United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Requesters

HOMELAND 

DEFENSE 

U.S. Northern 

Command Has Made 

Progress but Needs to 

Address Force 

Allocation, Readiness 

Tracking Gaps, and 

Other Issues 

April 2008 

 

GAO-08-251 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 2008

HOMELAND DEFENSE

U.S. Northern Command Has Made Progress but 

Needs to Address Force Allocation, Readiness

Highlights of GAO-08-251, a report to Tracking Gaps, and Other Issues

congressional requesters 

It has been 5 years since the 

Department of Defense (DOD) 

established U.S. Northern

Command (NORTHCOM) to 

conduct homeland defense and 

civil support missions in the United

States. Planning operations in the 

United States poses unique 

challenges for traditional military

planning. GAO was asked to assess 

(1) the status of NORTHCOM’s 

plans and the challenges it faces in

planning and conducting

operations, (2) the number,

experience, and training of

planning personnel, and (3) the 

extent to which NORTHCOM

coordinates with other federal 

agencies. To do this, GAO reviewed

available NORTHCOM plans, 

compared them to joint operational 

planning criteria, compared 

planning staff with those at other

commands, and reviewed

documentation and mechanisms 

for interagency coordination. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making several 

recommendations to DOD to direct

NORTHCOM to take actions to

address the challenges it faces in

its planning and interagency 

coordination efforts. GAO is also 

recommending that DOD develop

metrics by which to measure

readiness for civil support 

missions. DOD generally agreed

with the recommendations and 

suggested ongoing and future

efforts to satisfy the intent of the 

recommendations. 

NORTHCOM has completed—or is in the process of revising—all of the major 

plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and civil support 

missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning for and conducting 

these missions. NORTHCOM has completed its nine required plans. However, 

NORTHCOM does not know whether supporting plans that must be developed 

by other DOD organizations to assist NORTHCOM are complete because it 

has only recently begun to develop a process to track and assess these plans. 

NORTHCOM faces challenges in three key planning areas. First, NORTHCOM 

has difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part 

because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the states on the specific 

requirements needed from the military in the event of a disaster. Second, 

NORTHCOM has few regularly allocated forces and few capabilities allocated 

to its plans. DOD could allocate forces to NORTHCOM and assign specific 

forces to the command’s plans, but this would not guarantee that those forces 

would not have to be deployed elsewhere. However, it would provide DOD 

and the NORTHCOM commander with a better basis on which to assess the 

risk that the command would be unable to successfully execute one or more 

of its missions. Third, NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of 

military units for its civil support mission because its plans do not specify

mission tasks against which units can be assessed. NORTHCOM has 

undertaken mitigation efforts to address each challenge, and new national 

planning guidance may further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in addressing the 

challenges. Nevertheless, NORTHCOM and DOD can take additional actions 

to reduce the risk from these gaps and reduce the risk due to the overall 

uncertainty that stems from the nature of its mission. 

NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the 

command is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for 

staff needed to perform the command’s planning function. NORTHCOM’s 

planning staff is filled at over 96 percent of its authorized positions. 

NORTHCOM’s military planning staff receives the same planning training and 

education as planners in other combatant commands. To draw upon 

experience in planning and conducting domestic operations, NORTHCOM has 

integrated National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard personnel into its 

headquarters staff. NORTHCOM has also developed a curriculum for required 

mission-related training courses. 

Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve coordination of its 

homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal 

agencies, it lacks formalized guidance and procedures—such as 

memorandums of understanding or charters—to help ensure that interagency 

coordination efforts or agreements that are reached can be fully relied on. 

This is important because responding to a major disaster in the United 

States—natural or man-made—is a shared responsibility of many government

agencies with states often requiring federal assistance from DHS and DOD. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-251. 

For more information, contact Davi M. 

D'Agostino at (202) 512-5431 or 

dagostinod@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 5 

Background 9

NORTHCOM Has Completed Major Plans but Faces Considerable 

Challenges That Increase the Overall Risk to Its Ability to 

Execute Its Plans 14 

NORTHCOM’s Planning Personnel Have Adequate Staff Level and 

Are Expanding Experience and Training 31 

NORTHCOM Has Taken Actions to Improve Interagency

Coordination but Lacks a Formal Process to Ensure That 

Coordination Efforts Are Adopted 35 

Conclusions 43

Recommendations for Executive Action 44 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 45 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 49 

Appendix II NORHTCOM’s 25 Prescripted Mission Assignments 52 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 54 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 59 

Related GAO Products 60 

Tables 

Table 1: Status of NORTHCOM’s Plans 15 

Table 2: Homeland Security Council’s National Planning Scenarios 

Incorporated into NORTHCOM Plans 17 

Table 3: Staffing Level of Planning Personnel, by Combatant 

Command 31

Table 4: Military, Civilian, and Contractor Planners, by Combatant 

Command 32

Page i GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Table 5: Agencies and Organizations Represented at NORTHCOM 36 

Table 6: Prescripted Mission Assignments 52 

Figures 

Figure 1: NORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility 10 

Figure 2: NORTHCOM Organization 11 

Figure 3: FEMA Regions 39 

Abbreviations 

CBRNE chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

 explosive 

CCMRF CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force 

CONPLAN concept plan 

DCO defense coordinating officer 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

DOD Department of Defense 

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 

IMPT Incident Management Planning Team

JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group 

OPLAN operations plan 

NGB National Guard Bureau 

NORAD North American Aerospace Defense Command 

NORTHCOM U.S. Northern Command 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

April 16, 2008

Congressional Requesters

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) recognized the need for a more integrated 

military response to an attack on the homeland. In response, DOD 

established the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)1

 in October 2002 

to provide command and control of DOD homeland defense efforts and to 

coordinate defense support of civil authorities. These two activities are 

among DOD’s contribution to homeland security. The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead federal agency for homeland 

security, which is a national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the 

United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize

the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.2

 DOD contributes to 

homeland security through its military missions overseas and homeland 

defense and civil support operations. DOD is the lead federal agency for 

homeland defense, which it defines as the protection of U.S. sovereignty,

territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against 

external threats and aggression against the United States.3

 This involves 

strictly military actions, such as air defense. Civil support is DOD support 

to US civil authorities—such as DHS or other agency—for domestic 

emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities.4

NORTHCOM differs from the other combatant commands—such as the 

U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command—in that, in addition

to Canada and Mexico, its area of responsibility includes all 49 states on 

the North American continent and the District of Columbia. This poses a 

unique challenge for military planning and coordination in a U.S. domestic 

context and with respect to 49 separate and individual state governments. 

NORTHCOM also has to coordinate with numerous federal agencies that

 1

The command is combined with the North American Aerospace Defense Command 

(NORAD). DOD often refers to this command as NORAD-NORTHCOM. 

2

Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (Washington,

D.C.: June 2005). 

3

Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5. 

4

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support (Sep. 14, 2007), vii. 

Page 1 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
also have a role in planning for and responding to a wide variety of 

incidents in the homeland as reflected in the National Response 

Framework.

5

Since NORTHCOM was established in October 2002,6

 we have periodically 

evaluated and reported on issues related to its ability to carry out its 

missions. In our first report in July 2003, we reported that at the time it 

was too early to assess the adequacy of NORTHCOM’s planning for 

operations in the homeland but that there was a need for an assessment of 

the DOD force structure necessary to conduct homeland defense and civil

support missions.7

 Reports since then have consistently shown the need 

for clearly defined roles and responsibilities among responder agencies, 

the need for state and local involvement in the development of response 

plans, and the need to ensure response capabilities are developed and 

ready.8

 Many of these issues were highlighted in 2005, when despite a 

massive deployment of resources and support from both military and civil 

agencies in response to Hurricane Katrina, confusion arose as to what 

responsibilities the military had and what capabilities it would provide in 

planning and responding to a catastrophic event. 

 5

The National Response Framework—formerly called the National Response Plan—is a

national level guide to how local, state, and federal governments respond to incidents 

resulting from all kinds of hazards. The framework is based on the principal of tiered

response, starting from local communities and working up to include support from the 

other levels of government and the private sector. Department of Homeland Security, 

National Response Framework (Washington, D.C.: January 2008). 

6

The command was created in April 2002 as part of a revised Unified Command Plan, which 

outlines the areas of responsibility for the combatant commands. It became officially 

operational on October 1, 2002. 

7

GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic

Military Missions, GAO-03-670 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003). 

8

GAO, Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts Could 

Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk Mitigation, GAO-07-696 

(Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007); Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National

Guard Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 26, 2007); Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to

Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated National 

Priorities, GAO-07-143 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007); Catastrophic Disasters: 

Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability Controls Will Improve the 

Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises 

Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-643 

(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

Page 2 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Homeland defense and civil support operations are major responsibilities 

of NORTHCOM. DOD is the lead federal agency for homeland defense 

operations, and NORTHCOM is to command federal military forces 

conducting homeland defense operations in the United States. For civil 

support operations, although disaster preparedness and response is 

primarily the responsibility of the civilian government and its agencies, 

NORTHCOM must be prepared to assist when requested or when an 

incident overwhelms local, state, tribal, and other federal authorities.9

DOD is not the lead federal agency for civil support missions (unless 

designated so by the President) and operates in support of civil authorities 

only when directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. 

NORTHCOM would command only the federal military10 portion of such 

operations and would do so in direct support of another federal agency,

such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).11

In planning for both homeland defense and civil support missions, 

NORTHCOM relies on other DOD organizations and commands to prepare 

plans that will support NORTHCOM in its missions. These organizations 

include NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, such as Joint Task Force 

Alaska and Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region; component 

commands, such as Army Forces North, Air Forces North, and Marine 

Forces North; and supporting commands, such as Navy Fleet Forces 

Command, U.S. Transportation Command, and DOD agencies such as the 

Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency. 

Following the joint planning process,12 NORTHCOM provides its 

subordinate commands with planning guidance, such as types of incidents 

to prepare for, and collectively these plans should help to facilitate an 

adequate response to an incident in the homeland. Moreover, the joint 

planning process calls for required capabilities to be identified and 

allocated to ensure mission success and for the readiness of those units 

providing the capabilities for assigned missions to be monitored. 

 9

DOD refers to civil support operations conducted in accordance with the National 

Response Framework as Defense Support of Civil Authorities. See Joint Chiefs of Staff,

Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support , GL-7. 

10This does not include U.S. Coast Guard forces, which are under DHS. 

11See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support , vii.

12A number of DOD doctrine publications and other guidance govern the conduct of joint

operational planning. The principal guidance is published in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub.

5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Dec. 26, 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
As requested, this report addresses the extent to which NORTHCOM 

(1) has prepared plans to conduct its homeland defense and civil support 

missions and the challenges it faces in planning for and conducting these 

operations, (2) has an adequate number of planning personnel with the 

relevant experience and training to perform the planning function for the 

command, and (3) coordinates the development of its plans and 

operations with federal agencies and other organizations. We prepared a

separate report to address NORTHCOM’s coordination with the National 

Guard Bureau (NGB) and the states.13As agreed with your staff, we will 

address matters related to NORTHCOM exercises and training as part of a 

follow-on effort. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has prepared plans to 

execute its homeland defense and civil support missions, we reviewed 

NORTHCOM’s available major plans and supporting plans, comparing 

them to established DOD joint operational planning criteria for 

completeness and adequacy. We also met with knowledgeable 

NORTHCOM officials to discuss the status of each of the plans 

NORTHCOM is required to prepare and the process by which the plans 

were developed and assessed. Although we reviewed the assumptions, 

constraints, and other portions of the plans for general adherence to 

DOD’s joint operational planning criteria, we did not independently 

validate those elements. Therefore, we did not attempt to determine the 

extent to which NORTHCOM’s plans are executable. To assess the 

challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and conducting homeland 

defense and civil support operations, we developed a methodology 

comparing a series of questions and topics for joint operational planning

to the information related to the plans themselves. The methodology was 

based on DOD’s standards for joint operational planning for identifying 

needed capabilities, allocating those capabilities to accomplish the 

mission, monitoring the readiness of military units to meet the capability 

requirements of their missions, and capturing and incorporating lessons 

learned into planning. We used the results of this analysis and our 

discussions with a broad range of DOD officials to determine what gaps, if

any, exist in NORTHCOM’s planning efforts stemming from these 

challenges. Although we reviewed all of NORTHCOM’s plans according to 

these criteria, we concentrated on the two primary homeland defense and 

 13GAO, Homeland Defense: U.S. Northern Command Has Ongoing Efforts to Improve 

Coordination with the States and National Guard Bureau but Additional Efforts Are 

Needed, GAO-08-252 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 4, 2008). 

Page 4 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
civil support plans. To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM’s 

planning personnel have relevant and adequate training and experience,

we discussed staffing and training with a wide range of NORTHCOM and 

DOD officials and compared information on planning personnel at 

NORTHCOM with that of other combatant commands. We assessed the 

reliability of these data and found them to be sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of this report. To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM 

coordinates in planning for and conducting its missions, we reviewed the 

documentation and mechanisms for coordination with organizations 

outside NORTHCOM and interviewed officials from NORTHCOM’s 

subordinate commands, DHS, the FEMA, and NGB. Additional information 

on our scope and methodology appears in appendix I. 

