IMPORTANT NOTICE 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION 

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." 

PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), 

THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE 

CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER 

CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, 

UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, 

RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR 

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED 

OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE 

BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION 

BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED 

DECISIO,N IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY. OF THE 

ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE 

DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE 

ACTION. 
RENDERED: APRIL 2, 2015 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

Sujarnttr (Court of 7.fii tri-44uriki\F 

uu u 2014-SC-000129-MR 

DATE-t-.A.5-1%- 

WILLIAM YEAPLES APPELLANT 

ON APPEAL FROM BOURBON CIRCUIT COURT 

V. HONORABLE ROBERT G. JOHNSON, JUDGE 

NOS. 12-CR-00019 and 13-CR-00100 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 

AFFIRMING 

On Christmas day, 2011, Appellant, William B. Yeaples drove William 

Ross and John Haynes to the home of Lee Richardson. While at the residence, 

Ross and Haynes robbed and shot Lee and his son Joe Richardson. Lee died 

as a result. After the shooting, Yeaples drove away with Haynes and Ross in 

tow. 

Yeaples was subsequently arrested and indicted for complicity to murder, 

complicity to first-degree assault, and tampering with physical evidence. By 

information, Yeaples was also charged with complicity to first-degree robbery. 

At a pre-trial bond hearing, the lead investigating detective testified that 

Yeaples admitted to driving Ross and Haynes to and from the Richardson 

home, but denied knowing that they intended to rob, shoot, or kill anyone. The 

Commonwealth averred that Yeaples procured the murder weapon and 
provided it to Ross prior to the murder. This was based in part on Haynes' 

statements to the police. 

In exchange for a recommended sentence of 30 years' imprisonment, 

Yeaples pled guilty to all charges in both cases with the exception of complicity 

to murder, which was amended down to facilitation to murder. After entering 

his plea, Yeaples requested to waive his pre-sentence investigation and proceed 

immediately with sentencing. Considering the severity of the charges, the trial 

court postponed final sentencing. 

Two months later, Yeaples moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial 

court held a hearing on the motion and, after hearing testimony from Yeaples 

and his trial counsel, denied the motion. After reviewing Yeaples presentencing report, the court sentenced him in accordance with the plea 

agreement. Yeaples now appeals his conviction and sentence as a matter of 

right pursuant to § 110(2)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution. 

Withdrawing the Guilty Plea 

Yeaples' sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying 

his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. RCr 8.10 provides that "[alt any time 

before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty . . . to be withdrawn 

and a plea of not guilty substituted." When determining whether a guilty plea 

was entered voluntarily, trial courts must consider the totality of the 

circumstances. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 566 (Ky. 2006). 

"This inquiry is inherently fact-sensitive" and we review for clear error. Id. 

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On September 12, 2013, the trial court conducted a plea colloquy with 

Yeaples that satisfied the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 

(1969). During the proceeding, the court read the facts of the case aloud: 

[Yeaples] planned and supported armed robbery of Lee Richardson 

when he acquired pistol for robbery, loaded pistol, transported 

accomplices to and from Richardson's residence, and aided in 

concealment of the pistol, subsequent to the robbery and death of 

Lee Richardson, and assault of Joe Richardson. 

Yeaples acknowledged that these facts were accurate, that he was entering the 

plea of his own free will, and that he was pleading guilty in two separate cases. 

He further indicated that he understood the plea agreement and that he 

discussed it with his trial counsel, Heather Crabbe, and that he was satisfied 

with Ms. Crabbe's representation. 

On October 31, 2013, Yeaples filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea 

arguing that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his plea involuntary. He 

specifically asserted that: 1) trial counsel never advised him that pleading to 

lesser included offenses was a potential option; and 2) he complained to Ms. 

Crabbe that the facts recited in the guilty plea were inaccurate, but that Ms. 

Crabbe told him to plead to those facts because "they were just the 

Commonwealth's version of the facts." Yeaples maintains these arguments on 

appeal. 

On February 14, 2014, the trial court conducted a hearing on Yeaples' 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Yeaples acknowledged that he had 

authorized Ms. Crabbe to engage in plea negotiations with the Commonwealth 

and that he discussed his plea agreement with Ms. Crabbe and a mitigation 

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specialist. Ms. Crabbe testified that she discussed lesser included charges and 

potential defenses with Yeaples at various stages of the trial court proceedings. 

Ms. Crabbe also acknowledged that when Yeaples expressed reservations 

with the facts presented in the plea agreement, she informed him that it was 

her experience that the court would not accept the plea if Yeaples informed the 

court that he did not engage in those actions. Accordingly, the case would 

continue to trial. Ms. Crabbe further stated that it became clear over time that 

the Commonwealth was building a strong case and that she informed Yeaples 

that a sentence of life without parole was a possibility. She specifically noted 

that Yeaples' co-defendants and others agreed to testify against him. 

In support of his argument, Yeaples urges this Court to apply the multifactor test for withdrawing a guilty plea under the federal criminal rules 

presented in United States v. Hockenberry, 730 F.3d 645 (6th Cir. 2013). While 

these factors may prove instructive in certain instances, our own precedent is 

controlling. Edmonds, 189 S.W.3d at 566. Having considered the totality of 

the circumstances presented in the record and specifically Yeaples' testimony 

at the hearing on the motion to withdraw, we cannot determine that the trial 

court's denial of that motion was clearly erroneous. 

Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Bourbon Circuit Court is 

hereby affirmed. 

All sitting. All concur. 

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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 

Steven Jared Buck 

Assistant Public Advocate 

Department of Public Advocacy 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 

Jack Conway, Attorney General 

Julie Scott Jernigan 

Assistant Attorney General 

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