UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-2453

JOEL HAVEMANN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge. 

(1:10-cv-01498-ELH)

Submitted: June 12, 2013 Decided: August 1, 2013

Before WILKINSON, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Allan E. Feldman, SNIDER & ASSOCIATES, LLC, Baltimore, Maryland, 

for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, 

Joseph R. Baldwin, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

On March 10, 2010, pursuant to the Freedom of Information 

Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, Appellant Joel Havemann filed six 

requests for information with the Social Security Administration 

(SSA). Per 5 U.S.C. § 552(a), the SSA was required “within 20 

days after” receiving the request to (1) determine “whether to 

comply with [the] request” and (2) “immediately notify 

[Havemann] of [its] determination and the reasons therefor.” 

Id. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i). The SSA sent Havemann six letters, dated 

March 16 and 17, 2010, acknowledging receipt of his requests and 

inviting him to inquire regarding their status if he did not 

hear from them in thirty days. On June 8, 2010, Havemann filed 

a complaint in the United States District Court for the District 

of Maryland, (1) alleging that the SSA had failed to comply with 

the deadlines imposed by 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A) and (2) seeking 

“injunctive relief compelling the release and disclosure of the 

requested agency records.” The SSA then provided the following 

notifications to Havemann regarding its disclosure 

determinations: On August 13, 2010, it sent Havemann a letter 

denying Requests I, II, and IV, and partially denying Request 

III; on September 10, 2010, it sent a letter asking for 

clarification regarding Request V; and on September 13, 2010, it 

sent a letter communicating that it would partially grant 
3

Request VI. Later it reversed some of these determinations, but 

ultimately, as detailed below, it complied only partially with 

Havemann’s requests. As to the information that it withheld, it

moved for summary judgment, maintaining that “further disclosure 

would constitute a ‘clearly unwarranted invasion of personal 

privacy’ under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).” Havemann v. Astrue, No. 

10-1498, 2012 WL 4378143, at *1 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2012). The 

district court granted the motion, Havemann timely appealed, and 

we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

I.

Havemann is a free-lance journalist and filed his FOIA 

requests in conjunction with research for a story that he 

expects to publish in the National Journal. He is working with 

Ronald Cooley, a former SSA employee who is not a party to this 

case. According to Cooley, Havemann’s story (or stories) “will 

take an in-depth look at the workings inside the SSA and, to a 

lesser degree, the [Veteran’s Administration (VA)], as to their 

administration of certain of their benefit programs, and the 

relevant inter-agency interactions.” This appeal involves three 

of Havemann’s six requests—Requests I, II, and V.

A.
4

 In Request I, Havemann sought information regarding 

married couples “where both members . . . were applying for 

and/or receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits as 

an ‘aged, blind or disabled individual with an eligible spouse’

and where such benefits were denied or subsequently stopped 

because the couple also received a pension from the Department 

of Veterans Affairs.” Said differently, Havemann sought records 

with the following three characteristics: 

• The latest “type of master record”1 is “aged, blind 

or disabled individual with eligible spouse”;

• The record shows a denial of SSI for excess income 

in 1990 or later, or shows that the individual and 

spouse had been receiving SSI that was stopped in 

1990 or later, due to excess income;

• The record shows that one or both members of the 

couple received, or began receiving, a VA benefit 

(pension or compensation) based on need.

Havemann’s purpose for this request is to “shed light on the 

SSA’s handling of a regulatory policy concerning war veterans 

and their spouses who receive a VA pension . . . and also file 

for SSI benefits.”

The SSA released some of the information requested. Below, 

we delineate the requested versus released information in the 

same manner as the district court. The left column shows the 

 1 A “master record” is a code used to indicate relevant 

characteristics of the individual represented by that record.
5

information requested and the right column indicates to what 

extent the information was released. 

FOIA Request I (Veteran Couple Request)

Data Requested Data Released

Social Security Number (SSN) 

or alternative identifier

Alternative Identifier

Current or last shown “Master 

Record”

Yes

Full Name No

Address with 9-digit zip code No (only initial 5 digits of 

zip code released)

SSI application date No

Code for most recent state and 

county of residence

No (only state code released)

Current SSI status Yes

Reason for SSI denial Yes

Denial Date Yes

Date of status change due to 

excess income

Yes

Disability Payment Code2 Yes

Ledger Account File (LAF) Code3 Yes

Date of Birth No (only year released)

Earned Income Yes

Unearned Income Yes

Havemann challenges the SSA’s withholding of the month and day 

of birth, and the SSI application date.