We conducted our review from May 2006 to April 2008 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. Appendix I contains further detail on our scope and 

methodology. 

NORTHCOM has completed—or is in the process of revising—all of the 

major plans it is required to prepare for its homeland defense and civil

support missions, but it faces a number of challenges in planning for and 

conducting these missions. NORTHCOM has completed the nine major 

plans required by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and other DOD 

guidance and is in the process of revising four plans, including its 

Homeland Defense plan.14 However, it does not know whether supporting 

plans that must be developed by other DOD organizations to assist 

NORTHCOM are complete because it has only recently begun to develop a 

process to track and assess these plans. Further, although NORTHCOM’s 

plans adhere to DOD standards, the challenges NORTHCOM faces in three 

key planning areas increase the risk to NORTHCOM’s ability to execute its 

homeland defense and civil support plans. First, NORTHCOM has 

difficulty identifying requirements for capabilities it may need in part 

because NORTHCOM does not have more detailed information from DHS 

Results in Brief 

 14As part of DOD’s new adaptive planning process, plans are being reviewed and revised 

more often in order to keep them relevant. 

Page 5 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
and the states on the specific requirements needed from the military in the 

event of a disaster. Second, NORTHCOM has few regularly assigned 

military forces (units, trained personnel, and equipment), and it has only 

one major plan with which specific forces and units are associated. 

NORTHCOM therefore faces uncertainty about which DOD forces or 

capabilities are available to it to respond to a mission requirement. 

Although DOD stresses that homeland defense is a major priority, it has 

routinely chosen not to assign forces to NORTHCOM. DOD could allocate 

forces to NORTHCOM and assign specific forces to the command’s plans, 

but this would not guarantee that those forces would not have to be 

deployed elsewhere. However, it would provide DOD and the NORTHCOM 

Commander with a better basis to assess the risk that the command would 

be unable to successfully execute one or more of its missions. Third, 

NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of military units for 

its civil support mission because, in addition to having few forces 

associated with plans, most of NORTHCOM’s plans do not specify tasks 

against which units can be assessed in DOD’s existing readiness system.15

NORTHCOM has begun risk mitigation efforts for these challenges, and 

new national planning guidance and requirements may further assist 

NORTHCOM and DOD in addressing the challenges.16 However, there are 

additional actions that NORTHCOM and DOD could take—independently 

or as part of newly required planning efforts—that would reduce the 

overall risk to NORTHCOM’s ability to execute its missions. We are 

recommending that (1) NORTHCOM track the status and assess the 

suitability of all supporting plans, (2) DOD assign forces to NORTHCOM 

and require NORTHCOM to develop dedicated force deployment lists for 

each of its major plans, and (3) NORTHCOM develop mission tasks for its 

civil support plans. DOD generally agreed with the intent of our 

recommendations and discussed steps it is taking or planning to take to 

ensure that NORTHCOM reviews supporting plans, assign certain 

 15DOD refers to these tasks as mission essential tasks. Monitoring the readiness of military 

forces is ultimately the responsibility of the military services that train and equip the units 

in question. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1, Functions of the Department of 

Defense and Its Major Components, § 6.4 (Aug. 1, 2002) (certified current as of Nov. 21, 

2003). Nonetheless, monitoring unit readiness is also a means by which joint commanders

assure themselves that the military units that will respond to their mission are indeed

prepared. 

16See White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003); White House, HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007); and Department of Homeland Security, National Response 

Framework. 

Page 6 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
specialized forces to NORTHCOM, and develop metrics against which 

military units can be measured for readiness for the civil support mission. 

NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and they are 

pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training for staff 

needed to perform the command’s planning function. Because of the need

to plan for and conduct operations within the United States, NORTHCOM 

presents a challenge to most planners who have functioned solely in a 

military planning environment. NORTHCOM has over 96 percent of its 

authorized planning positions, which is higher than the percentages for the 

other combatant commands, except U.S. Central Command. The military 

officers who serve as NORTHCOM planners receive the same basic 

planning training and education as planners in other combatant 

commands. NORTHCOM has also integrated 36 National Guard and 22

U.S. Coast Guard personnel—who have experience working in the state 

environment—into most of the directorates that conducts some form of 

operational planning. This improves the command’s ability to plan for and 

coordinate with non-DOD entities to accomplish its domestic missions. 

NORTHCOM also supplements military planning training and education 

with mission-specific training that provides planners with the skills they 

need to properly plan its missions. NORTHCOM has also developed a 

curriculum for its staff and monitors this training to ensure the completion

of curriculum courses in a timely manner. Expanding the knowledge base 

of military staff at NORTHCOM should help improve the level of homeland 

defense and civil support knowledge in planners throughout DOD. At 

some point, this may allow NORTHCOM to require homeland defense and

civil support training, education, and experience requirements for military 

personnel wishing to transfer to the command in a planning position and

for civilian employees the command may hire. 

Although NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of 

its homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal 

agencies, it lacks formalized procedures—such as memorandums of 

understanding or charters—to ensure that agreements or arrangements 

made between the command and agency representatives can be relied on

for planning purposes. NORTHCOM has improved interagency

coordination through such efforts as establishing a headquarters 

directorate focused solely on coordination and integrating representatives 

from 40 agencies into the command’s headquarters. However, we found 

that federal agency representatives at NORTHCOM have varying degrees

of authority from their respective headquarters to agree on coordination 

efforts. Moreover, several agency representatives told us that as they 

rotate out of NORTHCOM, previously made agreements with these 

Page 7 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
representatives may change as new representatives rotate in. As a result, 

NORTHCOM may base its plans or responses on information that is not 

fully vetted and risks the possibility of planning with invalid information or 

responding to an incident with inadequate resources. Among other actions

it has taken to improve coordination, the command participates in an 

interagency incident management planning team. However, officials from 

several agencies on the team expressed concern that their agreements 

with NORTHCOM may not be completely viable because there was no 

formal process to obtain their headquarters’ concurrence with their 

agreements made with NORTHCOM. As we have reported, key practices 

that can enhance and sustain interagency coordination efforts include 

formalizing interagency agreements on such things as roles and 

responsibilities through a memorandum of understanding, a charter, or 

some other formal planning document between partner agencies.17 This is 

important because responding to a major disaster in the United States—

natural or man-made—is a shared responsibility of many government 

agencies with states often requiring federal assistance from DHS and DOD. 

Without effective interagency coordination and planning, there is a risk 

that NORTHCOM’S, DOD’s, and other federal agencies’ response to an 

incident may be fragmented and uncoordinated, such as in the aftermath

of Hurricane Katrina.18 The new integrated planning system required by 

national planning guidance issued by the President and DHS may help 

address the gaps we identified. Therefore, in conjunction with the 

development of the integrated planning system, we are recommending that 

NORTHCOM, in consultation with its federal interagency partners, develop 

clear guidance and procedures for interagency planning coordination 

efforts. DOD agreed with this recommendation and stated that it has 

begun to incorporate such direction into its major planning documents. 

 17GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005). 

18White House, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Feb. 23, 

2006); House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane

Katrina (Feb. 15, 2006); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (May 2006); and GAO, Hurricane

Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s Response to 

Catastrophic Natural Disasters, GAO-06-808T (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006). 

Page 8 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
As with other joint combatant commands, NORTHCOM’s organization 

includes subordinate commands that report directly to NORTHCOM; 

component commands, which are military service commands that assist 

NORTHCOM operations; and other supporting commands and DOD 

agencies. Each of these has a significant role in planning for NORTHCOM’s 

missions. NORTHCOM planning efforts are guided by DOD policies and 

procedures on joint planning that specify what should be included in the 

plans as well as what organizations are required to submit plans in order 

for the command to complete its planning process. 

NORTHCOM is the military command responsible for the planning, 

organizing, and executing DOD’s homeland defense mission within its area 

of responsibility—the continental United States (including Alaska) and 

territorial waters—and civil support missions within the United States19

(see fig. 1). Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, 

territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against 

external attacks and aggression. DOD is the lead federal agency for 

homeland defense operations, such as air defense.20 Other federal agencies

would act in support of DOD in those circumstances. NORTHCOM’s 

homeland defense mission incorporates air and space defense, land 

defense, and maritime defense against external threats. One example of 

how the homeland defense mission is conducted is Operation Noble Eagle, 

the ongoing effort to protect against an air attack, such as those that 

occurred on September 11, 2001. 

Background 

NORTHCOM Mission and 

Organization 

 19Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 8. 

20Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5. Homeland

defense is considered DOD’s portion of the broader area of homeland security. DHS is the 

lead federal agency responsible for homeland security, which is a concerted national effort 

to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to 

terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Homeland

Security Council, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2007),

3 and Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, 5. 

Page 9 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Figure 1: NORTHCOM’s Area of Responsibility 

Canada

Mexico

Sources: GAO analysis; Map Resources (map).

Alaska falls within

NORTHCOM’s area of 

responsibility, but 

military forces in the 

state are assigned to 

U.S. Pacific Command.

United States

NORTHCOM consists of a combatant command headquarters, a series of 

smaller subordinate commands focused on particular missions or regions, 

and component commands of the military services, which support 

NORTHCOM’s planning and operations and command the land, maritime, 

and air portions of a NORTHCOM joint operation. The NORTHCOM 

Commander also commands the North American Aerospace Defense 

Command (NORAD), a bi-national U.S. and Canadian organization charged 

with air and maritime warning and airspace control. Figure 2 shows 

NORTHCOM’s structure. 

Page 10 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Figure 2: NORTHCOM Organization 

U.S. Northern Command

Air Forces North

(Joint Force Air 

Component 

Commander)

Joint Force 

Maritime 

Component 

Commander

Joint Force 

Headquarters

National Capital

Region

Joint Task 

Force Alaska

Navy Fleet 

Forces

Command

Army Forces North

(Joint Force Land 

Component 

Commander)

Marine Forces

North

Joint Task 

Force

North

Joint Task 

Force Civil

Support

Source: GAO analysis of NORTHCOM information.

The Navy’s Fleet Forces Command is not a direct component command of NORTHCOM, but it provides day-to-day support to NORTHCOM operations.

Civil support is DOD support to US civil authorities—such as DHS or other 

agency—for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement 

and other activities.21 DOD is not a lead federal agency for such missions 

and thus operates in support of civil authorities only when directed to do

so by the President or the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM would 

command only the federal military portion of such operations and would 

do so in direct support of another federal agency, such as FEMA.22

Response to disasters or other catastrophic events in the United States is 

guided by the National Response Framework, which involves a stepped 

series of response, beginning with local authorities, state authorities, and

outside assistance from other states. Only when these capabilities are 

exeeded would federal assistance become involved. It is at this point that 

DOD may be asked to provide assistance.23 NORTHCOM would command 

that DOD assistance. For civil support operations, there are three primary 

situations in which DOD takes part in a federal response to a domestic 

 21Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, vii and Department of Homeland 

Security, National Response Framework. 

22See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support, vii. 

23See Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework.

Page 11 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
incident. Federal assistance, including assistance from DOD, can be 

provided (1) at the direction of the President, (2) at the request of another 

federal agency, such as DHS or FEMA.24 Federal assistance, including 

assistance from DOD, can be provided (1) at the direction of the President, 

(2) at the request of another federal agency, such as DHs or FEMA, or (3) 

in response to a request from local authorities when time is of the essence. 

Guidance for developing plans, such as NORTHCOM’s homeland defense

and civil support plans, is provided by DOD’s joint operation planning 

process.25 This process establishes objectives, assesses threats, identifies 

capabilities needed to achieve the objectives in a given environment, and 

ensures that capabilities (and the military forces to deliver those 

capabilities) are allocated to ensure mission success. Joint operation 

planning and execution procedures also include assessing and monitoring 

the readiness of those units providing the capabilities for the missions they 

are assigned. Overall, the purpose of joint operation planning is to reduce 

the risks inherent in military operations. 

The Joint Operation Planning 

Process 

Joint operations plans themselves can take several forms, from the more 

detailed to the more general. Examples of more detailed operations plans 

include those prepared by several combatant commands for the kinds of 

military operations dictated by a specific foreign threat or scenario, such 

as the need to oppose a landward invasion of the territory of a U.S. ally by

a hostile nation. Such operations plans (OPLAN) are meant to cover 

contingencies that are critical to U.S. national security and require detailed

planning in order to reduce risk to potential operations. These plans are 

accompanied by detailed lists of military forces that would provide 

required capabilities in order to execute the plan. Other plans are prepared 

for less compelling but otherwise important national interest

contingencies and for unspecific threats (e.g., disaster relief, humanitarian 

assistance, or peace operations fall under this category). These are 

 24See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 3-28, Civil Support and Department of Homeland 

Security, National Response Framework for a full description of these mechanisms and 

authorities. 

25Among the DOD guidance for joint operation planning is Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 

Operation Planning, Joint Pub. 5-0 and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 

3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning

Policies and Procedures (Sept. 29, 2006); Manual 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System (JOPES)Volume II, Planning Formats (Feb. 28, 2006); and Manual 

3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III, Crisis

Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment 

Execution (Mar. 22, 2004) (current as of July 19, 2006). 

