United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, 

U.S. Senate

2010 CENSUS

Census at Critical Juncture 

for Implementing Risk 

Reduction Strategies 

Statement of Mathew Scirè 

Director, Strategic Issues 

David A. Powner 

Director, Information Technology Management Issues 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 3:15 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, April 15, 2008

 

GAO-08-685T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 15, 2008

2010 CENSUS

Census at Critical Juncture for Implementing Risk 

Reduction Strategies

Highlights of GAO-08-685T, a testimony 

for the Committee on Homeland Security

and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate 

In 2007, the U.S. Census Bureau 

(Bureau) estimated the 2010

Census would cost $11.5 billion, 

including $3 billion on automation 

and technology. At a March 

hearing, the Department of

Commerce (Commerce) stated that 

the Field Data Collection 

Automation (FDCA) program was 

likely to incur significant cost 

overruns and announced a redesign 

effort. At that time, GAO

designated the 2010 Decennial 

Census as high risk, citing longstanding concerns in managing 

information technology (IT)

investments and uncertain costs 

and operations. This testimony is 

based on past work and work 

nearing completion, including 

GAO’s observation of the address 

canvassing dress rehearsal. For IT 

acquisitions, GAO analyzed system 

documentation, including

deliverables, cost estimates, other 

acquisitions-related documents, 

and interviewed Bureau officials 

and contractors. This testimony

describes the implications of 

redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and 

decennial operations, (2) IT

acquisitions management, and (3) 

Decennial Census costs. 

What GAO Recommends

In its reports, GAO has 

recommended that the Bureau

improve acquisition management 

capabilities, operational planning, 

cost estimation, and performance

measurement. The Bureau agreed

with most of these 

recommendations, but has not fully 

implemented them. 

The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in 

which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under 

census-like conditions. On April 3, 2008, Commerce announced significant 

changes to the FDCA program. It also announced that it expected the cost of 

the decennial to be up to $3 billion greater than previously estimated. The 

redesign will have fundamental impacts on the dress rehearsal as well as 2010 

Census operations. Changes this late in the decade introduce additional risks, 

making more important the steps the Bureau can take to manage those risks. 

The content and timing of dress rehearsal operations must be altered to 

accommodate the Bureau’s design. For example, Commerce has selected an 

option that calls for the Bureau to drop the use of handheld computers 

(HHCs) during the nonresponse follow-up operation, and the Bureau may now 

be unable to fully rehearse a paper-based operation. Additionally, reverting to 

a paper-based nonresponse follow-up operation presents the Bureau with a 

wide range of additional challenges, such as arranging for the printing of 

enumerator forms and testing the systems that will read the data from these 

forms once completed by enumerators. 

Given the redesign effort, implementing GAO’s recommendations associated 

with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the 

Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, including 

finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs to strengthen its risk 

management activities, including developing risk mitigation plans for 

significant risks and improving its executive-level governance of these 

acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and conduct key tests, including 

end-to-end testing, to help ensure that decennial systems perform as expected.

According to the Bureau, the redesign and related revision of the FDCA 

program is expected to result in significant increases to the life cycle cost 

estimate for the 2010 Census. Even without considering the recent expected 

cost increases announced by the Bureau to accompany the redesign of the 

FDCA program, the Bureau’s cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an 

escalating trend from previous censuses. Previously, GAO recommended that 

the Bureau develop an integrated and comprehensive plan to manage 

operations. Specifically, to understand and manage the assumptions that drive 

the cost of the decennial census, GAO recommended, among other actions, 

that the Bureau annually update the cost of the 2010 Census and conduct 

sensitivity analysis on the $11.5 billion estimate. However, while the Bureau 

understands the utility of sensitivity analysis, it has not conducted such an 

analysis. 

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-685T. 

For more information, contact Mathew Scirè 

at (202) 512-6806 or sciremj@ gao.gov or

David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or 

pownerd@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing. As you 

know, the last time we appeared before you we designated the 2010 

Decennial Census as a high-risk area, citing a number of long-standing and 

emerging challenges facing the census.

