backed up by——

Mr. PEARCE. That tells me that the people in Cloudcroft have a 

great reason to go ahead and fear. I mean, I am telling you that 

the greatest fear over anything that we have felt in the district is 

these. Because they saw the Scott Able fire, they saw the Kopelli 

fire in Ruidoso. They have seen us burn hundreds of thousands of 

48

acres to the ground, while we do not clean anything up. And they 

see a 500-foot buffer zone. 

Finally, when you talk about, to Mr. Bishop, using private firms, 

biomass, are you aware that the Forest Service in New Mexico will 

not give 20- or 30-year contracts in order that these private firms 

would come in and harvest for you? That we have had biomass 

firms appealing to us, can you help get us a contract, and the 

Forest Service will not grant those. 

So how are we going to get this stuff cleaned up? You are going 

two to three thousand acres yourselves, and it is obvious you are 

not going to put more there, because evidently, and according to 

your five different things, there is not enough negative consequences, I think was your second thing. So there is not enough 

life to be lost in New Mexico, so we do not evidently rank very high 

on the priority list. 

I know we are one of the driest states. We have about as much 

national forest as any state. We don’t rank high on the list. So 

what are we to tell our people back home? 

Mr. REY. I said earlier that these are high-priority treatments. 

Mr. PEARCE. They are high-priority treatments, but we haven’t 

done anything for seven years, and we are not going to do anything 

until the fall. And we put ourselves not having an EIS in place, so 

that you still stand the risk of getting appeals. 

And I will tell you that the risk is extremely big that the appeals 

will happen, and we will hear one more time I am sorry, we are 

not going to do anything. And that is not a very suitable answer 

for me to go back and tell these constituents, with one road 

through the town, that have no way to get out if a fire starts. 

I am stunned at——

Mr. REY. That is not an acceptable answer. We are going to do 

something. We are going to do these treatments this year. And if 

appellants show up and try to block them, we will defend our decisions aggressively, and see if the courts will agree with us about 

the immediacy of what needs to be done. 

One other clarification is the Forest Service cannot grant 20-year 

contracts. The longest contract length that we are statutorily able 

to grant is 10 years, and we do and have granted 10-year contracts 

to biomass energy facilities, including a couple in Arizona. 

Mr. PEARCE. But none in New Mexico. And I do appreciate it. 

And we will work with you any way we can to try to get rid of the 

problem there, because the people in both Ruidoso, Ruidoso towns, 

Cloudcroft, and the other mountain communities are extraordinarily concerned, as they are out in the West. We have talked 

mostly about the Lincoln, but the Gila. We have five national forests in our district, and they all have the same problems. 

But I appreciate your hard work, and appreciate that you are in 

difficult circumstances. 

Mr. Chairman, I have talked too long. I apologize. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. No problem. Mr. DeFazio. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Numerous hearings, 

Secretary Rey, the issue of a longer term for those sorts of contracts as have come up—you just mentioned in response to the gentleman from New Mexico that you are limited to 10 years. And yet 

49

I think you indicated previously that you didn’t feel it was necessary. Do you still hold that position? 

Mr. REY. I would like to get a little bit more experience in writing a larger number of 10-year contracts, to see whether 10 years 

is too short for the amortization of new infrastructure. Because 

that is the real issue. 

It is a question of how much capital an investor has to have in 

order to turn the ground to start constructing a biomass energy facility, or a cellulosic ethanol plant. So far we have had some luck 

with investors who have come in and, with access to 10-year contracts, have gone ahead and broken ground and built facilities. 

So I am not sure that the contract length is the impediment. 

What I need the opportunity to do is to get more 10-year contracts 

out on the landscape, and then see, in another year or two, what 

that looks like. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. What if we gave you the flexibility to make an exception; go to 20 years to get people to locate in high-risk areas, 

and engage in fuel reduction in those areas? 

Mr. REY. I don’t think we would find that objectionable. I would 

need to talk with the contracting experts in the Federal government to make sure that we write sufficient protections into those 

contracts, so that the government’s interest is maintained, which 

is always the concern with a longer-term contract. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. You mentioned at one point in the first round 

there ecological restoration, along with fuel reduction. I believe I 

mentioned this to you. But there is a proposal on the WallowaWhitman Forest up in Northeast Oregon in Representative Walden’s district, an east-side dryer forest, where there is a need for 

both some thinning and fuel reduction. A gentleman came by my 

office to talk about the possibility of doing, you know, going in 

there with a cellulosic plant. And what it was contingent upon was 

both the fuel reduction over a long term, and doing it in conjunction with the thinning, because he would also utilize the tops and 

limbs from the commercial thinning that would be done. 

I mean, would that be the kind of innovative approach you are 

talking about in doing ecological restoration along with fuel reduction? 

Mr. REY. Yes. In fact, that is an area we are looking at for a potential 10-year contract, [inaudible]. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. All right. And then just a last point, and I think 

we have had discussion of this before. The 10-year average on the 

fire, on your estimates for fire costs. 

I mean, there is nothing magic about 10 years, right? It is not 

required. 

Mr. REY. No. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. And/or there might be an outlier year that you 

would drop, or something like that. I mean, if it is leading us to 

making proposals that are insufficient, it seems we might reconsider the standard we are using there. 

Mr. REY. We have looked at that in terms of going to a five-year 

average, or just dropping the highest and lowest years to rationalize the longer-term average. 

I think this is sort of a good news, bad news observation, but I 

think we have now got enough high-cost years in the rolling 10-

50

year average that what we are going to find is that our borrowing 

needs are going to be significantly reduced. That, combined with 

the cost containment work that we are doing, may put us in a position this year where we don’t end up borrowing. 

Mr. DEFAZIO. OK, well, hopefully. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing. I appreciate 

it, because this is a critical—well, you live in the West, too, but obviously a critical issue. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. Let me ask a couple of 

questions second round, and then finish up with Ranking Member, 

Mr. Bishop. 

For Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary, if you wouldn’t 

mind, gentlemen. The Appropriations Committee has requested 

that the agencies deliver a joint report to the committee indicating 

how hazardous fuel funds are allocated among bureaus, agencies, 

regions, states, and make it available publicly. It appears from 

your testimony that you are moving in that direction. 

When can we anticipate that report or that communication to 

Congress? 

Mr. REY. Of course, it will depend on whether they ask for it in 

our budget request, or whether they would just like to see it after 

we get our final appropriation. 

In our budget request, we generally submit supporting information that shows how we propose to allocate what we have requested. I think the nature of their request, if I understand it 

right, is that they would like to see a re-spin of that, based upon 

what we actually get appropriated. And if that is the request, then 

what we will try to do is turn it around within a couple weeks after 

the Appropriations Bill is signed. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. OK. Following up on Appropriation Committee requests, I think we are going to hear from the second panel about 

the need to redefine the wildland-urban interface. 

The Appropriations Committee has directed the agencies to reevaluate those existing definitions and criteria. How do you feel 

about that request, in terms of that redefinition process, or redoing 

the criteria, or looking at it differently? 

Mr. REY. I think what we will propose to the Appropriations 

Committee is, rather than struggling through a redefinition, let us 

give them an analysis of what the combined, what the outlook is 

for the combination or the aggregation of the community wildfire 

protection plans. 

You know, we have now over 2,000 community wildfire protection plans in which there is a great deal of local agreement about 

what needs to be treated within the wildland-urban interface to 

protect the community. I would hate to walk backwards from that 

agreement, and start spitting out a new definition of the wildlandurban interface. I think I would rather take a pass at seeing if I 

can aggregate the results of that work, so that it is available to 

somebody to look at on a more landscaped scale, and then discuss 

whether it is adequate or whether there are changes that need to 

be done. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Let me see if I can construct your answer for myself. Evaluate and report on what has been done up to this point? 

Mr. REY. Correct. 

51

Mr. GRIJALVA. And then, based on that, make a decision about 

redefining or changing criteria. 

Mr. REY. Correct. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. OK. And the last question——

Mr. REY. I should get you to answer my questions more often. 

It goes a lot better that way. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Well, I tend to get confused easily, so I have to 

ask them. 

Mr. Under Secretary, the last question. And I was interested in 

the discussion that you had with Congressman Sarbanes about the 

pecking order, robbing Peter to pay Paul, and how the need to respond to suppression activities is priority A. And regardless of 

what is budgeted, that has to be done. Given that whole commentary, I mentioned the $96 million cut 

in wildfire preparedness in this year’s budget request from the Administration. Given the severe wildfire seasons that we have had 

the last three, four, five years, that we have been experiencing, 

how does the Administration justify that cut? If it is not being—

is it being redirected to suppression? 

Mr. REY. We actually are seeing an increase in suppression, in 

part because we are following the 10-year average. 

But we have been engaged in four years of cost containment 

work. And I will submit for the record at this hearing a list of 41 

separate cost containment initiatives that we have underway. I will 

also submit for the record at this hearing our testimony before the 

Appropriations Committees, which summarize some of the major 

cost containment initiatives. 

Looking forward into 2008, we believe that it is, we will see the 

fruits of some of that kind of, of that labor in different tactical approaches to both preparedness and suppression. 

Even this year, in 2007, as this fire season unfolds, we believe we will see savings in the neighborhood of $130 to $150 million, as 

a consequence of some of the cost containment initiatives that we 

have underway, some of the very initiatives that were recommended by our Inspector General or by the Government Accountability Office. 

So that $96 million reduction in suppression that we proposed for 

2008——

Mr. GRIJALVA. Preparedness. 

Mr. REY. Preparedness, I am sorry—for 2008 is a reflection of 

savings that we think we will incur as a result of these efficiencies. 

Now, if we are wrong and it doesn’t manifest, we still obviously 

have time to make some changes. We also have the authority from 

the Appropriations Committees to take money from suppression to 

boost preparedness if we find ourselves in a severity situation that 

we didn’t anticipate early in the fire season. 

So we think we have flexibility to cover that, but we think that 

those are real savings resulting from the work that we have done 

that has been recommended. 

[NOTE: The list and testimony submitted for the record have 

been retained in the Committee’s official files.] 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you. Given the reality of suppression activities will occur, regardless if there is a line-item limit to it. And 

52

I don’t see that as an either-or between suppression and preparedness. And I would think that additional resources directed in preparedness that are categorically committed to that activity doesn’t 

set up the question of either-or. I think it creates what I think is 

a necessary balance. 

But with that, I have gone over time. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you again. I might suggest, Mr. Rey, that if 

five years for a rolling average is enough to be actuarially sound 

in a public retirement system, it might be good enough for you. 

I did have a question for the Inspector General. We have talked 

and heard people talking about how fires that take place on public 

lands have an impact on private land and private forest land. Do 

we have any numerical data as to what the cost is to either state, 

local government, or private consumers that have to deal also with 

the fires that start on Federal lands, and then turn to private 

lands? 

Ms. TIGHE. I don’t know that we have that information. 

Mr. BISHOP. Does anyone on the panel have a numerical value 

as to what it costs? 

[No response.] 

Mr. BISHOP. OK. So I don’t have the answer. I might presumptively argue that that may be a good reason why land acquisition 

should be at a minimum in the future, but we will deal with that. 

And actually, these guys have been on the hot seat for quite a 

while. I have some others, but they are not that vital. If there is 

anything more I have, I will submit them in writing. I just thank 

you, all of you, for taking the time to be with us here today. 

Mr. REY. I think we may be able to get some of the data you just 

asked for. I don’t have it at the tip of my tongue, but if we have 

calculated it in conjunction with the firefighting community, I will 

poll the system. And if we have it, I will submit it for the record. 

Mr. BISHOP. If you have that, I would be appreciative. Thank 

you, sir. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Let me join Mr. Bishop in thanking the panel. 

Thank you for your time and for your very important testimony 

today. Your full written testimony will be made part of the record, 

in addition to other materials you may submit. 

Thank you again. And let me call the second panel, please. 

Mr. REY. Thank you. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Let me as well thank you today. I appreciate it 

very much. That was a rather lengthy first panel, and so I appreciate your patience. Some of you have traveled a long way, some 

of you from the great State of Arizona, and I appreciated that very 

much, as well. 

Let me begin with Supervisor Elizabeth Archuleta, Coconino 

County. Thank you for being with us. And testimony will be limited 

to five minutes, but all materials will be made part of the record. 

So thank you very much. 

Supervisor. 

STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH C. ARCHULETA, SUPERVISOR, 

COCONINO COUNTY, ARIZONA 

Ms. ARCHULETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Bishop and Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the opVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
53

portunity to testify on behalf of the National Association of Counties and Coconino County on wildfire preparedness. 

I am the Chairman of the National Association of Counties Public Land Steering Committee, and a supervisor from Coconino 

County. Coconino County is located in one of the largest strands of 

Ponderosa pine in the world. The county spans almost 19,000 

square miles, and is the second largest in the lower 48. 

Coconino County contains Grand Canyon, the cities of Flagstaff, 

Williams, Page, and other unincorporated communities. It is also 

only 13 percent private land. 

As many of you know, the State of Arizona has learned some real 

lessons in the last few years on wildfire preparedness. Five years 

ago the Rodeo Chediski fire in the White Mountains burned nearly 

half a million acres, and cost the taxpayers more than $400 million. 

Last year the Woody fire immediately threatened the city of 

Flagstaff, and nearly escalated into a catastrophic wildfire. However, local forest treatments in the WUI protected the city from a 

loss of structure and lives. 

The Brins fire in Oak Creek Canyon outside Sedona burned more 

than 4,000 acres, and the aftermath is still being felt today. Potential rock slides, soil degradation, and an impact on water quality 

are serious problems that Coconino County and its communities 

will be addressing for years to come. 

While wildfires are a very real danger in Northern Arizona, 

Coconino County has created plans to prepare for catastrophic 

wildfire prevention. With the passage of HFRA, communities across 

the county were urged to create community wildfire protection 

plans to be eligible for Federal hazardous fuel reduction funding. 

Coconino County has implemented and provided funding for 

these plans, in collaboration with cities, the Greater Flagstaff 

Forest Partnership, the Ponderosa Fire Advisory Council, and the 

Forest Service Nature Conservancy and many other groups. The result has been prioritized hazardous fuels reduction and collaborative planning efforts. 

Also, Coconino County is currently exploring the adoption of specific codes and ordinances related to developments in the WUI 

areas. 

In addition, our Governor has created the Governor’s Forest 

Health Advisory Council to develop a statewide strategy for managing Arizona’s forests. 

Let me just talk about the benefits of HFRA on a national level. 

It has benefitted the counties in major ways: three, to be exact. It 

has enabled counties across the Nation to create collaborative wildfire protection plans. Over 100 counties have developed these 

plans. 

It has encouraged the development of partnerships with Federal 

land management agencies, state agencies, cities, counties, universities, and scientists, and environmental groups to create strategies 

to mitigate and reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire. 

And three, it has provided streamlined compliance work under 

NEPA for fuel management projects, which has been very helpful. 

An important point I would like to stress today, though, is that 

we believed funding would come from this Act for the development 

of the CWPPs, and to support fuels management through the 

54

Forest Service and the State Fire Assistance Program. But that has 

not happened, to the extent that was anticipated or is needed. 

