alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 12.1



         United Air Lines, Inc. and Subsidiary Companies
                                
        Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges
                                
<TABLE>                                
<CAPTION>
                                          Three Months Ended
                                               March 31
                                                     
                                             1997     1996
                                             (In Millions)
Earnings:                                    -------------             
   <S>                                     <C>       <C>           
   Earnings before income taxes and                       
       extraordinary item                  $ 166     $  10
   Fixed charges, from below                 235       270
   Undistributed earnings of affiliates      (25)      (20)
   Interest capitalized                      (24)      (15)
                                           -----     -----        
       Earnings                            $ 352     $ 245
                                           =====     =====
                                                          
Fixed charges:                                            
                                                          
   Interest expense                        $  70     $  81
   Portion of rental expense                              
     representative of the interest factor   165       189
                                           -----     -----
   Fixed charges                           $ 235     $ 270
                                           =====     =====
                                                          
Ratio of earnings to fixed charges          1.50       (a)
                                           =====     =====
</TABLE>                                                          
                                                          

--------------
(a) Earnings were inadequate to cover fixed charges by $25
    million in the first quarter of 1996.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

IN RETHEPETITION OF DILLON HASKELL PR 20-0004 

# FILED JUN 30 2020 Bowen Greenw000 Clerk of Supreme Cour. State of Montan:, ORDER

Dillon Haskell has petitioned this Court for admission to active status in the State Bar ofMontana afterhaving been on inactive status since October 2018. IT IS ORDERED that upon payment ofthe appropriate fees to the State Bar of Montana, Petitioner shall be admitted to the active practice of law in the state of Montana. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within six months of the date ofthis Order, Petitioner shall submit to the Board of Continuing Legal Education, P.O. Box 577, Helena, MT 59624,proof of attendance at thirty hours of approved Continuing Legal Education to be credited to the timePetitioner wason inactive status. The Clerk is directed to provide copies ofthis Order to Petitioner and to the State Bar ofMontana. DATED this day ofJune,2020. For the Court,

ChiefJustice 06/30/2020

Case Number: PR 20-0004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This Schedule Contains Summary Financial Information Extracted From The
Consolidated Condensed Financial Statements As Of June 30, 1998 And For
The Six Months Then Ended And Is Qualified In Its Entirety By Reference
To Such Financial Statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                          18,389
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  128,798
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    943,188
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,267,090
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                        419,189
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           137
<OTHER-SE>                                     488,422
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,267,090
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               702,052
<CGS>                                          558,124
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  634,882
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              20,185
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 40,510
<INCOME-TAX>                                     7,515
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             32,995
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  3,026
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    29,969
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     2.51
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     2.26
        

</TABLE>
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

February 26, 2020

No. 04

- 19

- 00870

- CV

IN R E P.M.

Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

ORDER

On December 17, 2019, r elator filed a petition for writ of mandamus, to which the real

party in interest later responded. After considering the petition, the response, and the record, this

court concludes relator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, the petition for writ of

mandamus is denied. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(a).

It is so ORDERED on February 26, 2020

.

_____________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 26th day of February, 2020

.

_____________________________ Michael A. Cruz, Clerk of Court

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2019PA02194, styled In the Interest of J .M., a Minor Child , pending in the

224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Hon orable John D. Gabriel, Jr. presiding.
# C_2016191EN.01000202.xml

| 30.5.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 191/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.5.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 191/2

---

Appeal brought on 10 August 2015 by AgriCapital Corp. against the judgment of the General Court (Eighth Chamber) delivered on 10 June 2015 in Case T-514/13: AgriCapital Corp. v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

(Case C-440/15 P)

(2016/C 191/03)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Appellant: AgriCapital Corp. (represented by: P. Meyer, Rechtsanwalt, M. Gramsch, Rechtsanwalt)

Appellant:

Other party to the proceedings: Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM)

Other party to the proceedings:

By order of 3 March 2016 the Court of Justice (Tenth Chamber) held that the appeal was inadmissible.

---
April 24, 1944

No. 49377.

#### Petition 6340-K of Gerhart L. Kobrak.

C. D. 838. Government’s application for rehearing denied.
Exhibit 31.1


                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Arnold Simon, certify that,

(1) I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10K of Aris Industries, Inc.;

(2) Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements
were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;

(3) Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material
respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the
registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;

(4) The registrant's other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e) for the registrant and we have:

(a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this quarterly report is being prepared;

(b) (Intentionally omitted)

(c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this
report based on such evaluation; and

(d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

(5) The registrant's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent function):

(a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal controls over financial reporting which are reasonably to
adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize, and
report financial information; and

(b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal controls;


Date:  August 13, 2003


/s/ Arnold Simon
    Chief Executive Officer
#### Bergdorf Goodman (Globe Shipping Co., Inc.), et al. *v.*United States

No. 6747.

Entry No. 771134, etc.

Invoices dated London, England, May 20, 1946, etc.

Certified May 20, 1946, etc.

Entered at New York, N. Y., June 24, 1946, etc.

(Decided January 13, 1947)

*John D. Rode*for the plaintiffs. .

*Paul P. Rao,*Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.

Kincheloe,.Judge:

The appeals for reappraisement listed in schedule A, hereto attached and made a part hereof, have been submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of counsel for the parties hereto:

(Stipulation omitted.)

On the agreed facts I find the export value, as that value is defined in section 402 (d) of the Tariff Act of 1930, to be the proper basis for the determination of the value of the merchandise here involved, and that such values are the appraised values, less the additions made by the importers on entry because of advances by the appraiser in similar cases.

Judgment will be rendered accordingly.
EXHIBIT
32a





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Twin Disc, Incorporated (the “Company”)
on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ending December 26, 2008, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission as of the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
Michael E. Batten, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended,
  and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.











Date:  February
      4, 2009
            /s/ MICHAEL E.
      BATTENMichael
      E. BattenChairman
      and Chief Executive Officer
#### UNITED STATES, Appellee v LARRY E. SMITH, Private First Class, U. S. Marine Corps, Appellant

8 USCMA 400, 24 CMR 210

No. 10,564

Decided November 8, 1957

*Commander Charles Timblin,*USN, was on the brief for Appellant, Accused.

*Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. Beale. Jr..*USMC. was on the brief for Appellee, United States.

Opinion of the Court

Per Curiam :

One of the specifications to which the accused pleaded guilty sets out a violation of Article 1271 (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, which prohibits “possession of any dangerous weapon.” The specification was laid under Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 892.

The law officer’s instructions on the maximum sentence described the offense as punishable by confinement for two years. This was error. In United States v Lowe, 4 USCMA 654, 16 CMR 228, we held that a substantially similar regulation was intended to apply to conditions “which are analogous to concealment.” We pointed out that military personnel often possess dangerous weapons for legitimate purposes. A literal interpretation of the regulation would bring within its condemnation many persons having entirely proper possession of a dangerous weapon, such as a sentry or shore *401patrolman on duty, or a cook working in the galley with a carving knife. This construction would be contrary to the apparent purpose of the regulation. Here, as in the *Lowe*case, therefore, the offense defined by the regulation is substantially that of possessing a weapon under circumstances which would violate Article 134 of the Uniform Code. Since the Table of Maximum Punishments (Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951, paragraph 127c, Section A) lists a specific punishment for concealed weapons, Footnote 5 limits the punishment.1 Accordingly, the decision of the board of review as to the sentence is set aside. The record of trial is returned to the board of review for reassessment of the sentence.

1

 Footnote 5 provides as follows: “The punishment for this offense [Violating a general order or regulation] does not apply in those cases wherein the accused is found guilty of an offense which, although involving a failure to obey a lawful order, is specifically listed elsewhere in this table.”
#### Shorey *versus*Hussey.

.If an officer have served a replevin writ, the legal presumption is, that he complied with the law by taking a replevin bond, although his return do not expressly state that fact.

A writ may be quashed, *upon motion,*for an insufficient service,- but it must be made within the time allowed for pleading in abatement.

A party, having called the subscribing witness to prove the execution of an instrument, is not thereby precluded from proving by other persons that such witness had elsewhere made statements at variance from his testimony.

Replevin, before Howard, J.

The defendant pleaded the general issue. Afterwards, find-hog that the officer’s return did not state that a replevin bond *580had been taken, he moved that the writ be quashed for that reason. The motion was overruled.

To prove title to the property, the plaintiff introduced his bill of sale, also the subscribing witness, who, in answer to the plaintiff’s interrogatory, testified to its execution. He was then cross examined as to the consideration, delivery, &c.

To defeat the effect of that cross examination, the plaintiff, against the defendant’s objection, introduced witnesses, who testified that said subscribing witness had made statements elsewhere, inconsistent with his testimony given in said cross examination. The verdict was for the plaintiff, and the defendant excepted.

*Morrill*and *Libbey,*for the defendant.

1. The writ was not duly served, and the court had no jurisdiction. 11. S. chap. 130, sect. 3 and 10; *Purple*v. *Purple,*5 Pick. 227.

2. The defect may be taken advantage of on motion, and if there be no jurisdiction, the court will dismiss in any stage of the proceedings. 11 Mass. 285; 21 Maine, 39.

3. The plaintiff could not lawfully impeach his own witness. 5 Pick. 194; 15 Pick. 534; 1 Stark. Ev. 146; 7 Cowen, 239 ;. 17 Maine, 19; 27 Maine, 458.

*Lancaster & Baker,*for plaintiff.

Shepley, C. J.,

orally.—The statute, chap. 130, sect. 3 and 10, provides that a replevin writ shall not be served, unless a bond be given, &c. But no statute requires the officer to state affirmatively in his return, that hp had taken a bond. If he serve the writ, the implication is that the bond was given. In the absence of proof, he is presumed to have acted as the law requires.

The object of the return is merely to bring the defendant into court, or make him responsible for not coming.

But, if the officer’s return was insufficient, the objection comes too late. Though the objection may be taken on motion, it must be taken as early as if by plea in abatement.

The defendant has invoked the 27th rule. But it is inap*581plicable. That rule relates only to classes of cases, entirely dissimilar to this.

The remaining part of the case raises the question, whether a party, having called a subscribing witness, may prove that such witness has elsewhere made statements at variance from his testimony. But that point is settled in the case, *Dennett*v. *Dow, 17*Maine, 19. *Exceptions overruled.*
#### Mansfield *versus*Rounds. Rounds *versus*Davis.

No appeal lies to the Supreme Judicial Court from a judgment of the District Court, upon an agreed statement of facts, in a suit commenced before a Municipal Court or a justice of the peace.

The first suit was a libel, commenced in the Municipal Court, upon the impounding of a cow. One Hill was the impounder. Defendant was the pound keeper. The case comes *161into this court by appeal, from the judgment of the District Court, on agreed facts.

*Peters,*for the plaintiff.

*Sanborn,*for defendant.

Tenney, J.,

orally.—Our advice, if it were offered, would be unfavorable to the maintenance of the libel, because it is not brought in the name of the impounder. R. S. chap. 30, sect. 16. But we can only dismiss the case. It is not rightfully in this court. It was commenced in the Municipal Court, and by appeal carried into the District Court. From the judgment of that court, upon an agreed statement of facts, an appeal to this court was taken. From a judgment so rendered in a suit, appealed from a Municipal Court or justice of the peace, a further appeal does not lie. Exceptions would have been the proper course. *Appeal dismissed.*

The second suit was replevin of a swine which had been impounded, having been found going at large. An objection was taken to the impounder’s certificate, because it did not allege that the swine was found going at large “ *without a*keeper.”

The case was commenced in the Municipal Court, thence appealed to the District Court, and comes here upon an appeal taken to the judgment of the District Court, upon an agreed statement.

Tenney, J., orally,—after expressing an impression unfavorable to the defence of the suit, because of the omission, to allege that the animal was “ without a keeper,” directed,, for the reasons mentioned in the preceding case, that

*the action be dismissed.*
# C_2016038EN.01002901.xml

| 1.2.2016 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 38/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.2.2016

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 38/29

---

Request for a preliminary ruling from the Rechtbank van eerste aanleg West-Vlaanderen, afdeling Brugge (Belgium) lodged on 9 November 2015 — Johannes Van der Weegen, Anna Pot v Belgische Staat

(Case C-580/15)

(2016/C 038/41)

Language of the case: Dutch

Referring court

Referring court

Rechtbank van eerste aanleg West-Vlaanderen, afdeling Brugge

Parties to the main proceedings

Parties to the main proceedings

Applicants: Johannes Van der Weegen, Anna Pot

Applicants:

Defendant: Belgische Staat

Defendant:

Question referred

Question referred

Does Article 21(5) of the 1992 Belgian Income Tax Code (WIB 1992), as amended by Article 170 of the Law of 25 April 2014 laying down various provisions, infringe the provisions of Articles 56 TFEU and 63 TFEU and Articles 36 and 40 of the EEA Agreement, inasmuch as the provision in question, although applicable without distinction to domestic and foreign service providers, requires compliance with conditions similar to those included in Article [2] of the Royal Decree implementing the 1992 Income Tax Code (KB/WIB 1992) which are de facto specific to the Belgian market and consequently amount to a serious obstacle to foreign service providers offering their services in Belgium?

de facto

---
# C_2017151EN.01000601.xml

| 15.5.2017 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 151/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.5.2017

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 151/6

---

Judgment of the Court (First Chamber) of 15 March 2017 — Hitachi Chemical Europe GmbH, Polynt SpA v New Japan Chemical, REACh ChemAdvice GmbH, Sitre Srl, European Chemicals Agency, Kingdom of the Netherlands, European Commission

(Case C-324/15 P) (1)

1

((Appeal - Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (REACH Regulation) - Article 57(f) - Authorisation - Substances of very high concern - Identification - Equivalent level of concern - Hexahydromethylphthalic anhydride, hexahydro-4-methylphthalic anhydride, hexahydro-1-methylphthalic anhydride and hexahydro-3-methylphthalic anhydride))

(2017/C 151/07)

Language of the case: English

Parties

Parties

Appellants: Hitachi Chemical Europe GmbH, Polynt SpA (represented by: C. Mereu and M. Grunchard, avocats)

Appellants:

Other parties to the proceedings: New Japan Chemical (represented by: C. Mereu and M. Grunchard, avocats), REACh ChemAdvice GmbH (represented by: C. Mereu and M. Grunchard, avocats), Sitre Srl (represented by: C. Mereu and M. Grunchard, avocats), European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) (represented by: M. Heikkilä, C. Buchanan, W. Broere and T. Zbihlej, acting as Agents, and J. Stuyck, advocaat), Kingdom of the Netherlands (represented by: C. Schillemans and M. Bulterman, acting as Agents), European Commission (represented by: D. Kukovec and K. Mifsud-Bonnici, acting as Agents)

Other parties to the proceedings:

Operative part of the judgment

Operative part of the judgment

The Court:

| 1. | Dismisses the appeal; |
| --- | --- |

1.

Dismisses the appeal;

| 2. | Orders Hitachi Chemical Europe GmbH and Polynt SpA to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA); |
| --- | --- |

2.

Orders Hitachi Chemical Europe GmbH and Polynt SpA to bear their own costs and to pay those incurred by the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA);

| 3. | Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the European Commission to bear their own costs; |
| --- | --- |

3.

Orders the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the European Commission to bear their own costs;

| 4. | Orders New Japan Chemical and REACh ChemAdvice GmbH to bear their own costs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Orders New Japan Chemical and REACh ChemAdvice GmbH to bear their own costs.

---

(1)  OJ C 311, 21.9.2015.

1

---