Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 81 / Friday, April 26, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 24673 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska to the extent that it justifies 

making a regulatory distinction, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by 

removing airworthiness directive (AD) 

2000–04–14, Amendment 39–11597 (65 

FR 10698, February 29, 2000), and 

adding the following new AD: 

2013–08–20 General Electric Company: 

Amendment 39–17438; Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0817; Directorate Identifier 

99–NE–24–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective May 31, 2013. 

(b) Affected ADs 

This AD supersedes AD 2000–04–14, 

Amendment 39–11597 (65 FR 10698, 

February 29, 2000). 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all General Electric 

Company (GE) CF6–80C2 A1/A2/A3/A5/A8/ 

A5F/B1/B2/B4/B5F/B6/B1F/B2F/B4F/B6F/ 

B7F/D1F turbofan engines with any of the 

following installed: 

(1) Fuel tube, part number (P/N) 

1321M42G01, 1334M88G01, 1374M30G01, or 

1383M12G01. 

(2) Spray shield, P/N 1606M57G01, 

1606M57G03, or 1775M61G01. 

(3) Supporting bracket, P/N 

1321M88P001A. 

(d) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by several 

additional reports of fuel leaks and two 

reports of engine fire due to improper 

assembly of supporting brackets on the fuel 

tube connecting the flowmeter to the 

integrated drive generator (IDG) fuel-oil 

cooler. We are issuing this AD to prevent 

high-pressure fuel leaks caused by improper 

seating of fuel tube flanges, which could 

result in an engine fire and damage to the 

airplane. 

(e) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(f) Replacement 

After the effective date of this AD, if the 

fuel tubes are disconnected for any reason, or 

at the next engine shop visit, whichever 

occurs first, replace the fuel tubes and 

brackets with improved tubes and brackets 

eligible for installation. For on-wing 

maintenance, replace only tubes and brackets 

that have been disconnected. Do the 

following: 

(1) Replace the fuel flowmeter to IDG fueloil cooler fuel tube, P/N 1321M42G01, with 

a part eligible for installation. 

(2) For engines with Power Management 

Controls, replace the main engine control to 

fuel flowmeter fuel tube, P/N 1334M88G01, 

with a part eligible for installation. 

(3) For engines with full authority digital 

electronic controls, replace the 

hydromechanical unit to fuel flowmeter fuel 

tubes, P/Ns 1383M12G01 and 1374M30G01, 

with a part eligible for installation. 

(4) Replace supporting bracket, P/N 

1321M88P001A, and spray shields, P/Ns 

1606M57G01, 1606M57G03, and 

1775M61G01 with one-piece supporting 

bracket, P/N 2021M83G01. 

(5) Perform an idle leak check after 

accomplishing paragraphs (f)(1), (f)(2), (f)(3), 

or (f)(4), or any combination thereof. 

(g) Prohibition 

After the effective date of this AD, do not 

install any of the following parts into any GE 

CF6–80C2 series turbofan engines: fuel tubes 

P/Ns 1321M42G01, 1334M88G01, 

1374M30G01, and 1383M12G01, supporting 

bracket P/N 1321M88P001A, and spray 

shields P/Ns 1606M57G01, 1606M57G03, 

and 1775M61G01. 

(h) Definition 

For the purpose of this AD, an engine shop 

visit is the induction of an engine into the 

shop for maintenance involving separation of 

pairs of major mating engine flanges (lettered 

flanges), except that the separation of engine 

flanges solely for the purposes of transporting 

the engine without subsequent engine 

maintenance does not constitute an engine 

shop visit. 

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

The Manager, Engine Certification Office, 

FAA, may approve AMOCs for this AD. Use 

the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19 to 

make your request. 

(j) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Kasra Sharifi, Aerospace Engineer, 

Engine Certification Office, FAA, Engine & 

Propeller Directorate, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; 

phone: 781–238–7773; fax: 781–238 7199; 

email: kasra.sharifi@faa.gov. 