B.

 2 The “disability payment code” denotes the type of 

disability benefit awarded.

3 The “ledger account file code” denotes the current payment 

status.
6

In Request II, Havemann sought information regarding 

individuals who were over age sixty-five, who were receiving or 

entitled to SSI payments, and whose “most recent SSI record 

show[ed] no current receipt of [Social Security] benefits.” As 

to these individuals, Havemann also requested data indicating 

their date of enrollment in Medicare Part A and other Medicare 

information. Here, Havemann’s purpose is “to shed light on the 

SSA’s handling of referrals of SSI recipient[s] for Premium Part 

A Medicare . . . through the QMB [Qualified Medicare 

Beneficiary] Program.” The SSA released some of the data that 

Havemann requested, as shown below:

FOIA Request II (QMB Medicare Request)

Data Requested Data Released

SSN or alternative identifier Alternative Identifier

Citizenship/alien status Yes

Current or last shown “Master 

Record”

Yes

Address with 9-digit zip code No (only initial 5 digits of 

zip code released)

SSI application date No

Code for most recent state and 

county of residence

No (only state code 

released)

Individual Recipient 

Identification Code

Yes

Current Payment Status Code Yes

Beneficiary Identification Code 

(BIC)

Yes

Date of Birth No (only year released)

LAF Code Yes

Most recent federal SSI amount 

payable

Yes

Most recent federally administered 

SSI state amount payable

Yes

Hospital insurance enrollment and 

supplemental medical insurance 

Yes
7

information

Havemann challenges the SSA’s withholding of the month and day 

of birth.

C.

In FOIA Request V, Havemann sought information regarding 

deceased “primaries” (i.e., individuals whose SSN number is 

recorded in the Master Beneficiary Record and on whose earnings 

the record is based) and the beneficiaries listed on their 

record, including the primary. Havemann’s purpose for this 

request is “to assess and publicize how well the government is 

administering Title 38 of the United States Code, Veterans’ 

Benefits.” The chart below delineates the information that the 

SSA released.

FOIA Request V (MBR Request)

Data Requested Data Released

SSN of the deceased primary record 

holder

No

BIC Yes

Payment Identification Code Yes

Sex of Beneficiary Yes

SSI entitlement and termination 

dates

Yes

Code for most recent state and 

county of residence

No (only state released)

Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) Yes

Month and year of PIA Yes

9-digit zip code No

Date of birth No (only year released)

LAF code Yes

Monthly Benefit Amount (MBA) No

Monthly Benefit Payment (MBP) No
8

SSI benefit type Yes

SSI status code Yes

Havemann challenges the withholding of the month and day of 

birth, the MBA, the MBP, the county code, and the zip code.

II.

Although our standard of review for grants of summary 

judgment generally is de novo, Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of 

N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 556 (4th Cir. 2011), where FOIA 

is involved, our review is limited to determining “(1) [whether] 

the district court had an adequate factual basis for the 

decision rendered and (2) whether upon this basis the decision 

reached is clearly erroneous.” Spannaus v. Dept. of Justice, 

813 F.2d 1285, 1288 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Willard v. Internal 

Revenue Serv., 776 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1985)) (collecting 

cases)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A.

FOIA was enacted in 1967 as a means of “facilitating public 

access to [g]overnment documents.” Its predecessor, Section 3 

of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 1002 

(1964), ostensibly existed for the same purpose but, as time 

passed, was viewed “more as a withholding statute than a 

disclosure statute.” Dept. of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 
9

360 (1976) (quoting EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973)) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Congress therefore 

structured a revision whose basic purpose reflected ‘a general 

philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is 

exempted under clearly delineated statutory language.’” Id. at 

360–61 (quoting S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong. 1st Sess., 3 

(1965)). But Congress’s desire “to pierce the veil of 

administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the light of 

public scrutiny,” id. at 361 (quoting Rose v. Dept. of Air 

Force, 495 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation 

marks omitted), did not produce a statute that provides 

unfettered access to agency records. Rather, in its current 

form, FOIA reflects Congress’s intent that the public’s right to 

information be balanced against other competing interests. At 

issue here is the competing interest of privacy: Per 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(b)(6) (Exemption 6), an agency can refuse to disclose 

“personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of 

which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 

personal privacy.”

B.

