Interim Decision #2701 

MATTER OF GRANADOS 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-14103418 

Decided by Board April 26, 1979 

(1) Section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), is ineffective 

to remove deportability under section 241(a)(14) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(14), for 

conviction of possession of an unregistered sawed-off shotgun. 

(2) Section 212(c) of the Act is not a general form of discretionary relief. It is confined to 

the grounds of inadmissibility enumerated therein. 

(3) Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2 Cir. 1976) expanded the class of aliens to whom section 

212(e) relief is available but did not increase the statutory grounds to which section 

212(c) relief may be applied. 

<4) If a ground of deportation is also a ground of inadmissibility. section 212(c) can be 

invoked in a deportation hearing. 

(5) Conviction for possession of a concealed sawed-off shotgun is not a specified section 

212(a) ground of excludability. 

<6) Conviction for possession of a concealed sawed-off shotgun is not a crime involving 

moral turpitude that would render the respondent excludable under section 212(a)(9) of 

the Act. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a)(14) t8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(14)]—Convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun 

(Xi BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: UN BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Jack Wassermv, Esquire George Indelicato 

1707 H Street, N.W. Appellate Trial Attorney 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

Kendall Warren 

Trial Attorney 

Attorney of record: 

Dan F. Darnley, Esquire 

3828 Seattle-First National 

Bank Building 

Seattle, Washington 98154 

Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Applernan, Maguire, and Farb, Board Member's 

The respondent appeals from the June 12, 1978, decision by the immigration judge denying his motion to reopen the deportation proceedings 

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in order to apply for relief from deportation under section 212(c) of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1182(c). The appeal will be 

dismissed because we agree with the immigration judge's conclusicin 

that section 212(c) of the Act is ineffective to remove the basis for the 

respondent's deportability. 

The respondent is a native and citizen of Mexico who was admitted as 

a lawful permanent resident of the United States on August 28, 1965. 

On October 18, 1976, he was convicted in the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Washington for possession of an 

unregistered sawed-off shotgun in violation of 26 U.S.C. 5861(d), 5871. 

Consequently, he, was found deportable on January 12, 1978, under 

section 241(a)(14) of the Act, 8 U. S. C. 1251(a)(14). On May 5, 1978, we 

dismissed an appeal from the deportability decision as untimely. He 

then submitted on May 20, 1978, a motion to reopen the deportation 

proceedings and a request for a stay of deportation which the immigration judge denied on June 12, 1978. We agree with the immigration 

judge that he had jUrisdiction to entertain the motion to reopen. Matter 

of Mladineo, 14 L & N. Dec. 591 (BIA 1974). 

Section 212(c) of the Act provides that aliens lawfully admitted for 

permanent residence whu temporarily Trooccd abroad voluntarily and 

not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful 

unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in 

the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provisions 

of paragraphs (1) through (25) and paragraphs (30) and (31) of subsection 

(a) of section 212. That section was enacted in 1952 1to replace the 

seventh proviso to section 3 of the Inuraigration Act of 1917. 2Twice we 

examined the newly enacted section and concluded that section 212(c), 

unlike the seventh proviso it replaced, was not a general form of discretionary relief but instead was confined to the grounds of inadmissibility 

enumerated therein. See Matter of M—,. 5 I. & N. Dec. 642 (BIA 1954); 

Matter of T—, 5 I. & N. Dee. 389 (BIA 1953). 

The scope of permissible discretion under section 212(c) was expanded 

by the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 

Circuit in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2 Cir. 1976). In Francis, the 

Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the provisions of section 

212(c) are applicable not only to permanent resident aliens who temporarily proceed abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful -unrelinquished domicile of seven 

consecutive years, but that such provisions are also applicable to nondeparting permanent resident aliens. The rationale for the Francis 

decision was that to provide for section. 212(c) relief to deportable aliens 

Act of June 27, 1952, 66 Sta. 163; 8 U.S.C_ 1189(0 

2 Act of February 5, 1917, 39 Stat. 878; ch. 29, §3. 

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returning from abroad but not for aliens similarly situated who had not 

departed from the United States would constitute an unconstitutional 

classification inconsistent with due process. 532 F.2d at 272-273. Frarecis expanded the class of aliens to whom section 212(e) relief is available 

but did not increase the statutory grounds to which section 212(c) relief 

may be applied. 

In Matter of Silva, Interim Decision 2532 (BIA 1976), we adopted the 

holding of the Francis court and concluded that section 212(e) permits a 

waiver of a ground of inadmissibility to a permanent resident alien in a 

deportation proceeding regardless of whether he departs the United 

States following the act or acts which render him deportable. Therefore, 

if a ground of deportation is also a ground of inadmissibility, section 

212(c) can be invoked in a deportation hearing. Cf. Matter of Horn-, 

Interim Decision 2557 (BIA 1977); Matter of Tanori, Interim Decision 

2467 (BIA 1976). 3 

In the present case, however, the respondent seeks the expansion of 

section 212(c) relief to a ground of deportation which is not a ground of 

excludability listed under section 212(a) of the Act. Conviction for 

possession of a concealed sawed-off shotgun is not a specified section 

212(a) ground of excludability, nor a crime involving moral turpitude 

that would render the respondent excludable under section 212(a)(9) of 

the Act. See U.S. ex. rel. Andreacchi v. Curran, 38 F.2d 498 (S.D.N.Y1926); Ex part.? Saraceno, 182 F. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1910). 

We do not reach the respondent's contention that his conviction constitutes a ground of excludability because if deported he would thereafter be immediately excludable.' He would be excludable under section 

212(a)(17) of the Act because of his deportation, not because of the 

underlying conviction. However, assuming for the purpose of discussion 

that the conviction for shotgun possession constitutes some sort Of 

exclusion ground per se, under section 212(a) generally, it is not within 

the ambit of section 212(c). To adopt the respondent's reasoning would 

Make section 212(c) relief available for all grounds of deportability 

including the subversive grounds, section 212(a)(27) to (29) of the Act,. 

Which were specifically precluded from section 212(c) relief. We see 

nothing in the plain language or the legislative history of section 212(c) 

3 We reject the respondent's contenticon that the concurring opinion's reference to 

setion 212(c) as a full deportation relief meant that the section was available as relief for 

 deportation grounds. We read that sentence as stating that as a result of the Francis 

and Silva cases section 212(c) is a full deportation relief as to the grounds set forth in 

section 212(c). 

We are aware that the law prior to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act was 

construed as containing implied exclusion grounds derived from express deportations 

oloot.inds. See Matter of V—, 1 I. & N. Dec. 20 (DIA 1942). However, no such jittery]. etati.on has been applied under the 1952 Act. 

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justifying extending such administrative relief beyond the grounds 

listed under that section. See S. Rep. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 

(1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); U.S. Code 

Cong. & Adm. News 1952, pp. 1652, 1705. 

Therefore, we conclude that the respondent's conviction for possession of an unregistered sawed -off shotgun does not come within the 

grounds of excludability which are subject to a section 212(c) waiver. 

Since the respondent's counsel has conceded at oral argument that his 

other contentions, unrelated to section 212(c), are without merit, there 

are no other issues left before us and the appeal will be dismissed. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

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