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40–483 PDF 2008

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

REPRINTED

FROM THE

2007 ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 10, 2007

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State 

CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State 

HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor

DOUGLAS GROB, Staff Director 

MURRAY SCOT TANNER, Deputy Staff Director

(II) 

(1)

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

Government harassment, repression, and persecution of religious 

and spiritual adherents has increased during the five-year period 

covered by this report. In 2004, the Congressional-Executive Commission on China reported that repression of religious belief and 

practice grew in severity. The Communist Party strengthened its 

campaign against organizations it designated as cults, targeting 

Falun Gong in particular, but also unregistered Buddhist and 

Christian groups, among other unregistered communities.1 The 

Commission noted a more visible trend in harassment and repression of unregistered Protestants for alleged cult involvement starting 

in mid-2006.2 The Commission reported an increase in harassment 

against unregistered Catholics starting in 2004 and an increase in 

pressure on registered clerics beginning in 2005.3 The government’s 

crackdown on religious activity in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 

Region has increased in intensity since 2001.4 New central government legal provisions and local measures from the Tibet Autonomous Region government intensify an already repressive environment for the practice of Tibetan Buddhism.5 Daoist and Buddhist 

communities have been subject to ongoing efforts to close temples 

and eliminate religious practices deemed superstitious, as well as 

made subject to tight regulation of temple finances.6 Members of 

religious and spiritual communities outside the five groups recognized by the government continue to operate without legal protections and remain at risk of government harassment, abuse, and in 

some cases, persecution. China has remained a ‘‘Country of Particular Concern’’ because of its restrictions on religion since the 

U.S. Department of State first gave it this designation in 1999.7

The Chinese government’s failure to protect religion and its imposition of limits on religion violate international human rights 

standards. The Chinese Constitution, laws, and regulations guarantee only ‘‘freedom of religious belief’’ (zongjiao xinyang ziyou), but 

they do not guarantee ‘‘freedom of religion.’’ 8 As defined by international human rights standards, ‘‘freedom of religion’’ encompasses not only the freedom to hold beliefs but also the freedom to 

manifest them.9 Chinese laws and regulations protect only ‘‘normal 

religious activities.’’ They do not define this term in a manner to 

provide citizens with meaningful protection for all aspects of religious practice.10 Religious communities must register with the government by affiliating with one of the five recognized religions and 

they must receive government approval to establish sites of worship.11 The state tightly regulates the publication of religious texts 

and forbids individuals from printing religious materials.12 Statecontrolled religious associations hinder citizens’ interaction with 

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2

gious leaders.13 The government imposes additional restrictions on 

children’s freedom of religion.14 Chinese citizens who practice their 

faith outside of officially sanctioned parameters risk harassment, 

detention, and other abuses. In 2006, a top religious official in 

China claimed that no religious adherents were punished because 

of their faith, but the Chinese government continues to use a variety of methods within and outside its legal system—including selective application of criminal penalties—to punish and imprison citizens who practice religion in a manner authorities deem illegitimate.15

As recognized in international human rights standards,16 including those in treaties China has signed or ratified,17 freedom of religion ‘‘is far-reaching and profound.’’ 18 It includes the freedom to 

manifest one’s beliefs alone or in community with others; the freedom to believe in and practice the religion of one’s choice, without 

discrimination; the freedom to build places of worship; the freedom 

to print and distribute religious texts; the freedom to recognize religious leaders regardless of those leaders’ nationality; and the freedom of children to practice a religion.19

The Chinese government has failed to guarantee these freedoms 

to its citizens both in law and in practice. 

Party leaders manipulate religion for political ends. Like his 

predecessor, President and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao has 

responded to an increase in the number of religious followers 

through the use of legal initiatives to cloak campaigns that tighten 

control over religious communities.20 Despite official claims in 2004 

that the Regulation on Religious Affairs adopted that year represented a ‘‘paradigm shift’’ in limiting state intervention in citizens’ religious practice,21 it codified at the national level ongoing 

restrictions over officially recognized religious communities and discriminatory barriers against other groups. In the area of religion, 

the Party has used legal means as a tool for exerting tight control 

over all aspects of citizens’ religious practice. Beyond overt measures of control, internal public security handbooks call for undercover teams to monitor the activities of religious communities.22 In 

an essay on maintaining stability in western China, one public security analyst called for security officials to gather information on 

religious communities by cultivating ‘‘secret . . . ‘friends’ ’’ from 

within such communities.23

In recent years, top officials publicly have stated that religion 

may play a positive role in society,24 but have maneuvered this 

sentiment to meet Party goals. In its campaign to promote a ‘‘harmonious society,’’ the Party has emphasized ‘‘bringing into play the 

positive role of religion’’ through greater control of internal religious doctrine.25 In July 2006, Ye Xiaowen, head of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, said the government would

direct religious leaders to provide correct interpretations of religious tenets to ‘‘convey positive and beneficial contents to worshippers 

and direct them to practice faiths rightly.’’ 26 The announcement 

builds on earlier policies to manipulate doctrine to suit Party policy. For example, the national Islamic Association has continued a 

program to compile sermons that reflect the ‘‘correct and authoritative’’ view of religious doctrine in line with Party policy, making 

imams’ confirmation contingent on knowledge of the sermons. The 

3

official Protestant church continues to promote ‘‘theological construction,’’ a guiding ideology designed to minimize aspects of 

Christianity deemed incompatible with socialism.27 The government and Party continue to propagate atheism among Chinese citizens. In an August 2006 article, Ye Xiaowen called for strengthening propaganda and education on atheism.28

Despite controls over religion, unofficial estimates indicate that 

the number of religious and spiritual adherents in China continues 

to grow. In 2007, Chinese media reported on a poll by Chinese 

scholars that found China has approximately 300 million religious 

adherents, a figure three times as high as official figures.29 The 

growth of religion in Chinese society presents potential challenges 

to government authority, and government concerns over the rise of 

religion intersect with broader apprehensions about perceived social instability and ethnic unrest. A summary of religious work 

issued in 2005 listed ‘‘stability’’ as the ‘‘number one responsibility.’’ 30 As long as the government views religion as a potential 

flashpoint for conflict or challenge to Party authority, it is unlikely 

to ease restrictions on religious communities. Broader political liberalizations that address how China’s own restrictive policies exacerbate instability, however, could bring improvements in the area 

of religious freedom, but a review of events from the past five years 

indicates a trend in the opposite direction. 

Legislative Developments 

The central government has taken more steps to codify state and 

Party policy on religion in recent years, particularly through the 

2004 national Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) and subsequent provincial regulations. Though the regulations guarantee 

some legal protections to registered religious communities, they 

also condition many religious activities on government oversight 

and approval. Codification of government procedures lends more 

transparency and predictability about government actions, but as 

legal controls over the internal activities of religious communities, 

the regulations reflect rule by law rather than rule of law. 

Implementation of the RRA has been uneven, resulting in a

confusing legal terrain for citizens who aim to understand the applicability of legal protections and restrictions imposed by the regulation. Though the State Administration for Religious Affairs 

(SARA) and local governments have reported training local officials 

in the RRA,31 the complete scope of the training and indicators for 

measuring its progress are unclear. The central government has 

not issued general implementing guidelines, but has promulgated 

a limited number of legal measures that expand on specific provisions within the RRA. The new measures clarify some ambiguous 

provisions in the RRA, but generally articulate more rigid controls.32 Although SARA also has promoted a handbook that provides a more detailed explanation of each article of the RRA, the 

book does not appear to be widely distributed in training classes.33

The national government has not publicized a clear plan of action 

for ensuring local regulations on religion are consistent with national requirements, and inconsistencies among regulations persist. 

Most of the provincial-level regulations issued after the RRA entered into force promote consistency with the RRA by aligning 

4

many key provisions to national requirements, but at least one 

province initially retained provisions that conflicted with those in 

the RRA.34 Other provinces have yet to amend their regulations, 

leaving intact provisions that conflict with the RRA and, in some 

cases, impose harsher restrictions.35

Though the new provincial regulations have promoted uniformity 

with national regulations, they also contain provisions that differ 

from each other and from the national RRA. A new comprehensive 

regulation from Hunan province, for example, is the first comprehensive provincial-level regulation on religion to provide limited 

recognition for venues for folk beliefs.36 Measures from the Tibet 

Autonomous Region provide detailed stipulations for the designation and supervision of reincarnated Buddhist lamas.37 Some

provincial-level regulations recognize only Buddhism, Catholicism, 

Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. Others are silent on this 

issue.38

Recognized and Unrecognized Religious Communities 

The central government has not made progress in extending its 

limited legal protections for religion to all Chinese citizens. The 

Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) did not explicitly codify Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism as China’s 

only recognized religious communities, but the government perpetuates a regulatory system that recognizes only these communities, 

with limited exceptions.39 Although recognized groups receive limited guarantees to practice ‘‘normal religious activities,’’ they must 

submit to state-defined interpretations of their faith as well as ongoing state control over internal affairs. The RRA and subsequent 

regulations continue to subject recognized communities to onerous 

registration and reporting requirements.40

Party-sponsored religious associations,41 with which religious 

communities must affiliate, remain the state’s main vehicle for ensuring religious practice conforms to Party goals and for denying 

religious communities doctrinal independence.42 The associations 

vet religious leaders for political reliability, and religious leaders 

who express sensitive political views have faced dismissal from 

their posts. For example, in 2006, the national Buddhist Association, in coordination with government officials, expelled a Buddhist 

monk from a temple in Jiangxi province after the monk led religious activities to commemorate victims of the 1989 Tiananmen 

crackdown and took measures to address corruption among government officials and the Buddhist Association.43 Authorities in the 

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region have enforced an ongoing 

campaign to monitor imams and decertify religious leaders deemed 

unreliable.44

Unregistered religious and spiritual communities continue to 

practice their faith under the risk of harassment, detention, and 

other abuses. Differences in legislation and regional variations in 

the implementation of religious policy have allowed a limited number of unrecognized groups to operate openly.45 Without the clear 

guarantee that all citizens have a right to openly practice their religion, however, all unregistered communities remain vulnerable to 

official abuses and restrictions on their freedom. Religious and spiritual communities defined as ‘‘cults’’ remain subject to persecution. 

