NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

DANIEL ADAM MOSES, Appellee.

_____________________________________________________

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellant,

v.

KENNETH TUANHUY NGUYEN, Appellee.

______________________________________________________

Nos. 1 CA-CR 18-0115, 1 CA-CR 18-0116

(Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County

Nos. S8015CR201601431

 S8015CR201601500

The Honorable Richard Weiss, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Mohave County Attorney’s Office, Kingman

By Daniel B. Noble

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 12-6-2018
2

Law Offices of Shawn B. Hamp, Kingman

By Shawn B. Hamp, Virginia L. Crews, Troy Anderson

Counsel for Appellee Nguyen

Rideout Law P.L.L.C., Lake Havasu City

By Bradlee Rideout, Wendy Marcus

Counsel for Appellee Moses

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Presiding Judge James P. Beene and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

T H U M M A, Chief Judge

¶1 The State of Arizona appeals from an order granting Daniel 

Moses’ and Kenneth Nguyen’s motions to suppress evidence obtained 

following a stop of their car by Arizona Department of Public Safety 

Trooper Dickinson. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the 

superior court abused its discretion in finding, after an evidentiary hearing, 

that the State failed to show the Trooper had reasonable suspicion for the 

stop. As discussed below, because the State has shown no reversible error, 

the order granting Defendants’ motions to suppress is affirmed. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Because the ruling turned on the superior court’s assessment 

of credibility, the testimony at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to 

suppress is summarized in some detail. The evidence shows that, one 

morning in September 2016, Trooper Dickinson and his drug-sniffing dog 

were parked in a marked patrol car in the median of Interstate 40 in 

northwestern Arizona. The Trooper was “just patrolling looking for drug 

smugglers as well as people that are transporting weapons, credit card 

fraud, large type[s] of criminal activity.” At about 9:20 a.m., he saw a grey 

sedan, driven by Moses with Nguyen as the passenger, go eastbound past 

where he was parked.

¶3 While the car drove past at or below the posted speed limit of 

75 miles per hour, the Trooper saw the driver “ghost-driving. It’s anytime 

we see a vehicle pass by and they’re leaning back so far where they’re
STATE v. MOSES

Decision of the Court

3

hiding behind a B-pillar. . . . So that stuck out to me on this vehicle when it 

passed by me.” The Trooper testified that

[If] any kind of criminal activity [occurs] when 

somebody’s driving a vehicle, they don’t want 

to look at cops. And if they do, they know the 

cop can see right through them and see that

they’re guilty or see that they’re doing 

something wrong.

. . . .

It’s like when your parents find you and that 

you’re not supposed to do something, and they 

get that look upon your face. Same look. So it’s 

the shocked expression that you look for these 

people on their faces when they’re driving by.

¶4 After passing by the Trooper, the car moved into the right (or 

slower) lane, slowed down and continued driving on I-40. The Trooper 

testified that, “[f]or people that aren’t exiting the highway, this [moving to 

the slower lane and slowing down] is not common behavior, unless they 

are potentially involved in criminal activity. . . . [F]or this same type of 

driving behavior, I’ve gotten numerous amounts of warrants, people with 

warrants out for their arrest, suspended driver’s licenses, DUIs, as well as 

trafficking of drugs.”

¶5 The Trooper “pulled out and caught up to” the car about four 

miles later. After following for another three miles, the Trooper pulled the 

car over for “following too close[ly]” in violation of Arizona Revised 

Statutes (A.R.S.) section 28-730 (2018).

1 The Trooper testified that, before 

being pulled over, the car, while traveling at an estimated 75 miles per hour, 

was about “two car lengths,” or 40 feet, behind a tractor-trailer, which was

traveling at an estimated 70 miles per hour.

¶6 The Trooper collected Defendants’ licenses, viewed the rental 

car agreement on Moses’ phone and asked Moses “to exit the vehicle and 

come back to my patrol vehicle.” Moses complied, and the Trooper “began 

filling out a warning for the unsafe following distance” while he “engaged 

[Moses] in conversation.”

 

1 Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited 

refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
STATE v. MOSES

Decision of the Court

4

¶7 The Trooper testified Moses and Nguyen appeared nervous.

The Trooper added it was odd that Nguyen, the passenger, asked why the 

car was stopped. “This is very uncommon for a passenger to ever question 

the reason for a stop. I could probably count on one hand how many times 

it’s happened in my career. It’s typically somebody that’s involved in some 

type of criminal activity.” The Trooper also testified to observing other 

irregularities, including that given their stated destination, 

the quickest route of travel would be on I-10, not 

I-40. And I know that it’s a common practice for 

people that are smuggling that they avoid I-10 

because there is twice as many K-9s, and there’s 

checkpoints along I-10 that would hinder being 

able to move freely. And so I-40 sees an 

abundance of traffic that should be on I-10 that’s 

on I-40 because they’re trying to avoid the traffic 

points as well as the criminal interdiction 

officers.

¶8 After giving Moses a written warning, and returning the 

driver’s licenses, the Trooper asked “if they picked up any drugs” or had 

“anything illegal in the car.” The Trooper then asked to check his pulse, and 

Moses agreed. Using a personal “pulse oximeter that you could buy online 

that are like 15, 20 bucks,” the Trooper read his pulse at “129 beats per 

minute, and this is extremely high . . . I was a drug recognition expert for 

years and during that time, anything in excess of 90 beats per minute is 

considered high.” After his request to search the car was denied, the 

Trooper then “requested another unit to assist on the traffic stop” and asked 

“Nguyen to step out of the vehicle and stand on the shoulder.”

¶9 When he asked permission to “run my K-9 around the 

exterior of the vehicle,” Nguyen “said yeah.” The dog alerted, the Trooper 

told Defendants the dog alerted and Moses said “his jacket had some 

marijuana in it.”

