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41–928 PDF 

" ! COMMITTEE PRINT 110TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

S. PRT. 

2008

110–45 

PLAYING WITH FIRE: 

COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, AND VENEZUELA 

REPORT TO MEMBERS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 28, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

Available via World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/ 

index.html 


seneagle
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Staff Director 

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director 

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Letter of Transmittal ........................................................................................... v 

Background ........................................................................................................... 2 

Country Perspectives ........................................................................................... 4 

Colombia ............................................................................................................ 4 

The FARC at Its ‘‘Tipping-Point’’ ............................................................. 4 

The FARC’s Presence in Ecuador and Venezuela .................................. 5 

Venezuela’s Military as a Source of Instability ...................................... 5 

The GOC’s Take on the Possibility of U.S. Sanctions Against the 

Government of Venezuela ............................................................................ 6 

The Significance of the U.S.-Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement 

for Colombian Economic Stability ............................................................... 6 

Ecuador ............................................................................................................. 7 

Anger and Frustration Toward Colombia ............................................... 7 

Confronting the FARC the ‘‘Ecuadorean Way’’ ....................................... 8 

Ecuador-Colombian Border Issues ........................................................... 8 

The ‘‘Reyes Computers’’: ‘‘A Mixed Bag’’ ................................................. 9 

Analysis and Recommendations .......................................................................... 9 

APPENDIXES

Appendix I.—Resolution of the March 2008 Meeting of the Organization of 

American States (OAS) ........................................................................................ 15 

Appendix II.—Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the 

Rio Group on the Recent Events Between Ecuador and Colombia .................. 17 

Appendix III.—Report of the OAS Commission That Visited Ecuador and 

Colombia ............................................................................................................... 19 

Appendix IV.—Plan Ecuador .................................................................................. 30 

Appendix V.—FARC’s Presence on the Ecuadorean and Colombian Border ...... 45 

Appendix VI.—Permanent Ecuadorean Military Presence on the Ecuadorean 

and Colombian Border ......................................................................................... 46 

Appendix VII.—Discussions With Individuals in Ecuador and Colombia .......... 47 

(III)

(v) 

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 

UNITED STATES SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 

Washington, DC, April 28, 2008. 

DEAR COLLEAGUES: From March 18–19, 2008, I directed my senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member for 

Latin America, Carl Meacham, to visit Colombia and Ecuador to investigate their recent conflict in order to develop policy recommendations. 

On March 1, 2008, a Colombian raid on an Ecuadorean camp 

controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 

sparked the region’s worst diplomatic crisis in years, prompting Ecuador and Venezuela to send troops to their respective borders 

with Colombia. As a result of the Colombian raid, Ecuador and 

Venezuela cut ties with Colombia. However, following intense diplomatic efforts, mainly through the Organization of American 

States (OAS), both countries promised to withdraw troops and normalize relations. 

Consequently, Colombia pledged not to follow through on charges 

against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez at an international 

court for reportedly supporting the FARC, a group classified by the 

United States, Canada, the European Community and Colombia as 

a terrorist organization. But information gathered at the site of the 

raid alleges that Ecuadorean government officials were involved in 

coordination with the FARC regarding the trafficking of drugs 

through Ecuador. This information suggests that Venezuelan officials were not only involved in facilitating drug- trafficking through 

Venezuela, but that they were also in coordination with the FARC 

in efforts to overthrow the Colombian government. 

The United States is attempting to promote peace, prosperity 

and stability in the region. The robust economic relationship the 

Unites States has with all three includes the recent extension of 

the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) with Colombia and Ecuador and the important oil commerce with Venezuela. In addition, 

the United States has a strong relationship with Colombia through 

Plan Colombia and the proposed free trade agreement. 

Mr. Meacham’s report provides insight into the continuing 

sources of instability between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela 

and serious policy recommendations related to preventing future 

‘‘flare-ups’’ and promoting U.S. interests. 

I hope you find the report helpful as the U.S. Congress considers 

how to advance U.S. interests and promote peace and stability beVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:17 Apr 28, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 H:\DOCS\CARL.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
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tween these countries. I look forward to continuing to work with 

you on these issues, and I welcome any comments you may have 

on this report. 

Sincerely, 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Ranking Member, 

(1) 

1The FARC is a foreign organization that was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organizations 

(FTOs) (FARC FTO designated date: 10/8/1997; Latest designated date: 10/2/2003; EO 13224 

designation date 11/2/2001) by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our 

fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities 

and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business. Office of Counterterrorism, October 

11, 2005. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm 

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended 

1. It must be a foreign organization. 

2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) 

of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism. 

3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States. 

Legal Ramifications of Designation 

1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the 

United States to knowingly provide ‘‘material support or resources’’ to a designated FTO. 

(The term ‘‘material support or resources’’ is defined in 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(1) as ‘‘any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe-houses, 

false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal 

substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more individuals who maybe or include oneself), and 

transportation, except medicine or religious materials.’’ 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(2) provides that 

for these purposes ‘‘the term ‘training’ means instruction or teaching designed to impart a 

specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge.’’ 18 U.S.C. 2339A(b)(3) further provides that 

for these purposes the term ‘expert advice or assistance’ means advice or assistance derived 

from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.’’ 

2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible 

to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. 1182 

(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)–(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)). 

3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control 

over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession 

of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control 

of the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 

Other Effects of Designation 

1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to do 

the same. 

2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally. 

3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations. 

4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations. 

5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations. 

PLAYING WITH FIRE: 

COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, AND VENEZUELA 

From March 18-19, 2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee 

minority staff traveled to Colombia and Ecuador on an official visit 

to understand the conflict that commenced with the March 1, 2008 

raid by Colombia into Ecuador to eliminate the FARC’s1 second in 

command, Luis Edgar Devia Silva, better known by his nom de 

guerre, ‘‘Raul Reyes.’’ During this trip, staff met with senior officials of the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador and senior offiVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:17 Apr 28, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 5602 H:\DOCS\CARL.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
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2 Belligerent forces, 1907 Hague Regulations 

http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/ 

b1d1726425f6955aec125641e0038bfd6 

The qualifications of belligerents 

Article 1. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but also to militia 

and volunteercorps fulfilling the following conditions: 

1. To be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 

2. To have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; 

3. To carry arms openly; and 

4. To conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.In 

countries where militia or volunteer corps constitute the army, or form part of it, they 

are included under the denomination ‘‘army.’’ 

Art. 2. The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied, who, on the approach 

of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had 

time to organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be regarded as belligerents 

if they carry arms openly and if they respect the laws and customs of war. 

cials at the United States Embassies in those respective countries. 

(See Appendix VII). 

At the request of Senator Lugar, the purpose of the trip was to: 

• Understand the recent conflict between Colombia and Ecuador, 

and the role played by Venezuela; 

• Determine the outlook for future stability between the three 

countries, and what are the risks for another crisis; and 

• Develop policy recommendations for the United States Government (USG). 

BACKGROUND

On Saturday, March 1, 2008, Colombian Defense Minister Juan 

Santos, announced that ‘‘Raul Reyes’’ had been killed in a military 

raid led by Colombian military forces. The attack occurred in a 

guerilla camp in Ecuador, and involved both air force helicopters 

and Colombian troops fighting on Ecuadorean soil, two miles from 

the border with Colombia. 

On March 2, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez ordered the mobilization of ten tank battalions and the deployment of fighter jets 

to Venezuela’s border with Colombia. Chavez also shut down the 

Venezuelan Embassy in Colombia and threatened to cut off all 

commerce. Ecuador responded by expressing its intent to deploy 

several troop battalions to the border. 

That same day, in response to these developments, the Colombian government publicly released the contents of several documents allegedly found on laptop computers in the possession of 

‘‘Raul Reyes.’’ Among the documents found were what appear to be 

letters from Ecuador’s Minister of the Interior, Gustavo Larrea, offering logistical support to FARC commanders and discussing regional political issues. These letters appear to document a relationship between the FARC and the governments of Ecuador and Venezuela. However, it should be noted that President Correa claims 

to have dismantled 47 FARC camps inside Ecuador over the last 

year and on three occasions carried out joint operations with Colombian troops. 

President Chavez on the other hand has been unambiguous in 

his support for the FARC. Recently, President Chavez voiced his 

intention to campaign for the removal of the FARC from international terrorist lists and their reclassification to the status of 

‘‘belligerent army.’’ 2

3 

Art. 3. The armed forces of the belligerent parties may consist of combatants and noncombatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have a right to be treated as prisoners of war. 3The Rio Group is an international organization of Latin American and Caribbean states. It 

was created on 18 December 1986 in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro by means of the Declaration of Rio de Janeiro, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela (the members of the Contadora Group and the Contadora Support Group). 

To some extent it was perceived by some observers as an alternative body to the Organization 

of American States during the Cold War, since that body was dominated by the States. The Rio 

Group does not have a secretariat or permanent body, and instead relies on yearly summits of 

heads of states. Current member states are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa 

Rica, Dominican republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, 

Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 4 INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization, with 186 member countries. Created in 1923, it facilitates cross-border police co-operation, and supports and assists 

all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or combat international 

crime. INTERPOL aims to facilitate international police co-operation even where diplomatic relations do not exist between particular countries. Action is taken within the limits of existing 

laws in different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 

INTERPOL’s constitution prohibits ‘‘any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.’’ 