Page 12 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
referred to as concept plans (CONPLAN) and are much more general in

nature but nonetheless are required to adhere to joint operational planning

standards.26 All of NORTHCOM’s plans are currently categorized as 

CONPLANs.

Once a plan is drafted, it is reviewed several times by a number of DOD 

stakeholders, primarily from the Joint Planning and Execution

Community, which consists of a broad range of military stakeholders, from 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the military services, the 

combatant commands, and the major DOD agencies. These stakeholders 

provide input into all phases of planning, from mission analysis to the final

detailed plan. 

In the last several years, DOD has begun to use what it refers to as an 

adaptive planning process, whereby major plans are reviewed much more 

often than in the past. All plans are now reviewed by DOD stakeholders 

every 6 months. 

Part of NORTHCOM’s responsibility is to create plans to address its role in 

various potential threats to the homeland, whether from potential enemy 

attack or a natural disaster. Because the potential threats are so broad, 

whether they involve terrorist attacks or potential natural disasters, the 

plans NORTHCOM was required to develop by DOD usually take the form 

of CONPLANs. Among the specific areas for which NORTHCOM prepares 

plans are chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 

explosive (CBRNE) consequence management; pandemic influenza; and 

nuclear accident response. 

NORTHCOM Planning Process 

for Homeland Defense and 

Civil Support 

The specific contingencies for which NORTHCOM should plan are 

directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense. NORTHCOM 

follows several sets of strategies and guidance when planning for 

homeland defense and civil support. Homeland defense planning follows 

DOD guidance, such as the National Defense Strategy of the United States 

of America, the Unified Command Plan, and Contingency Planning 

Guidance. Civil support planning requires additional guidance. In addition 

to the military guidance, because DOD is not the lead federal agency for 

civil support missions involving domestic emergencies, natural disasters, 

and similar events, it also follows the guidance prepared by the Homeland 

Security Council and DHS in order to frame its civil support planning,

 26Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. 

Page 13 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
including the National Response Framework. To further guide planning

efforts for all hazards, the Homeland Security Council and DHS—along 

with the federal interagency, and state and local homeland security 

agencies—created the national planning scenarios. The scenarios provide 

parameters for 15 highly plausible terrorist attack and natural disaster 

situations, such as the detonation of a nuclear device by terrorists or a 

major earthquake. The scenarios focus on the consequences that federal,

state, and local first responders will have to address and are intended to 

illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic events for 

which the nation needs to be prepared. 

NORTHCOM prepares individual plans to cover its broad homeland 

defense and civil support missions as well as subsets of those missions. 

For example, while NORTHCOM has a major plan each for homeland 

defense and civil support, it also has plans for air defense and for CBRNE 

consequence management. NORTHCOM’s plans provide its subordinate, 

component, and supporting commands and agencies with planning 

guidance, such as types of incidents to prepare for and what kinds of plans 

to prepare to support NORTHCOM’s plans. 

NORTHCOM has completed—or is in the process of revising—all of its 

major plans. However, NORTHCOM does not regularly track or assess the 

required supporting plans from other DOD commands and agencies. This 

heightens the risk that NORTHCOM cannot properly assess whether the 

supporting organizations have adequately planned to assist the command 

when an event takes place. Further, although NORTHCOM plans adhere to

military guidance in both content and structure, the command faces 

additional challenges in such areas as (1) identifying required civil support 

capabilities, (2) allocating capabilities (units, trained personnel, and 

equipment) to meet potential requirements, and (3) monitoring the 

readiness of forces delivering those capabilities. NORTHCOM and DOD 

have some risk mitigation efforts under way in each of these areas that 

partially address the challenges we found. However, it could take 

additional steps to reduce the remaining level of risk to its ability to 

effectively achieve its mission. 

NORTHCOM Has 

Completed Major 

Plans but Faces 

Considerable

Challenges That 

Increase the Overall 

Risk to Its Ability to 

Execute Its Plans 

Page 14 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
To date, NORTHCOM has completed nine major homeland defense and 

civil support plans required by the President, the Secretary of Defense, and 

DOD guidance, and is in the process of revising several of its plans in 

accordance with the DOD requirement to review plans every 6 months for 

potential revision,27 including its homeland defense plan. NORTHCOM 

officials told us that they have placed priority on completing all of their 

major plans over the last 2 years. In addition, NORTHCOM’s plans are now 

undergoing review and consideration for major revision more often than 

when the command was first established. Table 1 lists NORTHCOM’s 

required major plans and the status of each with estimated completion and 

revision dates where applicable. 

Major Plans Are Complete 

or Are Undergoing 

Revision 

Table 1: Status of NORTHCOM’s Plans 

NORTHCOM plan Status of draft or revision

Estimated 

completion/revision date 

Defense Support of Civil Authorities Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing revision. Revision due March 2008 but 

postponed 

Homeland Defense Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing major revisions 

to delineate air, land, and maritime domains; NORTHCOM 

also coordinated with an interagency planning team for 

interagency coordination annex. 

Revision due March 2008 

Pandemic Influenza Global plan complete and approved; regional plan 

completed and approved in January 2008. 

Complete 

CBRNE Consequence Management Plan complete. Plan currently undergoing revision. Revision due April 2008 

Civil Disturbance Plan complete. Plan undergoing its first revision. Revision due February 2008 

National Capital Region Emergency 

Preparedness 

Plan complete. Its first revision is upcoming, but 

NORTHCOM officials do not anticipate major changes. 

Complete 

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations Plan completed. Complete 

Aerospace Defense Plan complete. Long-established NORAD plan. Complete 

Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Plan complete. Complete 

Source: NORTHCOM. 

Notes: One additional plan dealing with Caribbean mass migration was previously considered by 

NORTHCOM, but U.S. Southern Command has assumed responsibility for this plan because a major 

portion of its area of responsibility includes the majority of the Caribbean Sea, including the islands in

the sea and Central and South America. NORTHCOM officials told us that their responsibility for 

mass migration issues once people arrive in the United States is covered in the civil support plan, in 

support of DHS as the lead agency. Some of these changes were caused by DOD’s decision in 2006 

to shift some land and ocean areas in the Caribbean (including Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands) from NORTHCOM’s to U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility.

 27Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Instruction 3141.01C, Responsibilities for the 

Management and Review of Contingency Plans (Sept. 12, 2006). 

Page 15 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
NORTHCOM has also anticipated that DOD will require a 10th plan—

Strategic Communications—and has fully drafted a plan in advance of this 

guidance. 

Although the majority of our review was focused on the two major 

homeland defense and civil support plans, we also reviewed each of the 

other plans and compared them to DOD’s established joint planning 

standards for concept plans as well as NORTHCOM’s own concept of 

operations for how it should plan for and conduct its missions. We found 

that the plans met DOD’s standards for completeness in accordance with 

DOD’s joint planning doctrine and adhered to NORTHCOM’s overall 

concept of operations. For example, the plans include the required 

concept, objectives, assumptions, and constraints sections that frame the 

rest of the plan. We also reviewed the assumptions listed in the plans for 

potential contradictions between one or more plans and found none. We 

did not, however, independently validate the assumptions in the plans. 

Some assumptions—such as assuming that adequate DOD forces would be 

available to execute a plan—seemed broad and had the potential to affect 

the entire plan if the assumption was proved invalid during a crisis. 

However, NORTHCOM planning officials told us that some broad 

assumptions are always necessary in order to even begin planning. They

said that once a plan needs to be executed, the assumptions are reviewed

again and the plan altered to account for an assumption that was 

determined to be invalid. We also found that NORTHCOM’s civil support 

plan adheres closely to the National Response Framework concept in that

NORTHCOM is to provide support for civil authorities upon request by a 

lead federal agency. 

NORTHCOM Plans Adhere to 

Military Guidance 

We also found that NORTHCOM’s plans incorporate 14 of the 15 national 

planning scenarios developed by the Homeland Security Council in order

to guide federal agencies’ general planning and exercises. The one 

scenario not incorporated into NORTHCOM’s plans is the cyber attack 

planning scenario, which falls under U.S. Strategic Command’s area of 

responsibility.28 Table 2 summarizes each of the 15 planning scenarios and 

indicates where NORTHCOM planners have taken these scenarios into 

consideration in their plans. 

NORTHCOM Plans Incorporate 

National Planning Scenarios 

 28U.S. Strategic Command is a unified command with worldwide responsibilities for such 

functions as space operations; strategic deterrence; intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance; and global command and control. 

Page 16 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Table 2: Homeland Security Council’s National Planning Scenarios Incorporated into NORTHCOM Plans 

Planning scenario Planning scenario description Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans 

Nuclear detonation Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton nuclear device in a 

large city 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terrora

Biological attack Terrorists spray anthrax spores in a city using a 

concealed spray device 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Biological disease outbreak—

pandemic influenza 

Natural outbreak of pandemic influenza that begins 

in China and spreads to other countries 

• Global and Regional Pandemic Influenza 

Biological attack—plague Terrorists release pneumonic plague into three 

areas of a large city 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Chemical attack—blister agent Terrorists spray a combination of blister agents into 

a crowded football stadium 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Chemical attack—toxic industrial 

chemicals 

Terrorists use grenades and explosive devices at 

petroleum facilities 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Chemical attack—nerve agent Terrorists spray Sarin into the ventilation system of 

three commercial buildings in a city 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Chemical attack—chlorine tank

explosion 

Terrorists use explosives to release a large quantity 

of chlorine gas 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Natural disaster—major 

earthquake 

A 7.2 magnitude earthquake occurs in a major

metropolitan area 

• Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

•

Natural disaster—major 

hurricane 

Category 5 hurricane strikes a major city • Defense Support of Civil Authorities 

•

Radiological attack— radiological 

dispersal device 

Terrorists detonate “dirty bombs” in three cities in 

proximity to each other 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Explosives attack—bombing 

using improvised explosive 

devise 

Terrorists detonate improvised explosive device in 

a sports arena, and use suicide bombers in a public 

transit concourse and in a parking facility 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Biological attack—food 

contamination 

Terrorists contaminate food with anthrax in

processing facilities 

• CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Page 17 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Planning scenario Planning scenario description Primary corresponding NORTHCOM plans 

Biological attack—Foreign 

Animal Disease 

Terrorists infect livestock at specific locations • CBRNE Consequence Management 

• Homeland Defense 

• Regional War on Terror 

Cyber attack Terrorists conduct cyber attacks on U.S. financial 

infrastructure 

• NORTHCOM does not plan against civilian 

computer system attacks. This is 

addressed in U.S. Strategic Command’s 

plans 

Source: NORTHCOM. 

Note: The scenarios appear in the same order they were published by the Homeland Security

Council. They are not in any order of probability or impact. 

a

NORTHCOM’s Regional War on Terror plan is a supporting plan for U.S. Special Operations 

Command’s main plan. 

Limited Progress in 

Tracking and Reviewing 

Supporting Plans Increases 

Risk to the Planning 

Process 

Because NORTHCOM officials have spent considerable time and effort in

completing or revising their major plans, they have not focused adequately

on the supporting plans that have been—or are to be—developed by other 

organizations within DOD to assist NORTHCOM. Like all CONPLANs, 

NORTHCOM’s plans require supporting plans from NORTHCOM’s 

subordinate and component commands as well as other DOD agencies to 

assist the responsible command—NORTHCOM—when an event occurs. 

Because NORTHCOM’s major plans are less detailed and focused than the 

operational plans of other combatant commands, these supporting plans 

are critical for providing the operational level detail that is otherwise 

lacking in the major plans. Supporting plans must also adhere to the same 

joint doctrine standards as the broader plans and should contain 

objectives, assumptions and constraints, and sections on such areas as 

command and control, task organization, intelligence, and logistics.29

Although there is no explicit DOD requirement that NORTHCOM 

systematically review and track supporting plans, DOD guidance on joint

operation planning indicates that “in the absence of Joint Staff instructions 

to the contrary, the supported commander will review and approve 

supporting plans.”30 Regardless of whether there is an explicit requirement, 

we believe it is prudent to perform these reviews to reduce the risk that 

 29Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, C-3 and Manual

3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, Planning

Formats, and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, I-25. 

30Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manual 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and

Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, C-25, D-9; and 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, I-25. 

Page 18 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
supporting agencies have not adequately planned to support NORTHCOM 

when needed following a natural or man-made disaster. 

The number of supporting plans required varies with the type of major 

plan. For example, NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan required 

supporting plans from 25 commands and agencies, whereas the civil

support plan required supporting plans from only 6 commands and 

agencies. Of the 6 supporting plans required by the civil support concept 

plan, NORTHCOM officials had 4 in their possession when we reviewed 

the plans at NORTHCOM headquarters. Similarly, of the 25 supporting 

plans required by NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan, NORTHCOM also 

had only 3 at the time we reviewed plans. Some of the other 22

organizations expected to develop supporting plans for homeland defense 

are the Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Intelligence 

Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Defense Contract 

Management Agency. With the exception of supporting plans by 

NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands—such as Joint Task Force Alaska 

and Joint Task Force Civil Support—and the component commands31

whose plans they could provide copies of, NORTHCOM officials could not 

report to us how many of the other supporting plans are completed. As we 

report separately, NORTHCOM officials were uncertain about the status 

and completeness of the supporting plans that the homeland defense 

CONPLAN required NGB to coordinate with the states and forward to the 

command.32

We reviewed all the supporting plans NORTHCOM was able to locate for 

the Homeland Defense, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, and CBRNE 

Consequence Management plans, as well as several others we saw during 

visits to other commands and DOD organizations. We found that in general 

the supporting plans met the intent and objectives of the major strategiclevel plans and had compatible assumptions. We did not, however, review

the supporting plans to the degree NORTHCOM officials would have to in

order to satisfy themselves that the plans meet the command’s needs, nor 

did we independently validate the assumptions in the supporting plans. 

NORTHCOM officials acknowledged that because they had devoted most 

of their effort to completing and revising the major plans, until recently 

 31Component commands are generally the military service commands that directly support 

the combatant commands. 

32NGB forwarded these plans to NORTHCOM but received no indication that they had been 

reviewed and assessed. See GAO-08-252. 

Page 19 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
they had not devoted enough attention to the supporting plans. 

NORTHCOM officials told us that they are developing a process to track

the status of subordinate commands’ supporting plans. In fact, the officials 

provided us an update on the status of these supporting plans. But this did 

not include other DOD agencies, such as the Defense Threat Reduction 

Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Information Support 

Agency, that are also supposed to be developing supporting plans for some 

of NORTHCOM’s concept plans. Additionally, NORTHCOM officials told

us that they were planning to start reviewing supporting plans in a manner 

similar to how DOD stakeholders33 review major plans. As long as this 

approach encompasses all supporting plans, it could provide NORTHCOM 

planning and operations officials with a much more detailed analysis of 

the extent to which supporting plans meet their needs as well as help them 

identify potential planning gaps. Without knowledge about the 

completeness of supporting plans and the extent to which these plans 

address NORTHCOM’s objectives, NORTHCOM officials face increased

uncertainty about the extent of planning and preparedness of other DOD 

agencies if and when these agencies are called to respond. 

NORTHCOM Has 

Difficulty Determining 

Required Capabilities for 

Its Civil Support Mission 

Because It Lacks 

Information on States 

According to the strategic vision contained in NORTHCOM’s concept of

operations, NORTHCOM should facilitate the synchronization of national, 

state, and local assets and capabilities to defend the nation and support 

civilian authorities.34 One of the fundamental elements of operational 

planning is determining the capabilities requirements for the mission to be

performed. Because NORTHCOM’s plans are broader CONPLANs rather 

than more detailed OPLANs, they are not focused on specific scenarios 

and discrete sets of required capabilities needed to accomplish objectives.

Without an understanding of the capabilities necessary for DOD to 

conduct an operation, it is more difficult to plan in advance for the types, 

numbers, and timing of capabilities (trained personnel and equipment) to 

actually conduct an operation. For NORTHCOM’s homeland defense 

mission, the required capabilities are based on an assessment of threats 

and a number of factors that NORTHCOM and other DOD commands and 

organizations assess. For NORTHCOM’s civil support mission, the 

requirements the command faces are established by the needs of the 

 33As mentioned in the background section of this report, the Joint Planning and Execution

Community is composed of the DOD stakeholders for reviewing and contributing to joint 

operation plans.

34U.S. Northern Command, Concept of Operations (June 13, 2005), 3-11. 

Page 20 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
federal, state, and local agencies and organizations that DOD would be 

supporting in an actual event. 

Given the diverse environment that NORTHCOM is responsible for within 

its area of responsibility, its civil support role varies by area, incident, and 

other factors, which makes NORTHCOM’s ability to know its capability 

requirements for any given civil support operation uncertain. Further, 

NORTHCOM officials told us that they do not have access to enough detail 

about from DHS or from the states in order to know what capabilities exist 

at the state level and the extent to which there are capability gaps. DHS 

has reported on the weaknesses in state and federal emergency plans both 

in terms of the adequacy of the plans themselves and the lack of 

information on required capabilities.35 As we report in a separate letter, 

NORTHCOM has also not systematically reviewed state emergency plans 

in order to obtain detailed information about the specific challenges it may 

face in conducting homeland defense or civil support operations. 

Coordination between NORTHCOM, DHS, NGB, and the states is therefore 

important for emergency planning, particularly for civil support 

operations. 

NORTHCOM officials told us that understanding National Guard 

capabilities is also problematic. For example, as we have reported, neither 

DOD nor the states have fully determined the National Guard’s 

requirements for civil support operations in the United States.36 The 

National Guard serves as a critical portion of the response to a disaster, 

whether in its normal role under the direct command of a state governor 

or as part of a federal response once the President has made a 

determination to federalize the Guard. In either case, uncertainty about the 

National Guard’s civil support capabilities increases the risk to the 

adequacy of NORTHCOM’s and DOD’s overall civil support planning effort. 

In 2006, Congress required that DOD develop and maintain a database that 

includes the types of emergency response capabilities DOD may be able to 

provide in support of the National Response Framework’s emergency 

 35Department of Homeland Security, Nationwide Plan Review: Phase 2 Report

(Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). 

36GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment 

Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007). 

Page 21 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
support functions37 and the types of emergency response capabilities each

state’s National Guard may be able to provide in response to a domestic 

natural or man-made disaster.38 DOD is also required to identify in this 

database the specific units that are able to provide these capabilities.39

Also, in 2006, Congress required FEMA to accelerate the completion of an 

inventory of federal response capabilities and to develop a list of 

organizations and functions within DOD that may be used to provide 

support to civil authorities during natural or man-made disasters.40 FEMA 

is still developing this list, and DOD is still developing the required 

database. In January 2008, Congress required DOD to work with DHS to 

determine the military-unique capabilities DOD needs to provide for civil 

support operations and to prepare a plan to provide funds and resources 

to maintain existing military-unique civil support capabilities or any 

additional capabilities required for homeland defense and civil support 

missions.41 In addition to descriptions of the emergency support functions, 

the annexes to the previous National Response Plan42—such as the 

catastrophic incident annex—contain information about agency roles and 

responsibilities as well as descriptions of capabilities. These annexes are 

being revised as part of the new National Response Framework. 

Until these efforts are completed and are coordinated with similar 

information from the states, there remains a gap in knowledge about what 

capabilities exist at all levels for responding to natural and man-made 

disasters. This, in turn, limits NORTHCOM’s ability to fully identify the 

civil support requirements for DOD forces. 

 37Emergency support functions are how the federal government and many state 

governments organize much of their resources and capabilities. The 15 emergency support

functions are transportation; communications; public works and engineering; firefighting; 

emergency management; mass care, emergency assistance, housing, and human services; 

logistics management and resource support; public health and medical services; search and 

rescue; oil and hazardous materials response; agriculture and natural resources; energy; 

public safety; long-term community recovery; and external affairs. Each function has a 

federal agency coordinator. See Department of Homeland Security, National Response 

Framework.

38Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1406 (2006). 

39Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 1406(2) (2006). 

40Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 651 (2006). 

41Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1815 (2008). 

42Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: Dec.

2004). 

Page 22 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
NORTHCOM and DOD have taken some steps to mitigate the uncertainty 

in civil support requirements. NORTHCOM officials reported to us that 

through analyzing past disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, and potential 

disasters—such as those represented by the national planning scenarios—

they can reasonably determine the types of capabilities necessary to 

support civil authorities. NORTHCOM officials said that this allows them 

to anticipate the needs of states and local authorities in the event of a 

disaster to some extent but that they can only “lean forward” so far 

without infringing on the intent of the National Response Framework or 

the prerogatives of the state governments. NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff 

are also assessing NORTHCOM’s major plans (including Homeland 

Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities) in order to determine 

where the potential gaps in required capabilities may be and what specific 

military capabilities are potentially required to address them. This may 

better inform capabilities requirements and resource decisions. 

NORTHCOM has also worked with FEMA and DOD officials to develop 

prescripted mission assignments, which are descriptions of a set of 

capabilities civil authorities might need from DOD in an emergency and 

are written in such a way as to provide a common understanding of a 

capability. NORTHCOM officials told us that the intent was to avoid 

requests for specific DOD equipment that may or may not be suitable or 

available to meet the request and to base requests on capabilities a 

requesting agency needs that could potentially be addressed by a broader 

range of DOD assets. For example, FEMA might request the capability to 

move by air 40 metric tons rather than requesting a specific aircraft. This 

enables DOD to apply a wide range of resources for solving a problem and 

reduces confusion associated with varying requirements and terminology 

across agencies. These mission assignments are designed to leverage 

DOD’s areas of expertise and capabilities where civil agencies typically fall 

short. Appendix II shows the 25 prescriptive mission assignments that 

NORTHCOM and DOD have worked out with FEMA. 

These mitigation efforts help reduce the uncertainty NORTHCOM faces in 

determining requirements for civil support planning. But only a broader 

effort by NORTHCOM, DOD, DHS, and the states to comprehensively 

assess capabilities and capability gaps will help all stakeholders 

understand the true extent of requirements in order to plan for natural and 

man-made disasters in the United States. 

Page 23 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
One of the major challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and 

conducting both homeland defense and civil support operations is 

ensuring that it has adequate capabilities assigned to conduct those 

missions as required. The major combatant commands, such as U.S. 

European Command and U.S. Pacific Command, normally have forces 

allocated to their operational control on a regular basis to meet their 

general capabilities requirements and to perform other missions, such as 

demonstrations of military presence in support of U.S. foreign policy 

objectives. Further, the OPLANs prepared by combatant commands 

normally have lists that detail which military units will respond to the plan, 

if needed, and the timing of that deployment. DOD refers to this 

information as time-phased force deployment data. The combination of 

regularly assigned forces and force deployment lists associated with the 

more detailed operations plans provides combatant commanders with a 

reasonable level of assurance that sufficient forces will be available to

execute a plan if necessary and allows the commander to monitor the 

readiness of the units assigned to the respective area of responsibility or 

specific plan. 

Few Capabilities Are 

Allocated to Execute 

NORTHCOM’s Plans 

Since NORTHCOM was established in October 2002, DOD has routinely 

considered the regular assignment of forces to the combatant commands 

in what DOD refers to as a “Forces For Unified Commands” document. 

However, despite the priority placed on homeland defense in the National

Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and other DOD strategic 

guidance, DOD has only routinely assigned air defense and supporting 

forces to NORTHCOM. A contributing factor may be that the pace and 

scope of ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the 

world has severely limited the number and types of units available to 

respond to missions in the homeland. The assignment of forces to 

combatant commands provides commanders with a means to know which 

specific military forces are committed to that area of responsibility and, 

conversely, allows commanders to perform risk assessments if those 

forces must be committed elsewhere.

In addition to lacking regularly assigned forces, NORTHCOM officials told 

us that their plans usually do not have lists that detail the military units 

that will be used because the plans are meant to cover a less-specific and

broader range of threats, rather than specific scenarios. Only one 

NORTHCOM plan—the CBRNE Consequence Management plan—had a 

force deployment list at the time of our review of the plans. NORTHCOM 

has since developed force deployment lists as part of the revised 

homeland defense plan but not for the civil support plan. NORTHCOM 

officials told us that they created the CBRNE consequence management 

Page 24 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
list in order to stress the importance of providing forces to the CBRNE 

mission. The force deployment list lays out the capabilities for what DOD 

calls the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF), 

which is intended to be a series of separate units totaling roughly 15,000

personnel to provide initial response assistance to civil authorities in the 

event of a major CBRNE incident in the country. We reported previously 

on the lack of adequate training, equipment, and availability of active and 

reserve chemical and biological units and the potential difficulty DOD 

faced in meeting NORTHCOM’s CBRNE requirements.43 Despite being the 

only set of capabilities dedicated to a NORTHCOM civil support plan, the 

CCMRF has never been fully manned and equipped by DOD because many

of the units that would make up the force have been deployed to their 

wartime missions or because of other availability or sourcing issues. DOD 

and National Guard officials are currently negotiating a plan whereby 

Guard units may provide the majority of CCMRF capabilities for a certain 

period until the Active Army can resume responsibility. However, lack of

agreement between DOD and National Guard Bureau stakeholders on 

sources of funding and command and control issues continues to delay the 

effort.44

While a force deployment list does not guarantee that the appropriate 

units, trained personnel, and equipment will be available to execute a 

military plan, such a list provides a known set of capabilities against which 

to measure readiness and assess risk if all or part of the forces on the list 

are unavailable. None of NORTHCOM’s other civil support plans have 

force deployment lists, which limits NORTHCOM’s ability to know which 

military units may respond to its homeland defense or civil support 

missions if the need arises. 

To help mitigate the uncertainties caused by the lack of forces being 

assigned to execute NORTHCOM’s plans, NORTHCOM and DOD have 

developed a series of standing “execute orders” in the homeland defense

and civil support areas. These orders identify the general types and 

numbers of forces necessary to execute missions in such areas as air and 

 43GAO-07-143. 

44The CCMRF was designed to provide federal military assistance to a lead federal agency

in the event of a CBRNE attack. The National Guard units that would fulfill this mission 

may be in a nonfederalized state active duty status, which means they remain under the

command of their respective governors. Because of the state of negotiations, there remains

the issue of whether the units would be federalized and placed under NORTHCOM if 

needed. 

Page 25 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
maritime homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities. One 

example is the domestic air defense order associated with Operation 

Noble Eagle. Additionally, during periods of heightened specific threats, 

such as the yearly hurricane season, NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff have 

prepared temporary execute orders that detail more specific military 

forces that can be called upon to meet an emerging NORTHCOM need to 

support civil authorities. The execute orders serve as the gateway to the 

“request for forces” process whereby NORTHCOM requests forces from 

U.S. Joint Forces Command,45 through the Joint Staff, and Joint Forces 

Command assigns specific military forces from the services to meet the 

specific requirement, if possible. The orders also allow NORTHCOM to 

place units on notice to prepare to deploy for a short time in advance of 

their actual assignment to NORTHCOM. 

According to Joint Forces Command and NORTHCOM officials, about 

40,000 military personnel are associated with all of NORTHCOM’s execute 

orders and the CBRNE Consequence Management plan. However, with the 

exception of the dedicated homeland defense orders—such as Operation 

Noble Eagle—the CCMRF deployment list and civil support execute 

orders have very few units actually sourced to them.46 This means an 

increased level of uncertainty about whether the appropriate number of 

properly trained personnel and the correct equipment will be available 

when a plan needs to be executed. NORTHCOM officials are concerned 

about the high number of unsourced units and the corresponding level of

uncertainty about the availability of appropriate military forces to meet 

their homeland defense and civil support needs. It should be noted, 

however, that we found no instances where Joint Forces Command could 

not meet NORTHCOM’s operational needs for an actual homeland defense 

 45Joint Forces Command is the force provider for NORTHCOM and the other combatant 

commands. The commands transmit their force requirements (forces needed to execute 

their planned operations) to Joint Forces Command (through the Joint Staff), and it 

determines which mix of trained military service units (Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Marines) will provide the requested forces. See White House, Unified Command Plan

(Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2006), and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 5-0, Joint Operation 

Planning, p. I-10. In addition, any other combatant command to which forces have been

assigned by DOD, such as U.S. Pacific Command, could also be directed to provide forces

to NORTHCOM.

46Joint Forces Command officials explained to us that sourced units are those that Joint 

Forces Command has actually identified as specific units for meeting specific 

requirements. Unsourced units are units for which Joint Forces Command has not 

identified a specific unit in advance but will attempt to do so when the order or plan is 

executed. 

Page 26 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
or civil support mission. Fortunately, NORTHCOM’s homeland defense 

and civil support operations have mostly been manageable and not largescale events. For example, in addition to Operation Noble Eagle, which 

NORTHCOM carries out every day, the command conducts anticipated 

and unanticipated operations in support of civil authorities, such as the 

response to the Minneapolis bridge collapse and Hurricane Dean in August 

2007 and in response to the California wildfires in October 2007. 

NORTHCOM officials told us that the execute order process has provided 

them some limited measure of assurance that adequate military forces will 

be available for their homeland defense and civil support plans. However, 

the absence of regularly assigned forces in NORTHCOM’s area of 

responsibility and the lack of units specifically identified to execute 

NORTHCOM’s plans may increase the level of risk to homeland defense or 

civil support operations in terms of the availability of a sufficient number 

of personnel with the appropriate level of training and equipment for 

conducting the domestic mission. 

NORTHCOM’s Ability to 

Monitor the Readiness of 

Forces to Respond to Civil 

Support Missions Is 

Hampered 

NORTHCOM has difficulty monitoring the readiness of individual military 

units because in part, few requirements or units that may respond to a 

request for civil support have been identified. In contrast, through its 

planning process for homeland defense, NORTHCOM has determined the 

forces it needs for this mission and, through the services, monitors the 

readiness of these forces. DOD normally measures the readiness of 

military units by (1) assigning them to conduct missions associated with 

specific plans and (2) using lists of mission-essential tasks that correlate to 

the actual mission they would perform. The degree to which units have the 

numbers of trained personnel and the equipment necessary to accomplish 

those mission-essential tasks serves as the overall measure of a unit’s 

readiness. 

According to NORTHCOM, Joint Forces Command, Joint Staff, and U.S. 

Army Forces Command officials, DOD generally assumes that a unit 

capable of performing its military mission is also capable of performing a 

civil support mission, but this may not always be true. Neither 

NORTHCOM nor the military services have developed mission-essential 

tasks for civil support missions. We have reported on the mismatch 

between assessments of readiness based solely on wartime missions and 

the requirements of domestic civil support missions. Whereas homeland 

defense missions in and around the United States would be similar to 

traditional wartime missions, those same mission tasks do not necessarily

provide a complete picture of readiness for a domestic civil support 

Page 27 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
mission.47 As a result, DOD does not have a direct method to measure the 

readiness of units for the civil support mission. 

DOD officials told us that it is often possible for a unit to be considered 

not ready for its wartime mission but be able to execute a civil support 

mission. For example, a U.S. Army air defense unit whose surface-to-air 

missile launchers are still overseas or undergoing depot repair is not 

considered ready to conduct its wartime mission. However, to the extent 

that personnel, trucks, and other equipment were still with the unit, it may 

be ready to conduct a civil support mission, such as delivering supplies to

a disaster area. This is not captured in DOD’s readiness system. Further, 

the lack of mission-essential tasks for the range of civil support missions 

leads to a potential gap in DOD’s knowledge of whether sufficient trained 

personnel and equipment are available. For example, NORTHCOM’s civil 

disturbance plan assumes that nonlethal equipment and methods would be 

necessary and that the forces required to conduct such operations have 

been trained in nonlethal methods. But without a set of mission tasks 

against which to measure unit readiness, there is no objective means of 

determining if military units can meet these tasks. 

Because at the time of our review only one of NORTHCOM’s major plans 

has actual units assigned to it (CBRNE Consequence Management), 

NORTHCOM officials were unable to monitor readiness of units that may 

be asked to respond to other plans, even if there were specific civil 

support-related mission tasks. We have work under way reviewing DOD’s 

Readiness Reporting System, and we did not assess the accuracy of that 

system as part of this review. However, we asked NORTHCOM officials to 

show us the extent to which they could use DOD’s readiness systems to 

monitor readiness for both its homeland defense and civil support 

missions. 

For the ability to respond to potential CBRNE attacks, NORTHCOM has 

developed mission-essential tasks for the CCMRF. However, Joint Staff 

and National Guard officials told us that they estimated that the wartime 

military tasks of the units only met about 70 percent of the CCMRF’s total 

 47GAO has reported in the past on DOD’s focus on units’ wartime combat missions as 

opposed to domestic civil support missions. See GAO, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to 

Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions, GAO-03-670 

(Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003), and Chemical and Biological Defense: Management 

Actions Are Needed to Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and

Stated National Priorities, GAO-07-143 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).

Page 28 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
mission, which further indicates the mismatch between wartime tasks a 

unit may face in comparison to tasks it may face in a domestic, nonwartime environment. Joint Task Force Civil Support, NORTHCOM’s 

subordinate command for CBRNE consequence management, routinely 

uses the CCMRF’s mission-essential tasks, the existing DOD readiness 

system, and direct interaction with Joint Forces Command and Army 

officials to monitor the readiness of CCMRF forces on a routine basis. 

Even with this effort, NORTHCOM and Joint Task Force Civil Support 

officials told us that it is difficult to track readiness because, as we 

indicated earlier, so few of the units are actually filled with the personnel 

and equipment necessary. Nonetheless, the fact that the CBRNE forces 

have mission tasks against which to measure readiness in the existing 

system provides a level of knowledge about the overall state of readiness 

to execute the CBRNE plan. This, in turn, provides the NORTHCOM 

Commander and DOD with a clearer picture of the risk they face in that 

area. Because no mission tasks exist for general civil support missions, 

NORTHCOM and DOD face greater uncertainty about their ability to 

execute these plans. 

Mission-essential tasks are also critical guides for training military units 

for their missions and for conducting and evaluating exercises.

NORTHCOM conducts two major exercises each year that include both 

homeland defense and civil support elements. The command also 

participates in other commands’ live exercises as well as tabletop 

simulations of various homeland defense and civil support operations. 

Further, NORTHCOM has a system for incorporating lessons learned from

training exercises into plans and future training exercises. The system has 

a good structure for submitting and processing lessons, including multiple 

layers of review to assess the validity of lessons and the assignment of 

individuals with the responsibility of managing and addressing lessons. 

NORTHCOM officials believe that the system is adequate, and they 

continue to seek ways to improve the process. Ensuring that appropriate 

mission-essential tasks are associated with each of the missions for which 

NORTHCOM is responsible would further help NORTHCOM officials 

evaluate exercises and actual operations and incorporate lessons learned 

into future exercises and plan revisions. The command would also be in a 

better position to conduct meaningful analysis to identify recurring 

lessons and understand the causes of various systemic issues. This, in 

turn, would allow NORTHCOM and DOD to identify those areas where 

increased effort—and possibly resources—may be required.

To mitigate the uncertainties in readiness for civil support operations, 

NORTHCOM has worked with Joint Forces Command and the military 

Page 29 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
services in advance of some potential incidents, such as hurricanes and

wildfires, to gain a better understanding of what units were likely to be 

assigned, if necessary. This interaction has allowed NORTHCOM and other 

DOD stakeholders to directly monitor the personnel and equipment status 

of military units to determine if they would be prepared to adequately 

respond to a civil support mission. For the remainder of NORTHCOM’s 

potential civil support missions, NORTHCOM still lacks an objective 

means to determine if the units that will be conducting civil support 

operations in fact have the capabilities needed to fully conduct these 

missions. 

New National Planning 

Requirements May Help 

NORTHCOM Address 

Planning Challenges 

In December 2007, the President issued an annex to the 2003 Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 8 that establishes a standard and 

comprehensive approach to national planning for homeland security.48

Included in the new instructions is a requirement that the federal 

government more closely integrate federal, state, local, and tribal plans 

with respect to capability assessments. This may further assist 

NORTHCOM in more accurately determining its capability requirements 

for civil support missions. 

Among the new requirements was also a series of cascading plans at the 

strategic, operational, and tactical levels. For example, all relevant federal 

agencies are now required to prepare more detailed OPLANs with respect 

to their specific homeland security missions. Thus far, NORTHCOM has 

been required only to prepare less detailed CONPLANs. The definition for 

OPLANs in the new guidance includes a requirement that such a plan 

“identifies detailed resource, personnel and asset allocations.”49 This is 

similar to the level of detail DOD requires in its OPLANs, including the 

force deployment lists we discussed. 

If these comprehensive national planning processes are pursued by DOD, 

in coordination with DHS, NORTHCOM may be able to further address 

some of the challenges and gaps we highlight. 

 48White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, National Preparedness 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003), and White House, HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning 

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2007). The January 2008 National Response Framework also 

incorporates the recent national planning requirements. 

49White House, HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning, 2. 

Page 30 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
NORTHCOM has an adequate number of planning personnel, and the 

command is pursuing opportunities to expand the experience and training

for staff needed to perform the command’s planning function. While the 

unique characteristics associated with a domestic military command 

present challenges, NORTHCOM officials address these circumstances by 

integrating National Guard and Coast Guard personnel with NORTHCOM 

staff. NORTHCOM, independently and with other organizations, is also 

developing educational opportunities that address the challenges 

associated with the interagency and state/federal environment that 

planners face. 

We compared the numbers and general qualifications of NORTHCOM’s 

planning staff with those of other combatant commands as a way of 

gaining a rough understanding of what NORTHCOM’s staff looks like in

comparison to commands that have been established for a longer period of

time. NORTHCOM’s planning staff is assigned at over 96 percent of the

command’s authorized staffing level. These staff members include all

headquarters staff who have some form of planning function and not just 

the staff of the plans directorates or those personnel with specific 

designations as planners. As shown in table 3, with the exception of the 

U.S. Central Command, NORTHCOM also has a greater number of staff it 

considers to be planners and was staffed at a higher percentage of its 

authorization than all other combatant commands responding to our 

information requests. 

NORTHCOM’s 

Planning Personnel 

Have Adequate Staff 

Level and Are 

Expanding 

Experience and 

Training

NORTHCOM Planning 

Positions Staffed at High 

Levels 

Table 3: Staffing Level of Planning Personnel, by Combatant Command 

Combatant command Authorized staffing level Actual staffing level Percentage of authorization

U.S. Central Command 189 184 97.4

U.S. Northern Command 171 165 96.5

U.S. European Command 144 128 88.9

U.S. Southern Command 93 74 79.6

U.S. Pacific Command 123 110 89.4

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

Note: These numbers are only general comparisons of personnel who have planning functions at the 

commands and are not meant to reflect specific personnel or budget-related categories. 

We did not independently validate NORTHCOM’s requirements for 

planning personnel. However, NORTHCOM officials said that they believe 

they have an adequate number of planning personnel. Further,

NORTHCOM has been conducting an ongoing assessment of its overall 

Page 31 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
manpower needs and is evaluating the extent to which changes in 

requirements for personnel may be needed. 

NORTHCOM officials stated that partially because of the need to support 

other operations, such as ongoing military operations overseas, the 

command attempts to maximize the use of civilian staff in its workforce to 

maintain continuity and consistency. Civilian staff provides an institutional 

knowledge base and experience level that compliments the capabilities of 

military officers who rotate through the command’s directorates. Over 

one-half of the command’s planning staff is civilian or contractor 

personnel. As shown in table 4, two other commands in our review, U.S. 

Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command, also rely heavily on civilian 

or contract personnel. 

Table 4: Military, Civilian, and Contractor Planners, by Combatant Command 

Military personnel Civilian personnel Contractor personnel 

Combatant command Number 

Percentage

of total Number

Percentage

of total Number

Percentage

of total

U.S. Central Command 73 39.7 20 10.9 91 49.5

U.S. Northern Command 70 42.4 52 31.5 43 26.1

U.S. Southern Command 61 82.4 13 17.6 a a

U.S. European Command 110 85.9 8 6.3 10 7.8

U.S. Pacific Command 53 48.2 7 6.4 50 45.5

Source: GAO analysis of DOD information. 

a

U.S. Southern Command did not provide information on contractor personnel. 

The military personnel who serve as NORTHCOM planners receive basic 

planning-related training similar to that of planners in other combatant 

commands. DOD and the services provide educational opportunities for 

members of the U.S. Armed Forces, international officers, and federal 

government civilians. These opportunities provide a broad body of 

knowledge that enables students to develop expertise in the art and 

science of war. Many of NORTHCOM’s military planners have completed 

some of these courses. A number of these courses are also offered to 

civilian planning personnel. 

Page 32 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
To accomplish its homeland defense and civil support missions, 

NORTHCOM must plan for and interact with other federal, state, and 

territorial government agencies in addition to Canada and Mexico. The 

need to plan for and conduct operations (1) within the United States and 

(2) in support of other federal agencies, 49 state governments, and Canada

and Mexico presents a challenge to most planners who have functioned 

solely in a military environment. 

NORTHCOM has sought to address this challenge by integrating personnel 

from the National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard into NORTHCOM’s 

headquarters staff. These personnel have experience working in the state 

environment and are incorporated into most, if not all, of the NORTHCOM 

directorates that conduct some form of operational planning. Thirty-six 

National Guard and 22 U.S. Coast Guard personnel are stationed at 

NORTHCOM. These personnel provide command planners and operations 

personnel with co-workers who have experience planning for and 

conducting operations with other federal and state agencies. 

In January 2008, Congress required the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff to review the military and civilian positions, job descriptions, and 

assignments at NORTHCOM. The goal is to determine the feasibility of 

increasing the number of reserve component military personnel or civilian 

staff with experience in homeland defense and civil support at 

NORTHCOM.50

Having an adequate number of properly trained personnel to ensure that 

missions are successfully planned is a decisive factor in the success of any

mission. NORTHCOM officials have been attempting to establish and 

maintain a cadre of personnel in the active military with knowledge and 

experience in NORTHCOM planning, homeland defense, civil support, and 

interagency planning and coordination that go beyond the basic level 

training the military provides in joint planning. These efforts extend from 

the level of basic orientation training all the way to programs at the 

graduate level. 

NORTHCOM’s Staff 

Includes National Guard 

and Coast Guard 

Personnel 

NORTHCOM Has Efforts 

Under Way to Train DOD 

Planners for Domestic 

Operations 

NORTHCOM planners are required to complete an orientation course that 

serves as a “crosswalk” between DOD’s homeland defense and civil 

support plans and the plans of their agency partners. The orientation 

 50Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1821 (2008). 

Page 33 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
course also provides students with a better understanding of DOD policy 

regarding the protection of the homeland. DOD officials told us that 

additional such planning courses are now offered at other DOD schools, 

such as the Army’s Command and General Staff College and School of 

Advanced Military Studies. 

As recommended in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

NORTHCOM has taken steps to create training programs and partner with 

other agencies and private institutions. The goal is to develop educational

opportunities for interagency and state/federal environment planners to 

inform them of other agencies’ homeland security responsibilities to 

improve overall cooperation and coordination. For example, NORTHCOM 

has developed a course for DOD and interagency personnel that focuses 

on support to civil authorities. While the course does not directly address 

the detailed aspects of planning, it provides an overview of DOD and other 

agencies’ responsibility for homeland security. Officials from the Joint 

Forces Staff College believe this is a valuable course and they are 

considering requiring students to complete it before they can take certain

other courses at the college. In addition, NORTHCOM has developed a 

training curriculum for each of its planning personnel. NORTHCOM 

officials stated that each planner’s progress in completing the curriculum 

is automatically tracked to ensure timely completion. Several of the 

courses in the curriculum must be completed within specific time periods. 

To further expand the educational opportunities for its own staff as well 

as staff from agencies across the federal government, NORTHCOM has 

also partnered with the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs to 

develop the Center for Homeland Security, located on the campus of the 

University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, which provides research and

educational capabilities to meet specific needs regarding protection of the 

homeland. One of the accomplishments of the center is the creation of 

several programs of study in homeland defense, including undergraduate 

and graduate certificates in homeland security and homeland defense. 

According to a senior official with the center, the four courses required for 

the graduate certificate can also be applied toward a master of business 

administration and a master of public affairs. The center, in cooperation 

with several of its partners, including NORTHCOM, is also in the process 

of developing other educational programs, such as a master of arts and a 

doctoral program in homeland security. 

According to NORTHCOM officials, a cooperative effort among the 

University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, the Naval Postgraduate 

School, and NORTHCOM helped found the Homeland Security/Defense 

Page 34 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Education Consortium, which is a network of teaching and research 

institutions focused on promoting education, research, and cooperation 

related to and supporting the homeland security/defense mission. The 

consortium conducts two symposia annually, one at NORTHCOM and a 

second at a FEMA location. The Naval Postgraduate School also has a 

master’s degree program through its Center for Homeland Defense and 

Security. This program, designed in cooperation with FEMA, includes 

strategy development, organizational, planning, and interagency 

coordination aspects. NORTHCOM personnel have started to take 

advantage of these programs on a case-by-case basis, but there are no 

command requirements for NORTHCOM staff to attend any of these 

courses or programs. 

NORTHCOM’s efforts to provide additional training and education for its 

staff should help the command expand its experience in planning and 

conducting operations with partners at the international, federal, and state 

levels. NORTHCOM officials have recognized the need for such education 

opportunities at all levels for their own staff as well as for other military 

and civilian personnel. At some point, NORTHCOM may be in a position to

require certain prerequisites in this area for military or civilian staff who 

may be considered for assignment to the command. 

NORTHCOM has taken actions to improve the coordination of its 

homeland defense and civil support plans and operations with federal 

agencies. Such coordination is important for ensuring that proper planning

in advance of an attack or a natural disaster and that such operations 

proceed as smoothly as possible if they need to be conducted. However, 

NORTHCOM lacks formal guidance to coordinate its planning effort with 

its agency partners. This results in uncertainty about which planning 

coordination efforts are continued or agreed to by higher authorities and 

an increased risk that interagency planning will not be done effectively. 

We found several areas in which NORTHCOM has taken steps to improve 

coordination with other agencies and organizations, many resulting from 

the lessons learned following Hurricane Katrina. Coordination is important 

not just for interagency planning but also to ensure that NORTHCOM and 

its agency partners work together effectively when an incident actually 

occurs. For example, NORTHCOM created an Interagency Coordination 

Directorate in 2002 to assist in its collaboration efforts. Today, 40 agencies 

NORTHCOM Has 

Taken Actions to 

Improve Interagency 

Coordination but 

Lacks a Formal 

Process to Ensure 

That Coordination 

Efforts Are Adopted 

NORTHCOM Has Taken 

Steps to Improve 

Coordination 

Page 35 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
and organizations are represented at NORTHCOM, including a senior 

executive official from DHS as well as officials from FEMA, the Federal

Bureau of Investigation, and the Central Intelligence Agency. The 

directorate is designed to help build effective relationships by facilitating, 

coordinating, and synchronizing information sharing across organizational 

boundaries. NORTHCOM and U.S. Southern Command are the only 

combatant commands with directorates dedicated solely to interagency

coordination. Table 5 shows the agencies currently represented at 

NORTHCOM. 

Table 5: Agencies and Organizations Represented at NORTHCOM 

Department or agency of origin Represented agency 

DOD Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

NGB 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

U.S. Special Operations Command 

DHS FEMA

U.S. Coast Guard 

Customs and Border Protection 

Transportation Security Administration 

Federal Air Marshal Service

Other federal agencies Department of State 

Department of Agriculture 

Department of the Interior 

Department of Health and Human Services 

U.S. Public Health Service

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

Director of National Intelligence 

Central Intelligence Agency 

Environmental Protection Agency 

U.S. Geological Survey 

Federal Aviation Administration

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

Canada and Mexico Canadian Forces Liaison Office 

Canadian Department of Public Safety and Royal 

 Canadian Mounted Police 

Mexico Civil Response/Protection Organization 

Other Humanitarian International Services Group 

Source: NORTHCOM. 

Page 36 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
The presence of agency representatives provides a regular opportunity for 

direct interaction between them and NORTHCOM staff. NORTHCOM and 

other agency officials with whom we spoke agreed that this level of 

regular contact is beneficial for coordinating plans in advance but also for 

the more immediate needs of coordination when an event actually occurs. 

Such agency representatives should therefore have the experience to 

provide an effective link to their parent agencies and possess the 

appropriate level of access to agency leadership in order to facilitate 

interagency decision-making. When a major incident occurs, the agency

representatives, known as the Interagency Coordination Center, become a 

direct adjunct to the NORTHCOM Commander’s battle staff, assisting the 

command in its immediate crisis planning and providing a direct link to 

their parent agencies. 

The Interagency Directorate also administers NORAD-NORTHCOM’s Joint 

Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG), which is composed primarily of 

the 40 resident agency representatives who are experts in interagency

planning and operations on the command’s staff. The JIACG’s role is to 

coordinate with civilian federal agency partners to facilitate interagency 

operational planning in contingency operations. All combatant commands 

are establishing JIACGs. The JIACG supports day-to-day planning and 

advises NORTHCOM planners regarding civilian agency operations, 

capabilities, and limitations. Further, the JIACG provides the command 

with day-to-day knowledge of the interagency situation and links directly 

with agency partners at the command and in other locations when an 

operation is necessary. The JIACG also conducts focused planning on 

specific issues. For example, the group met with officials from the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention and the Department of Health and 

Human Services in August 2006 to coordinate federal efforts for 

responding to a potential influenza pandemic. The JIACG also formed a 

working group to integrate private sector capabilities and interests into 

NORTHCOM plans and operations as appropriate. Specifically, the group’s 

objectives were to determine how to provide NORTHCOM with private 

sector information regarding facilities and operations, achieve 

coordination and cooperation with the private sector, and gain and 

maintain awareness of technological initiatives developed in the private 

sector. The JIACG also formed working groups for law enforcement 

issues, earthquakes, and prescripted mission assignments. 

Page 37 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
According to FEMA’s Director, one of the most important interagency

planning tools developed as a result of the lessons learned during 

Hurricane Katrina is the prescripted mission assignments discussed 

earlier.51 NORTHCOM collaborated with FEMA and other agencies to 

identify the most likely tasks DOD would be asked to fulfill and drafted 

generic mission assignments for those tasks in terms of capability 

requirements rather than specific resources. Twenty-five prescripted 

mission assignments are included in NORTHCOM’s standing Defense 

Support for Civil Authorities Execute Order. 

These mission assignments also include defense coordinating officers 

(DCO) who are located in each of FEMA’s 10 regional offices (see fig. 3). 

Officials from several agencies told us that locating the DCOs in the FEMA 

regions and assigning greater emphasis to the DCOs’ missions has 

enhanced interagency coordination, particularly with states. The DCOs are 

senior military officers with joint experience and training on the National 

Response Framework, defense support to civil authorities, and DHS’s 

National Incident Management System. They are responsible for assisting 

civil authorities, when requested by FEMA, by providing liaison support 

and capabilities requirements validation. DCOs serve as single points of 

contact for state, local, and other federal authorities that need DOD 

support. DCOs work closely with federal, state, and local officials to 

determine what unique DOD capabilities are necessary and can be used to 

help mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made disaster. For example, 

during the recent California wildfires, NORTHCOM’s subordinate 

command, Army Forces North, deployed the Region IX DCO to support 

the Joint Field Office in Pasadena, California, and assess and coordinate 

defense support of civil authorities to FEMA. Based on the requirements 

identified by state and federal officials in consultation with the DCO, DOD 

and the National Guard deployed six aircraft equipped with the Modular 

Airborne Firefighting System to California to assist in fighting the 

wildfires. 

 51The federal government uses prescripted mission assignments to assist in planning and to 

reduce the time it takes to deploy response resources. Prescripted mission assignments

identify resources or capabilities of government organizations that are commonly called 

upon during response to an incident. Department of Homeland Security, National 

Response Framework, 29. 

Page 38 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Figure 3: FEMA Regions

WI

OH

GA

Sources: FEMA; Map Resources (maps).

Alaska

Guam

American

Samoa

Hawaii

Puerto Rico

U.S.

Virgin Islands

RI

NJ

DE

Northern

Mariana

Islands

2

Boston

New York

D.C.

Philadelphia

Atlanta

Chicago

Denton

Kansas City

Denver

Seattle

9

Oakland

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

9

10

NORTHCOM has also improved interagency coordination through its 

involvement in hurricane preparation with a wide range of state and 

federal partners, including state adjutants general, FEMA, NGB, and state 

and local emergency managers. NORTHCOM facilitates weekly hurricane 

teleconferences throughout the hurricane season, which lasts from June to

November every year, to provide the opportunity for agencies to discuss 

potential storms; resources available in the affected area as well as 

through other sources, such as the Emergency Management Assistance 

Page 39 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Compact (EMAC)

52 or FEMA; and potential needs or unique capabilities 

that DOD may be asked to provide. As a result of this frequent interaction, 

NORTHCOM, DHS, and state officials believe the command has begun to

build more productive and effective relationships with the hurricane states

and participating agencies. For example, in anticipation of Hurricane Dean 

being upgraded from a tropical storm in August 2007, at FEMA’s request 

NORTHCOM deployed a DCO and supporting team to the Caribbean in 

preparation for landfall. The DCO was prepared to coordinate requests for 

military assistance and resources and provide direct support to federal, 

state, and local agencies responding to the incident. 

In addition to efforts to coordinate with federal agencies and 

organizations, NORTHCOM recently began efforts to increase

coordination with private sector businesses and nongovernmental 

organizations in planning for and responding to disasters to help 

NORTHCOM better focus resources and ensure that efforts are not 

duplicated. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart was able to 

deliver bottled water to some locations more quickly than federal agencies 

could. Since many of NORTHCOM’s coordination efforts with 

nongovernmental organizations are recent, it is too soon to determine how 

successful they will be. 

NORTHCOM Lacks Formal 

Procedures to Ensure That 

Integrated Planning Will 

Be Fully Adopted 

Despite the steps that NORTHCOM has taken to improve federal 

interagency coordination, we found that it lacks formalized procedures—

such as memorandums of understanding or charters—to ensure that 

agreements or arrangements made between the command and agency 

representatives can be relied on for planning purposes. As we have 

reported in the past, key practices that can enhance and sustain 

interagency planning coordination efforts include—among others—

establishing mutually reinforcing or joint strategies, agreeing on roles and

responsibilities, and identifying and addressing needs by leveraging 

resources. We also reported that interagency coordination can be 

enhanced by articulating agreements in formal documents, such as a 

memorandum of understanding, interagency guidance, or interagency 

planning document, signed by senior officials in the respective agencies.53

DOD’s adaptive planning—that is, the joint capability to create and revise 

 52EMAC provides a means for states affected by disasters to access resources from other

states, including emergency managers, National Guard assets, and first responders. 

53GAO-06-15. 

Page 40 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require—includes 

interagency coordination as a key part of the plan development process. 

Further, the nature of NORTHCOM’s homeland defense and civil support 

missions requires interagency coordination and support throughout all 

levels of planning and operations. This is particularly important since so

many government agencies share the responsibility to ensure an effective 

response to disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. It is therefore crucial that 

DOD—through NORTHCOM—plan and coordinate thoroughly with all 

relevant federal agencies. 

NORTHCOM planners have achieved some success in coordinating 

NORTHCOM’s homeland defense plan with an Incident Management 

Planning Team (IMPT), an interagency team created by DHS to provide 

contingency and crisis action incident management planning based on the 

15 national planning scenarios.54 However, the planners told us that their 

successful collaboration with the IMPT is largely because of the dedicated 

personalities involved. For example, NORTHCOM planners have 

informally instituted workshops and biweekly teleconferences with the 

IMPT core and on-call groups to review NORTHCOM’s homeland defense 

plan, as well as to discuss the overarching objectives of homeland defense

and security. NORTHCOM officials told us that the IMPT offers a unique 

avenue of coordination direct to various agency partners and has helped to

break down institutional barriers by promoting more constructive 

relationships between the agencies involved. However, without a formal 

charter or memorandum of understanding that institutionalizes the 

structure for integrated interagency planning, there is a risk that these 

efforts to coordinate with agency partners will not continue when the 

current planning staff move to their next assignments. Further, these and 

other coordination efforts do not have mechanisms for obtaining parent 

agency approval of agreements reached, and it is unclear what will be 

done with the results of their efforts. Consequently, many otherwise 

valuable interagency efforts may not be sufficiently supported by one or 

more participating agencies, and key agency staff can be confused about 

which coordination mechanisms serve a particular function.

 54The IMPT includes a core group of 15 full-time senior-level planners from 8 different 

agencies: DHS, DOD, the Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, the Department 

of Transportation, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental 

Protection Agency, and the American Red Cross. In addition, the IMPT has an on-call group 

that is assembled during training or emergencies consisting of 33 officials representing 20

agencies. 

Page 41 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
As part of the new Homeland Security Presidential Directive annex on 

national planning, DHS is required to coordinate with the heads of other 

federal agencies and develop an integrated planning system. This planning

system is required to 

1. provide common processes for developing plans;

2. serve to implement phase one of DHS’s Homeland Security 

Management System; and 

3. include the following: 

• national planning doctrine and planning guidance, instruction, and 

process to ensure consistent planning across the federal 

government;

• a mechanism that provides for concept development to identify and 

analyze the mission and potential courses of action; 

• a description of the process that allows for plan refinement and 

proper execution to reflect developments in risk, capabilities, or 

policies, as well as to incorporate lessons learned from exercises 

and actual events; 

• a description of the process that links regional, state, local, and 

tribal plans, planning cycles, and processes and allows these plans 

to inform the development of federal plans; 

• a process for fostering vertical and horizontal integration of federal, 

state, local, and tribal plans that allows for state, local, and tribal 

capability assessments to feed into federal plans; and 

• a guide for all-hazards planning, with comprehensive, practical 

guidance and instruction on fundamental planning principles that 

can be used at federal, state, local, and tribal levels to assist the 

planning process.55

Such an integrated planning system, if developed and institutionalized 

across the federal government in coordination with state and local 

governments, should further address the interagency coordination gaps we

identified. 

 55See White House, HSPD-8 Annex 1, National Planning and National Response 

Framework. 

Page 42 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
After being in operation for over 5 years, NORTHCOM has begun to 

establish itself as a major combatant command and plan for its role in 

leading homeland defense operations and assisting civil authorities in the 

event of major disasters. 

Conclusions 

NORTHCOM has developed, refined, and is now revising a body of major 

homeland defense and civil support plans. Nonetheless, NORTHCOM’s 

limited progress in adequately tracking and assessing the supporting plans 

necessary to carry out homeland defense and civil support operations 

introduces increased risk in the planning process. The review process 

NORTHCOM officials told us they are developing to track and assess 

supporting plans from other commands and agencies should help them 

close this gap, but only if their process is consistently applied and includes 

supporting plans from all commands, organizations, and agencies required 

to submit them. Further, the considerable challenges NORTHCOM faces in 

planning for and conducting homeland defense and civil support missions 

are exacerbated by decisions DOD and the command have made. DOD’s 

decision not to assign regular forces to NORTHCOM, the decision not to 

associate specific military capabilities and units with NORTHCOM’s plans, 

and the decision not to develop mission-essential tasks for civil support 

missions each introduce increased uncertainty into NORTHCOM’s 

homeland defense and civil support planning efforts. When considering 

their compounding effects together, the risk to NORTHCOM’s planning 

effort are increased even further. To some degree, NORTHCOM will 

always face challenges and risk in planning because it has to be prepared 

for a wide variety of incidents that can range from a regional flood to a 

catastrophic nuclear incident to a widespread terrorist attack. The 

capabilities allocation and other planning challenges we discuss can be 

further addressed, but there is no guarantee that this will compensate for 

the scarcity of units and equipment because of the pace of ongoing 

operations overseas. However, addressing the planning gaps we identified

would permit NORTHCOM and DOD a much more accurate understanding 

of the risk associated with homeland defense and civil support operations 

in the United States. Such risk mitigation efforts have recently been

required as part of the President’s and DHS’s national preparedness 

guidance on national planning, and these requirements provide an 

opportunity for DOD and NORTHCOM to address the gaps we identified.

NORTHCOM’s federal interagency coordination efforts have helped

address some of the uncertainty in the homeland defense and civil support 

planning process and have improved NORTHCOM’s ability to coordinate 

in the event of actual incidents. This is important because responding to a 

major disaster in the United States—natural or man-made—is a shared 

Page 43 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
responsibility of many government agencies with states often requiring 

federal assistance from DHS and DOD. Without clear guidance and 

procedures on interagency roles and responsibilities across the federal 

government and an understanding about which interagency planning 

efforts or coordination mechanisms are authoritative, the multiple 

interagency efforts that have been ongoing might not meet their potential 

for integrating operational planning dealing with all threats to the 

homeland, natural or man-made. If the integrated planning system required 

by the President’s new homeland security guidance is developed and 

institutionalized across the federal government in coordination with state 

and local governments, it should further assist NORTHCOM and DOD in 

addressing the interagency coordination gaps we identified. 

To help NORTHCOM reduce the level of risk to its homeland defense and

civil support planning efforts, in conjunction with the new national 

planning requirements of the National Response Framework and the 

national planning annex to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, we 

are making three recommendations: 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

• We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of 

NORTHCOM to complete the process to track the status of all 

supporting plans, coordinate the completion of those plans by other 

commands and agencies, and assess the suitability of those plans to 

meet the intent and objectives of NORTHCOM’s major plans. 

• Given the priority DOD places on homeland defense, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense assign forces to NORTHCOM—as is done 

for other combatant commands—as well as require NORTHCOM to 

develop dedicated time-phased force deployment data lists for each of 

its major plans. 

• We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Commander of 

NORTHCOM, in consultation and coordination with the services, to 

develop mission-essential tasks for its civil support plans. Individual 

units required for these missions should be identified, and these 

mission-essential tasks should be included as part of DOD’s readiness 

assessment systems in order to permit consistent tracking of readiness 

for specific elements of NORTHCOM’s plans. 

To help NORTHCOM and DOD better integrate their operational planning 

practices into the interagency and national preparedness structure, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

Page 44 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Commander of NORTHCOM and other appropriate federal agencies, 

develop clear guidance and procedures for interagency planning efforts, 

including appropriate memorandums of understanding and charters for 

interagency planning groups. This should be done in conjunction with the 

integrated planning system required in the national planning annex to 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. 

In comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with the 

intent of our recommendations and discussed steps it is taking and 

planning to take to address these recommendations. DOD also provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where 

appropriate.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

In response to our recommendation that NORTHCOM complete the 

process to track the status of supporting plans, coordinate the completion

of those plans by other commands and agencies, and assess the suitability 

of those plans to meet the intent and objectives of NORTHCOM’s major 

plans, DOD agreed with the need for these actions but stated that the 

existing guidance we noted in our report already provides sufficient 

direction. We agree that further formal guidance or direction may be 

unnecessary as long as NORTHCOM consistently pursues its effort to 

review supporting plans, including the supporting plans of all commands, 

agencies, and organizations required to prepare such plans. For example, 

some plans call for other DOD agencies and even non-DOD agencies to 

prepare supporting plans. In these cases, while NORTHCOM may not have 

the authority to compel compliance, it should nevertheless review these 

supporting plans for adequacy. 

In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense assign 

forces to NORTHCOM, DOD agreed that certain specialized forces, such as

those trained and equipped for CBRNE consequence management, should 

be regularly assigned to NORTHCOM but said that it was not practical to 

attempt to assign general purpose forces to meet all possible civil support 

contingencies. DOD did not agree that all NORTHCOM plans should have 

force deployment lists because it would not provide the level of readiness 

tracking that we highlighted as being necessary in our report. We agree 

that it is not practical to assign forces to NORTHCOM in an attempt to 

cover all possible contingencies. Our concern was that the NORTHCOM 

Commander should have a similar level of flexibility and day-to-day 

readiness assurance that regularly assigned forces provide to other 

combatant commanders. Assigning some specialized forces to 

NORTHCOM would contribute to providing such flexibility and assurance. 

Page 45 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
DOD stated that it will work to develop civil support readiness metrics for 

general purpose forces rather than prepare specific force deployment lists 

for individual plans that were not already required to have them. We 

believe this effort would help institutionalize the importance of DOD’s 

domestic mission and provide NORTHCOM and other DOD authorities a 

means of monitoring readiness to accomplish domestic missions. 

With respect to our recommendation that DOD develop mission-essential 

tasks for NORTHCOM’s civil support plans and identify the units required 

for these missions, DOD agreed with our assessment that NORTHCOM 

needs to track units’ readiness to complete civil support missions but said 

that identifying units for all its civil support tasks would be impractical. 

