U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

Research Report 1871 

Developing Army Leaders Across Components: 

Assessing Knowledge Similarities and Differences 

 

Teresa Z. Taylor 

U.S. Army Research Institute 

 

May 2007 

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14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words): More than ever, it is critical that Army leaders are able to perform leader 

responsibilities with a high degree of expertise in a variety of skill-sets. Army leaders must demonstrate 

intrapersonal, interpersonal and organizational expertise in technical, tactical, and leader tasks under ambiguous 

and constantly changing conditions. Leaders develop their skills through a well-developed system of formal 

institutional training, experience gained through operational assignment and self-development. However, despite 

the Army’s comprehensive, methodical and standardized system for developing leaders, some are more effective 

than others. Recent research has explored how knowledge, specifically tacit knowledge, makes leaders more 

effective. That research was oriented on active Army officer tacit knowledge; this research seeks to measure 

differences in tacit knowledge levels between active (AC), U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard 

(ARNG) officers. In the spring of 2004, 666 ARNG, USAR, and AC Lieutenants, Captains, and Majors were 

surveyed to measure their tacit knowledge as well as their capacity for self-knowledge. Results showed that there 

are differences in levels of tacit knowledge between the three Army components, as well as a correlation between 

individual tacit knowledge and the person’s ability to self-assess their own knowledge strengths and weaknesses. 

Findings in this research can be used to enhance leader development programs by expanding levels of tacit 

knowledge to facilitate shared mental models of effective leadership in all Army leaders. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS 

 Tacit knowledge; Leader development; U.S. Army Reserve; Army National Guard; Leader effectiveness; 

 Meta-cognitive knowledge; Organizational learning

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iii 

Research Report 1871 

Developing Army Leaders Across Components: 

Assessing Knowledge Similarities and Differences 

Teresa Z. Taylor 

U.S. Army Research Institute 

 

Force Stabilization Research Unit 

Lincea Ruth, Chief

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3926 

May 2007 

Army Project Number Personnel Performance 

633007A792 and Training 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
iv 
v 

DEVELOPING ARMY LEADERS ACROSS COMPONENTS: ASSESSING KNOWLEDGE 

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Research Requirement: 

 To succeed in today’s volatile, unpredictable operational environment, U.S. Army officers, 

both commissioned and noncommissioned, must be capable of performing leader responsibilities 

with a very high degree of expertise in a variety of skill-sets. Army leaders must demonstrate 

intrapersonal, interpersonal and organizational expertise in technical, tactical, and leader tasks 

under ambiguous and constantly changing conditions. Leaders develop their skills through a 

well-developed system of formal institutional training, experience gained through operational 

assignment and self-development. However, despite the Army’s comprehensive, methodical and 

standardized system for developing leaders, some are more effective than others. 

 Research into what makes leaders effective has spanned decades and has explored leader 

traits; contingent roles leaders play; and leader styles. This work resulted in enhanced 

understanding about what effective leaders are like and what they do. However, less is 

understood about what leaders know that specifically facilitates the development of expertise. 

Recent research began the process of expanding understanding about what fulltime Army 

officers know. However, approximately 50% of Army units are led by reserve component 

officers, who must perform their leadership duties under a variety of conditions. Because all 

Army operations are conducted through the combined efforts of active and reserve component 

units, it is critical that all Army leaders share a mental model of what it takes to be an effective 

leader. This research takes a step towards articulating that by measuring the difference in leader 

tacit knowledge levels in active (AC), and reserve component (RC): Army National Guard 

(ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) officers. 

 

Procedure: 

 The research design employs tacit knowledge-based problem scenarios and a meta-cognitive 

self-assessment to measure the differences in levels of tacit knowledge and meta-cognitive 

awareness of individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses in AC, USAR and ARNG Platoon, 

Company, and Battalion level leaders. Mean scores of the respondents were also compared with 

previously established tacit knowledge expert mean scores. 

Findings: 

• A MANOVA showed statistically significant differences in levels of tacit knowledge at 

Platoon and Company level only, with reserve component Platoon level mean scores being 

higher than AC Platoon level mean scores; and AC Company level mean scores being higher 

than reserve component Company level mean scores. 

• A one-way ANOVA measuring differences in meta-cognitive awareness of individual 

knowledge strengths and weaknesses was significant at the Platoon level only. Correlational 
vi 

• analysis conducted comparing tacit knowledge and meta-cognitive awareness mean scores 

showed that USAR Platoon/Company level officers and AC Platoon level officers had the 

most consistent pattern of significant correlation. 

• A one sample t test comparing expert tacit knowledge mean scores with respondent tacit 

knowledge scores found that USAR Platoon and Company Level mean scores were closer to 

the expert mean scores than AC or ARNG; with statistically significant differences between 

expert and respondent mean scores being found more in ‘Worse’ choices than ‘Better’ 

choices. At Battalion level, AC mean scores were generally closer to the expert means; and 

there were fewer statistically significant differences in ‘Worse’ choice categories. 

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings: 

 The findings summarized in this report can be used to refine leader training and learning 

strategies which serve as the foundation for the development of curriculum during professional 

military education and during unit-sponsored leader development training. It could also serve as 

a basis on which to develop a universal mental model of how leaders should problem-solve. The 

information contained in this report could also be used to develop tacit knowledge scenarios that 

more comprehensively represent the intrapersonal, interpersonal or organizational problems 

active and reserve component commissioned and noncommissioned officers face. Finally results 

could be used to help commissioned and noncommissioned leaders cultivate the desired quality 

of self-awareness.
vii 

DEVELOPING ARMY LEADERS ACROSS COMPONENTS: ASSESSING KNOWLEDGE 

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 

CONTENTS 

Page 

BACKGROUND .......................................................................................... 1 

 Knowledge and Expertise ............................................................................ 1 

 Organizational Context................................................................................ 2 

METHOD ................................................................................................... 3 

 Participants ............................................................................................. 3 

 Instrumentation ......................................................................................... 4 

 Design and Procedure ................................................................................... 5 

RESULTS .................................................................................................... 6 

 Research Question 1.................................................................................... 6 

 Research Question 2.................................................................................... 12 

 Research Question 3....................................................................................13 

 Summary ................................................................................................. 16 

DISCUSSION ............................................................................................... 17 

 Key Findings ...........................................................................................17 

 Utilization of Findings ................................................................................ 18 

REFERENCES ............................................................................................. 21 

APPENDIX A............................................................................................... 25 

APPENDIX B ..............................................................................................73 

 

LIST OF TABLES 

TABLE 1. TKML CATEGORIES BY LEADER LEVEL .......................................... 4 

 

TABLE 2. PLATOON, COMPANY AND BATTALION LEVEL DEMOGRAPHICS........ 6 

TABLE 3. PLATOON LEVEL SUMMARY OF T-TEST ANALYSIS: PERCENT ........... 7 

 OF RESPONSE OPTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERT 

 AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES 
viii 

CONTENTS (continued) 

Page 

LIST OF TABLES (continued) 

TABLE 4. PLATOON LEVEL ONE-SAMPLE T-TEST: TKML EXPERT AND............... 7 

 RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES 

TABLE 5. COMPANY LEVEL SUMMARY OF T-TEST ANALYSIS: PERCENT............ 8 

 OF RESPONSE OPTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERT 

 AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES 

TABLE 6. COMPANY LEVEL ONE-SAMPLE T-TEST: TKML EXPERT AND.............. 9 

 RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES 

TABLE 7. BATTALION LEVEL SUMMARY OF T-TEST ANALYSIS: PERCENT......... 10 

 OF RESPONSE OPTION DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERT 

 AND RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES 

TABLE 8. BATTALION LEVEL ONE-SAMPLE T-TEST: TKML EXPERT AND............ 11 

 RESPONDENT MEAN SCORES 

 

TABLE 9. PLATOON LEVEL UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR AC AND RC.................12 

 OFFICERS 

TABLE 10. COMPANY LEVEL UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS FOR AC AND RC.............. 13 

 OFFICERS 

TABLE 11. PLATOON LEVEL METACOGNITIVE MEAN AND TKML .....................14 

 RESPONSE CORRELATIONS BY COMPONENT 

TABLE 12. COMPANY LEVEL METACOGNITIVE MEAN AND TKML.....................15 

 RESPONSE CORRELATIONS BY COMPONENT 

TABLE 13. SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES, STATISTICAL ANALYSIS......................16 

 METHOD, AND RESULTS 
 1 

DEVELOPING ARMY LEADERS ACROSS COMPONENTS: 

ASSESSING KNOWLEDGE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 

Background 

 To succeed in today’s volatile, unpredictable operational environment, U.S. Army Officers, 

both commissioned and noncommissioned, must be capable of performing leader responsibilities 

with a very high degree of expertise in a variety of skill-sets. The Army includes in its definition 

of professionalism an expectation that Army Officers, both reserve (RC) and active (AC) 

component, possess “expert knowledge” (FM 1, 2001, p. 7). Army Officers assigned to leader 

positions must demonstrate intrapersonal, interpersonal and organizational expertise in technical, 

tactical, and leader tasks under ambiguous and constantly changing conditions. Leaders develop 

their skills through a well-developed system of formal institutional training, experience gained 

through operational assignment and self-development (DA Pam 350-58, 1994). However, 

despite the Army’s comprehensive, methodical and standardized system for developing leaders, 

some are more effective than others. 

 Research into what makes leaders effective has spanned decades and has explored leader 

traits (Stogdill, 1974); contingent roles leaders play (Fiedler, 1967); and leader styles (Burns, 

1978; Bass, 1985). This research resulted in enhanced understanding about what effective 

leaders are like and what they do. However, less is understood about what leaders know that 

facilitates the development of expertise (Horvath et al., 1994a, p. 24). 

Knowledge and Expertise 

 The Army’s three-pillared leader development system (institutional training, operational 

assignment, and self-development) was designed to build expertise through the acquisition of 

knowledge and experience. Institutional training teaches Army Officers knowledge about ‘what’ 

to do. It is assumed that the experience gained through operational assignments will teach 

Officers knowledge about ‘how’ to do the tasks learned in formal training. Officers are expected 

to establish a proactive self-development process, which facilitates continuous learning through 

their Army career. Research has shown that “practically intelligent” (Sternberg, 1985) 

individuals are more adept at learning from experience and applying that tacit knowledge to new 

problems. Tacit knowledge is implicit knowledge, not formally taught, that is amassed by 

practically intelligent individuals, who use it to successfully adapt to, select, or shape real-world 

environments (Sternberg et al., 2000, p. 104), and has been linked with effective leadership 

(Sternberg et al., 2000, p. 198). 

 Research investigating the role tacit knowledge plays in the development of effective Army 

leaders began in 1994, through a collaborative partnership between Yale University and the U.S. 

Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). The Tacit Knowledge 

for Military Leaders (TKML) Project researchers gathered lessons learned about leadership 

experiences from Platoon, Company, and Battalion level AC Officers. Tacit knowledge 

compiled from this process was specific to each leader level, but could be organized into three 

basic categories: intrapersonal (knowledge one learns about oneself); interpersonal (knowledge 
 2 

about how to interact effectively with others); and organizational (knowledge about how to act 

within the organization) (Hedlund et al., 1999a, b, c; Sternberg et al., 2000). 

 The TKML Project identified important AC leader tacit knowledge considered central to the 

development of expertise. However, fifty percent of the Army consists of RC organizations 

whose leaders must develop and maintain a level of expertise commensurate with that of AC 

leaders, although under very different conditions. While the program of instruction that trains 

Soldiers to become Commissioned Officers is identical for the AC and RC, the majority of AC 

Officers earn their commission through the Reserve Officer Training Corp (ROTC) program, 

which is accomplished when an individual attends college (Soldiers, 2007). Consequently, most 

ROTC graduates are in their early to mid-twenties, and are just beginning their military careers. 

Conversely, most RC Soldiers have had military experience prior to attending a PreCommissioning program, having at least gone through Basic and Advanced Individual Training. 

Additionally, while there are many similarities between AC and RC Army organizations, the RC 

environment has a number of distinctly unique attributes: geographical dispersion, time and 

resource constraints, and diverse organizational systems. RC officers tend to be older (USAR, 

2006; OASD/DMDC, 1998; OASDRA, 2006), and must balance civilian and military 

professional commitments. Thus, problem-solving processes and solutions that are appropriate 

for one organization may not work in the other; and leaders in each organization may need 

different kinds of tacit knowledge expertise to solve problems successfully in different contexts. 

 Generally, experts may be distinguished from novices in a variety of ways. Experts possess 

not only domain-specific knowledge, but also metacognitive abilities, which are considered key, 

and have been identified as a “proximal predictors of leadership performance” and include 

superior skills in: analyzing and solving problems comprehensively and quickly; pattern 

detection; social judgment; and metacognitive assessment (Chi, Glaser & Farr, 1988, pp. xvii-xx; 

Marshall-Mies Fleishman, Martin, Zaccaro, Baughman & McGee, 2000, pp. 138-140). 

 In an era where the Army seeks to develop adaptive leaders, it is especially important for 

these individuals to be able to ‘self-diagnose’ their own metacognitive abilities. Among other 

key qualities, effective military leaders possess flexibility, self-monitoring, and orientation 

toward learning from experience (Yukl, 1999, p. 257). While AC and RC leaders who are selfaware of their own knowledge strengths and weaknesses can proactively manage their 

continuous learning and self-development process towards the desired level of expertise, the 

knowledge a leader acquires which contributes to the development of expertise can be influenced 

by the organization of which the leader is a member. 

 

Organizational Context 

 Organizations vary by how they function, how power is distributed, and how policies are 

implemented. As a machine bureaucracy, the Army’s doctrine (in which is recorded its 

institutional knowledge) is heavily prescribed and encoded. There are clear rules, procedures 

and standards, and this knowledge is managed by the leaders. Managers translate individual 

knowledge into organizational rules and procedures which serve to filter information throughout 

the organizational hierarchy (Lam, 2000, 1998, p. 15). 

 
 3 

 An organization’s culture or context shapes the thinking of organizational members (Schein, 

1999). Depending upon the patterns of thinking within an organization, there may be support or 

resistance to the changes in the individual thinking necessary to develop expertise. Certain 

factors influence the context in which a leader might function, which will shape how the 

individual deals with change. These include: a) an over-emphasis on one area of work; b) 

organizational dynamics preventing ideas of different ways of working being raised; c) cultural, 

historical and financial factors; d) lack of experience and confidence to ask or do ‘something 

different’; and e) management and leadership elements (Jensen, Malcolm, Phelps, & Stoker, 

2002, pp. 38-39). 

 The attitude of professionalism a leader maintains and the effort or motivation he or she 

invests in acquiring the necessary expert knowledge is influenced by the organization of which 

the leader is a member. Lam (1998) argues that expertise derived from tacit knowledge is 

“powerfully shaped by the broader social and institutional context,” and that the learning and 

sharing of expertise can only be understood by factoring in organizational influences (Lam, 

1998, p. 2-3). Lloyd (1996) contends that an organization’s approach to learning is influenced 

by the underlying dynamic of how power is defined in the organization, with a power-driven 

approach being linked to short-term goals (Lloyd, 1996, p. 5). A short term approach to learning 

risks undermining core organizational values, which are developed over time. This approach 

may be, in the long term, ineffective. 

 Under the current Operations Tempo OPTEMPO, the Army struggles to balance long and 

short-term goals, and to structure appropriate learning and development opportunities for both 

AC and RC leaders. An effective leader development system that compensates for the 

deficiencies that may exist within the context of some organizations incorporates the varieties of 

expert knowledge that are required by all members of the Army’s organizations, as well as the 

contextual and cognitive differences in the professional environment. The TKML Project 

compiled leader tacit knowledge important to the development of AC leader expertise. Because 

approximately 50% of the Army is composed of RC organizations, whose Officers perform 

leader responsibilities under a variety of conditions, this research assesses knowledge similarities 

and differences across AC and RC components and identifies ways the inventory might be 

enhanced to address component differences. 

Method 

Participants 

 The sample consisted of 666 part-time (RC) Army National Guard (ARNG), U.S. Army 

Reserve (USAR) and full-time AC 2nd and 1st Lieutenants, Captains, and Majors who were 

attending Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) institutional training in different 

occupational specialties. These Officers took the inventory at seven Army schools located at 

Forts Leavenworth (Command and General Staff College); Sill (Artillery Officer Basic and 

Advanced Courses); Benning (Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses); Knox (Armor 

Officer Basic and Advanced Courses; Lee (Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced Courses); 

and Leonard Wood (Military Police and Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses). The 
 4 

branch schools are representative of combat arms, combat service support and combat support 

specialties. 

Instrumentation 

 Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders (TKML) Inventory.

 The TKML Project resulted in the development of three versions of an inventory, which 

compiled tacit knowledge items for Platoon, Company, and Battalion level Officers based on 

lessons learned gathered from interviews with AC Officers. The inventory presents a variety of 

problem scenarios followed by a number of response options. Officers read the scenario and 

then rate, using a 9-point Likert scale (1:low; 9:high) to what degree the response option is an 

appropriate solution to the problem presented in the scenario. The items which were selected for 

inclusion on each instrument were those that best discriminated between experienced and novice 

Officers, as well as more and less effective leaders (Hedlund et al., 1999). Expert responses 

were identified based upon the input of AC Officers (59 Battalion; 29 Company; 50 Platoon) 

who had considerable organizational and leadership experience (Sternberg et al., 1999, p. 95). A 

summary of the expert responses is located at Appendix A. 

 The dependent variables in this research are the mean scores that each Officer achieved on 

the TKML Inventory as well as on the metacognitive section of the professional expertise 

questionnaire (described in the next section). TKML scores are further organized into ‘better’ 

and ‘worse’ choice categories. Table 1 presents the tacit knowledge categories relevant to each 

leader level (Hedlund et al., 1999 a, b, c). 

Table 1 

TKML Categories by Leader Level 

Platoon Leader Company Commander Battalion Commander 

Motivating subordinates Motivating subordinates Motivating subordinates 

Taking care of Soldiers Taking care of Soldiers Taking care of Soldiers 

Managing oneself Managing oneself Managing oneself 

Establishing trust Establishing trust 

Influencing the boss Communicating Communicating 

 Developing subordinates Developing subordinates 

Establishing credibility Directing/supervising subordinates Dealing with poor performers 

 Balancing mission and troops Protecting the organization 

 Cooperating with others Organizational Development 

 Because the professional context and environment for RC leaders differs from that of AC 

leaders, minor changes were made to the original TKML Inventory for each level of leader to 

make it appropriate (e.g., references to Annual Training, and traditional RC Soldiers were 

included). In addition to word changes within the scenarios and options, some of the scenarios 

that were not appropriate within the context of reserve component organizations were left out. In 

the version used in this research, the TKML-Battalion has 12 scenarios; the TKML-Company 

has 17 scenarios; and the TKML-Platoon has 13 scenarios. A summary of these changes, as well 
 5 

as the component means and standard deviations for each scenario response option, is located at 

Appendix A. 

 The Measurement of Professional Expertise: Self-Assessment Questionnaire. 

 Based on her theory that there were universal domain nonspecific dimensions to expertise, 

van der Heijden sought to “operationalize” expertise (van der Heijden, 1998; 2000, p. 11). Her 

research resulted in the development of the ‘Measurement of Professional Expertise SelfAssessment Questionnaire,’ which presents five dimensions that she argues can be used as 

general indices of professional expertise: 1) knowledge dimension; 2) metacognitive knowledge 

dimension; 3) skill requirement; 4) social recognition; and 5) growth and flexibility (van der 

Heijden, 2000, p. 11). The items included on the questionnaire reflect attributes or behaviors 

that have been attributed to experts or exemplary performance in various fields (van der Heijden, 

2000, p. 17). Reliability coefficients for the scales associated with each dimension ranged from 

.83 to .87 for one group to whom the instrument was administered, and .93 to .94 for the second 

group. The metacognitive knowledge dimension from van der Heijden’s Questionnaire is the 

only scale used in the present research. A 5-point Likert scale was provided, (1:low; 5:high); 

with a high mean score in this 15-item dimension indicating that an individual is aware of his or 

her own knowledge strengths or weaknesses (van der Heijden, 2000, p. 17). The mean 

calculated from this dimension was treated as a single dependent variable. Appendix B contains 

a summary of the items included in the metacognitive knowledge dimension scale. 

Design and Procedure 

 This research sought to measure differences in levels of tacit knowledge of AC and RC 

Officers at three leader levels. Multiple Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), t-test, Analysis of 

Variance (ANOVA), and Pearson product-moment correlation was used to measure differences 

as well as identify any relations that existed. Analyses were based on individual sample and 

expert mean scores, from which aggregated means were calculated that represent (item-by-item) 

responses considered through expert analyses to be better and worse choice response options to 

the problems posed in each vignette. Difference scores were then computed, both item-by-item, 

as well as between aggregated means (Legree, Heffner, Psotka, Martin & Medsker, 2003; 

Hedlund, Sternberg & Psotka, 2000). This procedure was selected because it provides a more 

detailed analysis than the original deviation score procedure. Unless indicated otherwise, alpha 

was set at the .05 level. The design of this research as well as the analysis is guided by the 

following research questions (RQ): 

• RQ1: Are there differences between AC/RC Officer TKML responses and the TKML 

expert responses. 

• RQ2: Are there between component (AC/ARNG/USAR) differences in levels of leader 

tacit knowledge among Officers. 

