IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-30768

(Summary Calendar)

PHILL J. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY former entity

of The Liberty Mutual Group

EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU former entity

of The Liberty Mutual Group

EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU, A MUTUAL CO.,

formerly known as Employers Insurance Company of Wausau

EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF WAUSAU

entity of Liberty Mutual Group, Inc.

LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP, INC. formerly known as

the Liberty Mutual Group

UNKNOWN NAME OF MANUFACTURER OF THE BOOTHSEAT & INSURER,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(6:04-CV-358-TLM-MEM)

Before WIENER, BENAVIDES, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## F I L E D

April 7, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the cour t has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

2 PER CURIAM: *

Plaint iff Phi ll Williams appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his action for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On January 6, 2000, Phill Williams (Williams) was a customer in a Church’s Fried Chicken

restaurant (Church’s) in New Iberia, Loui siana. Williams alleges that the booth seat he was

occupying gave way causing him serious injuries. Williams brought suit in the 16th Judicial District

Court, Parish of Iberia, State of Louisiana, aga inst Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. and Church’s,

alleging c laims o f negligence. Williams’ attorney subsequently withdrew from the case and he

proceeded, as he does here, pro se

. The state court granted the defendants’ mo tion for directed

verdict and dismissed the suit with prejudice. Williams appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court

of Ap peals. The st ate appellate court affirmed the judgement. Williams’ application for writ of

certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court was denied. His application for writ of certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court was defective and therefore, the writ could not be granted.

On February 2, 2004, Williams filed this suit in the United States Distric t Court f or the

Western District of

Louisiana against the alleged insurers of Church’s, an employee of one of the

insurers, employees of Church’s, attorney s who represented the defendants in the state court action,

a private investigator hired by the defendants’ attorneys, the Louisiana Attorney General, the state

court judge, the court reporter, the Iberia Parish Clerk of Court, the clerk court deputi es, the

unknown manufacturer of the booth, and AFC Enterprises, Inc., the owner and operator of Church’s.1 In addition, Williams argues that he did not give consent for the magistrate judge to rule in

his case. Williams’ objection is meritless. A magistrate judge’s jurisdiction to hear a civil case and

enter final judgment un der 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) is subject to consent of all the parties, however, §

636(b) authorizes a magistrate judge, upon referral, to hear and determine certain matters and then

submit a recommendation to the district judge for disposition of an action. In the present case, the

3 Williams sought damages for negligence, slander, fraud, and conspiracy, as well as damages for

violations of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Louisiana tort and unfair trade practice laws,

and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 8 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq

.

Williams so ught in excess of $350,000,000.00 in damages. The magistrate judge recommended

dismissal of Williams’ suit for lack of s u bject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. The district court adopted the recommendations of the magistrate judge. Williams filed a

notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a distr ict co urt ’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Robinson v. TCI/US West Communications Inc.

, 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997). A question

abo ut subject mat t er jurisdiction may be presented at any time by any party or s ua sponte by the

court. F ED

. R. C IV P. 12(h)(3); Gaar v. Quirk , 86 F.3d 451, 453 (5th Cir. 1996).

It is difficult to parse Williams’ pro se brief and glean arguments from the averments made

within. It seems the crux of his challenge to the district court’s dismissal is his assertion that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not apply because the claims asserted in the present case are distinct

from the claims asserted in the state court; specifically, he contends that there were no federal claims

in the state co u rt. Alternatively, he seems to argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not

apply because the state court judgment was procured by fraud or misrepresentation. We find these

arguments unavailing. 1final judgment was pro perly entered by the district court based upon the recommendation of the

magistrate judge and after an independent review of the record. Williams’ consent was unnecessary.

4 It is beyond peradventure that the federal courts, save for the U.S. Supreme Court, have no

authority to review, mo dify, or reverse final judgments of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257; D istrict

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman

, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.

, 263

U.S. 413, 416 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies where the plaintiff in federal court has

been a party to a final judgment in a sta t e co urt judicial proceeding, and the plaintiff’s federal

complaint was filed subsequent to the state court judgment and is seeking in substance an appellate

review of the state judgment in federal court. E xxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544

U.S.

---, --- S. Ct.

---, 2005 WL 711586, at *7 (March 30, 2005) (limit ing the Rooker-Fel dm an

doctrine to cases in which “the losing party i n st ate court filed suit in federal court after the state

proceedings ended, complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review

and rejection of that judgment.”); J ohnson v. De Grandy , 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). T here is

no dispute that Williams was subject to the final judgment of a st ate court judicial proceedings in

which he was the losing party. He filed his federal complaint after the state proceedings ended. It

is beyond cavil that Williams is now essentially seeking an appeal from the state court judgment.

Williams’ federal complaint hinges on his assertion that he was injured due to the negligence

of AFC Enterprises (AFC), and that the Liberty Mutual Group (Liberty Mutual) concocted a scheme

to conceal Employers Insurance of Wausau (Employers Insurance) as the true insurer of AFC. First,

whether AFC’s or its employees’ negligence resulted in bodily injury to Willi ams was plainly

adjudicated in the state court and disposed of on the me rits. The gravamen of Williams’ federal

claims stem from the fraud, bad faith and conspiracy that Williams charges the Defendants engaged,2 We note that W illiams’ claims could also have been dismissed based on issue preclusion.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein

, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996) (the full faith and credit clause

requires that state court judgments be given the same preclusive effect in the federal courts as another

court in that state would give it).

3 Although Williams asks us to recognize an exception to Rooker-Feldman based on fraud,

we can not find fraud where there is only the plaint iff’s conclusory allegations a nd absolutely no

evidence to support it.

5 in concealing Employers Insurance. However, Williams asserted various claims in state court,

including fra ud, premised on the same allegation that Liberty Mutual purposefully attempted to

conceal Employers Insurance as the tr ue insurer of AFC. The arguments presented and the cases

cited here betray the similarit y between Williams’ federal claims and the state court judgment.

Because Williams, as the losing party in state court, is seeking review of matters already subject to

a final state court judgment, we find that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear his complaint. 2

Williams argues that “[t]he Defendants and Courts under Color of Law deprived the Plaint iff

due Process of Law and Equal Protection in the State and Federal Court, the Right to an Impartial

Tribunal, the Right to Confront and Cross-Examine the accusers, Right to a Fair Trail [sic] and Right

to a Fair Trial by Jury.” In order to find that he was deprived of his constitutional rights, we would

have to conclude that the D efendant s engaged in a conspiracy to commit fraud by concealing

Employers Insurance and that the state court judge erred in dismissing his claims. His constitutional

claims are clearly “inexplicably interwined” with the state court judgment. F eldman

, 460 U.S. at 482

n.16. While we appreciate that Williams feels aggrieved, he has already had his day in court and we

do not have the constitutional nor statutory authority to allow him to re-litigate the same issues here. 3

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist. , 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (“Federal Courts are not courts

of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution6

and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”).

Williams also has pending before this court a motion for judgment by default as to appellees

Church’s Fried Chicken, AFC Enterprises, Inc., Jack Wing, Thomas Burgess, Dexter Ledet, Jeanetta

Edward, Che ryl Thibodeaux, Donna Williams, Michael R. Sistrunk, Scott A. Decker, Edward P.

Landry, and Daryl Carpenter. The entry of a default judgment is committed to the discretion of the

court; a party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right. S ee Ganther v. Ingle

, 75 F.3d

207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996); Mason v. Lister

, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977). The court cannot enter

a default judgment if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. S ee Forsythe v. Saudi Arabian Airlines

, 885

F.2d 285, 288 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989) ("a party cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction by its silence.").

For the reasons already el ucidated, the district court properly found that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to consider Williams’ claims. Therefore, Williams’ mo t io n for judgment by default is

DENIED. Williams’ motion for entry of default is similarly DENIED.

Because we find that the district court lacks jurisdiction over this case, Williams’ motion for

change of venue and motion for leave of court is rendered moot.

CONCLUSION

For the fo regoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this action.