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The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for

the District of Minnesota.

___________

No. 95-1393

___________

Steven Piepgras, *

*

 Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* 

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * District of Minnesota.

of the Social Security *

Administration, *

*

 Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: November 16, 1995

 Filed: February 14, 1996 ___________

Before HANSEN, JOHN R. GIBSON and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Steven Piepgras appeals from the district court's1 order

affirming an administrative law judge's denial of his application

for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits.

Piepgras argues that the administrative law judge erred in

rejecting the opinions of two of his doctors. He also argues that

the judge erred by asking the vocational expert a hypothetical

question which did not accurately state his impairments. We affirm

the judgment of the district court.

Piepgras is a thirty-nine-year-old man with a high school

education and experience working as a janitor, laundry attendant,
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film developer, film projectionist, general clerk, cruise control

installer, and fast food worker. Piepgras claims he has been

disabled since December 19, 1990 due to diabetes. He also asserts

that he suffers from a personality disorder, depression, and

bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, which limits the use of his

hands.

After conducting two days of hearings, the administrative law

judge concluded that although Piepgras has severe impairments, he

was not disabled and could still perform various jobs. The judge

found that Piepgras suffered from "type I diabetes, [a] personality

disorder, and an affective disorder." He also found that none of

these impairments were disabilities which automatically qualified

Piepgras for benefits under the Social Security Act. The judge

determined, however, that these impairments did prevent Piepgras

from performing the work he had done in the past. After describing

Piepgras's impairments, age, education, and work experience to a

vocational expert, the judge asked the expert if there were jobs

which Piepgras could perform. The expert stated that Piepgras

could perform light janitorial jobs and light jobs in packaging,

stocking, order filing, and shipping and receiving, and that

significant numbers of these jobs were available. The judge

accepted the expert's statements and concluded that Piepgras was

not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act.

The Commissioner of the Social Security Administration adopted

the judge's decision as her final decision. The district court

affirmed the Commissioner's decision, and Piepgras appeals.

I.

Piepgras argues that the administrative law judge erred in

rejecting the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Schultz.

We must affirm the administrative law judge's decision if
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substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports his

decision. Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1995). We

may not reverse merely because substantial evidence would have

supported an opposite decision. Id. A treating physician's

opinion deserves no greater respect than any other physician's

opinion when the treating physician's opinion consists of nothing

more than vague, conclusory statements. See Thomas v. Sullivan,

928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

Piepgras argues that Dr. Schultz concluded that Piepgras could

not hold a job because of his diabetes. He contends that the

administrative law judge rejected Dr. Schultz's conclusion in

finding that Piepgras's diabetes was not disabling.

Dr. Schultz's opinion of Piepgras's condition consists of

vague, conclusory statements. In three short letters submitted to

the judge, Dr. Schultz stated that Piepgras has had "an extremely

difficult time managing his diabetes" because he cannot maintain

the proper diet. Dr. Schultz also stated that because of this

difficulty in controlling his diabetes, Piepgras has had "great

difficulty" in keeping a job. Dr. Schultz did not explain what he

meant by "extremely difficult" and "great difficulty" in his

letters and he did not testify at Piepgras's hearings. In a

written medical assessment, Dr. Schultz stated that Piepgras's

blood sugar levels affected his ability to lift, carry, walk,

stand, and withstand temperature extremes. Dr. Schultz, however,

provided no explanation as to how Piepgras's blood sugar levels

affected his abilities.

The administrative law judge did not reject Dr. Schultz's

opinion, but merely stated that the opinion did not support

Piepgras's claims of pain, numbness, fatigue, loss of stamina,

tingling, blurred vision, double vision, headaches, and inability

to understand basic instructions. It is impossible to tell whether

Dr. Schultz's opinion supports or contradicts Piepgras's claims
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because it contains no specifics concerning Piepgras's condition.

We conclude that Dr. Schultz's opinion is of limited value due to

its vagueness. Thus, Dr. Schultz's opinion deserves no greater

deference than any other physician's opinion in the record. See

Thomas, 928 F.2d at 259.

Dr. Hammarsten, a medical expert, testified that Piepgras

should be able to do medium exertion work, provided it does not

require fine work or prolonged reading. The record also shows that

Piepgras performed a wide range of activities at the time he

claimed to be disabled. Piepgras stated that he worked as a

popcorn popper at a movie theater up to eight hours a day, two days

a week, and that this job required him to stand for up to eight

hours a day and to lift sixty-pound bags of unpopped popcorn and

fifty-pound cans of popping oil. In addition to this part-time

work, Piepgras stated that he cared for himself and his children,

handled his family's finances, helped with grocery shopping,

performed some household chores, entertained neighborhood children

occasionally, and participated in church activities twice a week.

Dr. Hammarsten's opinion and Piepgras's activities constitute

substantial evidence supporting the judge's conclusion that

Piepgras's diabetes was not disabling. In light of the substantial

evidence which supports the judge's conclusion, the judge properly

discounted the conclusory opinion of Piepgras's treating physician.

II.

Piepgras argues that the administrative law judge improperly

rejected Dr. Barron's opinion that Piepgras's mental problems

prevented him from holding a job.

We must uphold the judge's conclusion that Piepgras's mental

impairments were not disabling as long as it is supported by

substantial evidence. Shannon, 54 F.3d at 486.
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Two psychologists, Dr. Barron and Dr. Henze, examined Piepgras

and evaluated his mental health. Dr. Barron evaluated Piepgras at

the request of Piepgras's attorney and concluded that Piepgras was

not "capable of withstanding work stresses, interacting

appropriately with co-workers, supervisors, and the public, and

meeting production requirements at an unskilled, competitive

employment level." Dr. Henze, however, concluded that Piepgras did

not have a problem relating to others and that he did not suffer

from any impairment in his intellectual or memory abilities.

To resolve the conflict between Dr. Barron's and Dr. Henze's

conclusions, the judge called Dr. Jacobson, a psychologist, to

testify at a supplemental hearing. After examining all of the

evidence and questioning Piepgras, Dr. Jacobson stated that

Piepgras had only slight difficulties in relating to others and in

concentrating while working. Dr. Jacobson concluded that

Piepgras's mental problems did not interfere in any significant way

with his ability to work.

Piepgras argues that the judge rejected Dr. Barron's opinion

because Piepgras's attorney retained Dr. Barron. Piepgras contends

that there is no evidence that Dr. Barron was biased and,

therefore, the judge should not have given less weight to Dr.

Barron's opinion.

The judge stated that he was rejecting Dr. Barron's opinion

because it conflicted with the opinions of Dr. Henze and Dr.

Jacobson. It is only after this statement that the judge also

stated that he was inclined to give less weight to Dr. Barron's

opinion because of Dr. Barron's interaction with Piepgras's

attorney. There is no evidence in the record that Piepgras's

attorney influenced Dr. Barron's evaluation of Piepgras.

Nevertheless, the judge did not err in rejecting Dr. Barron's

opinion because the opinions of Dr. Henze and Dr. Jacobson

constitute substantial evidence supporting the judge's conclusion
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that Piepgras's mental impairments were not disabling.

III.

A.

Piepgras argues that the judge's hypothetical question to the

vocational expert was unclear and imprecise. While the judge's

hypothetical question is long and contains much discussion between

the judge, the expert, and the attorneys, the question clearly sets

out Piepgras's impairments. Although the question could have been

more precise, the complexity and number of Piepgras's impairments

certainly justified the judge's discussions with the expert and his

lengthy hypothetical question. We conclude that the judge's

question was clear and precise in describing Piepgras's

impairments.

B.

Piepgras also argues that the judge's hypothetical question to

the vocational expert did not accurately state his physical and

mental impairments.

The judge's hypothetical question must include all of

Piepgras's impairments which the judge found credible. See

Chamberlain v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 1489, 1495 (8th Cir. 1995).

Piepgras argues that the judge failed to take into account

some of his impairments, such as his severely reduced ability to

use his hands due to carpal tunnel syndrome, his inability to stand

for longer than fifteen to twenty minutes at a time, his reduced

intellectual ability, and his inability to get along with coworkers and the public. Piepgras contends that the judge's failure

to tell the vocational expert about these limitations caused the

expert to conclude that Piepgras could perform jobs which, in
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reality, he cannot perform.

The record shows that the judge and the vocational expert took

into account the impairments which Piepgras contends were

overlooked. The judge and the expert specifically discussed

Piepgras's reduced ability to use his hands, and the judge found

that Piepgras should be able to use his hands as much as he did in

his job as a popcorn popper. Piepgras's use of his hands as a

popcorn popper is substantial evidence to support the judge's

conclusion that his hands were capable of performing to that level.

The judge's hypothetical question included this impairment to the

extent that the judge found it credible. See Chamberlain, 47 F.3d

at 1495.

The judge and the expert also discussed Piepgras's inability

to stand for more than fifteen to twenty minutes at a time, his

inability to interact well with others, and his inability to follow

detailed instructions or perform complex jobs. The record shows

that the expert carefully considered each of these impairments

before determining that there were jobs which Piepgras could

perform. The expert stated that there were 69,000 stock clerk,

shipping and receiving clerk, and order filler clerk jobs, and

57,000 janitor jobs in Minnesota. After considering each of

Piepgras's impairments, the expert concluded that Piepgras could

perform only 7,000 of the clerk jobs and 10,000 of the janitor jobs

because of his impairments. There was no error in the judge's

hypothetical question to the vocational expert as it included, and

the expert considered, all of Piepgras's impairments which the

judge found credible. Id.

IV.

Finally, after the judge decided that Piepgras was not

disabled, Piepgras submitted for the record a letter from Dr.

Schultz, a letter from Dr. Barron, and a vocational expert's
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evaluation of his ability to perform certain jobs. The Appeals

Council of the Social Security Administration considered this

material and decided that it did not provide a basis for changing

the judge's decision. Our review is limited by statute to the

final decision of the Commissioner, which is the judge's final

decision. We have no jurisdiction to review the Appeals Council's

non-final decision to deny review. See Browning v. Sullivan, 958

F.2d 817, 822-23 (8th Cir. 1992). Additionally, we have reviewed

this evidence and it does not change our conclusions in this case.

See Riley v. Shalala, 18 F.3d 619, 622 (8th Cir. 1994).

We affirm the judgment of the district court which affirms the

Commissioner's denial of benefits.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.