i NO. 03-14-00386-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AUSTIN

GAYLEEN S. TODD Appellant

v. THE STATE OF TEXAS Appellee
On Appeal from Trial Court Cause No. 13-08168-3 In the County Court at Law Number Three, Williamson County, Texas

Hon. Doug Arnold, Presiding
STATE’S BRIEF

THE HONORABLE DEE HOBBS WILLIAMSON COUNTY ATTORNEY

RYAN PALMQUIST Assistant County Attorney Williamson County, Texas State Bar No. 24073307 405 Martin Luther King, # 7 Georgetown, Texas 78626 PHONE: (512) 943-1111 FAX: (512) 943-1120 ryanpalmquist@wilco.org ` Attorney on Appeal for the State ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED ACCEPTED 03-14-00386-CR 6433688 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS

AUSTIN, TEXAS 8/10/2015 5:05:48 PM JEFFREY D. KYLE

CLERKii IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL Appellant GAYLEEN S. TODD 2116 Juniper Trail Round Rock, Texas 78664 Appellate Counsel for Appellant Pro Se Trial Counsel for Appellant Pro Se Trial Counsel for the State Charles Falck Assistant County Attorney Williamson County Attorney’s Office 405 Martin Luther King Street, #7 Georgetown, Texas 78626 Appellate Counsel for the State Ryan Palmquist Assistant County Attorney Williamson County Attorney’s Office 405 Martin Luther King Street, #7 Georgetown, Texas 78626iii TABLE OF CONTENTS IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL ................... ........................................ ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................

................................................... ..... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..............................

................................................... .. iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................

................................................... .. 1 STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................

................................................... ..... 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................... ............................................. 2 I. State’s Response to Every Point of Error ....... .............................................. 3 II. Standard of Review ............................

................................................... ........ 5 III. The Statutes Applied to Appellant ............

................................................... . 6 IV. The Statutes Did Not Violate Appellant’s Right to Travel ........................... 7 V. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction ...............

................................................... 8 VI. Appellant Received Proper Notice ..............

.................................................. 9 VII. Statute Required the Trial Court Enter a Plea for Appellant ......................11 VIII. Appellant Received a Fair Trial .............

................................................... ..12 IX. Conclusion ...................................

................................................... ............15
PRAYER ............................................

................................................... ...................15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................

................................................... .17 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ......................... ..............................................17iv TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Bagheri v. State , 119 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. Crim App. 2003) ............ ............................ 5 Blevins v. State , 672 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.) ...9, 10 Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ........... ............................. 5 Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) .............. ....... 3, 7, 12, 13 Coyle v. State , 775 W.W.2d 843 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1989, no pet.) ......................11 Ex parte Arnold , 916 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d ) ................. 7 Green v. State , 934 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), cert. denie d, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997) ............................................

................................................... .....................13 Huynh v. State , 901 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ........... .............................. 8 Jackson v. Virginia , 433 U.S. 307 (1979) ............................. ..................................... 5 McCloud v. State , 527 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) ........... ........................14 McCrory v. State , 643 S.W.2d 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ........... .......................... 4 Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ........... ..................13 Riggle v. State, 778 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1989, no pet. ) ................ 8 Runningwolf v. State , 317 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2010), aff’d , 360 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) .................

................................................... 11 Schinzing v. State , 234 S.W.3d 208 (Tex. App. Waco 2007) ............ ........................ 9 Schmutz v. State , 440 16 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ......... ......................4, 5 Smith v. State , 907 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ........... ............................... 3 State v. Blakenship, 170 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. App. – Austin 2005, pet. ref’d ) ............ 8 Taylor v. State , No. 09-07-00493-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 718 (Tex . App. Beaumont Feb. 4, 2009)(not designed for publication ) ......................................... 7 Statutes T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC . 26.11 ........................................... ......................................11 T EX
. C ODE
. C RIM
. P ROC . 26.12. .......................................... .....................................11 T EX
. C ODE
. C RIM
. P ROC . 4.08 ............................................ ........................................ 8 T EX
. C ODE
. C RIM
. P ROC
. 45.019 ............................................ .................................... 9 T EX
. C ODE
. C RIM
. P ROC . 45.0426 ......................................... ..................................... 8 T EX . R. A PP . P 34.6 ..........................................

