IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

WILLIAM E. HALL, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. Civil Action 2-12-cv-726 

 Magistrate Judge King 

 

MICHELLE FRANCE, et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court, with the consent of the parties 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), upon the Motion for Summary Judgment

filed on behalf of defendants Michelle France and Glenn E. Cahall. 

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment”), Doc. No. 35. William E. Hall, who has been designated as 

plaintiff, Minute Entry, Doc. No. 18, opposes Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment, taking the position that it is he who is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiff’s Response”), Doc. 

No. 36. Defendants have filed a reply. Doc. No. 38. For the reasons 

that follow, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

I. Background 

 This action was initiated as an interpleader action by Central 

States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund (the 

“Fund”) to determine the proper beneficiary of a life insurance policy 

on the life of Donald Cahall (the “Decedent”), pursuant to an ERISAregulated plan (“the Plan”). See Complaint for Interpleader 

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(“Complaint”), Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff Hall claims the proceeds as the 

designated beneficiary; Michelle France and Glenn E. Cahall contend 

that the beneficiary designation is null and void under the express 

terms of the Plan and they claim the proceeds as the children of the 

Decedent. The Fund deposited the proceeds, $16,000, with the registry 

of the court and was dismissed from the action. Order to Deposit 

Funds and for Discharge, Doc. No. 19. 

 The Decedent was a disabled Central States Covered Participant, 

insured under the Plan for a $16,000 benefit payable to his 

beneficiary upon his death. Complaint, ¶ 4; Answer of Defendant, 

William E. Hall, Doc. No. 10, ¶ 1. On April 16, 2009, the Decedent 

designated plaintiff Hall as beneficiary under the policy. 

Designation of Beneficiary Form, attached to Plaintiff’s Response as 

Exhibit 2. The Designation of Beneficiary Form contained the 

following statement directly above the signature line: 

Please note: if the member’s marital status is terminated 

due to divorce, ANY beneficiary designation made by the 

member will be null and void. If, after a final decree of 

divorce, the member fails to supply the Fund with a 

properly executed Designation of Beneficiary form, benefits 

will be payable pursuant to the preference provisions of 

Plan Section 14.09. 

Id. (emphasis in original). 

 Section 14.09 of the Plan provides: 

It is the responsibility of each Covered Participant to 

supply the Fund with properly executed enrollment forms as 

required by the Fund, designating the beneficiary of any 

benefit described in this Article. . . . 

If a Covered Participant’s marital status is terminated due 

to a final decree of divorce, ANY beneficiary designation 

made by the Covered Participant pursuant to this Article, 

prior to the final decree of divorce, will be null and 

void. If, after a final decree of divorce, a Covered 

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Participant fails to supply the Fund with a properly 

executed enrollment form as required by the Fund, 

designating the beneficiary of any benefit described in 

this Article, benefits will be payable pursuant to the 

preference provisions as described below. 

If a Covered Participant fails to execute proper enrollment 

forms, then, at his death, benefits will be payable to the 

first surviving class, as follows: 

1. Covered Participant’s Spouse 

2. Covered Participant’s Children, in equal shares 

. . . . 

Complaint, Exhibit A, p. 82 (emphasis in original). 

 On October 1, 2010, the Decedent’s marriage to Glenna Cahall was 

terminated upon the issuance of by the Court of Common Pleas of 

Pickaway County, Ohio, of a Judgment Decree of Dissolution of 

Marriage. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A. The 

Decedent died on July 31, 2011, without supplying the Fund with a new 

properly executed Designation of Beneficiary Form. See Complaint, ¶ 

19, Exhibit C; Answer of Defendant, William E. Hall, ¶ 8. The 

Decedent was not married at the time of his death and he was survived 

by two children, defendants Michelle France and Glenn E. Cahall. 

Complaint, ¶¶ 20-22, Exhibit C. 

II. Standard 

The standard for summary judgment is well established. This 

standard is found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

which provides in pertinent part: “The court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Pursuant to Rule 56(a), summary 

judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Id. In making this determination, the evidence “must be viewed 

in the light most favorable” to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. 

Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Summary judgment will not lie 

if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, “that is, if the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). However, summary judgment is appropriate if the opposing 

party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence 

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party 

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The “mere existence of a scintilla of 

evidence in support of the [opposing party’s] position will be 

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [opposing party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 

 The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions” of the record which 

demonstrate “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” 

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the 

nonmoving party who “must set forth specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “Once the moving party has proved that no 

material facts exist, the non-moving party must do more than raise a 

metaphysical or conjectural doubt about issues requiring resolution at 

trial.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th 

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Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). 

III. Discussion 

The facts of this case, as set forth supra, are not in dispute 

and plaintiff Hall does not contend that the record reflects a genuine 

issue of material fact. Rather, the parties dispute whether the 

October 1, 2010 Judgment Decree of Dissolution of Marriage constitutes 

a “divorce” under Section 14.09 of the Plan. If so, the prior 

designation of plaintiff Hall as beneficiary is null and void and 

defendants are entitled to the life insurance proceeds; if not, the 

prior designation of plaintiff Hall as beneficiary remains valid and 

plaintiff Hall is entitled to the life insurance proceeds. 

As an initial matter, the parties disagree on the law governing 

the Plan. Referring to Section 11.11 of the Plan, plaintiff Hall 

argues that ERISA and Illinois law apply. Plaintiff’s Response, p. 1. 

Section 11.11 provides that the Fund is an employee benefit plan 

governed by ERISA and that “all questions pertaining to the validity 

or construction of the Trust Agreement shall be determined in 

accordance with the laws of the State of Illinois.” Complaint, 

Exhibit A, at p. 57. To the contrary, however, it is the Trust 

Agreement -- not the Plan -- that is governed by Illinois law. See 

id. Section 11.11 expressly provides that “[a]ll questions concerning 

the validity of the terms of the Plan shall be determined under 

ERISA.” Id. 

ERISA requires that plan administrators follow plan documents in 

determining the proper beneficiary. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) 

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(requiring an ERISA plan administrator to discharge his duties “in 

accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan”); 

Hendon v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., 145 F.3d 1331 (6th Cir. 

1998); McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1990) 

(“ERISA plans are to be administered according to their controlling 

documents.”). The parties agree that, in this case, the determination 

of the proper beneficiary requires an interpretation of the word 

“divorce” in Section 14.09. See Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment, p. 4; Plaintiff’s Response, pp. 2-3. 

“When interpreting ERISA plan provisions, general principles of 

contract law dictate that [courts] interpret the provisions according 

to their plain meaning in an ordinary and popular sense.” Williams v. 

Int’l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Perez v. 

Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 1998)). In applying 

this plain meaning analysis, courts must give effect to the plan’s 

unambiguous terms. Perez, 150 F.3d at 556; Lake v. Metro. Life Ins. 

Co., 73 F.3d 1372, 1379 (6th Cir. 1996). In the absence of 

established federal common law, courts may look to state-law 

principles for guidance in resolving any ambiguity. See Tinsley v. 

Gen. Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2000). 

In the case presently before the Court, the only dispute is 

whether a dissolution of marriage constitutes a “divorce” under 

Section 14.09. The plain meaning of “divorce,” in an ordinary and 

popular sense, is unambiguous — it includes a dissolution of marriage. 

Merriam-Webster, Oxford, Dictionary.com, and Black’s Law Dictionary 

all define “divorce” to include a dissolution of marriage. See

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Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/divorce (last visited Apr. 17, 2013) (defining 

“divorce” as “the action or an instance of legally dissolving a 

marriage” or “to dissolve the marriage contract between”); Oxford 

Dictionaries, http://english.oxforddictionaries.com/search?q=divorce&r

egion=us&contentVersion=US (last visited Apr. 17, 2013) (defining 

“divorce” as “the legal dissolution of a marriage by a court or other 

competent body”); Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/brow

se/divorce?s=t (last visited Apr. 17, 2013) (defining “divorce” as “a 

judicial declaration dissolving a marriage in whole or in part, 

especially one that releases the marriage partners from all 

matrimonial obligations,” “any formal separation of husband and wife 

according to established custom,” or a “total separation; disunion”); 

Black’s Law Dictionary 549 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “divorce” as 

“[t]he legal dissolution of a marriage by a court”). Although some 

states attach different legal requirements to the termination of a 

marriage by divorce and dissolution, see e.g., O.R.C. § 3105.08, the 

plain meaning of the word “divorce” includes both procedures. See 

e.g., 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 2 (“When used without qualification, the 

term ‘divorce’ imports a dissolution of the marriage relation between 

a husband and a wife, that is, a complete severance of the tie by 

which the parties are united.”); 46 Ohio Jur.3d Family Law § 285 (a 

dissolution of marriage is “more commonly known as a ‘no-fault 

divorce’”); Blum v. Koster, 919 N.E.2d 333, 336 (Ill. 2009) (“[The 

parties] divorced after 17 years of marriage. . . . The final 

judgment of dissolution of marriage incorporated the parties’ 

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settlement agreement.”). Accordingly, this Court interprets the use 

of the word “divorce” as used in Section 14.09 of the Plan to include 

the dissolution of a marriage. 

 The Decedent designated plaintiff Hall as his life insurance 

beneficiary on April 16, 2009. Designation of Beneficiary Form, 

attached to Plaintiff’s Response as Exhibit 2. That designation 

became “null and void,” pursuant to Section 14.09 of the Plan, on 

October 1, 2010, when the Decedent’s marriage to Glenna Cahall was 

terminated upon the issuance of the Judgment Decree of Dissolution of 

Marriage. See Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A; 

Complaint, Exhibit A, at p. 82. The Decedent, who did not thereafter 

supply the Fund with a new designation of beneficiary form, died on 

July 31, 2011. See Complaint, ¶ 19, Exhibit C; Answer of Defendant, 

William E. Hall, ¶ 8. 

 The Decedent’s prior beneficiary designation was rendered “null 

and void” and the Decedent “fail[ed] to supply the Fund with a 

properly executed Designation of Beneficiary form” after the October 

1, 2010 termination of his marriage. Because the Decedent died 

without a surviving spouse, the proceeds of his life insurance policy 

are therefore payable, pursuant to Section 14.09 of the Plan, to his 

“Children, in equal shares.” See Complaint, Exhibit A, at p. 82; 

Complaint, ¶¶ 20-22, Exhibit C. Defendants Michelle France and Glenn 

E. Cahall are therefore the proper beneficiaries under the Decedent’s 

insurance policy and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

 Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. No. 

35, is GRANTED. 

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 The Clerk is DIRECTED to release the funds held in the registry 

of the Court to defendants Michelle France and Glenn E. Cahall, in 

equal shares, as the lawful beneficiaries under the Decedent’s 

insurance policy. 

 The Clerk shall enter FINAL JUDGMENT accordingly. 

April 18, 2013 s/Norah McCann King_______ 

 Norah McCann King 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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