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40–802 PDF 2008

THE ENVIRONMENT

REPRINTED

FROM THE

2007 ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 10, 2007

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State 

CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State 

HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor

DOUGLAS GROB, Staff Director 

MURRAY SCOT TANNER, Deputy Staff Director

(II) 

(1)

ENVIRONMENT

INTRODUCTION

China’s leaders acknowledge the severity of their country’s

environmental problems, and the Chinese government has taken 

steps to curb pollution and environmental degradation. For example, the central government has developed an expansive framework 

of environmental laws and regulations to combat environmental 

problems. Nonetheless, effective implementation remains systemically hampered by noncompliance at the local level and administrative structures that prioritize the containment of ‘‘social unrest’’ 

and the generation of revenue over environmental protection. 

Just as China’s environmental policies have not kept pace with 

the country’s severe environmental degradation, neither have they 

kept pace with citizens’ aspirations for, and increasingly vigorous 

expression of concern over, environmental health and human 

rights. During 2007, China’s citizens confronted environmental 

public policy with an increasing propensity, not only to voice intense dismay with government and industry, but also to turn to petitions and mass protests, and to some extent to the courts, in 

order to pressure public officials for greater environmental accountability, enforcement, and protection. 

Participation in environmental protests has risen in the last two 

years, particularly among middle-class urban residents. Their participation is significant because, until recently, public protest related to environmental issues was concentrated in rural areas and 

thought to be a more remote concern for urban elites. Official responses to environment-related activism have included crackdowns 

on the free flow of information, and the suppression of citizen protest. In part because these strategies target potential allies instead 

of engaging them, further environmental degradation may require 

China’s leaders to confront the ways these strategies diminish their 

capacity to exercise effective environmental leadership over the 

long run. 

ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND PUBLIC FRUSTRATION WITH

OFFICIAL RESPONSES

Rapid economic growth without effective environmental safeguards has led to severe environmental degradation, with water, 

air, soil, and other forms of pollution threatening public health and 

quality of life. Poor soil and water conservation practices and government inattention to polluting industries exacerbate these problems. Many Chinese citizens suffer from respiratory diseases, and 

the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) estimated that there are approximately 358,000 premature deaths 

each year due to air pollution.1 Acid rain affects about one-third of 

the country.2 Deforestation and erosion leading to loss of arable 

2

land, landslides, and sedimentation of waterways are widespread.3

Water pollution and poor conservation practices have led to water 

shortages in many areas, leaving millions in urban areas, and onethird of the rural population without access to clean drinking 

water.4

The Chinese government acknowledges the severity of China’s 

environmental problems. The State Council’s White Paper on ‘‘Environmental Protection (1996–2005),’’ issued in June 2006, notes 

that ‘‘the contradiction between economic growth and environmental protection is particularly prominent’’ as the ‘‘relative shortage of resources, a fragile ecological environment, and insufficient 

environmental capacity are becoming critical problems hindering 

China’s development.’’ 5 Senior government officials also acknowledge the public protest that severe environmental degradation 

could prompt.6 A U.S. expert has observed that environmental degradation and pollution ‘‘constrain economic growth, contribute to 

large-scale migration, harm public health, and engender social unrest.’’ 7 According to official Chinese estimates, environmental degradation and pollution cost China an estimated 8 to 12 percent of 

annual gross domestic product (GDP), and the number of mass protests over pollution has increased by 29 percent per year in recent 

years.8

China has taken steps to curb pollution and environmental degradation. In both its 10th (2001–2005) and 11th (2006–2010) FiveYear Plans, the government formulated or revised environmental 

protection laws, administrative regulations, and standards, and has 

worked to strengthen enforcement of anti-pollution rules.9 In addition, SEPA and the Ministry of Health (MOH) are working together 

to facilitate the sharing of information resources, and to develop a 

national action plan and implementation measures on environmental health.10 As described below, for some incidents that have 

captured public attention, central and local governments have imposed administrative penalties on polluters and public officials

responsible for enforcement failures. 

Nonetheless, although the central government has issued numerous environmental laws and programs, effective implementation 

has been beset by problems that are fundamental and widespread. 

Local environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) depend on local 

governments for resources and funding, and submit to political control by local Party Committees. In part because local governments 

(and some officials) derive income from local enterprises, some local 

EPBs receive pressure to engage in weak or selective enforcement. 

Even without such pressure, officials in underfunded EPBs have 

incentives to permit polluting enterprises to continue operating in 

order to preserve revenue used to finance their bureau’s operating 

deficits. Shortages of well-trained environmental personnel, loopholes in the law, and weak interagency coordination contribute to 

an incentive structure that favors economic growth over the rigorous implementation and enforcement of environmental protection 

measures.11

China’s serious air, water, and soil pollution problems have 

emerged in recent years as one of the country’s most rapidly growing sources of citizen activism. For example, SEPA’s Minister Zhou 

Shengxian stated in July 2007 that the number of citizen petitions 

3

received by SEPA in the first five months of 2007 grew by 8 percent over the same period in 2006. Moreover, the number of pollution-related ‘‘mass incidents’’ (China’s official term for protests)

increased during a year when officials claimed that overall mass incidents decreased significantly.12 These numbers reflect, in part, 

Chinese citizens’ willingness, prompted by rapidly rising frustration with the government’s failure to rein in environmental degradation, to stand up for the environment, and for their rights.13

In its 2006 Annual Report, the Commission reported that central 

government officials delayed some of the proposed hydroelectric 

dams on the Nujiang (Nu River) in response to environmental concerns from civil society groups.14 As of February 2007, some villagers have already been resettled in advance of the Liuku dam, 

one of four approved dams, and there have been concerns over inadequate relocation compensation.15 Local residents around the 

site of the proposed Lushui dam, which has not been approved, 

have observed laborers engaging in survey work on the dam. Other 

villagers have limited knowledge of the proposed dams being built 

in their vicinity.16 This continued lack of transparency limits public 

involvement and violates the government’s own environmental protection laws and policies.17

In a nationwide campaign that inspected 720,000 enterprises in 

2006, the government reported that 3,176 polluting enterprises had 

been closed, and SEPA reported 161 pollution accidents in 2006.18

Administrative litigation and administrative reconsideration remain avenues for environmental dispute resolution and private enforcement, but attention in 2006–2007 turned to a rise in the form 

of ‘‘high-impact’’ litigation, particularly in cases involving compensation for the health impacts of environmental pollution. Although the government prevails in the majority of cases, experts 

have noted that high-impact cases often prompt an official response, typically in the form of new administrative rules and Party 

directives, even when plaintiffs lose.19

Promotion of rural officials for a long time has been tied to their 

record of containing social protest. For example, ‘‘(L)ocal officials 

will only be promoted to more senior positions if they can minimize 

social unrest in the countryside,’’ according to a senior Party official.20 These officials choose either to confront the underlying environmental problem or to suppress activists.21 Previously, experts 

have noted that rural residents tended more frequently than urban 

residents to engage in ‘‘large-scale’’ protests over environmental 

issues.22 Events in 2007, however, suggest that this impression 

may now be outdated, as the urban middle class’ supposed preference for non-confrontational approaches gave way to a rise in 

urban environmental activism. Mass protests in Xiamen over the 

construction of a chemical plant in June 2007 and protests shortly 

thereafter in Beijing over the building of a garbage incineration 

power project signal some of the first large-scale protests in urban 

areas by middle-class citizens over environmental pollution. These 

protests are significant because they suggest that middle-class 

urban residents regard alternative methods for pollution prevention and health preservation as inadequate. 

Chinese citizens concerned with environmental issues are increasingly organized. There are now an estimated 4,000 registered 

4

and unregistered environmental nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) nationwide.23 In recent years, these NGOs have broadened 

their focus beyond initial efforts at public education and awareness 

to assisting pollution victims in pursuing redress through the legal 

system, and mobilizing public participation in and support for environmental protection.24 SEPA has sought public support for and 

participation in environmental protection work and has, to a limited extent, encouraged and supported environmental NGO activism. In 2005, SEPA held a public hearing to encourage citizen

interest and NGO activism,25 and in February 2006, it released two 

provisional measures on public participation in Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures. These measures are the first to 

contain specific arrangements and procedures for public involvement in environmental issues.26 Since the release of the provisional 

measures, approximately 43 projects with a value of 160 billion 

yuan (US$20.5 billion) in investments have been halted for violating EIA procedures.27

In an effort to increase transparency, SEPA issued a regulation 

in April 2007 on environmental information disclosure, coinciding 

with the State Council’s issuance of the Regulation on the Public 

Disclosure of Government Information. [See Section II—Freedom of 

Expression.] The SEPA regulation lists 17 categories of government 

information that should be made public either through government 

Web sites, local newspapers, or upon request. Firms may voluntarily disclosure information in nine categories and are obligated to 

disclose information when they violate standards or cause an accident.28

In spite of this apparent support for limited citizen activism by 

SEPA, official efforts to increase control over environmental civil 

society groups during the past two years have had a chilling effect 

on citizen activism. During 2006–2007, the Commission has observed numerous official actions to repress citizen activism and organizers that work on environmental or environmental health 

issues:

• Fu Xiancai, who has protested forced resettlement of citizens 

during the construction of the Three Gorges Dam project, gave 

an interview with a German television station in May 2006. A 

public security official interrogated Fu about the interview in 

June 2006, and shortly thereafter an unidentified assailant attacked Fu. The attack left Fu paralyzed from the shoulders 

down.29 The official investigation into the assault concluded in 

August 2006 that Fu’s injuries were self-inflicted.30

• Environmental activist Tan Kai was detained in October 

2005 for his involvement in the environmental group ‘‘Green 

Watch’’ and was tried in May 2006 on charges of illegally obtaining state secrets. In August 2006, Tan was sentenced to 18 

months’ imprisonment and was reportedly released in April 

2007.31

• After activist Sun Xiaodi was awarded the Nuclear-Free Future Award in December 2006, officials have intensified their 

harassment efforts. Sun has spent more than a decade petitioning central authorities over radioactive contamination from 

the No. 792 Uranium Mine in the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture in Gansu province. Sun has protested illegal 

5

mining allegedly carried out by local officials that has resulted 

in an unusually high rate of cancer and other health problems 

for residents in the area. In February 2007, Sun traveled to 

Beijing to seek further medical consultation and treatment of 

a tumor in his abdominal cavity.32 In July 2007, the State

Security Bureau in Beijing reportedly ordered Sun to leave 

Beijing.33

Case: Human Rights Abuses and Intolerance of Environmental Activism 

Background 

Wu Lihong, a 39-year old sound-proofing equipment salesman turned 

environmental activist, has spent the past 17 years documenting the 

pollution in Taihu (Lake Tai) in his hometown of Yixing city, Zhoutie 

township, Jiangsu province, in the hopes of pressuring local officials 

and factories to stop the pollution and clean up the lake.34 Wu notes, 

‘‘My wish is that the lake will return to the lake of my childhood, 

when the water was safe and we could go swimming in it without 

fear.’’ 35 Wu collects physical evidence of pollution in Lake Tai, such as 

bottles of dirty water illegally discharged from chemical enterprises 

around the area and the local officials whose complicity exacerbate the 

situation, and submits this evidence to provincial- and central-level officials through the xinfang (petitioning) system.36

In interviews with foreign media in 2006 and early 2007, Wu remarked 

that ‘‘It is shameful that we can’t drink from the lake. The chemical 

factories and local government officials should be blamed. I want them 

to admit their responsibility so we will have clean drinking water 

again. . . . The corruption is severe. Some local officials are only after 

profits so they will do anything to protect their interests, even if it 

means flouting environmental standards and allowing polluting factories to operate.’’ 37 His strategy of bypassing local officials and filing 

petitions with provincial- and central-level officials seemed to have 

worked in part: more than 200 polluting factories have been closed 

since the mid-1990s. Local officials, such as the director of Yixing’s 

EPB, give a different assessment, ‘‘He is only interested in filing reports to officials above us. If you want me to commend him . . . sorry, 

I can only say I will not do that.’’ 38

Due to his environmental advocacy efforts, local government officials 

have repeatedly harassed Wu and his family members, even though a 

panel of judges from the People’s Political Consultative Conference 

and the National People’s Congress named him one of China’s top 10 

environmentalists in November 2005.39 According to foreign media 

interviews with him and his wife, Xu Jiehua, Wu lost his job after his 

manager was warned by local officials to fire him and in 2003, he was 

beaten on three occasions by local thugs. In addition, his daughter reportedly received threats over the phone from anonymous callers, and 

his wife lost her job in 1998, after the chemical factory where she was 

employed closed in response to one of his reports.40

Official Mistreatment in 2007

6

Case: Human Rights Abuses and Intolerance of Environmental Activism 

April 13, 2007: Shortly before Wu planned to provide central officials in 

Beijing with new evidence against local officials, Yixing public security officials detained Wu, accusing him of blackmail and extortion.41

Officials at the Yixing Detention Center restricted his ability to see 

his lawyer or family, and his lawyer reported evidence of torture when 

she met with him a month later.42

May to June 2007: Outbreaks of green-blue algae in Lake Tai left millions of residents in a rush to purchase bottled water. The central government’s main news agency, Xinhua, largely attributed the outbreaks 

to pollution.43 In June, Premier Wen Jiabao ordered a formal investigation into the algae growth, noting that despite numerous attempts 

to improve the quality of the water, ‘‘the problem has never been tackled at the root.’’ 44 State-controlled media and experts criticized local 

officials for blaming the problem on natural conditions, such as a 

warm climate, and for not taking effective steps to control pollution in 

Lake Tai.45

June 2007: The Yixing People’s Court charged Wu with blackmail and 

allegedly extorting 55,000 yuan (US$6,875) from enterprises in exchange for not exposing them as polluters.46 Wu’s original trial date 

was scheduled for June 12, but was postponed to allow a medical investigation of his wounds in response to a complaint filed by his lawyer.47

August 10, 2007: The Yixing People’s Court sentenced Wu to three 

years’ imprisonment for fraud and extortion, and ruled that there was 

no evidence of torture.48 Wu was also fined 3,000 yuan (approximately 

US$400) and ordered to return the money he allegedly extorted from 

enterprises.49 Xu Jiehua has taken on her husband’s cause by suing 

SEPA for naming Yixing a model city. The Yixing People’s Court reportedly refused to consider the case.50

A System of Policy Implementation That Relies on the Abuse of 

Rights 

Even though national leaders have publicly called on China’s citizens to 

report misbehavior by members of the Communist Party, Wu Lihong’s 

detention and imprisonment underscore the problem that activists are 

not afforded adequate whistleblower protections, but instead are singled out for harassment, and left vulnerable to revenge by the officials 

whose malfeasances they bring to light.51 Effective implementation of 

China’s announced commitment to environmental protection requires 

information, private initiative, and citizen leadership.52 Wu’s imprisonment illustrates the extent to which China’s leaders have structured political and legal affairs in ways that impose risks on citizen 

activists. 

7

Case: Human Rights Abuses and Intolerance of Environmental Activism 

According to Xinhua, the central government demanded that officials 

close several hundred factories near Lake Tai in June 2007. Officials 

also required 20,000 chemical plants in the Lake Tai area to meet 

tougher standards for sulfur dioxide emissions and water pollution. 

Plants that fail to meet the new standards by the June 2008 deadline 

risk suspension or closure. In addition, cities around Lake Tai must 

establish sewage treatment plants and can no longer discharge untreated sewage into the lake and rivers in the area. Existing plants 

must install nitrogen and phosphorus removal facilities before the 

deadline. In July 2007, senior provincial officials in Jiangsu instructed 

local officials to make combating pollution in Lake Tai a priority, even 

if it meant a 15 percent decrease in the province’s GDP.53 At the time 

of this writing, Wu Lihong remains in prison. 

CHALLENGES OF BUILDING BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY AND

OVERCOMING OBSTRUCTIONISM

Local EPBs are frequently unable or unwilling to carry out many 

of the numerous environmental laws and regulations passed by the 

central government. Strengthening local level EPB funding and enforcement capacity has been a significant challenge. Some local 

EPB offices rely upon income from fines to fund operating budget 

deficits, which in turn provides incentives for lax enforcement of 

environmental measures.54

China continues to delay publication of its 2005 Green GDP

report due to bureaucratic wrangling and pressure from local governments. The report has already been drafted but has now been 

‘‘indefinitely postponed.’’ The report’s release would have symbolized growing environmental transparency as it would have provided the public and Chinese and international NGOs more

detailed information than the first Green GDP report in 2004. The 

2004 report sparked controversy by estimating that China’s economic losses from environmental degradation amounted to 511.8 

billion yuan (US$67.7 billion), or approximately 3.1 percent of China’s entire GDP.55 Local governments reportedly opposed the

report’s publication because it contained detailed data on environmental performance and conditions broken down by province.56

SEPA and the National Bureau of Statistics also reportedly disagreed over what information to include and how to disseminate 

that information.57

The Chinese government reportedly pressured the World Bank to 

remove material from a joint report, including the figure that some 

750,000 people die prematurely in China each year due to air and 

water pollution.58 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has denied 

this charge.59 Several news accounts reported, however, that the 

Chinese government impugned the report’s methodology, calling it 

‘‘not very reliable,’’ and voiced concern that it might spark citizen 

protest if released.60 SEPA’s Vice Minister Zhou Jian noted that 

‘‘It’s a very complex issue to analyze the impact of pollution on 

8

human health. Without a common scientific methodology in the 

world, any survey on environment and health is not persuasive.’’ 61

In 2007, China finally issued punishments to those found responsible for the November 2005 Songhua River benzene spill that 

threatened the Chinese city of Harbin and the Russian city of 

Khabarovsk. As the Commission noted in its 2006 Annual Report, 

the coverup of the Songhua spill demonstrated a lack of transparency which, in turn, hampered the government’s ability to respond to the environmental disaster. In its aftermath, despite steps 

to improve local reporting to higher authorities, the central government did not address the larger issue of government control over 

the news media [see Section II—Freedom of Expression]. In

November 2006, the State Council supported administrative punishments and Party disciplinary punishments, but no criminal 

prosecutions, for 14 state-owned company and local government

officials involved in the Songhua incident.62 SEPA imposed the 

maximum fine on the state-owned Jilin Petrochemical Company as 

administrative punishment for its role in the incident.63 Some Chinese experts assert that SEPA’s maximum fines are still too low to 

act as an effective deterrent.64 A recent draft revision of the Water 

Pollution and Control Law may strengthen and increase punishments for unlawful conduct.65

9

Endnotes 

1Simon Elegant, ‘‘Barely Breathing,’’ Time Magazine (Online), 12 December 06. 

2 ‘‘China To Build Wind Farms Offshore,’’ China Daily (Online), 16 May 05. 

3 ‘‘Reckless Human Activity Blamed for Frequent Mountain Torrents,’’ Xinhua (Online), 23 

June 05; ‘‘World Research Group on Erosion Founded in China,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 20 October 04. 4 ‘‘Growth Leaves Country High and Dry,’’ China Daily (Online), 28 December 04; Ministry 

of Water Resources (Online), ‘‘Thirsty Countryside Demands Safe Water,’’ 23 March 05. 5State Council Information Office, White Paper on Environmental Protection in China (1996–

2005), People’s Daily (Online), 5 June 06. 6 ‘‘Analysis: Stability Concerns Drive China’s Environmental Initiatives,’’ Open Source Center, 

28 June 06; Ching-Ching Ni, ‘‘China Toughens Stance on Environmental Protection,’’ Los Angeles Times (Online), 22 February 06. 7 Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2004), 24. 8 Ibid., 25; ‘‘ ‘Mass Incidents’ on Rise as Environment Deteriorates,’’ Xinhua (Online), 5 July 

07. 9State Council Information Office, White Paper on Environmental Protection in China (1996–

2005); Andrew Baston, ‘‘China Takes on Pollution,’’ Wall Street Journal, 6 June 06, A8. 10 ‘‘SEPA and the Ministry of Health Will Draw Up Standards of Environmental Damage 

Caused Health,’’ Environment Public Information Network Center, reprinted in All-China Environment Federation (Online), 7 October 06. 11 Ching-Ching Ni, ‘‘China Toughens Stance on Environmental Protection;’’ Deng Weihua, Lin 

Wei, and Li Zebing, ‘‘A Strange Circle of Pollution-Control-the Worse the Pollution, the Wealthier the Environmental Protection Bureaus’’ [Zhiwu guaiquan: wuran yue zhong huanbao bumen 

yue fu], Legal Daily (Online), 12 July 05; Elizabeth C. Economy, The River Runs Black,’’ 20–

21. 12 ‘‘ ‘Mass Incidents’ on Rise as Environment Deteriorates,’’ Xinhua. 13 Jonathan Watts, ‘‘China Blames Growing Social Unrest on Anger over Pollution,’’ The 

Guardian (Online), 6 July 07; ‘‘ ‘Mass Incidents’ on Rise as Environment Deteriorates,’’ Xinhua. 14 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 103. 15Wang Yongchen, ‘‘Nu River News,’’ Three Gorges Probe (Online), 6 March 07. 16Wang Yongchen, ‘‘Nu River News;’’ Jianqiang Liu, ‘‘Fog on the Nu River,’’ China Dialogue 

(Online), 28 February 07. In February 2004, the government responded to citizen environmental 

concerns and agreed to suspend all 13 proposed hydroelectric dam projects on the Nujiang (Nu 

River) in Yunnan province, pending further review. In 2005, Chinese officials reversed this decision after a closed internal review of the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) report, said 

that four of the proposed dams would be built, and banned further domestic news media coverage of the topic. In September 2005, environmental activists posted an open letter to the State 

Council on the Internet, pointing out violations of the EIA law and demanding that officials organize a public hearing on the dam project. Yunnan provincial authorities subsequently released 

the government’s order approving the EIA report, after refusing to do so for two years. In April 

2006, Chinese activists reported signs of survey work near the proposed dams being covered up 

before a visit by a UNESCO–ICUN inspection team to investigate the potential impacts of building a dam in the Three Parallel Rivers National Park, which is a UNESCO world heritage site. 

Wang Yongchen, ‘‘Nu River News;’’ CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 107. 17 ‘‘Call for Public Disclosure of Nujiang Hydropower Development’s EIA Report in Accordance 

with the Law,’’ Three Gorges Probe News Service (Online), 6 September 05; Jim Yardley, ‘‘Seeking a Public Voice on China’s ‘Angry River,’ ’’ New York Times (Online), 26 December 05. 18 ‘‘New Rules to Curb ‘Rampant’ Violations of Pollution Laws,’’ Xinhua (Online), 12 July 07. 19 Experts have noted the significance of high impact litigation, in which even if the plaintiffs 

loses the case, it still may spur public officials to act, such as by issuing regulations. CECC Staff 

Interview; Xu Kezhu and Alex Wang, ‘‘Recent Developments at the Center for Legal Assistance 

to Pollution Victims (CLAPV),’’ Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, 8 China Environment Series 103, 104 (2006). 20 ‘‘Containing Social Unrest Key to Chinese Officials’ Promotion Prospects,’’ China Elections 

and Governance Web site (Online), 9 July 07. 21 Ibid. 22 ‘‘China’s Environmental Degradation Creating Social Time-Bomb,’’ China Corporate Social 

Responsibility (Online), 1 August 07; Guobin Yan, ‘‘Of Revolution and Reform: Two Faces of Environmental Activism in China,’’ presented at the Association for Asian Studies Conference, 

April 2006. 23 CECC Staff Interview. 24 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 75. 25 Ibid. 26The measures allow a limited role for the public in the EIA process through attendance at 

symposiums or public hearings, answering questionnaires, and consulting experts. In July 2006, 

a SEPA official announced that public hearings may be held on important, complex, or difficult 

environmental matters. ‘‘Public Can Help Environment,’’ China Daily (Online), 27 February 06; 

‘‘SEPA Chief: Emergency Environmental Incidents Can Be Directly Reported to the State Bureau For Letters and Calls’’ [Huanbao zongju: tufa zhongda huanjing shixiang ke zhi bao guojia 

xinfang ju], People’s Daily (Online), 6 July 06; ‘‘SEPA Issues New Measures on Environmental 

Letters and Petitions’’ [Huanbao zongju fabu shishi xin de huanjing xinfang banfa], Legal Daily 

(Online), 6 July 06. 27 Among the blocked projects, 31 were later granted approval after they carried out the proper consultation with the public. ‘‘SEPA Blocks 12 Industrial Projects for Lack of Public Support,’’ 

10

Xinhua (Online), 8 May 07; Ling Li, ‘‘New Environmental Transparency Rule Opens Opportunity for Public Participation,’’ China Watch (Online), 3 May 07. 28These regulations will become effective on May 1, 2008. Workshop on Information Disclosures and Environment in China, World Bank, 5 June 07; Ling Li, ‘‘New Environmental Transparency Rule Opens Opportunity for Public Participation;’’ ‘‘Govt’s, Firms Ordered To Release 

Pollution Figures,’’ Xinhua (Online), 26 April 07. 29 ‘‘Three Gorges Resettlement Activist Paralyzed After Assault,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 10–11. 30 ‘‘Officials Conclude Investigation, Increase Surveillance Over Activist Fu Xiancai,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 12. 31 Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘News Update: Hangzhou Environmentalist Tan Kai’s 

Trial Granted Continuance,’’ 22 June 06; ‘‘Environmentalist Tan Kai Sentenced to 1.5-Year 

Term’’ [Huanbao renshi tan kai bei pan yi nian ban xingqi], Radio Free Asia (Online), 11 August 

06; Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Zhejiang Environmental Activist Tan Kai Released from Prison’’ [Zhejiang huanbao renshi tan kai chuyu], 1 May 07. 32 Human Rights in China presented Sun Xiaodi’s acceptance message for the prestigious Nuclear-Free Future Award in Window Rock, Arizona on December 1, 2006. His wife, who stayed 

in Gansu province after Sun departed for Beijing, has continued to receive threats and harassment from unknown individuals believed to be hired by local officials. Human Rights in China 

(Online), ‘‘Sun Xiaodi Harassed, Faces Financial Hardship,’’ 27 March 07; Human Rights in 

China (Online), ‘‘Environmental Activist Sun Xiaodi Faces Stepped-up Harassment after International Award,’’ 2 January 07. 33 ‘‘State Security Bureau in Beijing Orders Sun Xiaodi To Leave Beijing’’ [Beijing guoan leling 

sun xiaodi li jing], Radio Free Asia (Online), 18 July 07. 34Minnie Chan, ‘‘Partner Profile: Defenders of Tai Hu,’’ South China Morning Post, reprinted 

in Pacific Environment (Online), 29 May 06. 35Tracy Quek, ‘‘The Man Who Wants To Save a Lake; Beijing’s Efforts To Protect the Environment Thwarted by Local Officials’ Subterfuge in their Drive for Growth,’’ Straits Times (Online), 21 January 2007. 36 Chan, ‘‘Partner Profile: Defenders of Tai Hu.’’ 37 Ibid.; Quek, ‘‘The Man Who Wants To Save a Lake.’’ 38 Chan, ‘‘Partner Profile: Defenders of Tai Hu.’’ 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 ‘‘ ‘Hero of Taihu’ Wu Lihong Detained’’ [‘‘Taihu weishi’’ wu lihong bei daibu], Deutsche Welle 

(Online), 23 April 07; Andreas Landwehr, ‘‘Attempt To Save Polluted Chinese Lake Leads to 

Arrest,’’ Deutsche Presse-Agentur (Online), 17 April 07; ‘‘China Detains Green Activist Once 

Hailed Hero,’’ Reuters (Online), 23 April 07; Shai Oster, ‘‘Police Hold Chinese Foe of Polluters,’’ 

Wall Street Journal (Online), 23 April 07. 42 ‘‘Jiangsu Environmental Activist Wu Lihong Beat Up in Prison’’ [Jiangsu huanbao renshi 

wu lihong zai jianyu zhong zao duda], Radio Free Asia (Online), 1 June 07; ‘‘Wife of Chinese 

Environmental Activist Wu Lihong Says Husband Tortured,’’ Agence France-Presse, 1 June 07 

(Open Source Center, 04 June 07); Wang Xiangwei, ‘‘Editorial: Release the Man Who First 

Raised the Alarm About Tai Lake’s Pollution,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 4 June 07; 

‘‘Extortion Trial for Chinese Environmentalist Postponed, Wife and Attorney Say,’’ Associated 

Press, reprinted in China Post (Online), 6 June 07. 43 ‘‘Premier Demands Thorough Investigation of Taihu Lake Crisis,’’ Xinhua (Online), 12 June 

07; ‘‘ ‘Mass Incidents’ on Rise as Environment Deteriorates,’’ Xinhua; Chris Buckley, ‘‘China 

Algae Outbreak Sparks Water Panic,’’ Reuters (Online), 31 May 07; Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘China’s Premier Orders Lake Algae Probe,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in the Washington Post 

(Online), 12 June 07. 44 Bodeen, ‘‘China’s Premier Orders Lake Algae Probe.’’ 45 Ibid. 46 ‘‘ ‘Eco-warrior’ Wu Lihong Charged for Blackmail,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 6 June 07. 47 ‘‘Extortion Trial for Chinese Environmentalist Postponed, Wife and Attorney Say,’’ Associated Press. 48 Benjamin Kang Lim, ‘‘China Jails Environment Activist, Cuts Dissident’s Term,’’ Reuters 

(Online), 18 August 07. 49Tracy Quek, ‘‘China Jails ‘Green’ Hero,’’ Strait Times, 12 August 07. 50Lim, ‘‘China Jails Environment Activist.’’ 51For example, in 2002, President Hu Jintao noted that ‘‘the masses should play a role in 

supervising party officials.’’ Simon Montlake, ‘‘Whistle-blower in China Faces Prison,’’ Christian 

Science Monitor (Online), 14 August 07. 52For example, Zhou Jian, Vice Minister of SEPA, mentioned that there is differing information relating to environmental health data. Yet, he reiterated the Chinese government’s promise 

to protect people’s health from pollution. Sun Xiaohua, ‘‘World Bank Environment Report ‘Not 

Very Reliable,’ ’’ China Elections and Governance Web site (Online), 18 July 07. 53Wang Jiaquan, ‘‘China’s Economic Engine Forced To Face Environmental Deficit,’’ China 

Watch (Online), 26 July 07. 54 China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED) 

Task Force on Environmental Governance, ‘‘Environmental Governance in China,’’ presented at 

the 5th Annual General Meeting of the CCICED, 10–12 November 06, 11–12. 55Ling Li, ‘‘China Postpones Release of Report on ‘Green’ GDP Accounting,’’ China Watch (Online), 31 July 07; ‘‘China’s Environmental Degradation Creating Social Time-Bomb,’’ China Corporate Social Responsibility. 56Ling Li, ‘‘China Postpones Release of Report on ‘Green’ GDP Accounting.’’ 57 Ibid. 

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58Sun Xiaohua, ‘‘World Bank Environment Report ‘Not Very Reliable.’ ’’ 59 ‘‘Beijing Denies Bid To Cover Up World Bank Pollution Data,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 9 July 07. 60Monica Liau, ‘‘Chinese Government Censors World Bank Pollution Report,’’ China Watch 

(Online), 11 July 07; Richard McGregorin, ‘‘Beijing Censored Pollution Report,’’ Financial Times 

(Online), 3 July 07; Mitchell Landsberg, ‘‘China Cancels Environment Report,’’ Los Angeles 

Times (Online), 24 July 07. 61Sun Xiaohua, ‘‘World Bank Environment Report ‘Not Very Reliable.’ ’’ 62State Council Information Office (Online), ‘‘The State Council Has Handled the Jilin Explosion Incident and Songhua Water Pollution Incident’’ [Guowuyuan dui jihua baozha shigu ji 

songhua jiang shuiwuran shijian zuo chuli], 24 November 06. 63 ‘‘Branch Office of Jilin Petrochemical Company Fined One Million Yuan for Songhua River 

Incident’’ [Jilin shihua fengongsi yin songhua jiang shuiwuran bei fakuan 100 wan], Xinhua 

(Online), 24 January 07. 64 ‘‘Can SEPA’s Maximum Fine Unsettle Enterprises’ Low Cost of Violating the Law?’’ 

[Huanbao zuida fadan nengfou zhenshe qiye dichengben weifa], China Youth Daily (Online), 25 

January 07. 65 ‘‘Draft of Revised Water Pollution Prevention Law Already Finished’’ [Shuiwuran fangzhi 

fa xiugai caoan yi ni chu], Legal Daily (Online), 30 January 07; ‘‘China Solicits Public Opinion 

on Draft Law on Water Pollution,’’ Xinhua (Online), 5 September 07.

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