TELECOMMUNICATIONS

GSA Needs to Share 

and Prioritize Lessons 

Learned to Avoid 

Future Transition 

Delays 

Report to Congressional Requesters

December 2013

GAO-14-63

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-63, a report to 

congressional requesters

December 2013

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

GSA Needs to Share and Prioritize Lessons Learned 

to Avoid Future Transition Delays

Why GAO Did This Study

GSA is responsible for ensuring that 

federal agencies have access to the 

telecommunications services and 

solutions needed to meet their mission 

requirements. As agencies’ 

telecommunications needs have 

evolved, so too have GSA’s contracts 

to help support them. Its latest 

contracts, signed in 2007 and 

collectively called Networx, provide 

transport; Internet protocol; wireless;

and management and application 

services, among others. In fiscal year 

2012, agencies spent over $1.4 billion 

on Networx services. However, the 

transition from the previous 

telecommunications contracts, known 

as FTS2001, has not been easy, taking 

almost 3 years longer than planned.

GAO’s objectives were to determine 

(1) what factors contributed to the 

delay in transitioning services to 

Networx and the consequences due to 

the delay, and (2) to what extent GSA 

is documenting and applying lessons 

learned as it prepares for the next

telecommunications contract transition.

GAO examined lessons learned

activities and supporting documents, 

cost and missed savings estimates, 

performed case studies at two 

agencies with large delays, and 

interviewed agency and service 

provider officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that, in preparing 

for the next transition, GSA, in 

coordination with OPM, examine 

potential government-wide expertise 

shortfalls, and that it provide agencies 

guidance on project planning and fully 

archive, share, and prioritize lessons 

learned. GSA and OPM agreed with 

GAO’s recommendations.

What GAO Found

Complex acquisition processes and weaknesses in project planning contributed 

to the delays experienced on the Networx transition, resulting in cost increases 

and missed savings. In particular, the complexity of the acquisition process was 

related to duplicative contract vehicles, the large number of service options, and 

changes related to the process for ensuring fair competition among service 

providers, among others. These issues were reported by the General Services 

Administration (GSA) to have been compounded by a decline in contracting and 

technical expertise within the agencies. GAO has identified skills gaps in the 

federal workforce as a government-wide high-risk area and highlighted the need 

for agencies to work with the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to close 

them. Weaknesses in agencies’ project planning also contributed to the delays. 

For example, agencies tended to transition easier items first, to demonstrate 

progress, before they transitioned items that needed a long lead time such as 

data networks and international services. As a result of the delays, GSA’s

estimated cost to complete the transition increased by $66.4 million, 44 percent 

over the baseline estimate. In addition to the extra transition costs, agencies may 

have paid more for similar services by staying on the FTS2001 contracts longer

than planned. Specifically, in April 2010, GSA estimated that agencies could

have saved 28.4 percent of their spending on FTS2001 by using Networx 

contracts instead. Based on this rate of savings, GAO estimates that agencies 

could have saved about $329 million if they had transitioned to Networx on time. 

The extent to which GSA is documenting and applying lessons learned in 

preparation for the next telecommunications transition varies. GSA has fully or 

partially satisfied five of six key practices necessary for a robust lessons learned 

process (see table). To its credit, GSA has collected, analyzed, and validated 

lessons learned from the Networx transition. However, it has not fully shared 

these lessons with its customer agencies or prioritized them to ensure that 

resources are applied to areas with the greatest return on investment. GSA plans 

to finalize its next telecommunications acquisition strategy in December 2013 

and begin the next transition when it awards new contracts in February 2017.

Fully addressing key lessons learned practices should help GSA and agencies 

better plan for and execute the next telecommunications transition.

Extent to which GSA Satisfied Lessons Learned Key Practices

Practice Satisfied?

Collecting information ●

Analyzing the information collected to identify lessons that lead to 

recommendations ●

Validating the accuracy and applicability of lessons to other projects ●

Archiving the lessons ◑

Sharing and disseminating lessons ◑

Prioritizing and applying lessons learned ○

Key: ● GSA satisfied the criteria. ◑ GSA has partially satisfied the criteria. ○ GSA has not satisfied 

the criteria.

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data. 

View GAO-14-63. For more information, 

contact Carol R. Cha at (202) 512-4456 or 

chac@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Letter 1

Background 2

Complex Acquisition Process and Weaknesses in Project Planning 

Contributed to Networx Transition Delays, Resulting in 

Increased Costs and Missed Savings 12

GSA Documented Lessons Learned but Has Not Effectively 

Archived, Shared, and Applied Them 18

Conclusions 23

Recommendations for Executive Action 23

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 24

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 26

Appendix II Comments from the General Service Administration 30

Appendix III Comments from the Social Security Administration 32

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34

Tables

Table 1: FTS2001-to-Networx Roles and Responsibilities 4

Table 2: Networx Universal and Networx Enterprise Contractors 5

Table 3: Planned and Actual FTS2001 Contract Expiration 8

Table 4: Change in Networx Transition Program Cost Estimates as 

a Result of Delays (dollars in millions) 18

Table 5: Description of Lessons Learned Key Practices 19

Table 6: Extent to which GSA Satisfied the Lessons Learned Key 

Practices 20

Figures

Figure 1: FTS2001 and Networx Contracts Periods of Performance 

and Transition Period 7

Figure 2: Increase in Transition Period 8

Contents
Page ii GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Figure 3: Percent FTS2001 Inventory Disconnected between 

December 2010 and February 2013 9

Figure 4: GSA’s Analysis of Potential Savings 28

Abbreviations

GSA General Services Administration

OMB Office of Management and Budget

SSA Social Security Administration

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 5, 2013

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman

The Honorable Tom Coburn, M.D.

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Chairman

Subcommittee on Financial and Contracting Oversight

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Susan M. Collins

United States Senate

The General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for ensuring 

that federal agencies have access to the telecommunications services 

and solutions that they need to meet their mission requirements. As 

agencies’ telecommunications needs have evolved, so too have GSA’s 

contracts to help support their needs. Currently, contracts established in 

2007 and collectively known as Networx provide voice and data 

communications transport services, Internet protocol services, wireless 

and satellite services, information security, and management and 

application services. GSA reports that in fiscal year 2012, agencies spent 

over $1.4 billion on Networx services. However, this evolution has not 

been easy. The latest transition, from the previous telecommunications 

contracts known as FTS2001 to Networx, took almost 3 years longer than 

planned.

At your request, we conducted a study of the Networx program. Our 

specific objectives were to determine (1) what factors contributed to the 

delay in transitioning services to Networx and the consequences the 

federal government experienced as a result of the delayed transition, and 

(2) to what extent GSA is documenting and applying lessons learned as it 

prepares for the next telecommunications contract transition.

To identify causes for the delay, we assessed key documentation, 

including transition project plans, management reports, and lessons 

learned results from GSA and two case study agencies, the Social 
Page 2 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Security Administration (SSA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We 

selected the case study agencies based on the extent of their delays in 

transitioning and their spending on telecommunications. To determine the 

consequences of the delay, we compared GSA’s latest transition cost 

estimates with its 2004 cost estimate, and assessed its April 2010 

analysis of the federal government’s potential savings resulting from 

transitioning from FTS2001 to Networx. To assess the reliability of the 

cost data, we tested them to identify obvious problems with completeness 

and accuracy, and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials about the 

systems and processes in place to collect and verify the data. On the 

basis of these steps, we determined these data to be sufficiently reliable 

for the purposes of our report. To assess the extent to which GSA is 

identifying and applying lessons learned, we compared GSA’s lessons 

learned process and supporting documentation with leading practices. 

We also interviewed GSA, SSA, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and 

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) officials, and representatives 

from all of the FTS2001 and Networx contractors.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to December

2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. More details about the 

scope and methodology can be found in appendix I.

GSA is responsible for ensuring that federal agencies have access to the 

telecommunications services and solutions that they need to meet 

mission requirements. The organization responsible for carrying out these 

duties is the Integrated Technology Services Office within GSA’s Federal 

Acquisition Service. Within the Integrated Technology Services Office, the 

Office of Network Services Programs develops and manages programs 

for federal civilian and military agencies that are intended to deliver costeffective administrative and technical support for telecommunications and 

network services. To provide cost savings to agencies, GSA aggregates 

requirements and develops government-wide contracts.

Background
Page 3 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Networx is the latest in a series of programs GSA has offered to agencies 

to provide telecommunications services. It is the successor to the 

FTS2001 program, which began in the late 1990s. FTS2001 was 

composed of two large contracts, one awarded to Sprint in December 

1998 and one awarded to MCI in January 1999. The program also 

included contracts that had been awarded to local telecommunications 

contractors for selected metropolitan areas. GSA allowed the local 

telecommunications contractors to also offer long distance services on 

the FTS2001 contracts. These contracts were termed “crossover 

contracts,” and were with AT&T and Qwest, among others.

In 2003, GSA, in conjunction with a group of senior federal information 

technology officials known as the Interagency Management Council, 

developed a successor program—Networx—to replace the FTS2001 

contracts. Networx was to provide agencies with traditional and emerging 

services to meet current and future requirements.

GSA identified several goals for the program, including several that were 

specific to the transition from FTS2001 to Networx. The goals for the 

transition included

• minimizing service impact,

• transitioning telecommunications services before the FTS2001 

contracts expired,

• expediting the availability of new services, and

• minimizing transition expenses.

GSA’s, the Interagency Management Council’s, and other key 

participants’ roles and responsibilities in carrying out the transition from 

FTS2001 to Networx are described in table 1.

Networx Provides 

Contract Vehicles for 

Agencies to Acquire 

Telecommunications 

Services
Page 4 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Table 1: FTS2001-to-Networx Roles and Responsibilities

Transition stakeholder Responsibilities

Interagency Management 

Council

The Interagency Management Council was established in 1992 to provide a forum and focal point for 

agency participation in planning and overseeing GSA’s telecommunications service. It is composed of 

senior executives representing 14 Cabinet-level departments and several other agencies. The council’s 

meetings have been suspended while GSA considers how it should be structured for the next 

telecommunications transition.

Transition Working Group A subgroup of the Interagency Management Council, the Transition Working Group was established in 

May 2004 to conduct collective planning and coordination activities related to the transition; to develop 

a consensus on common transition issues that affect multiple agencies; to develop guidance and 

processes for acquiring, validating, and maintaining customer agency services inventories; and to 

develop guidance for customer agency planning, preparation, and execution of the transition. The 

Transition Working Group was composed of one representative from each of the Interagency 

Management Council member agencies. 

GSA GSA, in conjunction with the Transition Working Group and agencies’ transition managers, developed 

and disseminated strategic guidance and government-wide plans. Its responsibilities included 

monitoring the transition; enforcing compliance with the government’s transition responsibilities in the 

Networx contracts; managing the overall operation of the Transition Coordination Center; providing 

guidance and assistance to agencies for the transition; monitoring Networx contractors’ performance 

during the transition; and providing program management and control for the transition, including 

maintaining the master schedule for transition. The Office of Network Services Programs, within GSA’s 

Integrated Technology Services Office, manages the Networx contracts.

Agencies Agencies were responsible for coordinating transition efforts with the incumbent and Networx

contractors to ensure that existing services under FTS2001 were disconnected and that new services 

were ordered. GSA and the Interagency Management Council requested that each of the customer 

agencies appoint a transition manager and establish a transition team to manage the agency’s internal 

transition planning, preparation, and execution efforts and to be responsible for interfacing with GSA, 

the Interagency Management Council, and officials within the agency.

OMB OMB, in conjunction with GSA, provided government-wide interpretation and direction for agency 

implementation and use of the Networx Program. Further, OMB received briefings from the Office of 

Network Services Programs to keep track of agencies’ transition progress.

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data.

In 2007, GSA made multiple awards of task- and delivery-order contracts1

 1

A task-order contract is a contract for services that does not specify a firm quantity of 

services (other than a minimum or maximum quantity) to be procured. Rather, it provides 

for the issuance of orders for the performance of tasks during the period of the contract. A 

delivery-order contract is a contract for supplies that does not specify a firm quantity of 

supplies (other than a minimum or maximum quantity) to be procured. Rather, it provides 

for the issuance or orders for the delivery of supplies during the period of the contract.

to five vendors under this program as vehicles for agencies to procure 

telecommunications services. These contract vehicles are known as 

Networx Universal and Networx Enterprise. Networx Universal contracts 
Page 5 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

were awarded to AT&T, Verizon Business Services,2 and CenturyLink3 in 

March 2007. In May 2007, Networx Enterprise contracts were awarded to 

these three vendors as well as to Level 3 Communications and Sprint 

Nextel Corporation.4

Table 2: Networx Universal and Networx Enterprise Contractors 

Table 2 lists the contractors for each of the Networx 

contracts.

Contracts Contractors 

Networx Universal AT&T

Verizon Business Services

CenturyLink

Networx Enterprise AT&T

Verizon Business Services

CenturyLink

Level 3 Communications

Sprint Nextel Corporation

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data.

Both contract vehicles offer voice and data services; wireless services; 

management and application services, such as video and audio 

conferencing; security services, including intrusion detection and 

prevention; and land mobile radio service. The Networx Enterprise 

contract offers services similar to those of Networx Universal, but with 

less extensive geographic coverage and service requirements than the 

Networx Universal contract. Mobile and fixed satellite services are unique 

to the Universal contracts, while certain access services are unique to the 

Enterprise contacts.

Once GSA awarded the Networx contracts, agencies could begin their 

transition from FTS2001 to Networx. Prior to executing their transition, 

agencies were to have validated their baseline service inventory. Then 

they were to select a Networx contract (Universal or Enterprise). Next, 

 2

MCI, one of the original FTS2001 contractors, merged with Verizon to form Verizon 

Business Services in January 2006.

3

The original contract was with Qwest Government Services. Qwest merged with 

CenturyLink, Inc., in April 2011.

4

Sprint Corporation, one of the original FTS2001 contractors, merged with Nextel 

Communications, Inc., to form Sprint Nextel Corporation in August 2005.
Page 6 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

agencies were to select the contractor to provide the services using the 

fair opportunity process required by law and the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation. This process requires agencies to provide all contractors a 

fair opportunity to be considered for each order in excess of $3,000 that is 

to be issued under a multiple-award task- or delivery-order contract.5

After selecting their contract and contractor, agencies were to submit 

transition and disconnect orders to their FTS2001 contractors.

According to the original contract terms, the FTS2001 contracts were set 

to expire in December 2006 and January 2007, and according to GSA’s 

April 2005 Networx Acquisition Plan, the agency planned to award 

replacement contracts in May 2006. However, GSA was delayed in 

finalizing the Networx contracts, and therefore negotiated sole-source 

contracts, termed FTS2001 bridge contracts, with Sprint and MCI in July 

and August 2006. These bridge contracts extended the terms of the 

original FTS2001 contracts until the ends of May 2010 and June 2010, 

respectively. In addition, in February 2009, GSA established a FTS2001 

bridge contract with AT&T until June 2010.

According to GSA’s August 2008 transition plan, agencies were to 

complete their transition of services from FTS2001 to Networx or an 

alternative by June 2010. However, the majority of agencies had not

transitioned their services by that time. Therefore, to allow additional time, 

GSA extended the bridge contracts with Sprint until May 2011 and with 

Verizon and AT&T until June 2011. In May 2010, it also extended the 

Qwest crossover contract until May 2011.

By the end of June 2011, however, only 61 out of 158 agencies had 

completed their transitions, and only 42 percent of the value of FTS2001 

services had been transitioned to Networx. To extend the time again for 

agencies to transition, GSA established contracts, termed FTS2001 

continuity bridge contracts, with Verizon, Sprint, AT&T, and Qwest (doing 

business as CenturyLink). These contracts expired in February and 

March 2013, 33 months later than planned in August 2008.

 5

10 U.S.C. § 2304c(b) and 41 U.S.C. § 4106(c); 48 C.F.R. § 16.505(b).

Transition to Networx 

Was Delayed and 

Required Extension of 

Existing Contracts
Page 7 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Figure 1 illustrates the FTS2001 contract extensions, the Networx 

contracts’ period of performance, and the amount of time the federal 

government took to transition services from the FTS2001 contracts.

Figure 1: FTS2001 and Networx Contracts Periods of Performance and Transition Period

See table 3 for a comparison of GSA’s 2008 plan with the actual end of 

the FTS2001 contracts.
Page 8 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Table 3: Planned and Actual FTS2001 Contract Expiration

GSA 2008 plan Actual Delay 

Transition start March 2007 March 2007

FTS2001 Contract expiration June 2010 March 2013

Time to transition 39 months 72 months 33 months

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data.

The growth in the time it took to complete the transition is illustrated in 

figure 2.

Figure 2: Increase in Transition Period

Networx transition progress reports emphasized the delay. Each month 

from December 2010 through December 2011, except February 2011, 

GSA reported on the progress of the Networx transition to OMB officials. 

Reports included (1) the percentage of the total baseline inventory of 

FTS2001 services (about 5 million items) that had been disconnected, 

and (2) the percentage of the peak value of FTS2001 services (about 

$1.1 billion) that had been disconnected. A service inventory item could 

range from a single calling card or a simple voice service to a complex 

call routing system or a unique solution designed to meet a single 

complex requirement. See figure 3 for a comparison of the progress as 

measured by percentage of items disconnected and percentage of peak 

value of FTS2001 services.
Page 9 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Figure 3: Percent FTS2001 Inventory Disconnected between December 2010 and February 2013

Note: GSA officials reported that they did not provide a briefing to OMB in February 2011 because of 

scheduling conflicts. GSA officials also reported that transition progress briefings were less frequent 

after 2011 because OMB and GSA were instead meeting with individual agencies about their 

transition delays.

GSA has begun planning the next telecommunications acquisition, known 

as NS2020. A new group, the NS2020 Interagency Advisory Panel, was 

established in December 2012 to collaborate in addressing technical, 

acquisition, financial, policy, and other matters related to the development 

of the NS2020 strategy. The Office of Network Services Programs has 

drafted an acquisition strategy, which it plans to finalize by the end of 

2013.

The Networx contracts are planned to expire in March and May of 2017; 

as of September 2013, GSA plans to award the next set of contracts in 

February 2017. However, according to agency officials, there is a high 

risk that this milestone will not be achieved. GSA expects that it will take 3 

years to transition all of the services from Networx. Therefore, the 

Networx contracts are already planned to be extended at least 3 years, 

into 2020. Office of Network Services Programs officials stated that the 

Planning for the 

Transition to the Next 

Telecommunications 

Contract
Page 10 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

additional time is needed to incorporate lessons learned from the 

FTS2001-to-Networx transition into the next transition strategy.

We have previously reported on GSA’s efforts to transition 

telecommunications services from one set of contracts to another. In 

March 2001, we reported on challenges federal agencies faced in 

transitioning to FTS2001 from its predecessor program.6

In June 2006, we reported on GSA’s and selected agencies’ FTS2001-toNetworx transition planning efforts, and found that they were generally 

planning to employ sound transition planning practices.

Specifically, we 

reported that several factors contributed to transition delays, including 

that the FTS2001 contractors did not provide GSA with the management 

data it needed to manage and measure the complex transition process; 

GSA was not able to rapidly add all the services to the FTS2001 contracts 

required by agencies to complete their transitions; customer agencies 

were slow to order FTS2001 services; FTS2001 contractors had staffing 

shortfalls and turnover on account teams, as well as billing and 

procedural problems, which impaired their support of agency transition 

activities; and local exchange carriers had problems delivering facilities 

and services on time to the FTS2001 contractors. We also noted that as 

the transition progressed, trends suggested that the final services to be 

transitioned were the most time-consuming. Specifically, the transition of 

switched data services—primarily large agency data communications 

networks using frame relay or asynchronous transfer mode 

technologies—was lagging significantly. We concluded that until it 

addressed the outstanding issues impeding transition and expeditiously 

completed the transition, GSA would be unable to achieve its basic goals 

for ensuring the best service and maximizing competition. We 

recommended GSA obtain usable and complete management information 

and track and report the status of disconnects and transition progress. 

We also made recommendations focused on identifying and resolving 

billing issues. GSA agreed and implemented our recommendations.

7

 6

GAO, FTS2001: Transition Challenges Jeopardize Program Goals, 

The practices 

GAO-01-289

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2001).

7

GAO, Telecommunications: Full Adoption of Sound Transition Planning Practices by 

GSA and Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning Efforts, GAO-06-476 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 6, 2006).

Prior GAO Reports on 

Telecommunications 

Transition
Page 11 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

included, among other things, establishing a structured management 

approach; identifying the resources, including human capital, that the 

transition effort will require; and developing a transition plan. We 

recommended, among other things, that GSA provide guidance to its 

customer agencies that reflects all of the sound transition planning 

practices. GSA agreed and implemented our recommendation.

In February 2007, we reported on GSA’s estimate of the amount of 

funding needed to meet its transition-related commitments, and found that 

the agency’s analysis was not sufficiently accurate, comprehensive, 

documented, or validated, as called for by best practices.8

In June 2008, we reported on the extent to which six selected customer 

agencies were following sound transition planning practices.

We 

recommended that GSA establish a cost estimation policy that reflects

best practices, and revise the transition cost estimate using best 

practices. GSA implemented our recommendations.

9 We found 

that the agencies were generally implementing the practices, but three of 

them had not fully implemented some of the key components of the 

practices and were not planning to do so. For example, one agency was 

using key project management processes in its transition planning efforts, 

and five planned to use them. Regarding identifying human capital needs, 

two agencies had identified their resource needs, and three had plans to 

identify them. One of the agencies did not plan to identify its human 

capital needs. We made recommendations to those agencies that had not 

implemented key practice components and did not plan to do so, focused 

on addressing the gaps in transition planning. The agencies implemented 

some but not all of our recommendations.

 8

GAO, Telecommunications: GSA Has Accumulated Adequate Funding for Transition to 

New Contracts but Needs Cost Estimation Policy, GAO-07-268 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

23, 2007).

9

GAO, Telecommunications: Agencies Are Generally Following Sound Transition Planning 

Practices, and GSA Is Taking Action to Resolve Challenges, GAO-08-759 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 27, 2008).
Page 12 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Several factors contributed to delays in transitioning from FTS2001 to 

Networx. In particular, the complex Networx acquisition process 

compounded by a reported lack of telecommunications and contracting 

expertise within the agencies contributed to delays. Weaknesses in 

project management also contributed to the delays. As a result of the 

delays, GSA experienced increased costs, and agencies missed savings.

The complexity of the acquisition process was related to duplicative and 

overlapping contract vehicles, the large number of potential service 

options for a given requirement, and challenges related to implementing 

the fair opportunity process,10

Duplicative and overlapping contract vehicles. According to GSA’s 

analysis, the establishment of two Networx contract vehicles—Universal 

and Enterprise—created confusion with customer agencies and added 

administrative cost for GSA. The two-contract-vehicle strategy was 

intended to address Networx program goals to provide all services that 

were available under FTS2001, as well as to provide access to a greater 

number of competing vendors that would provide new, enhanced services 

and emerging technologies. The Universal vehicle was intended to focus 

on the first of these goals, while the Enterprise vehicle was to focus more 

on the second. However, because of industry consolidation by the time 

the contracts were awarded, the strategy was not as effective as had 

been envisioned. Specifically, three of the five contractors awarded 

Enterprise contracts were also awarded Universal contracts, and most 

services are provided on both contracts. Having two vehicles essentially 

doubled GSA’s management and support responsibilities, and significant 

among others. The complexity was 

compounded by limited contract and technical expertise at some 

agencies.

 10As discussed earlier, the fair opportunity process requires agencies to provide all 

contractors awarded multiple-award task- or delivery-order contracts, such as the Networx 

contracts, a fair opportunity to be considered for each order in excess of $3,000 issued 

under one of the contracts. 

Complex Acquisition 

Process and 

Weaknesses in Project 

Planning Contributed 

to Networx Transition 

Delays, Resulting in 

Increased Costs and 

Missed Savings

Complex Acquisition 

Process Compounded by 

Limited Agency Expertise
Page 13 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

overlap existed with the two contracts. GSA agreed that the 

Universal/Enterprise construct should not be repeated in the follow-on 

NS2020 program.

Decoupled contract services. According to GSA and some service 

providers, another key factor that contributed to delays was that agencies 

could not purchase multiple services bundled11

To address this challenge, many agencies developed statements of work 

to request proposals from the contractors instead of using the Networx 

Unit Pricer. However, GSA had expected that the vast majority of orders 

would be placed using the Networx Unit Pricer and would not require the 

development of statements of work. Thus, this process added to GSA’s 

planned workload, requiring GSA to review the statements of work to 

determine if the requirements were within the scope of the Networx 

contracts and assist in ordering them. If the requirements were not in the 

scope of the contracts, additional time was required to modify the 

contracts. (This extra work, for example, resulted in the number of 

contract line items increasing from 5,100 to 13,400 as of June 2011.)

into a single item on the 

Networx contracts. Specifically, Networx contracts did not permit this type 

of bundling, as the FTS2001 contracts had. Instead, the Networx 

contracts offered services by detailed contract line items in order to allow 

agencies to more accurately identify and maintain inventories of the 

services they were purchasing. Agencies were expected to map their 

existing FTS2001 services to the individual services on Networx, using a 

tool called the Networx Unit Pricer. To facilitate this, agencies were 

expected to use the Networx Unit Pricer to compare unit prices at the lineitem level across the Networx Universal and Enterprise contractors and, 

where available, the FTS2001 contracts. However, the growth in the 

number of services offered (54 on Networx compared with 26 on 

FTS2001) and the number of contract line items (about 5,100 in the 

original contracts), including some that vary by location and bandwidth, 

led to a number of different potential service options for any given 

requirement.

 11Bundled services are not the same as a bundled contract. A bundled contract is a 

contract where the requirements for supplies or services, previously provided or 

performed under separate smaller contracts, were consolidated into a solicitation for a 

single contract that is likely to be unsuitable for award to a small business concern.
Page 14 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Challenges related to the fair opportunity process. Finally, according to 

GSA, agencies experienced challenges in implementing the fair 

opportunity process because of a lack of clear guidance on changes that 

were made to the process after GSA awarded the contract vehicles. At 

the time the Networx contracts were awarded, potential contractors could 

protest (i.e., contest) the issuance of an order only when an order 

increased the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under 

which the order was issued. However, soon after the Networx transition 

was under way, changes were made to the procurement statutes that 

resulted in agencies needing to take more measures than in the past. 

Specifically, the statutes were modified to allow protests of the issuance 

or proposed issuance of task or delivery orders above $10 million (not just 

on the grounds that the order increases the scope, period or maximum 

value of the contract under which it was issued). In addition, the new 

statutes required additional measures in giving all contractors a fair 

opportunity to be considered for orders over $5 million. In addition to 

lacking clear guidance, according to GSA’s analysis, because agencies 

previously relied on GSA to provide expertise on contract processes and 

procedures, several agencies lacked expertise in the fair opportunity 

process. To GSA’s credit, once aware of this issue, it responded by 

providing guidance; however, according to GSA, its guidance was 

sometimes inconsistent and created confusion. GSA officials agreed that 

different organizations within GSA, such as acquisition support or the help 

desk, provided oral guidance to customer agencies that was inconsistent.

According to GSA’s analysis, a decline in telecommunications technical 

and contracting expertise in the federal government contributed to some 

agencies’ inability to efficiently identify and contract for Networx solutions 

for their requirements. In particular, customer agencies requested GSA’s 

assistance in developing a statement of work and conducting the fair 

opportunity process. Moreover, according to the analysis, customer 

agencies are concerned that the shortage of telecommunications 

specialists will get worse because there are not enough to replace

experienced workers nearing retirement. Further, since February 2011, 

we have identified gaps in the skills of the federal workforce as a high-risk 

area that threatens the government’s ability to effectively address national 

issues. We have noted that agencies should work with the Office of 

Personnel Management, the central human resources agency for the 

federal government, to pursue a strategic, government-wide approach to 

addressing these critical skills gaps. GSA has yet to fully study this issue, 

and agreed that understanding expertise shortfalls would be useful for 

future transition planning purposes; however, it has not established a plan 

to do so. As we previously reported, sound transition planning practices 
Page 15 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

include ensuring that personnel with the right skills are in place to support 

the transition effort.12 These skills include contract expertise, legal 

expertise, asset management, and program management. Identifying 

current and projected shortfalls in critical telecommunication specialist 

roles early in the process of planning the next transition could better 

position GSA to assist customer agencies and help avoid future delays.

Another key factor that contributed to delays was weak project planning. 

According to sound transition practices, a transition such as the one from 

FTS2001 to Networx should be approached as a critical project.13

Accordingly, agencies should develop a project management plan as the 

primary document that defines how the transition is to be executed and 

controlled, as called for by leading project management practices.14

However, neither of our case study agencies had a current transition 

project management plan or an integrated transition time line. Although 

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had established a project management 

plan in February 2008, it had not established an integrated transition time 

line, and had not updated the plan to reflect the current status and 

endpoint of the project. Instead, it managed and tracked individual 

transition projects separately. For example, it used a spreadsheet to track 

As 

we previously reported, a transition project management plan should 

include, among other things, a time line of all activities that need to be 

completed, taking into account priorities relative to the agency’s missioncritical systems, contingency plans, and identified risks. Moreover, 

transition plans should be updated on an ongoing basis to reflect the 

current status of the project and allow for reporting progress.

 12GAO-06-476 and GAO-08-759. We identified the practices through research of 

telecommunications transitions literature and interviews with those with experience in 

telecommunications transitions, including industry experts, telecommunications vendors,

and private sector companies.

13GAO-06-476 and GAO-08-759.

14Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge 

(PMBOK® Guide), Fourth Edition, Project Management Institute, Inc. (PMI), 2008. 

Copyright and all rights reserved. Software Engineering Institute/Carnegie Mellon, 

Capability Maturity Model Integration® (CMMI®) for Acquisition, Version 1.3, CMU/SEI2010-TR-032 (Pittsburgh, Pa., November 2010).

Customer Agencies’

Weak Project Planning 

and Execution Issues
Page 16 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

the installation of Multiprotocol Label Switching15

In addition, SSA had prepared a transition project management plan by 

June 2008, but it had not established an integrated transition time line, 

nor had it updated its plan since then. SSA’s transition was divided into 

five components, and agency officials reported that three of the 

components were complete by March 2011, but that the two most 

complex components were not complete as of September 2013. While 

they had received contractor plans and schedules for the incomplete 

components, they had not updated these plans into one integrated 

transition project management plan. According to SSA officials, it was not 

feasible to integrate the schedules because of their complexity and 

scope. As of September 2013, SSA had yet to finish disconnecting its 

FTS2001 services. It has established Networx sole-source task orders

circuits at 868 sites. 

However, as of June 2012, according to a GSA report, only about 49 

percent of the Corps’s transition had been completed. Using an integrated 

transition time line and having an updated project management plan that 

included plans for addressing the issues it experienced with its local 

vendors might have helped the Corps identify and schedule sites that 

needed a longer lead time to upgrade. According to Corps officials, the 

transition was complete in March 2013.

16

We cannot generalize about project planning at all agencies based on 

what we found at SSA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. However, 

government-wide, agencies tended to transition easier items before they 

transitioned more complex items. For example, they transitioned items 

such as calling cards or simple switched voice services first, which 

demonstrated progress, before they transitioned complex, higher cost, 

items that needed a long lead time such as data networks and 

international services. This was reflected in the transition progress reports 

discussed earlier in this report. For example, as illustrated in figure 3, in 

June 2011, 88 percent of FTS2001 service inventory items had been 

disconnected, yet the value of the disconnected items was only 42 

to maintain the services until April 2014, while it completes its transition.

 15Multiprotocol Label Switching is a network routing protocol that is based on switching 

through the use of tag labels.

16An exception to the fair opportunity process allows a task order to be issued on a solesource basis in the interest of economy and efficiency if it is a logical follow-on to an order 

already issued under the contract, provided that all awardees were given a fair opportunity 

to be considered for the original order.
Page 17 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

percent of the value of the inventory. By planning to transition timeconsuming services earlier in the project, agencies could have reduced or 

avoided delays incurred.

In planning their next telecommunications transitions, agencies could 

avoid delays by approaching the process as a critical project and 

establishing transition plans that include detailed time lines that take into 

account priorities relative to their mission-critical systems, contingency 

plans, and identified risks and are updated to reflect the current status 

and endpoint of the transition.

In addition to weaknesses in project planning, our case study agencies 

described problems executing their transitions. U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers officials stated that the biggest factor contributing to their 

delays was related to installing new services at field sites. Specifically, 

they said that installation required additional work by the local 

telecommunications vendors, but that the local vendors were not always 

cooperative. According to the officials, the local vendors did not have an 

incentive to make the upgrades, and would therefore refuse to install the 

additional facilities or would quote excessive prices for the installation.

Similarly, SSA described problems related to Networx contractors’

performance in executing its contracts. SSA is working to resolve the 

problems, and as previously mentioned, expects to complete its transition 

by April 2014.

One result of the delayed transition to Networx was an increase in the 

cost of making the transition. Specifically, GSA estimated that the 

transition cost increased by $66.4 million, or 44 percent, over the $151.5 

million planned in 2004. This included increases in the costs for 

contractor support, as well as costs for GSA program management, which 

were not included in the 2004 estimate. For example, GSA’s updated 

2010 estimate showed an increase from $35 million to $87.3 million for 

contractor support through fiscal year 2013 (a $52.3 million increase) due 

to the slower-than-expected transition. In addition, in March 2013 GSA 

estimated program management costs, such as GSA staff and support 

systems, for the period from June 2010—when the transition had been 

planned to end as of 2008—through March 2013, when the FTS2001 

contracts expired. These additional costs were estimated at $18.1 million. 

Table 4 shows the estimated change in transition costs.

GSA Experienced 

Increased Costs, and 

Agencies Missed Savings
Page 18 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Table 4: Change in Networx Transition Program Cost Estimates as a Result of Delays (dollars in millions)

Cost element 2004 estimate Updated estimate Difference

Contractor support $35.0 $87.3 $52.3 

Nonrecurring charges $62.4 $58.4 - 4.0 

Other transition-related costs $54.1 $54.1 0.0

GSA program management staff not included $10.3 $10.3

GSA program support systems not included $ 7.8 $ 7.8

Total cost $151.5 $217.9 $66.4

Source: GAO analysis of GSA data.

Note: The updated estimate includes December 2010 actual and projected costs for transition 

contractor support through fiscal year 2013, nonrecurring charges, and other related costs; and 

GSA’s March 2013 estimates for its program management and support systems costs for the period 

June 2010 through March 2013.

In addition to the added transition costs incurred as a result of the delays, 

agencies likely paid about $329 million more for similar services by 

staying on the FTS2001 contracts longer. According to GSA’s most 

recent analysis, in April 2010, the rate of savings agencies could achieve 

through a move to Networx was 28.4 percent. Agencies spent about $1.2 

billion on FTS2001 services between July 2010 and March 2013, the 

period in which transition delays occurred. Applying GSA’s calculated 

savings rate to the amount spent on FTS2001 services, we estimate that 

agencies could have saved about $329 million.

The use of lessons learned is a principal component of an organizational 

culture committed to a continuous improvement, which serves to 

communicate acquired knowledge more effectively and to ensure that 

beneficial information is factored into planning, work processes, and 

activities. Lessons learned provide a powerful method of sharing good 

ideas for improving work processes, quality, and cost-effectiveness.

We have identified six key practices that can be used to identify and apply 

lessons learned. They include (1) collecting information, (2) analyzing the 

information collected to identify lessons that lead to recommendations, (3) 

validating the accuracy and applicability of lessons to other projects, (4) 

archiving the lessons, (5) sharing and disseminating lessons, and (6) 

GSA Documented 

Lessons Learned but 

Has Not Effectively 

Archived, Shared, 

and Applied Them
Page 19 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

deciding to invest resources to apply lessons learned. Table 5 provides a 

description of each of these lessons learned key practices.17

Table 5: Description of Lessons Learned Key Practices

Practice Description

Collect information Capture data through activities such as project critiques, written forms, interviews of 

participants, and direct observation.

Analyze the information collected to identify 

lessons that lead to recommendations

Analyze information collected to determine root causes and identify appropriate 

actions, and result in lessons that lead to recommendations.

Validate the accuracy and applicability of 

lessons to other projects

Verify the accuracy of lessons and their applicability to other projects.

Archive the lessons Store lessons in a manner—such as in an electronic database—that allows users to 

perform information searches using key words and functional categories. The 

database should also provide a logical system for organizing information that is 

easily retrievable and made available to any requester. In addition, archiving should 

be done on an ongoing basis to avoid becoming cumbersome and irrelevant.

Share and disseminate lessons Disseminate lessons learned through a variety of communication media, such as 

briefings, bulletins, reports, e-mails, websites, database entries, the revision of work 

process or procedures, and training. For example, lessons can be disseminated 

through automated delivery or by having a user search the database.

Prioritize and apply lessons learned Management determines whether to commit resources to a particular lesson. The 

decision focuses efforts on determining the most important issues on which to apply 

limited resources. Issues are prioritized by rank from most important to least 

important in order to determine where the greatest impact will be. Under a benefitcost analysis, some recommendations coming out of the lessons-learned process 

may simply be too costly to implement.

Sources: GAO and Center for Army Lessons Learned Handbook.

GSA collected, analyzed, and validated lessons learned, and partially 

archived and shared them. However, it has yet to prioritize and apply 

lessons learned. Table 6 summarizes the extent to which GSA satisfied 

the lessons learned key practices.

 17GAO, Federal Real Property Security: Interagency Security Committee Should 

Implement a Lessons Learned Process, GAO-12-901 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2012). 

We identified the lessons learned practices primarily using our previous work reported in 

GAO, NASA: Better Mechanisms Needed for Sharing Lessons Learned, GAO-02-195

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2002) and a report from the Center for Army Lessons 

Learned, Establishing a Lessons Learned Program: Observations, Insights, and Lessons

(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: June 2011). The practices we identified are based on research, 

interviews, and experience.
Page 20 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Table 6: Extent to which GSA Satisfied the Lessons Learned Key Practices

Practice Satisfied?

Collect information ●

Analyze the information collected to identify lessons that lead to 

recommendations

●

Validate the accuracy and applicability of lessons to other projects ●

Archive the lessons ◑

Share and disseminate lessons ◑

Prioritize and apply lessons learned ○

Key:

● GSA satisfied the criteria.

◑ GSA has partially satisfied the criteria.

○ GSA has not satisfied the criteria.

Source: GAO Analysis of GSA data.

GSA collected information. GSA collected information during meetings 

with agencies, vendors, and GSA employees from June 2009 until 

November 2010. It also collected information through a study conducted 

by Deloitte Consulting from March 2011 through September 2011. The 

study included 92 interviews with 117 stakeholders, including GSA 

personnel, customer agencies, vendors, and OMB officials. In addition, 

Noblis, a contractor that provided GSA project management services, 

provided GSA a lessons-learned report. The report was a critique of the 

program, based on the contractor’s experiences supporting it.

GSA analyzed the information collected and identified lessons that led to 

recommendations. The Deloitte study resulted in a July 2012 report that 

identified 27 lessons learned and made 94 recommendations. The 

lessons and associated recommendations were arranged by strategic 

themes, such as acquisition efficiency, tailored customer service, 

operational efficiency, customer partnership, and aggregated 

requirements. According to the study, one of the lessons learned was that 

agencies found it difficult to make fair opportunity decisions, a mandatory 

component of which is price, using the Networx Unit Pricer tool. This 

lesson learned resulted in recommendations that GSA should simplify 

contract structure, pricing, and communication. In addition, the report 

included a recommendation that GSA should consider making fair 

opportunity decisions for some agencies as part of the original contract 

award.
Page 21 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

GSA validated the accuracy and applicability of lessons to other projects.

GSA validated the lessons learned at meetings held in 2012 between 

GSA officials and government stakeholders. For example, in September 

2012, GSA discussed the lessons learned with agency chief information 

officers, who verified their accuracy and applicability. In addition, in 

December 2012, GSA officials discussed lessons learned with the

NS2020 Interagency Advisory Panel. GSA officials also reported that they 

conducted individual meetings and teleconferences about lessons 

learned with agency executives from the Departments of Defense, 

Homeland Security, and Justice.

GSA partially archived lessons. Specifically, GSA established a Networx 

transition lessons-learned database, which according to the Federal 

Acquisition Service Acting Commissioner’s May 2010 statement before 

the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, was 

intended to be used to collect lessons learned from the transition and 

efficiently analyze and easily report them. The database includes fields 

for title, functional category, identification number, description, submission 

date, and recommendation. As of May 2013, it included 38 records, 5 of 

which have associated recommendations. However, the database has not 

been updated since November 2010 and does not include any of the 

information from GSA’s July 2012 lessons-learned report. For example, 

the database was not updated with information about the need for 

network services expertise that was described in the July 2012 lessonslearned report. GSA officials explained that they had not considered it 

practical to update the database with the detail that is in the report. 

Nonetheless, GSA could populate its database with enough information 

about each of the lessons learned to allow those responsible for planning 

and implementing the next telecommunications transition to search the 

database and access key information about the lessons. Moreover, 

updating the database on an ongoing basis would help ensure that the 

process is not cumbersome and new information is readily available to 

stakeholders when the next telecommunications transition begins.

GSA partially shared and disseminated lessons learned. GSA shared 

briefings of lessons learned with agencies and OMB. However, its July 

2012 lessons-learned report is designated “for official use only,” and GSA 

has not made the information in it readily available to agencies and other 

transition stakeholders. According to GSA officials, the report is 

designated this way because the agency does not want attribution of the 

interview responses discussed in the report to be disclosed. Further, 

access to the report is controlled by the NS2020 program manager. GSA 

officials reported that they intend to only share the lessons learned with 
Page 22 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

program managers and contracting officers who will be developing the 

acquisition plans for the next telecommunications acquisition. While we 

agree that it is important to respect the potentially sensitive result of 

disclosing attribution, such information would not need to be disclosed in 

the lessons-learned database.

By making information on lessons learned readily available to 

stakeholders through a database that is updated on an ongoing basis, 

GSA would enhance the efforts of those responsible for the next transition 

and their ability to avoid the recurrence of past mistakes.

GSA has yet to prioritize and apply its lessons learned. It has not 

established a process for determining the most important issues to which 

to apply limited resources. Specifically, neither its lessons-learned 

management plan nor its lessons-learned process analysis18

 18In July 2013, GSA analyzed its lessons-learned activities relative to the key lessonslearned practices we identified.

discusses 

how the agency has prioritized or plans to prioritize lessons learned by 

importance in order to determine which lessons it will invest limited 

resources in addressing. Also, while the draft NS2020 strategic plan 

stated that it incorporated 63 of 94 recommendations, it does not describe 

how it was determined which ones to incorporate. GSA officials stated 

that they plan to incorporate the remaining recommendations in other 

NS2020 strategic planning documentation and have already begun 

investing resources to apply lessons learned. For example, GSA is 

investigating improvements in the Networx contract modification life-cycle 

process and improving Office of Network Services Programs support 

systems. However, GSA officials agreed that they did not have a plan for 

prioritizing its lessons learned. Moreover, GSA has yet to fully apply 

lessons learned to its next transition because it is still in the process of 

developing its next transition strategy. GSA plans to finalize the NS2020 

strategic plan by the end of 2013 and then develop its acquisition plans. 

According to its lessons-learned management plan, each program 

manager responsible for an acquisition plan is to check to ensure that the 

lessons captured in the July 2012 report have been applied. Until it 

determines which lessons learned are the most important and the order in 

which to apply them, GSA lacks assurance that it is using its limited 

resources to address the lessons that would provide the most benefit for 

the cost.
Page 23 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Given that the federal government invests at least $1.4 billion in 

telecommunications services annually, GSA has an important role to play 

in assisting agencies in acquiring these services in an efficient and costeffective manner. However, the complexity of the process for transitioning 

to Networx, which was compounded by a decline in telecommunications 

expertise at the agencies as well as weaknesses in project planning, 

contributed to delays in agencies’ transition to Networx. This in turn 

resulted in increased transition costs, missed savings, and delays in 

implementing new technologies. To its credit, GSA has studied the 

Networx transition and documented lessons learned. In light of the 

complexity of telecommunications services and the transition process, 

studying potential government-wide shortfalls in telecommunications 

expertise and providing agencies with additional guidance on transition 

project planning could help ensure that the next telecommunications 

transition proceeds more smoothly. In addition, it is important for GSA to 

effectively apply lessons learned from Networx to future transitions. In 

particular, ensuring that the agency’s lessons-learned database is fully 

populated and that these lessons are prioritized and applied to future 

transitions will assist GSA and agencies in planning and executing the 

next telecommunications transition.

To improve planning and execution of the next telecommunications 

transition, we recommend that the Administrator of General Services take 

the following actions:

• in coordination with the Office of Personnel Management, examine 

potential government-wide telecommunications expertise shortfalls 

and use the study to shape the NS2020 strategic approach, and

• ensure that project planning guidance to agencies on the future 

transition calls for establishing transition plans with detailed time lines 

that take into account priorities relative to agencies’ mission-critical 

systems, contingency plans, and identified risks, and are updated to 

reflect the current status and endpoint of the transition.

In addition, we recommend the Administrator take the following three 

actions related to GSA’s lessons-learned process:

• populate and maintain on an ongoing basis the agency’s transition 

lessons-learned database with the lessons GSA has identified and 

make it available for user searches by those involved in developing 

the next transition strategy;

Conclusions

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
Page 24 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

• prioritize the lessons, taking into particular consideration the factors 

we reported as contributing to delays, and determine the resources 

needed to apply them; and

• ensure that the lessons are applied, based on priority and available 

resources, to the next transition strategy.

We provided a draft of our report to GSA, the Office of Personnel 

Management, SSA, the Department of Defense, and OMB.

In written comments, GSA stated that it agrees with our findings and 

recommendations and will take appropriate action. The letter is 

reproduced in appendix II.

A Senior Analyst from the Office of Personnel Management’s office of 

Internal Oversight and Compliance responded via e-mail that the agency 

concurred with the recommendation and is prepared to support GSA in its 

efforts to examine the potential telecommunications expertise shortfalls 

discussed in the report.

In written comments, SSA stated that it did not agree that our statement 

that agencies tended to transition easier items first to demonstrate 

progress before they transitioned items that needed a long lead time 

applied to SSA. Specifically, the agency stated that it did not delay the 

transition of more complex requirements to demonstrate progress on 

simpler requirements and that it had begun its overall transition activities 

concurrently. We do not dispute this statement regarding SSA. Instead, 

our concern was with the agency’s lack of an integrated transition time

line. Our point about transitioning easier items before more complex ones 

applied across the government but not necessarily to each individual 

agency. SSA’s letter is reproduced in appendix III.

An official from the DOD Inspector General’s Office of Communications 

and Congressional Liaison responded via e-mail that department had no 

comments on our draft report. In addition, a Paralegal Specialist from 

OMB’s General Counsel Office responded via e-mail that the agency had 

no comments at this time on our draft report.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 25 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time we will send copies to other interested 

congressional committees; the Administrator of General Services; the 

Secretaries of the Department of Defense and the Army; the 

Administrator of the Social Security Administration, and the Directors of 

the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Personnel 

Management. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the 

GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4456 or chac@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix II.

Carol R. Cha

Director

Information Technology Acquisition Management Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Our objectives were to determine (1) what factors contributed to the delay 

in transitioning services to Networx and the consequences the federal 

government experienced as a result of the delayed transition, and (2) to 

what extent the General Services Administration (GSA) is documenting 

and applying lessons learned as it prepares for the next 

telecommunications contract transition.

To identify factors contributing to transition delays, we analyzed key GSA 

Networx programmatic documentation, including various management 

briefings and reports, transition plans and status reviews, and program 

risk logs. We also assessed GSA’s lessons-learned documentation, 

including Deloitte Consulting’s September 2011 Lessons Learned Report, 

and GSA’s July 2012 Network Services Programs Lessons Learned 

Report and September 2012 Networx Lessons Learned Report, which 

were based on Deloitte’s study. Deloitte Consulting analyzed stakeholder 

feedback on the Networx transition, and GSA incorporated the results of 

the study into its reports. In addition, we analyzed relevant statutes, the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation, and GSA guidance about the fair 

opportunity process to understand its impact on the transition.

To help address the first objective, we also selected two agencies—the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Social Security Administration 

(SSA) —for case study review, based on the extent of delay in 

transitioning and the amount spent on telecommunications. Specifically, 

as of November 2012, these two agencies had the most FTS2001 

services remaining to be disconnected. The Army Corps of Engineers had 

about 16 percent of its services remaining and SSA had about 9 percent 

of its services remaining. In addition, according to GSA documentation, in 

fiscal year 2011, SSA had the third-highest spending (behind the 

Departments of Defense and Homeland Security) on FTS2001 and 

Networx, which was about $121 million, while the Corps spent about $15 

million (the 12th-highest spending). Although the results from these two 

agencies may not be generalized to all agencies, they provide examples 

of the factors contributing to the delay in transitioning and the 

consequences thereof.

We relied on our past work on the FTS2000-to-FTS2001 transition and 

FTS2001-to-Networx transition, as well as on project planning and 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

management, to identify transition project best practices.1

To identify consequences occurring as a result of the delays, we 

determined the extent to which GSA incurred additional costs and the 

extent to which agencies missed savings. Specifically, we compared 

GSA’s latest transition cost estimates with its 2004 cost estimate. We also 

assessed GSA’s April 2010 analysis of the federal government’s potential 

savings resulting from transitioning from FTS2001 to Networx. (Figure 4 

illustrates GSA’s analysis.) Specifically, GSA calculated that agencies 

could save 28.4 percent of the cost of FTS2001 services by moving those 

services to Networx. For example, using this savings rate, it determined 

that in January 2010, agencies could have saved $22.4 million that 

month. To assess the reasonableness of GSA’s savings rate calculation, 

we conducted a detailed walkthrough of the formula, analysis, and 

supporting documentation with GSA Networx Program officials. From this 

exercise, we determined GSA’s estimated savings rate to be sufficiently 

reliable for the purpose of this audit.

We compared 

SSA’s and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ transition plans with key best 

practices. We also assessed their project status and risk reports, and 

analyzed SSA’s contractor performance reports for one of its transition 

component projects.

 1

GAO, FTS2001: Transition Challenges Jeopardize Program Goals, GAO-01-289

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2001); Telecommunications: Full Adoption of Sound 

Transition Planning Practices by GSA and Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning 

Efforts, GAO-06-476 (Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2006); Telecommunications: Agencies 

Are Generally Following Sound Transition Planning Practices, and GSA Is Taking Action 

to Resolve Challenges, GAO-08-759 (Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2008); and GAO 

Schedule Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Project Schedules, exposure draft, 

GAO-12-120G (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 2012).
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 28 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Figure 4: GSA’s Analysis of Potential Savings

To calculate savings agencies may have missed by remaining on 

FTS2001 after the transition was to be complete (i.e., as of July 2010), we 

applied the 28.4 percent savings rate to total agency spending on 

FTS2001 services between July 2010 and March 2013, as reported by 

GSA.

To assess the reliability of the cost data, we tested the data to identify 

obvious problems with completeness or accuracy and interviewed GSA 

Networx Services Program officials about the data, the automated 

systems used to collect them, and processes in place to verify them. For 

the purposes of our report, we determined that the cost data were 

sufficiently reliable. We did not test the adequacy of GSA’s cost 

accounting systems. Our evaluation of these cost data was based on 

what we were told by GSA and the information the agency could provide.

We also reviewed government-wide plans that involved the use of 

Networx to determine the extent to which delays contributed to nonfinancial consequences. Specifically, we assessed documentation on the 

Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) plans for implementing the 

Trusted Internet Connection relative to the progress of the Networx 

transition.

To determine the extent to which GSA is documenting and applying 

lessons learned, we compared GSA’s lessons learned process with key 

activities we previously identified as best practices. These key practices 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 29 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

are discussed in a September 2012 GAO report, Federal Real Property

Security: Interagency Security Committee Should Implement a Lessons 

Learned Process, and in the U.S. Army’s Lessons Learned Center’s 

Establishing a Lessons Learned Program: Observations, Insights, and 

Lessons.

2

For both objectives, we met with GSA, OMB, SSA, and U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers officials, and representatives from all of the FTS2001 and 

Networx contractors, including Sprint, Verizon, AT&T, CenturyLink, and 

Level 3 Communications.

We compared GSA’s lessons-learned documentation, including 

its lessons-learned reports, lessons-learned management plan, lessonslearned database, and lessons-learned process analysis with these key 

practices. Based on our analysis, we assessed whether GSA satisfied, 

partially satisfied, or had not satisfied the key practices. “Satisfied” means 

GSA provided complete evidence that satisfied the entire criteria. 

“Partially satisfied” means GSA provided evidence that satisfied a portion 

of the criteria. “Not satisfied” means GSA provided no evidence that 

satisfies any of the criteria.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2012 to December 

2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 2

GAO, Federal Real Property Security: Interagency Security Committee Should 

Implement A Lessons Learned Process, GAO-12-901 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 10, 2012) 

and Center for Army Lessons Learned, Establishing a Lessons Learned Program: 

Observations, Insights, and Lessons (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: June 2011). 
Appendix II: Comments from the 

General Services Administration

Page 30 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Appendix II: Comments from the 

General Services Administration
Appendix II: Comments from the 

General Services Administration

Page 31 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Social Security Administration

Page 32 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Social Security Administration
Appendix III: Comments from the 

Social Security Administration

Page 33 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 34 GAO-14-63 Telecommunications

Carol R. Cha at (202) 512-4456 or chac@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Eric Winter (Assistant Director), 

Melina Asencio, Virginia Chanley, Cheryl Dottermusch, Franklin Jackson, 

Lee McCracken, Jena Sinkfield, and Jack Wang made key contributions 

to this report.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(311600)
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability.

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (http://www.gao.gov). Each weekday 

afternoon, GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, 

and correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted 

products, go to http://www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.”

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537.

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information.

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube.

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts.

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov.

Contact:

Website: http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548

GAO’s Mission

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony

Order by Phone

Connect with GAO

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs

Congressional 

Relations

Public Affairs

Please Print on Recycled Paper.