The parties do not dispute that Exemption 6 applies to the 

data at issue here. See U.S. Dept. of State v. Wash. Post Co., 

456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982) (“[W]e do not think that Congress meant 
10

to limit Exemption 6 to a narrow class of files containing only 

a discrete kind of personal information. Rather ‘[t]he 

exemption [was] intended to cover detailed [g]overnment records 

on an individual which can be identified as applying to that 

individual.’” (second and third alterations in original) 

(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1497 (1966), reprinted in 1966 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2428). Accordingly, we determine whether 

disclosing this data would “constitute a clearly unwarranted 

invasion of personal privacy.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); see also

Core v. U.S. Postal Serv., 730 F.2d 946, 947 (4th Cir. 1984) 

(“If the files fall within th[e] definition [of similar files,] 

the remaining issue is whether disclosure would constitute a 

clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”). Making 

“[t]his determination requires ‘a balancing of interest between 

the protection of an individual’s private affairs from 

unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the 

public’s right to government information.’” Id. at 948 (quoting 

S. Rep. No. 813). 

1.

We think it obvious that the beneficiaries implicated by 

Havemann’s requests have a privacy interest in the information 

that the SSA has collected about them. Individuals have a right 

to control dissemination of information about their person, even 
11

if that “information may [already] be available to the public in 

some form.” U.S. Dept. of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations 

Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994); see also U.S. Dept. of Justice 

v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763–64 

(1989) (recognizing that the concept of privacy “encompass[es] 

the individual’s control of information concerning his or her 

person” and that “scattered disclosure of . . . bits of 

information” is different than wholesale dissemination of 

individuals’ profiles that are compiled by the government and 

not otherwise “freely available” to the public). The more 

pressing question is whether release of the withheld data would

enable identification of specific individuals and thus 

compromise beneficiaries’ privacy. 

Specific individuals obviously are identifiable through 

data that is exclusive to their person, such as a name, address, 

or social security number. Such data is termed a “unique 

identifier.” At issue here are elements of data that are not 

unique identifiers, but that, according to the SSA, function as 

unique identifiers because they can be combined with other 

available information to identify specific individuals. The 

district court agreed with the SSA’s categorization of this data 

and its decision to deny disclosure because of the possibility 

that the data could be used to single out certain beneficiaries. 

We find the district court’s decision sound. The record 
12

provided to this Court demonstrates that the SSA thoroughly 

analyzed and demonstrated the methods through which the withheld 

data could lead to the identification of specific individuals. 

The district court relied on the SSA’s analysis, and we can 

ascertain no reason why it should not have done so. Moreover, 

Havemann’s arguments to the contrary fall short because they 

focus on whether singular pieces of withheld data (e.g., month 

and day of birth, SSI application date, etc.) could lead to the 

identification of individuals rather than on whether those 

pieces of data working in combination with other information

could assist in such identification. 

Havemann faults the SSA’s rationale for withholding this 

data, charging that it is speculative: “[T]he Agency withheld 

the date of birth from disclosure based on the premise that 

personal information could lead to identification of a living 

individual. However[,] the cases dealing with this issue hold 

that possibility of identification is not a sound bas[is] for 

nondisclosure.” But Havemann’s argument lacks merit. It is 

true that an agency cannot withhold information based on a “mere 

possibilit[y]” that an individual’s privacy will be invaded. 

See Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378 (1976) 

(“The legislative history is clear that Exemption 6 was directed 

at threats to privacy interest more palpable than mere 

possibilities.”). But it can withhold data if it demonstrates a 
13

likelihood that releasing the information would connect private 

records to specific individuals. See Nat’l Ass’n of Retired 

Fed. Emp., 879 F.2d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“Where there is a 

substantial probability that disclosure will cause an 

interference with personal privacy, it matters not that there 

may be two or three links in the causal chain. The 

concern . . . is not . . . with the number of steps that must be 

taken to get to the threatened effect; rather, [it is on] the 

likelihood that the effect will ever come to pass.”). As noted 

above, the SSA conducted a thorough and careful demonstration of 

the effect that releasing the disputed data could have. As 

such, the district court did not err in concluding that 

disclosure of the data would implicate the beneficiaries’ 

privacy interests.

2.

