Appendix B: Husing Review 

   
Response to 

Barstow Analyst’s Review of December 18, 2010 Report: 

Potential Economic Impact of DesertXpress 

On the City of Barstow 

John E. Husing, Ph.D. 

June 2, 2011 

Economics & Politics, Inc. 

961 Creek View Lane 

Redlands, CA 92373 

(909) 307-9444 Phone 

(909) 748-0620 FAX 

john@johnhusing.com

www.johnhusing.com 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 1 

Response to 

Barstow Analyst’s Review of December 18, 2010 Report: 

Potential Economic Impact of DesertXpress On the City of Barstow 

Executive Summary

Ronald Barbieri, a real estate economist working for the City of Barstow, released a commentary 

(Barbieri Commentary) reviewing the economic impact on Barstow of the proposed 

DesertXpress high speed rail line between Victorville and Las Vegas authored by this analyst 

(Husing Study). Earlier, he had authored his own report on the economic impact of the 

DesertXpress on Barstow (Barbieri Report). 

The Barbieri Commentary purports to show where the Husing Study was correct and where it 

was flawed in analyzing the proposed high speed rail line on Barstow. This report is a response 

to that document explaining in some depth why the Husing Study remains valid. 

Does the Husing Study understate total Traveler Spending in Barstow? No. 

There is no basis offered in the Barbieri Commentary for changing the Husing Study’s 

$286,249,289 figure for total sales to travelers moving through Barstow. The Commentary 

simply assumed that the earlier Barbieri Report which yielded a $295,600,000 figure was a more 

valid estimate. It did so without any criticism of the methodology or assumptions used in the 

Husing Study and explained in detail. 

Does the Husing Study underestimate Las Vegas traveler spending? No. 

The Barbieri Commentary takes issue with the degree to which traveler spending in Barstow is 

from people not involved in a trip with a Las Vegas destination. It does so due to a 

misunderstanding of the meaning of Caltrans’s estimate of Annual Average Daily Trip (AADT) 

counts for private vehicle travel. It argues that Las Vegas destination travel volumes must be 

increased because most spending by them occurs on weekends. In fact, the agency’s AADT 

work already allows for weekend spikes in spending and thus it is inappropriate to raise volumes 

to Las Vegas simply based upon weekend travel. 

In the Husing study $197,880,658 of the $286,249,289 in traveler spending in Barstow is 

calculated as due to Las Vegas traveler expenditures in Barstow. The other $88,368,632 is 

calculated as from north-south travelers involved either with destinations beyond Las Vegas or 

moving east-west on the I-40 and SR-58. The Barbieri Commentary inappropriately chose to use 

a $275,000,000 figure for Las Vegas bound travelers, ignoring the important role that Caltrans 

data show comes from spending by travelers making trips unrelated to that city. 

Did the Husing Study Rely Upon An Unrealistically Low Estimate of Traveler Capture? 

No. 

In the Husing Study, it is estimated that 18.3% of Las Vegas bound travelers will be captured by 

DesertXpress. This equates to the 20.3% rate originally estimated by URS when the system is 

operating at 100%, lowered by a 10% factor as advised by Federal Railroad Administration’s 

(FRA) peer review of the ridership estimate. This reduced rate is the appropriate factor. 

In the Barbieri Commentary, as well as in the earlier Barbieri Report, the argument is made that 

the appropriate figure would be the 20.3% level scaled up to 33.33%. This is justified since a 

comment made by one firm using the URS and peer reviewed data seemed to comment that the 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 2 

20.3% level was consistent with the system operating at 60% of its capacity, and therefore it 

could be scaled up to 33.33%. A review of the source material showed that the Barbieri 

Commentary and Report were incorrect in this belief. 

Is Direct Impact of the DesertXpress on Barstow’s Taxable Retail Sales by the Husing 

Study Inappropriately Low? No. 

Combining the data discussed above and defended in detail in the body of this report, the Husing 

Study estimated that Barstow’s retail sales losses would be $36,875,921 a year due to 

DesertXpress’s diversion of travelers involved with a Las Vegas destination. 

The Barbieri Commentary used higher estimates of traveler sales, lower estimates of the amount 

of those sales made by travelers not bound for Las Vegas, and a 33.33% capture rate of Las 

Vegas bound travelers by DesertXpress to calculate the loss of $91,666,667 in sales by Barstow. 

It was demonstrated and documented, as summarized above, that in all three of the calculations 

used to determine that figure were invalid. 

Are the Husing Study’s Direct, Indirect & Induced Impacts of Lost Retail Activity Too 

Low? No. 

Once the level of decline in Barstow’s retail activity is determined, the full economic impact of 

the DesertXpress diversion of travelers is simply a matter of running models like IMPLAN to 

ascertain the direct, indirect and induced effect of this occurring. In doing so, this report 

calculated a revised loss of 511 direct jobs, 90 indirect and induced jobs and a total loss of 600 

jobs (rounding error eliminated). This is the result of DesertXpress causing $36,875,921 in 

retail sales declines in the city. 

The Barbieri Commentary arrived at a 1,981 job loss figure based upon the inflated estimate that 

DesertXpress would reduce retail spending in the city by $91,666,667. While the 600 job loss 

will be harmful, it is not of the order of magnitude of a 1,981 job loss. 

What are the sales tax revenue losses due to the loss of retail sales from DesertXpress? 

If Barstow loses $36,875,921 in retail sales, there will be a direct loss of $368,759 in sales tax 

revenue. Another $94,315 will be lost as the general economy slows due to the reduction of 

monies flowing through it. The combined loss would be $463,075 or a loss of 8.9% of the 

$5,231,016 in retail sales tax revenue in 2009. By contrast, using the Barbieri Commentary’s 

inordinately high input of lost sales, the degree of diversion to DesertXpress was estimated at 

$1,177,693 or 22.5% of the city’s sales tax revenue. 

Will the operation of DesertXpress cause Barstow to be headed for a long term decline? 

No. 

The Barbieri Commentary attempts to make the point that declines in the employment base of 

Barstow will lead to a long term permanent decline in the prosperity of the community. The 

logic of that position rests on the assumption that the Barstow area is a remote, stand-alone 

community with an economy separated from the balance of the High Desert. The Barbieri 

Commentary argued that the Barstow area’s economy must expand internally or it will fail. 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 3 

That contention is demonstrably untrue since 32% of the city’s workers currently commute over 

30 minutes to their jobs and 30% were doing so in 2000. This commuting pattern means that 

Barstow’s economic health is not self-propelling but rather has become increasingly tied to the 

economic health of the balance of the High Desert, including Victorville, where one terminal for 

DesertXpress is proposed to be located. There is no reason to believe that long term job creation 

in the Victor Valley will not support residents in Barstow, if local job opportunities become an 

issue. Besides, in the last decade, when the Barstow economy was booming and when it was 

not, its population included a large share of residents on social security income or public 

assistance. Neither of these flows of funds are generated by its local employment. 

Does the operation of DesertXpress condemn Barstow to a future with a declining 

population and permanent housing difficulties and related physical and social blight? No. 

There is no necessary relationship been the level of population in Barstow, the success of its 

housing markets and the potential operation of DesertXpress. This is the case since the city’s 

economy is and has been tied into the High Desert economy by commuters. It has also been 

inordinately and historically propped up by retirees and people on public assistance. 