Coconino County has taken a very proactive approach, as well as 

the State of Arizona. And this has been nurtured across the West 

by a partnership between NACo and the Sonoran Institute based 

in Pima County, Arizona. We know that open space, natural beauty, recreational opportunities, and a desirable quality of life are 

some of the driving forces behind the growth and development in 

the WUI areas throughout the West. 

For local elected officials, this period of growth and change presents real challenges. In 1999, NACo and the Sonoran Institute 

partnered to create the Western Communities Stewardship Forum, 

to provide training and support to assist more than 300 rural county officials from eight western states to effectively manage growth 

through innovative community-based land-use decisions and solutions. 

Counties are taking responsibility for growth in the WUI areas. 

Counties are considering land-use codes and ordinances. And we 

want to stress this. 

Contemplating a similar model, the National Association of 

Counties is currently working with the USDA, Forest Service, and 

the Bureau of Land Management on a similar program that would 

strengthen the capacity of counties to reduce wildland fire risk in 

the WUI area. 

Let me just tell you, though, that we want to advocate today for 

a paradigm shift, to move from suppression to prevention. We encourage Federal land management agencies in the state to create 

the capacity for forest restoration treatments. We encourage Federal agencies to emphasize preventative treatments through active 

management over suppression efforts when setting priorities. 

We encourage Congress to use the appropriations process to 

change the emphasis from suppression to treatment. We also encourage the stimulation of stewardship contracts to bring wood utilization industries to forested counties to help pay for fuel reduction efforts, and look to the Federal agencies in Congress to help 

with this effort. 

We also would like to encourage you to continue to seek ways to 

fully fund PILT and to secure rural schools, because many of the 

community wildfire protection plans and the fuel reduction efforts 

are funded by these two funding sources. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Archuleta follows:]

Statement of The Honorable Elizabeth Archuleta, Supervisor, Coconino 

County, Arizona, on behalf of The National Association of Counties 

INTRODUCTION 

Chairman Grijalva, Ranking Member Bishop, and members of the Subcommittee, 

I appreciate the opportunity to testify on behalf of the National Association of Counties and Coconino County on wildfire preparedness. 

I am Elizabeth Archuleta, Chairman of the National Association of Counties Public Lands Steering Committee and a Supervisor from Coconino County, Arizona. 

Coconino County is located in one of the largest stands of ponderosa pine in the 

world. The County spans almost 19,000 square miles and is the second largest in 

the lower 48. Coconino County contains the City of Flagstaff, the Grand Canyon, 

the City of Williams, the City of Page and other unincorporated communities. 

55

As many of you know, the State of Arizona has learned some real lessons in the 

last few years on wildfire preparedness. In 2002, the Rodeo Chedeski fire in the 

White Mountains burned nearly half a million acres and cost the taxpayers more 

than $400 million. The February Fire in northern Gila County started in February 

2006 and taught us that with extreme drought conditions, fire does not always occur 

in the summer months. The February Fire burned more than 4,000 acres and cost 

the taxpayers more than $3 million. 

Last year, the Woody Fire immediately threatened the City of Flagstaff and nearly escalated into a catastrophic wildfire. However, local forest treatment efforts in 

the wildland urban interface protected the City of Flagstaff from a loss of structures 

and lives. The Brins Fire in Oak Creek Canyon, outside of Sedona, burned more 

than 4,000 acres and the aftermath is still being felt today. Potential rockslides, soil 

degradation and impact on water quality are serious problems Coconino County 

communities will be addressing for years to come. 

With the passage of the Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003 (HFRA), communities across the country were urged to create collaborative Community Wildfire 

Protection Plans (CWPP) to be eligible for Federal hazardous fuels reduction funding. Coconino County and the City of Flagstaff, in collaboration with the Greater 

Flagstaff Forest Partnership (GFFP) and the Ponderosa Fire Advisory Council 

(PFAC), developed the Community Wildfire Protection Plan for the City of Flagstaff 

and surrounding communities. The USDA Forest Service is a member of both the 

GFFP and PFAC. The result of these efforts has been collaborative planning efforts 

and prioritized hazardous fuels reduction. 

In addition, the Governor of Arizona has created a Governor’s Forest Health Advisory Council to develop a statewide strategy for managing Arizona’s forests. With 

the recent release of the draft statewide strategy, the State is holding public hearings throughout the state. The goal of the draft strategy is to present scientific and 

policy recommendations to the Governor on forest health, unnaturally severe fire 

and community protection. 

While the dialogue in the State of Arizona and Coconino County has changed from 

a reactive approach to a proactive approach, more work needs to be done. Today, 

I would like to focus on a few key points to demonstrate how HFRA has helped 

counties and what additional tools we need to be more effective. First, I will focus 

on the community partnerships developed to address fire mitigation. Second, I will 

describe how counties are taking responsibility for growth and development in the 

Wildland Urban Interface. And finally, I would like to explain the real cost of wildfire suppression on the ground and encourage a paradigm shift from funding fire 

suppression to funding prevention and forest restoration through active forest management. 

PARTNERSHIPS, PLANNING AND FOREST HEALTH 

The National Association of Counties believes there is a clear and imminent danger to our public forest resources and adjacent communities stemming from years 

of fire suppression and other management decisions. In addition to increased fuel 

densities, past management decisions have led to unhealthy forests that are much 

more susceptible to insect infestation, disease, and catastrophic wildfire. 

Federal land management agencies should focus management efforts on high-risk 

forests utilizing an array of appropriate forest management practices, including 

thinning and harvesting, and prescribed burning. In addition, Federal land management agencies should increase private, state, and local contracts and partnerships 

for more effective fire suppression and pre-fire management of federal forest lands. 

Locally, our forest ecologists tell us that when a forest is healthy it will support 

low intensity ground fires every 2-20 years. One of the best defenses against catastrophic crown fires is landscape adaptation to historical fire types. Evidence suggests that a treated area is vital for effective fire suppression. Proactive communitybased approaches to wildland fire management combines cost-effective fire preparedness with fire suppression to protect communities and the environment. In 1996, 

Coconino County experienced several fires within and on the edge of the WUI that 

clearly focused the public’s attention to the risk posed by a catastrophic wildfire and 

the plight of the forests. As a result, an instrumental partnership was established 

to comprehensively address fire mitigation in the greater Flagstaff area. Further 

discussion on the success of this partnership is described below. 

Partnerships 

For a variety of reasons, partnerships between the Federal government, State and 

local government, and private organizations are vital to the development of local 

wildfire management strategies, fuels reduction and management projects, as well 

as the continuation of local community collaboration on all levels of government. 

56

Both Congress and the Administration have pushed for collaborative community 

management strategies through the Department of the Interior Collaborative Conservation and Healthy Lands Initiatives, as well as Congressional direction through 

PL 106-291 directing the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to develop a strategy that requires ‘‘close collaboration among citizens and governments at all levels,’’ 

including a diverse group of people representing all levels of government, tribal interests, conservation and commodity groups, and community-based restoration 

groups. 

NACo Partnership with Sonoran Institute 

The proactive approach we have adopted in Coconino County has been nurtured 

across the West by a partnership between NACo and the Sonoran Institute, based 

in Pima County, Arizona. We know that open space, natural beauty, recreational opportunities, and a desirable quality of life are some of the driving forces behind the 

growth and development in the wildland urban interface of communities throughout 

the West. For local elected officials, this period of growth and change presents real 

challenges. In 1999, NACo and the Sonoran Institute partnered to create the Western Community Stewardship Forum (WCSF) to provide training and support to assist rural county officials effectively manage growth through innovative, communitybased land use decisions and solutions. 

Since the Forum’s inception, more than 300 officials from counties in eight western states have participated in WCSF. Participants receive practical, innovative 

land-use tools and strategies that have stimulated healthy economies, while preserving local identity and the cultural assets of the community. Through a competitive application process, WCSF selects teams of up to six county officials responsible 

for local growth-management strategies to participate in an intensive three-day 

training workshop to explore solutions to community land-use issues, effective 

growth management plans to balance environmental, economic, and community concerns through locally-led decisions, and fostering collaboration among participants 

on a variety of growth issues. 

Future NACo Partnership with BLM & Forest Service 

Contemplating a similar model, the National Association of Counties is currently 

working with the USDA Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) 

to develop a program that would strengthen the capacity of counties to reduce 

wildland fire risk in the wildland urban interface. Specifically, the project would assess the current status of county development and implementation of Community 

Wildfire Protection Plans. County officials will be provided with technical assistance, training, and tools to build their capacity to proactively reduce wildland fire 

risk and contain associated costs in the wildland urban interface. The first goal of 

the proposal is to help local officials better understand how their decisions in the 

wildland urban interface influence public health and safety in their communities. 

In addition to capacity building on the local level, the second goal of the proposal 

would be the development and distribution of a Best Practices Guidebook for local 

officials and the development of training workshops. NACo would create a guidebook 

outlining practices and strategies in land use planning and fuels management policies for wildland fire protection. The publication would serve as a tool for communities seeking to develop new wildland fire plans. 

Coconino County serves as an excellent example of how communities can create 

successful partnerships to develop and implement Community Wildfire Protection 

Plans CWPP). Three key partnerships exist in Coconino County that actively plan 

and execute existing wildfire protection plans. A brief description of each partnership is below: 

Greater Flagstaff Forests Partnership 

After several near misses with fires in the wildland urban interface in 1996, the 

Greater Flagstaff Forests Partnership (GFFP) was formed. The GFFP is an alliance 

of more than 20 environmental, governmental, research and business organizations 

dedicated to researching and demonstrating approaches to forest ecosystem restoration in the ponderosa pine forests surrounding Flagstaff, Arizona. The Partnership’s 

three primary goals are to, (1) restore natural ecosystem structures, function, and 

composition of ponderosa pine forests, (2) manage forest fuels to reduce the probability of catastrophic fire, and (3) research, test, develop, and demonstrate key ecological, economic, and social dimensions of restoration efforts. 

Ponderosa Fire Advisory Council (PFAC) 

Created after the Yellowstone fires in 1988, PFAC is comprised of members of 

local fire departments, rural fire districts, emergency services, law enforcement, and 

the USDA Forest Service. PFAC focuses on ensuring that all agencies are properly 

57

prepared, trained in Incident Command System (ICS), share operating guidelines, 

operate under mutual aid contracts, and participate in interoperable communications planning. In addition, PFAC is committed to public fire wise education and 

community preparedness in the event of a wildfire emergency. PFAC is also actively 

involved in implementing the CWPP for the greater Flagstaff Area. 

Wildfire Advisory Council (WFAC) 

Similar to PFAC, WFAC is comprised of local representatives from the greater 

Williams area, including representatives from local fire departments, rural fire districts, the Kaibab National Forest, Coconino County Sheriff’s Office and the Department of Arizona State Lands. WFAC developed and is implementing the community 

wildfire protection plans for the community of Tusayan (gateway community to the 

Grand Canyon) and the City of Williams. 

The County participates in all of the collaborative forest partnerships discussed 

above to promote and facilitate forest restoration and fuels reduction throughout the 

County. 

Planning 

Community Wildfire Protection Plans 

Community Wildfire Protection Plans are authorized in the Healthy Forests Restoration Act (HFRA) enacted in 2003. The HFRA provides communities with a tremendous opportunity to influence where and how federal agencies implement fuel 

reduction projects on federal lands and how additional federal funds may be distributed for projects on non-federal lands. A CWPP is the most effective way to take 

advantage of this opportunity. Additionally, the HFRA directs the Forest Service 

and BLM to give preference to communities with CWPPS when allocating hazardous 

fuels reduction funding. 

The partnerships outlined above have created Community Wildfire Protection 

Plans (CWPP) in Flagstaff, Williams, and Tusayan. The County was actively involved in the development of the CWPPs and has provided funding for their development. In addition, plans are currently being developed for the Blue Ridge and 

Forest Lakes areas of the County, and the County has contributed funds to the development of these plans. The partnerships developing the CWPPs include a variety 

of interests from federal and state land management agencies to homeowner associations to environmental organizations. Collaboration and interagency cooperation 

is essential to addressing wildfire protection issues because wildfire and forest 

health issues do not respect jurisdictional boundaries. The goal of the CWPPs is a 

community-based approach to wildland fire issues, which combines cost-effective 

healthy forest mitigation, fire preparedness and suppression to protect communities 

with a proactive approach to achieving a healthy forest ecosystem. 

Some examples of the fire mitigation projects resulting from the partnerships’ 

CWPP efforts include: 

• Clint’s Wells Fuels Reduction—Target 2/2008

• Elk Parks Fuel reduction In progress 

• Munds Parks fuel reduction 10/2007

• GFFP eastside fuel management 5/2007

• Oak Creek Canyon fuel reduction 6/2007

• Grand Canyon Airport Fuel reduction 12/2007 Tusayan Community (gateway to 

Grand Canyon) 

• Bill Williams Mountain Communication/Electronic Site Hazardous Tree Reduction 9/2007

In addition, the City of Flagstaff is implementing a number of fire mitigation 

projects in the wildland urban interface adjacent to Flagstaff. 

Coconino County Hazard Mitigation Plan 2006

In addition to the CWPP work done by the forest partnerships, Coconino County 

developed a County Hazard Mitigation Plan, which was approved by FEMA in 2006. 

The Hazard Mitigation Plan identified wildland fire as the most significant risk to 

the communities within Coconino County. Potential economic loss due to a catastrophic fire could exceed $2.5 billion. A primary goal of the County Hazard Mitigation Plan is to promote public understanding, support, and demand for hazard mitigation—In addition, the plan aims to educate the public; promote partnerships between states, counties, local and tribal governments, and to identify, prioritize and 

implement mitigation actions. 

Creative Implementation Strategy 

Coconino County established the Coconino Rural Environment Corps (CREC) in 

1997 to promote environmental stewardship and youth job development skills. Over 

58

the past several years, CREC has become a key organization for implementing hazardous fuel reduction projects identified by the forest partnerships. In most cases, 

CREC assists USDA Forest Service and local fire districts with fuel management 

projects. In 2006 alone, CREC conducted forest fuels reduction projects on over 

1,200 acres in Coconino County, most of which are in the wildland urban interface. 

CREC also tackles other environmental improvement projects, such as clearing riparian areas of tamarisk, planting trees in burned areas, and restoring grassland 

habitats. 

Public Education, Outreach 

In addition to planning and implementing Community Wildfire Protection Plans, 

the partnerships, and in particular PFAC and the County, led public fire wise education efforts throughout the County. Each year the County provides fire wise information and emergency preparedness planning to residents through our annual 

County Newsletter, which is mailed to all county residents. In addition, the partnerships support the development and dissemination of an annual Survival Guide, 

which is an insert in our local newspaper. The guide provides residents with information on fire wise actions they can take to reduce fire hazards on their property 

as well as emergency preparedness tips. 

DEVELOPMENT IN THE WILDLAND URBAN INTERFACE 

Wildland fires continue to threaten lives, structures, infrastructure, watersheds, 

community parklands, and other vital community assets, particularly in the 

wildland urban interface (WUI). The National Association of Counties has adopted 

national policy calling on counties to enact better local land use ordinances and local 

fuels management policies for wildland fire protection in and around communities 

at risk of wildland fire. NACo supports Federal, state and local efforts to collaborate 

and cooperate on efforts to mitigate fire in the wildland urban interface. Coconino 

County again serves as a good example of community development planning that 

takes into consideration fire reduction within the WUI. 

