RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3329-17T1

J.R.B.,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

K.M.B.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted October 2, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino and Sumners.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, 

Docket No. FV-04-1925-18.

Craig Annin & Baxter LLP, attorneys for the appellant 

(Jeffrey Scott Craig, on the brief).

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Following a January 23, 2018 hearing addressing the married parties'

cross-complaints of harassment under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

November 7, 2019
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(Act), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, the trial judge issued final restraining orders 

(FRO) against each party for the reasons expressed in his oral decision. Only 

K.M.B (Karen)1appeals, arguing:

POINT I – THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF THE 

FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER VERSUS 

APPELLANT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED AND 

THE FRO VACATED BECAUSE RESPONDENT 

FAILED TO PROVE THE PREDICATE ACT OF 

HARASSMENT.

A. Standard of Review.

B. There Is No Evidence That Appellant Acted With 

 Purpose To Harass.

POINT II – THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT 

RESPONDENT FEARED FOR HIS SAFETY OR 

THAT A FINAL RESTRAINING ORDER WAS 

NECESSARY TO PREVENT FUTURE ABUSE.

Based upon the arguments presented and applicable law, we affirm.

We discern the following facts from the FRO hearing, in which neither 

party were represented by counsel, pertinent to the claims made against Karen

by J.R.B. (James). The parties had been married for almost six years, but were 

estranged – living apart across the street from each other – when the conduct 

 

1

 We use pseudonyms for the convenience of the reader, and to protect the 

parties' privacy.
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arose that formed the basis of the their cross-complaints. After James was 

released from county jail,

2 he told Karen he did not want to be with her anymore, 

and, according to his count, she texted and called him "at least 172 times . . . , 

within a 48 hour period[, about] just nutty things and all kinds of crazy things."

This included Karen's accusation that James was having an affair with her friend. 

When James texted her to "just please leave me alone," she replied, "you're 

going to be sorry that you did this."

After the judge examined the text messages on James's cell phone, he 

asked James whether he was afraid for "[his] safety or health." James replied, 

"Oh, yes. Yeah. I'm afraid she would do something even to stab herself and try 

to blame it on me." James further reiterated he was afraid because "[j]ust the 

way she talks and [talks] about her brother." James was on ISP because of a 

conviction arising from a violent incident with Karen's brother. James' sister 

testified that James and Karen had a "toxic" relationship.

In her testimony, Karen denied making any threatening calls or texts to 

James. She testified regarding previous incidences of domestic violence. She 

 

2

 James testified he was in jail "because [Karen] called [his] ISP [(Intense 

Supervision Probation)] officer an asshole."
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argues before us that James failed to prove she harassed him and he was fearful 

of his safety from her future conduct.

Our review of a trial court's factual findings is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Findings by the trial court "are binding on appeal 

when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at 411-12 

(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). 

"Appellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility findings that are often 

influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of 

witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the 

record." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).

An FRO may issue only if the judge finds the parties have a relationship 

bringing the complained of conduct within the Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(d); the 

defendant committed an act designated as domestic violence, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-

19(a); and the "restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors 

set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(6), to protect the victim from an 

immediate danger or to prevent further abuse." Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 

112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). 

Relevant here, the predicate act of harassment is defined in N.J.S.A. 

2C:33-4(a) and -(c), as when a person "with purpose to harass another":
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a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or 

communications anonymously or at extremely 

inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, 

or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;

. . . . 

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or 

of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or 

seriously annoy such other person.

Harassment requires the defendant to act with the purpose of harassing the 

victim. J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 486 (2011). "A finding of a purpose to 

harass may be inferred from the evidence presented," and a judge may use 

"[c]ommon sense and experience" to determine a defendant's intent. State v. 

Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577, (1997). To that end, judges should consider the 

totality of the circumstances to determine whether an underlying act of 

harassment in the context of domestic violence has occurred. Id. at 584-85.

Applying those principles here, we conclude there is no basis to disturb 

the factual findings or legal conclusions of the trial judge. Both parties testified. 

The judge had ample opportunity to assess their credibility, and found they were 

guilty of harassing each other. We are satisfied the record supports the trial 

judge's determination that based upon the parties' toxic relationship, Karen's 

texts constitute harassment as they were meant to seriously annoy and alarm

James. Contrary to Karen's contention on appeal, the judge did not find her 
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guilty of harassment based upon the evidence of a photo showing Karen giving 

"the finger" to no one in particular at the direction of a camera located at James' 

sister's house. We likewise discern no cause to upset the judge's finding that an 

FRO was necessary to protect James from further harassment considering the 

deterioration of his marital relationship and his testimony that he was fearful of 

Karen's potential future conduct. The finding is based upon the judge's finding 

that James' testimony was credible, to which we must defer. 

Affirmed.