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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re P. G. LOSSING, Minor. March 28, 2017

No. 333635 Wayne Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 14-517133-NA

Before: R IORDAN , P.J., and M ETER and F ORT H OOD , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent appeals as of right an order terminating her parent al rights to minor child PGL pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) (conditions that led to adjud ication continue to exist and no likelihood that they will be rectified within a reasonab le time), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody and no reas onable expectation of providi ng proper care and custody within a reasonable time), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if child is returned to parent’s home). We affirm.

I. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

Respondent argues that the trial court erred when it found cle ar and convincing evidence to support termination of her parental rights under MCL 712A.19 b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j). We disagree.

This Court reviews for clear er ror the trial court’s factual f indings and ultimate determinations regarding the s tatutory grounds for termination. MCR 3.977(K); In re Mason
, 486 Mich 142,152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). “A finding is clearly e rroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, this Court is left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” In re Hudson , 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). For termination of parental rights, the trial cour t must find that at least one of the statutory grounds set forth in MCL 712A.19b has been established by cl ear and convincing evidence. In re Terry , 240 Mich App 14, 21-22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).

The trial court found that three grounds for termination of re spondent’s rights had been proven by clear and convinci ng evidence—MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ), (g), and (j). In relevant part, MCL 712A.19b(3) states:

The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evide nce, 1 or more of the follo wing:-2- * * *
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of aninitial dispositional order, and the c ourt, by clear and convincing evi dence, finds either of the following:

( i ) The conditions that led to the a djudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

* * *
(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide pro per care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation th at the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable tim e considering the child’s age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable lik elihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.

A. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i )

MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) requires the court to assess th e circumstances that led to th e adjudication and determine whether those circumstances have bee n resolved or are reasonably likely to be rectified within a reasonable time. See, e.g., In re Dahms , 187 Mich App 644, 648; 468 NW2d 315 (1991). The determination of what is reasonable i ncludes both how long it will take for the parent to improve and how long the child can wait for the improvement. Id

. It is undisputed that more than 182 days had passed since the trial court’s initial dispositional order was entered in this matter. Further, we ar e not convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it determined that the conditions that led to the adjudication persisted. One issue was domestic violence. Both respondent’s foster care wor ker, Taylor Archer, and PGL’s Infant Mental Health therapist , Jessica Hendon, testified about their reasons for suspecting that respondent was still dealing with domestic violence, and even i f their claims, alone, did not rise to the level of “clear and convincing evid ence,” domestic viole nce was not the sole reason for the adjudication. The adjudication hearing also addressed issues i nvolving respondent’s criminal history, housing, and lack of in come. Despite respondent’s oft en commendable attempts to meet the requirements of her court-ordered treatment plan, a number of these barriers to reunification still existed nearly two years after PGL’s removal. Respondent had not obtained suitable housing, and as the trial court aptly noted, her babysitting an d food-stamp income was enough to “support herself sort of right now if she’s couch surfing and r aiding other people’ s refrigerators,” but not enough to “support herself and the child with the kind of housing she has and the kind of income she has[.]” Although respondent had no new criminal cha rges, she violated her probation twice and spent time in jail. We sympathize with res pondent’s inability to pay for the-3- drug screens related to probation, but the fact that she could not afford the screens tends to prove that respondent’s income was ina dequate to provi de a child with proper care.
As the trial court observed, th ere was simply no evidence that respondent would eradicate the pertinent issues within a rea sonable time. Considering the totality of the evi dence, we are not convinced that the trial court made a mistake when it found cle ar and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 7 12.19b(3)(c)( i ).

B. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)

Termination of respondent’s parental rights was also proper un der MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). We note that a parent’s failure to comply with a parent-agency agreement can be evidence of the parent’s failure to provide proper care and custody. In re JK , 468 Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).

In support of its determination with respect to this factor, t he trial court relied in substantial part on respondent’s demonstrated and continued ina bility to address PGL’s unique needs:

[M]om can’t provide proper care or custody for this child. The workers have been trying lots of different way s, including very highly speci alized ways to find things to deal with mom’s problems.

Each child that comes in the door is different. Each parent t hat comes in the door is different. And here we’ve seen the kind of special ized services provided to try and teach the mom to provide proper care for th e child. And after a reasonable period of time I los e the belief that it’s ever go ing to happen. And a reasonable period of time has passed.

I find grounds under subsection (3)(G) [sic]. This child need s specific things from, very specialized specific tools. . . . Mom has ac tually had those tools and the comments from the workers is [sic] they don’t stick.

The trial court’s statements were supported by the record. Bot h Archer and Hendon expressed concerns regarding respondent’s inability to parent PGL, especi ally in light of his special developmental needs. Respondent was often drowsy or distracted during her visits with PGL, and had trouble finding appropria te ways to interact with her s on. In addition, respondent was not adequately addressing her mental illnesses, and over the tw o years of protective proceedings, was still “explosive” and “unpr edictable” in her moods and beha viors. There was evidence that she was not taking her medication, and even on the final day of the termination hearing she had an “outburst” while speaking wi th Archer. Respondent’s struggl es with aggressive behavior were especially disconcerting, b ecause PGL exhibited similar be haviors at school. PGL’s behavior worsened after his visits with respondent, and while t his escalation might be attributed to circumstances other than PGL’s interactions with respondent, it is worth noting that respondent minimized PGL’s behav ioral problems and resisted adv ice on how to meet his special needs. Given that exposure to domestic violence and improper s upervision were some of the reasons PGL was originally broug ht into custody, respondent’s p erpetually aggressive behavior,-4- coupled with her denial of PGL’s needs, particularly demonstrat es an inability to provide proper care and custody for her son. Although respondent complied with the participation requirements of her treatment plan, it is cl ear that she failed to benefit s ufficiently from the services provided.

At the time of the termination hearing, respondent was still w ithout adequate housing. She was not employed, and lived only off of food stamps and bab ysitting money. The record adequately demonstrated a failure to provide proper care or cus tody, and there was no evidence to show that respondent had the ability to address her persisti ng problems and provide adequate care for PGL within a reasonable time. The trial court did not clearly err when i t found clear and convincing evidence to support termination pursuant to MCL 712A .19b(3)(g).

C. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)

Much of the evidence discu ssed concerning MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)( i ) and (g) established a reasonable likelihood that PGL would suffer harm if returned to respondent’s care, and also supports termination of respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712.19b(3)(j). The trial court considered the requirements fo r termination under this subsecti on and stated:

Is there a reasonable likelihood that the child would be harme d if returned to the home of the parent? Well, there’s a number of different concerns here. Does mom actually have a home to take the child home to? No. Would the child be harmed if the child couched [sic] surfed with mom, given tha t mom can’t deal with the child’s intellectual, developmental emotional needs? Is there a reasonable likelihood? Again, this is by clear and convincing evidence and I’ll find the answer is yes.

We cannot say that the trial cour t erred in reaching this concl usion. Respondent’s struggles with domestic violence, failure to ma intain stable or adequate housi ng, unpredictable moods, and inability to adequately address PGL’s emotional and behavioral needs represent continued risks of harm to PGL. Clear and convincing evidence supported the tr ial court’s conclusion that, based on the conduct and capacity of respondent, there existed a reasonable likelihood that PGL would be harmed if returned to his mother’s care. Therefore, t ermination of respondent’s parental rights was proper unde r statutory subsection MCL 712A. 19b(3)(j).

II. BEST-INTERESTS DETERMINATION

Next, respondent argues that the trial court erred when it fou nd that termination of her parental rights was in PGL’s be st interests. Again, we disagre e.
Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(5), th e “[t]rial court must order the parent’s rights terminated if [petitioner] has established a statutory ground for terminat ion by clear and convincing evidence and it finds from a pr eponderance of the evidence on t he whole record that termination is in the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s decision reg arding whether termination is in the child’s best interests. Id

.-5- In considering whether termination of parental rights is in th e best interests of the child, all available evidence on a wide variety of factors should be c onsidered. Id . These factors may include a parent’s history of dom estic violence, the existence of a bond between the child and the parent, the parent’s ability to parent, the child’s need for pe rmanency and stability, the parent’s compliance with his or her service plan, the parent’s visitatio n history with the child, and the child’s well-being while in care. Id . at 713-714.

We are not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial cour t made a mistake when it found that termination of respondent ’s parental rights was in P GL’s best interests. The trial court articulated a list of best-interests factors and carefully cons idered each one before reaching a final decision. Respondent places great emphasis on the parent -child bond. The trial court considered this bond, concluding: “This is a child who knows wh o mom is,” but “[t]he bond has dropped off a great deal from where it was initially.” Hendon, at the termination hearing, expressed the belief that PGL’ s bond to respondent was “insecur e.” At any rate, the existence of a bond, however strong, is but one factor to consider when deci ding what action is in a child’s best interests, and many other f actors were at issue in the pre sent case.

Respondent also argues that her c ompletion of the court-ordere d treatment plan “indicates that it is not in the best interest of the child to terminate.” Although respondent appears to make a legal argument, she cites no authority for the proposition th at completion of a treatment plan precludes a finding that a child’s best interests lay in termin ation of parental rights, and this Court need not do so for her. LME v ARS , 261 Mich App 273, 283; 680 NW2d 902 (2004) (“We will not search for authority to sustain petitioners’ argument. ”) Regardless, the trial court considered respondent’s progress in completing her treatment pl an, finding that, overall, she simply had not benefitted; the co urt stated, “different therapi sts have sequentially tried to get mom to deal with problems the child has and again the words tha t stick in my mind is they don’t stick in the mom’s mind.”

The trial court considered PGL’s need for permanence and stabi lity, especially at such a critical stage of development, and found that it weighed in fav or of termination. The trial court stated:

All these experts here express an opinion say it just isn’t wor king with mom. It’s in the child’s best interest to terminate and have the child ad opted. The child is coming out of one of the periods that the experts talk about, i t being particularly harmful for the child to have tumult. . . . [T]he child is almo st four. The child is exiting the first of two periods where tumult, trauma to a chil d is particularly dangerous and damaging to brain development. There’s still a n eed to -- there’s still a strong emphasis on the need to prevent such damage if the court can do it.

The trial court ac knowledged PGL’s like lihood of adoption, give n his young age a nd the fact that his “caregiver has been very clear that they [sic] wish to adop t.” More importantly, it considered this likelihood in tandem with r espondent’s inability to addres s PGL’s special needs:
The child has specific problems and mom cannot deal with these things. And even when special efforts are made to give the mom the specific tools, not just one way to deal with the problem but another way to deal with the problem being-6- done repeatedly, in the words of the therapists, it doesn’t sti ck. Yet, the caregiver does have the ability to do these things. This weighs very muc h in terms of there being a termination and adoption.

Given that PGL, who had “been in foster care for a [t]itanic pe riod, almost half of [his] life,” strongly needs a stable and nurturing environment, the trial co urt found that termination of respondent’s parental rights wa s in PGL’s best interests.

We are not definitely and firmly convinced that the trial cour t erred in its considerations or conclusions.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan /s/ Patrick M. Meter /s/ Karen M. Fort Hood