Land Ownership Patterns in Coconino County 

Approximately 13% of Coconino County is private land. The remainder is owned 

by the USDA Forest Service (28%), National Park Service (7%), Bureau of Land 

Management (5%), State of Arizona (9%), and Indian Reservations (38%). Most of 

the private land in the County encompasses very large ranches that have been historically subject to minimal development. The counties forested areas (which are 

subject to the greatest fire risk) are predominantly owned by the USDA Forest Service. While development occurs in small private inholdings that prevent growth from 

spreading very far into the forest, these developments, in effect do expand the 

wildland urban interface zone. However, the reality in Coconino County is that the 

vast majority of development exists in the greater ponderosa forest of Northern Arizona. One could consider the communities of Flagstaff, Williams, Parks, Kachina 

Village, Mountainaire, Fort Valley, Doney Park, Blue Ridge, Pinewood, and Forest 

Lakes as ‘‘pockets’’ of development within the forest. 

Coconino County’s Response to Development in Forested Areas 

Coconino County is exploring the adoption of a specific WUI code or ordinance. 

However, there are many aspects of fire risk reduction that have been incorporated 

into the County’s planning and development process already. Coconino County has 

taken a multi-pronged approach to addressing development in the wildland urban 

interface. This issue is addressed in the form of goals and policies in the Coconino 

County Comprehensive Plan, as well as local Area Plans for unincorporated communities. The WUI issues are addressed in the development review process in the form 

of conditions or stipulations that are placed on subdivisions and conditional use permits. In addition, fire prevention is addressed through the County’s participation in 

collaborative partnerships and interagency cooperation. Lastly, the County’s Community Development Department actively promotes public education and outreach 

regarding fire wise building and development. One of our approaches to public education is to provide informational materials to all persons seeking building permits. 

We provide handouts on Firewise landscaping and construction techniques, prescribed fire, tips for homeowners on reducing wildfire danger, and even a citizen’s 

guide to evacuation procedures. 

Comprehensive Plan—Goals & Policies Related to the WUI 

The current version of the Coconino County Comprehensive Plan was adopted 

September 23, 2003. It is a conservation-based plan that recognizes that we have 

an ethical obligation to the land, that we all, collectively and individually, have a 

responsibility for the health of the land. The concept is that the health of the land 

59

is the foundation of the health of the human community. The Coconino County Comprehensive Plan includes a Natural Environment element that addresses forest ecosystem health in a general way, but the Public Safety element more specifically addresses the ‘‘Wildland Urban Interface.’’

The Wildland Urban Interface goal is simply to: ‘‘[r]educe the threat of catastrophic wildfire in the wildland urban interface.’’ There are three policies related 

to this goal: 

1. A forest stewardship/fuels mitigation plan is required for major developments 

and subdivisions in the interface; 

2. Fire wise landscaping and building design and materials is encouraged in the 

interface; and 

3. Property owners and developers are encouraged to consult with adjacent land 

management agencies when they are developing fire mitigation plans to ensure 

compatibility between adjacent owners and land managers. 

In addition, the County regularly consults with and seeks input from the USDA 

Forest Service when we have development proposals adjacent to National Forest 

land. Community Development usually accommodates Forest Service concerns and 

issues through stipulations attached to development approval. Likewise, where rural 

fire districts exist, we seek their input and address their concerns through conditions of approval. 

Development Approval—Subdivisions and Conditional Use Permits for Development 

in the WUI 

For over ten years, Coconino County has required developers of subdivisions in 

forested areas to include a forest stewardship/fuels mitigation plan as a condition 

of approval of their preliminary plat. In some of the earliest cases, the Forestry Division of the State Land Department assisted the developers in writing these forest 

stewardship plans. More recently, developers have hired forestry consultants to 

write the forest stewardship plans. The stewardship plans have to be completed and 

accepted by the County prior to approval of the final plat. If the plan calls for 

thinning and burning (or other fuels mitigation measures are required), then the developer is responsible for completing that work prior to final plat approval, or it 

must be bonded as with other required improvements. Similar requirements are attached to conditional use permits where appropriate. 

Example of a Development with Fire Protection Requirements in Place 

An excellent example of a subdivision that developed a fuels mitigation plan is 

the Flagstaff Ranch development southwest of Flagstaff, which consists of 525 housing units along with a clubhouse and community center on about 480 acres of land. 

The plan called for thinning of the entire property, use of fire-resistive construction 

throughout the development, the formation of a fire district to provide fire protection for the subdivision, and use of fire sprinklers in every building. 

FUNDING SOURCES VITAL FOR WILDFIRE PREPAREDNESS 

Mr. Chairman, as Congress and the Administration struggle to find a way to contain the skyrocketing costs of wildland fire suppression, I urge you to pause and 

take a look at the cost containment issue from outside the beltway, on the ground 

in one of America’s public lands counties. 

As I have tried to make clear earlier in my testimony, Coconino County, Arizona 

Counties, NACo and many other counties across the country, are finding ways to 

reduce the risks—and the costs—of wildland fire in the WUI. We worry, however, 

that there may be a movement afoot in some quarters to force states and local governments to shoulder a greater share of the costs of suppression in the WUI. We 

believe that this would be a very costly mistake. 

First of all, please remember the enormous footprint the federal estate has in 

counties like mine. The United States is, by far, the largest and wealthiest landowner in so many of our counties, not only in the West, but also in places like Pocahontas County in Chairman Rahall’s district in West Virginia. For our public lands 

county governments to maintain basic public services—not to mention enhanced 

wildland fire suppression capacity—we depend on the federal government fulfilling 

the promise of the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) Act and the Secure Rural 

Schools and Community Self Determination Act. 

We are grateful that you and your colleagues in Congress were able to extend the 

latter for one year in the Supplemental Appropriation sent to the President in April. 

This ‘‘stay of execution’’ will allow us to continue to maintain essential transportation infrastructure and keep our rural schools open. It will also continue authorization of the Resource Advisory Committees (RAC’s) formed under Title II. 

Nationally these 15 person stakeholder committees have studied and approved over 

2,500 projects on federal forestlands and adjacent public and private lands using 

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funds that are approved by Forest County Boards of Commissioners for these purposes. These projects have addressed a wide variety of improvements drastically 

needed on our National Forests, including fuels reduction and reforestation projects. 

Many forest counties have also invested Title III funds in developing fire prevention strategies and educating citizens in fire safe actions. Since the passage of the 

Healthy Forest Restoration Act, over 100 counties have been actively engaged in developing Community Wildfire Protection Plans using Title III funding, including 

Coconino County. These same counties will be investing Title II funds through the 

RAC process to implement their community wildfire protection plans through 

HFRA. Reauthorization of PL 106-393 is vital to the continuation of fire prevention 

strategies and forest health projects in our communities. 

With the expiration of this fiscal year just around the corner, NACo respectfully 

asks that the Subcommittee continue to explore ways to provide stability and security for the citizens of America’s public lands counties, including by fully funding 

PILT and reauthorizing the Secure Rural Schools and Community Self Determination Act on a multi-year basis. Only with a stable, predictable bottom line will rural 

public lands county officials be able to be the kind of leaders for forest health and 

community safety that we ought to be. 

Costs of Fire Suppression versus Fire Prevention 

Last December, Northern Arizona University researcher Gary Snider published 

an article in the Journal of Forestry that examined our current investment in fire 

suppression versus inadequate investment in reducing fire risk by implementing 

hazardous fuel reduction treatments. The researchers found that by spending $238-

601/acre for hazard reduction treatments in the southwest today, these treatments 

will more than pay for themselves by avoiding the future costs of fire suppression. 

The economists concluded that current federal policy that inadequately invests in 

hazard reduction treatments does not represent rational economic behavior, because 

funding hazard reduction can pay for itself by lowering future fire suppression costs. 

Taking this research and applying it to the Rodeo-Chediski Fire that burned over 

469,000 acres you can see the fiscal wisdom of a prevention approach. A full cost 

accounting of all costs associated with the fire shows costs over $400 million. This 

includes $43 million in suppression costs, $75 million in lost timber and $120 million in private insurance payments to cover losses of over 490 residences, as well 

as many other damages. 

Research shows that if you strategically treat 1/3 of the landscape you can effectively reduce extreme fire behavior. If we had invested in treating 150,000 acres at 

a representative cost of $500/acre, then it would have cost us $75 million to reduce 

the probability of this catastrophe. Although this initially appears expensive, it is 

dwarfed by what the fire ultimately cost the federal, state and local governments, 

the White Mountain Apache Tribe and the citizens who were victims of this tragic 

event. 

In addition to this research, the General Accounting Office determined that from 

2000 to 2004 the Forest Service and Department of Interior transferred more than 

$2.7 billion from other programs to cover fire suppression costs. GAO indicated that 

the agencies ‘‘repeatedly underestimated how much money would be needed to pay 

for fire suppression’’ (GAO 2004). 

Post Fire Costs 

In many cases the costs that occur after a fire is suppressed can be significant 

and are generally the responsibility of the County or local jurisdiction. For example, 

the Brins Fire adjacent to Sedona and Oak Creek continues to create hazardous 

flooding and debris flow risk for the residents of Oak Creek Canyon due to the loss 

of ground vegetation from the intense fire behavior. Beyond the physical mitigation 

efforts, the County has implemented public education, awareness, rapid emergency 

notification and coordinated emergency response. A task force of Federal, state and 

local resource managers, geologists, public safety, ADOT, and National Weather 

Service personnel have partnered to provide for a safer and better informed Oak 

Creek Canyon community. 

FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 

Opportunity for Stewardship Contracting and Sustainable Forest-Based Enterprises 

Stewardship contracting can achieve forest management while meeting local and 

rural community needs as well as create renewable energy businesses. Forests can 

be a source of renewable biomass energy, a less-polluting energy source that can reduce dependence on foreign fossil fuels. Biomass utilization of materials from restoration treatments can create jobs and support local economies while assisting the 

complementary goals of community protection and forest restoration. Some costs of 

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restoration would be offset, because forest and wood-product enterprises would pay 

for harvested material such as saw logs, small-diameter trees, and woody biomass. 

There would be no need to pay for dead tree removal and disposal. 

The stewardship contracting procedure allows forest administrators to take factors other than bid price into consideration when awarding the contract. Issues such 

as local job creation, how the material would be utilized, and the use of local subcontractors are important aspects of the decision. This allows smaller local businesses to outbid larger timber companies for the contract. Western communities and 

public land managers have been struggling for years to develop markets for the 

small diameter material that results from fuel reduction activities. Stewardship contracting would create the market for small-diameter wood. Markets for a sustainable small diameter industry are dependent on government commitments through 

long-term contracting agreements. 

Example of Stewardship Contract 

The White Mountain Stewardship Contract on the Apache-Sitgreaves National 

Forest is designed around the goal of building a small-scale woody biomass industry 

based on the need for hazardous fuel reduction treatments following the devastating 

486,000 acre Rodeo-Chedeski Fire of 2002. 

This contract is the largest of its kind and covers fuel reduction and treatment 

of up to 15,000 acres per year for the next ten years. The contract was awarded 

to Future Forest, which is a partnership between a wood contracting business and 

a wood pellet manufacturing company that produces pellets for heating wood stoves. 

A local bio-energy plant also purchases 50,000 tons of limbs, tree tops, and small 

trees from Future Forest every year. A power plant that is being constructed in the 

area to produce green power credits for Arizona power companies is also expected 

to buy 170,000 green tons of biomass annually. Other businesses that are taking 

advantage of the woody materials that Future Forest can provide include a custom 

log home business, a post & pole operation, a chemical wood hardening company, 

and a small-diameter sawmill. The Contract supported 15 firms with total expenditures of almost $16 million. The forestry firms employ 245 full time employees with 

an additional 85 created through the multiplier process. 

Increased Funding for Hazardous Fuels Reduction 

There is an opportunity to reduce treatment costs by increasing the value of small 

trees thinned. Strategic planning of treatment types and sequencing can reduce peracre costs by positioning relatively costly mechanical treatments in a way that facilitates wildland fire use, comparatively less expensive across broader landscapes. Reduced treatment costs would create increased funding for hazardous fuels reduction. 

This will provide assistance to community property owners for vegetation reduction 

on property sites, which create a fire hazard for the community. Ultimately, hazardous fuels reduction treatments will ensure a safer community for residents with 

protection from and prevention of wildfires. 

Paradigm Shift from Funding Fire Suppression to Funding Fire Prevention 

Public awareness and support can lead to social changes in thought patterns that 

would encourage a proactive approach in preventing catastrophic wildfires through 

long term restoration, community protection and fire management. From my County’s perspective, a proactive approach is far more responsible than a reactive approach in dealing with the social, economic, and environmental damages following 

catastrophic fires in our community. 

CONCLUSION 

Coconino County has successfully used the Healthy Forest Restoration Act to create collaborative Community Wildfire Protection Plans to assist our communities in 

prioritizing fuel management projects. The County developed partnerships with Federal land management agencies, state agencies, cities, adjacent counties, universities, scientists and environmental groups to create strategies to mitigate and reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire. Importantly, HFRA has provided streamlined 

compliance work under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for fuel management projects. 

As we move forward, Coconino County encourages increased funding to federal 

land management agencies and to the state to create the financial capacity for significant forest restoration treatments. We support increased funding to enable communities, stakeholder groups, and tribes to collaborate in land management activities. These points are consistent with the Governor’s Forest Health Advisory Council’s Statewide Strategy. 

Coconino County encourages federal agencies to emphasize preventative treatments through active management over suppression efforts when setting priorities. 

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For example, the FY2006 enacted level for the USDA Forest Service included $282 

million for hazardous fuels treatment compared to $690 million for fire suppression. 

In addition, Congress should use the appropriations process to change the emphasis 

from suppression to treatment. 

Coconino County is excited at the possibility of bringing a wood utilization industry to Northern Arizona and look to the federal agencies and Congress to help with 

this effort. Stewardship contracting is crucial to successfully implementing this critical economic development opportunity and to re-establishing a healthy forest ecosystem. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much, Supervisor. And let me 

turn now to the Forester from the State of Georgia, Mr. Farris.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT FARRIS,

ACTING GEORGIA STATE FORESTER 

Mr. FARRIS. Good afternoon. On behalf of the Southern Group of 

State Foresters and the State of Georgia, I am pleased to present 

you with our views related to wildfire preparedness and funding. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, for 

your invitation to participate. 

I would like to start with a comment on Mr. Bishop’s comment 

about the relative humidity here in Washington. In Georgia over 

the past several months, with relative humidities in the 20 percent 

range and winds blowing 20 to 30 miles per hour, you would have 

felt right at home if you had been down visiting in Georgia. 

Our firefighters have been very thankful for the recovery of some 

of the relative humidity that we have seen recently here. 

The South is in the middle of the worst fire season in modern 

history. So far in 2007, the southern region has had over 28,000 

fires that have burned over a million acres and 404 structures. Just 

this past month, four fires merged together in Georgia and Florida 

to create the largest fire in recorded history in the Southeast. 

As far as values, currently our preliminary estimates are $48 

million of timber loss in Georgia, $33 million of timber loss in Florida. And this will be impacting the local economy for years to come, 

the forestry-dependent economy. 

We have had real problems with smoke impacting not only Georgia and Florida, but also Alabama and Tennessee. These fires have 

impacted the infrastructure, resulting in numerous highway closures, closures of airports, railroads, school closures, disrupting 

utility services, as with any natural disaster. Numerous evacuations have occurred in Georgia, with over 10,000 home evacuation 

days in Georgia. 

Georgia alone over this past fiscal year has had over 9,000 

wildfires that have burned more than 550,000 acres. To put that 

in perspective, typically, on a 10-year average in Georgia, we have 

about 8,000 fires that burn approximately 40,000 acres. So our 

losses this year are 13 times normal. 

Even after as much as six inches of rain from tropical storm 

Barry, some of our fires continued to burn in the organic soils 

throughout Southeast Georgia. These fires come on the heels of the 

horrendous fire activity in Texas and Oklahoma last year that 

burned over 1.7 million acres of forest land. 

Fire is certainly not anything new to the South. Typically, the 

southern region experiences more than half of the wildfires in the 

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nation, and conducts the vast majority of the prescribed burns in 

the country. 

For example, the southern region averages about 40,000 wildfires 

per year, and conducts over 225,000 prescribed burns on more than 

6 million acres. In Georgia alone, we average prescribed burning 

about a million acres per year. 

As opposed to the West, over 90 percent of the forested land in 

the South is in private ownership. The ability to effectively suppress and minimize losses from large-scale wildfire is becoming increasingly difficult to the WUI that we keep mentioning here. The 

divestiture of industry lands is also significantly impacting our 

ability to respond to wildfires, with the loss of over 500 industryequipped tractors that were once an integral part of our fire response. 

Again, to refer back to Georgia, back in 1989 we had 180 industry tractors equipped with fire plows that assisted us with the fire 

control. Today, we only have 20. 

The South has 50 percent of the wildland-urban interface in the 

nation. Again referring back to Georgia, Georgia has 23 of the 100 

fastest-growing counties in the nation. Virtually every fire in the 

South is a threat to homes and communities. 

I know that it is not possible to be 100 percent prepared to address the kind of fires we have been experiencing this year and last 

year; however, preparedness can help reduce the impacts to homes, 

infrastructure, and help protect the public and firefighter safety. 

There are several areas that I believe are key to being adequately prepared. One is early detection and rapid response. In the 

South we use single-engine airplanes to quickly detect fires and 

guide crews to those fires. Well-trained and equipped firefighters 

are critical, in addition to cooperative agreements that we have 

with the Federal fire agencies, the South also has two interstate 

compacts that prove critical to mobilizing over 3,000 firefighters 

and cooperators into the state this year, from 44 different states 

across the Nation to assist Georgia. 

Homeowner education is important. The development of community wildland protection plans and the use of Firewise are important to educating homeowners. 

Fuel treatments are important. Treating forest-reduced fuels 

around communities and constructing fire breaks is of paramount 

importance. Prescribed fire is by far the most cost-effective and efficient means of reducing fuels in the South. 

State fire assistance funds which come to the states through the 

U.S. Forest Service are extremely important for state wildfire preparedness. The Southern Group of State Foresters and the 

National Association of State Foresters are part of a national coalition advocating expansion of the State Fire Assistance Program to 

adequately address wildland fire in the U.S. 

It is estimated that $145 million is needed in the Fiscal 

Year 2008 appropriation for wildfire control. Budget constraints 

may not support this much increase; however, these figures do accurately reflect the true funding needs. 

Attached to my written comments is a briefing paper from the 

State Fire Assistance Coalition that provides further details. 

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

for the opportunity to present our thoughts. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Farris follows:]

Statement of Robert Farris, Acting State Forester of Georgia 

On behalf of the Southern Group of State Foresters and the State of Georgia, I 

am pleased to present you with our views related to wildfire preparedness and funding. Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee for your invitation 

to participate. 

The South is in the middle of the worst fire siege in modern history. So far in 

2007, the Southern Region has had over 28,000 wildfires that have burned more 

than a million acres and 404 structures. In late May four fires burned together in 

Georgia and Florida creating the South’s largest fire in recorded history. Smoke has 

impacted air quality not only in Georgia and Florida but also in Alabama and Tennessee. These fires have impacted infrastructure resulting in numerous highway closures including interstates, disrupted power and telephone service and caused airport, railroad and school closures. Numerous evacuations have been ordered resulting in over 10,000 home evacuation days in Georgia. Georgia alone has had over 

8,900 wildfires that have burned more than 550,000 acres. Even after as much as 

six inches of rain from Tropical Storm Barry, some of the fires continue to burn in 

organic soils of the Okefenokee area. Obviously these fires are unimpeded by landownership and political boundaries. One of these large fires started on private lands 

in Georgia and burned into the Okefenokee Wildlife Refuge. Another fire started inside the refuge and burned on a state forest, private land, and the Osceola National 

Forest. These fires come on the heels of the horrendous fires in Texas and Oklahoma last year in which 5,700 fires burned more than 1.7 million acres in those two 

states. 

Fire is certainly nothing new to the South. Typically the Southern Region experiences more than half the wildfires in the nation and conducts the vast majority of 

the prescribed burns in the country. 

For example the Southern Region averages about 40,000 wildfires per year and 

conducts over 225,000 prescribed burns on more than 6 million acres. The vast majority of these prescribed burns are conducted by private non-industrial landowners. 

Over 90 percent of the forested land in the South is in private ownership. 

The ability to effectively suppress and minimize losses from large scale wildfire 

has become increasingly difficult due to the extension of Wildland Urban Interface 

development into the forested landscape. Fragmentation of the forest and expansion 

of multiple ownerships has made fire management more complex. The divestiture 

of industry lands has also significantly reduced the availability of firefighting resources—over 500 industry tractor plow units that were once an integral part of initial and extended attack capabilities in Southern Region are no longer available. 

The large number of fires in the South is compounded by the fact that according 

to a study done by the University of Wisconsin—Madison, the South has over 50 

percent of the wildland urban interface (WUI) in the nation. The recently completed 

Southern Wildfire Risk Assessment identified over 50,000 communities or other populated areas at high or very high risk from wildfires in the South. Virtually every 

fire in the South is a threat to homes and communities. 

I am not sure that it is possible to be 100 percent prepared for the kind of fires 

that we have experienced this year with fire spotting up to a mile in advance of 

the flaming front. However, preparedness can help reduce the impacts to homes and 

infrastructure and help protect public and fire fighter safety. There are several 

areas that I believe are key to being adequately prepared to deal with fires. Such 

as: 

• Rapid detection—States in the South use single engine airplanes to quickly detect new fire starts and to guide fire crews to the fires. 

• Well trained and equipped fire fighters—In addition to using cooperative agreements with the federal wildland fire agencies, the South has two interstate 

forest fire compacts that were approved by Congress in 1954. These compacts 

provide a legal means for states to share fire fighting resources. During the period June 2006 through June 2007 the two southern forest fire compacts provided: 

Æ 79 Dozers/Tractor Plows 

Æ 65 Engines 

Æ 3 Helicopters 

Æ 2 Single Engine Aircraft 

Æ 237 Miscellaneous Equipment 

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Æ 9,323 Personnel Days of Assistance 

These resources are largely available for national deployment and for support of federal jurisdiction fires because the southern states have prepared 

to handle wildfires on private lands. SFA plays a major role in this preparedness. • Homeowner education—Educating and encouraging home owners to protect 

their property by providing defensible space. The development of Community 

Wildfire Protection Plans and the use of programs such as Firewise are important elements in educating homeowners as to the need to take responsibility for 

taking measures to protect their homes from wildfire. State forestry agencies 

are the heart of the national Firewise program. • Fuel Treatments and Pre-constructed fire breaks—Treating forests to reduce 

fuels around communities and constructing fire breaks is paramount to home 

and community protection. Prescribed burning is by far the fastest and most economical way to reduce fuels in the South. Because of the long growing season, 

fuel treatments in the South must be repeated every three to five years to remain effective. 

Some of the areas of concern related to wildfire preparedness include: 

• A shortage of heavy airtankers and heavy helicopters on national contracts. • Shortages of key wildfire management personnel such as safety officers, which 

may be related to concern over liability or other issues. • Air quality issues related to prescribed burning for fuel reduction. As the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues evermore stringent air quality standards, prescribed burning for fuel reduction becomes more difficult. 

State Fire Assistance (SFA) Funds which come to the states through the U.S. 

Forest Service are extremely important for state wildfire preparedness. The State 

Fire Assistance Program is the fundamental federal assistance program to states for 

developing preparedness and response capabilities for wildland fire. Improved response efficiency also reduces fire size and subsequent suppression costs. Since FY 

02 about 165,000 wildland firefighters have received training through SFA that has 

also enhanced interagency coordination on federal lands. Moreover, approximately 

65 percent of the funds have been used to mitigate high-priority hazard fuel situations on 470,000 acres within wildland-urban interface areas. 

State Fire Assistance is an essential funding source for the development of Community Wildfire Protection Plans and directly helped over 19,000 communities in FY 

2005 to prioritize their preparedness and mitigation efforts; however, much remains 

to be done. 

The FY 2001 Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act directed the Secretaries of Agriculture and Interior to develop a joint public and private sector 10-year 

strategy for reducing wildfire risk and improving forest health nationwide. The 

Strategy was recently updated (December, 2006) and calls for increased interagency 

coordination and close partnerships with communities to improve fire prevention 

and suppression, reduce hazardous fuels, restore ecosystems and promote community assistance. Such goals are only achievable through appropriate and sustained 

levels of funding for the State Fire Assistance Program. 

The Southern Group of State Foresters and the National Association of State Foresters are part of a national coalition advocating expansion of the State Fire Assistance Program to adequately address wildland fire in the U.S. It is estimated that 

$145 million is needed in the FY 08 appropriation for State Fire Assistance to develop and maintain sufficient preparedness and protection capabilities. Extraordinary measures will also be needed to assist landowners with recovery, reforestation, and fire mitigation efforts to replace damaged forestlands.


36214.001.eps
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Attached to my written comments is a briefing paper from the State Fire Assistance Coalition. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, for the opportunity 

to present our thoughts.


36214.002.eps
67

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much, sir. Let me now turn to 

Michael DeBonis, Southwest Region Director, Forest Guild. Sir. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DEBONIS,

SOUTHWEST REGION DIRECTOR, FOREST GUILD 

Mr. DEBONIS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of 

the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the 

subject of wildfire preparedness, and specifically the relationship 

between wildfire and poverty. 

The Forest Guild is an organization of more than 500 foresters 

and allied professionals who manage our country’s forest lands and 

advocate for ecologically sound forest practices. 


36214.003.eps
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This testimony focuses on three key points for Congress to consider when evaluating the Federal levels of assistance necessary to 

ensure that low-capacity communities at risk to wildfire have the 

resources to reduce their risk. 

First, many rural communities at risk to wildfire are also areas 

with significant poverty. Many of these communities have lower capacity to cope with fire-related disruptions of economic activity and 

social services, and risk losing more of their assets when their 

homes or their communities burn. 

Second, Federal agencies need better monitoring systems and 

performance measures for fuel reduction and forest restoration 

treatments to direct resources and track impacts in rural low-capacity communities. 

Third, a designation for low-capacity communities will increase 

the ability of Federal agencies and Congress to identify, assist, and 

monitor impacts in communities that need the most help. 

Each year the increasing risk of wildfires is illustrated by catastrophic fires affecting communities all across the United States. 

While the impacts to the general public are most often illustrated 

by images of large homes destroyed by wildfire, the significant and 

long-term effects on low-income communities often go unnoticed. 

The 2005 study by Resource Innovations and the National Network of Forest Practitioners investigated whether communities 

most at risk from wildfire are able to access and benefit from Federal programs established to serve these communities. In other 

words, are the dollars, assistance, and fuels reduction projects hitting the ground in areas that are most at risk. 

The report showed a higher percentage of poor households are located in inhabited wildlands, areas which are not considered part 

of the Federally defined wildland-urban interface, the areas that 

Federal agencies and Congress have prioritized to receive the majority of wildfire preparedness funds. 

Excluding inhabited wildlands from the Federally defined 

wildland-urban interface is one example of how well-meaning policies and programs can exclude low-income communities. The Federal government needs to ensure that rural low-income communities are not overlooked in hazardous fuel reduction programs. 

Mr. Chairman, Federal agencies need better monitoring systems 

and performance measures for fuel reduction forest restoration 

treatments for the direct resources and tracked impacts of rural 

low-income communities. 

Current performance measures use traditional input-output approach, such as acres treated and cost per acre. These measures 

incur short-term actions that rely on the quickest and cheapest 

way to treat the easiest acres, an approach that does not prioritize 

community watershed or socioeconomic health. 

Yet there are opportunities for Federal agencies to work collaboratively with non-governmental community partners to develop 

performance measures that direct capacity and poverty in the context of wildfire preparedness. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I recommend establishing the designation for low-capacity communities, so Federal agencies can identify 

and direct appropriate resources to those communities that need 

the most help. Such a designation should be used in assessing comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
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munities to target financial and technical assistance, wildfire risk 

assessments at a state and local level, and monitoring outcomes 

and performance measures for a range of Federal land management agency programs. 

The agencies should engage in a collaborative process with community-based forestry organizations to develop a designation and a 

strategy for its use. 

In closing, I offer the following recommendations for the Subcommittee as they explore responses to these issues. Recognize that 

some communities have a lower capacity to cope with fire-related 

destruction, and risk losing more when their homes and assets 

burn. 

Establish a designation for low-capacity communities that fire 

agencies can use to identify and direct appropriate wildfire preparedness resources, and design performance measures to ensure 

that assistance is applied in an equitable and appropriate way. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on wildfire preparedness and the relationship between wildfire and poverty. The Forest 

Guild supports your work to increase wildfire preparedness in our 

nation’s public lands, and your efforts to ensure that all communities, regardless of financial resources and social capital, have access to Federal assistance and resources. 

I welcome any questions that you have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DeBonis follows:]

Statement of Michael DeBonis, Southwest Region Director,

The Forest Guild, Santa Fe, New Mexico 

Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to testify on the subject of wildfire preparedness and specifically the 

relationship between wildfire and poverty. 

My name is Michael DeBonis and I am the Southwest Region Director of the 

Forest Guild. The Forest Guild is a national organization of more than 500 foresters 

and allied professionals who manage our country’s forestlands and advocate for ecologically sound forest practices. The mission of the Forest Guild is to practice and 

promote ecologically, economically, and socially responsible forestry—excellent 

forestry—as a means of sustaining the integrity of forest ecosystems and the human 

communities dependent upon them. The Guild engages in education, training, policy 

analysis, research, and advocacy to foster excellence in stewardship, support practicing foresters and allied professionals, and engage a broader community in the 

challenges of forest conservation and management. The Forest Guild’s Southwest 

program is built on 20 years of experience developing and managing forestry-related 

programs with rural, forest-based communities and partners in the region. The 

Forest Guild is also a member of the Rural Voices for Conservation Coalition 

(RVCC). RVCC is a coalition of western rural and local, regional, and national organizations that have joined together to promote balanced conservation-based approaches to the ecological and economic problems facing the West. 

This testimony focuses on the programs and levels of assistance necessary to ensure that low-income communities at risk to wildfire have the resources to reduce 

their risk. This testimony presents critical information about the relationship between wildfire and poverty and three key points for Congress to consider: 

1. Many rural communities at risk to wildfire are also areas with significant poverty. These communities have lower capacity to cope with fire-related disruptions of economic activity and social services, and risk loosing more of their assets when their homes or their communities burn. 

2. Federal agencies need better monitoring systems and performance measures 

for fuel reduction and forest restoration treatments to direct resources and 

track impacts in rural, low-income communities. 

3. A designation for low-capacity communities will increase the ability of federal 

agencies and congress to identify, assist, and monitor impacts in communities 

that need the most help. 

70

1. Many rural communities at risk to wildfire are also areas with 

significant poverty. 

Each year, the increasing risk of wildfire is illustrated by the catastrophic 

wildfires affecting communities all across the United States. In 2006, over 96,000 

wildland fires in the U.S. burned approximately 10 million acres, according to estimates from the National Interagency Fire Center. While the impacts to the general 

public are most often illustrated by images of large homes destroyed by wildfire, the 

significant and long-term affects on low-income and underserved communities often 

go unnoticed. 

A 2005 study by Resource Innovations and the National Network for Forest Practitioners, Mapping the Relationship between Wildfire and Poverty, (Lynn and 

Gerlitz 2005) examined the relationship between wildfire and poverty. The study 

used socioeconomic and ecological data to investigate whether communities most at 

risk from wildfire are able to access and benefit from federal programs established 

to serve these communities. In other words, are the dollars, assistance, and fuelsreduction projects hitting the ground in the areas that are most at risk? The study 

resulted in a series of maps, illustrating the relationship between poverty, federal 

land ownership and Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) classification—the areas that 

federal agencies and Congress have prioritized to receive the majority of funds 

under the national fire plan. 

The research indicated that a higher percentage of poor households are located 

in inhabited wildland areas, which are not considered part of the federally defined 

WUI. The report also showed that there is a relationship between poverty and federal land ownership, with more poor households located in close proximity to federal 

lands. The study indicated that the federally defined WUI is based on residential 

density that excludes many inhabited forest areas. Expanding the analysis to include wildland intermix, the less densely populated areas that are not included in 

the WUI, which we refer to from here on as ‘‘inhabited wildlands’’, allowed the researchers to include significant portions of rural, inhabited land in areas vulnerable 

to wildfire. 

Results from the Wildfire and Poverty study indicate that, in general, there are 

more households in poverty in inhabited wildland areas than there are in the WUI 

or in areas outside of the vegetated wildlands. The federally defined WUI is one example of how well meaning policies and programs can exclude low income communities. The map of the United States (Attachment 1) illustrates the data described 

above and provides a visual representation of the relationship between wildfire and 

poverty. The map illustrates areas where 20% of households or more are low-income 

households in WUI and inhabited wildland areas. The map indicates a tremendous 

amount of inhabited wildland, particularly in the western United States, that is not 

considered part of the WUI under the Federal Register definition. This inhabited 

wildland area also has relatively high level of poverty. 

State scale analyses echo the national scale findings of the Wildfire and Poverty 

study. For example, more than half of the communities at highest risk from wildfire 

in Oregon are low income. The Oregon Communities at Risk assessment identified 

and assessed the relative risk to wildfire in over 560 communities (Oregon Dept of 

Forestry 2006). The assessment assigned each Oregon community at risk from wildfire with a low, moderate, or high risk rating for hazard, risk, values, protection capability and structural vulnerability. Preliminary findings from Resource Innovations, in the University of Oregon’s Institute for a Sustainable Environment, indicate that of approximately 155 communities at high risk to wildfire, 54% are communities where over half of the population are very-low income. 

Not only are many rural communities at risk from wildfire and limited by poverty, 

but they can be excluded from the current definition of WUI. The federal government needs a broader definition for WUI to ensure that rural low-income communities are not overlooked when agencies prioritize areas for hazardous fuels reduction. 

2. Federal agencies need better monitoring systems and performance 

measures for fuel reduction and forest restoration treatments to direct 

resources and track impacts in rural, low-income communities 

Wildfires and the related government roles and responsibilities for federal 

wildland management are prominent today because of the increased severity of fires 

on and around public lands. In recent years, numerous laws, strategies, and implementation documents have been issued to direct federal efforts for wildfire prevention, firefighting, and recovery. Reliable national-level information and monitoring 

are essential to ensure good decision making, agency accountability, and to assist 

communities in reducing wildfire risk. 

71

Current performance measures developed by the agencies use a traditional inputoutput approach, such as ‘‘acres treated’’ and ‘‘cost per acre.’’ These measures encourage short-term actions that rely on the quickest and cheapest way to treat the 

‘‘easiest’’ acres, an approach that does not prioritize watershed or community socioeconomic health. Furthermore, current measures do not gauge agency progress towards collaboration, rural wildfire protection, or other actions necessary for inclusive and integrated forest stewardship. Consequently, current measurements fall 

short of responding to actual performance of restoration goals. The Rural Voices for 

Conservation Coalition developed a performance measure issue paper in 2006 that 

provides recommendations for performance measures related to low-capacity communities, collaboration, and capacity building (www.sustainablenorthwest.org/pdf/

policy/monitoring/perfmeasures.pdf). 

In September 2006, the Office of the Inspector General issued an audit report on 

the implementation of the Healthy Forests Initiative. The report found that USFS 

lacks a consistent analytical process for assessing the level of risk that communities 

face from wildland fire and determining if a hazardous fuels project is cost beneficial. The report concluded that without uniform, national criteria, there is no way 

to allocate funds to the most critical projects. (USDA Inspector General 2006). 

The findings of the OIG report hold true when analyzed at the regional scale. A 

recent study by the Forest Guild reviewed the legal and administrative hurdles facing fuel reduction projects on the U.S. Bureau of Land Management’s Medford Oregon District and the Rogue River-Siskiyou National Forest (Evans and McKinely 

2007). The report concluded that, overall, the federal government needs to improve 

its record keeping and increase public participation in planning fuel reduction treatments. 

A crucial element of monitoring fuel reduction projects is their effect on low-income communities. However, federal agencies currently lack adequate monitoring 

systems and performance measures to gauge the benefits of Forest Service programs 

in low-income and low capacity communities. In fact, in some cases, assistance has 

been given to wealthier communities to the detriment of less well off communities. 

During the Fiscal Years 2001 and 2002 in New Mexico, all of the $685,000 awarded 

for private land went to reduce fuels in wealthier, bedroom communities of Albuquerque rather than the predominantly economically distressed and forest-dependent communities of the Manzano Mountains (Morton 2003). 

Though there are challenges to efficiently treating the fire threat in our nations 

forests, there are also opportunities for the federal agencies to work collaboratively 

with non-governmental, community partners to develop performance measures that 

address capacity and poverty in the context of wildfire preparedness. These opportunities include the annual budget allocation process for the Forest Service and BLM 

(tied directly to the PART process), the fire allocation process (related to LANDFIRE 

and Fire Program Analysis), and efforts underway by agencies and partners to address the implementation tasks and performance measures in the revised 10-year 

comprehensive strategy (WFLC 2006). 

3. A designation for low-capacity communities will increase the ability of 

federal agencies and congress to identify, assist, and monitor impacts in 

communities that need the most help. 

Rural Voices for Conservation Coalition recommends the establishment of a designation for low capacity communities that federal agencies can use to identify and 

direct appropriate resources to those communities that need the most help. A low 

capacity community may be defined as a community that lacks: 

• the financial resources to invest in wildfire preparedness; 

• the social capital, leadership, or governance structure to participate in collaborative processes; 

• the experience and/or education to understand the dynamics at play in a restoration effort, the environmental factors at risk, and or the need for either restoration work or collaboration as a resolution and the human resources to dedicate to participating in a collaborative restoration effort. 

Indicators to identify low capacity communities that agencies could use include 

poverty, population size (to ensure that rural communities are targeted), governance, and special needs (RVCC 2007, Evans et al. 2007). Creating a low-capacity 

designation will assist agencies in directing reduced cost-shares, set-asides in 

grants, technical assistance, training, or other types of help to communities that require the most assistance to protect themselves from wildfire. 

In the past, federal programs such as the National Fire Plan and Economic Action 

programs have provided rural community assistance grants that are aimed at increasing community opportunities to engage in forest health, fire protection, and 

economic development opportunities. While these programs have been effective in 

72

providing community assistance, there has been no systematic effort to ensure that 

low-income or underserved communities benefit form these and other programs. 

There are ongoing efforts to identify and provide assistance to low-capacity communities at risk to wildfire. The Federal Emergency Management Agency uses a 

designation for small and impoverished communities. Communities within this designation have a reduced cost-share requirement for pre-disaster mitigation grants. 

Several counties in Oregon have integrated poverty data within their wildfire risk 

assessments to illustrate high risk, high poverty areas in Community Wildfire Protection Plans. Similarly, the Forest Guild in New Mexico has used a Community Capacity Index within community fire planning efforts in two separate communities, 

Taos County and the greater Cuba area (Evans et al. 2007). 

The low capacity designation should be used in 1) assessing low capacity communities to target financial and technical assistance, 2) wildfire risk assessments at a 

state and local level, and 3) monitoring outcomes and performance measures for a 

range of federal land management agency programs. The agencies should engage in 

a collaborative process with community-based forestry organizations to develop the 

designation and a strategy for its use. 

Recommendations and Conclusion 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on wildfire preparedness and the relationship between wildfires and poverty. Your bi-partisan work to increase wildfire 

preparedness on our nation’s public and private lands is commendable. 

I would like to provide several recommendations for the Subcommittee as they explore alternative responses to these issues. These recommendations are based both 

on my own experience and on discussions with community-based forestry partners 

and the Rural Voices for Conservation Coalition: 

• Recognize that some communities have lower capacity to cope with fire-related 

disruptions of economic activity and social services, and risk losing more of their 

assets when their homes or their communities burn. 

• Expand the federal definition of WUI to include the inhabited wildlands to ensure rural low-income communities are not overlooked. 

• Establish a designation for low capacity communities that fire agencies can use 

to identify and direct appropriate resources. 

• Design measurement criteria and performance measures to ensure that assistance is applied in an equitable and appropriate way. 

The Forest Guild supports the work of this Subcommittee and hopes our comments will help ensure that all communities, regardless of financial resources and 

social capital, have access to Federal wildfire preparedness assistance. I welcome 

any questions that you may have. 

References 

Evans, A. M., M. DeBonis, E. Krasilovsky, and M. Melton. 2007. Measuring 

Community Capacity for Protection from Wildfire. Forest Guild, Santa Fe, NM. 

http://www.forestguild.org/publications/ICCPWl07.pdf 

Evans, A. M., and G. McKinley. 2007. An evaluation of fuel reduction projects and 

the Healthy Forest Initiative. Forest Guild, Santa Fe, NM. http://forestguild.org/

publications/Evaluating—HFI—07.pdf 

Lynn, K., and W. Gerlitz. 2005. Mapping the Relationship between Wildfire and 

Poverty. National Network of Forest Practitioners, Resource Innovations at the 

University of Oregon, and the United States Department of Agriculture Forest 

Service State and Private Forestry, Portland, OR. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/

2417

Morton, J. 2003. An Evaluation of Fuel Reduction Projects in the Eastern Cibola 

National Forest. National Community Forestry Center, Working Paper 8, Forest 

Guild, Santa Fe, NM. http://theforesttrust.org/images/swcenter/pdf/Working

Paper8.pdf 

Oregon Department of Forestry. 2006. Statewide Risk Assessment. http://

www.oregon.gov/ODF/FIRE/docs/PREV/06CAR.pdf 

Rural Voices for Conservation Coalition. 2007. Performance Measures Issue Paper. 

http://www.sustainablenorthwest.org/pdf/policy/monitoring/perfmeasures.pdf 

USDA Inspector General. 2006. Implementation of the Healthy Forests Initiative. 

08601-6-AT, U.S. Dept of Agriculture Office of the Inspector General, Southeast 

Region, Washington, DC. http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/08601-6-AT.pdf 

Wildland Fire Leadership Council. 2006. A Collaborative Approach for Reducing 

Wildland Fire Risks to Communities and the Environment 10-Year Strategy: 

Implementation Plan, December 2006 http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/

plan/documents/10-YearStrategyFinallDec2006.pdf 

73

Attachments 

1. Map: Poverty and Wildland Urban Interface / Inhabited Wildlands http://

ri.uoregon.edu/publicationspress/map—3.pdf 

2. Executive Summary: Mapping the Relationship between Wildfire and Poverty. 

3. Executive Summary: Measuring Community Capacity to Resist and Respond to 

Wildfires


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Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. Let me turn now to the 

Forester for the State of Arizona. Mr. Rowdabaugh, your testimony, 

please. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF KIRK ROWDABAUGH,

ARIZONA STATE FORESTER 

Mr. ROWDABAUGH. Yes, sir. Thank you, Chairman Grijalva, 

Members of the committee, for this opportunity to testify on behalf 

of the Western Governors Association and the State of Arizona. 

America’s fire environment has changed. The recent adverse 

trends in fuels, weather, and demographics are projected to continue unabated in the foreseeable future. More than half the naVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY

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tion’s forests are unhealthy, and are now subject to frequent outbreaks of insect and disease and extreme fire behavior. Prolonged 

drought and global climate change have exacerbated these forest 

health conditions and wildfire concerns. Forest fragmentation and 

the rapid expansion of the wildland-urban interface have complicated our ability to manage the landscape and to manage the 

fires that burn across them. 

For these reasons, effective wildfire preparedness will be even 

more essential in the future for protecting the thousands of communities at risk, the forest-based industries that support our rural 

economies, and the critical watersheds that sustain our cities. 

In 2002, the Western Governors Association, at the request of 

Congress, and in collaboration with the Departments of Interior 

and Agriculture, developed a 10-year comprehensive strategy for 

reducing wildfire risks. Congress adopted the collaborative approach developed in the 10-year strategy in its Healthy Forest Restoration Act of 2003. 

Since then, the 10-year strategy has formed the basis for forest 

health efforts across the nation. And in December of 2006, the 

Western Governors and their Federal, tribal, and local partners 

completed an update of the implementation plan. And it called for 

a long-term commitment to maintaining the essential resources 

needed for full implementation of the 10-year strategy. 

The Governors believe it is more effective and efficient and safer 

to thin forests and protect communities in advance of a wildfire 

than it is to control the fires and repair the damage after the fact. 

State and local governments are doing their fair share, as well. 

In Arizona, Governor Janet Napolitano created both a Forest 

Health Advisory Council and a Forest Health Oversight Council 

shortly after taking office to address the state’s rapidly deteriorating forest health and fire environment. 

These councils have just completed a 20-year strategic plan for 

restoring Arizona’s forests, for reducing wildfire potential, and increasing community protection. Its recommendations require action 

from Congress and the Federal land management agencies, as well 

as the Governor’s office and her state agencies, county and local 

governments, and private citizens. 