................................................... ....... 4 T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1. ........................................

................................................... ....... 3 T EX . R. A PP . P 44.2 ..........................................

................................................... ....... 4 T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.002 ........................................... .......................................... 6 T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.051 .......................................... .......................................2, 6 T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.191 ........................................... .......................................... 61 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant received a citation for the offense of fa ilure to maintain financial responsibility on or about May 15, 2013 (CR: 8). Ap pellant was convicted by a jury in Round Rock municipal court 1 on October 1, 2013 and was assessed a fine of one hundred and seventy-five dollars ($175.00)(C R: 27). The municipal court denied Appellant’s lengthy Special Appearance and M otion for New Trial on October 10, 2013 (CR: 73). Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on October 11, 2013 (CR: 74). On June 3, 2014, the case went to tr ial in County Court at Law #3 and Appellant was found guilty by a jury (CR: 219). The jury assessed fine of two hundred and twenty dollars ($220.00)(CR: 222). Appe llant filed another lengthy Special Appearance and Motion for New Trial on June 9, 2014 (CR: 239-280) which was denied by operation of law. Appellant the n filed a Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2014 (CR: 281). STATEMENT OF FACTS Appellant did not arrange for the production of a reporter’s record, therefore the State cannot give a full and complete State of Facts on record. This limits the Court’s consideration of the case to the Clerk’s Re cord alone. 2 Appellant was

1 Round Rock Municipal Court is not a court of recor d. 2 The clerk’s record has a “transcript” of sorts fro m the municipal court level. Appellant filed this d ocument. There is no way of confirming the accuracy, veracity or v alidity of this document. Appellant does not refere nce this document in her brief.2

convicted of the class c offense failing to maintai n financial responsibility under
T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.051.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT Appellant has not demonstrated any error using refe rences to the record or relevant case law. The eleven points of error amoun t to unsubstantiated assertions unsupported by the record. Because of this, Appella nt has not provided anything for this Court’s review and the points of error sho uld be overruled. To the extent that Appellant has adequately briefed her points of error, they should still be overruled. First, the Texas Transpo rtation Code statutes apply to Appellant and it does not matter if she was engaged in commerce at the time of committing the offense of failure to maintain finan cial responsibility. Secondly, the statutes are a proper exercise of the State’s polic e powers as it has an interest in maintaining safe roadways. A valid complaint was filed in this case, granting the trial court jurisdiction. Appellant filed notice of appeal from the municipal court thereby invoking the jurisdiction of the trial court. She again filed no tice of appeal thus invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. Appellant received proper notice of the charge agai nst her. The notice started with the issuance of a citation on the day of the offense. There was a valid3

complaint filed in the municipal court and in the c ounty court and Appellant had multiple court dates in both courts. Finally, Appellant received a fair trial. Statue re quired the trial court to enter a plea on Appellant’s behalf. Additionally, Appella nt knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to counsel. Appellant did nothing to rebut the presumption of regularity in proceedings and documents. Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court abused discretion during the admittance of evidence. Furthermore, the trial court’s answered the jury question properly. None of Appellant’s eleven points of error have any merit and should be overruled and the verdict of the trial court upheld

.

I. State’s Response to Every Point of Error Appellant’s points of error are inadequately briefe d. It is proper for this Court to overrule points of error as inadequately b riefed when Appellant neglects to present proper argument and authorities as requi red by T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(i), Cardenas v. State, 30 S.W.3d 384, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Furtherm ore, points of error can be overruled when arguments and authorities are different in character from the error alleged. Smith v. State , 907 S.W.2d 522, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). Appellant, in the case at hand, cites a litany of authorities that are improper in that the cases are not relevant, the ca ses do not stand for the stated rule, the stated rule comes from dicta, or the cite d case itself has been overruled or4

superseded. Furthermore, Appellant’s brief contains no references to the record and Appellant has nowhere applied law to facts illu strating reversible error. In each of Appellant’s points of error, Appellant fails to cite proper or relevant authority. As such, this Court should consider each point as i nadequately briefed and overrule each one. In the event that the Court concludes App ellant adequately brief one or more points of error, the State will address them i n turn. Appellant’s points of error are all unconfirmed, un proven, and unsupported claims. Appellant failed to arrange for the product ion of a record in this case. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(b). Therefore, without direct support in th e record, the claims of error are only unsubstantiated assertions. As su ch, the claims are not appropriate appellate argument and should be overruled. See generally, McCrory v. State , 643 S.W.2d 725, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (noting a co urt “cannot be expected to decide cases solely on the basis of self-serving cl aims by the [Appellant]”). Furthermore, even if the trial court did err in any way, the points of error should be overruled, as the alleged error did not a ffect Appellant’s substantial rights. The Court must disregard any non-constituti onal error that does not affect the Appellant’s substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injur ious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. Schmutz v. State , 440 S.W.3d 29, 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). In assessing the likelihood that the er ror adversely affected the jury's5

decision, an appellate court considers everything i n the record. Id . This includes testimony, physical evidence, jury instructions, th e State's theories and any defensive theories, closing arguments, and voir dir e, if applicable. Id ., citing Bagheri v. State , 119 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. Crim App. 2003). As App ellant has not produced a record, there is nothing for the Cou rt to consider. Additionally, Appellant has not shown how any alleged error would have affected the jury’s verdict. The alleged points of error would not have swayed the jury’s verdict at all. Therefore, this Court should overrule each of Appel lant’s points of error.
II. Standard of Review The standard of review in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence at trial was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia , 433 U.S. 307 (1979) and followed by the Court of Criminal Ap peals in Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In Jackson , the United States Supreme Court held that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, the reviewing court must determine whet her any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements beyond a re asonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson , 403 U.S. at 319. It appears from Appellant’s brief that the crux of arg ument stems from the evidence not being enough to convict her of failing to maint ain financial responsibility. Here6

since there is no record, the Court is left only to consider the Clerk’s Record and view it in the light most favorable to the State.

III. The Statutes Applied to Appellant T EX . T RANSP . C ODE sections 601.051 and 601.191 apply directly to Appellant. According to T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.191(a), a person commits an offense if the person operates a motor vehicle in v iolation of Section 601.051.
T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.051 sets out that a person may not operate a m otor vehicle in this state unless financial responsibility is es tablished for that vehicle. To further define these two statutes, T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.002(8) defines operator as the person in actual physical control of a motor vehicl e. Additionally, T EX . T RANSP
. C ODE 601.002(10) defines a person as, amongst other thin gs, an individual. Finally, T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.002(5) defines a motor vehicle as, amongst other things, a self-propelled vehicle designed for use o n a highway. Appellant, an individual, operated a 2000 silver Mazda Protégé on Gattis School Road and A.W. Grimes Boulevard (CR: 8), both highways under T EX . T RANSP . C ODE 601.002(4) in Round Rock, Williamson County, Texas

. Appellant could not and has not to this day provided proof through any of the statutorily p roscribed means the she possessed valid insurance for that vehicle on May 1 5, 2013. As such, this Court should uphold the verdict of the trial court.7