5

In 2004, the Party increased its campaign against organizations it 

designated as cults, targeting Falun Gong practitioners as well as 

unregistered communities including Buddhist and Christian 

groups.46 In July 2007, the central government instructed officials 

to ‘‘strike hard against illegal religions and cult activities’’ as part 

of a campaign to address perceived instability in rural areas.47 The 

promulgation of the RRA may increase pressures on unregistered 

groups. A district in Shanghai, for example, has set targets for carrying out work to eliminate ‘‘abnormal religious activity’’ in accordance with the RRA.48

Freedom To Interact with Foreign Co-religionists and Coreligionists Abroad 

The Chinese government restricts Chinese citizens’ freedom to 

interact with foreign citizens in China and with citizens abroad as 

part of its policy to promote self-management and independence 

from foreign religious institutions.49 Chinese officials have increased oversight of citizens’ contacts with foreign religious practitioners within China in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Summer 

Olympic Games. In March 2007, Minister of Public Security Zhou 

Yongkang said the government would ‘‘strike hard’’ against hostile 

forces inside and outside the country, including religious and spiritual groups, to ensure a ‘‘good social environment’’ for the Olympics and 17th Party Congress.50 In 2006, local officials expelled a 

registered church leader in Shanxi province after his church invited an American missionary to the church.51 According to the 

nongovernmental organization China Aid Association, authorities 

implemented a campaign in 2007 to expel foreigners thought to be 

engaged in Christian missionary activities.52 National rules governing the religious activities of foreigners forbid them from ‘‘cultivating followers from among Chinese citizens,’’ distributing ‘‘religious propaganda materials,’’ and carrying out other missionary activities.53

Freedom of Religion for Chinese Children 

The Chinese government failed to secure the rights of children 

to practice religion in its recent codification of religious policy. Although a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official stated in 2005 that no 

laws restrict minors from holding religious beliefs and that parents 

may give their children a religious education,54 recent legislation 

has not articulated a guarantee of these rights. Regulations from 

some provinces penalize acts such as ‘‘instigating’’ minors to believe 

in religion or accepting them into a religion.55 In practice, children 

in some parts of China participate in religious activities at registered and unregistered venues,56 but in other areas, they have 

been restricted from participating in religious services.57

Ambiguities in the law and variations in implementation have 

created space for children in some parts of China to receive a religious education. Some Muslim communities outside the Xinjiang 

Uighur Autonomous Region have established schools to provide secular and religious education to children.58 In some ethnic minority 

communities, children receive education at Buddhist temples.59

6

Some recent government campaigns against religion have targeted children. In 2004, authorities launched campaigns to educate 

children against the evils of government-designated cults and to 

encourage children to expose family members engaged in ‘‘illegal 

religious activities.’’ 60 In 2006, Ye Xiaowen called for strengthening 

education in atheism especially among children.61

Social Welfare Activities by Religious Communities 

The government accommodates, and in some cases, sponsors, the 

social welfare activities of recognized religious communities where 

such activities meet Party goals. Article 34 of the Regulation on Religious Affairs allows registered religious communities to organize 

such undertakings.62 In some cases, government offices and Partyled religious associations initiate and control the scope of social 

welfare activities.63 In other cases, religious civil society organizations organize their work under other auspices or are able to operate without registering with the government.64

Government support for religious charity work is part of a broader 

policy allowing civil society organizations to provide welfare services in certain areas. [See Section III—Civil Society for more information.] The government also has permitted some international

religious organizations to engage in charity work within China.65

In recent years, however, the government has increased pressures 

on civil society organizations.66 Religiously affiliated civil society 

groups in tightly controlled regions such as the Xinjiang Uighur 

Autonomous Region (XUAR) face additional restrictions. For example, local authorities in the XUAR have banned meshrep, Islamcentered groups that have sought to address social problems.67

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR TIBETAN BUDDHISTS

Overview 

The Chinese government creates a repressive environment for 

the practice of Tibetan Buddhism. Two new sets of legal measures 

increase legal bases for repression. Tibetan Buddhist monks and 

nuns remain subject to expulsions from religious institutions and 

imprisonment for refusing to accept government policy on issues 

such as the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama as a religious leader, and 

the identity of the Panchen Lama. For a detailed overview of

current conditions for Tibetan Buddhists in China, see Section IV—

Tibet. 

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA’S CATHOLICS

Overview68

The Chinese government continues to deny Chinese Catholics the 

freedom to recognize the authority of overseas Catholic institutions 

in a manner of their choosing. Authorities blocked Web sites in 

2007 to prevent Catholic practitioners from viewing an open letter 

from Pope Benedict XVI urging reconciliation between registered 

and unregistered communities in China. Government harassment 

against Catholic communities has escalated since 2004. The government continues to detain unregistered bishops and coerce registered bishops to exercise their faith according to Party-dictated 

7

terms. The return of property owned by the Catholic Church in the 

1950s and 1960s remains a contentious issue. Officials and unidentified assailants have beaten people protesting slated demolitions of 

church property. 

Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses 

Both unregistered Catholics and registered clergy remain subject 

to government harassment, and in some cases, detention. The Commission noted an increase in reported detentions of unregistered 

Catholics in 2005, after the Regulation on Religious Affairs entered 

into force.69 In June 2007, the public security bureau detained Jia 

Zhiguo, underground bishop of the Diocese of Zhending, in Hebei 

province, for 17 days.70 Authorities detained him again in August 

as he prepared to lead meetings to discuss a letter Pope Benedict 

XVI issued to Chinese Catholics in June.71 Jia previously spent 

more than 20 years in prison.72 In 2006, the government increased 

pressure on registered bishops and priests to coerce them to participate in bishop consecrations without papal approval. Authorities 

detained, sequestered, threatened, or otherwise exerted pressure on 

registered Catholic clerics to obtain compliance.73 Authorities have 

pressured both unregistered clergy and lay practitioners to join registered churches or face repercussions such as restricting children’s 

access to school, job dismissal, fines, and detention.74

Closures of Religious Structures and Confiscation of Religious 

Property 

The return of religious property remains a contentious issue. In 

recent years, some registered Catholic groups have called on the 

government to give back church property confiscated in the 1950s 

and 1960s, and in separate incidents, officials or unidentified assailants have beaten people protesting the slated demolition of 

such property. For example, in 2005, government officials assaulted 

a group of Catholic nuns in a village near the city of Xi’an, in 

Shaanxi province, after the nuns had attempted to prevent the

authorities from erecting a new building on property that the government confiscated from their religious order during the 1950s. 

According to overseas sources, the nuns were not injured, and the 

construction work was halted after the assault. In another incident 

in 2005, unidentified assailants beat a group of Catholic nuns in 

Xi’an after the nuns had organized a sit-in to prevent the demolition of a school formerly belonging to their religious order. In a separate incident, unidentified assailants beat a group of Catholic 

priests in Tianjin who had occupied a building formerly belonging 

to their Shanxi dioceses and demanded its return. At issue in all 

three cases was the refusal of local authorities to abide by government instructions mandating the return of such property.75

China-Holy See Relations 

The state-controlled Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) does not 

recognize the authority of the Holy See to appoint bishops and has 

continued to appoint bishops based on its own procedures, in some 

cases coercing clerics to participate in consecration ceremonies. 

While in recent years authorities had tolerated discreet involveVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40483.TXT DEIDRE
8

ment by the Holy See in the selection of some bishops, in 2006 the 

CPA moved to appoint more bishops without Holy See approval. 

For example, in November 2006, the CPA appointed Wang Renlei 

as auxiliary bishop of the Xuzhou diocese, Jiangsu province, without Holy See approval, and authorities reportedly detained two 

bishops to force their participation in the ordination ceremony.76

In September 2007, the CPA ordained Paul Xiao Zejiang as coadjutor bishop of the Guizhou diocese. Though the CPA elected him 

according to its own practices, the Holy See expressed approval of 

his election to bishop.77 The same month, the CPA ordained Li 

Shan as bishop of Beijing according to its own practices. The Holy 

See expressed approval for the ordination.78

The ordinations follow a June 2007 open letter from Pope Benedict XVI to Catholic church members in China, urging reconciliation between registered and unregistered Catholic communities in 

China and stating that ‘‘the Catholic Church which is in China 

does not have a mission to change the structure or administration 

of the State.’’ 79 After the letter was published on the Vatican Web 

site, Chinese authorities blocked Internet access and ordered 

Catholic Web sites within China to remove the letter.80 An overseas news agency reported that local authorities have since detained at least 11 unregistered church priests in an effort to assert 

official authority in the aftermath of the letter’s publication.81

Government apprehension about Chinese Catholics’ relationship 

with foreign religious communities and institutions also manifested 

itself in 2007 in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). 

In July, the XUAR government announced it would strengthen 

oversight of Catholic and Protestant communities to prevent foreign infiltration, a call reiterated in August by local authorities in 

the XUAR’s Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture.82

The government has penalized members of the unregistered 

Catholic community for their overseas travel. In 2006, authorities 

detained two leaders of the unregistered Wenzhou diocese, Peter 

Shao Zhumin and Paul Jiang Surang, after they returned from a 

pilgrimage to Rome. Six months after their detention, Shao and 

Jiang received prison sentences of 9 and 11 months, respectively, 

after authorities accused them of falsifying their passports and 

charged them with illegally exiting the country.83

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA’S MUSLIMS

Overview84

The government strictly controls the practice of Islam, and religious repression in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region 

(XUAR), especially among the Uighur ethnic group, remains severe. In recent years the government has increased control over 

Muslim pilgrimages and continued an ongoing project to author 

sermons that reflect Party values. New confirmation rules for religious leaders require knowledge of the sermons. Authorities reportedly have tried to restrict the number of Muslim students who 

study religion overseas. Within the XUAR, the government restricts access to mosques, imprisons citizens for religious activity 

determined to be ‘‘extremist,’’ has detained people for possession of 

unauthorized texts, and most recently has confiscated Muslims’ 

9

passports. The XUAR government maintains the harshest legal restrictions in China on children’s right to practice religion. Religious 

repression in the XUAR accompanies a broader crackdown in the 

region aimed at diluting expressions of Uighur identity. [See Section II—Ethnic Minority Rights for more information on conditions 

in the XUAR.] 

Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses 

Authorities in the XUAR have intensified their crackdown on religion since 2001. Official records have indicated an increase in 

Uighurs in the XUAR sent to prison or reeducation through labor 

centers because of religious activity since the mid-1990s.85 XUAR 

residents reported to overseas human rights organizations that police monitoring for illegal activity, including systematic door-to-door 

searches within neighborhoods and villages, has increased in recent 

years.86

In recent years, authorities have detained people for having

unauthorized religious texts. In 2005, authorities in the XUAR detained a religion instructor and her students, accusing the teacher 

of ‘‘illegally possessing religious materials and subversive historical 

information.’’ 87 XUAR officials also detained a group of people for 

possessing an unauthorized religious book.88

Access to Religious Sites and Closures of Religious Structures 

The government continues to enforce tight restrictions on XUAR 

residents’ ability to enter mosques. Overseas media has reported on 

restrictions on mosque entry enforced against minors under 18, 

local government employees, state employees and retirees, and 

women, among other groups. Authorities reportedly monitor attendance at mosques and levy fines when people violate the bans.89

Authorities in the XUAR continue to enforce earlier policies to 

demolish ‘‘illegal’’ religious sites, and they have increased oversight 

since 2001.90 Authorities reportedly have not allowed Uighurs in 

the XUAR to build new mosques since 1999.91

Restrictions on the Freedom To Make Overseas Pilgrimages 

The central government has increased its control over Muslims’ 

overseas pilgrimages in recent years, and public officials in the 

XUAR have followed suit with further restrictions. The 2004

national Regulation on Religious Affairs charged the Islamic Association of China (IAC) with responsibility for organizing Chinese 

Muslims’ overseas pilgrimages, and stipulated punishments for the 

unauthorized organization of such trips.92 In 2006, the IAC established an office to manage pilgrimages to Mecca.93 It also signed 

an agreement with the Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage allowing Chinese Muslim pilgrims to receive Hajj visas only at the Saudi Embassy in Beijing and restricting visas to pilgrims in official Chinese 

government-sponsored travel groups. The government announced 

its agreement with Saudi Arabia after a group of Muslims from the 

XUAR attempted to obtain Saudi visas via a third country. In addition, the IAC issued a circular in 2006 that regulates secondary pilgrimages (umrah) to Mecca outside the yearly Hajj.94 Some citizens 

who have tried to take trips outside official channels reportedly 

10

have done so to avoid requirements to demonstrate political reliability to the government and to save money, among other factors.95 Authorities also reportedly have tried to restrict Muslims’ 

opportunities to study religion overseas.96

Local officials in the XUAR have used pilgrimage policy to further religious repression in that region. In June 2007, after XUAR 

Party Secretary Wang Lequan announced that the government 

would further increase its oversight of pilgrimages in the region, 

overseas media reported that local authorities implemented a policy to confiscate passports from Muslims, and Uighurs in particular.97 In July, the XUAR government announced that the public 

security bureau would strengthen passport controls as part of its 

campaign to curb unauthorized pilgrimages.98

Religious Publications 

The government continues to exert tight control over the publications of religious materials in the XUAR. In 2007, authorities in 

the XUAR city of Urumqi reported destroying over 25,000 ‘‘illegal’’ 

religious books.99 During a month-long campaign in 2006 aimed at 

rooting out ‘‘political and religious illegal publications,’’ XUAR authorities reported confiscating publications about Islam with 

‘‘unhealthy content.’’ 100 In 2005, official news media reported that 

XUAR authorities had confiscated 9,860 illegal publications involving religion, ‘‘feudal superstitions,’’ or Falun Gong.101

Children 

Restrictions on children’s right to practice religion are harsher in 

the XUAR than elsewhere in China. Legal measures from the 

XUAR, unseen elsewhere in China, forbid parents and guardians 

from allowing minors to engage in religious activity.102 Local governments throughout the XUAR continued restrictions on children’s 

right to practice a religion during 2006. They enforced measures 

during Ramadan to prevent students from fasting and participating 

in other religious activities. Authorities also directed such measures at college students who are legal adults under Chinese law.103

Also in 2006, a county government in the XUAR began a campaign 

aimed at monitoring and reforming the children of religious figures, 

alongside other students including truants and children of those

released from administrative detention.104

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR CHINA’S PROTESTANTS

Overview105

The government and Party control the activities of its official 

Protestant church, and the government continues to target unregistered Protestant groups for harassment, detention, and other forms 

of abuse. The targeting of Protestant groups deemed to be cults intensified in 2004 and again in 2006. Authorities continue to close 

house churches and confiscate property. The government has included in this crackdown groups with ties to foreign co-religionists. 

Religious adherents serving prison sentences include clergy who 

printed and distributed religious texts without government permission. Members of unregistered house churches have made some adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40483.TXT DEIDRE
11

vances in challenging government actions, but harassment and 

abuses continue. 

Harassment, Detention, and Other Abuses 

Authorities continue to target some unregistered Protestant communities for harassment, detention, and other abuses. A July 2007 

report from a district within Shanghai called on authorities to 

strengthen control over grassroots religious activity and singled out 

private Protestant gatherings for monitoring and regulation.106 The 

China Aid Association (CAA), a U.S.-based nongovernmental organization that monitors religious freedom in China, recorded 600 detentions of unregistered Protestants in China during 2006. It noted 

that the figure represents a decline from over 2,000 detentions recorded in 2005, but attributed the decrease to a new strategy of 

targeting church leaders over practitioners and interrogating practitioners on the spot rather than formally arresting them.107 The 

CAA found that 18 people were sentenced to more than a year of 

imprisonment in 2006.108 In 2007, seven police officers attacked 

and wounded Beijing house church pastor and farmer advocate 

Hua Huiqi and his 76-year-old mother Shuang Shuying.109 Officials 

charged Hua, who had been previously detained by local officials, 

with obstruction of justice and sentenced him to six months in prison. Shuang was charged with willfully damaging property and

sentenced to two years in prison. An overseas report in August 

2007 indicated that police were using Shuang’s imprisonment as leverage to pressure Hua to become a police informant. In September, authorities reportedly denied Shuang medical parole despite her poor health.110 In October, CAA reported that authorities 

placed Hua under house arrest on October 1 and informed him that 

his mother’s imprisonment was intended to pressure Hua to stop 

his activism. CAA reported Shuang had been beaten in prison.111

Gong Shengliang, founder of the South China Church, continues to 

serve a life sentence for alleged assault and rape, and is reported 

to be in poor health.112 Authorities released Liu Fenggang from 

prison in February 2007 after he served a three-year sentence for 

reporting on the government demolition of house churches.113 CAA 

reported that authorities later placed him under house arrest, 

starting on October 1, 2007.114

Closures of Religious Structures and Confiscation of Religious 

Property 

The government states there are no registration requirements for 

religious gatherings within the home,115 but public officials continue to target unregistered Protestant churches for closure and 

demolition. For example, in July 2007, CAA reported that three underground church buildings in Wenzhou, Zhejiang province faced 

imminent demolition by local government authorities. The government accused the believers of subscribing to an ‘‘evil cult’’ and 

threatened to arrest them if they impeded the demolition.116 In 

2006, a court case against religious adherents who had protested 

the demolition of a church building in the Xiaoshan district of 

Hangzhou, Zhejiang province, concluded with the sentencing of 

eight house church leaders for ‘‘inciting violence to resist the 

12

law.’’ 117 According to the CAA, closures of house churches increased between 2005 and 2006.118

The government also exerts control over the property of registered Protestant churches. In 2006, approximately 300 members 

of a registered Protestant church in Gansu province engaged in a 

peaceful demonstration to demand the return of property that had 

been confiscated by the government in 1966.119

Religious Speech 

Chinese authorities continue to punish citizens who publish religious materials without permission, including Protestant religious 

leaders who have printed and given away Bibles. In separate incidents in 2005 and 2006, pastors Cai Zhuohua and Wang Zaiqing 

received prison sentences of three and two years, respectively, after 

each printed and distributed religious materials without government permission. In each case, the sentencing court found that the 

preparation and distribution of the materials constituted the ‘‘illegal operation of a business,’’ a crime under Article 225 of the 

Criminal Law.120 Authorities released Cai from prison upon completion of his three-year prison sentence on September 10, 2007.121

The government has also detained people for publicizing abuses 

against house church members. In 2006, Chinese authorities detained a documentary filmmaker who was making a film about 

house churches and detained a journalist after he posted reports 

publicizing protests about a church demolition.122

Challenging Government Actions 

Some members of unregistered churches have used the legal system to challenge government actions. In August 2006, a court in 

Henan province rescinded a decision to subject a house church pastor to one year of reeducation through labor for participating in a 

house church gathering authorities deemed illegal. In November 

2006, a group in Shandong province that previously had been 

placed in administrative detention for their attendance at a house 

church service reached a settlement with the Public Security Bureau to rescind the administrative detention decision against them. 

[See Section II—Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants for 

more information.] In neither case did the rescission include recognition of practitioners’ right to assemble for worship outside of 

registered venues for religious activity.123 Not all challenges to government actions have been successful. In 2007, local governments 

in Henan province and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region rejected unregistered church leaders’ applications for administrative 

review of their detentions.124 In addition, rights defenders who 

have advocated on behalf of house church members and other 

groups have faced repercussions.125

Outside of legal channels, international pressure has resulted in 

advances for some house churches. CAA reported that international 

pressure facilitated the release of 33 arrested house church leaders 

and 3 South Korean church leaders who had been detained after 

officials raided a house church study group in Henan province in 

2007.126 Two days after two house church pastors appealed for administrative reconsideration regarding a 2007 raid on their churchVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40483.TXT DEIDRE
13

es, local officials in Jiangsu province returned confiscated property, 

citing concerns about negative international repercussions.127

Freedom To Interact with Foreign Co-religionists and Coreligionists Abroad 

Authorities have promoted official exchanges with overseas 

Protestant churches, including Chinese participation in a 2005 

World Council of Churches conference,128 but have restricted citizens from participating in programs outside these official channels. 

For example, authorities prevented house church members and 

legal advocates Fan Yafeng, Gao Zhisheng, and Teng Biao from attending a Washington, DC-based forum on religious freedom in 

2005.129

In July, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) government announced it would strengthen oversight of Protestant and 

Catholic communities to prevent foreign infiltration in the names 

of these religions.130 The announcement followed church service 

raids in the XUAR during 2006 and 2007, including those with foreign worshippers and pastors.131 According to CAA, more than 60 

of over 100 missionaries expelled from China between April and 

June 2007 came from the XUAR.132

The government has punished some house church members for 

traveling overseas. Unregistered Protestant church leader Zhang 

Rongliang, who resorted to obtaining illegal travel documents after 

the government refused to issue him a passport, was sentenced to 

seven and a half years’ imprisonment in 2006 on charges of illegally crossing the border and fraudulently obtaining a passport.133

Also in 2006, authorities placed house church historian and former 

political prisoner Zhang Yinan and his family under surveillance 

after he applied for a passport to attend a religious function in the 

United States.134

GOVERNMENT PERSECUTION OF FALUN GONG

The government has continued its campaign of persecution 

against Falun Gong practitioners, which it began in 1999. In its 

2007 report on religious freedom in China, the U.S. Department of 

State noted past reports of deaths and abuse of Falun Gong practitioners in custody.135 Government officials have used both the 

Criminal Law and administrative punishment regulations as legal 

pretexts for penalizing Falun Gong activities.136 Citizens sentenced 

to prison terms under the Criminal Law include Falun Gong practitioners who demonstrated in support of Falun Gong in 1999, as 

well as practitioners who prepared leaflets about Falun Gong, including Wang Xin, Li Chang, Wang Zhiwen, and Ji Liewu.137 Authorities released Yao Jie in 2006 after sentencing her in 1999 to 

seven years’ imprisonment for crimes related to organizing and 

using a cult and for illegal acquisition of state secrets. The charges 

stem from accusations that she organized an April 1999 rally of 

Falun Gong practitioners outside the central government’s leadership compound.138

Falun Gong practitioners and rights defenders who advocate on 

their behalf, as well as on behalf of other communities, including 

house church members, face serious obstacles in challenging govVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40483.TXT DEIDRE
14

ernment abuses. In 2006, authorities intensified a campaign of harassment against lawyer Gao Zhisheng, who has represented

numerous activists, religious leaders, and writers, after he publicized widespread torture against Falun Gong practitioners. A

Beijing court convicted him in 2006 to a three-year sentence, suspended for five years, for ‘‘inciting subversion of state power.’’ 139

Gao went missing immediately after an open letter that he sent to 

the U.S. Congress was made public at a Capitol Hill press conference on September 20, 2007. Authorities also have harassed 

members of his family.140 [For additional information, see Section 

II—Rights of Criminal Suspects and Defendants.] Overseas organizations reported that on September 29, 2007, unidentified assailants beat rights defense lawyer Li Heping, who had advocated on 

behalf of Falun Gong practitioners and house church members, 

among others.141

In 2006, courts in Shandong province rejected appeals from Liu 

Ruping and his lawyer that challenged Liu’s sentence of 15 months 

of reeducation through labor for posting Falun Gong notices.142

In 2007, the government used possession of Falun Gong materials as a pretext for squelching a political activist. In March, a 

court in Zhejiang province gave a three-year sentence to Chi 

Jianwei, a member of the Zhejiang branch of the China Democracy 

Party, for ‘‘using a cult to undermine implementation of the law’’ 

after authorities found Falun Gong materials in his home.143

OTHER RELIGIOUS AND SPRITUAL COMMUNITIES

Local governments continue to shut down unauthorized Buddhist 

and Daoist temples. Towns and cities reported in 2006 on campaigns to address the presence of illegal temples through measures 

that included closure and demolition.144 Some local governments 

have targeted temples that include practices deemed as superstitious beliefs.145 Other temples have registered and submitted to 

official control. At a forum evaluating implementation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs in 2007, the president of the Daoist Association of China noted that the regulation has led to the registration of previously unregistered Daoist temples.146

The government has supported some official interactions between 

domestic and foreign Buddhist communities,147 but also limited 

some foreign involvement. In 2004, authorities closed a Buddhist 

temple renovated by an American Buddhist association and

detained the temple’s designated leader.148

Chinese religious adherents with ties to foreign religious communities not recognized within China have had leeway to practice 

their religion in some cases. The U.S. Department of State reported 

in 2006 that some Chinese citizens who joined the Church of Jesus 

Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) while living abroad met for

worship in a Beijing location that Chinese authorities permitted

expatriate LDS members to use.149 The central government continues to deny formal recognition to the LDS church as a domestic 

religious community, however, as it does other religious communities outside the five recognized groups, including Christian denominations that maintain a distinct identity outside the Chinese 

government-defined Protestant and Catholic churches. A few local 

governments provide legal recognition to Orthodox Christian comVerDate 0ct 09 2002 10:52 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40483.TXT DEIDRE
15

munities, but the central government has not recognized Orthodoxy 

as a religion.150 In recent years, officials have met with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church to discuss China’s Orthodox 

communities.151

Central and local authorities have drawn some aspects of folk

beliefs into official purview. Since at least 2004, the State Administration for Religious Affairs has operated an office that undertakes 

research and policy positions on folk beliefs and religious communities outside the five recognized groups,152 but the government 

has neither extended formal legal recognition to any of these 

groups nor altered its system whereby religious communities must 

receive government recognition to operate. In 2006, Hunan province issued the first provincial-level regulation on religious affairs 

to provide for the registration of venues for folk beliefs.153 The 

Hunan provincial government’s decision to channel folk religions 

into the government system of religious regulation provides some 

limited legal protections, but also may subject more aspects of folk 

practice to government control. To date, no other provincial regulation has regulated folk beliefs,154 but a central government official 

has indicated that the government is studying the Hunan model 

and may formulate national legal guidance on the regulation of folk 

belief venues.155 Authorities continue, however, to express concern 

over components within recognized religions deemed as folk beliefs, 

and view some aspects of folk practice as superstitions subject to 

official censure, and in some cases, legal penalties.156

16

Endnotes 

1 CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 5 October 2004, 34, 36–37. 

2 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 2006, 93. 

3 CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 39; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 49; CECC, 2006 

Annual Report, 86–87. 4See, e.g., CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 52; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 91. 

5See discussion infra and in Section IV, ‘‘Tibet,’’ for more information on religion-related legislative developments in Tibetan areas of China. 6 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International 

Religious Freedom Report—2006, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 15 September 

06. See discussion infra for more information on closures of Buddhist and Daoist temples. 7 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, International 

Religious Freedom Report—2007, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), 14 September 

07. The International Religious Freedom Act mandates that the ‘‘Country of Particular Concern’’ 

designation be made for countries that ‘‘engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations 

of religious freedom,’’ and sets out possible courses of action, including sanctions, toward these 

countries. See International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. 6401 et seq., 

6442(b)(1)(A), 6442 (c), 6445. In 2006, John V. Hanford III, Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, noted that the climate for religious freedom had improved in recent 

decades but that ‘‘a number of setback[s]’’ have taken place in the past two to three years. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, On-the-Record Briefing on the Release of the Department of State’s Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, 15 September 06. 8See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 36; Regulation on Religious Affairs (RRA) [Zongjiao shiwu 

tiaoli], issued 30 November 04, art. 2; PRC Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), enacted 

31 May 84, amended 28 February 01, art. 11. 9See, e.g., the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted and proclaimed by 

General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10 December 48, art. 18. 10See, e.g., PRC Constitution, art. 36; RRA, art. 3; REAL, art. 11. 11 Registration requirements to form a religious organization and establish a venue for religious activities are found in RRA, art. 6 and art. 13–15. See also Measures on the Examination, 

Approval, and Registration of Venues for Religious Activity [Zongjiao huodong changsuo sheli 

shenpi he dengji banfa], issued 21 April 05. 12See discussion on religious speech, infra, as well as ‘‘Prior Restraints on Religious Publishing in China’’ in the CECC Virtual Academy for more information. 13See discussions on citizens’ freedom to interact with foreign co-religionists, infra. 14See the discussion on children, infra. 15 ‘‘Head of Religious Association: Religious Adherents Not Arrested Due to Their Faith,’’ 

CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 26 June 06. 16See, e.g., UDHR, art. 18; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 

adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 

March 76, art. 18; the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 

(ICESCR) adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into 

force 3 January 76, art. 13(3) (requiring States Parties to ‘‘ensure the religious and moral education of . . . children in conformity with [the parents’] own convictions’’); and the Convention 

on the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession 

by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 November 89, entry into force 2 September 90, art. 

14; Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on 

Religion or Belief, General Assembly resolution 36/55 of 25 November 81. 17 China is a party to the ICESCR and the CRC, and a signatory to the ICCPR. The Chinese 

government has committed itself to ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, 

the ICCPR and reaffirmed its commitment as recently as April 13, 2006, in its application for 

membership in the UN Human Rights Council. China’s top leaders have previously stated on 

three separate occasions that they are preparing for ratification of the ICCPR, including in a 

September 6, 2005, statement by Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd 

World Congress on Law, in statements by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 

Europe tour, and in a January 27, 2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before the 

French National Assembly. As a signatory to the ICCPR, China is required under Article 18 

of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which it is a party, ‘‘to refrain from acts 

which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty’’ it has signed. Vienna Convention on the 

Law of Treaties, enacted 23 May 69, entry into force 27 January 80, art. 18. 18See General Comment No. 22 to Article 18 of the ICCPR for an official interpretation of 

freedom of religion as articulated in the ICCPR. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Freedom of Thought, Conscience, and Religion (Art. 18), 30 July 93, para. 1. This section of the Commission’s Annual Report primarily uses the expression ‘‘freedom of religion’’ but encompasses 

within this term reference to the more broadly articulated freedom of ‘‘thought, conscience, and 

religion’’ (see, e.g., UDHR, art. 18; ICCPR, art. 18). 19 ICCPR, art. 18(1), (2), (4). See also General Comment No. 22, para. 1, 2, 4, 6; and CRC, 

art. 14. See also Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 20For more background on government policy to ‘‘use law to strengthen management of religious affairs,’’ see, e.g., Ye Xiaowen, ‘‘Preface,’’ in Shuai Feng and Li Jian, Interpretation of the 

Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli shiyi], (Beijing: Beijing Religious Culture 

Press, 2005), 1–2 (pagination for preface); Beatrice Leung, ‘‘China’s Religious Freedom Policy: 

The Art of Managing Religious Activity,’’ The China Quarterly, no. 184, 894, 907–911 (2005). 

17

21Zhang Xunmou, Policy and Law Department of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, quoted in Nailene Chou Wiest, ‘‘Religious Groups Get More Room to Move,’’ South China 

Morning Post (Online), 20 October 04. 22See, e.g., Public Security Bureau Personnel Training Bureau, Lectures on Domestic Security 

Defense Studies [Guonei anquan baoweixue jiaocheng] (Beijing: Mass Publishing Company, 

2001), 141–142. 23Wang Zhimin, ‘‘Thoughts on How To Safeguard Social Stability and Supply High-Grade 

Service in the Course of Developing the West’’ [Dui xibu dakaifa zhong ruhe weihu shehui wending tigong youzhi fuwu de sikao], in Police Science Society of China, ed., Collected Essays on 

Public Security Work and Developing the West, (Beijing: Chinese People’s Public Security University Press, 2002), 254. 24See, e.g., Ye Xiaowen, ‘‘Give Play to the Positive Role of Religion in Pushing Forward Social 

Harmony,’’ Study Times, 25 December 06 (Open Source Center, 8 January 07). For earlier statements, see, e.g., Sun Chengbin and Yin Hongzhu, ‘‘National Work Conference on Religious Affairs Held in Beijing, Jiang Zemin Stressed Need to Effectively Do a Good Job in Religious Work 

at the Beginning of This Century To Serve the Overall Situation of Reform, Development, and 

Stability,’’ Xinhua, 12 December 01 (Open Source Center, 12 December 01). 25See, e.g., Ye, ‘‘Give Play to the Positive Role of Religion in Pushing Forward Social Harmony;’’ ‘‘SARA Director Calls for Continued Controls on Religion,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 8. 26 ‘‘SARA Director Calls for Continued Controls on Religion,’’ CECC China Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 8. 27For more information, see, e.g., CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 89, 93. 28 Ye Xiaowen, ‘‘Correctly Understanding and Handling the Religious Relationship in the Socialist Society—Studying Comrade Hu Jintao’s Important Speech at the National United Front 

Work Conference,’’ Seeking Truth, 18 August 06 (Open Source Center, 23 August 06). 29Wu Jiao, ‘‘Religious Believers Thrice the Official Estimate: Poll,’’ China Daily, 7 February 

07 (Open Source Center, 7 February 07). Figures differ greatly. Unofficial estimates indicate a 

rapid growth in numbers in some religious communities. For example, overseas sources have 

estimated that up to 100 million people worship in unregistered Protestant churches and that 

the number continues to grow. Official government sources have stated that China has 16 million Protestants and 4.5 million Catholics affiliated with the state-controlled Catholic church, 

but State Administration for Religious Affairs director Ye Xiaowen also reportedly said that 

China had 130 million Protestants and Catholics as of 2006. For an overview of official and unofficial statistics, see U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, 

China, and U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report —2007, China. 30 ‘‘Diligently Strengthen the Foundation, Arouse the Passions To Serve the Situation—A Scan 

of Religious Work in 2005’’ [Yongxin guben qiangji dongqing fuwu daju—2005 zongjiao gongzuo 

saomiao], China Religions 2006 volume 1, reprinted on the State Administration for Religious 

Affairs Web site, 27 January 06. 31See, e.g., ‘‘SARA Holds First Term of Religious Work Cadre Training’’ [Guojia zongjiaoju 

juban diyiqi zongjiao gongzuo ganbu peixunban], United Front Work Department (Online), 4 December 06; ‘‘Suzhou Daily: Our City’s Religious Personages Discuss Study and Implementation 

of ‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’’ [Suzhou ribao: woshi zongjiaojie renshi zuotan xuexi 

guanche ‘zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’], Suzhou Daily, reprinted on the Suzhou Ethnic and Religious 

Affairs Bureau Web site, 17 March 07. 32Measures on the Examination, Approval, and Registration of Venues for Religious Activity; 

Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism 

[Cangchuan fojiao huofo zhuanshi guanli banfa], issued 18 July 07; Measures on Establishing 

Religious Schools [Zongjiao yuanxiao sheli banfa], issued 1 August 07; Measures for Putting on 

File the Main Religious Personnel of Venues for Religious Activities [Zongjiao huodong changsuo 

zhuyao jiaozhi renzhi bei’an banfa], issued 29 December 06; Measures for Putting on File Religious Personnel [Zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan bei’an banfa], issued 29 February 06. Measures Regarding Chinese Muslims Signing Up To Go Abroad on Pilgrimages (Trial Measures) [Zhongguo 

musilin chuguo chaojin baoming paidui banfa (shixing)], undated (estimated date 2006), available on the SARA Web site. See Section IV—Tibet for an analysis of the Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas in Tibetan Buddhism. 33Shuai and Li, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs. This book is written 

by drafters of the Regulation on Religious Affairs. See p. 6 of the preface. The book includes 

a preface by State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) director Ye Xiaowen and is advertised on the SARA Web site. A Web search of the book’s title, limited to Web sites with 

‘‘gov.cn’’ in the Web address, found only three local governments reporting on having received 

or used the text. Web search conducted July 16, 2007. While the text clarifies some ambiguous 

provisions of the Regulation on Religious Affairs, it also leaves some ambiguities—such as the 

question of whether religions outside the five belief systems are recognized in practice by the 

central government—unanswered. 34 Between March 1, 2005, when the national RRA entered into force, and September 2007, 

11 provincial-level areas issued new or amended comprehensive regulations on religious affairs 

and made the texts available on legal databases and other Web sites. These regulations are: 

Shanghai Municipality Regulation on Religious Affairs [Shanghaishi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 

adopted 30 November 95, amended 21 April 05; Henan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs 

[Henansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 July 05; Zhejiang Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Zhejiangsheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 6 December 97, amended 29 March 

06; Shanxi Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Shanxisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 

29 July 05; Anhui Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Anhuisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 

issued 15 October 99, amended 29 June 06 and 28 February 07; Beijing Municipality Regulation 

on Religious Affairs [Beijingshi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued 18 July 02, amended 28 July 06; 

Chongqing Municipality Regulation on Religious Affairs [Chongqingshi zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], 

18

issued 29 September 06; Hunan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Hunansheng zongjiao 

shiwu tiaoli], issued 30 September 06; Liaoning Province People’s Congress Standing Committee 

Decision on Amending the Liaoning Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Liaoningsheng 

renmin daibiao dahui changwu weiyuanhui guanyu xiugai ‘‘Liaoningsheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ 

de jueding], issued on 28 November 98 as the Liaoning Province Regulation on the Management 

of Religious Affairs, amended and name changed on 1 December 06; Sichuan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs [Sichuansheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli], issued on 9 May 00 as the 

Sichuan Province Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs, amended and name 

changed on 30 November 06; and Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the 

‘‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’ (Trial Measures) [Zizang zizhiqu shishi ‘‘zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ 

banfa (shixing)], issued 19 September 06. In addition, the Hebei provincial government also 

amended its 2003 Regulation on Religious Affairs, according to a report from the Hebei Province 

Ethnic and Religious Affairs Department Web site, but a public copy appears to be unavailable. 

Hebei Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Department (Online), ‘‘Hebei Province Regulation 

on Religious Affairs Revised and Promulgated’’ [‘‘Hebeisheng zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ xiuding bing 

gongbu], 14 February 07. The Anhui provincial government retained inconsistent provisions in 

its first amendments, in 2006. For an analysis of the Anhui amendments and other regulations, 

see ‘‘Anhui Government Amends Provincial Religious Regulation,’’ CECC China Human Rights 

and Rule of Law Update, October 2006, 10–11; ‘‘Zhejiang and Other Provincial Governments 

Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 

2006, 9–10; ‘‘Beijing Municipality Amends Local Religious Regulation,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 8–9; ‘‘Chongqing Municipality and Hunan 

Province Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 4 January 07 35 Article 79 of the Legislation Law says that national regulations have higher force than local 

ones, and Articles 64 and 88 call for amending or canceling local regulations that conflict with 

national legal sources. PRC Legislation Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo lifafa], adopted 15 

March 00. Nonetheless, out-of-date provisions remain within local-level legislation. For example, 

the Guangdong Province Regulation on the Administration of Religious Affairs retains a provision requiring yearly inspections of venues for religious activities in accordance with a national 

legal measure (banfa) on the topic, but subsequent legal developments have voided this legal 

guidance. See Guangdong Province Regulation on the Administration of Religious Affairs 

[Guangdongsheng shiwu guanli tiaoli], adopted 26 May 00, art. 15. See also ‘‘Beijing Municipality Amends Local Religious Regulation,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 8–9; and Shuai and Li, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs, 93. According to this book of interpretations, the national RRA annuls an earlier measure 

requiring yearly inspections. This annulment is not explicit within the text of the RRA itself. 36 Hunan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs, art. 48. See also ‘‘Chongqing Municipality 

and Hunan Province Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 4 January 07. 37Tibet Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the ‘‘Regulation on Religious Affairs,’’ 

art. 36–40. 38See, e.g., ‘‘Zhejiang and Other Provincial Governments Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 9–10, for a comparison of regulations from four provincial-level areas. 39The central government has referred to the five religions as China’s main religions, but in 

practice the state has created a regulatory system that institutionalizes only these five religions 

for recognition and legal protection. See, e.g., State Council Information Office, White Paper on 

Freedom of Religious Belief in China, October 1997 (Online) (stating that the religions citizens 

‘‘mainly’’ follow are Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism). Wording from 

this White Paper is posted as a statement of current policy on the Web sites of the United Front 

Work Department, the agency that oversees religious affairs within the Communist Party, and 

the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). Some local regulations on religious affairs define religion in China to mean only these five categories. See, e.g., Guangdong Province 

Regulation on the Administration of Religious Affairs, art. 3, and Henan Province Regulation 

on Religious Affairs, art. 2. There is some limited tolerance outside this framework for some 

ethnic minority and ‘‘folk’’ religious practices. See text infra and see also Kim-Kwong Chan and 

Eric R. Carlson, Religious Freedom in China: Policy, Administration, and Regulation (Santa 

Barbara: Institute for the Study of American Religion, 2005), 9–10, 15–16. Some local governments have recognized the Orthodox church. See the discussion, infra, on Orthodoxy in China. 

Officials told a visiting U.S. delegation in August 2005 that they were considering at the national level whether to allow some other religious communities, including the Orthodox church, 

to register to establish organizations or religious activity venues, but no decisions in this area 

have been reported. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF), ‘‘Policy 

Focus: China,’’ 9 November 05, 4. See also ‘‘A Year After New Regulations, Religious Rights Still 

Restricted, Arrests, Closures, Crackdowns Continue,’’ Human Rights Watch (Online), 1 March 

06 (reporting no decision on whether or not to recognize additional religions). 40See, e.g., RRA, art. 6 (requiring religious organizations to register in accordance with the 

Regulations on the Management of the Registration of Social Organizations); art. 8 (requiring 

an application to the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) to establish an institute 

for religious learning); art. 13–15 (imposing an application procedure to register venues for religious activity); art. 27 (requiring the appointment of religious personnel to be reported to the 

religious affairs bureau at or above the county level and requiring reporting the succession of 

living Buddhas for approval to governments at the level of a city divided into districts or higher, 

and requiring reporting for the record the appointment of Catholic bishops to SARA). 41These Party-led associations are sometimes also referred to as ‘‘patriotic religious associations.’’ 42For a description of the religious associations in Chinese sources, see Shuai and Li, Interpretation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs, 4–5. 