DOD reiterated its proposal to develop civil support-specific metrics 

against which all general purpose forces could be measured. We believe 

that developing such metrics would meet the intent of our 

recommendation and would further institutionalize DOD’s domestic 

mission throughout the force. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that clear guidance be developed 

for interagency planning efforts. DOD stated that it had begun to 

incorporate such direction in its major planning documents and would 

continue to expand on this guidance in the future. We believe DOD’s 

efforts as part of the Integrated Planning System and on its own, if pursued 

consistently, should help better focus interagency planning to meet the 

range of natural and man-made threats. 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

DHS also reviewed a draft of this report and provided technical comments, 

which we have incorporated where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense and other

interested parties. We will also make copies available to others on request. 

In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Page 46 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Key staff members who contributed to this report are listed 

in appendix IV. 

Davi M. D’Agostino 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 47 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
List of Requesters 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Tom Davis 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Christopher Shays 

Ranking Member 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

House of Representatives 

The Honorable Kit Bond 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Patrick Leahy 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Gene Taylor 

House of Representatives 

Page 48 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the extent to which U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) 

has prepared plans to execute its homeland defense and civil support 

missions, we reviewed NORTHCOM’s available major plans and 

supporting plans, comparing them to established Department of Defense 

(DOD) joint operational planning criteria for completeness and adequacy. 

We also met with knowledgeable NORTHCOM officials to discuss the 

status of each of the plans NORTHCOM is required to prepare and the 

process whereby the plans were developed and assessed. We did not 

independently validate the planning elements, such as the assumptions 

NORTHCOM used. We therefore did not attempt to state the extent to 

which the plans are executable. We compared the 15 national planning 

scenarios with NORTHCOM’s plans and discussed the incorporation of the 

scenarios within those plans with NORTHCOM officials. To assess the 

challenges NORTHCOM faces in planning for and conducting homeland 

defense and civil support, we developed a methodology based on DOD’s 

standards for joint operational planning. Although we included all of 

NORTHCOM’s plans in our review, we concentrated on the two primary 

homeland defense and civil support plans as well as the Chemical, 

Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Consequence

Management plan. The methodology involved a series of questions and 

topics to determine the extent to which NORTHCOM and DOD have 

considered the following as part of their planning for homeland defense 

and civil support: 

• Identification of required capabilities 

• Allocation of military capabilities to meet identified capability 

requirements 

• Readiness of forces (trained personnel and equipment) to meet the 

missions for which they are assigned

• Conduct of exercises and evaluation of lessons learned that can be fed 

back into the planning process 

We discussed this methodology with officials from the National Defense 

University, NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Joint Forces Staff College 

to ensure that it was a reasonable approach to evaluating joint operational 

planning. 

We used the results of this analysis and our discussions with a broad range 

of DOD officials to determine what gaps, if any, exist in NORTHCOM’s 

planning efforts stemming from these challenges. We also reviewed the 

structure of NORTHCOM’s lessons learned process and collected 

information on the origin, analysis, and disposition of homeland defense 

and civil support lessons. As part of this effort, we observed a major 

Page 49 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

exercise (Ardent Sentry/Northern Edge) in the Indianapolis area in May 

2007. During our review, the NORTHCOM Inspector General’s Office was 

conducting an assessment of the command’s lessons learned process, 

including oversight mechanisms and internal controls. Therefore, we did 

not conduct a deeper analysis of those elements. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM has adequate planning 

personnel with the relevant experience and training to perform the 

planning function for the command, we discussed personnel staffing and 

training with officials from NORTHCOM headquarters, NORTHCOM 

subordinate commands, and Joint Forces Staff College who were 

knowledgeable of training courses available to planning personnel. We 

discussed the extent to which NORTHCOM addresses planning challenges 

unique to the command in its planning staff structure. In addition, we 

compared basic information on planning personnel at NORTHCOM with 

that of U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command, U.S. European 

Command, and U.S. Pacific Command in such areas as overall staffing 

levels; numbers of military, civilian, and contractor personnel on staff; and 

number of planning personnel who had received Joint Professional 

Military Education credit. Since our intention was to look at all the staff 

who have a direct relation to planning at the commands, and not just the 

staff of the plans directorates, we left it up to the commands to define who 

should be included. We did not validate the commands’ requirements for 

specific numbers of planning personnel, and we did not independently 

validate the personnel data we received from the combatant commands. 

However, we assessed the data reliability measures the commands took to 

gather and maintain the data and determined that the information 

originated with the commands themselves and represented the best 

available source. We did not obtain the data from other sources, such as 

databases maintained by the military services’ personnel centers. We 

found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

To determine the extent to which NORTHCOM coordinates with federal 

agencies and other organizations in planning for and conducting its 

missions, we met with officials from NORTHCOM’s Interagency 

Coordination Directorate; reviewed the documentation and mechanisms 

for coordination with organizations outside NORTHCOM; and interviewed 

officials from NORTHCOM’s subordinate commands, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA), and the National Guard Bureau (NGB). We also surveyed the 

adjutants general from the 48 contiguous states, Alaska, and the District of 

Columbia and obtained information from NORTHCOM, DHS, and NGB on 

Page 50 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

NORTHCOM’s coordination with the states. We are reporting separately

on the results of that work. 

In addressing our objectives, we reviewed plans and related documents, 

obtained information, and interviewed officials at the following locations:

• NORTHCOM Headquarters, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado Springs, 

Colorado 

• Joint Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia 

• The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. 

• The Joint Staff, Washington, D.C. 

• Joint Task Force-Civil Support, Fort Monroe, Virginia 

• U.S. Army North, Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas 

• U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia 

• U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Atlanta, Georgia 

• Joint Force Headquarters National Capitol Region, Fort McNair, 

Washington, D.C. 

• Fleet Forces Command, Norfolk, Virginia 

• NGB, Arlington, Virginia 

• DHS, Washington, D.C. 

• U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, D.C. 

• FEMA, Washington, D.C. 

We conducted our review from May 2006 to April 2008 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. 

Page 51 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: NORHTCOM’s 25 Prescripted

Mission Assignments 

Table 6 shows the 25 prescripted mission assignments that NORTHCOM 

and FEMA officials coordinated in order to facilitate the process for 

requesting DOD capabilities in the event of an emergency. 

Table 6: Prescripted Mission Assignments 

NORTHCOM Prescripted

mission assignments Capability providers 

Defense coordinating officer/defense 

coordinating element 

Army Forces North coordinated colonel and nine-person emergency preparedness 

liaison officer staff 

Rotary wing lift (heavy) Marine Corps CH-53E helicopter squadron, Navy MH-53 helicopter squadron, or Army 

CH-47 helicopter detachment

Rotary wing lift (medium) Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter squadron, Army UH-60 helicopter detachment, or 

Navy MH-60 helicopter detachment 

Tactical transportation Army transportation company or light-medium truck company 

Strategic transportation U.S. Transportation Command provides strategic airlift and the Army’s Surface 

Deployment and Distribution Command provides ground transportation (commercial

trucks) 

Communications - first responders NORTHCOM or Army Forces North communications van 

Communications - 25 user package Army communications company (detachment) or Marine Corps communications 

battalion (detachment); and a satellite communications ground station (four-person 

team) 

Communications - 75 user package Army communications company (detachment) or Marine Corps communications 

battalion (detachment); and a satellite communications ground station (four-person 

team) 

Emergency route clearance Army or Marine Corps heavy equipment engineer battalion/company with infantry 

battalion/company in direct support or Air Force civil engineering squadrona

Aerial damage assessment Marine Corps CH-46 squadron, Army CH-47/UH-60 helicopter detachment, Navy MH60 helicopter detachment, or Air Force Global Hawk (unmanned aerial vehicle) 

Prepare temporary housing sites Air Force civil engineering squadron or Navy naval mobile construction battaliona 

Mobilization centers Army personnel support detachmenta

Operational staging areas U.S. Transportation Command Joint Task Force for port openinga

Fuel distribution points (ground) Army bulk fuel unit or Marine Corps bulk fuel detachment

a

Rotary wing medical evacuation Army air ambulance squadrona

Temporary medical facilities Air Force medical rapid response forcea

Air component coordination element Air Force/AFNORTH-coordinated eight-person detachment

Air fuel distribution points Air Force air expeditionary force fuel detachment or Marine Corps forward arming and 

refueling point detachmenta

Strategic patient movement (formerly 

contingency aeromedical staging facility) 

U.S. Transportation Command coordinated joint patient movement team 

Airborne command and control in support of 

emergency management authorities 

U.S. Strategic Command command and control aircrafta 

Mortuary affairs Army mortuary affairs company 

Appendix II: NORHTCOM’s 25 Prescripted 

Mission Assignments 

Page 52 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix II: NORHTCOM’s 25 Prescripted

Mission Assignments 

NORTHCOM Prescripted

mission assignments Capability providers 

Full Motion video capability Air Force Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicle 

Public affairs support Military public affairs detachment-joint 

Regional/state emergency preparedness 

liaison officer 

Military-provided liaison officer

Air space control (ground) U.S. Transportation Command coordinated Joint Task Force for port opening 

Source: NORTHCOM. 

a

These are recommended units only and are not sourced, because NORTHCOM has never executed

this mission assignment. 

Page 53 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 54 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 55 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 56 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 57 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 58 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 59 GAO-08-251 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Davi M. D’Agostino, (202) 512-5431 or dagostinod@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Lorelei St. James, Assistant 

Director; Steven D. Boyles; Yecenia C. Camarillo; Angela S. Jacobs; 

David F. Keefer; Joseph W. Kirschbaum; Joanne Landesman; Robert D. 

Malpass; Lonnie J. McAllister; Erin S. Noel; Pamela Valentine; and Jena R. 

Whitley made key contributions to this report. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 

Homeland Defense
Related GAO Products Related GAO Products 

Homeland Defense: Steps Have Been Taken to Improve U.S. Northern 

Command’s Coordination with States and the National Guard Bureau, 

But Gaps Remain. GAO-08-252. Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2008. 

Homeland Security: DHS Improved its Risk-Based Grant Programs’ 

Allocation and Management Methods, But Measuring Programs’ Impact 

on National Capabilities Remains a Challenge. GAO-08-488T. 

Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2008. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made in Implementation of 

Management and Mission Functions, but More Work Remains. 

GAO-08-457T. Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2008. 

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Address Critical 

Infrastructure Protection Challenges That Require Federal and Private 

Sector Coordination. GAO-08-36. Washington, D.C.: October 31, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to 

Address Challenges Faced by State and Local Information Fusion 

Centers. GAO-07-1241T. Washington, D.C.: September 27, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: Opportunities Exist to Clarify Federal Leadership

Roles and Improve Pandemic Planning. GAO-07-1257T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 26, 2007. 

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation

of Mission and Management Functions. GAO-07-1240T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 18, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare 

for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 

Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-1142T. Washington,

D.C.: July 31, 2007. 

Influenza Pandemic: DOD Combatant Commands’ Preparedness Efforts 

Could Benefit from More Clearly Defined Roles, Resources, and Risk 

Mitigation. GAO-07-696. Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic

Equipment Requirements and Readiness. GAO-07-60. Washington, D.C.: 

January 26, 2007. 

Page 60 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Related GAO Products 

Chemical and Biological Defense: Management Actions Are Needed to 

Close the Gap between Army Chemical Unit Preparedness and Stated 

National Priorities. GAO-07-143. Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard and Army Reserve Readiness for

21st Century Challenges. GAO-06-1109T. Washington, D.C.: September 21, 

2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 

D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Preparation, Response, and Recovery

Missions Related to Hurricane Katrina. GAO-06-903. Washington, D.C.: 

July 31, 2006.

Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil 

Support Teams’ Mission and Address Management Challenges. 

GAO-06-498. Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Need to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-808T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the 

Military’s Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters. GAO-06-643. 

Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,

D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Reserve Forces: Army National Guard’s Role, Organization, and 

Equipment Need to be Reexamined. GAO-06-170T. Washington, D.C.: 

October 20, 2005. 

Page 61 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
Related GAO Products 

Homeland Security: DHS’ Efforts to Enhance First Responders’ AllHazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 

July 11, 2005.

Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for

Future Overseas and Domestic Missions. GAO-05-21. Washington, D.C.: 

November 10, 2004. 

Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in Overseas

and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges. GAO-04-670T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 29, 2004. 

Homeland Security: Selected Recommendations from Congressionally 

Chartered Commissions. GAO-04-591. Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2004.

Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for 

Domestic Military Missions. GAO-03-670. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2003. 

Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related 

Recommendations. GAO-01-822. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2001. 

(350863) Page 62 GAO-08-251 Homeland Defense
GAO’s Mission The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; 

and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help

Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO’s 

commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no cost

is through GAO’s Web site (www.gao.gov). Each weekday, GAO posts 

newly released reports, testimony, and correspondence on its Web site. To

have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products every afternoon, go 

to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 each. 

A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent of 

Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 

more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders 

should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

441 G Street NW, Room LM 

Washington, DC 20548 

To order by Phone: Voice: (202) 512-6000 

TDD: (202) 512-2537 

Fax: (202) 512-6061 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Ralph Dawn, Managing Director, dawnr@gao.gov, (202) 512-4400 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7125 

Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Mail or Phone 

To Report Fraud,

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER