United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Energy and 

Natural Resources, U.S. Senate 

DEFENSE 

INFRASTRUCTURE 

Planning Efforts for the 

Proposed Military Buildup 

on Guam Are in Their Initial 

Stages, with Many 

Challenges Yet to Be 

Addressed 

Statement of Brian J. Lepore, Director 

Defense Capabilities and Management 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 2:15 p.m. EDT

Thursday, May 1, 2008

 

GAO-08-722T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 1, 2008

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE 

Planning Efforts for the Proposed Military Buildup on 

Guam Are in Their Initial Stages, with Many 

Highlights of GAO-08-722T, a testimony Challenges Yet to Be Addressed 

before the Committee on Energy and 

Natural Resources, U.S. Senate 

To reduce the burden of the U.S. 

military presence on Japanese 

communities while maintaining a 

continuing presence of U.S. forces 

in the region, in 2005 and 2006 the

U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review 

Initiative outlined the effort to

relocate American military units in 

Japan to other areas, including 

Guam. The Department of Defense 

(DOD) plans to move 8,000 Marines 

and an estimated 9,000 dependents 

from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by

the 2014 goal.

GAO was asked to discuss the 

planning effort for the buildup of

U.S. forces and facilities on Guam. 

Accordingly, this testimony 

addresses (1) DOD’s planning 

process for the military buildup on 

Guam, (2) potential challenges for 

DOD and the government of Guam 

associated with the buildup, and 

(3) the status of planning efforts by

the government of Guam to meet

infrastructure challenges caused by

the buildup. 

This testimony is based largely on

findings of a September 2007 GAO

report on DOD’s overseas master 

plans and prior work on issues 

related to the U.S. military 

presence in Okinawa. It is also 

based, in part, on preliminary 

observations from an ongoing GAO

review of DOD’s planning effort to 

address the challenges associated 

with the military buildup on Guam 

and on other GAO work on the

effects of DOD-related growth on

surrounding communities in the 

continental United States. 

GAO is not making

recommendations at this time. 

DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; however, 

many key decisions remain, such as the final size of the military population, 

which units will be stationed there, and what military facilities will be 

constructed. This part of the planning process is ongoing, along with the 

development of a required environmental impact statement, currently 

expected to be issued in 2010. However, DOD will submit budget requests for 

fiscal year 2010 prior to that date, and thus may not know the full extent of its 

facility requirements before asking Congress to provide the associated 

funding. Officials of the Navy’s Joint Guam Program Office told us that 

immediately after the environmental impact statement is completed, DOD will 

commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal discussed 

in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. However, other DOD and government 

of Guam officials believe that this is an optimistic schedule considering the 

possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the 

complexities of moving thousands of Marines and their dependents to Guam, 

and the need to obtain sufficient funding from the governments of United 

States and Japan to support the move. 

DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges 

associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DOD’s challenges 

include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such as 

mobility support and training capabilities. There are also challenges in 

addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on Guam’s community 

and civilian infrastructure. For example, according to DOD and government of 

Guam officials, Guam’s highways may be unable to bear the increase in traffic 

associated with the military buildup, its electrical system may not be adequate 

to deliver the additional energy needed, its water and wastewater treatment 

systems are already near capacity, and its solid waste facilities face capacity 

and environmental challenges even without the additional burden associated 

with the projected increase in U.S. forces and their dependents. 

The government of Guam’s efforts to plan to meet infrastructure challenges 

caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities are in the initial stages, 

and existing uncertainties associated with the military buildup contribute to 

the difficulties Guam officials face in developing precise plans. These 

challenges are somewhat analogous to challenges communities around 

continental U.S. growth bases face. Government of Guam officials recognize

that the island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand; 

however, funding sources are uncertain. These same officials are uncertain as 

to whether and to what extent the government of Guam will be able to obtain 

financial assistance for projected infrastructure demands due to the military 

buildup. In September 2007, GAO reported that most communities 

experiencing civilian and military population growth at Army installations in 

the continental United States will likely incur costs to provide adequate

schools, transportation, and other infrastructure improvements, and many of 

these communities are also seeking federal and state assistance.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on GAO-08-722T. 

For more information, contact Brian Lepore at

(202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss the planning effort

for the buildup of U.S. forces and facilities in Guam and to describe the 

associated challenges for the Department of Defense (DOD) and the local 

community in accommodating the expansion of DOD’s military presence 

on Guam. To reduce the burden of the U.S. military presence on Japanese 

communities while maintaining a continuing presence of U.S. forces in the 

region, the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative1

 established a 

framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan, including the 

relocation of American military units in Japan to other areas, including 

Guam. As a part of this initiative, DOD plans to move 8,000 Marines and 

their estimated 9,000 dependents from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam by the 

2014 goal. At the same time, the other military services are also planning to 

expand their operations and military presence on Guam. For example, the 

Navy plans to enhance its infrastructure, logistic capabilities, and 

waterfront facilities; the Air Force plans to develop a global intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen Air Force Base; 

and the Army plans to place a ballistic missile defense task force on Guam. 

As a result of these plans and the Marine Corps realignment, the total 

military buildup on Guam is estimated to cost over $13 billion and increase 

Guam’s current population of 171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active duty 

military personnel and dependents (or 14.6 percent) to 196,000. The 

government of Japan is expected to contribute about $6.1 billion toward 

the costs of the Marine Corps move, although a portion of these funds 

could be repaid over time by the U.S. government.

We have issued several reports on DOD’s integrated global presence and 

basing strategy2

 and its overseas master plans for changing U.S. military 

infrastructure overseas as required by the fiscal year 2004 Senate military 

 1

DOD officials refer to the process through which the United States and Japan negotiated 

the initiatives that realign U.S. forces in Japan as the Defense Policy Review Initiative. The 

realignment initiatives were the result of Security Consultative Committee meetings in 2005 

and 2006 between U.S. and Japan officials. The Security Consultative Committee is made 

up of the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and 

Minister of State for Defense. The committee sets overall bilateral policy regarding the 

security relationship between the United States and Japan. The results of these meetings 

established a framework for the future U.S. force structure in Japan, including the Marine

Corps move from Okinawa, Japan, to Guam. 

2

GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting Are Needed

to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture Restructuring, GAO-06-852 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2006). 

Page 1 GAO-08-722T 
construction appropriation bill report.3

 Most recently, in September 2007,

we reported on DOD’s overseas master plans for changing its 

infrastructure overseas and on the status of DOD’s planning effort and the 

challenges associated with the buildup of military forces and facilities on 

Guam.4

 In that report, we found that DOD’s planning effort for the military 

buildup on Guam was in its initial stages, with many key decisions and 

challenges yet to be addressed. Additionally, we found that the potential

effects of the increase in military forces on Guam’s infrastructure—in 

terms of population and military facilities—had not been fully addressed. 

Also, in September 2007, we reported how communities in the continental 

United States are planning and funding for infrastructure to support 

significant personnel growth in response to implementing base 

realignment and closure, overseas force rebasing, and force modularity 

actions.5

As requested, my testimony today will focus on three principal objectives. 

First, I will address DOD’s planning process for the military buildup on 

Guam. Second, I will point out potential challenges for DOD and the 

government of Guam associated with the military buildup. Third, I will 

describe the status of planning efforts by the government of Guam to 

address infrastructure challenges to the local community caused by the 

buildup of military forces and facilities. 

My testimony is based largely on findings of our September 2007 report on

DOD’s overseas master plans and information from a prior report on 

issues related to reducing the effects of the U.S. military presence in 

Okinawa.6

 My testimony is also based, in part, on preliminary observations

 3

GAO, DOD’s Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve, GAO-06-913R 

(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2006); Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master

Plans for Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas, GAO-05-680R (Washington, 

D.C.: June 27, 2005); and Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure

Costs Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans, GAO-04-609 

(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004). 

4

GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD Needs to 

Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military Buildup on Guam, 

GAO-07-1015 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2007). 

5

GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial Growth, 

GAO-07-1007 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2007). 

6

GAO, Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. Military

Presence on Okinawa, GAO/NSIAD-98-66 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 2, 1998).

Page 2 GAO-08-722T 
from our ongoing review of DOD’s overseas master plans and its planning 

effort to address the challenges associated with the military buildup on 

Guam and on two separate reports of the effects of DOD-related growth on 

surrounding communities in the continental United States.7

 As part of our 

ongoing work, we met with officials from the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, U.S. Pacific Command, Marine Forces Pacific, Third Marine 

Expeditionary Force, and the Navy’s Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO)—

the office established to plan and execute the military buildup on Guam—

to discuss the planning process for DOD’s military realignments on Guam 

and to identify challenges associated with the buildup of military forces 

and infrastructure on Guam. We also met with the Governor of Guam and 

his staff, members of the Guam legislature, staff from the office of the

Guam Delegate to the House of Representatives, and various Guam 

community groups to discuss their planning efforts and any challenges 

they may face related to the military buildup. We expect to report the 

results of our ongoing review to congressional defense committees later 

this year. We conducted this performance audit and our prior reports in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

DOD has established a framework for the military buildup on Guam; yet, 

many key decisions must still be made, such as the final size of the military 

population, which units will be stationed there, and what military facilities 

will be required. The U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative 

established a framework for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan and 

the Marine Corps realignment to Guam. The U.S. Pacific Command then 

developed the Guam Integrated Military Development Plan8

 to provide an

overview of the projected military population and infrastructure 

requirements. However, the exact size and makeup of the forces to move 

to Guam and the housing, operational, quality of life, and service support

Summary 

 7

GAO, Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road Improvements 

Surrounding Growth Installations, GAO-08-602R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2008), and

GAO-07-1007. 

8

U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan (Camp H.M. Smith,

Hawaii: July 11, 2006). 

Page 3 GAO-08-722T 
infrastructure required are not yet fully known. This part of the planning 

process is ongoing, along with the development of a required

environmental impact statement. Before JGPO can finalize its master plan 

for the military buildup on Guam, it needs to complete the required 

environmental impact statement, currently expected to be issued in 2010.

Prior to that date, DOD will submit its fiscal year 2010 budget request to 

Congress for the first phase of military construction projects on Guam. 

Thus, DOD may be asking Congress to fund the military construction 

projects without the benefit of a completed environmental impact 

statement or a final decision on the full extent of its facility and funding 

requirements. DOD officials said that the department often requests 

funding during the same period environmental impact statements are 

being developed for large projects, including major base realignments and 

closures. JGPO officials told us that immediately after the environmental 

impact statement is completed, DOD will commence construction of 

facilities in efforts to meet the 2014 goal identified in the Defense Policy 

Review Initiative. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials 

believe that this is an ambitious and optimistic schedule considering the 

possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the 

complexities of moving thousands of Marines and their dependents from 

Okinawa to Guam, and the need to obtain sufficient funding from the 

governments of United States and Japan to support the Marine Corps 

move. 

DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges 

associated with the proposed military buildup on Guam. DOD’s challenges 

include obtaining adequate funding and meeting operational needs, such 

as mobility support and training capabilities. There are also challenges in 

addressing the effects of military and civilian growth on Guam’s 

community and infrastructure. For example, according to DOD and 

government of Guam officials, Guam’s highways may be unable to bear the 

increase in traffic associated with the military buildup, its electrical 

system may not be adequate to deliver the additional energy needed, its 

water and wastewater treatment systems are already near capacity, and its

solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental challenges even 

without the additional burden associated with relocation of U.S. forces 

and their dependents. 

The government of Guam’s efforts to plan to meet infrastructure 

challenges caused by the buildup of military forces and facilities on Guam 

are in the initial stages, and existing uncertainties associated with the 

military buildup further contribute to the difficulties Guam officials face in

developing precise plans. These challenges are somewhat analogous to the 

Page 4 GAO-08-722T 
challenges communities around continental United States growth bases 

face. Furthermore, government of Guam officials stated that Guam will 

likely require significant funding to address the island’s inadequate 

infrastructure capacity; however, funding sources are uncertain. These 

same officials are uncertain as to whether and to what extent the 

government of Guam will be able to obtain financial assistance for 

projected infrastructure demands due to the military buildup. In 

September 2007, we reported that most U.S. communities surrounding 

growing Army bases have unique infrastructure improvement needs, such

as schools, transportation, and other infrastructure improvements, and 

many of these communities are also seeking state and federal assistance.9

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. military has based forces in 

Okinawa and other locations in Japan. The U.S. military occupation of 

Japan ended in 1952, but the United States administered the Ryukyu 

Islands, including Okinawa, until 1972. Efforts to address the Japanese 

population’s concerns regarding U.S. military presence in Okinawa began

more than a decade ago. One chief complaint is that the Okinawa 

prefecture hosts over half of the U.S. forces in Japan and that more than 

70 percent of the land U.S. forces utilize in Japan is on Okinawa. Many 

citizens of Okinawa believe the U.S. presence has hampered economic 

development. The public outcry in Okinawa following the September 1995 

abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three U.S. 

servicemembers brought to the forefront long-standing concerns among 

the Okinawan people about the effects of the U.S. military presence on the 

island. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, at that time, 

the continued ability of the United States to remain in Japan was at risk, 

and it was important to reduce the effects of the U.S. military presence on 

the Okinawan people. To address these concerns, bilateral negotiations 

between the United States and Japan began, and the Security Consultative 

Committee established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa in 

November 1995. The committee developed recommendations on ways to 

limit the effects of the U.S. military presence on Okinawa by closing 

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma and relocating forces from that base to 

another base on Okinawa, and recommended numerous other operational 

changes. On December 2, 1996, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, U.S. 

Ambassador to Japan, Japan Ministers of Foreign Affairs and State, and

Background 

 9

See GAO-07-1007. 

Page 5 GAO-08-722T 
the Director General of the Japan Defense Agency issued the committee’s 

final report.

In 1998, we reviewed the Special Action Committee’s Final Report.10 At 

that time, among other things, we reported that the forward deployment

on Okinawa significantly shortens transit times, thereby promoting early

arrival in potential regional trouble spots such as the Korean peninsula 

and the Taiwan straits. For example, it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean

peninsula from Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam, 

11 hours from Hawaii, and 16 hours from the continental United States. 

Similarly, it takes about 1-1/2 days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship 

to South Korea, as compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from 

Hawaii, and 17 days from the continental United States. Also, the cost of 

this presence is shared by the government of Japan, which provides land 

and other infrastructure on Okinawa rent free and pays part of the annual 

cost of Okinawa-based Marine Corps forces, such as a portion of the costs 

for utilities and local Japanese labor. Most initiatives of the Special Action 

Committee on Okinawa involving training operations, changes to the 

status of forces agreement procedures, and noise reduction were 

successfully implemented. In contrast, initiatives involving land returns 

have not been as successful, with the majority still ongoing. For example, 

the closure of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma was never completed and 

the air station remains open and operational. According to U.S. Forces 

Japan officials, these initiatives may involve multiple construction projects 

to satisfy the requirements of the initiatives as well as detailed

coordination between the government of Japan and the local communities 

to gain consensus for these projects.

In 2004, the United States and Japan began a series of sustained security 

consultations aimed at strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance to 

better address today’s rapidly changing global security environment. 

DOD’s Defense Policy Review Initiative established a framework for the 

future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to create the conditions to

reduce the burden on Japanese communities and create a continuing 

presence for U.S. forces in the Pacific theater by relocating units to other 

areas, including Guam (app. I shows the location of Guam). This initiative 

also includes a significant reduction and reorganization of the Marine 

Corps presence on Okinawa to include relocating 8,000 Marines and their 

estimated 9,000 dependents to Guam. More than 10,000 Marines and their 

 10See GAO/NSIAD-98-66. 

Page 6 GAO-08-722T 
dependents will remain stationed in Okinawa after this relocation. Another 

initiative includes the closure and replacement of Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma at a less densely populated location on Okinawa by the 2014 goal 

as a result of local concerns involving safety and noise. DOD officials view 

the success of the Futenma replacement facility as a key objective of the 

initiative that will need to be completed in order for other realignment 

actions to take place. Previously, the United States and Japan were 

unsuccessful in closing and replacing the Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma as a part of the Special Action Committee effort on Okinawa. 

Other Global Realignments In recent years, DOD has been undergoing a transformation that has been

described as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces

overseas since the end of the Korean War. The initiative is intended to 

close bases no longer needed to meet Cold War threats as well as bring 

home U.S. forces while stationing more flexible, deployable capabilities in

strategic locations around the world. As part of its transformation, DOD 

has been reexamining overseas basing requirements to allow for greater 

U.S. military flexibility to combat conventional and asymmetric threats 

worldwide. 

The Marine Corps realignment from Okinawa to Guam is just one of 

several initiatives to move military forces and equipment and construct 

supporting military facilities on Guam. In addition to the Marine Corps’ 

move to Guam, the Navy plans to enhance its infrastructure, logistic 

capabilities, and waterfront facilities to support transient nuclear aircraft 

carrier berthing, combat logistics force ships, submarines, surface 

combatants, and high-speed transport ships at Naval Base Guam. The Air 

Force plans to develop a global intelligence, surveillance, and

reconnaissance strike hub at Andersen Air Force Base by hosting various 

types of aircraft, such as fighters, bombers, and tankers, and the Global 

Hawk system, which is a high-altitude, long-endurance unmanned aerial

reconnaissance system, on both permanent and rotational bases. The 

Army also plans to place a ballistic missile defense task force on Guam 

with approximately 630 soldiers and 950 dependents. As a result of these 

plans and the Marine Corps realignment, the active duty military personnel 

and dependent population of more than 14,000 on Guam is expected to

increase approximately 176 percent to more than 39,000 (app. II shows 

current U.S. military bases on Guam). 

Page 7 GAO-08-722T 
As initiatives for expanding the U.S. military presence on Guam began to 

emerge, the Senate Appropriations Committee noted the ambitiousness of 

the military construction program and the need for a well-developed 

master plan to efficiently use the available land and infrastructure. In July 

2006, the committee recommended deferral of two military construction 

projects at Andersen Air Force Base that were included in the President’s 

budget request until such time as they can be incorporated into a master 

plan for Guam and viewed in that context. Further, the committee directed 

the Secretary of Defense to submit to the appropriation committees a 

master plan for Guam by December 29, 2006, and a report accounting for 

the United States’ share of this construction program to project-level detail 

and the year in which each project is expected to be funded.11 The Senate

report also directed GAO to review DOD’s master planning effort for 

Guam as part of its annual review of DOD’s overseas master plans.12 As 

discussed in our 2007 report, DOD has not issued a Guam master plan for 

several reasons. First, the required environmental impact statement, which 

will take at least 3 years to complete according to DOD documents and 

officials, was initiated on March 7, 2007.13 According to DOD officials, the 

results of that environmental impact statement will influence many of the 

key decisions on the exact location, size, and makeup of the military 

infrastructure development on Guam. Second, exact size and makeup of 

the forces to be moved to Guam are not yet identified. Third, DOD officials 

said that additional time is needed to fully address the challenges related 

to funding uncertainties, operational requirements, and Guam’s economic 

and infrastructure requirements. 

Master Planning 

Requirements for the 

Military Buildup on Guam 

Organizations and 

Responsibilities 

The U.S. Pacific Command was responsible for the initial planning for the 

movement of Marine Corps forces to Guam. In August 2006, the Office of 

 11S. Rep. No. 109-286, at 15 (2006). 

12See GAO-07-1015. 

13The primary purpose of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an actionforcing device to ensure that the policies and goals defined in the National Environmental 

Policy Act are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the federal government.

Further, regulations for implementing the act established by the Council on Environmental 

Quality specify that to the fullest extent possible, agencies shall prepare draft 

environmental impact statements concurrently with and integrated with other 

environmental impact analyses and related surveys and studies required by the Fish and 

Wildlife Coordination Act, the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the Endangered 

Species Act of 1973, and other environmental review laws and executive orders. See 40 

C.F.R. § 1502.25. 

Page 8 GAO-08-722T 
the Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to establish JGPO to facilitate,

manage, and execute requirements associated with the rebasing of Marine

Corps assets from Okinawa to Guam, including the planning for all the 

other remaining military realignments on Guam. Specifically, JGPO was 

tasked to lead the coordinated planning efforts among all the DOD 

components and other stakeholders to consolidate, optimize, and integrate 

the existing DOD infrastructure on Guam. The office’s responsibilities 

include integration of operational support requirements, development, and 

program and budget synchronization; oversight of the construction; and 

coordination of government and business activities. JGPO is expected to

work closely with the local Guam government, the government of Japan, 

other federal agencies, and Congress in order to manage this 

comprehensive effort and to develop a master plan. 

The Secretary of the Interior has administrative responsibility over the 

insular areas for all matters that do not fall within the program 

responsibility of other federal departments or agencies. Also, the Interior 

Secretary presides over the Interagency Group on Insular Areas and may 

make recommendations to the President or heads of agencies regarding 

policy or policy implementation actions of the federal government 

affecting insular areas. The Secretary, as the presiding officer of this 

interagency group, established a Working Group on Guam Military 

Expansion to address issues related to the military buildup. The working 

group includes representatives of the Departments of State, Agriculture, 

Health and Human Services, Labor, Justice, Transportation, Housing and 

Urban Development, Education, and Veterans Affairs as well as the Navy,

the Small Business Administration, the Office of Management and Budget, 

and others. Five ongoing subgroups were established to discuss policy and 

resource requirements relating to (1) labor and workforce issues, 

(2) Guam civilian infrastructure needs, (3) health and human services 

requirements, (4) the environment, and (5) socioeconomic issues. 

The U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative has established the 

framework for the future of the U.S. force structure in Japan, including the 

realignments on Okinawa and Guam. However, no final decision on the 

exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam, including their 

operational, housing, and installation support facilities, has been made. 

The environmental impact statement expected in 2010 may affect many 

key planning decisions.

DOD Has Established 

a Framework for 

Military Buildup on 

Guam, but the 

Planning Process Is 

Ongoing 

Page 9 GAO-08-722T 
DOD has established various planning and implementation documents that 

serve as a framework to guide the military realignment and buildup on 

Guam. Originally, the Marine Corps realignment was discussed in the U.S.-

Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative, which established the framework 

for the future of U.S. force structure in Japan designed to create the 

conditions to reduce the burden of American military presence on local 

Japanese communities and to create a continuing presence for U.S. forces 

by relocating units to other areas, including Guam. In its Defense of Japan 

2006 publication, the Japan Ministry of Defense reported that more than 

70 percent of U.S. facilities and areas are concentrated in Okinawa and 

regional development has been greatly affected by the concentration.14

That publication recommended that the relocation of the U.S. Marine 

Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam should occur as soon as possible. It 

further noted that based on bilateral meetings in 2005 and 2006, the

government of Japan had decided to support the United States in its 

development of necessary facilities and infrastructure, including 

headquarters buildings, barracks, and family housing, to hasten the 

process of moving Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam. 

Framework for the Military 

Realignment and Buildup 

Subsequently, in July 2006, the U.S. Pacific Command developed the Guam 

Integrated Military Development Plan15 to provide an overview of the 

projected military population and infrastructure requirements; however, it

provides limited information on the expected effects of the military 

buildup on the local community and off base infrastructure. The plan is 

based upon a notional force structure that was used to generate land and

facility requirements for basing, operations, logistics, training, and quality 

of life involving the Marine Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special 

Operations Forces in Guam. Also, JGPO has completed its first phase of 

the Guam master planning process and developed basic facility 

requirements with general cost estimates and mapping concepts. The 

second phase of the master planning is in progress and will include more 

detailed infrastructure requirements, facility layouts, and cost estimates 

for fiscal years 2010 and 2011. JGPO is developing a planning-level Guam 

joint military master plan that will be submitted to congressional staff by 

September 15, 2008. However, that plan is not considered a final master 

plan since DOD is awaiting the results of the environmental impact 

statement and record of decision, which are due in 2010. 

 14Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2006 (Japan: October 2006). 

15U.S. Pacific Command, Guam Integrated Military Development Plan. 

Page 10 GAO-08-722T 
The exact size and makeup of the forces to move to Guam and the 

operational, housing, and installation support facilities required are not yet

fully known. While the U.S.-Japan Defense Policy Review Initiative 

identified Marine Corps units for relocation from Okinawa, assessments 

are still under way within DOD to determine the optimal mix of units to 

move to Guam, which may also include Marines from other locations, such

as Hawaii and the continental United States. 

Size and Makeup of Forces 

and Other Variables Are 

Not Yet Known 

Approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 dependents of the 

Third Marine Expeditionary Forces Command Element, Third Marine 

Division Headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Group Headquarters, 1st 

Marine Air Wing Headquarters, and 12th Marine Regiment Headquarters 

are expected to be included in the move to Guam. The Marine Corps 

forces remaining on Okinawa will consist of approximately 10,000 Marines 

plus their dependents of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. While these 

broad estimates provide a baseline, according to DOD officials we spoke 

with, the Marine Corps is still determining the specific mix of units and 

capabilities needed to meet mission requirements on Guam. In addition, 

Marine Corps officials said that the department was reviewing the mix of 

units moving to Guam in light of the department’s plan to increase the 

number of Marines to 202,000 from 180,000.16

The number and mix of units is significant because, according to Marine 

Corps officials, the operational, housing, and installation support facilities 

on Guam will depend on the type, size, and number of units that will make 

the move. That determination will define the training and facility 

requirements, such as the number and size of family housing units, 

barracks, and schools and the capacity of the installation support facilities 

needed to support the military population and operations. In response to 

the ongoing assessment by the Marine Corps, JGPO officials said that they 

were initiating a master plan that will reflect the building of “flexible” 

infrastructure that could accommodate any mix of military units that may 

move to Guam. However, the lack of information on the number and mix 

of forces makes it difficult to provide an accurate assessment of specific 

facility and funding requirements at this time. 

 16The planned increase in the Army’s and Marine Corps’ forces collectively is commonly 

referred to as Grow the Force. 

Page 11 GAO-08-722T 
Before JGPO can finalize its Guam master plan, it will need to complete 

the required environmental impact statement. According to DOD officials, 

the results of the environmental statement, currently expected to be 

issued in 2010, can affect many of the key decisions on the exact location, 

size, and makeup of the military infrastructure development.

Results of the Required 

Environmental Impact 

Statement May Affect 

Several Key Decisions 

On March 7, 2007, the Navy issued a public notice of intent to prepare an

environmental impact statement pursuant to the requirements of the 

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),17 as implemented by 

the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations,18 and Executive Order

12114. The notice of intent in the Federal Register19 states that the 

environmental impact statement will: 

• Examine the potential environmental effects associated with relocating 

Marine Corps command, air, ground, and logistics units (which 

comprise approximately 8,000 Marines and their estimated 9,000 

dependents) from Okinawa to Guam. The environmental impact 

statement will examine potential effects from activities associated with 

Marine Corps units’ relocation to include operations, training, and 

infrastructure changes. 

• Examine the Navy’s plan to enhance the infrastructure, logistic

capabilities, and pier/waterfront facilities to support transient nuclear 

aircraft carrier berthing at Naval Base Guam. The environmental 

impact statement will examine potential effects of the waterfront 

improvements associated with the proposed transient berthing. 

• Evaluate placing a ballistic missile defense task force (approximately 

630 solders and their estimated 950 dependents) in Guam. The 

environmental impact statement will examine potential effects from 

activities associated with the task force, including operations, training, 

and infrastructure changes. 

JGPO officials recognize that the results of this environmental assessment 

process may affect the development and timing of JGPO’s master plan for 

Guam. Under NEPA and the regulations established by the Council on 

Environmental Quality, an environmental impact statement must include a

 17National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4347. 

1840 C.F.R. pts. 1500-1508. 

1972 Fed. Reg. 10186-7 (Mar. 7, 2007). 

Page 12 GAO-08-722T 
purpose and need statement, a description of all reasonable project 

alternatives and their environmental effects (including a “no action” 

alternative), a description of the environment of the area to be affected or

created by the alternatives being considered, and an analysis of the 

environmental impacts of the proposed action and each alternative.20

Further, accurate scientific analysis, expert agency comments, and public

scrutiny are essential to implementing NEPA. For example, federal 

agencies such as DOD are required to ensure the professional integrity, 

including scientific integrity, of the discussions and analyses contained in

the environmental impact statement. Additionally, after preparing a draft

environmental impact statement, federal agencies such as DOD are 

required to obtain the comments of any federal agency that has 

jurisdiction by law or certain special expertise and request the comments 

of appropriate state and local agencies, Native American tribes, and any 

agency that has requested that it receive such statements. Until an agency

issues a final environmental impact statement and record of decision, it 

generally may not take any action concerning the proposal that would 

either have adverse environmental effects or limit the choice of reasonable 

alternatives.

DOD officials stated that performing these alternative site analyses and 

cumulative effects analyses may delay the completion of Guam master 

plan and thus affect the construction schedule of military facilities needed 

to accommodate thousands of Marines and dependents by the 2014 goal 

identified in the Defense Policy Review Initiative. DOD will submit its 

fiscal year 2010 budget request to Congress for the first phase of military 

construction projects prior to the completion of the environmental impact 

statement. Thus, DOD may be asking Congress to fund the military 

construction projects without the benefit of a completed environmental 

impact statement or a final decision on the full extent of its facility and 

funding requirements. DOD officials said that this practice of requesting 

funding during the development of environmental impact statements is 

common within the department for large projects, such as major base 

realignments and closures. JGPO officials told us that immediately after 

the environmental impact statement and record of decision are completed, 

the department will commence construction of facilities in efforts to meet 

the 2014 goal. However, other DOD and government of Guam officials 

believe that this is an ambitious and optimistic schedule considering the 

possibility that the environmental impact statement could be delayed, the 

 2040 C.F.R. § 1502.13-1502.16. 

Page 13 GAO-08-722T 
complexities of moving thousands of Marines and dependents from 

Okinawa to Guam, and the need to obtain funding from the United States 

and Japan to support military construction projects. 

DOD and the government of Guam face several significant challenges 

associated with the military buildup, including addressing funding and 

operational challenges and community and infrastructure impacts, which 

could affect the development and implementation of their planning efforts. 

First, DOD has not identified all funding requirements and may encounter 

difficulties in obtaining funding given competing priorities within the 

department. Second, DOD officials need to address the operational and 

training limitations on Guam, such as for sea and airlift capabilities, and 

training requirements for thousands of Marines. Third, the increase in 

military personnel and their dependents on Guam and the large number of 

the construction workers needed to build military facilities will create 

challenges for Guam’s community and civilian infrastructure. 

Several DOD and 

Government of Guam 

Challenges Have Yet 

to Be Addressed 

DOD Faces Funding 

Challenges 

The military services’ realignments on Guam are estimated to cost over 

$13 billion. Included in this $13 billion cost estimate, the Marine Corps 

buildup is estimated to cost $10.3 billion. However, these estimates do not 

include the estimated costs of all other defense organizations that will be 

needed to support the additional military personnel and dependents on 

Guam. For example, the Defense Logistics Agency, which will help 

support the services’ influx of personnel, missions, and equipment to 

Guam, will likely incur additional costs that are not included in the current 

estimate. Also, the costs to move and accommodate Marine Corps units 

from locations other than Okinawa to Guam are not included in the 

estimate. In addition, the costs associated with the development of 

training ranges21 and facilities on nearby islands are not included in the 

current estimate for the military buildup. According to JGPO officials, the 

total costs for the military buildup will eventually be identified and 

integrated into JGPO’s master plan for Guam. 

Of the $10.3 billion estimate for the Marine Corps buildup, the government 

of Japan is expected to contribute up to $2.8 billion in funds without 

reimbursement for the construction of facilities, such as barracks and 

office buildings. The government of Japan is also expected to provide 

 21Adequate training ranges are critical to maintaining military readiness. 

Page 14 GAO-08-722T 
another $3.3 billion in loans and equity investments for installation support 

infrastructure, such as on base power and water systems, and military 

family housing. Most of this $3.3 billion is expected over time to be 

recouped by Japan in the form of service charges paid by the U.S. 

government and in rents paid by American servicemembers with their 

overseas housing allowance provided by DOD. 

In addition, according to DOD officials, there are several conditions that 

must be met before the government of Japan contributes to the cost of the 

Marine Corps move. First, the government of Japan has stipulated that its 

funds will not be made available until it has reviewed and agreed to 

specific infrastructure plans for Guam. Second, failure or delay of any 

initiative outlined in the Defense Policy Review Initiative may affect the 

other initiatives, because various planning variables need to fall into place

in order for the initiatives to move forward. For example, DOD officials 

expect that if the Futenma replacement facility in Okinawa (estimated to 

cost from $4 billion to $5 billion) is not built, the Marine Corps relocation 

to Guam may be canceled or delayed. Previously, the United States and 

Japan were unsuccessful in closing and replacing Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma as a part of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa process in 

1996.

22 DOD officials view the success of the Futenma replacement facility 

as a key objective of the initiative that will need to be completed in order 

for other realignment actions to take place, including the move to Guam. 

Finally, the government of Japan may encounter challenges in funding its

share of the Marine Corps move considering Japan’s other national 

priorities and its commitments associated with funding several other 

major realignments of U.S. forces in Japan under the Defense Policy 

Review Initiative. 

DOD Faces Operational 

Challenges 

Operational challenges, such as providing appropriate mobility support 

and training capabilities to meet Marine Corps requirements, have not 

been fully addressed. According to Marine Forces Pacific officials, the 

Marine Corps in Guam will depend on strategic military sealift and airlift

to reach destinations in Asia that may be farther away than was the case 

when the units were based in Okinawa. For example, in a contingency

operation that requires sealift, the ships may have to deploy from Sasebo, 

Japan, or other locations to collect the Marines and their equipment on 

 22The United States and Japan are continuing their effort to close and replace Marine Corps 

Air Station Futenma as a part of the Defense Policy Review Initiative. 

Page 15 GAO-08-722T 
Guam and then go to the area where the contingency is taking place, 

potentially risking a delayed arrival at certain potential trouble spots. 

According to Marine Corps officials, amphibious shipping capability and 

airlift capacity are needed in Guam, which may include expanding existing 

staging facilities and systems support for both sealift and airlift. The 

Marine Corps estimated additional costs for strategic lift operating from 

Guam to be nearly $88 million annually. 

Existing training ranges and facilities on Guam are not sufficient to meet 

the training requirements of the projected Marine Corps force. A DOD 

analysis of training opportunities in Guam concluded that no ranges on 

Guam are suitable for the needs of the projected Marine Corps force 

because of inadequacy in size or lack of availability. U.S. Pacific Command 

is also in the process of conducting a training study that covers both Guam 

and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands to see what 

options are available for training in the region. Marine Forces Pacific 

officials stated that live-fire artillery training, amphibious landings, and 

tracked vehicle operations will be challenging because of the combination 

of factors associated with the limited size of training areas available and 

the environmental concerns on the Northern Mariana Islands. 

Increase in Military 

Presence Is Likely to 

Cause Local Community 

and Infrastructure 

Challenges 

The increase in military presence is expected to have significant effects on

Guam’s community and infrastructure, and these challenges have not been

fully addressed. This undertaking is estimated to increase the current 

Guam population of approximately 171,000 by an estimated 25,000 active 

duty military personnel and dependents (or 14.6 percent) to 196,000. The 

Guam population could also swell further because DOD’s personnel 

estimates do not include defense civilians and contractors who are also 

likely to move to Guam to support DOD operations. 

DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the military buildup 

will have significant effects on the local community. For example: 

• As a result of the military buildup on Guam, construction demands will 

exceed local capacity and the availability of workers, though the extent 

to which the local workers can meet this increase has yet to be

determined. For example, on the basis of trend data, government of 

Guam officials estimate the current construction capacity to be 

approximately $800 million per year, as compared with the estimated 

construction capacity of more than $3 billion per year needed by DOD 

to meet the planned 2014 completion date. In addition, Guam currently 

faces a shortage of skilled construction workers. Preliminary analysis 

Page 16 GAO-08-722T 
indicates that 15,000 to 20,000 construction workers will be required to 

support the projected development on Guam. One estimate is that 

Guam may be able to meet only 10 to 15 percent of the labor 

requirement locally, a concern to federal, military, and local officials. 

Nearby countries may have workers willing to come to Guam to take 

jobs to construct needed facilities, but these workers will have to 

temporarily enter the United States on temporary nonagricultural 

workers visas, currently capped at 66,000 per year. JGPO officials said 

that legislation recently passed by both the Senate and the House of 

Representatives that will increase the cap in the short term is a first 

step toward addressing many of their concerns with temporary 

nonagricultural workers visas. 

• The government of Guam has expressed several concerns about the 

potential effects of an influx of foreign workers on Guam’s community. 

The Civilian Military Task Force recommended that Guam needs to 

establish a department that would focus on processing foreign 

workers. Further, a government of Guam report stated that the influx 

of foreign workers would put a strain on existing emergency care 

services, medical facilities, and public utilities. 

In addition, DOD and government of Guam officials recognize that the 

island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the increased demand due to

the military buildup. For example: 

• Guam’s commercial port has capacity constraints with pier berthing 

space, crane operations, and container storage locations. The military 

buildup requires a port with double the current capacity, and military 

cargo is expected to increase sixfold during construction of facilities 

required for the buildup.

• Guam’s two major highways are in poor condition and, when ordnance 

(ammunition and explosives) is unloaded from ships for Andersen Air 

Force Base now and for the Marine Corps in the future, the ordnance 

must be transported on one of these major roads that run through 

highly populated areas. The current highway system also experiences 

slippery surfaces, potholes, and occasional flooding. Traffic between 

military installations and commercial, business, and residential areas is 

anticipated to increase significantly with the military buildup.

• Guam’s electrical system—the sole power provider on the island—is 

not reliable and has transmission problems resulting in brownouts and 

voltage and frequency fluctuations. The system may not be adequate to 

Page 17 GAO-08-722T 
deliver the additional energy requirements associated with the military 

buildup. 

• Guam’s water and wastewater treatment systems are near capacity and 

have a history of failure due to aged and deteriorated distribution lines. 

The military buildup may increase demand by at least 25 percent. 

• Guam’s solid waste facilities face capacity and environmental 

challenges as they have reached the end of their useful life. Currently, 

the solid waste landfills in Guam have a number of unresolved issues 

related to discharge of pollutants and are near capacity. 

The government of Guam’s planning efforts to address infrastructure 

challenges associated with the buildup of military forces are in the initial 

stages, and several uncertainties further contribute to the difficulties the 

government of Guam faces in developing precise plans to address the 

effects of the military buildup on the local community and infrastructure. 

In addition, funding sources to address infrastructure challenges are 

uncertain. As we have found with some communities experiencing civilian 

and military population growth surrounding Army installations in the 

continental United States, the government of Guam will likely ask for 

assistance to provide civilian infrastructure improvements. 

Government of 

Guam’s Planning 

Efforts Are in Their 

Initial Stages 

Two recent studies that examine the various effects of the military buildup

on the local infrastructure and community were developed by the 

government of Guam and KPMG. First, the Governor of Guam 

commissioned the Civilian Military Task Force to develop a plan that 

would both accommodate the military personnel expansion and provide 

opportunities for the Guam community. The task force issued its report in 

November 2007, which provided a synopsis of the various funding and 

resource needs.23 Second, the government of Guam contracted KPMG to 

examine the needs and challenges Guam faces in regard to the military 

buildup. The October 2007 report made preliminary assessments on the 

effects of the military buildup on Guam’s infrastructure, economy, and 

social services.24 One study estimated that more than $3 billion will be 

 23Guam Civilian Military Task Force, Planning for Military Growth: November 2007 Needs

Assessment (Hagåtña, Guam: Nov. 2007). 

24KPMG, Conduct Studies Associated with Military Growth and Integration Initiatives

for the Island of Guam (Oct. 31, 2007). 

Page 18 GAO-08-722T 
required for civilian infrastructure and government services to address the 

military buildup.25

The uncertainties associated with exact size, makeup, and timing of the 

forces to be moved to Guam make it difficult for the government of Guam 

to develop comprehensive plans to address the effects of the proposed 

military buildup. Guam officials said that without accurate information it 

is difficult to develop an infrastructure program that identifies civilian 

construction projects and financing to support the military buildup and to 

form an administrative structure to oversee and coordinate project 

scheduling and implementation. In our September 2007 report on 

communities experiencing civilian and military population growth at 

continental U.S. Army installations, we found that without knowing 

whether Army headquarters-level offices or the local base plans have 

accurate information about the expected growth, communities are not 

well positioned to plan for and provide adequate schools, housing, 

transportation, and other infrastructure. 

As discussed previously, government of Guam officials recognize that the

island’s infrastructure is inadequate to meet the projected demand and will 

likely require significant funding to address this challenge. However, the 

extent to which the government of Guam will be able to obtain financial

assistance for projected infrastructure demands from the federal 

government is unclear. Government of Guam officials we met with were 

uncertain as to whether and to what extent federal grant programs will be 

available to address Guam’s public infrastructure to support the military 

realignments. On the basis of its initial review, KPMG reported that the 

data it collected from the government of Guam suggested that it is likely 

there will be a significant funding gap between the availability of funds 

and requirements for Guam’s infrastructure program.26 KPMG further 

reported that $282 million in federal funding was provided to Guam in 

2006. Without additional federal assistance, government of Guam officials 

believe that local infrastructure improvements to accommodate the 

military buildup would take decades to complete. In our September 2007 

report on U.S. communities experiencing civilian and military population 

 25According to KPMG, the cost estimates and figures presented in the study are incomplete 

and were not verified or validated by government of Guam or KPMG officials. Moreover, 

KPMG officials concluded that more work in terms of testing and analysis needed to be 

conducted on financial data presented in the report. 

26See footnote 24. 

Page 19 GAO-08-722T 
growth at Army installations, we found that communities will likely incur 

costs to provide adequate schools, transportation, and other infrastructure 

improvements.27 Because of limited local funding, some of these 

communities are seeking federal and state assistance. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 

any questions you or any members of the committee may have at this time. 

For further information regarding this statement, please contact Brian J. 

Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this testimony. GAO staff members making major 

contributions to this testimony are listed in appendix III. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

 27See GAO-07-1007. 

Page 20 GAO-08-722T 
Page 21 GAO-08-722T 

Appendix I: Location of Guam 

Guam is the westernmost territory of the United States and is located in 

the Pacific Ocean approximately 3,810 miles southwest of Honolulu, 

Hawaii; 1,600 miles east of Manila, the Philippines; and 1,560 miles 

southeast of Tokyo, Japan (see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: Location of Guam

Source: DOD.
Page 22 GAO-08-722T 

Appendix II: Military Installations on Guam 

According to the Department of Defense (DOD), about 29 percent of the 

land on Guam is controlled by DOD (as indicated in white in fig. 2), 52 

percent is privately owned, and 19 percent is under the supervision of the 

government of Guam. 

Figure 2: U.S. Military Installations on Guam 

Source: DOD.

Note: NCTS is the abbreviation for naval computer and telecommunications station and AFB is the 

abbreviation for air force base. 
Page 23 GAO-08-722T 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Brian J. Lepore, (202) 512-4523 or leporeb@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Mark Little, Assistant Director; 

Nelsie Alcoser; Susan Ditto; Kate Lenane; and Jamilah Moon made major 

contributions to this testimony. 

GAO Contact 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products 

Page 24 GAO-08-722T 

Related GAO Products 

Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD 

Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military 

Buildup on Guam. GAO-07-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007. 

Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting 

Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture 

Restructuring. GAO-06-852. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006. 

DOD’s Overseas Infrastructure Master Plans Continue to Evolve. GAO06-913R. Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2006. 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Comprehensive Master Plans for 

Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. GAO-05-680R. 

Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005. 

Defense Infrastructure: Factors Affecting U.S. Infrastructure Costs 

Overseas and the Development of Comprehensive Master Plans. GAO-04-

609. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2004.

Overseas Presence: Issues Involved in Reducing the Impact of the U.S. 

Military Presence on Okinawa. GAO/NSIAD-98-66. Washington, D.C.: 

March 2, 1998. 

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 

Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008. 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007. 

Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands: Pending Legislation 

Would Apply U.S. Immigration Law to the CNMI with a Transition 

Period. GAO-08-466. Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2008. 

Overseas Master 

Plans/Global 

Posturing 

Community Growth 

Bases 

U.S. Insular Areas 

U.S. Insular Areas: Economic, Fiscal, and Financial Accountability 

Challenges. GAO-07-119. Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2006. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Multiple Factors Affect Federal Health Care Funding.

GAO-06-75. Washington, D.C.: October 14, 2005. 
Related GAO Products 

Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing 

with Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam. GAO-02-423. Washington,

D.C.: April 11, 2002. 

Compact of Free Association: Negotiations Should Address Aid 

Effectiveness and Accountability and Migrants’ Impact on U.S. Areas. 

GAO-02-270T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2001. 

Foreign Relations: Migration From Micronesian Nations Has Had 

Significant Impact on Guam, Hawaii, and the Commonwealth of the 

Northern Mariana Islands. GAO-02-40. Washington, D.C.: October 5, 2001. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Application of the U.S. Constitution. GAO/OGC-98-5. 

Washington, D.C.: November 7, 1997.

Insular Areas Update. GAO/GGD-96-184R. Washington, D.C.: 

September 13, 1996. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Information on Fiscal Relations with the Federal 

Government. GAO/T-GGD-95-71. Washington, D.C.: January 31, 1995. 

U.S. Insular Areas: Development Strategy and Better Coordination 

Among U.S. Agencies Are Needed. GAO/NSIAD-94-62. Washington, D.C.: 

February 7, 1994. 

Page 25 GAO-08-722T (351211) 
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