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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DRED COLEMAN, 

 

 Petitioner, Case No. 2:12-CV-1213 

 Judge Marbley 

 v. Magistrate Judge King 

 

WARDEN, TRUMBULL CORRECTIONAL 

INSTITUTION, 

 Respondent. 

ORDER 

 Petitioner brings this action for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions in the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas on charges of aggravated murder with a firearm 

specification, aggravated burglary with a firearm specification, 

having a weapon under disability with a firearm specification and 

tampering with evidence, all in connection with the murder of Darryl 

Wood. The Petition raises the following claims: 

1. The trial court erred and deprived appellant 

of due process of law when his convictions are 

not supported by sufficient evidence and were 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

2. Appellant was deprived of his right to be 

present and to the presence and assistance of 

counsel during a critical stage of his jury 

trial violating his right to due process and a 

fundamentally fair trial. 

3. The trial court erred by imposing consecutive 

sentences without making the requisite factual 

findings. 

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On May 5, 2014, the United States Magistrate Judge recommended that 

the action be dismissed as either procedurally defaulted or without 

merit. Report and Recommendation, ECF 11. This matter is now before 

the Court on petitioner’s objection to that recommendation. 

Objection, ECF 15. The Court will consider the matter de novo. See

28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 Petitioner’s objection addresses only his sufficiency of the 

evidence claim. Citing Rosemond v. United States, -- U.S. --, 134 

S.Ct. 1240 (2014) and State v. Shabazz, 2014 WL 1775686, *6 (Ohio App. 

8 Dist. May 1, 2014), Petitioner argues that, because there was no 

evidence “that Dred Coleman knew one or more of the so-called 

accomplices possessed a gun prior to the aggravated burglary,” 

Objections, PAGEID # 1814, his convictions must be vacated. At a 

minimum, petitioner contends that an evidentiary hearing should be 

held on this issue. Id. Petitioner’s arguments are not well-taken. 

Rosemond stands for the proposition that conviction on a charge 

of aiding and abetting a federal gun offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 

requires proof of advance knowledge that a co-defendant would use or 

carry the gun. The court in Shabazz applied Rosemond to reverse the 

defendant’s conviction on charges of aggravated murder, murder, 

felonious assault with a firearm and having a weapon while under 

disability in light of the fact that “[t]here was absolutely no 

evidence that Shabazz was aware that his [accomplice] had a gun.” 

Shabazz, 2014 WL 1775686, *8. 

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 Even assuming that Rosemond applies to this habeas corpus case 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the evidence amply supports petitioner’s 

convictions and the state appellate court so held: 

In the present case, the state presented evidence 

indicating that appellant's uncle, Rudolph Lynch, 

had been charged with a serious drug offense, and 

that Wood had agreed to testify against him. 

Several days before the shooting, appellant, who 

had been living with his uncle, accompanied his 

uncle to Cleveland to pick up Blevins. Lynch then 

drove them to Columbus, where Lynch rented a 

motel room for the two men. The day prior to the 

shooting, Lynch drove appellant and Blevins to 

Wood's neighborhood, where they watched his house 

for approximately one hour. The next day, they 

returned and waited for Wood and his wife to 

leave the house and then entered it, searching 

for drugs and money. Blevins testified that he 

observed a .357 revolver in the van. 

When Wood returned to his house, Blevins and 

appellant hid in the basement. Wood started down 

the stairs, but then noticed appellant. As Wood 

ran upstairs, appellant chased after him and 

multiple shots were fired outside. Wood was heard 

saying, “[d]on't kill me” or “[n]o, man, no” 

before he was killed. (Tr. 291; 549.) Wood was 

shot five times, including three wounds to the 

back of the body (head, upper back and mid-back). 

The testimony by Jones was that the last two 

shots were fired at close range as the shooter 

was standing over Wood. (Tr. 293.) Appellant and 

Blevins fled the area after the shooting and 

disposed of a weapon, coats, gloves, and a mask. 

Appellant himself testified he told the police 

that he lied about his alibi being a girl named 

“Pebbles.” 

Blevins testified that appellant told him that 

Wood had agreed to testify against Lynch. 

Further, two jailhouse informants provided 

testimony about encounters with appellant 

following the shooting. Andre Brown testified 

that appellant told him that he and Blevins came 

to Columbus with his uncle, and that his uncle 

“had paid him to kill a dude so he wouldn't 

testify on him.” Appellant expressed concern to 

Brown about gunshot residue on his clothing, and 

that he was worried his co-defendant would “tell 

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on him.” The other informant, Mason, similarly 

testified that appellant expressed concern about 

gunshot residue on his clothing. 

Upon review, considering all of the facts and 

circumstances, including the number of shots 

fired and the location of the wounds on the 

victim's body, there was evidence upon which a 

reasonable trier of fact could have found that 

appellant made a calculated decision to kill 

Wood. Here, construing the evidence most strongly 

in favor of the state, there was sufficient 

evidence for the jury to have found that the 

state proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

element of prior calculation and design necessary 

to convict appellant of aggravated murder. 

In arguing that his conviction was against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, appellant 

challenges the credibility of the testimony of 

Blevins as well as the testimony of the 

“jailhouse informants.” However, as noted by the 

state, Blevins' testimony was corroborated by 

other evidence. The state introduced evidence 

that a van was rented by Lynch's wife during the 

time surrounding the events. Cell phone records 

indicated that appellant phoned Lynch shortly 

after the incident. Blevins testified that he 

threw a mask, gloves, and coat in the trash, 

where they were later recovered by police 

officers. Blevins also testified that appellant 

threw the weapon into a sewer, and officers 

recovered the weapon from that location. A Motel 

6 employee testified that appellant appeared to 

be in charge, and that appellant kept trying to 

call his uncle. As to the credibility of Brown, 

one of the informants, the record reflects 

similarities between Blevins' version of the 

events and the testimony given by Brown. Further, 

it was within the province of the jury to believe 

or disbelieve Brown's testimony, including 

testimony that appellant stated his uncle “paid 

him to kill a dude so he wouldn't testify.” 

Upon review, giving deference to the jury's 

determinations regarding credibility, and having 

reviewed the entire record, we do not find that 

the jury clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the 

conviction must be reversed and a new trial 

ordered. Accordingly, the conviction is not 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

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Finally, although appellant's assignment of error 

only addresses the conviction for aggravated 

murder, we further note that a review of the 

record indicates there was sufficient evidence to 

support appellant's remaining convictions, and 

that those convictions are similarly not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Based upon the foregoing, appellant's . . . 

assignment of error is overruled. 

State v. Coleman, 2011 WL 1483891 *8-9 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. Apr. 19, 

2011). 

 The factual findings of the state court are presumed to be 

correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Moreover, a federal habeas court 

cannot grant relief unless the state court’s decision was contrary to 

or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Finally, a state court’s 

determination regarding the sufficiency of the evidence is entitled to 

a “double layer” of deference. Brown v. Konteh, 567 F.3d 191, 205 (6th

Cir. 2009). As the Magistrate Judge reasoned, petitioner has not 

established that federal habeas relief is warranted. 

 Petitioner’s objections and request for an evidentiary hearing 

are DENIED. The Report and Recommendation, ECF 11, is ADOPTED AND 

AFFIRMED. 

 The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter FINAL JUDGMENT in this case. 

 s/Algenon L. Marbley 

 Algenon L. Marbley 

 United States District Judge

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