• RQ3: Are there between component differences in the level of metacognitive selfawareness of individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses among Officers. 

 To compose sample sizes (which ranged from 10-25 Officers), information about TRADOC 

institutional training course schedules and class sizes was obtained from the Army Training 
 6 

Requirements and Resource System (ATRRS). The TKML and metacognitive inventory was 

administered on days and times specified by the institutions sponsoring the courses attended by 

the Officers in the sample. At the Command and General Staff College, because the class size 

was much larger than at the other institutions, a random number generator was used to determine 

the sample composition to make the sample size both random as well as consistent with the other 

institutions. At the other institutions, when the class size was the approximate size of the 

requested sample, an entire class was administered the inventory. Other samples were composed 

of Officers who were drawn from classes that were in session at the time of the data collection 

and who were not involved in testing or field training. During administration of the inventory, a 

brief explanation of the research was provided to Officers, as well as instructions on how to 

complete the inventory. Officers were also given the opportunity to read the instructions. 

Results 

 Findings are presented organized first by research question, then by leader level. Table 2 

summarizes demographic information for Platoon, Company, and Battalion level officers. 

Table 2 

Platoon, Company and Battalion Level Demographics

Level USAR ARNG 

RC 

(Merged) AC Total

Combat

Arms 

Combat 

Service 

Support 

Combat 

Support Total

Platoon 

n 

% of Total 

32 

11% 

139 

49% 

171 

60% 

114 

40%

285 161 

57% 

24 

8% 

100 

35% 

285 

Company 

n 

% of Total 

44 

14% 

149 

48% 

193 

62% 

116 

38%

309 184 

59% 

47 

15% 

78 

25% 

309 

Battalion 

n 

% of Total 

30 

42% 

19 

26% 

49 

68% 

23 

32%

72 30 

42% 

27 

37% 

15 

21% 

72 

Total 666 Total 666 

Research Question 1: Are there differences between AC/RC Officer TKML responses and the 

TKML expert responses. 

 Platoon level. 

 Individual item level analysis was accomplished by conducting a One Sample t-test between 

the expert mean and respondent means, by component, for each vignette response option. 

Detailed results are in Appendix A. Table 3 shows the percentage of response options for each 

vignette that differed significantly from the expert mean for each component. Two vignettes are 

not included in the table. The vignettes selected for non-inclusion are those where the statistical 

difference resulted from respondents rating the majority of the better choices more highly than 

the experts rated them. Both vignettes are part of the ‘Managing Oneself’ category. 
 7 

 Table 3 

 Platoon Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response 

 Option Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores 

 AC USAR ARNG

Motivating Subordinates 

• Vignette P22 

• Vignette P30 

50% 

57%

20% 

43% 

30% 

86% 

Influencing the Boss 

• Vignette P23 

• Vignette P24 

62% 

45%

25% 

18% 

100% 

64% 

Managing Oneself 

• Vignette P25 

• Vignette P26 

• Vignette P32 

• Vignette P33 

70% 

54% 

55% 

67%

10% 

18% 

44% 

33% 

60% 

63% 

55% 

67% 

Establish Trust 

• Vignette P27 70% 30% 50% 

Establish Credibility 

• Vignette P28 70% 70% 50% 

Taking Care of Soldiers 

• Vignette P31 75% 25% 75% 

 Twelve dependent variables that represent better and worse choices were developed for 

Platoon level Officers. Results of One Sample t-tests shown in Table 4 showed significant 

differences between the Officer means and the expert means. 

 Table 4 

 Platoon Level One-Sample t-test: TKML Expert and Respondent Mean Scores 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

n=114 

USAR 

n=32 

ARNG 

n=139 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

n=114 

USAR 

n=32 

ARNG 

n=139 

Motivating Subordinates Motivating Subordinates 

6.92 6.64* 6.85 6.62** 2.87 3.59** 3.77** 3.68** 

Influencing the Boss Influencing the Boss 

7.13 6.66** 6.94 6.67** 3.42 4.07** 3.46 3.75** 

Managing Oneself Managing Oneself 

7.20 6.91** 7.25 7.01* 3.49 4.45** 4.48** 4.16** 

Establishing Trust Establishing Trust 

6.43 6.19 6.39 6.17* 2.86 3.85** 3.77* 3.82** 

Establishing Credibility Establishing Credibility 

7.62 7.80* 8.03* 7.83* 2.41 3.68** 3.76** 3.55** 

Taking Care of Soldiers Taking Care of Soldiers 

7.22 6.90* 7.05 7.02 3.09 3.65** 3.46* 3.32* 

Overall Overall 

7.09 6.85 7.08 6.89 3.02 3.88 3.78 3.71 

 *p < .05. **p < .01. 
 8 

 As shown in Table 4, among the better choices, with the exception of the category of 

‘Establishing Credibility,’ AC and ARNG scores were all significantly lower than the expert 

mean. For that category, the mean scores of all three groups were significantly higher than the 

expert mean scores. Results suggest that even though the TKML Inventory was developed with 

AC input, this fact does not appear to give AC Officers at this level any advantage in achieving 

expert scores on the instrument. There was no significant difference between the scores of 

USAR Platoon Leaders and the Expert Mean scores on the better choice end of the scale. These 

results suggest that, despite being new to the Army, these Officers had nonetheless been able to 

develop tacit knowledge in these categories on par with the experts. 

 

 For the worse choices, the mean scores of all three groups were higher than the expert mean, 

with the mean scores being significantly higher, statistically, in the majority of cases. In other 

words, each group did not rate the worse choices as low as the expert group did. The AC group 

was closest one out of six times; the USAR group was closest two out of six times; and the 

ARNG group closest three out of six times. These results suggest that Officers at this level have 

accrued more tacit knowledge about what to do in response to problems related to these 

categories, and less about what not to do. 

 Company level. 

 Individual item level analysis was accomplished by conducting a One Sample t-test between 

the expert mean and respondent means, by component, for each vignette response option. 

Detailed results are in Appendix A. Table 5 shows the percentage of response options for each 

vignette that differed significantly from the expert mean. 

 Table 5 

 Company Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option 

 Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores 

 AC USAR ARNG 

Taking Care of Soldiers 

• Vignette C22 50% 62% 44% 

Directing and Supervising 

Subordinates 

• Vignette C23 

• Vignette C35 

42% 

86% 

33% 

14% 

58% 

57% 

Cooperating With Others 

• Vignette C24 100% 37% 62% 

Establishing Trust 

• Vignette C25 

• Vignette C28 

57% 

57% 

14% 

14% 

47% 

14% 

Managing Oneself 

• Vignette C26 

• Vignette C37 

80% 

33% 

60% 

0% 

60% 

55% 

Developing Subordinates 

• Vignette C27 

• Vignette C32 

83% 

54% 

33% 

18% 

83% 

36% 
 9 

 Table 5 

 Company Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option 

 Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores (continued) 

 AC USAR ARNG 

Motivating Subordinates 

• Vignette C29 

• Vignette C30 

• Vignette C33 

50% 

60% 

67% 

58% 

20% 

42% 

83% 

70% 

58% 

Communicating 

• Vignette C31 50% 40% 50% 

Balancing Mission and Troops 

• Vignette C34 

• Vignette C36 

60% 

30% 

60% 

10% 

60% 

50% 

 Table 6 shows the results of the One Sample t test for the Company Level Officers. There 

were 18 dependent variables analyzed. One Sample t-test showed significant differences 

between the Officer means and the expert means. 

 Table 6 

 Company Level One-Sample t-test: TKML Expert and Respondent Mean Scores 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

n=149 

USAR 

n=44 

ARNG 

n=116 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

n=149 

USAR 

n=44 

ARNG 

n=116 

Taking Care of Soldiers Taking Care of Soldiers 

7.76 7.74 7.79 7.44** 3.37 3.94** 4.23** 4.02** 

Directing and Supervising Subordinates Directing and Supervising Subordinates 

7.17 6.97** 6.98 6.87** 3.13 3.55** 3.81** 4.00** 

Cooperating With Others Cooperating With Others 

7.53 6.52** 6.43** 6.25** 2.19 2.86** 2.54 2.94** 

Establishing Trust Establishing Trust 

7.34 7.30 7.46 7.20 2.25 2.46* 2.38 2.49* 

Managing Oneself Managing Oneself 

7.48 7.31* 7.35 7.28* 2.14 3.29** 3.27** 3.15** 

Communicating Communicating 

7.32 7.18 7.53 7.29 3.46 4.44** 4.07** 4.29** 

Motivating Subordinates Motivating 

7.44 7.34 7.46 7.32 3.04 3.89** 4.04** 4.07** 

Developing Subordinates Developing Subordinates 

7.79 8.13** 8.02* 7.97** 3.33 3.57** 3.70* 3.93** 

Balancing Mission and Troops Balancing Mission and Troops 

6.95 6.90 6.74 6.55** 2.46 2.76** 3.04** 3.03** 

Overall Overall 

7.42 7.26 7.31 7.13 2.82 3.42 3.45 3.55 

 *p < .05. **p < .01. 

 
 10 

 At the Company level, of the four statistically significant mean scores among the better 

choices in the AC group, three were lower than the expert mean. There were two statistically 

significant differences between the expert mean scores and the mean scores of the USAR group; 

one above and one below. The ARNG group had six mean scores that were significantly 

different, with five of the scores being lower than the expert mean scores. Again, results suggest 

that despite the fact the Inventory was developed with AC input, this apparently gave AC 

Company level Officers no advantage. Also, the mean scores of the USAR Officers, again, were 

closer to the expert mean scores. These results suggest that these Officers may be able to draw 

on a variety of military and civilian experiences and apply relevant tacit knowledge to their 

current military position. 

 In the worse choice area, the mean scores of all three groups were higher in each category 

than the expert mean scores. While significantly different, the scores of the AC group were 

closer to the expert mean scores in five out of nine categories; with the scores of the USAR 

group being closer to the expert mean in four out of nine categories. These results suggest that 

Officers at this level, like Officers at Platoon level, know more about what to do, than what not 

to do in response to problems within these categories. 

 Battalion level. 

 Individual item level analysis was accomplished by conducting a One Sample t-test 

between the expert mean and respondent means, by component, for each vignette response 

option. Detailed results are in Appendix A. Table 7 shows the percentage of response options 

for each vignette that differed significantly from the expert mean. 

 Table 7 

 Battalion Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option 

 Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores 

 AC USAR ARNG 

Developing Subordinates 

• Vignette B22 

• Vignette B31 

50% 62% 44% 

Managing Oneself 

• Vignette B23 

• Vignette B30 

42% 

86% 

33% 

14% 

58% 

57% 

Protecting the Organization 

• Vignette B24 

• Vignette B25 

100% 37% 62% 

Motivating Subordinates 

• Vignette B25 9% 45% 9% 

Taking Care of Soldiers 

• Vignette B26 27% 54% 45% 
 11 

 Table 7 

 Battalion Level Summary of t-test Analysis: Percent of Response Option 

 Differences Between Expert and Respondent Mean Scores (continued)

 AC USAR ARNG 

Communicating 

• Vignette B27 

• Vignette B28 

• Vignette B29 

• Vignette B32 

14% 

12% 

13% 

0% 

28% 

62% 

33% 

25% 

0% 

25% 

27% 

8% 

Dealing With Poor Performers 

• Vignette B33 40% 30% 30% 

 Table 8 shows the results of One Sample t-test analysis, involving 16 dependent variables, 

which showed significant differences between the Officer means and the expert means. 

 Table 8 

 Battalion Level One-Sample t-test: TKML Expert and Respondent Mean Scores 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

n=23 

USAR 

n=30 

ARNG 

n=19 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

n=23 

USAR 

n=30 

ARNG 

n=19 

Developing Subordinates Developing Subordinates 

6.80 6.53 6.44 6.24* 2.84 3.47* 3.73** 3.40* 

Organization Development Organization Development 

7.08 7.28 6.90 7.07 3.02 3.35 3.07 3.63 

Protecting the Organization Protecting the Organization 

7.50 7.24 7.11** 7.16* 3.51 3.40 3.88* 4.00 

Motivating Subordinates Motivating Subordinates 

7.20 6.93 6.55** 6.74* 3.05 3.19 3.88 3.63 

Taking Care of Soldiers Taking Care of Soldiers 

7.72 7.20* 7.19** 7.20** 3.40 4.26 4.63* 3.63 

Communicating Communicating 

7.27 7.04 6.95* 6.93* 3.62 3.92 3.80 3.86 

Managing Oneself Managing Oneself 

6.74 6.43 6.09* 6.17 2.98 3.00 3.62* 3.74 

Dealing With Poor Performers Dealing With Poor Performers 

7.65 7.13* 7.44 7.14 3.37 4.04* 3.95 4.05 

Overall Overall 

7.24 6.97 6.83 6.83 3.22 3.58 3.82 3.74 

 *p < .05. **p < .01. 

 At the Battalion level, among the better choices, while the mean scores of all groups were 

lower than the expert mean, the AC group had two mean scores out of the eight that were 

significantly lower; while the USAR and the ARNG groups both had five of eight that were 

significantly lower. These results suggest that at this level, the opportunity to share knowledge, 

which is more available for AC Officers, may provide an advantage in the development of tacit 

knowledge. 
 12 

 Among the worse choices, ARNG group had one significantly higher score; the AC group 

had two significantly higher scores; and the USAR group had four significantly higher scores 

than the expert mean. These results suggest that Officers at this level have developed a larger 

body of tacit knowledge about what not to do as well as what to do in response to problems in 

these categories. 

Research Question 2: Are there between component (AC/ARNG/USAR) differences in levels of 

leader tacit knowledge among Officers. 

 Platoon level. 

 MANOVA conducted initially with three component groups (AC/ARNG/USAR) was not 

significant. Because of the extremely uneven sample size, another MANOVA was conducted 

after combining the ARNG and USAR RC groups. A small but significant MANOVA, F(1, 283) 

= 1.93, eta squared = .08 was obtained for the analysis done comparing RC and AC Platoon level 

Officers. For the majority of items, the RC mean scores were higher for the better choices, and 

lower for the worse choices. Table 9 shows significant follow-up univariate F tests. 

 Table 9 

 Platoon Level Univariate Analysis for AC and RC Officers 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

AC 

n=114 

RC 

n=171 

AC 

n=114 

RC 

n=171 

Influencing the Boss Influencing the Boss 

6.66 6.72 4.07* 3.70* 

F(1, 283) = 7.95 

Managing Oneself Managing Oneself 

6.91 7.05 4.45* 4.22* 

F(1, 283) = 3.97 

Taking Care of Soldiers Taking Care of Soldiers 

6.90 7.02 3.65* 3.35* 

F(1, 283) = 4.41 

 *p < .05. 

 Results show that while Platoon level RC mean scores were generally higher than AC mean 

scores in the better choice category, the significant differences in mean scores were all found 

among worse choices, in the categories of: Influencing the Boss, Managing Oneself, and Taking 

Care of Soldiers. These results suggest that RC Platoon level Officers may be able to bring 

higher levels of tacit knowledge to their military positions because they are able to draw on a 

wide variety of civilian experiences and are generally older than their AC counterparts. 

 Company level. 

 A significant multivariate F(1, 307) = 2.97, eta squared = .16 was obtained for the combined 

(USAR/ARNG and AC) component analysis. Table 10 shows the results of the univariate tests 

which were done to identify which of the dependent variables most accounted for the differences 

between the components. 
 13 

 Table 10 

 Company Level Univariate Analysis for AC and RC Officers 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

AC 

n=116 

RC 

n=193 

AC 

n=116 

RC 

n-=193 

Taking Care of Soldiers Taking Care of Soldiers 

7.74* 7.52* 3.94 4.07 

F(1, 307) = 4.376 

Directing and Supervising Subordinates Directing and Supervising Subordinates 

6.97 6.89 3.56** 3.96** 

F(1, 307) = 9.061 

Developing Subordinates Developing Subordinates 

8.13 7.98 3.57** 3.87** 

F(1, 307) = 7.363 

Balancing Mission and Troops Balancing Mission and Troops 

6.90** 6.59** 2.76* 3.03* 

F(1, 307) = 7.443 F(1, 307) = 4.381 

 *p < .05. **p < .01. 

 While mean scores for Officers at the Company level were generally higher for AC Officers 

in the better choice and lower in the worse choice areas, multiple comparisons showed the RC 

and AC differed significantly on the better choice responses for Taking Care of Soldiers and 

Balancing Mission and Troops. Among the worse choice responses, the RC and AC differed on 

Directing and Supervising Subordinates, Developing Subordinates, and Balancing Mission and 

Troops. These results suggest that at this level, having the opportunity to network full-time with 

one’s counterparts may give AC Company level Officers an advantage in developing tacit 

knowledge problem-solving skills in both better and worse choice areas. 

 Battalion level.

 Multivariate analysis conducted at the Battalion level for this research question was not 

significant. 

Research Question 3: Are there between component differences in the level of metacognitive 

self-awareness of individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses among Officers. 

Platoon level. 

 Results of one-way ANOVA showed no significant differences in the metacognitive mean 

scores of USAR, ARNG, and AC Platoon Level Officers. Result of one-way ANOVA for an RC 

combined group was significant, F(1, 283) = 4.96. The combined group RC metacognitive mean 

score was 3.84; the AC mean score was 3.71. Correlations were computed to identify any 

relations between TKML and Metacognitive Self-Assessment variables. Correlation analysis 

comparing metacognitive mean scores and TKML mean scores was significant in four of six 

areas under the better choice category. Table 11 shows the correlation between the 
 14 

Metacognitive Assessment mean scores for Platoon Leaders and their TKML responses 

organized by component. 

 Table 11 

 Platoon Level Metacognitive Mean and TKML Response Correlations by Component 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

 AC 

n=114 

USAR 

n=32 

ARNG 

n=139 

AC 

n=114 

USAR 

n=32 

ARNG 

n=139 

Metacog. 

Mean 3.71 3.80 3.85 

Metacog. 

Mean 3.71 3.80 3.85 

Influencing the Boss Influencing the Boss 

 6.66 

(.155) 

6.94 

(.382*) 

6.67 

(.023) 

4.07 

(-.003) 

3.46 

(-.295) 

3.75 

(-.046) 

Managing Oneself Managing Oneself 

 6.91 

(.192*) 

7.25 

(.414*) 

7.01 

(.175*) 

4.45 

(-.132) 

4.48 

(-.174) 

4.16 

(-.070) 

Establishing Credibility Establishing Credibility 

 7.80 

(.208*) 

8.03 

(.495*) 

7.83 

(.131) 

3.68 

(-.009) 

3.76 

(.118) 

3.55 

(.044) 

Taking Care of Soldiers Taking Care of Soldiers 

 6.90 

(.087) 

7.05 

(.353*) 

7.02 

(.135) 

3.65 

(-.084) 

3.46 

(-.206) 

3.32 

(-.132) 

Overall Overall 

 6.85 

(.173) 

7.09 

(.486**) 

6.89 

(.140) 

3.88 

(-.069) 

3.79 

(-.176) 

3.71 

(-.093) 

 *p < .05; **p < .01. 

 Correlation for Platoon level Officers of all components was significant between the 

metacognitive mean score and the TKML Intrapersonal item of Managing Oneself, in the better 

choice category. These results suggest that the intrapersonal ability to manage oneself is related 

to the intrapersonal ability to know one’s knowledge strengths and weaknesses. A summary of 

the items included in the Metacognitive Self-Assessment is at Appendix B. 

 Company level. 

 

 Results of one-way ANOVA at this level showed no significant differences between the 

metacognitive mean scores of USAR, ARNG, and AC Company level Officers. Correlations 

were computed to identify relations between TKML and Metacognitive Self-Assessment 

variables. Correlation analysis comparing metacognitive mean scores and TKML mean scores 

was significant in all areas. Table 12 shows the results of this analysis. 
 15 

 Table 12 

 Company Level Metacognitive Mean and TKML Response Correlations by Component 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

 AC 

n=116 

USAR 

n=44 

ARNG 

n=149 

AC 

n=116 

USAR 

n=44 

ARNG 

n=149 

Metacog. 

Mean 4.01 4.01 3.98 

Metacog. 

Mean 4.04 4.01 3.98 

Taking Care of Soldiers Taking Care of Soldiers 

 7.74 

(-.012) 

7.79 

(.218) 

7.44 

(.295**) 

3.94 

(.138) 

4.23 

(-.299*) 

4.02 

(-.005) 

Directing and Supervising Subordinates Directing and Supervising Subordinates 

 6.97 

(.194*) 

6.98 

(.345*) 

6.87 

(.164*) 

3.56 

(-.015) 

3.81 

(.023) 

4.00 

(.053) 

Cooperating With Others Cooperating With Others 

 6.52 

(.016) 

6.43 

(-.070) 

6.25 

(-.099) 

2.86 

(.021) 

2.54 

(-.238) 

2.94 

(-.242**) 

Establishing Trust Establishing Trust 

 7.30 

(.160) 

7.46 

(.194) 

7.20 

(.158) 

2.46 

(-.143) 

2.38 

(-.478**) 

2.49 

(-.305**) 

Managing Oneself Managing Oneself 

 7.31 

(.097) 

7.35 

(.602**) 

7.28 

(.083) 

3.29 

(-.276**) 

3.27 

(-.430**) 

3.15 

(-.274**) 

Communicating Communicating 

 7.18 

(.067) 

7.53 

(.504**) 

7.29 

(.183*) 

4.44 

(.170) 

4.07 

(-.079) 

4.29 

(-.133) 

Motivating Subordinates Motivating Subordinates 

 7.34 

(.143) 

7.46 

(.364*) 

7.32 

(.227**) 

3.89 

(.158) 

4.04 

(.148) 

4.07 

(-.103) 

Developing Subordinates Developing Subordinates 

 8.13 

(-.049) 

8.02 

(.425**) 

7.97 

(.205*) 

3.57 

(.033) 

3.70 

(-.147) 

3.93 

(-.170*) 

Balancing Mission and Troops Balancing Mission and Troops 

 6.90 

(.103) 

6.74 

(.447**) 

6.55 

(.140) 

2.76 

(-.045) 

3.04 

(-.093) 

3.03 

(-.169*) 

Overall Overall 

 7.27 

(.134) 

7.31 

(.530**) 

7.13 

(.204*) 

3.42 

(.011) 

3.45 

(-.352*) 

3.55 

(-.247**) 

 *p < .05; **p < .01 

 At this level, there was a significant correlation for Company level Officers of all 

components between the metacognitive mean score and the TKML Intrapersonal item of 

Managing Oneself in the worse choice category. These results suggest that intrapersonal 

knowledge about one’s strengths and weaknesses and knowledge about how not to manage 

oneself develops as one gains experience in one’s job. The USAR group had more significant 

correlations in the better choice category, as well as the strongest overall correlations. 
 16 

 Battalion level. 

 Results of one-way ANOVA at this level indicated no significant differences in the 

metacognitive mean scores of USAR, ARNG, and AC Battalion level Officers. Correlations 

were computed to identify relations between TKML and Metacognitive Self-Assessment 

variables. There were no significant correlations. 

Summary 

 Table 13 summarizes the overall results on the analyses conducted in response to each 

research question. 

Table 13 

Summary of Hypotheses, Statistical Analysis Method, and Results 

Hypothesis Statistical Method/Results 

RQ1: Are there differences between AC/RC 

Officer TKML responses and the TKML expert 

responses. 

One Sample t-test showed significant 

differences between AC/RC Officer 

means and the expert means. 

RQ2: Are there between component 

(AC/ARNG/USAR) differences in levels of 

leader tacit knowledge among Officers. 

Results of MANOVA showed significant 

differences at the Platoon and Company 

level, but not at the Battalion level. 

RQ3: Are there between component differences 

in the level of metacognitive self-awareness of 

individual knowledge strengths and weaknesses 

among Officers. 

Results of One-Way ANOVA were 

significant at Platoon level only. 

Correlation analysis comparing 

metacognitive mean scores and TKML 

mean scores was significant. 

 RQ1: Generally, with a few exceptions, for each level of Officer, the mean scores for 

Platoon, Company, and Battalion Officers of all components were lower than the expert mean 

scores in the better choice category and higher than the expert mean scores in the worse choice 

category. At Platoon and Company levels, more statistically significant differences were found 

on the worse choice side of the table, which suggests that the development of tacit knowledge 

about what to do occurs before the development of tacit knowledge about what not to do in 

response to problems. At Platoon and Company level, USAR mean scores were not significantly 

different than the expert mean scores, in more comparisons. This suggests that USAR junior and 

mid-level Officers may be able to draw from experiences outside of their current military 

assignment which assists them to develop their tacit knowledge problem-solving skills. 

 RQ2: MANOVA conducted at Platoon and Company level where Officers are aggregated by 

component (AC/RC) was significant. TKML mean scores of RC Platoon level Officers were 

higher than those of AC Platoon level Officers; and TKML mean scores of RC Company level 

Officers were lower than those of AC Company level Officers. There were no significant 

differences in the mean scores of Battalion level Officers. Effect sizes were small. These results 
 17 

suggest that maturity may provide an advantage at Platoon level, while the opportunity to 

network while living and working together full-time provides the advantage at the Company 

level. 

 RQ3: Results of one-way ANOVA comparing the metacognitive mean scores of RC and AC 

Platoon level Officers showed a significant difference, with RC Officers having a higher score. 

Results of one-way ANOVA comparing the metacognitive mean scores of RC and AC Company 

level Officers showed no significant difference. There were significant correlations between the 

metacognitive mean score and TKML mean scores at Platoon and Company level. Results 

suggests there is a relationship between one’s awareness of one’s knowledge strengths and 

weakness and the individual’s level of tacit knowledge. There were no significant results at 

Battalion level. 

Discussion 

Key Findings 

 The TKML Expert Means were developed from active Officer input. Because of this, one 

might logically conclude that AC mean scores might be closer to the Expert Mean scores than 

either the USAR or ARNG, if for no other reason than the fact that AC Officers, who live and 

work together, have more opportunity to network and informally share knowledge. However, 

more USAR Platoon and Company level TKML mean scores were closer to the TKML Expert 

Mean scores than either the AC or ARNG. This suggests that factors other than continuous 

proximity contribute to the building of tacit knowledge. Additionally, across all components 

there were more significant differences between Officer mean scores and the Expert Means in 

the worse choice category than in the better choice category. This suggests that junior and 

midlevel Officers develop capabilities that are oriented on what to do in response to a problem, 

first, and then acquire knowledge about what not to do. 

 Statistically significant differences in levels of leader tacit knowledge possessed by USAR, 

ARNG, and AC Platoon and Company level Officers were found. The TKML mean scores of 

RC (combined ARNG and USAR) Platoon level Officers were higher for the better choices than 

the AC Officers at this level; and lower for the worse choices. Conversely, the AC Company 

level TKML scores were higher for better choices and lower for worse choices than the RC 

Officers at this level. It may seem confusing trying to reconcile two seemingly contradictory 

findings: USAR Platoon and Company level Officers were closer to the Expert Means than AC 

Officers but AC Company Level TKML scores were higher than RC. A modest, but consistent 

finding that helps explain these results is that the ARNG TKML scores were generally lower 

than USAR scores, which overall lowered RC means. Combining USAR and ARNG Officers 

into one RC group was an appropriate step because, with one exception, the ARNG and USAR 

share a common RC environment, which is characterized by geographical dispersion, training 

time and resource constraints. 

 The MANOVAs conducted at Platoon and Company level were modestly significant, with 

small effect sizes. Because what should be considered a small, medium, or large effect size for 

MANOVA is unclear, (Green & Salkind, 2003, p. 204), the effect size for this analysis is 
 18 

difficult to interpret. However, analyses resulting in small and medium effect sizes are common 

in social science research (Stevens, 2002, p. 195). This fact combined with the strong power in 

each analysis in this research suggests there is a significant difference between these groups that 

merits further study. 

 While there were limited statistically significant differences with respect to the metacognitive 

mean scores between the groups at any level, the correlations between the metacognitive mean 

and the TKML scores for the USAR and ARNG Officers suggest that there is a relationship 

between an individual’s capacity to recognize valuable tacit knowledge and that person’s 

metacognitive self-awareness. Correlation analysis done comparing metacognitive and TKML 

mean scores shows more significant results at the Company level than at the Platoon level, which 

suggests that with maturity comes more self-awareness. The interpretation of the positive 

correlation between TKML responses and the metacognitive mean score suggests that 

individuals who are self-aware of their own knowledge strengths and weaknesses also possess 

higher levels of tacit knowledge to distinguish better from worse choices in response to 

problems. This finding could serve as a preliminary construct to help Officers self-identify their 

own capacity to acquire tacit knowledge. 

Utilization of Findings 

 The majority of AC Officers receive their commissions through ROTC, upon graduation 

from college. This means that AC 2nd Lieutenants are generally in their early 20’s, and have not 

had the opportunity to gain much life or professional experience. RC Officers are generally 

older than AC Officers, for example the average age of USAR Officers is 42 (USAR, 2006); 

while the average age for AC Officers is 34 (OASD/DMDC, 1998). Additionally, many RC 

Officers have previous active duty experience, and may have had the opportunity to accrue 

relevant tacit knowledge from civilian professional experiences. By the time an Officer becomes 

a Captain, the professional ‘landscape’ is more complex. At the Company level, having the 

opportunity to share work-related experiences and problem-solving strategies may be more 

critical. RC Captains may be at a disadvantage here, juggling multiple demands, because by this 

point, Officers at this level are fully engaged in a civilian occupation, many have Families, but 

must now be able to solve difficult Army-related problems. ARNG Officers are further 

restricted in their ability to network because members frequently serve much of their careers 

within a limited geographical area; with many of the same individuals; have limited 

opportunities for assignment and career progression; and when mobilized, serve almost 

exclusively with other ARNG members. These factors may contribute to the development of a 

specific leader and organizational culture that could influence the acquisition of tacit knowledge. 

 There were differences between the responses of ARNG Officers and AC Officers. These 

differences may be justified because of the time, geographical, resource and command 

constraints outlined earlier. However, as noted there were also differences between how ARNG 

and USAR Officers responded. Within the reserve component, both USAR and ARNG 

organizations must contend with time, geographical and resource constraints. The one factor that 

distinguishes these groups from one another is that ARNG units train and mobilize as units, 

whereas members of USAR organizations may be mobilized individually. While this suggests 

that leaders (commanders) of ARNG units might influence tacit knowledge levels more 
 19 

profoundly than in USAR organizations, further research to identify discriminating factors that 

distinguish differences between USAR and ARNG organizations should be done before firm 

conclusions can be drawn. 

 Because of the important role Company level leaders play, differences in levels of tacit 

knowledge between the Army’s components among officers at Company level strengthen the 

argument for component specific leader development programs. One perspective might be that 

RC leaders employ different kinds of leader tacit knowledge not addressed in the AC oriented 

TKML instrument. Because the RC environment is so different from the AC environment, it 

seems appropriate to identify specific leader tacit knowledge considered central to the success of 

an RC Officer. The same effort could be made for Noncommissioned Officers in both the active 

and reserve components. Further research should be done, as well, to identify how and why 

ARNG and USAR organizations differ, to include which RC specific constraint has the most 

impact on the development and performance of leaders within these organizations. More 

research should be done to establish the relationship between levels of tacit knowledge and other 

measures of effectiveness. 
20 

 
21 

 

References 

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 NY: Free Press. 

Burns, J. M. (1978). Leadership. New York, NY: Harper & Row. 

Chi, M.T.H., Glaser, R. & Farr, M.J. (Eds.). (1988). The nature of expertise. Hillsdale, NJ: 

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 24 
 

 25 

Appendix A 

Tacit Knowledge for Military Leaders: 

Platoon, Company and Battalion-Level Leader Problem Vignettes, 

TKML Expert and Component Responses (Means and Rankings), and Changes to the Instrument

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; standard deviations are shown in parentheses below each mean. 

Platoon-Level: Motivating Subordinates 

P22. You are a new Platoon leader. The Battalion you support is preparing to conduct a 

night move. You assemble your Platoon and tell everyone to start packing equipment in 

preparation for the move that same night. When you come back to inspect their 

movement preparation, you find that your Soldiers have not packed the equipment and 

are talking to personnel from other Platoons, who are hanging around the area. What 

should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Order the Soldiers from other Platoons to leave the 

area. 

6.86 

(1.86) 

6.26** 

(2.14)

6.66 

(2.07) 

6.01** 

(2.04)

b. Take charge of the situation, get your unit moving, 

then talk to the NCOs to bring the chain of 

command online. 

7.40 

(1.84) 

7.75* 

(1.69)

7.13 

(2.47) 

7.41 

(1.92) 

c. Tell the Soldiers exactly what you want done and 

when you will return to inspect. 

5.82 

(2.11) 

5.70 

(2.15) 

6.34 

(2.15) 

6.07 

(2.11) 

d. Assemble your entire Platoon and tell them that 

their work priorities are not on target. 

4.42 

(2.05) 

5.46** 

(1.83)

5.50** 

(2.03)

5.42 

(2.14) 

e. Remind Soldiers of the time urgency and the need 

to get many things done quickly in preparation for 

the night move. 

5.66 

(1.92) 

5.63 

(1.91) 

6.00 

(2.23) 

5.92 

(1.95) 

f. Use verbal leadership and commands to influence 

your Soldiers. 

6.36 

(1.92) 

6.31 

(1.76) 

6.75 

(1.9) 

6.43 

(1.68) 

g. Wait and see if the Soldiers do the task later on 

their own. 

1.80 

(1.48) 

1.82 

(1.48) 

2.19 

(2.18) 

1.81 

(1.31) 

h. Assemble your squad leaders and talk about the 

situation. 

7.06 

(1.96) 

6.39** 

(2.11)

6.75 

(2.34) 

6.69* 

(1.98)

i. Speak to the Soldiers in a friendly manner without 

emphasizing your authority as their leader. 

2.76 

(1.78) 

2.78 

(1.79) 

2.38 

(1.52) 

2.86 

(1.99) 

j. ORIGINAL: Warn the Platoon sergeant that you 

will consider using punishment (such as an Article 

15) if the Platoon does not pull things together 

immediately. 

2.36 

(1.72) 

 

j. CHANGE: Warn the Platoon sergeant that you 

will consider punishment if the Platoon does not 

pull things together immediately. 

 4.31** 

(2.37)

4.66** 

(2.29)

4.45** 

(2.36) 

Rationale for Change: Members of the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve do not 

fall under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which prescribes Article 15 for nonjudicial offenses when they are in an inactive duty training status. 
 

 26 

Platoon-Level: Influencing the Boss 

P23. You are a Platoon leader, and your unit is training at the National Training Center. Your 

battery commander makes your howitzer sections dig individual positions every time you stop, 

even in the offense. The other batteries do not dig in as much as you do. The Observer 

Controllers (OCs) tell you that your sections dig good positions, but they question why you do this 

so much in the offense. The battery commander’s order is making a big problem for you because 

your sections are under-strength, and digging in so much burns everyone out and has a bad effect 

on morale. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Explain your view to the battery commander by 

talking in terms of Mission-Enemy-TerrainTroops-and-Time (METT-T) and the effect of the 

decision on the unit’s mission. 

7.68 

(1.45) 

7.12** 

(1.55)

8.00 

(1.02) 

7.04** 

(1.83)

b. Tell the battery commander that his directive 

adversely impacts the unit’s morale. 

5.98 

(1.96) 

5.18** 

(2.01)

5.56 

(2.2) 

5.30** 

(2.00)

c. Go to the battery commander alone and ask him 

why he issued the directive. 

6.64 

(1.95) 

5.12** 

(2.24)

6.31 

(2.23) 

4.98** 

(2.23)

d. Try to figure out on your own why the battery 

commander issued the directive and explain it to 

your Soldiers. 

4.10 

(2.37) 

3.94 

(2.07) 

3.16* 

(2.0)

3.63* 

(2.14)

e. Speak to the Company first sergeant for advice and 

assistance. 

6.78 

(1.58) 

6.56 

(1.74) 

6.56 

(2.05) 

5.88** 

(2.29)

f. Enlist the support of one or two other Platoon 

leaders and go together to speak to the battery 

commander. 

5.84 

(1.89) 

5.52 

(2.46) 

4.03** 

(2.51)

5.21** 

(2.15)

g. Based on the position of your troops, make a 

decision not to comply with the commander’s 

directive on the basis of “mission first,” then 

explain your actions after the fact. 

1.94 

(1.27) 

3.11** 

(2.04)

2.06 

(1.56) 

2.86** 

(2.27)

h. Get together with the other Platoon leaders and 

agree on a common position, get the support of 

senior NCOs, and then go as a group and together 

state your case to the battery commander. 

4.00 

(2.31) 

5.17** 

(2.88)

4.19 

(2.58) 

4.56** 

(2.71)
 

 27 

Platoon-Level: Influencing the Boss 

P24. You have spent two months working with your new battery commander. In his last 

position as the Fire Support Officer for an infantry Battalion he supervised a 

shorthanded team. Consequently, he was required to perform many duties himself. 

Your commander still tries to stay involved in all of the day-to-day details of running the 

unit, and he generally delegates tasks less often than you would like. You believe that 

your commander is overburdened, and you are worried about the consequences of his 

time-management techniques. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. If you know that the battery commander intends to 

give someone a task, speak to that person before 

the battery commander does, so that he or she has 

already started the task before the battery 

commander meets with him or her. 

4.29 

(2.17) 

5.10** 

(2.02)

4.84 

(2.48) 

4.72* 

(2.19)

b. Wait to take action on specific things under after

he mentions them to you. 

2.51 

(1.52) 

3.46** 

(1.74)

3.13 

(1.84) 

3.47** 

(1.92)

c. Help your battery commander to better manage his 

time in any way you can. 

7.55 

(1.26) 

7.04** 

(1.53)

7.13 

(1.89) 

7.32 

(1.67) 

d. Don’t wait to be told what to do—anticipate what 

needs to be done, and if you are capable, do it. 

8.31 

(1.00) 

7.81** 

(1.43)

8.13 

(1.18) 

7.65** 

(1.58)

e. If something needs to be done but you can’t do it, 

find someone else who can and get him/her 

involved—without being asked by the battery 

commander. 

7.49 

(1.61) 

7.40 

(1.66) 

7.69 

(1.45) 

7.46 

(1.47) 

f. Offer to take care of specific tasks before he 

mentions them to you. 

7.78 

(1.25) 

7.50 

(1.58) 

7.78 

(1.34) 

7.71 

(1.57) 

g. When he returns from command and staff 

meetings, meet with him right away by yourself 

and write down everything that has to be done. 

5.65 

(1.83) 

5.85 

(2.16) 

6.81** 

(1.8)

6.29** 

(2.13)

h. Rely on the NCO chain of command; deal with the 

appropriate NCO and get NCO support. 

6.53 

(1.61) 

6.03** 

(1.94)

6.06 

(1.99) 

6.29 

(2.15) 

i. Go to the first sergeant and/or executive Officer 

and ask for suggestions about what to do about the 

commander’s management style. 

6.04 

(2.13) 

5.64 

(2.21) 

5.19* 

(2.36)

5.33** 

(2.25)

j. Ask the battery commander often what you can do 

to help and to relieve his task burden. 

6.52 

(1.95) 

6.42 

(1.91) 

6.56 

(1.78) 

7.02** 

(1.77)

k. Assume this is just the way he is and do your best 

to get along. 

3.69 

(1.76) 

3.63 

(2.03) 

3.41 

(1.66) 

3.27** 

(1.79)
 

 28 

Platoon-Level: Managing Oneself 

P25. During the live fire attack at the National Training Center, your tank Platoon is in 

an overwatch position, as part of the observation post (OP) plan. You are supposed to 

wait to be called forward into the attack. From your position, you watch the artillery 

come in on the enemy positions. The smoke from the artillery obscures the enemy’s view. 

At this point, you should move out—you should call your commanding Officer and tell 

him you are moving while the enemy is blinded. Instead, you wait to be told to move out, 

as the OP plan called for. Consequently, you move after the smoke lifts, and you lose 

three tanks, including your own. You are angry with yourself and ashamed; you believe 

you should have known better. How should you deal with this situation? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Think about this negative performance feedback 

from the NTC as a way to identify and repair your 

weaknesses. 

7.32 

(1.67) 

7.75** 

(1.53)

7.59 

(2.18) 

7.68* 

(1.74)

b. Try to understand other people’s roles in the 

decision, if any. 

6.00 

(1.81) 

6.25 

(1.88) 

6.19 

(1.63) 

6.29 

(1.83) 

c. During the After Action Review, admit to your 

Soldiers that you made a mistake; take 

responsibility for what happened. 

7.30 

(1.82) 

6.86* 

(2.06)

6.69 

(2.78) 

6.88* 

(2.21)

d. Reflect on the decision and determine what you 

should have done, in order to derive the lessons 

learned. 

8.34 

(.89) 

8.04** 

(1.08)

8.44 

(.76) 

8.08** 

(1.17)

e. Remind yourself that you will do better on the next 

mission. 

7.00 

(1.44) 

6.82 

(1.60) 

7.41 

(1.5) 

7.04 

(1.95) 

f. During the After Action Review, describe your 

mistake to your subordinate leaders in order to 

develop and train them. 

8.14 

(1.05) 

7.31** 

(1.73)

7.69 

(1.67) 

7.35** 

(1.75)

g. Put the decision behind you; try not to dwell on it. 6.26 

(1.80) 

5.67** 

(2.34)

5.25* 

(2.45)

6.05 

(2.38) 

h. During the After Action Review, try to explain the 

reasons for your decision to your Soldiers. 

5.60 

(2.04) 

5.42 

(2.10) 

5.97 

(2.46) 

5.15* 

(2.26)

i. Don’t let the Soldiers get down on themselves 

because of your decision—build up their 

confidence and encourage them. 

7.92 

(1.08) 

7.43** 

(1.68)

8.09 

(1.17) 

7.86 

(1.62) 

j. Discuss the issue with your Company commander 

and convince your Company commander to allow 

you the freedom to exercise initiative at certain 

times, like this one. 

7.74 

(1.27) 

7.30* 

(2.08)

7.31 

(1.49) 

7.31** 

(1.89)
29 

Platoon-Level: Managing Self 

P26. You are a Platoon leader, and one day your driver has a motivational problem while 

out on the field. He starts mouthing off to you while standing on top of the turret in front 

of the rest of the Platoon. Everyone in the Platoon is listening to what he’s saying about 

you, and it is extremely negative and harsh. What should you not do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. In front of the Platoon, order your driver to do an 

unpleasant task as punishment for his 

insubordination. 

1.88 

(1.39) 

3.72** 

(2.06)

3.59** 

(1.93)

3.63** 

(3.39)

b. Pull him aside and read him his rights: really 

chew his butt. 

5.39 

(2.37) 

5.65 

(2.34) 

5.97 

(2.21) 

5.75* 

(2.12)

c. Go to the PSG and tell him to take care of this 

problem. 

4.12 

(2.24) 

4.66* 

(2.23)

4.75 

(2.31) 

4.86** 

(2.32)

d. Order your driver to be quiet and get back to his 

job. 

5.88 

(2.02) 

4.59** 

(2.28)

5.03 

(2.36) 

5.06** 

(2.25)

e. Pull him aside and tell him to come speak to you 

in one hour. 

6.08 

(2.40) 

5.89 

(2.25) 

6.41 

(2.43) 

6.14 

(2.33) 

f. Answer your driver back immediately and defend 

yourself by arguing your position. 

1.60 

(.97) 

2.53** 

(1.79)

2.50** 

(1.83)

2.35** 

(1.77)

g. Tell your driver you are recommending him for an 

Article 15. 

3.64 

(2.32) 

4.45** 

(2.06)

4.38 

(2.18) 

3.89 

(2.18) 

h. Do nothing; walk away and wait for your driver to 

blow off steam. 

2.44 

(1.81) 

2.32 

(1.74) 

2.41 

(1.70) 

2.45 

(1.82) 

i. Speak to your Company commander about the 

problem and get his/her advice. 

4.82 

(2.41) 

4.75 

(2.28) 

4.56 

(2.41) 

5.12 

(2.54) 

j. Speak to another Platoon leader and get his/her 

advice. 

4.88 

(2.16) 

5.33* 

(2.15)

5.59 

(2.24) 

5.37* 

(2.29)

k. Pull him aside, talk to him in private, and ask 

what’s wrong. 

6.63 

(1.94) 

6.90 

(1.67) 

6.72 

(2.10) 

7.12** 

(1.91)
30 

Platoon-Level: Establishing Trust 

P27. Your battery commander makes a decision you do not agree with. You try speaking 

with him and stating your position as effectively as you can, but his mind is made up and 

he is not going to change his position. Other Platoon leaders agree with you that the 

battery commander’s decision is wrong. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Use the first sergeant or executive Officer as a 

voice-piece for your ideas: Convince one of them 

to state your opinions to the battery commander. 

5.14 

(2.22) 

5.68** 

(2.17)

5.00 

(2.03) 

4.92 

(2.23) 

b. Speak to the Battalion commander and ask for 

advice. 

2.60 

(1.93) 

3.88** 

(2.29)

4.13** 

(2.35)

3.78** 

(2.40)

c. Tell only your NCOs that you support the battery 

commander’s decision. 

4.72 

(2.15) 

4.31* 

(1.96)

4.66 

(2.73) 

4.09** 

(2.08)

d. Tell your Platoon that you support the battery 

commander’s decision, and they must implement 

it. 

6.56 

(1.93) 

6.24 

(2.01) 

6.47 

(2.44) 

6.29 

(2.14) 

e. Tell only your NCOs that you do not support the 

battery commander’s decision, but ask for their 

help in implementing the decision anyway. 

3.16 

(2.05) 

4.51** 

(2.36)

4.28* 

(2.68)

4.24** 

(2.44)

f. Tell the NCOs that you do not support the battery 

commander’s decision, and ask for their opinions 

and advice on how to handle the situation with the 

troops. 

2.86 

(1.75) 

4.37** 

(2.19)

3.66 

(2.62) 

4.09** 

(2.57)

g. Tell your Platoon that you do not support the 

battery commander’s decision, but ask for their 

cooperation in implementing the decision anyway.

2.16 

(1.68) 

2.75** 

(2.12)

2.94 

(2.64) 

2.81** 

(2.18)

h. Formulate the best possible argument that you can 

in support of the battery commander’s decision, 

and then explain the decision to the Platoon while 

asking for their support. 

5.58 

(2.43) 

5.13* 

(2.29)

4.63* 

(2.64)

5.27 

(2.44) 

i. Go back to the battery commander and tell 

him/her that because you do not agree with the 

decision, it will be very hard for you to gain the 

support of the NCOs and troops to carry out the 

battery commander’s wishes. 

3.54 

(2.46) 

3.75 

(2.39) 

3.88 

(2.55) 

4.17** 

(2.39)

j. Wait an hour after the meeting, then approach the 

battery commander with an alternative solution. 

6.30 

(2.12) 

6.14 

(1.99) 

6.31 

(2.21) 

6.05 

(2.29) 
31 

Platoon-Level: Establishing Credibility 

P28. You are a new Platoon leader who takes charge of your Platoon when they return 

from a lengthy combat deployment. All members of the Platoon are war veterans, but 

you did not serve in the conflict. In addition, you failed to graduate from Ranger School. 

You are concerned with building credibility with your Soldiers. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Do not change procedures that work. 7.92 

(1.02) 

7.61* 

(1.51)

7.28 

(1.89) 

7.66* 

(1.46)

b. Ask the members of the Platoon to share their 

combat experience: Ask what they learned and 

how it can help the Platoon. 

8.18 

(.88) 

7.94* 

(1.18)

8.47* 

(.72)

8.20 

(1.17) 

c. Work hard to get into excellent physical shape so 

that you excel in PT. 

7.55 

(1.34) 

8.08** 

(1.18)

8.16** 

(1.25)

7.78 

(1.36) 

d. Maintain good military bearing by wearing a 

pressed uniform, shined boots, and having good 

posture. 

7.02 

(1.56) 

7.74** 

(1.32)

8.28** 

(1.25)

7.86** 

(1.27)

e. Speak to your Soldiers with a tone of voice that 

conveys respect for them. 

7.63 

(1.51) 

7.86 

(1.35) 

8.31** 

(1.23)

8.01** 

(1.13)

f. Study field manuals and military history in order 

to gain technical and tactical competence. 

7.80 

(1.27) 

8.01 

(1.36) 

8.13 

(1.10) 

8.04 

(1.14) 

g. Defer to Soldiers on matters related to their 

combat experience, thus acknowledging that they 

know more than you do in some areas. 

6.73 

(1.68) 

7.16* 

(1.78)

7.47* 

(1.85)

7.07 

(2.08) 

h. Tell your NCOs about all of the studying you have 

done to increase your competence. 

2.69 

(1.46) 

4.02** 

(1.99)

4.00** 

(2.08)

4.05** 

(2.33)

i. Listen frequently to your Soldiers; hear their 

views, opinions, comments, and suggestions. 

8.17 

(.91) 

8.06 

(1.04) 

8.16 

(1.14) 

8.04 

(1.48) 

j. Announce right up front that you are in charge and 

the Soldiers must accept this fact and treat you 

with appropriate respect. 

2.14 

(1.49) 

3.35** 

(2.19)

3.53** 

(2.68)

3.05** 

(2.28)
32 

Platoon-Level: Managing Oneself

P29. You are a new Platoon leader, and you are under a great deal of stress. Everyone is 

expecting a lot of you, and there never seem to be enough hours in the day to accomplish 

everything. There is a lot of competition for key awards and positions in the future, and 

other Officers are working as hard as you are. At home, your family also needs your time 

and attention. You also have tremendous responsibilities associated with your full time 

civilian job. How should you manage your stress? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Find a trustworthy military person or confidante 

(not your rater) to talk to about your frustrations 

and problems—someone who will provide you 

with positive feedback about your performance. 

5.52 

(1.81) 

6.33** 

(2.00)

6.81** 

(1.55)

6.65** 

(1.93)

b. Ask a senior military leader whom you respect for 

specific advice and suggestions. 

6.86 

(1.43) 

8.04 

(8.78) 

7.84** 

(1.22)

7.69** 

(1.53)

c. Find a trustworthy military person or confidant (not 

your rater) to talk to about your frustrations and 

problems—someone who will provide you with 

honest feedback about your performance. 

7.66 

(1.26) 

7.59 

(1.65) 

8.22* 

(1.34)

7.88 

(1.51) 

d. Limit the amount of additional, unpaid (non-drill) 

time you devote to working on problems from your 

military assignment. 

7.74 

(1.51) 

5.22** 

(1.94)

5.69** 

(2.13)

5.39** 

(2.01)

e. If tempted to use additional, unpaid (non-drill) time 

to work on problems from your military 

assignment, ask yourself if it is really critical, or 

whether it can wait until the next time you are on 

duty. 

7.96 

(1.32) 

6.31** 

(1.76)

6.31** 

(2.44)

6.24** 

(1.99)

f. Find a trustworthy military person to talk to who 

will give you positive reinforcement. 

5.78 

(1.42) 

5.82 

(1.94) 

6.56* 

(1.66)

6.09 

(1.88) 

g. Put your problems in perspective by reflecting on 

people who are worse off then you are. 

4.90 

(1.83) 

4.96 

(2.16) 

5.59 

(2.39) 

4.71 

(2.37) 

h. Remind yourself of your long-term goals—five or 

more years out—and look for relationships 

between the current situations and your long-term 

goals. 

6.41 

(1.85) 

6.57 

(1.78) 

7.25** 

(1.67)

6.86** 

(1.76)

i. Take up a hobby of interest to you and do it even 

though you are tired. 

4.88 

(1.88) 

5.13 

(1.98) 

5.78* 

(2.32)

4.95 

(2.16) 

j. Remember to place your military career in 

perspective by focusing on the many aspects of 

your life that matter in addition to that. 

7.84 

(1.30) 

6.80** 

(1.91)

7.59 

(1.27) 

7.32** 

(1.79)

k. Speak to your commander about your stress, 

frustrations, and problems, and request her/his 

advice. 

6.20 

(2.09) 

6.48 

(1.97) 

7.25** 

(1.68)

6.85** 

(1.81)
33 

Platoon-Level: Motivating Subordinates 

P30. You are an engineer Platoon leader training with your Soldiers. One squad is given 

the mission to put in a minefield for the Infantry Battalion. You pick the second squad 

because they are good Soldiers, have better equipment, and are better trained to do the 

job. But the squad is exhausted and the Soldiers really complain. They note that it is 

nearing the end of the exercise and they are very tired. You tell them what you want done 

and you make the standards clear. When you return to check, the minefield is not up to 

standard and the squad is sitting around eating. You talk to the squad leader, and point 

out that the minefield is not up to standard. He tells you in front of the squad that the 

squad is not interested in your standards and that what they have done is the best you are 

going to get. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

a. Relieve the squad leader, put a team leader in 

charge, and provide him with your guidance to 

complete the task. 

6.74 

(2.25) 

5.97** 

(2.16)

6.06 

(2.39) 

5.75** 

(2.28)

b. Recognize that the Soldiers have reached their 

limit and tell them you recognize this and will 

take steps to ensure they are not pushed too far in 

the future. 

3.82 

(2.39) 

4.13 

(2.03) 

5.41** 

(2.37)

5.02** 

(2.34)

c. Try to convince the squad leader and Soldiers that 

you will not give them another mission until they 

have had a chance to rest, but that they must bring 

the minefield up to standard. 

4.72 

(2.40) 

5.73** 

(2.00)

5.91** 

(2.43)

6.01** 

(2.17)

d. Assume that the Soldiers are overworked and let 

them off the hook this time—do not make them 

complete the task. 

1.60 

(1.14) 

2.06** 

(1.47)

2.22 

(1.75) 

2.24** 

(1.65)

e. Punish the squad leader by recommending him 

for an Article 15 for mouthing off to you about 

the Soldiers not caring about your standards. 

4.69 

(2.62) 

4.77 

(2.18) 

4.44 

(2.33) 

4.38 

(2.36) 

f. Order the Soldiers to stoop eating immediately 

and complete the task, and threaten punishment if 

they do not comply. 

3.32 

(1.85) 

4.58** 

(1.96)

4.03 

(2.04) 

4.01** 

(2.17)

g. Say that you recognize they are tired, but tell the 

Soldiers that the task must be completed, and ask 

what assistance you can arrange for to help them 

get the task done. 

7.12 

(1.96) 

7.13 

(1.83) 

7.78** 

(1.34)

7.47* 

(1.84)
34 

Platoon-Level: Taking Care of Soldiers 

P31. You are a Platoon leader, and your Battalion requires the Company to turn in 

training schedules (ORIGINAL: six weeks) three months in advance. But the Battalion 

does not give you (ORIGINAL: six weeks) three months notice on requirements. Thus, 

there are a lot of changes to the training schedule. The Battalion tells you (ORIGINAL: 

six weeks) three months out is too far in the future to assign projects, yet they expect you 

to plan training (ORIGINAL: six weeks) three months out! The Soldiers think that these 

changes in the schedule jerk them around and sometimes cause (ORIGINAL: morale) 

problems with civilian employers. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Tell your Soldiers to stop griping and worrying 

about the changes in the schedule-remind them 

that they always prepare their classes the night 

before anyway. 

2.98 

(1.61) 

4.45** 

(1.76)

4.03* 

(2.31)

4.22** 

(2.07)

b. Let the Soldiers know the changes to the 

schedule are not your fault, and that you 

appreciate their need to be able to plan. 

5.02 

(1.61) 

5.61** 

(1.78)

6.06** 

(1.95)

5.50** 

(1.84)

c. Buffer the Platoon from changes that take place 

higher up by filtering the information you give 

them about these changes—provide Soldiers 

with as much stability and predictability as 

possible. 

7.78 

(1.28) 

6.95** 

(1.87)

7.06 

(2.06) 

7.04** 

(1.88)

d. Submit all required paperwork to change the 

schedule to the Battalion, but for your own 

Platoon, publish a special calendar that is more 

short term but is always accurate. 

6.10 

(2.25) 

6.98** 

(1.72)

6.59 

(1.90) 

6.83** 

(2.19)

e. Tell your Platoon to ignore the training schedule, 

since it changes so much. 

1.88 

(.98) 

2.59** 

(1.62)

1.94 

(1.29) 

2.07 

(1.45) 

f. Speak to your Company commander about the 

disruptions caused by the changes in the 

schedule, and solicit his advice and assistance. 

7.78 

(1.00) 

6.76** 

(1.84)

7.50 

(1.83) 

7.18** 

(1.92)

g. Let the Soldiers know that you agree with them 

that sometimes it seems that the Battalion and the 

Company don’t know what they are doing. 

3.04 

(1.71) 

3.31 

(1.96) 

3.00 

(1.68) 

2.90 

(2.09) 

h. Don’t publish your own short-term schedule 

because then Soldiers will think with too shortterm a focus and won’t take the necessary time to 

prepare for classes, etc. 

4.48 

(1.93) 

4.26 

(1.68) 

4.88 

(1.70) 

4.11* 

(2.19)

Rationale for Change: Due to the less frequent training periods, as well as the need to 

consider civilian employers when scheduling training, Army regulations require that reserve 

component units stabilize and publish their training schedules much earlier than active units. 
35 

Platoon-Level: Managing Self 

P32. You are a new second lieutenant. Due to numerous inactivations you have been 

assigned to the Battalion staff until a Platoon becomes available. You are somewhat 

intimidated about working with people who outrank you by such an extent—your direct 

boss is the Battalion executive Officer. However, as an Officer, you know you have a job 

to do. Rate the quality of the following strategies for establishing yourself as an effective 

Officer in your new position: 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Do not try to act like you know it all. 8.16 

(1.15) 

7.48** 

(1.89)

8.06 

(1.46) 

7.71** 

(1.71)

b. Be assertive; do not be afraid of using your rank. 5.20 

(2.15) 

6.34** 

(1.85)

6.25** 

(1.93)

6.20** 

(1.85)

c. Do not worry about upsetting people, even higherranking Officers, when you are doing your duty. 

4.64 

(2.07) 

6.03** 

(2.01)

6.41** 

(2.17)

5.67** 

(2.21)

d. Be careful not to use words or say things that 

might offend people who outrank you. 

6.06 

(1.86) 

6.56** 

(1.81)

6.94** 

(1.64)

6.79** 

(1.89)

e. Check with other lieutenants or captains and hear 

their opinions and get their input on an issue 

before taking the issue to the boss. 

7.18 

(1.65) 

7.06 

(1.57) 

7.53 

(1.39) 

7.14 

(1.80) 

f. Be respectful when you speak to Officers who 

outrank you. 

8.42 

(.81) 

8.36 

(.99) 

8.78** 

(.49)

8.38 

(1.45) 

g. Approach competent Officers directly, and ask 

frequently for their advice and help. 

7.80 

(1.43) 

7.60 

(1.43) 

7.97 

(1.40) 

7.62 

(1.79) 

h. Find out who the competent Officers are by 

reputation, then seek out these individuals and use 

them as mentors and sources of advice. 

8.02 

(1.27) 

7.81 

(1.29) 

8.13 

(1.34) 

7.73 

(1.87) 

i. Concentrate on the facts you are trying to 

communicate when you speak to high-ranking 

Officers—present the facts accurately and do not 

change what you are saying to avoid upsetting 

higher-ranking Officers. 

7.96 

(1.38) 

7.54* 

(1.76)

8.28 

(1.14) 

7.57* 

(1.83)
36 

Platoon-Level: Managing Oneself 

P33. You and your Company commander don’t talk about your performance very often. 

When you do, he usually blows up and chews you out, but never explains what you did 

wrong. In fact, you rarely know exactly what your Company commander thinks of you 

or what he expects. He generally just tells you what he wants, and that’s it: He never 

communicates with you concerning your overall performance or development. What 

should you do in a situation with this type of commander? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

N=139 

a. Have a friendly competition with the other PLs in 

order to set goals and judge your progress. 

4.32 

(1.52) 

5.71** 

(1.80)

5.44** 

(2.14)

5.20** 

(2.17)

b. Speak to another CO about your problem and ask 

for his advice. 

3.35 

(1.83) 

4.86** 

(2.17)

4.78** 

(2.41)

4.57** 

(2.31)

c. Avoid talking to other Officers about your 

complaints about your CO—figure things out for 

yourself as best you can. 

4.59 

(1.87) 

4.46 

(1.78) 

4.78 

(2.31) 

4.83 

(2.12) 

d. Try to learn by talking with others about the 

boss’s likes and dislikes, in order to understand 

his style and expectations. 

7.02 

(1.35) 

6.73* 

(1.49)

6.31* 

(1.75)

6.58** 

(1.82)

e. Use your fellow lieutenants as a feedback group 

to determine how your performance compares 

with that of your peers. 

6.22 

(1.54) 

6.69** 

(1.65)

6.66 

(1.77) 

6.53 

(1.89) 

f. Ask 1SG if your subordinates are having 

problems with the Company commander, so that 

you can counsel them. 

4.22 

(1.96) 

4.50 

(1.72) 

4.53 

(2.54) 

4.26 

(2.18) 

g. Accept the fact that this is just the way your CO 

is, and drive on. 

5.38 

(1.95) 

4.82** 

(2.08)

4.56* 

(1.78)

4.76** 

(2.28)

h. Ask the XO or senior lieutenant questions about 

the boss’s opinion of you as a way of getting 

more information. 

6.06 

(1.86) 

5.88 

(1.96) 

6.16 

(1.82) 

5.63* 

(2.17)

i. Recognize that cooperation among the lieutenants 

in a Company is key to the success of a Platoon 

leader, and make sure that you cooperate with the 

other Platoon leaders. 

7.68 

(1.20) 

7.13** 

(1.64)

7.63 

(1.26) 

7.32* 

(1.68)

j. Use your fellow lieutenants as a social support 

group to determine if your experiences with the 

CO are normal. 

7.04 

(1.11) 

6.61** 

(1.72)

6.81 

(1.31) 

6.46** 

(2.10)

k. Assume that when your boss is not chewing you 

out, it basically means that he is satisfied. 

4.92 

(2.00) 

5.08 

(2.02) 

4.38 

(2.50) 

4.76 

(2.22) 

l. Use your fellow LT’S as a social support 

structure to vent your feelings and reduce your 

stress. 

5.54 

(1.97) 

5.55 

(1.94) 

6.53** 

(1.93)

5.32 

(2.16) 

m

. 

Approach your CO, explain that your goal is to 

do and be your best, and tactfully ask him for 

detailed performance feedback and 

developmental counseling. 

8.20 

(.90) 

7.56** 

(1.47)

7.97 

(1.49) 

7.73** 

(1.47)

n. Speak to Platoon leaders in other companies 

about your performance and frustrations. 

3.46 

(1.68) 

4.62** 

(1.90)

4.31 

(2.63) 

3.95* 

(2.26)

o. Ask the 1SG what the CO says about you behind 

your back. 

2.52 

(1.55) 

3.31** 

(1.87)

3.22 

(2.18) 

2.94* 

(2.15)
37 

Platoon-Level: Managing Oneself 

P34. You are a medical service Platoon leader, and you have been in the unit for several 

months. You have frequently seen your peers yelling at Soldiers when the Soldiers make 

a mistake. You do the same thing when one of your squads does not follow the Platoon’s 

standardized load plan – and you really lose control. You believe you were out of line, 

and you did not achieve the desired results. You also believe that yelling at people is 

demeaning and wrong. What should you do now? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=114 

USAR 

N=32 

ARNG 

a. Recognize that it is not appropriate to scream at 

people, and that there are other, more effective 

ways to handle situations. 

8.38 

(.85) 

7.69** 

(1.55)

8.25 

(1.24) 

7.77** 

(1.84)

b. Think about how your superior Officers’ anger 

has or would affect you – try to put yourself in 

the shoes of the sergeant and the other Soldiers. 

