NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2838-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SIWAN R. BROWN, a/k/a

SHAWN BROWN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Argued November 26, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Sabatino, Sumners and Mitterhoff.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Indictment No. 15-09-1253.

Daniel S. Rockoff, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, 

Public Defender, attorney; Daniel S. Rockoff, of 

counsel and on the brief).

Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the 

cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney 

General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel and on 

the briefs).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

SABATINO, P.J.A.D.

December 27, 2018

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

AS REDACTED

December 27, 2018

APPELLATE DIVISION
A-2838-16T1 2

Tried by a jury, defendant Siwan R. Brown was found guilty of various 

drug offenses. The State's case was largely based on the seizure of over one 

thousand bags of heroin and other drug paraphernalia from a residence that 

defendant shared with other relatives. 

Among other things, defendant argues on appeal the trial court erred in 

declining the jury's request during their deliberations to have the court play 

back defense counsel's closing argument for them. The court denied that 

request on the basis that, as the Model Criminal Jury Charges state, the 

summations of counsel do not comprise evidence. The propriety of granting 

such a playback request from jurors has not been addressed before in any 

published New Jersey opinion, although the issue has arisen in case law from a 

few other jurisdictions.

For the reasons that follow, we hold that trial courts in our State have the 

discretion in appropriate circumstances to grant jury requests to have the 

closing arguments of all counsel played back or read back to them, in full or in 

part. In recognizing that discretionary authority, we follow other jurisdictions 

that have acknowledged the discretion of judges to allow such playbacks or 

readbacks. We reject, however, defendant's contention that the denial of the 

jury's playback request in his own case was unduly prejudicial and requires a 

new trial.
A-2838-16T1 3

In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we affirm the trial court's 

pretrial ruling to admit incriminating statements that defendant made to police 

officers after they stopped his car for a traffic violation and smelled marijuana. 

However, with the State's acquiescence, we remand this case to the trial court 

to reevaluate, under the multi-factor voluntariness test of State v. King, 44 N.J. 

346 (1965), whether the police obtained defendant's valid consent to search his 

residence after the motor vehicle stop. We also remand this matter for the trial 

court to reevaluate whether the police had a sufficient lawful basis at the time 

of the motor vehicle stop to request defendant's consent to search his 

residence.

I.

[At this court's direction Parts I(A), (C), (D), (E), 

II, III, and V of this opinion, which concern 

matters not pertinent to the playback issue in Part 

IV, have been omitted from the published version 

of this opinion. R. 1:36-3.]

B.

The Indictment

Based on this evidence, a Hudson County grand jury charged defendant 

with multiple crimes. The charges included first-degree operation of a facility 

for manufacturing heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-4 (count one); second-degree 

possession of heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(l) and 
A-2838-16T1 4

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2) (count two); third-degree possession of heroin with 

intent to distribute while within 1,000 feet of school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-

7 (count three); second-degree possession of heroin with intent to distribute 

while within 500 feet of a public park, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.l (count four); thirddegree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(l) (counts five and six); and 

fourth-degree possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to distribute, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:36-3 (count seven). 

IV.

We turn to the novel legal issue of whether the trial judge had the 

authority to grant the deliberating jurors' request to have defense counsel's 

closing argument played back or read back to them. This issue has not yet 

been the subject of any reported opinions in our State. 

A.

The chronology pertinent to this playback issue is as follows. The jurors 

were read the court's charge on Friday, September 16, 2018. After some 

deliberations, the jurors submitted a question to the court that day that read: 

"The jury wants to confirm if [defendant] admitted and officially [sic] that he 

had two bundles in his pocket. Who alleges that [defendant] said this?" The 

trial judge informed the jurors that he could not answer this question, and 

instead they had to rely on their own recollection of the evidence presented. 
A-2838-16T1 5

Later that day, the jurors sent another note to the court that read: "We 

don't have unanimous votes. Are we going to wait for your advice?" The 

judge summoned the jurors back into the courtroom and told them that, 

because it was nearly 5:00 p.m. on a Friday, he was going to discharge them 

for the weekend. The judge instructed the jurors to return to court Monday 

morning to continue deliberations. 

On Monday, September 19, the court started the day by replacing a juror, 

with no objection from counsel, with an alternate juror. The reconstituted jury 

then resumed its deliberations. 

After a lunch order was arranged, the deliberating jurors sent a note to 

the court that read: "We would like to hear the defense summation again." 

Before calling the jurors back into the courtroom, the trial judge advised the 

prosecutor and defense counsel that he intended to respond to this request by 

telling the jurors that "openings and summations are not evidence [and] . . . 

they're going to have to rely upon their recollections." 

Defense counsel urged the court to reconsider playing back the 

summations, even though they are not evidence. Counsel advised that a judge 

in the same vicinage had recently granted such a request, although that case 

was not precedential. The State objected, arguing that summations are not 

considered evidence and therefore should not be replayed. 
A-2838-16T1 6

The judge agreed with the State's position. The jurors were brought 

back into the courtroom. The judge explained to them that he would not replay 

summations because they are not considered evidence. He instructed them to 

rely on their recollections of the evidence to guide their decision. 

The jurors also asked the court to replay the trial testimony of Officer 

DeJesus. The judge agreed to do so. He informed the jury the playback of the 

officer's direct and cross-examination would take about seventy minutes. The 

court took a short recess to arrange the playback. Before the playback 

occurred, the jurors sent back another note that said, "The jury is already 

satisfied with the answer given. We decided to withdraw the other request. 

The jury has reached a unanimous decision." 

The jurors returned to the courtroom and issued their verdict, finding 

defendant not guilty on the manufacturing charge in count one, but guilty of 

the remaining charges. The judge polled the jurors individually and confirmed 

their verdict was unanimous.

B.

The core issue posed to us is whether a trial judge may – as at least one 

judge in the vicinage had apparently done – grant a jury's request to have all or 

parts of counsel's closing arguments played or read back to the jury a second 
A-2838-16T1 7

time. To resolve this question, we consider the important functional role that 

closing arguments can have in trial practice, particularly in a jury trial.

Unlike an opening statement from trial counsel, which can only preview 

what evidence is anticipated, a closing argument provides an important chance 

for all counsel to highlight and analyze the proofs that were actually presented 

at the trial. An effective summation can helpfully tie together for the trier of 

fact the various pieces of evidence, and explain how those pieces do or do not 

fit into the advocate's theory of the case. 

In a criminal case such as this one, summations can supply an organized 

and focused explanation of how the evidence does or does not satisfy the 

elements of an offense, and how those proofs do or do not establish a 

defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Closing arguments can also 

spotlight the testimony of certain witnesses, and address how crossexamination or other evidence either impeached (or, conversely, bolstered) the 

credibility of those witnesses. In essence, the summation has an important 

function of providing a coherent analysis of the evidence for the jury, or for 

the judge in a non-jury case.

The United States Supreme Court expounded upon these important 

principles in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). In that case, the 

Court struck down as unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment a New 
A-2838-16T1 8

York statute that gave trial judges the discretion to disallow closing arguments 

of counsel in non-jury criminal cases. The Court reasoned in Herring that such 

closing arguments are a vital part of trial counsel's advocacy role. We repeat 

here portions of the Court's insights concerning that role:

The widespread recognition of the right of the 

defense to make a closing summary of the evidence to 

the trier of the facts, whether judge or jury, finds solid 

support in history. In the 16th and 17th centuries, 

when notions of compulsory process, confrontation, 

and counsel were in their infancy, the essence of the 

English criminal trial was argument between the 

defendant and counsel for the Crown. Whatever other 

procedural protections may have been lacking, there 

was no absence of debate on the factual and legal 

issues raised in a criminal case. As the rights to 

compulsory process, to confrontation, and to counsel 

developed, the adversary system's commitment to 

argument was neither discarded nor diluted. Rather 

the reform in procedure had the effect of shifting the 

primary function of argument to summation of the 

evidence at the close of trial, in contrast to the 

"fragmented" factual argument that had been typical 

of the earlier common law.

[Id. at 860-61 (emphasis added).]

As the Court further elaborated:

It can hardly be questioned that closing 

argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for

resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal case. For it 

is only after all the evidence is in that counsel for the 

parties are in a position to present their respective 

versions of the case as a whole. Only then can they 

argue the inferences to be drawn from all the 

testimony, and point out the weaknesses of their 
A-2838-16T1 9

adversaries' positions. And for the defense, closing 

argument is the last clear chance to persuade the trier 

of fact that there may be reasonable doubt of the 

defendant's guilt. 

The very premise of our adversary system of 

criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides 

of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that 

the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free. In a 

criminal trial, which is in the end basically a fact

finding process, no aspect of such advocacy could be 

more important than the opportunity finally to marshal 

the evidence for each side before submission of the 

case to judgment. 

[Id. at 862 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).]

Having emphasized these fundamental principles, the Court in Herring

acknowledged that an attorney's right to present a closing argument is not 

unbounded:

This is not to say that closing arguments in a 

criminal case must be uncontrolled or even 

unrestrained. The presiding judge must be and is 

given great latitude in controlling the duration and 

limiting the scope of closing summations. He may 

limit counsel to a reasonable time and may terminate 

argument when continuation would be repetitive or 

redundant. He may ensure that argument does not 

stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the 

fair and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these 

respects he must have broad discretion. 

. . . .

Some cases may appear to the trial judge to be 

simple – open and shut – at the close of the evidence. 

And surely in many such cases a closing argument 
A-2838-16T1 10

will, in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, be "likely to 

leave [a] judge just where it found him." But just as 

surely, there will be cases where closing argument 

may correct a premature misjudgment and avoid an 

otherwise erroneous verdict. And there is no certain 

way for a trial judge to identify accurately which cases 

these will be, until the judge has heard the closing 

summation of counsel.

[Id. at 863 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).] 

See also Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques 387 (8th ed. 2010) ("Closing 

arguments are the chronological and psychological culminations of a jury trial. 

They are the last opportunity to communicate directly with the jury.").

New Jersey case law has recognized these general principles. See R.

1:7-1(b) (granting counsel a right to present closing statements at the end of a 

case "except as may be otherwise ordered by the court"); see also State v. 

Briggs, 349 N.J. Super. 496, 500-01 (App. Div. 2002) (citing Herring by 

analogy in upholding defense counsel's right to present "meaningful argument" 

at sentencing). 

In keeping with these concepts, our trial courts have been granted the 

discretion to allow counsel to present supplemental closing arguments in 

appropriate circumstances, particularly where there has been a significant gap 

in time between deliberations stopping and resuming, or where a legal issue 

has arisen that might warrant further advocacy. See, e.g., State v. Rovito, 99 

N.J. 581, 588 (1985) (finding no error when a trial court granted an additional 
A-2838-16T1 11

ten minutes to both parties to present supplementary summations after the 

court decided to charge the jury on an additional provision after the completion 

of summations); see also State v. Speth, 324 N.J. Super. 471 (Law Div. 1997), 

aff'd, 323 N.J. Super. 67 (App. Div. 1999) (in which the trial court permitted 

both sides to supplement any summations after deliberations were underway, 

in a complex case where lengthy deliberations over several weeks had been 

interrupted by religious holidays and a weekend).

C.

Mindful of the well-established important function of summations, we 

now turn to the principles that pertain to the process of playing back or reading 

back portions of a trial, when requested by a jury.

Our courts have long recognized that juries sometimes will ask to review 

testimony when they are in the midst of deliberations. The Supreme Court has 

held that "[a]bsent 'some unusual circumstance,' those requests should be 

granted." State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 119-20 (2011) (quoting State v. 

Wolf, 44 N.J. 176, 185 (1965)). The Court reasoned in Miller that "[t]he 

requests are a clear sign that the evidence sought is important to the 

deliberative process" and therefore, "the 'true administration of justice' 

requires that judges typically accede to jury requests to review testimony." 

Miller, 205 N.J. at 120. 
A-2838-16T1 12

Comparably, judges who have reserved decision in a case sometimes 

play back the recorded arguments of counsel. They do so in order to refresh or 

clarify their recollections before issuing a ruling. Jurors understandably may 

want a similar opportunity before rendering a verdict. 

Trial courts have "broad discretion as to whether and how to conduct 

read-backs and playbacks." Id. at 122; see also State v. Wilson, 165 N.J. 657, 

660 (2000) ("It is well-established that 'the reading of all or part of the 

testimony of one or more of the witnesses at a trial, criminal or civil, at the 

specific request of the jury during their deliberations is discretionary with the 

trial court.'") (quoting Wolf, 44 N.J. at 185). A party opposing the playback of 

testimony has the burden to object and demonstrate prejudice. Miller, 205 N.J. 

at 124; see also State v. Ortiz, 202 N.J. Super. 233, 245 (App. Div. 1985). 

The trial judge in the present case rightly noted that, unlike trial 

testimony, the arguments of counsel are not evidence, and should not be 

treated by a jury as such. Our Model Jury Charges reinforce that principle. 

See, e.g., Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Criminal Final Charges" (rev. May 

12, 2014). This does not mean, however, that jurors categorically are 

prohibited from hearing once again the closing arguments of counsel on 

appropriate terms and conditions – if, for some reason that arises in their 

deliberations, they wish to have those arguments repeated or replayed. 
A-2838-16T1 13

Jurors may have difficulty remembering exactly what counsel said in 

summations about a hotly disputed aspect of the evidence. Jurors also may not 

have heard the words of counsel in summation clearly if counsel spoke softly 

or mumbled, or they might not have understood them. 

In such rare circumstances when they arise, we discern no reason why a 

playback or readback of closing arguments should be categorically disallowed, 

provided, of course, the summations of both sides are presented. Instead, trial 

courts should maintain the discretion to allow or disallow such requests, in the 

interests of justice.1

Other jurisdictions, most notably California, have recognized a trial 

court's discretionary authority to allow such readbacks or playbacks. As the 

California Supreme Court stated in People v. Gordon, 792 P.2d 251, 274 (Cal. 

1990), "We do not doubt that a trial court's inherent authority regarding the 

performance of its functions includes the power to order argument by counsel 

to be reread to the jury or to be furnished to that body in written form. The 

exercise of such power must be entrusted to the court’s sound discretion." 

(Emphasis added). See also People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643, 680 (Cal. 1992) 

 

1 By analogy, our Rules of Court have been amended to require a written copy 

of the court's instructions in criminal cases to be provided to jurors in the jury 

room, in recognition that jurors may have trouble remembering the precise 

words of those instructions. See R. 1:8-8(b)(2).
A-2838-16T1 14

(noting the trial court correctly concluded that it had discretion to deny the 

jury's request to playback summation and "expressed appropriate concern over 

diverting the jury's attention from proper consideration of the evidence and 

instructions"); People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992, 1021 (Cal. 1993) (noting the 

"trial court erred in suggesting that it lacked authority to order the reading 

back of defense counsel's closing summation," but concluding the error was 

not prejudicial); People v. Gurule, 51 P.3d 224, 286 (Cal. 2002) (finding no 

abuse of discretion where a trial court declined a request for readback of 

closing argument, particularly when defense counsel's closing arguably had 

misstated the law).

New York courts likewise have recognized this principle. See, e.g.,

People v. Jones, 483 N.Y.S.2d 89, 89 (App. Div. 1984) (noting the trial court's 

discretion to grant such a jury request, but finding no "improvident" exercise 

of that discretion in denying the request in that case); People v. Foster, 499 

N.Y.S.2d 808, 808 (App. Div. 1986) (finding no error in the court's denial of a 

similar jury request). 

The only jurisdiction we know of that disallows the playback or 

readback of counsel's summations is Vermont, which perceived a risk of 

prejudice in engaging in such a procedure where only the State's summation 

was read back. State v. Fitzgerald, 449 A.2d 930, 932 (Vt. 1982) (criticizing a 
A-2838-16T1 15

trial court for allowing a rereading of only a prosecutor's summation without 

the defense summation, but finding no "clear error" requiring the jury's verdict 

to be overturned).

Consistent with the practice in California and New York, we hold that 

trial courts in New Jersey have the discretion to grant requests from juries to 

play back or read back closing arguments. In exercising that discretion, courts 

may consider such factors as: (1) whether counsel made improper or 

inflammatory remarks in summation; (2) whether counsel materially misstated 

the evidence; (3) whether multiple objections to the closing arguments had 

been interjected, and whether they were sustained or overruled; (4) the length 

and complexity of the trial; (5) whether deliberations had been lengthy or 

significantly interrupted; and (6) other practical and equitable considerations.

Applying these precepts of discretion to the present case, we find no 

reason to grant defendant a new trial on this basis. The trial was not 

particularly lengthy. The issues were not especially complex. The jurors'

deliberations only covered portions of two days. The weekend gap between 

those two days was not protracted. Although defense counsel was interrupted 

in summation a few times by the prosecutor with objections, none of those 

interruptions was exceptional. 
A-2838-16T1 16

While it may have been helpful, in retrospect, for the trial court to have 

accommodated the jurors' request to hear the closing arguments again, the 

denial of their request was not an abuse of discretion, nor a reversible error 

mandating a new trial. Notably, the jurors decided to forego a playback of 

Officer DeJesus's testimony, after being told that his playback would consume 

about seventy minutes. A playback of both counsel's summations presumably 

would have taken considerable time, and it is possible the jurors would have 

eschewed that playback as well. We will not speculate that the denial of the 

playback request was prejudicial to either party. 

In sum, although we agree with defendant that the trial court did possess 

the inherent authority to grant the jurors' playback request, the court did not 

misapply its discretion in denying it. Moreover, the denial did not manifestly 

prejudice defendant, certainly not to a degree warranting a new trial. R. 2:10-

2. 

Affirmed in part, and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.