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*********************************************** 
BYRON HERRERA v. MEADOW

HILL, INC., ET AL.

(AC 44949)

Alvord, Seeley and Sheldon, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, two companies

that possessed, controlled, managed and maintained certain condominium premises, for personal injuries he sustained in connection with an

alleged slip and fall as a result of untreated ice on the premises. The

trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, in

which they argued that there was an ongoing storm at the time of the

plaintiff’s alleged fall or that a reasonable time had not elapsed following

the completion of the storm for them to have remediated the snowy or

icy condition. On the plaintiff’s appeal to this court, held:

1. This court declined to review the plaintiff’s unpreserved claim that issues

of material fact remained as to whether the defendants had a reasonable

time between the end of the precipitation and the plaintiff’s fall to have

remediated the icy condition, as that claim was never distinctly raised

before the trial court.

2. The trial court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment because the defendants met their initial burden to demonstrate

that there was no genuine issue of material fact that there was an

ongoing storm at the time of the plaintiff’s fall or that a reasonable time

had not elapsed following the conclusion of the storm within which

they should have remediated the snowy or icy condition, and the plaintiff

thereafter failed to sustain his burden to raise a triable issue of fact as

to whether the precipitation from the storm was not the cause of the

accident, specifically, that the defendants created or exacerbated the

allegedly dangerous condition on the steps where he fell by engaging

in remediation efforts during the storm: the defendants submitted admissible evidence, including a local ordinance, showing it was undisputed

that the two hour period between the end of the precipitation event

and the plaintiff’s fall was not a reasonable time for them to have

remedied any dangerous conditions, and the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to whether the allegedly

negligent actions of the defendants with respect to snow or ice removal

caused his fall, as his evidentiary submissions were based on mere

speculation or conjecture.

Argued October 6, 2022—officially released February 21, 2023

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of the defendants’ alleged negligence,

and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Hartford, where the court, Noble,

J., granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the

plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Christopher G. Brown, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Kathleen F. Adams, with whom, on the brief, was

Michael T. Lynch, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

SEELEY, J. The plaintiff, Byron Herrera, appeals from

the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in

favor of the defendants, Meadow Hill, Inc. (Meadow

Hill), and Imagineers, LLC, in this premises liability

action arising out of the plaintiff’s alleged slip and fall

on ice on property possessed and controlled by the

defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court

improperly rendered summary judgment in favor of the

defendants because the documents submitted in support of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment

did not eliminate all questions of material fact about

(1) whether they had a reasonable time to remediate

the snowy or icy condition prior to the plaintiff’s fall,

or (2) whether, if they did have a reasonable time to

remediate that condition before the plaintiff’s fall, they

failed to do so or did so negligently. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and procedural history are necessary for the resolution of this appeal. In his complaint,

the plaintiff alleged that, on February 8, 2018, at approximately 12:30 a.m., he was returning home to his condominium unit located at 76 Hollister Way South in Glastonbury (premises) when he slipped and fell due to the

icy condition of the exterior steps and walkway on

the premises. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants

possessed and controlled the premises. The plaintiff

further alleged that, as a result of his fall, he suffered

various physical injuries and incurred, and may continue to incur, medical expenses, a loss of wages and

earning capacity, and loss of the ability to participate

in life’s usual activities. The defendants filed an answer

and asserted, as a special defense, that the plaintiff’s

alleged injuries were caused by his own negligence.

On December 18, 2020, the defendants filed a motion

for summary judgment, accompanied by a supporting

memorandum of law, arguing that there was an ongoing

storm at the time of the subject incident or that a reasonable time had not elapsed following the completion of

the storm for them to have remediated the snowy or

icy condition. The defendants argued, therefore, that

they were not liable to the plaintiff as a matter of law

pursuant to the ongoing storm doctrine set forth in

Kraus v. Newton, 211 Conn. 191, 197–98, 558 A.2d 240

(1989), which provides that a property owner ‘‘may

await the end of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow from outside walks

and steps.’’1

In support of their motion for summary

judgment, the defendants submitted excerpts from the

plaintiff’s deposition testimony, a copy of article IV,

§ 17-52, of the Glastonbury Code of Ordinances, which

provides a twenty-four hour grace period for the

removal of snow, sleet and ice after the cessation of

precipitation,2 and the affidavit of meteorologist Robert
Cox, who opined about the weather conditions in Glastonbury on February 7, 2018, and February 8, 2018. Cox

averred that there was snow and freezing rain during

this time, that the last snow ended at 10:11 p.m. on

February 7, 2018, and that many surfaces would have

been icy at 12:30 a.m. on February 8, 2018, due to the

precipitation that ended approximately two to two and

one-half hours earlier.3

On August 11, 2021, the plaintiff filed an objection

to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In

his objection, the plaintiff argued that an exception to

the ongoing storm doctrine applied because the defendants undertook snow removal and salt application during the storm. The plaintiff contended that, because the

defendants undertook these remediation efforts while

the storm was ongoing, genuine issues of material fact

existed regarding the nature and extent of the remediation process and whether it was done in a nonnegligent

manner. As evidentiary support for his argument, the

plaintiff appended to his objection the deposition transcript of Darien Covert, the superintendent of Meadow

Hill,4 and Michael Curtis, the assistant superintendent of

Meadow Hill, regarding their remediation efforts during

the storm in question. The defendants thereafter filed

a reply to the plaintiff’s objection, and the plaintiff filed

a supplemental objection to the defendants’ motion.

On August 20, 2021, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that liability may

be imposed for snow or ice remediation that occurs

during a storm if it is done in a negligent manner. The

court noted that the plaintiff had offered no evidence

to rebut the defendants’ proffer of § 17-52 of the Glastonbury Code of Ordinances as evidence of the standard

of care. The court further concluded that the plaintiff

had failed to establish that the defendants’ snow remediation efforts were in any way negligent. Accordingly,

‘‘[b]ecause the defendants . . . offered unrebutted evidence of the standard of care and because of the plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate that the negligence of

the defendants’ employees resulted in his injuries,’’ the

court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff then filed the present appeal.

I

On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the evidence submitted by the defendants in support of their motion for

summary judgment did not eliminate all questions of

material fact as to whether the defendants had had a

reasonable time to remediate the ice on the walkway

before the plaintiff fell. He contends that what constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact dependent

on the circumstances, that the Glastonbury ordinance

attached to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was not evidence of a reasonable time to remediate the icy condition, and that the defendants’ proof
did not establish the time at which the storm ended.5

The plaintiff did not make these arguments either in

his objection or his supplemental objection to the

motion for summary judgment or at the hearing on the

motion for summary judgment. In fact, at the hearing

on the motion for summary judgment, counsel for the

plaintiff specifically stated that the reasonable time window ‘‘isn’t the appropriate question’’ and that ‘‘the question is if you’re going to do [it], you should do it appropriately.’’ He conceded that two hours was a ‘‘short

window’’ and that the court ‘‘would not want to set a

precedent that that window was enough time.’’6

‘‘Our appellate courts, as a general practice, will not

review claims made for the first time on appeal. We

repeatedly have held that [a] party cannot present a

case to the trial court on one theory and then seek

appellate relief on a different one . . . . [A]n appellate

court is under no obligation to consider a claim that is

not distinctly raised at the trial level. . . . [B]ecause

our review is limited to matters in the record, we [also]

will not address issues not decided by the trial court.

. . . The requirement that [a] claim be raised distinctly

means that it must be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court the precise matter on which its decision

is being asked. . . . The purpose of our preservation

requirements is to ensure fair notice of a party’s claims

to both the trial court and opposing parties. . . . These

requirements are not simply formalities. They serve to

alert the court to potential error while there is still time

for the court to act.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) DiMiceli v. Cheshire, 162

Conn. App. 216, 229–30, 131 A.3d 771 (2016).

Having thoroughly reviewed the pleadings, the filings

the plaintiff made in opposition to the defendants’

motion for summary judgment, and other submissions

before the court, as well as the transcript of the oral

argument on the motion for summary judgment, we

conclude that the plaintiff failed to argue distinctly that

issues of material fact remained regarding whether the

defendants had a reasonable time between the end of

the precipitation and the plaintiff’s fall to have remediated the icy condition. Because the issues raised by the

plaintiff on appeal were not expressly raised before

the trial court, we decline to consider these issues on

appeal.7

II

The plaintiff next argues that his rebuttal proof

showed that the defendants had a reasonable time to

remediate the icy condition but either did not do so or

did so negligently. He contends that, ‘‘[v]iewing the

evidence most favorably to [the plaintiff], a reasonable

person could conclude that the defendants, despite

being present with ample time and personnel, either

did not salt as they claim that they did or did not salt

adequately. That creates a genuine issue of material
fact about whether the defendants were negligent in

their postprecipitation remediation effort.’’

In considering this claim, we note that there is a split

of authority in the Superior Court as to whether there

is an exception to Kraus v. Newton, supra, 211 Conn.

197–98, that would permit liability to be imposed for

snow or ice remediation that occurs during a storm if

it is done negligently. Compare Zyskowska v. Danbury

Mall, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury,

Docket No. CV-18-6029256-S (March 9, 2020) (recognizing exception ‘‘upon the principle of Connecticut law

that a party who undertakes an act gratuitously is liable

for performing it negligently’’), with Rodriguez v.

Midstate Medical Center, Docket No. CV-07-5002619,

2008 WL 2745173, *3 (Conn. Super. June 17, 2008)

(declining to recognize exception and concluding that

‘‘[t]o suggest that one should not begin to plow because

they may then become liable for an icy condition during

the snowstorm is contrary to the holding of Kraus,

which did not find a duty to clear snow or to spread sand

or ashes while a storm continues’’ (emphasis omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted)). In the present case,

the court recognized the exception but concluded that

the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that the defendants’ remediation efforts were in any way negligent.

We need not decide whether the court correctly recognized this exception to the ongoing storm doctrine

because, even if the court correctly recognized the

exception, the plaintiff did not present evidence demonstrating the existence of a disputed issue of material fact

in opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.

We first set forth the relevant standard of review.

‘‘Practice Book § 17-49 provides that summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

A party moving for summary judgment is held to a strict

standard. . . . To satisfy his burden the movant must

make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is,

and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of

any genuine issue of material fact. . . . As the burden

of proof is on the movant, the evidence must be viewed

in the light most favorable to the opponent. . . . When

documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine

issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence

of such an issue. . . . Once the moving party has met

its burden, however, the opposing party must present

evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue. . . . It is not enough, however, for

the opposing party merely to assert the existence of

such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact . . . are

insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact
and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court under Practice Book § [17-45]. . . .

Our review of the trial court’s decision to grant [a]

motion for summary judgment is plenary.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Belevich v. Renaissance I,

LLC, 207 Conn. App. 119, 124, 261 A.3d 1 (2021).

In Belevich, this court considered the application of

the ongoing storm doctrine in the context of summary

judgment and its attendant burden shifting. Id., 125.

Noting the scant authority from other jurisdictions on

the issue of the ongoing storm doctrine in the context

of summary judgment, this court adopted, as a matter

of Connecticut common law, the approach taken by

the New York Appellate Division in Meyers v. Big Six

Towers, Inc., 85 App. Div. 3d 877, 877–78, 925 N.Y.S.2d

607 (2011), which held that, ‘‘[a]s the proponent of the

motion for summary judgment, the defendant ha[s] to

establish, prima facie, that it neither created the snow

and ice condition nor had actual or constructive notice

of the condition . . . . [T]he defendant [may sustain]

this burden by presenting evidence that there was a

storm in progress when the plaintiff fell . . . . [Upon

the defendant meeting its burden], the burden shift[s]

to the plaintiff to raise a triable issue of fact as to

whether the precipitation from the storm in progress

was not the cause of his accident . . . . To do so, the

plaintiff [is] required to raise a triable issue of fact

as to whether the accident was caused by a slippery

condition at the location where the plaintiff fell that

existed prior to the storm, as opposed to precipitation

from the storm in progress, and that the defendant

had actual or constructive notice of the preexisting

condition . . . . ’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Belevich v. Renaissance I, LLC, supra, 207 Conn.