8.18 

(.92) 

7.49** 

(1.59)

8.19 

(1.06) 

7.78** 

(1.50)

c. Apologize with sincerity to the squad. 6.66 

(1.80) 

6.35 

(2.03) 

6.31 

(2.22) 

6.37 

(2.21) 

d. Write a note to yourself on your camouflage 

notebook that says “Control Your Temper,” in 

order to remind you to stay in control. 

5.12 

(1.94) 

5.82** 

(1.88)

6.13** 

(2.06)

5.38 

(2.59) 

e. Ask yourself how other effective leaders at your 

level would have handled the situation, and make 

plans to modify your behavior accordingly in the 

future. 

7.72 

(.90) 

7.29** 

(1.46)

7.59 

(1.54) 

7.47 

(1.72) 

f. Speak to the chaplain or a counselor about how 

you might better control your temper. 

5.72 

(1.94) 

6.56** 

(1.80)

7.41** 

(1.41)

6.62** 

(2.16)

g. Next time you are about to lose your temper, 

practice a technique like counting to ten several 

times to delay and hopefully stifle your outburst. 

6.64 

(1.32) 

6.46 

(1.78) 

7.59** 

(1.34)

6.73 

(1.90) 

h. Sit down with your Soldiers and explain why you 

felt so strongly about the ambulances’ 

standardization; try to make them see why you 

felt this was worth yelling about. 

5.72 

(2.19) 

6.56** 

(1.79)

6.16 

(1.22) 

5.98 

(2.21) 

i. Take deliberate action to reward Soldier 

initiatives in the future to encourage them to be 

more forward. 

6.37 

(1.86) 

6.54 

(1.72) 

7.00* 

(1.72)

6.58 

(1.86) 

j. Ask your Company commander for ideas about 

how you should have handled the situation. 

6.48 

(1.72) 

6.48 

(1.96) 

7.19* 

(1.59)

6.64 

(2.20) 

k. Accept that even though you may not like to do it, 

being in the Army sometimes means yelling at 

others. 

4.26 

(1.95) 

6.06** 

(1.97)

6.22** 

(1.5)

5.42 

(2.34)

l. Ask other Platoon leaders whom you admire for 

their advice about handling similar situations in 

the future. 

6.84 

(1.72) 

7.13 

(1.92) 

7.78** 

(1.18)

6.78 

(1.93) 
38 

UNUSED SCENARIOS 

Your Platoon has been working on building a range for 17 months. The assignment has 

been unpleasant. One reason for this is that the range site is more than an hour’s drive 

away from the Army post. Suddenly, you are told that your Platoon has to finish the 

project in the next three weeks. This will mean that you will have to stay out at the range 

and work nights, all in the summer heat of Georgia. What should you do to keep your 

Soldiers motivated? 

Rationale for Change: I chose not to include this scenario in the survey. While there are 

fulltime staff members whose job it is to assist unit operations, the majority of reservists are in a 

duty status every few weeks. Consequently, a scenario like this is not relevant. 

You are a Platoon leader, and you receive a new private. On his second day in your 

Platoon, he says that he wants to kill himself. You refer the Soldier to the Medical Health 

Center and the Chaplain. Soon after, you learn that the medical center has not assigned a 

person with relevant professional training to help the Soldier. The Chaplain is not having 

much effect because the Soldier is not religious. In general, you have doubts about the 

qualifications of the people assigned to help him. You are very concerned about this 

situation. What should you do? 

Rationale for Change: This scenario has been left out completely. While mental health issues 

are just as relevant in civilian life as they are within the military community, because reserve 

leaders see their Soldiers monthly, they would not generally be faced with this kind of problem, 

unless the Soldier had a crisis during a drill weekend, or during annual training. However, parttime Soldiers are not eligible for military medical health care while in an inactive duty training 

status, so the Soldier would still have to be cared for within the civilian medical system. 

Summary of Mean Responses for Platoon Level 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

Expert 

Mean 

AC USAR ARNG Expert 

Mean 

AC USAR ARNG 

Motivating Subordinates 

6.92 6.64** 6.85 6.62** 2.87 3.59** 3.77** 3.68** 

Influencing the Boss 

7.13 6.66** 6.94 6.67** 3.42 4.07** 3.46 3.75** 

Managing Oneself 

7.20 6.91** 7.25 7.01* 3.49 4.45** 4.48** 4.16** 

Establishing Trust 

6.43 6.19 6.39 6.17* 2.86 3.85** 3.77** 3.82** 

Establishing Credibility 

7.62 7.80* 8.03** 7.83* 2.41 3.68** 3.76** 3.55** 

Taking Care of Soldiers 

7.22 6.90* 7.05 7.02 3.09 3.65** 3.46* 3.32* 

*p < .05; **p < .01 
39 

Company-Level: Taking Care of Soldiers 

C22. You take over a newly-formed Company as a Company commander. At the same 

time, the Company also receives a new first sergeant, two new Platoon leaders, two 

Platoon sergeants, and a supply sergeant. You quickly begin to perceive that the Soldiers 

in the Company have a bad attitude regarding training. A few weeks after taking 

command, you deploy the unit to the field for a (ORIGINAL: 21-day) lengthy Field 

Training Exercise (FTX). There, you again observe (on the second day of the FTX) that 

the Soldiers’ performance is poor. For example, their stand-to procedures don’t meet 

your standards. What should you do?

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Call your key leaders together and communicate 

your training standards in terms of the Company’s 

METL. 

7.74 

(1.31) 

7.68 

(1.16) 

8.14** 

(.930)

7.59 

(1.52) 

b. Sit down with your first sergeant, discuss the 

situation, and ask for his opinion. 

8.08 

(.88) 

8.15 

(1.06) 

7.59* 

(1.60)

7.27** 

(1.90)

c. Talk to the informal leaders in the Company (for 

example, specialists who have demonstrated 

knowledge gained by reading field and training 

manuals) privately to find out why the Soldiers 

have a negative attitude about training. 

4.39 

(2.21) 

4.70 

(2.20) 

5.36* 

(2.46)

5.46** 

(2.45)

d. Call a Company meeting and communicate clearly 

your training standards in terms of the Company’s 

mission-essential task list. 

5.34 

(2.45) 

5.97** 

(2.25)

6.27** 

(2.24)

6.10** 

(2.08)

e. Speak to your Platoon leaders as a group, but 

away from the Soldiers, tell them your standards 

and show them how to deal with the stand-to 

problem. 

7.82 

(1.06) 

7.63 

(1.53) 

7.86 

(1.23) 

7.42** 

(1.54)

f. Speak with each of your Platoon leaders 

individually and privately and tell each one to deal 

with the problem. 

4.39 

(1.95) 

5.07** 

(2.21)

4.75 

(2.16) 

4.36 

(2.12) 

g. Give the Platoon leaders several more days to 

conduct their own training so that you can more 

closely observe and interact with the Soldiers. 

4.74 

(2.54) 

4.59 

(2.19) 

4.89 

(1.82) 

4.33 

(2.22) 

h. Personally inspect the stand-to procedures—

inspect each fighting position and range card 

yourself. 

5.76 

(2.55) 

5.12** 

(2.36)

4.75** 

2.42

5.39 

(2.43) 

i. Call a Company meeting, tell the Platoon leaders 

to stand off to the side, ask the Soldiers why their 

performance is poor, and listen to their reasons. 

2.11 

(1.69) 

3.04** 

(2.11)

3.27** 

(1.90)

3.19** 

(2.07)

j. Get the first sergeant and the Platoon leaders 

together to discuss the situation with you. 

7.18 

(1.77) 

7.33 

(1.67) 

7.32 

(1.41) 

7.19 

(1.78) 

k. Threaten disciplinary action to the entire 

Company if the stand-to procedures are not 

performed well during your next inspection. 

1.42 

(.83) 

2.17** 

(1.65)

2.18** 

(1.61)

2.30** 

(1.73)

l. Conduct an After Action Review on stand-to and 

define your criteria for success. 

7.97 

(1.1) 

7.93 

(1.22) 

8.02 

(1.10) 

7.74 

(1.53) 

m. Speak to the Battalion commander and get his 

advice and direction regarding the best way to 

handle the problem. 

4.79 

(2.28) 

4.09** 

(2.32)

4.18 

(2.16) 

4.40 

(2.25) 
40 

C22. Continued: 

n. Call a Company meeting fully involving the 

Platoon leaders, ask the Soldiers why their 

performance is poor, and listen to their reasons. 

3.62 

(2.28) 

4.08* 

(2.12

4.70** 

(2.28)

4.31 

(2.16) 

o. Investigate where the Soldiers got their prior ideas 

about what constituted acceptable standards. 

4.32 

(2.3) 

4.59 

(2.33) 

5.09** 

(1.75)

4.54 

(2.22) 

p. Bring in the entire chain of command, all at once, 

for a group discussion about the situation. 

4.84 

(2.13) 

5.75** 

(1.92)

6.45** 

(1.54)

5.81** 

(2.23)

Rationale for Change: Reserve units regularly conduct field training exercises, and some of 

them are 21 days in length, but most frequently they are shorter in duration, so I opted to use 

the word ‘lengthy.’
41 

Company-Level: Directing and Supervising Subordinates 

C23. You are a Company commander on a National Training Center (NTC) rotation. 

Your Company is cross-attached to a mechanized infantry Battalion to form a task force. 

Before you deployed to the NTC, you were given a new Platoon leader, who had been 

transferred from another Company in order to get a second chance. You have reason to 

believe he is weak tactically. When the task force is organized into Company teams, you 

are required to provide a Platoon to an infantry Company. You have been advised by 

your first sergeant to send this new Platoon over to the infantry Company. What should 

you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Give the weak lieutenant specific step-by-step 

instructions regarding how to do his job. 

4.84 

(2.16) 

4.31** 

(1.87)

4.14* 

(2.22)

4.48* 

(2.06)

b. Talk to the first sergeant, ask him to explain the 

reasons for his opinion, and listen to these reasons 

closely before making a decision. 

7.32 

(1.34) 

7.61* 

(1.47)

7.43 

(1.62) 

7.23 

(1.79) 

c. Send your best tank Platoon over the infantry 

Company. 

6.63 

(1.79) 

6.01** 

(2.20)

5.30 

(2.30) 

5.44** 

(2.19)

d. Keep both your strongest and weakest Platoons 

and send an average-performing Platoon over to 

the infantry Company. 

6.61 

(1.33) 

6.34 

(1.92) 

6.25 

(1.93) 

6.08** 

(1.82)

e. Send the new Platoon leader and his Platoon over 

to the infantry Company. 

2.66 

(1.62) 

3.33** 

(2.01)

3.36* 

(2.17)

3.69** 

(2.23)

f. Speak to the Soldiers in the poorly-performing 

Platoon: Tell them you have confidence in their 

ability to perform well, and that to display your 

level of confidence you are sending them over to 

the infantry Company where they will represent 

your Company. 

3.76 

(2.06) 

4.50** 

(2.07)

4.70** 

(2.11)

4.85** 

(2.33)

g. Send the Platoon you would normally send. 7.34 

(1.62) 

7.23 

(1.65) 

7.07 

(2.03) 

6.69** 

(1.93)

h. Send the weak Platoon leader out with a strong 

Company to observe and learn, without giving 

him any responsibility. 

3.59 

(2.14) 

3.93 

(2.32) 

4.59** 

(2.18)

4.43** 

(2.35)

i. Have a closed-door talk with the weak lieutenant: 

Tell him he has a free opportunity to learn here, 

and he should do his best to learn what he can and 

then call you with any problems. 

6.47 

(2.04) 

6.44 

(2.04) 

6.75 

(1.79) 

6.42 

(2.03) 

j. Speak to your Battalion commander and tell him 

that you were given this new, ill-prepared Platoon 

leader before you deployed to the NTC, and ask 

for his direction in making your decision. 

3.21 

(2.15) 

3.01 

(1.89) 

3.20 

(2.16) 

3.44 

(2.04) 

k. Speak to the Platoon leader; try to uncover the 

reasons for his weaknesses, and deal with these 

issues as best you can. 

7.16 

(1.44) 

7.34 

(1.57) 

7.34 

(1.41) 

7.23 

(1.76) 

l. Tell your Platoon sergeant to look out for the 

weak lieutenant. 

5.26 

(2.48) 

5.12 

(2.72) 

4.75 

(2.69) 

5.44 

(2.48) 
42 

Company-Level: Cooperating With Others 

C24. You are a Company commander, and your Battalion commander is the type of 

person who seems always to “shoot the messenger” – he does not like to be surprised by 

bad news, and he tends to take his anger out of the person who brought him the bad 

news. You want to build a positive, professional relationship with your Battalion 

commander. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Speak to your Battalion commander about his 

behavior and share your perception of it. 

5.00 

(2.68) 

4.01** 

(2.31)

3.91** 

(2.33)

3.90** 

(2.61)

b. Attempt to keep the Battalion commander “overinformed” by telling him what is occurring in 

your unit on a regular basis (e.g., daily or every 

other day). 

4.95 

(1.90) 

4.47* 

(2.24)

4.64 

(2.00) 

4.72 

(2.09) 

c. Speak to the sergeant major and see if she/he is 

willing to try to influence the Battalion 

commander. 

5.82 

(2.14) 

5.05** 

(2.40)

5.02* 

(2.33)

4.47** 

(2.18)

d. Keep the Battalion commander informed only on 

important issues, but don’t bring up issues you 

don’t have to discuss with him. 

5.50 

(2.15) 

6.41** 

(2.01)

6.32* 

(2.11)

5.79 

(2.28) 

e. When you bring a problem to your Battalion 

commander, bring a solution at the same time. 

8.53 

(.60) 

8.75** 

(.525)

8.64 

(.532) 

8.38 

(1.37) 

f. Disregard the Battalion commander all of the 

good news you can, but try to shield him from 

hearing the bad news. 

6.53 

(2.10) 

5.75** 

(2.33)

5.64 

(2.46) 

5.92** 

(2.29)

g. Tell your Battalion commander all of the good 

news you can, but try to shield him from hearing 

the bad news. 

1.92 

(1.08) 

2.23* 

(1.57)

1.98 

(1.24) 

2.21* 

(1.45)

h. Tell the Battalion commander as little as possible; 

deal with problem son your own if at all possible. 

2.47 

(1.31) 

3.48** 

(2.17)

3.11 

(2.26) 

3.66** 

(2.35)
43 

Company-Level: Establishing Trust 

C25. You are a Company commander on a Battalion-level field training exercise. Your 

unit has just completed a night move and has been in position for about two hours. At 

midnight, you learn that a weapon is missing. The Platoon sergeant with responsibility 

for weapons is confident that he knows where the weapon is because he saw it during the 

sensitive-items check completed after he arrived. A sensitive item report is due to 

brigade at 0400 hours. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. If you are confident the weapon will be found at 

first light, submit a sensitive item report stating 

that all weapons are accounted for. 

1.11 

(.390) 

1.29* 

(.780)

1.32 

(1.02) 

1.51** 

(1.39)

b. Do not speak to the Battalion commander until 

shortly before the sensitive-tem report is due; at 

this point, completely and honestly report all of 

your actions since the weapon was discovered 

missing. 

3.29 

(2.59) 

3.56 

(2.65) 

3.23 

(2.13) 

3.68 

(2.57) 

c. Immediately mobilize everyone in the unit, and 

conduct a 100% inventory followed by a hands-on 

search. 

7.68 

(1.92) 

7.68 

(1.85) 

7.41 

(2.09) 

7.49 

(2.07) 

d. Before the sensitive-tem report deadline, notify 

the Battalion executive Officer of the situation in 

person. 

5.53 

(2.49) 

6.81** 

(1.94)

6.52** 

(2.02)

6.28** 

(2.38)

e. Consult the standing operating procedures manual 

to ensure that you follow the rules correctly. 

7.29 

(2.01) 

6.95 

(2.08) 

7.45 

(1.78) 

6.81** 

(2.15)

f. Immediately notify the Battalion commander and 

tell him your plans for finding the weapon and 

resolving the incident. 

7.63 

(1.70) 

7.22* 

(2.03)

7.52 

(1.95) 

7.07** 

(2.19)

g. If the weapon is not located within one hour, 

notify the entire chain of command of the lost 

weapon. 

6.24 

(2.41) 

6.72* 

(2.36)

6.77 

(2.32) 

6.66 

(2.07) 
44 

Company-Level: Managing Self 

C26. You are a Company commander. Your Battalion is training for gunnery. 

Currently, all of the companies are well-prepared to pass gunnery. There is a great deal 

of competition among the companies and all of the commanders have Officer Evaluation 

Reports (OERs) due in the next few months. You have an NCO (Platoon sergeant) in 

your unit who just arrived from teaching gunnery at the branch school. He tells you 

about some advanced training techniques using available equipment that have 

significantly improved gunnery scores in other units. This information has not been 

made available to units in the field. After some practice with the techniques, you find 

that they significantly improve the scores of your sections. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Do nothing—allow the information about the 

training techniques to be passed through NCO 

channels if it comes up. 

2.42 

(1.60) 

3.19** 

(1.94)

2.86 

(2.05) 

2.60 

(1.72) 

b. Share the information about the training 

techniques with the Battalion commander, then 

tell all of the other Company commanders. 

8.21 

(1.07) 

7.48** 

(1.95)

7.95 

(1.27) 

7.90** 

(1.29)

c. Train your Company using the information, 

execute gunnery—presumably beating all of your 

fellow Company commanders—then tell everyone 

how you did it after the fact. 

2.26 

(1.43) 

3.34** 

(2.42)

3.57** 

(1.86)

3.66** 

(2.31)

d. Initiate a meeting with all Company commanders, 

Platoon leaders, first sergeants, and Platoon 

sergeants, and have your new Platoon sergeant 

present and describe the techniques. 

7.11 

(2.12) 

7.38 

(1.88) 

7.84** 

(1.55)

7.37 

(1.87) 

e. Tell the Platoon sergeant to keep close hold over 

the information about the training techniques so 

that only your Company possesses this 

information. 

1.53 

(.830) 

1.95** 

(1.47)

2.09* 

(1.39)

1.91** 

(1.47)
45 

Company-Level: Developing Subordinates 

C27. You are a new Company commander. There are a lot of things you want to fix in 

the Company. You have quickly become overwhelmed by the many pressures you face 

and the many demands on your time. You realize that you cannot possibly do everything. 

What should you do to better manage your key leaders and your time so that you are able 

to accomplish more in the same amount of time? Rate the following strategies: 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Have your key leaders execute the alternative 

after you select it. 

4.42 

(1.94) 

4.65 

(2.00) 

4.98 

(2.24) 

4.99** 

(2.15)

b. Allow key leaders on their own to select 

alternatives to solve problems and implement 

these strategies. 

5.87 

(2.27) 

6.68** 

(1.96)

6.93** 

(1.70)

6.26* 

2.08

c. Use key leaders to solve problems by having them 

research alternatives in their area of responsibility 

that would solve the problems and report these 

alternatives to you. 

7.34 

(1.56) 

7.98** 

(1.15)

7.75 

(1.44) 

7.78** 

(1.33)

d. ORIGINAL: Try to report earlier in the morning 

and/or stay later at night to get more done.

3.21 

(1.88) 

5.08** 

(2.31)

4.73** 

(2.27)

5.34** 

(2.11)

d. CHANGED: Commit additional time (above and 

beyond normal duty hours) to get more done.

e. Give your key leaders more specific directions when it 

comes to solving problems—tell them what to do to get 

the job done. 

4.21 

(2.09) 

4.78** 

(1.98)

4.61 

(2.20) 

5.23** 

(2.12)

f. Learn to spot check by walking around the Company 

area and getting a general idea of what’s going on—

don’t feel compelled to check every single thing 

personally. 

7.82 

(.830) 

8.21** 

(.956)

8.02 

(1.10) 

7.88 

(1.18) 

Rationale for Change: In reserve units, while leaders routinely work many extra unpaid 

hours, sandwiched around civilian responsibilities, they would not be able to report early and 

stay late on a daily basis. 
46 

Company-Level: Establishing Trust 

C28. You are a new Company commander who has just taken over your unit. One of 

your Soldiers is leaving the Army. The supply sergeant brings you a Report of Survey 

and a $250 Statement of Charges for the Soldier’s missing TA-50 and asks you to sign one 

or the other. You talk to the Soldier and learn that the equipment was lost on redeployment and that the chain of command had not taken appropriate action. The 

Soldier had notified the old commander three times in writing, saying that his equipment 

was missing—but the commander took no action because he did not want to submit a late 

Report of Survey. (The Battalion Commander also did not want any late Reports of 

Survey.) The Soldier says he will sign the Statement of Charges because he just wants to 

get out. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. In spite of his dislike for late reports, notify the 

Battalion commander that you are initiating a late 

report of survey on the Soldier’s lost TA-50. 

7.97 

(1.17) 

7.97 

(1.42) 

8.23 

(.961) 

7.86 

(1.60) 

b. Have the supply sergeant validate the statements 

made by collecting relevant information from the 

Soldier and other sources, put this information 

together, and bring it to the Battalion commander. 

8.05 

(1.09) 

7.62* 

(2.00)

7.89 

(1.57) 

7.86 

(1.64) 

c. Initiate a late report of survey without first 

informing the Battalion commander. 

3.05 

(1.47) 

2.68* 

(1.86)

3.20 

(2.17) 

3.20 

(2.13) 

d. Point out to the Battalion commander that the 

chain of command failed to properly uphold its 

responsibility and failed the Soldier, and explain 

that this situation must be rectified now. 

6.53 

(2.08) 

6.96* 

(2.23)

6.93 

(2.24) 

6.67 

(2.34) 

e. Allow the Soldier to sign the Statement of 

Charges so that he can leave. 

2.13 

(1.28) 

3.03** 

(2.12)

2.45 

(1.82) 

2.29 

(1.74) 

f. If the Battalion commander is hard on Company 

commanders who initiate late Reports of Survey, 

do not initiate the report. 

1.66 

(.850) 

1.76 

(1.16) 

1.68 

(1.02) 

1.77 

(1.32) 

g. Attempt to contact the past Company commander 

to find out why, exactly, he did not take care of 

the situation. 

4.84 

(2.27) 

4.90 

(2.68) 

5.73* 

(2.60)

5.50** 

(2.57)
47 

Company-Level: Motivating Subordinates 

C29. You are a brand new Company commander, and you want to establish yourself 

quickly as an effective leader. You have assessed the current physical training program, 

and you believe it could use a total overhaul in order to ensure that the Company will 

meet the PT standards. Your Company does not have a qualified master fitness trainer. 

What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Ask for a volunteer from the entire Company to 

take charge and run the PT program, and 

supervise this individual very closely. 

3.49 

(1.80) 

4.27** 

(2.07)

4.66** 

(2.15)

5.00** 

(1.98)

b. Talk to your first sergeant and get his/her advice. 8.00 

(.970) 

8.14 

(1.14) 

7.84 

(1.18) 

7.62** 

(1.31)

c. Ask for a volunteer from among your Platoon 

sergeants and Platoon leaders to take charge and 

run the PT program, and supervise this individual 

very closely. 

4.41 

(2.17) 

5.63** 

(1.89)

5.41** 

(2.10)

5.72** 

(1.94)

d. Offer a reward or incentive to any Soldier who 

comes up with the best idea for how to revamp the 

PT program. 

4.16 

(2.36) 

5.07** 

(2.05)

5.95** 

(2.04)

5.70** 

(2.14)

e. Publicly praise and reward Soldiers who 

demonstrate initiative in revamping the PT 

program. 

5.84 

(1.89) 

6.48** 

(1.73)

6.75** 

(1.60)

6.99** 

(1.53)

f. Consult a fellow commander who has a solid 

fitness program for guidance and suggestions. 

7.35 

(1.06) 

7.46 

(1.44) 

8.00** 

(1.10)

7.75** 

(1.23)

g. Ask for a volunteer from among your Platoon 

sergeants and Platoon leaders to take charge and 

run the PT program, and program overhaul. 

4.86 

(2.08) 

5.74** 

(2.11)

6.00** 

(2.13)

5.98** 

(2.16)

h. Assess the Company’s other goals and decide 

which of the goals is most important before taking 

action on the PT program overhaul. 

5.49 

(1.98) 

5.59 

(2.34) 

5.70 

(2.28) 

5.94* 

(2.31)

i. Appoint the most competent person to work with 

you in revamping the PT program. 

6.70 

(1.73) 

6.68 

(1.83) 

6.66 

(1.67) 

7.04 

(1.71) 

j. Ask the Soldiers and key leaders for their ideas 

and suggestions before deciding on a course of 

action. 

6.27 

(2.23) 

6.18 

(2.06) 

6.55 

(1.75) 

6.49 

(2.04) 

k. Ask for a volunteer from the entire Company to 

take charge and run the PT program, and give this 

person the authority to do it his/her way. 

3.89 

(2.08) 

3.83 

(2.04) 

4.36 

(2.09) 

4.42** 

(2.24)

l. Speak with your Battalion commander to get 

his/her suggestions regarding the PT overhaul 

before deciding on a course of action. 

6.14 

(1.84) 

4.10** 

(2.46)

4.34** 

(2.29)

4.60** 

(2.36)
48 

Company-Level: Motivating Subordinates 

C30. You are a new Company commander. The previous commander was a 

micromanager. This individual was extremely detail-oriented, gave very little positive 

feedback and often tore down the Platoon leaders when even the slightest infraction 

occurred. For example, the old Company commander noted one day that one of the 

Platoon leaders was wearing a dirty soft-cap and he called the entire Platoon a disgrace. 

This behavior on the part of the outgoing Company commander was very hard on the 

Platoon leaders. Several developed nervous conditions such as ulcers and sleep problems. 

Your goal is to create a more positive leadership atmosphere in the unit. What should 

you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Give all unit members more responsibility than 

they had before, and then hold them accountable. 

7.11 

(1.87) 

6.22** 

(2.29)

6.27* 

(2.15)

5.90** 

(2.22)

b. When you must give negative feedback to your 

Platoon leaders, do so constructively, pointing out 

specific areas that need improvement and 

explaining how this improvement can be 

achieved. 

8.37 

(.820) 

8.26 

(1.15) 

8.43 

(.818) 

8.06** 

(1.17)

c. Allow the Platoon leaders and their Soldiers the 

benefit of the doubt—don’t jump to negative 

conclusions. 

7.95 

(1.14) 

7.64* 

(1.39)

7.93 

(1.08) 

7.31** 

(1.54)

d. Assign work goals with clear milestones to all 

Officers. 

7.76 

(1.48) 

8.07** 

(1.06)

8.09 

(1.09) 

7.98* 

(1.27)

e. Involve senior NCOs in the decision-making 

process. 

8.00 

(1.16) 

8.12 

(1.08) 

8.00 

(1.38) 

7.95 

(1.30) 

f. Give the Platoon leaders frequent, specific 

positive feedback. 

8.16 

(.950) 

7.66** 

(1.29)

8.05 

(.914) 

7.79** 

(1.37)

g. Continue with the micromanagement style since it 

is common practice in the Company, and relieve 

and/or replace the lieutenants who cannot handle 

the stress. 

1.39 

(.820) 

1.39 

(.766) 

1.45 

(.951) 

1.56 

(1.34) 

h. Let your subordinates know your intent and then 

let them develop their own plans. 

7.24 

(1.62) 

7.36 

(1.73) 

7.41 

(1.63) 

7.23 

(1.86) 

i. Recognize Soldiers’ achievements with awards. 7.79 

(1.85) 

8.06* 

(1.22)

8.02 

(1.28) 

8.07** 

(1.08)

j. Have positive expectations: State often that you 

believe that every member of the unit has the 

ability to perform well if he or she applies himself 

or herself and works hard. 

8.42 

(.890) 

8.13** 

(1.08)

7.98* 

(1.17)

8.00** 

(1.26)
49 

Company-Level: Communicating 

C31. You are a Company commander with a new brigade commander. Before the new 

brigade commander took over, the Battalion conducted After Action Reviews by 

critiquing each training task according to the Mission Training Plan. The new brigade 

commander asks to see how AARs are conducted in the brigade—he wants to find 

someone who does AARs improperly so he can use this individual as an example to show 

what needs to be improved. When the brigade commander observes you he says he does 

not like your AAR format and he feels you are critiquing instead of letting the Soldiers 

talk. Thus, you must now develop a system for listening more to your Soldiers while still 

maintaining an effective command. Rate the quality of the following strategies. 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Ask yourself why you talk when you do and 

evaluate whether you need to speak at these times 

to optimally benefit your unit. 

7.47 

(1.64) 

6.79** 

(1.73)

7.21 

(1.83) 

7.11** 

(1.66)

b. Listen most to Soldiers who have the best interest 

of the unit at heart and have no hidden agendas. 

6.55 

(1.66) 

6.16* 

(2.00)

6.68 

(1.91) 

6.24 

(2.04) 

c. Ask around among the Soldiers to discover the 

informal leaders in the group, then seek out and 

listen to these Soldiers. 

4.42 

(1.67) 

5.39** 

(1.93)

5.75** 

(1.90)

5.62** 

(1.96)

d. Try listening at moments when you would 

customarily talk. 

7.61 

(1.15) 

7.41 

(1.43) 

7.80 

(.978) 

7.56 

(1.54) 

e. When Soldiers’ safety is at risk, use directive 

leadership instead of listening. 

7.45 

(2.19) 

7.82* 

(1.68)

7.89* 

(1.33)

7.71* 

(1.51)

f. Whenever you have time, seek out your Soldiers, 

ask them questions, and listen to their opinions 

and views. 

7.84 

(1.13) 

7.69 

(1.36) 

8.07 

(1.04) 

7.85 

(1.22) 

g. Do not listen to Soldiers when they lack the 

knowledge necessary to make a decision. 

2.50 

(1.39) 

3.50** 

(2.01)

2.39 

(1.33) 

2.95** 

(1.96)

h. Schedule regular meetings with your NCOs when 

you just sit and talk about the unit—and make 

these meetings times when you do less talking 

and more listening. 

7.03 

(1.48) 

7.20 

(1.52) 

7.59** 

(1.12)

7.26 

(1.51) 

i. Listen most to Soldiers who are squared away and 

who command the respect of other Soldiers. 

5.66 

(1.66) 

5.47 

(1.89) 

5.91 

(1.85) 

5.70 

(2.10) 

j. Listen to Soldiers who are willing to express their 

opinions before a group. 

5.42 

(1.65) 

5.59 

(1.73) 

6.02* 

(1.69)

5.81* 

(2.17)
50 

Company-Level: Developing Subordinates 

C32. You are a Company commander with some relatively junior lieutenants. Your goal 

is to develop these lieutenants. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving 

your goal. 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Involve the lieutenants in every administrative 

action in the Company. 

5.53 

(1.87) 

4.66** 

(2.14)

4.82* 

(2.14)

4.99** 

(2.25)

b. Beginning early on, encourage the lieutenants to 

determine their own goals, and use this 

information during counseling sessions. 

7.43 

(1.28) 

7.72* 

(1.34)

7.61 

(1.40) 

7.63 

(1.36) 

c. Involve the lieutenants only in those decisions 

that affect their Platoons. 

3.95 

(1.84) 

4.26 

(1.73) 

3.48 

(1.69) 

4.17 

(1.96) 

d. Explain the big picture to the lieutenants 

regarding upcoming missions. 

8.03 

(.90) 

8.27* 

(1.06)

8.18 

(1.29) 

8.09 

(1.23) 

e. When going on a mission, explain only their 

portion to the lieutenants. 

2.68 

(1.31) 

2.31* 

(1.59)

2.75 

(1.89) 

2.66 

(1.87) 

f. Tell the lieutenants when things in the Battalion 

are bothering you. 

3.36 

(1.91) 

2.18** 

(1.32)

3.09 

(2.26) 

2.96* 

(2.10)

g. Involve the lieutenants in administrative activities 

only with Soldiers from their own Platoon. 

5.25 

(1.86) 

5.53 

(2.32) 

5.05 

(2.26) 

4.92 

(2.58) 

h. Don’t share ideas with the lieutenants; make your 

own decisions and implement them. 

1.92 

(1.02) 

2.37** 

(1.52)

2.25 

(1.52) 

2.50** 

(1.75)

i. Have the lieutenants present for administrative 

punishments (Article 15s, etc.) only if their 

schedules allow it. 

2.86 

(2.11) 

2.95 

(2.13) 

3.68 

(2.72) 

3.58** 

(2.41)

j. Start a professional development program to assist 

the lieutenants in their growth. 

8.34 

(1.12) 

8.48 

(.839)

8.55 

(.761) 

8.48 

(1.19) 

k. Involve the lieutenants in all decisions. 5.03 

(2.15) 

5.09 

(2.21) 

6.48** 

(1.88)

5.30 

(2.18) 
51 

Company-Level: Motivating Subordinates

C33. You are a Company commander. You have a Platoon leader who is causing you 

problems. Once he was cleaning his weapon on the mail loading dock and he pointed it at 

a civilian. Another time he was late to a range. He frequently argues with you and does 

not do what you ask him to do. This is a new problem for your first sergeant—he has 

never experienced this situation before. The behaviors are continuing and growing in 

severity to a point where the lieutenant is insubordinate. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. If a relatively severe instance of insubordinate 

behavior occurs in public, shift the focus and 

avoid humiliating the Platoon leader in public, but 

have him see you one-on-one later on. 

4.72 

(2.51) 

4.52 

(2.72) 

5.20 

(2.75) 

4.62 

(2.73) 

b. Use all assets available to you—but do not 

involve your boss (the Battalion commander). 

3.19 

(1.81) 

4.34** 

(2.15)

4.05* 

(2.25)

3.95** 

(2.11)

c. Deal with the situation immediately—do not let it 

fester. 

8.64 

(.680) 

8.64 

(1.05) 

8.70 

(.594) 

8.48 

(1.31) 

d. Counsel the Platoon leader only when his/her 

performance warrants it. 

2.58 

(1.57) 

3.89** 

(2.65)

4.23** 

(2.65)

4.32** 

(2.75)

e. Ask the Battalion commander to give him a letter 

of reprimand. 

4.11 

(1.97) 

4.62* 

(2.26)

4.48 

(2.38) 

4.05 

(2.37) 

f. If a severe instance of insubordinate behavior 

occurs in public, dismiss the Platoon leader from 

the room and deal with him later. 

5.72 

(2.47) 

5.03** 

(2.79)

5.64 

(2.81) 

5.97 

(2.65) 

g. Before taking action, find out if the Platoon leader 

has been counseled before for his bad behavior. 

6.06 

(2.10) 

6.54* 

(2.28)

6.73 

(2.24) 

6.97** 

(2.15)

h. Talk with the Platoon leader and work out the 

problem. 

6.28 

(1.63) 

6.74* 

(1.96)

7.20** 

(1.25)

7.05** 

(1.74)

i. Establish regular sessions during which you 

counsel the Platoon leader about his performance. 

7.44 

(1.40) 

7.60 

(1.47) 

8.00** 

(1.01)

7.46 

(1.71) 

j. To prepare for counseling sessions, get together 

with your first sergeant and role play various 

scenarios for dealing with the Platoon leader 

including his potential reactions to your actions. 

5.31 

(2.14) 

5.94** 

(2.44)

7.14** 

(1.79)

6.30** 

(2.16)

k. Wait awhile to see if the situation improves on its 

own. 

1.53 

(.910) 

1.97** 

(1.56)

1.75 

(1.01) 

1.89** 

(1.56)

l. If an instance of insubordinate behavior occurs 

between the two of you in private, immediately 

reprimand the Platoon leader. 

7.78 

(1.76) 

7.91 

(1.95) 

7.64 

(2.07) 

7.38* 

(2.39)
52 

Company-Level: Balancing Mission and Troops 

C34. You are a Company commander, and your Battalion commander often gives 

directives that you believe are unreasonable. You have tried to give your commander 

input regarding these directives, but he has not listened to your input. The NCOs and 

Soldiers also feel these orders are unreasonable, and the situation is causing you 

considerable stress. You have generally lost respect for the Battalion commander. He 

gives you another order you believe is unreasonable. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Speak to the sergeant major and see if she/he will 

use her/his influence with the Battalion 

commander to improve the situation. 

6.22 

(2.13) 

6.19 

(2.34) 

6.20 

(2.22) 

5.57** 

(2.32)

b. Let your key subordinates know this is not your 

directive but rather the commander’s. 

2.22 

(1.29) 

2.61** 

(1.59)

3.84** 

(2.25)

3.46** 

(2.31)

c. Do your best to gain the NCOs’ and Soldiers’ 

compliance by explaining the rationale for the 

commander’s orders, being as convincing as you 

can be. 

6.64 

(1.62) 

6.43 

(1.69) 

6.98 

(1.74) 

6.23 

(2.06) 

d. Go alone to the Battalion commander and tell 

him/her you believe the order is unreasonable. 

7.56 

(1.34) 

6.89** 

(2.01)

6.82* 

(1.89)

7.11** 

(1.82)

e. Keep trying to give your Battalion commander 

input regarding his unreasonable directives. 

7.47 

(1.36) 

7.21 

(1.54) 

6.91 

(2.03) 

7.05** 

(1.84)

f. Represent the orders as your own to your key 

subordinates. 

7.53 

(1.50) 

7.02** 

(2.05)

6.27** 

(2.54)

6.10** 

(2.36)

g. Say that the system is to blame for the 

unreasonable order. 

1.94 

(1.37) 

2.34** 

(1.58)

2.48* 

(1.70)

2.17 

(1.67) 

h. Let your Soldiers know that this is not your 

directive but rather the commander’s. 

1.83 

(1.28) 

2.39** 

(1.72)

2.86** 

(2.00)

3.08** 

(2.13)

i. Assign the unreasonable order a lower priority 

and accomplish it in the manner you choose. 

3.39 

(1.71) 

3.68 

(2.38) 

3.77 

(2.22) 

3.41 

(2.19) 

j. Get your key leaders together and go as a group to 

the Battalion commander and say that the order is 

unreasonable. 

1.89 

(1.41) 

2.84** 

(2.32)

3.32** 

(2.55)

2.74** 

(2.12)
53 

Company-Level: Directing and Supervising Subordinates 

C35. You are a Company commander with (ORIGINAL: both military and civilian) 

part-time military, civilian, Technician and AGR personnel in your unit. You have no E5 

sergeants—instead, you have civilians doing supervisory jobs with Soldiers working 

under them. You are experiencing problems in maintaining group cohesion: For 

example, (ORIGINAL: civilians seeing Soldiers) Technicians seeing AGR’s taking off for 

training and wonder why they have to keep working; (ORIGINAL: Soldiers seeing 

civilians) AGR’s see Technicians getting cash awards for good performance and wonder 

why they can’t have similar awards; and so on. You must deal with these problems to 

keep your unit running smoothly. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. ORIGINAL: Try to develop cohesion separately 

in the civilians and military members by having 

separate social functions. 

1.65 

(1.16) 

a. CHANGE: Try to develop cohesion separately in 

the civilian, Technician, AGR, and part-time 

military members by having separate social 

functions. 

 2.02* 

(1.82)

1.95 

(1.44) 

2.45** 

(2.10)

b. ORIGINAL: Educate the Soldiers and the 

civilians about the differing requirements of their 

jobs: Tell your Soldiers that they have contractual 

obligations and they must accept their situation; 

tell the civilians that their situation is different 

from the Soldiers’ situation. 

7.32 

(1.51) 

 

b. CHANGE: Educate everyone about the differing 

requirements of their jobs: Tell the military 

people that they have contractual obligations and 

they must accept their situation; tell the civilians 

that their situation is different from the Soldiers’ 

situation. 

 6.89* 

(1.86)

7.18 

(1.89) 

7.32 

(1.79) 

c. ORIGINAL: Have both civilian and military 

members of the unit draw up a poster of your 

organization (an organization chart) and post it 

where everyone can see it. 

5.36 

(1.48) 

 

c. CHANGE: Have representatives from each 

group draw up a poster of your organization (an 

organization chart) and post it where everyone 

can see it. 

 4.99* 

(1.97)

5.86 

(1.88) 

5.55 

(2.14) 

d. ORIGINAL: Form a morale committee 

composed of both civilian and military personnel 

to plan Company social functions. 

7.00 

(1.20) 

 

d. CHANGE: Form a morale committee composed 

of representatives from each group to plan 

Company social functions. 

 6.39** 

(1.96)

6.80 

(2.06) 

6.68* 

(1.80)

e. Create a sign-out roster, and have people sign out 

when they leave their place of duty, stating where 

exactly they are going and why. 

3.92 

(1.88) 

4.56** 

(2.41)

5.02** 

(2.58)

5.14** 

(2.30)

f. Study your own procedures to ensure that you are 

being fair and equitable to all personnel. 

7.92 

(1.04) 

7.82 

(1.43) 

8.11 

(1.58) 

7.91 

(1.38) 
54 

C35. Continued: 

g. Schedule outings, pot luck dinners, parties, and 

dining outs that include all members of the unit 

and their Families. 

7.97 

(1.07) 

7.60* 

(1.57)

7.61 

(1.95) 

7.67* 

(1.54)

Rationale for Change: Reserve Component organizations have a mix of part and full time 

staff who are responsible for the administrative, training and logistical support of the unit. The 

individuals work under a variety of personnel rules and regulations that prescribe the length of 

their duty day, as well as their specific responsibilities. This differs from Active Component 

units, where people who perform the support tasks are members of the same unit. 
55 

Company-Level: Balancing Mission and Troops 

C36. You are a Company commander, and you believe that you have an incompetent 

Battalion commander. This incompetence is both technical and tactical. Often this 

person issues directives that are not going to achieve the mission. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Infer the underlying intent of the directive, go to 

your commander, and inform him of your 

interpretation of the underlying intent and the 

steps being taken to achieve this intent. 

6.65 

(2.03) 

7.17** 

(1.64)

7.02 

(2.21) 

7.26 

(5.99) 

b. When provided with the next unworkable 

directive, go back to the commander immediately 

and try to help direct the commander’s thinking 

into more appropriate and workable solutions. 

6.92 

(1.53) 

6.66 

(1.87) 

6.75 

(1.81) 

6.58* 

(1.83)

c. Use your first sergeant to help you develop ways 

to make the directive work well and look good to 

the troops. 

6.43 

(2.19) 

6.84* 

(1.90)

6.84 

(1.86) 

6.29 

(2.18) 

d. Speak to the sergeant major and the executive 

Officer, ask for any relevant information and listen 

to their opinions. 

7.65 

(1.03) 

7.47 

(1.61) 

7.00 

(2.02) 

7.18** 

(1.77)

e. Confront the commander and provide specific 

examples of why his directives are incompetent. 

3.49 

(2.30) 

3.53 

(2.19) 

3.14 

(2.19) 

3.95* 

(2.50)

f. Speak to the brigade commander about the 

problem, arming yourself with specific examples 

of incompetent directives. 

2.51 

(1.84) 

2.58 

(1.98) 

2.48 

(1.91) 

3.35** 

(2.32)

g. Continue to follow directives and let the chips fall 

where they may. 

2.97 

(1.74) 

2.78 

(1.78) 

3.00 

(2.14) 

2.86 

(1.95) 

h. Explain to your subordinates that the Battalion 

commander does not understand the area in 

question because it is not his primary specialty. 

1.95 

(1.31) 

2.10 

(1.48) 

2.52* 

(1.78)

2.24* 

(1.71)

i. Infer the underlying intent of the directive and 

develop your own strategy to solve the problem 

and achieve the mission. 

6.57 

(1.92) 

6.76 

(1.92) 

6.36 

(2.29) 

6.37 

(2.19) 

j. Communicate the Battalion commander’s intent 

(rather than his specific directive) and ensure that 

it is met. 

6.84 

(1.91) 

7.28** 

(1.70)

6.98 

(1.73) 

6.74 

(2.06) 
56 

Company-Level: Managing Oneself 

C37. You are a Company commander on deployment. Your unit is sustaining continuous 

operations. You are feeling the stress of the many demands upon your time, but you want 

to maintain your mental effectiveness and readiness. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

a. Sleep. 7.51 

(1.46) 

7.10* 

(1.96)

7.14 

(2.56) 

7.19* 

(1.67)

b. Take time alone each day to read inspirational 

books or materials 

6.05 

(1.68) 

5.91 

(2.19) 

5.82 

(2.20) 

5.89 

(2.13) 

c. Use your peers as a sounding board and support 

group. 

7.27 

(1.22) 

7.20 

(1.89) 

7.05 

(2.04) 

6.95* 

(1.61)

d. Maintain contact with family and friends back 

home to keep you centered and remind you there’s 

more to life than your job. 

7.38 

(1.32) 

7.44 

(1.87) 

6.93 

(2.37) 

6.90** 

(2.08)

e. Take time alone each day to think, regroup, and 

work through what’s on your mind. 

8.14 

(.980) 

7.91* 

(1.20)

7.77 

(1.68) 

7.85** 

(1.28)

f. Keep perspective by remembering that you have 

other talents and skills that are not related to your 

current job. 

5.27 

(2.06) 

5.90** 

(2.20)

5.82 

(2.12) 

5.87** 

(2.06)

g. Work as hard and as fast as you can: Have as your 

goal getting to tomorrow’s work as soon as 

possible. 

4.35 

(1.99) 

4.70 

(2.13) 

4.57 

(2.12) 

4.44 

(2.10) 

h. Mentor or counsel troubled Soldiers regularly to 

keep your own problems in perspective. 

5.38 

(1.88) 

5.43 

(2.15) 

5.84 

(2.43) 

5.13 

(2.19) 

i. Each day, reflect on your successes and on what 

you can do better in the future—maintain a 

positive focus. 

8.16 

(.990) 

8.09 

(1.37) 

8.30 

(1.47) 

8.19 

(1.24) 
57 

UNUSED SCENARIOS 

You are a Company commander, and your unit is dispersed and is assigned to various 

garrison commands. Thus, you cannot possibly exercise direct control over your troops. 

The garrison commanders have non-judicial authority over your Soldiers. You want to 

develop a good relationship with the garrison commanders. What should you do to take 

care of your Soldiers under these conditions? 

Rationale for Change: I chose not to include this scenario in its entirety. While reserve units 

are geographically dispersed, the chain of command is usually clear and under the control of a 

single individual who would have authority over the Soldiers. Even if a reserve Soldier was 

assigned to a Multi-Component Unit, and had an active duty commander, unless the Soldier 

has been mobilized, he or she does not fall under the Uniform Code of Military Justice 

(UCMJ). Oversight on this Soldier would still be maintained by a reserve chain of command. 

You are a Company commander, and there has been an ongoing problem in your unit 

with alcoholism and especially with Soldiers driving under the influence of alcohol. Two 

Soldiers in the unit who previously had bad problems have since joined Alcoholics 

Anonymous groups and are now recovered. One other Soldier is now in jail because of a 

car accident he caused while intoxicated which resulted in the death of a civilian. You are 

extremely concerned about this ongoing problem, and you would like to do something to 

get through to the Soldiers about its seriousness and impact upon your unit. What should 

you do? 

Rationale for Change: I chose not to include this scenario in its entirety. While alcohol 

abuse and alcoholism is certainly a problem in civilian life, reserve leaders do not have to deal 

with this issue on a daily basis. If a reserve Soldier gets a DUI, he or she will be handled held 

accountable by the civilian authorities. There would be a military penalty for this behavior, but 

the legal consequences would be handled through the local police, rather than within the 

military judicial system. 

You are a battery commander. Consequently, you work for both your Battalion 

commander and the brigade commander whom you support. During preparation time 

for the National Training Center (NTC), you are also preparing for a Battle Command 

Training Program (BCTP). Your Battalion commander is interested in the BCTP, but 

the maneuver brigade commander wants you to focus on the NTC. What should you do? 

Rationale for Change: I have chosen not to include this scenario in the survey. While reserve 

units may ‘doctrinally’ have the same dual support relationships, in reality, because of the 

severe time constraints, a reserve unit leader’s time is very closely managed, and the decision 

would be made for that leader on who would be supported. 
58 

Summary of Mean Responses for Company Level 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=116 

USAR 

N=44 

ARNG 

N=149 

Taking Care of Soldiers 

7.76 7.74 7.79 7.44** 3.37 3.94** 4.23** 4.02** 

Directing and Supervising Subordinates 

7.17 6.97** 6.98 6.87** 3.13 3.55** 3.81** 4.00** 

Cooperating With Others 

7.53 6.52** 6.43** 6.25** 2.19 2.86** 2.54 2.94** 

Establishing Trust 

7.34 7.30 7.46 7.20 2.25 2.46* 2.38 2.49* 

Managing Oneself 

7.48 7.31* 7.35 7.28* 2.14 3.29** 3.27** 3.15** 

Communicating 

7.32 7.18 7.53 7.29 3.46 4.44** 4.07** 4.29** 

Motivating Subordinates 

7.44 7.34 7.46 7.32 3.04 3.89** 4.04** 4.07** 

Developing Subordinates 

7.79 8.13** 8.02* 7.97** 3.33 3.57** 3.70* 3.93** 

Balancing Mission and Troops 

6.95 6.90 6.74 6.55** 2.46 2.76** 3.04** 3.03** 

*p < .05; **p < .01 
59 

Battalion-Level: Developing Subordinates 

B22. You are a new Battalion commander, and you want to develop detailed knowledge 

of the strengths and weaknesses of each of your Company commanders. Rate the 

following strategies for their effectiveness in helping you gain this information: 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. If you plan to talk to the Soldiers, discuss 

beforehand with each Company commander your 

intention to talk directly to the Soldiers and 

explain your reasons for doing so. 

6.05 

(2.40) 

5.96 

(2.09) 

5.77 

(2.46) 

6.21 

(2.25) 

b. For each Company, direct a sensing session of the 

entire Company with 

3.41 

(2.21) 

4.00 

(2.55) 

3.47 

(2.09) 

3.89 

(1.88) 

c. Ask the command sergeant major, Battalion XO, 

and operations Officer for their assessment. 

7.69 

(1.44) 

7.35 

(1.69) 

7.07* 

(1.39)

7.63 

(1.14) 

d. If you choose to talk to the Soldiers, express your 

desire to each Company commander to use the 

information you will learn to help with their 

development as leaders. 

6.31 

(2.27) 

5.91 

(1.70) 

6.07 

(2.39) 

5.89 

(1.66) 

e. Ask your Company commanders to talk to their 

own Soldiers and ask a specific list of questions, 

and then report back to you with the information 

they have learned. 

3.83 

(2.16) 

4.48 

(1.88) 

4.43 

(2.17) 

3.63 

(2.08) 

f. Talk directly (in private) with the Soldiers and 

ask them to comment on the commanders’ 

strengths and weaknesses. 

2.05 

(1.46) 

3.22* 

(2.55)

3.50** 

(2.14)

2.21 

(1.43) 

g. Talk directly (in private) with the Soldiers and 

ask them their options about the quality of their 

training, what they are learning, and other 

impressions they have. 

7.07 

(2.12) 

6.13 

(2.51) 

6.57 

(2.19) 

5.47* 

(3.06)

h. Ask your Company commanders to speak to 

other commanders’ Soldiers (not their own 

Soldiers) and report back to you with the 

information they have learned. 

1.59 

(1.07) 

2.57* 

(1.92)

2.67** 

(1.74)

2.58* 

(1.89)

i. Assign a Battalion staff member who does not 

rate the Company commanders to speak with the 

Soldiers and report to you on what he/she learns. 

2.44 

(1.58) 

3.26 

(2.13) 

4.17** 

(2.00)

4.00** 

(2.05)

j. Rely on historical statistical indicators of 

performance. 

4.78 

(2.00) 

4.78 

(1.59) 

5.00 

(1.78) 

5.63 

(1.80) 

k. Talk directly (in private) with the Soldiers and 

ask them specific questions about their work 

hours, their job descriptions and responsibilities, 

and other factual items. 

6.64 

(2.06) 

5.87 

(2.02) 

5.67 

(2.27) 

5.00** 

(2.16)

l. Speak to the Company commanders individually 

and ask each of them to comment on the strengths 

and weaknesses of the other Company 

commanders and units. 

3.19 

(2.85) 

2.87 

(2.30) 

4.47* 

(2.78)

3.00 

(2.38) 

m. Ask the brigade commander for his/her 

assessment. 

6.07 

(2.41) 

6.43 

(1.56) 

5.63 

(2.22) 

5.89 

(1.99) 
60 

Battalion-Level: Managing Self 

B23. You are a Battalion commander and it is the end of your first battle at a major 

externally-evaluated training exercise, during which your unit revealed some major 

shortcomings. During the After Action Review, the Chief Evaluator is highly critical of 

the Battalion and dwells on all the negative things your unit did that day. You carefully 

record all of the negative observations, but you know full well that the Battalion also did 

some very positive things that day. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Leave the After Action Review and return to your 

units; once there, communicate exactly what the 

Evaluator said. 

3.02 

(1.79) 

3.35 

(1.96) 

3.07 

(1.66) 

3.63 

(2.40) 

b. If you have a good relationship with your CSM or 

other similar person, discuss your frustrations and 

feelings with him or her. 

6.28 

(1.85) 

5.83 

(2.01) 

4.93** 

(1.59)

5.37 

(2.40) 

c. Forget about trying to get any positive feedback: 

Thank the Evaluator directly for the negative 

feedback, say you will deal with the problems 

immediately, and do so without expecting 

anything more from. 

4.53 

(2.32) 

4.78 

(2.08) 

4.43 

(2.01) 

3.47* 

(2.19)

d. Be careful not to vent your frustrations with the 

Evaluator’s feedback in front of the Soldiers or 

your junior Officers. 

7.60 

(1.80) 

7.78 

(1.04) 

7.43 

(1.35) 

7.47 

(1.98) 

e. Ask the Chief Evaluator if he has anything else he 

would like to say. 

6.25 

(2.04) 

6.87 

(1.89) 

6.97* 

(1.79)

7.53** 

(1.07)

f. Mention one or two successes the Battalion had, 

and ask the Evaluator if he would like to comment 

on these positive events. 

6.74 

(2.16) 

7.78** 

(1.04)

7.67** 

(1.66)

7.89** 

(1.19)

g. Leave the After Action Review and return to your 

units, but when you report to them make sure to 

note the successes that occurred that day as well as 

the failures and shortcomings. 

8.52 

(.880) 

8.43 

(.843) 

8.07 

(1.66) 

8.47 

(.905) 

h. Speak to the Evaluator at another time, and state 

your desire to receive positive as well as negative 

feedback so that you know what the units are 

doing right and wrong. 

7.77 

(1.62) 

8.13 

(1.25) 

7.40 

(2.09) 

7.11 

(1.99) 

i. Share your feelings with a friend or confidante at 

your own level to help you work through any 

negative feelings. 

6.42 

(1.96) 

6.17 

(1.89) 

5.90 

(2.12) 

5.68 

(2.00) 
61 

Battalion-Level: Protecting the Organization 

B24. You are a new Battalion commander and one of your most important and 

challenging tasks is to establish the training priorities for your unit. While everything 

looks important and you would like to meet every possible contingency, you also realize 

that you do not have the time or resources to “do it all.” Rate the following strategies for 

how effective they would be in helping you establish your priorities. 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Study the brigade’s training schedule. 7.71 

(1.50) 

7.52 

(1.08) 

7.33 

(1.42) 

7.26 

(1.40) 

b. Talk to the brigade S-2, S-3, and CSM to verify 

your understanding of the brigade commander’s 

training focus. 

7.98 

(1.20) 

7.22** 

(.951)

7.13** 

(1.59)

7.05* 

(1.64)

c. Schedule meetings to discuss training with each of 

your staff members during your first week of 

command. 

7.05 

(1.64) 

6.48 

(1.70) 

6.67 

(1.39) 

6.79 

(1.71) 

d. Explain your goals and your plans for the 

Battalion very clearly to your Officers and staff. 

8.39 

(1.08) 

8.09 

(1.31) 

8.23 

(.817) 

8.26 

(1.44) 

e. Assess the tactical and technical competence of 

your Soldiers individually by giving them formal 

and informal tests. 

4.42 

(2.14) 

3.83 

(1.92) 

3.87 

(2.21) 

4.74 

(2.44) 

f. Rely on the assessments made by the previous 

Battalion commander. 

5.78 

(1.80) 

5.00** 

(1.31)

4.67 

(1.68) 

5.68 

(1.76) 

g. Select three to five upcoming missions (based on 

the brigade training plan) to focus your Soldiers’ 

energy on. 

6.83 

(1.60) 

7.30 

(1.10) 

6.67 

(1.68) 

7.32 

(1.56) 

h. Before doing anything, make sure you understand 

the commander’s intent two levels up. 

7.64 

(1.52) 

7.78 

(1.16) 

7.93 

(1.17) 

8.00 

(1.00) 

i. Soon after taking command, visit each staff 

section’s shop and get a full briefing on their 

operations. 

7.81 

(1.37) 

6.96* 

(1.91)

7.87 

(1.00) 

6.84* 

(1.80)

j. Talk to the brigade commander to determine his 

training priorities. 

8.44 

(1.09) 

8.39 

(.783) 

8.43 

(1.04) 

8.32 

(.820) 
62 

Battalion-Level: Protecting the Organization and Motivating Subordinates 

B25. You are a Battalion commander. Your brigade commander has made it clear that 

he does not wish to speak with you about pressing issues that arise in your Battalion. 

Also, he expects perfection from your Battalion at all times, and he seems to view your 

Battalion’s poor performance at the JRTC as unforgivable – he keeps harping on past 

failures. The brigade commander does not provide you with feedback on your strengths 

and how to improve your weaknesses. His communication style is formal, abrupt, and in 

your opinion, ineffective. He begins every conversation by reminding you that you are 

only an 0-5. You are frustrated because you never know where you stand, performancewise, in your brigade commander-s eyes and you lack a person from whom to receive 

performance feedback. In general, you find your situation with the brigade commander 

to be intolerable, and morale in your unit seems dangerously low. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Speak to the Assistant Division Commander, 

explain your need for extra feedback, and request 

feedback on your performance. 

3.95 

(2.19) 

4.09 

(1.80) 

5.07** 

(1.83)

4.37 

(2.00) 

b. Deal with the brigade commander as best you can, 

but hold regular sessions with the members of 

your unit to air concerns and voice problems in the 

hope of improving morale. 

7.10 

(1.76) 

6.57 

(1.47) 

6.80 

(1.27) 

6.68 

(1.66) 

c. Remain loyal to the brigade commander so you do 

not model disloyalty in front of the members of 

your unit. 

7.97 

(1.08) 

6.87** 

(1.21)

6.67** 

(1.74)

7.21 

(1.71) 

d. Seek a formal appointment with the brigade 

commander, state that you and he seem to have a 

problem, and ask him why. 

7.71 

(1.50) 

7.39 

(1.64) 

7.03* 

(1.65)

6.89* 

(1.32)

e. If you choose to speak with the Assistant Division 

Commander and your Officers are critical of your 

decision, then explain your reasons for your 

actions to them, and let them know they are 

welcome to voice concerns about how you are 

leading the unit. 

4.75 

(2.45) 

5.22 

(1.93) 

5.67* 

(2.10)

5.11 

(1.94) 

f. Speak to your family members, the chaplain, or 

other friends from outside the military in order to 

deal with your personal frustrations. 

6.12 

(1.82) 

6.09 

(1.53) 

5.47 

(2.12) 

5.16 

(2.81) 

g. Jump the chain of command and speak to the 

Assistant Division Commander about the problem 

with the brigade commander. 

2.15 

(1.35) 

2.30 

(1.55) 

2.70 

(1.62) 

2.89 

(1.85) 

h. If you speak to the Assistant Division 

Commander, prepare yourself for the possibility of 

a disruption of loyalty in your own unit. 

4.68 

(2.20) 

4.55 

(2.15) 

4.67 

(1.78) 

5.42 

(1.83) 

i. Talk to your fellow Battalion commanders about 

the problem and try to develop a joint solution. 

7.12 

(1.52) 

7.00 

(1.59) 

6.53 

(1.99) 

6.89 

(1.72) 

j. Request advice from one of your brigade 

commanders’ superiors whom you already know 

and trust. 

5.17 

(1.40) 

5.13 

(1.91) 

6.17** 

(1.80)

5.26 

(2.02) 

k. Talk to the brigade XO and the brigade S3 and try 

to get some information. 

7.19 

(1.73) 

7.70 

(1.22) 

6.83 

(2.00) 

7.58 

(1.17) 
63 

Battalion-Level: Taking Care of Soldiers 

B26. You are a Battalion commander and your goal is to implement effective training. 

Rate the following strategies in terms of how good they would be at achieving your goal. 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. ORIGINAL: Provide Soldiers and their Families 

with a copy of an extended training schedule (for 

example, six months out). 

8.05 

(1.13) 

 

a. CHANGED: Provide Soldiers and their Families 

with a copy of an extended training schedule (for 

example, one year out). 

 7.70 

(1.39) 

6.90** 

(1.97)

7.26 

(2.02) 

b. Develop specific rules and procedures that your 

Battalion uses regularly in order to manage 

training. 

7.83 

(1.33) 

7.74 

(1.25) 

7.80 

(.961) 

7.47 

(1.07) 

c. Go to the brigade S-3 and demand that the 

training schedule not be changed. 

4.88 

(2.10) 

4.26 

(2.24) 

4.63 

(2.23) 

3.63* 

(2.36)

d. ORIGINAL: Give Soldiers three or four-day 

holiday weekends whenever possible. 

6.92 

(1.84) 

 

d. CHANGED: Build in a ‘fun drill’ whenever 

possible. 

 6.39 

(2.16) 

6.73 

(1.48) 

5.89* 

(1.99)

e. ORIGINAL: Take into consideration school 

vacations and events when planning training. 

8.19 

(1.21) 

 

e. CHANGED: Take into consideration hunting 

season, community and school events when 

planning training. 

 5.70** 

(2.03)

6.53** 

(1.97)

6.00** 

(2.42)

f. Brief Families collectively on the extended 

training schedule once it has been developed – 

have a family dinner in the mess hall, for 

example, and then go over the extended training 

schedule. 

7.90 

(1.47) 

6.74** 

(1.45)

6.20** 

(1.78)

6.74** 

(1.62)

g. Be willing to change the training schedule in 

order to capitalize on unplanned training 

opportunities. 

6.14 

(2.14) 

6.43 

(1.80) 

7.13** 

(1.33)

6.21 

(2.29) 

h. Have regular meetings with your brigade 

commander to keep him/her focused on what 

your Battalion is doing. 

7.68 

(1.32) 

7.04* 

(1.29)

7.30 

(1.46) 

7.47 

(1.30) 

i. If someone violates the training schedule without 

authority, and without good cause, recommend 

the person for appropriate punishment. 

5.12 

(1.81) 

5.30 

(2.12) 

5.97* 

(1.86)

6.05* 

(1.71)

j. Once inside the specified time limit, do not make 

changes to the schedule once the schedule has 

been distributed. 

7.24 

(1.62) 

7.13 

(1.01) 

6.73 

(2.14) 

7.05 

(1.58) 

k. ORIGINAL: If you take a Soldier’s weekend 

for a training exercise, make sure he or she gets it 

back during another training cycle. 

7.81 

(1.37) 

 

k. CHANGED: If you require your Soldiers be 

present for additional drill weekends for a 

training exercise, make sure he or she is 

recognized for the extra time the Soldier was 

willing to commit to the organization. 

 7.61 

(1.07) 

7.33 

(1.34) 

8.16 

(1.11) 
64 

B26. Continued: 

l. Try to dissuade your superiors from making 

sudden changes to the training schedule. 

8.32 

(.90) 

7.96 

(1.18) 

7.70* 

(1.29)

8.16 

(.898) 

m. Communicate your training goals and your vision 

to your subordinates and your superiors. 

8.86 

(.350) 

8.74 

(.541) 

8.70 

(.596) 

8.79 

(.419) 

Rationale for Changes: Reserve Component units traditionally train one weekend a month 

and two weeks per year. Because unit members spend less time together and to give employers 

more notice of training periods, regulations require that training schedules be provided further 

out. Time constraints are such in reserve units that unit members cannot be given ‘time off.’ 

However, reserve unit leaders do have the option to vary the training schedule and structure the 

training in such a way that Soldiers can include family members or employers in some events. 

Reserve unit leaders plan training around community events, and during the summer so as to 

not conflict with educational or other activities. In reserve units, hunting season is a BIG 

DEAL, a commander quickly learns NEVER to plan any training that will conflict with 

hunting season. Because it is not an option to give a Soldier ‘time off’ other steps must be 

taken to recognize dedication and service. 
65 

Battalion-Level: Communicating

B27. You are a Battalion commander, and you want to make sure that your Soldiers and 

junior Officers share your vision for the Battalion. Rate the effectiveness of the following 

strategies for communicating your vision to your unit. 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Distribute your command philosophy in writing to 

all Soldiers in your Battalion. 

7.39 

(1.69) 

7.26 

(1.57) 

7.67 

(1.78) 

7.68 

(1.63) 

b. Reinforce your vision in all daily/weekend 

activities and interactions, and do so for the entire 

term of your command. 

8.29 

(.930) 

7.91 

(1.24) 

7.53* 

(1.81)

7.84 

(1.25) 

c. Do not adhere to a single perspective—be willing 

to change your vision as necessary to reflect 

changing needs of the unit. 

6.64 

(2.35) 

5.39* 

(2.58)

6.67 

(2.21) 

5.84 

(2.73) 

d. ORIGINAL: On a daily basis, visit Company 

areas in the garrison and in the field, and highlight 

shortcomings and the progress that has been made 

toward achieving your vision. 

6.41 

(2.39) 

 

d. CHANGED: Frequently visit Company areas in 

the garrison and in the field, and highlight 

shortcomings and the progress that has been made 

toward achieving your vision. 

 6.65 

(1.74) 

7.60** 

(1.56)

6.74 

(2.42) 

e. Communicate your vision starting on the first day 

of your command. 

7.78 

(1.90) 

8.17 

(1.30) 

7.87 

(1.38) 

7.95 

(1.95) 

f. Reward those who support your vision, and punish 

those who don’t. 

4.17 

(1.92) 

4.39 

(2.08) 

3.83 

(2.21) 

4.26 

(2.05) 

g. Solicit feedback and ideas from your junior 

Officers regarding your vision – be alert for ways 

to improve it. 

8.08 

(1.24) 

7.70 

(1.55) 

7.73* 

(.907)

7.79 

(1.35) 

Rationale for Change: ‘Daily’ was replaced with ‘frequently’, because reserve units do not 

have the opportunity to visit Company areas on a daily basis. 
66 

Battalion-Level: Communicating

B28. You are an artillery Battalion commander. You are in direct support of a brigade 

whose commander is a light infantryman, while your background is mechanized artillery. 

On several occasions, the differing perspectives of you and your brigade commander 

result in communication difficulties. For example, you are used to moving on the 

battlefield at a very fast pace, whereas your commander is used to moving at a slow pace. 

In fact, communication problems arise often between the two of you. Your goal is to 

improve your communication with your brigade commander. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Ask a peer of your brigade commander, such as a 

DIVARTY commander, for help with the problem. 

5.17 

(2.20) 

5.09 

(2.19) 

4.77 

(2.09) 

4.58 

(1.71) 

b. Invite the brigade commander over to your house 

to watch a sporting event or movie and try to 

establish a friendship with him. 

4.07 

(2.24) 

3.74 

(1.93) 

3.10* 

(2.10)

3.37 

(1.83) 

c. Speak to the brigade commander, express your 

feelings about why the two of you sometimes have 

trouble communicating, and ask for his help with 

the problem. 

7.27 

(1.73) 

7.09 

(1.64) 

6.63* 

(1.56)

6.53 

(2.11) 

d. Make an effort to think from the brigade 

commander’s point of view about your unit’s 

activities and performance. 

8.02 

(1.03) 

8.09 

(1.08) 

7.53** 

(.819)

8.05 

(.911) 

e. Speak to the brigade commander, ask him why he

believes the two of you sometimes have trouble 

communicating, and ask for his help with the 

problem. 

7.31 

(1.78) 

7.48 

(1.27) 

6.77 

(1.63) 

6.05* 

(2.41)

f. Field an interest or hobby you and your brigade 

commander share, then use this shared interest to 

develop analogies to help you communicate with 

him more effectively: In other words, talk in terms 

of topics you both understand. 

6.05 

(2.14) 

5.96 

(2.01) 

5.20* 

(1.99)

5.32 

(2.56) 

g. Make an attempt to interact with the brigade 

commander as a person outside of the work 

environment, in a wide variety of settings. 

5.64 

(2.13) 

4.39** 

(2.01)

4.37** 

(2.09)

4.58* 

(1.98)

h. Speak to your brigade commander’s superior 

about the problem and ask for his advice. 

1.92 

(1.09) 

1.91 

(1.27) 

2.43 

(1.63) 

2.00 

(1.33) 
67 

Battalion-Level: Communicating

B29. You are a new Battalion commander and you are feeling somewhat lonely and 

frustrated with your job. Your goal is to manage your stress effectively so that it does not 

interfere with your ability and motivation to perform at your best. Rate the quality of the 

following strategies for achieving your goal. 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Budget time for inspirational reading. 6.54 

(2.03) 

6.04 

(2.44) 

6.90 

(1.88) 

6.21 

(2.72) 

b. Develop a mutual support group with other 

Battalion commanders – talk to them frequently. 

7.25 

(1.54) 

7.09 

(1.31) 

7.07 

(1.43) 

7.05 

(1.68) 

c. Realize that dealing with stress is important to 

your promotion, and Soldier on. 

4.58 

(2.24) 

5.09 

(2.31) 

5.50** 

(1.83)

6.00** 

(2.02)

d. Spend more time at the office and work harder—

recognize that more satisfaction will come from 

pushing yourself harder and getting more done. 

2.73 

(1.73) 

3.22 

(1.97) 

3.70* 

(2.13)

2.84 

(1.57) 

e. Combat stress by engaging in physical exercise or 

an activity you enjoy. 

8.19 

(.860) 

8.09 

(1.04) 

8.10 

(1.60) 

8.21 

(.918) 

f. Use your spouse or other close friend from outside 

of the military as a sounding board. 

7.37 

(1.79) 

7.17 

(1.72) 

6.07** 

(2.39)

6.11* 

(2.51)

g. Use your junior Officers to bounce ideas off of. 4.37 

(2.41) 

5.65** 

(1.82)

4.37 

(2.28) 

4.74 

(2.25) 

h. Talk over your feelings with the brigade 

commander. 

5.16 

(2.12) 

5.13 

(1.74) 

5.33 

(2.15) 

4.95 

(2.41) 

i. Take up a hobby that is unrelated to your job 

demands. 

7.08 

(1.49) 

6.78 

(1.78) 

6.73 

(1.43) 

6.79 

(1.47) 

j. Budget time for personal reflection and relaxation. 8.03 

(1.03) 

7.57 

(1.40) 

7.33* 

(1.60)

7.89 

(1.04) 

k. Keep a journal or notebook of ideas in order to 

organize your thoughts and work through things 

on paper. 

6.86 

(1.61) 

6.65 

(1.64) 

6.93 

(1.28) 

7.26 

(1.32) 

l. Remind yourself often that all Battalion 

commanders experience such feelings and that 

your feelings are normal and will resolve 

themselves in time. 

6.25 

(2.06) 

6.09 

(1.90) 

5.80 

(1.76) 

6.21 

(1.71) 

m

. 

Take as much leave as you are entitled to, and 

while on leave, do not think about work or have 

contact with work personnel. 

6.12 

(1.82) 

5.13* 

(2.24)

5.27* 

(2.19)

5.26* 

(1.75)

n. Realize that it is your job to tough things out for 

24 months. 

3.8 

(1.89) 

4.09 

(2.17) 

4.47 

(1.96) 

5.00* 

(2.10)

o. Renew your vision and remind yourself of why 

you wanted to be a Battalion commander. 

7.25 

(1.32) 

6.87 

(1.98) 

7.30 

(1.39) 

7.11 

(1.96) 
68 

Battalion-Level: Managing Oneself 

B30. You are a Battalion commander, and one of your primary goals is to ensure that 

your Soldiers have predictability in their lives. Thus, you are concerned about planning 

training way in advance, and you make it a point to do so. For some time, your unit has 

been scheduled for a pre-planned Battalion-level training exercise. At the last minute, 

there is a brigade command and staff meeting. At that meeting, the brigade staff 

announces that they are making major changes in your Battalion training plan. What 

should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Ask to have a minute alone with your commander 

and express your concerns to him privately, 

allowing him to voice these concerns openly at the 

meeting if he chooses to do so. 

7.27 

(1.92) 

6.87 

(1.76) 

6.27* 

(2.22)

6.63 

(2.56) 

b. After the meeting, attempt to get a consensus 

among all the Battalion commanders regarding 

this issue, and communicate this shared viewpoint 

to the brigade commander. 

6.24 

(1.85) 

5.87 

(1.89) 

5.40* 

(1.95)

4.84* 

(2.45)

c. Be silent, but try to recruit your commander to 

your position after the meeting is over. 

4.76 

(2.38) 

4.57 

(2.21) 

3.87* 

(2.09)

4.11 

(2.35) 

d. State that Soldiers need predictability in their 

lives, and note that the senior leaders should be 

setting the correct example. 

5.78 

(2.14) 

5.65 

(2.47) 

5.97 

(2.28) 

6.68* 

(1.76)

e. State that good training exercises require 

predictability so that leaders of all levels can learn. 

6.71 

(1.88) 

6.57 

(1.85) 

6.60 

(1.79) 

7.05 

(1.87) 

f. Stand up and remind the brigade staff, the brigade 

commander, and your peers about the brigade’s 

specific doctrinal responsibilities for training. 

3.92 

(2.18) 

4.17 

(2.36) 

4.87* 

(1.96)

5.58* 

(2.56)

g. State that the brigade staff’s proposal to change 

the short-term training schedules is a violation of 

training doctrine. 

4.63 

(2.50) 

4.61 

(2.64) 

4.90 

(1.97) 

5.68 

(2.54) 

h. Be silent: Do not try to second-guess the brigade 

staff’s decision. 

2.05 

(1.55) 

1.83 

(1.26) 

2.37 

(1.67) 

1.89 

(1.41) 
69 

Battalion-Level: Developing Subordinates 

B31. You are a Battalion commander. You have one Company commander who is 

particularly intense. He sets extremely high – even unrealistic – standards for himself. 

While his Company has yet to pay the price for this problem, his expectations are so high 

that he never can meet them, and this situation is hindering his personal health as well as 

his professional development as an Officer. His Company is scheduled for a major 

training exercise next month. Your goal is to help him better understand how he is 

hurting himself by maintaining unreasonable standards. Rate the quality of the following 

strategies for achieving your goal. 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Talk to all of your Company commanders as a 

group about potential roadblocks to their 

development, mentioning too high standards as 

one potential problem and describing examples to 

illustrate your point. 

6.46 

(1.99) 

6.87 

(1.84) 

6.93 

(1.91) 

5.89 

(2.02) 

b. Wait to speak to the Company commander until 

after he goes to the training exercise, using 

examples based on his experiences there to 

illustrate your points. 

2.90 

(1.84) 

3.87* 

(1.89)

3.50 

(1.99) 

4.32* 

(2.35)

c. Do nothing: Allow him to learn from his own 

mistakes that no one can successfully maintain 

unrealistic standards forever. 

2.00 

(1.31) 

2.30 

(1.52) 

2.13 

(1.27) 

2.53 

(1.61) 

d. Ask another Company commander to have a 

friendly chat with the obsessive Company 

commander about the need to set realistic goals. 

3.58 

(2.28) 

3.96 

(1.71) 

3.93 

(2.03) 

3.89 

(1.91) 

e. Have a discussion with the Company commander 

about his potential problem before he leaves for 

the training exercise, using examples you are 

aware of from your daily interactions with him in 

your unit. 

8.08 

(1.04) 

7.70 

(1.39) 

7.87 

(1.00) 

7.95 

(.911) 

f. Warn the Company commander before he goes to 

the training exercise that you believe he has a 

serious problem that requires his immediate 

attention and that may ultimately derail his career. 

3.39 

(2.26) 

4.22 

(2.50) 

5.00** 

(2.33)

3.95 

(2.36) 
70 

Battalion-Level: Communicating 

B32. You are a Battalion commander, and you notice early in your command that your 

guidance often becomes distorted when it reaches the lower ranks. For example, one day 

you comment that you want the line companies at 100% personnel strength for aircraft 

mechanics before you will start to assign them to headquarters. A few days later, the 

headquarters maintenance tech asks you why you are going to fill the line units at 150% 

of authorized mechanics before assigning them to headquarters! Your goal is to ensure 

that your guidance is communicated accurately to all levels of the organization. Rate the 

quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal. 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Hold meetings with your Platoon leaders to verify 

what they know. 

4.27 

(2.05) 

4.48 

(2.19) 

4.70 

(1.80) 

4.79 

(1.87) 

b. When you must communicate important 

information verbally, try to speak directly to as 

many Officers and Soldiers as you can. 

5.73 

(2.10) 

6.04 

(1.77) 

5.53 

(2.11) 

6.37 

(2.08) 

c. Hold the chain of command responsible for 

accurately passing information down to lower 

ranks. 

7.80 

(1.01) 

7.65 

(1.11) 

7.87 

(1.16) 

7.74 

(1.62) 

d. Work on your relationship with your senior NCOs. 7.08 

(1.32) 

6.91 

(1.41) 

6.03** 

(1.79)

7.00 

(1.33) 

e. Conduct periodic discussions with your Soldiers to 

correct misperceptions, clarify your intent, and 

locate sources of information loss. 

7.56 

(1.57) 

7.39 

(1.30) 

6.73** 

(1.41)

6.68 

(2.08) 

f. Ask your Company commanders to conduct 

periodic discussions with the Soldiers so that the 

Company commanders can verify that the lower 

levels are receiving accurate information. 

7.83 

(1.15) 

7.57 

(1.16) 

7.20 

(1.73) 

7.00* 

(1.41)

g. Whenever possible, post and distribute written 

statements outlining your objectives. 

6.83 

(2.09) 

7.26 

(1.51) 

7.23 

(1.43) 

6.68 

(2.18) 

h. Encourage your junior Officers to be on the 

lookout for Soldiers’ statements about your orders 

that are not completely accurate – and ask the 

junior Officers to correct these misperceptions 

immediately. 

7.25 

(1.70) 

7.09 

(1.41) 

6.63 

(2.12) 

6.37 

(2.08) 

i. Develop an NCO professional development 

program that stresses how to pass down 

information properly. 

6.63 

(2.16) 

5.87 

(2.02) 

6.17 

(2.13) 

6.11 

(1.82) 

j. Spend more time leading by walking around the 

unit and talking to people. 

8.08 

(1.26) 

7.91 

(1.53) 

7.23** 

(1.30)

8.00 

(1.29) 

k. Look for breaks in the chain of command. 6.86 

(1.55) 

7.00 

(1.85) 

6.97 

(1.45) 

6.79 

(1.84) 

l. Use multiple means of communicating the same 

message. 

7.97 

(1.34) 

7.48 

(1.72) 

7.63 

(1.54) 

7.58 

(1.17) 
71 

Battalion-Level: Dealing With Poor Performers 

B33. You are a Battalion commander. Reluctantly, you gave your S-1 a Company 

command for his professional development, even though you had questions about his 

abilities. He was a loyal S-1, but not a very good on: He had problems with organization, 

and his work style was a bit “helter-skelter.” In conversations with lieutenants you have 

learned that they are having a hard time with this individual. Also, as you walk around 

the Battalion, you see other indications that confirm your doubts about his person’s 

abilities. In general, you are concerned and you have doubts about this Officer’s ability 

to command effectively. What should you do? 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

a. Ask your sergeant major to spend more time 

coaching the former S1. 

5.17 

(2.38) 

3.87** 

(2.20)

3.60** 

(2.40)

4.05* 

(2.17)

b. Ask a competent Company commander to mentor 

the problematic Officer. 

4.47 

(2.42) 

4.61 

(2.38) 

4.73 

(2.57) 

4.89 

(2.15) 

c. Provide the former S-1 specific help with 

organization such as hints and strategies you and 

others have found useful. 

8.14 

(.830) 

7.30** 

(1.10)

7.87 

(1.07) 

7.74 

(1.04) 

d. Set the former S1 up with a strong 1SG and 

Company XO. 

7.19 

(1.94) 

7.22 

(1.31) 

7.43 

(1.33) 

7.32 

(2.28) 

e. Explain to the former S-1 specifically why it is 

important for him to change his behavior for the 

Soldiers’ benefit. 

7.46 

(1.41) 

7.13 

(1.57) 

7.43 

(.858) 

6.68 

(2.05) 

f. Help the lieutenants you spoke with to work 

through their direct superiors to solve problems. 

5.41 

(2.34) 

5.86 

(1.75) 

5.63 

(2.39) 

5.32 

(2.45) 

g. Communicate regularly with the Officer and 

encourage him to use you as a resource whenever 

he has problems. 

8.10 

(1.41) 

7.39** 

(1.19)

7.47* 

(1.40)

7.68 

(1.63) 

h. Come down hard on the former S1 about his 

shortcomings and threaten to take disciplinary 

action if he does not improve. 

2.27 

(1.54) 

3.48** 

(2.04)

3.17* 

(1.80)

3.21* 

(1.87)

i. Conduct sessions with the former S-1 during 

which you talk to him about aspects of his 

behavior you want changed. 

7.34 

(1.59) 

6.61 

(2.10) 

7.00 

(1.61) 

6.26* 

(1.79)

j. Talk to the S1’s first sergeant to get a better feel 

for what’s going on. 

5.95 

(2.15) 

6.70 

(1.84) 

5.40 

(2.52) 

5.00 

(2.44) 
72 

UNUSED SCENARIO 

You are a Battalion commander, and there are many unmarried Soldiers in your unit. 

You are concerned about the special needs and problems unmarried Soldiers may have, 

since they do not have a regular family life. Your goal is to ensure high morale for your 

unmarried Soldiers. Rate the quality of the following strategies for achieving your goal. 

Rationale for Changes: I have chosen to not include this scenario at all. Active units live and 

work together at an Army installation. Therefore, the issues of single Soldiers would be a 

concern for an active duty leader. In reserve units, because these units are geographically 

dispersed in communities where the Soldiers live and work, reserve leaders do not have to 

worry about morale and welfare issues for single Soldiers in their units. 

Summary of Mean Responses for Battalion Level 

Better Choices Worse Choices 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

Expert 

Mean 

AC 

N=23 

USAR 

N=30 

ARNG 

N=19 

Developing Subordinates 

6.80 6.53 6.44 6.24* 2.84 3.47* 3.73** 3.40* 

Organization Development 

7.08 7.28 6.90 7.07 3.02 3.35 3.07 3.63 

Protecting the Organization 

7.50 7.24 7.11** 7.16* 3.51 3.40 3.88 4.00 

Motivating Subordinates 

7.20 6.93 6.55** 6.74* 3.05 3.19 3.88** 3.63 

Taking Care of Soldiers 

7.72 7.20** 7.19** 7.20** 3.40 4.26 4.63** 3.63 

Communicating 

7.27 7.04 6.95** 6.93* 3.62 3.92 3.80 3.86 

Managing Oneself 

6.74 6.43 6.09* 6.17 2.98 3.00 3.62* 3.74 

Dealing With Poor Performers 

7.65 7.13* 7.44 7.14 3.37 4.04* 3.95 4.05 

*p < .05; **p < .01 

TKML Scales: Each response is evaluated based upon the following scale. 

 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 

 

Extremely Somewhat Neither Bad Somewhat Extremely 

 Bad Bad Nor Good Good Good 
73 

Appendix B 

Metacognitive Knowledge Dimension Scale 

I consider myself to be (not at all...extremely): 

• competent to judge who can help me supplement any deficiencies in my own knowledge. 

• competent to judge whether my skills are sufficiently up to date. 

• competent to organize my work in terms of fixed targets and deadlines. 

• competent to assess which colleagues (inside and outside the organization) I should keep 

in contact with to stay at the forefront of developments in the domain of my work. 

• competent to join in the planning when time estimates need to be made for tasks 

belonging to my domain of work. 

• competent to indicate when my knowledge is insufficient to perform a certain task or 

solve a particular problem. 

• competent to distinguish main issues from issues of secondary importance and to set 

priorities. 

• competent to indicate the causes of any obstacles that may emerge in my work. 

• competent to consider the advantages and disadvantages of particular decisions, which 

have to do with working methods, materials and techniques in my work domain. 

• competent to assess what skills I do not possess when tackling new problems or a new 

task in my work or in related areas. 

• competent to asses what professional literature I should keep up with to stay up to date 

for future needs. 

• competent to see the overall picture, even in complex situations. 

• competent to react promptly in situations where I perceive errors, even in situations 

where there are obstacles and impediments. 

• competent to judge who can be of assistance in helping me to supplement any 

deficiencies in my skills. 

One item was reverse scored: 

In situations where there are obstacles or impediments, I (never...very often) give up. (Van der 

Heijden, 1998; 2000).