1

 These include weaknesses in 

managing information technology (IT), operational planning, and cost 

estimating, as well as uncertainty over dress rehearsal plans and the 

ultimate cost of the census. 

For 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau (Bureau) planned to make greater use of 

technology. Among other things, the Bureau planned to automate some of 

its field data collection activities as a way to reduce costs and improve 

data quality and operational efficiency. In fact, census workers used new 

technology, handheld computers (HHCs), during last spring’s dress 

rehearsal operation. The Field Data Collection Automation (FDCA) 

program is a key IT acquisition that includes systems, equipment, and 

infrastructure for field staff to use in collecting census data for the 2010 

Census. Last year, the Bureau had estimated this and other IT acquisitions

would account for about $3 billion of the then-estimated $11.5 billion total 

cost of the census. Under the FDCA program the Bureau planned to use 

HHCs during operations such as address canvassing, nonresponse followup, and census coverage measurement. Last year, during address 

canvassing dress rehearsal field activities in California and North Carolina, 

both we and Bureau officials observed a number of performance problems 

with the HHCs (such as slow and inconsistent data transmissions). 

At a March 2008 hearing before this committee, the Department of 

Commerce (Commerce) and the Bureau stated that the FDCA program 

was likely to incur significant cost overruns and said that a redesigning 

effort to get the Decennial Census back on track was under way. The 

Secretary of Commerce outlined several alternatives for redesigning this 

central technology investment, including possibly dropping the HHCs from

the nonresponse follow-up operation. On April 3, 2008, the Secretary chose 

to do just that. Additionally, he decided that the Bureau would reduce 

deployment of field technology infrastructure by the contractor, and have 

the contractor provide HHCs for address canvassing and develop the 

information system for controlling field operations. 

 1

 GAO, Information Technology: Significant Problems of Critical Automation Program

Contribute to Risks Facing 2010 Census, GAO-08-550T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2008).

Page 1 GAO-08-685T 
As requested, our testimony today will call upon our past work, including 

our observation of the use of HHCs in the address canvassing dress 

rehearsal, as well as an update of the status of the Bureau’s redesign 

efforts, to provide a description of the redesign for (1) dress rehearsal and 

Decennial Census operations, (2) IT acquisitions management, and (3) 

Decennial Census costs. We discussed these issues last week before the 

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform and the Subcommittee 

on Information Policy, Census, and National Archives, House of 

Representatives.2

 That testimony and our remarks today are based 

primarily on reports that we issued from 2002 through December 2007 on 

the planning and development of the 2010 Census, as well as the results of 

work nearing completion. We visited census test sites in Queens, New 

York; several counties in rural south-central Georgia; Austin, Texas; and 

the Cheyenne Indian Reservation in South Dakota. During these visits we 

observed tests of the address canvassing operation, and we observed tests 

of the nonresponse follow-up operation. In May and June 2007, we 

observed address canvassing at the 2008 Dress Rehearsal in sites located 

in North Carolina and California. For IT acquisitions we analyzed system 

documentation, including project plans, deliverables, cost estimates, 

earned value management data, other acquisition-related documents, and 

we interviewed Bureau officials and contractors. 

This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

The redesign of the Decennial Census carries with it significant 

implications for its key operations—address canvassing and nonresponse 

follow-up. Among these are the need for putting in place a paper-based 

nonresponse follow-up operation, devising approaches to manage work 

load from late mail returns, and ensuring that the automation for address 

canvassing works. This is not an exhaustive list of the numerous 

challenges the Bureau faces going forward. While these challenges are 

significant, it must be stressed that the Bureau could have faced 

Results in Brief 

 2

 GAO, 2010 Census: Census at Critical Juncture for Implementing Risk Reduction 

Strategies. GAO-08-659T (Washington, D.C.: April 9, 2008).

Page 2 GAO-08-685T 
overwhelming challenges had it chosen not to redesign the Decennial 

Census. 

Given the redesign effort, implementing our recommendations associated 

with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. Specifically, the 

Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management capabilities, 

including finalizing FDCA requirements. The Bureau also needs to 

strengthen its risk management activities, including developing risk 

mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its executive-level 

governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to plan and 

conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing to help ensure that 

decennial systems perform as expected. 

According to the Bureau, this redesign and subsequent revision of the 

FDCA program is expected to result in significant increases to the life 

cycle cost estimate for the 2010 Census. On April 3, 2008, the Secretary 

testified that the Decennial Census could cost up to $3 billion more than 

the existing $11.5 billion total life cycle cost estimate. Even without 

considering the recent expected cost increases announced by the Bureau

that will accompany the streamlining of the FDCA program, the Bureau’s 

cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an escalating trend 

compared to those from previous censuses. In constant 2010 dollars, the 

estimated $11.8 billion cost of the 2010 Census, before the FDCA program 

redesign, represented a more than tenfold increase over the $1 billion 

spent on the 1970 Census. To manage the 2010 Census and contain costs, 

we previously recommended that the Bureau develop a comprehensive, 

integrated project plan for the 2010 Census that should include itemized 

estimated costs of each component, including a sensitivity analysis and an 

explanation of significant changes in the assumptions on which these 

costs were based.3

 In response, the Bureau provided us with the 2010 

Census Operations and Systems Plan dated August 2007. This plan 

represented an important step forward at the time. It included inputs and

outputs and described linkages among operations and systems. However, 

it did not include sensitivity analysis, risk mitigation plans, a detailed 2010 

Census timeline, or itemized estimated costs of each component. With the 

redesign, this plan will need to be updated. 

 3

 GAO, 2010 Census: Redesigned Approach Holds Promise, but Census Bureau Needs to 

Annually Develop and Provide a Comprehensive Project Plan to Monitor Costs, 

GAO-06-1009T (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-08-685T 
The Decennial Census is at a critical stage in the 2008 Dress Rehearsal, in 

which the Bureau has its last opportunity to test its plans for 2010 under 

census-like conditions. The dress rehearsal features a mock Census Day, 

now set for May 1, 2008. Last year at this time, the Bureau carried out a 

major dress rehearsal operation—address canvassing—in which the 

Bureau updated address lists and collected global positioning coordinates

for mapspots. The largest field operation of the dress rehearsal was to 

have begun this month. In this operation (nonresponse follow-up), field 

staff were to conduct face-to-face interviews with households that did not 

mail back their questionnaires. 

Redesign Implications 

for Decennial Census 

Operations 

Prior to the redesigning effort, the Bureau had already changed its plans 

for the dress rehearsal, in part, to focus greater attention on the testing of

technology. In a November 20, 2007, decision memo, the Bureau 

announced that it would delay Census Day for the dress rehearsal by 1 

month, to May 1, 2008. The Bureau also listed a number of operations it no

longer planned to rehearse, including group quarters enumeration and 

census coverage measurement. Also in February 2008, the Bureau 

announced that it would remove from the scope of the FDCA program 

contract the development of all systems and software associated with the 

census coverage measurement operation. 

The redesign approach selected by the Secretary will require that the 

Bureau quickly develop and test a paper-based nonresponse follow-up 

operation. Any paper-based option has its own set of unique issues, such 

as setting up operations to support paper field data collection centers and 

seeking printing solutions for enumerator forms. Among other issues, 

decisions on a printing solution will need to be made soon. Although the 

Bureau has carried out paper-based operations before, in some cases they 

now involve new procedures and system interfaces that as a result of their 

exclusion from the dress rehearsal, will not be tested under census-like 

conditions. For nonresponse follow-up in 2010 the Bureau will be using 

newly developed systems for integrating responses and controlling 

workload. For example, the Bureau will need to rely on a newly developed 

system called the Decennial Response Integration System to help identify

households that have not returned census forms and for collecting the 

results of enumerators conducting nonresponse follow-up person 

interviews. Dropping the use of the HHCs for nonresponse follow-up and 

reverting to paper for that operation this late in the decade also precludes 

nonresponse follow-up from being fully tested in the dress rehearsal. 

Under the delayed dress rehearsal this operation was to begin next month, 

soon after households in dress rehearsal locations were to return their 

census forms. A paper operation requires different training, maps, and 

Page 4 GAO-08-685T 
other material to be prepared prior to the operation. The Bureau has 

announced no specific plans for conducting field testing of certain key 

operations, such as nonresponse follow-up. Without sufficient testing, 

operational problems can go undiscovered and the opportunity to improve 

operations will be lost. 

The redesign’s move from the use of HHCs to a paper-based nonresponse 

follow-up operation may limit the Bureau’s ability to reduce follow-up with 

persons who are late in returning their census questionnaires. One of the 

primary advantages the Bureau cited for using HHCs was the ability, as

late mail returns came in, to remove those addresses from enumerators’ 

assignments—preventing enumerators from doing unnecessary work. 

According to the Bureau, in 2000 enumerators visited over 4 million 

households that had returned their census form late. In 2004, the Bureau 

tested the capability of an earlier prototype of the HHC to adjust 

workloads by identifying late mail returns. We reported in 20074

 that based 

on these tests it appears that if the Bureau had possessed this capability 

during the 2000 Census, it could have eliminated the need to visit nearly 

773,000 late-responding households and saved an estimated $22 million 

(based on our estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in workload 

could add at least $34 million in direct salary, benefits, and travel costs to 

the price tag of nonresponse follow-up5

). The Director of the Census 

Bureau stated that he believes that the Bureau can still partially adjust 

enumerator workload to recognize late mail returns without the use of 

HHCs. To achieve this objective, the Bureau will need to specify the 

process it will use and conduct appropriate tests. 

The redesign will also affect the 2010 Census address canvassing 

operation. The Secretary’s decision to use the HHCs for the 2010 address 

canvassing operation means that certain performance issues with the 

handheld technology must be addressed promptly. Field staff experienced 

difficulties using the technology during the address canvassing dress 

rehearsal. For example, workers reported problems with HHCs when 

working in large assignment areas during address canvassing. The devices 

could not accommodate more than 720 addresses—3 percent of dress 

 4

 GAO, 2010 Census: Design Shows Progress, but Managing Technology Acquisitions, 

Temporary Field Staff, and Gulf Region Enumeration Require Attention. GAO-07-779T 

(Washington, D.C.: April 24, 2007). 

5

 GAO, 2000 Census: Contingency Planning Needed to Address Risk That Pose a Threat to

a Successful Census, GAO/GGD-00-6 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 1999). 

Page 5 GAO-08-685T 
rehearsal assignment areas were larger than that. The amount of data 

transmitted and used slowed down the HHCs significantly. Identification 

of these problems caused the contractor to create a task team to examine 

the issues, and the team recommended improving the end-to-end 

performance of the mobile solution by controlling the size of assignment 

area data delivered to the HHC both for address canvassing and 

nonresponse follow-up operations. One specific recommendation was 

limiting the size of assignment areas to 200 total addresses. However, the 

redesign effort took another approach deciding not to use HHCs in certain 

large assignment areas. It is not yet clear how this workaround will be 

carried out. Furthermore, the Bureau will need to define specific and 

measurable performance requirements for the HHCs as we recommended 

in January 2005.6

Another operational issue is the ability of the contractor to accept changes 

to its address files after it completes address canvassing updates. This 

could preclude the Bureau from conducting “restart/redo” operations for 

an area where the address file is discovered to be incorrect. This function 

is critical in developing an accurate and complete address list. Without the 

ability to update the mailing list for “restart/redo” operations, the Bureau 

would consider not mailing census questionnaires to addresses in that 

area and instead deliver census forms by hand. This has the potential to 

significantly increase costs. 

The Bureau still needs to agree upon and finalize requirements for the 

FDCA program. In March 2006, we reported that the FDCA project office 

had not implemented the full set of acquisition management capabilities 

(such as project and acquisition planning and requirements development 

and management) that were needed to effectively manage the program.7

For example, although the project office had developed baseline 

functional requirements for the acquisition, the Bureau had not yet 

validated and approved them. Subsequently, in October 2007, we reported 

that changes to requirements had been a contributing factor to both cost 

Redesign Implications 

for IT Acquisitions 

 6

 GAO, 2010 Census: Basic Design Has Potential, but Remaining Challenges Need

Prompt Resolution, GAO-05-9 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 12, 2005). 

7

GAO, Census Bureau: Important Activities for Improving Management of Key 2010 

Decennial Acquisitions Remain to be Done, GAO-06-444T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1,

2006). 

Page 6 GAO-08-685T 
increases and schedule delays experienced by the FDCA program.8

 In June 

2007, an assessment by an independent contractor of the FDCA program 

reported on requirements management problems—much like those we 

reported in March 2006. Similar to our recommendation, the independent

assessors recommended that the Bureau immediately stabilize 

requirements by defining and refining them. The Bureau has recently made 

efforts to further define requirements for the FDCA program, and it has 

estimated that the revised requirements will result in significant cost 

increases. On January 16, 2008, the Bureau provided the FDCA contractor 

with a list of over 400 requirements for the FDCA program to reconcile.

Although some of these new requirements will be dropped based on the 

Secretary’s recent decision, many will still need to be addressed to ensure 

that FDCA will perform as needed. 

Commerce and Bureau officials need to address critical weaknesses in risk 

management practices. In October 2007, we reported that the FDCA 

project had weaknesses in identifying risks, establishing adequate 

mitigation plans, and reporting risk status to executive-level officials.9

 For 

example, the FDCA project team had not developed mitigation plans that 

were timely or complete nor did it provide regular briefings on risks to 

senior executives. The FDCA project team’s failure to report a project’s 

risks to executive-level officials reduces the visibility of risks to executives 

who should be playing a role in mitigating them. 

As of October 2007, in response to the cost and schedule changes, the 

Bureau decided to delay certain system functionality for FDCA. As a 

result, the operational testing that was to occur during the dress rehearsal 

period around May 1, 2008, would not include tests of the full complement 

of Decennial Census systems and their functionality. Operational testing 

helps verify that systems function as intended in an operational 

environment. In late 2007, according to Bureau officials, testing plans for 

IT systems were to be finalized in February 2008. Therefore, we 

recommended that the Bureau plan and conduct critical testing, including

end-to-end testing of the Decennial Census systems.10 As of March 2008, 

the Bureau still had not developed these test plans. In the recent program 

 8

 GAO, Information Technology: Census Bureau Needs to Improve Its Risk Management 

of Decennial Systems, GAO-08-79 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 5, 2007). 

9 GAO-08-79

10 GAO-08-79

Page 7 GAO-08-685T 
redesign, the Bureau included conducting end-to-end testing. The inability 

to perform comprehensive operational testing of all interrelated systems 

increases the risk that further cost overruns will occur, that decennial 

systems will experience performance shortfalls, or both. 

Given the redesigning effort, implementing our recommendations 

associated with managing the IT acquisitions is as critical as ever. 

Specifically, the Bureau needs to strengthen its acquisition management 

capabilities, including finalizing FDCA requirements. Further, it also needs 

to strengthen its risk management activities, including developing 

adequate risk mitigation plans for significant risks and improving its 

executive-level governance of these acquisitions. The Bureau also needs to

plan and conduct key tests, including end-to-end testing, to help ensure 

that decennial systems perform as expected. 