Having concluded that beneficiaries’ privacy interests are 

at stake, we evaluate whether those interests are outweighed by 

the public’s interest in disclosure. Per the Supreme Court, 

“the only relevant public interest in the FOIA balancing 

analysis [is] the extent to which disclosure of the information 

sought would ‘she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its 

statutory duties’ or otherwise let citizens know ‘what their 

government is up to.’” U.S. Dept. of Defense v. Fed. Labor Rel. 
14

Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 497 (1994) (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 

U.S. at 773). 

Havemann’s stated intent to evaluate the SSA’s 

administration of various benefit programs fits within FOIA’s 

goal of “shed[ding] light on an agency’s performance of its 

statutory duties.” But he fails to satisfactorily articulate 

how the withheld data aids his pursuits. In his brief to this 

Court, he avers that “to properly inform the public about SSA’s 

operations and associated failures, [he] needs records and 

combinations of records that pertain to individuals.” But the 

information that the SSA has already disclosed does relate to 

individuals, and Havemann does not indicate why it is 

insufficient. Havemann further maintains that “dates of birth 

are essential to identification of eligibility for certain 

categories of benefits.” As noted by the district court, 

however, the SSA has explained that Havemann can achieve nearly 

100% accuracy on eligibility determinations with access simply 

to the year of birth. Thus, it is unclear how access to the 

month and day of beneficiaries’ birth will assist Havemann in

any significant way.

Having reviewed the district court’s decision and 

Havenmann’s arguments, we are convinced that any interest the 

public may have in the withheld data is sufficiently outweighed 

by the privacy interests that would be compromised by such 
15

disclosure. The public’s interest in disclosure of the withheld 

data is negligible at best. The SSA has provided significant 

details for more than 140 million individuals, and such details 

appear sufficient to allow Havemann to conduct his analysis. To 

the extent that they are lacking, we do not believe that the 

marginal gains ostensibly possible through further disclosure 

are worth the burdens that will likely result to beneficiaries’ 

privacy interests. Accordingly, we conclude that the district 

court “had an adequate factual basis for the decision [it] 

rendered” and that its decision was not clearly erroneous. 

Spannaus, 813 F.2d at 1288. Thus, we affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment to the SSA.

III.

Havemann contends that he is entitled to attorney’s fees 

and costs and that the district court erred in denying his 

motion to this effect. Per 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E), “[t]he 

court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney 

fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case 

under this section in which the complainant has substantially 

prevailed.” A complainant “substantially prevail[s]” in a case 

when he proves that “(1) his filing of the FOIA action was 

necessary to obtain the information sought and (2) the action 

had a ‘substantial causative effect’ on the ultimate receipt of 
16

that information.” Long v. U.S. I.R.S., 932 F.2d 1309, 1313 

(9th Cir. 1991). Here, Havemann did not “substantially 

prevail[]” in his opposition to the SSA’s summary judgment 

motion. Thus, he is not entitled to attorney’s fees connected 

with that endeavor. He appears to argue, however, that he is 

entitled to the fees associated with filing his complaint on 

June 8, 2010, because, as noted above, although the SSA 

acknowledged his requests for information within the timeframe 

outlined in section 552(a)(6)(A), it failed to communicate its 

determinations regarding disclosure within that timeframe. The 

filing of the complaint thus arguably “was necessary to obtain 

the information [Havemann] sought” and “had a ‘substantial 

causative effect’ on the ultimate receipt of [the] information” 

that the SSA did disclose. Id. We decline to explore this 

argument further, however, because, as the SSA points out, 

Havemann failed to comply with the requirements of Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 54 regarding claims for attorney’s fees. 

Rule 54 requires that “[a] claim for attorney’s fees . . . be 

made by motion”; “be filed no later than 14 days after the entry 

of judgment”; “specify the judgment and the statute, rule, or 

other grounds entitling the movant to the award”; “state the 

amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it”; and “disclose, 

if the court so orders, the terms of any agreement about fees 

for the services for which the claim is made.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
17

54(d)(2)(A)-(B). Havemann made no such motion. We recognize 

that in his “Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 

to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment,” Havemann argued 

that he was entitled to attorney’s fees because the SSA did not 

provide a substantive response to his request until after he 

filed his complaint in this action. But even if we reckon this 

argument sufficient to comply with Rule 54’s requirement that 

“[a] claim for attorney’s fees . . . be made by motion,” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(A), we cannot ignore Havemann’s failure to 

“state the amount sought or provide a fair estimate of it,” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(iii). Because Havemann failed to make a 

proper plea for attorney’s fees before the district court, the 

district court did not err in denying his request.

IV.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court. We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before the Court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED