Table of Contents 

Executive Summary............................................................................1 

Charge to the Staff ....................................................................................1 

Overview ...................................................................................................1 

Methods ....................................................................................................2 

Findings.....................................................................................................2 

Conclusion ................................................................................................4 

Key Recommendations .............................................................................5 

Public Health Security in the Mass Gathering Context ...................6 

Q Fever Attack Scenario ...........................................................................7 

Background ..............................................................................................8 

What Has Been Happening ......................................................................9 

What Non-Federal Entities Should Do ....................................................11 

What the Federal Government Should Do ..............................................11 

What Congress Should Do ......................................................................13 

Collaborative Planning in the Mass Gathering Context .................14 

Change to Code Orange Scenario ..........................................................15 

Background .............................................................................................16 

What Has Been Happening .....................................................................16 

What Non-Federal Entities Should Do ....................................................19 

What the Federal Government Should Do ..............................................20 

What Congress Should Do ......................................................................22

Partnering Across Sectors in the Mass Gathering Context...........23 

Tornado at the Convention Center Scenario ...........................................24 

Background .............................................................................................25 

What Has Been Happening .....................................................................26 

What Non-Federal Entities Should Do ....................................................28 

What the Federal Government Should Do ..............................................29 

What Congress Should Do ......................................................................31 

Conclusion ........................................................................................33 

Discussion ...............................................................................................33 

Next steps ...............................................................................................33 

Endnotes ...........................................................................................34 
1

Public Health, Safety, and Security for Mass Gatherings 

Executive Summary

Charge to the Staff 

Ensuring the public health, safety, and security of 

the public at mass gatherings can be especially 

challenging. These areas are interrelated and do 

not fall within the exclusive domain of the private 

sector. On the contrary, mass gatherings require 

that the public and private sectors interact with and 

support one another in complex ways. 

With these challenges and characteristics in mind, 

as well as his ongoing emphasis on preventing, 

deterring, and preparing for terrorist attacks and 

other potential disasters before they occur, 

Chairman Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS) of the 

House Committee on Homeland Security, charged 

the Democratic Majority staff to: 

 Examine a number of different mass gathering 

events and venues, 

 Observe how the public and private 

organizations providing support at mass 

gatherings identify, meet, and overcome the 

challenges inherent in dealing with threats to 

events, attendees, and the Nation, and 

 Identify areas where additional homeland 

security resources and/or other assistance 

might help the public and private sectors as 

they work to ensure the public health, safety, 

and security of attendees, participants, support 

personnel, and surrounding communities at 

these events. 

Overview 

Mass gatherings pose special challenges in terms 

of management and control, especially considering 

their value as targets for terrorism and other 

crimes.1

 The terrorist goal of attacking cities in 

order to kill and injure the most people – and 

otherwise have the greatest impact for the least 

amount of effort – applies to mass gatherings as 

well. All large-scale mass gatherings need to be 

protected in the post-9/11 world. 

Mass gatherings can be categorized in a number of 

different ways. Mass gatherings occur over 

different periods of time. Some are one-day 

events, such as the Super Bowl. Others extend for 

longer, such as the Lollapolooza music festival. 

Still others are composed of a series of one-day 

events, such as National Collegiate Athletic 

Association (NCAA) “March Madness.” In this 

paper, one-day events are referred to as “shortterm mass gatherings.” This paper primarily 

focuses on mass gatherings lasting for longer than 

one-day and the attendees, participants, and 

support personnel who physically remain in the 

same constrained location – “long-term mass 

gatherings.” 

Mass gatherings can also be categorized according 

to whether they are designated National Special 

Security Events (NSSEs)2

 or non-NSSEs. The 

President, or the Secretary of Department of 

Homeland Security, has the authority to designate 

a mass gathering as an NSSE.3

 Mass gatherings 

that have been designated as NSSEs include the 

Democratic National Convention,4

 the Republican 

National Convention,5

 the Super Bowl,6 the state 

funeral for President Gerald Ford,7

 and the Olympic 

Games.8

 The declaration as an NSSE carries with 

it a large commitment of Federal funding and other 

resources,9

 as well as the leadership and 

management of the U.S. Secret Service of all 

security matters, including security planning.10

Non-NSSE mass gatherings may include political 

events, business conventions, highly-attended 

religious services, county and State fairs, parades, 

Independence Day celebrations,11 multi-day 

camping events held by National youth 

organizations,12 music festivals,13 and sporting 

events such as those hosted by NASCAR, the 

NCAA,14 the National Basketball Association 

(NBA), Major League Baseball (MLB), and the 

National Football League (NFL)15 (aside from those 

Super Bowl events that have been declared 

NSSEs). 
2

Other mass gatherings occur on a standing basis 

without being related to specific events. For 

example, mass gatherings occur at large shopping 

malls, casinos, etc., to engage in certain activities 

but not because certain events are occurring at 

specific venues. These sorts of mass gatherings 

are not addressed in this report. 

Whether mass gatherings are declared NSSEs or 

not, they can be so large and prolonged that they 

take on many of the characteristics of a city. These 

characteristics include population density, the need 

for law enforcement and first responder resources 

to manage crises, and the physical infrastructure of 

the venues themselves. 

Mass gatherings may present an attractive set of 

targets to terrorists16 when they incorporate 

patriotic and or military activities; corporate 

advertisements;17 governmental sponsorship;18 and 

large-scale television broadcasts.19 The threat to 

such venues is real and believed to be rising. 

Methods

On a bipartisan basis, Committee Staff visited and 

examined a number of mass gathering locations 

with different characteristics and challenges. 

These were the Democratic National Convention 

and Republican National Convention venues in 

Colorado (visited in August 2007) and Minnesota 

(visited in April 2008), two NASCAR venues in 

Alabama and North Carolina (both visited in 

October 2007), and the venue for the Papal Mass 

in Washington, DC (visited in April 2008). 

Security officials were present during site visits to 

enable continuity and accessibility to public and 

private organizations at each venue. Staff met with 

a variety of personnel, including but not limited to 

those from the: local police; local bomb squads; 

local fire departments; local emergency medical 

services; State public health; State police; State 

transportation; State fusion centers; State 

homeland security; State emergency management; 

the Department of Homeland Security; Federal law 

enforcement; the National Guard; contract security; 

contract emergency medical services; corporate 

security; venue management; and venue medical 

services. 

Democratic Majority Staff also researched other 

mass gathering events, including the Super Bowl; 

sporting events in collegiate stadiums; county fairs; 

parades; Independence Day festivities; large-scale 

athletic events such as the Olympics and other 

international games; multi-day camping events held 

by National youth organizations; and multi-day 

music festivals. 

It is clear that support personnel at these venues 

are doing the best they can with what they have, 

and that their efforts are commendable. However, 

personnel supporting non-NSSEs need assistance 

in three particular areas: countering biological 

threats, collaborative planning, and partnering 

across sectors. 

Findings 

Public Health Security in the Mass Gathering 

Context 

Biological agents – whether introduced intentionally 

or unintentionally – will likely cause greater 

numbers of people to become ill and/or die at longterm mass gathering venues for the simple reason 

that more people are concentrated in these 

geographic areas than is normally the case. 

Additionally, for those mass gathering venues 

consist of open-air facilities, there are few barriers 

to prevent the dissemination of biological agents. 

The public health community throughout the U.S. 

tracks, identifies, and works to control the spread of 

contagious diseases, whether or not the organisms 

causing these diseases are intentionally released. 

However, the public health infrastructure where 

some venues are located is limited. The Federal 

government needs to help these localities by 

strengthening the public health infrastructure; 

establishing comprehensive surveillance systems; 

and ensuring that intelligence regarding intent to 

use biological agents is combined with public health 

data in ways that produce actionable information for 

decision-makers without compromising privacy. 

Some organizations – such as State fusion centers 

– foster non-traditional partnerships among the 

intelligence, law enforcement, and public health 

communities. The Federal government must 

enable them to continue their work in building nontraditional relationships. The Federal government 
3

must also encourage their efforts to seek the advice 

and input of non-traditional partners on an ongoing 

basis. Doing so will help them produce better 

medical and biologically-oriented intelligence. 

Key Recommendations for Public Health 

Security: 

 Analyze health data for unusual trends at mass 

gatherings, 

 Fully establish a National biosurveillance 

system, 

 Develop better biological detectors, 

 Communicate information from biological 

detectors so it can be understood by decisionmakers, 

 Improve domestic medical intelligence efforts, 

 Continue to demand that biological detectors 

produce valid and reliable results, and 

 Establish a comprehensive National medical 

intelligence program. 

Collaborative Planning in the Mass Gathering 

Context 

Planning efforts occur throughout the public and 

private sectors. Both sectors use a variety of 

approaches and produce plans that vary as much 

or more in their utility. Organizations in charge of 

mass gatherings use planning processes that are 

based on capacity, capability, scenarios and/or 

collaboration to address requirements for managing 

and protecting the attending public. In the case of 

declared NSSEs, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) 

leads planning efforts, drawing upon a great deal of 

experience. On the other hand, non-NSSEs do not 

generally benefit from Federal guidance and 

planning support. 

It is imperative that all mass gathering venues 

utilize collaborative planning processes to develop 

emergency action plans for use by all of the 

organizations involved. The Federal government 

can help with this and other planning efforts by 

providing planning guidance to these venues. 

However, to have utility, Federal guidance should 

not be difficult to put into practice or impose too 

great a burden to implement. 

Key Recommendations for Collaborative 

Planning: 

 Involve high-level decision-makers personally in 

planning efforts, 

 Connect planning efforts to other activities, 

 Develop and implement a comprehensive 

emergency action plan at each venue, 

 Create more specific and useful planning 

guidance, 

 Issue more guidance specific to changes in the 

National Threat Levels, 

 Provide better guidance for special events and 

mass gatherings, 

 Release more flexible funding guidance, 

 Use a more comprehensive approach to 

funding, 

 Ensure that planning, training, exercises, 

standards, and lessons learned are connected, 

 Hold the Federal government accountable for 

delivering more useful planning and other 

products, 

 Require the Department of Homeland Security 

to issue better guidance regarding the National 

Threat levels, and 

 Require the Department of Homeland Security 

to work with the public and private sectors to 

develop emergency action plans for mass 

gatherings. 

Partnering Across Sectors in the Mass 

Gathering Context 

No one public or private organization that supports 

a mass gathering venue has enough resources to 

handle all of the public health, safety, and security 

requirements that need to be addressed. In the 

case of NSSEs, the Federal government dedicates 

significant resources to addressing these 

requirements. For NSSEs (and some non-NSSEs), 

it is remarkable how some of the organizations 

involved in providing support have established 

trusted relationships with each other and the extent 

to which information and resources are shared as a 

result. 
4

When traditional and non-traditional partnerships 

occur and are successful in ensuring public health, 

safety, and security for mass gatherings, they 

should be institutionalized in order to better address 

future requirements and the always-changing threat 

context. For example, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement (ICE) has worked with local police, 

venue security, and NFL corporate security to 

address instances of commercial fraud and 

intellectual property rights infringements at the 

Super Bowl.20 This has resulted in the successful 

prosecution of crime. Institutionalizing kind of 

partnership will ensure that crime is more efficiently 

and uniformly addressed. 

Key Recommendations for Partnering Across 

Sectors: 

 Share responsibility for providing resources, 

 Put different types of organizations in the State 

fusion centers to help analyze information, 

 Institutionalize the same valuable partnerships 

at all venues, 

 Share more and better information and 

intelligence, 

 Make it a practice to share information with 

trusted non-Federal partners, 

 Continue to assist States, localities, and tribes 

in increasing their own resources, 

 Hold the Department of Homeland Security 

accountable for creating useful planning 

guidance that does not create additional 

burdens for those that need to use it, 

 Encourage the Department of Homeland 

Security to fund partnership-based activities, 

 Hold the Department of Homeland Security and 

other Federal agencies accountable for sharing 

information, 

 Encourage the Department of Homeland 

Security to expand its funding criteria, and 

 Work with the Department of Homeland 

Security to help its employees better assist in 

emergency situations. 

Conclusion 

Reinforcing the efforts of the public and private 

sectors as they manage and protect mass 

gatherings contributes to the stability and security 

of our Nation. Effective and efficient Federal 

support is critical. Congressional oversight is vital 

Helping the organizations that safeguard mass 

gathering events – regardless of NSSE designation 

– will increase the public health, safety, and 

security of the Nation in numerous and practical 

ways.
5

Key Recommendations re: Public Health, Safety, and Security for Mass Gatherings

What Non-Federal Entities 

Should Do 

What the Federal Government 

Should Do 

What Congress 

Should Do 

Public Health Security in the 

Mass Gathering Context: 

Countering Biological and 

Other Threats to 

Human Health 

Analyze health data for unusual 

trends at mass gatherings. 

Fully establish a National 

biosurveillance system. 

Develop better biological detectors. 

Communicate information from 

detectors so it can be understood 

by decision-makers. 

Improve domestic medical 

intelligence efforts. 

Continue to demand that biological 

detectors produce valid and reliable 

results. 

Establish a comprehensive 

National medical intelligence 

program. 

Collaborative Planning in the 

Mass Gathering Context: 

Closing the Gap between 

Decisions and Emergency 

Action 

Involve high-level decision-makers 

personally in planning efforts. 

Connect planning efforts to other 

activities. 

Develop and implement a 

comprehensive emergency action 

plan at each venue. 

Create more specific and useful 

planning guidance. 

Issue more guidance specific to 

changes in the National Threat 

Level. 

Provide better guidance for special 

events and mass gatherings. 

Release more flexible funding 

guidance. 

Use a more comprehensive 

approach to funding. 

Ensure that planning, training, 

exercises, standards, and lessons 

learned are connected. 

Hold the Federal government 

accountable for delivering more 

useful planning and other products. 

Require the Department of 

Homeland Security to issue better 

guidance regarding the National 

Threat Levels. 

Require the Department of 

Homeland Security to work with the 

public and private sectors to 

develop emergency action plans for 

mass gatherings. 

Partnering Across Sectors in 

the Mass Gathering Context: 

Sharing Information and 

Resources to Achieve Mutual 

Goals and Objectives 

Share responsibility for providing 

resources. 

Put different types of organizations 

in the fusion centers to help 

analyze information. 

Institutionalize the same valuable 

partnerships at all venues. 

Share more and better information 

and intelligence. 

Make it a practice to share 

information with trusted nonFederal partners. 

Continue to assist States, localities, 

and tribes in increasing their own 

resources. 

Hold the Department of Homeland 

Security accountable for creating 

useful guidance that does not 

create additional burdens for those 

that need to use it. 

Encourage the Department of 

Homeland Security to fund 

partnership-based activities. 

Hold the Department of Homeland 

Security and other Federal 

agencies accountable for sharing 

information. 

Encourage the Department of 

Homeland Security to expand its 

funding criteria. 

Work with the Department of 

Homeland Security to help its 

employees better assist in 

emergency situations. 
6

Public Health Security in the Mass Gathering Context 

Countering Biological Terrorism and Other Threats to Human Health 

CONGRESS SHOULD...

Continue to demand that 

biological detectors produce 

valid and reliable results. 

Continue to support the 

fusion of public health and 

biological threat information. 

Encourage the inclusion of 

non-traditional law 

enforcement partners, 

including public health 

professionals, at State fusion 

centers. 

Establish a comprehensive 

National medical intelligence 

program. 

Ensuring the public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings is 

extremely challenging. Disease is a particular concern,21 especially when 

thousands of people are in close proximity to each other over extended 

periods of time. 

Attempts to create a National biosurveillance system have been largely 

unsuccessful to date. It has been hard to incorporate the large number of 

different disease tracking systems that exist in every State, locality, and 

tribe. Additionally, different diseases affect different locations. The 

National value we place on protecting the privacy of our citizens (which 

includes information about their health) makes this task particularly 

challenging. The Federal government continues to integrate 

biosurveillance efforts and improve early warning systems for disease 

outbreaks. There has been some improvement, but there is much left to 

be done. 

The technology to detect all types of agents used in weapons of mass 

destruction must be improved. In particular, first responders supporting 

mass gatherings need biological detectors that provide valid and reliable 

results.22 The Department of Homeland Security and other Federal 

agencies not only need to continue their efforts to improve this technology 

but also come up with acceptable devices that can provide some amount 

of reliable data in the meantime. The Science and Technology Directorate 

of the Department of Homeland Security specifically should continue to 

make such research a top priority. 

An accurate picture of the biological threat also must be generated. 

Historically, information about human health, disease, and illness has been 

the responsibility of the public health and health care delivery 

communities. On the other hand, information on the intent to use 

biological agents for terrorist purposes has been the responsibility of the 

intelligence community. Further, information about the intent to use 

biological agents is often kept separate from information regarding 

outbreaks of disease. As a result, an important intelligence opportunity is 

being missed. The intelligence and public health communities need to 

combine information on disease with intelligence about enemy intent to 

use biological agents for terrorist and other criminal purposes. 

Biological terrorism and naturally-occurring diseases could have an 

enormous impact on mass gatherings. Comprehensive biosurveillance, 

pervasive biological detectors, and domestic medical intelligence could 

help protect populations. Strengthening these areas will better ensure the 

public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings throughout the 

Nation. 

 
7

Q FEVER ATTACK – SCENARIO 

The crowds had been gathering for days ahead of the 

races that they had come from across the country to 

watch. The race facility had the capacity to hold 150,000 

in the grandstands and by race day it was full. In 

addition, the infield and miles of surrounding 

campgrounds hosted thousands more. Including the 

hundreds of support personnel who were also present, 

about 200,000 had descended on this otherwise quiet 

rural county. There were so many people assembled in 

and around the facility that the county suddenly became 

the third largest population center in the State.23 

The large number of people coming into the county gave 

the area many of the same urban characteristics that 

exist in cities. The Federal government did not take this 

into account when it was distributing homeland security 

funds, including those to help prevent terrorist attacks 

against urban areas. 

Prop-airplanes and the occasional helicopter flew 

overhead, pulling advertising banners behind them. 

They flew at a 3000-foot or higher ceiling up until one 

hour before and one hour after a race, during which time 

greater Federally-imposed flight restrictions came into 

play.24 

Having long wanted to target one of America’s favorite 

pastimes, the terrorist – a trained pilot – decided to use 

one of these banner planes (originally a crop duster)25 to 

commit an act of biological terrorism. Weeks before, he 

filed a flight plan to pull a banner, release it, and then do 

some sky-writing. By race day, he had mounted both 

crop-spraying26 and smoke-generating equipment on the 

plane. Consistent with his flight plan, the pilot drew a 

banner behind the plane up until 30 minutes before FAA 

rules required that planes stop flying above the venue. 

Over the next 25 minutes the plane flew lower and lower. 

Five minutes before all aircraft needed to leave the area 

completely; the terrorist dropped the plane close to the 

stands, flying 4000 feet along the front and back 

stretches of the track. The air traffic controllers furiously 

demanded that the plane fly to an appropriate distance 

away from the venue. The pilot insisted that he was just 

trying to give the crowds a thrill. No one saw the 

biological agent he released. The weather27 and the 

configuration of the grandstands kept the biological 

agent in the air at one to five meters28 above and around 

the crowds along two lines29 near the front and back 

stretches of the track. 

The audience was excited to have the plane fly so close, 

and did not notice anything coming out of the plane. 

First responders at the track did not realize what had 

occurred because the agents used was not visible and 

they did not have biological detectors.30 

The terrorist had not been interested in killing large 

numbers of people at this venue. Killing just a few would 

accomplish his purposes – mass panic, and economic 

and social disruption. With these aims in mind, the 

enemy chose a biological agent that was not known to 

cause large numbers of deaths.31 

Ordinarily, the symptoms of the disease caused by the 

agent would not show up until 10-14 days after people 

had been exposed to a small amount of the agent. 

However, knowing that some would have had a higher 

exposure than others, the terrorist expected that at least 

some people in the audience would get sick in only a few 

days. 

Most fans stayed to watch the race that day and 

overnight. About 80,000 fans had left for their homes 

throughout the region, and another 80,000 continued to 

camp near the venue when the first signs of illness 

began to occur, including a number of nonspecific 

symptoms such as fever, headache, chills, weakness, 

and mild coughing.32 Unfortunately, people suffering 

these symptoms did not feel they needed to see a 

doctor. When some began to develop pneumonia, 

however, they did get medical treatment. As more 

became ill, and it became clear something had 

happened at the race, many people began to panic and 

similar venues began to worry about the impact on ticket 

sales. 

Eventually, the organism was identified as the rickettsia 

Coxiella burnetii, which causes Q Fever, a potentially 

(but not usually) deadly disease.33 Almost everyone who 

had been at the venue was treated with antibiotics and 

recovered. However, some died either from the disease 

itself or because they had compromised immune 

systems that were unable to fight the disease. An 

investigation by Federal law enforcement identified the 

banner plane as the delivery vehicle. In the end this act 

of biological terrorism was attributed to a homegrown 

terrorist – a member of an extremist white supremacist 

organization. 
8

“Mass gatherings such as 

NASCAR races present major 

public health risks.”46

- Dr. Lou Turner 

Department of Health 

North Carolina 

Background 

Since the anthrax events of 2001, the threat of 

biological terrorism has been taken seriously34 and 

is no longer considered a remote possibility.35 

Although there are no biological weapons in the 

U.S., and it is more difficult to obtain biological 

organisms now than it used to be,36 the biological 

threat is still real. Some organisms, such as 

anthrax37 and plague,38 are found naturally 

throughout the U.S. and the world. It is easy to get 

training in laboratory procedures at most 

universities. Security is also not as tight as it 

should be in many places where scientists are 

conducting research on these diseases.39 As a 

result, it is possible for terrorists to get hold of and 

grow these and other naturally 

occurring organisms for biological 

terrorism.40 It is also relatively 

easy to figure out how to deliver 

these biological agents.41 

Large groups of people congregate 

at mass gatherings of all types for 

days before, during, and after the events. In some 

cases, the number of people concentrated in these 

areas can grow so large that ordinarily small towns 

become some of the largest cities in the States 

where these events happen. Infectious diseases 

such as Q Fever42 and anthrax43 infect a person but 

do not spread directly from one person to another. 

Bioterrorism using infectious disease agents 

benefits from mass gatherings because there are 

more people present that could be exposed initially. 

Using military-grade biological weapons or material 

in this context could be devastating.44 Just one of 

these biological agents could kill hundreds to 

hundreds of thousands, depending on whether the 

organism has been modified, how much of it is 

used, and how it is delivered.45

As for contagious diseases (diseases that one 

person can pass on to another), the more people 

concentrated in one area, the quicker a contagious 

disease spreads, and the more likely people will get 

sick.46 Moreover, many may not show signs of 

disease until some time after they return home.47

Mass gatherings can be affected by naturallyoccurring diseases, as well as bioterrorism.48 

Existing guidelines state that if a potentially 

devastating disease was spreading throughout a 

population, then community leaders should 

seriously consider canceling and prohibiting public 

gatherings.49 Pandemic influenza is an example of 

this type of disease.50 However, this decision 

would be made only after the disease has already 

obviously begun to spread. In the case of a longterm mass gathering, it could be that a disease 

starts to spread just as events are happening at a 

particular venue, but before anyone has had a 

chance to notice. As a result, a naturally-occurring 

disease could cause the hundreds of thousands of 

people attending these events to become sick even 

without an act of biological 

terrorism. 

Furthermore, diseases that could 

be prevented by vaccines could 

be the source of outbreaks at 

mass gatherings if enough of the 

people exposed there had not 

been immunized beforehand.51 People decide not 

to get vaccinated for a variety of reasons (such as 

fear of bad reactions, expense, and the misguided 

belief that they are unnecessary). As a result, the 

overall immunity of a group that can protect 

unvaccinated individuals (herd immunity)52

decreases.53 Complicating the problem is that 

some public officials have incorrectly stated that all 

necessary immunizations are obtained as 

children.54 Seasonal influenza is only one of a 

number of immunizations that adolescents and 

adults must get.55 

Adults who were never vaccinated as children 

against certain diseases, or have not received 

boosters for them, may not be able to fight off the 

organisms that can cause an outbreak – including 

those that could be introduced by terrorists 

deliberately at mass gatherings.56 An example of 

such a naturally-occurring disease is Hepatitis A, 

which afflicted attendees of mass gatherings at an 

outdoor concert series in 2003.57 The attendees 

that became ill were young adults that had never 

been vaccinated against the disease.58 
9

What Has Been Happening 

Sharing Information 

Public and private sector personnel in different 

States share information about the biological threat 

and resources to counter this threat with those they 

consider partners. However, personnel in the 

States have decided to do so for different reasons. 

For example, in Alabama, many talked about a 

culture of cooperation that exists in that State.59 

They said that this cooperative culture was a 

characteristic of Alabamians. In another example, 

public and private sector personnel in North 

Carolina described sharing information as a best 

practice, feeling that doing so makes organizations 

more efficient in their State.60 

Collecting and reporting information regarding 

health and illness is the responsibility of 

Departments of Health throughout the Nation. 

Different States employ different strategies for 

collecting, reporting, and sharing public health 

information about mass gatherings. For example, 

some States have teams of public health personnel 

physically onsite during mass gatherings.61 Others 

have teams spread throughout the State on a 

permanent basis, sometimes near venues where 

mass gatherings occur frequently.62 Having public 

health personnel at or near mass gathering venues 

could allow them to pass information from the 

Departments of Health to support personnel at the 

venues and back. 

Regardless of the type of mass gathering event, 

health care professionals (emergency medical 

technicians, nurses, doctors, etc.) that treat 

attendees, participants, and others report 

information about their patients in accordance with 

State requirements.63 Additionally, there is 

communication between the private sector entities 

that provide this health care and those that pay for 

this service.64 These private sector health care 

entities also may have the ability to communicate 

directly with personnel within the venue’s Joint 

Operations Center, if there is one.65 

The FBI has already established relationships with 

all State Departments of Health throughout the 

country,66 and the State and other public health 

laboratories that form the Laboratory Response 

Network for Bioterrorism (LRN).67 Therefore, 

information can be shared and exchanged between 

the FBI and the public health community generally 

and with the LRN member public health 

laboratories specifically.68 When the FBI is present 

at mass gatherings,69 it is possible for those in the 

public health community to relate information about 

a biological threat to the FBI, which could in turn 

communicate that information to the Federal and 

non-Federal organizations they partner with at 

these venues. 

National Guard Civil Support Teams70 are 

sometimes deployed to mass gathering venues, 

with equipment to detect biological and other 

agents that could be used for terrorism.71 The Civil 

Support Teams throughout the U.S. have worked 

hard over the past 10 years to establish 

relationships with the members of the LRN.72 They 

have also learned how to communicate information 

about what they detect to both their military and 

civilian partners (including those within the public 

health community).73 

Some information regarding biological threats may 

exist at the State fusion centers.74 A fusion center 

is defined as “a collaborative effort of two or more 

agencies that provide resources, expertise, and 

information to the center with the goal of 

maximizing their ability to detect, prevent, 

investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist 

activity.”75 Many fusion centers have established 

relationships with non-traditional law enforcement 

partners, such as the public health community.76 

They reach out to members of those communities if 

they need help in analyzing information about 

biological threats.77 

Conducting Biosurveillance

Departments of Health throughout the country 

possess public health surveillance systems that 

track, monitor, and report public health and 

disease-related information. Additionally, public 

health teams are often deployed throughout States. 

Personnel who specialize in identifying and 

controlling disease outbreaks are members of 

these teams. The teams reach out to the 

community and monitor diseases.78 If these teams 
10

are in the right place at the right time, they can be 

in an ideal position to identify and help manage 

outbreaks.79 

North Carolina, for instance, assigns public health 

personnel to hospitals throughout the State to 

monitor patient information and identify unusual 

trends that could indicate that an act of bioterrorism 

or a naturally-occurring outbreak has occurred.80 

The North Carolina Department of Health has put 

public health personnel in 11 major hospitals for 

these purposes. Known as the North Carolina 

Detect System, this hospital information is 

combined with information from North Carolina 

State Poison Control to create an overall picture of 

disease within the State.81 Leaders at the North 

Carolina Department of Health recognize that 

information technology may eventually gather, 

analyze, and communicate this sort of information 

more efficiently. However, at this point, they feel 

there is no better solution than to have public health 

personnel in the same place that generates the 

patient information. This allows them to use their 

best judgment to identify trends and communicate 

concerns back to the Department of Health and 

throughout the State. 

County health departments in Florida have 

biosurveillance systems that they use regularly. 

When Super Bowl XLI came to Miami in 2007, 

three County health departments and the State 

Department of Health increased their public health 

activities in general and biosurveillance efforts in 

particular.82 These four departments managed to 

incorporate a number of very different 

biosurveillance systems to obtain additional data, 

enabling them to more quickly detect an outbreak 

or bioterrorist attack should they occur during this 

two-week period.83 A bioterrorist attack did not 

occur, but the combined and focused use of these 

multiple systems did pick up increased cases of 

illness, accidents, and absenteeism.84 This effort 

demonstrated that it was possible to integrate 

different biosurveillance systems – even in the 

absence of a coherent National biosurveillance 

program. 

The collocation of public health epidemiology 

personnel with health care delivery personnel has 

occurred at some mass gatherings. For example, 

this occurred during the XVII Central American and 

Caribbean Games.85 This collocation was part of a 

public health surveillance system that was 

established specially for this mass gathering 

venue.86 

The collocation of public health and medical 

personnel who were implementing a biosurveillance 

system tailored to a particular event also occurred 

during an outdoor mass gathering of a National 

youth organization.87 At this mass gathering, 

collaborative planning88 resulted in daily syndromic 

surveillance that was conducted throughout the 

event.89 This allowed for rapid disease 

identification and control.90

Overseas, China is increasing its biosurveillance 

and biosecurity efforts in advance of the Olympics 

to be held this summer in Beijing.91 The country 

has recognized that a biological event could occur if 

organisms that cause illness and/or death are left 

unsecured. They also realize that the impact of 

such an event would be much greater due to the 

large numbers of attendees, participants, and 

support personnel that will make up the Olympic 

mass gathering. The effort to better ensure 

laboratory safety and security is being carried out 

by a non-traditional partnership between the Beijing 

Municipal Health Bureau and the Beijing AntiTerrorism Office.92 

Assessing the Biological Threat

The FBI is responsible for both obtaining and 

generating intelligence regarding a variety of 

threats and potential targets, including mass 

gatherings throughout the U.S. As a member of the 

intelligence community, the FBI can also obtain 

intelligence (regarding the targeting of mass 

gatherings) from other intelligence organizations. 

Whether and how much information the FBI gets 

depends on: 

 How well it understands the threats against 

mass gatherings, 

 Its relationships with others in the intelligence 

community, and 
11

 Its ability to generate requests for information to 

which FBI and other agents can realistically 

respond. 

The FBI also creates threat assessments.93 It 

shares those assessments with State, local, and 

tribal personnel in the public and private sectors, if 

they think it is necessary.94 If the FBI gets 

information that indicates that a biological agent 

might be used for terrorism at a particular mass 

gathering, that information is included in the threat 

assessment for that venue. Other more nonspecific or unsubstantiated threats may be 

addressed in FBI bulletins. For example, a threat 

against sporting venues (including NCAA venues) 

was indicated online, and was the subject of an FBI 

bulletin in 2006.95 These bulletins provide 

information about possible 

targeted groups and events 

throughout the U.S. These 

bulletins are more widely 

distributed and accessible to the 

public than the threat 

assessments. 

What Non-Federal Entities 

Should Do 

Analyze Health Data for 

Unusual Trends at Mass 

Gatherings 

As stated previously, some 

information is collected on the 

patients seen by health care 

providers at mass gatherings and passed to 

appropriate State public health entities. Although 

an outbreak would quickly be identified after 

patients had been transported to hospitals and 

doctors offices, it is possible that patients decline to 

be seen by other health care professionals, 

choosing instead to return to the mass gathering. 

For this reason, information generated by these 

mass gathering venues should be analyzed for 

unusual trends, regardless of whether patients 

leave the venue for additional medical treatment. 

What the Federal Government Should Do

Fully Establish a National Biosurveillance 

System 

Systems of varying sizes, capabilities, and utility 

that track diseases operate throughout the Nation. 

However, these systems differ in each State, 

locality, and tribe by: 

 How much tracking is done, 

 Which diseases and health conditions are 

monitored, and 

 Whether personnel just look at reported 

information or actively go out to see if people 

are getting sick. 

Attempts to create a National 

biosurveillance system have been 

largely unsuccessful to date. It has 

been hard to incorporate the large 

number of different disease tracking 

systems that exist in every State, 

locality, and tribe. Additionally, 

different diseases affect different 

locations. The National value we 

place on protecting the privacy of 

our citizens (which includes 

information about their health) also 

makes this task particularly 

challenging. The Federal 

government continues to integrate 

biosurveillance efforts and improve 

early warning systems for disease 

outbreaks. There has been some 

improvement, but there is much left to be done. 

Funding to improve and integrate disease tracking 

technology throughout the U.S. must be 

systematically applied in order to achieve the goal 

of creating a comprehensive National 

biosurveillance system. Funding from the 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) 

and some private sector entities has been used to 

upgrade the technology for existing systems and to 

create new systems. However, technology will 

have to leap over current levels to achieve the sort 

of National system needed. 

“Tonight, we will have a 

weather inversion. If 

aerosolized or powdered 

biological agents were 

dropped via aircraft doing a 

fly-over of the stands and 

track, this biological material 

would stay over the crowd. 

We know this would occur, 

but we would not be able to 

detect it unless the agent 

was visible.”30

- Fire Chief Randy Holloway 

Department of Fire & Life Safety 

City of Concord 

North Carolina
12

Develop Better Biological Detectors 

In addition to the information technology 

requirements described above, the technology to 

detect all types of agents used in weapons of mass 

destruction must be improved. In particular, first 

responders supporting mass gatherings need 

biological detectors that provide valid and reliable 

results.96 However, because biological detectors 

vary in their ability to provide valid and reliable 

results, the widespread use of the biological 

detectors currently available to first responders is 

not recommended at this time. 

Other detectors provided by the Federal 

government (such as the Department of Homeland 

Security BioWatch detectors) are not yet prevalent, 

and efforts to improve the technology are still 

ongoing. However, even if the technology was 

perfect, these detectors might not necessarily be 

the best kind to put in non-urban venues as they 

were originally designed to be used in metropolitan 

environments. Regardless, first responders 

providing support to mass gathering venues need 

reliable detectors for biological and other agents,97

whether they are hand-held devices or the type that 

could be mounted to facilities found at mass 

gatherings.98 The Department of Homeland 

Security and other Federal agencies not only need 

to continue their efforts to improve this technology 

but also come up with acceptable devices that can 

provide some amount of reliable data in the 

meantime. The Science and Technology 

Directorate of the Department of Homeland 

Security specifically should continue to make such 

research a top priority. 

Communicate Information from Detectors So It 

Can Be Understood by Decision-Makers 

The information generated by detectors will be 

used by decision-makers at mass gatherings 

themselves and by policymakers at the Federal, 

State, local, and tribal levels. It must be 

understandable. Ideally, this information should 

also be easily uploaded by standard information 

management systems such as the FBI Virtual 

Command Center (VCC). The VCC system is 

utilized by some mass gathering venues in their 

Joint Operations Centers for the purpose of 

managing events and identifying public health, 

safety, and security requirements. 

Improve Domestic Medical Intelligence Efforts 

An accurate picture of the biological threat must be 

generated. In order to do so, it is important to 

gather, validate, and analyze information about: 

 

 Human health, disease, and illness, and 

 Terrorist or other criminal intent to use 

biological agents against a particular group or 

population. 

Historically, information about human health, 

disease, and illness has been the responsibility of 

the public health and health care delivery 

communities. On the other hand, information on 

the intent to use biological agents for terrorist 

purposes has been the responsibility of the 

intelligence community. 

The intelligence community is addressing the 

biological threat in a variety of ways. Its efforts 

have grown out of historical requirements such as 

the need to understand the threats from biological 

warfare and naturally-occurring diseases in the 

areas in which military troops operate. The Armed 

Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), for 

example, has produced medical intelligence for 

soldiers deployed abroad for 68 years.99 However, 

AFMIC activities are strictly confined to DOD 

personnel and activities overseas. Here in the 

U.S., there is no equivalent military or civilian 

activity. Other programs run by the intelligence 

community to address the biological threat are also 

so specialized that they do not provide a 

comprehensive or particularly useful picture of this 

biological threat to or within the U.S. 

Approaches for keeping patient data anonymous 

must be developed in order to promote better 

intelligence analysis of biological threats. Patient 

health information is not shared easily with the 

intelligence or Federal law enforcement 

communities. This is necessary to protect the 

privacy of these patients. However, because 

information about the intent to use biological agents 

is separate from information regarding outbreaks of 
13

disease, an important intelligence opportunity is 

being missed. 

An attempt has been made at the Federal level to 

solve this problem by providing some intelligence to 

a few Federal health agencies, such as the Centers 

for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 

However, because these agencies are not part of 

the intelligence community they do not usually 

possess intelligence analysts who can make best 

use of this information. Additionally, often only 

high-level personnel (who are not responsible for 

intelligence analysis) in these organizations 

possess the clearances necessary to view 

classified information in the first place. Another 

way to combine patient health information with 

intelligence regarding intent to use biological 

agents for terrorist or other criminal purposes must 

be found. 

Working through these issues marks the beginning 

of a domestic medical intelligence program. 

However, these efforts are not yet organized or 

robust enough to produce medical intelligence for 

the entire Nation. Additionally, what little medical 

intelligence is produced by the Federal government 

is not yet efficiently or effectively communicated to 

State, local, and tribal personnel. 

What Should Congress Do 

Continue to Demand that Biological Detectors 

Produce Valid and Reliable Results 

The Department of Homeland Security has made 

next-generation technology for BioWatch a top 

priority. However, it is just as important to improve 

biological detectors for first responders that can be 

used in a variety of areas, and that will produce 

valid and reliable results. 

Congress should continue to conduct oversight of 

the Department of Homeland Security regarding 

BioWatch. Congress should also continue to hold 

the Department of Homeland Security and other 

Federal Departments and agencies that develop 

biological detection technology accountable for 

detectors that produce valid and reliable results, 

and that the first responder community can afford 

and will use. 

Establish a Comprehensive National Medical 

Intelligence Program 

The U.S. needs a comprehensive National Medical 

Intelligence program that will provide early warning 

of disease outbreaks. The program should allow 

public health information to be combined with 

information about the biological threat and the 

intent to use biological agents for terrorism and/or 

other criminal acts. To support these aims, 

Congress should continue to conduct oversight 

over current efforts to produce domestic medical 

intelligence, within a framework that protects 

patient privacy. Congress should also continue to 

support the expansion of State fusion center 

activities to address the biological threat by 

including non-traditional law enforcement 

partners100 such as public health professionals.101 
14

Collaborative Planning in the Mass Gathering Context 

Closing the Gap between Decisions and Emergency Action 

CONGRESS SHOULD...

Ensure that training, 

exercises, standards, and 

lessons learned are 

connected to planning 

efforts. 

Hold the Federal government 

accountable for delivering 

more useful planning and 

other products. 

Require the Department of 

Homeland Security to issue 

better guidance regarding 

the National Threat Levels. 

Require the Department of 

Homeland Security to work 

with the public and private 

sectors to develop 

emergency action plans for 

mass gatherings. 

Planning for long-term mass gatherings is extremely challenging especially 

when hundreds of thousands of people attend for days at a time. They 

can be spread out over many acres, and they may move in and out of the 

venues frequently. They may also participate in events that occur before, 

during, and after the main events. Additionally, because so many people 

attend, it may be that it is not possible for every person, container, and 

vehicle to be checked conclusively for safety and security. 

The public and private sector entities that work with mass gatherings utilize 

a variety of planning processes to determine how best to deal with threats 

to these events. The most effective of these is collaborative planning.102 

This type of planning has been used to produce plans and guidance and to 

inspire ongoing interaction among partners striving to ensure public health, 

safety, and security at mass gatherings. Event managers and the public 

and private sector organizations providing support to mass gathering 

venues also need to ensure that training opportunities, exercise 

requirements, setting of standards, and identification and communication 

of lessons learned are connected to the collaborative planning processes 

they engage in together. 

Public and private sector personnel providing support to mass gathering 

venues must create tailored emergency action plans and become familiar 

with their contents. They must address public health, safety, and 

security,103 as well as a variety of risks, including those from hazardous 

materials and agents that could be used by terrorists.104 Additionally, 

every emergency action plan should be revisited at least annually to take 

into account different threats, vulnerabilities, and risks that may have 

arisen over the past year. 

The Federal government must issue additional specific guidance so that 

those in the public and private sector know what to do when the National 

Threat Level changes105 – including at mass gatherings. It will be 

impossible for the Department of Homeland Security to effectively and 

efficiently communicate requirements to all public and private sector 

entities throughout the Nation in the midst of an emergency. This 

guidance needs to be developed and issued now, so that response is not 

delayed. 

The Federal government needs to improve its mechanisms for developing 

and communicating planning guidance regarding mass gatherings to the 

public and private sectors. It must also create more flexible grant guidance 

that takes into account unique State, local, and tribal needs without being 

either too general or specific. Strengthening these areas will better ensure 

the public health, safety, and security of mass gatherings throughout the 

Nation. 
15

CHANGE TO CODE ORANGE – SCENARIO

On July 2nd, the Department of Homeland Security 

raised the National Threat Level106 from yellow to 

orange107 for the entire country and every sector 

within it. Throughout the country, decision-makers 

in communities, large and small, had to weigh 

whether to go forward with parades, festivals, 

concerts, and fireworks to celebrate July 4th. Most 

decided to host Independence Day festivities as 

planned so as not to allow the terrorists to win. 

Although people were aware that the National 

Threat Level had changed and that the Department 

of Homeland Security had 

issued recommended actions 

for citizens,108 they did not 

change their plans to attend 

community-sponsored July 4th

celebrations. 

Across the country, local law 

enforcement personnel tried to 

get additional information about 

the threat from the Federal 

government to find out whether 

their particular events were at risk. All that the 

Department of Homeland Security would say was 

that the National Threat Level has been raised to 

orange as a precaution and to stand by for further 

information. Law enforcement personnel also 

approached their local FBI field office in hopes of 

getting clarification but were disappointed to find 

that their contacts at the FBI were unable or 

unwilling to provide more information. 

At the State level, the State Directors of Homeland 

Security asked their respective Governors as well 

as their own contacts in the Departments of 

Homeland Security and Justice whether additional 

resources would be deployed to any of the States 

since the National Threat Level had been raised. 

The response from the Federal government was 

that Federal resources were not being sent at that 

time. 

In the absence of actionable information or 

intelligence, most local, tribal, and State law 

enforcement officers felt compelled to ramp up 

security. All emergency personnel were required to 

be on standby. Hospitals were told to bring in 

additional personnel, as opposed to simply having 

them on call. Members of the public health 

community were told to activate their disease 

surveillance systems. Organizations responsible 

for environmental monitoring were also told to 

increase their efforts. Doing all of this came at an 

enormous economic cost, as so many in each 

community took an “all-handson-deck” approach to address 

an unknown threat to their July 

4th festivities. 

The parades, concerts, 

festivals, and fireworks went off 

as planned. All across the 

country, there was a collective 

sigh of relief that terrorists did 

not attack one of our most 

cherished National holidays. 

However, the added public health, safety, and 

security precautions came at a huge price. Over 

the weeks that followed, costs were tallied. 

American citizens were appalled to find out that 

their State and local governments—many of whom 

had budget deficits—were forced to spend between 

$20,000 and $1,000,000 to ramp up their efforts to 

protect these mass gatherings from a terrorist 

threat that was never properly identified. There 

was never any indication from the Federal 

government after July 4th as to whether a threat had 

been deterred, or whether the increased security 

efforts throughout the Nation contributed to 

preventing an act of terrorism from occurring. 

Without “specific, actionable 

information...we run the risk of 

communities taking it upon 

themselves to mobilize for every 

possible threat.”105

- Rep. Bennie G. Thompson (D-MS) 

Chairman 

Committee on Homeland Security 

U.S. House of Representatives
16

Background 

The public and private sectors create plans to 

address preparedness, detection, response, and 

recovery requirements for when mass gatherings 

are threatened. Planning efforts for large-scale 

long-term mass gatherings rank among the most 

challenging, since they can be so large and 

complex.109 This planning is difficult because: 

 Attendees can stay in the vicinity for longer than 

a week,110 

 Hundreds of thousands of people may flock to 

the area,111

 The venue could be targeted for acts of 

terrorism112 and 

 The association of many of these events with 

American culture113 could increase terrorist 

motivation to target these over other activities 

and events. 

What Has Been Happening 

Planning Based on Scenarios 

Military and paramilitary organizations commonly 

use scenarios to drive their planning efforts. For 

example, the U.S. Secret Service uses scenarios to 

help them identify training and other requirements 

necessary to protect Presidential candidates at 

mass gatherings.114 Local law enforcement also 

understands the value of this type of planning.115

NASCAR corporate security uses scenarios to drive 

planning efforts with its own employees as well as 

with the public and private sector personnel that 

support its venues.116 For example, NASCAR 

hosts an annual security summit,117 during which 

time a variety of concerns are addressed. A 

scenario is used to frame discussion regarding: 

 How well the threats, vulnerabilities, and risks 

particular to the scenario are being addressed, 

and 

 How current resources and actions can be 

applied to situations that have not yet arisen at 

the different venues.118 

The trouble with scenario-based planning is that it 

can be difficult for participants to believe that the 

hypothetical scenario could really happen. When a 

well-respected organization such as the U.S. 

Secret Service uses a realistic scenario for 

planning efforts, participants are inclined to believe 

the same and plan accordingly. However, when 

other organizations put forward scenarios for the 

same planning purpose, they do not necessarily 

carry the same level of credibility. If participants 

do not believe a planning scenario is possible, they 

may not be inclined to seriously consider what 

actions they would need to take to address the 

challenges presented in the scenario. 

PLANNING PROCESSES USED FOR MASS 

GATHERINGS 

Scenario-based planning is used to consider 

different possible environments (including potential 

threats that may be intentionally introduced, 

naturally-occurring, or accidental in nature), and to 

determine what steps would have to be taken today 

in order to accomplish organizational goals and 

objectives in those environments.119 Many 

organizations in the public and private sector use 

scenarios to help plan for different possible future 

states and contingencies.120

Capacity-based planning occurs outside of or in 

addition to scenario-based planning. In this process, 

the amount of work that can be completed within a 

specified timeframe to accomplish a specific task or 

set of tasks is determined. Capacity-based planning 

also seeks to identify areas in which efficiency can 

be increased and subsequently addressed.121

Capability-based planning also occurs outside of 

or in addition to future-oriented scenario-based 

planning activities. In this process, performance 

standards and desired capabilities in a variety of 

situations are identified and subsequently 

pursued.122 

 

Collaborative planning is one of the most effective 

planning processes. In this process, organizations 

with unique goals and objectives share information 

and other resources, working together to plan for 

and achieve goals agreed upon by the group.123 
17

Planning Based on Capacity 

State and local organizations providing support to 

mass gatherings emphasize the importance of 

planning based on current capacities.124 They are 

often very focused on: 

 The resources they have, 

 The limitations of their equipment and training, 

and 

 The difference between what they can do now 

and what they could do if they had more 

resources.125 

These organizations are also concerned about 

what they might be called upon to do, based on the 

needs of a particular emergency, regardless of the 

resources they possess.126 State and local 

personnel are clear that given their current 

resource constraints, they are very limited in their 

ability to take on additional requirements. For 

example, the local bomb squad in Cabarrus 

County, North Carolina, provides much of the bomb 

detection support for mass gatherings that occur in 

the county and has one team composed of four 

people, one of whom provides 

administrative support only.127 

The equipment it has is 

antiquated128 and the team 

possesses very few detection 

dogs.129 The bomb squad 

works in concert with other law 

enforcement organizations 

that bring their own personnel, 

dogs, and equipment to 

address various situations.130 It does have the 

capacity to sweep a mass gathering venue on 

multiple occasions, respond to suspicious 

packages, and conduct some other limited 

activities. However, in an emergency, it would not 

be able to take on many more duties. It simply 

does not have the human, animal, or physical 

resources to do so.131

Local personnel are fully aware of their 

predicament. They are quite clear in their 

communications with others about what they have 

and what they can do. Reality guides their planning 

and operations, not wishful thinking. They are also 

aware of what they could do if they had more 

resources – funding, equipment, and personnel. 

This knowledge allows them to participate in 

capability-based planning as well.132 

As part of capacity-based planning for different 

mass gatherings, there has been discussion of how 

to evacuate venues such as the Olympics 133 and 

whether to shelter in place when evacuation is not 

possible or advisable.134 During an exercise at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, the public and private 

sector personnel supporting the races addressed 

what to do in the event of a biological attack. They: 

 Learned that evacuation may not always be the 

best choice for response – because there may 

be more medical assets and personnel at the 

venue, among other reasons,135

 Weighed the benefits and consequences of 

evacuating spectators – realizing that panicked 

evacuation could cause injuries,136 and 

 Decided that having fans and support personnel 

remaining in place might be a better option – 

because evacuation could possibly infect or 

harm others beyond the venue.137 

The Department of Homeland 

Security has produced 

evacuation planning guidance to 

be used at all NASCAR 

venues.138 Members of the 

public and private sector that 

provide support at three race 

facilities met in 2007 with 

personnel from the Department 

and provided input regarding 

their challenges and circumstances.139 Originally, 

the public and private sector participants expected 

that the Department would help personnel 

supporting these three venues develop evacuation 

plans specific to their tracks and surrounding areas 

that could then be modified and tailored for use by 

the other venues.140 Instead, the Department 

preliminarily issued more general guidance141 that 

the track personnel responsible for evacuation 

planning found to be of limited use.142 The 

Department has accepted this feedback and 

continues to work with NASCAR and its public and 

private sector partners to refine this guidance.143 

“We must continually anticipate 

possible dangers and be ready 

with a plan of action to keep the 

public safe.”115

- Mark H. Luttrell 

Sheriff, Shelby County, Memphis 

Tennessee 
18

Planning Based on Capabilities 

Capability-based planning is undertaken by those 

at the State, local, and tribal levels who know or 

believe they can obtain more resources than what 

they usually have on hand.144 They do not 

necessarily expect that additional resources will 

come from the Federal government. States that 

have more resources because they have larger 

economic bases145 often engage in capabilitybased planning. Florida’s economy, for example, 

allows for such planning because it possesses 

large organizations such as Universal Studios and 

attractions like Walt Disney World, dense 

population centers,146 and other characteristics 

such as urban areas that qualify for funding under 

the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI).147 

Additional resources generated or paid for in the 

State can be and have been leveraged throughout 

the State to respond to emergencies (such as 

large-scale fires) and disasters (such as 

hurricanes). Therefore, local and tribal personnel in 

States like these expect that additional resources 

can be made available to them in the future as well. 

Collaborative Planning 

Of the four types of planning, collaborative planning 

has the most utility, results in 

products that are helpful to all 

participants, and is recognized 

as such. For example, even 

with NSSEs such as the 

Democratic and Republican 

National Conventions, it is clear 

that collaborative planning 

involving the U.S. Secret 

Service and non-Federal entities 

is effective.148 For the 

Democratic National 

Convention, the U.S. Secret 

Service has established an executive steering 

committee for planning purposes that includes 

traditional partners (such as local police 

departments and State public safety) and nontraditional law enforcement partners (such as the 

Denver Health Medical Center).149

During its annual security summit, NASCAR also 

encourages and supports participation in 

collaborative planning. Topics addressed at the 

summit vary150 and attendance has increased over 

the years.151 The summit provides a forum for the 

presentation of ideas, information, and training.152 

It also provides a unique opportunity for those 

attending to express their opinions about NASCAR 

guidance, Federal requirements, and other 

concerns.153 Members of the NASCAR Corporate 

Security team often serve as facilitators.154 This 

year, the summit engaged in collaborative planning 

regarding various requirements resulting from 

changes in the National Threat Level.155 

Collaborative planning also fills a conspicuous gap 

created by the Federal government’s failure to 

issue specific guidance about what to do when the 

National Threat Level changes from one level to 

another.156 Instead of waiting for the Federal 

government to finally issue such guidance, some 

States157 and private sector organizations158 have 

taken the initiative to address this and other issues 

using collaborative planning. 

Other Activities Related to Planning 

Training and education play key roles in fulfilling 

accreditation and/or professional development 

requirements for those in the public and private 

sectors.159 State and local governmental personnel 

stated that they do not have enough 

funding to provide all the training 

they would like160 or to provide 

coverage so that critical personnel 

can attend training.161 In the case of 

an NSSE occurring in a particular 

State, the U.S. Secret Service pays 

for and provides training to State 

and local personnel as part of their 

NSSE security operations.162 For 

mass gatherings that are not 

designated as NSSEs, training is 

not always provided.163 However, 

some mass gathering venues do provide training 

regarding the services available at and for those 

venues.164 

The University of Southern Mississippi Center for 

Spectator Sports Security Management165 has 

established a program to provide training and 

education in areas of concern to mass gatherings 

at sporting venues. The Center takes a number of 

“Public health planning for 

multi-day, outdoor mass 

gatherings should involve 

the event planning staff, local 

and State health 

departments, and other 

agencies responsible for 

public health and safety.”88

- Centers for Disease Control 

and Prevention 
19

threats into account, including terrorism, violence, 

and disasters.166 It delivers its training through 

academic and professional forums, as well as 

workshops.167 Students include event managers 

and organizers, venue staff, first responders, and 

private security,168 as well as other support 

personnel, such as ushers.169

Specialized training has been developed for some 

mass gatherings. For example, in advance of the 

Republican National Convention of 2004, 

thousands of law enforcement officers received 

training regarding weapons and agents of mass 

destruction.170 This training was developed and 

delivered by the New York City Police Department 

(NYPD) – not the U.S. Secret Service.171

Personnel throughout the Nation have also 

participated in exercises related to different types 

of mass gatherings, especially to test emergency 

preparedness and response.172 For example, the 

Large Stadium Initiative conducted by the Office of 

Homeland Security in the State of California has 

addressed various requirements regarding mass 

gatherings that occur at stadiums throughout the 

State using an exercise series.173 This Initiative 

has conducted a number of exercises at mass 

gathering venues including Dodger Stadium and 

the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum.174 

As with training requirements, standards are often 

set by professional bodies.175 Meeting these 

standards is required to maintain professional 

accreditation or certification.176 Local, tribal, State, 

and Federal governmental entities also require that 

accreditation and certification standards be met.177

Some mass gathering venues establish certain 

safety and security standards that personnel and 

venues must meet in order to be able to host 

events. For example, NASCAR has established 

and requires that certain safety and security 

standards be met in order for race facilities to be 

able to host NASCAR races.178 When standards 

are already established, they are incorporated into 

plans.179

On the other hand, standards have no yet been set 

for other mass gathering venues. For example, 

although the NCAA has issued planning 

guidelines,180 it has not yet identified and 

established public health, safety, and security 

standards for the venues that host NCAA games. 

Lessons learned during training events, exercises, 

and real-world experiences are valuable pieces of 

information that deserve to be recorded and shared 

with others.181 Lessons learned by the U.S. Secret 

Service and its partners when planning for and 

executing security requirements for previous 

NSSEs should be identified and also 

communicated to the organizations that must 

manage mass gatherings that are not declared 

NSSEs.182 The FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 

system183 could host this information because 

people at and in support of some mass gathering 

venues already have access to LEO.184 However, 

the Department of Homeland Security Lessons 

Learned Information Sharing (LLIS) system was 

specifically established for this purpose and could 

be used to centralize lessons learned regarding all 

mass gatherings.185 However, greater efforts need 

to be made to make the Federal, State, local, and 

tribal public health, safety, and security personnel 

that manage and support mass gatherings aware of 

LLIS and its utility. 

What Non-Federal Entities Should Do 

Involve High-Level Decision-Makers Personally 

in Planning Efforts 

There is a need for high-level public and private 

sector decision-makers to be more involved in 

planning efforts for mass gatherings, especially 

those that have not been declared NSSEs.186 

Although these decision-makers, such as State 

homeland security directors and venue owners are 

often not present for these discussions, they are 

the ones who request and control many of the 

resources necessary to accomplish the new goals 

and objectives that result from these planning 

efforts. Unfortunately, other demands often prevent 

their involvement. However, without the 

participation of these decision-makers, their 

personnel must still return and convince them that 

the new goals and objectives should be funded and 

supported.187 This severely limits opportunities to 

communicate and promote change. 
20

Connect Planning Efforts to Other Activities 

Planning is part of a cycle that should generate 

requirements for: 

 Training,188

 Exercises,189

 Setting of standards,190

 Identifying lessons learned,191 and 

 Receiving feedback that informs further 

planning.192 

Regardless of the type of planning process used, it 

must maintain connection with these activities. 

Event managers and the 

public and private sector 

organizations providing 

support to mass gathering 

venues need to ensure that 

training opportunities, exercise 

requirements, and setting of 

standards are connected to 

the collaborative planning 

processes they engage in 

together. In addition, special emphasis should be 

placed on observing, identifying, describing, 

recording, and communicating lessons learned to 

all partners involved in providing support to these 

venues. Purposeful attention to these areas and 

commitment to ensuring that training, exercises, 

standards, and lessons learned remain connected 

to planning is necessary to ensure the public 

health, safety, and security of those attending mass 

gatherings and the personnel that provide support 

to these venues. 

Develop and Implement a Comprehensive 

Emergency Action Plan at Each Venue 

Each venue that hosts mass gatherings needs to 

have a comprehensive emergency action plan. 

This should be the case regardless of the National 

prominence of the venues. For example, the 

emergency action plan for Ontario County, New 

York, contains plans that address emergency 

requirements (including evacuation) for a number of 

their large mass gatherings, such as the county fair 

and the Hill Cumorah Pageant in Manchester.193 

Frankly, if local entities can develop emergency 

action plans for their venues, higher-level betterresourced organizations should be able to do so as 

well. 

Example plans194 and templates195 are widely 

available. A preexisting emergency action plan can 

serve as a model or a template can be used, but 

either way emergency action plans must take into 

account the unique characteristics and 

requirements of each venue. Public and private 

sector personnel providing support to mass 

gathering venues must create tailored emergency 

action plans and become familiar with their 

contents. They must address public health, safety, 

and security,196 as well as a variety of risks, 

including those from hazardous materials and 

agents that could be used by 

terrorists.197 Lastly, every 

emergency action plan should 

be revisited at least annually to 

take into account different 

threats, vulnerabilities, and risks 

that may have arisen over the 

past year. 

Emergency action planning is 

part of a sound preparedness approach that 

addresses emergency situations. For the private 

sector, the return on investment has been proven to 

be high198 when such planning efforts are 

undertaken.199 Further, putting such a plan in place 

could decrease potential liability if an emergency 

occurs. 

What the Federal Government Should Do

Create Specific and Useful Planning Guidance 

In some cases, the Federal government has issued 

general guidance addressing mass gatherings. For 

example, the Department of Homeland Security 

worked with NASCAR Corporate Security and 

personnel at three of the tracks to create 

evacuation planning guidance.200 Much of the first 

product was deficient in a number of ways – too 

vague in parts201 and too overwhelming in the way 

of questions asked of track planners.202 As a result, 

many felt that they could not use the guidance at 

all, choosing instead to rely on other resources and 

“There is an interaction between 

doing what is right to add to the 

economy and the government 

obligation to protect – States 

need to plan for both.”125

- James M. Walker, Jr. 

Director of Homeland Security 

Alabama 
21

their own judgment.203 The Department continues 

to work with NASCAR and its public and private 

sector partners to refine this guidance.204 It needs 

to be finalized soon. It should not take years to 

produce useful planning guidance specific to these 

venues. 

Provide Better Guidance for Special Events and 

Mass Gatherings 

There are cases in which the Federal government 

has issued guidance that applies only when it says 

it applies, leaving State, local, and tribal personnel 

guessing. For example, the Department of 

Homeland Security uses a five-level rating scheme 

(called the Special Events Assessment Rating) to 

determine how different special events should be 

classified.205 The Department has created 

guidance specific to each rating level, and has also 

pre-identified what sort of Federal support will be 

provided accordingly.206 However, it has not 

provided lists of events that fall into each rating. 

It is extremely difficult for organizations to selfclassify using this rating system, and at the same 

time apply the limited amount of publicly available 

guidance to their venues or events.207 Further, the 

system is skewed towards Federal support as 

opposed to the identification of requirements for 

those supporting these venues at the State, local, 

and tribal levels.208 

Issue More Guidance Specific to Changes in the 

National Threat Level 

The Federal government must issue more guidance 

so that those in the public and private sector know 

what to do when the National Threat Level 

changes.209 Further, it will be impossible for the 

Department of Homeland Security to effectively and 

efficiently communicate new requirements to all 

public and private sector entities throughout the 

Nation while emergencies, disasters, or attacks are 

occurring and the Department is in the midst of 

responding to them. This guidance needs to be 

developed and issued now, so that response is not 

delayed in the future. 

Release More Flexible Funding Guidance 

The Federal government must create more flexible 

homeland security, emergency preparedness, 

planning, and planning-related funding guidance 

that takes into account individual State, local, and 

tribal needs without being too general or overly 

specific. Of course, Federal entities must strictly 

manage the grants, contracts, and cooperative 

agreements they issue. However, Federal entities 

must also understand the inter-relatedness of 

different activities, and take into account State, 

local, and tribal realities. For example, it is not 

uncommon to find that Federal exercise funding 

cannot be used to cover training expenses.210 

Unfortunately, it is also commonly the case that 

personnel must participate in an exercise without 

having been trained.211 In this situation, there is no 

point in forcing personnel to participate in exercises 

that test them on things that they have not yet been 

trained to do. 

The rules governing how funding can be applied 

should take into account these sorts of situations. 

It is also imperative that representatives from the 

Department of Homeland Security meet with the 

State Directors of Homeland Security to understand 

these situations and better inform Federal funding 

decisions.212 

Use a More Comprehensive Approach to 

Funding 

Connecting planning, training, exercises, setting of 

standards, and identification of lessons learned to 

each other is necessary to ensure public health, 

safety and security for mass gatherings. The 

Federal government must help non-Federal entities 

establish and execute programs composed of these 

interrelated activities. Funding and other support 

should be flexible enough to allow recipients to 

allocate the money to address and connect each of 

these elements. However, flexibility should not 

trump accountability. 
22

What Congress Should Do 

Ensure that Planning, Training, Exercises, 

Standards, and Lessons Learned are 

Connected 

Congress should continue to conduct oversight 

over programs established by the Federal 

government for planning, training, exercises, setting 

of standards, and identification of lessons learned. 

In particular, Congress should require the 

Department of Homeland Security to support 

programs in these areas that are connected and 

complement each other. Congress should also 

demand integration among these same areas 

within the Department. 

Hold the Federal Government Accountable for 

Delivering More Useful Planning and Other 

Products 

Congress should continue to solicit feedback about 

how valuable guidance, intelligence products, and 

other resources produced by the Federal 

government are to public and private sector 

entities. Congress should use that information to 

advocate on behalf of individuals and organizations 

throughout the Nation, and hold the Federal 

government accountable for delivering useful 

materials. 

Require the Department of Homeland Security 

to Issue Better Guidance Regarding the 

National Threat Levels 

Congress should establish a deadline for the 

Department of Homeland Security to provide clear 

and comprehensive guidance to the public and 

private sectors regarding what to do when the 

National Threat Level changes. Currently, there is 

too little information at the Department of Homeland 

Security’s website213 and other publicly available 

sources about what to do when these levels 

change. 

Require the Department of Homeland Security 

to Work with the Public and Private Sectors to 

Develop Emergency Action Plans for Mass 

Gatherings 

Congress should require the Department of 

Homeland Security to work with private sector 

entities that host mass gatherings to create 

emergency action plans for venues where mass 

gatherings occur. Congress should also ensure 

that the evacuation planning guidance developed 

by the Department of Homeland Security is not 

finalized until planners at the venues find the 

guidance useful enough to produce evacuation 

plans and incorporate them into the emergency 

action plan for each venue. 
23

Partnering Across Sectors in the Mass Gathering Context 

Sharing Information and Resources to Achieve Mutual Goals and Objectives 

CONGRESS SHOULD...

Hold the Department of 

Homeland Security 

accountable for creating 

useful guidance that does 

not generate additional 

burdens for those who need 

to use it. 

Require that the Department 

of Homeland Security keep 

improving its evacuation 

planning guidance until 

stakeholder needs are met. 

Encourage the Department 

of Homeland Security to fund 

partnership-based activities. 

Hold the Department of 

Homeland Security and other 

Federal agencies 

accountable for sharing 

information regarding mass 

gatherings. 

Encourage the Department 

of Homeland Security to 

expand its funding criteria for 

programs that impact mass 

gatherings. 

Work with the Department of 

Homeland Security to help 

its employees better assist 

State, local, and tribal 

personnel in emergency 

situations.

Sharing information and resources helps ensure the public health, 

safety, and security of mass gatherings. The public and private sector 

organizations that support mass gatherings interact in complex ways. 

These organizations need to collaborate and cooperate to achieve their 

goals and objectives. No one organization by itself has enough 

information, funding, and resources to control everything that happens 

at mass gatherings. 

Organizations are most successful when they set aside professional 

differences, adopt the same mission, and purposely choose to work 

together in order to achieve that mission. When that occurs, 

information and resources are shared. When it does not, information is 

held back, resources are hoarded, and unnecessary competition 

occurs. 

The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI need to partner 

effectively with the State fusion centers. Additionally, all Federal 

Departments and agencies need to help States obtain and maintain 

back-up systems and resources to handle a crisis when Federal 

organizations have to pull back and support other missions. 

Partnerships also need to be strengthened and institutionalized 

between the public and private sectors. 

Employees of the Department of Homeland Security are assigned to 

field offices and are conducting operations throughout the Nation. 

They must be trained and empowered to better assist State, local, and 

tribal personnel should they have to assist in a response to a disaster 

or catastrophe. Department of Homeland Security personnel need to 

know: how to serve as intermediaries between the Department and 

State, local, and tribal personnel; and what duties to carry out until a 

Principal Federal Official and a Federal Coordinating Officer can be 

identified and deployed to the area, if the situation warrants. 

Strengthening these areas will better ensure the public health, safety, 

and security for mass gatherings throughout the Nation. 
24

TORNADO AT THE CONVENTION CENTER – SCENARIO

The Washington County Council had decided to issue 

permits to the organizers of a major traveling 

alternative music festival, allowing them to put on 

shows at three different venues, over a three-day 

period in August. This festival was expected to draw 

more than 180,000 and was viewed as a potential 

boon to the local economy. It was the responsibility of 

the sheriff’s office to coordinate with security 

personnel at the three venues (the Regal 

Amphitheater, the Corner Community Playhouse, and 

Washington County Community College Stadium) and 

other public safety and security personnel who 

volunteered to come in from other areas of the State 

to help protect this mass gathering. 

The sheriff did not expect much in the way of Federal 

support. However, the sheriff had worked with an ICE 

agent a few years ago on a human trafficking case, 

and was informed by that agent that ICE would be 

bringing a five-person team to the festival, working in 

an undercover capacity. The team was following the 

music festival as it moved across the Nation, building 

a case against a ring that was selling counterfeit 

merchandise.214

On the morning of the second day of the festival, 

organizers announced that one of the bands, a 

legendary group out of Chicago, was breaking up and 

would not be performing that night. In response to the 

news, vendors outside the three venues quickly sold 

out of all merchandise associated with this group. 

The ICE agents realized this would result in the sale 

of more counterfeit merchandise and a bigger bust, if 

only they had more agents on site. However, ICE did 

not send more agents to the venue because 

investigations elsewhere needed support and there 

were no more agents to spare. 

By that afternoon, the weather turned unseasonably 

hot and humid. Weather forecasts mentioned 

possible tornado conditions, but most people at the 

festival believed the odds were low. The military, 

however, canceled a field exercise that had been 

going on at a nearby base because it was concerned 

that excessive winds could damage the 

communications equipment being used in the 

exercise. 

The troops were given time off and many decided to 

come to the festival. 

At approximately 4:30 pm, a tornado hit the 

Washington County Community College Stadium. 

There was no advance warning, so it was not possible 

to evacuate anyone before landfall. Fans, musicians, 

and emergency personnel were surprised by the 

sudden appearance of the tornado. Some were killed 

instantly by flying debris. The extensive damage to 

the stadium hindered evacuation, search, and rescue 

efforts. 

Tornados also touched down in two other areas of the 

State. They overwhelmed the capacity and capability 

of the State and local governments to respond. The 

Governor asked the President to declare a state of 

emergency215 which would allow Federal response 

assets to be sent to the State to assist. The President 

made the declaration. 

Although there was a county emergency action plan, 

that plan only contained general evacuation planning 

guidance. The college also had an emergency action 

plan, but it was specific to evacuating intact buildings. 

According to the National Response Framework, the 

Department of Justice should be in charge of public 

safety and security216 when responding to a 

Presidentially declared disaster. Because there were 

no representatives from the Department of Justice 

present at the festival, leadership of the emergency 

support function was assumed by the ICE agents, 

when the team members identified themselves. The 

ICE agents also offered to assist with response 

activities, feeling it was their duty as representatives 

of the Department of Homeland Security, the Federal 

agency responsible for emergency management, 

response, and recovery. The agents had little prior 

training in and knowledge of these areas and the 

Department’s emergency management and response 

assets. They were essentially flying blind, developing 

expertise and relationships as they helped State and 

local personnel respond to the disaster. 
25

Background 

Managing mass gatherings is challenging. Many 

organizers and venue owners feel that they have 

seen and prepared for almost everything. They 

also believe that the Department of Homeland 

Security or some other Federal agency will tell 

them if there are additional risks or threats to their 

venues. Without new information, they assume 

there is nothing else to worry about. 

Partnerships have been established over the years 

to address acts of terrorism,217 crime,218 and 

nature219 for mass gatherings. These partnerships 

are between the public and private sectors, 

different levels of government, and different 

businesses. They vary according to: 

 Location, 

 Organizational policies, 

 Priorities of powerful stakeholders (such as 

venue owners), and most importantly, 

 Whether individuals decide to partner. 

Different partners in this effort nevertheless still find 

it difficult to work together.220 Events like those of 

September 11, 2001, however, provide a reminder 

of what can happen when different organizations 

operate separately but then are suddenly expected 

to work and communicate with each other. The 

NYPD221 and the New York City Fire Department 

(FDNY),222 for example, were historically 

competitive organizations that took great pride in 

maintaining their differences. However, on 

September 11, 2001, they found that they could not 

communicate quickly with one another because 

they lacked interoperable communications 

equipment223 and because communicating with one 

another on a daily basis was not a priority for either 

the NYPD or FDNY until that day.224 Today, 

despite this horrific example of what happens when 

partnerships are not in place ahead of time, many 

organizations throughout the country are still 

unable to communicate with each other due to old 

communications equipment225 and reluctance to 

abandon longstanding competition.226 This serves 

no one. 

THE LABORATORY RESPONSE NETWORK: 

NON-TRADITIONAL PARTNERSHIPS ADDRESSING 

THE BIOLOGICAL THREAT 

The Association of Public Health Laboratories (APHL),227

the CDC, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the 

FBI decided to work together to establish the Laboratory 

Response Network for Bioterrorism (LRN) in 1999.228 

Although these Federal entities had some experience 

working with each other before 1999, the State Public 

Health Laboratories (SPHLs)229 did not have significant 

ongoing experience with the FBI. Members and staff of 

APHL decided to make developing a relationship with 

the FBI across the Nation a priority – and senior 

management and staff at the FBI decided to 

reciprocate.230 Personnel in both organizations were 

required to: 

 Communicate with one another, 

 Identify points-of-contact, and 

 Ensure that they knew where the SPHLs, and FBI 

offices were located, etc.231 

 

All of this was required well in advance of the anthrax 

events of 2001.232 As a result, these attacks were 

handled far more efficiently and effectively than would 

have happened otherwise. 

Non-traditional relationships of this sort take continuous 

work to maintain. Nearly ten years later, FBI agents new 

to the LRN still walk into meetings announcing that they 

are “in charge,” and are surprised to find that others do 

not agree (even within the FBI). Technicians in the 

laboratories who find that they have to support LRN 

activities for the first time still shy away from contacting 

local FBI field offices, nervous about communicating with 

someone in Federal law enforcement on matters of 

National and homeland security. The bottom line is that 

these relationships require maintenance, clearly defined 

and understood roles, open lines of communication, and 

the ongoing support of senior leadership in all of the 

partner organizations. Only then will entities such as 

the LRN continue to be successful when responding to 

potential and suspected acts of terrorism. 
26

The public and private sectors historically also have 

operated independently.233 However, there is 

growing recognition that in certain situations the 

public sector may need to get involved in what the 

private sector is doing. One of these situations is 

when mass gathering events need greater security 

than had been necessary before, because they 

have become: 

 So successful that losing them would hurt the 

economy, 

 So popular that they would make attractive 

targets for terrorism or other crimes, or 

 So large that acts of terrorism and other crimes 

committed there would affect more people. 

Consequently, all levels of government and the 

private sector need to be involved in ensuring the 

public health, safety, and security of mass 

gatherings where a terrorist could have tremendous 

social and economic impact. 

What Has Been Happening 

Sharing Information at the Fusion Centers 

One of the reasons State fusion centers were 

established was to help share information and 

intelligence between the Federal government and 

State and local authorities, within a framework that 

protects privacy and civil liberties.234 Fusion 

centers try to meet the State and local demand for 

homeland security information. They are a 

testament to the fact that personnel at the State 

and local level are the best people to obtain 

information about acts of terrorism and other crimes 

occurring in their own localities.235 They also 

provide logical nexus points for the Federal 

government to share its data on threats. 

Throughout the Nation, fusion centers have 

received varying levels of funding, other resources, 

and support.236 Also, each fusion center: 

 Is developing at a different rate,237

 Emphasizes different things, 

 Builds on old State and Federal systems, 

 Is affected by the leadership styles of their 

State Homeland Security Director,238 and 

 Varies in terms of the ongoing presence of nontraditional law enforcement partners.239

Federal entities vary in the speed at which they 

have placed their own personnel at these fusion 

centers.240 For example, in North Carolina, the FBI 

already has two personnel in the fusion center, but 

the Department of Homeland Security has yet to 

send anyone.241 Other fusion centers, such as the 

center in Alabama, are still waiting for personnel 

from both of these Federal Departments.242 As of 

March 2008, DHS has deployed personnel to 19 

fusion centers, with plans to have personnel in an 

additional 21 centers by the end of the year.243

Fusion centers share a number of different types of 

information. However, it is often easiest for them to 

share criminal statistics because the law 

enforcement databases that generate this 

information have already been integrated there.244 

Fusion centers also keep track of major events that 

are occurring in their States on common calendars, 

so that their partners are aware that these events 

are happening.245 Additionally, fusion centers may 

assess threats to mass gathering events or rely 

upon other entities (such as the FBI or the State 

Highway Patrol) to conduct threat assessments and 

send them to the centers. Organizations that need 

information obtain it by contacting the fusion 

centers directly. 

Sharing Information by Participating in Task 

Forces 

Information is also shared when participating in 

task forces and working groups that focus on 

issues of mutual concern. Including 

representatives from a variety of different 

organizations in these groups is the key to success. 

For example, membership in bioterrorism task 

forces in North Carolina goes well beyond the 

public health community.246 The bioterrorism task 

force in North Carolina has been so effective in 

using non-traditional partnerships, sharing 

information, and working together that it is now 

looking to address other issues as well.247 
27

Sharing Resources

No one entity by itself has all of the necessary 

resources to control and manage mass gatherings. 

This is especially the case when they: 

 Are very large, 

 Last for long periods of time, and 

 Include many events. 

This holds true for corporate entities, each 

individual venue, and every public and private 

sector organization providing support during mass 

gathering events. Therefore, resources must be 

shared. 

Some resources utilized by law enforcement are 

commonly shared in order to better secure mass 

gatherings. For example, for football games 

occurring at Ohio State University (which attract 

more than 100,000 people), a local police force 

combines their canine resources with those of the 

State Highway Patrol, and together they sweep the 

venue for bombs.248

In the case of NASCAR, ATF brings a number of its 

resources to these venues.249 Although they share 

these resources or access to them, all remain 

under the control of ATF.250 For example, ATF 

places cameras throughout each venue but grants 

track private security personnel access to the video 

feeds.251 Sharing resources in this case is easy 

because: 

 The entities involved share the same mission 

requirements, 

 ATF leaders have made support to such events 

and local governments a priority,252 and 

 Bringing in their own equipment allows ATF to 

respond more quickly and help prosecute 

criminals more efficiently. 

Other Federal entities may also be present at mass 

gathering venues and share their resources at 

varying levels and for different reasons. For 

example, the FBI sometimes has a presence at 

mass gatherings to counter terrorism and can share 

its equipment with some of the venues in order to 

help its partners manage the mass gathering.253 

Additionally, when requested by the Governor or 

the Governor’s authorized representative, the 

National Guard also deploys civil support teams to 

some mass gathering venues. These teams bring 

their own detection equipment for weapons of mass 

destruction and their agents.254 Although they do 

not share their equipment, they do share the 

information about what they detect with their 

partners at these venues.255 

State entities can play a similarly important role. 

For example, the Alabama State Department of 

Transportation shares access to its camera network 

and video feeds with the State Highway Patrol.256 

In North Carolina, the Department of 

Transportation257 and the Highway Patrol258

command posts are collocated at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, where they share space as well as 

equipment with each other.259 In Alabama, this is 

not the case, but the Department of 

Transportation260 and Highway Patrol261 often 

physically place their personnel, vehicles, and other 

resources together on the roads at major 

intersections.262 Because the Department of 

Transportation and the Highway Patrol in both 

States share traffic control and safety missions, it is 

easier for them to share their resources and better 

control traffic at mass gatherings. 

Organizations coming together to ensure the public 

health, safety, and security of the attendees, 

participants, and support personnel at these 

venues recognize that together they can 

accomplish more than they can alone. In order for 

different organizations to share resources, they 

must: 

 Agree to support the overarching public health, 

safety, and security mission, 

 Share a goal that supports this mission, 

 Trust each other, and 

 Be willing and able to communicate frequently. 

Cooperation among Different Entities

The sharing of information and resources is always 

a challenge in any context, but happens more often 

when organizations are part of the same sector 

(such as defense) or when they share goals and 
28

objectives (such as law enforcement and public 

health agencies both working together to address 

the threat of terrorism). Agreeing to support the 

overall mission – to ensure the public health, 

safety, and security of attendees, participants, and 

support personnel at mass gatherings – is a good 

place to start partnering at these venues. Not only 

is this mission inspirational, it is also the sort of 

mission that no one argues against. From there, 

similarities can be identified, differences can be 

resolved, and disagreements about who is in 

charge of what can be negotiated.263 

Responsibilities for public health, safety, and/or 

security are sometimes shared by organizations in 

different professions or sectors. For example, at a 

mass gathering for an NFL Redskins football game 

at FedEx Field in Maryland, the stadium owner, 

county police, and the county fire department share 

responsibilities for public safety and security.264 In 

order for ordinary and emergency-oriented public 

safety and security decisions to be made efficiently, 

these different entities must cooperate to make 

decisions together or have decided ahead of time 

who is specifically responsible for what type of 

decision and in what instances. 

During the XVII Central American and Caribbean 

Games, public health and health care delivery 

personnel were collocated.265 Although it may 

seem to some readers that this would not be an 

unusual occurrence, the public health and medical 

professions do not usually collocate in this manner. 

In another remarkable occurrence, public health 

information was also shared with a very nontraditional public health set of partners – officials at 

the games.266 

What Non-Federal Entities Should Do 

Share Responsibility for Providing Resources 

Scarce resources cause even the most tight-knit 

communities to fight. This certainly holds true for 

the community of people that should work together 

to ensure the public health, safety, and security of 

mass gatherings. Even in the case of NSSEs 

(where the Federal government provides many 

resources), there is debate. Some believe that 

corporate entities should pay for everything 

because they turn profits. Others believe it is the 

responsibility of the Federal government to pay 

because it appears to have the most resources at 

its disposal. Still others believe that local 

governments should pay because they possess 

primary jurisdiction over where mass gathering 

venues are located. All of these stakeholders need 

to discuss what each organization can and will 

provide. No one organization by itself has all of the 

resources necessary to manage and control every 

mass gathering. 

There are many processes for understanding the 

point-of-view of others and getting people to agree 

on plans and procedures. One of these processes 

should be chosen and used in the mass gathering 

context. How much responsibility for providing 

funding and other resources public and private 

sector organizations should take is something that 

should be debated,267 with the expectation that 

everyone needs to share at least some of their 

resources. 

Put Different Types of Organizations in the 

Fusion Centers to Help Analyze Information

The best products from information analysis are 

those that: 

 Draw upon a variety of sources,268 

 Have very different entities viewing the same 

problem, and 

 Incorporate radically different perspectives.269 

Fusion centers go out of their way to develop 

partnerships with those outside of the law 

enforcement community. However, unless a 

variety of organizations are present in the fusion 

center full-time, the analysis of information can 

never really be complete. For example, without 

public health personnel in the fusion centers, the 

centers can never fully understand the biological 

threat or other threats to public health. 

Fusion centers should build upon the good work 

they have done so far in establishing, developing, 

and maintaining partnerships with personnel that 

are not in the law enforcement community. Fusion 

centers that do not have these non-traditional 
29

partners physically within their centers should work 

to make that happen. This will better enable: 

 Information sharing between and among these 

different communities, 

 Intelligence development at the fusion centers, 

and 

 Earlier detection of threats. 

Institutionalize the Same Valuable Partnerships 

at All Venues 

As discussed previously, ICE has partnered with 

the private sector to investigate commercial fraud 

and violations of intellectual property rights at a 

number of mass gathering events, including the 

Super Bowl.270 This partnership between the public 

and private sectors works well.271 It benefits the 

sport (preventing the illegal use of logos, etc.), and 

it benefits ICE (helping them to execute their law 

enforcement missions). Having ICE and other 

Department of Homeland Security personnel at the 

stadium also allows for more rapid communication 

with the Department of Homeland Security.272 This 

is a clear example of a partnership that should be 

institutionalized at other mass gathering venues. 

What the Federal Government Should Do

Share More and Better Information and 

Intelligence 

Information sharing remains a challenge at all 

levels. After September 11, 2001, National policy 

was changed to require that Federal agencies 

share information and intelligence with State, local, 

tribal, and private sector organizations.273 

However, Federal law enforcement and intelligence 

agencies were not accustomed to sharing 

information with non-Federal entities and found it 

difficult to do so despite the new emphasis on 

needing to share. This is not surprising 

considering the historical challenges that have 

prevented Federal agencies from sharing 

information and intelligence with each other. 

The FBI sometimes generates and distributes 

intelligence bulletins to State and local law 

enforcement officers nationwide. These bulletins 

contain information about potential threats and 

other issues for which FBI partners should be on 

the lookout. Although these bulletins are often sent 

to State and local law enforcement, because they 

are unclassified, they also find their way to other 

types of organizations. 

Lack of information sharing has had a tangible 

impact. For example, the FBI field office in 

Birmingham, Alabama, had developed a threat 

assessment regarding the Talladega Super 

Speedway.274 The FBI decided that it did not need 

to share this assessment, since there was no 

special threat to the Speedway.275 This made 

State, local, and private sector personnel 

needlessly wonder if there were threats to the 

Speedway that they were not being told about.276 

Complicating matters has been the tendency of 

Federal agencies not to share threat assessments 

and other information and intelligence with State 

fusion centers on an ongoing basis.277 As a result, 

fusion centers must either create their own threat 

assessments for mass gatherings and other 

situations, or go without them altogether.278

The Federal government certainly has the right to 

decide whether it is appropriate to share its threat 

assessments, information, and intelligence. 

However, deciding whether an outside entity needs 

this information is not only dependent on the 

judgment of the Federal organization that created 

the product in the first place. Without building 

relationships and understanding the information 

requirements of its partners, a Federal agency may 

have no idea what sort of information another 

Federal, State, local, tribal, or private sector entity 

might need. Organizations must develop these 

relationships and overcome barriers to information 

sharing. 

Make it a Practice to Share Information with 

Trusted Non-Federal Partners 

The Federal government should establish a 

nationwide policy for Federal agencies to share 

certain types of information with trusted nonFederal partners, understanding that exceptions 

must be made in certain circumstances. For 

example, FBI field offices should share the results 
30

of threat assessments for mass gatherings in the 

States where they are located with at least one 

non-Federal organization that helps to provide 

security at these venues, such as the local Sheriff’s 

Department or the State Bureau of Investigation. 

Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security 

should share the information it has about threats to 

mass gatherings regularly with trusted partners 

throughout the country, such as the State 

Departments of Homeland Security or the State 

fusion centers. If the lack of security clearance is a 

problem, then Federal agencies should make it a 

priority to get their trusted partners cleared. Until 

that happens, they should make as much of the 

necessary information available in an unclassified 

format. 

Continue to Assist States, Localities, and Tribes 

in Increasing Their Own Resources 

Sharing resources to fill gaps that no one 

organization or sector can fill is certainly a good 

idea, and one that is implemented to varying 

extents at mass gathering venues throughout the 

country. However, filling gaps is not enough. As 

described above, some Federal 

Departments and agencies share 

resources with non-Federal 

public and private sector 

personnel in support of mass 

gatherings. Unfortunately, these 

resources can be called away 

from these venues if some 

higher priority situation happens 

(such as an act of terrorism). 

For example, ATF brings in 

resources to address the threat 

of bombing at a number of mass 

gathering venues and events, 

and shares these resources with State and local 

police as well as private venue security.279 

However, should ATF be called away to address a 

bombing or other threat, then ATF may well have to 

pull some or all of its resources away from its 

commitment. This would leave the venue short the 

resources that its track and public security forces 

count on to keep the attending public safe. It is, 

therefore, important for these non-Federal agencies 

to have strong infrastructures and their own 

resources (such as closed-circuit television) so that 

they will not be so dependent on those of the 

Federal government. 

Additional funding for State, local, and tribal 

agencies to purchase the equipment and other 

resources they need must be provided by the 

Federal government. On the other hand, State, 

local, tribal, and private sector entities also need to 

make a concerted effort to apply for additional grant 

funding to make these purchases. The need to 

support mass gathering events, and the reality that 

Federal assets that are usually shared but could be 

pulled at any time to support higher priority 

missions, should serve as two parts of the funding 

justification. Additionally, State leaders and 

bureaucracies should not stand in the way of 

applicants getting all or most of the funding for 

which they apply. 

It is also well worth exploring how much 

redundancy should exist. Federal, State, local, and 

tribal budgets are tight, so wise choices about how 

to allocate homeland security resources must be 

made. Purchasing equipment and other resources 

that are not used often and simply collect dust on a 

shelf is wasteful. On the other 

hand, without some redundancy, 

communities are: 

 Less prepared, 

 Less able to withstand 

emergencies, 

 Less able to carry out response 

and recovery activities, and 

 More prone to their 

infrastructure being 

compromised. 

One solution is to purchase additional equipment 

and resources that not only shore up existing 

stocks and support current missions but also have 

alternate uses in addition to homeland security. 

This kind of flexibility allows communities to deal 

with a whole host of issues. 

 

“State and Federal 

collaboration needs to 

increase. States need to be 

included in the process and 

strategy sessions that 

determine Federal funding 

allocations.”241

- Bryan E. Beatty 

Secretary of the Department of 

Crime Control & Public Safety 

North Carolina
31

What Congress Should Do 

Hold the Department of Homeland Security 

Accountable for Creating Useful Guidance that 

Does Not Create Additional Burdens for Those 

That Need to Use It 

Congress should continue to hold the Department 

of Homeland Security accountable for creating 

useful guidance that does not create additional 

burdens for those that need to use it. Using the 

specific example of the evacuation planning guide 

produced recently by the Department of Homeland 

Security for use by NASCAR venues,280 Congress 

should take into consideration the feedback from 

NASCAR about this guidance. Congress should 

require the Department of Homeland Security to 

improve that guidance until these stakeholders feel 

they have a tool that meets their needs. 

Encourage the Department of Homeland 

Security to Fund Partnership-Based Activities 

Congress should encourage the Department of 

Homeland Security to fund activities that are based 

on partnerships, including those that are nontraditional. Organizations seeking grants, 

contracts, and cooperative agreements from the 

Federal government often feel that they have no 

choice but to limit their activities (including reaching 

out to non-traditional partners) in order to compete 

successfully for funding. Congress should ensure 

that individual members of the Federal government 

do not unnecessarily restrict partnering activities 

with funding requirements that prevent 

organizations from establishing relationships with 

non-traditional partners, such as law enforcement 

partnering with public health. 

Hold the Department of Homeland Security and 

Other Federal Agencies Accountable for 

Sharing Information 

Congress should not only hold the Department of 

Homeland Security accountable for sharing 

information within its own organization. Congress 

should also hold the Department of Homeland 

Security accountable for sharing information with 

the non-Federal organizations and citizens it 

serves. If these non-Federal entities are not getting 

what they need, then the Department of Homeland 

Security has failed. Systems such as the 

Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN)281

need to be reworked, taking into better account the 

needs of the people who will use HSIN in the public 

and private sectors. 

Congress should also continue to hold the Federal 

government accountable for sharing information 

and intelligence. In addition to fulfilling various 

mandates, the basic act of sharing overcomes longstanding distrust. Trust can be fostered by holding 

Federal Departments and agencies to benchmarks 

for progress in this arena. This ensures that 

requirements are being met going forward. 

Encourage the Department of Homeland 

Security to Expand its Funding Criteria 

Congress should encourage the Department of 

Homeland Security to expand its criteria for funding 

so that it can be better used to purchase 

appropriate equipment and other resources. A 

State, locality, or tribe should be more competitive 

for funding if it has provided compelling justification 

for receiving it. Compelling justification exists if: 

 A State, local, or tribal organization can show 

that what it purchases will be used frequently 

for one homeland security purpose and 

occasionally for others, 

 The resources purchased will provide additional 

back-up, which would in turn improve 

preparedness, response, and recovery, and 

 Input from a wide array of potential users has 

been obtained and shows there is consensus 

that the equipment and resources add 

significant value to homeland security efforts. 

Work with the Department of Homeland 

Security to Help Its Employees Better Assist in 

Emergency Situations 

Congress should work with the Department of 

Homeland Security to help its employees 

throughout the Nation better assist State, local, and 

tribal personnel in emergency situations. Congress 

should also encourage the Department of 

Homeland Security to continue to refine the 
32

National Response Framework, better clarifying 

roles and responsibilities.282 In addition, training 

should be provided by the Department to teach its 

personnel how best to represent the Department 

during disasters and catastrophes. At a minimum, 

they should be trained to: 

 Know exactly who at the Department of 

Homeland Security they need to call in different 

situations, 

 Coordinate Federal and emergency assets and 

services until the Principal Federal Official283

and Federal Coordinating Officer284 are named 

and arrive on-scene (should a situation warrant 

naming such officials), and 

 Delegate or drop their other Federal mission 

requirements until relieved. 

Such a program would require additional resources 

to design and maintain. Congress should provide 

such funding. 
33

Public Health Security in the Mass Gathering Context 

Conclusion 

CONGRESS WILL DO ITS 

PART THROUGH...

Continuing conversations 

with personnel in the public 

and private sectors. 

Oversight of the Department 

of Homeland Security and 

other Federal Departments 

and agencies. 

Legislation, where 

necessary. 

Discussion 

It is clear that public and private sector partners have done and are 

doing a great deal on their own to ensure the public health, safety, and 

security of attendees, participants, and support personnel at mass 

gathering venues. There are major differences between the Federal 

resources and other Federal support provided to NSSEs and to mass 

gatherings that are not declared NSSEs. These disparities are not 

always appropriate, given the relative similarities between many mass 

gatherings that have been declared NSSEs to date, and those that 

have been considered non-NSSEs. Gaps also still exist, particularly in 

the areas of countering biological threats, collaborative planning, and 

partnering across sectors – all areas where the Department of 

Homeland Security should step up and do what it can to fill these gaps 

effectively. 

In the meantime, mass gathering lessons learned should be identified 

and adopted by organizers of all events, leveraging valuable 

experiences. All levels of government need to remain aware of 

potential threats to mass gatherings and continue to provide the 

additional funding and resources necessary to make up critical 

shortfalls. 

Next Steps

This report recommends a number of actions that should be taken to 

ensure public health, safety, and security at mass gatherings. They 

should be executed immediately by those in the public and private 

sectors. 

It is imperative that mass gatherings of all types and varying lengths be 

protected in the post-9/11 world. The House Committee on Homeland 

Security has examined a number of venues for mass gatherings and 

will continue to do so in its efforts to help keep the American people 

safe. 

# # #
34

Endnotes

 

1

 “Arenas and stadiums are attractive potential targets during events.” Esposito, R. (2008, March 4). March Madness: Homeland

Security Issues Warning on Sports Arenas – FBI and DHS Issue Warning Just in Time for March Madness. ABC News. Retrieved on 

March 6, 2008 at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Story?id=4387469&page=1

2

 “When an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the U.S. Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead 

federal agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan and Federal resources are deployed to maintain the 

level of security needed for the event and the area. The goal of such an operation is to prevent terrorist attacks and criminal acts. Once 

an event is designated a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service relies on existing partnerships with federal, state and local 

law enforcement and public safety officials with the goal of coordinating participating agencies to provide a safe and secure 

environment for the event and those in attendance.” Department of Homeland Security. (2006, December 28). Fact Sheet: National 

Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167323822753.shtm. 

“...The Secret Service is authorized to participate in the planning, coordination, and implementation of security operations at special 

events of national significance,” termed National Special Security Events. “When an event is designated by the Secretary of Homeland 

Security as a National Special Security Event, the Secret Service assumes its mandated role as the lead agency for the design and 

implementation of the operational security plan.” United States Secret Service. National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 5, 

2008 at http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml. 

3

 Reese, Shawn. (2008). CRS Report for Congress: National Special Security Events. Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on 

May 5, 2008 from http://www.congress.gov/erp/rs/pdf/RS22754.pdf

4

 “A political convention has "all of the elements of a terrorist's target — it's got a lot of people there, it's very symbolic ... and it's also 

very political," former CIA operative and senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, Peter Brookes, told FOX News. "The threat 

continues and there's no doubt this is a prime time to insert themselves — not only to kill Americans, but to insert themselves into our 

democratic process." Porteus L. (2004, July 8). Officials Warn of Summer Threats. FOXNews. Retrieved on May 8, 2008 at 

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,125065,00.html. 

5

 “A political convention has "all of the elements of a terrorist's target — it's got a lot of people there, it's very symbolic ... and it's also 

very political," former CIA operative and senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation, Peter Brookes, told FOX News. "The threat 

continues and there's no doubt this is a prime time to insert themselves — not only to kill Americans, but to insert themselves into our 

democratic process." Porteus L. (2004, July 8). Officials Warn of Summer Threats. FOXNews. Retrieved on May 8, 2008 at 

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,125065,00.html. 

6

 Department of Homeland Security. (2003, July 9). National Special Security Events Fact Sheet. Retrieved on May 11, 2008 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0207.shtm. 

7

 Department of Homeland Security. (2006, December 28). Fact Sheet: National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 11, 2008 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167323822753.shtm. 

8

 Department of Homeland Security. (2003, July 9). National Special Security Events Fact Sheet. Retrieved on May 11, 2008 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0207.shtm. 

9

 The NSSE designation is viewed “...as important to garner more Federal resources to protect the public and the event.” Archibold 

RC. (2003, July 10). GOP Convention Has Top Security Status. The New York Times. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at 

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E3DF103DF933A25754C0A9659C8B63. 

10 ‘”The objective behind the National Special Security Event as well as its designation is to coordinate a seamless security plan with 

our State and local partners, one that will create a safe and secure environment for all involved,” Secretary Ridge said.’ Archibold RC. 

(2003, July 10). GOP Convention Has Top Security Status. The New York Times. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at 

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E3DF103DF933A25754C0A9659C8B63. 

11 “As with past July 4 festivities since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the [National] Mall was fenced off and visitors will be required 

to pass through security checkpoints.” The Associated Press. (2007, July 4). July 4 Marked Amid Heightened Security. Retrieved on 

May 7, 2008 at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19602173/. 

12 “43,000 youths and adults attending a 10-day camping event held every 4 years by a national youth organization.” Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass 

Gathering – Virginia, 2005. MMWR Weekly 55(03):71. 
35

 13 “The bands performing at these concerts and festivals attract fans who travel from one concert to another, sometimes continuously 

over several months. Concerts are often multiday events involving camping on established or impromptu campgrounds...Attendance at 

the events has ranged from 1,200 to 82,000 persons.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003, September 5). Public Health 

Dispatch: multistate outbreak of Hepatitis A among young adult concert attendees – United States, 2003. MMWR Weekly 52(35): 844. 

Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5235a5.htm. 

14 “...College sports events were among the most vulnerable, with hundreds of venues, varying security emphasis and a high emotional 

impact. More than 48 million people attend at least one National Collegiate Athletic Association football game a season, offering an 

easy target.” The Associated Press. (2007, December 25). Experts Worry About College Stadium Security. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at 

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22394686/. 

“The intercollegiate game-day environment meets the criteria for a perfect strike with high consequences.” Hall S. Effective Security 

Management of University Sport Venues. The Sports Journal. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/effective-security-management-university-sport-venues. 

15 According to Al-Queda’s Manual of Afghan Jihad, football stadiums are recommended possible sites for acts of terrorism. Hall S. 

Effective Security Management of University Sport Venues. The Sports Journal. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/effective-security-management-university-sport-venues

16 According to the FBI, some mass gathering venues could be considered ripe targets due to the openness of the venues and amount

of people in one area at one time, as well as clear association as American sports or activities, the amount of money generated, and 

the huge number of sponsorships. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field

Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15). 

17 For example, “according to the IEG Sponsorship Report, NASCAR had total corporate sponsorship revenue last year of $1.5 billion, 

compared with $445 million for the NFL and $340 million for Major League Baseball...There are 106 Fortune 500 companies involved 

as sponsors – more than in any other sport.” O’Keefe B. (2005, September 5). America’s Fastest Growing Sport. CNN. Retrieved 

November 20, 2007 from http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/09/05/8271412/index.htm

18 For example, U.S. government agencies that are NASCAR sponsors include the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Naval Criminal 

Investigative Services, as well as entities within the Department of Homeland Security – the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border 

Protection. 

19 For example, NASCAR is widely televised. Bernhardt K. (2006, May 26). NASCAR’s Marketing Prowess a Biz Model. The Atlanta 

Business Chronicle. Retrieved on December 6, 2007 from http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/2006/05/29/smallb2.html

20 For example, “A week-long enforcement blitz led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeting the sale of 

counterfeit sports merchandise during Super Bowl XLII led to the seizure of more than 9,500 pieces of clothing and sports memorabilia 

valued at nearly a half-million dollars. As part of the crackdown, ICE agents and officers from the Glendale and Phoenix police 

departments arrested 24 individuals who now face charges of trafficking in counterfeit goods. The ICE-led enforcement effort, which 

also included investigators under contract to the NFL, focused on counterfeit items being sold by stores and street vendors across the 

Phoenix metropolitan area.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2008, February 7). ICE-led Task Force Seizes Nearly $500,000 

Worth of Phony NFL Merchandise and Sports Memorabilia. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080207phoenix.htm

In another example, “A joint operation by ICE, the NFL and the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office at Super Bowl XXXIX seized about 20,000 

counterfeit items valued at more than $5 million.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2007, August 2). ICE Seizes $5M in Fake 

NFL Goods. Inside ICE 2(4). Retrieved on May 8, 2008 at http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/insideice/articles/insideice_021405_Web1.htm. 

21 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an 

Outdoor Gathering – Virginia 2005. MMWR Weekly 55(03): 71-74, p. 71. Retrieved on January 20, 2007 from 

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5503a3.htm

22 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life

Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

 

23 This is similar to what occurs when NASCAR races occur at the Talladega Super Speedway in Talladega, Alabama. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, Physicians Medical Center Carraway, lead physician at 

Hardwick Care Center at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6) 
36

 24 “Pursuant to 14 CFR Section 99.7, Special Security Instructions, commencing one hour before the scheduled time of the event until 

one hour after the end of the event, all aircraft and parachute operations are prohibited at and below 3,000 feet agl within a three 

nautical mile radius of any stadium having a seating capacity of 30,000 or more people in which a Major League Baseball, National 

Football League, NCAA Division One football, or major motor speedway event is occurring.” Federal Aviation Administration. (2003, 

June 3). Special Notice, USA. Security NOTAM: FDC 3/1862. Retrieved on February 14, 2008 at 

http://tfr.faa.gov/save_pages/detail_3_1862.html

25 Various entities that provide support at the Talladega Super Speedway, such as the 46th Civil Support Team that deployed to the 

track from Montgomery, Alabama, believe they are prepared to detect and respond to biological agents distributed via crop duster at a 

mass gathering event like NASCAR. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with LTC James Heartsill and CPT Mark 

Smith of the 46th Civil Support Team (WMD), at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

26 Jane’s Information Group. (1992). Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition), p.138. Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group. 

27 Jane’s Information Group. (1992). Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition), p.140. Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group. 

28 Jane’s Information Group. (1992). Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition), p. 140. Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group. 

29 Jane’s Information Group. (1992). Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition), p. 140. Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group. 

30 The possible impact of the lack of biodetectors is a particular concern to first responders. For example, on the day he was 

interviewed by Committee Staff, Fire Chief Randy Holloway stated that, “Tonight, we will have a weather inversion. If aerosolized or 

powdered biological agents were dropped via aircraft doing a fly-over of the stands and track, this biological material would stay over 

the crowd. We know this would occur, but we would not be able to detect it unless the agent was visible.” House Committee on 

Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe’s 

Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

31 Jane’s Information Group. (1992). Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition), pp. 160-1. Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group. 

32 Jane’s Information Group. (1992). Jane’s Chem-Bio Handbook (2nd edition), p.160. Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group. 

33 For more information on Q Fever, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/qfever/. 

34 “At the extreme, some biological agents are as much as 14 billion times more effective than chemical agents, making it easy to see 

why biological agents are often described as the poor man’s atomic bomb.” Fatah AA, Barrett JA, Arcilesi RD, Ewing KJ, Lattin CH, 

and Moshier TF. (2001, December). An Introduction to Biological Agent Detection Equipment for Emergency First Responders (NIJ

Guide 101-00), p.1. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. 

35 Chang M, Glynn MK, and Groseclose SL. (2003, May). Endemic, Notifiable Bioterrorism-related Diseases, U.S., 1992-1999. 

Emerging Infectious Diseases 9(5): 556 

Mintz J and Warrick J. (2004, November 8). U.S. Unprepared Despite Progress, Experts Say. The Washington Post, p. A01. 

Retrieved on January 23, 2008 at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32738-2004Nov7.html. 

36 American Type Culture Collection. (2003, September 8). Material Transfer Agreement. Retrieved on January 23, 2008 at 

http://www.atcc.org/common/documents/mta/mta.cfm

37 Chang M, Glynn MK, and Groseclose SL. (2003, May). Endemic, Notifiable Bioterrorism-related Diseases, U.S., 1992-1999. 

Emerging Infectious Diseases 9(5): 556-564. 

38 Chang M, Glynn MK, and Groseclose SL. (2003, May). Endemic, Notifiable Bioterrorism-related Diseases, U.S., 1992-1999. 

Emerging Infectious Diseases 9(5): 556-564. 

39 Franko C. (2007, September 7). CDC Reports Further Texas A&M Lab Safety Failures, Select Agent Research Remains 

Suspended. UPMC Biosecurity Briefing. Retrieved on January 23, 2008 at http://www.upmcbiosecurity.org/website/biosecurity_briefing/archive/science_biosecurity/content/2007-09-07-cdcreportsfurthertxamlabsafetyfailures.html

40 Olsen KB. (1999, July-August). Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat? Emerging Infectious Diseases 5(4): 513-514. 
37

 41 Interpol. (2007). Bioterrorism Incident Pre-planning and Response Guide, p.4. Lyon, France, ICPO-Interpol. Retrieved on January 

23, 2008 at http://www.interpol.int/Public/BioTerrorism/BioterrorismGuide.pdf. 

 

42 American Public Health Association. (1990). Control of Communicable Diseases in Man, pp. 350-1. Washington, DC: American 

Public Health Association. 

43 American Public Health Association. (1990). Control of Communicable Diseases in Man, p. 18. Washington, DC: American Public 

Health Association. 

44 Alibek K and Handelman S. (1999). Biohazard: the chilling true story of the largest covert biological weapons program in the world –

told from the inside by the man who ran it. New York: Random House. 

45 Danzig R. (2003, August). Catastrophic Bioterrorism – What is to be Done? Washington, DC: National Defense University. 

46 For example, “Mass gatherings such as NASCAR races present major public health risks.” House Committee on Homeland Security 

Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of 

Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina.

(2007, October 16). 

Stergarchis A and Tsouros AD. (2007). International experience and framework of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games: Overview and 

Framework. In Tsouros AD and Efstathiou PA (Eds.) (2007). Mass Gatherings and Public Health: the experience of the Athens 2004 

Olympic Games, pp.6-8, 13. Copenhagen, Denmark: World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. 

Franaszek J. (1986). Medical care at mass gatherings. Annals of Emergency Medicine 15:600–601. 

47 Examples of diseases with incubation periods that could span the time that fans and support personnel are at mass gathering venues 

include anthrax (two to seven days), plague (one to six days), and smallpox (7-17 days). American Public Health Association. (1990). 

Control of Communicable Diseases in Man, pp. 18, 326, and 396. Washington, DC: American Public Health Association. 

48 Stergarchis A and Tsouros AD. (2007). International experience and framework of the Athens 2004 Olympic Games: Overview and 

Framework. In Tsouros AD and Efstathiou PA (Eds.) (2007). Mass Gatherings and Public Health: the experience of the Athens 2004 

Olympic Games, p.6. Copenhagen, Denmark: World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe. 

49 “...A combination of early, targeted use of antiviral medicines and social distancing (measures such as cancelling mass gatherings 

and closing schools) can stop a pandemic, or at least slow its spread. There would be significant practical challenges to implementing 

such measures, but the enormous social trauma and human suffering that an influenza pandemic could inflict creates an obligation to 

thoroughly explore all proposals to limit this damage.” World Health Organization. (2005, August 3). WHO Statement. Retrieved on 

January 25, 2008 at http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2005/s08/en/index.html

50 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease 

Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency

Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Jeffrey Engel, Section Chief, Epidemiology 

Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services 

headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

51 For example, it is feared that there will be a measles outbreak at the Euro 2008 soccer games. “Significant outbreaks are occurring 

in Switzerland and Austria, the two countries hosting the competition this summer, Europe-wide figures show...Hundreds of thousands 

of people, some of whom may be unvaccinated against measles, are expected to travel to Austria and Switzerland for the 

championship, European officials warned. ECDC director Zsuzsanna Jakab said: ‘Measles is one of the most contagious viruses in

existence, causing serious illness and even death. If unvaccinated people are exposed to it they have a high chance of being infected.’” 

BBC News. (2008, April 18). Euro 2008 Fans at Risk of Measles. Retrieved on April 22, 2008 at 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7352490.stm

Another example is mumps. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, May 18). Update: Multistate Outbreak of Mumps – 

U.S., January 1 – May 2, 2006. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 55(Dispatch): 1-5. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at 

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm55d518a1.htm
38

 52 Herd immunity is “the resistance to an infectious agent of an entire group or community (and, in particular, protection of susceptible 

persons) as a result of a substantial proportion of the population being immune to the agent. Herd immunity is based on having a 

substantial number of immune persons, thereby reducing the likelihood that an infected person will come in contact with a susceptible 

one among human populations.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2007, April 25). Glossary of Epidemiology Terms. 

Retrieved on April 17, 2008 at http://www.cdc.gov/excite/library/glossary.htm#immunityherd

53 For example, “...As long as vaccine-preventable diseases circulate in the world, a decline in immunization could leave American 

children vulnerable to infection...Without sustaining and maintaining the high coverage levels, these diseases can come back.” 

Manning A. (2005, July 26). Immunization Rates Exceed Federal Goals. USATODAY. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at 

http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-07-26-baby-immunization_x.htm

54 For example, the statement that everyone at the NASCAR races in Concord got all of their immunizations when they were born is 

both inaccurate and impossible, since not all immunizations are given to children but must be obtained as adolescents or adults, 

including those that are delivered on an annual basis, such as seasonal influenza. Hayes R. “Come to Concord. We'd love to have you 

[inaudible]. We got our shots when we were born.” CNN. (2007, October 11). Lou Dobbs Tonight. Transcript retrieved on January 

25, 2008 at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0710/11/ldt.01.html

55 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, October 13). Recommended Adult Immunization Schedule – U.S., October 

2006 – September 2007. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 55(40): Q1-Q4

56 “Even though most infants and toddlers have received all recommended vaccines by age 2, many under-immunized children remain, 

leaving the potential for outbreaks of disease. Many adolescents and adults are under-immunized as well, missing opportunities to 

protect themselves against diseases such as Hepatitis B, influenza, and pneumococcal disease.” Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention. (2007, July 19). Vaccines and Preventable Diseases. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vpdvac/default.htm

“...If we were not protected by vaccinations these diseases could quickly spread throughout the population, causing epidemics here. At 

the same time, the relatively few cases we currently have in the U.S. could very quickly become tens or hundreds of thousands of 

cases without the protection we get from vaccines.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2007, May 29). Basic and Common 

Questions: some common misconceptions about vaccination and how to respond to them. Retrieved on January 25, 2008 at 

http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/6mishome.htm#Vaccinepreventable

57 “...A cluster of hepatitis A cases were identified among young adults who had attended outdoor concert and camping events 

featuring various jam bands.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003, September 5). Public Health Dispatch: Multistate 

Outbreak of Hepatitis A Among Young Adult Concert Attendees – United States, 2003. MMWR Weekly 52(35):844. Retrieved on May 

7, 2008 at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5235a5.htm. 

58 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2003, September 5). Public Health Dispatch: Multistate Outbreak of Hepatitis A Among 

Young Adult Concert Attendees – United States, 2003. MMWR Weekly 52(35):844-845. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5235a5.htm. 

59 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease 

Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency

Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

60 “Sharing information is critical. The less information shared, the less efficiently things run.” House Committee on Homeland Security 

Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, 

Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

61 For example, the Alabama Department of Health puts an emergency preparedness team onsite at the Talladega Super Speedway 

over the entire time that the campgrounds are open for fans attending NASCAR events. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff 

Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of

Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at 

the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

62 This is the case with the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services which operates a regional public health response 

team out of Charlotte, North Carolina, near the Lowe’s Motor Speedway. They remain nearby while NASCAR events are occurring. 

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology 

Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services 

headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 
39

 

63 For example, public health reporting during NASCAR races at Talladega occurs in accordance with normal State reporting 

requirements. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. 

Walker, Jr. and Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 

5). 

64 For example, the Carraway Physicians Medical Center was contracted by and communicates with NASCAR to provide medical 

support at the Talladega Super Speedway. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the 

Hardwick Care Center in the Talladega Super Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

Additionally, Carolinas Hospital has a contract and communicates with Lowe’s Motor Speedway (not NASCAR itself) to provide medical 

services. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe’s 

Motor Speedway Medical Director, and Mr. Joe Penner, MEDIC Executive Director at MEDIC (Mecklenberg Emergency Medical 

Services Agency), Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 12). 

65 For example, the Talladega Super Speedway care centers can communicate directly with the Joint Operations Center for the 

Speedway. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the Hardwick Care Center in the 

Talladega Super Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

This is also the case with the care centers at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview

with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe’s Motor Speedway Medical Director, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, 

Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 12). 

66 For example, both the FBI and the Alabama Department of Health participate in the Alabama State Bioterrorism Advisory Council. 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control 

and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency 

Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

The FBI also has a Memorandum of Understanding with the State Department of Health in Alabama. House Committee on Homeland 

Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4). 

67 Caruso JT. (2001, November 6). Bioterrorism. Testimony of J. T. Caruso, Deputy Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI, 

before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at 

http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/caruso110601.htm

Jarboe JF. (2001, November 7). Law Enforcement Response to Bioterrorism. Testimony of James F. Jarboe, Section Chief, 

Counterterrorism Division, Domestic Terrorism Section, FBI before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime. Retrieved 

on January 26, 2008 at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress01/jarboe110701.htm

68 For example, the public health laboratories in North Carolina page or otherwise alert the FBI field personnel in the State with 

information regarding suspicious and strange findings. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special 

Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology 

Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services 

headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

A similar situation is described in Alabama between the public health laboratories and the FBI field personnel in the State. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and 

Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, 

Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

69 For example, the FBI is physically present at the races at Talladega to protect life and to call in assets if something were to happen. 

The FBI also works closely with track security and has agents present during the pre-race meetings and during the races. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 

4). 

The FBI also maintains a physical presence at the races in Concord. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI 

Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15). 
40

 70 “The WMD Civil Support Teams were established to deploy rapidly to assist a local incident commander in determining the nature

and extent of an attack or incident; provide expert technical advice on WMD response operations; and help identify and support the 

arrival of follow-on State and Federal military response assets. They are joint units and, as such, can consist of both Army National 

Guard and Air National Guard personnel, with some of these units commanded by Air National Guard lieutenant colonels.” Weapons of 

Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. Retrieved on December 17, 2007 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmdcst.htm

71 “The mission of Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams is to support local and State authorities at domestic WMD/NBC 

incident sites by identifying agents and substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, 

and assisting with requests for additional military support.” Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. Retrieved on 

December 17, 2007 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmd-cst.htm

72 For example, the Alabama State Department of Health partners with the 46th Civil Support Team (WMD) – the Civil Support Team 

has an infrared scanner for powders enabling them to identify primary components before the LRN laboratory utilizes its standard 

testing protocols. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer 

for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for 

Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with LTC James Heartsill and CPT Mark Smith of the 46th Civil Support Team 

(WMD), at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6) 

73 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with LTC James Heartsill and CPT Mark Smith of the 46th Civil Support 

Team (WMD), at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6) 

74 National Governors Association. Issue Brief: Establishing State Intelligence Fusion Centers, p. 11. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at 

http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/FusionCenterIB.pdf

75 U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice. (2006, August). Fusion Center Guidelines: developing and 

sharing information and intelligence in a new era, p. 2. Washington, DC: Department of Justice. Retrieved on December 14, 2007 at 

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf. 

76 Numerous fusion centers - including centers in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, 

Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, 

Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin – have established relationships with public health, private sector, and other non-traditional 

law enforcement partners. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to 

Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion Centers. GAO-08-35, pp. 56-107. 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control 

and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency 

Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Pubic 

Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in 

Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of 

Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, 

North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

77 For example, the Alabama Department of Health is a non-traditional partner that works with (but does not maintain a physical 

ongoing presence at) the State Fusion Center. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller,

Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services is also such a non-traditional partner that works with the State Fusion 

Center. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and 

Pubic Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special 

Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State 

Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis

Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

78 For example, there is one emergency preparedness team in each of 11 public health areas in the State of Alabama. Nurses on these 

teams link to infection control personnel in counties throughout Alabama. These nurses also obtain information from the county
41

 laboratories and forward it to the epidemiology division of the Alabama State Department of Health. House Committee on Homeland 

Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama 

Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department 

of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services fields regional response teams throughout the State. Team members 

integrate and communicate with local public health departments. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff

Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, 

at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

79 For example, the Alabama Department of Health puts an emergency preparedness team onsite at some long-term mass gatherings 

for the entire time that events are occurring. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, 

Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health 

Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, 

Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

The North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services operates a regional public health response team out of Charlotte, North 

Carolina, which is located near a number of venues featuring mass gatherings. They, too, remain nearby while mass gathering events 

are occurring. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, 

Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and 

Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

80 In North Carolina, the Department of Health and Human Services has put a public health epidemiologist in each of 11 major hospitals 

to examine emergency room data and report suspicious trends to the Department. This is known as the North Carolina Detect System. 

Bioterrorism preparedness funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is utilized to purchase and maintain the 

system. It is housed at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and provides syndromic surveillance for the State. Additionally, 

some data are also provided by State Poison Control. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview 

with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the

North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

81 In North Carolina, the Department of Health and Human Services has also put a public health epidemiologist in each of 11 major

hospitals to examine emergency room data and report suspicious trends to the Department. This is known as the North Carolina 

Detect System. Bioterrorism preparedness funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is utilized to purchase and 

maintain the system. It is housed at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and provides syndromic surveillance for the State. 

Additionally, some data are also provided by State Poison Control. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff 

Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, 

at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

82 “Four departments participated: Miami-Dade County Health Department, Cook County Department of Public Health, Marion County 

Health Department, and Indiana State Health Department.” Sniegoski C, Loschen W, Dearth S, Gibson J, Lombardo J, Wade M, 

Westercamp M, Wojcik R, and Zhang G. (2007). Super Bowl Surveillance: a practical exercise in inter-jurisdictional public health 

information sharing. Advances in Disease Surveillance4: 195. 

For example, “though the Miami-Dade County Health Department has in place a syndromic surveillance system, additional public health 

measures were implemented to ensure the health and safety of all residents and visitors in the weeks surrounding...” Super Bowl XLI. 

O’Connell E, Zhang G, Leguen F, Bustamante M, Borroto-Ponce, R. (2007). Enhanced Public Health Surveillance Activities in MiamiDade County for Super Bowl XLI. Advances in Disease Surveillance 4: 181. Retrieved on May 7, 2009 at 

http://www.isdsjournal.org/article/viewFile/2084/1652. 

83 “The Miami-Dade County Health Department utilized four surveillance systems, which included the Biological Warning and Incident 

Characterization system to support the BioWatch program, the Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Communitybased Epidemics, the Miami-Dade Fire Rescue 911 Call Center data, and school absenteeism data received from the Miami-Dade 

County Public School System.” O’Connell E, Zhang G, Leguen F, Bustamante M, Borroto-Ponce, R. (2007). Enhanced Public Health 

Surveillance Activities in Miami-Dade County for Super Bowl XLI. Advances in Disease Surveillance 4: 181. Retrieved on May 7, 2009 

at http://www.isdsjournal.org/article/viewFile/2084/1652. 

84 “Although no communicable disease outbreak or bioterrorism event was detected during the days surrounding these festivities, the 

Super Bowl had a public health impact on the community as evidenced by an increase in respiratory syndrome cases, motor vehicle

accidents and school absenteeism during that period.” O’Connell E, Zhang G, Leguen F, Bustamante M, Borroto-Ponce, R. (2007). 
42

 Enhanced Public Health Surveillance Activities in Miami-Dade County for Super Bowl XLI. Advances in Disease Surveillance 4: 181. 

Retrieved on May 7, 2009 at http://www.isdsjournal.org/article/viewFile/2084/1652. 

85 “Physicians provided medical care at the athletic village hospital, where an epidemiology unit conducted surveillance while the village 

was open.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1996, July 12). Public Health Surveillance During the XVII Central American 

and Caribbean Games – Puerto Rico, November 1993. MMRW Weekly 45(27): 581. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042955.htm. 

86 “To monitor injury- and illness-related morbidity among participants, the schools of public health and medicine at the University of 

Puerto Rico and the Puerto Rico Olympic Committee established a public health surveillance system designed specifically for this 

event.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1996, July 12). Public Health Surveillance During the XVII Central American and 

Caribbean Games – Puerto Rico, November 1993. MMRW Weekly 45(27): 581. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042955.htm. 

87 “...As buses arrived during the first two days of the event, medical and public health personnel screened persons on each incoming 

bus...” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an 

Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. MMWR Weekly 55(30): 71-74. 

88 “Public health planning for multi-day, outdoor mass gatherings should involve the event planning staff, local and State health

departments, and other agencies responsible for public health and safety.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 

27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. MMWR Weekly 55(30): 74. 

89 “...A daily syndromic sentinel surveillance system was used for rapid detection of communicable disease outbreaks to enable prompt 

public health intervention.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease 

Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. MMWR Weekly 55(30): 71-74. 

90 “...A daily syndromic sentinel surveillance system was used for rapid detection of communicable disease outbreaks to enable prompt 

public health intervention.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2006, January 27). Surveillance for Early Detection of Disease 

Outbreaks at an Outdoor Mass Gathering – Virginia, 2005. MMWR Weekly 55(30): 71-74. 

91 (2008, March 16). China Steps Up Biosurveillance for Safe Olympics. China View. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/16/content_7802796.htm. 

92 (2008, March 16). China Steps Up Biosurveillance for Safe Olympics. China View. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-03/16/content_7802796.htm. 

93 The FBI generates threat assessments for mass gatherings, when the FBI believes it is necessary. The threat assessment is law

enforcement sensitive and is sometimes shared with other law enforcement providing support at these mass gatherings. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 

4). 

For example, the Charlotte field office of the FBI also generates threat assessments for mass gatherings. Larger police departments 

throughout the State have their own threat assessment units as well. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with 

Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Pubic Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David 

Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant 

Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, 

at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

 

94 The threat assessment is law enforcement sensitive and is shared with other law enforcement providing support at mass gatherings, 

when the FBI believes it is necessary. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field 

Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4). 

On the other hand, some threat assessments generated by the FBI field office in Charlotte for some mass gatherings can be viewed via 

the LEO database. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, 

North Carolina. (2007, October 15). 

95 “The FBI said Friday there is no specific, credible threat of a terror attack aimed at college basketball arenas or other sports 

stadiums, but acknowledged alerting law enforcement to a recent Internet posting discussing such attacks... The FBI and Homeland 

Security Department distributed an intelligence bulletin...to State and local law enforcement nationwide describing the online threat 

against sporting venues...” The Associated Press. (2006, March 10). FBI: no credible terror threat on NCAA tournament. USATODAY. 
43

 Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2006-03-10-terrorthreat_x.htm?POE=SPOISVA%3Cbr%3E%3C/a%3E. 

“With college basketball championships under way around the country, the FBI has warned stadium operators of a possible suicide

bomb attack at sporting events...In a directive...the FBI said a posting on an extremist message board ‘advocated suicide attacks 

against sporting events as a cost-effective means of killing thousands of Americans.’" Ross B. (2006, March 10). FBI Warns of Possible 

Terror Threat at Sporting Events: extremist web posting comes as NCAA basketball’s finals heat up. ABC News. Retrieved on May 7, 

2008 at http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1711158. 

96 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life

Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

97 For example, regarding chemical detectors, “...the large number of community festivals and sporting events in Shelby County that

routinely attract thousands of people. Homeland Security Deputies will set up the sensing devices at community festivals such as the 

Memphis in May festivities and races at the Memphis International Motorsports Park in North Shelby County, which is located next door 

to a chemical company. Should chemicals be released into the air, the monitoring equipment would detect the type of chemical, give 

the speed and direction of the wind, and even provide guidance for an evacuation. Included with the sensing devices are detailed 

computer files about residential neighborhoods and business districts and their proximity to chemical companies.” Shelby County

Sheriff’s Office, Memphis, Tennessee. (2007, February 23). Sheriff’s Office to Receive Equipment for Terrorist and Chemical Disasters. 

Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://www.shelby-sheriff.org/press_releases/homelandsecuritysystem.asp. 

98 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life

Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

99 Kaufman DC. (February 21, 2001). Medical Intelligence: a theater engagement tool, p.11. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 

College. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at https://carlisle-www.army.mil/srp/ex_paper/Kaufman_D_C_01.pdf

100 “Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported facing challenges related to obtaining personnel...” Larence E. (2007, 

September 27). Homeland Security: Preliminary Information on Federal Actions to Address Challenges Faced by State and Local 

Information Fusion Centers. Statement of Eileen Larence, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability 

Office, submitted for the record when testifying before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 

Assessment, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives. Retrieved on January 26, 2008 at 

http://hsc.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20070927132600-95675.pdf

101 This is supported by personnel at the Alabama Fusion Center, who indicated that they would like to get someone from the Alabama 

Department of Health assigned to work at the Center to help with the Center’s efforts to address the biological threat. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, 

Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

102 “Collaborative planning is a process whereby individuals, agencies, and organizations, often with widely varied interests, work 

together to share knowledge and resources, and achieve mutually beneficial goals and enduring solutions through structured, civil 

dialogue.” Sonoran Institute. (2004). Collaborative Planning. Retrieved on February 16, 2008 at 

http://www.trustland.org/challenges/collab_planning.cfm

103 “Isolation of these agencies from...planning will lead to potentially significant hindrances in caring for the public in the event of an 

emergency incident during the special event.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: 

guidelines for law enforcement, p.51. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

104 “In planning security for major special events, law enforcement must always consider the risk from hazardous materials and 

weapons of mass destruction.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law 

enforcement, p.53. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

105 “The Committee on Homeland Security has repeatedly emphasized the importance of getting specific, actionable information to our 

first preventers in law enforcement and other emergency response providers. I urge you to follow up on your “gut feeling” and share 

whatever information our nation’s first preventers need to be on alert and prepared. Otherwise, we run the risk of communities taking it 

upon themselves to mobilize for every possible threat. This not only would result in communities depleting their scarce homeland 

security resources but runs contrary to your efforts to move toward a risk-based approach to homeland security.” Thompson, BG. 

(2007, July 11). Letter to Secretary Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at 

http://homeland.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=241. 
44

 

106 “The Homeland Security Advisory System is designed to guide our protective measures when specific information to a particular 

sector or geographic region is received. It combines threat information with vulnerability assessments and provides communications to 

public safety officials and the public.” Department of Homeland Security. (2008, February 1). Homeland Security Advisory System. 

Retrieved on February 2, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/Copy_of_press_release_0046.shtm

107 A “color-coded threat level system is used to communicate with public safety officials and the public at-large through a threat-based, 

color-coded system so that protective measures can be implemented to reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack.” Department of 

Homeland Security. (2008. February 1). Homeland Security Advisory System. Retrieved on February 2, 2008 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/Copy_of_press_release_0046.shtm

108 Department of Homeland Security. Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory System. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 

at www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CitizenGuidanceHSAS2.pdf. 

109 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. 

(2007, October 15). 

110 “Sports events of extended duration particularly need thorough monitoring and planning.” Horrocks M and Stewart D. (1999). 

Enhancing Healthy Mega-Events: Planning for Health Rights. First International Conference on Sports and Human Rights 1-3 

September 1999, Sydney, Australia, p.100. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://catalogue.ausport.gov.au/fulltext/1999/nsw/p96-101.pdf

For example, fans can remain in and around NASCAR venues for as long as 10 days. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff 

Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

111 For example, approximately 250,000 people come into Talladega to watch the races and/or participate in other related activities, 

making Talladega among the largest cities in Alabama during races weeks. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview 

with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4). 

112 According to the FBI, some mass gatherings might be ripe targets due to the openness of their venues, the amount of people in one 

area at one time, and other characteristics, such as the perception that the activity is clearly American, and that it generates a large 

amount of money generated. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, 

Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15). 

113 According to the FBI, Lowe’s Motor Speedway could be considered a ripe target due to the openness of the venue and amount of 

people in one area at one time, as well as the clear association as an American sport, the amount of money generated, and the huge 

number of sponsorships. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, 

Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15). 

114 King J. (2007, June 20). Elections Already Putting Strain on Secret Service. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at 

http://www.cnn.com/2007/POLITICS/06/19/secret.service/index.html. 

115 We must continually anticipate possible dangers and be ready with a plan of action to keep the public safe.” Shelby County Sheriff’s 

Office, Memphis, Tennessee. (2007, February 23). Sheriff’s Office to Receive Equipment for Terrorist and Chemical Disasters. 

Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://www.shelby-sheriff.org/press_releases/homelandsecuritysystem.asp. 

116 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

117 “NASCAR Security and Track Services host an annual education and training summit for all sanctioned facilities to enhance their 

platforms.” NASCAR Security. Mission Statement. Retrieved on February 12, 2008 at 

http://www.nascarsecurity.com/wfMissionStatement.aspx

118 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Talladega Super 

Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

119 Schwarz P. (1991). The Art of the Long View, p.4. New York, NY. 

120 For example, the National Planning Scenarios are used to generate requirements that are subsequently addressed by many levels 

of government. “The National Planning Scenarios...depict a diverse set of high-consequence threat scenarios of both potential terrorist 

attacks and natural disasters. Collectively, the 15 scenarios are designed to focus contingency planning for homeland security 
45

 preparedness work at all levels of government and with the private sector. The scenarios form the basis for coordinated Federal

planning, training, exercises, and grant investments needed to prepare for emergencies of all types.” Department of Homeland 

Security. (2007, October 3). National Preparedness Guidelines: Critical Elements. Retrieved on January 29, 2009 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/publications/gc_1189788256647.shtm

121 Capacity-based planning is “the process of determining the amount of capacity required to produce in the future.” NCSU. Supply 

Chain Management at NCSU. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at http://scrc.ncsu.edu/public/DEFINITIONS/C.html

122 “This method involves a functional analysis of operational requirements. Capabilities are identified based on the tasks required... 

Once the required capability inventory is defined, the most cost effective and efficient options to satisfy the requirements are sought...It 

starts by asking questions regarding what we need to do, rather than what equipment are we replacing.” Joint Systems and Analysis 

Group, Technical Panel 3 of the Technical Cooperation Program. (2004, October 1). Guide to Capabilities-Based Planning, pp.1-2. 

Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at http://www.mors.org/meetings/cbp/read/TP-3_CBP.pdf

123 “Collaborative planning is a process where-by individuals, agencies, and organizations, often with widely varied interests, work 

together to share knowledge and resources, and achieve mutually beneficial goals and enduring solutions through structured, civil 

dialogue.” Sonoran Institute. (2004). Collaborative Planning. Retrieved on February 16, 2008 at 

http://www.trustland.org/challenges/collab_planning.cfm

124 For example, San Francisco EMS identifies minimum standards and planning requirements for a variety of types of events, including 

mass gatherings at Candlestick Park. Department of Public Health, City and County of San Francisco. San Francisco Emergency 

Medical Services Agency: EMS Plan for Mass Gatherings. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at 

http://www.sanfranciscoems.org/index.php?cat=no&name=massGathering&exten=html. 

In another example, “for the assessment on medical response capacity for disaster in local area (such as rescue capacity, transport 

capacity and treatment capacity), it is necessary to...understand how many sufferers from disaster the hospital can respond to.” 

Takahashi A, Ishii N, Kawashima T, and Nakao H. (2007, January 16). Assessment of Medical Response Capacity in the time of 

Disaster: the Estimated Formula of Hospital Treatment Capacity (HTC), the Maximum Receivable Number of Patients in Hospital. Kobe 

Journal of Medical Science 54(5): 189. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://www.med.kobe-u.ac.jp/journal/contents/53/189.pdf. 

125 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. 

and Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control 

and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency 

Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super 

Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the Hardwick Care Center in the Talladega Super 

Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Sheriff Jimmy Harris, Dekalb County, Fort Payne, Alabama, at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Emergency Management Coordinator Jim Sells, City of Concord, at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director 

Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Alan Overcash, Concord Police Department, at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 
46

 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Captain Jeff Smith, Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with 1SG T.E. Ellis, North Carolina Highway Patrol and Regional ITS 

Engineers Ann Lorscheider and Scott Cole, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Metrolina Regional Transportation 

Management Center, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway Medical Director, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life 

Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology 

Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services 

headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview Major Alan Overcash, Concord Police Department, at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 

Office, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

126 For example, State public safety personnel balance the security needs of multiple mass gatherings occurring at the same time 

against the limits of the resources at their disposal. “Most events on the Esplanade, such as the Pops Fourth of July concert, do not 

undergo the same level of scrutiny...but...given the fact that there’s a National Special Security Event going on at the same time that is 

drawing manpower and resources, the security analysis is warranted...Kerry’s proposed concert has raised objections from some 

convention planners, who feared that the July 28 event would strain resources on the same night that security personnel are focused on 

vice presidential nominee John Edward’s speech to the convention.” Estes A. (2004, July 7). Kerry’s Concert Faces Scrutiny. The 

Boston Globe.. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at 

http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2004/07/07/kerrys_concert_faces_scrutiny/. 

In another example, while the races were occurring at the Talladega Super Speedway, the Alabama Highway Patrol had to stay on alert 

for hurricanes, provide support for two major university footballs games that were occurring at Auburn and the University of Alabama, 

and be ready to deal with a strike was occurring in the northwest part of the State – all with limited resources. They are fully aware that 

should any of these situations become large crises, they would not be able to stretch far enough to handle them adequately. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super Speedway, 

Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

127 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 

Office, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

128 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 

Office, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

129 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 

Office, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 
47

 130 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 

Office, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

131 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 

Office, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

132 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease 

Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency

Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. and 

Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super 

Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the Hardwick Care Center in the Talladega Super 

Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Sheriff Jimmy Harris, Dekalb County, Fort Payne, Alabama, at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Emergency Management Coordinator Jim Sells, City of Concord, at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director 

Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Alan Overcash, Concord Police Department, at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Captain Jeff Smith, Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11).

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with 1SG T.E. Ellis, North Carolina Highway Patrol and Regional ITS 

Engineers Ann Lorscheider and Scott Cole, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Metrolina Regional Transportation 

Management Center, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway Medical Director, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life 

Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology 

Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services 

headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 
48

 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Alan Overcash, Concord Police Department, at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 

Office, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Assistant Director Alan Thompson, Cabarrus County Emergency Medical 

Services, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

133 For example, mass evacuation needs have been visited and revisited in planning for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing. The Beijing 

Organizing Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad. (2007, November 15). Olympic Boxing Venue Gets One More Entrance for 

Evacuation Needs. Retrieved on February 13, 2008 at http://en.beijing2008.cn/cptvenues/venues/nst/headlines/n214197307.shtml. 

134 “When evacuation to shelters is either inappropriate or impossible, you may be asked to stay where you are.” New York City Office 

of Emergency Management. In an Emergency: Shelter in Place. Retrieved on February 13, 2008 at 

http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/ready/emergency_sip.shtml

“When these events occur, emergency response officials have two basic tools to protect the threatened public. One is to evacuate the 

public out of the area affected by the hazardous material release. The other is to request that the public shelter in place...The goal of 

sheltering in place during hazardous materials accidents is to minimize the exposure of the threatened public to the dangerous 

chemical(s). Sheltering in place uses a structure and its indoor atmosphere to temporarily separate people from a hazardous outdoor 

atmosphere.” National Institute for Chemical Studies. (2001, June). Sheltering in Place as a Public Protective Action, p.2. Charleston, 

WV: National Institute for Chemical Studies. 

135 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

136 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

137 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

138 Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot. 

Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 

 

139 Methodology as communicated by the Department of Homeland Security during the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, 

North Carolina. (2008, January 11). 

140 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

141 Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot. 

Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 

142 Comments made to Democratic Majority Staff, House Committee on Homeland Security, at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, 

Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11). 

143 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

Comments made to Democratic Majority Staff, House Committee on Homeland Security, at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, 

Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11). 

144 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease 

Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency

Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. and 

Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5). 
49

 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super 

Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Bobby R. Lewis, MD, at the Hardwick Care Center in the Talladega Super 

Speedway Infield, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Sheriff Jimmy Harris, Dekalb County, Fort Payne, Alabama, at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Emergency Management Coordinator Jim Sells, City of Concord, at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director 

Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Alan Overcash, Concord Police Department, at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Captain Jeff Smith, Concord Department of Fire and Life Safety at the 

Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with 1SG T.E. Ellis, North Carolina Highway Patrol and Regional ITS 

Engineers Ann Lorscheider and Scott Cole, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Metrolina Regional Transportation 

Management Center, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway Medical Director, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Fire Chief Randy Holloway of the Concord Department of Fire and Life 

Safety at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13).

House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology 

Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services 

headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Captain Phillip J. Patterson, Support Services, Cabarrus County Sheriff’s 

Office, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Assistant Director Alan Thompson, Cabarrus County Emergency Medical 

Services, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

145 For comparative information, see http://www.statemaster.com. 

146 Comparative information can be found at http://www.statemaster.com. 

147 Department of Homeland Security. (2007, January 5). Overview: FY 2007 Homeland Security Grant Program, p. 5. Retrieved on 

February 13, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/grants-2007-program-overview-010507.pdf. 

148 Regarding the 2004 Republican National Convention, “Mr. Ridge said it was too soon to spell out the kinds of resources the Secret 

Service would deploy. But he and city officials tried to dispel any notion that the New York Police Department was being pushed aside. 

Rather, he said, the agency would form a partnership with the Police Department, which would still be in charge of maintaining order on 

the streets and guarding many sites, and would play a leading role in devising security plans.” Archibold RC. (2003, July 10). GOP 

Convention Has Top Security Status. The New York Times. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at 

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9D00E3DF103DF933A25754C0A9659C8B63. 
50

 

149 “For example, in Denver, the Democratic National Convention executive steering committee includes representatives from the 

Denver Police Department, Denver Fire Department, FBI, FEMA, Colorado Department of Public Safety, Denver Office of Emergency 

Preparedness, Colorado State Patrol, Denver Health Medical Center, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Pepsi Center Management, and the Secret 

Service.” Koerner TJ. (2007, August 10). Prepared remarks of Timothy J. Koerner, Assistant Director, Office of Protective Operations, 

U.S. Secret Service, before the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence Information Sharing and 

Terrorism Risk Assessment. 

150 Some of the topics addressed at the 2008 Security Summit included but were not limited to: the FBI Law Enforcement Online (LEO) 

system, incident command, access control, support provided by various Federal entities, and evacuation. NASCAR 2008 Security 

Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9-13). 

151 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Talladega Super 

Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

152 For example, counterterrorism training was provided by the Office of Bombing Prevention of the Department of Homeland Security

at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9). 

153 Such opinions were solicited from the audience by Summit facilitators at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North 

Carolina. (2008, January 9-13). 

154 For example, NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner served as the main meeting facilitator at the 2008 Summit. NASCAR 

2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9-13). 

155 NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9-13). 

156 “The Committee on Homeland Security has repeatedly emphasized the importance of getting specific, actionable information to our 

first preventers in law enforcement and other emergency response providers. I urge you to follow up on your “gut feeling” and share 

whatever information our nation’s first preventers need to be on alert and prepared. Otherwise, we run the risk of communities taking it 

upon themselves to mobilize for every possible threat. This not only would result in communities depleting their scarce homeland 

security resources but runs contrary to your efforts to move toward a risk-based approach to homeland security.” Thompson, BG. 

(2007, July 11). Letter to Secretary Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at 

http://homeland.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=241

157 For example, the State of Vermont has generated guidance specific to its State when the National Threat Level changes. For more 

information, see http://www.dps.state.vt.us/homeland/terrorism.html. 

158 For example, a discussion regarding the implications of changes in the National Threat Level at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, 

Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 10). 

159 For example, training regarding the Criminal Justice Information System (CJIS) is provided as part of professional development to 

personnel in the Alabama Fusion Center. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion 

Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

In another example, emergency and disaster response training is provided as part of professional to public health personnel. In 

addition to the training and continuing education they must obtain to maintain accreditation in their profession. House Committee on 

Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, 

Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama 

Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

In another example, professional development training regarding crowd management is felt to be necessary and is provided as funds 

are available to police officers in the Talladega County Sheriff’s Department. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview 

with Jimmy Kilgore, Chief Deputy Sheriff, Talladega County Sheriff’s Department, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, 

Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

In another example, tactical medicine programs are sought from and provided by Guilford Technical Community College to emergency 

medical technicians. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David 

Hampton, Assistant Director Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency 

Medical Services, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 
51

 In another example, ongoing additionally Federal training regarding explosives is a priority for bomb squads at the State and local 

levels. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s 

Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

In another example, the Mecklenberg County Emergency Medical Services Agency provides hands-on training using cadavers for 

emergency medical technician certification. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC 

Medical Director and Lowe’s Motor Speedway Medical Director, and Mr. Joe Penner, MEDIC Executive Director at MEDIC 

(Mecklenberg Emergency Medical Services Agency), Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 12). 

In another example, safety training specific to the Lowe’s Motor Speedway is provided at the Speedway Safety School, as a 

requirement to provide safety services at the track. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Norris Baird, EMS 

Director, Lowe’s Motor Speedway, at Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 12). 

160 For example, the Alabama Fusion Center would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, 

Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

The Alabama Department of Health would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on 

Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, 

Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama 

Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

The Talladega County Sheriff’s Department would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Jimmy Kilgore, Chief Deputy Sheriff, Talladega County Sheriff’s Department, at 

the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director Alan

Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe’s 

Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

The Concord Police Department would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on 

Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Alan Overcash, Concord Police Department, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, 

North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

The Cabarrus County Bomb Squad would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House Committee on

Homeland Security Staff Interviews with members of the Cabarrus County Bomb Squad at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, 

North Carolina (2007, October 11). 

Mecklenberg Emergency Medical Services would obtain more training for its employees if they had additional funding. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. Thomas Blackwell, MEDIC Medical Director and Lowe’s Motor Speedway 

Medical Director, and Mr. Joe Penner, MEDIC Executive Director at MEDIC (Mecklenberg Emergency Medical Services Agency), 

Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 12). 

161 For example, the Alabama Department of Health wants to pursue training for its employees, but specifically needs “...additional 

funding to provide coverage, which would allow staff to go to training.” House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Dr. 

Charles H. Woernle, Assistant State Health Officer for Disease Control and Prevention, Alabama Department of Health, and Mr. Andy 

Mullins, Health Services Administrator, Center for Emergency Preparedness, Alabama Department of Health, at the RSA Tower, 

Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

162 “The Secret Service also provides federal, state and local law enforcement partners, who give substantial, critical support to the 

mission, with the necessary guidance and training regarding their role in the overall operational security plans.” Department of 

Homeland Security. (2006, December 28). Fact Sheet: National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167323822753.shtm. 

“The goal of the cooperating agencies is to provide a safe and secure environment for Secret Service protectees, other dignitaries, the 

event participants and the general public. There is a tremendous amount of advance planning and coordination in preparation for these 

events, particularly in the areas of venue and motorcade route security, communications, credentialing and training.” U.S. Secret 

Service. (2008). National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://www.secretservice.gov/nsse.shtml
52

 163 An example of a Federal agency providing training for non-NSSEs, counterterrorism training was provided by the Office of Bombing 

Prevention of the Department of Homeland Security to help safety and security personnel that provide support at NASCAR venues 

execute their counter-bombing responsibilities and requirements. This training occurred at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, 

Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 9). 

Recognizing that events that are not designated as NSSEs have significant requirements, the U.S. Secret Service also “...regularly 

sponsors training seminars for command-level law enforcement and public safety officials from jurisdictions all over the country to 

provide fundamental principles for managing security aspects of major events and strategies for reducing vulnerabilities related to 

terrorism and other criminal acts. Seminars discuss key strategies and lessons learned from past events.” Department of Homeland 

Security. (2006, December 28). Fact Sheet: National Special Security Events. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1167323822753.shtm. 

164 For example, the Lowe’s Motor Speedway requires that public safety personnel coming to the venue to help provide emergency 

services complete certain training programs that address special requirements specific to the race facility, extracting race car drivers 

from crashed race cars, etc. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Norris Baird, EMS Director, Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, at Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 12). 

165 For more information on the University of Southern Mississippi Center for Spectator Sports Security Management, see 

http://www.sporteventsecurity.com/index.php. 

166 “A myriad of issues constituting potential and actual threats to the ongoing security and safety of sporting events and venues are 

addressed including: terrorist activities and attacks, weapons of mass destruction, explosions, crowd control, societal and fan

violence, natural disasters.” Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at http://www.sporteventsecurity.com/index.php. 

167 “Training objectives are to: create and deliver courses in sports event security management; create knowledge through research

activities; [and] disseminate knowledge through academic programs, professional forums, and workshops.” Retrieved on May 7, 2008 

at http://www.sporteventsecurity.com/index.php. 

168 “These programs are aimed at: sports managers; facility personnel; special event organizers; law enforcement and emergency 

responders; [and] outsourced security staff.” Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at http://www.sporteventsecurity.com/index.php. 

169 “Law enforcement and private security guards are not the only employees in need of training for a venue to be safe. Everyone from 

ticket takers and ushers to the people approving credentials must be vigilant.” The Associated Press. (2007, December 25). Experts 

Worry About College Stadium Security. Retrieved on May 5, 2008 at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22394686/. 

170 “The NYPD has developed a useful course entitled Chemical, Ordinance, Biological, and Radiological Awareness (COBRA) training. 

For the 2004 RNC, thousands of officers received this training.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special 

Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.56. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services. 

171 “The NYPD has developed a useful course entitled Chemical, Ordinance, Biological, and Radiological Awareness (COBRA) training. 

For the 2004 RNC, thousands of officers received this training.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special 

Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.56. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing 

Services. 

172 For example, EMS personnel have participated in mass gathering exercises with other local and Federal agencies. One of the 

exercises involved the simulated air release of a biological agent at a local mass gathering venue. House Committee on Homeland 

Security Staff Interview with Jim Sells, City of Concord Emergency Management Coordinator, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, 

North Carolina. 2007, October 11). 

173 For example, the State of California Office of Homeland Security “conducts the California Large Stadium Initiative which is a series 

of exercises that explore the commonalities of large stadium/mass gathering venues related to preparedness issues and assist in

developing strategies for enhancing prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. The program: assists large stadiums and mass 

gathering venues in establishing state-wide best practices for security and response procedures; assists in developing strategies for 

enhancing prevention, response and recovery capabilities; and provides large stadium partners with customized training including 

venue roles and responsibilities, mass care and shelter issues, and crisis communication.” State of California Office of Homeland 

Security. (200X). OHS Initiatives. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://homeland.ca.gov/pdf/hseep/OHS_Initiatives_11-7.pdf

174 “Since 2005, OHS had conducted multiple exercises throughout California involving high profile venues such as Dodger Stadium, 

Monster Park, SBC (AT&T) Park, Staples Center, ARCO Arena, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, and others. The exercises included: 
53

 three regional seminars; two workshops; [and] eight tabletop exercises.’ State of California Office of Homeland Security. (200X). OHS 

Initiatives. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://homeland.ca.gov/pdf/hseep/OHS_Initiatives_11-7.pdf

175 “...Standards measure an institution’s effectiveness according to the profession’s expectations for high quality...preparation as 

America enters the 21st century.” National Council for Teacher Accreditation. (2001). Professional Standards for the Accreditation of 

Schools, Colleges, and Departments of Education, p. 7. Washington, DC: NCATE. 

176 For example, standards are required for teacher accreditation. National Council for Teacher Accreditation. (2001). Professional 

Standards for the Accreditation of Schools, Colleges, and Departments of Education, p.8. Washington, DC: NCATE. 

177 For example, “All 50 States require certification for each of the [Emergency Medical Technician] EMT levels. In most States and the 

District of Columbia registration with the NREMT is required at some or all levels of certification. Other States administer their own 

certification examination or provide the option of taking either the NREMT or State examination. To maintain certification, EMTs and 

paramedics must recertify, usually every two years. Generally, they must be working as an EMT or paramedic and meet a continuing 

education requirement.” Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor. Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2008-09 Edition,

Emergency Medical Technicians and Paramedics. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos101.htm. 

178 NASCAR. (2008, January 7). NASCAR Minimum Security Standards ’08. 

179 For example, standards have been incorporated in the Emergency Action Plan for the Lowe’s Motor Speedway. Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway Emergency Action Plan: 2007 October Races. Reviewed by House Committee on Homeland Security Staff at the Lowe’s 

Motor Speedway Joint Operations Center, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

180 The National Collegiate Athletic Association. NCAA Security-Planning Options. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www1.ncaa.org/membership/emergency_planning/security_options. 

181 Davidson J. (2006 July/August). Finding the Value in Lessons Learned Databases. Knowledge Management Review. Retrieved on 

May 6, 2008 at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5362/is_200607/ai_n21394347

182 “An essential element of the operational security planning process is information sharing regarding lessons learned from previous 

NSSEs. Based on our experiences, we are able to provide detailed observations and recommendations regarding areas of success and 

areas for improvement that are invaluable to future event security planners.” Koerner TJ. (2007, August 10). Prepared remarks of 

Timothy J. Koerner, Assistant Director, Office of Protective Operations, U.S. Secret Service, before the House Committee on Homeland 

Security Subcommittee on Intelligence Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment. 

183 For more information, see www.leo.gov. 

184 LEO is currently being used at a number of the tracks that host NASCAR races, as well as some other venues that host sporting 

events. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North

Carolina. (2007, October 15). 

185 For more information, see www.llis.gov. 

186 For example, decisions could be made during such a planning activity that relate directly to a public health mission. Yet 

representatives from the local or State Department of Health may not have been invited or present to guide or even inform that 

planning. However, there are good models for the inclusion of public health, such as the George State Public Health Laboratory’s 

involvement in the planning for the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta, and the Utah State Public Health Laboratory’s involvement in planning for 

the 2002 Olympics in Salt Lake City. House Committee on Homeland Security Democratic Majority Staff Interview with Dr. Lou Turner, 

Deputy Section Chief, Epidemiology Section, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, at the North Carolina 

Department of Health and Human Services headquarters, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

187 For example, during discussion regarding the implications of changes in the National Threat Level, local public sector personnel 

willingly discussed possible requirements, but were clear that no commitments would be made to fulfill requirements put forward by 

NASCAR Corporate Security until they were discussed with those in the public and private sectors back in their home States, who had 

decision-making authority and control of funding. Discussion at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, 

January 10). 

188 “The objective of this activity is to ensure that individuals assigned to a project are provided the requisite training in order to perform 

the job and that key goals and responsibilities are identified for the team members at the start of the project.” Ohio State University. 

(2004). Project Management Framework. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at http://oit.osu.edu/projmanage/project_lifecycle.html. 
54

 

189 “As an outcome of your community’s or organization’s emergency planning process, plans should be in place that specify how you 

prepare for emergencies, how you will respond if an emergency occurs, how you will mitigate the potential effects of emergencies, and 

how you will recover. Practice is an important aspect of the preparation process. Experience and data show that exercises are a

practical, efficient, and cost-effective way for organizations in the government, nonprofit, and private sectors to prepare for emergency 

response and recovery.” Emergency Management Institute. (2007, May 24). IS-139 Exercise Design: Course Overview. Retrieved on 

April 7, 2008 at http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is139.asp. 

190 ” The objective of this activity is to ensure that the project team meets the project requirements and that all requisite quality criteria 

are met.” Ohio State University. (2004). Project Management Framework. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at 

http://oit.osu.edu/projmanage/project_lifecycle.html. 

191 “The objective of this activity is to ensure that the lessons learned during the project are documented and incorporated in the 

knowledge base for future use.” Ohio State University. (2004). Project Management Framework. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at 

http://oit.osu.edu/projmanage/project_lifecycle.html. 

192 “The objective of this activity is to ensure that the lessons learned during the project are documented and incorporated in the 

knowledge base for future use.” Ohio State University. (2004). Project Management Framework. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at 

http://oit.osu.edu/projmanage/project_lifecycle.html. 

193 Livada G. (2007, March 12). Disaster Plans Cover Host of Woes. Democrat and Chronicle. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www.democratandchronicle.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070312/NEWS01/703120337/1002/NEWS. 

194 For example, Vermont Technical College has produced an emergency action plan. Vermont Technical College. (2003, September 

29). Emergency Action Plan for Randolph Center Campus. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at 

http://www.vtc.edu/Downloads/EmergencyActionPlan.pdf. 

Another example was produced by the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency. Pennsylvania Emergency Management 

Agency. Special Event Emergency Action Plan Guide. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at 

http://www.pema.state.pa.us/pema/lib/pema/Special%20Event%20Emergency%20Action%20Plan%20Guide.pdf. 

195 For example, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health has produced an emergency action planning template for 

facilities. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2004). Emergency Action Plan (Template). Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at

http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2004-101/emrgact/emrgact1.html. 

Another example was produced by the University of California at San Francisco. University of California at San Francisco. (2006). 

UCSF Emergency Action Plan. Retrieved on May 6, 2008 at http://www.police.ucsf.edu/documents/EAP Template_2006.doc. 

196 “Isolation of these agencies from...planning will lead to potentially significant hindrances in caring for the public in the event of an 

emergency incident during the special event.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: 

guidelines for law enforcement, p.51. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

197 “In planning security for major special events, law enforcement must always consider the risk from hazardous materials and 

weapons of mass destruction.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law 

enforcement, p.53. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

198 For example, “In the case of Hurricane Katrina, across 476 locations with a total of $42 billion in insured property exposed to the 

hurricane’s impact, FM Global clients collectively spent $2.3 million to prevent a projected $480 million in loss, with cost of those 

improvements averaging only $7,400 per facility. That’s a 208 to 1 payback or in other words for every $1 spent on targeted 

preparedness measures $208 in resources were saved, in one single event.” International Center for Enterprise Preparedness. (2006, 

October 9). Lost Cost Preparedness Efforts Significantly Mitigate Loss (an InterCEP mini-case study), p. 1. New York: New York 

University. 

199 “Having effective corporate emergency preparedness programs can result in relatively lower insurance costs and better policy terms 

for companies. This can be an important financial consideration in evaluating investment in corporate preparedness and may not be 

widely known.” Raisch WG and Statler M. (2006, October 17). Insurance Incentives for Corporate Preparedness (discussion draft white 

paper), p.1. New York: New York University. 

200 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with NASCAR Director of Security Gary Gardner at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 
55

 

Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot. Washington, 

DC: Department of Homeland Security. 

201 For example, questions such as, “How will you ensure team awareness and preparedness?” and “What controls will be implemented 

to manage the incident?” are too vague, and lead to so many other questions as to be of little use when trying to plan for an evacuation. 

Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot, p. 6. 

Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 

202 For example, questions such as, “What are you relocating from” have so many answers that they are of little use when trying to plan 

for an evacuation. In fact, taking the time to answer such questions completely can cause the entire process to grind to a halt. 

Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot, p. 11. 

Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 

203 Comments made by track security personnel attending the summit to Democratic Majority Staff, House Committee on Homeland 

Security, at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11). 

204 Comments made to Democratic Majority Staff, House Committee on Homeland Security, at the NASCAR 2008 Security Summit, 

Concord, North Carolina. (2008, January 11). 

205 There are five Special Event Assessment Rating levels. “Level 1 - Events of significant National and/or international importance that 

may require extensive Federal interagency security and incident management preparedness. Level 2 - Significant events with National 

and/or international importance that may require direct National-level Federal support and situational awareness. Level 3 - Events of 

National and/or international importance that require only limited direct Federal support to augment local capabilities. Level 4 - Events 

with limited National importance that are generally handled at the State and local level. Level 5 - Events that may be nationally 

recognized but generally have local or State importance.” Electronic communication from Margaret Laubscher, Department of 

Homeland Security, Office of Legislative Affairs with Asha M. George, DrPH, Senior Professional Staff, Committee on Homeland 

Security, Democratic Majority Staff, U.S. House of Representatives, on February 29, 2008. Email on file with the Committee. 

206 The Special Event Assessment Rating scheme used by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice 

“...incorporates a risk methodology that prioritizes special events submitted to the Federal government for their awareness and 

consideration of support. The system uses seven factors in its risk assessment process to arrive at five Special Event Assessment 

Rating levels (for example, SEAR-I: full U.S. Government support to SEAR-V: require State and local resources).” Connors E. (2007, 

March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.16. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

207 Only limited information on National Special Security Events seems to be readily and/or easily available at www.dhs.gov. 

208 The Special Event Assessment Rating scheme used by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice 

“...incorporates a risk methodology that prioritizes special events submitted to the Federal government for their awareness and 

consideration of support. The system uses seven factors in its risk assessment process to arrive at five Special Event Assessment 

Rating levels (for example, SEAR-I: full U.S. Government support to SEAR-V: require State and local resources).” Connors E. (2007, 

March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law enforcement, p.16. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

209 “The Committee on Homeland Security has repeatedly emphasized the importance of getting specific, actionable information to our 

first preventers in law enforcement and other emergency response providers. I urge you to follow up on your “gut feeling” and share 

whatever information our nation’s first preventers need to be on alert and prepared. Otherwise, we run the risk of communities taking it 

upon themselves to mobilize for every possible threat. This not only would result in communities depleting their scarce homeland 

security resources but runs contrary to your efforts to move toward a risk-based approach to homeland security.” Thompson, BG. 

(2007, July 11). Letter to Secretary Chertoff, Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on January 29, 2008 at 

http://homeland.house.gov/press/index.asp?ID=241. 

210 For example, Alabama has found that exercise funding cannot be used for training, even when the personnel that need to participate 

in the exercise have not been trained to do what the exercise would require of them. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff 

Interview with Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October

6). 

211 For example, Alabama has found that exercise funding cannot be used for training, even when the personnel that need to participate 

in the exercise have not been trained to do what the exercise would require of them. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff 
56

 Interview with Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October

6). 

212 State Secretaries of Homeland Security have not been able to get the information (or meetings to better procure that information) 

from the Department of Homeland Security. Both Secretary of Homeland Security Walker and North Carolina Secretary of Homeland 

Security Beatty has been trying to get a meetings with the Department of Homeland Security to get more information about the threat to 

their States, the Department of Homeland Security’s view on facilities within their States, how grant eligibility was determined for their 

States, etc. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. 

Walker, Jr. at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5). House Committee on Homeland Security Staff

Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Pubic Safety Bryan E. Beatty at the North Carolina 

Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

213 Department of Homeland Security. (2008, February 1). Homeland Security Advisory System. Retrieved on February 2, 2008 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/Copy_of_press_release_0046.shtm. 

214 “According to the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. industry loses between $200 and $250 billion annually to counterfeit products and 

other intellectual property rights (IPR) Violations. As the largest investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security, ICE plays a 

leading role in targeting criminal organizations responsible for producing, smuggling, and distributing counterfeit products.” Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement/Department of Homeland Security. (2005, May 3). 

215 “The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (referred to as the Stafford Act - 42 U.S.C. 5721 et seq.) 

authorizes the President to issue major disaster or emergency declarations before or after catastrophes occur.” McCarthy FX. (2007, 

August 27). CRS Report for Congress – FEMA’s Disaster Declaration Process: a primer, p. 2. Washington, DC: Congressional 

Research Service. Retrieved at February 16, 2008 at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34146_20070827.pdf. 

216 The Emergency Support Function (ESF) Coordinator and Primary Agency for ESF#13 is the Department of Justice. Department of 

Homeland Security. (January 2008). The National Response Framework: Emergency Support Function #13 – Public Safety and 

Security Annex, pp. ESF#13 – 1-12. Retrieved on February 10, 2008 at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-esf-13.pdf. 

217 For example, the FBI partners with local law enforcement at both the Talladega Super Speedway and the Lowe’s Motor Speedway – 

to differing extents – to address potential acts of terrorism at these venues. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview 

with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4). 

The same is true in North Carolina. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field 

Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15). 

218 For example, ICE has partnered with NASCAR and local law enforcement to seize counterfeit merchandise and prosecute those 

who have brought this merchandise over the border and into the U.S. to sell illegally. At the Talladega Super Speedway and the Bristol 

Motor Speedway, this is known as “Operation Race Day.” House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ICE Assistant

Special Agent-in-Charge Dwight McDaniel at the ICE Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. (2007, October 4). 

 

219 For example, the Alabama State Emergency Management Agency partners with the Porch Creek Indians to provide aid in response 

to disasters that occur in the State. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Regional Coordinator Ricky Little, 

Alabama State Emergency Management Agency, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6 and 7). 

220 For example, The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the FBI continue to have problems in this regard. “Since the CIA's birth in 

1947, its relationship with the much-older FBI has rarely, if ever, been close. For decades, the two agencies' interactions were hostile 

and sporadic. Since 9/11, though, their shared desire to prevent another terrorist attack on the U.S. has forced them to try to move 

beyond turf wars and talk to each other. But the organizations' institutional cultures are so different that real coordination will be very 

difficult to achieve.” Gorman S. (2003, August 1). FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0803/080103nj1.htm

221 For more information on the City of New York Police Department (NYPD), see 

http://www.ci.nyc.ny.us/html/nypd/html/home/home.shtml. 

222 For more information on the New York City Fire Department (FDNY), see http://www.nyc.gov/html/fdny/html/home2.shtml. 

223 “Interoperability simply refers to the ability of public safety personnel to communicate by radio (or another communication device) 

with staff from other agencies, on demand and in real time. Interoperability is important because responses during emergencies and 

disasters require a joint response by all first responder personnel—police, fire, and emergency medical services.” New York City 
57

 Council. (2006, November 16). Oversight: Improvements in Communication Technology among First Responders. Retrieved on 

February 17, 2008 at http://webdocs.nyccouncil.info/attachments/75263.htm?CFID=1316018&CFTOKEN=30510853. 

224 “...First-person interviews with FDNY and NYPD personnel showed that at times some issues related to a given department’s 

operational responsibility and the competitive nature of departments did exist.” Lawson JR and Vettori RL. (2005, September). Federal 

Building and Fire Safety Investigation of the World Trade Center Disaster: The Emergency Response Operations (Draft for Public 

Comment), p.160. Washington, DC: National Institute of Standards and Technology. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://wtc.nist.gov/pubs/NISTNCSTAR1-81.pdf. 

225 “America's first responders today face a crisis that drastically reduces their ability to effectively address emergency situations. 

Across the country, public safety departments cannot talk to one another, because their radios and communications systems are not 

interoperable. Different technologies, a lack of radio spectrum and frequencies, uncoordinated work on finding solutions, and insufficient 

funding have all contributed to this problem.” First Response Coalition. Issue Background. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://www.firstresponsecoalition.org/issues.shtml. 

226 The CIA and FBI continue to have problems in this regard. “Since the CIA's birth in 1947, its relationship with the much-older FBI 

has rarely, if ever, been close. For decades, the two agencies' interactions were hostile and sporadic. Since 9/11, though, their shared 

desire to prevent another terrorist attack on the U.S. has forced them to try to move beyond turf wars and talk to each other. But the 

organizations' institutional cultures are so different that real coordination will be very difficult to achieve.” Gorman S. (2003, August 1). 

FBI, CIA Remain Worlds Apart. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0803/080103nj1.htm

227 For more information about the Association of Public Health Laboratories, see www.aphl.org. 

228 The Laboratory Response Network for Bioterrorism was established in 1999. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Facts 

about the Laboratory Response Network. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/factsheet.asp. 

229 For more information on State and other public health laboratories, see www.aphl.org. 

230 George AM, Becker SJ, Anders DL, and Decker S. (2000, November 15). Public Health Laboratory Infrastructure: don’t counter 

terrorism without it. Washington, DC: American Public Health Association. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://apha.confex.com/apha/128am/techprogram/paper_13590.htm. 

231 Electronic communication from Scott J. Becker, Executive Director, Association of Public Health Laboratories with Asha M. George, 

Senior Professional Staff, Committee on Homeland Security, Democratic Majority Staff, U.S. House of Representatives, on February 

19, 2008. Email on file with the Committee. 

232 Electronic communication from Scott J. Becker, Executive Director, Association of Public Health Laboratories with Asha M. George, 

DrPH, Senior Professional Staff, Committee on Homeland Security, Democratic Majority Staff, U.S. House of Representatives, on 

February 19, 2008. Email on file with the Committee. 

233 Brownson OA. (1866). The American Republic: Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny. New York: P O’Shea. 

234 “Conceptually, fusion centers differ from their predecessors in that they are intended to broaden sources of data for analysis and 

integration beyond criminal intelligence, to include Federal intelligence as well as public and private sector data. Furthermore, fusion 

centers broaden the scope of State and local analysis to include homeland security and counterterrorism issues.” Masse T and Rollins 

J. (2007, September 19). CRS Report for Congress – A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress, p. 2. 

Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on April 7, 2008 at http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL34177.pdf. 

235 “State, local, and tribal law enforcement and public sector agencies are in a unique position to make observations and collect

information that may be central to...threat assessment....” Masse T and Rollins J. (2007, September 19). CRS Report for Congress – A 

Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options for Congress, p. 3. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 

Retrieved on April 7, 2008 at http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL34177.pdf. 

236 Masse T and Rollins J. (2007, September 19). CRS Report for Congress – A Summary of Fusion Centers: Core Issues and Options 

for Congress, p.11. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on April 7, 2008 at 

http://www.congress.gov/erp/rl/pdf/RL34177.pdf. 

 

237 “...Fusion centers across the country vary in their stages of development—from operational to early in the planning stages.” U.S. 

Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges 

Encountered State and Local Information Fusion Centers, p. 5. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office. 
58

 

238 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Alabama State Director of Homeland Security James M. Walker, Jr. 

and Art Faulkner, Alabama State 911 Coordinator, at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 5). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Pubic 

Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in 

Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of 

Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, 

North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

239 U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to Alleviate Some 

Challenges Encountered State and Local Information Fusion Centers, p. 5. Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office. 

240 “To support fusion centers, as of September 2007, DHS had assigned intelligence officers to 17 of the operational fusion centers we 

contacted, and the FBI had assigned personnel to about three quarters of the fusion centers we contacted.” Masse T and Rollins J. 

(2007, September 19). U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal Efforts are Helping to

Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered State and Local Information Fusion Centers, p. 7. Washington, DC: Government 

Accountability Office. 

241 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Pubic 

Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in 

Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of 

Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, 

North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

242 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama 

Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

243 Department of Homeland Security. (2008, March 14). 911 Act, Title V Briefing to House Committee on Homeland Security Staff. On 

file with author. 

244 Criminal databases, information systems, and portals utilized by the Alabama fusion center include but are not limited to: the

Criminal Justice Information System and ALACOP. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, 

Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). 

Criminal databases, information systems, and portals utilized by the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center include but 

are not limited to: GangNet and the FPOS Network. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North 

Carolina Department of Crime Control and Pubic Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North 

Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent 

in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North 

Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

245 For example, the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center keeps track of all major events scheduled in the State

through an online calendar. These events include but are not limited to: the U.S. Open, NASCAR races, large/popular football games 

and other widely-attended sporting events, the State Fair, etc. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Secretary 

of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Pubic Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina State Patrol Capt. David Broome,

North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special 

Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the 

North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 16). 

246 In North Carolina there is a taskforce entitled Taskforce 21 that addresses the biological threat and is composed of a number of 

different and non-traditional partners. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services 

Director David Hampton, Assistant Director Alan Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus 

County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 

247 Members of Task Force 21 are now looking to address other threats than just the biological and not become stagnant. House 

Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with Emergency Medical Services Director David Hampton, Assistant Director Alan

Thompson, and Emergency Management Planner David Hunter of the Cabarrus County Emergency Medical Services, at the Lowe’s 

Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 11). 
59

 248 “Law enforcement also shares canine resources. For example, in Columbus, Ohio, providing public safety at Ohio State University 

football games (110,000 people) involves four police agencies: the Columbus Police Department, Franklin County Sheriff’s Department, 

State Highway Patrol, and Ohio State University police. The stadium is swept by dogs from the Franklin County Sheriff’s Department 

and State Highway Patrol.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law 

enforcement, p.9. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

249 For example, ATF provides video equipment, canines, and its own personnel (among other resources) to the races at Lowe’s Motor

Speedway and other NASCAR venues, in accordance with requests for assistance, and as other ATF missions and priorities allow. 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ATF Special Agents supporting the races, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, 

Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

250 ATF equipment and other resources at these venues remain under the control of ATF. ATF grants access to the video feeds by 

non-ATF personnel, but neither the equipment nor the data are handed-off entirely. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff 

Interview with ATF Special Agents supporting the races, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

251 In this case, ATF grants access to the video feeds by local police and track security, lending them the necessary equipment to

achieve that access as well. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ATF Special Agents supporting the races, at 

the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina (2007, October 13). 

252 “...ATF's Explosives Program provides vital resources to local communities to investigate explosives incidents and arson-for-profit 

schemes.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Programs: Arson and Explosives. Retrieved on February 17, 2008

at http://www.atf.treas.gov/about/programs/proex.htm. 

253 For example, the FBI brings its Visual Communications Center (VCC) to a number of mass gathering venues. House Committee on 

Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15) 

254 “Each team has two large pieces of equipment, a mobile analytical laboratory that it deploys with, that is utilized for field analysis of 

chemical or biological agents, and they also have a uniform command suite that has the ability through multiplexing systems to provide 

interoperability of communications to the various and sundry responders who may be on scene.” Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil

Support Teams. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/wmd-cst.htm. 

255 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with LTC James Heartsill and CPT Mark Smith of the 46th Civil Support 

Team (WMD), at the Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

256 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super 

Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with 1SG T.E. Ellis, North Carolina Highway Patrol and Regional ITS 

Engineers Ann Lorscheider and Scott Cole, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Metrolina Regional Transportation 

Management Center, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

257 “...North Carolina’s transportation system is one of the finest in the country, providing its citizens with the Nation’s second largest 

State highway system and the largest ferry system on the east coast.” The North Carolina Department of Transportation offers “...a 

full-service, multi-modal transportation network encompassing all forms of travel – land, air and sea.” North Carolina Department of 

Transportation. (2005, July 20). Quick Facts. Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at 

http://www.ncdot.org/download/about/ncdot/quickFacts.pdf. 

258 The North Carolina “...Highway Patrol now employs 1,813 Troopers to cover more than 78,000 miles of North Carolina roadways 

[and] has eight troop locations throughout the State.” Retrieved on February 15, 2008 at 

http://www.nccrimecontrol.org/Index2.cfm?a=000003,000014. 

259 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interviews with 1SG T.E. Ellis, North Carolina Highway Patrol and Regional ITS 

Engineers Ann Lorscheider and Scott Cole, North Carolina Department of Transportation, Metrolina Regional Transportation 

Management Center, at the Lowe’s Motor Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

260 The Alabama Department of Transportation, “...is organized into nine geographic regions called Divisions, with a Central Office 

located in Montgomery. The Central Office is organized into the Office of the Transportation Director and the Office of the Chief 

Engineer with Bureaus and Divisions reporting to the Chief Engineer. Additionally, the department has several other boards and 

committees that operate either within a bureau or as a cooperative effort among several bureaus and/or divisions.” The mission of the 

Alabama Department of Transportation is, “...to provide a safe, efficient, environmentally sound intermodal transportation system for all 
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 users, especially the taxpayers of Alabama. To also facilitate economic and social development and prosperity through the efficient 

movement of people and goods and to facilitate intermodal connections within Alabama. Alabama Department of Transportation must 

also demand excellence in transportation and to be involved in promoting adequate funding to promote and maintain Alabama's 

transportation infrastructure.” Alabama Department of Transportation. Alabama Department of Transportation Organization Information. 

Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.dot.state.al.us/Docs/Bureaus/Public+Affairs/Mission+Statement.htm. 

261 The Alabama “Highway Patrol Division troopers patrol approximately 69,465 miles of rural roadways in the State’s 67 counties. 

During the fiscal year, Highway Patrol troopers worked approximately 884,086 hours and traveled 12.5 million miles in the performance 

of their duties. They recorded approximately 615,000 motorist contacts, up 139,000 from the previous year. During the fiscal year, HP 

troopers made 367,295 arrests, an increase of 106,556 compared with FY 2004-2005.” Alabama Department of Public Safety. 71st

Annual Report FY 2005-2006, p. 26. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://dps.alabama.gov/Information/pdf/AnnualReports/2005_2006.pdf. 

262 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Major Roscoe Howell, Chief, Highway Patrol, at the Talladega Super 

Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

263 Gray B. (1993). Collaboration: the constructive management of differences. In Lewicki RJ, Litterer JA, Saunders DM and Minton JW 

(Eds.). (1993). Negotiation, p. 113-4. Burr Ridge, Illinois: Irwin. 

264 “During a Washington Redskins NFL game, which draws over 90,000 spectators to FedEx Field in Lanham, Maryland, leadership is 

shared among the stadium wonder, the Prince George’s County Police Department, and the Fire Department, depending on the nature

of the decision that has to be made.” Connors E. (2007, March). Planning and Managing Security for Special Events: guidelines for law 

enforcement, p.9. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. 

265 “Physicians provided medical care at the athletic village hospital, where an epidemiology unit conducted surveillance while the 

village was open.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1996, July 12). Public Health Surveillance During the XVII Central 

American and Caribbean Games – Puerto Rico, November 1993. MMRW Weekly 45(27): 581. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042955.htm. 

266 “Staff in the epidemiology unit analyzed data daily and shared reports with games officials.” Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention. (1996, July 12). Public Health Surveillance During the XVII Central American and Caribbean Games – Puerto Rico, 

November 1993. MMRW Weekly 45(27): 581. Retrieved on May 7, 2008 at 

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00042955.htm. 

267 Congressional Budget Office. (2004, December). Homeland Security and the Private Sector. Washington, DC: Congressional 

Budget Office. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdoc.cfm?index=6042&type=0&sequence=0. 

268 “...Fusion is a clearly defined, ongoing process that involves the delineation of roles and responsibilities; the creation of 

requirements; and the collection, blending, analysis, timely dissemination, and reevaluation of critical data, information, and

intelligence.” Department of Homeland Security – Homeland Security Advisory Council. (2005, April 28). Intelligence and Information 

Sharing Initiative: homeland security intelligence and information fusion, p.3. Washington, DC: Department of homeland Security. 

Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/HSAC_HSIntelInfoFusion_Apr05.pdf

269 “With logic you start out with certain ingredients just as in playing chess you start out with given pieces...In most real life situations 

the pieces are not given, we just assume they are there. We assume certain perceptions, certain concepts and certain boundaries. 

Lateral thinking is concerned not with playing with the existing pieces but with seeking to change those very pieces. Lateral thinking is 

concerned with the perception part of thinking.” De Bono E. Lateral Thinking. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://www.edwdebono.com/debono/lateral.htm

270 For example, “A week-long enforcement blitz led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeting the sale of 

counterfeit sports merchandise during Super Bowl XLII led to the seizure of more than 9,500 pieces of clothing and sports memorabilia 

valued at nearly a half-million dollars. As part of the crackdown, ICE agents and officers from the Glendale and Phoenix police 

departments arrested 24 individuals who now face charges of trafficking in counterfeit goods. The ICE-led enforcement effort, which 

also included investigators under contract to the NFL, focused on counterfeit items being sold by stores and street vendors across the 

Phoenix metropolitan area.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2008, February 7). ICE-led Task Force Seizes Nearly $500,000 

Worth of Phony NFL Merchandise and Sports Memorabilia. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080207phoenix.htm. 

271 For example, “A week-long enforcement blitz led by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeting the sale of 

counterfeit sports merchandise during Super Bowl XLII led to the seizure of more than 9,500 pieces of clothing and sports memorabilia 
61

 valued at nearly a half-million dollars. As part of the crackdown, ICE agents and officers from the Glendale and Phoenix police 

departments arrested 24 individuals who now face charges of trafficking in counterfeit goods. The ICE-led enforcement effort, which 

also included investigators under contract to the NFL, focused on counterfeit items being sold by stores and street vendors across the 

Phoenix metropolitan area.” Immigration and Customs Enforcement. (2008, February 7). ICE-led Task Force Seizes Nearly $500,000 

Worth of Phony NFL Merchandise and Sports Memorabilia. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/080207phoenix.htm. 272 Roman, PJ. (2008, February 13). The National Response Framework: the enduring challenges of Federal responses to large-scale 

incidents. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center. 

273 For example, “as part of its mission and in accordance with the Homeland Security Act, DHS has responsibility for coordinating

efforts to share homeland security information across all levels of government, including Federal, State, local, and tribal governments 

and the private sector.” U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2007, October). Homeland Security: Federal efforts are helping to 

alleviate some challenges encountered State and local information fusion centers, p. 5. Washington, DC: Government Accountability 

Office. 

274 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Birmingham, Alabama. 

(2007, October 4). 

275 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). While Committee Staff were interviewing Deputy Sheriff Kilgore, 

a representative from the FBI offered to share the FBI’s threat assessment for the track. The contents of the threat assessment had not 

been shared previously because the FBI believed there was no special threat to the Speedway. 

276 House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Kilgore, Talladega County, Alabama, at the 

Talladega Super Speedway, Talladega, Alabama. (2007, October 6). 

Unlike the situation for Talladega Super Speedway, the FBI in Charlotte, North Carolina develops and shares a threat assessment for 

the Lowe’s Motor Speedway more broadly and in advance of the races in Concord. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff 

Interview with FBI Special Agents at the FBI Field Office, Charlotte, North Carolina. (2007, October 15) 

277 For example, the Alabama Fusion Center and the North Carolina Information and Analysis Center have described instances where 

different field offices of the same Federal law enforcement agency engage with these Centers to different extents, with one field office 

passing little information and the other passing more. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill Eller, 

Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3). House Committee on Homeland 

Security Staff Interview with Secretary of North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Pubic Safety Bryan E. Beatty, North Carolina 

State Patrol Capt. David Broome, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Special Agent in Charge William Carter, State Bureau 

of Investigations Assistant Special Agent in Charge Don Gale, and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigations Assistant Special 

Agent in Charge Steele Myers, at the North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center, Raleigh, North Carolina. (2007, October 

16). 

278 For example, the Alabama Fusion Center generates some of its own threat assessments, but does not feel it has the assets to do so 

for every situation that comes up in the State of Alabama. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with Lieutenant Bill 

Eller, Fusion Center Commander, at the Alabama Fusion Center, Montgomery, Alabama. (2007, October 3) 

279 For example, ATF assisted with securing Super Bowl XLII in Phoenix, Arizona. A cadre of special agents with explosives expertise, 

as well as explosives detection canines...deployed throughout the numerous Super Bowl venues in the Glendale, Phoenix area, 

including the University of Phoenix Stadium, the NFL Experience, and team hotels and practice facilities to name a few. ATF has the 

largest commitment of explosives experts assisting with security during Super Bowl week. These assets include Special Agent Bomb 

Technicians, Explosives Enforcement Officers, Certified Explosive Specialists, K-9’s, robots, the explosives response truck and ATF’s 

mobile forensic laboratory.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. (2008, January 24). ATF Agents Assist Arizona with 

Super Bowl XLII Security. ATF Media Advisory. Retrieved on May 8, 2008 at http://www.atf.gov/press/2008press/012408atf_superbowlmediaadvisory.pdf. 

In another example, ATF provides video equipment, canines, and its own personnel (among other resources) to the races at Lowe’s

Motor Speedway as and other NASCAR venues, in accordance with requests for assistance, and as other ATF missions and priorities

allow. House Committee on Homeland Security Staff Interview with ATF Special Agents supporting the races, at the Lowe’s Motor 

Speedway, Concord, North Carolina. (2007, October 13). 

 

280 Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January 3). Mass Evacuation Planning Guide for Major Events: NASCAR Pilot. 

Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 
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281 “The Homeland Security Information Network is a computer-based counterterrorism communications system connecting all 50 

States, five Territories, Washington, DC, and 50 major urban areas. The Homeland Security Information Network allows all States and 

major urban areas to collect and disseminate information between Federal, State, and local agencies involved in combating terrorism.” 

Department of Homeland Security. (2006, August 29). Homeland Security Information Network. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/programs/gc_1156888108137.shtm. 

282 Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January). National Response Framework. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland 

Security. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. 

283 “By law and by Presidential directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the Principal Federal Official [PFO] responsible for 

coordination of all domestic incidents requiring multiagency Federal response. The Secretary may elect to designate a single individual 

to serve as his or her primary representative to ensure consistency of Federal support as well as the overall effectiveness of the 

Federal incident management. When appointed, such an individual serves in the field as the PFO for the incident.” Department of

Homeland Security. (2008, January). National Response Framework, p.66. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. 

Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf. 

284 “For Stafford Act incidents (i.e., emergencies or major disasters), upon the recommendation of the FEMA Administrator and the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, the President appoints an FCO [Federal Coordinating Officer]. The FCO is a senior FEMA official

trained, certified, and well experienced in emergency management, and specifically appointed to coordinate Federal support in the 

response to and recovery from emergencies and major disasters. The FCO executes Stafford Act authorities, including commitment of 

FEMA resources and the mission assignment of other Federal Departments or agencies. If a major disaster or emergency declaration 

covers a geographic area that spans all or parts of more than one State, the President may decide to appoint a single FCO for the 

entire incident, with other individuals as needed serving as Deputy FCOs.” Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January). National 

Response Framework, p.67. Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved on February 17, 2008 at 

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf.