14-2277-cv 

LaSonde v. Seabrook

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY 

ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE 

OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A 

SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE 

FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). 

A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

23rd day of January, two thousand fifteen. 

Present: ROBERT A. KATZMANN, 

 Chief Judge, 

 AMALYA L. KEARSE, 

 REENA RAGGI, 

 Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

CHANDRA LASONDE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

 14-2277-cv 

NORMAN SEABROOK in his individual and official capacity as a Correction Officer for the 

New York City Department of Correction, ELIAS HUSAMUDEEN in his individual and official 

capacity as a Correction Officer for the New York City Department of Correction, JOSEPH 

BRACCO in his individual and official capacity as a Correction Officer for the New York City 

Department of Correction, ELIZABETH CASTRO in her individual and official capacity as a 

Correction Officer for the New York City Department of Correction, THOMAS FARRELL in his 

individual and official capacity as a Correction Officer for the New York City Department of 

Correction, KAREN BELFIELD in her individual and official capacity as a Correction Officer for 

the New York City Department of Correction, STEVE ROBINSON in his individual and official 

capacity as a Correction Officer for the New York City Department of Correction, CITY OF NEW 

YORK, ROSE GILL HEARN in her individual and official capacity as Commissioner for the New 

York City Department of Investigation, ROBERT A. GIGANTE in his individual and official 

capacity as Inspector General of the New York City Department of Investigation for the New York 
2 

City Department of Correction, JACQUELINE MAQUINE in her individual and official capacity 

as Chief of Staff for the Correction Services Unit for the New York City Department of 

Investigation, VINCENT COPPOLA, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PREET 

BHARARA in his individual capacity, and SHEILA NICKENS-THOMAS in her individual and 

official capacity as Criminal Investigator for the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern 

District of New York, 

Defendants-Appellees, 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW 

YORK, 

 Defendant.

*1

_____________________________________ 

For Plaintiff-Appellant: Chandra LaSonde, pro se, 

Middletown, NY. 

For Defendants-Appellees Seabrook, Husamudeen, 

Bracco, Castro, Farrell, Belfield, Robinson, & Coppola: Howard Wien, Koehler & Isaacs 

LLP, New York, NY. 

For Defendants-Appellees City of New York, 

Hern, Gigante, & MaQuine: Marta Soja Ross, New York City 

Law Department, for Zachary W. 

Carter, Corporation Counsel of the 

City of New York, New York, NY. 

For Defendants-Appellees United States, Bharara, 

& Nickens-Thomas: Tomoko Onozawa (Emily E. 

Daughtry, on the brief), Assistant 

United States Attorneys, for Preet 

Bharara, United States Attorney’s 

Office for the Southern District of 

New York, New York, NY. 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 

(Crotty, J.). 

 

* The Clerk is directed to amend the caption. 
3 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Appellant Chandra LaSonde, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment 

dismissing her claims of malicious prosecution for failure to state a claim. LaSonde’s claims arise 

from her prosecution for mail fraud in connection with a false insurance claim submitted by Allen 

Blake. Blake and LaSonde were tried together. Blake was convicted and LaSonde was acquitted. 

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and 

the issues on appeal. 

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” 

Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). The complaint must plead 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is 

“inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” and pleadings that “are no more than 

conclusions [] are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 678, 679. 

 In New York, a plaintiff alleging malicious prosecution must show, inter alia, that “the 

defendant did not have probable cause to believe the plaintiff was guilty of the crime charged.” 
4 

Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1994). “[T]he existence of probable cause is a complete 

defense to a claim of malicious prosecution in New York.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 

63, 72 (2d Cir. 2003). And “indictment by a grand jury creates a presumption of probable cause 

that may only be rebutted by evidence that the indictment was procured by fraud, perjury, the 

suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad faith.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 Here, the grand jury’s indictment of LaSonde created a presumption of probable cause. 

LaSonde argued below that the presumption was overcome, however, because the indictment was 

procured based on lies regarding Blake’s entitlement, or lack thereof, to the insurance proceeds he 

attempted to claim for himself. However, as the district court correctly noted, that argument cannot 

survive the ruling that Blake’s entitlement was irrelevant to his conviction—and by extension, to 

the probable cause supporting the indictment—which was premised on his choice to intentionally 

lie in his benefits application. See United States v. Blake, 558 F. App’x 129, 130 (2d Cir. 2014) 

(summary order).

LaSonde now disavows her earlier theory of the case and asserts that her claims are in fact 

premised on the lies allegedly told by various defendants regarding her authority to process 

Blake’s insurance application, and that these allegations are sufficient to rebut the presumption of 

probable cause. This argument does not address the basis for the indictment, however, which was 

Blake’s intentionally false statement in his application. Whether LaSonde had authority to process 

the application is immaterial. 

LaSonde also claims that defendants made false statements concerning her knowledge of 

Blake’s marital status, which further rebut the presumption of probable cause. LaSonde, 
5 

however, does not—and cannot—allege that probable cause was based on these statements, or that 

any of the defendants who made these statements initiated her criminal prosecution. See 

Manganiello v. City of New York, 612 F.3d 149, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (observing that, to initiate 

prosecution, defendant “must play an active role in the prosecution, such as giving advice and 

encouragement or importuning the authorities to act,” and “must do more than report the crime or 

give testimony”). Accordingly, the malicious prosecution claims are barred. 

LaSonde’s brief addresses only her claims of malicious prosecution. She has therefore 

abandoned all other claims raised in her second amended complaint. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 

F.3d 225, 233 (2d Cir. 2011). We have considered all of LaSonde’s remaining arguments and find 

them to be without merit. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk