III 

109TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION S. RES. 91 

Urging the European Union to maintain its arms export embargo on the 

People’s Republic of China. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MARCH 17, 2005 

Mr. SMITH (for himself, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. BROWNBACK, Mr. KYL, Mr. 

CHAMBLISS, Mr. ENSIGN, Mrs. DOLE, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. LIEBERMAN, 

and Mr. ALLEN) submitted the following resolution; which was considered 

and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

Urging the European Union to maintain its arms export 

embargo on the People’s Republic of China. 

Whereas, on June 4, 1989, the Communist Government of 

the People’s Republic of China ordered the People’s Liberation Army to carry out an unprovoked, brutal assault 

on thousands of peaceful and unarmed demonstrators in 

Tiananmen Square, resulting in hundreds of deaths and 

thousands of injuries; 

Whereas, on June 5, 1989, President George H. W. Bush 

condemned these actions of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and the United States took several concrete steps to respond to the military assault, including suspending all exports of items on the United 

States Munitions List to the People’s Republic of China; 
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Whereas, on June 27, 1989, the European Union (then called 

the European Community) imposed an arms embargo on 

the People’s Republic of China in response to the Government of China’s brutal repression of protestors calling for 

democratic and political reform; 

Whereas the European Council, in adopting that embargo, 

‘‘strongly condemn[ed] the brutal repression taking place 

in China’’ and ‘‘solemnly request[ed] the Chinese authorities to put an end to the repressive actions against those 

who legitimately claim their democratic rights’’; 

Whereas the poor human rights conditions that precipitated 

the decisions of the United States and the European 

Union to impose and maintain their respective embargoes 

have not improved; 

Whereas the Department of State 2004 Country Reports on 

Human Rights Practices states that, during 2004, ‘‘[t]he 

[Chinese] Government’s human rights record remained 

poor, and the Government continued to commit numerous 

and serious abuses’’; 

Whereas, according to the same Department of State report, 

credible sources estimated that hundreds of persons remained in prison in the People’s Republic of China for 

their activities during the June 1989 Tiananmen demonstrations; 

Whereas the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

continues to maintain that its crackdown on democracy 

activists in Tiananmen Square was warranted and remains unapologetic for its brutal actions, as demonstrated by that Government’s handling of the recent 

death of former Premier and Communist Party General 

Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, who had been under house ar-
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rest for 15 years because of his objection to the 1989 

Tiananmen crackdown; 

Whereas, since December 2003, the European Parliament, 

the legislative arm of the European Union, has rejected 

in five separate resolutions the lifting of the European 

Union arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China 

because of continuing human rights concerns in China; 

Whereas the February 24, 2005, resolution passed by the 

European Parliament stated that the Parliament ‘‘believes that unless and until there is a significant improvement in the human rights situation in China, it would be 

wrong for the EU to envisage any lifting [of] its embargo 

on arms sales to China, imposed in 1989’’ and that it 

‘‘requests that the Commission formally oppose such a 

move when it is discussed in the [European] Council’’; 

Whereas the governments of a number of European Union 

member states have individually expressed concern about 

lifting the European Union arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China, and several have passed resolutions of opposition in their national parliaments; 

Whereas the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, as a non-binding set of principles, is insufficient to 

control European arms exports to the People’s Republic 

of China; 

Whereas public statements by some major defense firms in 

Europe and other indicators suggest that such firms intend to increase military sales to the People’s Republic 

of China if the European Union lifts its arms embargo 

on that country; 

Whereas the Department of Defense fiscal year 2004 Annual 

Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of 
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China found that ‘‘[e]fforts underway to lift the European Union (EU) embargo on China will provide additional opportunities to acquire specific technologies from 

Western suppliers’’; 

Whereas the same Department of Defense report noted that 

the military modernization and build-up of the People’s 

Republic of China is aimed at increasing the options of 

the Government of the People’s Republic of China to intimidate or attack democratic Taiwan, as well as preventing or disrupting third-party intervention, namely by 

the United States, in a cross-strait military crisis; 

Whereas the June 2004, report to Congress of the congressionally-mandated, bipartisan United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded that 

‘‘there has been a dramatic change in the military balance between China and Taiwan,’’ and that ‘‘[i]n the 

past few years, China has increasingly developed a quantitative and qualitative advantage over Taiwan’’; 

Whereas the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) 

codifies in United States law the basis for continued relations between the United States and Taiwan, affirmed 

that the decision of the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China was 

based on the expectation that the future of Taiwan would 

be determined by peaceful means; 

Whereas the balance of power in the Taiwan Straits and, specifically, the military capabilities of the People’s Republic 

of China, directly affect peace and security in the East 

Asia and Pacific region; 

Whereas the Foreign Minister of Japan, Nobutaka 

Machimura, recently stated that Japan is opposed to the 
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European Union lifting its embargo against the People’s 

Republic of China and that ‘‘[i]t is extremely worrying as 

this issue concerns peace and security environments not 

only in Japan but also in East Asia as a whole’’; 

Whereas the United States has numerous security interests 

in the East Asia and Pacific region, and the United 

States Armed Forces, which are deployed throughout the 

region, would be adversely affected by any Chinese military aggression; 

Whereas the lifting of the European Union arms embargo on 

the People’s Republic of China would increase the risk 

that United States troops could face military equipment 

and technology of Western or United States origin in a 

cross-strait military conflict; 

Whereas this risk would necessitate a reevaluation by the 

United States Government of procedures for licensing 

arms and dual-use exports to member states of the European Union in order to attempt to prevent the reexport 

or retransfer of United States exports from such countries to the People’s Republic of China; 

Whereas the report of the United States-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission on the Symposia on Transatlantic Perspectives on Economic and Security Relations 

with China, held in Brussels, Belgium and Prague, Czech 

Republic from November 29, 2004, through December 3, 

2004, recommended that the United States Government 

continue to press the European Union to maintain the 

arms embargo on the People’s Republic of China and 

strengthen its arms export control system, as well as 

place limitations on United States public and private sector defense cooperation with foreign firms that sell sensitive military technology to China; 
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Whereas the lax export control practices of the People’s Republic of China and the continuing proliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles by state-sponsored entities in China remain 

a serious concern of the Government of the United 

States; 

Whereas the People’s Republic of China remains a primary 

supplier of weapons to countries such as Burma and 

Sudan where, according to the United States Commission 

on International Religious Freedom, the military has 

played a key role in the oppression of religious and ethnic 

minorities; 

Whereas the most recent Central Intelligence Agency Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, found that ‘‘Chinese entities continued to 

work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related 

projects during the second half of 2003,’’ and that 

‘‘[d]uring 2003, China remained a primary supplier of 

advanced conventional weapons to Pakistan, Sudan, and 

Iran’’; 

Whereas, as recently as December 27, 2004, the Government 

of the United States determined that seven entities or 

persons in the People’s Republic of China, including several state-owned companies involved in China’s militaryindustrial complex, are subject to sanctions under the 

Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–178; 

50 U.S.C. 1701 note) for sales to Iran of prohibited 

equipment or technology; 
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Whereas the authority under the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 

2000 to impose sanctions on Chinese persons or entities 

was used 23 times in 2004; and 

Whereas the assistance provided by these entities to Iran 

works directly counter to the efforts of the United States 

Government and several European governments to curb 

illicit weapons activities in Iran: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) strongly supports the United States embar3 go on the People’s Republic of China; 

4 (2) strongly urges the European Union to con5 tinue its ban on all arms exports to the People’s Re6 public of China; 

7 (3) requests that the President raise United 

8 States objections to the potential lifting of the Euro9 pean Union arms embargo against the People’s Re10 public of China in any upcoming meetings with Eu11 ropean officials; 

12 (4) encourages the Government of the United 

13 States to make clear in discussions with representa14 tives of the national governments of European 

15 Union member states that a lifting of the European 

16 Union embargo on arms sales to the People’s Repub17 lic of China would potentially adversely affect trans18 atlantic defense cooperation, including future trans19 fers of United States military technology, services, 

20 and equipment to European Union countries; 
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1 (5) urges the European Union— 

2 (A) to strengthen, enforce, and maintain 

3 its arms embargo on the People’s Republic of 

4 China and in its Code of Conduct on Arms Ex5 ports; 

6 (B) to make its Code of Conduct on Arms 

7 Exports legally binding and enforceable in all 

8 European Union member states; 

9 (C) to more carefully regulate and monitor 

10 the end-use of exports of sensitive military and 

11 dual-use technology; and 

12 (D) to increase transparency in its arms 

13 and dual-use export control regimes; 

14 (6) deplores the ongoing human rights abuses 

15 in the People’s Republic of China; and 

16 (7) urges the United States Government and 

17 the European Union to cooperatively develop a com18 mon strategy to seek— 

19 (A) improvement in the human rights con20 ditions in the People’s Republic of China; 

21 (B) an end to the military build-up of the 

22 People’s Republic of China aimed at Taiwan; 

23 (C) a permanent and verifiable end to the 

24 ongoing proliferation by state and non-state 

25 owned entities and individuals in the People’s 
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1 Republic of China of munitions, materials, and 

2 military equipment and the trade in such items 

3 involving countries, such as Burma and Sudan, 

4 whose armies have played a role in the per5 petration of violations of human rights and of 

6 humanitarian law against members of ethnic 

7 and religious minorities; 

8 (D) improvement in the administration and 

9 enforcement of export controls in the People’s 

10 Republic of China; and 

11 (E) an end to the ongoing proliferation by 

12 state and non-state owned entities and individ13 uals in the People’s Republic of China of tech14 nology related to conventional weapons, weap15 ons of mass destruction, and ballistic missiles. 

Æ