Even without considering the recent expected cost increases announced

by the Bureau to accommodate the redesign of the FDCA program, the 

Bureau’s cost projections for the 2010 Census revealed an escalating trend

from the 1970 Census. As shown in figure 1, the estimated $11.8 billion 

cost (expressed in constant 2010 dollars) of the 2010 Census, before the 

FDCA program redesign, represented a more than tenfold increase over 

the $1 billion spent on the 1970 Census. The 1970 Census was the first 

Census to rely on mailing census forms to households and asking for a 

mail return—a major part of the data collection. Although some of the cost 

increase could be expected because the number of housing units—and 

hence the Bureau’s workload—has gotten larger, the cost growth has far 

exceeded the increase in the number of housing units. The Bureau 

estimated that the number of housing units for the 2010 Census would 

increase by almost 14 percent over Census 2000 levels. 

Redesign Implications 

for Decennial Census 

Life Cycle Costs

Page 8 GAO-08-685T 
Figure 1: Decennial Census Costs from 1970 through 2010 (Projected) in Constant

2010 Dollars 

As figure 2 shows, before the FDCA program redesign, the Bureau 

estimated that the average cost per housing unit for the 2010 Census was 

expected to increase by approximately 26 percent over 2000 levels, from 

$69.79 per housing unit to $88.19 per housing unit in constant 2010 dollars.

When the projected cost increase that accompanies the FDCA program 

redesign is considered, the average cost per housing unit will increase by 

an even greater percentage. 

Page 9 GAO-08-685T 
Figure 2: Decennial Census Average Cost per Housing Unit from 1970 through 2010 

(Projected) in Constant 2010 Dollars 

Given the projected increase in spending, it will be imperative that the 

Bureau effectively manage the 2010 Census, as the risk exists that the 

actual, final cost of the census could be considerably higher than 

anticipated. Indeed, this was the case for the 2000 Census, when the 

Bureau’s initial cost projections proved to be too low because of such 

factors as unforeseen operational problems and changes to the 

fundamental design. The Bureau estimated that the 2000 Census would 

cost around $5 billion. However, the final price tag for the 2000 Census 

was more than $6.5 billion, a 30 percent increase in cost. Large federal 

deficits and other fiscal challenges underscore the importance of 

managing the cost of the census, while promoting an accurate, timely 

census. 

We have repeatedly reported that the Bureau would be challenged to 

control the cost of the 2010 Census. In January 2004, we reported that 

under the Bureau’s approach for reengineering the 2010 Census, the 

Bureau might find it difficult to reduce operational risk because 

Page 10 GAO-08-685T 
reengineering introduces new risks.11 To manage the 2010 Census and 

contain costs, we recommended that the Bureau develop a 

comprehensive, integrated project plan for the 2010 Census that should 

include the itemized estimated costs of each component, including a 

sensitivity analysis and an explanation of significant changes in the 

assumptions on which these costs were based. In response, the Bureau 

provided us with the 2010 Census Operations and Systems Plan, dated 

August 2007. This plan represented an important step forward at the time. 

It included inputs and outputs and described linkages among operations

and systems. However, it did not yet include sensitivity analysis, risk 

mitigation plans, a detailed 2010 Census timeline, or itemized estimated 

costs of each component. Going forward, it will be important for the 

Bureau to update its operations plan. 

The assumptions in the fiscal year 2009 President’s Budget life cycle cost 

estimate of $11.5 billion may not have included recent productivity data 

from last year’s address canvassing dress rehearsal. According to the 

Bureau, initially, the cost model assumed productivity for address 

canvassing to be 25.6 addresses per hour for urban/suburban areas. 

However, results from the address canvassing dress rehearsal showed 

productivity of 13.4 addresses per hour for urban/suburban areas. While 

the life cycle cost estimate increased slightly to $11.5 billion in the fiscal 

year 2009 President’s Budget, these increases were attributed to other 

factors and not to lower-than-expected canvassing productivity. Best 

practices call for cost model assumptions to be updated as new 

information becomes available. We previously reported that the life cycle 

cost estimate has not been updated to reflect changes in assumptions. In 

July 2006, we testified that the estimate had not been updated to reflect 

the results of testing conducted in 2004.12 As the Bureau updates its 

estimate of the life cycle cost annually and as part of the redesigning 

effort, it will be important that it reflect changing assumptions for 

productivity and hours worked. 

 11 GAO, 2010 Census: Cost and Design Issues Need to Be Addressed Soon,

GAO-04-37 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15, 2004).

12 GAO, 2010 Census: Redesigned Approach Holds Promise, but Census Bureau Needs to 

Annually Develop and Provide a Comprehensive Project Plan to Monitor Costs, 

GAO-06-1009T (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006). 

Page 11 GAO-08-685T 
Given its size and complexity, carrying out the Decennial Census presents 

significant challenges under any circumstances. Late changes in census 

plans and operations, long-standing weaknesses in IT acquisition and 

contract management, limited capacity for undertaking these critical 

management functions, scaling back of dress rehearsal activities, and 

uncertainty as to the ultimate cost of the 2010 Census puts the success of 

this effort in jeopardy. Managing these risks is critical to the timely 

completion of a reliable and cost-effective census. Implementing our 

recommendations would help the Bureau effectively manage the myriad of 

interrelated operations needed to ensure an accurate and complete count

in 2010 (Bureau officials have agreed with many of our recommendations, 

but have not fully implemented them). 

Concluding 

Observations 

The dress rehearsal represents a critical stage in preparing for the 2010 

Census. This is the time when the Congress and others should have the 

information they need to know how well the design for 2010 is likely to 

work, what risks remain, and how those risks will be mitigated. We have 

highlighted some of the risks today. Going forward, it will be important for 

the Bureau to specify how it will ensure that planned dress rehearsal 

operations will be successfully carried out, and how it will provide 

assurance that the largest operation—nonresponse follow-up—will be 

tested in the absence of a full dress rehearsal. Likewise, the Bureau will 

need to establish plans for working around limitations in the technology to

be used in address canvassing operations. It is critical that the Bureau 

ensure that the technology for conducting address canvassing is a success. 

The Bureau should implement prior recommendations in moving forward. 

Contractor-developed IT systems and deliverables need to be closely 

monitored to ensure that contractors are performing within budget. As we 

have stressed throughout this testimony and in our prior 

recommendations, the Bureau needs to practice aggressive project 

management and governance over both the IT and non-IT components. 

Further, it is essential that the Bureau implement our recommendations 

related to information technology. The Bureau must solidify the FDCA 

program requirements, strengthen risk management activities, and plan

and conduct critical testing of the Decennial Census systems. 

Mr. Chairman, Census Day is less than 2 years away and address 

canvassing is 1 year away. The challenges we highlighted today call for 

effective risk mitigation by the U.S. Census Bureau, and careful monitoring 

and oversight by the Department of Commerce, the Office of Management 

and Budget, the Congress, GAO, and other key stakeholders. As in the 

Page 12 GAO-08-685T 
past, we look forward to supporting the committee‘s oversight efforts to 

promote an accurate and cost-effective census. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We would be glad to answer 

any questions you and the committee members may have. 

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please 

contact Mathew Scirè at (202) 512-6806 or sciremj@gao.gov or David A. 

Powner at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this testimony. Other key contributors to this testimony 

include Signora May, Assistant Director; Mathew Bader; Thomas Beall; 

Jeffrey DeMarco; Elizabeth Hosler; Richard Hung; Anne Inserra; Andrea 

Levine; Lisa Pearson; Sonya Phillips; Cynthia Scott; Niti Tandon; Jonathan 

Ticehurst; Timothy Wexler; and Katherine Wulff.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

Page 13 GAO-08-685T (450673) 
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