NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Marriage of: 

MARIA MEAD, Petitioner/Appellant,

v.

ROBERT ALLEN MEAD, Respondent/Appellee.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0657

Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County

No. S1400DO201201419

The Honorable Lisa W. Bleich, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Law Office of Jose De La Luz Martinez, PLLC, Phoenix

By Jose De La Luz Martinez

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Law Office of Jeremy Claridge, PLC, Phoenix

By Jeremy Claridge

Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
MEAD v. MEAD

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kenton D. Jones and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

G E M M I L L, Judge:

¶1 Petitioner/Appellant Maria Mead (“Wife”) appeals the 

superior court’s dissolution decree, contesting the court’s denial of her 

request for spousal maintenance and its division of marital property. For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶2 Wife petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to 

Respondent/Appellee Robert Allen Mead (“Husband”). After conducting 

a trial, the superior court found that Wife was not entitled to spousal 

maintenance and equitably divided the parties’ community property. Wife 

timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).

Issues

¶3 Wife challenges the superior court’s ruling on spousal 

maintenance and division of community property.

Discussion

I. Spousal Maintenance

¶4 Wife contends the superior court erred by denying her 

request for spousal maintenance. An award of spousal maintenance is 

within the trial court’s sound discretion and we will reverse only if we find 

an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 583, ¶ 31, 5 

P.3d 911, 917 (App. 2000) (citation omitted). We view the evidence in the 

“light most favorable to the non-appealing party and will sustain the 

judgment if any reasonable evidence supports it.” Id. at 583-84, ¶ 31, 5 P.3d 

at 917-18.

¶5 To be eligible for spousal maintenance, Wife was required to 

establish that she met one or more of the following conditions:
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1. Lacks sufficient property, including property 

apportioned to [her], to provide for [her] reasonable needs.

2. Is unable to be self-sufficient through appropriate 

employment or is the custodian of a child whose age or 

condition is such that [she] should not be required to seek 

employment outside the home or lacks earning ability in the 

labor market adequate to be self-sufficient.

3. Contributed to the educational opportunities of 

[Husband].

4. Had a marriage of long duration and is of an age that 

may preclude the possibility of gaining employment 

adequate to be self-sufficient.

A.R.S. § 25–319(A).

¶6 The superior court found Wife failed to prove any of these

statutory grounds. Wife argues the court erred because she is entitled to 

spousal maintenance pursuant to the first, second, and fourth factors.

¶7 The court heard evidence that Wife earned approximately 

$1,500 per month working part-time, and would receive an estimated 

$2,323 per month as her share of Husband’s pension, in addition to more 

than $150,000 from Husband’s retirement savings plan, and her share of the 

community property. While Wife claimed her reasonable monthly 

expenses totaled $5,342, Husband testified that many of those expenses 

were excessive and included the costs of supporting Wife’s adult children. 

In addition, although the parties had been married for 28 years, Wife had

not yet reached the age of retirement and offered no evidence that she was 

unable to continue her employment or even work full-time. Given this 

record, we find no error in the superior court’s determination that Wife did 

not qualify for an award of spousal maintenance.1

 

1 Wife also argues that the court erred in denying her spousal maintenance 

because Husband’s income would have been substantially higher if he had 

not decided to retire early. The factual basis for Wife’s argument does not 

support a legal finding that Wife is entitled to spousal maintenance under 

the statute.
MEAD v. MEAD

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II. Division of Community Property

¶8 Wife argues the court erred in valuing and dividing certain 

community property. The division of marital property in a dissolution 

proceeding is governed by A.R.S. § 25-318(A), which provides that a court 

shall “divide the community, joint tenancy and other property held in 

common equitably, though not necessarily in kind[.]” See also Toth v. Toth, 

190 Ariz. 218, 221, 946 P.2d 900, 903 (1997) (noting that in most cases 

dividing jointly held property substantially equally will be the most 

equitable result). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the superior court’s findings and will not disturb its 

apportionment of community property absent an abuse of discretion. 

Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. 343, 346, ¶ 5, 972 P.2d 676, 679 (App. 1998).

A. Money Market Account

¶9 Wife argues the court improperly reduced her equalization 

payment from Husband by granting him an offset against monies she 

withdrew from a money market account.

¶10 The evidence at trial showed that Wife held a money market 

account valued at $40,723 on December 31, 2009. Wife testified the account 

lost value and she withdrew the remaining amount (approximately 

$35,000) in April 2010. She claimed she kept $7,000 for household expenses 

and transferred the balance to Husband, who spent a large portion of the 

money repairing and improving his vehicles, taking a trip to New Mexico, 

and paying for certain legal expenses. Wife testified she purchased a 

$20,000 certificate of deposit with the remaining money, but later withdrew 

the money after paying the $12,125 balance on a community loan from 

Wells Fargo, leaving her approximately $8,000, which she spent on medical 

bills and other expenses. Husband denied that he received any of the 

$40,723 from Wife and pointed out that Wife obtained cashier’s checks from 

Wells Fargo on the day of the court’s temporary orders hearing that, when 

combined with the community loan payment, totaled approximately 

$40,000.

¶11 The court found Wife’s testimony concerning these funds not 

credible. It determined that Wife withdrew $40,000 of community funds 

and used $12,125 to pay a community debt. Accordingly, the court equally 

divided the remaining amount, $27,875, resulting in a credit to Husband of 

$13,937.50. We defer to the trial court’s determination of 

witness credibility and the weight to give conflicting evidence. Gutierrez, 

193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680. Reasonable evidence supports the 
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court’s conclusion and we find no abuse of discretion. Id., 193 Ariz. at 346, 

¶ 5, 972 P.2d at 679. 

¶12 Further, we reject Wife’s argument that the superior court 

erred by determining that the funds in the money market account were 

community property. While the parties acknowledged that the source of 

the funds was a worker’s compensation payment, Wife did not assert that 

the funds in the money market account were separate property. The record 

indicates that Wife listed the property as community property in her 

exhibits and her attorney asserted at trial that Wife was not claiming the 

property was sole and separate. Cf. Armer v. Armer, 105 Ariz. 284, 288, 463 

P.2d 818, 822 (1970) (ruling husband was precluded from challenging 

characterization of real property because he admitted in his answer that it 

was community property).

B. Valuation of Marital Property

¶13 Wife disputes the court’s valuation of three marital assets. As 

discussed below, we reject each argument.

1. Husband’s Taxidermy Business

¶14 Wife contends the court erred by attributing no value to

Husband’s taxidermy business. Wife claimed the business had a value of 

$18,000 based on its gross receipts for the eighteen months preceding trial. 

Husband offered tax documents that showed the business operated at a loss 

and testified it had no value except for its tools and equipment, which the 

parties had agreed were worth $5,000. The court awarded the taxidermy 

tools to Husband and granted Wife an equalization payment for their value. 

It assigned no value to the business and awarded it to Husband. We defer 

to the trial court’s determination of the conflicting evidence and find no 

abuse of discretion. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 13, 972 P.2d at 680.

2. 1994 Chevrolet

¶15 Wife argues the court erroneously attributed a value of zero

to the parties’ 1994 Chevrolet 1500 Extended Cab, which it awarded to 

Husband. Although both parties valued the 1994 Chevrolet at $1300 prior 

to trial, Husband testified he had learned that the vehicle’s transmission 

needed to be replaced, effectively reducing the value to zero. Wife did not 

dispute that evidence. We therefore find no error in the court’s 

determination that the vehicle has no value. Gutierrez, 193 Ariz. at 347, ¶ 

13, 972 P.2d at 680.
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3. Sea-Doo Personal Watercraft

¶16 Wife also claims the superior court erred by assigning a value 

of $250 to each of the parties’ two Sea-Doo personal watercrafts. The parties 

agreed that one Sea-Doo was worth $250 dollars and the second was worth 

$500. The court awarded both watercrafts to Husband, and Wife was given 

an equalization payment based on the value of the Sea-Doos. Wife says the 

court erred because it should have valued the second Sea-Doo at the agreed 

value of $500, granting Wife an equalization payment of $250. Because the 

court placed a $250 value on that Sea-Doo, Wife received a $125

equalization payment instead of the $250 she would have received if the 

court accepted the agreed to value. This $125 discrepancy in Wife’s 

equalization payment does not render the court’s equitable division of the 

community property substantially unequal. See Toth, 190 Ariz. at 221, 946 

P.2d at 903. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. Gutierrez, 193 

Ariz. at 346, ¶ 5, 972 P.2d at 679.

Conclusion

¶17 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. In the exercise of our 

discretion, we deny Husband’s request for an award of attorneys’ fees on 

appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25–324, which permits a court to make such an 

award after it considers the financial resources of both parties and the 

reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout the 

proceedings. We grant Husband’s request for an award of taxable costs on 

appeal subject to his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate 

Procedure 21.