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86–146 PDF 2014

S. HRG. 113–135

COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES AND PRIORITIES:

ADDRESSING THE EVOLVING THREAT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MARCH 20, 2013

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

JOHN McCAIN, Arizona 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

DANIEL E. O’BRIEN, Staff Director

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Republican Staff Director

(II)

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C O N T E N T S 

Page

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 2

Harman, Hon. Jane, director, president, and CEO, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Member, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC ......................................................................................... 3

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5

Leiter, Hon. Michael E., senior counselor to the chief executive officer, 

Palantir Technologies, former director of the National Counterterrorism 

Center, McLean, VA ............................................................................................. 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening statement .... 1

Wainstein, Hon. Kenneth L., partner, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, LLP, 

former Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Washington, DC ................................................................................. 13

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 15

(III)

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(1)

COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES AND PRIORITIES: ADDRESSING THE EVOLVING THREAT 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20, 2013 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:35 p.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert Menendez 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Menendez, Murphy, Kaine, and Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

Let me first apologize to our panel. There are some things 

beyond my control, like when we vote. Unfortunately, a series of 

votes were called for 2:15, which is when we would have been in 

the midst of the hearing, and I thought they were going to end by 

4 o’clock, by my calculation; but, sometimes the best calculations 

in the world go challenged. We just had the last vote, on continuing 

to keep the government open. So, I appreciate your forbearance, 

your willingness to stay and enrich the committee with your knowledge. And you have our thanks and our gratitude for waiting. 

Today, as we investigate counterterrorism policies and priorities 

to address the evolving threat we face, we want to thank our panelists for being here today. 

We know the core of al-Qaeda has been significantly degraded. 

We know that Ayman al-Zawahiri is not Osama bin Laden, and 

that the central organization is, as many have stated, on a path of 

decline that will be difficult to reverse. But, the threat that 

remains is now decentralized. We still live in a challenging world. 

Al-Qaeda affiliates and other emerging extremist groups still pose 

a threat to the United States and our national interests. 

Last week, this committee held a classified hearing, with Under 

Secretary Wendy Sherman and NCTC Director Matt Olsen, to gain 

a deeper understanding of the threats we face, the true extent of 

the links between and among extremist groups, and what that 

means for U.S. national interests. 

From Al Qaeda in Iraq to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, from 

al-Shabaab to Lashkar-e-Taiba, emerging extremist groups use

al-Qaeda ties for financial assistance, training, arms, and messaging purposes. At the same time, they are often pursuing independent goals. Groups like Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 

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have emerged as one of the most dangerous threats to the United 

States, targeting the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, and making at least 

three unsuccessful attempts to bomb airlines over United States 

airspace. 

We also know that many of these extremist groups are internally 

divided, torn between a local agenda and more global set of goals. 

We need an effective strategy to counter these new threats without 

losing sight of al-Qaeda’s beleaguered core in Pakistan. 

Finally, the threat from extremist groups is not just a military 

and intelligence challenge, it is a foreign policy challenge, as well. 

We ask our diplomats to operate in often dangerous, high-threat 

areas made all the more unpredictable by these extremist groups. 

As we think through ways to better protect our diplomats, we must 

also consider ways to make our foreign policy more resilient to 

these ever-changing and irregular threats. We need to look at every 

tool in our toolkit, from development efforts to long-term governance-building initiatives. From Somalia to Mali, we have seen that 

weak governance only adds fuel to the proverbial fire. It gives 

extremist groups the space they need to train, recruit, and plan. 

We also need to refine our efforts to understand and address root 

causes of extremism and better target the recruitment pipeline, 

and we need to strengthen and build our global partnerships. In 

my view, we need to take a step back and look at the whole board, 

and see the whole picture from every angle if we are to develop a 

comprehensive counterterrorism policy, and that is why we are 

here today. 

The questions before us are clear. Yes, we have had tremendous 

success in decimating al-Qaeda, but the threats have shifted, and 

we need to know to what extent these new threats put us and our 

allies at risk. Given this new paradigm, do we need to revisit our 

approaches and reassess our overall strategy? How has the Arab 

Spring and other recent events changed both the threats and our 

options? 

To answer these questions today, we are fortunate to have three 

highly knowledgeable witnesses: Congresswoman Jane Harman, 

the director, president, and CEO of the Woodrow Wilson Center for 

International Scholars, and a former nine-term Congresswoman 

from California who has served on the Armed Services, Intelligence, and Homeland Security Committees; Mike Leiter, who is 

currently the senior counselor to the chief executive of Palantir 

Technologies, and the former Director of the National Counterterrorism Center under Presidents Bush and Obama; and Ken 

Wainstein, currently a partner at Cadwalader, and formerly the 

Assistant to President Bush for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. 

Again, thanks to all of you. 

Let me turn to the Ranking Member, Senator Corker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER,

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

Senator CORKER. Thank you all. And our apologies for what has 

happened today. I think you know we had a CR that took a little 

longer than the norm, but we are glad you are here. And this will 

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play a role as we shape things, going forward, even at 4:35 in the 

afternoon. So, thank you very much. 

Today, the Foreign Relations Committee is convening its second 

counterterrorism hearing of the 113th Congress, and its first open 

hearing on these matters. 

Given recent events around the world, and the growing influence 

of the al-Qaeda brand in places such as Syria and North and West 

Africa, I think the chairman’s decision to hold these hearings is 

timely. 

I recently traveled to North and West Africa, where I had a 

chance to meet with key foreign leaders, our State Department, 

and other U.S. Government personnel to discuss with them the 

evolving threat posed by al-Qaeda, both in Africa and around the 

world. What struck me most clearly, when considering groups like 

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, is that the evolution of al-Qaeda 

really requires an evolution of our response and strategy. 

First, the United States cannot do it all on its own. We must 

work with other countries around the world, not just Western countries, but the countries in which al-Qaeda operates, no matter how 

difficult. Poorly governed and ungoverned space presents an especially difficult challenge in this respect. 

Second, the evolution of al-Qaeda from a core-based entity to one 

that has nodes around the world presents an entirely different 

challenge than what we understood to be the threat in the aftermath of 9/11. I hope this hearing will allow us to have a full and 

frank discussion about the evolving threat posed by al-Qaeda, and 

the U.S. Government’s response to this threat. 

In particular, I would like to discuss the need for Congress to 

play a more active role in authorizing the use of force, in this conflict as well as others, and the need for Congress to help set appropriate policies for confronting these threats. We must ask and 

answer whether the act of Congress, over a decade ago, that sought 

to address the threat of al-Qaeda meets the requirements of today. 

We must also ask whether it is appropriate for Congress to play 

what has been largely a consultive role in the process of our prosecution of this war against al-Qaeda, and whether that meets our 

constitutional duties. 

I hope this hearing is the beginning of an effort by this committee, which has an exclusive jurisdiction in authorizing the use 

of force, to look at these hard issues and to make the tough calls 

that we were elected to make on behalf of the American people. 

And I thank you and look forward to your testimony today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

With that, let me invite Congresswoman Harman to start off. 

Your full statements will be entered into the record, and we will 

look forward to having a conversation with you once you are 

finished. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JANE HARMAN, DIRECTOR, PRESIDENT, 

AND CEO, WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR 

SCHOLARS, FORMER MEMBER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 

Corker. I served with both of you during my long time on the Hill, 

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and I commend you both for staying in the game. And I hope you 

voted to keep the Government open. Did you? 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Ms. HARMAN. That is a relief. Then it was worth waiting. 

The CHAIRMAN. That is a bipartisan ‘‘yes,’’ so——

Ms. HARMAN. As the former Member of Congress, here, I will 

defer to my good friends for more of the tactical discussion, but I 

thought I would raise a bigger policy issue, at least it is one that 

troubles me, because I think that the Foreign Relations Committee 

needs to consider this, beyond just the assertion of kinetic power, 

to defeat—and we have defeated—some of these enemies. And as 

I reflect on my own role, and the role of many who tried to keep 

us safe after 9/11, I think we got the tactics right, but my point 

today is, we got the strategy wrong. We have yet to develop a narrative, a positive-sum roadmap for where we are going and why 

others will benefit by joining us. 

Stan McChrystal recently was interviewed by Foreign Affairs 

magazine, and he nailed it, at least the way I think about it. He 

said that, when he first was involved with Iraq and Afghanistan, 

he asked, ‘‘Where’s the enemy?’’ As things evolved, he then asked, 

‘‘Who is the enemy?’’ Then he asked, ‘‘What is the enemy trying to 

do?’’ And finally, the question that he asked was, ‘‘Why is he the 

enemy?’’ And that is something that is sobering and I really think 

we have to think about. 

I am betting you agree with me that we cannot kill our way to 

victory, because kinetics alone are more likely to inflame than persuade. But, what is the United States doing to persuade? Are we 

coordinated? Are we delivering the same message? I want to say 

our tactics have had an impact. And, as you said, Mr. Chairman, 

we have certainly decimated core al-Qaeda. But, now al-Qaeda has 

morphed into a more horizontal organization, and the question is, 

Is that growing? And are some of the things we are doing causing 

it to grow? 

I think I will skip how the threat has changed, because you will 

hear it from my friends, but just to point out that the 10th issue 

of Inspire magazine is back online and as savvy as ever. Extremist 

digital natives have also created something called Muslim Mali. It 

is a computer game that simulates aerial combat against French 

fighter jets and is designed to inspire fellow extremists to take up 

arms against the French. Once a user clicks ‘‘Play,’’ an Arabic message appears with the words, ‘‘Muslim brother, go ahead and repel 

the French invasion against Muslim Mali.’’ And this kind of propaganda is appearing in many places. And to beat this propaganda, 

we really have to win the argument with some kid in the rural 

parts of Yemen deciding whether to strap on a suicide vest or join 

society. And what I am saying is, we may not be winning that 

argument. 

So, quickly, let me just go to some recommendations. 

First, stop piecemeal counterterrorism policy and implementation. Stop stovepiped one-off CT efforts and create a whole-ofgovernment strategy. Give the Department of State’s CT Bureau 

more support to do its job. This is within your jurisdiction. The 

Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Countering Violent Extremism 

Grants, and coordinating efforts through the Center for Strategic 

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Counterterrorism Communications, all a mouthful, are important, 

but not adequate. A more robust CT Bureau could help us better 

find the gaps in our nonkinetic efforts, and to fill those gaps. 

Two, smarter investments. Carefully analyze foreign aid budgets 

and find ways to plus-up funds to countries that need it most, and 

resist funding flavor-of-the-month countries. 

Third, live our values. Our actions really do speak louder than 

words. Semantics like ‘‘rendition,’’ ‘‘enhanced interrogation,’’ ‘‘targeted killing’’ fuel the terror propaganda machine. We have a perception problem and have to apply a matrix of our interests and 

our values, and test it against our future engagements. Again, we 

have got to win the argument, not just play ‘‘Whac-a-Mole.’’ We 

need a public conversation about tactics and strategy, and that is 

what this hearing is designed to do, and I commend you for holding 

it. 

Fourth, reduce overclassification of intelligence. Far too much 

information is classified. Instead of safeguarding our secrets, we 

are actually preventing ourselves from seeing the bigger threat picture. One of my last accomplishments in Congress was to author 

something called the Reducing Overclassification Act, which President Obama signed in October 2010. I do not really know that it 

has led to much. I still think this problem needs attention. 

Finally, we have to drain the swamp. And, as a scholar at the 

Wilson Center, Aaron David Miller, suggests, we will reduce the 

pool of potential terrorists by encouraging reform efforts by authoritarian governments. Secretary Kerry understands this, and hopefully will implement it. 

In conclusion, I urge you to play a major role in developing this 

overdue strategy. After all, it is foreign relationships, not more foreign enemies, that we need. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Harman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JANE HARMAN

TACTICS V. STRATEGY

It is fitting that this committee—the Foreign Relations Committee—is holding 

this hearing. As I reflect on my own role and the role of many who tried just as 

hard to keep us safe after 9/11, we got many of the tactics right but the strategy 

wrong. We have yet to develop a narrative, a positive-sum roadmap for where we 

are going and why others will benefit by joining with us. 

Retired General Stanley McChrystal—former head of Special Operations Command and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan—recently 

nailed it. In an interview in Foreign Affairs on Iraq and Afghanistan, he first asked 

‘‘Where is the enemy?’’ As the engagement evolved, he asked ‘‘Who is the enemy?’’ 

Then, ‘‘What is the enemy trying to do?’’ Finally, he realized the question we most 

needed to answer was: ‘‘Why is he the enemy?’’ 

This realization is bone-chilling. Many senior policymakers know we cannot kill 

our way to victory—because kinetics alone are more likely to inflame than persuade. 

But what is the United States doing to persuade? Are we coordinated in our actions? 

Are we delivering the same message? 

Our tactics have an impact—and playing whack-a-mole will not win the argument 

with the kid in rural Syria or Yemen deciding whether or not to strap on a suicide 

vest. 

EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT

How has the threat evolved over time? We all know that what once was a highly 

centralized structure—Core Al Qaeda leadership—has been decimated. But, rather 

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than disappear, it has morphed into a decentralized horizontal organization—composed mainly of so-called ‘‘affiliates.’’

Our adversaries—many of them young, digital natives—have spent the past few 

years—while the United States focused on eliminating core leadership—building up 

their propaganda elements and their recruiting shop. Smaller scale, easier to accomplish attacks are now the name of the game—in an effort to cause as much chaos 

as possible. 

Inspire magazine is back online and as savvy as ever. Extremist digital natives 

have created a ‘‘Muslim Mali’’ computer game that simulates aerial combat against 

French fighter jets, and is designed to inspire fellow extremists to take up arms 

against the French. Once a user clicks ‘‘play,’’ an Arabic message appears with the 

words, ‘‘Muslim Brother, go ahead and repel the French invasion against Muslim 

Mali.’’

These digital natives can sit in their homes or computer cafes anywhere in the 

world. What really keeps me up at night? That this generation will turn to cyber 

attacks—even small ones, because the information is sitting right at their fingertips. 

Let me be clear: the United States is not just facing Chinese hackers seeking ballistic missile blueprints or Russian hackers trying to steal credit card numbers. We 

also face nonstate actors who have drunk the al-Qaeda Kool-Aid. 

THE NEXT TEN YEARS

Despite astonishing adaptation since 9/11—including a massive reform of the intelligence community, in which I played a fairly big role—Uncle Sam is still built 

for yesterday’s threats. 

So, what do we do? 

Christopher Paul of the RAND Corporation says: ‘‘The trick . . . is to apprehend 

or otherwise deal with [the] residual threat without creating a chain of events that 

renews motivations for participation and support.’’

Here are my recommendations: 

1. Stop piecemeal counterterrorism policy and implementation 

• Stop stovepiped, one-off CT efforts and create a whole-of-government strategy. 

Excuses about bureaucratic inertia and the number of people involved should 

not stop us from doing what is necessary. This includes our cyber defenses. 

• Give the Department of State’s CT Bureau more support to do its job. The 

Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Countering Violent Extremism grants, and 

coordinating efforts through the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications are all important but just not enough. A more robust CT Bureau could 

help us better find gaps in our nonkinetic efforts and fill them. 

2. Smarter investments 

Carefully analyze the foreign aid budgets and find ways to plus-up funds to the 

countries that need it most—and resist funding for the flavor-of-the-month countries. Foreign aid is in many cases the only leverage we have—and should have serious strings attached. This will also be a very difficult task—and requires a clear, 

reasoned message to the American people about why such targeted investments are 

necessary for the U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, has urged similar efforts as 

has a senior Republican Senator. 

3. Live our values 

• Our actions really do speak louder than words. It should be no wonder that the 

semantics America used in the past—when extra judicial kidnapping became 

‘‘rendition,’’ torture became ‘‘enhanced interrogation,’’ and assassination became 

‘‘targeted killing’’—only fueled the terror propaganda machine. We have a perception problem. 

• We must apply a matrix of our interests and our values, and test against it our 

future engagements. Then we stand a better chance at defeating the negative 

narrative being created about us. That means paying more than lip service to 

privacy protections, and considering legal protections, especially regarding ‘‘Big 

Data.’’ Trying more terror suspects in U.S. Federal courts—like Sulaiman Abu 

Ghaith—is also the right move. 

• We need a public conversation about tactics and strategy, and Congress should 

legislate clear limits. Self-policing by the executive branch was wrong in the 

Bush 43 administration, and is wrong now. I have recently suggested that FISA 

could be adapted to cover drones and offensive cyber. 

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4. Reduce overclassification of intelligence 

• Far too much information is classified. Instead of safeguarding our secrets, we 

are actually preventing ourselves from seeing the bigger threat picture. If we 

can’t see all the ‘‘dots’’ of intelligence, how could we hope to get ahead of future 

threats? 

5. Drain the swamp 

• As Wilson Center Scholar Aaron David Miller suggests, we will reduce the pool 

of potential terrorists by encouraging reform efforts by authoritarian governments. Secretary Kerry’s efforts to persuade the Egyptians to move forward 

with reforms are an example of what we need more of. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I urge this committee to play a major role in developing this overdue strategy. After all, it is foreign relationships—not more foreign enemies—that 

we need.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Leiter. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. LEITER, SENIOR COUNSELOR TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, PALANTIR 

TECHNOLOGIES, FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL 

COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, MCLEAN, VA 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Corker, members 

of the committee, thanks for having me. 

I would note that, in my 4 years at the National Counterterrorism Center, I do not believe I ever testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which, I have to tell you, is not a good 

sign, and I think it is a good sign that you are holding these hearings today and the Director of NCTC is here before you, because 

this is not just an intel, not just an Armed Services issue, this is 

very much for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. So, I am 

very happy you are doing it. 

In my written testimony, I go through, in some detail, my assessment of the threat. I am not going to rehash that here, but I do 

want to highlight a few things. 

First of all, in my view, we are in a better position to detect and 

disrupt a catastrophic attack like we saw on 9/11 than anytime 

since 2001. We have done very, very well in this fight. 

That being said, as both of you have already noted, we do face 

a fragmented threat, but I would urge this committee not to read 

too much into some of the recent events. They are undoubtedly 

tragic; I do not mean to minimize the attack in Benghazi and the 

death of four Americans, the attack in Algeria, the rise of AQIM. 

But, in terms of large-scale, catastrophic threats to the homeland, 

these are not anywhere remotely on the same page. They threaten 

U.S. interests. We will always, have always, and will continue to 

face threats in these regions. We must continue to battle the terrorists, as Jane Harman said, drain the swamp, all these things; 

but, on average, I think we should actually be enormously proud 

of the Congress, the executive branch, and, to some extent, the 

courts, in enabling a fight against terrorism that has been pretty 

successful. 

Now, I do want to highlight a couple of areas where I think we 

do face enormous challenges. We have mentioned North Africa 

already. I think the other key place that we have to really recognize a huge threat to the United States is Syria and what we see 

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in the al-Nusra Front. We are seeing a magnet for foreign fighters, 

and we see enormous instability and tension between Shias and 

Sunnis, with access to weapons of mass destruction. And this is, if 

not an existential threat, certainly an existential threat to our interests in the region. 

Second, one that is, unfortunately, often forgotten in these hearings, Hezbollah. And especially as tensions increase between the 

United States, Iran, and Israel, and what was going on in Syria, 

we have to keep our eye on Hezbollah, who has gotten increasingly 

aggressive, both with kinetic strikes—the attack in Bulgaria, killing Israeli tourists—and also, destructive cyber attacks against 

Saudi Aramco and RasGas in Qatar. Both of these are signs that 

Hezbollah is, indeed, moving toward a more aggressive approach; 

the United States and our allies. 

Now, with that, let me offer four quick observations on things 

that I think this committee should, in fact, focus on; vis-a-vis, terrorism, writ large. 

First, after 10-plus years, we really do, I believe, face a terrorism 

fatigue problem. And that is, we have been talking about this for 

10 years, and people want to move on. And that poses a real challenge, because we need to have discussions to make sure that our 

tools to combat terrorism are on a solid footing. In that regard, I 

am extremely heartened about the conversations we have seen in 

the public and with Congress over the past several months about 

targeted killings and potentially reforming the authorization for 

use of military force. I believe these are exactly the conversations 

we need to have so these do have a strong footing for the years to 

come. 

Second, for terrorism fatigue, I am extremely worried that, with 

every terrorist attack, we now view it as a systemic failure rather 

than, to some extent, a fact of life in counterterrorism work. And 

I am all for examining these events after the fact to see how we 

can do better, but I would plead with this committee that these do 

not become ex-post investigations and excoriations of terrorism professionals, because it will chase the good people out of government. 

Last, I do think that terrorism fatigue affects the executive 

branch, and I am very worried that things that the executive 

branch needs to push on quickly and hard, like informationsharing, fall by the wayside. 

Second significant issue: weapons of mass destruction. We are, I 

think, faced with small-scale attacks, no matter what we do. These 

are tragic, but we will live with them, and we will prosper. Weapons with mass destruction pose a very different threat. And securing nuclear material, trying to prevent improvised nuclear devices, 

trying to prevent complex biological weapons attacks, they are lowprobability, but enormous-consequence events, and we must keep 

our eye on these things. And this committee has a huge role in that 

way. 

Third, counterterrorism partnerships. With terrorism fatigue has 

become a fatiguing of the partnerships that we rely on. And, as you 

said, Senator Corker, especially in regions of Middle East and 

North Africa, these partnerships, both in willingness and capacity, 

have frayed significantly, and we have to work very hard to work 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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closely with our partners to maintain them and maintain the programs within the U.S. Government to support those partners. 

And, last but not least, staying on the offense on all fronts. And, 

to me, that means continuing programs of targeting killing, where 

we have to take people off the battlefield, but, equally if not more 

importantly, expanding our efforts on soft power, because kinetic 

focus has, in fact, sapped much of the focus within the executive 

branch of putting the resources and the time and energy into those 

things that take time to, as Jane said, drain the swamp and reduce 

the attraction of terrorism. 

And last, covering all of these things, as you all know from having just voted on continuing to open the government, after 12 years 

we have poured—it is difficult to estimate, but probably about $100 

billion each year into counterterrorism efforts, including Iraq and 

Afghanistan. This money is not going to be there in the future. So, 

this is exactly the time that we have to do a far more rational look 

at mission-focused budgeting—not department by department, but 

mission—to understand where we can put our limited dollars that 

we have to get the biggest bang for the buck for the whole of the 

U.S. Government. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Leiter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. LEITER

OVERVIEW

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, and members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me to testify on my perspectives on the evolving threat of 

terrorism and how it can be best addressed by the United States and our allies. I 

believe now is an opportune time to take stock of the threat we face and our associated response. While we have made remarkable strides against the threat of catastrophic attacks like that which we experienced on 9/11, the continued presence of 

al-Qaeda in Yemen, the growing presence of al-Qaeda-associated elements in North 

Africa and Syria, and increased instability across North Africa and the Middle East 

highlight how the threat of terrorism continues. Combined with a fiscal reality that 

precludes the sort of spending we have maintained since 2001, this is a historic 

moment to rationalize and calibrate our response to terrorism and related threats 

to our national security. 

THE THREAT LANDSCAPE

Today al-Qaeda and its allies in Pakistan are at their weakest point since 9/11. 

The death of Osama bin Laden and the continued decimation of senior ranks has 

made the organization a shadow of its former self. Ayman al-Zawahiri is not bin 

Laden and although the organization still attempts to provide strategic guidance 

and global propaganda, its influence continues to wane. Whether this trajectory can 

be maintained with a significant decrease of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan and 

a continued challenging political landscape in Pakistan will be, in my view, the biggest determinants of al-Qaeda Core’s relevance for the coming decade. 

The degradation of al-Qaeda’s ‘‘higher headquarters’’ and relatively well-coordinated command and control has allowed its affiliates and its message to splinter, 

posing new dangers and challenges. Al Qa’ida affiliates or those inspired by its message have worrisome presences in Yemen, East Africa, North Africa, Syria, Western 

Europe, and of course to a lesser degree the United States. 

Beginning with Yemen, in my view Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)—

as I stated 2 years ago—continues to pose the most sophisticated and deadly threat 

to the U.S. homeland from an overseas affiliate. The death of operational commander Anwar al-Aulaqi significantly reduced AQAP’s ability to attract and motivate English speakers, but its operational efforts continue with lesser abatement. 

As we saw in 2009, 2010, and 2012, AQAP has remained committed—and able—

to pursue complex attacks involving innovative improvised explosives devices. 

Although some of the organization’s safe haven has been diminished because of 

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Yemeni and U.S. efforts, the inability of the Government of Yemen to bring true 

control to wide swaths of the country suggests that the group will pose a threat for 

the foreseeable future and (unlike many other affiliates) it clearly remains focused 

on transnational attacks. 

East Africa, surprisingly to many, is a brighter spot in our efforts. Although alShabaab remains a force and poses significant risks in the region—most especially 

in Kenya and to the fledgling government in Somalia—its risk to the homeland is 

markedly less today than just 2 years ago. Kenya’s offensive in the region shattered 

much of al-Shabaab’s power base and most importantly the attractiveness of Somalia to Americans and other Westerners is radically less than was the case. The relative flood of Americans has turned into a trickle, thus significantly reducing the 

threat of trained terrorists returning to our shores. Maintaining this positive momentum will require continued U.S. attention and close cooperation with the African 

Union in Somalia (AMISOM) to nurture what clearly remains a fragile recovery. 

As the world witnessed over the past 6 months, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 

(AQIM) has shifted the focus in Africa as the organization has made gains in Mali, 

Libya, and the rural areas of Algeria. To be clear, to those of us in the counterterrorism ranks this is not particularly surprising. In my view while the attacks in 

Benghazi and on the Algerian oil facility are tragic, the major change to the region 

is not a massive increase in AQIM’s attractiveness, but rather the huge shift that 

occurred with the virtual elimination of Libya’s security services, the associated 

flood of weapons in the region, and the coup d’etat in Mali. 

AQIM has thus far proven a less tactically proficient and more regionally focused 

criminal organization than other al-Qaeda affiliates. Although we cannot blindly 

hope this remains the case, I would argue that we should also not read too much 

into recent events. Regional capacity building, targeted offensive measures, and 

forceful engagement with government like France, Algeria, and Libya that have a 

huge vested interest in the region should remain at the forefront of our strategy. 

And we must roundly condemn (and try to limit) the payment of ransoms that have 

proven to be the lifeblood of AQIM and its affiliates. 

One notable area of concern that we must forcefully combat in the region—and 

one which the United States is uniquely able to address given our global footprint—

is the cross-fertilization across the African Continent that has recently accelerated. 

Coordination amongst al-Shabaab, AQIM, Boko Haram, and others is particularly 

problematic as it allows each organization to leverage the others’ strengths. We 

must use our intelligence capabilities to define these networks and then assist in 

disrupting them. 

The most troubling of emerging fronts in my view is Syria, where Jabhat al-Nusra 

has emerged as the most radical of groups within the opposition. Given the enormous instability in Syria, which has to some degree already spread to Iraq and elsewhere in the Levant, Jabhat al-Nusra has become a magnet for al-Qaeda-inspired 

fighters from around the globe. With virtually no likelihood of rapid improvements 

in Syria (and a not insignificant risk of rapid decline caused by the use of chemical 

or biological weapons), the al-Nusra front will almost certainly continue to arm, 

obtain real world combat experience, and attract additional recruits—and potentially state assistance that is flowing to the FSA. 

Moreover, Jabhat al-Nusra’s ideology not only contributes to the threat of terrorism, but more broadly it is contributing significantly to the regional Sunni-Shia 

tension that poses enormous risks. The rapid removal of Bashar al-Assad would not 

solve these problems, but an ongoing civil war does in my view worsen the situation. 

Although there is no easy answer to this devilish issue, I believe that with the 

U.K.’s recent movement to providing lethal assistance to the FSA, we too should 

move more forcefully with additional aid and the creating of safe havens in border 

areas. 

Without declaring victory, we should also have some optimism about al-Qaedainspired terrorism in Western Europe and especially the homeland. As recent studies have shown, there has been a continuing decline in numbers of significant homeland plots that have not been closely controlled by the FBI since 2009. In addition, 

the relative sophistication of homeland terrorists has not increased. Combined with 

successful counterterrorism efforts in Western Europe—most particularly huge 

strides in the U.K.—the picture faced today is far brighter than just 3 years ago. 

Similar optimism cannot be applied to the threat posed by Lebanese Hezbollah, 

especially given its successful and foiled attacks over the past 2 years. Most notably, 

Hezbollah attack in Bulgaria killed six tourists and highlights the extent to which 

the group (and its patrons in Iran) continue to see themselves as being in an ongoing unconventional war with Israel and the United States. Predicting Hezbollah and 

Iranian ‘‘redlines’’ is a notoriously challenging endeavor—as illustrated by the surprising 2011 plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S.—but both organizations 

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almost certainly would launch attacks at least outside the U.S. were there a strike 

on Iranian nuclear facilities. 

There is little doubt that both Hezbollah and the IRGC Qods Force maintain a 

network of operatives that could be used for such strikes. In this regard the heavy 

Iranian presence in Latin America and Iranian cooperation with former Venezuelan 

President Hugo Chavez is of particular concern. Although not every Hezbollah member and Iranian diplomat is a trained operative, a significant number could in the 

case of hostilities enable other operatives to launch attacks against Israeli or U.S. 

diplomatic facilities, Jewish cultural institutions, or high profile individuals. 

In addition, and generally unlike al-Qaeda affiliates, the specter of Hezbollah or 

Iranian-sponsored cyber attacks is disturbingly real. Recent Distributed Denial of 

Service (DDOS) attacks on major U.S. financial institutions, as well as even more 

destructive Iranian-sponsored attacks on Saudi Aramco and Qatar-based RasGas, 

have highlighted the extent to which physical attacks might be combined with cyber 

attacks. 

LOOKING AHEAD

This threat picture, although complex and dynamic, is in many ways more heartening than that which we faced from 2001 until at least 2010. Numerous organizations continue to threaten terrorist attacks, but as a very general matter the threats 

are away from the homeland and the scale of the attacks is markedly less than 

what we saw in September 2001 or even 2006, when al-Qaeda came dangerously 

close to attacking up to 10 transatlantic airliners. It is not that events like Benghazi 

are not tragic. But threats to U.S. diplomatic facilities in Libya are of a radically 

different type than planes flying into civilian facilities in New York and Washington. In this regard, this is an appropriate juncture to look at a few of our biggest 

risks and challenges. 

Terrorism Fatigue. After 10-plus years of near constant public discussion of terrorism—in our politics, the media, and through public messaging—many have simply had enough. This is not all bad as an unhealthy obsession with the threat of 

terrorism at the expense of countless other societal woes, such as cyber threats and 

Iranian nuclear ambitions, would in many ways hand our enemy a victory. On the 

other hand, there is real value in public discussion of terrorism: it can build resilience in the population and it can lead to the tackling of tough public policy questions like targeted killings and domestic intelligence. With terrorism fatigue we run 

a real risk of not addressing these issues in a way that provides a lasting 

counterterrorism framework. In this regard I actually see the current discussion 

around the use of drones and the potential for updating the 2001 Authorization for 

the Use of Military Force as quite heartening signs. 

Terrorism fatigue poses at least two additional challenges. First, with all of our 

counterterrorism success such victories have become expected and any failure—no 

matter how small—can result in political finger pointing and excoriation of our 

counterterrorism professionals. In effect we have become victims of our own success 

and unlike in 2001, perfection has become a political expectation. Although we 

should continuously examine how we can improve our capabilities, we must guard 

against ex poste investigations that lack a serious appreciation for the ex ante difficulties of counterterrorism. 

Second, terrorism fatigue can cause dangerous lethargy within the executive 

branch on issues that do not appear to require immediate attention but which can 

do longer term damage to counterterrorism efforts. I have repeatedly seen urgency 

morph into bureaucratic sluggishness as time passes since the last attack on issues 

like information-sharing and interagency cooperation. Whether it is countering violent extremism programs or information access for the intelligence community, we 

must not take our foot off the gas pedal. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. There is no doubt that smallish terrorist attacks or 

at least attempts will continue to occur at home and abroad. Such attacks can cause 

enormous pain and suffering to victims and their families, but they are clearly of 

a scale—at least with respect to absolute numbers killed—that is dwarfed by other 

societal ills such as routine criminal activity. The same cannot be said of terrorists’ 

use of weapons of mass destruction—and more specifically biological weapons or an 

improvised nuclear device (IND). 

Although we have also made progress in reducing the likelihood of terrorists 

obtaining WMD, for the foreseeable future we are faced with the possibility that a 

terrorist organization will successfully acquire these weapons. In this case, technology is not yet our friend as the ease with which these weapons can be obtained 

and hidden continues to exceed our ability to detect them. 

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Weapons of mass destruction pose a unique challenge as they are the prototypical 

low likelihood, high consequence event and thus determining the proper allocation 

of resources to combat them is particular contentious. That being said, we must continue to protect against the most dangerous of materials (e.g., HEU) being obtained 

by terrorists, secure weapons in the most dangerous places (e.g., Pakistan and increasingly Syria), and pursue research and development that will assist in detecting 

chemical and biological weapons in places where they would do the most harm. 

Counterterrorism Partnerships. Counterterrorism has always been and continues 

to be a ‘‘team sport.’’ Although the United States can do much alone, we have 

always been incredibly reliant on a vast network of friendly nations that have 

extended massively our intelligence, law enforcement, military, and homeland security reach. Even before the Arab Awakening we witnessed some weakening of these 

partnerships. Whether it was fatigue on our partners’ part, their own resource challenges, or differing views on the proper scope of counterterrorist efforts (e.g., fights 

over data sharing between the United States and the European Union), these partnerships have been under some pressure. Post-Arab Awakening we face an exponentially more daunting task, having lost some of our most valuable partners—and key 

security services even where political leadership remains supportive—in the very 

places we need them most. 

Again, part of the challenge is that we have been a victim of our own success. 

Al-Qaeda is simply not viewed as the same existential threat that it was in 2001. 

But without robust partnerships it will be increasingly difficult for us to detect and 

disrupt rising al-Qaeda (or other groups’) cells, thus making it more likely that they 

will metastasize and embed themselves in ways that makes them more dangerous 

and more difficult to displace. 

To maintain our partnerships we must carefully preserve funding for programs 

that provide critical capabilities—and potentially more important, a positive U.S. 

presence—for our allies. The increase in funding for special operations forces is a 

good step, but relatively tiny investments in Department of State and Justice programs can also deliver real results in this realm. In addition, we will have to 

approach new governments in the Middle East with sophistication and ensure they 

continue to view terrorism as a mutual threat. 

Staying on the Offense—on all Fronts. Over the past month an enormous amount 

has been said about targeted killings, especially of U.S. persons. In my view, having 

served under both Presidents George W. Bush and Obama, such targeted killings 

are a vital tool in the counterterrorism toolbox. And regrettably, in some cases that 

tool must also be used against U.S. persons like Anwar al-Aulaqi who was a senior 

al-Qaeda operational commander who was continuing to plot attacks against the 

United States. 

From my perspective, the memorandum and administration practice (contrary to 

claims by some) appropriately constrains the President’s authority, has provided 

significant congressional oversight and the opportunity to limit the program, and 

provides realistic standards given the inherent challenges of intelligence and 

counterterrorism. 

As I have previously implied, however, I am equally supportive of the current 

public debate on the issue. In fact, I believe bringing greater visibility to some programs could be useful not only to build U.S. support, but also to build greater international understanding if not support—a key element in our ideological efforts. 

Moreover, I would suggest that the current debate highlights the need to examine 

seriously the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF). During my 

tenure at the National Counterterrorism Center the AUMF provided adequate 

authority for the use of force, but it was not always a simple or straightforward 

application. With the continued evolution of the terror threat and most notably its 

increasing distance from the 9/11 attacks and Core Al Qaeda, I believe it is the time 

to reevaluate the AUMF to better fit today’s threat landscape. 

As supportive as I am of targeted killings in appropriate circumstances, I am 

equally (if not more) supportive of ensuring that these are not our only counterterrorism tools employed. I do believe that our reliance on kinetic strikes has in 

some cases allowed other efforts to atrophy or at least pale in comparison. This is 

enormously dangerous, as we cannot strike everywhere nor can we lethally target 

an ideology. As we increase targeted killings we must double down on our soft 

power and ideological efforts—building capacity in civilian security forces, increasing the rule of law to diminish undergoverned or ungoverned safe havens, and the 

like—lest we win a few battles and lose a global war. This committee must stand 

at the very center of these efforts, as I fear in the current fiscal climate that the 

programs that support our ideological efforts will be given short shrift. 

Resources. Finally, and not entirely inappropriately, counterterrorism resources 

will undoubtedly decline significantly in the coming years. It is difficult to estimate 

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accurately how much has been spent on counterterrorism over the past 11 years, 

but the amount certainly comes close if not exceeds $100 billion a year. Some of this 

was undoubtedly well spent, but it is folly to think that inefficiencies and 

redundancies do not exist widely. In this sense, a bit of frugality is likely a very 

good thing. 

The question, however, is whether we will be willing or able to make smart reductions to preserve critical capabilities. Our historic ability to direct funds where the 

threat is greatest—as opposed to where the political forces are strongest—have not 

been good. Perhaps the declining threat will mean that we can continue to spend 

imperfectly, but this is surely a dangerous bet to make. 

We should use this imposed frugality to do serious mission-based—as opposed to 

Department and Agency-specific based—budgeting in the Federal Government. This 

approach will require enormous changes within the executive and congressional 

branches, but looking across the counterterrorism budget, identifying the critical 

capabilities we must preserve, and then figuring out how that matches Departmentspecific budgets can be done. And if we are serious about maintaining these capabilities we have little choice. 

CONCLUSION

More than a decade after 9/11, combating terrorism isn’t over. No one should be 

surprised by this fact. Nor should anyone be surprised that we are fighting in different places and, although some approaches are the same as they were in 2001, 

many of our tools must evolve with the evolving threat. Moreover, having the benefit of almost 12 years of national effort we are in a better place today to balance 

our counterterrorism efforts with other significant threats to our national security, 

most notably state-sponsored cyber intrusions, theft, and attacks, and broad instability across much of North Africa and the Middle East. 

Thank you for inviting me to testify, and for this committee’s leadership on these 

critical issues. I look forward to working with this committee to ensure that we as 

a nation are protecting our citizens, our allies, and our interests from the scourge 

of terrorism.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Wainstein. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN, PARTNER, 

CADWALADER, WICKERSHAM & TAFT, LLP, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

COUNTERTERRORISM, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. WAINSTEIN. Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, 

Senator Kaine, I want to thank the three of you and the committee 

for the invitation to join in this discussion of the evolving threat 

that our Nation faces today. 

And it is a particular pleasure for me to be here with my two 

copanelists and colleagues, who are proven experts in this field and 

have devoted much of their professional lives to protecting our 

country against terrorist adversaries. 

It is vitally important that we, as a nation, continually gauge our 

readiness to meet the evolving threat that we face. And we have 

seen the consequences of failing to do that throughout our recent 

history. Go back to 1941, when we were completely unready for the 

threat that struck us at Pearl Harbor. We built up after that and 

ultimately defeated the Axis Powers, and then the subsequent 

Soviet threat of the cold war, but then we sort of dropped our 

guard again a little bit when we failed to anticipate the looming 

threat that was posed by globally connected terrorist organizations 

like al-Qaeda. 

Since 9/11, the last two administrations have made tremendous 

efforts to bring our counterterrorism readiness back in line with 

the post-9/11 threat. As a result of these efforts, as Mike Leiter just 

said, we, as a nation, are significantly better prepared to meet that 

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threat than we were on the morning of 9/11, and I think there is 

no better gauge of that than—or evidence of that than—the number of top-echelon al-Qaeda leaders who are no longer on the battlefield and the list of terrorist plots that have been foiled over the 

past few years. 

It has become clear, however, that the al-Qaeda threat that has 

occupied our attention and our focus since 9/11 is no longer the 

threat that we will need to defend against in the future. Due largely to the effectiveness of our counterterrorism operations, the centralized leadership of al-Qaeda that directed operations from the 

sanctuary that it held in Afghanistan and Pakistan, known as alQaeda core, is now just a shadow of what it once was. The result 

of that has been a migration of operational control and operational 

authority away from core al-Qaeda into al-Qaeda’s affiliates in 

other regions of the world—Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al 

Qaeda in Iraq, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, to name a 

few. 

In light of this evolution, we are now at a pivot point where we 

need to reevaluate the means and reevaluate the objectives of our 

counterterrorism program. And the executive branch, by all reports, is currently engaged in that process, and has made a number 

of policy shifts to reflect the altered threat landscape, including, for 

example, focusing on the development of stronger cooperative relationships with those countries, or governments in those countries, 

like Yemen, where these franchises are operating. 

It is important, however, that Congress also participate closely

in that process. Over the past 12 years, Congress has proven its 

value in the creation of the post-9/11 counterterrorism program. It 

has been instrumental in strengthening our counterterrorism capabilities. It has helped to create a lasting framework and structure 

for the long war against international terrorism. And its actions 

have provided one other very important element to our 

counterterrorism program, and that is a measure of political legitimacy that can never be achieved through unilateral executive action, alone. Therefore, as Mike Leiter just said, it is heartening to 

see that Congress is again starting to ratchet up its engagement 

in this area, with a discussion of a variety of different legislative 

proposals. 

Now, in assessing these proposals, Congress should be guided by 

a pair of principles that it has largely followed over the past 12 

years. First, it is important that any legal authorities that it consider be crafted in a way that permit operators and decisionmakers 

in the executive branch to act and react without undue delay. For 

instance, any scheme for regulating the use of targeted drone 

strikes should be designed with an appreciation for the need for 

quick decisionmaking and action in the context of war and 

targeting. 

Second, Congress should continue to resist any legislation that 

unduly restricts the government’s flexibility in the fight against 

international terrorists. Flexibility is the key to operational success 

in counterterrorism operations, and it should be the watchword for 

any national security legislation. 

Congress is to be commended for having largely followed these 

principles over the last 12 years, and also commended for playing 

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a vitally important role in the construction of our national counterterrorism program since 9/11, which is a role that Congress should 

continue to play in the years to come. And, as my colleague said, 

this committee is, specifically, to be commended for recognizing the 

recent evolution of the terrorist threat we are facing, and recognizing the need to reassess our strategy and our terrorism program 

in light of that evolution. 

It has been an honor to be a part of that effort today, and I look 

forward to any questions that the committee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wainstein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN

Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker and members of the committee, 

thank you for the invitation to join in this discussion of the evolving threat that our 

Nation faces today. My name is Ken Wainstein, and I’m a partner at the law firm 

of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft. It is an honor to appear before you along with 

my two copanelists, both proven experts in this field who have devoted much of 

their professional lives to defending our Nation against its terrorist adversaries. 

Today’s topic is particularly timely, given that we are now seeing a transition in 

the scope and nature of the terrorist threat we face—a transition that requires us 

to assess whether we have the right counterterrorism strategy, organization, and 

authorities to successfully meet this evolving threat. 

It is vitally important that we, as a nation, continually gauge our readiness to 

meet the threat we face. Our Nation’s history since World War II illustrates both 

the importance and the mixed record of calibrating our readiness to meet overseas 

threats. In 1941, we found ourselves completely unready to meet the threat that 

struck us at Pearl Harbor. After building the warmaking machine that defeated the 

Axis Powers, we then recognized the new threat from the Soviet bloc and designed 

a governmental infrastructure and a foreign policy that successfully contained the 

Communist threat. 

In the aftermath of the cold war, however, we let our guard down again. We enjoyed the peace dividend while the threat of international terrorism evolved from 

the relatively isolated operations of the Red Brigades, the Baader-Meinhof gang and 

the other violent groups of the 1970s into the more globally integrated organizations 

of the 1990s—a threat that emerged in its most virulent form in the network of violent extremists operating out of its safe haven under Taliban rule in Afghanistan. 

Despite its potency, we did not reorient our defenses to meet this threat and continued to operate with an intelligence and military apparatus largely designed for 

the cold war. As we had in the 1930s when the storm of fascism was gathering overseas, we failed throughout the 1980s and 1990s to anticipate and prepare for the 

looming new threat posed by a globally networked terrorist organization with the 

resources, the operational sophistication and the fanatical following to mount a sustained campaign against the United States and its allies. 

Since 9/11, the last two administrations have made tremendous efforts to bring 

our counterterrorism readiness more in line with the post-9/11 threat. These efforts 

have included a fundamental restructuring of our government’s counterterrorism 

infrastructure, new and expanded investigative authorities for our intelligence and 

law enforcement personnel, the reorientation of our military to fight an asymmetric 

war against a nontraditional and shadowy foe, and the adoption of a foreign policy 

designed to enlist and coordinate with foreign partners in the global fight against 

international terrorism. 

Thanks to the concerted efforts of both administrations, the past seven Congresses 

and countless committed public servants, we as a nation are significantly better prepared to meet the international terrorist threat than we were on the morning of

9/11. There is no better evidence of that fact than the number of top-echelon

al-Qaeda leaders who have been removed from the battlefield and the list of terrorist threats that have been foiled over the past few years. 

It has recently become clear, however, that the al-Qaeda threat that occupied our 

attention after 9/11 is no longer the threat that we will need to defend against in 

the future. Due largely to the effectiveness of our counterterrorism efforts, the centralized leadership that had directed al-Qaeda operations from its sanctuary in 

Afghanistan and Pakistan—known as ‘‘Al Qaeda Core’’—is now just a shadow of 

what it once was. While still somewhat relevant as an inspirational force, Zawahiri 

and his surviving lieutenants are reeling from our aerial strikes and no longer have 

the operational stability to manage an effective global terrorism campaign. The reFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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sult has been a migration of operational authority and control from Al Qaeda Core 

to its affiliates in other regions of the world, such as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. 

As Andy Liepman of the RAND Corporation cogently explained in a recent article, 

this development is subject to two different interpretations. While some commentators diagnose al-Qaeda as being in its final death throes, others see this franchising 

process as evidence that al-Qaeda is ‘‘coming back with a vengeance as the new 

jihadi hydra.’’ As is often the case, the truth likely falls somewhere between these 

polar prognostications. Al Qaeda Core is surely weakened, but its nodes around the 

world have picked up the terrorist mantle and continue to pose a threat to America 

and its allies—as tragically evidenced by the recent violent takeover of the gas facility in Algeria and the American deaths at the U.S. mission in Benghazi last September. This threat has been compounded by a number of other variables, including 

the opportunities created for al-Qaeda by the events following the Arab Spring; the 

ongoing threat posed by Hezbollah, its confederates in Iran and other terrorist 

groups; and the growing incidence over the past few years of home-grown violent 

extremism within the United States, such as the unsuccessful plots targeting Times 

Square and the New York subway. 

We are now at a pivot point where we need to reevaluate the means and objectives of our counterterrorism program in light of the evolving threat. The executive 

branch is currently engaged in that process and has undertaken a number of policy 

shifts to reflect the altered threat landscape. First, it is working to develop stronger 

cooperative relationships with governments in countries like Yemen where the

al-Qaeda franchises are operating. Second, they are coordinating with other foreign 

partners—like the French in Mali and the African Union Mission in Somalia—who 

are actively working to suppress these new movements. Finally, they are building 

infrastructure—like the reported construction of a drone base in Niger—that will 

facilitate counterterrorism operations in the regions where these franchises operate. 

While it is important that the administration is undergoing this strategic reevaluation, it is also important that Congress participate in that process. Over the past 

12 years, Congress has made significant contributions to the post-9/11 reorientation 

of our counterterrorism program. First, it has been instrumental in strengthening 

our counterterrorism capabilities. From the Authorization for Use of Military Force 

passed within days of 9/11 to the Patriot Act and its reauthorization to the critical 

2008 amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Congress has repeatedly answered the government’s call for strong but measured authorities to fight the 

terrorist adversary. 

Second, congressional action has gone a long way toward institutionalizing measures that were hastily adopted after 9/11 and creating a lasting framework for what 

will be a ‘‘long war’’ against international terrorism. Some argue against such legislative permanence, citing the hope that today’s terrorists will go the way of the radical terrorists of the 1970s and largely fade from the scene over time. That, I’m 

afraid, is a pipe dream. The reality is that international terrorism will remain a 

potent force for years and possibly generations to come. Recognizing this reality, 

both Presidents Bush and Obama have made a concerted effort to look beyond the 

threats of the day and to focus on regularizing and institutionalizing our counterterrorism measures for the future—as most recently evidenced by the administration’s 

effort to develop lasting procedures and rules of engagement for the use of drone 

strikes. 

Finally, congressional action has provided one other very important element to 

our counterterrorism initiatives—a measure of political legitimacy that could never 

be achieved through unilateral executive action. At several important junctures 

since 9/11, Congress has undertaken to carefully consider and pass legislation in 

sensitive areas of executive action, such as the legislation authorizing and governing 

the Military Commissions and the amendments to our Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. On each such occasion, Congress’ action had the effect of calming public 

concerns and providing a level of political legitimacy to the executive branch’s 

counterterrorism efforts. That legitimizing effect—and its continuation through 

meaningful oversight—is critical to maintaining the public’s confidence in the means 

and methods our government uses in its fight against international terrorism. It 

also provides assurance to our foreign partners and thereby encourages them to 

engage in the operational cooperation that is so critical to the success of our combined efforts against international terrorism. 

These post-9/11 examples speak to the value that congressional involvement can 

bring both to the national dialogue about counterterrorism matters and specifically 

to the current reassessment of our strategies and policies in light of the evolving 

threat. It is heartening to see that Congress is starting to ratchet up its engagement 

in this area. For example, certain Members are expressing views about our existing 

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targeting and detention authorities and whether they should be revised in light of 

the new threat picture. Some have asked whether Congress should pass legislation 

governing the executive branch’s selection of targets for its drone program. Some 

have suggested that Congress establish a judicial process by which a court reviews 

and approves any plan for a lethal strike against a U.S. citizen before that plan is 

put into action. Some have proposed legislation more clearly directing the Executive 

branch to send terrorist suspects to military custody, as opposed to the criminal justice system. Others have argued more generally that the AUMF should be amended 

to account for the new threat emanating from Ansar al-Sharia, Boko Haram, and 

the other dangerous groups that have little direct connection to al-Qaeda and its 

affiliates or to anyone who ‘‘planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist 

attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.’’ While these ideas have varying 

strengths and weaknesses, they are a welcome sign that Congress is poised to get 

substantially engaged in counterterrorism matters once again. 

In assessing these and other proposals for national security legislation, Congress 

should be guided by a pair of principles that their legislative efforts have largely 

followed over the past 12 years. First, it is important to remember the practical concern that time is of the essence in counterterrorism operations and that legal 

authorities must be crafted in a way that permits operators and decisionmakers in 

the executive branch to react to circumstances without undue delay. That concern 

was not sufficiently appreciated prior to 9/11, and as a result many of our counterterrorism tools were burdened with unnecessary limitations and a stifling amount 

of process. In fact, the tools used by our national security investigators who were 

trying to prevent terrorist attacks were much less user-friendly than those available 

to criminal investigators who were investigating completed criminal acts. The result 

was slowed investigations and an inability to develop real-time intelligence about 

terrorist threats, like the one that hit home on 9/11. 

The Patriot Act and subsequent national security legislation helped to rectify that 

imbalance and to make our counterterrorism tools and investigations more nimble 

and effective, while at the same time providing for sufficient safeguards and oversight to ensure that they are used responsibly and consistent with our respect for 

privacy and civil liberties. Any future legislation should follow that model. For instance, any scheme for regulating the use of targeted drone strikes—which may well 

raise myriad practical and constitutional issues beyond the concern with operational 

delay—should be designed with an appreciation for the need for quick decisionmaking and action in the context of war and targeting. 

Second and more generally, Congress should maintain its record of largely resisting legislation that unduly restricts the government’s flexibility in the fight against 

international terrorism. For example, there have been occasional efforts to categorically limit the executive branch’s options in its detention and prosecution of terrorist 

suspects. While there may well be good principled arguments behind these efforts, 

pragmatism dictates that we should not start taking options off the table. We should 

instead maximize the range of available options and allow our counterterrorism professionals to select the mode of detention or prosecution that best serves the objectives for each particular suspect—development of intelligence, certainty of successful 

prosecution, etc. 

Flexibility should also be the watchword when approaching any effort to amend 

the Authorization for Use of Military Force. The diffusion of terrorist threats that 

has led to the call for amending the AUMF is bound to continue, and new groups 

will likely be forming and mounting a threat to the United States in the years to 

come. Any amended AUMF must be crafted with language that clearly defines the 

target of our military force, but that also encompasses all such groups that pose a 

serious threat to our national security. 

Congress is to be commended for having largely followed these principles in its 

legislative efforts over the past 12 years and for playing a vitally important role in 

the construction of our national counterterrorism program since 9/11—a role that 

it should continue to play in the years to come. 

This committee is specifically to be commended for recognizing the recent evolution of the terrorist threat and the need to assess our counterterrorism program 

and policies in light of that evolution. It has been an honor to be a part of that 

effort, and I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you all for your insights. 

And I see we have had several colleagues join us. 

So, let me start off with exploring some of what you have suggested a little greater in depth. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

18

Most of the government’s most critical counterterrorism effort 

takes place at the strategic level, from countering violent extremism programs to the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Have we 

done enough, though, to target the recruitment pipeline? And how 

can we enhance our efforts to undercut—I think it goes to Congresswoman Harman’s comments—the extremist narrative and 

address the grievances that are the underlying fuel instability? Any 

thoughts on that? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well—by the way, it is a great personal pleasure 

to see ‘‘Senator’’ Murphy. I have not called him that yet, so—a 

former colleague. 

That is what I was really talking about. We have to win the argument with this pipeline of potential recruits. And we cannot win 

the argument if all we are doing is playing ‘‘Whac-a-Mole,’’ as I call 

it, knocking off some folks, whom we should either apprehend or 

kill, depending on what the options are. Obviously, capturing is a 

better option, I think, when it is possible. But, nonetheless, if that 

is all we are perceived to do, if we have a drone-centric foreign policy, I do not think that wins the argument. 

And therefore, both Mike and Ken have suggested things that we 

can do. I think we should put a strict legal framework around the 

use of drones. Congress should do this. I have recommended that 

we could bring drones under the FISA framework, which most in 

Congress supported, including then-Senator Obama. And these 

FISA courts, I—although some disagree—I think can work to improve the framework for the use of drones—not the operations, but 

the framework. And Congress can provide oversight. That is just 

one example of how we could win the argument with potential recruits, because then we have a rules-based program for the use of 

force against certain high-value targets. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. And maybe—I invite your answers, but let me 

specify my question a little bit more. It seems that having a framework for the use of drones, assuming you give the flexibility necessary that was referred to here, may be desirable, but, at the end 

of the day, we do not win hearts and minds because we have a rule 

framework about how we might strike at somebody. We win hearts 

and minds because we change—or, we work to change the realities 

of their lives on the ground. 

I mean, the Arab Spring, in my mind, is a challenge of a very 

young population, mostly in or near poverty, having no future—the 

aspirations for the future not on the horizon with any possibility 

of that future——

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. Being better, and then having that 

despair being manipulated against—whether it be the West or 

Israel or others. 

So, should not our policy consider—and this might be a longer 

term context, but, nonetheless, we are in this for—despite fatigue, 

we are in this for a while, it certainly seems to me—aren’t there 

other things that we should be considering? 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. 

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Mr. LEITER. Mr. Chairman, in my view, this has been—and this 

is a self-indictment, since I was in both administrations, and we 

did not effectively do this, in my view—countering violent extremism, that ideological fight, has been woefully, in my view, underfunded and under-focused-on, compared to the kinetic piece. Now, 

there are a variety of reasons for this. It is really easier to get 

funding for weapon systems that are built in people’s districts than 

it is to build up a mini-army of people who are going to work the 

Web and get our message out there, and counter al-Qaeda’s message from the basement of the State Department. It is much easier 

to see tangible results from a kinetic strike, using a drone or anything else, than it is to understand, you know, a 1-point or a 2-

point change in perceptions in the United States, as opposed to bin 

Laden. That is a much longer program, which requires much greater patience. 

So, in my view, we can do a couple of things on this front. First 

of all, I do think, again, we have significantly underfunded ideological efforts at the State Department; to some extent the Department of Homeland Security; and the people who actually have the 

most money to do these sorts of programs, the Department of 

Defense. Now, with all respect to my Defense colleagues, they tend 

to be the worst people to actually carry the message that the 

United States is not at war with Islam, because they are wearing 

uniforms. So, we have to reallocate funds to the people who can 

responsibly go out and take this message. 

Second, this is about acts and not just words, so we have to 

maintain foreign-aid programs and rule-of-law programs that are 

now going to help work with these emerging democracies, which we 

hope are democracies. And we have to work closely with them even 

if some of their views are very much in tension with some of our 

interests. These are two quick things that I would offer. 

I do think that there is something heartening, also, about the 

Arab Awakening, though, Mr. Chairman. And I would offer that, 

frankly, al-Qaeda’s message did not drive the Arab Awakening.

Al-Qaeda was largely irrelevant to the Arab Awakening, and it

is exactly the motivation that you identify, as opposed to a purely 

al-Qaeda-driven: we must get rid of the old regimes and move in 

through violence. The Arab Awakening proved that you can do this 

without violence. And, in that sense, we actually have an opportunity, now, going forward; although we have lost partners and we 

have lost some counterterrorism kinetic capability, this was actually a win for us, ideologically. 

Mr. WAINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow up on that 

last—Mike’s last point. 

I think the challenge was clear, from the beginning of the Arab 

Spring, that there is going to be a bit of a tradeoff for the United 

States. In the short term—if you are looking at the Arab Spring 

just through the counterterrorism lens—in the short term we were 

going to lose partners who had been reliable in the efforts against 

terrorism. And we have seen that. We have certainly lost some 

partnerships. We have lost some cooperation that we used to be 

able to rely on in that part of the world, a very volatile part of the 

world. But, the long-term solution for terrorism is not just, you 

know, stamping out the fires, day by day, it is to change the 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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circumstances under which people live in that area. And the Arab 

Spring was a way to do that as a source of hope for democracy and 

economic development; and it was very important that the United 

States was seen on the side of the people who were looking for 

reform. 

The additional danger, as Mike pointed out, though, is, al-Qaeda 

now is getting a foothold in some parts of the Arab Spring; whereas, they were completely irrelevant to the beginning of it. And so, 

it is all the more important that we solidify whatever cooperative 

relationships that we can before al-Qaeda gets more of a foothold. 

The CHAIRMAN. You know, it seems to me that one of our—and 

I will turn to Senator Corker next—it seems to me that one of our 

challenges, as we think about this, whether it is the rules of 

engagement, the question of Congress revisiting the authorization 

of under what set of circumstances we use force—but, one of the 

key questions that we seem to sweep under the rug, which is the 

whole question that I was trying to get to you, I think several of 

you alluded to, which is that there is an underpinning here, of people’s economic circumstances. And unless we deal, whether through 

partnership with others—and that is why I would be interested, 

when I come back, after the other colleagues get their chance here 

to question you—about what partnerships really work and how we 

could foster partnerships that look at, for example, development 

assistance. We have a challenge here on foreign aid, in general, 

even though it is, approximately 1 percent of the Federal budget, 

it is one of the most powerful tools that we have, especially when 

I look at this universe. You are just not going to do this by striking 

at individuals, which I agree, those who, in fact, are of great threat 

to the country and you can capture, because if you could capture 

them, you would want to capture them for the information flow 

that comes from that then you have to strike at them, but in the 

longer term, the changing of the dynamics here comes from how we 

engage in changing people’s lives. And we cannot do that alone, but 

we certainly could engage in partnerships to do that. And the messages that flow from that are pretty dramatic, I think. 

And it is something I would like to explore, because we are going 

to be having some challenges as we look at our budget and we look 

forward—and, as you said, we are not going to have $100 billion 

in counterterrorism money, moving forward, in the foreseeable continuous future. So, then the question is, How do we change the 

dynamics? How do we get better bang for our buck? And how do 

we change the underpinnings? That is what I am looking to get at. 

With that, Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy, if you would take over the chair 

while I——

Senator CORKER. He is moving from Senator to chairman awfully 

quickly, but—it is an amazing thing. So—yes. [Laughter.] 

So, again, thank you for your testimony. And I appreciate all the 

comments regarding some of the softer pieces, if you will, that need 

to be pursued. And I agree that those certainly have not been pursued in the way they should. 

And I want to go back to the legal case first. And I think each 

of you have said, look, al-Qaeda is more amorphous and, you know, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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spread around. Core al-Qaeda’s been, basically—I will use somebody else’s word—‘‘decimated.’’ But, it also makes it—does it not?—

much more difficult to tie the groups that we are actually pursuing 

today back to 9/11, which is what generated the authorization for 

the use of military force on September 18. I think all of you would 

agree, it is very difficult to tie these groups back to that authorization. Is that correct? 

Mr. LEITER. Yes. 

Ms. HARMAN. Yes. And I would add that, those of us who voted 

for it—I certainly did; everyone except for one Member of Congress 

voted for it, as I recall—thought it would be limited in time and 

space. I never imagined that it would still be in force over a decade 

later and would be used by the executive branch to underpin a 

huge variety of actions against disparate enemies. That does not 

mean that there should not be a legal framework. I think there 

should be a legal framework. But, maybe one that is more attuned 

to the new threats, and also the goal of, I would say, Senator 

Corker—the goal of winning the argument, not just ‘‘whacking’’ 

people. That is our challenge now. And unless we can win the argument, there will be more and more people in more and more countries who are able to produce propaganda tools to recruit more and 

more people. 

And so, that is why I said, in my testimony, that we need a 

whole-of-government approach to counterterrorism, which certainly 

includes diplomacy and development as tools. We need smarter 

investments. We need foreign aid budgets that do not just pick the 

flavor-of-the-month country, but that bear down on those countries 

that are the most serious threats, and perhaps condition aid based 

on changing some government policies. And then, we do need to 

live our values. And that means that everything we do should be 

rules-based. 

Senator CORKER. So, I believe, in order for that to happen, in 

order for Congress and the executive branch to work together to 

drive that kind of effort, I really do think this entire authorization 

needs to be updated, and I think the debate that comes from that 

will cause people to look at what you are saying, and drive that. 

Otherwise—you know, as you mentioned, I mean, there is fatigue; 

people really do not want to deal with it. The executive branch is 

dealing with it. 

And, candidly, as we travel in the field, most of the folks that 

we deal with, in intelligence and other places, say there is a very 

thin thread, if any, back to the original authorization. And I think 

all of you are agreeing with that. 

So, let me just ask you, on that point, What would be—I know 

we have talked about the idealism issues. I know there are all 

kinds of things we need to do to help people understand our values 

and all those kinds of things. But, if you got back to the authorization of military force, what would some of the characteristics be of 

this one that are different from the one we put in place on September 18? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I would, first, say that, in my view, the current AUMF is too broad, too narrow, and too vague. It is too broad, 

because, as Jane Harman said, we are now 12 years later, and I 

think a lot of people, when they voted for it, did not quite realize 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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that it would still be applying. It is too narrow, because, honestly, 

by the end of my tenure in the U.S. Government, you were having 

to do some shoehorning to get some groups or individuals in there 

that posed a very clear and imminent threat to the United States 

into the language of the AUMF. And it is too vague, because I 

think it is very difficult to look at it and say, How would that apply 

to a group like Jabhat al-Nusra?—which the American people and 

this Congress should know, up front. 

So, my suggestion would be that you have some—first of all, I 

would commend the Hoover Institution report on the AUMF, on 

reforming the AUMF. I think it is quite good. I don’t agree with 

every word of it. I think it is a good theoretical way of considering 

what has to be changed. 

In my view, there should be some process, somewhat similar to 

the designation of terrorist groups, that happens through the State 

Department now, where groups are nominated by the executive 

branch, they are approved by the executive branch, then there is 

some period for the U.S. Congress to review whether that group 

should be included in a new authorization of military force. And I 

would say that should include groups that pose a near-term threat 

to the United States through acts of terrorism. And that is going 

to be broader than al-Qaeda affiliates, but it will also give the Congress some opportunity to, not necessarily vote, but to at least 

review executive branch determinations of the types of groups that 

the executive branch thinks should be targeted. That is how I 

would approach it. 

Senator CORKER. Kenneth. 

Mr. WAINSTEIN. Senator, I subscribe to the idea of having a list, 

and the Executive can then propose that additional groups be put 

on that list as those groups become a serious threat to the United 

States. And that was one of the points I made in my initial 

remarks, that it needs to be a system that is flexible enough to account for the changing situation, because the threat picture today 

is going to be very different a year from now, and radically different 10 years from now. So, I think something along the lines of 

what Mike just described would be perfect. 

Let me just sort of go up to 30,000 feet for a second. There are 

a couple of benefits to Congress considering this, at this time or 

any time. First, by looking at possibly revising the AUMF, it will 

be a recognition of what I think many of us have known for years, 

which is, this effort against terrorism is a long-term war. It is 

going to be around for a long time. This is not a threat that is 

going to go away once we destroy core al-Qaeda. It is going to extend well beyond 9/11 and the years since 9/11. So, it will be sort 

of a national recognition that we need to account for the fact that 

this is going to be a permanent state of life. 

Also, as I mentioned in my initial remarks, right now the administration seems to be able to shoehorn their activities into the 

AUMF, and what they have done seems to have been covered

by the law. But, there really is an element of Congress lending 

legitimacy to their actions when Congress deliberates over the authority that it is considering giving to the executive branch, looks 

at all the implications of it and vests that authority in the execuFOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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tive branch. I think it is good for all branches, and I think it would 

be good for our counterterrorism program. 

Ms. HARMAN. Could I just raise one caution? Because I was 

thinking about this as both Mike and Ken were talking. 

I am not sure Congress should give a blanket authorization for 

the use of force. I think Congress’ role is to consider carefully different circumstances around different assertions of the use of force. 

And I do not mean that every 2 days, Congress has to consider 

some terrorist organization that we have not heard of before, and 

authorize the government to do something specifically there. But, 

Congress’ role in oversight and legislating has to be much more 

assertive than it has been, in my view, over the last 12 years. And 

one size does not fit all. That is one point. 

The second point is, calling this the ‘‘war on terror,’’ as many 

have, I think has not helped us win the argument. Terror is a tactic. How do you fight a war against a tactic? That was modified by 

the Obama administration to say it was a ‘‘war on al-Qaeda and 

affiliates.’’ I thought that was an improvement. But, again, I think 

we should be careful with our language. And perhaps this committee, the Foreign Relations Committee, that does do positive-sum 

things—passes a foreign aid budget, helps us project diplomacy, not 

just kinetic power in the world—should consider some form of 

authorization or some process for oversight that weighs other factors in addition to the use of force. 

Senator CORKER. Well, I could not agree more. And again, I 

think a real debate about how broad, how narrow, how vague, how 

blanket an authorization is, I think will drive us to focus on all 

these things, which we have not been focusing on. So, I could not 

agree more. And I think the administration—I do not know where 

they are. I mean, on one hand, they are able to do whatever it is 

they wish; and many people in Congress like that, because they 

have no ownership over the outcome. But, I do think that, you 

know, there is almost no thread of tieback to where we were. I 

think it is time to update this and to create another authorization 

that is different. And I do think we should take some ownership 

over this and, hopefully, drive a little bit different approach to how 

we deal with this. 

This is long term, you are exactly right. There is not going to be 

a finite end. And I think this whole debate would help invigorate 

the approach, and actually overcome the fatigue that we are talking about. It still is a threat, we still have issues of nation-states 

that we have to deal with. And obviously that is a whole nother 

component. But, this is one that certainly we need to be paying 

attention to for a long, long time. 

And I thank you for your testimony. 

Senator MURPHY [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Corker. 

I will take it as no coincidence that Congresswoman Harman 

showed up and I got elevated to chairman, so I appreciate your 

bumping me up. 

I want to fit in two questions, one on winning the argument and 

one on Syria. 

Congresswoman Harman, you talked about working with actions, 

not just words. Or it actually may have been Mr. Leiter. And I 

have a question about how actions that we take here in the United 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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States are viewed abroad, and to what extent they factor into the 

recruitment tools. 

After September 11, there was, frankly, a remarkable restraint 

showed in this country, in terms of anti-Islamic and Islamicphobic—Islamophobe behavior. That worm has turned in the last 

8 years, and whether it is State legislators looking at bans on 

shariah law or mosques being ridden out of neighborhoods or 

advertisers pulling their money from shows about Muslim families 

in the last 5 to 10 years, we have seen a remarkable increase in 

some pretty bad behavior toward the Islamic religion here in this 

country. 

And I guess my question—and I will direct it to you first, Congresswoman Harman—is, How much does this matter? How much 

does this matter, when set against the other drivers of recruitment, 

whether it be our drone policy, our military policy, or economic factors within these regions? How much should we be paying attention to this turn that’s happened in the United States, I would 

argue, in the last 5 years or so, as a means toward trying to ultimately win this argument across the globe? 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, Chairman Murphy—has a nice ring—it matters a lot. I actually think our record is mixed. There are some good 

stories, too. Let us remember that, shortly after 9/11, a Sikh, not 

a Muslim, I think, gas station attendant was murdered by a mob 

just because he looked like he might have been Muslim, or that 

was what the folks who murdered him thought; and it was a black 

eye for America, that that happened. And there have been some 

very bad actions. 

On the other hand, I know quite a bit about Los Angeles, where 

I am from and where my congressional district was, and the police 

department there, and the sheriff’s office, have made major efforts 

to reach out for Muslim communities and to have advisory task 

forces and so forth, both to project a friendly image, but also, it is 

very smart policing, because if you build trust in a community, 

they are more likely to come forward and identify some of these 

folks who have clean records but who are contemplating some very 

bad deeds. 

And, in fact, if I remember this, right in Virginia, there were five 

guys, who moved to Pakistan, who were plotting against America, 

and they were identified by their own community. These were kids, 

college-age or high-school-age kids, who were basically identified by 

their own communities so they could be apprehended, stopped. 

So, it is a big part of the counterterrorism—of a good counterterrorism strategy to project tolerance and build positive relationships 

with a community that 99 percent of which is peace-loving and patriotic Americans. And those are the folks in the United States, and 

it is true around the world, too. 

And one other fact to point out, and that is that more Muslims 

have been the target of terror attacks by al-Qaeda and affiliates 

than have non-Muslims. So, hopefully, the community itself—

again, if we project the kind of relationship we should—will push 

against its own bad apples. That is a big part of the solution here. 

Senator MURPHY. Any thoughts from——

Mr. LEITER. I guess I call you Senator or Half-Chairman at this 

point, Senator Murphy. [Laughter.] 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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Senator MURPHY. Same thing. 

Mr. LEITER. At some risk, I am going to disagree with my friend 

Jane Harman. I, frankly, think that these are bricks in a wall, and 

the wall is the narrative that the United States is at war with 

Islam. And if the United States—if there was a lack of Islamophobia in the United States, al-Qaeda would still attack the United 

States, without a doubt. They are factors, but they are not driving, 

and I do not think they are dispositive factors. 

The piece that I think is most important about this, besides the 

fact that, from my perspective, it is abhorrent and un-American 

and, you know, horrible that we would judge anyone by their religion in this country—the piece that I do think is important is, it 

undermines the willingness, in many cases, of the American 

Muslim community, which is the single most important community 

to messaging to the rest of the Muslim world that the United 

States is not at war with Islam—it makes it less likely that they 

are really going to be motivated to help and be a part of this fight. 

You know, despite all the Islamophobia, they are. 

And I adamantly reject the view that the American Muslim community has not spoken out against al-Qaeda. The American Muslim community that does that does not get a lot of press time, but 

I have worked with Muslims for the past 8 years who are adamantly against them. 

But, when they see Islamophobia, they are less likely to stand up 

and say, ‘‘America is a great place to be, and the United States is 

not at war with Islam.’’ And that is an important set of messengers 

that we can either embrace or chase away. 

Senator MURPHY. Mr. Wainstein, if I could just turn to my second question, regarding Syria, which is connected to your comment 

about some of the optimism that comes out of the Arab Spring, in 

that, (a) anti-Americanism was not necessarily a driver of those 

revolutions, and (b) we were largely seen as being on the right side 

of those conflicts. What are the lessons, then, that we draw to the 

current conflict in Syria? Certainly, a lot of concern has been 

expressed, in this body, about whether or not, when Assad falls, we 

will be perceived on the right side, and what consequences that ultimately has for the very bad actors affiliated with extremist 

groups to hold sway in a democratic or semidemocratic process that 

plays out once Assad is gone. 

Mr. WAINSTEIN. Senator, that is a very good question. And, in 

many ways, Syria is sort of the perfect storm, because it has developed into this civil war of horrific proportions, a human tragedy on 

a major scale. And then you throw in the prospects that it is now 

also the launching pad for a rejuvenated al-Qaeda presence in that 

part of the world, and, you know, it is the perfect conditions for

al-Qaeda. 

Obviously, you know, we have—as a matter of foreign policy—we 

have every reason to see the Assad regime get ushered out, but we 

also want to make sure that what comes in after he leaves, or is 

kicked out, is something that is hostile to al-Qaeda and is accommodating to our interests. 

I know it is a balancing act, and the administration is in a tough 

position because they are trying to sort of keep al-Qaeda suppressed, but, at the same time, try to help the opposition, which, 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

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in many ways, is indistinguishable from al-Qaeda, in certain quarters. 

So, I think that it is a tough one to draw lessons from, because 

it is the perfect storm. 

Senator MURPHY. But, would you agree, today, that we are not 

perceived to be on the right side of this, and the danger is, is that 

if circumstances change and Assad goes, in the next several weeks 

or months, that, unless our disposition changes, that we are not 

really balancing that question very well right now? 

Mr. WAINSTEIN. Right. You can see where we have been with 

other countries. Just take Libya and our decisions as to how and 

when to get involved, and how much to be involved, and how that 

was calibrated, and how that turned out. I think, in Syria right 

now, if Assad were to walk out, there would be a large percentage 

of the incoming government who would think that we were not 

there for them. And so, if they are looking for support, they would 

be less likely to look to us and more likely to look to other regimes 

that are less friendly. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I am intrigued with the winning-the-narrative argument that the 

Chairman raised and, Congresswoman Harman, that you raised in 

your testimony. And I am thinking of the winning-the-narrative 

argument in a slightly different way. So, one way to do it is to be 

truer to our principles and portray the right values to the world, 

and to do it in such a way that our own Muslim-American population feels like they can communicate the message. But, another 

thought that I have is a narrative does not have to be won by us, 

it can be won by other nations and other actors, globally, that can 

offer a countermodel to terrorism as a path to success. 

And so, although this is not my area of the world, I would say, 

you know, a Turkey, that is a cochair with United States in the 

global counterterrorism forum, that has a growing GDP, that is a 

nation, you know, that is in the Muslim world, but that has a 

strong, kind of, economic track record now, that, on the sectarianto-secular scale, is a little more over to the secular side than many; 

or a Morocco, with a constitutional monarchy, where the king is a 

lineal descendant of Mohammad, again with some tradition of respect for religious liberty, but strong—obviously, a strong Muslim 

nation, and an economy that has been stronger than some others—

you know, helping our allies, you know, elevate their posture so 

that there is an alternative success model for young populations 

that are prone to be recruited into terrorism, that a success model 

is, you know, a functioning—more or less functioning government 

and a path to economic success. 

So, some of the winning-the-narrative is not just about us, but 

I think some of the winning-the-narrative is about nations that 

many in these countries might feel more immediately akin to than 

us in helping them tell their stories. And I am just intrigued by 

that, especially, I guess, as a result of Turkey’s role in cochairing 

this global counterterrorism forum with the United States. And I 

would just be interested in your thoughts on that. 

FOREI-43947 with DISTILLER

27

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I strongly agree with you, and I think there 

is a big opportunity right now, especially given a reasonably close 

relationship between President Obama and Prime Minister Erdogan, of Turkey, to work together in partnership to do more, 

together, to frame a narrative and show a model to other parts of 

the region. 

That is not to say that some of the recent actions of Turkey have 

been attractive. The anti-Israel and anti-Semitic rhetoric is horrible, and I think we have to condemn it. But, by and large, Turkey 

offers a more moderate model of an Islamist society. 

Islamist political parties are not necessarily bad. I think it is 

much better to have these religious parties inside the tent than trying to blow up the tent, which is the al-Qaeda model. So, I am for 

that. But, I do agree that there are some models better than 

others. 

And final comment on the Arab Awakening, because—we have 

talked about that. And certainly, the aspirations of the people who 

overthrew their government are enormously impressive, and their 

personal courage is impressive. But, some of these governments—

new governments—have yet to succeed in a way that reflects democratic pluralism or tolerance. And that is very worrisome. Which is 

another reason why better models should be out. 

So, you know, I strongly favor collaboration with Turkey to do 

this, and think you have a great idea. 

Senator KAINE. Additional thoughts on that? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I think you can look across and outside the 

region throughout the Muslim world for some really good examples. 

The United States partnership with Indonesia has been fantastic. 

And you may remember, in 2001–2002, people talked about how 

Indonesia could be the next Afghanistan, next home of al-Qaeda. 

And it simply has not. And why? Because the Indonesians have 

taken this seriously because of significant foreign aid, good intelligence, and good defense partnerships. Real success story. 

I think the transition that Jordan is going through, slowly moving toward greater democratization in that region, in the heart of 

a region that has been affected by al-Qaeda—a very, very important example. 

I absolutely agree with Jane Harman, as well, that, in places like 

Libya and Egypt, two very different challenges, we have to use our 

foreign aid in ways that makes them walk the right path, but we 

also have to take a very sophisticated look at the pressures they 

are under and who are in these governments. And we cannot simply look and say, ‘‘Oh, they are a member of x group. We cannot 

work with them on anything.’’ If we do that, we will cut off our 

nose to spite our face. 

Senator KAINE. Well, one additional question, a kind of a separate topic. I am on Armed Services, as well, and we have been 

having a series of briefings by commanders in different AORs—

AFRICOM and Southern Command—talking a lot about things like 

the drug trade—really, criminal networks from South America to 

North America, or across the Atlantic into Africa and then up to 

Europe. And it always strikes me, as we are talking about these 

criminal networks, if it is easy to move drugs, if it is easy to do 

human trafficking, if it is easy to move arms, if it is easy to move 

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cash, it would be easy to move, you know, nuclear materiel or 

something else that could cause a significant challenge. And so, it 

strikes me that part of our counterterrorism challenge is the disruption of criminal networks that are not, in and of themselves, 

part of the same group of people that are terrorists, but that are 

now getting so blended together, or at least have a financial interest in working with people who have terrorism as a motive. And 

the more hearings I go to, the more nervous I get. 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I actually just spent 2 hours, before this, 

with staff from Senator Rockefeller’s office and Senator Reid’s 

office, talking about illicit networks, and you are absolutely right 

that it is simply the movement of people, materials, and, to some 

extent, ideology and money, and it is all the same networks. And 

especially as we have seen in North Africa, the Tuaregs and what 

they have enabled. It was 5 years ago; it was drugs and other 

things. And now it is weapons, Libya, and the like. 

So, we have to get better at those networks. Those networks 

require not just traditional military force, which is in this region, 

but requires real enabling by us, in terms of aid and significant 

training on the Customs front, Department of Homeland Security, 

law enforcement, DEA. We have to look at this in a more holistic 

way than we have in the past. 

Ms. HARMAN. That is why——

Mr. LEITER. Thank you. 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. I just—if I might add something——

Senator KAINE. Yes. 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. I advocated a whole-of-government

approach to counterterrorism. If you just stay in silos and think, 

‘‘What can the State Department do?’’ or, ‘‘What can the Homeland 

Security Department do?’’ you are not going to get at this problem. 

You have to put all the pieces together and remember that instead 

of a top-down structure that we saw on 9/11, now we have a horizontal structure of loosely affiliated groups, and some of them are 

criminal networks, and they are parasitic. They attach to each 

other for the purpose of funding an operation or moving goods, and 

then they disconnect. And we really have to see all of this as 

linked, and we have to think about how it will evolve. It won’t look 

this way in 3 months or a year. 

And they use the most modern technology. We should not 

assume that we are better digital natives than they are. These are 

the kids in the cafes who are inventing, I think, state-of-the-art 

cyber attacks and other things. And if you ask, What should we 

worry about at 3 a.m.? We should worry about these kids and what 

they are up to. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

One last set of questions, because you have been so gracious with 

your time. The whole question of ‘‘drain the swamp.’’ What do you 

envision—and I invite any of you and, Jane, you specifically mentioned it—but, what do you envision as the elements that you 

would promote to ‘‘drain the swamp’’? 

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And, second, what are the partnerships that have particularly 

worked well or the partnerships that we have not engaged in yet 

but that we should be engaging in toward this goal? 

Any of you want to—it is a ladies-first——

Ms. HARMAN. All right. Well, I think we have talked about a 

number of them already. You know, ‘‘draining the swamp.’’ I said 

whole-of-government approach, looking at foreign aid not as a 

flavor of the month, making sure that some of these programs in 

the State Department are considered in a broader context, which 

is, Do they really help our CT capability, or not? 

But, I think some other things that were raised—partnerships 

with other countries; and this is the other piece that no one has 

discussed yet, and that is public/private partnerships. The private 

sector has many tools that—and a lot of agility that the public sector does not have. And especially if you look at create—I would not 

say ‘‘changing’’—inventing education systems and models that fit 

some of these countries. Illiteracy is a huge terrorism recruitment 

tool. If people do not have any hope that they can change their circumstance, they can be more easily recruited. They also cannot get 

employed if they lack basic skills. 

So, I think there are approaches to this that the private sector, 

in particular, has, and the NGO community, that we should lash 

onto, that would magnify, geometrically, our capability. 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I would offer, first, on the words front.

Domestically, we have to do a better job of actually engaging the 

American Muslim community in this. The U.S. Government is 

pretty darn bad at this. Different elements of the government are 

OK at it. The FBI has some skills at it. The DHS has some skills. 

But, overall, we have not effectively engaged the American Muslim 

community. 

Second, we have to accept that what the United States says 

about Islam on a global basis is generally dismissed. We are not 

a credible speaker on this subject. So, what we ought to seek to do, 

following on what Jane said, is, we ought to seek to empower moderate voices, rather than be the amplifier, ourselves. We have to 

provide funding so people can understand, so American Muslim 

groups and other Muslim groups around the world who counter

al-Qaeda’s message know how to use the Web and can actually 

counter al-Awlaki’s message, or inspire his message more effectively, and they know how to use those tools. If it comes from a 

U.S. Government speaker, it probably is not going to be that 

effective. 

On the acts front—because just the words without acts is simply 

hollow rhetoric—the pieces that have worked incredibly well for us 

in the past, disaster relief has been spectacular. If you look at 

the—not all the time, but what we have done in Pakistan for 

disaster relief and the like, Indonesia with the earthquake and 

tsunami—these sorts of programs, which really show a nonmilitary 

face, or perhaps a military face, but a military face using—doing 

humanitarian acts, have been incredibly effective. 

Last, but not least, we should not think that we are going to win 

this alone. In part, we should simply be highlighting how bankrupt 

al-Qaeda’s ideology is. If you look at the countries that have seriously rejected al-Qaeda—places like Jordan—it was not because of 

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anything we said; it was because of al-Qaeda’s acts. And we have 

to get better at showing how bankrupt the ideology is, how successful something like an Arab Awakening peaceful revolution can be, 

versus the killing of Muslims that al-Qaeda brings. 

To me, those are the three main components that I would advocate for. 

Mr. WAINSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could just follow on Mike’s 

comments about the domestic side. We have talked about outreach 

and countering radicalization here in the United States, and 

whether those efforts have translated into a positive message going 

out—emanating from the United States out to the rest of the world. 

Keep in mind, I think we all recognize this, but that message is 

also important here in the United States, as a counterterrorism 

matter, because we are seeing, more and more over the last few 

years, the phenomenon of homegrown terrorism, and we have people who are getting radicalized, here within our midst, in a way 

that did not happen before. 

It has not happened to the degree that we saw over in Europe 

in the early ’00s; in part, I think, because the Muslim community 

here in the United States—those communities generally feel a 

lower level of alienation than many of the communities over in 

Europe. But, we are starting to see an uptick over the last few 

years, and that is troubling. 

And I believe that messaging that comes out from the United 

States Government—whether it is the prosecution of hate crimes or 

the FBI going out and doing outreach to the Muslim community—

directly translates into a diminution of any interest on the part of 

your potential recruit to actually move up to the level of being an 

extremist. 

And so, it has a very tangible impact on our national security 

here in the United States. And, the better we get at detecting the 

movement of terrorists around the world—and therefore, being able 

to interdict terrorists when they come into our country—the bigger 

the threat from terrorists who are here—who are ourselves. And so, 

that message is important. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. I will just—one last question. 

Again, I appreciate the testimony and look forward to talking to 

you all as we move along. 

And I want to change the subject. I know you all have talked 

about a lot of things that I agree with, on the soft side, the message side, and in trying to deal with some of the economic issues 

that drive this. But, back to the authorization, and back to dealing 

with what we actually do, kinetically or in other ways. 

As we are looking at a potential different type of authorization, 

do—when we deal with people kinetically—do they have to pose a 

direct threat to the United States? And does that threat have to 

be against U.S. facilities here at home, or can they be U.S. facilities 

abroad? Or can the United States, through—or should the United 

States, through an authorization like this, actually target—and I 

know I am using a word that you all have said we should not use—

but, should we direct our activities toward people that, candidly, 

just disagree with our way of life, and maybe tried to hamper other 

Western societies? I mean, how do you—as you walk down that 

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chain, how do you deal with an authorization in a way that really 

gets at the threat that we now have? 

Ms. HARMAN. Carefully, is my answer. I do not think we want 

to trade the AUMF, which is outdated and designed for a different 

problem, for something that may be updated but is overly broad. 

I would suggest, first, that we understand what current and future 

threats are, and we define them carefully, if we are thinking about 

one statute. And I am not sure it is a good idea to think about one 

statute that would be the predicate for all of our actions. But, at 

any rate, that is where I would start. 

The second point that I would make is, there should be an 

explicit statement that U.S. interests or U.S. persons have to be 

involved in order for us to target an individual. There should be no 

other reason to do it, unless we are in a—you know, in a ground 

combat or a—some kind of situation that fits the standard law-ofwar definition, which this probably, presumably, would not. 

Senator CORKER. But, can I just——

Ms. HARMAN. I——

Senator CORKER. Can I just—let me just ask you, on that. So, 

you know, I was just in Mali, and you have got three groups who 

have come together in northern Africa, with—by the way, with very 

differing reasons for being together. The Tuaregs actually have a 

political issue that has caused them to be a part of the conflict. It 

is not really, maybe, even a full insurgency, from that standpoint. 

But, you have—you know, it is criminality that people are dealing 

with there. They are, you know, a threat to Mali. They are a threat 

to Western thinking. 

So, how would we—let us say we were in partnership, today, in 

a little different way, maybe more like the French are, on the 

ground—how would you differentiate? I mean, you know, a lot of 

this is just pure criminality. I mean, you’ve got hostage-taking, 

you’ve got drug-running. At some point, they may pose a threat. 

How do you deal with that? 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I would disagree a little bit with my friend 

Jane, in that I—first of all, I would—let me say, unequivocally—

you know, you said, ‘‘Should we target people who we just disagree 

with?’’—we should only be targeting people who pose a threat of 

violence. 

Now the question becomes, ‘‘Violence toward whom? And how 

imminent must that violence be?’’ And, in my view, certainly violence toward the United States, our interests globally; that would 

be enough. It would not have to be a threat to the homeland. 

Second, I do believe that we should have some authorization to 

use force against groups that pose a threat of violence against our 

allies in this fight. Because if we are talking about building up 

partnerships, one of the ways you build up partnerships is when 

your friends in x country come to you and say, ‘‘These guys are 

planning a terrorist attack against us now. We cannot target them. 

They are part of a group that has targeted you in the past, but now 

they are targeting us.’’ It is very important that we can assist them 

with military force. So, in fact, you build that partnership up. 

So, I think it should not be limited only to threats against the 

United States. We should have some more expansive language to 

use force against our close allies in this global fight. 

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And, in terms of imminence, I would not use language, as was 

used in the justification for targeting Americans—U.S. persons, 

American citizens, by—that was released recently—or, not 

released, but obtained. I think that is appropriate for targeting 

U.S. persons; but for non-U.S. persons, I would include a looser 

standard that—not ‘‘imminent,’’ but some sort of immediacy, beyond imminence, so that, if there were historical plotting and the 

organization was still aligned against us, we could use military 

force. 

But, the key is, Whom are they using force against, and how 

close is it? And I think, on both those, there does need to be some 

operational flexibility, as my friend Ken Wainstein said. 

Senator CORKER. So, your friend Jane seems to be differing with 

you. 

Ms. HARMAN. Well, I am differing. I certainly think we should 

prevent and disrupt plots against us around the world, and we 

should use appropriate means to do that. That is not always kinetic 

means. I think we would agree about that. But, if Congress is acting—this is why I am pausing—I think some very broad statement 

of U.S. interests in and aiding our allies, and so forth, will end up 

backfiring. I think it should be something much narrower. We do 

have agreements with allies, and we have section 5 of NATO, 

which——

Senator CORKER. Right. 

Ms. HARMAN [continuing]. Is a common defense provision. And 

those things should stay in place. But, Congress legislating all this 

in one blanket statute, I would find—if the goal is to come up with 

a narrative that is going to persuade others to join us, I think this 

would not be a constructive part of that narrative. 

Senator CORKER. Ken. 

Mr. WAINSTEIN. If I may, Senator, just if I could follow on, on 

what Mike said. In terms of imminence, there has been a good bit 

of talk about the imminence of the threat that al-Awlaki posed at 

the time that he was killed, and people said, ‘‘Well, you know, he 

didn’t have his finger on the trigger, and he wasn’t about to set off 

a bomb.’’ But that is not the imminence you need, whether it is an 

American or a non-American. He had a clear track record of targeting the United States, of fomenting and bringing recruits in to 

commit terrorist acts against the United States. It was clear, the 

threat that he posed. 

But, I think it is important to recognize that, if you adopt a 

scheme, such as what Mike was describing—where different terrorist groups are found to be terrorist organizations and put on a 

list, and the government’s now authorized to use military force 

against those organizations—then we are at war with those organizations. 

And, traditionally, when you are at war against a state actor, 

you do not have to wait for the soldier to pull a gun out at you before you kill him. You can kill him on the battlefield, and you can 

kill him as he is preparing and getting poised to come out at the 

battlefield. So, imminence that is well back from the battlefield can 

justify the use of force in a war. And in this war against terrorist 

organizations, I think that same paradigm would apply. 

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Ms. HARMAN. If I could just add one more thing. I think it 

would—we were totally justified in the action we took against 

Awlaki. No question about it. There was a strong predicate there. 

He was inciting people to commit violent acts in the United States, 

and there was a long track record. And the fact that he was an 

American did require us to be careful in how we identified him. 

But, we were, and we did the right thing, in that case. 

However, I think, as we go forward, saying, as Ken just did, ‘‘We 

are at war with a number of organizations,’’ is a storyline that is 

troubling. We are trying to tell a story about America that is a 

positive story to persuade kids not to become suicide bombers and 

terrorists. And Congress has a big role in deciding how we tell that 

story. Yes, there should be legislative oversight and specific legislation to authorize kinetic acts. But I, again, would caution that it 

should deliver a message that is not just about being at war; it 

should deliver a message about trying to find ways to win the argument and to be at war as a last resort against those who are 

beyond rehabilitation. 

Mr. LEITER. Senator, I know we are over time, but I just want 

to—I have to clarify one thing that Jane said. 

Anwar al-Awlaki was not just inciting Americans, because I 

think there is a question whether simply being—inciting violence 

would be enough to be targeted. Anwar al-Awlaki was an operational commander who was actively recruiting and training bombers who were trying to blow up planes over the United States. 

Ms. HARMAN. And I agree with that. I—that was—inciting people 

to commit violent acts was one of the things he was doing. I think 

we were totally justified. 

And one more point that none of us has raised, which is that 

Congress is entitled to see the legal documents prepared by the 

Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, in my view, 

that authorize acts like the targeting of Awlaki. Some of those documents should only be seen, I think, in classified settings and by 

appropriate committees, but, nonetheless, it is not OK—and I think 

Ken said this, as well—for the executive branch to police itself. I 

think we have seen that movie before, and what should happen is, 

the separation of powers should work, and Congress should have 

the ability to conduct adequate oversight and to legislate. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well——

Mr. WAINSTEIN. May I just respond? 

The CHAIRMAN [continuing]. You will have the last word, because 

we are going to have to close out the hearing. 

Mr. WAINSTEIN. OK. Just to respond to Congresswoman Harman’s point. She makes a good point about the messaging. 

When I talk about war in this context, I am just making the 

point that when Congress authorizes the use of military force 

against an organization, we are using the tools of war against an 

organization. Nobody should fool themselves. War is what it is, and 

so we draw on the traditions of war. 

But, Jane makes a very good point about the messaging. And, 

you know, the more we talk about being at war with terrorism, the 

more that is misconstrued by the Muslim world, and used against 

us. 

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So, I think the terminology now from the executive branch, about 

‘‘being at war with al-Qaeda’’ is dead on, because we are at war 

with al-Qaeda, but not with anybody who is not an adherent of alQaeda. I think it is important to draw that distinction, and it is 

important, as Jane said, just to keep mindful of the language we 

use, because that has real-life impacts on our relationships overseas. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this has been incredibly helpful, and it has 

been insightful, and obviously there are some differences of opinion, when we get to this authorization, on what is the universe of 

it and what it looks like. But, it has been helpful to start that 

conversation. 

So, again, with the thanks of the committee for all of your insights, your past service to our country, and for your forbearance 

today, it has been very helpful to us. 

The committee’s record will stand open until Friday for any 

members who have any questions. 

And, with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 5:55 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

Æ

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