In fact, a close look at Barstow’s housing data strongly suggest that Barstow’s housing market is 

driven by the same forces affecting the wider High Desert market. When the general market 

accelerated, so did new and existing sales in Barstow. When it decelerated, the same occurred. 

Prices in Barstow followed a similar pattern and mimicked those for the full High Desert market. 

Significantly, these changes in the Barstow housing market occurred during a period when the 

Barstow markets employment was essentially static. 

What the data strongly suggests is that Barstow has assumed the role as the affordable housing 

alternative within the High Desert. This is the role historically played by somewhat more distant 

locations, when a new market, in this case the Victor Valley, suddenly becomes a center of 

intense real estate activity. Thus, it is Barstow’s lower relative prices as well as overall housing 

market conditions in the High Desert, not the city’s fluctations in the employment, that have 

been governing the demand for Barstow’s housing. There is every reason to assume this will 

remain the case in the future. 

True, Barstow’s housing is facing pressure brought on by the fluctuations in the housing market 

in the Inland Empire and the High Desert. In this, however, it is not unique. These pressures 

will end when the mortgage crisis is resolved and the market can return to its natural rhythms. 

Forecasts by several economists put that in the 2015-2016 time frame, four to five years in the 

future. In the meantime, the community will be experiencing issues related to physical blight 

that accompany a housing market that is in trouble. Meanwhile, since Barstow is not an isolated 

market from a housing or jobs standpoint, employment in it, as affected by DesertXpress or any 

other single activity, will not be the determining variable as to the long term success of the city’s 

housing market. In particular, by 2017, when DesertXpress reaches its full operation, any job 

losses created by it will be after the mortgage crisis has been resolved and should not impact 

physical decay in Barstow. 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 4 

Is there a relationship between crime rates in Barstow and its economic activity? No. 

One of the assertions in the Barbieri Commentary is that by negatively affecting Barstow’s 

economy, DesertXpress will negatively affect public safety. In fact, looking at data since 1993 

when the city’s crime rate peaked, there is virtually no correlation between crime rates and 

employment. For instance, two of the three lowest crime rates recorded in the city were in 2009 

and 2010 when unemployment rates in the city and the Inland Empire were at record high levels. 

Is there a relationship between economic activity and the age profile of Barstow? No. 

Another contention of the Barbieri Commentary is that Barstow is vulnerable to any fluctuations 

in its employment base because its history shows that a slow economy has caused it to become 

inordinately older with its younger, better educated workers moving away to find jobs. A look at 

the data however disproves that notion. The young adult 20-44 year old demographic included 

35% of city residents in 2000 and 36% in 2007-2009. The county average is 35%. The share of 

city residents with bachelor’s degrees and above was 9.1% in 2000 and 9.2% in 2007-2009. The 

share who have completed high school or higher levels of education was 77.6% in 2000 and 

81.1% in 2007-2009. 

Did the Husing Study over-estimate DesertXpress construction employment in Barstow? 

No. 

In looking at the 3 year construction period for DesertXpress, the Husing Study estimated that 

1,600 of the 18,361 construction jobs per year estimated by a UNLV economist to be created in 

San Bernardino County would end up in Barstow. This was based upon the Barstow area’s 

1.74% share of the county’s employment and the fact that this major construction effort would be 

near the city. This should therefore allow its workers to capture a disproportionate share of the 

jobs (8.7%). 

In reviewing the UNLV study, the Barbieri Commentary reduced the portions of the building 

effort to those functions that it felt Barstow workers would be qualified to perform and/or that 

would be undertaken in or near to the city. Given these changes, this left 12,911 jobs that could 

still be performed by city residents. Since the city area had 2,139 workers employed in affiliated 

blue collar sectors in 2008, and assuming city workers had a higher likelihood of capturing jobs 

on a nearby major project, it was argued that for 1,600 of the DesertXpress’s construction jobs to 

end up in Barstow, as estimated in the Husing Study, was still reasonable. 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 5 

Economics & Politics, Inc. 

961 Creek View Lane 

Redlands, CA 92373 

(909) 307-9444 Phone 

(909) 748-0620 FAX 

john@johnhusing.com

www.johnhusing.com

Response to 

Barstow Analyst’s Review of December 18, 2010 Report: 

Potential Economic Impact of DesertXpress On the City of Barstow 

John E. Husing, Ph.D. 

May 28, 2011 

On May 2, 2011, Ronald Barbieri, Ph.D., CPA, a real estate economist working for the City of 

Barstow, released a commentary (Barbieri Commentary)

1

 reviewing the economic impact on 

Barstow of the proposed DesertXpress high speed rail line between Victorville and Las Vegas 

authored by this analyst (Husing Study).2 Earlier, he had authored his own report on the 

economic impact of the DesertXpress on Barstow (Barbieri Report).3

In summary, the Barbieri Commentary purports to show where the Husing Study was correct and 

where it was flawed in its analysis of the proposed high speed rail line on Barstow. Below is a 

response to that document explaining in some depth why, in fact, that the Husing Study remains 

valid. It also presents updated information confirming the validity of its key results. 

Does the Husing Study understate total Traveler Spending in Barstow? No. 

In the Husing Study, a detailed analysis is made of the sectors in which travelers overwhelming 

are likely to spend money in Barstow’s retail sectors. The city’s total retail sales in 2009 of 

$523,102,000 were shown to include $415,655,000 in these traveler-impacted sectors, including 

service stations, general merchandise, eating & drinking, food and apparel. The retail groups not 

included were those unlikely to be receiving traveler purchases. They included: vehicle sales, 

furniture, building materials, other personal services and direct sales by manufacturers and 

construction firms. 

Next, the $415,655,000 sales figure in traveler related sectors was reduced to the estimated 

$286,249,289 in purchases by travelers. To derive that figure, a detailed outline of the process 

was explained in great depth in the Husing Study.4 It relied upon U.S. Census Bureau data on 

consumption by local residents to show the extent to which they were likely to make purchases 

in the five relevant sectors. It estimated the share of that spending that residents were likely to 

make in Barstow. And, it estimated the extent to which service station sales were powered by 

interstate truckers, not private travelers. Without explanation or disagreement with the Husing 

Study’s methodology or its assumptions, the Barbieri Commentary simply assumes that the

                                                      

1 Economic Impact of the DesertXpress Project on the City of Barstow California – Part II Response To Issue 

Raised By Dr. Jon Husing Impact Study, Ronald Barbieri, Ph.D., CPA, May 2, 2010 2 Potential Economic Impact of DesertXpress On the City of Barstow, John Husing, Ph.D., December 18, 2010

3 Economic Impact of the DesertXpress Project on the City of Barstow California, Ronald Barbieri, Ph.D., CPA, 

October 14, 2010

4

Husing Study, Appendix A
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 6 

Husing Study’s work was not as accurate as the Barbieri Report’s prior determination of a 

$295,600,000 figure. At the least some explanation of why the Barbieri Commentary felt its own 

methodology was superior should have been offered. Without doing so, the Barbieri 

Commentary introduces an unsupported $9,350,711 upward bias into all of its later calculations. 

Conclusion: There is no basis offered in the Barbieri Commentary for changing the 

Husing Study’s $286,249,289 figure for total sales to travelers moving through Barstow. 

Does the Husing Study underestimate Las Vegas traveler spending? No. 

Next, the Barbieri Commentary argues that Caltrans “average daily trip counts” figure should not 

be used in the Husing Study to estimate the travelers going north and south on the I-15 involving 

a Las Vegas destination. Instead, it contends that higher average trip counts based upon 

“weekend traffic levels” should be used.5

 This argument implicitly assumes that the Husing 

Study used a daily average that did not allow for the higher weekend traffic levels. That is, in 

fact, untrue as it misses a major definitional point with regards to the Caltrans data analyzed in 

the Husing Study. The actual measure is not average daily trip counts that somehow ignore 

weekend spiking. On the contrary, the measure is rather the Annual Average Daily Traffic 

Counts. This is an important distinction as the Caltrans measure provides a measure that 

includes both weekday and weekend traffic annualized for a year. As Caltrans explains on its 

website: 

“Annual average daily traffic is the total volume for the year divided by 365 days. The 

traffic count year is from October 1st through September 30th. Very few locations in 

California are actually counted continuously. Traffic Counting is generally performed by 

electronic counting instruments moved from location throughout the State in a program 

of continuous traffic count sampling. The resulting counts are adjusted to an estimate 

of annual average daily traffic by compensating for seasonal influence, weekly 

variation and other variables which may be present” (emphasis added).6

As the Barbieri Commentary states, the author spoke to a Caltrans traffic analyst who clearly 

understood that there were higher weekend than weekday traffic counts moving along the I-15 

freeway.7

 One must therefore assume that the “compensating seasonal influence and weekly 

variation” were part of the Average Annual Daily Traffic Counts calculations made by the 

agency. These were used in the Husing Study because the purpose is to measure total annual 

retail sales by travelers to Las Vegas, not total weekend sales. Since Caltrans measures total 

volume for the year on highways and divides by 365 days to get the averages, reversing their 

calculation by multiplying the resulting averages by 365 reproduces the total number of annual 

travelers moving along the I-15, the I-40 and the SR-58 used by the agency. 

                                                      

5 Barbieri Commentary, p. 10-11

6 Definition: Annual Average Daily Traffic. Traffic and Vehicle Data Systems Unit 2009 All Traffic Volumes on 

California State Highway System. http://traffic-counts.dot.ca.gov/2009all/2009TrafficVolumes.htm 7

 Barbieri Commentary, p. 10-11 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 7 

Exhibit 1.-Total Passengers Traversing Barstow on Non-Las Vegas Trips, 2009

Non-Las Vegas Trips Total Private Vehicles Passengers Per Vehicle Total Diverted Passengers 

I-40 928,834 2.20 2,043,434

SR-58 357,900 2.20 787,381

Beyond Las Vegas 1,062,818 2.46 2,614,533

Total 2,349,553 5,445,349

 Source: CalTrans Annual Average Daily Traffic Counts, 2009 

 2.20 from National Household Travel Survey, U.S. Federal Highway Administration, 2009 

 2.46 from Desert Xpress Updated Ridership and Revenue Study, URS, December 22, 2005 

In the Husing Study, the Annual Average Daily Traffic Counts were employed to estimate that 

there were 17,638,119 total private vehicle passengers a year able to impact Bartow’s economy 

including those moving along I-15, I-40 and SR-58 and bus passengers making the trip to Las 

Vegas. Based upon the estimated $286,249,289 in total spending in the city by travelers, the 

result is an annual per capita traveler expenditure of $16.23. 

Using the Caltrans data, it was estimated that 5,445,349 passengers were either: 

 Passing through Las Vegas on north-south trips to or from locations to the east 

 Passing through Barstow as part of east-west trips along the SR-58 and/or I-40 freeways 

Dividing 5,445,349 passengers by 365, an annual average daily passenger count of 14,919

people moving in these ways was derived (Exhibit 1). That left 17,638,119 less 5,445,349 or 

11,013,344 passengers making private vehicle trips to Las Vegas. That figure times $16.23 per 

capita spending in Barstow by private vehicle travelers results in an estimate of $197,880,658 in 

annual Las Vegas traveler spending. The 5,445,349 travelers not involved with a final Las 

Vegas destination, at $16.23 each, accounted for $88,368,632 of traveler spending in Barstow. 

The Barbieri Report estimated that total private vehicle traveler sales in Barstow was a minimum 

of $275,000,000. The Barbieri Commentary defends that figure based upon using higher figures 

for Las Vegas travelers based solely on the incorrect assumption that Caltrans data did not allow 

for both weekend and weekday freeway volumes in their Average Annual Traffic Counts.8

 If 

that view was correct, the deduction for travelers not involved in a Las Vegas trip would be 

$286,249,289 less $275,000,000 or $11,249,289. Dividing that figure by the per capita spending 

level of $16.23 would result in only 693,191 annual passengers that were either passing through 

Las Vegas on trips to/from locations to the north, or passing through Barstow as part of east-west 

trips along the SR-58 and/or I-40 freeways. That result cannot possibly be accurate. For 365 

days, it amounts to an annual average daily passenger count of a minuscule 1,899 passengers in 

less than half that number of vehicles. No one who has traveled to/from areas beyond Las Vegas 

or east-west on the I-40 or SR-58 would accept that contention. 

As a result, the Husing Study’s estimate of $197,880,658 in sales to travelers involved with a Las 

Vegas destination is based upon a sound analysis of traffic flows. The Barbieri Report and 

Commentary’s estimate of $275,000,000 is 39.0% higher and cannot be justified. The Barbieri 

                                                      

8

 Barbieri Commentary, p. 12 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 8 

Report’s estimate of $275,000,000 in such sales, deducted from the previously defined figure of 

$286,249,289 in total traveler spending means 96.1% was by travelers involved with a Las 

Vegas destination. That leaves only $11.2 million (3.9%) for those passing through Las Vegas 

on trips to/from locations to the north, or passing through Barstow as part of east-west trips along 

the SR-58 and/or I-40 freeways. That is equally improbable. It contrasts with the 30.9% 

attributable to those trips in the Husing Study. 

Note: As indicated earlier, the Barbieri Commentary assumes that total traveler retail sales in 

Barstow are $295,600,000, not the $286,249,289 carefully documented in the Husing Study. If 

that contention were accurate, the calculation would be $295,600,000-$275,000,000 leaving 

$20,600,000 in spending by those passing through Las Vegas on trips to/from locations to the 

north, or passing through Barstow as part of east-west trips along the SR-58 and/or I-40 

freeways. Dividing by $16.23, this would result in 1,269,389 passengers a year making those 

trips. For 365 days per year, that means an annual daily average of 3,478 passengers and less 

than half that number of vehicles making those trips. While this is still an unrealistically low 

estimate, it highlights the risk in the Barbieri Commentary’s simply assuming $295,600,000 is 

correct without discussion of how the Barbieri Report’s methodology would be more accurate 

than that explained in calculating the Husing Study’s $286,249,289 figure. 

Conclusion: Caltrans’s work on traffic movements supports the $197,880,658 figure 

that the Husing Study indicates is appropriate for Las Vegas traveler expenditures in 

Barstow. 

Did the Husing Study Rely Upon An Unrealistically Low Estimate of Traveler Capture? 

No. 

Three studies of the capture rate by DesertXpress of the automobile travelers involved with a Las 

Vegas destination were reviewed as part of the Husing Study. These were: 

 Desert Xpress Updated Ridership and Revenue Study by URS, in 2005 

 DesertXpress Ridership & Revenue Audit, Steer Davies Gleave in 2007 

 DesertXpress Ridership Forecast Review by Cambridge Systematics in 2008. This 

FRA-directed analysis was a peer review of both the previous studies. 

The initial conclusions from URS was that with the system fully operational, the automobile 

capture rate would 20.3%. Based upon the peer review of this work, the share was lowered to 

18.3%. A telling comment in the Cambridge Systematics review of the URS work was that: 

“Like all ridership forecasts, the URS forecasts assume that the system is fully 

operational and that all travelers have knowledge of the system” (italics added).9

The 18.3% market factor was thus used in the Husing Study since that is the anticipated Las 

Vegas traveler diversion with the DesertXpress system in full operation. 

                                                      

9

 Desert Xpress Ridership Forecast Review, Cambridge Systematics, February 28, 2008, p. 25 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 9 

Another report on the DesertXpress was conducted by DMJM Harris/AECOM in 2009. Coming 

after the traffic diversion reports, this work was aimed at explaining the impact on street and 

highway facilities if the levels of automotive traveler diversion to DesertXpress occurred. This 

study conducted no independent analysis of the size of the diversion, rather it relied upon the 

work by URS as an input to their analysis of how street and freeway facilities would then be 

affected: 

“This report quantifies the potential impact of the DesertXpress project in terms of 

vehicular traffic on surrounding roadway facilities. The project represents the 

introduction of a new mode of travel in the Southern California to Las Vegas corridor. As 

such, the project will have the effect of shifting travelers from one mode to another. The 

size of these shifts have been forecast in a rail ridership report prepared for DesertXpress 

Enterprises and peer-reviewed by a firm hired by the FRA’s EIS consultant.”10

Later, DMJM Harris/AECOM goes on to summarize the diversion work of URS stating that: 

“According to the project’s ridership study (see below), the projected travel demand from 

Southern California to Las Vegas in the year 2012 will be 18.2 million trips. The study 

found that DesertXpress would potentially capture over 20 percent of the total trips 

between southern California and Las Vegas in the first full start up year.”11

This is not a statement about DMJM Harris/AECOM’s own research but rather a summary of the 

URS work. The key term in this statement is the “first full start up year.” It is important since 

the Barbieri Commentary and Report contend that this refers to the first year of the project when 

it is anticipated to only be 60% operational. The Barbieri Commentary and Report then contend 

that a 20% Las Vegas tourist capture rate at 60% of operational levels would equal a 33.33% 

capture rate when it is scaled up to 100%. In fact, the documentation shows that the URS work 

was based upon when the system is in full or 100% operation, so no scaling up is appropriate. In 

fact, given the belief by the peer reviewers that the 20.3% rate should be lowered by 10%, or to 

18.3%, only that is the appropriate capture rate. 

In the review of the Husing Study, the Barbieri Commentary defends moving up to 33.33% 

capture rate in the manner discussed above stating that: 

“It is assumed the DMJM Harris-AECOM Traffic Study represents the most objective of 

the capture rates for the DesertXpress” (italics added).12 

That is an inappropriate assumption given that DMJM Harris-AECOM conducted no 

independent analysis of automobile capture rates but rather relied on URS’s research. And, it is 

incorrect given that that neither the 20.3% rate from URS or the peer reviewed 18.3% rate should 

be scaled up since they calculated assuming the DesertXpress system would be in full or 100% 

operation. 

                                                      

10 Draft Final Report, Traffic Impact Analysis, DMJM Harris/AECOM, 2009, p. 1-3 11 DMJM Harris/AECOM, p. 2-1

12 Barbieri Commentary, p.13 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 10 

Conclusion: These factors support the use of the 18.3% traveler capture rate used in the 

Husing Study. 

Is Direct Impact of DesertXpress on Barstow’s Taxable Retail Sales by the Husing Study 

Inappropriately Low? No. 

In the Husing Study, the following calculations were made: 

 An initial total level of traveler spending in Barstow of $286,249,289. 

 Deduction from travelers not involved with a Las Vegas trip of $88,368,632 based upon 

5,445,349 travelers involved in north-south travelers involving locations beyond Las 

Vegas or traveling east-west on the I-40 and SR-58, meant total spending from Las Vegas 

related travelers of $197,800,658. 

 An 18.3% capture rate for DesertXpress combined with 11,013,344 in private vehicle 

travelers and $16.23 per capita spending figure yielded a $32,653,534 decline in retail 

spending in Barstow spending because of losses to the market. 

 URS estimated and its peer reviewers agreed there would be 1,180,227 bus travelers with 

a 22.0% capture rate for DesertXpress. With $16.23 in per capita spending that would 

add a loss of $4,222,387 in Barstow spending diverted because of bus passenger declines. 

 A total decrease in Barstow’s retail spending of $36,875,921 from the $197,800,658 base. 

In the Barbieri Commentary, the attempt is made to increase the DesertXpress diversion loss to 

$91,666,667 from Barstow’s retail activity. This is based upon assumptions refuted above: 

 $295,600,000 in total Barstow retail sales to all travelers. The lower $286,249,289 figure 

was documented in the Husing Study with no methodological or assumption based 

rationale for not using it given by the Barbieri Commentary. 

 $275,000,000 in Barstow retail spending by Las Vegas travelers based upon an incorrect 

understanding in the Barbieri Commentary of Annual Average Daily Traffic counts. 

That problem led to unreasonably low estimates of travelers driving north-south from/to 

areas beyond Las Vegas and those moving through Barstow east-west on the I-40 and 

SR-58. This meant an inappropriately low allowance for travelers from/to those areas 

and the $275,000,000 figure. As indicated, the lower $197,800,658 figure in the Husing 

Study was shown to be based on an accurate understanding of the Caltrans data, and the 

deduction of $88,368,632 in spending by non-Las Vegas travelers from the $286,249,289 

in total traveler spending in Barstow. 

 Capture rates of 33.33% not the 18.3% for automobiles and 22.0% for buses 

appropriately defined by URS and its peer reviewers. This error was based upon the 

misreading of both the importance of DMJM Harris-AECOM to estimates of diversion 

and that firm’s statement about when in the ramp up process estimates were made by 

URS. DMJM Harris-AECOM did not independently create diversion data and thus did 

not have, as assumed by the Barbieri Commentary, a “most objective” estimate of it than 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 11 

URS and its peer reviewers. Also, the work of URS and it peer reviewers was based 

upon the DesertXpress system at 100% operation, not at 60% of capacity. Thus, the 

capture rates could not be reasonably scaled up as the Barbieri Report and Commentary 

contended. 

 Using these incorrect assumptions, Barbieri Commentary estimated a loss of 33.33% 

from $275,000,000 in sales by Las Vegas bound travelers or $91,666,667. That figure is 

2.48 times the losses of $36,875,921 more accurately measured and documented in the 

Husing Study. 

Conclusion: Based upon these factors, the Husing Study’s estimate of Barstow’s retail sales 

losses of $36,875,921 a year due to DesertXpress’s diversion of travelers involved with a Las 

Vegas destination remains as the most probable estimate, given the strength of the 

information on which it is based. 

Are the Husing Study’s Direct, Indirect & Induced Impacts of Lost Retail Activity Too 

Low? No. 

