FORSECRET OIG Report on CIA Accountability
Hes ON -NOLOR HH With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

That said, CTC’s analytic component, the Assessments and
Information Group (AIG), addressed aspects of these issues
in several more narrowly focused strategic papers and other
analytic products.

wo The personnel resources of AIG were heavily
dedicated to policy-support and operational-support
activities. Analysts focused primarily on current and tactical
issues rather than on strategic analysis. In the two years
prior to 9/11, the Directorate of Intelligence’s
{ Jand others had
raised with CTC managers the need to dedicate some
proportion of the analytic work force to strategic analysis, as
was the practice in many DI offices. In early 2001, the DCI
specifically directed CTC to establish a strategic analysis unit
within AIG. The Chief of AIG had for some time been aware
of the need to strengthen the analytic work force and was
working to do so. The strategic analysis unit was formed in
July 2001; as of late July, it was manned by [___ analysts.

The Team found that the National Intelligence
Council (NIC) addressed the al-Qa’ida threat to only a
limited extent. The NIC produced a National Intelligence
Estimate on the terrorist threat to the United States in 1995
and an update in 1997. It did not produce a similar,
comprehensive assessment from that point until after 9/11,
although preparation of such a product was underway, with
a CTC drafter, in the early months of 2001 and was being
edited as of 9/11.

(U) See Team discussions of Factual Findings 2 (Signs
of an Impending Attack), 3 (The Threat to the United States),
and 4 (Aircraft as Weapons) and Systemic Finding 5
(Strategic Analysis) for further information on these topics.

(U) Operations (Unilateral and Liaison)
(SLAF The Joint Inquiry charges that CIA did not

effectively develop and use human resources to penetrate
al-Qa’ida’s inner circle, thus significantly limiting the IC’s

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focusing on operations is critically important and does not
necessarily mean that other elements of mission will be
ignored, the Team found that this nearly exclusive focus—
which resulted in many operational successes—had a
negative impact on CTC’s effectiveness as a coordinator of
IC counterterrorism strategy. The Team found that the most
effective interagency effort against UBL was that of the
Assistant DCI for Collection, who, from the early months of
1998 to 9/11, worked with representatives of several
intelligence agencies to stimulate collection.

4S+4NP In the years leading up to 9/11, the DCI
worked hard and with some success, at the most senior
levels of government, to secure additional budgetary
resources to rebuild the CIA and the IC. At the same time,
the Team found that he did not use his senior position and
unique authorities to work with the National Security
Council to elevate the relative standing of counterterrorism
in the formal ranking of intelligence priorities, or to alter the
deployment of human and financial resources across
agencies in a coordinated approach to the terrorism target.
While the nature of the IC makes the mission of managing it
problematic and difficult, the DCI at the time had some
authority to move manpower and funds among agencies.
The Team found that, in the five years prior to 9/11, the DCI
on six occasions used these authorities to move almost

ero funds from other agencies to the CIA for a
number of important purposes

One of these transfers helped fund a
Middle East program that was terrorism-related, but none
supported programs designed to counter UBL or al-Qa’ida.
Nor were DCI authorities used to transfer any personnel into
these programs in the five years prior to 9/11.

{CLANFY The Team notes that the former DCI
recognized the need for an integrated, interagency plan, and
believes that such a plan was needed to mobilize all of the
operational, analytic, and resource capabilities of the IC to
enable the several agencies of the Community to work
cooperatively and with maximum effectiveness against
al-Qa’ida. At the same time, the Team concludes that the
former DCI, by virtue of his position, bears ultimate
responsibility for the fact that no such strategic plan was

“FOP-SECREF,

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group of assets, who were of questionable reliability and had
limited capabilities, proved insufficient to mount a credible
operation against Bin Ladin. Efforts to develop other
options had limited potential prior to 9/11.

The Joint Inquiry
states that US military officials were reluctant to use military
assets to conduct operations in Afghanistan or to support or
participate in CIA operations against al-Qa’ida prior to 9/11.
At least in part, this was a result of the IC’s inability to
provide the necessary intelligence to support military
operations. The findings of the Team match those of the JI as
they relate to the CIA. The Agency was unable to satisfy the
demands of the US military for the precise, actionable
intelligence that the military leadership required in order to
deploy US troops on the ground in Afghanistan or launch
cruise missile attacks against UBL-related sites beyond the
August 1998 retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan.
Differences between CIA and the Department of Defense
over the cost of replacing lost Predators also hampered
collaboration over the use of that platform in Afghanistan.
The Team concludes, however, that other impediments,
including the slow-moving policy process, reduced the
importance of these CIA-military differences. The Team
believes CIA handled its relationship with the US military
responsibly and within the bounds of what was reasonable
and possible.

The Joint Inquiry charges that the CIA
failed to attack UBL’s finances and failed to work
cooperatively with the Department of the Treasury to
develop leads and establish links to other terrorist funding
sources. The Team, likewise, found that CIA failed to attack
Bin Ladin’s money successfully but finds that this was not
for lack of effort. | l

e Team also agrees that bureaucratic
obstacles and legal restrictions inhibited CLA’s partnership
with the Department of the Treasury.

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these officers had information that the other had flown from
Bangkok to Los Angeles.

4S+ANPFT In the period January through March 2000,
some 50 to 60 individuals read one or more of six Agency
cables containing travel information related to these
terrorists. These cables originated in four field locations and
Headquarters. They were read by overseas officers and
Headquarters personnel, operations officers and analysts,
managers and junior employees, and CIA staff personnel as
well as officers on rotation from NSA and FBI. Over an
18-month period, some of these officers had opportunities to
review the information on multiple occasions, when they
might have recognized its significance and shared it
appropriately with other components and agencies.
Ultimately, the two terrorists were watchlisted in late
August 2001 as a result of questions raised in May 2001 by a
CIA officer on assignment at the FBI.

{9% In 1998, CTC assumed responsibility for
communicating watchlisting guidance in the Agency. As
recently as December 1999, less than a month before the
events of early January 2000, CTC had sent to all field offices
of the CIA a cable reminding them of their obligation to
watchlist suspected terrorists and the procedures for doing
so. Field components and Headquarters units had
obligations related to watchlisting, but they varied widely in
their performance. That so many individuals failed to act in
this case reflects a systemic breakdown—a breakdown
caused by excessive workload, ambiguities about
responsibilities, and mismanagement of the program.
Basically, there was no coherent, functioning watchlisting

program.

{Sy The Review Team recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of the two
Chiefs of CTC in the years between 1998 and 2001
concerning their leadership and management oversight of
the watchlisting program.

(SLAMPr Agency officers also failed to pass the travel
information about the two terrorists to the FBI in the
prescribed channels. The Team found that an FBI officer

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks . HCS/SLL/ORCON,-NOKORN LMR

conclusion regarding the proper level of funding for
counterterrorism programs,

&y The Team did find, however, that during the same
period they were appealing the shortage of resources, senior
Officials were not effectively managing the Agency's
counterterrorism funds. In particular, Agency managers
moved funds from the base budgets of the Counterterrorist
Center and other counterterrorism programs to meet other
corporate and Directorate of Operations (DO) needs. The
Team found that from FY 1997 to FY 2001 (as of 9/11),

as redistributed from counterterrorism
programs to other Agency priorities. Some of these funds
were used to strengthen the infrastructure of the DO and,
thus, indirectly supported counterterrorism efforts; other
funds were used to cover nonspecific corporate “taxes” and
for a variety of purposes that, based on the Agency’s
budgetary definitions, were unrelated to terrorism.
Conversely, no resources were reprogrammed from other
Agency programs to counterterrorism, even after the DCI’s
statement in December 1998 that he wanted no resources
spared in the effort. The Team found that the Agency made
little use of the Reserve for Contingencies to support its
counterterrorism effort. Finally, CTC managers did not
spend all of the funds in their base budget, even after it had
been reduced by diversions of funds to other programs.

425 The Team recommends that an Accountability
Board review the performance of the Executive Director, the
Deputy Director for Operations, and the Chief of CTC
during the years prior to 9/11 regarding their management
of the Agency’s counterterrorism financial resources,
including specifically their redirection of funds from
counterterrorism programs to other priorities.

JF Concerning human resources, the Team found
that the unit within CTC responsible for Usama Bin Ladin,
UBL Station, by the accounts of all who worked there, had
an excessive workload. Most of its officers did not have the
operational experience, expertise, and training necessary to
accomplish their mission in an effective manner. Taken
together, these weaknesses contributed to performance
lapses related to the handling of materials concerning

June 2005

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OIG Report on CIA Accountability

HES HEHLLORECON NOFORN AMR With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

ever created, despite his specific direction that this should be
done.

SSLAMFY The JI report discussed a persistent strain in
relations between CIA and the National Security Agency
(NSA) that impeded collaboration between the two agencies
in dealing with the terrorist challenge from al-Qa'ida. The
Team, likewise, found that significant differences existed
between CIA and NSA over their respective authorities. The
Team did not document in detail or take a position on the
merits of this disagreement, but notes that the differences
remained unresolved well into 2001 in spite of the fact that
considerable management attention was devoted to the
issue, including at the level of the Agency's Deputy
Executive Director. Senior officers of the CIA and the IC
Management Staff stated that these interagency differences
had a negative impact on the IC’s ability to perform its
mission and that only the DCI’s vigorous personal
involvement could have led to a timely resolution of the
matter.

{Ff The Team recommends that an Accountability
Board review the performance of the former DCI for failing
to act personally to resolve the differences between CIA and
NSA in an effective and timely manner.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings
2 (The DCI’s Role); 4 (Application of Technology); and 7
(Computer Exploitation) for discussion of these issues.

(U) Management of CIA’s Resources for Counterterrorism

§& Funding for the Agency’s counterterrorism
programs increased significantly from Fiscal Year (FY)1998
to FY 2001 as a result of supplemental appropriations. These
funds were appropriated, in part, because of the efforts of
the CIA’s Director and senior leaders to convince the
Administration and Congress that the Agency was short of
resources for counterterrorism and other key programs. The -
Team preparing this report did not attempt to reach a

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With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HESASILAAORCON-NOFORN AMR

(U) Technology

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings
13 (Covert Action), 14 (Collaboration with the Military), and
16 (Strategy to Disrupt Terrorist Funding) for more
information on these issues.

\The Joint Inquiry charged that
technology had not been fully and effectively applied in
support of US counterterrorism efforts. The Team found
that significant differences existed between CIA and NSA
over several critical issues. One of these involved a dispute

over which agency had authority

This dispute had not yet been resolved
in Sept er . The second issue involved NSA’s
unwillingness to share raw SIGINT transcripts with CIA;
this made it more difficult for CTC to perform its mission
against al-Qa’ida. In the late 1990s, however, NSA managers
offered to allow a CTC officer to be detailed to NSA to cull
the transcripts for useful information. CTC sent one officer
to NSA for a brief period of time in 2000, but failed to send
others, citing resource constraints. The Team recommends
that an Accountability Board review the performance of the
Chiefs of CTC for their failure to detail officers to NSA ona
consistent, full-time basis to exploit this material in the years
before 9/11.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings
4 (Application of Technology) and 7 (Computer
Exploitation) for discussion of the technology issue.

June 2005



OIG Report on CIA Accountability FOPSECRED
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failure to produce any ae overase of
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad from 1997 to 2001."

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Finding 3
(Counterterrorism Resources) and Factual Finding 5i

(Khalid Shaykh Muhammad) for further information on
these issues.

(U) Information Sharing

Ji&} The Team’s findings related to the issue of
information sharing are in general accord with the JI’s
overall assessment of CIA’s performance. Like the JI, the
Team found problems in the functioning of two separate but
related processes in the specific case of the Malaysia
operation of early 2000: entering the names of suspected
al-Qa'ida terrorists on the “watchlist” of the Department of
State and providing information to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in proper channels. The Team also found
that CTC did not forward relevant information to

Tn regard to broader issues of
information sharing, the Team found basic problems with
processes designed to facilitate such sharing. In particular,
CTC managers did not clarify the roles and responsibilities
of officers detailed to CTC by other agencies.

{SL+44PY The Malaysia Operation. Agency officers
did not, on a timely basis, recommend to the Department of
State the watchlisting of two suspected al-Qa’ ida terrorists,
Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. These individuals,
who later were among the hijackers of 9/11, were known by
the Agency in early January 2000 to have traveled to Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, to participate in a meeting of suspected
terrorists. From Kuala Lumpur, they traveled to Bangkok.
In January 2000, CTC officers received information that one
of these suspected terrorists had a US visa; in March 2000,

*(U) Asa result of a conflict of interest, the Inspector General recused himself from deliberations
on the performance of Agency components and individuals relating to the KSM issue and to the
strategic analysis issues discussed below. The two successive Deputy Inspectors General did
participate in accountability discussions regarding analysis and all other issues.

sorcucrey

June 2005 xiii HEESACH/ORCONTNOFORN AR



OIG Report on CIA Accountability TORSECRET,
With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and
the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
requested that the CIA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG)
review the findings of their Joint Inquiry (JI) Report and
undertake whatever additional investigations were
necessary to determine whether any Agency employees
were deserving of awards for outstanding service provided
before the attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), or should be
held accountable for failure to perform their responsibilities
in a satisfactory manner. -

(U) The Accountability Review Team assembled by
the Inspector General (IG) focused exclusively on the issues
identified by the JI. The IG was not asked by the Congress to
conduct a comprehensive review of the capabilities and
functioning of the Agency’s many components involved
with counterterrorism programs, and the Team did not do
so. Asa result, this account does not document the many
successes of the Agency and its officers at all levels
(including many whose actions are discussed in this report)
in the war on terrorism, both before and after 9/11.

(U) Similarly, because this report was designed to
address accountability issues, it does not include
recommendations relating to the systemic problems that
were identified. Such systemic recommendations as were
appropriate to draw from this review of the events of the
pre-9/11 period have been forwarded separately to senior
Agency managers. In its regular program of audits,
investigations, and inspections, the OIG continues to review.
the counterterrorism programs and operations of the
Agency, identifying processes that work well and those that
might be improved.

(U) After conducting its review, the Inspector
General Team reports that, while its findings differ from
those of the JI on a number of matters, it reaches the same
overall conclusions on most of the important issues.

June 2005

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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wo The Team recommends that an Accountability
Board review the performance of
jor failing

to ensure that someone in the Station informed the FBI and
took appropriate operational action regarding al-Hazmi in
March 2000. In addition, the Team recommends that the
Accountability Board assess the performance of the latter
three managers for failing to ensure prompt action relevant
to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar during several later
opportunities between March 2000 and August 2001.

(U) Broader Information Sharing Issues. The Joint
Inquiry charged that CIA’s information-sharing problems
derived from differences among agencies with respect to
missions, legal authorities, and cultures. It argued that CIA
efforts to protect sources and methods fostered a reluctance
to share information and limited disclosures to criminal
investigators. The report also alleged that most Agency
officers did not focus sufficiently on the domestic terrorism
front, viewing this as an FBI mission. The 9/11 Review
Teams findings are similar in many respects, but the Team
believes the systemic failures in this case do not lie in
reluctance to share. Rather, the basic problems were poor
implementation, guidance, and oversight of processes
established to foster the exchange of information, including
the detailee program.

a CTC and UBL Station had on their rosters
detailees from many different agencies, including the FBI,
NSA, Federal Aviation Administration , and State
Department. The manner in which these detailees were
managed left many of them unclear about the nature of their
responsibilities. Many CLA managers and officers believed
the detailees were responsible for conveying information to
their home agencies, while most of the detailees maintained
that they were working as CTC officers and had neither the
time nor the responsibility to serve as links to their home
agencies. The Team found, at a minimum, that there were
fundamental ambiguities about the responsibilities of the
detailees as they related to information sharing, and that
these responsibilities were never delineated explicitly or in

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assigned to CTC on 5 January 2000 drafted a message about
the terrorists’ travel that was to be sent from CIA to the FBI
in the proper channels. Apparently because it was in the
wrong format or needed editing, the message was never
sent. On the same date, another CTC officer sent a cable to
several Agency addressees reporting that the information
and al-Mihdhar’s travel documents had been passed to the
FBI. The officer who drafted this cable does not recall how
this information was passed. The Team has not been able to
confirm that the information was passed, or that it was not
passed. Whatever the case, the Team found no indication
that anyone in CTC checked to ensure FBI receipt of the
information, which, a few UBL Station officers said, should
have been routine practice.

(& Separately, in March 2000, two CIA field locations
sent to a number of addressees cables reporting that
al-Hazmi and another al-Qa’ida associate had traveled to the
United States. They were clearly identified in the cables as
“UBL associates.” The Team has found no evidence, and
heard no claim from any party, that this information was
shared in any manner with the FBI or that anyone in UBL .
Station took other appropriate operational action at that
time.

£25 In the months following the Malaysia operation,
the CIA missed several additional opportunities to nominate
al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar for watchlisting; to inform the FBI
about their intended or actual travel to the United States;
and to take appropriate operational action. These included a
few occasions identified by the Joint Inquiry as well as
several others.

£2f The consequences of the failures to share
information and perform proper operational followthrough
on these terrorists were potentially significant. Earlier
watchlisting of al-Mihdhar could have prevented his
re-entry into the United States in July 2001. Informing the
FBI and good operational followthrough by CIA and FBI
might have resulted in surveillance of both al-Mihdhar and
al-Hazmi. Surveillance, in turn, would have had the
potential to yield information on flight training, financing,
and links to others who were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.

June 2005

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individuals who were to become the 9/11 hijackers. The
Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the
performance of the Chiefs of CTC during the period 1997-
2001 regarding the manner in which they staffed the UBL
component. .

&& The Team found that certain units within CTC
did not work effectively together to understand the structure
and operations of al-Qa’ida. This situation had a
particularly negative impact on performance with respect to
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM), the mastermind of the
9/11 attacks. The Team, like the Joint Inquiry, found that
CTC’s assigning principal responsibility for KSM to the
Renditions Branch had the consequence that the resources of
the Sunni Extremist Group, UBL Station, and CTC analysts
were not effectively brought to bear on the problem. CTC
considered KSM to be a high-priority target for
apprehension and rendition, but did not recognize the
significance of reporting from credible sources in 2000 and
2001 that portrayed him as a senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant and
thus missed important indicators of terrorist planning. This
intelligence reporting was not voluminous and its
significance is obviously easier to determine in hindsight,
but it was noteworthy even in the pre-9/11 period because it
included the allegation that KSM was sending terrorists to
the United States to engage in activities on behalf of
Bin Ladin.

(@&F The evidence indicates that the management
approach employed in CTC had the effect of actively
reinforcing the separation of responsibilities among the key
CTC units working on KSM. The Team recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of the
|
for failure to provide proper oversight and guidance fo their _
officers; to coordinate effectively with other units; and to
allocate the workload to ensure that KSM was being covered
appropriately. The Team also recommends that an
Accountability Board review the performance of the Chief of
CTC for failure to ensure that CTC units worked in a
coordinated, effective manner against KSM. Finally, the
Team recommends that an Accountability Board review the
performance of the| for

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HESAGEL/ORCON-NORORNLIMR- With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

42 The Team found that the DCI was actively and
forcefully engaged in the counterterrorism efforts of the CIA.
Beginning in 1999, he received regular updates, often daily,
on efforts to track and disrupt UBL. He was personally
engaged in sounding the alarm about the threat to many
different audiences in the policy community, military,
Congress, and public, and he worked directly and
personally with foreign counterparts to encourage their
cooperation. :

{SLAF In December 1998, the DCI signed a
memorandum in which he declared: “We are at war.” In
addition to directives related to collection programs and
other matters, this memorandum stated that the Deputy
Director for Central Intelligence (DDCI) would chair an
interagency group to formulate an integrated, interagency
plan to counter the terrorist challénge posed by

Usama Bin Ladin. The DCI wrote that he wanted “...no
resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or
the Community.”

(SLA4F) The Team found that neither the DCI nor
the DDCI followed up these warnings and admonitions by
creating a documented, comprehensive plan to guide the
counterterrorism effort at the Intelligence Community level.
The DDCI chaired at least one meeting in response to the
DCI directive, but the forum soon devolved into one of
tactical and operational, rather than strategic, discussions.
These subsequent meetings were chaired by the Executive
Director of the CIA and included few if any officers from
other IC agencies. While CIA and other agencies had
individual plans and important initiatives underway, senior
officers in the Agency and Community told the Team that no
comprehensive strategic plan for the IC to counter UBL was
created in response to the DCI’s memorandum, or at any
time prior to 9/11.

(SLA4FP The DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) was
not used effectively as a strategic coordinator of the IC’s
counterterrorism efforts. CTC’s stated mission includes the
production of all-source intelligence and the coordination of
the IC’s counterterrorism efforts. Before 9/11, however, the
Center’s focus was primarily operational and tactical. While

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ability to acquire actionable intelligence before 9/11. The
teport argues that this lack of sources resulted from an
excessive reliance on foreign liaison services and walk-ins
(sources who volunteer); a focus on disruption and capture
rather than collection; and adherence to the dirty asset rules
(guidelines that restricted the recruitment of sources who
had committed certain proscribed acts).

(LAMY The Review Team did not find that CIA’s
reliance on liaison for collection was excessive but did find
tha this reliance was not balanced with a strong
focus on developing unilateral assets. The Team did not find
that CIA reliance on walk-ins was misguided

[Although the CIA focused its al-Qa'ida
Operations on Afghanistan, possibly limiting its ability to
focus elsewhere, the Team believes that this approach was
reasonable and that its purpose was collection on al-Qa'ida
as well as disruption of al-Qa’ida’s activities. While
agreeing that the dirty asset rules may have created a climate
that had the effect of inhibiting certain recruitment
operations, the Team is unable to confirm or determine the
extent of the impact. Finally, the Team found that several
operational platform |

were not effectively engaged in the battle against al-Qa’ida.
In the case of is reflected the weakness
of the program itself. lit reflected CTC’s
focus on Afghanistan and the priority of its attempts to
penetrate al-Qa’ida’s inner circle.

{SL44F) The Team found that the CIA’s relations
with foreign liaison services were critical to its ability to
disrupt al-Qa’ida and thwart some terrorist attacks on the
United States. While the capabilities and cooperation of
liaison services were uneven, the program itself did not
detract from CIA’s efforts to mount its own unilateral
operations, The Team did raise serious questions about
whether CTC prior to 9/11 had made the most effective use
of |

Tiaison services in its operations against al-Qa'ida. |

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and delayed the aration of Agency approaches[_|
|< negatively affecting the timel

and effective functioning of the exchange with Cp

terrorism issues.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Systemic Findings
11 (HUMINT Operations Against Al-Qa’ida) and 15
(Reliance on Foreign Liaison), Factual Finding 5h (The
Hijackers’ Associates in Germany), and Related Finding 20
(Issues Relating to Saudi Arabia) for additional information.

(U) Covert Action

(@f The Joint Inquiry charged that US policymakers
had wanted Usama Bin Ladin killed as early as August 1998
and believed CIA personnel understood that. However, the
government had not removed the ban on assassination and
did not provide clear direction or authorization for CIA to
kill Bin Ladin or make covert attacks against al-Qa’ida[_]
ee JI said that the CIA was reluctant to
seek authority to assassinate Bin Ladin and averse to taking
advantage of ambiguities in the authorities it did receive that
might have allowed it more flexibility. The JI argued that
these factors shaped the type of covert action the CIA .
undertook against Bin Ladin and that, before September 11,
covert action had little impact on al-Qa'ida or Bin Ladin.

The findings and conclusions of the
Review Team correspond with most but not all of the JI
conclusions. The Team believes that the restrictions in the
authorities given the CIA with respect to Bin Ladin, while
arguably, although ambiguously, relaxed for a period of
time in late 1998 and early 1999, limited the range of
permissible operations. Given the law, executive order, and
past problems with covert action programs, CIA managers
refused to take advantage of the ambiguities that did exist.
The Team believes this position was reasonable and correct.
Ultimately, the Team concludes the failure of the Agency’s
covert action against Bin Ladin lay not in the language and
interpretation of its authorities, but in the limitations of its
covert action capabilities: CIA’s heavy reliance on a single

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OIG Report on CIA Accountability FOR-SEECREF,
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(U) The Review Team found that Agency officers
from the top down worked hard against the al-Qa’ida and
Usama Bin Ladin (UBL) targets. They did not always work
effectively and cooperatively, however. The Team found
neither a “single point of failure” nor a “silver bullet” that
would have enabled the Intelligence Community (IC) to
predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks. The Team did find,
however, failures to implement and manage important
processes, to follow through with operations, and to
properly share and analyze critical data. If IC officers had
been able to view and analyze the full range of information
available before 11 September 2001, they could have
developed a more informed context in which to assess the
threat reporting of the spring and summer that year.

(U) This review focuses orily on those findings of the
Joint Inquiry that relate to the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Team cooperated with the Department of Justice
Inspector General and the Kean Commission as they
pursued their separate inquiries. For this report, the Team
interviewed officers from other agencies who had been
detailed to the CIA in the period before 9/11, but did not
undertake to interview systematically other officers outside
CIA and the IC Management Staff. This report reaches no
conclusions about the performance of other agencies or their
personnel.

(U) Senior Leadership and Management of the Counterterrorism
Effort

(U) The JI concluded that, before 9/11, neither the US
Government nor the IC had a comprehensive strategy for
combating al-Qa'ida. It charged that the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) was either unwilling or unable to marshal
the full range of IC resources necessary to combat the
growing threat to the United States. The OIG Team also
found that the IC did not have a documented,
comprehensive approach to al-Qa’ida and that the DCI did
not use all of his authorities in leading the IC’s strategic
effort against UBL.

June 2005 » vii  -HOS/SLLLORCON,-NORORNL AMR


-FOP-SECREF OIG Report on CIA Accountability
With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

Concerning certain issues, the Team concluded that the
Agency and its officers did not discharge their
responsibilities in a satisfactory manner. As a result, the
Inspector General recommends that the Director, Central
Intelligence Agency establish an Accountability Board made
up of individuals who are not employees of the Agency to
review the performance of some individuals and assess their
potential accountability.

(U) In its deliberations, the Team used a “reasonable
person” approach and relied on Agency regulations—which
are subjective—concerning standards of accountability. A
discussion of those regulations is included in the Foreword.
While the Team found that many officers performed their
responsibilities in an exemplary fashion, it did not
recommend individuals for additional recognition because
these officers already have been rewarded.

(U) The Team found no instance in which an
employee violated the law, and none of the errors discussed
herein involves misconduct. Rather, the review focuses on
areas where individuals did not perform their duties in a
satisfactory manner; that is, they did not—with regard to the
specific issue or issues discussed—act “in accordance with a
reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence,” as
required by Agency regulation. On occasion, the Team has
found that a specific officer was responsible for a particular
action or lack of action, but has not recommended that an
Accountability Board review the officer’s performance. Such
a conclusion reflects the Team’s view that extenuating
circumstances mitigate the case.

(U) The findings of greatest concern are those that
identify systemic problems where the Agency's programs or
processes did not work as they should have, and concerning
which a number of persons were involved or aware, or
should have been. Where the Team found systemic failures,
it has recommended that an Accountability Board assess the
performance and accountability of those managers who, by
virtue of their position and authorities, might reasonably
have been expected to oversee and correct the process. In
general, the fact that failures were systemic should not
absolve responsible officials from accountability.

-HCS/SILLORCON;NOFORNT WE vi June 2005


OIG Report on CIA Accountability FOP-SECREF

With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks HES/ACH-/ORECON-NOFORN AER

writing. The Team recommends that an Accountability
Board review the performance of the two Chiefs of CTC
during the years before 9/11 concerning their oversight of
the Center’s practices in management of the detailee

program.

(U) See the Team’s discussions of Factual Finding 5b
(The Watchlisting Failure) and Systemic Findings 9
(Information Sharing Within the IC) and 10 (Information
Sharing with Non-IC Members) for elaboration on these
issues.

(U) Strategic Analysis

(of The Team, like the JI , found that the IC’s
understanding of al-Qa'ida was hampered by insufficient
analytic focus, particularly regarding strategic analysis. The
Team asked three individuals who had served as senior
intelligence analysts and managers to conduct an
independent review of the Agency's analytic products
dealing with UBL and al-Qa’ida for the period from 1998 to
2001 and assess their quality. They found that, while CTC’s
tradecraft was generally good, important elements were
missing. Discussion of implications was generally weak, for
example. Most important, a number of important issues
were covered insufficiently or not at all. The Team found:

¢ Nocomprehensive strategic assessment of al-Qa’ida by
CTC or any other component.

e Nocomprehensive report focusing on UBL since 1993.

e No examination of the potential for terrorists to use
aircraft as weapons, as distinguished from traditional
hijackings.

¢ Limited analytic focus on the United States as a potential
target.

¢ Nocomprehensive analysis that put into context the
threats received in the spring and summer of 2001.

June 2005

ovsccney

xvii HEG/CH-/ORECON-NORORN LOR



FOR-SECRET OIG Report on CIA Accountability
With Respect to the 9/11 Attacks

Nevertheless, the Team observes that the complicated
dynamics of liaison relationships, including lack of common

goals and counterintelligence problems, suggest that CTC
managers made reasonable judgments

(SLANPY The Joint Inquiry particularly criticized CIA
for the conduct of its operational relationship
It noted that CIA had unsuccessfully pre:
authorities for additional information on individuals later
identified as associates of some of the hijackers. It placed
some of the blame for this on CIA’s decisions

|The
Team also found that CIA was unable to acquire the
information cited by the JJ but found that it made repeated
efforts to do so and that its lack of success was the result of a

difficult operating environment and limited cooperation on
the part of The Team concluded that

the decisions made with respect to ere

reasonable.

(SLANFF The Joint Inquiry also argued that both the
FBI and CIA had failed to identify the extent of support from
Saudi nationals or groups for terrorist activities globally or
within the United States and the extent to which such
support, to the extent it existed, was knowing or inadvertent.
While most of the JI discussion on the Saudi issue dealt with
issues involving the FBI and its domestic operations, the
report also/ 1

ir he Team found that a significant
Bap existed in the s understanding of Saudi extremists’
involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The primary

reasons for this gap were the difficulty of the task, the hostile
operational environment, and[ |

NFY The Team also found, however, that UBL
Station and ere hostile to each other and
working at cross purposes over a period of years before
9/11, The Team cannot measure the specific impact of this
counterproductive behavior. At a minimum, however, the
Team found that organizational tensions clearly complicated

Xx June 2005