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S. Hrg. 110–323

NOT A MATTER OF ‘‘IF’’, BUT OF ‘‘WHEN’’:

THE STATUS OF U.S. RESPONSE FOLLOWING

A RDD ATTACK

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, 

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE

AND

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, 

LOCAL AND PRIVATE SECTOR 

PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2007

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL 

WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Staff Director 

JODI LIEBERMAN, Professional Staff Member 

JENNIFER A. HEMINGWAY, Minority Staff Director 

THOMAS BISHOP, Minority Legislative Aide 

JESSICA K. NAGASAKO, Chief Clerk 

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR 

PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN WARNER, Virginia

KRISTIN SHARP, Staff Director 

MICHAEL MCBRIDE, Minority Staff Director 

AMANDA FOX, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Akaka .................................................................................................. 1

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 2

Senator Pryor .................................................................................................... 16

WITNESSES

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007

Eugene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 4

Glenn M. Cannon, Assistant Administrator, Disaster Operations Directorate, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security ................................................................................................................. 5

Steven Aoki, Ph.D., Deputy Under Secretary for Energy for Counterterrorism, 

National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy ........ 7

Thomas P. Dunne, Associate Administrator of Homeland Security, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency .............................................................................. 9

Kevin Yeskey, M.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Preparedness and Response, accompanied by Richard J. Hatchett, M.D., Associate Director for 

Radiation Countermeasures Research and Emergency Preparedness, National Institutes of Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ......................................................................................................................... 10

Kenneth D. Murphy, Director, Oregon Department of Emergency Management ...................................................................................................................... 24

Thomas S. Tenforde, President, National Council on Radiation Protection 

and Measurements ............................................................................................... 26

Wayne J. Tripp, Program Manager, Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program .................................................................................... 27

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Aloise, Eugene: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 4

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 39

Aoki, Steven, Ph.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 7

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 76

Cannon, Glenn M.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 60

Dunne, Thomas P.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 9

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 81

Hatchett, Richard J., M.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10

Murphy, Kenneth D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 24

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 108

Tenforde, Thomas S.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 26

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 114

Tripp, Wayne J.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 27

Prepared statement with an attachment ....................................................... 119

Yeskey, Kevin, M.D.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 96

Page

IV

APPENDIX 

Background .............................................................................................................. 129

Questions and Responses submitted for the Record from: 

Mr. Cannon ....................................................................................................... 135

Dr. Aoki ............................................................................................................. 146

Mr. Dunne ......................................................................................................... 152

Dr. Yeskey ......................................................................................................... 155

(1)

NOT A MATTER OF ‘‘IF’’, BUT OF ‘‘WHEN’’: THE 

STATUS OF U.S. RESPONSE FOLLOWING A 

RDD ATTACK 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007

U.S. SENATE,

OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,

THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE DISTRICT

OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE, JOINT WITH THE

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND

PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

6AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in 

Room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, 

Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, and 

Hon. Mark L. Pryor, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on 

State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, presiding. 

Present: Senators Akaka, Pryor, and Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA 

Senator AKAKA. I call this joint hearing of the Subcommittee on 

Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and 

the District of Columbia, and the Subcommittee on State, Local, 

and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration, to order. 

Senator Pryor and I are jointly chairing this hearing. I want to 

thank him and his staff for making this joint hearing possible. I 

will be chairing the first panel and he will be chairing the second. 

At this time, I would like to welcome our witnesses to this hearing and I want to thank you very much for being here. 

Today’s hearing is the latest in a series I have held over the last 

several years on various aspects of nuclear and radiological terrorism. In March, the OGM Subcommittee examined U.S. programs 

underway to secure the highest-risk radiological materials in other 

countries. Today, we will examine how well prepared the Nation is 

to respond to a radiological dispersal device (RDD) attack. 

Detonating a dirty bomb in the United States is one of al Qaeda’s 

top goals and we must be realistic about the consequences of such 

an attack. Three aspects of our response concern me: First, the 

ability of Federal agencies to respond in a coordinated and effective 

way to a dirty bomb attack; second, if they have sufficient guidance 

2

to do so; and third, the technical capabilities of government agencies to take care of victims and clean up contamination. 

The goal of a dirty bomb attack is to create fear and to inflict 

economic damage. Having an effective Federal response, the resources to address people’s fears, and the ability to mitigate and to 

reduce the economic damage from such an attack will make the 

consequences of a dirty bomb attack less severe. 

Our first panel will examine whether or not the agencies of the 

Federal Government are working together to be able effectively to 

respond to a terrorist attack involving a dirty bomb. Even if the 

Federal response is well coordinated, other questions remain. Do 

agencies have adequate technical expertise to clean up operations 

and to conduct them and to properly diagnose and care for those 

injured during such an attack? Are existing assets well protected 

so that they are available when we need them? 

I look forward to this hearing from our witnesses regarding the 

kinds of capabilities they have in place and what is needed to ensure our continued preparedness over the long term. 

In a report released in September 2006, the Government Accountability Office found that the Department of Energy may not 

be providing enough physical security for its fixed-wing aircraft 

and helicopters which carry radiation survey equipment that could 

be used in the aftermath of a dirty bomb attack. I look forward to 

hearing from DOE today about the measures they have put in 

place to better protect the unique capabilities they already have. It 

is not enough to have these assets on the books; they must be 

available for use when they are needed. 

At this time, I would like to call on Senator Coleman for any remarks he may have. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly, first, 

I want to thank you for holding this very important hearing. 

A number of months ago, we had the opportunity through the 

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations to look at the issue of 

individuals getting materials for use in a dirty bomb, radiological 

materials that are used, for example, in the construction industry. 

We worked with Mr. Aloise from the Government Accountability 

Office, and I believe we found some holes in the system. Holes that 

we subsequently have tightened up. 

But during the course of that hearing, we had testimony from 

Commissioner McGaffigan (who has passed away), from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In our exchange, we talked about the 

psychological impact that dirty bombs can have. So often, the focus 

has been on nuclear weapons and nuclear bombs, but the reality 

is that the psychological impact of a dirty bomb, the impact upon 

the community, the impact upon the economy, is something that we 

really need to better understand. We need to better educate people 

about the nature of the threat, and we have to make sure that we 

have the highest level of preparation. 

I fear in this dangerous world that it is not a matter of if, as the 

title of this presentation indicates, but rather a matter of when. 

The ability for a terrorist to be able to detonate a dirty bomb is 

3

something that we need to understand. It can happen and we have 

to be prepared to deal with it. 

So I just want to thank you for holding this hearing. I am only 

going to be able to stay through the first panel. But there needs 

to be an education process that goes on, not just at the Federal 

level, but also at the local level. As a former elected mayor, I know 

firsthand that we have got to make sure that the first responders 

at the local level are prepared, and we also need to do a better job 

of simply educating our citizens about what this is all about and 

how we can respond. 

So this hearing is timely, it is important, and I look forward to 

hearing from the witnesses. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. I want 

to thank you for joining us at this hearing. 

I would like to welcome our witnesses to the Subcommittee hearing today: Gene Aloise, Director of Natural Resources and Environment at the Government Accountability Office; Glenn M. Cannon, 

Assistant Administrator for Disaster Operations at the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency; Steven Aoki, Ph.D., Deputy 

Under Secretary of Energy for Counterterrorism at the National 

Nuclear Security Administration; Thomas Dunne, Associate Administrator for Homeland Security at the Environmental Protection 

Agency; and Dr. Kevin Yeskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the Department of Health and Human 

Services. Dr. Yeskey will be supported by Dr. Richard Hatchett, Associate Director for Radiation Countermeasures Research and 

Emergency Preparedness at the National Institute for Allergy and 

Infectious Diseases, National Institutes of Health at the HHS. 

As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear in 

all witnesses. I would ask all of you to stand, raise your right hand 

and take this oath. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 

so help you, God? 

Mr. ALOISE. I do. 

Mr. CANNON. I do. 

Dr. AOKI. I do. 

Mr. DUNNE. I do. 

Dr. YESKEY. I do. 

Dr. HATCHETT. I do. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Let the record note that 

the witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

Before we start, I want to let you know that your full written 

statements will be made a part of the record. I would also like to 

remind you to keep your remarks brief, given the number of people 

testifying at this hearing. 

Mr. Aloise, will you please begin. 

4

1The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise appears in the Appendix on page 39. 

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE ALOISE,1 DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. ALOISE. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to be here 

today to discuss DOE’s use of aerial background radiation surveys 

and physical security measures at DOE’s two remote sensing labs. 

My remarks are based on our September 2006 report on DOE’s nuclear response efforts. 

DOE has long maintained an emergency response capability to 

quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological threats to the 

United States. This capability took on increased significance after 

the attacks of September 11, 2001, because of concern that terrorists may try to smuggle materials into the United States and detonate a nuclear or radiological dispersal device (RDD). 

In response, DOE developed the expertise to search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in U.S. cities and 

help minimize the consequences of such threats. One of DOE’s 

unique capabilities is that it is able to conduct aerial background 

radiation surveys with helicopters and planes equipped with radiation detectors to establish radiation levels against which future 

levels can be compared to more easily detect a radioactive threat. 

Although DOE has dispersed these emergency response capabilities across the country, a number of assets are primarily located at 

two key facilities in Nevada and Maryland. These facilities house, 

among other things, specialized search teams, planes and helicopters with radiation detection equipment, and laboratories that 

design specialized equipment. DOE requires that these facilities be 

adequately protected to defend against possible terrorist attacks. 

Regarding aerial radiation surveys, in our view, there are real 

benefits to conducting these surveys of U.S. cities. The surveys can 

be used to help detect radiological threats in the United States 

more quickly because law enforcement officials could focus on 

sources of radiation not previously identified, and they can be used 

to measure contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist 

in or reduce the cost of clean-up efforts. DOE officials estimate that 

information from the surveys could save millions and perhaps tens 

of millions of dollars in clean-up costs. The surveys do have some 

limitations, including difficulty in detecting certain well-shielded 

nuclear and radiological materials. 

Nonetheless, in 2005, New York City’s Police Department asked 

DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The 

survey cost about $800,000 and was funded with DHS grants. 

NYPD officials told us that the survey was tremendously valuable 

because it identified more than 80 locations with radiological signatures that needed to be investigated. In fact, while investigating 

the 80 locations, they found radium, a radiological material linked 

to diseases such as bone cancer, at a local park that once was an 

industrial site. Officials used this data to close and clean up the 

area. 

Despite these benefits, New York is the only major U.S. city that 

has conducted such a survey because neither DOE nor DHS is inVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:44 Mar 27, 2008 Jkt 040502 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
5

1The prepared statement of Mr. Cannon appears in the Appendix on page 60. 

forming cities about the surveys, and neither agency has mission 

responsibility for conducting them. In addition, DOE officials told 

us that they have limited equipment and funding and DHS doesn’t 

believe it has the expertise or capability to conduct the surveys. As 

a result, U.S. cities may be missing an opportunity to be better prepared for a terrorist attack. 

Regarding the security of the two remote sensing labs, there are 

a number of critical assets that are available only at the labs and 

their loss would hamper DOE’s ability to quickly prevent or respond to a nuclear incident. These capabilities include highlytrained personnel and specialized equipment, helicopters and 

planes. In our view, the current physical security measures at the 

two labs may not be sufficient to protect against a terrorist attack. 

For example, one lab does not have a fence, vehicle barriers, or 

other protection around the building. While both labs are located 

on Air Force bases, access is not strictly limited and GAO’s team 

gained access multiple times with little or no scrutiny. However, 

DOE believes the security at the labs is sufficient and has no contingency plans in the event one or both labs were attacked. 

Over a year ago, we recommended that DOE and DHS evaluate 

the costs and benefits of aerial surveys and inform State and local 

governments about them. We also recommended that DOE consider 

strengthening the physical security of the remote sensing labs. To 

date, little has been done to implement our recommendations. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be happy 

to respond to any questions you or other Members may have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Aloise. Mr. Cannon. 

TESTIMONY OF GLENN M. CANNON,1 ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, DISASTER OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, FEDERAL 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. CANNON. Chairman Akaka, Senator Coleman, I am here to 

represent a new FEMA, one that takes our Nation’s all-hazard preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation systems 

and capabilities to a new level. 

Building on the lessons we have learned in recent years and with 

your continued support, we are taking steps to significantly increase FEMA’s core disaster response capabilities. This new FEMA 

has adopted a more forward-leaning and collaborative disaster response approach and we are strengthening our capabilities by 

building stronger regions and stronger ties with our partners 

across all levels of government, the private sector, and the nonprofit community. 

FEMA’s all-hazards approach encompasses activities involving 

RDD events. In fact, the law requires that DHS develop and implement measures to prepare for and respond to chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear threats. In the event of a major RDD incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for domestic incident management. In responding to such an event, the Secretary may select a coordinating agency, most likely the Department of Energy, to provide technical expertise to support DHS, 

6

FEMA, and the FBI. The FBI would have lead responsibility for 

RDD criminal investigations. 

The National Response Plan and its eventual successor, the National Response Framework, outlines specific guidance for RDD incident responses. This is discussed more thoroughly in my written 

testimony. 

FEMA is responsible for coordinating the complex planning and 

response activities of its Federal, State, Tribal, and local partners. 

For example, FEMA chairs the Federal Radiological Preparedness 

Coordinating Committee, an interagency body that provides a national-level forum for the development and coordination of radiological prevention and preparedness policies and procedures. It also 

provides policy guidance for Federal radiological incident management in support of emergency management and preparedness activities at all levels of government. 

The emergency support functions in the NRP are the operationallevel mechanism for providing assistance to all levels of government in functional areas, such as decontamination and monitoring, 

mass care, energy, public health and medical services. More detail 

on those interagency activities is also provided in my written testimony. 

FEMA’s own resources are critical to ensuring interagency coordination. Our National Response Coordination Center, supported 

by our regional centers, provides a central point of communications 

for any response. Our written testimony explains these capabilities 

in greater detail, but the key point I would like to make is that 

with these resources, government agencies can truly work together 

as a team in response to a radiological dispersal device (RDD) incident. 

While FEMA has the critical responsibility to coordinate the response activities of our Federal partners, my written testimony explains in more detail the support capabilities of the key partners 

in a RDD event, including the Departments of Energy, Defense, 

Justice, the Veterans Affairs, Environmental Protection Agency, 

and Health and Human Services, among others. Of course, FEMA 

and DHS have resources that can be deployed. FEMA’s Emergency 

Response Teams, the Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, the 

Mobile Emergency Response Support Detachments, our Prepositioned Equipment Program, the Joint Nuclear Incident Response 

Team, and the Joint Domestic Emergency Support Team will all 

play a vital role in responding to a RDD event. 

We can also leverage our partners within DHS, such as Customs 

and Border Patrol, the U.S. Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Transportation Security Administration, 

and the National Infrastructure Coordination Center, for their extensive personnel resources, technical expertise, and other support. 

Again, I refer you to my written testimony for additional details. 

Knowing that it is not just a matter of ‘‘if’’ but of ‘‘when’’, FEMA 

is instrumental in making sure that all of our partners work together to be prepared for all hazards, including a RDD event. For 

example, our National Exercise Program (NEP) is just one of the 

mechanisms used to evaluate and ensure our preparedness. The 

NEP is a national interagency-wide program that prioritizes, focuses, and coordinates national security and homeland security 

7

1The prepared statement of Dr. Aoki appears in the Appendix on page 76. 

preparedness-related exercises. Results from these exercises provide information that informs the policy process, allow evaluation 

of the capability to perform in a crisis or emergency, and ultimately 

are used to improve the government’s preparedness posture. 

This fall, TOPOFF 4 was the first in the TOPOFF series to focus 

on RDDs and it allowed all levels of government to evaluate capabilities required to respond to near-simultaneous events of a similar type. My written testimony provides more details on FEMA’s 

responsibilities, including our role in coordinating the wide-ranging 

activities of our partners. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Cannon. Dr. Aoki. 

TESTIMONY OF STEVEN AOKI, PH.D.,1 DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, NATIONAL 

NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF ENERGY 

Dr. AOKI. Chairman Akaka, Senator Coleman, thank you very 

much for the opportunity to appear today to discuss the Department of Energy’s role in national response to a terrorist attack involving a Radiation Dispersal Device (RDD). I submitted a written 

statement that describes the capabilities that DOE could contribute. So this morning, in the interest of brevity, I will just focus 

on a few key points. 

First, it is important to keep in mind that the scale of a RDD 

event is significantly smaller than, for example, a nuclear detonation. There is certainly going to be a significant problem managing, 

guiding public reaction to what is an unprecedented occurrence, 

and there certainly is going to be a very complicated restoration 

and recovery process, but the actual number of injuries, of casualties directly caused by radiation released in a RDD is going to be 

relatively small. 

Second, DOE’s emergency response specialists function, as Mr. 

Cannon just noted, as part of an interagency team. We support the 

Department of Homeland Security in its designated role as the 

Federal incident manager for disaster response and recovery. In 

addition, if an incident is connected to terrorism, we support the 

FBI’s investigatory and law enforcement role. For a RDD event, the 

National Response Plan assigns the Department of Energy to be 

the coordinating agency for technical support until such time as 

that responsibility is handed over to EPA during a transition from 

the response phase to the longer-term recovery phase. Even after 

relinquishing our primary role, we will continue to provide technical support to EPA and our other Federal partners, as needed. 

Third, our ability to tap into our national laboratories means 

that we can bring a considerable depth of expertise to bear in an 

emergency like a RDD attack. In this kind of event, we would expect to send to the incident scene a Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), that would be manned by 

personnel from multiple Federal agencies. They would coordinate 

radiation measurements in the field, ensuring that Federal, State, 

and local officials receive a complete and consistent picture of the 

8

situation. They would also provide expert assistance in interpreting 

the data. 

We maintain 28 regionally-based Radiation Assistance Program 

(RAP), teams who are trained to deploy to an incident site to make 

on-the-ground measurements of radioactive contamination. These 

teams are supported by DOE’s aerial measuring system that can 

make radiation measurements from helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. We would make available, often within minutes of an event, 

computer-generated models of the dispersion of radioactive material through the atmosphere, assisting officials in advising the public and in directing their own response measures. 

DOE also provides expert consultations on the medical treatment 

of people exposed to radioactive materials through a program 

known as the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training 

Sites (REAC/TS). This year, REAC/TS successfully brought a cytogenetic dosimetry laboratory back online after not having its program functioning for many years, adding significantly to the Nation’s readiness to diagnose patients who have received high radiation doses. All of these activities can be linked by dedicated fielddeployable emergency communications equipment. 

Taken together, our response to a major RDD event could involve 

hundreds of people in the field, supported by additional scientific 

expertise, computer modeling capability, and specialized facilities 

at our national labs. 

One of the challenges facing the Department of Energy will be 

to ensure that as we consolidate and transform the nuclear weapons complex, we preserve the unique technical capabilities and 

workforce that underlie our Emergency Response Program. In 

doing so, we must also wrestle with the hard fact that people with 

some critically-needed skills, for example, radiochemistry, will increasingly be in short supply as the number of university graduates 

in these areas diminishes. 

Another challenge will be developing appropriate tools and procedures to ensure that the information developed by our specialists 

can be properly interpreted by officials at the Federal, State, and 

local level charged with making public safety decisions who are not 

themselves experts on radioactivity. This need continues to be underscored by exercises, including the recently-concluded TOPOFF 

4. 

Public communications remains a concern, as well, in view of the 

unprecedented nature of a RDD attack. 

Finally, and although it is not the subject of today’s hearing, I 

want to emphasize our belief that the best approach to protecting 

the country against nuclear or radiological terrorism is to increase 

security of the materials that could be used in such attacks. This 

is an area where DOE has major efforts, both domestically and 

internationally. 

That concludes my prepared statement and I look forward to 

your questions. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Aoki. Mr. Dunne. 

9

1The prepared statement of Mr. Dunne appears in the Appendix on page 81. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS P. DUNNE,1 ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL 

PROTECTION AGENCY 

Mr. DUNNE. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I am Thomas P. Dunne. I am the Associate Administrator of Homeland Security at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and thank you for the opportunity to discuss EPA’s efforts to prepare for and respond to an attack with a Radiological 

Dispersion Device. 

Since the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, 

EPA has made a significant effort to improve its emergency response and homeland security functions, including the creation of 

my Office of Homeland Security. In addition, EPA has reorganized 

emergency response functions under the Office of Emergency Management. We have hired 50 additional On-Scene Coordinators. We 

have created an additional Environmental Response Team. We 

have established a National Decontamination Team. And we have 

developed an EPA national approach to response. 

In an incident or attack involving a radiological device, EPA 

would be expected to respond with other Federal agencies through 

the National Response Plan. During the early phase of a response, 

EPA’s primary role would be to assist the Department of Homeland 

Security and the Department of Energy in characterizing environmental impacts and providing recommendations to State and local 

decisionmakers regarding the actions needed to protect the public. 

As a situation transitioned to the longer-term recovery phase, at 

some point, EPA will take over the leadership of the environmental 

characterization and we would assume responsibilities for managing the Federal radiological clean-up activities. 

EPA maintains personnel and assets ready to respond to radiological emergency response situations and we provide technical expertise and support, when needed. We have approximately 350 personnel for emergency responses and we also built in a Response 

Corps to expand our capability. 

EPA’s trained personnel and specialized equipment includes 250 

On-Scene Coordinators and special teams under the National Oil 

and Hazardous Substance National Contingency Plan, and they 

would include the National Decontamination Team, the Radiological Emergency Response Team, the Emergency Response Team, 

and the National Counterterrorism Evidence Response Team. We 

have 3,700 field-ready contractors, and according to a recently-conducted EPA survey, EPA contractors could provide an additional 

4,500 personnel to support large-scale incidents, and we have now 

developed a Response Corps that has nearly 1,000 staff members. 

In the area of environmental laboratory capabilities and capacity, 

EPA has begun a demonstration study aimed at improving national 

radiological laboratory capacity through enhancing State laboratories, and we are developing guidance and training, such as rapid 

radiochemistry methods, lab incident response analysis guidance 

documents for environmental media, and radiochemistry training 

for laboratory personnel to enhance capacity of commercial laboratories throughout the United States. 

10

1The prepared statement of Dr. Yeskey appears in the Appendix on page 96. 

We understand that the American people expect a timely response to a radiological incident or attack and that is the goal that 

EPA and all the Federal agencies we work with are striving for. 

However, it is a goal that presents some real challenges. For instance, EPA has conducted an assessment of the environmental 

sample demand for the National Homeland Security Planning Scenario Number 11, which involves a detonation of radiological devices in three major urban business districts. EPA’s analysis of the 

Nation’s existing laboratory radiological capacity revealed a significant capacity gap. This capacity gap will result in a lack of timely, 

reliable, and interpretable data and will delay national and local 

response and consequence management activities. 

In addition to the capacity gap, EPA’s assessment also revealed 

capability and competency gaps specific to radiological or nuclear 

incident responses and overall nationally declining infrastructure 

for radiological laboratories. If there were multiple large-scale attacks, the system we currently have in place would be strained. Today’s technology and trained personnel are simply not sufficient to 

meet the needs of such a response, and in the case of a radiological 

incident or attack, this is magnified by the dose limits we enforce 

in order to protect responders from radiation. 

In addition, while field detection capabilities can quickly be used 

to take action to evacuate or relocate the public following an incident, more extensive and time consuming fixed lab analysis will be 

needed to allow EPA and others to assess whether or not the public 

can return to their homes. Therefore, it is unlikely that the public 

expectations for quick reoccupation of an impacted area would be 

met. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks. Again, I 

want to thank you for inviting me to today’s hearing and I would 

be pleased to answer any questions that you or the Members may 

have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Dunne. Now we will 

hear from Dr. Yeskey. 

TESTIMONY OF KEVIN YESKEY, M.D.,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD J. HATCHETT, M.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR RADIATION COUNTERMEASURES RESEARCH AND 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF 

HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 

Dr. YESKEY. Good morning, Chairmen Akaka and Pryor, and 

Senator Coleman. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the domestic preparations HHS has made for radiologic incidents. The 

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response’s 

mission is to lead the Nation in preventing, preparing for, and responding to the adverse effects of public health emergencies and 

disasters and the vision we see as a Nation prepared. 

Like our response counterparts in other agencies, the ASPR has 

taken an all-hazards approach to health preparedness planning. 

My oral comments today will focus on the HHS’s preparations speVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:44 Mar 27, 2008 Jkt 040502 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
11

cific to radiation events and the initial observations by HHS 

through its participation in the Top Officials (TOPOFF) 4 exercise, 

which involved several simulated attacks using Radiologic Dispersal Devices. 

The Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act created the 

ASPR and focused the leadership for all Federal public health and 

medical preparedness and response functions in that office. HHS 

has implemented an incident command system that is complementary to and consistent with the National Response Plan and the 

National Incident Management System. HHS supports the overall 

lead of DHS in coordinating the Federal response. In responses, we 

place HHS staff in operations centers at the State, regional, and 

Federal levels and deploy our staff to the Joint Field Office. 

HHS has developed an ESF–8, Emergency Support Function 8 

Playbook, focused on RDDs, which provides a comprehensive guide 

for managing Federal health and medical operations in response to 

a RDD. These response steps are pre-planned and pre-scripted in 

the preparation of the playbooks. 

HHS has representatives on the advisory team for environment, 

food, and health—a collection of experts from a variety of Federal 

agencies that advise State, local, and territorial governments on 

ways to protect people and the environment following a radiological 

incident. ASPR has worked with State, Tribal, territorial, and local 

officials to enhance their levels of preparedness. Our Regional 

Emergency Coordinators work with States and local jurisdictions to 

coordinate and enhance preparedness within their regions. 

For all disasters, systems are needed to rapidly expand research 

capabilities to meet the needs of the event. Regarding surge capacity for radiation events, the Strategic National Stockpile can rapidly deploy medical countermeasures after notification to deploy. 

The National Disaster Medical System Response Teams can deploy 

to provide acute care to victims. NDMS hospitals can provide surge 

beds for victims who require inpatient clinical care. HHS also 

works with the American Burn Association to assess burn bed 

availability on a weekly basis. 

We also participate in the Radiation Injury Treatment Network 

(RITN), in collaboration with the National Marrow Donor Program 

and the National Cancer Institute Cancer Centers. This voluntary 

network includes centers that have concentrations of experts in oncology and hematology and are used to caring for patients with 

bone marrow suppression. 

ASPR and the National Library of Medicine have developed a 

web-based site with just-in-time information on medical management of radiation injuries for physicians and nurses. In the event 

of an incident, clinicians at all levels could refer to this website for 

the most current treatment protocols for patients injured by a 

RDD. 

With regard to TOPOFF 4, HHS was fully engaged. We had liaisons in operations centers at the State, regional, and Federal levels. HHS deployed public health and medical response teams to 

Portland, the site of the largest simulated activities. HHS took the 

opportunity to exercise a number of functions, to include the ESF–

8 RDD Playbook, Secretarial Declaration of a Public Health Emergency, issuance of an Emergency Use Authorization for Prussian 

12

Blue in children under the age of two, and deployment of our Incident Response Coordination Team. We felt well integrated into the 

overall Federal response and had very good communications at the 

local, State, and Federal levels. HHS staff participated in regular 

national incident communications conference line calls, which facilitates coordination of public communications across the Federal 

interagency partnership. HHS also produced several Public Service 

Announcements that aired on a virtual news network. 

Despite the successes, we also identified areas for improvement 

and efforts are already underway to take the lessons observed in 

TOPOFF 4 and incorporate them into our RDD Playbook. A major 

lesson observed is that enhanced laboratory capacity to measure 

radionuclides in patients will facilitate patient management. With 

our interagency partners, HHS has developed a concept for a radiation laboratory network. 

We have made progress in developing the plans and surge capacities to deal with public health and medical consequences resulting 

from a RDD. We have used exercises like TOPOFF 4 to identify 

gaps and vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. We continue to 

work closely with our local, State, Tribal, territorial, and Federal 

partners on improving our responses. While our progress is considerable, there is still much more to accomplish. 

That concludes my testimony. I would be glad to answer any 

questions. Thank you. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Dr. Yeskey. 

Dr. Aoki and Mr. Cannon, there is some evidence that aerial radiation surveys, which include having a helicopter or airplane fly 

over an area with radiation detection equipment, can help manage 

the consequences of a dirty bomb attack or even prevent such an 

attack. The GAO report states that neither DOE nor DHS have 

embraced mission responsibility for funding and conducting aerial 

radiation surveys or even notifying city officials that such a capability exists. 

Given the usefulness of an aerial radiation survey in mitigating 

the consequences of a dirty bomb attack, why is this the case? Dr. 

Aoki. 

Dr. AOKI. Mr. Chairman, I think we can actually report some 

progress since the GAO report came out. We have now a pilot 

project that we are working jointly with the Department of Homeland Security in which we are looking at the City of Chicago actually acquiring some radiation detection equipment for their own 

helicopters and I believe there may be some DHS funding involved 

in that, and we will then help them develop plans for conducting 

aerial surveys and for using that equipment in the event of some 

sort of emergency involving the release of radiation. We hope that 

this will be a pilot project that would then give us a basis for looking at extending that sort of approach to other major metropolitan 

areas. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Cannon. 

Mr. CANNON. I would also comment that the Preparedness Directorate returned to FEMA in April, and it was through the Preparedness Directorate that those grants were made available or 

where that support would come from. We are able now that preparedness has returned to FEMA to take their activities and much 

13

more closely integrate them and grant guidance for those grants 

into the programs supporting local governments and large metropolitan areas. So I think what we will be able to see in the future 

is a different approach to supporting the monitoring that you have 

spoken of, because it is absolutely essential to have that as rapidly 

as possible to support the response to the incident, including for 

the first responders. 

I would add that some equipment that has been purchased 

through the anti-terrorism programs, such as radiation monitors, 

are on first responder fire apparatus, significantly tells us on the 

front end when they respond to an explosion whether or not radiation is available so that they can be better prepared to deal with 

the response. So the earlier we can get detection of radiation in the 

incident, the more accurately we can assess the situation and provide for the initial response. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Yeskey, if three simultaneous RDDs were to 

be detonated around the United States similar to the attack exercised in TOPOFF 4, how important is it to process all of the human 

clinical samples taken from victims and is there sufficient laboratory capacity to do that? 

Dr. YESKEY. Sir, laboratory capacity to do that is limited nationwide. It is important to have the ability to be able to determine 

who has been exposed and who has not been exposed so we can use 

the medical countermeasures for those people who were exposed. 

So it is important to have that capability for a RDD. 

What we have looked at and the concept we have for the Radiation Laboratory Network would look at expanding that capability 

to test for radionuclides in patients. It would also look at assessing 

the cytogenetic biodosimetry in patients, not necessarily for a RDD 

but for a nuclear event. It would also look at addressing hematology surge capacity, the ability to do some basic blood tests on patients, which would also be an indicator of exposure. So it is an important component in the medical management of patients who 

might have been exposed. 

Senator AKAKA. Let me pursue that a little more on the lab capacity. Would the EPA have the lab capacity to process all of the 

environmental samples? 

Dr. YESKEY. I think I will defer to EPA. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Dunne. 

Mr. DUNNE. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my statement, 

there is a significant gap and we have actually done an analysis 

of one major business district in a major city which I alluded to in 

my comments. I can tell you the capacity in this country, and that 

is Federal Government, State Government, and commercial labs, 

that do radiological chemistry is about 6,400 samples a week. Taking one of these cities—not three, just one—you are talking about 

a demand that would be about 9,600. So you have a gap every 

week of 3,200. At peak times, when you need the most number of 

samples, that demand could rise up to 13,000. 

So, in effect, when you take a look, as we are talking about having to do 350,000 samples, under the existing capacity that is in 

this country right now, you are talking 2 years to get all the analysis done. That has nothing to do with whether or not the restoraVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:44 Mar 27, 2008 Jkt 040502 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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tion and clean-up is taking place, and you can’t do that without the 

analysis. 

Senator AKAKA. I see. Dr. Aoki, in your testimony, you mentioned the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center and Training 

Site as one of the key capacities DOE has to provide medical expertise and analysis for victims in the event of a dirty bomb attack. 

How many experts do you have staff the Center? 

Dr. AOKI. I actually don’t know the number of staff. We will have 

to get that for you, Senator. The capacity of the Center, though, is, 

in fact, small. It is designed to really deal with a—process the 

number of patients that correspond to a high-level of exposure in 

a very acute sort of incident, and so I think the number is something like 50 patients per week who can be assessed through that 

Center. 

The important thing that REAC/TS does is actually do outreach 

and training, as its name implies, for medical personnel from 

around the country, and we actually do maintain rosters of people 

who have received that training and can make that information 

very quickly available to whoever needs it, whether that is HHS or 

FEMA. So it is really a core cadre of expertise that can then reach 

out into a broader medical community. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Aoki, if three simultaneous dirty bomb attacks were to occur in the United States, would the Center have 

the ability to process all the samples taken from the victims? 

Dr. AOKI. No, and I think that is actually in some ways not the 

scenario that we are really looking at for handling people who have 

been exposed to radiation in a RDD attack. Again, the very large 

numbers of people who would be exposed, receive relatively low 

doses and the capability of REAC/TS really is designed to assess 

people who have received high doses of radiation. So the laboratory 

capability that Dr. Yeskey was speaking of is actually where we 

would be turning for the majority of laboratory analysis that is required for people who have been exposed in a RDD event. 

Senator AKAKA. Finally, can you tell me if the Center is certified 

under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments so that 

HHS could use its capabilities to process those samples? 

Dr. AOKI. I don’t actually know the answer to that. I will have 

to give you a response. 

Senator AKAKA. Would you know, Dr. Yeskey? 

Dr. YESKEY. No, sir, I don’t know. 

Senator AKAKA. All right. Well, let me call on Senator Coleman 

for his questions. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Aoki, in your testimony at the very end, the written testimony, you describe the difference between the consequences resulting from detonation of a RDD and the obviously lesser consequences from detonation involving fissionable nuclear material. 

The real impacts and things we are concerned about here are psychological, and, as you know, the economic. It could have devastating effects on the local economy with impacts on a national 

scale, so it is not the death toll from the incident itself but it is 

the psychological panic and the resulting economic displacement. If 

it were Wall Street, you would be shutting down Wall Street for 

perhaps a very long time. 

15

Who has responsibility and what is being done to better educate 

the public about the real impact of a dirty bomb so as to lessen the 

potential psychological impact? Which agency has responsibility 

and what is being done in that regard? 

Dr. AOKI. Well, I think the primary responsibility probably falls 

to DHS. However, we have a job to do here in actually providing 

information and scientific expertise that can be used as the basis 

for developing that information for the public. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I am looking for the distribution. Actually, Mr. Cannon, I am going to turn to you. I will add to that question, because I was reviewing some of the editorials in the October 

18 Oregonian newspaper, which was talking about the TOPOFF 4 

exercise and highlighted the concerns of citizens who felt the public 

was left out of the exercise, was not well informed or educated 

what to do after dirty bomb attacks. 

So my question for you is two-fold. First, what is going on to educate the broader public about the impacts of a dirty bomb before 

an attack, and second, can you detail what FEMA is doing to address the concerns raised in the Oregonian about involving the 

public and educating them about what to do after a dirty bomb attack? 

Mr. CANNON. Yes, sir. There are a couple of programs that we 

operate within DHS–FEMA that are written at a level for the general public. FEMA has a guide entitled, ‘‘Are You Ready?’’ It is a 

step-by-step guide for people to prepare for all kinds of hazards and 

it is written at a level so that they can understand it. It is an indepth guide to citizen preparedness. Within that is a section on 

RDDs and it is accessible to everyone at FEMA.gov, ‘‘Are You 

Ready?’’ So we use that in all of our outreach programs. 

Additionally, FEMA has had a program called (REPP), the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, for years, which was focused initially on safety around nuclear power facilities, and if you 

lived in the area of one of those, what you would do in the event 

of an issue. That program also has returned to FEMA now. So we 

will look at the protection action guides and the work that they 

have done and expand that to all radiation-nuclear incidents, not 

just around power plants. 

And finally, in terms of the Oregonian and local governments, we 

have developed a new tool which we call the Gap Analysis, which 

is a planning tool which we utilize through our regions, 10 FEMA 

regions, with all State and major local governments, and it looks 

at their preparation for all these events that may occur in the national planning scenarios and we look for places where we could do 

some more work to improve that preparedness. That program 

kicked off last March. We focused initially on the hurricane States, 

and as we move this year, we are going to focus on all hazards. 

And in there, part of that will be the kinds of plans that States and 

locals have to prepare for these kinds of events. 

I am sure I don’t need to remind you, but the way we deal with 

emergency management in our country is we start at the local level 

and then it moves on up from there. So we want to make sure that 

at the local level, we do everything we can to support that local incident commander through the Unified Command System, and part 

16

of that will be working with them as their partner to make sure 

they are prepared at the local level. 

Senator COLEMAN. I am not sure I am going to have time to get 

to some questions about the incorporation of the private sector into 

the response, but I want to turn to you, Mr. Dunne. In your testimony, you talked about existing radiological laboratory capacity 

gaps. You talked about competency gaps, capability gaps. You indicated at the very end if there were multiple large-scale attacks, the 

system we currently have in place would be strained. Today’s technology and trained personnel are simply not sufficient to meet the 

needs of such response, etc. 

What is it that we in Congress have to do to fill the capacity gap, 

the capability gap, the competency gap, and to lessen the strain put 

on technology and trained personnel to meet the needs that would 

arise should we be subject to multiple dirty bomb attacks? 

Mr. DUNNE. It is always interesting for me to tell the Congress 

what to do. [Laughter.] 

Senator COLEMAN. I would like to know what the advice is. 

[Laughter.] 

The question ultimately is can we get it done? That is a separate 

issue. But I certainly welcome your advice——

Mr. DUNNE. I think that I want to backtrack for a second, Senator, and say that I think the emphasis in this country since September 11, 2001 appropriately has been on detection and prevention and the initial response. I don’t think that we have had much 

focus at the Congressional level in our appropriations process or in 

the budget process internally about restoration and recovery, and 

that is where the greatest number of samples will be taken. 

There is a declining market for radiochemists. The biggest user 

is probably the Defense Department in cleaning up the old sites 

that they have had, and as they have made progress, there is less 

demand for the samples. So laboratories are not going to stay in 

business with people and equipment unless there is some revenue 

flowing in. Similarly, DOE and EPA have very limited capacity and 

States have even less than that. When we looked at the commercial 

market, and we have done a fairly decent analysis, I believe, that 

gap is going to grow. So if we ran the scenario, which I only mentioned one, you could triple that time. 

So as a matter of fact, it takes resources to do this thing. You 

could lay out a scale in terms of what you would need in terms of 

certain periods and whether or not the country will make the investment to get there, and that is an open question and we can’t 

answer that. We can only tell you what we perceive the problem 

is. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Dunne. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Senator Pryor. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know we have another panel, so I am going to try not to keep 

this panel too long, but let me start with a question for you, Mr. 

Cannon, if I may. It is really one question, but I am going to ask 

it in a series; but it has to do with communication and coordinaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:44 Mar 27, 2008 Jkt 040502 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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tion. We have several agencies here today and they all have independent statutory authority, so when I see all these agencies lined 

up, the questions I have are after an initial explosion or an initial 

incident: Who is in charge initially? Are there criteria for when 

States can and should ask for Federal help? Once the Federal Government gets involved, how does DHS determine which agency 

should be the lead agency and the lead coordinating agency? Who 

has the final decisionmaking authority? Do the roles of the agency 

change over time and do certain things get handed off? 

We don’t have time to go into all of that in the limited time we 

have today, but the question I have for you is: Are you confident 

in the system that we have in the event, heaven forbid, that there 

is an incident in this country? Are you confident that we will be 

prepared with the right authority and the right agencies to work 

through it? 

Mr. CANNON. Yes, sir, I am, and I can say that because there 

have been significant changes in that system in the last 2 years. 

We have all learned many lessons from the past and all these 

members today are signatories to the National Response Plan. All 

agreed that the coordination will occur through the National Response Coordination Center, where they all have a seat. They all 

come down to sit and be engaged with subject matter experts to coordinate. 

It is the Department of Homeland Security’s responsibility to 

protect the homeland and to coordinate a response to those. Now 

in terms of our involvement, local governments have the initial response authority and the system used for a radiation incident in 

terms of the Federal Government access and involvement is the 

same as if it is a hurricane or a tornado. If the locals are overwhelmed, then they request through the series. 

Our role is to make sure that when it gets to the Federal Government, that our response is in a coordinated, effective manner, and 

you are exactly right. People with independent authorities do have 

the ability to respond, but we need to make sure that is a unified 

effort of response so that we provide the best thing in the shortest 

time possible, and we exercise that and we do that in day-to-day 

activity. 

Senator PRYOR. So you have confidence in the system we have 

in place, then? 

Mr. CANNON. I do, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask Dr. Aoki a question about something 

that the GAO found not too long ago. The GAO says that the DOE 

has the capability to survey American cities to create a baseline 

map when it comes to radiation and that there is some funding out 

there available for this. It sounds like that has not been done. If 

we have both the capability to do it and the money to do it, why 

aren’t we doing it? 

Dr. AOKI. Senator Pryor, I think we discussed this a little bit before you came in, but we are actually now moving in cooperation 

with DHS to first start out with a pilot program in Chicago and 

then possibly move on to other major metropolitan areas. The funding will be DHS grant funding to cities, and at least with the Chicago experience, what they are proposing to do is to purchase 

equipment that would be flown on their aircraft, their helicopters 

18

that are operated by the police department, and then we would assist them in planning and conducting the survey portion of that activity. I think we want to assimilate the lessons from doing this in 

one additional city and then see if that can be translated into many 

more. 

Senator PRYOR. And so do you have a timetable to move through 

the cities to try to get the site maps that you need? 

Dr. AOKI. We don’t have a firm timetable. We expect to get the 

work in Chicago done this year, or I guess 2008, but we will then 

see from that what is appropriate to do and how many more cities 

might be interested. They have an expression of some interest from 

a number of other cities. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Mr. Cannon, let me ask you one further 

question, and that is that one of the lessons learned from 

Chernobyl was that the radioactive contamination can’t just be 

washed away. It gets into the dirt or concrete, and you can’t just 

wash it away. It gets in the groundwater and it stays around for 

a long time. 

Are there any Federal guidelines about what to do with contaminated dirt or concrete or other materials that would be identified 

during the clean-up effort? What are we going to do with all that 

material? 

Mr. CANNON. Senator, I believe that would be an EPA issue. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Sure. 

Mr. DUNNE. Senator, there is limited capacity in this country to 

take radiation debris. There are only a handful of places we could 

put it. If you took the scenario that is presented, depending upon 

what we found, we would have to improvise, working with State 

and local governments and other Federal agencies in terms of finding adequate storage because it just plain doesn’t exist on any massive basis and we just haven’t had that many radiological disposal 

issues to deal with. 

Senator PRYOR. Is the EPA taking steps and doing——

Mr. DUNNE. We have done an analysis of where it is. As you 

know, permitting for those types of facilities involve not just Federal Government issues, they involve State and local issues, and it 

takes a concentrated effort, a long-term effort to be able to get 

those capacities developed. 

But as is somewhat similar to the lab capacity problem nobody 

is going to build these things unless they are used, and you just 

don’t go and create a hole in the ground so you can go dispose of 

this type of material. So it is a very complicated issue. But that is 

a significant gap if we ever do have an attack. 

Senator PRYOR. Is the EPA trying to fill that significant gap? 

Mr. DUNNE. Yes. We are dealing through our Office of Solid 

Waste and Emergency Response with this issue now, but it is a 

long-term problem and we have analyzed the problem, I think, adequately well. It is what is going to be your planning premise in 

terms of what you are going to do about disposal. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. I am going to go into a second round here of 

questions. I want to first follow up with Dr. Aoki. You stated that 

the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center and lab is set up to 

19

deal with people who receive large radiation doses. What about 

those who receive low doses, which is more likely as a result of a 

dirty bomb attack? 

Dr. AOKI. Well, clearly, the large numbers of people affected are 

most likely going to receive relatively low doses of radiation, and 

again, I think Dr. Yeskey talked about the need to strengthen the 

clinical laboratory capacity around the country to create a network 

of laboratories that can do things like urinalysis or other clinical 

procedures to assess people who may have received relatively low 

doses of radiation. There constantly will be a few individuals who, 

depending on the exact details of a scenario, there may be a few 

individuals who receive a relatively high dose and that really is the 

background of the capacity that we have put in place. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Cannon, DHS has established a National 

Technical Nuclear Forensic Center within the Domestic Nuclear 

Detection Office which is supposed to provide an enduring national 

technical nuclear forensics capability. However, Dr. Carol Burns 

from Los Alamos National Laboratory testified in front of a House 

Homeland Security Subcommittee that this capability is aging rapidly. What is DHS doing to correct this problem? 

Mr. CANNON. Sir, I will have to get back to you on that. 

Dr. AOKI. Senator, if I may——

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Aoki. 

Dr. AOKI [continuing]. With your permission—they always say, 

don’t volunteer for anything, but if you don’t mind, Los Alamos National Laboratory is a DOE laboratory and let me just comment 

quickly on some of the things that we see we need to do. 

We are in the process of resizing and recalibrating the size and 

scope of our National Laboratory System, and one of the things 

that is very much in our minds is the need to make sure that the 

National Laboratories are responsive to the national security challenges of the future as we move away from the sort of legacy issues 

of nuclear weapons and the Cold War. So this is a planning process 

that really is going on as we speak, but I think we are very much 

seized with the idea that we need to make sure that our National 

Laboratories actually have the ability to fulfill these new sorts of 

missions and are planning appropriately to do work for things like 

nuclear forensics. It is both facilities, aging facilities, and ensuring 

that we have the right people, but we really do have to think about 

that and are doing so. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Yeskey, during TOPOFF 4, Prussian Blue, 

one of the few medical countermeasures available for radiation exposure, was distributed to victims of the theoretical dirty bomb attack. It is part of the National Stockpile. However, according to the 

Food and Drug Administration, Prussian Blue is available only by 

prescription and should be given only under the supervision of a 

physician after assessing a victim’s medical condition. In addition, 

its effectiveness is limited. Can you describe the work you are 

doing to develop medical radiation countermeasures for exposure to 

other radioactive sources that could be used in a dirty bomb attack? 

Dr. YESKEY. That is an area of Dr. Hatchett’s expertise and I will 

turn it over to him. 

Senator AKAKA. Dr. Hatchett. 

20

Dr. HATCHETT. Mr. Chairman, I represent the Radiation Countermeasures Program at the National Institutes of Health. We have 

a broad-based program that focuses on the development of radiation countermeasures for high-dose exposures that might produce 

bone marrow suppression, gastrointestinal injury, other types of 

organ injury. We also have programs within the NIH program that 

focus on the development of countermeasures like Prussian Blue, 

which are primarily designed to remove radionuclides from patients’ bodies. We have a number of grants and contracts to develop 

improved countermeasures with greater efficacy that would be 

nontoxic. Those countermeasures are in early stages of development and face quite a long road before they would be licensed and 

ready for use in the field. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Dunne, TOPOFF 4 only exercised the immediate and near-term response to a dirty bomb attack. I am pleased 

that DHS is planning a long-term recovery tabletop exercise to be 

conducted next month. Will this exercise, Mr. Dunne, focus more 

attention on consequence management in the aftermath of such an 

attack? 

Mr. DUNNE. Mr. Chairman, that is the purpose of it. As I understand it, it will be a 2-day tabletop session. We will bring together 

a variety of Federal and State agencies that deal with this. I understand DHS will issue a total report on TOPOFF 4 and that 

would include the part that deals with restoration and recovery. 

Senator AKAKA. You mentioned DHS. Can you describe the role 

of EPA in that exercise? 

Mr. DUNNE. The EPA will take over as the lead Federal agency 

and coordinator for the restoration and repair of the affected sites. 

That would mean we would deploy numbers of people and contractors in EPA, to work with the State and locals to clean up the facilities. We have 350 emergency response personnel. They are highly skilled. They are scientists and engineers. We have contractor 

capability to reach back. When you take a look at the magnitude 

of three, you would be talking about having to augment this with 

additional personnel because of the amount of time that people can 

stay in a zone where they are exposed to radiological doses. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Yeskey, you discussed the web-based cycle at Radiation 

Event Medical Management, the physicians, medical personnel, 

using just-in-time information on the medical management of radiation injuries. I think your testimony was if there were an incident, 

that folks could go on the web and they could get the information. 

My concern is similar to what happened in September 11, 2001. 

You have an incident, the web slows down or becomes inaccessible. 

What is the plan B? 

Dr. YESKEY. One of the ways to pass that information out—and 

the REMM is not the only site that is available for this type of information—CDC also has on its website information that can be 

used. There are other mechanisms, such as the Health Alert Network System, that can pass along information. There is what CDC 

has developed called EpiAccess. It is for passing epidemiologic information to State health officers through fax machines, through 

other methodologies, telecommunications methodologies to do that. 

21

So there are redundant systems for getting that communications 

out. 

Again, what we would do is we would have our CDC personnel 

contact State and local health officials. Our Regional Emergency 

Coordinators would also help determine what kind of information 

is needed and how to best pass that if one of those methodologies 

would go down. 

Senator COLEMAN. And are there specific contingency plans in 

place so that plan A is directing people to web sites, and there are 

specific contingency plans? One of the important parts of this hearing is you have multiple agencies and they all have capacities. I am 

not worried, but focused on the pre-incident planning and coordination so that when it happens, people just respond because they 

have been trained to respond. Do we have that in place? 

Dr. YESKEY. I think we have redundant systems that can be used 

to get that passed, so if one fails, then we would go to the next one 

and go to the next one. 

Senator COLEMAN. And again, I mentioned the planning. We had 

the terrible incident of the bridge being destroyed in Minnesota 

and one positive thing was that we were prepared. I was a mayor 

on Sepember 11, 2001, when we didn’t know how many hospital 

beds we had available in the case of a major incident, when we 

didn’t have systems of communication between sheriffs’ offices and 

police departments, but now all that training that we did is paying 

off. People just knew exactly what they had to do. I know we have 

the systems, but do we have in place the preplanned, coordinated 

response? For example, if plan A doesn’t work, do we go to plan B? 

Dr. YESKEY. Yes, sir. That is included, as I mentioned, in the 

RDD ESF–8 Playbook that we have developed and tested during 

TOPOFF 4, so those kinds of plans for contingencies are included 

in the playbooks for how we would respond to those events. 

Senator COLEMAN. Dr. Hatchett, you actually mentioned the response to the question regarding treatment. There is a Minnesota 

company called Humanetics. They work with the Defense Department on food-based responses to radiological attacks. Again, the coordination issue. How well coordinated, how well tied in are you at 

Health and Human Services to that kind of research? 

Dr. HATCHETT. Historically, Senator Coleman, as you probably 

know, a lot of this research has been performed by the Department 

of Defense over the last several decades. Our program was initiated 

in 2005. We have worked very closely with the Department of Defense, with our colleagues at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, and at the Joint Program Executive Office to coordinate research programs. We actually have an interagency 

agreement with the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 

and fund research of mutual interest there. In the last fiscal year, 

we had coordinated releases of initiatives focusing on gastrointestinal acute radiation syndrome with the Joint Program Executive Office and we funded 10 grants for early-stage research. They 

are still evaluating their RFP in that area. So we work very closely. 

Senator COLEMAN. How close are we to having in place, and understanding—and again I use Humanetics as an example. They are 

a recipient of a number of grants moving forward in this. How close 

are we to having a system in place that, should there be an attack, 

22

we would be able to distribute beyond the pharmaceutical approach, food stuffs and other things. How close are we to saying, 

‘‘OK, we have something now that if it hit, we can use it?’’

Dr. HATCHETT. Sir, is your question what is the status of the 

medical countermeasures that we are developing, or is it more a 

question related to the response mechanisms, because I——

Senator COLEMAN. I am looking at the status. 

Dr. HATCHETT. OK. 

Senator COLEMAN. And if something happened, I want to know, 

would we be prepared to take something that is in experimental 

phase or do we have a level of confidence in some of these foodbased substances or others that we could readily then distribute 

them through the systems that are in place? 

Dr. HATCHETT. Sir, if I could answer part of the question and 

defer to Dr. Yeskey for part of the question, our goal at the Radiation Countermeasures Program is to bring countermeasures forward to licensure for the radiation treatment indications so that we 

have great confidence that the drugs will actually work. We have 

a number of products that we are evaluating currently. They are 

in various stages of development, various stages of testing. Some 

of them are closer than others, certainly, and could potentially be 

ready within the mid-term, which I would define as 3 to 5 years, 

because of the testing that would be required to achieve licensure 

and the FDA review time. 

In terms of other mechanisms for bringing experimental countermeasures to individuals who might need them, let me defer to Dr. 

Yeskey. 

Dr. YESKEY. I think one of the mechanisms we have for that is 

what is called the Emergency Use Authorization, and that is for 

medications that are either not approved or are not approved for 

the specific indication. They have been otherwise approved for 

other indications. So we have that mechanism that HHS can employ to bring those countermeasures to use by the public. 

Senator COLEMAN. That is very helpful, Dr. Yeskey. Thank you, 

Dr. Hatchett. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Coleman. 

We are going to move on to the second panel now, so I would like 

to ask the staff to make the arrangements there and I want to 

thank the first panel for all that you have done, the time to prepare, to be here. I know you put a lot of effort into this, so I appreciate it. 

While the first panel is leaving and the second panel is coming 

up, let me just say a few words. I would like to reiterate Senator 

Akaka’s thanks to the first panel and some of the things he said 

in his opening statement. 

Our second panel today will focus attention on our response 

plans at a local and a community level. I would especially like to 

welcome Wayne Tripp from my home State of Arkansas, who will 

be testifying about the importance of radiation detection and decontamination training for first responders. 

But before we get into all the introductions and what everybody 

is going to say, I would like to say this, that we know that the dirty 

bomb threat is real and it is a legitimate danger. There are two 

23

factors that make this particular kind of terrorist attack possible. 

First, you have motivation. Second, you have capability. 

Since Osama bin Laden has announced that it is his religious 

duty to inflict terror on the United States through weapons of mass 

destruction, we know that the motivation exists. We also know that 

it is easier for a terrorist group to develop a dirty bomb capability 

than a nuclear bomb capability. Unlike a true nuclear weapon, a 

dirty bomb doesn’t require a nuclear reaction. It only requires some 

means of dispersing radioactive materials. 

The most likely scenarios involve a conventional bomb laced with 

stolen radioactive material. Exploding a dirty bomb in an American 

city would widely disperse radioactive materials and create a public 

panic, but the actual casualty rates would likely be low, probably 

in the tens or maybe hundreds of fatalities. However, the combination of panic, the reaction of the panic after the bomb, and the resulting economic devastation could cause an affected area to be 

abandoned for years. 

Luckily, we have emergency managers and community leaders 

across the country who are taking steps to prepare for a dirty bomb 

event now. They have been participating in national exercises so 

that State and local leaders know how to coordinate with FEMA 

and DHS. They are learning to use detection equipment and to 

work while wearing HAZMAT suits. They are also thinking ahead 

about the psychological and economic needs of our communities in 

the aftermath of a radioactive weapon. 

In Washington and across the country, we appreciate and encourage these efforts and I am eager to learn today how Congress can 

best help first responders. 

So I want to thank the second panel for being here. We are going 

to have Senators coming and going today. We have a busy floor 

schedule. There is a lot going on in committees around here, as 

well. I’d like to notify the panel that you may get some questions 

in writing after this because not all Senators can attend the hearing today. 

Let me go ahead and introduce the first witness. Ken Murphy, 

Director of the Oregon Department of Emergency Management. 

Mr. Murphy joined the agency in 1999 and served as Administrative Operations Manager and Deputy Director prior to becoming 

Director. He has extensive experience in the Army, the National 

Guard, and on various Homeland Security advisory councils. 

Then I would like to hear from Thomas Tenforde. He will be our 

second witness. He is the President of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements. Mr. Tenforde specializes in 

developing plans to protect communities from the psychological and 

economic consequences of a dirty bomb. He has a B.A. in physics 

from Harvard and a Ph.D. in biophysics from UC–Berkeley and has 

written over 150 scientific articles and reports, and he is with a fellow named Dave Shower today, and he played college baseball with 

a very good friend of mine who now lives in Little Rock. So anyway, I want to get acquainted with you after the hearing. 

Last would be Wayne Tripp. He is the Program Manager of the 

Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program 

and he oversees a variety of training programs to help first responders use nuclear and radiological detection equipment. He also 

24

1The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy appears in the Appendix on page 108. 

supports the development, analysis, and testing of emergency management, disaster and interoperability communication plans for the 

government and for private sector clients. 

So again, I want to thank you all for being here today, and Mr. 

Murphy, if we can start with you. 

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH D. MURPHY,1 DIRECTOR, OREGON 

DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Chairman Pryor and Members of the 

Subcommittee, for the opportunity to provide you with this statement for the record on Oregon’s Top Official 4 exercise. In my 

statement, I am representing the State of Oregon and the Office of 

Emergency Management which is a division of the Oregon Military 

Department. 

One of the great benefits of participating in this exercise was the 

almost 2 years of planning by all levels of government, the private 

sector, and some of the most valuable learning and training took 

place during the planning phase. There are four key areas I want 

to highlight: Learn and work with your mutual aid partners as 

much as you can; learn and practice with your State and Federal 

partners; good coordination with policy makers is essential; and cooperation with the private sector is critical to success. 

The Radiological Dispersion (RDD) was somewhat new to portions of the first responder community. In preparations for this exercise, it was very important to understand what a RDD was, its 

characteristics, its intended purposes. It became very important to 

learn as a group of first responders, to include those jurisdictions 

that would or could provide mutual aid. This allowed for a common 

understanding of procedures, equipment, and actions to take place 

during this type of an event. 

Working with State and Federal partners is where I believe some 

of the best relationships and learning experiences took place. The 

practice with State and Federal partners provided local responders 

with another set of tools that help them determine how far they 

could go or should go in dealing with a RDD. This also taught the 

State and Federal entities what the local first responders were capable of and how the State and Federal partners could be more effective during the initial stages of a RDD. 

The local first responders and the State of Oregon’s National 

Guard Civil Support Team worked very well together in the initial 

stages of the event. The Civil Support Team was able to provide 

more technical assistance immediately and long-term support to 

the incident commander. Additionally, as the exercise continued 

and Federal assets arrived from the Department of Energy and the 

Environmental Protection Agency, this provided the first responders with more tools and allowed them to deal with other residual 

events from the RDD, such as the plume moving and requiring first 

responders to block off more streets or specific areas of the city. 

Information from the incident scene must flow quickly and accurately in which to support policy makers. The information must be 

accurate and disseminated from the incident command post to policy makers to support their decisionmaking and their communicaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:44 Mar 27, 2008 Jkt 040502 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
25

tions strategy. It is also important this information be flowing to 

more of the technical experts, allowing them to provide the science 

and the advice to policy makers. 

Working with the private sector was a rewarding experience. We 

had approximately 70 private sector partners participate during 

the planning process and exercise. We had utilities, banking, transportation, commercial retail, and manufacturing, just to name a 

few, that participated. There is no question or doubt that the private sector must be part of every phase of a city, county, and 

State’s planning effort for any event, to include a RDD. 

I have four areas I want to highlight with the private sector: 

Being part of the entire process, being part of government communications; being part of government or emergency operations centers; and being part of the decisionmaking process for recovery. 

The private sector has very qualified and trained personnel to 

deal with emergencies. In the government sector, we must take advantage of this expertise and integrate these professionals into 

each level of government as we plan, train, and exercise. The private sector was involved in the planning, which made a difference 

in how we responded and how we started to deal with short-term 

and long-term recovery. 

As an example, when a first responder had to deal with a private 

sector entity that was in the plume, the responder did not have to 

deal with that entity as they might with a neighborhood. The private sector was better prepared and put in place a business continuity plan, thus allowing the first responder to attend to the 

needs of others. 

When something bad happens, it is imperative that the private 

sector is notified just as soon as possible. In Oregon, we created an 

e-mail and phone system to notify the private sector. This system 

was for larger organizations. We need to improve upon this in trying to reach private sector groups of different sizes. We are looking 

at using professional organizations or business alliances to act as 

focal points during the initial alert phase of an incident and have 

them relay the message. The private sector organizations in the 

greater Portland area are creating a regional communications network for emergencies to begin to address communications. I think 

this will work well, but we need to expand it State-wide. 

One of the challenges is to have the private sector representatives in Emergency Operations Centers (EOC). The real issue here 

is how to organize the private sector so as to have one representative or a small group in the EOC that can coordinate with multiple 

private sector organizations. The representatives must be integrated into the State and local government EOCs and able to provide relevant information to multiple private sector organizations. 

This will require some training in the National Incident Management System and participating with the government in training exercises. But, I would also submit that government personnel should 

receive training to participate in private sector exercise. During the 

exercise, it may be very helpful to have the private sector become 

part of or know what decisions are being made. In the response 

phase, this has allowed the private sector to know what decisions 

would affect their business functions. Additionally, they can in 

26

1The prepared statement of Mr. Tenforde appears in the Appendix on page 114. 

some cases offer resources or personnel that we in government may 

not realize. 

Also during the response phase, the private sector can also help 

in advising or recommending courses of action which may affect 

initial recovery plans. The private sector is key to how the government entities begin to address short-term and long-term recovery 

in the decisionmaking process. 

TOPOFF 4 was very intense and a rewarding event for Oregon 

and the City of Portland. We learned a great deal and are still 

learning. We conducted a short-term recovery tabletop the Monday 

after the exercise finished, and as was mentioned earlier, we are 

now preparing to do a long-term tabletop recovery with our Federal 

partners on December 4 and 5 here in Washington, DC. As with 

any exercise, we must now clearly identify all the lessons learned, 

correct them quickly, and retest the plans and actions to ensure 

that we have the best procedures and plans in place. 

I appreciate Congress’s attention and focus on RDDs, the first responders, and the private sector. I thank you for this opportunity 

to testify on behalf of the State of Oregon. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Dr. Tenforde. 

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS S. TENFORDE,1 PRESIDENT, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND MEASUREMENTS 

Mr. TENFORDE. Senator Pryor, thank you very much for providing an opportunity for the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements to present its views on the important 

issues that are faced by the United States in preparing for potential acts of radiological terrorism and also to briefly describe the 

role of NCRP in providing guidance to the government and the 

public on this very important subject. 

NCRP is a nonprofit organization that was founded in 1929 and 

was chartered by Congress in 1964 under Public Law 88–376 to 

serve as a national resource for recommendations on radiation 

health protection and radiation measurements. 

In October of 2001, 1 month after the tragic September 11, 2001 

event, NCRP issued its Landmark Report No. 138 on management 

of terrorist events involving radioactive material. This report has 

subsequently been supplemented by a series of NCRP publications 

on the important subjects of, first, preparing emergency responders 

for nuclear and radiological terrorism; second, ensuring operational 

safety of security screening systems for use at ports of entry into 

the United States and in public areas, such as airports; and third, 

providing medical care for responders and members of the public 

who might be contaminated with radionuclides as a result of an act 

of radiological terrorism. 

Another new activity of NCRP supported by the Department of 

Homeland Security is the preparation of a report on key decision 

points and information needed by decisionmakers in the aftermath 

of a nuclear or radiological terrorism incident. This report will address many of the issues of interest to the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs related to effective 

27

1The prepared statement of Mr. Tripp with an attachment appears in the Appendix on page 

119. 

command and control actions by local, regional, Tribal, State, and 

Federal responders to an act of radiological terrorism. It will in 

many ways be complementary to the National Response Plan and 

will be a document that can be used as a basis for responder training and for carefully coordinating the actions that must be taken 

during response to a radiological terrorism incident. 

NCRP and the members of its expert scientific committees have 

remained current in evaluating the preparedness of the United 

States at the Federal, State, and local levels for responding to potentially catastrophic acts of radiological terrorism. On this graphic, I have depicted our view of the three primary components of 

readiness for such acts. 

The basic elements of this triangle are at the base detection and 

deterrence, and that involves, of course, developing methods for detection and deterrence of entry and use of radiological materials for 

terrorist actions. Second, should there be a RDD or Improvised Nuclear Device incident, it is essential to mount a rapid and effective 

response to a nuclear or radiological terrorism incident. And then 

the last phase is performing optimized recovery and restoration activities in sites that are radioactively contaminated by acts of terrorism. So this is our somewhat high-level and rather simple view 

of the key elements of U.S. preparedness for radiological terrorism. 

We have submitted a 5-year proposal to the Department of 

Homeland Security for the preparation of new reports that will address specific issues in each of these areas that have not previously 

been addressed in a comprehensive manner. The writing of these 

reports will involve the efforts of both scientists and stakeholders 

at the local, State, and Federal levels involved in preparing for effective responses to radiological terrorism. 

A more detailed discussion of the key issues that must be addressed to improve the preparedness of the United States for potential acts of nuclear radiological terrorism is contained in my 

written testimony. 

I wish to again thank Senator Pryor and the Subcommittee 

Members for giving me this opportunity to present NCRP’s views 

on actions that must be taken to improve the readiness of the 

United States for acts of radiological terrorism. I will conclude by 

stressing again that NCRP is uniquely qualified to assist in strategic planning as the United States prepares for potential acts of 

radiological terrorism. Thank you very much. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Mr. Tripp. 

TESTIMONY OF WAYNE J. TRIPP,1 PROGRAM MANAGER, DOMESTIC PREPAREDNESS EQUIPMENT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 

Mr. TRIPP. Chairman Pryor and Members of the Subcommittee, 

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to talk with you today about 

something that is very important to me and my program, which is 

the preparedness of our Nation’s first responders and first receivers. 

28

The Domestic Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance 

Program, or as we refer to it since we get tongue-tied easily, 

DPETAP, is a partnership between the Pine Bluff Arsenal, the Department of Homeland Security, and is operated by General Physics. DPETAP is a nationwide technical assistance equipment training program on capabilities and limitations of chemical, biological, 

radiological, and nuclear detection, protection, decontamination, 

and response equipment for our Nation’s first responders and first 

receivers. 

I am going to focus my discussion on what we have observed during our more than 7 years of providing DPETAP technical assistance to more than 82,000 responders from 45 States, two Territories, and the District of Columbia. More than 15,000 of these participants have received radiological detection training. 

In the field, the majority of detectors that we have observed tend 

to be of two types, portable survey meters and personal radiation 

detectors. A personal radiation detector is essentially a small item 

that a responder would carry on their belt, such as this pager 

model, to alert them that there is an increase in the level of radiation. It is a first alert system, doesn’t tell them a significant 

amount about what the threat they are facing is, just that there 

is something potentially there. 

Portable survey meters are things such as these two models here. 

These are used to both identify the type of radiation that might be 

present in an area as well as the intensity and distribution of that 

radiation. It is useful for both surfaces as well as for personnel, to 

identify whether casualties have radiological contamination on 

them. 

In terms of the participants in our training, we found that more 

than 74 percent of those who have attended the DPETAP training 

have come from the fire service. About 6 percent are from law enforcement, and the remainder are from a number of different disciplines. The types and distribution of equipment vary widely 

across agencies and across the Nation, as well as the age of the 

equipment they are using and their familiarity with it. 

The rapid identification of the risk of radiation, as was mentioned on the earlier panel, is critical activity. The sooner it is identified, the sooner appropriate protective measures are taken. One 

of the key actions that should occur is decontamination, the removal of radiation the victims and from evacuees from an affected 

area. Ideally, this happens very close to the incident site. 

DPETAP has provided decontamination training to more than 

6,500 responders and first receivers in 443 agencies. The training 

provides them with the skills and abilities to implement their plans 

and their procedures to rapidly process a large number of potentially contaminated individuals. We found that this is a very important type of training, particularly for hospitals that would be on 

the receiving end of any self-evacuated casualties. 

The training we provide on decontamination and detection is 

only one component of achieving proficiency. The personnel need to 

also be working under appropriate plans and procedures that identify when to deploy their technologies, when to use them, and what 

to do if radiation is detected. These plans, procedures, and the 

training are validated using exercises such as TOPOFF 4. A wellVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:44 Mar 27, 2008 Jkt 040502 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
29

designed exercise and well-evaluated exercise develops an after-action report and improvement plan that identifies very specific recommendations for additional training, planning, or procedures that 

is based on solid guidance or standards. 

Fortunately, the vast majority of explosions in this Nation are 

not radiological. The response to one that does contain radiation, 

however, will likely begin the same as every other response to an 

explosion. Early use of detection to identify the presence of radiation is critical to stopping the spread by evacuation of contaminated individuals and casualties to the hospitals and ensuring that 

those affected are appropriately protected and decontaminated. 

The continuous cycle of planning, training, and exercises with effective after-action review and improvement planning is key to the 

long-term enhancement of the front-line personnel across the Nation that would be called upon to respond to a terrorist incident. 

Thank you for the opportunity to talk with you today and I am 

available to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. I thank all of you for your comments. 

Let me start with you, if I might, Mr. Tripp. And again, welcome 

to Washington. It is good to have you up here from Arkansas. Just 

so everybody will know, we have been fighting in the full Committee and my office to keep the funding for DPETAP, because it 

is a very economical way to do training and to help first responders 

and first receivers out there around the country do what they are 

supposed to do. It has been a very strong program for a long time, 

so we are going to continue to fight for that fight up here. 

Let me ask about the existing State guidance that the Federal 

Government is giving about national agencies being involved. At 

DPETAP, do you all get into some of that, sort of the chain of command issues when there is an incident like this, where does the 

Federal Government fit in, where do the State people fit in, where 

do the local people fit in? Do you all get into that? 

Mr. TRIPP. To a certain degree. All of our technical assistance 

training, particularly our practical exercises, incorporates the National Incident Management System (NIMS), into our framework. 

As part of the training around the deployment and the operational 

survey techniques and advance survey techniques, we also provide 

information about reach-back, what agencies are appropriate, 

might be available to support the responders, and the appropriate 

methods for activating that support, working through the chain of 

command from the incident command or the unified command post 

through the local or county Emergency Operations Center, then 

through the request up to the State Operations Center, to have 

them request appropriate Federal support. 

Senator PRYOR. In your testimony, you talked about human exposure to radiological materials and the contamination of people, and 

as I understand it, and you tell me if I am wrong, if you respond 

quickly, it is fairly easy to get the radiation off a person. You take 

your clothes and have to dispose of them in some way and then you 

can basically wash off a lot of the radiation. Is that right? 

Mr. TRIPP. That is correct. 

Senator PRYOR. One of the problems is that if you inhale materials and somehow they get into your system, then that is a difVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:44 Mar 27, 2008 Jkt 040502 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
30

ferent matter. But just the more general exposure, if you act quickly, a lot of people will be perfectly fine. Is that your understanding? 

Mr. TRIPP. That is a fairly accurate statement, yes, sir. The 

prompt removal of the radiation contamination from the exterior, 

from the hair, clothing, skin, removes the vast majority of risk for 

the individual if it is done quickly. The danger arises, as you noted, 

if the contamination gets inside the body through drinking water, 

inhaling it, through an open wound, and also from the contaminated individual leaving the incident site and bringing that contamination with them, whether it is to the hospital or to their 

home. 

Senator PRYOR. Let me ask this. I know that you cited some statistics about DPETAP and how many you have trained, etc., but 

what is your impression of the percentage of first responders and 

first receivers out there around the country? What percentage of 

them have the appropriate level of training for something like this? 

Mr. TRIPP. I believe, what we have seen through the DPETAP 

training, that the areas that have an awareness of the risk and an 

awareness of the threat, whether it is through a nuclear power 

plant or through a terrorist threat, there is a fairly high level of 

attention, training, and equipping that has occurred. In areas that 

aren’t as aware of the threat or don’t perceive it to be a threat to 

their area, there is a much lower level of preparedness and equipping. 

Senator PRYOR. So you are talking about a geographical difference there, really. Is there also a difference or an unevenness in 

the training that people receive, say, for example, fire fighters 

versus policemen versus hospital workers versus whatever it may 

be, paramedics? Is that inconsistent from place to place, as well? 

Mr. TRIPP. That tends to be much more consistent in the way the 

distribution breaks out. The vast majority tend to be fire fighters 

that have received detection-related training because of their generally dominant role or preeminent role in hazardous materials response. Law enforcement has received less. Most of what we have 

seen in terms of law enforcement have been things such as the radiation pagers, the personal alerting devices to warn them that 

there is a risk. Hospitals are increasing their level of awareness 

and their level of training, but there is still a significant gap between where they are and where they want to be. 

Senator PRYOR. OK. Let me also ask, this is really for you, Mr. 

Tripp, and also for you, Mr. Murphy. In the event of a dirty bomb, 

heaven forbid that would happen, but in the event of a dirty bomb, 

the first consideration would be to identify and help those who 

have been directly affected by the blast or the radiation, but then 

there is a second priority which is also present and that is that basically this area is a crime scene. Does the response to the incident 

trample over the crime scene in such a way that we are destroying 

evidence or that we are not mindful of the investigation that is 

going to start very quickly after an incident? Do you all cover that 

in DPETAP, and I would like to get your thoughts on it, too. 

Mr. TRIPP. In DPETAP, what we do is we stress the importance 

of awareness of their surroundings as they are going in to assist 

the victims, to be aware to try not to move things, watch what you 

are stepping on. If you observe something that looks like it might 

31

be important, mark it somehow so that it can be flagged as evidence. If you need to move it, make a note that you had to move 

it to access victims. But we stress the importance of maintaining 

the integrity of the criminal incident as much as you can while you 

are attempting to save lives. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Murphy, did you all cover that in Oregon? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, Senator, and I would just add to that something we did coordinate, and one of the benefits that has been 

around since the Department of Homeland Security started. A lot 

of the DHS training programs and their basic awareness courses 

and operation courses, incorporate addressing a crime scene in an 

event response. This is one of the common themes that we teach, 

or that we receive teachings on, is how to deal with the response 

versus a crime scene. But I suspect in reality, there is always a 

great chance that some of that potential forensics evidence could be 

destroyed, but that is something that is taught commonly and 

something that we prepared for TOPOFF. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Murphy, let me ask you while I have you, 

I am curious about TOPOFF and your other experience there in the 

State of Oregon. I am curious about the intelligence and whether 

various intelligence agencies make threat assessments when they 

gather information. Is there a protocol or process that intelligence 

agencies go through that is a standard protocol or process where 

you are notified, you are alerted under certain conditions? What is 

your experience there? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator Pryor, my experience so far with this has 

been that you must have a well-established relationship with lawenforcement and intelligence in advance of the event. I think, with 

the law enforcement community, no matter who they represent—

city, county, State, Federal, or the Joint Terrorism Task Force, 

building a relationship is critical. In Oregon, we have a relationship where they will alert me, maybe not be able to tell me all of 

the details because it does involve a crime or a potential crime, but 

very simple to let me know that within a certain time frame, this 

could happen or may happen, and they have also agreed to tell if 

it is imminent. This has been a fairly coordinated effort through 

the Fusion Center in the State and it has been just a good custom 

to let people know. They won’t give you a lot of the details, but I 

know as far as I am concerned in my State, as long as I know the 

potential is there, I can start taking action. So I don’t need to know 

a lot of the specific details. 

Senator PRYOR. So just to clarify, are you talking about just the 

information being shared within the State or are you talking about 

when it comes down from the Federal level? In other words, are 

you involved at all when the intelligence or the threat assessments 

are made at the Federal level and when that is shared and how 

that is shared with the State? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. I was speaking at the State level, but the Federal intelligence, we do receive that both through our fusion centers, the Homeland Security Information Network, and we are notified of that also, and that can either be by computer or actual telephone calls, because we are on a call-down list for any type of intelligence that may be breaking or critical. 

32

Senator PRYOR. As far as you can tell, that process is working 

well right now? 

Mr. MURPHY. So far, yes, sir. 

Senator PRYOR. Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Chairman Pryor. 

Mr. Murphy. Welcome to this hearing. In your testimony, you 

stated that the dirty bomb was new to portions of the first responder community in Oregon. What kinds of training and equipment does the Oregon first responder community have to deal with 

a radiological incident, and do you believe what you have is adequate? 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Chairman Akaka. I would start by answering that in our larger metropolitan areas, such as Portland 

and some of the other cities, that they do have the capabilities, the 

equipment, and the training. As we prepared for TOPOFF, one of 

the points is you work with smaller jurisdictions that may become 

your mutual aid partners in some of the areas of the State that are 

not part of a metropolitan area. 

It became evident that we need to take into account maybe the 

smallest fire department or police department that you may not 

even think would ever be involved in something like that and, really, as I told my Governor as we went through TOPOFF, we were 

making decisions for one city and a few counties. What if this was 

20 counties and 100 cities? So, you really need to take a look at 

making sure that the capabilities are everywhere in the State as 

best you can based on money and resources. 

And I think most of our major metropolitan areas are in good 

shape. We still have some areas, such as the personal protection 

detectors for radiological dispersion that were shown earlier in the 

hearing that I think would be good for law enforcement or some of 

the first receivers to have. But, most of the training and decontamination type of equipment is there. I am sure that we can have 

some more of it in more of our rural areas, but I think we are well 

prepared thanks to the TOPOFF effort. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Tenforde, in your testimony, you 

note that recovery and restoration plans for contaminated areas 

need to be developed. You then stated that you have proposed a report to EPA that would focus on aspects of the late-phase recovery 

and site restoration following a nuclear or radiological terrorist incident. My question to you is, has EPA accepted your proposal? 

Mr. TENFORDE. I have talked with several members of the Office 

of Radiation and Indoor Air, which will take the lead at EPA on 

finalizing the Protective Action Guides that were originally developed by Homeland Security and issued in the Federal Register for 

comments. They recognize, I believe it is fair to state, that there 

is a need for a very well developed optimization plan, and that is 

not really described in depth in the Protective Action Guides as 

they exist now and may not be developed further before the Protective Action Guides are released. 

However, I know that EPA is determined to follow up on the 

need to develop formal procedures for optimizing the clean-up and 

restoration. One person in that office discussed with me the need 

to have some exercises, if you will, to look at coordinating and optimizing resources and cleaning up in a way that restores infrastrucVerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:44 Mar 27, 2008 Jkt 040502 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\40502.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
33

ture, such as medical facilities, as quickly as possible, and then 

perhaps going on from there to a very detailed report, such as the 

one proposed by NCRP. So I believe that there is strong interest, 

but we don’t have the funding yet to carry through on that plan. 

Senator AKAKA. I see. Mr. Tripp, in your testimony, you point out 

that you have come across jurisdictions where radiation detectors 

had not been properly maintained or calibrated to be of any use to 

first responders following a radiological incident. Do you believe 

that State and local first responders need additional support so 

that the equipment is properly maintained over time, or is there 

a program for such? 

Mr. TRIPP. Chairman Akaka, I am not aware of any specific program for the maintenance of equipment, although I believe it is authorized under certain of the Homeland Security grant programs. 

The key issue we identified was that some of this equipment was 

from the Civil Defense days. They had it for 10 or 15 years, and 

had not really received any appropriate training on it in some time, 

which included the operation and the maintenance aspects of the 

equipment. 

To keep these types of detectors in operating mode, they need to 

periodically be calibrated to ensure that what they are reading on 

their display and what they are telling you for the radiation readings is accurate and dependable, and without those calibrations 

and the periodic maintenance, even things as simple as changing 

out the batteries so they don’t corrode in it, the detectors become 

just another piece of equipment on a truck. 

Senator AKAKA. How would that kind of assistance be provided 

and how frequently can it be done? 

Mr. TRIPP. The frequency of the calibration depends on the specific type of equipment and also how it is done depends on the 

equipment. In some cases, it needs to go back to the manufacturer 

for calibration. In other cases, there needs to be a licensed or certified calibration facility that does the work. 

A program that the Department of Homeland Security teamed 

with the Department of Energy and Health Physics Society on, the 

Homeland Defense Equipment Reuse Program, which DPETAP 

was one of the training entities for, provided a lot of surplus detection technologies from the Federal Stockpile. They essentially went 

through the equipment, renovated it, made sure it was working, 

calibrated it before distributing it to the jurisdictions. That type of 

process makes a big difference in what is out there and the reliability of it. That was, again, in partnership with the Health Physics Society, providing certified health physicists to aid in that process. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Murphy, do you have such equipment in 

your jurisdictions? 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, most of it. But I want to get back 

to you with more specifics because it is relatively new. I am sure 

hidden on a shelf somewhere, there is a very old piece of equipment 

that has not been maintained, but I agree with Mr. Tripp. In a lot 

of the first responder organizations, especially in the more rural 

entities, you have volunteer fire departments that are not fully 

staffed or very small staffs and it is not only when you talk about 

this actual equipment that needs to be calibrated or as simple as 

34

battery changes, but these different types of personal protective 

suits have to be maintained and made sure they fit properly when 

there is a rotation of people and training. So, it is a pretty good 

challenge. For a lot of local first responders, especially when you 

get into the rural area. But again, we do have some of the more 

modern equipment, but I am sure we don’t have enough of it 

spread out throughout our entire State. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. Senator Pryor. 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you. Let me pick up there if I may with 

you, Mr. Murphy. You went through the TOPOFF exercise, which 

sounds like it was a very good experience, but my experience with 

some of these exercises, I know the Stimson Center’s Domestic Preparedness Project made the same comment, is that oftentimes a 

State will participate and that is great, but then after it is over, 

you are left with the dilemma of not having enough money to follow through on some of the needs the exercises made you aware 

of. Is that the situation that Oregon and other States are in, that 

you need more resources? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I think right now, it might be a little bit 

early in our process of our after-actions to determine all the things 

that we do need. The things that we have determined initially as 

far as updates to our plans and our procedures and things like 

that, I think we could take care of. If we do come across certain 

items that are equipment or require fairly large sums of money, I 

am hoping that as we continue through the Homeland Security 

Grant process or our State legislative process that we can build 

that into our State strategies and hopefully have them fund it. I 

don’t have any specifics, but I would be happy to provide those at 

a later time, because I am sure some of them will cost money that 

we may not have. 

Senator PRYOR. All right. Mr. Murphy, let me ask you and Mr. 

Tenforde a follow-up from the first panel. I asked a question about 

disposal, and I talked a little bit about Chernobyl. One of the outcomes of that situation is material that they didn’t know what to 

do with. You heard one of the witnesses earlier say that basically 

the EPA doesn’t really have a plan. They have thought about it, 

but it is a huge undertaking, long-term problem. Is that true on the 

State level, as well? Are the States looking at what to do with 

radiologically-tainted material? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, Senator. I would tell you that the same problems or issues you may have heard in the first panel this morning 

are very similar to the State. One of my passions of this exercise 

that I feel is very important is what we are going to do about longterm recovery and whether it is debris or psychological issues or 

economic issues. We even learned from a few years back, Washington State had some potential ‘‘mad cow’’ issues and we even had 

discussions about what to do with that type of debris, let alone 

something that is radiological. 

So it is something that we are clearly trying to figure out and 

I think as—it was mentioned earlier—we are having a tabletop exercise here in a couple of weeks in Washington, DC to just talk 

about those type of specific issues and identify the problems and 

what we might be able to do short-term and long-term to fix them. 

35

Senator PRYOR. And Mr. Tenforde, did you have any comments 

on what to do with the nuclear or the radiologically-tainted material? 

Mr. TENFORDE. I believe that is a very critical issue. Actually, it 

is part of the optimization process as we see it at NCRP, and which 

I believe others see it, as well, that one needs to carefully classify 

the contaminated materials that are generated through a RDD or 

other nuclear incident and treat them appropriately. There may be 

a possibility of using rather common landfill procedures that EPA 

uses to dispose of material that is not very contaminated. 

We do not expect for a RDD to have high levels of material contamination except perhaps in the immediate location of the event, 

and there may be many hundreds of thousands or even millions of 

cubic meters of very slightly contaminated material that needs to 

be appropriately either decontaminated or disposed of, and I believe that the representative, Mr. Dunne from EPA, stated, as well, 

that there is a national need for more landfills and other disposal 

mechanisms for low-level radioactively-contaminated materials. 

So I would agree, it is a serious need, but I believe that one has 

to approach this in a very systematic way that really looks optimally at the disposal options and doesn’t discard low-level material 

treating it as high-level waste. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Murphy, I had a couple more questions for 

you. Apparently Oregon has created a system to notify the private 

sector in emergencies. Is that working well, and could you just 

briefly describe what you do there? 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it is nothing fancy, Senator. It is really just 

using telephones and e-mails and trying to be able to focus on how 

you could call just one or two people in the private sector that 

could represent a larger group. We have been kind of experimenting, really, as you well know, and when you look at the entire 

breadth and width of the private sector, there are so many different parts and pieces, depending on if they are manufacturing or 

commercial or critical infrastructure. 

Between what we have used, and the private sector responsibility after TOPOFF to try and refine this system, we are looking 

at how to represent identify groups and then sub-notify in maybe 

a cascading telephone tree or an e-mail tree and then other types 

of redundant communications and how they could be notified. For 

example, I would be notified that an event is pending or something 

has happened and we need them to participate. 

I will provide you the results as we work. We are going to start 

on a regional level in the greater Portland area and then, depending on what we learn, try and expand that State-wide, and especially how do you account for the very smaller private sector organizations instead of the large ones. 

Senator PRYOR. The last question I had for you, Mr. Murphy, is 

about the TOPOFF exercise. It seems to me it would be hard to duplicate the panic effect that you might have with a radiological incident. Do you feel like TOPOFF did a good job of trying to capture 

the sense of panic and the ramifications of mass panic? 

Mr. MURPHY. Senator, I think they did a good job, but my staff 

would probably not agree. I think we would have protracted that 

aspect for a couple more days to try and create some more panic 

36

and make the people think about that, because I don’t think we experienced enough during the exercise. The people that directly participated did have the experience and the virtual news network 

added to the experience, but to really experience the depth and 

width of what might happen to the panic that would come from the 

public, I don’t think we got to experience as much as we should 

have, and especially for our policy makers and top officials and how 

would they deal with that. What is the communication strategy, because you have those that surely know they might be affected, you 

have the worried well, you have the people that may depend economically on a portion of Portland’s economy and they are questioning and they are panicking. So I think we started into it, but 

we did not get to deal with it or practice the issues as much as I 

would have liked. 

Senator PRYOR. Just as a personal note, we had a taste of that 

here in the Senate a few years ago. It was right before I came to 

the Senate, where they had the anthrax incident here. People 

didn’t know what to do. When people don’t know what to do, they 

always fear the worst, and the fear is real. That is a real factor in 

how we respond to this. 

Those are all the questions I have. Senator Akaka, do you have 

any more? 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Pryor. I have a few questions here. 

Mr. Tripp, you note that the Domestic Preparedness Equipment 

Technical Assistance Program has provided radiation-related training to more than 15,000 first responders and first receivers since 

the year 2000, and I want to commend you for such efforts. What 

is the cost of an average training effort and who bears that cost? 

Mr. TRIPP. Chairman Akaka, thank you for those kind words. 

There is no standard cost for one of our technical assistance 

trainings. It depends on a lot of variables, including the specific 

technologies we are training, how many different technologies—

there are 36 different ones in our catalog right now, how many responders will be going through, how many different shifts we are 

going to cover. 

A rule of kind of a very broad assessment might be a 9-day technical assistance visit where each of the three shifts receives 3 days 

of training, and again, we will keep it fairly simple, it is three or 

four instructors for the schedule somewhere within a reasonable 

distance of Pine Bluff, where we are based, might be around 

$35,000. 

The cost of DPETAP is borne from a Department of Homeland 

Security, it is a contract funded by DHS through the Pine Bluff Arsenal. We also do make it available to jurisdictions to utilize their 

grant funds. If the funding for the contract is not adequate to cover 

the training, the jurisdiction is able to utilize grant funds to obtain 

that technical assistance. 

Senator AKAKA. So there is grant funding that is available under 

Homeland Security? 

Mr. TRIPP. To a certain degree, sir. Generally, it is the larger jurisdictions or urban areas, security initiative cities, areas like that 

that have those funds available. 

37

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Tripp, in your testimony, you described a 

range of assistance and training you have provided to first responders and first receivers, including hospitals, in methods such as decontamination. Does your program provide training and use and 

distribution of medications, such as Prussian Blue, that are used 

if someone is exposed to radiation? 

Mr. TRIPP. No, sir, we do not cover the medical treatment as part 

of our curriculum. 

Senator AKAKA. I see. Mr. Murphy, in your testimony, you emphasized the importance of involving the private sector in response 

and recovery efforts in the aftermath of a dirty bomb attack. State 

and local governments receive Homeland Security grants to fund 

some of these functions. How would the private sector fund its role 

in emergency response and recovery, particularly since it is commercial property that is likely to be contaminated? 

Mr. MURPHY. Chairman Akaka, I am not sure exactly how the 

private sector might deal with the funding of that, but I think as 

we go through this process, as I stated in my testimony, I do truly 

believe the private sector plays a key role in the response, or in the 

recovery effort, especially, because as we rebuild a city or a portion 

of a city, it is very important that it is a coordinated effort to restart that economic engine. If we do have commercial property that 

is damaged or destroyed or unusable, I think it is very important 

to initially try and figure out, could you move that business somewhere else in the city? How would you address that issue? 

Because as we have discussed throughout the testimony in the 

first panel and this panel, you may have an area that is not usable 

for a while until the truth and science and everything is determined. Initially, there may be a cost to bear, but I think that is 

something that we would have to discuss further down the road 

and how that would be taken care of financially if they had to pay 

for it. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, I want to thank you all for your valuable 

testimony at this hearing. Dr. Graham Allison, Director of Harvard 

University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and 

a well-known expert in nuclear terrorism and arms control recently 

said, ‘‘The security community agrees that there will be a dirty 

bomb attack on an American city at some point. The puzzle is why 

it hasn’t happened yet, especially since the means and motives are 

readily available.’’

Dr. Allison’s comment puts a fine point on why Senator Pryor 

and I have convened this hearing. It is, as the hearing title indicates, not a question of if, but when a terrorist will succeed in 

launching a dirty bomb attack on U.S. soil. We must be prepared 

for such an eventuality. We must also be proactive in our preparedness and our efforts. We cannot afford to wait for another Hurricane Katrina-scale disaster to force changes and make fixes in our 

ability to respond to a catastrophe. 

Federal Government agencies such as DHS, DOE, EPA, and 

HHS must work together on a routine basis to hammer out the 

practical considerations involved in deploying a coordinated response to a dirty bomb attack. DHS must, in its lead role, work to 

ensure that the agencies listed in the Nuclear Radiological Incident 

Annex of the National Response Plan have clear guidance and are 

38

able to conduct the requisite medical and environmental analysis. 

If these capabilities are found to be lacking, they should be bolstered. If the expertise falls short, it must be supplemented. Anything less cannot be acceptable. 

The first panel of this hearing has shed some light on issues confronting the Federal response. The second panel aimed to shed 

light on issues involving responding to such an attack at the State 

and local levels. 

We are looking for information, data, and advice in what needs 

to be done in case of such attacks. I thank you so much for your 

valuable responses and your testimony to this Subcommittee. 

Are there any further remarks, Mr. Chairman? 

Senator PRYOR. No. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, with that, I thank all of you again. This 

hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the Subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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