(2) For guidance on the replacements, refer 

to GE Alert Service Bulletins CF6–80C2 SB 

73–A0224, CF6–80C2 SB 73–A0231, CF6– 

80C2 SB 73–A0401, and CF6–80C2 SB 73– 

0242. 

(3) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact General Electric Company, 

GE-Aviation, Room 285, 1 Neumann Way, 

Cincinnati, OH 45215, phone: 513–552–3272; 

email: geae.aoc@ge.com. You may view this 

service information at the FAA, Engine & 

Propeller Directorate, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 781–238–7125. 

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Burlington, Massachusetts, on 

April 16, 2013. 

Frank P. Paskiewicz, 

Acting Director, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–09650 Filed 4–25–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0333; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–080–AD; Amendment 

39–17436; AD 2013–08–12] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing 

Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule; request for 

comments. 

SUMMARY: We are superseding an 

existing airworthiness directive (AD) for 

The Boeing Company Model 787–8 

airplanes. That AD currently requires 

modification of the battery system, or 

other actions. This AD requires 

installing main and auxiliary power unit 

(APU) battery enclosures and 

environmental control system (ECS) 

ducts; and replacing the main battery, 

APU battery, and their respective 

battery chargers. This AD also requires 

revising the maintenance program to 

include an airworthiness limitation. 

This AD also revises the applicability by 

removing airplanes on which these 

changes have been incorporated in 

production prior to delivery. This AD 

was prompted by recent incidents 

involving lithium ion battery failures 

that resulted in release of flammable 

electrolytes, heat damage, and smoke on 

two Model 787–8 airplanes. We are 

issuing this AD to minimize the 

occurrence of battery cell failures and 

propagation of such failures to other 

cells and to contain any flammable 

electrolytes, heat, and smoke released 


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during a battery thermal event in order 

to prevent damage to critical systems 

and structures and the potential for fire 

in the electronics equipment bays. 

DATES: This AD is effective April 26, 

2013. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of April 26, 2013. 

We must receive any comments on 

this AD by June 10, 2013. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: 202–493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC 20590, between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Boeing Commercial 

Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services 

Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H–65, 

Seattle, WA 98124–2207; telephone 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax 206– 

766–5680; Internet https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. You may 

review copies of the referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, Washington. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The street address for 

the Docket Office (phone: 800–647– 

5527) is in the ADDRESSES section. 

Comments will be available in the AD 

docket shortly after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Robert Duffer, Manager, Systems and 

Equipment Branch, FAA, ANM–130S, 

Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

Washington 98057–3356; phone: (425) 

917–6493; fax: (425) 917–6590; email: 

robert.duffer@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

On February 1, 2013, we issued AD 

2013–02–51, Amendment 39–17366 (78 

FR 12231, February 22, 2013), for all 

The Boeing Company Model 787–8 

airplanes. That AD requires 

modification of the battery system, or 

other actions. That AD resulted from 

recent incidents involving lithium ion 

battery failures that resulted in release 

of flammable electrolytes, heat damage, 

and smoke on two Model 787–8 

airplanes. We issued that AD to prevent 

damage to critical systems and 

structures and the potential for fire in 

the electrical compartment. 

Actions Since AD 2013–02–51, 

Amendment 39–17366 (78 FR 12231, 

February 22, 2013), Was Issued 

Since we issued AD 2013–02–51, 

Amendment 39–17366 (78 FR 12231, 

February 22, 2013), the National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

released an Interim Factual Report, 

NTSB Case Number DCA13IA037, on 

March 7, 2013, presenting its initial 

findings concerning a battery failure on 

a Model 787–8 airplane operated by 

Japan Airlines. That report can be found 

at: http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/ 

2013/boeing_787/ 

interim_report_B787_3-7-13.pdf. 

That report documents thermal and 

mechanical damage to the battery and 

the battery control units, and a lack of 

containment of the battery electrolytes, 

heat, and smoke from the battery case. 

The cause(s) of this battery failure 

incident has not yet been determined by 

the NTSB. Likewise, the cause(s) of the 

battery failure incident on a Model 787– 

8 airplane operated by All Nippon 

Airways has not yet been determined by 

the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB), 

which is the accident investigative 

authority for Japan. 

The FAA has reviewed the NTSB’s 

interim factual report, as well as 

information provided by the JTSB, 

Boeing, All Nippon Airways, and Japan 

Airlines. The main and APU batteries 

are identical, but perform different 

functions on the airplane. The main 

battery installed on Model 787–8 

airplanes is used to provide power 

while the engines are off during ground 

maintenance operations (e.g., power-up, 

refueling, braking, and navigation lights 

during towing) and backup electrical 

power while airborne. The APU battery 

is required to start and operate the APU. 

The APU may be used on the ground, 

or in flight to generate backup electrical 

power. Each of the two engines drives 

two variable frequency starter generators 

(VFSGs) for a total of four VFSGs 

providing power to the airplane. 

Therefore, while in flight, the two 

generators driven by the APU provide 

the 5th and 6th layer of power 

generation for the airplane. 

On March 12, 2013, the FAA 

approved a Boeing plan to mitigate the 

unsafe condition identified by AD 

2013–02–51, Amendment 39–17366 (78 

FR 12231, February 22, 2013). The plan 

resulted from a detailed review by 

Boeing and the FAA that considered all 

potential causal factors of the two recent 

battery incidents. The plan provides 

three layers of protection to improve the 

reliability of the battery and to prevent 

any hazardous effects on the airplane 

from a battery failure. Those layers are 

(1) measures to minimize the probability 

of a single battery cell failure, (2) 

measures to minimize the probability of 

any single battery cell failure from 

propagating to other cells in the battery, 

and (3) measures to preclude hazardous 

airplane-level safety effects of any 

battery failure that might occur. Details 

of these measures, which are mandated 

by this AD, are as follows: 

• Minimize the Probability of a Single 

Battery Cell Failure—Each main and 

APU battery consists of a set of 

individual cells within a battery case. 

Each battery cell will be encapsulated to 

isolate the cell electrically. Locking nuts 

with specific torque values will be used 

on every cell terminal to prevent 

overheating of the terminal due to a 

loose electrical connection. Drainage 

within the battery case will be improved 

to remove any condensation within the 

battery. The battery monitoring and 

charging unit will be changed to reduce 

the operational voltage range to lessen 

electrical stress on the battery cell, and 

to enhance over-discharge protection. 

Boeing has also made mandatory 

changes to the battery manufacturing 

and acceptance testing processes to 

improve the overall quality of the 

battery. 

• Minimize the Probability of 

Multiple Cell Failure Propagation— 

Additional insulation will be provided 

between each battery cell and between 

each cell and the battery case to 

thermally and electrically isolate the 

individual battery cells. High 

temperature sleeving will also be added 

to the battery internal wiring harness to 

protect against short circuits. In 

addition, cell venting will be added to 

the battery case to allow any cell gasses, 

including electrolytes, to escape into the 

battery enclosure to minimize heat 

build-up within the battery case. 

• Preclude Hazardous Airplane-Level 

Safety Effects of a Battery Failure That 

Might Occur—As stated previously, 

each main and APU battery consists of 

a set of individual cells within a battery 


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 81 / Friday, April 26, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 24675 

case. The case containing the cells will 

be secured within a stainless steel, 

sealed enclosure. This enclosure will be 

connected to a titanium ECS duct that 

vents to the outside of the airplane. 

Should a battery failure occur, and 

generate significant heat, pressure, and 

gasses, a metallic frangible disc (also 

referred to as a vent burst disc) at the 

interface of the enclosure and vent duct 

will open and allow the heat, pressure, 

and gasses to safely vent overboard 

through the ECS duct. This will prevent 

the introduction of any heat, pressure, 

or gasses in the electronics equipment 

bays or any occupied area of the 

airplane. 

Relevant Service Information 

We reviewed Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin B787–81205–SB500003–00, 

Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013; and 

Section D, ‘‘Airworthiness Limitations— 

Life Limits,’’ of the Boeing 787 

Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) 

Document D011Z009–03–01, dated 

April 2013. For information on the 

procedures and compliance times, see 

this service information at http:// 

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

Docket No. FAA–2013–0333. 

FAA’s Determination 

We are issuing this AD because we 

evaluated all the relevant information 

and determined the unsafe condition 

described previously is likely to exist or 

develop in other products of the same 

type design. 

AD Requirements 

This AD requires accomplishing the 

actions specified in the service 

information identified previously. 

Change to Applicability of AD 2013–02– 

51, Amendment 39–17366 (78 FR 

12231, February 22, 2013) 

This AD applies to The Boeing 

Company Model 787–8 airplanes, as 

identified in Boeing Alert Service 

Bulletin B787–81205–SB500003–00, 

Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013, instead 

of ‘‘all’’ airplanes, as specified in AD 

2013–02–51, Amendment 39–17366 (78 

FR 12231, February 22, 2013). The 

actions required by this AD address the 

identified unsafe condition for inservice airplanes. For all future 

delivered airplanes, the replacement 

batteries, their respective chargers, and 

enclosure and duct installations will be 

incorporated at the factory prior to 

delivery. 

FAA’s Justification and Determination 

of the Effective Date 

AD 2013–02–51, Amendment 39– 

17366 (78 FR 12231, February 22, 2013), 

effectively grounded the Model 787–8 

fleet and prevented delivery of new 

Model 787–8 airplanes because there 

was no design solution available. While 

necessary in the short term to address 

the unsafe condition, this caused a 

significant economic burden on 

domestic and international operators of 

Boeing Model 787–8 airplanes. The 

purpose of this AD is to allow the 

aircraft to return to service as soon as 

possible by mandating a modification 

that will address the unsafe condition. 

Therefore, we find that notice and 

opportunity for prior public comment 

are impracticable and would defeat the 

Agency’s regulatory objective, and that 

good cause exists for making this 

amendment effective in less than 30 

days. 

Comments Invited 

This AD is a final rule that involves 

requirements affecting flight safety, and 

we did not provide you with notice and 

an opportunity to provide your 

comments before it becomes effective. 

However, we invite you to send any 

written data, views, or arguments about 

this AD. Send your comments to an 

address listed under the ADDRESSES

section. Include the docket number 

FAA–2013–0333 and Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–080–AD at the 

beginning of your comments. We 

specifically invite comments on the 

overall regulatory, economic, 

environmental, and energy aspects of 

this AD. We will consider all comments 

received by the closing date and may 

amend this AD because of those 

comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http:// 

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects 6 

airplanes of U.S. registry. 

We estimate the following costs to 

comply with this AD: 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per 

product 

Cost on U.S. 

operators 

Installation and replacement ........................... 112 work-hours × $85 per hour = $9,520 ...... $455,158 $464,678 $2,788,068 

Revise maintenance program ......................... 1 work-hour × $85 per hour = $85 ................. None 85 510 

According to the manufacturer, some 

of the costs of this AD may be covered 

under warranty, thereby reducing the 

cost impact on affected individuals. We 

do not control warranty coverage for 

affected individuals. As a result, we 

have included all costs in our cost 

estimate. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

Section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 


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24676 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 81 / Friday, April 26, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends part 39 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by 

removing airworthiness directive (AD) 

2013–02–51, Amendment 39–17366 (78 

FR 12231, February 22, 2013), and 

adding the following new AD: 

2013–08–12 The Boeing Company: 

Amendment 39–17436; Docket No. 

FAA–2013–0333; Directorate Identifier 

2013–NM–080–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective April 26, 2013. 

(b) Affected ADs 

This AD supersedes AD 2013–02–51, 

Amendment 39–17366 (78 FR 12231, 

February 22, 2013). 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to The Boeing Company 

Model 787–8 airplanes, certificated in any 

category; as identified in Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin B787–81205–SB500003–00, 

Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013. 

(d) Subject 

Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/ 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America 

Code 24, Electrical Power. 

(e) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by recent incidents 

involving lithium ion battery failures that 

resulted in release of flammable electrolytes, 

heat damage, and smoke on two Model 787– 

8 airplanes. We are issuing this AD to 

minimize the occurrence of battery cell 

failures and propagation of such failures to 

other cells and to contain any flammable 

electrolytes, heat, and smoke released during 

a battery thermal event in order to prevent 

damage to critical systems and structures and 

the potential for fire in the electronics 

equipment bays. 

(f) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(g) Installation/Replacement 

Before further flight: Install main battery 

and auxiliary power unit (APU) battery 

enclosures and environmental control system 

(ECS) ducts; and replace the main battery, 

APU battery, and their respective battery 

chargers; in accordance with the 

Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin B787–81205–SB500003–00, 

Issue 001, dated April 19, 2013. 

(h) Maintenance Program Revision 

Before further flight: Revise the 

maintenance program to incorporate Item No. 

1b. in Section D, ‘‘Airworthiness 

Limitations—Life Limits,’’ of the Boeing 787 

Airworthiness Limitations (AWLs) Document 

D011Z009–03–01, dated April 2013. This 

new item is the Systems Life-Limited Parts 

requirement for replacement of the main and 

APU battery enclosure vent burst discs. 

(i) No Alternative Actions and Intervals 

After accomplishing the revision required 

by paragraph (h) of this AD, no changes may 

be made to Item No. 1b. in Section D, 

‘‘Airworthiness Limitations—Life Limits,’’ of 

the Boeing Model 787 Airworthiness 

Limitations (AWLs) Document D011Z009– 

03–01, dated April 2013, unless approved as 

an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) 

in accordance with the procedures specified 

in paragraph (j) of this AD. 

(j) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft 

Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested using the procedures found in 14 

CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, 

send your request to your principal inspector 

or local Flight Standards District Office, as 

appropriate. If sending information directly 

to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 

attention of the person identified in the 

Related Information section of this AD. 

Information may be emailed to: 9-ANMSeattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable 

level of safety may be used for any repair 

required by this AD if it is approved by the 

Boeing Commercial Airplanes Organization 

Designation Authorization (ODA) that has 

been authorized by the Manager, Seattle 

ACO, to make those findings. For a repair 

method to be approved, the repair must meet 

the certification basis of the airplane, and the 

approval must specifically refer to this AD. 

(k) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Robert Duffer, Manager, Systems and 

Equipment Branch, ANM–130S, Seattle 

Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98057– 

3356; phone: (425) 917–6493; fax: (425) 917– 

6590; email: robert.duffer@faa.gov. 

(l) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

(IBR) of the service information listed in this 

paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. 

(2) You must use this service information 

as applicable to do the actions required by 

this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. 

(i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin B787– 

81205–SB500003–00, Issue 001, dated April 

19, 2013. 

(ii) Boeing 787 Airworthiness Limitations 

(AWLs) Document D011Z009–03–01, dated 

April 2013. 

(3) For Boeing service information 

identified in this AD, contact Boeing 

Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & 

Services Management, P.O. Box 3707, MC 

2H–65, Seattle, WA 98124–2207; phone: 

206–544–5000, extension 1; fax: 206–766– 

5680; Internet: https:// 

www.myboeingfleet.com. 

(4) You may review copies of the 

referenced service information at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information 

on the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

(5) You may view this service information 

that is incorporated by reference at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

202–741–6030, or go to: http:// 

www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibrlocations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on April 22, 

2013. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–09990 Filed 4–25–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

33 CFR Part 117 

[Docket No. USCG–2013–0270] 

Drawbridge Operation Regulation; 

Willamette River, Portland, OR 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Notice of deviation from 

drawbridge regulation. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard has issued a 

temporary deviation from the operating 

schedule that governs the Steel Bridge 

across the Willamette River, mile 12.1, 

at Portland, Oregon. This deviation is 

necessary to accommodate the Rose 

Festival Rock N Roll Half Marathon. 


erowe on DSK2VPTVN1PROD with RULES