NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________ No. 1 5

- 1 981

_____________ KEVIN PATRICK WHEELER , Appell ant v. CHAD WHEELER, Individually and in his offi cial capacity as an officer of the Pennsylvania State Police , JOHN STRELISH , Individually and in his offi cial capacity as an officer of the Pennsylvania State Police

_______________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3:14

- cv
- 00 432 ) District Judge: Hon. Karoline Mehalchick

_______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L

. A

. R

. 34.1(a)

January 19 , 201 6
Before: JORDAN , HARDIMAN , and GREENAWAY , J R ., Circuit Judges

. (Filed : January 20, 2016 )

_______________ OPINION 

_______________

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.2

JORDAN, Circuit Judge

. Kevin W heeler appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismiss ing his amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted

. We
wil l affirm.
I. Background 1 On July 26 , 2012 , Kevin Wheeler ( “ Wheeler ” ) was all egedly attacked by Chad
Wheeler (“Chad”)

. 2 As a result of the altercation, Wh eeler sustained serious injuries

. The Pennsylvania State Police initiated an investigation , and t he t rooper assigned to the

case described the incident as an aggravated assault perpetrated by Chad. At some point
after that first assessment , responsibility for the investigation was transferred to Trooper
John Strelish

. According to Wheeler , Strelish chose to ignore evidence about the nature of the incident, refused to return to the scene of the inc ident, refused to interview
eye witnesses “before they were ultimately intimidated,” refused to retrieve Wheel er’s medical records, and threatened to have Wh eeler “evaluated” (presumably referring to a

1 Because this case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, we accept the facts recited in the operative complaint as true , for purpose s of appeal

. Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015).

2 Chad Wheeler is n ot a participant in this appeal. All references to “Wheeler” are to the appellant, Kevin Wheeler. While we do not mean to presume an undu e familiarity, for simplicity and clarity we will refer to Chad Wheeler as “Chad.” Although the shared last name of Kevin and Chad Wheeler suggests that they are related, the record provides no indication of the existence or nature of their relationship.3

mental health evaluation) for inquiring into whether criminal charge s would be brought against Chad. ( App. at 24a.)
As a result of St r elish’s investigation, both parties to the alter c ation were charged
in sta te court with simple assault and harassment. 3 Following a preliminary hearing,
Wheeler and Chad were scheduled to face formal arraignment and a further hearing in the
C ourt of C ommon P leas in Wayne County, Pennsylvania . The prosecutor ultimately requeste d that the charges against Wheeler be entered nolle pro sequi , after Chad made clear that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment right not to testify in the proceedings.
T he prosecutor’s request was granted

. In March of 2014, Wheeler filed this suit in fede ral court. He alleged that he was
the victim of an assault and battery by Chad , and he further alleged substantive due
process violations by Strelish individually and in an official capacity , citing 42 U.S.C

. §
1983

. Strelish moved to dismiss the complai nt for failure to state a claim. The District Court granted that motion but gave Wheeler leave to amend

. 4 He did so and reframed his § 1983 claim s against Strelish as being for Fourth Amendment and due process violations
based on malicious prosecution an d false arrest , though he continued to press what is arguably a more general due process claim

. Strelish filed another motion to dismiss , again for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The District Court

3 Chad was charged with both second and third degree misdemeanor simple assault, while Wheeler was charged with only third degree misdemeanor simple assault.

4 By consent of the parties, the matter was adjudicated by a magistrate judge.4

granted that motion and de clined to exercise jurisdiction over the pende nt state claims against Chad

. This timely appeal followed.
II. Discussion 5
Wheeler contends that the District Court erred in dismiss ing his claims against Trooper Strelish. Our review of the order of dismissal is plenary. Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015)

. A. The Court Properly Dismiss ed Wheeler’s Fourth Amendment Claims Based on Malicious Prosecution and False Arrest 6
In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we consider t he well

- pleaded allegations of the complaint, 7 accept ing factual allegations as true and draw ing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 174

. “W e are not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a leg al conclusion couched as a factual

5 Being pr imarily a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this case was subject to the jurisdiction of the District Court under 2 8 U.S.C. §§ 13 31 and 1343

. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

6 Wheeler’s complaint that he suffered malici ous prosecution and false arrest in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in relevant part, [e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subje cts ... any citizen of the United States

... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law , suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress

... .
7 As noted later, infra n.10, we may also rely, when relevant, on any documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and any matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick , 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).5

allegation. ” Morrow v. Balaski , 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a claim t o relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Fleisher
v. Standard Ins. Co. , 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007))

. To state such a “plausible” claim, a plaintiff must plead sufficient fact s to permit a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence establishing each element of the relevant cause of action

– in this case malicious prosecution and false arrest

.

“ To prove malicious prosecution ... a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendan t
initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent w ith the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding. ” Johnson v. Kno rr , 477 F.3d 75, 81

- 82 (3d Cir. 2007). T he District Court dismissed Wheeler’s complaint based on a failure to ple ad facts supporting a lack of probable cause, and we likewise focus on that element , which is dispositive of both the malicious prosecution and false arrest allegations

. 8

8 Because a lack of probable cause is an element of the prima facie case that Wheeler must establish, whether couched in terms of malicious prosecution or false arrest, and because the absence of that element is as fatal to the false

- arrest variety of his Fourth Amendment claim, s ee James v. City of Wilkes

- Barre , 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012) (“To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.”) , as it is the mal icious

- prosecution variety, we address only the latter. Although the existence of probable cause in a suit such as this is generally a question for the jury,6

Wheeler was required to plead facts that make it plausible that Trooper Strelish
la cked probable cause to arrest him. While a plaintiff need only plead fact s “ sufficient to
show that [he] ha s ‘ a plausible claim for relief, ’ ” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside , 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009 ) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 55 6 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)) , h e cannot rest upon “formulaic recitation of th e elements of a cause of action, ” and a d istrict c ourt
need not credit such statements. Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555 . Thus, although Wheeler
asserted in his complaint that Strelish initiated charges “not based up on probable cause,”
the District Court wa s under no obligat ion to accept that legal conclusion as true. Beyond
such bald conclusory allegations, Wheeler’s federal claims revolve around how the investigation was conducted , yet he makes no allegations tha t call into question whether Strelish had probable cause to arrest him for his role in the altercation. For example,

amo ng the facts Wheeler pled about Strelish’s investigation are that Strelish “refused” to hear Wheeler and his wife’s story of how the al tercation occurred or to visit the scene of
the incident with Wheeler , (App. at 24a. ¶ 16 ) , or to retrieve Wheeler’s medical records,
and that he threatened to have Wheeler “evaluated” for asking abo ut the charges that
Chad would face , ( Id. at 24a

. ¶ 17)

. 9 N one of th o se factual assertions , even if true,

“a district court ma y conclude that probable cause exists as a matter of law if the evidence, vie wed most favorably to Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a contrary factual finding ... .” Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist. , 211 F.3d 782, 788

- 89 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation s omitted).

9 Wheeler also goes on, at length, about Strelish’s allege d reduction of the “charge” against Chad. That focus is curious , as there is no explanation, either in the complaint or in the appellate briefing, of how the charges brought against Chad in any7

suggest that Strelish lacked probable cause to believe that Wheeler had committed the
offense s with which he was charged. Probable cause requires only that Strelish had
concluded there was “a probability o r substantial chance ” of the criminal activity in question. United States v. Miknevich , 638 F.3d 178, 185 (3d Cir. 2011) ( internal quotations and citations omitted ).
T he judicial record in Wheeler’s criminal case further undermines his argument

. T he D istrict Court properly took judicial notice of the state court docket in the very prosecution Wheeler claims was malicious

. 10 That record shows that, following the preliminary hearing, Wheeler ’s prosecution was scheduled for trial

. In determining
whether a case will proceed in Pennsylvania, one of the judicial tasks at the preliminary hearing is to determine “whether there is a prima facie case that (1) an offense has been committed and (2) the defendant has committed it .” 234 Pa. Code § 542(D). That

sta ndard is akin to the standard for probable cause, which requires only that a “ reasonable
person [would] b elieve that an offense has been ... committed by the person

... arrested .”
Merkle , 211 F.3d at 788 (internal quotation omitted). Consequently, the Pennsy lvania

way affected Strelish’s probable cause calculus as it relates to the arrest and prosecution of Wheeler.

10 While a District Court is generally limited to a plaintiff’s complaint in ass essing a motion to dismiss, it may take judicial notice of public records, including records of judicial proceedings. Sands , 502 F.3 d at 268. More specifically, when a document is “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint [, it] may be considered without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig. , 114 F.3 d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). Because Wheeler’s complaint alleges that his state prosecution was malicious, the District Court was permitted to consider the documentation of court action in that prosecution in assessing the mo tion to dismiss.8

court’s decision to schedule Wheeler for trial is evidence of an independent, contemporaneous judicial determination that there was sufficient probable cause to justify try ing Wheeler for assault and harassment

. In contrast, Wheeler has not alle ge d any facts that would give the District Court ,

or us , any reason to question Strelish’s probable cause conclusion

. That being so , the District Court was right to conclude that Wheeler failed to adequately plead the “lack of probable cause” element of h is Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution and false arrest
claim

. B. T he District Court Properly Dismissed Wheeler’s

Fourteenth Amendment Claim Wheeler also ar g u es that the District Court erred in dismissing his Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due pr ocess claim

. The most straightforward reading of Wheeler’s complaint is that his substantive due process claim is a restating of his

a llegations of malicious prosecution and false arrest

. 11 The less repetitive but more confounding reading (asserted on app eal as a clarification of how the complaint is “meant
to read” ) is that there was some substantive due process violation based on a deprivation
of Wheeler’s “liberty interest in his personal security and well

- being.” ( Opening Br. at
22 ) However interpret ed, the claim lacks merit. Looking first to Wheeler’s allegation of a substantive due process violation based

on the Fourth Amendment claim we have just discussed, it is plain that the claim fares no

11 This argument appears only in the original complaint , which was dismissed in response to Strelish’s first 12(b)(6) motion on June 24, 2014. Th e relevant claim was reframed in the amended complaint to reflect a Fourth Amendment violat ion.9

better in Fourteenth Amendment garb

. The Supreme Cou rt has noted that , “[w]here a particular Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these
claims.” Albright v. Oliver , 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). More specifically, redress for alleged false arrest or malicious prosecution “ cannot be based on substantive due process considerations, but in stead must be based on a provision of the Bill of Rights ” such as the Fourth Amendment

. Merkle , 211 F.3d at 792

. The alternative reading of Wheeler’ s substantive due process claim

– the “personal security and well

- bei ng” reading put forth on appeal (O pening Br. at 22)

– is similarly unsupported in law. The only case cited by Wh eeler for the idea that there exists a freestanding “personal security and well

- being” liberty interest is inapposite , as it relates to the unique circumstance in which a state has a juvenile in its custody and an attendant obligation to care for that juvenile

. A.M. v. Luzerne Cty

. Juvenile Det

. Ctr

. , 372 F.3d 572, 579 (3d Cir. 2004). The due process concerns in such a circumstance are not implicated in a run
- of

- the

- mill assaul t charge prosecution that, from the record, appears to have included not a single moment of actual detention. As a result, the dismissal of Wheeler’s substantive due process claim was appropriate. 12

12 Wheeler also complains about the District Court’s decision to dis miss hi s pendant state law claims. As Wheeler correctly notes, though, any jurisdiction the District Court would have over his state law claims would be under its discretionary jur isdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The statute is unequivocal that a court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when “the d istrict court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “ W e rev iew the District10

III. Conclusion For the forgoing reasons, we will affir m
.

Court ’ s refusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction [ over state law claims ] for abuse of discretion .” Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc. , 188 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1999)

. Wheeler’s only argument on this issue is that the underlying dism issal of his federal claims was erroneous, and thus the dismissal of the state law claims was similarly in error. Because we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the federal claims, and Wheeler points to no other potential abuse of the Court’s discret ion, we also affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Wheeler’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).