On March 5, the Permanent Council of the OAS agreed on a resolution approved by all 34 Member countries calling the attacks ‘‘a 

violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and 

of principles of international law’’ (See Appendix I). However, the 

resolution did not textually condemn the raid. The killing of ‘‘Raul 

Reyes’’ resulted in a series of accusations and tense diplomatic exchanges between Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa and President Chavez against Colombian President Alvaro Uribe. 

Colombian President Uribe ordered the strike into Ecuador in 

order to neutralize a high value FARC target, and safeguard the 

stability and democracy of Colombia within the context of a long 

standing war. A desire to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ecuador animated Ecuadorean President Correa’s response. 

The issue seemed to have subsided on Friday, March 7, at the 

Rio Group3 Summit in the Dominican Republic, where President 

Correa accepted the apologies of President Uribe stating: ‘‘with the 

commitment of never attacking a ‘brother country’ again and by 

asking forgiveness, we can consider the very serious incident resolved.’’ President Uribe expressed the regret of the Colombian government, but stated that it was necessary ‘‘in the fight against terrorism.’’ Subsequently, on Sunday March 9, Venezuela stated that 

diplomatic relations with Colombia would immediately normalize. 

(See Appendix II for Rio Group Summit Declaration) 

From March 9 to March 12, the Permanent Council asked that 

an OAS Commission led by OAS Secretary General Jose Miguel 

Insulza travel to Colombia, Ecuador and the site of the raid. As a 

result of the visit, President Correa said he would like to reactivate 

the Bi-national Border Commission (Combifrom) between Ecuador 

and Colombia to address border issues, and President Uribe called 

for mechanisms to enforce existing bilateral agreements. 

On March 12, in response to an invitation from the Colombian 

government, an INTERPOL4 team was placed in Bogota to review 

and assess the authenticity of the FARC files found on the laptop 

computers in the possession of ‘‘Raul Reyes.’’ The Venezuelan government called the documents ‘‘a collection of inconsistent and incomprehensible documents.’’ 

4 

5 BBC News Ecuador’s Military Chief Resigns http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7339743.stm 

6 El Ecuador presentara μ queja formal ante la OEA por las ultimas acciones del Gobierno 

Colombiano http://www.presidencia.gov.ec/noticias.asp?noid=13360 

On March 17, the OAS reconvened in an ‘‘Emergency Session’’ 

with the attendance of Foreign Ministers from member countries, 

per the March 5th Resolution to report on the OAS Commission’s 

visit to the raid site in Ecuador and to meet with Government officials in Ecuador and Colombia. The Commission concluded in a 

March 17th report that ties of trust between the two governments 

have been severely damaged. The Commission also determined that 

the Ecuadorean and Colombian versions of the raid are contradictory and that the situation in the border area between the two 

countries is complex in terms of geographical, territorial, communications and economic aspects (See Appendix III). 

On March 24, 2008, Ecuadorean Attorney General Alfredo Alvear 

confirmed that one of the bodies found on the scene of the guerilla 

camp in Ecuador belonged to Ecuadorean citizen Franklin Aisalla 

(an alleged FARC locksmith). The Ecuadorean government sought 

help from the OAS in condemning the killing. 

Though concern regarding the worth and legitimacy of the ‘‘Reyes 

Computers’’ exists, on March 17 information derived from the computers led to the recovery of more than $480,000 in clandestine 

cash apparently hidden for several years in Costa Rica; on March 

26, Colombian officials reported recovering 66 pounds of depleted 

uranium that they allege was originally acquired by the FARC. 

Juan Manuel Santos, Colombian Defense Minister, said that he expected the validation of the files to be completed by the end of 

April; ‘‘It is a great deal of information that is extremely valuable 

and important.’’ 

On April 9, Ecuadorean Defense Minister, Wellington Sandoval 

stepped down, along with the four top military commanders, after 

President Correa accused the military of aiding U.S. operations 

against FARC rebels.5

On April 14, Ecuadorean Minister of Public Administration, 

Communications and Information, Vinicio Alvarado, announced 

that a formal complaint would be filed with the OAS regarding 

statements made by Colombian officials on April 13 accusing President Correa of stopping Ecuadorean military operations against the 

FARC. The Minister said that the Ecuadorean Government found 

this to be a violation of the March 17, 2008, resolution.6 As well, 

on April 17 President Correa warned the Colombian government— 

and Colombia’s FARC rebels—to stay out of his country, saying future incursions would be considered an ‘‘act of war.’’ 

COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES

COLOMBIA

The FARC at Its ‘‘Tipping-Point’’ 

Throughout staff’s meetings, Colombian officials reiterated that 

they had accepted responsibly in their incursion into Ecuador, and 

noted that the Government of Colombia (GOC) was satisfied with 

the OAS resolution.GOC officials believe that the computers recovered at the scene of the raid provided explicit evidence of VenVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:17 Apr 28, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 5602 H:\DOCS\CARL.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
5 

ezuelan involvement with the FARC and support the contention 

that Venezuela turns a blind eye to FARC on Venezuelan soil. Furthermore, GOC officials believe that the death of ‘‘Raul Reyes’’ 

might be a critical blow to the FARC. GOC officials pointed to the 

example of Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (‘‘Shining Path’’): ‘‘When 

Abimael Guzman (Sendero Luminoso’s leader) went down, the rest 

of Sendero went down with him, over time.’’ 

Reviewing the history of Colombia’s conflict with the FARC over 

the last decade, the argument was made that FARC behavior, particularly when offered the freedom of the Demilitarized Zone 

(Despeje, in Spanish) during the 1990’s, demonstrated that the organization no longer had political legitimacy. One Colombian official noted that when the FARC was offered territory and political 

control, the group decisively chose narco-trafficking, banditry and 

violence. Since then, GOC officials assert, the gap between rhetoric 

and reality has only grown, and information acquired from the 

‘‘Reyes Computers’’ decisively proves this. 

One GOC official also expressed optimism that the ‘‘Reyes Computers’’ would continue to generate more revelations: At the time 

this quote was recorded, ‘‘Only ten percent of Reyes’ principal computer has been exploited.’’ GOC officials spoke of a tipping point 

where the cumulative blows to the FARC may lead to the implosion 

of the organization. 

More broadly, GOC officials noted that the obtained evidence of 

‘‘Reyes Computers’’ demonstrated that the FARC had developed 

broad and comfortable ties throughout Latin America and further 

afield. GOC officials were quick to point out that the information 

obtained from the ‘‘Reyes Computers’’ to date indicated that FARC 

had fraternal ties with communist parties in Brazil, Argentina, 

Mexico, Chile, and Spain, as well as longstanding and deep ties 

with President Chavez and networks of Marxists in Venezuela and 

Colombia. 

The FARC’s Presence in Ecuador and Venezuela 

Prior to the March 1, 2008 raid, GOC officials had identified 

some 32 FARC camps operating freely on Ecuadorean soil. According to Ecuadorean officials the FARC would move their camps, at 

Ecuador’s behest. GOC officials pointed out: ‘‘the real issue is not 

that ‘Raul Reyes’ was in his pajamas and not in his military fatigues when he was killed; the issue is that he felt comfortable 

enough in his Ecuadorean base to feel that he could sleep in his 

pajamas.’’ Clearly, to the GOC this feeling of FARC security in Ecuador is a real outrage. 

Regarding Venezuelan support for the FARC, GOC officials 

showed staff a map indicating FARC camps in Venezuela. The 

GOC knew that they were there, but could do nothing against 

them, GOC officials claimed. The Venezuelans are repeatedly informed by the GOC that the FARC is actively using Venezuelan 

soil; they cite Venezuelan inaction as evidence that Venezuela was 

actively supporting the FARC. 

Venezuela’s Military as a Source of Regional Instability 

The Colombian Military believes that the Venezuelan mobilization at the Colombian frontier was disorganized and inconsequenVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:17 Apr 28, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 5602 H:\DOCS\CARL.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
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7The Kilo-class Project 636 submarines are mainly intended for anti-shipping and anti-submarine operations in relatively shallow waters. Venezuela, the fourth largest arms buyer from 

Russia after China, India and Algeria, has so far purchased some $3 billion worth of arms from 

Russia, including military helicopters, Kalashnikovs and Sukhoi fighter jets. 

tial. Yet, according to a Colombian Defense Ministry official, there 

remains a risk that Venezuela will take this logistical failure as 

‘‘lessons learned’’ and improve its military to enable future action 

against Colombia. GOC officials believe that a successful Venezuelan attack on Colombia in the short term is ‘‘unimaginable.’’ 

Yet, Venezuela’s military shopping remains of deep concern to the 

GOC. The possibility that Venezuela may be seeking Man-Portable 

Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), as well as plans to purchase 

four Kilo-class Project 636 Russian diesel-electric submarines7 and 

related talks with Russian officials to purchase additional weapons 

systems could pose a threat to Colombian military superiority, according to GOC officials. 