Once the estimate of $36,875,921 in Barstow’s potential lost retail sales is made, the economic 

impact is simply a matter of feeding that information into models to see what the impact would 

be on various measures of economic activity in the city or its market area. The standardized 

model used by nearly every economist working on economic impact reports is the IMPLAN 

model based upon input-out data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Recently, data for 

lower levels of disaggregation of information have become available which have allowed 

IMPLAN to offer modeling down to the zip code level.13 It is therefore used with the input of 

$36,875,921 in lost Barstow sales. Contrast is made to the Barbieri Commentary’s conclusions 

using the inappropriate input of an estimated $91,666,667 in lost sales. 

Exhibit 2-Diversion By Sector & Direct Job Impact Barstow, 2009 

Sector Diversion Shares Direct Job Losses Old Model Job Losses 

Apparel $8,321,041 22.6% 152 126

General Merchandise $4,382,372 11.9% 69 71

Food Stores $1,081,978 2.9% 16 16

Eating & Drinking $6,360,482 17.2% 106 111

Service Stations $16,730,048 45.4% 167 170

Total Diversion $36,875,921 100.0% 510 501

Sources: Diversion shares from Exhibit 15, Husing initial study; Job Losses from Old & New Implan modeling for Barstow Area 

Dividing the $36,875,921 in lost Barstow sales between the traveler based sectors according to 

the overall importance of each sector to the city, and inputing that information into the revised 

IMPLAN model leads to estimates that there would be 510 direct job losses in the retail sectors, 

not the 501 estimated in the initial Husing study (Exhibit 2). In the new calculations, the 

following zip codes were aggregated to create the Barstow Area: 92310 (Fort Irwin), 92311-

                                                      

13 IMpacts for PLANning (IMPLAN), Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. v. 3.0.5.2, 2010 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 12 

92312 (Barstow & environs), 92327 (Daggett), 92342 (Helendale, Silver Lakes), 92365 

(Newberry Springs), 92398 (Yermo). 

Exhibit 3.-Full Economic Impact on Barstow Area, 2009 

 Full Economic Activity Full Jobs Impact Labor/Proprietorship Income

Type of Impact New Model Old Model New Model Old Model New Model Old Model 

Direct: 511 501 $36,225,639 $36,875,921 $17,626,673 $13,473,747

 Indirect 22 $3,124,422 $959,488

 Induced 67 $8,134,843 $2,657,247

County Secondary 90 41 $11,259,265 $4,737,938 $3,616,735 $1,819,674

City Total Impact 600 542 $47,484,904 $41,613,859 $21,243,408 $15,293,421

Source: Full Economic Impact and Job Losses from Old & New Implan modeling for Barstow Area

New lost jobs calculations raise the impact on the Barstow market from 542 to 600 of the 10,463 

jobs that existed in the area in 2009, using ES 202 data on firms in the area from the CA 

Employment Development Department (EDD). That represents a change from 5.2% to 5.7%. 

This contrasts with the 1,981 job losses estimated by the Barbieri Commentary. 

Note: The Barbieri Commentary and Report rely on data from Claritas, a private firm. 

They put total employment in the market area at 15,039 civilians. The Husing Study and 

this commentary rely on official data provided by EDD at the company and agency level. 

The EDD data are by address and come from the unemployment insurance payment 

filings of each employer in a zip code. It estimated Barstow Area employment at 10,463. 

If the loss of 600 total jobs is compared to the total 15,933 employment base used by 

Barbieri, the share would be 3.8%. On that job base, the Barbieri Commentary calculated 

a 12.4% job loss. The difference is due to Barbieri Commentary’s inappropriately high 

input of lost spending to the Barstow market, as discussed earlier. 

Using the revised IMPLAN model, the level of economic activity lost to the Barstow area goes 

from $41,613,859 to $47,484,904. That is from an IMPLAN reported level of gross product in 

the Barstow market of $1,191,500,569. This is a change from a loss of 3.5% to 4.0% of the 

economic activity in the market. 

Using the revised model, pay levels lost to workers in the Barstow market increase from 

$15,293,421 in the old modeling to-$21,243,408 in the new. This is from a total EDD reported 

payroll of $359,599,088 in 2009. That is a change from 4.3% to 5.9%. 

While the operation of DesertXpress would have some adverse impact on the Barstow market’s 

economy, it will not be of the dimensions referred to in the Barbieri Report or Commentary. 

This is the case due to that documents reliance upon faulty assumptions. Specifically: 

 There would be a loss of roughly 600 jobs, not the 1,981 predicted in the Barbieri 

Commentary. This would be a decline of 5.7% in the job base (3.8% using the Barbieri 

base) not 12.4%. 

 Economic activity would decline 4.0%. 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 13 

 Payroll would decline 5.9% 

Conclusion: While the 600 job decline would be harmful, it is not of the order of magnitude 

of the 1,981 job losses discussed in the Barbieri Commentary. 

What are the sales tax revenue losses due to the loss of retail sales from DesertXpress? 

Exhibit 4.-Sales Tax Loses, 2009 

Activity Direct Secondary Total 

Secondary Sales Tax loss $36,875,921 $9,431,549 $46,307,470 

City Tax Rate 1.0% 1.0% 1.0%

Loss of Sales Taxes $368,759 $94,315 $463,075 

Total 2009 Sales Tax Revenue $5,231,016 

Share Lost -8.9% 

A direct loss of -$36,875,92 in retail spending in Barstow, at the city’s 1% tax rate, would 

directly reduce sales tax revenue by $368,759. Based the decline of 600 jobs in the Barstow 

Market, the secondary loss to sales taxes is estimated at $9,431,549. At 1.0% that would mean a 

loss of another $94,315 in sales tax revenue to the city. The total loss to the city would be 

$463,075. Together, the operation of DesertXpress would lower the city’s sales tax revenues by 

8.9% of the $5,231,016 in 2009. By contrast, using the Barbieri Commentary’s inordinately 

high input of lost sales, the degree of diversion to DesertXpress was estimated at $1,177,693 or 

22.5% of the city’s sales tax revenue. 

Conclusion: The Barbieri Commentary’s error in calculating the level of sales lost to the 

Barstow market leads to an inappropriately extreme 22.5% estimate of the share of sales 

tax losses to the city. 

Will the operation of DesertXpress cause Barstow to be headed for a long term decline? 

No. 

The discussion of the impact of DesertXpress on the potential for a long term decline for 

Barstow must start with whether or not the city is a self-contained economy. The Barbieri 

Commentary clearly states that belief: 

“. . .the Greater Barstow area and the City of Barstow has its own employment base that 

is very isolated from the rest of the High Desert. It is not a bedroom community for the 

Los Angeles Basin or the other High Desert cities of Victorville, Apple Valley or 

Hesperia. In order for Barstow to experience growth in employment and therefore an 

increase in population and households over the next couple of decades it will be 

necessary for the Barstow area to realize a growth in Base Employment that would lead 

to an expansion of Secondary Employment” (emphasis added).14

In fact, Barstow is just 32 miles from the center of Victorville, the main employment hub of San 

Bernardino County’s High Desert. For Californians, that is a relatively short 27 minutes drive on 

desert freeways at the posted 70 miles per hour speed limit. A significant share of Barstow’s 

                                                      

14 Barbieri Commentary, p. 6-7 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 14 

workers already take advantage of this fact. Thus, the 2007-2009 American Community Survey 

found that 3,313 workers or 31% of city’s working labor force commuted 30 minutes or more to 

work putting them either in the Victor Valley (south), Fort Irwin (north) or farther away (Exhibit 

5). In addition, of the 50 cities in the Inland Empire (San Bernardino & Riverside counties, 

California), workers in 22 cities were more isolated from their jobs, with all workers in those 

cities averaging one-way commute times of over 30 minutes. 

Looking back to the 2000 Census, the data show that even a decade ago, there were 2,290 

workers driving 30 or more minutes to their jobs. They represented 30% of Barstow’s working 

residents. Though the city has grown slowly in the intervening years, the number of commuters 

working outside of it has gone faster, increasing by 1,023 or 44.7%. 

Conclusion: This commuting pattern means that Barstow’s economic health is not selfcontained but rather has become increasingly tied to the economic health of the balance 

of the High Desert, including Victorville, where one terminal for DesertXpress is 

proposed to be located. There is no reason to believe that long term job creation in the 

Victor Valley will not support residents in Barstow, if local job opportunities become an 

issue. 

Exhibit 5.-One Way Driving Time To Work 

Barstow, 2007-2009 v. 2000

2009 2000 

Less than 5 minutes 1,130 521

5 to 9 minutes 2,323 1,706

10 to 14 minutes 1,606 1,602

15 to 19 minutes 1,250 1,016

20 to 24 minutes 740 492

25 to 29 minutes 144 95

30 to 34 minutes 245 275

35 to 39 minutes 120 208

40 to 44 minutes 361 252

45 to 59 minutes 1,298 1,023

60 to 89 minutes 833 362

90 or more minutes 312 170

Total: 10,362 7,722 

30 Minutes or More 3,169 2,290 

Share leave City Area 32% 30% 

 Source: Table B08303, American Community Survey, 2007-2009, 2000 Census 

A second factor with reference to the dependence of households in Barstow on jobs within its 

immediate vicinity is the share of households on retirement income. Here, the 2007-2009 

American Community Survey found that the city had a large retirement community with over 

one in four households (26%) receiving retirement income through social security. The share 

was 25% in 2000 indicating that this has been a stable phenomenon. It is also above average for 

the Inland Empire. Of the area’s 50 cities, 29 have a smaller percent of households on social 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 15 

Exhibit 6.-Share of Households On Social Security 

Barstow 2007-2009 & 2000 

 2007-2009 2000 

Total Households 8,180 7,670 

HH with Social Secutiry 2,126 1,907 

Share 26% 25% 

 Source: American Community Survey, 2007-2009 & U.S. Census 2000 

security. The flow of funds to these retired households in Barstow will occur regardless of the 

status of the Barstow economy. 

A third factor is that historically, Barstow has always had a very large share of its population on 

some form of public assistance. In 2010, the share is unusually high at 43.0% of the population. 

However, even during the 2005-2007 boom period, the share represented over 35% of city 

residents (Exhibit 7). This situation has perpetuated itself likely because the city’s rents and 

home prices have been well below San Bernardino County general levels, attracting this 

population. 

Conclusion: In the last decade, when the Barstow economy was booming and when it 

was not, its population included a large share of residents on social security income or 

public assistance. Neither of these flows of funds are generated by its local employment. 

Does the operation of DesertXpress condemn Barstow to a future with a declining 

population and permanent housing difficulties and related physical and social blight? No. 

In the Barbieri Commentary, a good deal of discussion is developed aimed at showing that the 

advent of DesertXpress will not just lower the city’s retail sales, but also dramatically reduce its 

employment, and because it is a self-contained economy, this will inevitably lead to the city 

losing population and undergoing significant physical and social blight. However, it has been 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 16 

shown above that the level of retail sales losses, the number of job losses and the reduction in 

retail sales revenue to the local government will not approach the levels used in the Barbieri 

Commentary due to flaws in its analysis discussed earlier in great detail. 

Beyond those facts, the Barbieri Commentary’s idea that employment fluctuations will 

necessarily lead to serious problems in Barstow housing stock is dependent upon the assumption 

that the city’s economy is entirely self-contained and must expand its internal job base to 

maintain or expand its population and secure its housing market. The fact that the city is close to 

the Victor Valley and has long had a significant number and share of commuters to that area 

means that this assumption is demonstrably untrue. There is no reason job fluctuations in the 

Barstow market should not lead to somewhat high commuting to nearby employment centers, 

providing they have jobs to offer. If they do not, that cannot be attributable to the operation of 

DesertXpress which will create jobs in the Victor Valley. Beyond that, the flows of money into 

over one-quarter of Barstow’s households is from retirement income. And, somewhere between 

one-quarter and one-third of the city’s residents have long been on some form of public 

assistance. They add stability into the city’s population levels. 

Conclusion. There is no necessary relationship between the level of population in 

Barstow and the potential operation of DesertXpress since the city’s economy is and has 

been tied into the High Desert economy by commuters. It has also been inordinately and 

historically propped up by retirees and people on public assistance. 

Meanwhile, the data show that Barstow’s housing market shows a strong relationship to trends in 

the High Desert as a whole, not those in its internal job market. Employment data from EDD 

reveal that the Barstow area’s employment base has been essentially flat since at least 1991. In 

particular, through the boom (2003-2007) and bust (2008-2009) period of the housing market, 

employment in the city area market remained remarkably stable, fluctuating from a high of 

10,806 jobs in 2005, to a low of 10,292 in 2006 (Exhibit 8). 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 17 

Despite the stability of the Bartow market’s employment base, there have been significant 

fluctuations in its housing market. Existing home volume began rising in the late 1990s, 

ultimately reaching highs of 689 and 683 sales in 2004 and 2005. Volume then retreated to as 

low as 254 in 2008 before foreclosure sales brought it back to 349 in 2009 and 326 in 2010 

(Exhibit 9). 

With existing home sales soaring, developers began seeing Barstow as a potential High Desert 

affordable market alternative for the first time. New home sales, which had never exceeded 35 

sales in the proceeding 17 years, moved to 62 in 2005, jumped to 111 in 2006 and were at 56 in 

2007, before retreating to 30 in 2010 (Exhibit 10). 

Barstow’s existing and new home markets thus felt the impact of the same surge in demand for 

affordable housing demand that migrated into the whole High Desert area in the past decade. It 

also felt the effect of the bust that occurred when the mortgage crisis hit with full force. 

However, these movements were not related to its very stable internal employment levels. 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 18 

Simultaneously, in the last decade, surging demand for affordable homes caused Barstow’s 

existing home median price to soar from a very stable average of $66,605 from 1988-2004, up to 

$192,000 in 2006, before retreating to the current level at $57,500 (Exhibit 11). 

During the period from 2000-2011, these fluctuations, allbeit at higher levels, also occurred in 

the High Desert as a whole in exactly this sequence. In tracking existing home prices in both 

markets, several lessons emerge (Exhibit 12): 

 In the past decade, Barstow’s existing home prices have acted similarly to those of the 

overall High Desert, despite the stability of its employment base. 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 19 

 In the 1990s, Barstow’s existing home prices varied from $6,300 (4th qtr. 1996) to 

$38,000 (2nd qtr. 1991) above those in the High Desert as a whole. At best, it was only a 

slightly more affordable option for families seeking a better price alternative. 

 As the Southern California’s housing prices soared, those communities closer to the Los 

Angeles urban hub began feeling the force of the need for families looking for affordable 

housing to migrate to places like Victorville, Hesperia, Apple Valley, Adelanto and even 

Barstow. This surge in demand caused existing home prices in the overall market to 

surge to a high of $298,772 (2nd qtr. 2006). 

 While Barstow’s existing home prices surged as well, the differential between it and the 

overall market expanded dramatically. From 2004 to 2007, homes in Barstow were from 

$93,000 to $127,500 less expensive than those in the High Desert as a whole. 

 With prices having fallen dramatically in both the overall High Desert market and 

Barstow, the city’s prices have remained roughly $50,000 less expensive. 

 In effect, Barstow has become the High Desert’s low cost alternative for families 

wanting truly affordable homes. 

Conclusion. These data strongly suggest that Barstow’s housing market is driven by the 

same forces affecting the wider High Desert market. They also indicate that it is Barstow’s 

lower relative prices as well as overall housing market conditions in the High Desert, not the 

city’s fluctations in the employment, that have been governing the demand for Barstow’s 

housing and that there is every reason to assume this will remain the case in the future. 

In 2011, is Barstow’s housing market having great difficulties that could lead to difficulties with 

physical blight? Yes. In this respect, it mirrors the difficulties facing the entire Inland Empire, 

where CoreLogic found 48.9% of homes were underwater in December 2010. By April 2011, 

the result has been a large overhang of homes in some level of the foreclosure process. The 

share of the single family housing stock in each community in various stages of the foreclosure 

process is (Exhibit 13): 

 7.5% in Barstow 

 8.6% for the nearby Victor Valley cities (Adelanto, Apple Valley, Hesperia, Victorville) 

 6.1% for all of San Bernardino County 

Exhibit 13.-Inventory of Homes In Foreclosure Process But Not Yet Sold 

Barstow & San Bernardino County, April 2011 

Status of Homes Barstow Victor Valley San Bernardino 

Notice of Default But Not Notice of Trustee Sale 188 2,369 10,494

Notice of Trustee Sale but Not Yet Taken By Bank 78 1,764 8,812

Bank Taken But Unsold 153 2,573 10,393

Total in Foreclosure Process 419 6,706 29,699

Total Single Family Detached Homes 5,623 77,981 488,422

Percentage of SFR Homes in Foreclosure But Unsold 7.5% 8.6% 6.1%

 Source: ForeclosureRadar.com 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 20 

The current stress being experienced by Barstow’s housing stock is in line with the condition of 

both the county’s market and that of the High Desert generally. As such, the city faces the same 

issues of potential housing degradation brought on by the mortgage crisis as the market 

generally. The lack of fluctuations in the city market’s employment base underscores that the 

local job market is not the culprit. 

Would the loss of 600 jobs in 2017 fundamentally exacerbate this situation? According to recent 

forecasts by six major economists, the mortgage crisis in the Inland Empire and the recession 

felt by the region will end in 2015-2016, four to five years from now. Six years from now, when 

DesertExpress is expected to start full operations, the residential market and the economy are 

expected to have returned to normal, though with slower growth than in the last decade.15 

Housing markets in Barstow should have absorbed the mortgage difficulties and workers will 

have access to jobs in the nearby Victor Valley, if not Barstow itself. Given these forecasts, the 

expected timing of construction-related employment, and the expected timing of full operations, 

the predicted loss of 600 jobs related to DesertXpress by 2017 would not be expected to cause 

physical blight. 

Conclusion. Barstow’s housing is facing pressure brought on by the fluctuations in the 

housing market in the Inland Empire and the High Desert. In this, it is not unique. These 

pressures will end when the mortgage crisis is resolved and the market can return to its 

natural rhythms. In the meantime, the community will be experiencing issues related to 

physical blight that accompany a housing market that is in trouble. 

Looking longer term, the evidence indicates that Barstow’s housing market will return to 

being the affordable housing alternative for the High Desert, once the mortgage crisis is 

resolved. That is the role it assumed in the last housing cycle and once a Southern 

California market begins acquiring that rhythm, the forces affecting it will permanently 

change. Barstow is just one of the most recent cities to undergo this change (Yucca 

Valley near the Coachella Valley has undergone the same transition). 

Meanwhile, since Barstow is not an isolated market from a housing or jobs standpoint, 

employment in it, as affected by DesertXpress or any other single activity, will not be the 

determining variable as to the long term success of the city’s housing market. 

Is there a relationship between crime rates in Barstow and its economic activity? No. 

One measure of “blight,” is the level of crime that occurs in a community, particularly when its 

economy is struggling. At least this is the often stated belief among analysts that lack of jobs 

and crime rates are correlated with one another. With regards to the potential for DesertXpress 

to create difficulties for Barstow’s economy, the Barbieri Commentary thus states that with the 

slowdown in economic activity: 

                                                      

15 Forecasts made for the Southern California Economic Development strategy and agreed upon by Dr. Wallace 

Walrod, Ph.D., economist of Orange County Business Council; Jack Kyser, former economist of Southern 

California Economic Development Corporation; John Husing, Ph.D. Chief Economist Inland Empire Economic 

Partnership; Brad Kemp, Beacon Economics; Michael Bracken, Development Management Group. 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 21 

“It would also cause crime rates that constitute a serious threat to the public safety and 

welfare.”16

Interestingly, the Uniform Crime Reports made by Barstow’s police department to the U.S. 

Department of Justice do not agree with this supposition. Certainly, the worst two years of the 

recession for the Inland Empire were 2009 and 2010 when the region’s unemployment rate was 

among the highest in the U.S. at 13.3% and 14.5% respectively. In Barstow, the rates were 

16.0% and 17.0%. Despite these facts, the city’s crime rates per 1,000 residents at 47.9 (2009) 

and 51.4 (2010) were second and third lowest since 1993 when the rate peaked (91.0) (Exhibit 

14). They were thus below the rates during the economic boom years when they stood at 57.2 

(2005), 56.0 (2006) and 65.5 (2007). For whatever reason, economic stress and crime rates in 

Barstow have become detached. Note: this has been the case for most Inland Empire cities. 

Conclusion: Economic difficulty and high crime rates do not correlated in Barstow. 

Is there a relationship between economic activity and the age profile of Barstow? No. 

Another measure of social blight is the belief that decreases in economic activity will cause 

younger working age adults to leave a community, leaving behind a non-productive workforce. 

The Barbieri comments on this for Barstow indicating that: 

“A disproportionate share of the city’s population consists of aging baby boomers and 

retirees while there is an unusually low share of young adults.” “The city of Barstow is 

an aging, isolated and small city that has not been able to provide jobs for its children. 

                                                      

16 Barbieri Commentary, p. 34 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 22 

The younger, more educated people have relocated to other areas in search of job 

opportunities.”17

Exhibit 15.-Age Profile, Barstow 2000 & 2007-2009 and San Bernardino Co., 2009

Age Group 2000 Share Group 2007-2009 Share Group SB County Group 

0-9 3,682 17.4% 3,596 14.7% 15.9%

10-19 3,493 16.5% 34% 4,195 17.2% 32% 17.3% 33%

20-24 1,520 7.2% 1,780 7.3% 8.0%

25-34 2,640 12.5% 3,089 12.7% 13.9%

35-44 3,149 14.9% 35% 3,815 15.6% 36% 13.6% 35%

45-54 2,502 11.8% 3,289 13.5% 13.6%

55-64 1,584 7.5% 19% 2,253 9.2% 23% 9.1% 23%

65-74 1,385 6.6% 1,359 5.6% 4.9%

75 & Up 1,164 5.5% 12% 1,041 4.3% 10% 3.7% 9%

Total 21,119 100.0% 100.0% 24,417 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 

Source: U.S. Census, 2000; American Community Survey, 2009 

Again, the data do not support this view. In 2000, 35% of the city’s population was 20 to 44. In 

2007-2009, the American Community Survey found the share to have risen to 36%. In the wider 

market, San Bernardino County’s 2009 share was 35%. True, there are more aging baby 

boomers and retirees: Barstow 2000 (31%), Barstow 2007-2009 (33%) and San Bernardino 

County (32%). However, the differences are insignificant over time and with respect to the 

county. The upward movement was with respect to those under 20: Barstow 2000 (34%), 

Barstow 2007-2009 (32%) and San Bernardino County (33%). 

At the same time, the share of Barstow’s population with bachelor’s or higher degrees has never 

been high. It was 9.1% in 2000; it was at 9.2% in 2007-2009. The share with high school or 

greater schooling was 77.6% in 2000; it was 81.1% in 2007-2009 

Conclusion: There is no evidence that Barstow economic situation has caused its 

younger educated population to migrate away, leaving the city with an abnormal share of 

older residents. 

Did the Husing Study over-estimate DesertXpress construction employment in Barstow? 

No. 

In looking at the creation of construction employment during the building of DesertXpress, the 

Husing Study relied heavily on work by Thomas Carroll, Ph.D., a professor of economics at the 

University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Carroll found that in San Bernardino County, an average of 

9,461 direct jobs per year would be created for three years as well as another 8,900 indirect and 

induced jobs. Altogether, that would represent an annual average of 18,361 jobs per year for 

three years. 

In 2008, the Husing Study found that the city had 2,139 workers in blue collar sectors 

(construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, trucking, warehousing). It contended that many 

                                                      

17 Barbieri Commentary, p. 9 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 23 

of them would likely find work on a nearby project as large as the building of DesertXpress. 

Also, it should help with the city’s unemployment rate which stood at 16.5% in April 2011. 

Looking at the average of 18,361 total jobs created by DesertXpress construction activity in San 

Bernardino County, the Husing Study noted that in 2008 there were 10,463 jobs in the Barstow 

area out of a total of 600,307 in the county or 1.74%. It had earlier estimated that economic 

activity in Barstow would be 10 times more likely to create jobs in that city, giving it a share of 

17.4%. It applied half that level (5 times more likely) or 8.7% to the jobs that would be affiliated 

with nearby DesertXpress construction. The result was 18,361 x 8.7% or 1,600 jobs. 

In looking at these calculations, the Barbieri Commentary first opined that Barstow area workers 

would only be involved in track work ($1,890,041,000 budget) and the environmental work 

($242,368,000 budget), a total of $2,132,409,000 of the $3,634,787,000 allocated by Carroll to 

San Bernardino County or 58.7% of the project spending. That statement was made based on the 

assumption, without documentation, that Barstow’s workers lacked the skills to do other work 

that would be available on the DesertXpress project. Also, work that would occur at locations 

remote from the city is deducted. 

Next, the Carroll analysis allocated 80% of the track construction costs to labor ($1,512,032,800) 

and 60% of environmental mitigation costs to labor ($145,240,800), a total of $1,657,233,600 of 

the project’s estimated payroll of $2,160,318,000 or 76.7%. The Barbieri Commentary took 

issue with the 80% factor for labor cost involved with the track function. It did so with the 

caveat that this might be valid if San Bernardino County workers were involved in making the 

track and transporting it to the job. In fact, that is likely the case since the largest steel mill in the 

Western U.S. is California Steel located in Fontana. 

Exhibit 16.-Average Annual Jobs Attributable to Track & Environmental Work 

DesertXpress, Three Year Construction Period 

Job Categories Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total 

Direct Jobs 

Civil/Track Jobs 4,090 9,871 5,717 19,678 

Environmental Jobs 84 203 118 405 

Total Jobs 4,174 10,074 5,835 20,083 

Three Year Average: Direct Jobs 6,694 

Indirect Jobs

Civil/Track Jobs 3,847 9,285 5,378 18,510

Environmental Jobs 79 191 111 381

Total Jobs 3,926 9,476 5,489 18,891

Three Year Average: Indirect Jobs 6,297 

Three Year Average: Total Jobs 12,991 

 Source: DesertXpress Predicted Employment & Economic Impact Analysis Summary, 2010, p. 11-12 

Even accepting the Barbieri Commentary’s concerns about what work could be done by Barstow 

based workers, and using the Carroll analysis’s calculation of the jobs associated with only the 

track and environmental functions, then 12,991 (71%) of the 18,361 jobs from the project could 

be undertaken by Barstow’s workers (Exhibit 16). Assuming the validity of the concern that 
Husing Commentary on Barstow’s Economic Impact Commentary Page 24 

workers elsewhere, such as those at California Steel are in this mix, the fact that the Husing 

Study only allocated 1,600 of the project’s jobs to the city was well within this limit. 

However, the Barbieri Commentary also questioned the method by which the 1,600 figure was 

derived. As indicated, the Husing Study calculated that number of jobs by assuming that a 

construction project near Barstow would be five times more likely to use local workers than the 

area’s 1.74% share of overall county jobs. That meant 8.7% of the 18,361 jobs related to 

DesertXpress’s construction or 1,600 jobs would be undertaken by Barstow area workers. In the 

Husing Study, a 10 times factor had been used for the share of county jobs landing in Barstow 

because of economic activity generated by retailing (17.4%). The Barbieri Commentary’s 

criticism seemed to assume that retail data was somehow involved in the 17.4% figure. It was 

not. It was the Barstow area’s 1.74% share of San Bernardino County that was at the base of this 

calculation with a 10 times factor used to put jobs and activity into the Barstow area. In fact, the 

analysis for this report showed that this led to an underestimate of the local impact of retailing 

(see Exhibit 3 discussion on page 8). 

Another way to come up with a factor is to look at the share of San Bernardino County’s 

personal income that is within the Barstow area. In 2009, it was $1,716,387,000 of the county’s 

$59,097,550,000 or 2.9%. If the construction activity was three times more likely to put income 

into the Barstow area, that would also yield the same 8.7% factor and 1,600 jobs. 

In any case, with a major construction project occurring in and near Barstow, it does not seem 

unreasonable to assume that 1,600 of the 12,911 jobs being created in San Bernardino County in 

functions for which the Barbieri Commentary found local residents were competent would go to 

them or 12.3%. This is especially the case given the high unemployment rate and the fact that 

2,139 local workers were doing related types of work in 2008. 

The Barbieri Commentary raises a last issue in that federal construction projects require union 

workers for most blue collar functions. Without documentation, the statement is made that, 

“Barstow does not have a high percentage of union employees.”18 Whether or not this is true, 

and whether it would inhibit participation in the DesertXpress project is pure speculation as no 

data appears to exist. 

Conclusion. The Husing Study’s conclusion that the building of DesertXpress would 

lead to an annual average of 1,600 construction jobs in the Barstow area over a period of 

three years, appears to be reasonable. This is the case when allowances are made for the 

concern in the Barbieri Commentary that local residents are only qualified to undertake 

work on a limited number of activities that will happen in San Bernardino County, or that 

those activities would be located at some distance from Barstow. 

                                                      

18 Barbieri Commentary, p. 36