While this 20-year plan is specific to Arizona, many of its recommendations are appropriate on a national scale, especially those 

directed at Congress and the Federal management agencies. 

The Arizona plan calls for, among other things, increasing funding for forest restoration on Federal and tribal lands, and the implementation of community wildfire protection plans. 

It is important to recall that in much of the West, the Federal 

and tribal agencies manage the vast majority of forested lands. In 

Arizona, it is over 80 percent. And therefore, Federal funding is not 

only essential, it is also appropriate for reducing the threats to our 

rural communities. 

Wildfire suppression costs have received a lot of attention. We 

know that large fire costs are highly correlated with large fire size, 

and that large fires represent less than 2 percent of all fires, but 

account for almost 95 percent of all suppression expenditures. 

78

We know that the potential for large fires increases with adverse 

fuels, weather, and topography. And we know that the potential for 

large fires decreases with effective initial and extended attack. 

Practically speaking, there isn’t anything we can do about the 

weather or the topography. But we can manage the fuels, and we 

can support effective firefighting forces. This is why pre-suppression activities are so critical to controlling wildfire suppression 

costs. 

It is imperative that sufficient investments in community assistance, restoring fire-adapted ecosystems, reducing hazardous fuels, 

and deploying effective firefighting resources are made to contain 

suppression costs and minimize losses. 

Unfortunately, the increase in fire suppression costs in recent 

years has resulted in decreased funds available for the very presuppression programs that are essential to continue future suppression costs. Western Governors support proposals for a new 

funding mechanism to be provided to the Forest Service and Interior agencies for paying extraordinary suppression expenditures, 

along with implementing strict cost management controls. 

We believe that Congress must resolve these critical funding 

issues in order to maintain effective wildfire preparedness programs. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rowdabaugh follows:]

Statement of Kirk Rowdabaugh, Arizona State Forester, on behalf of

The Western Governors’ Association and the State of Arizona 

Thank you Chairman Grijalva and Committee Members for this opportunity to 

testify before the National Parks, Forests and Public Lands Subcommittee. This testimony is presented on behalf of the Western Governors’ Association (WGA) and the 

State of Arizona. 

My testimony today will focus on perspectives from the great State of Arizona and 

the west at-large on the current status of wildfire preparedness and the changes 

needed to fully realize the benefits of preparedness relative to long-term suppression 

costs. My discussion points will start with progress made, or in some cases lack 

there of, on implementing the 10-year Comprehensive Wildfire Strategy. I will then 

move to discuss how we have adapted the collaborative efforts outlined in the 10-

year Strategy at home, in Arizona, by discussing our comprehensive strategy which 

details how to deal with current and future threats to the public and private 

forestland within the state. And then I will conclude with a number of thoughts 

from a west-wide perspective on cost containment measures, firefighting needs, fuels 

treatments, and funding concerns. 

As this hearing commences, there have been 42,628 fires that have burned over 

1,475,775 acres this year. This wildfire season is forecasted to be severe and may 

result in a large amount of acres burned. When the Forest Service exhausts their 

suppression budget it has a direct impact on the agency’s programmatic abilities. 

Fire seasons are increasingly longer and wildfires are occurring with higher frequency and these trends are projected to continue in the future. 

The long range wildfire projections show that this trend of increased frequency 

and severity of wildfire in the West will continue into the future. For this reason, 

wildfire preparedness is very important to the federal agencies and state and local 

entities. Insect infestations, invasive species, fragmentation of forestland, increasing 

development in the wildland urban interface, loss of timber markets, prolonged 

drought and climate change all exacerbate our forest health problems and the need 

for increased wildfire preparedness. 

10-year Comprehensive Strategy 

The Western Governors’ Association’s Implementation Plan to the 10-Year Comprehensive Strategy ‘‘A Collaborative Approach for Reducing Wildland Fire Risks to 

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1http://www.westgov.org/wga/pulbicat/TYIP.pdf 

2http://www.westgov.org/wga/press/tyip12-6-06.htm 

Communities and the Environment’’ 1 is important to discuss when speaking about 

wildfire preparedness. The Strategy was requested by the Congress in 2000. Since 

then, the Strategy and its Implementation Plan have formed the basis for forest 

health efforts across the nation and significant progress has been made on the 

ground in using locally-driven collaboration and in undertaking landscape-level 

planning and treatments. Congress adopted the collaborative approach developed in 

the Strategy in its Healthy Forests Restoration Act of 2003. 

The action items agreed to in the first plan that the Governors signed with the 

Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture in May 2002 have, for the most part, 

been completed. At the urging of WGA’s Forest Health Advisory Committee, which 

conducted a review of the original plan in 2004, the Governors updated the plan 

with the federal agencies, counties, state foresters, fire chiefs and stakeholders. The 

goals of the plan remain the same as in the 10-year Strategy. 

A collaborative approach is necessary to: 

• Improve Prevention and Suppression of Wildfires 

• Reduce Hazardous Fuels 

• Restore Fire-Adapted Ecosystems 

• Promote Community Assistance 

The Implementation Plan puts additional emphasis in the following areas: 

• Information sharing and monitoring of accomplishments and forest conditions 

to improve transparency; 

• A long-term commitment to maintaining the essential resources for the plan; 

• A landscape-level vision for restoration of fire adapted ecosystems; 

• The importance of using fire as a management tool; and 

• Continuing improvements in collaboration 

The Implementation Plan was endorsed and sent to the Congress by WGA, the 

Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture, the National Association of Counties and 

the National Association of State Foresters in December 2006 2. WGA’s 60-person 

Forest Health Advisory Committee, comprised of national experts on fire fighting, 

forest health treatments and communities’ role helped draft the implementation 

plan. 

When fully implemented, the 10-Year Strategy and the Implementation Plan will 

use proactive measures to improve the health of our forests as a means to prevent 

catastrophic wildfires. As noted above, but to reinforce, these efforts require cross 

boundary work, full involvement of states and stakeholders, and, most importantly, 

a long-term commitment of time, resources and manpower. With large fires eating 

up the resources that are appropriated for suppression, full implementation, with 

adequate funding, of all four goals of the 10-Year Strategy is a wise and economical 

cost-containment strategy. The efforts to date have not lived up to expectations and 

needs. Yes, much progress has been and continues to be made in implementing the 

tasks under the 10-year Implementation Plan, but the funding proposed by the Administration and subsequently funded via Congress has not reinforced all four goals 

of the 10-year Strategy. If one looks at funding since the inception of the 10-year 

Strategy, the vast majority has gone to goal one, suppression and prevention. And 

rightly so in many regards, as protection of life and property is first and foremost. 

However, without balanced and proportionate investment in the other three goals 

of the 10-year Strategy, we will not make the on-the-ground progress the public expects, nor get ahead of the wildfire curve. 

The bottom line is that the 10-year Strategy represents a proactive and comprehensive way to address wildfire and forest health issues. Funding needs to follow 

the same proactive, comprehensive philosophy. More investment needs to be made 

in fuels reduction (goal 2), rehab and restoration (goal 3) and community assistance 

(goal 4). It is more cost effective and efficient to thin forests and protect communities in advance than to put out fires and repair their damage after the fact. 

10-year Comprehensive Wildfire Strategy: An Arizona Evaluation 

I would now like provide a good example of what we are talking about. I want 

to demonstrate how we in Arizona are translating the 10-year Strategy in landscape 

scale, comprehensive action at the state level. Governor Janet Napolitano created 

an Arizona Forest Health Advisory Council and the Forest Health Oversight Council 

in 2003 to address the increasing number, frequency and intensity of wildfires in 

the State of Arizona. The Councils established a subcommittee to draft a 20-year 

strategy and develop policy recommendations on forest health, the increase in 

wildland fire and community protection. The strategy has been developed by busiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:27 Apr 22, 2008 Jkt 098700 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 L:\DOCS\36214.TXT Hresour1 PsN: KATHY
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ness people, environmentalists, ranchers, academics, elected officials, and federal, 

state and tribal land managers. 

The Statewide Strategy for Restoring Arizona’s Forests was developed with public 

input and sets the stage for the next 20 years of strategic and efficient restoration 

work. The Strategy takes into account the scientific information, the community collaboration and the economics of forest health needed to identify the future steps 

needed for forest restoration in the State of Arizona. As solutions are going to require everyone acting cooperatively, the Strategy recommends actions for Congress, 

Federal Land Management Agencies, the Governor and Executive Branch Agencies 

and Counties and Local Governments. All of the recommendations are based on five 

strategies for successfully restoring forests including: 

• increasing the human and financial resources dedicated to restoring Arizona’s 

forests and protecting communities, 

• coordinating and implementing action at a landscape-scale so that limited dollars go further, 

• increasing efficiency of restoration, fire management and community protection 

activities by prioritization, 

• encouraging ecologically sustainable, forest-based economic activity by working 

to engage and encourage the private sector, and 

• building public support for accomplishing restoration, community protection and 

fire management across the state 

This strategy is specific to the State of Arizona but many of the recommendations 

can be examined at a national scale, especially the State’s recommendations for 

Congressional action and the Land Management Agencies. The Strategy recommends increased funding to both federal land management agencies and to the 

state in order to increase capacity for collaborative work on restoration projects. 

This includes a focus on Community Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP) implementation and fuels treatment funding which will in turn reduce national suppression 

costs. 

Relative to the Land Management Agencies, the Strategy recommends collaborative planning and implementation across the board as well as specific items such 

as updating the annual Fire Management Plans. Also noted is the importance of 

CWPPs and the need for priority status for the implementation of projects identified 

by the CWPPs. 

The Statewide Strategy for Restoring Arizona’s Forests is an Arizona-specific document with national significance. This strategy will help guide Arizonans to use 

their resources in the most effective way possible and highlight the need for Congressional action and the Land Management Agencies to examine their current way 

of doing business. This document provides a landscape-level view that would be beneficial for the federal agencies and their partners to examine for complimentary 

strategies. 

Cost Containment 

As a starting point in any discussion of wildfire preparedness, the Forest Service 

and the DOI, and all wildland fire suppression entities, must be accountable for how 

much they are spending and how it is spent relative to wildfire suppression. The 

State of Arizona believes that it is important for both the Forest Service and the 

DOI to adopt necessary cost containment solutions in order to facilitate a decrease 

in wildfire suppression costs. The costs of wildfire are increasing every year and 

soon the 10-year average will be more than 45 percent of the total Forest Service 

budget. 

The Forest Service and the Department of the Interior (DOI) have many recommendations from numerous internal and external sources in front of them on how 

to reduce suppression costs and increase fire preparedness. There are several reports that have focused on the need for increased cost containment and management practices by the federal agencies. I will touch on the two most recent reports 

that include recommendations that will help the agencies remain accountable for 

wildfire suppression costs. An additional note should be made that the Implementation Strategy for the 10-year Plan includes many important goals and strategies 

that will result in reduction of the suppression costs, both over the short and longterm. This is another good reason to focus on its full implementation. 

The most recent and definitive assessment of cost containment was completed by 

the Wildland Fire Leadership Council (WFLC) in 2004 (www.fireplan.gov/reports/

2004/costmanagement.pdf). On behalf of WGA, I co-chaired the Strategic Issues 

Panel on Fire Suppression Costs that facilitated the drafting of the report Large 

Fire Suppression Costs—Strategies for Cost Management. The report was endorsed 

by Western Governors and the WFLC. The report’s recommendations provide a good 

81

3See Testimony of Kirk Rowdabaugh, State Forester of Arizona (Co-Chairman, Strategic 

Issues Panel on Fire Suppression Costs) on behalf of the Western Governors’ Association before 

the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, January 30, 2007. http://

www.westgov.org/wga/testim/fire-cost1-30-07r.pdf 

starting point for ways to provide productive rewards for good cost decisions on the 

ground. 3

The Strategic Issues Panel recommended seven primary actions to contain federal 

fire suppression costs. The first recommended action, to increase the level of accountability for large fire costs and their impacts by allocating suppression funds 

on a regional or equivalent basis, was intended to provide incentives to federal agency administrators for controlling costs. It was this single recommendation that the 

Panel believed would provide the greatest cost savings to the federal government 

because wildfire costs are driven by management decisions on the ground. The recommendation has yet to be adopted in any meaningful manner although it could 

lead to the greatest cost savings. 

Another important report offering cost containment recommendations was just 

completed by the Brookings Institution in May 2007. The Brookings Institution recently released a report titled Towards a Collaborative Cost Management Strategy—

2006 U.S. Forest Service Large Wildfire Cost Review Recommendations. This report 

examines 20 fires that burned 1.1 million acres across 17 national forests in 2006. 

This report, conducted by an independent panel, determined that the agency had 

been fiscally diligent when managing the suppression activities related to these 

fires. 

Along with reporting on the agency’s fiscal diligence, the panel recommended 

areas for improvement related to fire suppression costs. Of import, the panel found 

that at best, implementation of cost containment actions could potentially result in 

around a 10% savings in wildfire suppression costs. It is obvious that cost containment alone will not solve our problem, but it is important to note that there are 

many actions the federal agencies could and still must take to improve the savings, 

notably incorporating and delegating cost containment considerations closer to the 

regional levels of the agencies. 

It is worthwhile to note that the federal agencies have taken cost containment seriously and have undertaken several self-initiated cost containment measures including transitioning to risk-informed management. This measure allows for flexibility in the field and increased application of wildland fire use, a fire management 

method where natural fires are allowed to burn under monitored parameters. Further, the Forest Service and other agencies are moving to a centralized oversight 

system in order to better model fire behavior and cost. These efforts are a step towards lessening the demand on suppression dollars, but more changes are necessary 

to eliminate the drain on the federal agencies’ budget for other programs. 

Wildfire preparedness is the ability to prepare for wildfire before it happens and 

respond to a wildfire in the most effective and efficient manner when it happens. 

It is vitally important that preparedness be looked at across the spectrum of wildfire 

responders, federal, state and local, especially related to initial attack. Too often the 

focus is only on the federal preparedness level. Advancements need to be made for 

minimal investment in local and rural fire departments in general. This will result 

in significant costs savings as successful wildfire preparedness results in a reduction 

of the wildfire threat itself. 

Suppression Costs and Related Factors 

Wildfire suppression costs are increasing with every fire season. These costs will 

continue to rise as forest health declines. It is very important to recognize that cost 

containment is not the sole solution to this issue. That is not to say that the federal 

agencies do not have steps they can take to ensure the most efficient federal wildfire 

suppression apparatus. But the real story here is that a solution is needed for our 

current suppression budgeting crunch as explained below. 

Within the Forest Service budget, suppression costs are allocated based on a 10-

year average. Due to the increase in catastrophic wildfire, this 10-year average allocation increases every year. A problem arises as the Forest Service operates under 

an overall flat budget. Basically, their budget does not increase along with the rise 

in the 10-year average, meaning that all other programs under the agency get 

squeezed, eventually having suppression funds eat away at all the other Forest 

Service programs. One branch of the USFS, State & Private Forestry (S&PF), is of 

particular concern here as these programs provide necessary fuels treatment work, 

Community Wildfire Protection Plans in high-risk communities and other benefits 

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4See NASF Federal Wildland Fire Suppression Costs: Budget Reform issue paper, May 29, 

2007 http://www.stateforesters.org 

ness. These S&PF programs have been eroded over the years due to the ever increasing cost of suppressing large wildfires. 

The astronomical suppression costs impact both types of preparedness; fire fighting and fuels treatment. As these costs continue to rise, if a solution is not found, 

successful initial attacks and the ability to reduce dangerous fuel levels before fires 

start will become a thing of the past. As suppression costs draw down the funding 

available for fuels treatment and preparedness activities, the ability for the agencies 

and other entities to work on pre-suppression activities is limited. These pre-suppression activities accomplished though numerous State & Private Forestry programs help to reduce the future suppression costs. 

It is important to note that 1% of fires burn upwards of 95% of the acres and consume 85% of the total suppression costs 4. These figures demonstrate that much of 

our suppression expenditures could truly be treated as emergency funding. We propose that a new fiscal funding mechanism, with strict cost management controls, 

needs to be found for suppression. 

The National Association of State Foresters has proposed a solution to reduce suppression costs and change the current budget formula to reduce the borrowing of 

funds from other Forest Service programs. The National Association of State Foresters (NASF) proposes a partitioning of the Forest Service budget by introducing 

a budget set-aside for a flexible suppression spending account that would be linked 

to rigorous cost containment management controls and agency line officer incentives. 

As budget pressures and cost savings are realized in this process, it needs also 

to be realized that those monies should be reinvested into USFS programs that reduce wildfire threat and help to further reduce suppression costs. We believe that 

Congress should facilitate a resolution of this funding issue in order to promote the 

use of appropriated dollars for the original intent of those moneys. The need for a 

reevaluation of wildfire suppression budgeting and the effect that the current budgeting format has on the other Forest Service programs is a crucial step in increasing 

the Forest Service’s wildfire preparedness in the State of Arizona and throughout 

the West. 

We believe that a solution to the ever increasing suppression costs is crucial to 

the future of the Forest Service. If no solution is found, the Forest Service will become the ‘‘Fire Service’’ and will not have a programmatic offering, just a fire fighting service. 

Preparedness 

As suppression costs eat up more of the federal agencies budget, the ability for 

the agencies, and States and locals to fight wildfire at their current success rate is 

impossible. Suppression costs have pulled funds from programs that enable improved initial attack, such as Volunteer Fire Assistance and Hazardous Fuels treatment. The more successful the state and local firefighters are, the larger the reduction in federal suppression costs. As the wildfire capacity of the federal agencies diminishes and the maturation and skills of the state and local firefighters increase, 

the need for programs that provide funding to prepare for fire and fire fighting becomes more important. 

Related and of note, the recent House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee 

markup of the FY08 spending bill has some very insightful language relating to 

state and local preparedness under the Cooperative Fire Programs that we are supportive of. Allowing state and locals to pilot preparedness and suppression responsibilities on federal lands will demonstrate and prove their efficiency and effectiveness in relation to federal resources. This is not to say that a sole shift to state and 

local preparedness is in order, because wildland firefighting is only successful in 

full, cooperative partnership between the federal, state and local agencies. But it is 

to say that we should be experimenting with our traditional approaches to the issue 

of preparedness. 

Another important factor essential to reducing catastrophic wildfire is community 

planning. CWPPs allow communities to set priorities for treatment and reduce their 

risk. Over 1,100 CWPPs have been completed nationally covering more than 3,300 

communities and there are at least 450 plans moving towards completion. A significant problem here is that there are many fuels treatment projects that have been 

identified by CWPPs that are unable to be completed due to lack of funding. In Arizona alone, we have 300,000 acres identified by communities, National Environment 

Policy Act (NEPA) approved and in need of treatment, but implementation is slowed 

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by funding. These important projects hang in the balance due to the ever increasing 

suppression costs siphoning money from other Forest Service Programs. 

The federal agencies have been partnering with state and local fire fighting departments and communities for fire fighting and for completion of work on the 

ground. Programs such as State Fire Assistance (SFA), which is the only federal 

program that supports work on private lands, are crucial to decreasing the suppression costs. The SFA program funds CWPPs, fuels treatment work on private lands, 

education and preparedness and in turn reduces wildfire suppression costs. NASF 

estimates an accurate reflection of funding needs for this program is $145 million 

per year. The current funding proposal from the Administration included only $68.1 

million for SFA. Luckily the House FY08 Interior appropriations bill markup restored funding to last year’s level. 

As I explained earlier in my testimony, wildland firefighting is only successful 

when it occurs in full, cooperative partnership among the federal, state and local 

agencies. Federal agencies partner with state and local fire departments and communities for fire firefighting activities. This partnership has been damaged by the 

recent and unprecedented legal proceedings associated with the fatalities that occurred during the 2001 Thirtymile Fire in the State of Washington. 

The legal proceedings that followed the Thirtymile Fire resulted in threats to firefighter morale, recruitment and retention, and safety; and the impacts are being felt 

at all levels of the national fire community. The issue of ‘‘firefighter liability’’ will 

continue to impact the ability for federal agencies and state and local fire departments to work together to fight wildland fire. 

The ability for firefighters on the front line to share information during safety investigations with the agencies is paramount. This information must be candid and 

complete in order to improve firefighter safety and enhance risk management practices during wildland fire events. When the internal safety investigations are no 

longer internal documents, the ability for the agencies to conduct ‘‘lessons learned’’ 

investigations is eliminated. Along with information sharing, the scope of duty for 

firefighters is very important when discussing firefighter liability as well as the 

availability of information and resources (such as liability insurance). 

The House Interior Appropriations Subcommittee markup of the FY08 spending 

bill included a directive that the Forest Service should report to the Committees on 

the ‘‘firefighter liability’’ situation and suggest appropriate remedies. The Committee expressed their concern about recent reports that fire fighters may be subject 

to personal liability for on-the-job activities during emergencies. 

Individual firefighter civil and criminal liability, in the absence of obvious criminal intent, needs to be resolved on a national level. Until a solution is found that 

limits the civil and criminal liability of wildland firefighters, wildfire preparedness 

will continue to be compromised. The issue of firefighter liability impacts firefighting manpower and the ability to be prepared to fight wildland fire. 

Another issue impacting wildfire preparedness is the need for an aviation strategy 

that addresses the current wildland firefighting needs. A significant portion of the 

National Interagency Aviation Strategy, especially the section on large air tankers, 

focuses on the past rather than the future role of aviation needs. The strategy uses 

the 2002 large air tanker capacity as one of the benchmarks for future aviation 

needs. There are opportunities to explore additional criteria for aviation needs in 

today’s changing world of wildland fire. This should be explored in conjunction with 

the Blue Ribbon Panel recommendations on aviation as Phase 3 of the National 

Interagency Aviation Strategy is developed. 

Wildfire risk within the WUI is becoming more complex and dangerous due to 

many factors, including drought, climate change, forest fragmentation and increasing human population. Fuels treatment and community-based stewardship projects 

to help restore forest health are important aspects of reducing the wildfire risk to 

WUI communities. 

The Forest Service and DOI treated four million acres of land in 2006. Two million of those acres were in WUI areas. There are millions more acres that are in 

dire need of treatment. The number of acres that receive treatment will decrease 

as the funding for hazardous fuels reduction is diverted to fund suppression activities. Improving fuel conditions and ecosystem health on the landscape is an important part of limiting the spread of wildfire. We believe that the four million acres 

treated in 2006 is a commendable start, however, in the future, acres need to be 

treated based on priority. The current funding for hazardous fuels treatment does 

not allow for the treatment of priority acres, often the acres treated are the ones 

that cost the least to complete. For this reason, the use of ‘‘acres treated’’ as a metric for success does not tell the full story. The relevance of this metric should be 

re-examined. 

84

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present the views of the great 

State of Arizona on wildfire preparedness. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much, sir. And our last witness, 

Dr. Peter Daugherty, Oregon Department of Forestry. Sir. Doctor. 

STATEMENT OF PETER J. DAUGHERTY, PhD, PRIVATE FOREST 

PROGRAM DIRECTOR, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Chairman Grijalva, Ranking Member Bishop, 

and Members of the committee, my name is Peter Daugherty, and 

I am currently the Oregon Department of Forestry’s Private Forest 

Program Director. 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to testify today on an issue 

that is critical to the sustainability of our nation’s forests. And if 

you don’t mind, I will acquiesce to your dress code; it is quite warm 

in here. 

I am going to briefly summarize a study I did, a peer-reviewed 

study I did with my colleagues, graduate student, PhD candidate 

Gary Snider and Professor Emeritus Brent Wood. I will then relate 

these study results to the situation in Oregon, and then I will conclude with three recommendations. 

Prior to summarizing real briefly the study, I have a full copy, 

and I will respectfully submit it for the record. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Without objection, sir. 

[NOTE: The study has been retained in the Committee’s official 

files.] 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Basically, we are all aware of the worsening 

conditions of the forests, and so I won’t belabor that point. 

We were asked to look at the economics of doing restoration 

treatments. And now we look at the previous literature, and they 

are saying well, it is a very complicated problem; you have to look 

at the cost of fuel treatments, the values of non-market and market 

benefits. 

But given the severity of the problem, we decided to take a much 

more simple approach. After all, you don’t need to know the exact 

mass and velocity of a freight train to know that it is good policy 

not to continue to stand on the tracks. 

So what we did is, and let us just get rid of all values except the 

avoided cost of large fire suppression. So let us just compare. We 

know we can treat these forests and save on future fire suppression 

costs. And we did some relatively simple avoided-cost analysis to 

say how much could we spend per acre to avoid the cost of these 

large fires. 

We only included the variable costs associated with large fires. 

We didn’t include the fixed costs of preparedness. We assumed that 

costs and the size of fires would remain constant, which has not 

turned out to be true. We also didn’t include any loss to infrastructure in the wildland-urban interface, and we didn’t include any loss 

for ecological values. We essentially assumed that a burned and an 

unburned forest had the same value. 

And using these really conservative costs, we compared the cost 

with treatment and fire suppression to the cost of fire suppression 

without treatment. And using these conservative values, we came 

85

up with that we could spend anywhere between $238 to $600 per 

acre to avoid the future cost of fire suppressions. 

We conclude that the underfunding, the current underfunding of 

hazardous treatments do not represent an economically rational 

choice. 

In Oregon we are facing an analogous situation, as in the Southwest. We have about 13 million overly dense acres on Federal land 

that are in need of high-priority treatment. In Oregon we are having these Federal fires and insect outbreaks spill over onto private 

lands, and that is a real issue. We are beginning to have impacts 

on the private lands to the point that one of our legislators suggested putting in a fire break between all Federal lands and private lands in the State of Oregon. 

The lack of current investment in treatments of our Federal 

lands indicates that we have a lack of a clear national policy on 

forest sustainability and what we need to do to maintain sustainable forests. 

In closing, I recommend that we need to significantly increase 

the investment in active forest management to achieve healthy and 

sustainable ecosystems for our children and grandchildren. We 

need to increase active management on Federal forest lands, in collaboration with state and private forest lands, to promote sustainable forestry. 

And finally, we need to develop a national policy on sustainable 

forests to clarify and enhance the role of Federal, state, and local 

governments in relation to sustainable forests, promoting regional 

collaboration, joint planning, and coordinated action. 

Thank you very much, and I will be glad to answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Daugherty follows:]

Statement of Dr. Peter Daugherty, on Behalf of

The Society of American Foresters and The Oregon Department of Forestry 

Chairman Grijalva, Ranking Member Bishop, and Members of the Committee, my 

name is Peter J. Daugherty, and I am the Director of the Oregon Department of 

Forestry’s Private Forests Program. I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide 

testimony on an issue critical to the sustainability of our Nation’s forest. I am providing this testimony on behalf of the Society of American Foresters, the Oregon Department of Forestry (ODF), and myself. The Society of American Foresters (SAF) 

is the national scientific and educational organization representing the forestry profession in the United States. It is the largest professional society for foresters in the 

world. The mission of the Society includes advancing the science, education, technology, and practice of forestry to ensure the continued health and use of forest ecosystems and the present and future availability of forest resources to benefit society. 

The Oregon Department of Forestry serves all Oregonians by practicing and promoting sustainable forestry intended to produce a wide range of benefits. The department offers on-the-ground guidance and other services to private landowners, 

helping them to improve and maintain forest health and productivity. ODF protects 

16 million acres of private and public forestlands from wildfire. 

Historical practices have created vast areas of unhealthy forest ecosystems in the 

western United States. The overly dense conditions, exacerbated by drought, have 

increased bark beetle mortality and the size and frequency of stand-replacing crown 

fires. These interconnected symptoms warn society of the jeopardy of losing these 

forest ecosystems. Although it has become increasingly apparent that an ounce of 

prevention activity is worth a pound of suppression funds, federal land-management 

agencies continue to allocate vastly more funds to suppression activities than to 

prefire hazard reduction. Without large-scale implementation of fire-hazard reduction treatments, the costs of uncharacteristic crown fires in western forests will continue to increase. 

86

In a study conducted with Ph.D. candidate, Gary Snider, and Dr. Brent Wood, we 

examined the economic rationality of continuing the policy of emphasizing fire suppression activities over restoration-based fire-hazard reduction treatments. We conducted an avoided-cost analysis to answer the question of how much can we invest 

in prevention to avoid the continued cost of large fire suppression and rehabilitation. 

We compared treatment plus fire suppression costs to the cost of fire suppression 

without treatments over 40 years for southwestern forests. This avoided-cost analysis estimates the amount one could invest in treatments to avoid future suppression costs for large fires. We only included the variable costs directly associated with 

large fire suppression; we assumed that fixed preparedness cost would continue. We 

assumed no increase in average number and size of large fires or in average peracre fire suppression cost. We did not include losses and damages associated with 

structures, private land value, and other infrastructure associated with the 

wildland-urban interface in the avoided costs. We did not include changes in ecological and social values associated with restoration-based treatments. We essentially 

assumed that there is no difference between the value of a burned and restored forest. 

Using these very conservative economic values, we found that avoided future costs justifies spending $238-$601/acre for hazard reduction treatments in the southwest. 

We conclude that the policy of under funding hazard reduction treatments does not 

represent rational economic behavior, because funding hazard reduction would pay 

for itself by lowering future fire suppression costs. 

In Oregon, the current policy has resulted in analogous conditions. On federal 

lands, there are 13 million acres of over-dense forests outside of wilderness and 

inventoried roadless areas that are a high priority for treatment in Oregon. The majority of these acres are now outside their historic range of variability in terms of 

stand density and fuel loads, and are at risk of losing key ecosystem components 

to uncharacteristically severe wildfire or uncharacteristic vegetation succession. The 

current forest conditions constitute an extremely large problem that continues to get 

worse with time. 

The lack of active management on federal lands is also putting many private 

forestlands at risk. Fires and insect outbreaks are moving from federal forestland 

into private forest and associated communities. The current conditions in Oregon’s 

forests are not sustainable with respect to fire and insects, and can only be corrected 

with active management. The lack of active management allows current conditions 

in these forests to worsen, leading to a train wreck that will affect many ecological, 

economic and social values. 

There are no risk-free management actions. Indeed, under present forest conditions, the no-action or go-slow alternative may very well be the most risky of all. 

Our results indicate that the ever-increasing ecological and economic costs resulting 

from high-severity, ecosystem scale fires in the southwest far exceed the cost to society of proactive restoration-based thinning treatments. The current sociopolitical 

condition of continuing to spend dollars on fire suppression while implementing limited treatment of high-risk forest areas represents an irrational ecological and economic decision. 

We no longer face the question of whether society will spend the money or not. 

We are going to pay, one way or another, unless we make the unlikely choice not 

to spend money trying to fight and contain unnatural crown fires. We now face the 

choice of how we are going to spend the money and what are we likely to obtain 

from that expenditure. 

If we invest in restoration-based hazardous fuel treatments, we invest in the future; we invest in healthy, sustainable ecosystems for our children and grandchildren. By not investing in restoration-based fuel treatments, we continue the depreciation of our forests, increasing the risk of radical shifts in their structure and 

function because of uncharacteristic crown fire. This lack of investment indicates 

that our nation lacks a clear vision and policies that promote the sustainable management of the nation’s public and private forests as an integrated and high priority. 

Given these choices, it makes a great deal of economic sense to conduct forest restoration on a large scale today to retain future ecological and economic values. Our 

analysis shows that the fire suppression costs that can be avoided in the future are 

sufficiently large by themselves to justify restoration-based fuel treatment expenditures today. 

Recommendations 

Significantly increase the investment in active forest restoration and management 

to achieve healthy, sustainable ecosystems for our children and grandchildren. 

87

Increase active management on Federal forestlands in collaboration with state 

and private forest lands to promote sustainable forestry. 

Develop a national policy on sustainable forests to clarify and enhance the roles 

of federal, state, and local governments in relation to sustainable forests, promoting 

regional collaboration, joint planning and coordinated action. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, sir. Let me, to begin the questioning, 

turn to our colleague, Mr. Inslee, for any questions he might have. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. I appreciate the Chair and Ranking 

Member’s courtesy in that regard. 

I want to ask you about insect infestation and its causes. It is 

not exactly the exact subject matter, but I want to ask you your 

review of that. 

My understanding is there are some causes of these terrible infestations. I am from the State of Washington; we are experiencing 

them in Eastern Washington, as well. 

I guess the question I have, I have heard of the sources of stress 

being drought, being temperature change, and being overly dense 

forests that can perpetuate or lead to these infestations. 

I would just have a broad question to the whole panel, to the extent you can help us understand those causes, or tease out their 

respective contributions to these infestations. I would be interested 

in any of your even opinions about what part, what cause is responsible for what percentage of these infestations, or any guidance 

you can give us on that. 

Mr. ROWDABAUGH. Representative, what you describe would certainly be appropriate for the situation in Arizona’s forests, as well. 

What we do know from history is that drought is cyclic in the 

Southwest, about every 50 years; and that the last time Arizona experienced this sort of epidemic explosion of bark beetle, the primary insect of concern in Arizona, it was also 50 years ago. 

What is different about this episode than the one 50 years ago 

is the forests in Arizona are tremendously overstocked now, and 

that wasn’t the case 50 years ago. And global climate change seems 

to have already identified one of its signatures, and that is early 

snow melt, not just in Arizona, but all the western states are now 

seeing early snow melt. 

The normal environmental controls for bark beetle in the West 

is cold weather. The beetles over-winter just under the bark. And 

if we had typically hard, cold freezes during the winter, that would 

hold the beetle populations in check. 

We are not having hard, cold winters in the Southwest any more. 

And in fact, because of the early snow melt, instead of having one 

or two generations of beetles during the active summer season, we 

are seeing now we have four or maybe five generations of beetles 

emerge, because the beetle active season is so much longer than it 

used to be. 

We also know that en masse, these overstocked trees are competing for a very scarce resource: that is water. And because of 

that, none of them have sufficient access to water to repel bark 

beetles. The normal response for a pine tree when it is attacked is 

to form pitch, and to pitch the beetle out. And that requires sufficient water to do that. And these drought-stressed, overstocked, 

highly competing trees don’t have enough water available to form 

pitch to actively repel the beetles. 

88

Mr. INSLEE. Anyone else want to add to that? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. I would just add that the treatment for those 

bark beetles that are density-dependent, where increased stand 

density is the cause of their outbreaks, and the treatment of 

thinning for fuel reductions is analogous to the treatment that you 

would do for bark beetle reduction. So thinning the forest prior to 

attack would increase the vigor of the trees and increase their resistance to attack. 

Mr. INSLEE. Thank you. So it really sounds like a triple play hitting us all at the same time, then, between drought, which removes 

the ability to respond; density, which reduces the resources available; and the underlying global climate change that is decreasing 

the cold snaps that would kill the beetles. 

And it may be impossible to tease out the exact percentages, but 

they all sound, in combination, potentially catastrophic. Is that a 

fair statement? Anyone can field that. 

Mr. FARRIS. There is all those statements are true, with the exception of one thing. In Georgia we don’t have the cold snaps to kill 

our bark beetles. They are cyclic. 

And one of the things that we are really working hard on to try 

and address overstocking in the state is ensuring that we provide 

markets for our landowners. And one of our focuses is to see Georgia become the silicone valley of bio-energy. So we are promoting 

the development of woody cellulose to ethanol in our state, and 

have the proposed first woody cellulose for ethanol production plant 

opening up in Georgia breaking ground in July. 

Mr. INSLEE. I am meeting the fellow who is doing that, Bernard 

Colson, in about three hours here. So I will tell him you are on the 

job. 

Ms. ARCHULETA. I would like to address the near catastrophe 

that you were talking about. On Saturday we escaped a near-catastrophic wildfire in Coconino County that was 60 feet from a subdivision of homes, and that was because the forested area that was 

adjacent to it was 90 percent destroyed by bark beetle, and had not 

been treated by removing those trees. 

The reason the subdivision didn’t burn and the fire didn’t spread 

to the subdivision is because that private subdivision had been 

treated, and fire-wise implementation of defensible space was implemented in that subdivision. 

And so that is part of the problem that we are having, is that 

we can work with private property owners to create fire-wise space, 

but the adjacent Forest Service property needs to be treated and 

make sure that we——

Mr. INSLEE. Well, congratulations to local leaders. I will just lead 

to one comment. We are having a serious discussion for the first 

time about a response to global warming here. Your knowledge 

base, if it is shared with Members of Congress, could be useful on 

that. 

I don’t think Members to date, because they haven’t gotten to 

serve on this committee, all the Members, understand the correlation between global warming and these catastrophic fires. And to 

the extent that you can help educate Members, it probably wouldn’t 

be such a bad thing. 

Thank you very much. 

89

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, Mr. Inslee. Mr. Bishop. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I appreciate you all being here. Let me 

see if I can get some simple questions. 

Ms. Archuleta, first of all, what percent of your PILT money do 

you spend actually on fire? 

Ms. ARCHULETA. In terms of Coconino County specifically? 

Mr. BISHOP. Yes. 

Ms. ARCHULETA. We spend in Coconino County, we have had a 

severe reduction, of course, in our PILT. We get about $938,000. 

And of that money, we spend I would say a third of it in activities 

to begin to address community preparedness and wildfires. 

Mr. BISHOP. OK, thank you. Mr. Farris, I appreciate your comments. I have to tell you, though, anything above 5 percent humidity is too much. 

When you were talking about the devastation that is taking place 

on private and public land, you were saying that about 90 percent 

of the forests you have in Georgia are private. Is that about the 

same number that is being consumed by fire? 

Mr. FARRIS. No, sir, not with this particular fire. The large Okefenokee Swamp fire? About 87,000 acres of that, approximately 

600,000 acres are on private lands. The remainder burned through 

the swamp, and then also into U.S. Forest Service property in Florida. 

Mr. BISHOP. So the bulk was Federal. 

Mr. FARRIS. Yes. 

Mr. BISHOP. Something about a fire going through swamps says 

something about wetlands, doesn’t it? I appreciate that. 

The same thing with Mr. DeBonis. When you were coming up 

with the concept of areas in poverty, and you identified those areas, 

do you have any kind of data of how many of those areas are getting rural school emergency aid funds? Do you have any correlation 

between those two numbers? 

Mr. DEBONIS. Mr. Bishop, I don’t have those numbers at this 

time, but I will say generally that there is a lack of data, a lack 

of information about where these resources are going. It is one of 

the challenges. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, I appreciate that. Mr. Rowdabaugh, 

when you were talking about the cyclical nature of the drought 

that is also producing the problem with harvests, you no longer 

have the freeze, I am assuming that tree removal is still the only 

other option you now have as far as controlling infestation. 

Mr. ROWDABAUGH. Yes, sir, that is absolutely correct. The only 

factor that we have any hope of managing is forest density. 

Mr. BISHOP. You know, it is not in my district, but Dixie 

National Forest in Utah is one of those that was not in one of those 

cycles, but it did have that infestation that took place. And even 

with the best analysis of the professionals in the field who wanted 

tree removal, they were prohibited from doing that. And what it 

did cause is greater destruction of the forest, as well as fires then 

took place with that. So I understand that. 

Mr. Daugherty, I appreciate you being here. When you wrote and 

said increased active management on Federal forest lands, what 

did you mean by that? 

90

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Treatment of high-density forest stands to 

lower the risk of stand-replacing fires in ecosystems that is 

uncharacteristic for them. So active management by thinning the 

forest using prescribed fires, using all the tools, as opposed to not 

treating the forest. 

Mr. BISHOP. OK. How long would you estimate it would take before a hazardous fuels reduction policy would pay for itself by lowering the future fire suppression costs? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. That is a really good question, and it really depends on the rate at which we treat. 

We had assumed kind of fairly aggressive treatment, treating 

about 15 percent of the problem per year. And so if you treat 15 

percent in a given area of the problem, the high-hazard areas, you 

should have a significant reduction in cost after 10 years, depending on the lag effect. 

Mr. BISHOP. So if we heard that we are basically treating about 

5 percent of the identifiable area, so we would be talking about either 15, what did you say, 20 years at 15 percent? 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. It would be, yes, 15 to—we ranged it between 

15 percent and 30 percent treatment per year. And I think realistically, to get a handle on this problem we do need to be treating 15 

percent to 20 percent of the high-hazard areas per year. 

Mr. BISHOP. So anything to be done to help solve this problem 

in my lifetime, which isn’t all that much any more, needs to have 

a significant increase in either what we are doing by the government, or we have to bring the private sector in to assist in that, 

if we are actually going to get our hands on the situation. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you. I appreciate all of you for being here, 

and for your time and patience. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. Some quick questions. 

Mr. Rowdabaugh, can you give me an estimate of acreage about, 

in Arizona, how many NEPA-approved hazardous fuel projects and 

treatments are approved in the State of Arizona, and that are 

awaiting some level of Federal funding to implement those? 

Mr. ROWDABAUGH. Yes, sir. It is sometimes hard to tease that 

out of our Federal partners. But they do put in the National Fire 

Plan Reporting System their program of work for the next few 

years. 

And for Fiscal Year 2007 and 2008, what is in the NFPR’s database indicates more than 240,000 acres of NEPA-approved projects, 

which would take an additional $33 million to fund. So we know 

at a minimum that that is the magnitude of what is already available, and perhaps there is quite a bit more. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. The Supervisor, if I may, 

tell us a little bit more about NACo’s policy calling counties to 

enact better local ordinances, wildland-urban interface issue, how 

this policy affects Coconino County. And you also talked about the 

role that Federal land management agencies play in helping counties address that wildland-urban interface, besides funding, which 

you made that point very clear. What other needs do you think the 

Federal government needs to address to help with that policy initiative that NACo has? 

91

Ms. ARCHULETA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the 

question. 

N.A.C.O. has enacted national policy calling on counties to enact 

Federal land use ordinances and local fuels management policies 

for the WUI areas in and around the communities. And one of the 

ways that they have been doing that is through some training and 

development they have provided county staff and county supervisors. And we want to continue that effort, of course, and develop 

a best practices guide. 

Coconino County in particular, we are exploring an ordinance at 

the local level for development in the WUI area. Absent that at this 

particular time, we do have policies in our county, comprehensive 

plans specific to the wildland-urban interface. Those particular 

three policies call for the immediate fuels reduction firewise application around homes to create a defensible space. We encourage 

the use of materials that are fire-retardant building materials. And 

we also encourage landowners to meet with the adjacent property 

owners, the Federal land managers, to make sure that they get 

their input as to what they could do to create a firewise community. 

We also support a collaborative initiative to enact land ordinances. And we would encourage other counties to do the same. 

In terms of what the Federal land managers can do, we have several areas that are ready for fuels reduction, that we have gone 

through the NEPA process. And what we have been told is it is because of a lack of funding that those applications have not transpired on Forest Service property. 

One specific example in my district, we have a rural fire district 

who is willing to work with the Forest Service, to go out and get 

rid of the bark beetle trees, and to reduce the fuels on Forest Service property. And they have had difficulty. Just in the past five 

years they have been trying to develop an MOU with the Forest 

Service, and the rural fire department, summer fire department, 

has not been able to get the Forest Service to agree to an MOU. 

They have the personnel to be able to reduce the fuels on the 

Forest Service property, but the Forest Service has not given them 

the permission to do that. And so we would appreciate any help in 

that regard, because communities do want to work together with 

the Forest Service. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Yes. The example, painful to me, is Summerhaven 

in Arizona, that burned to the ground awaiting a $1 million allocation of an already-approved fuels reduction and thinning proposal. 

And while they were waiting, that occurred. 

Mr. Farris, I am certainly interested when you said your state 

is 50 percent of the wildland-urban interface in the country, I think 

is the percentage you used. 

Mr. FARRIS. That was the South. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. The South in general, OK. 

Mr. FARRIS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. In the administrator’s budget there is a cut, about $11 million, on the State Fire Assistance Program. That assistance 

program, how critical is it to the work in your state? 

Mr. FARRIS. State Fire Assistance funds are critical in the South. 

We believe one of the best ways to keep fires small, and all fires 

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do start small, is through early detection and rapid response. And 

those funds assist the states in the South, retaining and matching 

the resources to perform that service. 

Mr. GRIJALVA. Thank you very much. Mr. DeBonis, I am out of 

time, but I am very interested in the issue of designation for communities at risk and low-capacity rural communities in particular. 

I think that designation for the Forest Service would be very, very 

useful. So as you prioritize, as you said, you go to the greatest 

need. And any additional information you would like to submit on 

that issue of the designation would be very much appreciated by 

the committee. 

Mr. DAUGHERTY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I think 

creating a designation is really the key. The designation includes 

information on the social, economic, and cultural values in communities that can help identify communities that are most at risk. 

We have applied designations on a local scale in New Mexico 

through the Community Wildfire Protection Plan process. So applying similar designations in collaboration with state, Federal, and 

non-governmental groups can help create the——

Mr. GRIJALVA. I agree, particularly with the testimony earlier 

today by the Under Secretary and the Assistant Secretary that 

they are in the process of working to implement solutions to hazardous fuels prioritization and allocation. It would be particularly 

important to have to be dealing with the designation issue, as well. 

I have run out of time. Mr. Bishop, any other questions? 

[No response.] 

Mr. GRIJALVA. I don’t have any more. And I appreciate your patience and your information. Very useful. Thank you so much. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

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