The GOC’s Take on the Possibility of U.S. Sanctions Against the 

Government of Venezuela 

Staff relayed the increased likelihood that the impact of the information in the ‘‘Reyes Computers,’’ if certified by Interpol, is likely to be followed by pressure in the U.S. Congress for a determination by U.S. authorities that the government of Venezuela is supporting an FTO, triggering mandatory sanctions. 

GOC had an ambiguous position on any such sanctions. From the 

GOC standpoint, a decision triggering economic sanctions could severely limit Venezuelan commercial revenues, including oil, thus 

affecting Venezuela’s ability to attract funds for arms purchases. 

On the other hand, as Venezuela’s economic policies have progressively hollowed out the Venezuelan economy, and in particular its 

agriculture, GOC officials noted that Venezuela has grown into an 

enormous market for Colombia’s agricultural produce. Any broad 

economic sanctions that would inhibit Venezuela’s ability to attract 

capital would lessen Venezuela’s ability to purchase Colombian 

goods, and any reduction in Venezuela’s ability to purchase Colombian products would invariably have a negative impact on Colombia’s economy. Moreover, any broad economic sanctions against 

Venezuela might result in political pressure for the United States 

to curtail economic relations; ultimately, this would rebound to the 

detriment of the Colombian economy. 

The Significance of the U.S.-Colombian Trade Promotion Agreement 

for Colombian Economic Stability 

Colombia is highly dependent on Venezuela as an export market 

for its products. According to U.S. Embassy officials in Colombia, 

commerce between Colombia and Venezuela has returned to normal after the recent crisis between those two countries and Ecuador. The Colombian Finance Minister estimates that a complete 

shutdown of trade with Venezuela could cost 100,000 jobs. 

Venezuela is Colombia’s second-largest trading partner after the 

United States. Trade between the nations totaled $6.5 billion as of 

December 2007, according to Colombian government statistics. 

Venezuela imported $5.2 billion in goods from its neighbor, nearly 

double the 2006 amount because of high demand for ColombianVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:17 Apr 28, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 5602 H:\DOCS\CARL.TXT sfrela2 PsN: MIKEB
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8 Irregular Groups/ Irregular Forces (Rexton Kan, Paul. March 2008. Drug Intoxicated Irregular Fighters: Complications Dangers and Responses. Strategic Studies Institute http:// 

www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ 

Continued 

made vehicles, car parts and clothing. Colombia, meanwhile, purchased only $1.3 billion worth of Venezuelan goods, mostly petrochemical products and plastic goods. Venezuela currently absorbs 

some 15 percent of Colombia’s total exports and about one-third of 

its manufacturing exports. 

Venezuela is now Colombia’s single most important destination 

for non-traditional (other than commodities) exports, accounting for 

32% of such sales. Colombian exports of food to Venezuela are particularly crucial for Colombia commercially, and given price controls and shortages of many staples in Venezuela, for Venezuela as 

well. Colombian exports to the U.S. consist of mainly commodities 

and low value added products. 

In relation to the to the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion Agreement, Colombia already gets 95% access to the U.S. through the 

Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) that is subject to renewal by 

the U.S. Congress periodically. But, it is important to note that 

ratification of this agreement will not only provide an extra 5% access to the U.S. economy, once implemented, the agreement will 

eliminate tariffs on more than 80 percent of American exports of 

industrial and consumer goods immediately and 100 percent over 

time. 

The agreement will also allow for the development of a stable, 

long-term environment for broad investment opportunities that will 

provide many gains. Preeminent among these gains, this environment would help Colombia to diversify its export markets. 

ECUADOR

Anger and Frustration Toward Colombia 

According to GOE officials, the GOC had an obligation on March 

1, 2008, to notify Ecuador of its intent to raid the camp. GOE officials explained that they would not have had a problem capturing 

and extraditing Reyes to Colombia if GOC officials had requested 

it. According to GOE Military officials the Ecuadorean military was 

only minutes from capturing him last November. 

GOE military officials state that unlike Colombia, Ecuador has 

cities close to its border, including Quito, suggesting that Ecuador 

is more vulnerable to the FARC than Colombia. 

GOE officials admitted that they have lost political confidence in 

the role the United States could play in seeking the release of hostages held by the FARC. But, GOE officials noted that they remain 

interested in working for the release of all FARC-held hostages. In 

this regard, it is important to note that President Correa has called 

on the FARC to liberate all hostages without conditions. 

The GOE holds that it has been accused unfairly by the United 

States of collaborating with the FARC when it was just doing its 

part to work for the release of hostages under a ‘‘humanitarian 

mandate.’’ 

President Correa has condemned the kidnappings of what the 

GOE designates as irregular forces8 like the FARC. 

8 

Leadership of irregular group uses the promise of drugs to their fighters as a reward. 

Leadership of irregular group encourages drug use as a motivation for atrocities against 

civilians. 

Command and control of irregular troops are nearly nonexistent due to widespread drug 

use among fighters. 

The types of equipment used by irregular forces do not require a great degree of skill. 

Giving drugs to individuals coincides with the tactics employed by irregular forces. 

Over time, drug use among irregular forces generally degrades combat effectiveness and 

leads to internal division and fragmentation. 

Their members are not full-time, regularly trained military professionals. As a result, 

draftees and conscripts have sought drugs as a way to cope with an unfamiliar atmosphere 

and can behave similarly to irregular troops. 

Confronting the FARC the ‘‘Ecuadorean Way’’ 

The GOE explained that the Ecuadorean approach to dealing 

with the FARC emphasizes prevention of conflict using social and 

economic programs and a police presence. The GOE wants to invest 

in sustainable development and community policing rather than 

the military. 

The GOE believes that the police can do what is necessary to 

combat illegal activity and ensure citizen security, including dismantling the FARC. The GOE is working to increase its presence 

in the border area, including medical clinics and judicial authorities, as well as the police. The objective is to reduce incentives for 

Ecuadorean citizens in the border area to work with irregular 

forces and to build a law-abiding society. Ecuador welcomes international assistance in these areas under a policy proposal devised 

by the GOE called ‘‘Plan Ecuador’’ (See Appendix IV). 

Ecuador-Colombian Border Issues 

The GOE believes that it can control the border if the GOC does 

so as well. The GOE explained that the FARC are present in Ecuador as a result of Plan Colombia—which is forcing FARC personnel 

to flee to Ecuador—and the inability of the GOC to contain the 

FARC within its borders. 

GOE officials explained that they will never be able to make the 

border completely impassable. Yet, they were quick to point out 

that the Ecuadorean military has destroyed 47 FARC camps since 

2007. 

GOE officials emphasized that the FARC’s 32th and 48th Fronts 

are located in southern Colombia (See map, Appendix V). The GOE 

has 14 military posts in its border region; according to GOE officials Ecuador covers the area more consistently than does Colombia 

(See map, Appendix VI). 

The GOE has fought narcotics trafficking more effectively than 

has the GOC, according to GOE officials. Asked whether they 

would name the FARC a terrorist group, GOE officials offered that 

it would only make Ecuador a target. 

GOE officials explained that for years they have welcomed a 

large number of Colombian refugees. But, they have never once received compensation for their care, or for Ecuadorean properties 

that were destroyed by the Colombian military during GOC operations along the border area. Nor has the GOC conducted impartial 

investigations when Ecuadoreans are killed during these operations. According to GOE officials, their requests to the GOC on 

this subject have gone unanswered. 

9 

One Ecuadorean military official admitted that he believed that 

the FARC’s actions are ‘‘terrorist,’’ and was glad to see Reyes dead. 

This same official admitted the conflict with Colombia is painful; 

however, he asserted that ‘‘it is Colombia’s fault. A relationship of 

mutual confidence has been broken through a chain of lies,’’ he 

said. 

According to GOE officials, bilateral mechanisms like the 

Combifrom have failed, and observers representing a third party 

(e.g., Rio Group, OAS, United Nations (UN)) are needed to ensure 

the rule of law. 

According to the GOE, the origin of the problem is Colombia, 

since there are no Ecuadorean terrorists, mafias, or troops attacking Colombia. For its part, the GOE will continue its efforts to improve security, and even redouble them, while also seeking to address the causes of the conflict. 

The ‘‘Reyes Computers’’: ‘‘A Mixed Bag’’ 

Going forward, GOE officials stated that they would have confidence in the documents ‘‘allegedly contained in ‘Reyes’ Computers’ 

collected during the Colombian military’s raid’’ only if they were 

analyzed by an impartial source and handled in a transparent 

manner, rather than for political ends as Colombia is doing, GOE 

officials said. 

Once the GOE has access to the information, it will investigate. 

According to GOE officials, some of the information in the computers will likely turn out to be wishful thinking on the part of the 

FARC and some will be unsubstantiated gossip or hearsay. Other 

parts, they admit, will be true. 

ANALYSIS AND RECCOMENDATIONS

A violation of the territorial integrity of a country is a very serious infraction punishable by international law. An appreciation of 

Latin American sensitivities regarding sovereignty and the history 

in which these sensitivities developed is needed to place the recent 

crisis in full context. The often visceral Latin American response to 

issues of sovereignty springs largely from the reoccurrence of border conflicts between Latin countries and past interventions from 

European powers and the United States. 

