COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-13-00414-CR

ROY TYLER BEAUCHAMP APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 415TH DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CR12-0447

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant Roy Tyler Beauchamp pleaded guilty to a state jail felony offense 

in exchange for two years’ confinement probated to five years’ community 

supervision. Three months later, the State filed a motion to revoke his 

community supervision. Beauchamp pleaded true to the State’s allegations, and 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

the trial court accepted his plea, conducted a punishment hearing, revoked his 

community supervision, and sentenced him to twenty-four months’ confinement.

In his sole issue on appeal, Beauchamp asks us to determine whether a 

duty to sua sponte withdraw a plea in a bench trial extends to “true” pleas in 

revocation hearings and, if so, whether the trial court’s failure to sua sponte 

withdraw his plea here constituted an abuse of discretion when the record “raises 

the question of whether [he] knew, at the time the plea was entered, precisely 

what the allegations against him were.”

First, there is no duty to sua sponte withdraw a plea in a bench trial. 

Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that the 

defendant has the burden to timely seek to withdraw his guilty plea and that he 

may not complain for the first time on appeal that the trial court did not sua 

sponte withdraw his guilty plea).

Further, a trial court has no duty to withdraw a plea of true in a revocation 

proceeding, and a plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support revocation. 

Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) 

(“[T]here is no duty upon a trial court to withdraw a plea of true in a revocation of 

probation proceeding even if a probationer presents a defensive issue.”); see 

also Gutierrez v. State, 108 S.W.3d 304, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (stating that 

in the revocation context, the legislature has not authorized binding plea 

agreements, has not required the court to inquire as to a plea agreement’s 
3

existence or admonish the defendant pursuant to article 26.13, and has not 

provided for withdrawal of a plea after sentencing).

Finally, Beauchamp did not raise his complaint here in the trial court or in a 

motion for new trial, see Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, but even if he had, the record as a 

whole reflects that Beauchamp knew what the State’s allegations were when he 

pleaded true,2that he pleaded true in the hope of getting his community 

supervision reinstated, and that the punishment evidence from his own witnesses 

established the violations alleged by the State. Therefore, we overrule 

Beauchamp’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

PER CURIAM

PANEL: MCCOY, GARDNER, and WALKER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: July 17, 2014

 

2Beauchamp does not argue that he did not receive the State’s motion to 

revoke or that it failed to provide him fair notice of the alleged violations so that 

he could prepare a defense. Cf. Labelle v. State, 692 S.W.2d 102, 105 & n.2 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (stating that a motion to revoke must simply give fair 

notice of the violation involved in order to comport with minimum due process).