App. 127–28.

In the present case, the trial court, relying on Cox’s

affidavit and § 17-52 of the Glastonbury Code of Ordinances, concluded that the defendants had satisfied

their initial burden to demonstrate that there was no

genuine issue of material fact that there was an ongoing

storm or that a reasonable time had not elapsed following the conclusion of the storm within which the defendants should have remediated the snowy or icy condition.8 The court stated that ‘‘the defendants proffer § 17-

52 as evidence of the standard of care. Specifically, this

is evidence that the two hour period between the end of

the precipitation event and the fall is not [a reasonable]

period of time for them to have remedied any dangerous

conditions. The plaintiff offers no evidence to dispute

this and as such the defendants would be entitled to

summary judgment if the plaintiff’s counterargument

regarding the inadequacy of snow remediation fails.’’

In accordance with Belevich v. Renaissance I, LLC,

supra, 207 Conn. App. 127, the burden then shifted to

the plaintiff ‘‘to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether
the precipitation from the storm in progress was not

the cause of his accident.’’ To do so, ‘‘the plaintiff was

required to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue

of fact as to whether the snow abatement efforts

engaged in by [the defendants] exacerbated the natural

hazard created by the snowstorm.’’ Ali v. Pleasantville,

95 App. Div. 3d 796, 797, 943 N.Y.S.2d 582 (2012).9

Accordingly, we must determine whether the plaintiff

provided any evidence that the allegedly negligent

actions of the defendants with respect to the snow or

ice removal caused the plaintiff’s fall.

The trial court determined that the plaintiff had not

satisfied this burden, concluding that he ‘‘offered no

evidence as to the time the salt had been applied or

whether the efficacy of the salt application was deteriorated by continued precipitation. The plaintiff fails also

to demonstrate any evidence that the result of the application of salt rendered the condition more defective or

dangerous than if they had not applied salt. In short,

the plaintiff has failed to establish that the defendants’

efforts at snow remediation were in any way negligent.’’

On the basis of our plenary review of the pleadings and

documentary submissions, we agree with the trial court

that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact

as to whether the precipitation from the storm was not

the cause of the accident.

As stated earlier in this opinion, the plaintiff submitted the deposition testimony of Covert and Curtis in

support of his objection to the defendants’ motion.

According to Covert, the condominium complex is comprised of thirty-three acres and is divided into three

sections, a gray section, a red section, and a brown

section. The plaintiff’s fall occurred in the gray section.

Covert and Curtis both testified that they shoveled and

applied salt at the complex on February 7, 2018, until

approximately 11 p.m. or 11:30 p.m. and returned at

approximately 4 a.m. on February 8, 2018, to complete

the job.10 Covert testified that they did not document

when they put salt down during this storm; rather, they

did a walk-through when they were done to make sure

that they did not miss any locations. Although Covert

testified that rock salt is used for heavy storms, he

could not recall what type of salt he used for this storm.

Looking at a photograph showing the walkway where

the plaintiff fell, Covert identified the area where he

and Curtis had put salt down. Covert testified that he

trained Curtis to put down salt ‘‘like [he] didn’t pay for

it’’ and that they ‘‘take a lot of pride in making sure

[their] complex is safe.’’ With regard to the gray area

of the complex, Covert testified that they ‘‘put down a

majority of salt on [the] walkways.’’11 He could not recall

how many times he and Curtis applied salt to this area

of the complex.

Curtis recalled that he and his crew of part-time

employees shoveled the pathways and stoops on Febru-
ary 7, 2018. He recalled that, at some point, the snow

changed over to freezing rain and that they applied salt

before leaving the premises.12 He recalled putting salt

down two times during the storm. He testified that he

came back in the morning after only ‘‘a couple of hours

of sleep’’ to complete the job.

Although Covert and Curtis both testified regarding

their remediation efforts during the storm in question,

the plaintiff testified in his deposition that snow

removal and salt application had not been performed

on the steps where he fell.13 The plaintiff attached, as

exhibits to his supplemental objection to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, photographs that

he had taken after his fall; the plaintiff contended that

these photographs, which were marked as exhibits at

the plaintiff’s deposition, arguably showed that salt had

not been applied to the walkways of the complex. At

the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, counsel for the plaintiff argued that ‘‘[the plaintiff] says it

wasn’t done. [The defendants] said it was done, and

that’s the issue we believe that [we] should bring . . .

to a jury.’’ In its decision, the court stated that, ‘‘[i]n

essence, the plaintiff’s argument is that his lack of

observation of any conditions indicating plowing, shoveling of snow or application of salt or other treatment

ipso facto raises an issue of material fact as to whether

such efforts were negligently performed.’’

As noted by the trial court, the evidence is unclear

as to when and if Covert and Curtis applied salt to the

precise steps on which the plaintiff fell. Even if the

plaintiff is correct that the defendants did not salt the

precise steps where he fell, he has failed to raise a

triable issue of fact as to whether the defendants created or exacerbated the allegedly dangerous condition

by engaging in remediation efforts during the storm.

‘‘The mere failure of a defendant to remove all of the

snow and ice, without more, does not establish that

the defendant increased the risk of harm.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Henenlotter v. Union Free

School District No. 23, 210 App. Div. 3d 657, 658, 177

N.Y.S.3d 156 (2022); see also Glover v. Botsford, 109

App. Div. 3d 1182, 1184, 971 N.Y.S.2d 771 (2013) (‘‘the

mere failure to remove all snow and ice from a sidewalk

. . . does not constitute negligence and does not constitute creation of a hazard’’ (emphasis omitted; internal

quotation marks omitted)); Ali v. Pleasantville, supra,

95 App. Div. 3d 797 (‘‘[the defendant’s] alleged failure

to remove snow that had fallen during the course of

the storm and its alleged failure to apply salt or sand

to the sidewalk, do not constitute affirmative acts of

negligence’’).

Furthermore, ‘‘[a] party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to

overcome a motion for summary judgment. . . . A

party opposing a motion for summary judgment must
substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is

a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Martinez v. Premier

Maintenance, Inc., 185 Conn. App. 425, 456, 197 A.3d

919 (2018). The plaintiff in the present case points to

his testimony and the photographs marked as exhibits

at his deposition to support his claim that the defendants did not salt adequately; according to the plaintiff,

this creates a genuine issue of material fact about

whether the defendants were negligent in their postprecipitation remediation efforts. We disagree and conclude that the plaintiff’s claims are based on mere speculation or conjecture and, therefore, that the plaintiff

has failed to substantiate his adverse claim in his objection to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

See Aronov v. St. Vincent’s Housing Development Fund

Co., 145 App. Div. 3d 648, 650, 43 N.Y.S.3d 99 (2016)

(summary judgment for defendants properly granted

when ‘‘[t]he plaintiff offered nothing more than conjecture and speculation as to how the defendants’ efforts to

remove snow from the sidewalk created or exacerbated

the icy condition upon which she allegedly slipped and

fell’’); Scher v. Kiryas Joel Housing Development Fund

Co., 17 App. Div. 3d 660, 661, 794 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2005)

(‘‘the plaintiff merely speculated that the defendants

created the icy condition by negligently shoveling the

walkway [and] [s]uch speculation was insufficient to

raise a triable issue of fact to defeat the motions [for

summary judgment]’’).

In light of the foregoing, and on the basis of our

plenary review of the pleadings and documentary submissions, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the plaintiff had failed to raise a triable

issue of fact in opposition to the defendants’ motion

for summary judgment and, therefore, properly granted

the defendants’ motion.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

In Kraus v. Newton, supra, 211 Conn. 191, our Supreme Court held that,

‘‘in the absence of unusual circumstances, a property owner, in fulfilling

the duty owed to invitees upon his property to exercise reasonable diligence

in removing dangerous accumulations of snow and ice, may await the end

of a storm and a reasonable time thereafter before removing ice and snow

from outside walks and steps. To require a landlord or other inviter to keep

walks and steps clear of dangerous accumulations of ice, sleet or snow or

to spread sand or ashes while a storm continues is inexpedient and impractical. Our decision, however, does not foreclose submission to the jury, on

a proper evidentiary foundation, of the factual determinations of whether

a storm has ended or whether a plaintiff’s injury has resulted from new ice

or old ice when the effects of separate storms begin to converge.’’ (Footnote

omitted.) Id., 197–98.

2 The Glastonbury Code of Ordinances provides in relevant part:

‘‘Sec 17-52—Removal of snow, ice, debris, vegetative growth and other

obstructions.

‘‘(a) The owner, agent of the owner, or occupant of any property bordering

upon any street, square or public place within the town where there is a

paved or concrete sidewalk shall cause to be removed therefrom any and

all snow, sleet, ice, debris, vegetative growth and other obstructions. Nothing
in this section shall be deemed to remove or alleviate the owner’s responsibility and liability for correcting hazardous conditions on their property.

‘‘(1) Removal of snow, sleet and ice shall be done within twenty-four

(24) hours after the same shall have fallen, been deposited or found, or in

the case of ice that cannot be removed, such ice shall be covered with sand

or some other suitable substance to cause such sidewalk to be made safe

and convenient within such time period. Removal of snow and ice shall

mean the removal of snow and ice to the full width of the sidewalk.’’

(Emphasis added.)

The defendants also submitted the ordinances of the neighboring towns

of Rocky Hill, East Hartford and Manchester.

3 Cox’s affidavit provides in relevant part:

‘‘6. On February 7, 2018, between 9:44 a.m. and 1:10 p.m., snow fell in

Glastonbury, Connecticut. The snow accumulated 0.5’’–1.0.’’

‘‘7. On February 7, 2018, between 1:10 p.m. and 9:52 p.m., freezing rain

fell in Glastonbury, Connecticut.

‘‘8. On February 7, 2018, between 9:52 p.m. and 10:11 p.m., snow fell in

Glastonbury, Connecticut.

‘‘9. On February 8, 2018, at 12:30 a.m., many surfaces would have been

icy due to the precipitation that ended about 2.0–2.5 hours earlier.’’

4 Meadow Hill is the association for the condominium complex in which

the premises is located.

5

In support of this argument, the plaintiff points out that, although Cox

averred in his affidavit that the precipitation ended in Glastonbury at 10:11

p.m. on February 7, 2018, the plaintiff testified in his deposition that the

precipitation ended in Middletown at approximately 7 p.m. or 8 p.m. that

night.

6 The transcript of the hearing on the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment reveals the following:

‘‘The Court: [Counsel], do you concede that there was a reasonable time

between the stop of the precipitation and the following—that the two hour

period wasn’t—was—it would be unreasonable to expect the defendants to

have cleared the ice and snow and were salted?

‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Your Honor, the—I have to concede that that

is a short amount of time, and the court would—would not want to set a

precedent that that window was enough time. So, I can’t—that’s not my

argument.

’’To answer your question, it’s a short window. My argument is different.

My argument relies on the cases that it doesn’t—I’m not talking about the

window—first I have to commit to Your Honor and the court that the

window isn’t the appropriate question, the question is if you’re going to

do [it], you should do it appropriately. And what—what’s here, when you

ask the maintenance men how much salt did you apply, how much shoveling

did you do, where did you do it, what areas did you do it, they don’t document

it. There is no way—they testified to that, but there is no documentation

as to during this eleven hours, this is what we did on hour one, two, three

and four. My client says it wasn’t done. They said it was done, and that’s the

issue we believe that [we] should bring . . . to a jury.’’ (Emphasis added.)

7 The plaintiff also argues that, even if the claims raised on appeal are

not sufficiently the same as the claims raised before the trial court, review

pursuant to the plain error doctrine is appropriate. We disagree.

‘‘[The plain error] doctrine . . . is an extraordinary remedy used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at trial that, although unpreserved,

are of such monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our system

of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on the aggrieved party.

. . . It is a rule of reversibility . . . that this court invokes in order to

rectify a trial court ruling that, although either not properly preserved or

never raised at all in the trial court, nonetheless requires reversal of the trial

court’s judgment, for reasons of policy. . . . An appellate court addressing

a claim of plain error first must determine if the error is indeed plain in the

sense that it is patent [or] readily discernible on the face of a factually

adequate record, [and] also . . . obvious in the sense of not debatable.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O’Rourke v. Dept. of

Labor, 210 Conn. App. 836, 855 n.15, 271 A.3d 700 (2022). ‘‘[T]he plain error

doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary situations where the existence

of the error is so obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and

public confidence in the judicial proceedings.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Wright v. Dzurenda, 207 Conn. App. 228, 240, 271 A.3d 664 (2021).

After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the plaintiff has failed

to demonstrate that there was an error ‘‘so clear, obvious and indisputable
as to warrant the extraordinary remedy of reversal.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 241.

8 As it was undisputed in Belevich v. Renaissance I, LLC, supra, 207 Conn.

App. 128, that there was an ongoing storm at the time of the plaintiff’s

alleged fall, it was unnecessary for this court to consider in that case whether

a reasonable time had elapsed following the conclusion of the storm within

which the defendant could have remediated the ice and snow.

9 As we did in Belevich v. Renaissance I, LLC, supra, 207 Conn. App.

126–27, we turn to the body of law from New York for guidance on this issue.

10 Covert testified as follows:

‘‘Q. Okay. And do you recall what your plan was with regard to this

particular storm and applying salt on the walkways?

‘‘A. I do.

‘‘Q. What was that?

‘‘A. After we had removed the snow, I believe it transitioned to freezing

rain, and it—I believe—I’m trying to go by my memory—that it did turn

back to snow again, and I believe we went out and salted before we left

during—when the storm was still coming down.

‘‘We had to get some rest. I believe we left somewheres around 11 o’clock

with a return to work time of 4 a.m. So, off the property—we were off the

property from a little after 11, back on property 4 a.m.

‘‘Q. That’s 11 p.m.?

‘‘A. Correct.

‘‘Q. Okay. And is it your memory that—I think you said that during the

storm, or during the transition, salt was applied?

‘‘A. Correct.’’

11 Covert testified as follows:

‘‘Q. And in terms of what you did to the gray area of the complex before

11 p.m., are you able to tell me what you did in terms of fighting the storm?

‘‘A. We took care of all of the snow on the walkways. As I previously

stated, if you leave the snow and freezing rain comes onto it, it turns into

a block of ice. To make our jobs easier we make sure we get rid of the

snow before the transition or during the transition. I do remember that night

being very cold and us being very wet doing it. We put down a majority of

salt on all these walkways.’’

12 Curtis testified as follows:

‘‘Q. And do you recall what you did to deal with the storm on Friday,

February 7, 2018?

‘‘A. I recall coming in. There was a minimal amount of snow, one or two

inches. Me and my crew all shoveled, pathways and stoops. It stopped for

a period of time, changed over to freezing rain. We went out again after a

nice break and got some food. Went through it again, dropped the shovels.

Then at the end, we went through and salted. Finished around 11, 11:30.

‘‘Q. When you say with ‘your crew,’ you’re talking about the part-time help?

‘‘A. Yes. Shovelers only.’’

13 Specifically, when asked what he did when he got out of his car just

before he fell, the plaintiff testified: ‘‘I did [try] to walk slowly because I

knew they didn’t do anything, they didn’t plow, they didn’t shovel or put

anything on it so I just walked nice and easy tippy-toed just to be careful

of what I was walking on. Once I got to the stairs the stairs were icy so I

grabbed to the railing and I went up slowly, but as soon as I got to the last

step, the last spot to grab and I had nothing else to grab and . . . that’s

when I slipped.’’