A commercial activity distinction does not exist in the statute at hand. T EX
. T RANSP . C ODE sections 601.051 and 601.191 are not restricted to operators of motor vehicles for hire. Taylor v. State , No. 09-07-00493-CR, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 718, at *7 (Tex. App. Beaumont Feb. 4, 2009)( not designed for publication). If the Legislature wanted to restrict sections 601.051 and 601.191 to commercial motor vehicles, it would have written th e term “commercial” into the statute. Furthermore, the qualifier “commercial” is also absent from the definition of motor vehicle, thus not limited to just vehicles engaged in commerce and applicable, in this case, to Appellant. Additional ly, Appellant provides no legal or factual support anywhere in the brief for the claim that sections 601.051 and 601.191 apply only to commercial vehicles. The comm ercial distinction is an unsubstantiated assertion made by Appellant. Since the statute applies to Appellant and Appellant has not shown through case law or ref erences to the record that it does not, this Court should uphold the trial court’ s verdict. Cardenas , 30 S.W.3d at 393.
IV. The Statutes Did Not Violate Appellant’s Right to T ravel The State has an interest in the safety of the publ ic roadways. Driving is a privilege, not a constitutionally protected right. Ex parte Arnold , 916 S.W.2d 640, 642 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, pet. ref’d). Requiring financial responsibility as a condition of operating a motor vehicle on the state ’s highways secures redress for8

injured highway travelers and is a proper subject o f the state’s police power. Riggle v. State, 778 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App. – Texarkana 1989, no pet.). The exercise of police power hinges on the public need for safet y, health, security, and protection of the general welfare. Id. One of the many conditions of the driving privilege in this state is the requirement for esta blished financial responsibility. As this was a valid exercise of the state’s police pow er, Appellant’s right to travel was not violated. Finally, Appellant does not demonstra te how her right to travel was violated at the trial court level nor how it create d reversible error. As such, this Court should uphold the judgment of the trial court

.

V. The Trial Court Had Jurisdiction The trial court had proper jurisdiction to conduct the jury trial from which this appeals stems. A complaint invokes the original cri minal jurisdiction of a municipal court. Huynh v. State , 901 S.W.2d 480, 481 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). A complaint is the sole charging instrument in a mu nicipal court. Id. A complaint is sufficient on its face to invoke the jurisdictio n of a municipal court. State v. Blakenship, 170 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Tex. App. – Austin 2005, pet. ref’d). Furthermore, T EX
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. P ROC . 4.08 provides that county courts shall have appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases of which j ustice courts and other inferior courts have original jurisdiction. T EX
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. P ROC . 45.0426(a) allows for the perfecting of this type of appeal upon the fili ng of an appeal bond not later than9

the tenth day after the date the judgment was enter ed. Thus, appellate criminal jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of an appeal bond, not by filing an indictment or information Schinzing v. State , 234 S.W.3d 208, 210 (Tex. App. Waco 2007). Finally, an information is not required in the coun ty court at law because the complaint in the inferior court served as the funct ional equivalent of an information in the county court at law. Blevins v. State , 672 S.W.2d 828, 829 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no pet.). In the case at hand, Appellant was issued citation #225631 titled “complaint/affidavit” on Ma y 15, 2013 (CR: 8). A sworn complaint that complies with T EX
. C ODE
. C RIM
. P ROC . 45.019 was signed and sworn on June 24, 2013 (CR: 10) thereby invoking th e original jurisdiction of the Round Rock Municipal Court. Appellant filed a Noti ce of Appeal on October 22, 2013 (CR: 74-79) exactly ten days after Appellant’s Motion for New Trial was denied. As such, the trial court had proper jurisdi ction over the matter as an information was not needed at the trial court level . The jurisdiction points of error should be overruled and the conviction upheld.

VI. Appellant Received Proper Notice Appellant received notice of the charge against her many times throughout the course of the criminal process. Notice was original ly given on the citation that was issued on May 15, 2013 which bears Appellant’s sign ature (CR: 8). Notice was again conferred when the statutorily valid complain t was sworn and signed on June10

24, 2013 (CR: 10). Additionally, at the municipal c ourt level, there was a pretrial date on July 15, 2013 (CR: 9) and trial dates on Se ptember 10, 2013 (CR: 11) and October 1, 2013 (CR: 18) where the charge was discu ssed. One particular illuminating piece comes in the form of Appellant’s hand written request for continuance filed on August 29, 2013 (CR: 14). In t hat request, Appellant states, “I planned to procure all documents needed for my case . I need time to receive and review such documents in order to present my defens e to the court.”(CR: 14). This indicates that Appellant was well aware that she wo uld be preparing a defense for the failure to maintain financial responsibility ch arge. Appellant also received notice of the charge agains t her many times at the trial court level. Notice was given on the case setting n otice from February 11, 2014 which bears the Appellant’s signature (CR: 149), on the case setting notice from April 7, 2014 which bears the Appellant’s signature (CR: 205), and at the pre-trial hearing date on March 25, 2015 where the prosecutor handed her the entire appeal packet. Finally, the same sworn complaint that was used in the municipal court was filed with the County Clerk on October 22, 2013 (CR: 10) long before the trial date of June 3, 2014. As stated above, no informati on was required in the county court at law because the complaint in the justice c ourt served as the functional equivalent of an information in the county court at law. Blevins , 672 S.W.2d at 829. Finally, Appellant argues that there was no n otice so the case is civil. The11

case at hand is obviously a criminal offense that w as tried in a criminal trial court, and is now being heard before this Court in a crimi nal context. A valid complaint was a proper charging mechanism, as discussed above , and the clerk’s record shows Appellant’s awareness of the charge against h er. Furthermore, Appellant’s brief does not contain any support in the record th at she did not receive notice or how this alleged lack of notice was error. Finally, this Court should not allow Appellant to remain willfully ignorant as to the ch arge against her, then turn around and claim error, with no support, on appeal. Thus, each notice point error should be overruled and the trial court’s verdict u pheld.

VII. Statute Required the Trial Court Enter a Plea for A ppellant Appellant’s refusal to enter a plea had no effect o n the trial court nor does Appellant demonstrate how her refusal caused revers ible error. T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC . 26.11 states, “the indictment shall be read, and the defendant asked whether he is guilty or not, as therein charged.” Next, Art icle 26.12 states that “if [the defendant] refuses to answer, the plea of not guilt y shall [be entered upon the minutes of the court].” T EX
. C ODE C RIM
. P ROC . 26.12. Therefore, not only was it not error for the trial court to enter a not guilty plea on Appellant’s behalf, it was statutorily required to do so. See Runningwolf v. State , 317 S.W.3d 829, 833-34 (Tex. App. – Amarillo 2010), aff’d , 360 S.W.3d 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Coyle v. State , 775 W.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App. – Dallas 1989, no pet.). Since the12

trial court was obliged to enter a plea for Appella nt and since Appellant does not assert any error, points one and two should be over ruled and the trial court verdict upheld. Cardenas , 30 S.W.3d at 393.

VIII. Appellant Received a Fair Trial The number of attorneys used and the access to info rmation is immaterial. Appellant voluntarily waived her right to counsel w hen she filed her “Special Appearance and Waiver of Right to Counsel” on Janua ry 31, 2014 (CR 124). In that motion Appellant asserts that she, “is aware o f her right to representation and that she intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily waives such right” (CR 127). Further, Appellant points to T EX
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. P ROC . 45.020(b) as limiting the number of attorneys to one. However, Chapter 45 gov erns only justice and municipal courts, not county courts at law. Further more, as stated above, Appellant waived her right to counsel, but she could have sou ght legal counsel before announcing ready for trial. Appellant also argues t hat she was prevented from using a computer and complains that the prosecutor was allowed computer usage. Appellant did not demonstrate how she was prevented from using her own materials or own laptop computer. Furthermore, Appe llant again fails to substantiate these claims or demonstrate how this i s error. Accordingly, these points should be overruled. Cardenas , 30 S.W.3d at 393.13

The State still had to prove the criminal offense b eyond a reasonable doubt. The jury charge submitted to the jury provides, “if you believe beyond a reasonable doubt...you will find the defendant ‘Guilty’”. It goe s on, “If you do not so believe or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict ‘Not Guilty’” (CR: 213). Appellant has not cited any authority, referenced the record, or shown any other means how the trial court did not hold the State to the burden of beyond a reasonable doub t. Therefore, Appellant’s points of error should be overruled. Cardenas , 30 S.W.3d at 393. Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial judge abused his discretion on the admission of evidence. A trial court’s ruling on th e admission of evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 is reviewed under an abu se of discretion standard and should not be set aside absent a showing on the rec ord that the trial court abused its discretion by acting in an arbitrary and unreasonab le manner. Montgomery v. State , 810 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Th ere should be reluctance on the part of an appellate court to reverse trial court decisions that admit or exclude evidence. Id . at 378. The fact that a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretion in a different manner than an appellate judge does not demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurre d. Id . at 380. The reviewing court should not reverse a trial judge whose ruling was within the “zone of reasonable disagreement.” Green v. State , 934 S.W.2d 92,101-102 (Tex. Crim.14

App. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1200 (1997); Montgomery , 810 S.W.2d at 391. Appellant has not shown through any references to t he record that the trial judge acted in an arbitrary or reasonable manner. Since t he trial court did not abuse his discretion, this Court should uphold the judgment. The trial court did not prevent Appellant from defe nding herself as her brief claims. Appellate courts are to “indulge every pres umption in favor of the regularity of the proceedings and documents” in the trial courts. McCloud v. State , 527 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). The Jud gment and Sentence provides that a jury of six was selected, empanelle d, and sworn. It also specifies that the jury heard arguments and received evidence (CR: 225). By extension and although there is no record, Appellant was afforded an opportunity for voir dire, to give an opening statement, and the ability to cross -examine State’s witnesses. Under the presumption of regularity, Appellant rece ived a full and fair trial and the judgment of the trial court should be upheld. Finally, the trial court properly answered the jury question (CR218). Without a record, this Court does not know if Appellant objec ted to the trial court’s answer, thus preserving any error for appeal. In addition, if the trial court answered the jury question differently, he would be giving evidence d irectly to the jury, supporting or contradicting testimony, or he would be commenting on the weight or sufficiency15

of the evidence. Since this Court does not know if error was preserved and the fact that Appellant did not demonstrate error this point should be overruled.

IX. Conclusion Without a record, this Court does not know what was said, what testimony was elicited, what objections were lodged, and what rul ings on objections and evidence were made. Additionally, this Court does not know w hat error, if any, Appellant preserved at the trial court level. As stated above , Appellant’s brief amounts to nothing more than inadequately briefed, improperly sourced, unsupported selfserving claims. Appellant chose to operate a motor vehicle in this State without established financial responsibility freely and vol untarily. There is no evidence in the record indicating otherwise. As all of Appellan t’s eleven points of error have no merit and should be overruled, the judgment and sentence of the trial court should be upheld.

PRAYER WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State prays t his Honorable Court affirm the judgment of the trial co urt and overrule Appellant’s points of error.16

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Ryan Palmquist RYAN PALMQUIST Assistant County Attorney Williamson County, Texas State Bar No. 24073307 405 Martin Luther King, # 7 Georgetown, Texas 78626 PHONE: (512) 943-1111 FAX: (512) 943-112017 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I certify that a true and correct copy of State’s Brief was served upon Gayleen S. Todd, 2116 Juniper Trail Round Rock, Tex as 78664, Appellant, by certified mail, on this the 10 th day of August, 2015

/s/ Ryan Palmquist RYAN PALMQUIST

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE I certify that this Brief contains a word count of 4,235, and thus complies with the requisites of T EX . R. A PP . P. 9.4(i)(2)(C).

/s/ Ryan Palmquist RYAN PALMQUIST