I asked him if there was any pounds of marijuana 

in the car, and he had the defeated look, 

wouldn’t answer. I went up to Nguyen and 

advise[d] him I was going to be searching the 

vehicle. I asked if I was going to find anything, 

and he said there was some oil in the vehicle.
STATE v. MOSES

Decision of the Court

5

A search revealed “a jar containing marijuana” as well as marijuana in 

duffel bags.

¶10 The State charged Defendants with possession of marijuana 

for sale, transportation of marijuana for sale and possession of drug 

paraphernalia. Defendants moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a 

result of the traffic stop on three grounds: “insufficient reasonable 

suspicion” for the stop; prolonged detainment in violation of Rodriguez v. 

United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015); and insufficient probable cause for the 

search because the K-9 was unreliable.

¶11 After an evidentiary hearing, where the Trooper was the only 

witness, the superior court granted Defendants’ motions on the first two 

grounds. In doing so, the court first noted the stop was “spurious. And I 

think that this case shows it may be really no grounds for it.” Addressing 

the testimony regarding the speed of the vehicles, the court noted: “so what 

choice does a driver have with a truck that couldn’t be going 70 miles-anhour? Because if somebody is going 75, the physics of that equation is that 

you’re driving ahead of the truck in absolutely no time.” The court also 

noted “[t]here was no information” on what “the other traffic was.” Having 

assessed the evidence and credibility, the court repeated that the stop was 

“spurious” and granted the motion to suppress “on the basis of no 

reasonable grounds to make a stop.” The court also granted the motion on 

the independent ground of prolonged detainment. 

¶12 The State successfully moved to dismiss the charges without 

prejudice and appealed the suppression order. This court has jurisdiction 

over the State’s timely appeals pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the 

Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031 and 13-

4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶13 As directed by the Arizona Supreme Court, this court 

“review[s] a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for abuse of 

discretion, considering only the evidence presented at the suppression 

hearing and viewing the facts in a light most favorable to sustaining the 

trial court’s ruling.” State v. Adair, 241 Ariz. 58, 60 ¶ 9 (2016) (citing State v. 

Butler, 232 Ariz. 84, 87 ¶ 8 (2013)). Evidence is not reweighed on appeal but, 

instead, this court defers to the superior court’s factual findings, “including 

findings on credibility and the reasonableness of the inferences drawn by 

the officer.” State v. Teagle, 217 Ariz. 17, 22 ¶ 19 (App. 2007) (citing cases).
STATE v. MOSES

Decision of the Court

6

This court reviews de novo questions of law and legal conclusion. State v. 

Sweeney, 224 Ariz. 107, 111 ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (citing cases).

¶14 The dispositive issue is whether the car properly could be 

stopped for “following too closely.” For that stop to be valid, the State had 

to show, by sufficient evidence, that the Trooper had “reasonable 

suspicion” that a violation of A.R.S. § 28-730 occurred. State v. Starr, 222 

Ariz. 65, 69 ¶ 12 (App. 2009). Reasonable suspicion requires proof by the 

State of “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person 

stopped of criminal activity.” Ornelas v. U.S., 517 U.S. at 693, 696 (1996)

(citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion must be supported by “specific 

and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 

those facts, reasonably warrant” the stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 

It “must be more than an inchoate ‘hunch,’” but “only requires that police 

articulate some minimal, objective justification.” Teagle, 217 Ariz. at 23 ¶ 25

(citation omitted). 

¶15 The testimony at the evidentiary hearing summarized above, 

and the parties’ briefs on appeal, address a variety of factual and legal 

issues regarding reasonable suspicion. The State’s brief on appeal asserts, 

with substantial force, that accepting the testimony as true, there was 

reasonable suspicion to stop the car. But the record reveals that, based on a 

credibility assessment, the superior court did not accept as true critical 

aspects of the testimony. On that basis, the court concluded the State had 

not met its burden to show reasonable suspicion for the stop.

¶16 The court started its ruling by stating that the stop was 

“spurious,” which Defendants correctly note means “bogus, fake, false, . . . 

misleading.” The court questioned the plausibility of the Trooper’s 

estimates of speed and distance and found persuasive Defendants’ 

suggestion that the Trooper was “on [Defendants’] tail,” in their blind spot 

and “following too close[ly]” to Defendants while driving near their car. 

The court opined the tractor-trailer “couldn’t be going 70” miles per hour if 

Defendants were traveling at 75 miles per hour as they approached it, given 

the “physics of that equation.” The court concluded there might “be really 

no grounds” for a violation of “following too close” where a “defendant . . 

. is driving a vehicle and a cop is on [their] tail.” In the end, the court found 

“the stop to be spurious” and granted the motion to suppress “on the basis 

of no reasonable grounds to make a stop.”

¶17 It is for the superior court at the evidentiary hearing, not this 

court on appeal, to weigh and assess witness credibility. Teagle, 217 Ariz. at

22 ¶ 19. Similarly, this court is directed to view the facts received at an 
STATE v. MOSES

Decision of the Court

7

evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress “in a light most favorable to 

sustaining the trial court’s ruling.” Adair, 241 Ariz. at 60 ¶ 9 (citing Butler, 

232 Ariz. at 87 ¶ 8). On this record, applying these directives and given the 

superior court’s credibility assessment that the stop was spurious, the State 

has shown no abuse of discretion in that court granting the motions to 

suppress.

2

CONCLUSION

¶18 Because the State has shown no reversible error, the superior 

court’s order granting Defendants’ motions to suppress is affirmed. 

 

2 As a result, this court does not address the additional grounds relied on 

by the superior court or argued by the parties on appeal.