Staff believes that these attitudes serve as a backdrop for a situation that is still evolving and could escalate in the near future. In 

this regard, it is important for the United States to encourage a 

constructive regional framework that features a clear and explicit 

consensus. This consensus should unequivocally declare that the 

methods used by the FARC, and other like groups, violate both Colombia’s sovereignty and the sovereignty of other countries where 

they operate, regardless of how these groups are classified, whether 

terrorist, irregular or belligerent. 

Given that some countries view the FARC as a legitimate organization and benefit to some degree from FARC activities, finding 

agreement on such a framework presents a major challenge for the 

region. However, once the nature of FARC activities and the alleged relationships of some countries with the FARC are verified 

and exposed, it will be difficult for the complicit countries to continue to support the FARC through action or inaction. 

10 

9 Country Reports on Terrorism Released by the Office of the Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, U.S. State Department, April 30, 2007 

State Sponsors of Terrorism: Overview 

State sponsors of terrorism provide critical support to non-state terrorist groups. Without 

state sponsors, terrorist groups would have much more difficulty obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations. Most worrisome is that some of these countries also have the capability to manufacture weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) and other destabilizing technologies that could get into the hands 

of terrorists. The United States will continue to insist that these countries end the support 

they give to terrorist groups. As a result of the historic decisions taken by Libya’s leadership 

in 2003 to renounce terrorism and to abandon its WMD programs, the United States rescinded Libya’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism on June 30. Since pledging to 

renounce terrorism in 2003, Libya has cooperated closely with the United States and the 

international community on counterterrorism efforts. Sudan continued to take significant 

steps to cooperate in the War on Terror. Cuba, Iran, and Syria, however, have not renounced terrorism or made efforts to act against Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Iran and 

Syria routinely provided safe haven, substantial resources, and guidance to terrorist organizations. Venezuela was certified by the Secretary of State as ‘‘not fully cooperating’’ with 

U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The designation, included in Section 40A of the Arms Export 

Control Act, was based on a review of Venezuela’s overall efforts to fight terrorism. Effective 

October 1, the decision imposed sanctions on all commercial arms sales and transfers. It 

remains in effect until September 30, 2007, when it may be renewed by a determination 

by the Secretary. (Venezuela is the only nation certified as ‘‘not fully cooperating’’ that is 

not a state sponsor of terrorism.) 

State Sponsor: Implications 

Designating countries that repeatedly provide support for acts of international terrorism 

as state sponsors of terrorism imposes four main sets of U.S. Government sanctions: 

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales. 

2. Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification 

for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country’s military 

capability or ability to support terrorism. 

3. Prohibitions on economic assistance. 

4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including: 

Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other 

international financial institutions; 

Lifting diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil 

lawsuits in U.S. courts; 

Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terroristlisted countries; 

Denial of duty-free treatment of goods exported to the United States; 

Authority to prohibit any U.S. citizen from engaging in a financial transaction 

with a terrorist-list government without a Treasury Department license; and Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above $100,000 with companies 

controlled by terrorist-list states. 

Though there are other issues that make up the political landscape regarding this complicated situation, the chief question the 

USG may confront in the short term is: 

• If the information found by Interpol in the ‘‘Reyes Computers’’ 

is determined to be credible and verifiable, what policy tools 

will the USG use to protect USG interests and, in partnership, 

the security of individual nations at risk? 

The following are specific points that should be considered by relevant USG officials to ensure that the United States protects its interests in the region, advances regional partnership and plays a 

constructive role in creating a positive regional environment to 

minimize the possibility of crisis among Colombia, Ecuador and 

Venezuela. 

1. Considerations for Additional Sanctions on Venezuela 

Many have suggested that Venezuela be designated as a State 

Sponsor of Terrorism9 due to its support for the FARC. Should evidence of closer collaboration between the FARC and Venezuela 

11 

10 Tier 3 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) 

Pursuant to Presidential Determination (PD) 2008-4 (October 18, 2007), during fiscal year 

2008, as in prior recent fiscal years, the Government of Venezuela is ineligible for non-humanitarian, non-trade-related foreign assistance (as defined in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Div. A, P.L. 106–386), as amended) including most ESF and DA programs, and 

FMF and IMET. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are also restricted. Except under specific circumstances including anti-TIP related programs, projects addressing basic human needs or 

certain regional projects, the United States must use its ‘‘best efforts’’ to actively lobby 

against International Financial Institution (IFI) financing for Venezuela. 

Counternarcotics 

For the past three years, Venezuela has been found to have ‘‘failed demonstrably’’ during 

the previous 12 months to adhere to its obligations under international counter-narcotics 

agreements and to take certain counter-narcotics measures under Section 706 of the Foreign 

Relations Authorization Act, FY 2002–2003 (FRAA) (P.L. 107–228). This sanction applies to 

the country as a whole and not just the government. The restriction applies to most assistance under the FAA, OPIC programs, sales and financing under the Arms Export Control 

Act (AECA), agricultural commodities other than food, Export-Import Bank financing, but 

does not apply to humanitarian or counternarcotics assistance. The President has waived 

the sanctions with respect to programs to aid Venezuela’s democratic institutions. See PD 

2007-33 (September 14, 2007). 

Counterterrorism 

Venezuela was designated as ‘‘not cooperating fully’’ with U.S. antiterrorism efforts, pursuant to section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended, in both 2006 and 

2007. The certification will lapse unless renewed by May 15, 2008. Pursuant to this certification, defense articles and services may not be sold or licensed for export to Venezuela during the relevant fiscal year. Prior to this certification taking effect, the Department of State 

announced as a policy matter in August 2006 that it would deny all applications for licenses 

or for other approvals to export defense articles or services to Venezuela. 

Designations 

Certain individuals and entities with Venezuelan addresses and/or identification cards 

have been designated by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, primarily under its counter-narcotics trafficking sanctions programs. Any assets belonging to 

these individuals within U.S. jurisdiction are frozen, and transactions with these individuals 

and entities are prohibited. 

come to light from Reyes’ computer, pressure in Congress and in 

the Administration for such a shift in policy will grow. 

If events lead to this option, policymakers must ensure that the 

law is carefully and flexibly crafted to guarantee that any enhanced sanctions diminish, rather than solidify, President Chavez’s 

ability to mobilize public opinion in his favor, both in Venezuela 

and in the rest of Latin America. 

Staff strongly cautions that policymakers must be wary of the 

implications of poorly thought out sanctions which might isolate 

the United States and lessen its ability to bring about constructive 

reforms and thereby advance USG interests. 

Venezuela is currently subject to a number of legal restrictions, 

some of which create overlapping prohibitions. Some relate to the 

provision of foreign assistance, and some relate to other programs 

that do not necessarily utilize foreign assistance funds, e.g. Foreign 

Military Sales and licensing of defense articles and services (full 

list of U.S. Sanctions against Venezuela).10 Some of these provisions restrict assistance to the government of Venezuela while others restrict assistance to the country as a whole. 

Staff advises that any new sanctions regime must not impinge on 

U.S. commercial prospects in Venezuela. 

It is difficult to conjure all appropriate possibilities that exist 

within the flexible framework provided in anti-terrorism law, although we can recall that the United States has crafted targeted 

sanctions against other problematic governments employing, 

among other restrictions, sanctions that have frozen assets and 

banned the travel of prominent officials and their families. 

12 

Staff believes in this case that U.S. actions are stronger if they 

rest on the foundation of regional support. Absent such support, 

U.S. sanctions on Venezuela would be less effective. Indeed, they 

might be counter-productive. The USG has to act with care that 

other Latin American countries do not see themselves labeled unnecessarily and provocatively as supporters of terror, or the surrogates of terrorists, simply because they are carrying out their perceived national interest in maintaining relations with Venezuela. 

It is better for the United States’ long term interests in the region to be seen as respectful of the on-going process established in 

the OAS, which up to now has been beneficial in defusing tensions. 

On this occasion, rather than ‘‘speaking softly and carrying a big 

stick’’ the better posture for the USG to assume is one of speaking 

with gentle persuasion, and wise counsel, and letting those ‘‘sticks’’ 

that may need to be wielded be ones of a multi-lateral rather than 

a unilateral nature. Additional sanctions would be perceived as 

more legitimate if enacted within a multilateral framework. 

This does not mean that support for terrorism is accepted, or 

that U.S. interests should be made vulnerable to the timetable or 

whims of the collective will of Latin nations. On the contrary, if 

evidence is established of serious and substantive support for the 

FARC by the Government of Venezuela then the Government of 

Venezuela’s credibility in Latin America will be reduced. Venezuela 

will be viewed as an unreliable actor that seeks to sabotage the security interests of countries that do not share its economic paradigm, or its political views. To put it in context: Venezuela will be 

seen as infringing upon the sovereign rights of a Latin American 

neighbor, not because the U.S. says it is, but because the evidence 

proves it is. This can turn antipathy toward the USG by any single 

individual Latin American country into Latin American regional 

scrutiny of an intrusive brother country, whose government has 

proclaimed itself to be the major foe of the USG. 

In other words, if Venezuela is found to be complicit, the U.S 

would be wise to allow for the regional dynamic to take its course. 

If the U.S. reacts too strongly, attention will go from Venezuela’s 

transgressions to yet another example of ‘‘American intervention’’ 

and strong-arm tactics. 

It is in this climate that political space will open for USG input 

that seeks to engender effective multilateral action in reaction to 

any nation that contravenes U.S. national security priorities and 

the collective interests of member countries of the OAS and signatories of its Charter. 

2. Ensure that information gathered from the ‘‘Reyes Computers’’ is 

disseminated broadly and the process of how it was analyzed 

is transparent 

If the Reyes information is proven to be authentic, Latin countries will need time to examine the information with the utmost 

transparency. In this regard, the creation of an official webpage, 

associated either with Interpol, or another credible multilateral organization, could serve as the exclusive venue through which documents are made public. Information that is sensitive to the military 

should be indexed appropriately. 

13 

This information must be kept and distributed by an organization that is viewed by Latin governments and people as impartial. 

If this does not occur, the information could be regarded in some 

Latin sectors as being doctored by the United States, thus losing 

its usefulness. This could easily alienate other Latin American 

countries. Obviously, this would not be helpful for U.S interests in 

the long term. 

3. Should the ‘‘Reyes Computers’’ not yield credible and verifiable 

information that incriminates the highest ranks of the GOE the 

U.S. should work with the GOE and OAS to devise a comprehensive northern border security assistance plan for Ecuador 

perhaps as a refurbishment of ‘‘Plan Ecuador’’ 

Staff encourages the U.S. Department of State to consider advancing in conjunction and partnership with Ecuador an effort 

through the OAS for the development of a northern border multilateral security assistance program that involves support for the 

GOE’s efforts to gain control of the drug trafficking corridors of the 

country. 

If the information from the ‘‘Reyes Computers’’ is not proven to 

be credible and verifiable, and assuming affirmative acceptance by 

Ecuador, this regional initiative in support of a sovereign country 

would be an effective first collective regional reaction in recognition 

by Latin America of the danger represented by the FARC to Ecuador’s sovereignty, given the difficulty of patrolling and controlling 

the border. Necessarily this would include regional cooperative engagement for certain aspects of training and equipping Ecuador’s 

counternarcotics forces, and the provision of humanitarian assistance and development components to help Ecuador deal with Colombian refugees and others displaced by conflict in the region. 

As well, a regional assistance package should provide assistance 

to enhance Ecuadorean narcotics interdiction efforts along the border and at ports facilities. Assistance should also be considered for 

radar systems and should include support for Ecuador’s police in 

the border area, specifically for procurement and training. Funds 

should also be made available for communications equipment, as 

well as ammunition and logistical support to enhance the Ecuador 

military’s guarding of the border region. 

In addition, an OAS regional plan developed with strong acceptance and input from Ecuador and Colombia that performs the functions associated with Combifrom would be a positive development 

for the entire region, and would set an example for conflict resolution and the primacy of rule of law across Latin America. 

(15) 

A P P E N D I X 

Appendix I.—Resolution of the March 2008 Meeting of the Organization of American States 

(OAS) 

(SOURCE: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MARCH 2008)

ANNEX 1—RESOLUTION OF THE OAS 

PERMANENT COUNCIL 

OEA/SER.G 

CP/RES.930 (1632/08) 

5 MARCH 2008 

ORIGINAL: SPANISH

CP/RES. 930 (1632/08)

CONVOCATION OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION

(APPROVED AT ITS MEETING OF MARCH 5, 2008)

THE PERMANENT COUNCIL OF THE ORGANIZATION OF 

AMERICAN STATES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT: 

That the Organization of American States (OAS) is fully competent to take cognizance of deeds and events that jeopardize hemispheric peace and security; 

That the purposes of the Organization of American States include respect for the personality, sovereignty, and independence of 

states and the faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and other sources of international law; 

That Article 15 of the Charter of the Organization of American 

States establishes that ‘‘[t]he right of each State to protect itself 

and to live its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts 

against another State’’; 

That Article 19 of the Charter prescribes that ‘‘No State or group 

of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any 

reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 

State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but 

also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the 

personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements’’; 

16 

That Article 21 of the Charter emphasizes that ‘‘The territory of 

a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of 

military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another 

State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever’’; 

That the Charter of the Organization of American States stipulates, in Article 28, that ‘‘Every act of aggression by a State against 

the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or 

against the sovereignty or political independence of an American 

State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other 

American states’’; 

That the Charter of the Organization of American States reaffirms the principle that ‘‘Controversies of an international character arising between two or more American States shall be settled 

by peaceful procedures’’; and 

That ‘‘[t]o strengthen the peace and security of the continent’’ 

and ‘‘ensure the pacific settlement of disputes that may arise 

among the Member States’’ are among the essential purposes of the 

OAS Charter; 

CONSIDERING: 

That on the morning of Saturday, March 1, 2008, military forces 

and police personnel of Colombia entered the territory of Ecuador, 

in the province of Sucumbφos, without the express consent of the 

government of Ecuador to carry out an operation against members 

of an irregular group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia who were clandestinely encamped on the Ecuadorian side of the 

border; 

That that act constitutes a violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law; 

That that act has triggered a serious crisis between those two 

countries, leading to the breaking off of relations between the two 

states and grave tension in the region; 

That, pursuant to Article 84 of the Charter, one function of the 

OAS is to keep vigilance over the maintenance of friendly relations 

among the member states, using the procedures provided for in 

that Charter; and 

That this case meets the conditions for convocation of a Meeting 

of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, in light of Articles 

61 ff of the OAS Charter, 

17 

RESOLVES: 

1. To reaffirm the principle that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever. 

2. To constitute a commission, headed by the Secretary General 

and composed of four ambassadors designated by him, to visit both 

countries, traveling to the places that the parties indicate, to submit the corresponding report to the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and to propose formulas for bringing the 

two nations closer together. 

3. To convene, under the provisions of Articles 61, 62, and 63 of 

the Charter of the Organization of American States, a Meeting of 

Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to be held on Monday, 

March 17, 2008, at OAS headquarters, to examine the facts and 

make pertinent recommendations. 

(19) 

Appendix II.—Declaration of the Heads of State 

and Government of the Rio Groupon the Recent 

Events Between Ecuador and Colombia 

(FINAL REVISED VERSION, 4:50 P.M., MARCH 7, 2008)

(SOURCE: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MARCH 2008)

The Heads of State and Government of the Permanent Mechanism for Consultation and Policy Coordination—Rio Group—meeting on the occasion of the XX Summit Meeting, in Santo Domingo, 

Dominican Republic, mindful of the situation prevailing between 

Ecuador and Colombia, have decided to issue the following Declaration: 

1. The entire region views as a matter of grave concern the 

events that occurred on March 1, 2008, when military forces and 

police personnel of Colombia entered the territory of Ecuador, in 

the province of Sucumbφos, without the express consent of the Government of Ecuador, to carry out an operation against members of 

an irregular group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, 

who were clandestinely encamped on the Ecuadorian side of the 

border. 

2. We denounce this violation of the territorial integrity of Ecuador, and we therefore reaffirm that the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds. 

3. We note, with satisfaction, the full apology that President 

Alvaro Uribe offered to the Government and people of Colombia, for 

the violation on March 1, 2008, of the territory and sovereignty of 

this sister nation by Colombian security forces. 

4. We also acknowledge the pledge by President Alvaro Uribe, on 

behalf of his country, that these events will not be repeated under 

any circumstances, in compliance with Articles 19 and 21 of the 

OAS Charter. 

5. We note the President Rafael Correa’s decision to receive the 

documentation offered by President Alvaro Uribe and which would 

have been reached the Government of Colombia after the events of 

March 1, so as to enable the Ecuadorian judicial officials to investigate possible violations of national law. 

6. We also recall the principles, enshrined in international law, 

of respect for sovereignty, abstention from the threat or use of 

force, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, 

underscoring that Article 19 of the Charter of the Organization of 

American States stipulates that ‘‘[n]o State or group of States has 

the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other 

20 

form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of 

the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.’’ 

7. We reiterate our commitment to peaceful coexistence in the region, based on the fundamental precepts of international law contained in the charters of the United Nations and the Organization 

of American States, as well as in the essential purposes of the Rio 

Group, in particular the peaceful settlement of disputes and its 

commitment to the preservation of peace and the joint search for 

solutions to conflicts affecting the region. 

8. We reiterate our firm commitment to counter threats to the security of all states, arising from the action of irregular groups or 

criminal organizations, in particular those associated with drugtrafficking activities. Colombia considers these criminal organizations as terrorist. 

9. We support the resolution adopted by the Permanent Council 

of the Organization of American States on March 5, 2008. Likewise, we express our support for the Secretary General as he carries out the responsibilities assigned to him by said resolution, 

namely, to head a commission that will visit both countries, traveling to the places that the parties indicate, to submit a report on 

its observations to the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and to propose formulas for bringing the two nations 

closer together. 

10. We urge the parties involved to keep respectful channels of 

communication open and to seek formulas for easing tension. 