19

43 Authorities accused the monk of engaging in improper relations with lay practitioners and 

dismissed him on those alleged grounds. ‘‘Jiangxi Buddhist Master Accused of Being a Womanizer and Driven Out of Temple,’’ Sing Tao Jih Pao, 25 August 06 (Open Source Center, 27 August 06). ‘‘Top Buddhist Officials Join in Persecution of Activist Monk,’’ Human Rights in China 

(Online), 23 August 06. 44 Human Rights Watch and Human Rights in China, ‘‘Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang,’’ April 2005, 49–53, 55–57 (pagination follows ‘‘text-only’’ pdf 

download of this report). 45Some organizations operate without any registration and are tolerated by local authorities. 

A limited number of organizations have registered with local officials without affiliating with 

a Party-controlled religious association. U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China. 46See CECC, 2004 Annual Report, Section III(c) Freedom of Religion, for more information. 47Ministry of Public Security (Online), ‘‘Liu Jinguo’s Speech at Conference on National Work 

To Investigate and Deal with Rural Districts That Have Public Order in Disarray’’ [Liu Jianguo 

zai quanguo paicha zhengzhi nongcun zhi’an hunluan diqu huiyi shang de fayan], 6 July 07. 

The China Aid Association (CAA) reported detentions in the aftermath of the campaign’s launch. 

‘‘Chinese Government Launched Nationwide Campaign against Uncontrolled Religious Activities; Massive Arrests Occurred in Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Xinjiang, Jiangsu, Henan, 

Shandong, and Anhui,’’ CAA (Online), 24 August 07. 48 ‘‘Our District’s Work on the Administration of Abnormal Religious Activities Is Taking on 

a Desirable Posture’’ [Woqu feizhengchang zongjiao huodong zhili gongzuo xingcheng lianghao 

taishi], Baoshan Ethnicities and Religion Net (Online), 20 July 07. 49See, e.g., RRA, art. 4 and White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China, for more 

information on these principles. 50 ‘‘PRC Public Security Minister Zhou Yongkang Urges Crackdown on ‘Hostile Forces,’’’ 

Agence France-Presse, 20 March 07 (Open Source Center, 20 March 07). Zhou made a similar 

statement again in September, calling for increased security specifically for the 17th Party Congress, scheduled for October 2007. Shi Jiangtao, ‘‘Crackdown by Police Ahead of Party Congress,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 7 September 07. After Western media reported that 

foreign missionaries planned to increase their presence during the Olympics, Party-led China 

Christian Council head Cao Shengjie told foreign groups to adhere to Chinese rules and not engage in religious activities without invitation from the Party-led Protestant church. Kristine 

Kwok, ‘‘Olympic Missionaries Warned To Follow Rules,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 29 

May 07; ‘‘Thousands Planning to Bring the Gospel to China During the Olympic Games,’’ 

AsiaNews (Online), 21 May 07. 51 ‘‘Government Intervenes into a Three-Self Church in Shanxi Province, Pastor Evicted,’’ CAA 

(Online), 9 August 06. 52 ‘‘Over 100 Foreign Missionaries Expelled or Forced To Leave by Chinese Government Secret 

Campaign,’’ CAA (Online), 10 July 07. For additional reporting on this news, see, e.g., Alexa 

Olesen, ‘‘Christian Aid Group Says China Kicking Out Foreign Missionaries Ahead of 2008 

Olympics,’’ Associated Press (via Nexis), 10 July 07 (citing a U.S. Embassy spokesperson who 

said her office had ‘‘heard some reports of deportations.’’) 53Detailed Implementing Rules for the Provisions on the Management of the Religious Activities of Foreigners within the PRC [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jingnei waiguoren zongjiao 

huodong guanli guiding shishi xize], issued 26 September 00, art. 17. 54Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ‘‘MFA Spokesperson Liu Jianchao Answers Reporters 

Questions’’ [Waijiaobu fayanren Liu Jianchao huida jizhe tiwen], 16 March 05. 55See, e.g., Fujian Province Implementing Measures on the Law on the Protection of Minors 

[Fujiansheng shishi ‘‘Zhonghua renmin gongheguo weichengnianren baohufa’’ banfa], issued 21 

November 94, amended 25 October 97, art. 33; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region (IMAR) Implementing Measures on the Management of Venues for Religious Activity [Neimenggu zizhiqu 

zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli shishi banfa], issued 23 January 96, art. 13. While the national regulation addressed in the IMAR measures was annulled in 2005, the IMAR measures 

appear to remain in force. 56 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China. 57 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices —2006, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) (Online), 6 March 07. 58 Elisabeth Alle`s, ‘‘Muslim Religious Education in China,’’ 45 Perspectives Chinoises (January–February 2003) (Online); Will Religion Flourish Under China’s New Leadership? Staff 

Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 24 July 03, Testimony of Dr. 

Jacqueline M. Armijo-Hussein, Assistant Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Stanford 

University. 59See, e.g., Sara L.M. Davis, ‘‘Dance, Or Else: China’s ‘Simplifying Project,’’’ China Rights 

Forum 2006, No. 4—Ethnic Groups in China, 20 December 06. 60See CECC 2004 Annual Report, 37, for more details on these campaigns. 61 Ye Xiaowen, ‘‘Correctly Understanding and Handling the Religious Relationship in the Socialist Society—Studying Comrade Hu Jintao’s Important Speech at the National United Front 

Work Conference.’’ 62 RRA, art. 34. 63See, e.g., Guangdong Province Ethnic and Religious Affairs Commission (Online), ‘‘Shantou 

City Religious Circles Launch Compassion Activities to Help Haojiang District’s Dusheng Village 

Resume Work After Disaster’’ [Shantoushi zongjiaojie kaizhan aixin huodong bangzhu 

haojiangqu dushengcun zuohao zaihou huifu gongzuo], 12 June 06; Hebei Province Ethnic and 

Religious Affairs Department (Online), ‘‘Hebei Province’s Two Catholic Associations Establish 

the ‘Hebei Promote-Virtue Charity Service Center’’’ [Hebeisheng tianzhujiao lianghui chengli 

‘‘Hebei jin de gongyi shiye fuwu zhongxin’’], 14 July 06. 

20

64Susan K. McCarthy, ‘‘The Three Represents and the Four Noble Truths: Faith-Based Civil 

Society Organizations in Contemporary China,’’ Paper submitted for the 2007 annual meeting 

of the Association of Asian Studies, March 22–25, Boston, 9–10. [On File.] 65See, e.g., ‘‘Muslim Hands Reach Out to Gansu,’’ China Development Brief (Online), 6 May 

05; ‘‘MH in China: 70 Kids Have Cleft Lip Correction,’’ Muslim Hands Feedback Report 2004 

(Online), last visited 6 October 07; Correspondence to the CECC, 9 May 06; Elaine Chan, ‘‘Beyond Parallel,’’ South China Morning Post, 30 September 06. 66See Section II—Civil Society, infra, for more information. 67See, e.g., Jay Dautcher, ‘‘Public Health and Social Pathologies in Xinjiang,’’ in Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderland, ed. S. Frederick Starr (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 285–

6. 68This overview paragraph provides a summary of key issues of concern. See the text that 

follows the paragraph for more information, including detailed citations. 69 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 49. 70 ‘‘Underground Bishop Jia Zhiguo Is Arrested Again,’’ Cardinal Kung Foundation (Online), 

6 June 07 ‘‘Msgr. Jia Zhiguo, Underground Bishop Is Freed,’’ AsiaNews, reprinted on the CAA 

Web site, 23 June 07. 71 ‘‘Mgr Julius Jia Zhiguo, Who Wanted To Disseminate the Pope’s Letter, Is Arrested,’’ 

AsiaNews (Online), 23 August 07. 72 ‘‘Underground Bishop Jia Zhiguo Is Arrested Again,’’ Cardinal Kung Foundation. See the 

CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. 73 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 87. 74 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China. 75 ‘‘Officials Assault Nuns Over Land Dispute in Shaanxi Province,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 11; ‘‘Registered Catholics Claim Property in 

Tianjin,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 11–12; ‘‘Nuns and 

Alleged Assailants Reach Out-of-Court Settlement in Xi’an Beating Case,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 9. 76 ‘‘Chinese Government Appoints Bishop Without Holy See Approval,’’ CECC China Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 5–6. Wang’s ordination followed the CPA’s ordinations in April and May 2006 of other bishops who also lacked Holy See approval. 77 ‘‘Guizhou Scheduled To Hold First Episcopal Ordination Since Papal Letter,’’ Union of 

Catholc Asian News (UCAN) (Online), 3 September 07; ‘‘Vatican Approval for Guiyang Episcopal 

Ordination Made Public,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 10 September 07. 78 ‘‘Beijing Ordination Had Papal Approval,’’ UCAN (Online), 22 September 07; ‘‘New Bishop 

Vows To Lead Catholics Contributing to a Harmonious Society,’’ UCAN (Online), 21 September 

07. Holy See approval was not openly made known until after the ordination. Earlier articles 

on Li’s nomination differed on whether Li had received approval. ‘‘China Nominates Bishop, 

Threatening Vatican Rift,’’ Reuters (Online), 18 July 07. The Vatican has expressed some support for Li, whom outside media has suggested is less entrenched in official Chinese Catholic 

institutions than his predecessor, Fu Tieshan. ‘‘The New Bishop of Beijing is Elected,’’ AsiaNews 

(Online), 18 July 07. ‘‘Vatican Welcomes New China Bishop,’’ BBC (Online), 19 July 07. ‘‘Beijing 

Getting Ready for the Ordination of Mgr Li Shan, CCPA Seizes Bishop’s Residence,’’ AsiaNews 

(Online), 17 September 07. For Chinese reporting on the appointment, see ‘‘Li Shan Picked as 

Bishop of Beijing Diocese’’ [Li Shan dangxuan tianzhujiao Beijing jiaoqu zhujiao], China Ethnicity News (Online), 3 August 07. 79 ‘‘Letter of the Holy Father Pope Benedict XVI to the Bishops, Priests, Consecrated Persons 

and Lay Faithful of the Catholic Church in the People’s Republic of China,’’ Vatican Web site, 

27 May 07. Though dated May 27, the Holy See released the letter on June 30. ‘‘More on Pope’s 

Letter to China Over Religious Freedom, Appointment of Bishops,’’ Agence France-Presse, 30 

June 07 (Open Source Center, 30 June 07). 80 ‘‘Beijing Removes Papal Letter to Chinese Church from Web,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 3 July 

07. 81 ‘‘Priests Arrested and Put into Solitary Confinement: the Governments Answer to the Pope’s 

Letter,’’ AsiaNews (Online), 2 August 07. 82 Yang Yingchun, ‘‘Ismail Tiliwaldi, While Speaking at an Autonomous Region-Wide Religion 

Work Meeting, Calls for Stronger Management Over Pilgrimage and the ‘Two Religions’ To Safeguard the Masses’ Interest,’’ Xinjiang Daily, 11 July 07 (Open Source Center, 13 July 07); ‘‘Autonomous Prefecture’s Religion Meeting Stresses Strengthening Management of Religion, Safeguarding Social Stability’’ [Zizhizhou zongjiao huiyi qiangdiao jiaqiang zongjiao guanli weihu 

shehui wending], Changji Evening News, reprinted on the Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture 

Government Web site, 14 August 07. 83 ‘‘Two Priests Detained in Wenzhou After Arrest on Return from Europe,’’ UCAN, 3 October 

06; ‘‘‘Underground’ Chinese Catholic Priests Charged, Likely To Face Trial,’’ UCAN (Online), 26 

October 06. ‘‘Two Underground Priests from Wenzhou Soon To Be Freed,’’ AsiaNews, 17 May 

07; ‘‘Two Underground Priests, Arrested After Pilgrimage, Sentenced Six Months After Arrest,’’ 

UCAN (Online), 16 May 07. Authorities released Shao from prison in May 2007 to obtain medical treatment. ‘‘Jailed Wenzhou Priest Released Provisionally for Medical Treatment,’’ UCAN, 

30 May 07. Authorities released Jiang in August. ‘‘Second Of Two Jailed Wenzhou Priests Released, Diagnosed With Heart Conditions,’’ UCAN, 29 August 07. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. Jiang Surang is also known by the name Jiang Sunian. 84This overview paragraph provides a summary of key issues of concern. See the text that 

follows the paragraph for more information, including detailed citations. 85 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Devastating Blows,’’ 73–74. The report cites official data published 

in 2001. 86 Ibid., 69. 87 ‘‘Teacher and 37 Students Detained for Sudying [sic] Koran in China: Rights Group’’ Agence 

France-Presse, 15 August 05 (Open Source Center, 15 August 05). 

21

88 ‘‘Three Detained in East Turkistan for ‘Illegal’ Religious Text,’’ Uyghur Human Rights 

Project (Online), 3 August 05. 89See, e.g., ‘‘Xinjiang Government Continues Restrictions on Mosque Attendance,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, March 2006, 8. XUAR regulations forbid parents 

from allowing children to engage in religious activities, and mosques have restricted children’s 

entry. The U.S. Department of State noted in its 2006 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for China, however, that such restrictions were not uniformly enforced in practice. U.S. 

Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2006, China. 90 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Devastating Blows,’’ 55–56. 91 USCIRF, ‘‘Policy Focus: China,’’ 6. 92 RRA, art. 11, 43. 93 ‘‘Islamic Congress Establishes Hajj Office, Issues New Rules,’’ CECC Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, June 2006, 12–13. 94 ‘‘Government Increases Controls Over Muslim Pilgrimages,’’ CECC Human Rights and Rule 

of Law Update, December 2006, 20; Circular of Provisions Regarding Organizing and Carrying 

Out Secondary Pilgrimage Activities [Guanyu zuzhi kaizhan fuchao huodong ruogan guiding de 

tongzhi], August 2006. 95 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2007, China (noting 

reasons why some Uighur Muslims in particular have avoided participating in official trips). 96 Jackie Armijo, ‘‘Islamic Education in China,’’ 9 Harvard Asia Quarterly, (Winter 2006) (Online). 97 Cheng Lixin, ‘‘Wang Lequan, Speaking at the Feedback Meeting of the United Front and 

Religious Affairs Investigation and Study Team, Emphasizes the Need To Strengthen Management of Pilgrimage Activity To Safeguard the Masses Interests,’’ Xinjiang Daily, 19 June 07 

(Open Source Center, 25 June 07); ‘‘China Confiscates Muslims’ Passports,’’ Radio Free Asia 

(Online), 27 June 07; ‘‘Activist: Members of Muslim Minority Group in China Forced To Surrender Their Passports,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in the International Herald Tribune, 20 

July 07. 98 Yang, ‘‘Ismail Tiliwaldi, While Speaking at an Autonomous Region-Wide Religion Work 

Meeting, Calls for Stronger Management Over Pilgrimage and the ‘Two Religions’ To Safeguard 

the Masses’ Interest.’’ 99 ‘‘Over 70,000 Illegal Publications ‘Smashed to Dust’’’ [7 wan duo ce feifa chubanwu 

‘‘fenshensuigu’’], Xinjiang Legal Daily (Online), 6 August 07. 100 ‘‘Xinjiang Government Seizes, Confiscates Political and Religious Publications,’’ CECC 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 7–8. 101 ‘‘Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Destroys 29 Tons of Illegal Books’’ [Xinjiang weiwuer 

zizhiqu xiaohui 29 dun feifa tushu], Tianshan Net (Online), 16 March 06. 102 Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region Implementing Measures of the Law on the Protection 

of Minors [Xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu shishi ‘‘Weichengnianren baohufa’’ banfa], issued 25 September 93, art. 14. No other provincial or national regulation on minors or on religion contains 

this precise provision. Devastating Blows, 58. 103 ‘‘Local Governments in Xinjiang Continue Religious Repression During Ramadan,’’ CECC 

Virtual Academy, 12 December 06. Some local governments also extended these campaigns to 

teachers. 104Kashgar Government (Online), ‘‘Yopurgha County Implements ‘Mandatory Visits System’ 

Among Students in Elementary and Secondary Schools,’’ [Yuepuhuxian zai zhongxiaoxuesheng 

zhong shixing ‘‘bifangzhi’’], 11 October 06. 105This overview paragraph provides a summary of key issues of concern. See the text that 

follows the paragraph for more information, including detailed citations. 106The document says that meetings that are ‘‘purely’’ gatherings of family members within 

the home should be placed under normal management, and non-family gatherings that are large 

in scope and disruptive should be stopped and participants urged to go to approved sites of worship. Gatherings with elements of cult practices or foreign infiltration should be dispelled and 

if necessary subject to penalties. ‘‘Our District’s Work on the Administration of Abnormal Religious Activities Is Taking on a Desirable Posture’’ [Woqu feizhengchang zongjiao huodong zhili 

gongzuo xingcheng lianghao taishi], Baoshan Ethnicities and Religion Net (Online), 20 July 07. 107 ‘‘Annual Report on Persecution of Chinese House Churches by Province from January 2006 

to December 2006,’’ CAA (Online), January 2007, 3. 108 CAA noted that while church members are often released after interrogation, authorities 

have held church leaders for longer periods, in some cases imposing prison sentences. Ibid.,19. 109 ‘‘Beijing House Church Activist Hua Huiqi and His Mother Attacked and Detained by Police,’’ CAA (Online), 27 January 07. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for additional information. 110 ‘‘Beijing House Church Activist Hua Huiqi Sentenced for 6 Months Secretly,’’ CAA (Online), 4 June 07; ‘‘House Church Christian Activist Hua Huiqi and Mr. Qi Zhiyong Were Removed from Home Before US Presidential Visit,’’ CAA (Online), 21 November 05; ‘‘Activist’s 

Mother ‘Held Hostage’ for Information,’’ Human Rights In China (HRIC) (Online), 17 August 

07; ‘‘Elderly Activist Denied Medical Parole,’’ HRIC (Online), 13 September 07. See the CECC 

Political Prisoner Database for more information. 111 ‘‘Prominent Beijing Rights Defense Christian Lawyer Li Heping Kidnapped and Tortured; 

Two Beijing Christian Activists Held Under House Arrest,’’ CAA, reprinted in Christian News 

Wire, 3 October 07. 112See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. See also ‘‘UN Petition 

Submitted for Jailed Ailing Church Leader; Medical Parole Appeal Filed by Family Members,’’ 

CAA (Online), 12 July 06. Gong’s accusers say they were tortured into signing allegations 

against Gong. Authorities originally charged Gong with using a cult to undermine the implementation of the law, along with premeditated assault, and rape, but the cult charges were later 

22

dropped. Examples of cult activity included carrying out unauthorized missionary activities and 

publishing and distributing a church periodical. 113 ‘‘Beijing House Church Activist Liu Fenggang Released,’’ CAA (Online), 7 February 07. 114 ‘‘Prominent Beijing Rights Defense Christian Lawyer Li Heping Kidnapped and Tortured; 

Two Beijing Christian Activists Held Under House Arrest,’’ CAA. 115White Paper on Freedom of Religious Belief in China. 116 ‘‘Three House Church Buildings in Zhejiang Facing Imminent Destruction by Government,’’ 

CAA (Online), 14 July 07. 117 ‘‘Basic People’s Court of Xiaoshan District, Hangzhou City, Criminal Judgment’’ [Hangzhou 

xiaoshanqu renminfayuan xingshi panjueshu], 22 December 06, reprinted on the CAA Web site, 

15 January 07. 118 ‘‘Annual Report on Persecution of Chinese House Churches, ’’ CAA, 3–4. 119 ‘‘Church Property in Gansu Occupied by the Government, 300 Christians Protest by Sitting 

Demonstration; 3 Singapore Christians Arrested & Released in Xinjiang, 5 Local Believers Still 

in Detention,’’ CAA (Online), 31 October 06. Government officials threatened to withhold retirement benefits to church members and reportedly used violence against the demonstrators. The 

group reportedly reached a compromise with authorities. ‘‘Annual Report on Persecution of Chinese House Churches,’’ CAA, 19. 120See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information about these cases. CAA 

reported in September 2007 that authorities arrested Zhou Heng, a house church leader in the 

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, on August 31 after he received a shipment of Bibles reported to have been donated by an overseas church. Authorities accused him of illegally operating a business. ‘‘House Church Leader in Xinjiang Formally Arrested for Receiving Bibles and 

Abused in Jail,’’ CAA (Online), 5 September 07. In March 2007, CAA reported that authorities 

arrested unregistered church leader Chen Jiaxi in January 2007 for distributing religious literature, on the grounds he was illegally managing a business. CAA reported that Chen was expected to stand trial soon but has not reported further information on the case. ‘‘House Church 

Leaders Arrested in Liaoning and Anhui Province,’’ CAA (Online), 31 March 07. In 2006, the 

CAA reported that authorities levied a similar charge on pastor Liu Yuhua after he printed and 

distributed religious literature. ‘‘Multiple Arrests of Protestants Occurred in Shandong and 

Jiangsu; One South Korea Missionary Expelled from China; Prominent Chinese Legal Scholar 

Banned to Go Abroad,’’ CAA (Online), 16 May 06. 121 ‘‘Renowned Beijing Church Leader Cai Zhuohua Released After Three Years Imprisonment 

for Distributing Bibles; Forced Labor for Olympics Products Imposed,’’ CAA (Online), 14 September 07. 122 ‘‘Chinese Authorities Release House Church Filmmaker After 140 Days in Custody,’’ CECC 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 9; ‘‘Journalist Arrested for Posting 

Reports About Crackdown on Christians,’’ Reporters Without Borders (Online), 11 August 06. 123 ‘‘House Church Members Successfully Fight Detentions For Unauthorized Worship,’’ CECC 

Virtual Academy, 19 December 06. 124The church leaders have since filed lawsuits against the government. According to an April 

report from the China Aid Association, Dong Quanyu and Li Huage of Henan province await 

a decision on whether their case will be heard. In April 2007, the People’s Court of Duolun 

County, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region accepted Zhi Ruiping’s case for an upcoming trial. 

‘‘Released Church Leaders in Henan and Inner Mongolia File Lawsuit Against Abusers in the 

Government,’’ CAA (Online), 18 April 07. 125See the subsection on ‘‘Government Persecution of Falun Gong,’’ infra, for more information. 126 ‘‘Thirty-Three Chinese and Three Korea[n] Pastors Released in Henan After International 

Religious Pressure; One Sentenced for 10 Days Detention,’’ CAA (Online), 7 March 07. 127 ‘‘Confiscated Church Properties in Jiangsu Returned after International Pressure,’’ CAA 

(Online), 11 May 07. 128 ‘‘Delegation of Chinese Protestants Attends International Mission Conference,’’ CECC 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2005, 6. 129 ‘‘House Church Lawyers Promote Religious Freedom Through the Rule of Law,’’ CECC 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, July 2006, 3. 130 Yang, ‘‘Ismail Tiliwaldi, While Speaking at an Autonomous Region-Wide Religion Work 

Meeting, Calls for Stronger Management Over Pilgrimage and the ‘Two Religions’ To Safeguard 

the Masses’ Interest.’’ This call was reiterated by local authorities in Changji Hui Autonomous 

Prefecture in August. ‘‘Autonomous Prefecture’s Religion Meeting Stresses Strengthening Management of Religion, Safeguarding Social Stability,’’ Changji Evening News. 131See, e.g., ‘‘Massive Arrest of Chinese and American Christian Leaders in Xinjiang,’’ CAA 

(Online), 24 April 07; ‘‘3 Singapore Christians Arrested and Released in Xinjiang, 5 Local Believers Still in Detention,’’ CAA (Online), 31 October 06; ‘‘35 Arrested Christians in Xinjiang Released after Interrogation; American Korean Pastor Put Under Surveillance in a Hotel,’’ CAA 

(Online), 27 October 06; ‘‘On Christmas Day, Christmas Services Stopped in Xinjiang; House 

Church Leaders Arrested; Persecution Against Beaten Christian Businessman Intensified,’’ CAA 

(Online), 27 December 05. 132 ‘‘Over 100 Foreign Missionaries Expelled or Forced To Leave by Chinese Government Secret Campaign,’’ CAA (Online), 10 July 07. 133 ‘‘China Sentences Underground Pastor to 7.5 Years in Prison,’’ Agence France-Presse (Online), 12 July 06. See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. 134Timothy Chow, ‘‘Chinese House Church Historian Denied ID Card,’’ Compass Direct News, 

reprinted on the CAA Web site, 17 February 06. 135 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2007, China. 136 ‘‘Head of Religious Association: Religious Adherents Not Arrested Due to Their Faith,’’ 

CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 26 June 06; ‘‘Falun Gong Practitioners To Be Punished Under 

23

New Administration Punishment Law,’’ CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, 

May 2006, 6. 137See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. 138See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. 139See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. 140See China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group (Online), ‘‘Demand Immediate Release 

of Beijing Human Rights Lawyer Gao Zhisheng,’’ 27 September 07. For more information about 

Gao’s open letter, which called on the Congress to take action against the Chinese government’s 

human rights abuses, see Human Rights Torch Relay (Online), ‘‘Gao Zhisheng’s letter to the 

Senate and the Congress of the United States,’’ 12 September 07; Bill Gertz, ‘‘Chinese dissident 

urges boycott of Olympics,’’ Washington Times (Online), 21 September 07. 141 ‘‘Prominent Beijing Rights Defense Christian Lawyer Li Heping Kidnapped and Tortured; 

Two Beijing Christian Activists Held Under House Arrest,’’ CAA; ‘‘Amnesty International’s Urgent Appeal for Beijing Human Rights Lawyer Li Heping, Who Was Abducted and Assaulted,’’ 

Amnesty International, reprinted in CAA (Online), 4 October 07. 142 ‘‘House Church Members Successfully Fight Detentions For Unauthorized Worship,’’ CECC 

Virtual Academy, 19 December 06; ‘‘Court Officials Refuse Falun Gong Practitioner’s Appeal of 

RTL Sentence,’’ CECC Virtual Academy, 3 November 06. 143See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more information. 144See, e.g., ‘‘Dachang Demolishes Illegal Small Temple According to Law’’ [Dachang zhen yifa 

chaichu yichu feifa xiao miao], Shanghai Baoshan Ethnicity and Religion Net (Online), 1 September 06; Mianyang City Bureau of Ethnic and Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘Govern According 

to the Law for Good Results, Strength To Demolish ‘Illegal Small Temples’ Great,’’ [Yifa zhili 

xiaoguo hao, chai ‘‘feifa xiao miao’’ lidu da], 08 June 06. 145See, e.g., ‘‘Investigative Report on the Situation of Unregistered Small Temples and Convents’’ [Weijing zhengfu dengji de xiao miao xiao an qingkuang de diaoyan baogao], Xiaogang 

Information Net (sponsored by the Beilun District People’s Government Xiaogang Neighborhood 

Committee Office) (Online), 12 September 06; ‘‘Some Reflections on Rural Religious Work in a 

New Period’’ [Xin shiqi nogcun zongjiao gongzuo de jidian sikao], Yixing United Front Web Site 

(Online), 13 June 05. 146State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘Forum for Religious Personages Opens 

in Beijing at Second-year Anniversary of the Implementation of the ‘Regulation on Religious Affairs’’’ [‘‘Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli’’ shishi liang zhou nian zongjiaojie renshi zuotanhui zai jing 

zhaokai], 3 March 07. 147See, e.g., ‘‘China Exclusive: China Supports Buddhism in Building Harmonious World,’’ 

Xinhua, 12 April 06 (Open Source Center, 12 April 06). 148 Jim Yardley, ‘‘In Crackdown, China Shuts Buddhist Site and Seizes Catholic Priests,’’ New 

York Times, 19 August 04. 149 U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China. 150 Among provincial-level areas, the Heilongjiang Regulation on the Management of Religious 

Affairs and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the Management 

of Venues for Religious Activity recognize the Orthodox Church. Heilongjiang Regulation on the 

Management of Religious Affairs [Heilongjiangsheng zongjiao shiwu guanli tiaoli], issued 12 

June 97, art. 2; Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Implementing Measures for the Management of Venues for Religious Activity [Nei menggu zizhiqu zongjiao huodong changsuo guanli 

shishi banfa], issued 23 January 96, art. 2. 151For more information see ‘‘Religious Freedom for China’s Orthodox Christians’’ in the 

CECC 2005 and 2006 Annual Reports. 152 In addition to work in these areas, it also oversees anti-cult work and addresses ‘‘foreign 

infiltration.’’ The Web site of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) includes a 

description of this office but does not indicate when it was established. The curriculum vitae 

for a SARA staff members notes he was made head of this department in December 2004. The 

Hong Kong newspaper Ta Kung Pao reported the establishment of this department in September 2005. Chan and Carlson write that authorities decided at a January 2004 conference 

to establish a SARA department focused on folk beliefs. Chan and Carlson, 15–16. State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘Fourth Work Department’’ [Yewu sisi], last visited 6 October 07; State Administration for Religious Affairs (Online), ‘‘CV of [SARA Official] Jiang 

Jianyong’’ [Jiang Jianyong jianli], last viewed 6 October 07. ‘‘Religious Affairs Bureau Establishes Special Department To Manage Folk Religions’’ [Zongjiaoju she zhuansi guanli minjian 

zongjiao], Ta Kung Pao (Online), 20 September 05. 153 Hunan Province Regulation on Religious Affairs, art. 48. See also ‘‘Chongqing Municipality 

and Hunan Province Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC Virtual Academy (Online), 4 January 07. Some localities outside Hunan province also regulate folk beliefs. See, e.g., ‘‘Xiamen 

Exchanges Experiences on Management of Venues for Folk Beliefs’’ [Xiamen jiaoliu minjian 

xinyang huodong changsuo guanli jingyan], China Ethnicities News (Online), 6 February 07; 

‘‘Yanping District, Jian’ou City Standardizes Financial Management of Venues for Folk Beliefs,’’ 

[Jian’ou shi yanping qu guifan minjian xinyang changsuo caiwu guanli], China Ethnicities News 

(Online), 13 February 07. 154 ‘‘Chongqing Municipality and Hunan Province Issue New Religious Regulations,’’ CECC 

Virtual Academy (Online), 4 January 07. 155 Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs Bureau (Online), ‘‘State Administration for Religious 

Affairs Comes To Hunan To Investigate and Research Our Province’s Present Conditions for 

Folk Beliefs and Experimental Management Situation’’ [Guojia zongjiaoju lai xiang diaoyan wo 

sheng minjian xinyang xianzhuang he shidian guanli qingkuang], last viewed 6 October 07 

(posted on the Hunan Provincial Religious Affairs Bureau Web site in 2007, in apparent reference to events in August 2006). See also ‘‘Popular Folk Beliefs and Religion’’ [Minjian xinyang 

yu zongjiao], China Religion, September 2004 (indicating, within an official publication under 

SARA, some support for protecting folk beliefs but also subjecting them to state control). 

24

156State Administration for Religious Affairs, ‘‘Forum for Religious Personages Opens in Beijing at Second-year Anniversary of the Implementation of the Regulation on Religious Affairs;’’ 

‘‘Some Reflections on Rural Religious Work in a New Period,’’ Yixing United Front Web Site; 

U.S. Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report—2006, China. Some activities related to ‘‘superstitions’’ or ‘‘feudal superstitions’’ are penalized under the Criminal Law 

and administrative regulations. See, e.g., the PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 

14 March 97, art. 300, and the PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law, enacted 

28 August 05, art. 27(1).

Æ