(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2005 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. v. CARDEGNA 

ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 

No. 04–1264. Argued November 29, 2005—Decided February 21, 2006 

For each deferred-payment transaction respondents entered into with 

Buckeye Check Cashing, they signed an Agreement containing provisions that required binding arbitration to resolve disputes arising out 

of the Agreement. Respondents sued in Florida state court, alleging 

that Buckeye charged usurious interest rates and that the Agreement 

violated various Florida laws, rendering it criminal on its face. The 

trial court denied Buckeye’s motion to compel arbitration, holding 

that a court rather than an arbitrator should resolve a claim that a 

contract is illegal and void ab initio. A state appellate court reversed, 

but was in turn reversed by the Florida Supreme Court, which reasoned that enforcing an arbitration agreement in a contract challenged as unlawful would violate state public policy and contract law. 

Held: Regardless of whether it is brought in federal or state court, a 

challenge to the validity of a contract as a whole, and not specifically

to the arbitration clause within it, must go to the arbitrator, not the 

court. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U. S. 395, 

and Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 1, answer the question 

presented here by establishing three propositions. First, as a matter 

of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract. See Prima Paint, 388 

U. S., at 400, 402–404. Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by 

the arbitrator in the first instance. See id., at 403–404. Third, this 

arbitration law applies in state as well as federal courts. See Southland, supra, at 12. The crux of respondents’ claim is that the Agreement as a whole (including its arbitration provision) is rendered invalid by the usurious finance charge. Because this challenges the 
2 BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. v. CARDEGNA 

Syllabus 

Agreement, and not specifically its arbitration provisions, the latter 

are enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract, and the 

challenge should be considered by an arbitrator, not a court. The 

Florida Supreme Court erred in declining to apply Prima Paint’s severability rule, and respondents’ assertion that that rule does not apply in state court runs contrary to Prima Paint and Southland. 

Pp. 3–8. 

894 So. 2d 860, reversed and remanded. 

SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, 

C. J., and STEVENS, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., 

joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. ALITO, J., took no part in 

the consideration or decision of the case. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to 

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order 

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–1264 

BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC., PETITIONER v. 

JOHN CARDEGNA ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

FLORIDA 

[February 21, 2006] 

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. 

We decide whether a court or an arbitrator should consider the claim that a contract containing an arbitration 

provision is void for illegality. 

I 

Respondents John Cardegna and Donna Reuter entered 

into various deferred-payment transactions with petitioner Buckeye Check Cashing (Buckeye), in which they 

received cash in exchange for a personal check in the 

amount of the cash plus a finance charge. For each separate transaction they signed a “Deferred Deposit and 

Disclosure Agreement” (Agreement), which included the 

following arbitration provisions: 

“1. Arbitration Disclosure By signing this Agreement, 

you agree that i[f] a dispute of any kind arises out of 

this Agreement or your application therefore or any 

instrument relating thereto, th[e]n either you or we or 

third-parties involved can choose to have that dispute 

resolved by binding arbitration as set forth in Paragraph 2 below . . . . 
2 BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. v. CARDEGNA 

Opinion of the Court 

2. Arbitration Provisions Any claim, dispute, or controversy . . . arising from or relating to this Agreement 

. . . or the validity, enforceability, or scope of this Arbitration Provision or the entire Agreement (collectively 

‘Claim’), shall be resolved, upon the election of you or 

us or said third-parties, by binding arbitration . . . . 

This arbitration Agreement is made pursuant to a 

transaction involving interstate commerce, and shall 

be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’), 9

U. S. C. Sections 1–16. The arbitrator shall apply applicable substantive law constraint [sic] with the FAA 

and applicable statu[t]es of limitations and shall

honor claims of privilege recognized by law . . . .” 

Respondents brought this putative class action in Florida state court, alleging that Buckeye charged usurious 

interest rates and that the Agreement violated various 

Florida lending and consumer-protection laws, rendering 

it criminal on its face. Buckeye moved to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion, holding that a 

court rather than an arbitrator should resolve a claim that 

a contract is illegal and void ab initio. The District Court 

of Appeal of Florida for the Fourth District reversed, 

holding that because respondents did not challenge the

arbitration provision itself, but instead claimed that the 

entire contract was void, the agreement to arbitrate was 

enforceable, and the question of the contract’s legality 

should go to the arbitrator. 

Respondents appealed, and the Florida Supreme Court 

reversed, reasoning that to enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a contract challenged as unlawful “ ‘could breathe 

life into a contract that not only violates state law, but 

also is criminal in nature . . . .’” 894 So. 2d 860, 862 

(2005) (quoting Party Yards, Inc. v. Templeton, 751 So. 2d 

121, 123 (Fla. App. 2000)). We granted certiorari. 545 

U. S. ___ (2005). 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

II 

A 

To overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, Congress

enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. §§1– 

16. Section 2 embodies the national policy favoring arbitration and places arbitration agreements on equal footing 

with all other contracts: 

“A written provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by

arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of

such contract . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out 

of such a contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and 

enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 

in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 

Challenges to the validity of arbitration agreements “upon

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 

of any contract” can be divided into two types. One type

challenges specifically the validity of the agreement to 

arbitrate. See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U. S. 

1, 4–5 (1984) (challenging the agreement to arbitrate as 

void under California law insofar as it purported to cover

claims brought under the state Franchise Investment

Law). The other challenges the contract as a whole, either 

on a ground that directly affects the entire agreement 

(e.g., the agreement was fraudulently induced), or on the

ground that the illegality of one of the contract’s provisions renders the whole contract invalid.1 Respondents’ 

—————— 

1The issue of the contract’s validity is different from the issue of 

whether any agreement between the alleged obligor and obligee was 

ever concluded. Our opinion today addresses only the former, and does 

not speak to the issue decided in the cases cited by respondents (and by 

the Florida Supreme Court), which hold that it is for courts to decide 

whether the alleged obligor ever signed the contract, Chastain v. 

Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F. 2d 851 (CA11 1992), whether the 

signor lacked authority to commit the alleged principal, Sandvik AB v. 
4 BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. v. CARDEGNA 

Opinion of the Court 

claim is of this second type. The crux of the complaint is 

that the contract as a whole (including its arbitration 

provision) is rendered invalid by the usurious finance 

charge.

In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 

U. S. 395 (1967), we addressed the question of who—court 

or arbitrator—decides these two types of challenges. The 

issue in the case was “whether a claim of fraud in the 

inducement of the entire contract is to be resolved by the 

federal court, or whether the matter is to be referred to 

the arbitrators.” Id., at 402. Guided by §4 of the FAA,2 we 

held that “if the claim is fraud in the inducement of the 

arbitration clause itself—an issue which goes to the making of the agreement to arbitrate—the federal court may 

proceed to adjudicate it. But the statutory language does 

not permit the federal court to consider claims of fraud in 

the inducement of the contract generally.” Id., at 403–404 

(internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). We 

rejected the view that the question of “severability” was 

one of state law, so that if state law held the arbitration 

provision not to be severable a challenge to the contract as 

a whole would be decided by the court. See id., at 400, 

402–403. 

 Subsequently, in Southland Corp., we held that the FAA 

—————— 

Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F. 3d 99 (CA3 2000); Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. 

All American Ins. Co., 256 F. 3d 587 (CA7 2001), and whether the 

signor lacked the mental capacity to assent, Spahr v. Secco, 330 F. 3d 

1266 (CA10 2003). 2 In pertinent part, §4 reads: 

“A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of 

another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may 

petition any United States district court [with jurisdiction] . . . for an 

order directing that such arbitration proceed in a manner provided for 

in such agreement . . . . [U]pon being satisfied that the making of the 

agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in 

issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to 

arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . .” 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

“create[d] a body of federal substantive law,” which was 

“applicable in state and federal court.” 465 U. S., at 12 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We rejected the view 

that state law could bar enforcement of §2, even in the 

context of state-law claims brought in state court. See id., 

at 10–14; see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 

513 U. S. 265, 270–273 (1995). 

B 

Prima Paint and Southland answer the question presented here by establishing three propositions. First, as a 

matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the 

contract. Second, unless the challenge is to the arbitration 

clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance. Third, this 

arbitration law applies in state as well as federal courts. 

The parties have not requested, and we do not undertake, 

reconsideration of those holdings. Applying them to this

case, we conclude that because respondents challenge the 

Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration provisions, 

those provisions are enforceable apart from the remainder 

of the contract. The challenge should therefore be considered by an arbitrator, not a court. 

In declining to apply Prima Paint’s rule of severability, 

the Florida Supreme Court relied on the distinction between void and voidable contracts. “Florida public policy 

and contract law,” it concluded, permit “no severable, or 

salvageable, parts of a contract found illegal and void 

under Florida law.” 894 So. 2d, at 864. Prima Paint 

makes this conclusion irrelevant. That case rejected

application of state severability rules to the arbitration 

agreement without discussing whether the challenge at 

issue would have rendered the contract void or voidable. 

See 388 U. S., at 400–404. Indeed, the opinion expressly

disclaimed any need to decide what state-law remedy was 
6 BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. v. CARDEGNA 

Opinion of the Court 

available, id., at 400, n. 3, (though Justice Black’s dissent 

asserted that state law rendered the contract void, id., at 

407). Likewise in Southland, which arose in state court, 

we did not ask whether the several challenges made 

there—fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, 

breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the California 

Franchise Investment Law—would render the contract 

void or voidable. We simply rejected the proposition that

the enforceability of the arbitration agreement turned on 

the state legislature’s judgment concerning the forum for 

enforcement of the state-law cause of action. See 465 

U. S., at 10. So also here, we cannot accept the Florida 

Supreme Court’s conclusion that enforceability of the 

arbitration agreement should turn on “Florida public

policy and contract law,” 894 So. 2d, at 864. 

C 

Respondents assert that Prima Paint’s rule of severability does not apply in state court. They argue that Prima 

Paint interpreted only §§3 and 4—two of the FAA’s procedural provisions, which appear to apply by their terms 

only in federal court—but not §2, the only provision that 

we have applied in state court. This does not accurately 

describe Prima Paint. Although §4, in particular, had 

much to do with Prima Paint’s understanding of the rule 

of severability, see 388 U. S., at 403–404, this rule ultimately arises out of §2, the FAA’s substantive command

that arbitration agreements be treated like all other contracts. The rule of severability establishes how this equalfooting guarantee for “a written [arbitration] provision” is 

to be implemented. Respondents’ reading of Prima Paint 

as establishing nothing more than a federal-court rule of 

procedure also runs contrary to Southland’s understanding of that case. One of the bases for Southland’s application of §2 in state court was precisely Prima Paint’s 

“reli[ance] for [its] holding on Congress’ broad power to 
Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause.” 

465 U. S., at 11; see also Prima Paint, supra, at 407 

(Black, J., dissenting) (“[t]he Court here holds that the 

[FAA], as a matter of federal substantive law . . .” (emphasis added)). Southland itself refused to “believe Congress

intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes subject 

only to federal-court jurisdiction.” 465 U. S., at 15. 

Respondents point to the language of §2, which renders 

“valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” “a written provision 

in” or “an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an 

existing controversy arising out of” a “contract.” Since, 

respondents argue, the only arbitration agreements to 

which §2 applies are those involving a “contract,” and 

since an agreement void ab initio under state law is not a 

“contract,” there is no “written provision” in or “controversy arising out of” a “contract,” to which §2 can apply. 

This argument echoes Justice Black’s dissent in Prima 

Paint: “Sections 2 and 3 of the Act assume the existence of 

a valid contract. They merely provide for enforcement 

where such a valid contract exists.” 388 U. S., at 412–413. 

We do not read “contract” so narrowly. The word appears 

four times in §2. Its last appearance is in the final clause, 

which allows a challenge to an arbitration provision “upon 

such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 

of any contract.” (Emphasis added.) There can be no 

doubt that “contract” as used this last time must include 

contracts that later prove to be void. Otherwise, the 

grounds for revocation would be limited to those that 

rendered a contract voidable—which would mean (implausibly) that an arbitration agreement could be challenged 

as voidable but not as void. Because the sentence’s final 

use of “contract” so obviously includes putative contracts, 

we will not read the same word earlier in the same sentence to have a more narrow meaning.3 We note that 

—————— 

3Our more natural reading is confirmed by the use of the word “con-
8 BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC. v. CARDEGNA 

Opinion of the Court 

neither Prima Paint nor Southland lends support to respondents’ reading; as we have discussed, neither case

turned on whether the challenge at issue would render the 

contract voidable or void. 

* * * 

It is true, as respondents assert, that the Prima Paint 

rule permits a court to enforce an arbitration agreement in 

a contract that the arbitrator later finds to be void. But it 

is equally true that respondents’ approach permits a court 

to deny effect to an arbitration provision in a contract that 

the court later finds to be perfectly enforceable. Prima 

Paint resolved this conundrum—and resolved it in favor of 

the separate enforceability of arbitration provisions. We 

reaffirm today that, regardless of whether the challenge is 

brought in federal or state court, a challenge to the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the 

arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.

The judgment of the Florida Supreme Court is reversed, 

and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 

JUSTICE ALITO took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case. 

—————— 

tract” elsewhere in the United States Code to refer to putative agreements, regardless of whether they are legal. For instance, the Sherman 

Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, states that “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy in restraint of trade . . . is hereby declared to be 

illegal.” 15 U. S. C. §1. Under respondents’ reading of “contract,” a 

bewildering circularity would result: A contract illegal because it was in 

restraint of trade would not be a “contract” at all, and thus the statutory prohibition would not apply. 
_________________ 

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Cite as: 546 U. S. ____ (2006) 1 

THOMAS, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 04–1264 

BUCKEYE CHECK CASHING, INC., PETITIONER v. 

JOHN CARDEGNA ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 

FLORIDA 

[February 21, 2006] 

JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 

I remain of the view that the Federal Arbitration Act 

(FAA), 9 U. S. C. §1 et seq., does not apply to proceedings 

in state courts. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 

513 U. S. 265, 285–297 (1995) (THOMAS, J., dissenting); 

Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U. S. 681, 689 

(1996) (same); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 

U. S. 444, 460 (2003) (same). Thus, in state-court proceedings, the FAA cannot be the basis for displacing a state law 

that prohibits enforcement of an arbitration clause contained in a contract that is unenforceable under state law. 

Accordingly, I would leave undisturbed the judgment of the 

Florida Supreme Court.