11. Taking into account the valuable tradition of the Rφo Group, 

as a fundamental mechanism for the promotion of understanding 

and the search for peace in our region, we express our full support 

for this effort at rapprochement. In that regard, we offer the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador the good offices of the Group 

to help bring about a satisfactory conclusion, to which end the 

Group’s Troika will pay heed to the results of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. 

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, March 7, 2008 

(21) 

Appendix III.—Report of the OAS Commission 

That Visited Ecuador and Colombia 

(SOURCE: ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, MARCH 2008)

OEA/SER.F/II.25 

RC.25/DOC. 7/08 

16 March 2008 

ORIGINAL: SPANISH

TWENTY-FIFTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION 

OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

March 17, 2008 

Washington, D.C. 

REPORT OF THE OAS COMMISSION THAT VISITED 

ECUADOR AND COLOMBIA 

I. ORIGIN AND MANDATE

By a note dated March 2, 2008, the Government of Ecuador requested that a special meeting of the OAS Permanent Council be 

convened to consider ‘‘the incursion into Ecuador of Colombian 

armed forces to conduct an operation against members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).’’ 

The OAS Permanent Council held that special meeting on March 

4 and 5, 2008. On March 5, it adopted resolution CP/RES. 930 

(1632/08), ‘‘Convocation of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers 

of Foreign Affairs and Appointment of a Commission,’’ in which it 

resolved: 

‘‘1. To reaffirm the principle that the territory of a state is 

inviolable and may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another 

State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatsoever. 

‘‘2. To constitute a commission, headed by the Secretary General and composed of four ambassadors designated by him, to 

visit both countries, traveling to the places that the parties indicate, to submit the corresponding report to the Meeting of 

Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and to propose 

formulas for bringing the two nations closer together. 

‘‘3. To convene, under the provisions of Articles 61, 62, and 

63 of the Charter of the Organization of American States, a 

Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, to be 

held on Monday, March 17, 2008, at OAS headquarters, to examine the facts and make pertinent recommendations.’’ 

[See Annex 1—OAS Permanent Council resolution CP/RES. 930 

(1632/08.] 

22 

Pursuant to operative paragraph 2 of that resolution, the OAS 

Secretary General invited the following four permanent representatives to the OAS to serve on the Commission: Ambassador Rodolfo 

Gil from Argentina, Ambassador Osmar Chohfi from Brazil, Ambassador Aristides Royo from Panama, y Ambassador Maria Zavala 

from Peru. In addition, the Ambassador from The Bahamas, 

Cornelius Smith, was part of the Commission in his capacity as 

Chair of the OAS Permanent Council. 

The Commission departed from Washington, D.C., in the early 

morning of March 9 in a Brazilian Armed Force aircraft that the 

Government of Brazil had made available for that purpose. The 

Commission began its work in Ecuador, on March 9 and 10. On 

March 10 at night it traveled to Colombia. Then, on March 12 in 

the afternoon, it set out on its return journey to Washington. As 

established in the Permanent Council resolution, the Commission 

visited the places and held the meetings proposed to it by each of 

the governments of the states concerned. 

The Commission would like to express its appreciation for the 

broad cooperation that the officials of both governments extended 

to it and for all the information provided to enable it to carry out 

its mandate. Likewise, it thanks the Governments of the Republic 

of Colombia and the Republic of Ecuador for providing the delegation with hospitality and transportation in each of the countries. 

The Commission also wishes to express its appreciation to the 

Government of Brazil for providing a Brazilian Armed Force aircraft enabling it to travel from Washington, D.C., to the capitals of 

Colombia and Ecuador and thus carry out the mission entrusted to 

it. This made it possible for the Commission to travel to both countries in accordance with its established agenda and to return to 

Washington. 

It should be mentioned that during the time period between the 

adoption of the OAS Permanent Council resolution and the start of 

the Commission’s mission, the XX Summit of the Rio Group was 

held in the Dominican Republic, on March 7, 2008. At that meeting, the Heads of State discussed tensions in the region extensively. Following that discussion, they adopted a resolution supporting the work entrusted to the Commission by the OAS [See 

Annex 2—Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the 

Rio Group on the recent events between Ecuador and Colombia]. 

It bears noting that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 

Ban Ki-moon, publicly expressed that organization’s support for the 

efforts of the OAS to bring about a rapprochement between Ecuador and Colombia. In that regard, in a press release dated March 

6, the United Nations Secretary-General extended his full support 

for the mediating efforts of the Organization of American States to 

address the crisis between Colombia and Ecuador and said that the 

resolution adopted by the OAS Permanent Council on that topic 

‘‘provides (an) impartial mechanism to clarify events and offers 

both countries a path to resolve their differences peacefully and cooperatively.’’ [See Annex 3—United Nations Press Release.] 

II. VISIT TO ECUADOR

Upon its arrival in the country, as set out in its agenda, the 

Commission met with the President of the Republic of Ecuador, 

23 

1 COMBIFRON was established on November 21, 1996, by the Ministers of National Defense 

of Ecuador and Colombia. It ‘‘coordinates, evaluates, and supervises compliance with military 

and police-related border security commitments signed by both countries, and proposes mechanisms for helping to solve problems in this area in a timely fashion and to strengthen relations 

between these institutions.’’ Statute of COMBIFRON. 

Rafael Correa; members of his cabinet; and other senior government officials. [See Annex 4—Agenda in Ecuador]. President 

Correa expressed his appreciation to the OAS and the Commission 

for the speed with which the latter had initiated its work. He explained that the incident had been resolved at the Rio Group Summit from a political point of view and that, as a result, tensions between the two governments had started to abate, even though it 

would be very difficult for him, from a personal point of view, to 

rebuild trust in his Colombian counterpart. However, he reiterated 

that it was essential to ascertain the truth about what had occurred with regard to all facets of the Colombian military incursion 

and to determine whether international humanitarian law had 

been complied with. In that connection, he emphasized that the 

Commission’s work was important because it would make it possible to verify what had happened on March 1 and, on that basis, 

to propose mechanisms or measures to avoid its recurrence in the 

future. 

President Correa raised a few specific concerns about the incident: (1) whether the bombing took place during a flyover of Ecuadorian territory; (2) what type of aircraft and technology was used 

for it; (3) how long the Colombian Air Force incursion into Ecuadorian territory lasted; (4) how the presence of Luis Edgar Devia 

Silva, alias ‘‘Raul Reyes,’’ was detected and why he was put down 

in Ecuadorian territory; (5) what the condition was of the bodies of 

the deceased members of the FARC found in the camp; and (6) as 

some of those who had died had bullet wounds in the back and had 

been shot at close range, whether the rules of international humanitarian law were obeyed. 

With regard to the operations of the Binational Border Commission between the Republic of Ecuador and the Republic of Colombia 

(COMBIFRON), President Correa expressed his strong desire to see 

that body reactivated and strengthened so that diverse border security matters could be resolved in that context.1 Lastly, a video was 

shown depicting the state of the FARC camp when the Ecuadorian 

officials and armed force officers arrived. [See Annex 6—List of documents received by the Commission]. 

After a luncheon hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, Maria Isabel Salvador, the Commission held a working 

meeting at which the following presentations were made: 

• General information on the border area, operations against irregular groups carried out by the Armed Forces of Ecuador, 

prior incursions by the Colombian Armed Forces into Ecuadorian territory: presentation by the Minister of National Defense, Mr. Wellington Sandoval 

• Military technical report on the bombing site giving detailed 

information on the locations hit by bombs and the type of 

bombs used: presentation by Air Force pilot Major Santiago 

Galarza and Air Force Technical Captain Eduardo Narvaez 

24 

• Activities conducted by the Departments of Criminology and 

Forensic Medicine of the Ecuadorian National Police with regard to the incident in the province of Sucumbios-Angostura 

sector: presentation by Lieutenant Colonel Milton Zarate of the 

National Police’s Criminology Department 

• Legal analysis of the consequences of the Colombian incursion 

into Ecuadorian territory: presentation by Minister of Foreign 

Affairs, Trade, and Integration (acting)—Jose Valencia 

Documents, which may be found in the annexes, were presented 

on all of these topics. [See Annex 6—List of documents received by 

the Commission]. 

The Commission visited the Military Hospital where the three injured women-two of them Colombian and the other Mexican-who 

had survived the attack on the camp were hospitalized, and questioned two of them. The young Mexican woman, Lucia Andrea 

Morett, was still in a state of shock and her version was very confused. The Colombian, Marta, relived with great clarity the explosions that awakened her in the middle of the night, the moment 

at which she realized she was injured, the noise and the moaning 

that she heard over a period of several hours, the arrival of the helicopters and soldiers, her encounter with them when they asked 

her about Reyes, the shooting and screaming, and the announcements that Reyes had been found. Later she heard that they had 

found a computer. The soldiers came to her assistance. First they 

told her that they would take her away and they put her on a 

stretcher, and later she felt that they had gone away. Then she 

waited for several hours, with the Mexican woman close by, until 

the Ecuadorian personnel arrived. 

At the end of the day on March 9, the Commission also met with 

Ecuadorian civil society representatives, with the participation of 

the Minister for Policy Coordination, Ricardo Patino. 

On March 10, the Commission took an Ecuadorian Air Force 

(FAE) aircraft to go to Lago Agrio (Nueva Loja) in the province of 

Sucumbios. From there it traveled by helicopter to the scene of the 

events located in the Angostura sector, 1,800 meters from the Colombian border. The Commission members went through the camp 

with Ecuadorian officials, who showed them the craters produced 

by the impact of the bombs dropped by Colombian aircraft, the 

trees with bullet marks, the locations of the Direct TV antennas, 

the different areas used by the FARC members (kitchen, sleeping 

areas, a schoolroom, power generators, a mess area, a corral, and 

dug-out pools for bathing), and the area where the bodies and injured victims were found. The camp is located in a remote forest 

zone, with very tall trees, dense vegetation, and no inhabited areas 

in the vicinity. According to the Minister of Defense of Ecuador, 

Wellington Sandoval, the camp was two to three months old. It accommodated some 20 to 30 people and received people who came 

from outside. AK-47 and M-16 rifles and one machine gun were 

found there. 

Before leaving the country, the Secretary General and some 

Commission members held a meeting with the Ecuadorian chapter 

of the Colombia-Ecuador Dialogue Group, sponsored by the Carter 

Center with support from UNDP. 

25 

The Commission also held a press conference for national and 

international media to inform them of the activities carried out 

during its stay in the country. That very night, the Commission 

traveled to Bogota. 

III. VISIT TO COLOMBIA

On March 11, the Commission, in keeping with its agreed agenda 

[See Annex 5—Agenda in Colombia] held a working meeting with 

officials from the Ministry of Defense and the Colombian Armed 

Forces in the Military Transport Air Command (CATAM). At that 

meeting, presentations were made on the location of radars, communications between Colombia and Ecuador at the foreign ministry 

level and COMBIFRON, and the description of Operation Phoenix 

(Operacion Fenix), which are contained in this document, and other 

information, which may be found in the respective annex. [See 

Annex 6—List of documents received by the Commission]. 

Following the presentations, the Commission departed for Puerto 

Asis in the Department of Putumayo in a Colombian Air Force aircraft. There the Commission held a brief meeting with the Government of the Department of Putumayo, with three demobilized 

FARC members and a local Teteye leader. Later on, the Commission conducted flew by helicopter over the border zone with Ecuador. During the flight, the Colombian officials indicated the location 

in Colombian territory from which, according to Colombian officials, the bombing had taken place. Later the aircraft landed in an 

area where illicit coca crops are eradicated by hand. 

The Commission then went to Puerto Ospina, located on the Colombian bank of the Putumayo River, the natural border between 

the two countries, where it held a working meeting on board the 

river patrol boat ARC ‘‘Pastrana’’ with the Colombian Government 

delegation and some of that vessel’s officers, who reported on the 

border river patrol’s activities. Upon its return to the Department 

of Putumayo, it met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Colombia, Fernando Araujo. 

On March 12, the Commission had a working breakfast with the 

President of the Republic of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe Velez, which 

was attended by cabinet members and military officers. President 

Alvaro Uribe thanked the Commission for its presence and drew attention to the support the OAS extends to the peace process in Colombia through the MAPP. He recalled that the Colombian Constitution assigned two main responsibilities to the President of the 

Republic: (1) the conduct of international relations; and (2) leadership of the Armed Forces of Colombia in order to guarantee citizen 

security. He pointed out that respect for territorial sovereignty 

must be tied to respect for citizen security. He expressed the need 

to move beyond political agreements that are necessary to ease tension between the two countries, by identifying concrete mechanisms 

that ensure that existing bilateral and cooperation agreements are 

complied with. 

Following the meeting with President Uribe, the OAS Secretary 

General and some Commission members held a brief meeting with 

members of INTERPOL who had come to Colombia at the request 

of that country’s government to conduct an expert examination of 

three computers, three USBs (portable memory), and three hard 

26 

disks, which, according to the Colombian officials, had been found 

in the FARC camp. The INTERPOL delegates, accompanied by officials from the Administrative Security Department (DAS), informed the Commission that the results of their investigation 

would be ready in late April. 

The Secretary General and some Commission members met with 

the Colombian chapter of the Colombia-Ecuador Dialogue Group, 

sponsored by the Carter Center with support from UNDP. Lastly, 

the Commission held a press conference for national and international media to inform them of the activities it carried out during its stay in the country. That same afternoon, the Commission 

began its return journey to Washington. 

IV. VERSIONS OF THE FACTS

At 00:25 hours on Saturday, March 1, 2008, Colombian planes 

bombed a FARC camp located at Angostura, in the province of 

Sucumbios, on Ecuadorian territory, 1,800 meters from the frontier 

with Colombia, which borders on the Department of Putumayo. 

The Government of Colombia indicates that the operation was 

initially planned to take place in Colombian territory because, according to intelligence information, Raul Reyes was going to be at 

that camp that night. At 22:30 hours on Friday, February 29, they 

received human intelligence information to the effect that Raul 

Reyes was at a camp located in Ecuadorian territory. For that reason they decided to carry out a dual operation on both of the identified camps. The two operations were carried out using different 

planes. During its flight over the area, the Commission was shown 

the location of the camp on Colombian territory and a map showing 

where the bombs were released [See Annex 6—List of documents 

received by the Commission]. 

The Government of Ecuador expresses doubts about the—in its 

view—very short period of time in which the Colombian authorities 

decided to carry out the operation and regards it as unlikely that 

it was done on the basis of human intelligence data because of the 

precision of the bombing. The Government of Ecuador also states 

that, according to the investigation carried out by its Air Force 

technical staff, six 500-pound GBU12 bombs were dropped by 

planes flying from South to North and four more were dropped by 

planes flying in a North-South direction, from Ecuadorian air 

space. It also points out that, judging by the remains of the bombs 

found at the camp, their delivery required advanced technology, 

which, they say, the Colombian Air Force does not possess. 

For its part, the Colombian Government maintains that 10 

bombs were dropped, which it classified as conventional. It also 

specifies that they were delivered from Colombian air space by five 

Super Tuscan aircraft and three A37 airplanes. The A37s dropped 

GPS-guided bombs, while the five Super Tuscan aircraft had sufficient technological capacity to drop bombs on targets with a 5- 

meter margin of error. The Government of Colombia adds that, 

technically, it is possible to verify the flight and delivery of the 

bombs in the information stored in radars located in Colombian 

territory and in the aircraft computers. When the Air Force operation was over, Colombian military and police flew into Ecuadorian 

territory in helicopters in order to recover the body of ‘‘Raul Reyes,’’ 

27 

which was the objective of what was called Operation Phoenix. According to what the Government of Colombia went on to say, when 

they were landing on Ecuadorian territory, the Colombian military 

clashed with some members of the FARC who had not been killed 

by the bombs. Having identified the body of ‘‘Raul Reyes,’’ they proceeded to take it to Colombian territory together with the body of 

a person who, it was presumed, could be Guillermo Enrique Torres, 

alias ‘‘Julian Conrado,’’ an assumption that was subsequently discarded. They also transferred the body of one Colombian soldier 

killed in the operation. Hours later, the Colombian military together with personnel from the Public Prosecutor’s Office examined 

the material found in the camp and the state of the people found 

there. 

According to information provided by the military authorities in 

Ecuador on March 1 at 06:15., the Colombian military authorities 

informed them that, on that same day, at 00:30 there had been a 

clash between the Colombian Armed Forces and a Colombian irregular armed group in its territory. Along those lines, President 

Correa said that he had received President Uribe’s first call informing him that this clash had taken place and that it had begun in 

Colombian territory and had been continued in Ecuadorian territory, in a what was called a ‘‘hot’’ pursuit, resulting in the deaths 

of 17 irregular forces, the wounding or capture of 11, and the death 

of one Colombian soldier. The Commander of the Fourth ‘‘Amazonas’’ Jungle Division, having received the information from the 

Colombian side, ordered Jungle Brigade No. 19 Napo to go to that 

location. Because the initially provided coordinates were incorrect, 

that Brigade took longer than expected to arrive, which it did, finally, at 13:00 hours on that day. That was when the first Ecuadorian military contingent arrived. It was followed at 17:40 hours 

by the Ecuadorian Public Prosecutor from Lago Agrio, who on 

March 3 and 4, ascertained the existence of 22 bodies, some wearing only underwear, three wounded women, and a number of rifles. 

If the two bodies found by the Colombian Army were added in, the 

total would be 24 victims. Added to this is the body buried near 

the camp found on March 7 in a state of decomposition, which, according to the forensic information available, has most likely been 

a victim of the bombing a few days earlier. [See Annex 6—List of 

documents received by the Commission]. 

The preliminary study by the National Police of Ecuador found 

that there were three sets of causes of death: 

1. From the blast of the explosions. 

2. Mixed cause of death due to the blast and to penetration (with entry and exit orifices) of bullets shot from firearms. 

3. Penetration (with entry and exit orifices) of bullets 

shot from firearms. 

The different communications exchanged by both parties between 

their government and their military officers on these facts are to 

be found in the documents delivered to the Commission and in the 

press releases issued by the two countries. 

[See Annex 6—List of documents received by the Commission]. 

28 

V. INVIOLABILITY OF THE TERRITORY

The Ecuadorian Government has asserted that Colombian troops 

entered Ecuadorian territory without its authorization. The Colombian Government acknowledges that fact. 

This incursion of military forces of one State into the territory of 

another, without authorization, violates the principle established in 

Article 21 of the OAS Charter. Article 21 states: 

The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the 

object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other 

measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by 

other means of coercion shall be recognized. 

This principle is one of the cornerstones of the international legal 

order and, in particular, the inter-American legal system, and a 

principle that from has always been indisputably linked to the 

principle of peaceful settlement of controversies between States and 

cooperation to safeguard peace, security, and development. 

Already in 1888, when the Secretary of State of the United 

States of America, invoking the authorization granted by the Senate, issued invitations to the First International Conference of 

American States, held in Washington, D.C. from 1889 to 1890, 

which later gave rise to the Pan American Union, the origin of the 

OAS, he said that one of the purposes of that Conference was to 

consider: 

First. Measures that shall tend to preserve the peace 

and promote the prosperity of the several American States. 

Seventh. An agreement upon and recommendation for 

adoption to their respective Governments of a definite plan 

of arbitration of all questions, disputes, and differences 

that may now or hereafter exist between them, to the end 

that all difficulties and disputes between such Nations 

may be peaceably settled and wars prevented. 

Thus, on April 18, 1890, the Conference adopted a resolution on 

the ‘‘Right of Conquest’’ condemning wars of conquest and affirming that the insecurity of national territory would lead fatally to 

the ruinous system of armed peace. 

From then on, the principles of territorial inviolability and peaceful settlement of disputes among American States have been the 

cementing factors that have enabled States in the Americas to preserve peace in their relations with one another like no other region 

in the world. 

To cite only one example prior to the OAS Charter, one can mention the ‘‘Convention on Rights and Duties of States,’’ adopted at 

the Seventh International Conference of American States (Montevideo, 1933). Among other principles, this Convention establishes 

that: 

Article 8—No state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another. 

Article 10—The primary interest of states is the conservation of peace. Differences of any nature which arise 

29 

between them should be settled by recognized pacific 

methods. 

Article 11—The contracting states definitely establish as 

the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which 

have been obtained by force whether this consists in the 

employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of 

military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed 

by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive 

whatever even temporarily. 

These principles were reaffirmed in 1948 when the OAS Charter 

was drafted. As in Chapter V of the OAS Charter, numerous conventions before and after that Charter referred to the obligation to 

peaceably resolve differences between States and that has been the 

path chosen by our States. 

There are also numerous agreements reaffirming the importance 

of cooperation in respecting each State’s internal legal order. To 

take just two recent examples, let us recall: 

a. Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (1997, especially its 

Articles III (Sovereignty), XIII (Exchange of Information), 

XIV (Cooperation), and XV (Exchange of experience and 

training), XVI (Technical Assistance), and XVII (Mutual 

Legal Assistance). 

b. Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (2002), 

especially its Articles 7 (Cooperation on Border Controls), 

8 (Cooperation among Law Enforcement Authorities), and 

9 (Mutual Legal Assistance). 

Finally, it is worth pointing out that Article 2.c. of the OAS 

Charter proclaims as one of the Organization’s essential purposes 

‘‘[t]o prevent possible causes of difficulties and to ensure the pacific 

settlement of disputes that may arise among the Member States.’’ 

As for universal instruments, the Charter of the United Nations 

cites among the principles governing its member states that of sovereign equality among them and the need to settle their disputes 

by peaceful means, as well as to refrain from the threat or use of 

force against the territorial integrity of any state. These principles 

were then developed in the ‘‘Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 

among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’’ (Resolution 2625 of the United Nations General Assembly in 

1970), particularly in reference to the principle of the sovereign 

equality of states, pointing out that ‘‘the territorial integrity and 

political independence of the State are inviolable.’’ 

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 

Crime (Palermo Convention) establishes, in its Article 4, that: 

1. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under 

this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles 

of sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and 

30 

that of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other 

States. 

2. Nothing in this Convention entitles a State Party to 

undertake in the territory of another State the exercise of 

jurisdiction and performance of functions that are reserved 

exclusively for the authorities of that other State by its domestic law. 

VI. CONCLUSIONS

On the morning of Saturday, March 1, 2008, military forces and 

police personnel of Colombia entered the territory of Ecuador, in 

the province of Sucumbφos, without the express consent of the Government of Ecuador to carry out an operation against members of 

an irregular group of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 

who were clandestinely encamped on the Ecuadorian side of the 

border. 

That act constitutes a violation of the sovereignty and territorial 

integrity of Ecuador and of principles of international law, as indicated in the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of 

the Rio Group on this matter and in resolution CP/RES. 930 (1632/ 

08), ‘‘Convocation of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 

Foreign Affairs and Appointment of a Commission.’’ 

At the XX Summit of the Rio Group, President Alvaro Uribe 

pledged, on behalf of his country, that these events would not be 

repeated in the future under any circumstances, in compliance with 

Articles 19 and 21 of the OAS Charter. 

Accordingly and taking into account the information that this 

Commission received from the two governments during its visit, 

the Commission has reached the following conclusions: 

1. The ties of trust between the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador have been seriously damaged. 

2. The Ecuadorian and Colombian versions of the manner in which the incursion took place are contradictory. 

3. The situation in the border area between Ecuador and 

Colombia is complex and difficult in terms of geographical 

aspects, territorial control, communications, and the economic and social situation, among other factors. 

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Operative paragraph 2 of resolution CP/RES. 930 established 

that the Commission headed by the OAS Secretary General should 

visit both countries, traveling to the places that the parties indicate, submit the corresponding report to the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and propose formulas for bringing the two nations closer together. 

Accordingly, chapters II and III of this report provide a detailed 

report on those visits. On the basis of the aforementioned conclusions, the Commission suggests or proposes the following recommendations: 

1. The restoration of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador and reactivation of existing political 

consultation mechanisms. 

31 

2. The formation of an OAS mission for follow-up on and 

verification of commitments assumed and agreements 

reached by the two countries for cooperation on border 

issues and other matters of common interest. 

3. The strengthening of border mechanisms for dialogue 

and cooperation, and study of a possible bilateral earlywarning system. 

4. The development, with the support of international organizations and entities like the IDB, the CAF (ADC), and 

the UNDP, among others, of border area cooperation and 

integration programs, including environmental projects. 

5. The provision of incentives to dialogue among civil society organizations in the two countries. 

6. The strengthening of relations among business organizations of the two countries, to identify ways to increase 

bilateral trade, including border-area trade. 

In this context, the Commission deems it especially important to develop confidence-building measures between 

the two countries by means of periodic consultations and 

meetings among officials responsible for border control and 

security. 

ANNEXES 

Annex 1.—OAS Permanent Council resolution 

Annex 2.—Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of 

the Rio Group on the recent events between Ecuador and Colombia 

Annex 3.—Press Release by the United Nations Secretary-General 

Annex 4.—Agenda in Ecuador 

Annex 5.—Agenda in Colombia 

Annex 6.—List of documents provided to the OAS Commission by 

the officials of both countries solely for the preparation of this report 

32 

Appendix IV.—Plan Ecuador 


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CarlA6.eps
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Appendix V.—FARC’s Presence on the 

Ecuadorean and Colombian Border 

Source: Ecuadorean Ministry of Defense, March 2008. 


cap6.eps
48 

Appendix VI.—Permanent Ecuadorean Military 

Presence on the Ecuadorean and Colombian 

Border 

Source: Ecuadorean Ministry of Defense, March 2008. 


cap7.eps
(49) 

Appendix VII.—Discussions With Individuals in 

Ecuador and Colombia 

ECUADOR

Ecuadorean Government Officials 

Under Secretary for Bilateral Affairs, Diego Stacy, 

Director General for North America, Santiago Chavez, Ministry 

of Foreign Affairs 

Minister of Government and Police, Fernando Bustamante 

Under Secretary General, Juan Sebastian Roldan 

Chief of Staff, David Vaca for Minister Bustamante 

Under Secretary General of Defense, Miguel Carvajal 

Under Secretary of National Defense, Jorge Pena 

Ecuadorean Opinion Leaders 

Berta Garcia, Catholic University, Military Analyst 

Cesar Montufar, Simon Bolivar Andina University, Political Analyst 

Franklin Barriga Lopez, Academic Director of Ecuadorian Institute of Studies of International Relations, Journalist 

United States Department of State, U.S. Embassy Quito, Ecuador 

Linda Jewell, U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador (DAS, POL, RA, 

MLGP, DATT) 

COLOMBIA

Colombian Government Officials 

Vice Minister of Defense, Juan Carlos Pinzon 

Brigadier General, Rafael Parra, Deputy Director, Colombian National Police 

Brigadier General, Alvaro Caro, Director Counternarcotics, Colombian National Police 

Minister of Trade, Luis Guillermo Plata 

United States Department of State, U.S. Embassy Bogota, Colombia 

William Brownfield, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia (DAS, POL, 

NAS, ECON, MLGRP, ORA, RSO) 

Æ