MARITIME SECURITY

DHS Could Benefit 

from Tracking 

Progress in 

Implementing the 

Small Vessel Security 

Strategy

Report to Congressional Requesters

October 2013

GAO-14-32

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-14-32, a report to 

congressional requesters 

October 2013 

MARITIME SECURITY

DHS Could Benefit from Tracking Progress in 

Implementing the Small Vessel Security Strategy

Why GAO Did This Study

The Coast Guard estimates that there 

were more than 22 million small 

vessels operating in the United States 

in 2012. Terrorists, smugglers, and 

other criminals can use small vessels 

as platforms for their activities because 

small vessels are generally 

unregulated and largely anonymous. 

Law enforcement agencies face the 

challenge of distinguishing between 

legitimate small vessel operators and 

the relatively few individuals estimated 

to be engaged in illicit activities. DHS 

issued its SVSS in April 2008 and its 

follow-on SVSS Implementation Plan in 

January 2011 to help guide actions to 

mitigate the security risks arising from 

small vessels. Given the importance of 

small vessel security, GAO was asked 

to review DHS’s efforts in developing 

and implementing the SVSS

Implementation Plan. 

This report examines what actions, if 

any, DHS and its components have 

taken to address small vessel security 

concerns, and the extent to which they 

have implemented action items in the 

SVSS Implementation Plan. GAO 

analyzed DHS documents; interviewed 

DHS officials; and visited two ports 

selected on the basis of the volume of 

small vessel traffic and security 

initiatives in place, among other things. 

While the results of the port visits 

cannot be generalized across all ports, 

they provided insights on small vessel 

security issues and operations.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS regularly 

update the progress its components 

and other relevant stakeholders are 

making in addressing action items in 

the SVSS Implementation Plan. DHS 

concurred with the recommendation.

What GAO Found

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components—such as the 

U.S. Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)—have started or 

completed initiatives to address small vessel security risks, but DHS is not 

tracking the progress being made to address action items in the Small Vessel 

Security Strategy (SVSS) Implementation Plan. “Small vessels” are characterized 

as any watercraft—regardless of method of propulsion—less than 300 gross 

tons, and used for recreational or commercial purposes. DHS component officials 

GAO met with identified examples of key initiatives that they have completed or 

have under way to enhance small vessel security, including an initiative to help 

CBP better track small vessels arriving from foreign locations and another to 

assist the Coast Guard in assessing and monitoring small vessel launch sites. 

Although the SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS is to assess and 

update the plan, DHS has not determined the progress its components and other 

relevant stakeholders—such as the Department of Defense—are making in 

completing the action items and has no current plans to do so. DHS officials 

stated that this is due, in part, to budget constraints that make this a low priority. 

DHS officials stated that updating the SVSS Implementation Plan would be 

valuable, and doing so is particularly important since more than one component 

could be responsible for action items in the plan. Accordingly, by systematically 

gathering information from its components and other relevant stakeholders to 

regularly update the progress they are making in addressing the action items in 

the plan, DHS could help prioritize initiatives given constrained budgets and 

better identify successes and lessons learned, among other things.

The Results of a Small Vessel Attack on the USS Cole 

View GAO-14-32. For more information, 

contact Stephen Caldwell at (202) 512-9610 or

caldwells@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Letter 1 

Background 4

DHS and Its Components Are Taking Actions, but DHS Is Not 

Tracking Progress in Addressing the SVSS Implementation Plan 11

Conclusions 18

Recommendation for Executive Action 18

Agency Comments 19

Appendix I Stakeholders Involved in Small Vessel Security 20

Appendix II Examples of DHS Components’ Initiatives to Address 

Small Vessel Security 22

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 33

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 35

Related GAO Products 36

Tables

Table 1: Examples of Key DHS Components’ Roles and 

Responsibilities Regarding Small Vessel Security 20

Table 2: Number of Participants, Float Plans, and Vessels 

Registered in the Small Vessel Reporting System, May 2010 

through May 2013 27

Figures

Figure 1: The Results of a Small Vessel Attack on the USS Cole 5

Figure 2: Coast Guard Vessels Escorting a Cruise Ship and a Liquid 

Natural Gas Tanker 12

Figure 3: A Floating Security Barrier (Foreground) 16

Contents 
Page ii GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Figure 4: A Citizen Awareness Program Poster 24

Figure 5: Portable Radiation Detectors 29

Abbreviations

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CSS Coastal Surveillance System

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

MSRAM Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model

OIG Office of Inspector General

PRND preventive radiological/nuclear detection

RIID Radioisotope Identification Device

SVRS Small Vessel Reporting System

SVSS Small Vessel Security Strategy

S&T Science and Technology 

WCMP West Coast Maritime Pilot

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Page 1 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

October 31, 2013

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller

Chairman

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation

United States Senate

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that there were more than 22 million 

small vessels operating in the United States in 2012.1 Terrorists, 

smugglers, and other criminals can use small vessels as platforms for 

their activities because small vessels are generally unregulated and 

largely anonymous. Consequently, law enforcement agencies face the 

challenge of distinguishing between the vast number of legitimate small 

vessel operators and the comparatively few individuals that are estimated 

to be engaged in illicit activities. On any given day, small vessels share 

waterways with commercial and military vessels, operating at hundreds of 

U.S. ports and waterways. According to the Coast Guard’s Strategy for 

Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, a small vessel represents 

one of the greatest risks from terrorism in the maritime domain.2

 

1

This number is based on Coast Guard statistics compiled in 2011 and 2012 from its 

national recreational boating survey. “Small vessels” are characterized as any 

watercraft—regardless of method of propulsion—less than 300 gross tons, and used for 

recreational or commercial purposes. Small vessels include commercial fishing vessels, 

recreational boats and yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, and any 

other small commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages.

Further, 

small vessels have the potential to be used to smuggle terrorists or 

weapons of mass destruction into the United States. According to the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the consequences of a weapon 

of mass destruction attack in the United States could be catastrophic, and 

potentially include the loss of life, direct and indirect economic costs, and 

2

U.S. Coast Guard, The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and 

Stewardship (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

adverse environmental effects, including the contamination of the impact 

area with subsequent loss of its use for decades.3

Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to attack 

targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband to enter the 

United States, DHS issued its Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) in 

April 2008 and its follow-on SVSS Implementation Plan in January 2011 

to help guide its efforts to mitigate the security risks arising from small 

vessels.4 The SVSS and Implementation Plan identify several DHS 

components that have a key role in addressing small vessel security, 

including the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection (CBP), 

DHS’s Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate, and DHS’s Domestic 

Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), as well as other federal stakeholders.5

• What actions, if any, have DHS and its components taken to address 

small vessel security concerns, and to what extent have they 

implemented action items from the SVSS Implementation Plan? 

For more information on the roles and responsibilities of these DHS 

components, see appendix I. Given the importance of small vessel 

security, you asked us to review DHS’s efforts in developing and 

implementing the SVSS Implementation Plan. This report addresses the 

following question:

To answer this question, we analyzed DHS documents, such as the 

SVSS, the SVSS Implementation Plan, and the Report of the DHS 

National Small Vessel Security Summit.

6 We also reviewed relevant 

federal legislation, such as the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 

2002,7

 

3

Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 

April 2008).

as well as corresponding regulations and guidance. We compared 

4

Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 

April 2008), and Small Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to the Public 

(Washington, D.C.: January 2011). DHS also issued a sensitive security information 

version of the SVSS Implementation Plan. 

5

Other federal stakeholders include the Departments of Justice and Defense and the 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

6

Homeland Security Institute, Report of the DHS National Small Vessel Security Summit

(Arlington, Virginia: Oct. 19, 2007). The Homeland Security Institute prepared this report 

for DHS. 

7

See Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064.
 

Page 3 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

DHS’s actions for tracking the SVSS Implementation Plan with (1) 

Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,

8 (2) provisions 

in DHS’s SVSS, (3) key management practices,9 and (4) useful practices 

for performance management and measurement.10 Further, we 

interviewed headquarters officials responsible for developing or 

addressing the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan from the 

DHS Office of Policy, as well as four DHS components—the Coast 

Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T.11

 

8

GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 

In these meetings, we also 

discussed key initiatives that each of the four DHS components’ have in 

place to address small vessel security and reviewed related documents 

on these initiatives. Although these initiatives relate to the overarching 

goals of the SVSS, each initiative is not directly aligned with a specific 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 1999). 

9

GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist Mergers and 

Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2003). We 

convened a forum in September 2002 to identify and discuss useful practices and lessons 

learned from major private and public sector organizational mergers, acquisitions, and 

transformations. The participants—who were a cross section of leaders who have 

experience managing large-scale organizational mergers, acquisitions, and 

transformations; academics; and others who have studied these efforts—identified key 

practices that have been found at the center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and 

transformations. These criteria remain relevant today, and are applicable to the tracking of

the SVSS Implementation Plan because of their emphasis on tracking implementation 

goals.

10GAO, Managing for Results: Strengthening Regulatory Agencies’ Performance 

Management Practices, GAO/GGD-00-10 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 28, 1999). We 

gathered information from 23 federal and state organizations that we or other sources 

identified as using or planning to use a variety of useful practices to enhance specific 

aspects of their performance management and measurement processes. As we 

concluded in 1999, we continue to believe these procedures are readily transferable to 

governmental agencies seeking to improve their implementation of performance-based 

management, as they are consistent practices identified in our previous work. We have 

applied these practices in other reports assessing federal efforts; see, for example, GAO, 

Aviation Weather: FAA and the National Weather Service Are Considering Plans to 

Consolidate Weather Service Offices, but Face Significant Challenges, GAO-09-761 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2009).

11Although other DHS components or federal agencies may be listed as lead or colead for 

some of the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan, DHS officials we met with 

stated that these four components were the key ones involved in the development or 

implementation of the plan. Further, these DHS components, along with DHS, are listed 

as the lead or colead for the majority of the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. 

These entities are specifically listed as the lead or colead for 119 of the 132 action items.
 

Page 4 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

action item in the SVSS Implementation Plan.12

We conducted this performance audit from February 2013 to October 

2013, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Accordingly, we focused 

on describing these key initiatives identified by the DHS components, not 

the individual action items in the plan. In addition, we conducted visits to 

two ports—San Diego, California and Miami, Florida—to interview port 

security stakeholders and observe small vessel security activities. We 

selected these ports on the basis of various factors, including the (1) 

relatively high volume of small vessel traffic and (2) initiatives initiated at 

these ports by DHS components to address small vessel security risks. At 

these ports, we interviewed officials from local Coast Guard units, as well 

as from CBP’s Office of Field Operations and Office of Air and Marine. 

Further, we interviewed representatives from the U.S. Navy, two local law 

enforcement agencies, two port authorities, and six industry 

associations—who were selected because they worked with DHS 

components regarding small vessel security issues and operations. While 

we cannot generalize the results of our interviews and observations to all 

ports, officials we interviewed and observations we made provided us 

with a general overview and perspective on small vessel security issues 

and operations at the selected locations.

Larger vessels—such as cruise ships, container ships, and oil and natural 

gas tankers—can travel among small vessels that operate with little 

scrutiny or notice, and some of these larger vessels have suffered 

waterborne attacks overseas by terrorists or pirates who operated from 

small vessels. Although there have not been any small vessel attacks in 

 

12Initiatives may help to address multiple SVSS goals and action items in the SVSS 

Implementation Plan, rather than one specific action item. Further, specific action items in 

the plan could be addressed through several initiatives implemented by multiple DHS 

components.

Background 

Small Vessels Pose 

Security Risks
 

Page 5 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

the United States, terrorists have used small vessels to facilitate their 

attacks, such as those on the USS Cole in 2000 (see fig. 1), the French 

oil tanker Limburg in Yemen in 2002, and the Japanese tanker M Star in 

2010. Our prior work has found that the use of small vessels to deliver 

improvised explosive devices was one of the most significant concerns for 

larger vessels.13

Figure 1: The Results of a Small Vessel Attack on the USS Cole

The concern about small vessel attacks is exacerbated 

by the fact that some larger vessels, such as cruise ships, sail according 

to precise schedules and preplanned itineraries that could provide 

information to terrorists in preparing for and carrying out an attack against 

a vessel. Small vessels have also been successfully employed by pirates 

to hijack international cargo vessels, and at least three cruise ships have 

been attacked by pirates aboard small vessels who were armed with 

automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades.

In addition, DHS reported that small vessels have the potential to be used 

to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States. 

According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, from 1993 through 

2012, there were 2,331 confirmed incidents of illicit trafficking of nuclear 

 

13GAO, Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but Existing 

Studies Could Further Enhance Security, GAO-11-207 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 3, 2010); 

Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship Security, but Some 

Concerns Remain, GAO-10-400 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 9, 2010); and Maritime Security:

Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist 

Attacks on Energy Commodity Tankers, GAO-08-141 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 10, 2007).
 

Page 6 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

and other radioactive material.14 Although these incidents do not all 

involve the use of small vessels, the former commandant of the Coast 

Guard testified that small vessels pose a greater threat than cargo 

containers for smuggling nuclear materials.15 In addition, DHS reported 

that there is limited ability to screen small vessels for weapons of mass 

destruction, and as a result, small vessels could be used by terrorists to 

transport such weapons.16 In January 2009, we reported that DNDO had 

developed and tested equipment for detecting nuclear material on small 

vessels, but that efforts to use this equipment in a port area had been 

limited to pilot programs.17 We further reported that DNDO had not 

established a detailed plan to address gaps and vulnerabilities and 

recommended that DHS develop a plan to help ensure the future success 

of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and vulnerabilities and that this plan 

should focus on, among other things, small vessels. To address this 

recommendation, DHS issued a strategic plan in December 2010 and an 

implementation plan in April 2012.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, maritime enforcement 

efforts have been primarily focused on large commercial vessels (over 

300 gross tons), while federal efforts to address small vessels are more 

limited. In particular, large commercial vessel security is governed by 

Coast Guard regulations issued pursuant to the Maritime Transportation 

Security Act of 2002 and other relevant legislation.18 For example, certain 

larger vessels are required to submit information—in advance of U.S. 

arrival or departure—on crew members, passengers, cargo, and vessel 

operations.19

 

14International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Security Achievements 2002-2012

(Vienna, Austria: May 2013). 

This advance information allows the Coast Guard and CBP 

to conduct risk-based analyses and gain a greater awareness of large 

15From testimony delivered by Vice Admiral Thad Allen, Chief of Staff, United States 

Coast Guard, during a hearing on the Coast Guard’s role in border and maritime security, 

before the Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, U.S. 

Senate (Apr. 6, 2006). 

16Department of Homeland Security, Small Vessel Security Strategy. 

17GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Should Improve Planning to 

Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities, GAO-09-257 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2009). 

18See Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064.

1933 C.F.R. § 160.201-.215.

Small Vessels Are 

Generally Unregulated
 

Page 7 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

commercial vessel operations, their passengers, and their crews. In 

addition, certain large commercial vessels are also required to carry and 

operate transponders—such as an automatic identification system—

which broadcast information on the vessels and their locations, allowing 

authorities to track their movements.20 In contrast, small vessels are 

generally exempt from these requirements.21 As a result, the federal 

government has limited knowledge regarding the owners and locations of 

small vessels.22

Although small vessels are generally unregulated, the federal government 

has put in place some requirements for these vessels. For example, small 

vessel operators traveling to foreign ports or places are required to report 

to CBP upon their return to the United States.23 However, CBP estimates 

that a small percentage of the international small vessel traffic returning to 

the United States actually report this information. According to CBP, this 

low level of compliance is due, in part, to a lack of (1) public awareness of 

the reporting requirements, and (2) inspections to emphasize and ensure 

compliance. CBP has taken actions to help address this issue as part of 

its Small Vessel Reporting System initiative, which is discussed later in 

this report. At the international level, the International Maritime 

Organization issued guidelines in 2008 regarding the security of small 

vessels that are not subject to the International Ship and Port Facility 

Security Code, but these guidelines are voluntary.24

 

2033 C.F.R. § 164.46. According to Coast Guard officials, most large commercial vessels 

fall under this provision. 

21For example, vessels 300 gross tons or less are generally exempt from the notice of 

arrival and transponder requirements. 33 C.F.R §§ 164.46(a)(2)(iv).160.203(b)(1). 

22States require certain small vessels to be registered, and according to Coast Guard 

officials, 33 states have voluntarily entered into memorandums of agreement with the 

Coast Guard to share their registry data through the Vessel Identification System. 

However, there is no federal repository for registration or ownership information that 

encompasses all 50 states.

2319 C.F.R. § 4.2. This requirement is generally applicable to any vessel arriving from a 

foreign port or place, any foreign vessel arriving from a port or place within the United 

States, or any U.S. vessel carrying foreign merchandise for which entry has not been 

made. A foreign port or place includes a hovering vessel or any point in customs waters 

beyond the territorial sea or on the high seas at which the vessel has received 

merchandise. 

24The International Maritime Organization is a specialized agency of the United Nations 

that is responsible for developing an international regulatory framework addressing, 

among other things, maritime safety and security.
 

Page 8 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

In March 2009, we reported on the challenges of tracking small vessels 

using available technologies.25

According to the SVSS, in the United States, there is a tradition and 

expectation among small vessel operators to generally have unrestricted 

access to U.S. waterways. In addition, small vessel operators have 

expressed concerns about the cost of requirements that would allow the 

government to track their movements. For example, DHS conducted 

outreach efforts with the small vessel community while developing the 

SVSS, and DHS reported that small vessel operators and national 

recreational vessel associations expressed concern that the cost of 

transponders would present an objectionable burden for recreational 

boaters. Accordingly, DHS faces a challenge in balancing the collection of 

information necessary for the proper assessment of risks posed by small 

vessels with the freedom of the seas expected by small vessel operators.

For example, we reported that although 

the Coast Guard and other agencies may have technology systems that 

can track small vessels within some ports, these did not always work in 

bad weather or at night. Further, we reported that even with systems in 

place to track small vessels, there is agreement among maritime 

stakeholders that it is difficult to detect threatening activity by small 

vessels without prior knowledge of a planned attack. Ultimately, DHS 

documents report that the U.S. government has only limited knowledge 

about international recreational boaters and their travel patterns.

 

25For more information on vessel tracking systems, see GAO, Maritime Security: Vessel 

Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be 

Reviewed, GAO-09-337 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 17, 2009).
 

Page 9 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

In June 2007, DHS held an initial small vessel security summit to engage 

private, commercial, and government stakeholders in discussions on a 

range of issues involving the security risks posed by small vessels in the 

U.S. maritime environment.26 During this summit, the stakeholders that 

attended provided numerous recommendations to DHS, including a 

recommendation that DHS develop a national strategy regarding small 

vessel security. In response to this recommendation, DHS convened the 

Small Vessel Security Working Group in August 2007, which consisted of 

representatives from DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, CBP, 

and the Transportation Security Administration, as well as participation by 

representatives from the Departments of Justice and Defense. The 

working group developed the SVSS in April 2008 to address the potential 

for small vessels to be used (1) to smuggle terrorists or weapons, 

including weapons of mass destruction, into the United States; (2) as a 

standoff weapon platform; or (3) as a direct attack method to deliver a 

waterborne improvised explosive device.27

• develop and leverage a strong partnership with the small vessel 

community and public and private sectors in order to enhance 

maritime domain awareness;

The four overarching goals—

which include more specific objectives—of the SVSS are to

28

 

26The objectives of the 2007 summit—which brought together approximately 260 

stakeholder and federal observers—were to (1) educate small vessel stakeholders on 

security risks in the U.S. maritime domain; (2) provide a national forum for small vessel 

stakeholders to present and discuss their ideas on the development of security measures 

to mitigate gaps in small vessel management and control in the maritime domain; (3) 

provide a national forum for state and local government officials, as well as private 

members of the small vessel population, to discuss transportation concerns regarding 

security threats and present their ideas toward addressing those threats; and (4) record all 

issues and concerns from the small vessel stakeholders, and complete an after-action 

report for public, industry, and government to support conclusions for national-level 

decisions involving the development of small vessel security measures to detect, deter, 

interdict, and defeat terrorist use of small vessels in the U.S. maritime domain. 

27The SVSS is to provide a framework to improve maritime security and safety through 

coordinating the efforts of federal, state, local, and tribal authorities, as well as with 

international partners, private industry, and recreational boaters. Further, the intent of the 

SVSS is to reduce potential security and safety risks posed by small vessels through 

operations that balance fundamental freedoms, adequate security, and continued 

economic stability.

28Maritime domain awareness is the effective understanding of anything in the maritime 

environment that could affect the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United 

States.

Development of the SVSS

and SVSS Implementation 

Plan
 

Page 10 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

• enhance maritime security and safety based on a coherent plan with a 

layered, innovative approach;

• leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect; determine intent; 

and, when necessary, interdict small vessels; and

• enhance coordination, cooperation, and communications between

federal, state, local and tribal partners and the private sector, as well 

as international partners.

DHS subsequently issued the SVSS Implementation Plan in January 

2011.29

• increase systematic visits to maritime facilities to build relationships, 

improve knowledge of threat conditions at marinas, and deter 

criminals;

In developing the plan, the SVSS Working Group relied on 

subject matter experts at DHS components to provide input on what 

action items should be included. From these efforts, DHS includes a total 

of 132 action items in the plan, organized according to the four 

overarching SVSS goals. Each of the action items provides a description 

of the action to be taken and the lead federal department or component 

responsible for coordinating and implementing the action. Examples of 

action items include the following:

• partner and coordinate with foreign countries, particularly in the 

Caribbean region, on radiological and nuclear detection and 

interdiction;

• explore research and development of a permanent sensor system to 

detect and track noncooperative vessels; and

• improve federal, state, tribal, and local interagency information 

sharing, joint targeting, collaboration on boardings, and related 

operations.

Based on input from the DHS components’ subject matter experts, the 

SVSS Implementation Plan also includes information on the general time 

 

29According to DHS, the SVSS Implementation Plan (1) serves as a road map for 

stakeholders to work together and focus on achieving the goals and objectives set forth in 

the SVSS, (2) lays out ongoing and contemplated action items, and (3) is a living 

document.
 

Page 11 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

frames, estimated relative costs, and anticipated impacts that each action 

item may have in achieving the goals of the SVSS.

30

After DHS issued the SVSS Implementation Plan, each federal agency or 

component was responsible for separately determining the feasibility of 

the relevant action items and deciding which ones to implement after 

taking into account its specific mission, priorities, and the resources 

available.31 The SVSS Implementation Plan states that it is intended to be 

a guidance document to provide greater specificity about how preexisting 

programs may be developed and coordinated to achieve the goals and 

objectives outlined in the SVSS. 

DHS components have completed some initiatives and have other 

initiatives under way to address small vessel security concerns. Some of 

these initiatives go back more than a decade, and include security 

measures that the components have implemented to protect vessels and 

infrastructure from small vessel attacks, including the enforcement of 

security zones around certain vessels—such as ferries—or infrastructure. 

 

30Implementation of the action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan is based on two 

time frames for accomplishing its strategic goals. The plan defines short-term action items 

as those that are intended to be evaluated or implemented within 5 years of plan approval. 

The plan defines long-term action items as those that are most likely to require more than 

5 years to achieve because of resource, technological, and statutory challenges. 

31The SVSS Implementation Plan states that all action items, whether short- or long-term, 

are expected to be implemented through standard U.S. government appropriation 

processes, budgetary processes, and regulatory review procedures.

DHS and Its 

Components Are 

Taking Actions, but 

DHS Is Not Tracking 

Progress in 

Addressing the SVSS 

Implementation Plan

DHS Components Have 

Various Initiatives to 

Address Small Vessel 

Security Concerns
 

Page 12 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Another security measure is the escort of larger vessels—such as cruise 

ships and liquid natural gas tankers—into a port, as shown in figure 2.

Figure 2: Coast Guard Vessels Escorting a Cruise Ship and a Liquid Natural Gas 

Tanker

More recently, DHS components developed initiatives to address small 

vessel security concerns that relate to the four goals of the SVSS—

although many initiatives began prior to issuance of the SVSS 

Implementation Plan. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that many of 

the initiatives in the plan are not new or uniquely dedicated to terrorist 

threats or small vessels, and that a number of the initiatives are ongoing 

in the various federal agencies responsible for facilitating maritime safety, 

security, recreation, and commerce.32 Further, more than one DHS 

component may be responsible for addressing a single action item in the 

SVSS Implementation Plan, and a single action item could be addressed 

through several initiatives. In addition, DHS officials stated that initiatives 

often aligned with multiple action items in the plan.33

DHS component officials we met with identified the following key 

initiatives that they have completed or have under way to enhance small 

 

32Officials we met with from four key DHS components involved in the implementation of 

the SVSS Implementation Plan—the Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T—stated 

that they are not conducting new initiatives or programs as a result of the SVSS 

Implementation Plan. For example, Coast Guard officials stated that implementing the 

action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan did not create separate, new programs 

addressing small vessel risks, but were preexisting programs or operations. 

33Given the general nature of the action items in the plan, we were not able to directly 

align action items in the plan to component initiatives.
 

Page 13 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

vessel security. These initiatives relate to the goals of the SVSS and are 

linked to multiple action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. For 

additional information on these four initiatives, see appendix II.

• Focused Lens. Originally piloted by the Coast Guard in 2008, 

Focused Lens is an ongoing initiative intended to assist Coast Guard 

units in preventing small vessel attacks in their areas of operation by 

identifying and directing additional resources and efforts toward the 

most likely points of origin for a small vessel attack, such as marinas 

and boat ramps.

• Small Vessel Reporting System. In May 2010, CBP developed this 

voluntary, online program to enable small vessel operators to expedite 

the reporting of their foreign voyages to and planned arrivals in the 

United States. This program is intended to allow CBP to assess the 

risks for known small vessels and associated passengers in advance 

of arrival in the United States and, as a result, make it easier to 

identify suspicious or unknown small vessels.

• West Coast Maritime Pilot. Under this pilot, DNDO provided 

equipment and training to a variety of federal, state, local, and tribal 

agencies to enhance their ability to detect and interdict the smuggling 

of radiological and nuclear materials onboard small vessels. The pilot 

ran from September 2007 to December 2010, and according to DNDO 

officials, has integrated the lessons learned and standard operating 

procedures developed to expand assistance efforts in other regions 

around the country.

Coastal Surveillance System. DHS S&T is developing a system that 

is designed to integrate information from publicly available data 

sources and sensors to improve (1) maritime domain awareness by 

tracking vessels in real time and (2) the interdiction of vessels

involved in illegal or illicit activities by identifying anomalies or 

suspicious behavior.

In addition to specific initiatives, DHS officials and port security 

stakeholders cited general efforts that they believed have helped to 

improve coordination among federal, state, and local agencies—one of 

the goals of the SVSS. For example, federal and local port security 

stakeholders at one of the ports we visited stated that their joint 

operations center has helped them coordinate security operations, such 

as the security boarding of small vessels. According to Coast Guard 

officials, the Coast Guard performed 11,399 small vessel security 
 

Page 14 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

boardings in 2012, and with the assistance of other port security 

stakeholders, an additional 789 small vessels security boardings were 

conducted that year.34 In addition, in one of the ports we visited, the 

Coast Guard and local law enforcement officials developed a 

memorandum of understanding to conduct joint boardings of small 

vessels. Local law enforcement and port authority officials at the two ports 

we visited stated that enhanced coordination with federal agencies has 

improved the overall level of communication and cooperation related to 

small vessel security operations.

Although DHS components have various initiatives under way, DHS does 

not know the extent to which its components or other relevant 

stakeholders have made progress in addressing SVSS Implementation 

Plan action items because DHS is not systematically gathering 

information on their efforts. The SVSS Implementation Plan states that 

DHS is to assess and update the plan annually and focus on realigning 

the plan with the activities under way by its components and other federal 

agencies. The SVSS Implementation Plan directs that this review is also 

to (1) eliminate short-term action items that have been completed over 

the previous year; (2) transition action items from long-term to short-term 

status, as appropriate; and (3) augment the plan with new action items. 

Since the SVSS Implementation Plan was issued in 2011, however, 

neither DHS nor its components are tracking progress on the action items 

in the plan.

Officials we spoke with from four of the key DHS components that have 

responsibility for leading the majority of the action items in the SVSS 

Implementation Plan (the Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS S&T) 

stated that while they are tracking efforts and initiatives of their 

component-specific missions that may address risks posed by small 

vessels, they are not systematically tracking these efforts as they relate to 

the specific action items listed in the plan. After the SVSS Implementation 

Plan was issued, the Coast Guard conducted a one-time review in 

November 2011 of the action items in the plan where it was identified as a 

lead or colead. This review included information on the status of 

preexisting or planned Coast Guard initiatives that were related to each 

 

34Specifically, the Coast Guard and other government agencies jointly performed 254 

small vessel security boardings, and other government agencies alone performed 535 

small vessel security boardings. 

DHS Is Not Tracking 

Progress on the SVSS 

Implementation Plan
 

Page 15 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

action item and which action items were determined to not be 

implementable.

DHS officials we spoke with stated that there is no plan to update the 

SVSS Implementation Plan because it is not a priority, given budget 

constraints, and it is too early to measure the effectiveness of action 

items in the plan. According to a senior DHS Policy official, although the 

SVSS Implementation Plan states that DHS should assess and update 

the plan annually, given these constraints, an annual review is too 

frequent. The senior DHS official added that per the Secretary of 

Homeland Security’s direction, DHS components are focusing on 

maintaining their ongoing operations under constrained budgets, and so 

efforts to update the SVSS Implementation Plan are not currently a 

priority. For example, Coast Guard officials we met with stated that, in 

many instances, the ability to expand certain efforts in scope or scale so 

as to more effectively address small vessel security risks may be 

dependent on the funding of particular port programs or the availability of 

related grant funding, which can be affected by budget constraints. Coast 

Guard officials added that America’s Waterway Watch—a program 

highlighted in the SVSS Implementation Plan that provides outreach to 

the public, including the small vessel community, on awareness of threats 

and how to report suspicious activity—may not receive funding in DHS’s 

fiscal year 2014 appropriation.

DHS officials also stated that because the SVSS Implementation Plan

was issued in early 2011, it is too early to expect a majority of the action 

items to be completed or, especially for the long-term action items, to 

have been implemented. These officials stated that accomplishing the 

SVSS’s goals and objectives through implementation of the many action 

items in the SVSS Implementation Plan will require a significant 

investment of time and resources, along with buy-in from state and local 

maritime security stakeholders. Accordingly, it could take years to fully 

implement some of the action items and determine whether they are 

effective. Further, according to DHS officials, not all action items listed in 

the SVSS Implementation Plan may be feasible or implemented at all port 

locations nationally. For example, Coast Guard officials we met with 

stated that while the placement of floating security barriers is an effective 

security strategy used by the U.S. Navy to protect certain high-value 

assets (see fig. 3), it would not be economically feasible to install such 
 

Page 16 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

barriers at all ports because they would have to be designed for the 

specific characteristics and needs of each port location.35

Figure 3: A Floating Security Barrier (Foreground)

DHS officials involved with the SVSS Working Group, as well as officials 

from four of the DHS components we spoke with, stated that receiving 

updates on progress or lessons learned from efforts to implement the 

action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan would be valuable 

information. For example, officials we met with from DHS Policy and the 

Coast Guard stated that they recognize the value in updating the 

progress of the SVSS Implementation Plan to incorporate new 

information about threats, changes in technologies, requirements, and 

lessons learned as programs are assessed, prioritized, and implemented. 

In addition, a Coast Guard port security specialist we met with at one of 

the ports added that updating the progress of the plan could help DHS 

better determine where to focus its research and development efforts and 

prioritize the related funding and resources needs. Further, DNDO 

officials we met with stated that there is value in understanding what 

individual DHS components are implementing regarding the SVSS 

 

35According to Coast Guard officials, the decision to use floating security barriers is up to 

individual facilities or port authorities, and some ports have purchased these barriers with 

the use of federal grant funding.
 

Page 17 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Implementation Plan, as well as the methods and techniques that are 

being used. The DNDO officials added that obtaining a common 

understanding of ongoing efforts to implement related initiatives could 

prevent duplication of effort, provide a means of sharing lessons learned 

among components, and potentially save time and resources. DHS S&T 

officials we met with similarly stated that there is value in learning about 

the overall progress of the SVSS Implementation Plan and that, to do this 

effectively, this information needs to be collected in a more systematic 

way and then be made widely available to all the agencies involved.

Although it may be too early to measure the effectiveness of some action 

items in the SVSS Implementation Plan, updating the progress made in 

addressing the action items could help DHS and its components prioritize 

their efforts given constrained budgets; better identify successes and 

lessons learned; and enhance collaboration with federal, state, and local 

stakeholders regarding small vessel security issues. The SVSS 

Implementation Plan states that, because of risk, the unpredictability of 

budgets, policy changes, and administrative priorities, the plan must be 

reviewed regularly to ensure that it remains current and accurate. By 

engaging in this review process, the plan states that it is intended to be a 

living document that provides a strategic overview of participating 

agencies’ implementation of the SVSS. Standards for Internal Control in 

the Federal Government calls for federal agencies to design and 

implement control activities to enforce management’s directives.36

 

36

Further, the SVSS Implementation Plan calls for DHS to assess and 

update the plan to determine the progress that has been made to address 

the action items in the plan. This provision is a control activity to help 

ensure the achievement of the goals and objectives of the SVSS. The 

SVSS Implementation Plan calls for this review to be conducted annually, 

but given resource constraints and the time it will take to complete some 

of the action items, less frequent but regular assessments may be 

warranted. By systematically gathering information from its components 

and other relevant stakeholders to update the action items in the SVSS 

Implementation Plan on a regular basis, DHS would be better able to 

monitor progress against the plan and the goals and objectives of the 

SVSS. This is particularly important given that more than one agency or 

component may be responsible for addressing action items in the plan 

and because, according to DHS officials, accomplishing the SVSS’s goals 

GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 
 

Page 18 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

and objectives will require a significant investment of time and resources. 

According to key management practices, for agency efforts that require a 

substantial commitment and that could take years to complete, it is 

essential to track implementation goals to pinpoint performance shortfalls 

and gaps and suggest any needed corrections.37 Further, according to 

useful practices for performance management and measurement, having 

a clear understanding of current performance—a baseline—is essential to 

determining whether new initiatives will result in accomplishing the goals 

and objectives of the SVSS.

38

Recognizing the risks posed by terrorists using small vessels to attack 

targets or as a conveyance for terrorists and their contraband to enter the 

United States, DHS issued its SVSS Implementation Plan in January 

2011 to help guide efforts to mitigate the security risks arising from small 

vessels. DHS component agencies have completed some initiatives and 

have other initiatives under way to address the risk of a small vessel 

attack, but DHS is not gathering information on the progress its 

components or relevant stakeholders are making to address action items 

in the SVSS Implementation Plan and has no plans to do so. The SVSS 

Implementation Plan, by design, is to be revised to accommodate new 

information about threats, technologies, requirements, and lessons

learned as action items are implemented, but DHS has not updated the 

plan since it was issued in 2011. Given that internal controls call for 

federal agencies to design and implement control activities to enforce 

management’s directives, DHS could better prioritize initiatives and 

identify successes if it was to regularly update the progress its 

components and other relevant stakeholders are making to address the 

action items in the SVSS Implementation Plan. This information could be 

particularly useful to DHS components that may be operating under more 

constrained budgets than when the plan was first issued.

To improve DHS’s ability to monitor progress, prioritize action items, and 

identify successes, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security systematically gather information from the department’s 

components and other relevant stakeholders to regularly update the 

 

37See, for example, GAO-03-669.

38GAO/GGD-00-10. 

Conclusions 

Recommendation for 

Executive Action
 

Page 19 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

progress they are making in addressing action items in the SVSS 

Implementation Plan.

In September 2013, we requested comments on a draft of this report from 

the Department of Homeland Security. The department provided technical 

comments, which we have incorporated into the report, as appropriate. In 

addition to its technical comments, DHS provided an official letter for 

inclusion in the report, which can be seen in appendix III. In the letter, 

DHS stated it concurred with the recommendation and, by October 31, 

2014, plans to complete a review of the progress its components are 

making in addressing SVSS Implementation Plan actions. We think this 

review is an important first step, but want to emphasize that such 

progress reviews should be conducted on a periodic basis until the SVSS 

Implementation Plan action items are fully addressed.

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security, appropriate congressional committees, and other 

interested parties. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

appendix IV. 

Stephen L. Caldwell, Director

Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Agency Comments
Appendix I: Stakeholders Involved in Small 

Vessel Security

Page 20 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

This appendix provides details on the numerous stakeholders that play a 

role in small vessel security. These stakeholders include various 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components with regulatory, 

statutory, and management responsibilities that affect small vessel 

security. See table 1 for key DHS components involved in small vessel 

security, including the components that are the lead or colead for the 

majority of the action items in the Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) 

Implementation Plan. 

Table 1: Examples of Key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components’ Roles and Responsibilities Regarding Small 

Vessel Security

DHS component/role Small vessel security-related responsibilities

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP)

CBP’s top priority is to keep terrorists and 

their weapons from entering the United 

States.

• Makes final admissibility determinations regarding cargo and persons arriving from a 

foreign port or place

• Enforces applicable requirements for commercial vessel operations, including 

requirements for vessel operators to provide and screen inbound and outbound 

cargo declarations and passenger manifests, and provide entry and clearance 

notifications

• Employs resources to identify and interdict terrorists and terrorists’ weapons as far 

from the U.S. shores as possible

• Served as one of the lead DHS components for the development of the SVSS and 

SVSS Implementation Plan

U.S. Coast Guard

The Coast Guard’s core roles are to 

protect the public, the environment, and 

U.S. economic and security interests in the 

U.S. maritime domain.

• Inspects and assesses the security of U.S. ports in accordance with pertinent 

legislation

• Facilitates efforts to enhance maritime domain awareness—including the monitoring 

of all vessels in U.S. waters

• Provides operational capabilities to deter, respond to, and mitigate small vessel 

attacks

• Served as one of the lead DHS components for the development of the SVSS and 

SVSS Implementation Plan

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 

(DNDO)

DNDO was established to improve the 

capability to detect and report the 

presence of nuclear or radiological 

material.

• Develops the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture

• Establishes operation protocols to ensure that nuclear detection leads to effective 

response

• Conducts a research and development program in nuclear detection

• Partners with DHS components, including the Coast Guard and CBP, for the 

acquisition of radiation and nuclear detection equipment

DHS Science and Technology (S&T) 

Directorate

DHS S&T is the primary research and 

development arm of DHS.

• Drives development and use of technology in support of homeland security missions

• Develops technologies that are to provide real-world capabilities to support the 

reduction of risk from the exploitation of small vessels by terrorists

• Develops technologies to support the mission of other DHS components

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by DHS components.

Note: In addition to the DHS components listed above, DHS’s Office of Policy—which is the primary 

policy formulation and coordination component for DHS—also helped develop the SVSS and SVSS 

Implementation Plan. 

Appendix I: Stakeholders Involved in Small 

Vessel Security
Appendix I: Stakeholders Involved in Small 

Vessel Security

Page 21 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

To enhance deterrence and improve preparedness, state, local, and tribal 

governments are also involved in small vessel security. For example, 

state and local law enforcement agencies carry out a variety of security 

operations at their respective ports, such as small vessel boardings or 

escorts of vessels into port. Finally, the general public, including the small 

vessel community and fishing associations, play a role in small vessel

security by identifying and reporting suspicious activity to relevant law 

enforcement agencies.
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 22 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

This appendix provides additional details on four key initiatives that DHS 

components have completed or have under way to improve small vessel 

security. Each of these initiatives is led by one of the four DHS 

components with a key role in addressing small vessel security—the 

Coast Guard, CBP, DNDO, and DHS’s S&T. The initiatives included in 

this appendix are illustrative of actions DHS components have taken to 

enhance small vessel security and are linked to multiple action items in 

the SVSS Implementation Plan. 

Originally created by the Coast Guard’s District Eleven as Operation 

Focused Lens, the initiative was piloted in 2008 to address small vessel 

security risks.1

Focused Lens is composed of three phases. In phase 1, Coast Guard 

officials are to identify small vessel launch sites in their area of operation 

and assess their attributes, including the size of the launch sites and their 

proximity to people, homes, and businesses, and whether the sites have 

security measures in place, such as video cameras and lighting.

As a continuing Coast Guard initiative, Focused Lens is 

intended to increase awareness of suspicious activity in and around U.S. 

ports. In particular, Focused Lens is intended to assist Coast Guard units 

in preventing small vessel attacks in their areas of operation by directing 

additional resources and efforts toward the most likely points of origin for 

a small vessel attack, such as marinas and vessel ramps. Focused Lens 

relates to the SVSS goals, particularly the goal to develop and leverage a 

strong partnership with the small vessel community and public and private 

sectors. 

2

 

1

The term “operation” has been dropped for the expansion of Focused Lens, as that word 

generally denotes—especially among military and law enforcement agencies—an initiative 

that has a specific end date. Coast Guard District Eleven, headquartered in Alameda, 

California, encompasses the states of California, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah; the coastal 

and offshore waters out over 1,000 miles; and the offshore waters of Mexico and Central 

America down to South America. 

In 

phase 2, Coast Guard officials are to enter the data they collect on launch 

sites in their area of operation into the Coast Guard’s Maritime Security 

2

Phase 1 activities can be conducted by the Coast Guard, the Coast Guard Auxiliary (a 

voluntary organization), or local law enforcement officials. Under the pilot initiative, District 

Eleven identified any location that could be used as a launch site. The expansion of 

Focused Lens is limited to identifying and assessing privately owned or public access 

marinas and boat launch ramps, per the guidance of local Coast Guard officials.

Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Focused Lens
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 23 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM).3 A MSRAM analyst is to evaluate the 

data to determine the potential of the launch sites to be used by terrorists 

based on the various attributes, and prioritize the launch sites 

accordingly. In phase 3, the Coast Guard is to decide on where to 

conduct security activities (i.e., boarding small vessels, conducting 

surveillance patrols, or promoting citizen awareness programs) based on 

the prioritization of the launch sites. These security activities are to be 

conducted at the discretion of Coast Guard officials in their specific areas 

of operation to prevent and deter terrorist activity.4

 

3

MSRAM is the Coast Guard’s primary approach to assessing and managing security 

risks. MSRAM is designed to capture the security risks facing different types of targets, 

allowing comparison between different targets and geographic areas at the local, regional, 

and national levels. After District Eleven piloted Focused Lens, the Coast Guard modified 

MSRAM to accept launch site attributes, and MSRAM is capable of prioritizing launch 

sites based on security inadequacies, the proximity of those sites to and vulnerability of 

infrastructure, and the consequences of a successful attack.

Even if activities are 

not routinely conducted, MSRAM data can be used to provide the Coast 

Guard with important information on launch sites so that it can prioritize 

and focus its security activities during times of emerging terrorist threat 

conditions. According to Coast Guard documentation, citizen awareness 

programs can help to increase understanding among the general public—

including marina and small vessel operators—regarding the process for 

reporting suspicious activities. See figure 4 for a poster promoting a 

citizen awareness program.

4

The Coast Guard does not have a requirement to conduct operations in support of 

Focused Lens. Such operations are left to the Coast Guard officials responsible for 

determining which activities to undertake given the MSRAM analysis of launch sites.
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 24 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Figure 4: A Citizen Awareness Program Poster

Since the initiative was first piloted in District Eleven in 2008, the Coast 

Guard has identified Focused Lens as a best practice, and it began to 

expand the initiative in fiscal year 2012. Focused Lens has been 

implemented, or is being implemented, in various locations within Coast 

Guard districts and sectors. According to Coast Guard officials, it is left to 

the discretion of Coast Guard commanding officers whether to implement 

Focused Lens in their area of operation, given their competing priorities 

and limited resources. Coast Guard officials stated that Focused Lens 

may not be feasible to implement in some locations, such as areas that 

include a river that has no designated launch sites, and where a vessel 

could be launched at any location along its length. Further, Focused Lens 

may not be implemented in locations where the area of operation is 

relatively small and response teams can respond in a timely manner. For 

example, Coast Guard officials in one of the ports we visited stated that 

they decided not to implement Focused Lens because their area of 

operation was condensed and all launch sites could be reached within a

matter of minutes. Through regular analysis and refinement, and with 

feedback from its field units, the Coast Guard reports that Focused Lens 

is expected to remain a useful tool for operational decision makers.
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 25 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

CBP developed the Small Vessel Reporting System (SVRS)—a 

voluntary, online program for small vessel operators and passengers 

(participants) to report their foreign travels—to better track small vessels 

and make it easier to identify suspicious or unknown vessels. To enroll in 

the SVRS program, participants are to first complete an online application 

and then make an appointment for a face-to-face interview with a CBP 

officer who verifies the information provided and, if needed, obtains their 

digital fingerprints and photograph.5 Once enrolled, participants are able 

to submit float plans for their intended international travel online.6 By 

doing so, participants can expedite the process for reporting their 

intended arrivals from foreign locations and may not have to appear in 

person for inspection by CBP officers each time they enter the United 

States.7

Since the SVRS enables CBP to capture certain biographical and vessel 

data much earlier than upon a vessel’s arrival at the United States from a 

foreign location, CBP can review this information to identify potential highrisk small vessels and determine, in advance of the vessels’ arrival, if a 

face-to-face inspection may need to be conducted. A CBP official we met 

with who is familiar with the SVRS stated that if the SVRS is used by a 

participant, CBP inspection officers will be better able to determine if a 

face-to-face inspection is needed and, if so, what level of resources is 

needed to conduct an inspection upon the participant entering the United 

States. Further, CBP officials we spoke with at one of the ports we visited 

stated that the SVRS enables them to increase the amount of time CBP 

officers are spending in the field to conduct enforcement activities by 

limiting the amount of time officers spend collecting and entering data 

from boaters reporting their arrival by phone. The SVRS relates to the 

goals of the SVSS, particularly the goal of enhancing maritime security 

 

5

The online enrollment application requires biographical information, address, e-mail 

address, citizenship documentation, and vessel registration data if a person is registering 

as a master of a vessel.

6

A float plan consists of biographical information of all persons traveling, vessel 

registration information, and itinerary information.

7

CBP requires that vessels must report their arrival if they (1) arrive or return from a 

foreign location, (2) are a foreign vessel arriving from a port or place within the United 

States, or (3) a U.S. vessel carrying foreign merchandise for which entry has not been 

made. 19 C.F.R. § 4.2. Small vessels’ crew and passengers seeking U.S. entry must 

physically report to a designated CBP location for a face-to-face inspection unless they 

are enrolled in an alternative inspection program, like the SVRS, which allows reporting 

arrival by telephone or other means. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.1.

Small Vessel 

Reporting System
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 26 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

and safety through the implementation of advanced data submission 

procedures and efforts to increase reporting compliance.

The SVRS was initially piloted in Miami, Florida, in May 2010. Miami was 

selected as the pilot location because of the large population of small 

vessels operating in that area. The pilot was made available to 

participants already enrolled in a local CBP registered traveler program. 

Later in 2010, the SVRS pilot was expanded to additional CBP field 

offices covering southern Florida, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands. In May 2011, CBP further expanded the pilot to include five 

additional field offices—Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Detroit, and Seattle—

and eligibility was also expanded to include all U.S. and Canadian 

citizens, among others.8 As of October 2011, the SVRS pilot was 

deployed to all CBP field offices nationwide with the exception of two—El 

Paso and Tucson—that do not have a nexus to water. According to CBP, 

as of May 28, 2013, the number of participants enrolled in the SVRS had 

grown to 30,190, along with a total of 5,862 float plans submitted, and 

11,189 vessels registered, as shown in table 2.

 

8

Specifically, eligibility was expanded to include all U.S. citizens, nationals, and lawful 

permanent residents; Canadian citizens and permanent residents of Canada who are 

nationals of a Visa Waiver Program country or who hold a U.S. visa, a valid passport, and 

a CBP Form I-94/Arrival-Departure Record; Canadian Border Boat Landing Program 

participants (CBP Form I-68 holders); and members of CBP trusted traveler programs. 

Trusted traveler programs provide expedited international travel clearance for 

preapproved, low-risk travelers. To qualify for one of these programs, applicants must 

voluntarily undergo a thorough background check and a personal interview with a CBP 

officer.
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 27 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Table 2: Number of Participants, Float Plans, and Vessels Registered in the Small Vessel Reporting System, May 2010 

through May 2013

Milestones

U.S. 

citizens

Legal 

permanent 

residents

Canadian 

citizens

Total 

participants

Submitted 

float plans

Registered 

vessels

May 2010, to May 22, 2011

(pilot deployed in South Florida, Puerto 

Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) 8,253 1 47 8,301 822 3,225

May 23, 2011, to October 28, 2011

(pilot expanded to Boston, Buffalo, 

Chicago, Detroit, and Seattle) 6,659 2 488 7,149 1,428 2,389

October 29, 2011, to May 28, 2013

(pilot expanded to all Customs and 

Border Protection field offices 

nationwide) 13,892 8 840 14,740 3,612 5,575

Totals 28,804 11 1,375 30,190 5,862a 11,189

Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

a

Of the float plans submitted, 4,634 (79 percent) of them have been completed. The remaining 1,228 

(21 percent) were float plans that were submitted but not used or were for trips that had not yet taken 

place.

As of May 2013, three CBP field office locations—Miami and Tampa, 

Florida, and San Juan, Puerto Rico—accounted for 79 percent of the 

SVRS registrants. CBP officials attributed this to the fact that the SVRS 

pilot originated in these locations and the number of small vessels 

operating in these locations is very high relative to the number in other 

locations. CBP officials added that the number of SVRS registrations is 

not very high in some locations and noted that CBP is attempting to 

address challenges to implementing the SVRS in other locations. For 

example, CBP officials we met with at one of the ports we visited stated 

that, as of April 2013, a total of 14 people had enrolled in the SVRS at 

their location and a few float plans had been submitted. The CBP officials 

stated that they believed these numbers were low, in part, because of the 

lack of publicity regarding the SVRS program. CBP officials added that 

CBP is in the process of increasing its efforts to promote the SVRS 

through various community outreach efforts at a number of locations in an 

attempt to expand public awareness and increase use of the SVRS 

among small vessel operators and passengers. Finally, CBP officials told 

us that because of the proximity of many locations along the U.S. border 

to Canada, a trip between the two countries may require only a few 

minutes to complete. As a result, a program to expedite the reporting 

process is already being utilized in this region, thereby negating the need 
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 28 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

to register in the SVRS.9 CBP officials stated that CBP is in the process of 

determining whether modifications can be made to the SVRS in an effort 

to increase its use in this region.

DNDO conducted the West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) program from 

September 2007 to December 2010. The pilot program—which provided 

equipment and training to a variety of federal, state, local, and tribal 

agencies—was designed to enhance agencies’ ability to detect and 

interdict the smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials being 

transported onboard small vessels. DNDO implemented the WMCP 

program in two locations—Puget Sound, Washington, and San Diego, 

California—and coordinated it through local Area Maritime Security 

Committees.10

In both of the pilot locations, DNDO procured commercially available 

boat-mounted and portable radiation detection equipment (for examples 

of the latter, see fig. 5), trained agency personnel on how to use the 

equipment, and evaluated agencies’ maritime PRND operations in 

exercises involving small vessels that were carrying radiological or 

nuclear materials onboard.

The objective of the WCMP program was to create a 

layered, preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) defense across 

the participating state and local agencies that would enhance the limited 

resources of federal agencies. The WCMP program also sought to 

develop, implement, and evaluate standard operating procedures for 

detecting and interdicting radiological and nuclear materials transported 

onboard small vessels that could then be adapted to the needs of other

ports or regions. The WCMP program relates to the goals of the SVSS, 

including enhancing maritime security and safety based on a coherent 

plan with a layered, innovative approach.

 

9

The program already in place—the Canadian Border Boat Landing Program—allows 

certain individuals entering the United States by small vessels to be inspected just once 

per year, and to enter the United States without inspection at other times.

10To facilitate information sharing with port partners and in response to the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act of 2002, the Coast Guard has established 43 Area Maritime 

Security Committees covering the nation’s 361 ports. Pub. L. No. 107-295, § 102(a), 116 

Stat. 2064, 2081 (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. § 70112). These committees are 

typically composed of members from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 

and other port stakeholders and are responsible for, among other things, identifying critical 

port infrastructure and operations, identifying risks, and providing advice to the Coast 

Guard on mitigation strategies.

West Coast Maritime 

Pilot
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 29 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Figure 5: Portable Radiation Detectors

Note: Pictured, from left to right, are (1) the Polimaster PM 1703GN PRD, which is designed to be 

worn on a belt and to alert in the presence of radiation levels above a defined threshold; (2) the 

ThermoFisher IdentiFINDER-U RIID (Radioisotope Identification Device—or RIID—which is designed 

to detect and localize radiation sources, identify specific types of radiation and the specific isotope 

emitting the radiation, and store radiation data for transmission to subject matter experts for analysis; 

and (3) the ORTEC MicroDetective-EX, which is a more advanced, high-resolution type of RIID.

According to DNDO’s final reports, the WCMP program resulted in the 

successful development of a regionally coordinated, layered, maritime 

PRND capability to reduce the risk of radiological and nuclear threats 

transported onboard small vessels at each of the two pilot locations. The 

final report for one of the pilot locations stated that more than 250 

additional radiation detectors were deployed, new training materials were 

developed, and training was provided to over 400 emergency responders. 

Further, the final report for the other pilot location stated that the number 

of agency boats conducting PRND screenings of small vessels has more 

than doubled and the number of screenings has increased significantly 

because of leveraging the resources and expertise of state, local, and 

tribal agencies. These reports also stated that the participating agencies 

successfully detected the presence of radiological or nuclear materials 

transported on small vessels during exercises.11

 

11Similar to other radiation detection programs, for the WCMP program, secondary 

screenings are often necessary—in this case onboard the small vessels—to identify the 

specific isotopes and whether the materials are for a legitimate use. For example, the 

materials could be legitimate if transported for medical purposes or from an authorized 

industrial source.

Additionally, according to 

DNDO officials, the WCMP program demonstrated that it is possible for 

maritime PRND operations to be integrated into the operations of law 

enforcement and emergency responders with limited impact on their 

duties.
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 30 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

The final WCMP program reports also highlighted some challenges 

related to the development of maritime PRND capability focused on small 

vessels. For example, although these reports stated that the WCMP 

program exercises proved successful, DNDO officials stated that reducing 

the risk posed by small vessels containing illicit radiological or nuclear 

materials in the real world is a challenge, in part because, at any given 

time, there could be a large number of small vessels that would need to 

be screened. DNDO reported that further analysis is needed at the port 

level to determine the numbers and placement of PRND equipment and 

operational tactics that would be most effective.12

Since completion of the pilots, DNDO has integrated the lessons learned 

from the WCMP program to expand its maritime PRND program 

assistance efforts in other regions around the country. For example, 

according to DNDO officials, lessons learned from the WCMP program 

were used to develop a regional maritime PRND program in Boston, 

Massachusetts, and similar efforts are under way in Charleston, South 

Carolina; Rochester, New York; and San Francisco, California. DNDO 

also developed generic standard operating procedures for a regional 

maritime PRND program and provided these to the Coast Guard for 

potential distribution to all of the Area Maritime Security Committees 

around the nation. Further, both WCMP programs in Puget Sound and 

San Diego have been sustained with continued use of the equipment 

from the pilot, and, according to DNDO officials, the maritime PRND 

program in Puget Sound continues to grow with additional agencies 

joining the effort and the number of boat-mounted detection systems in 

the region increasing as well.

DHS S&T is developing and piloting the Coastal Surveillance System 

(CSS),13

 

12Pacific Northwest National Laboratory produced a study that examined the modeling of 

equipment and assets at the two pilot locations—San Diego and Puget Sound.

which is intended to improve (1) maritime domain awareness by 

tracking vessels in real time and (2) the interdiction of vessels involved in 

illegal or illicit activities by identifying anomalies or suspicious behavior. 

With respect to small vessels, DHS S&T officials stated that the key 

benefit of the CSS, once fully developed, will be its ability to help users—

13CSS is a joint effort by the Naval Research Laboratory, the Space and Naval Warfare 

Systems Center Pacific, the Air Marine Operations Center, and SRI International, in 

support of DHS S&T Borders and Maritime Security Division.

Coastal Surveillance 

System 
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 31 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

such as CBP, the Coast Guard, and law enforcement agencies—

distinguish small vessels that are not a threat from those that may warrant 

further action. Specifically, DHS S&T officials stated that they believe the 

CSS will be able to improve interdiction effectiveness—the number of 

boardings that result in apprehensions and prosecutions. Accordingly, the 

CSS relates to the goals of the SVSS, particularly the goal to leverage 

technology to enhance the ability to detect; determine intent; and, when 

necessary, interdict small vessels.

According to DHS S&T documents, the CSS is intended to improve 

maritime domain awareness and interdiction effectiveness by integrating 

a variety of unclassified information on vessels collected from publicly 

available data sources, as well as data collected from sensors.14

Although the 3-year CSS pilot program was to be initiated in fiscal year 

2014, DHS S&T officials stated that they were ahead of scheduled time 

frames and deployed the CSS to three DHS field locations in December 

2012 to obtain early feedback on the system.

Through 

analytical tools, the CSS is intended to alert users to suspicious vessels. 

According to DHS S&T officials, the CSS is intended to provide users with 

an operational picture similar to what the Federal Aviation Administration 

uses to identify the location of all airplanes at all times.

15

Although DHS S&T intends for the CSS to track small vessels, DHS S&T 

officials stated that, as of May 2013, the CSS does not have the capability 

to detect most small vessels, since these vessels are generally not 

required to submit information to systems that would feed into the CSS. 

DHS S&T officials stated that more information sources are needed to be 

able to track small vessels. For example, according to an April 2013 CBP 

assessment of the CSS, the initial rollout of the CSS to its Air and Marine 

Operations Center had limited sensor integration to track small vessels. 

DHS S&T officials stated 

that they are documenting feedback they receive on the CSS and are 

making changes before the pilot is officially launched in fiscal year 2014 

and the CSS is deployed to other entities, including state and local law 

enforcement agencies and international partners.

 

14Owners of the data sources that feed into the CSS are to have the ability to provide 

access rights to other agencies.

15The CSS is being piloted at CBP’s Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, 

California; Coast Guard Sector Los Angeles-Long Beach; and DHS S&T’s Maritime 

Security Technology Pilot in St. Petersburg, Florida.
Appendix II: Examples of DHS Components’ 

Initiatives to Address Small Vessel Security

Page 32 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

DHS S&T reports that it plans to take advantage of technological 

advances to detect small vessels that are being developed under two 

DHS S&T programs, and incorporate these data sources into the CSS 

over time.16 DHS S&T officials identified some examples of technologies 

DHS S&T is in the process of developing or piloting, including the Smart 

Chart Automatic Identification System—a smart phone application that is 

to provide free nautical maps to the user but is to also provide vessel 

positioning information to authorized federal agencies—and the SeaWeb 

acoustic tripwire, which is to deliver an acoustic sensor to detect small 

vessels. DHS S&T officials stated that these are currently in different 

phases of development and are not yet integrated into the CSS.

 

16Specifically, the Small Dark Vessel project focuses on technologies to detect the semiand fully submersible threats, and the Port and Coastal Surveillance Improvement project 

focuses on technologies to detect the go-fast and panga threats. A panga is an open, 

outboard-powered fishing boat common throughout much of the developing world, 

including Central America and Mexico.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 33 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 34 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 35 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Stephen L. Caldwell, (202) 512-9610 or caldwells@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Christopher Conrad (Assistant 

Director), Tracey Cross, Julian King, Tracey King, Stanley J. Kostyla, 

Jessica Orr, and Hugh Paquette made significant contributions to the 

work.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 36 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Coast Guard: Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Faced in 

Developing and Implementing a Common Operational Picture. 

GAO-13-784T. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2013.

Coast Guard: Clarifying the Application of Guidance for Common 

Operational Picture Development Would Strengthen Program. 

GAO-13-321. Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2013.

Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could 

Advance DHS’s Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other 

Infrastructure. GAO-13-11. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2012.

Supply Chain Security: CBP Needs to Conduct Regular Assessments of 

Its Cargo Targeting System. GAO-13-9. Washington, D.C.: October 25, 

2012.

Maritime Security: Progress and Challenges 10 Years after the Maritime 

Transportation Security Act. GAO-12-1009T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 11, 2012.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed Plans for Its Global 

Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Challenges Remain in Deploying 

Equipment. GAO-12-941T. Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2012.

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Efforts to Address Port Recovery and

Salvage Response. GAO-12-494R. Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2012.

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and Management 

of Interagency Operations Centers. GAO-12-202. Washington, D.C.: 

February 13, 2012.

Coast Guard: Security Risk Model Meets DHS Criteria, but More Training 

Could Enhance Its Use for Managing Programs and Operations. 

GAO-12-14. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.

Maritime Security: Progress Made but Further Actions Needed to Secure 

the Maritime Energy Supply. GAO-11-883T. Washington, D.C.: August 

24, 2011.

Maritime Security: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address 

Risks Posed by Seafarers, but Efforts Can Be Strengthened. 

GAO-11-195. Washington, D.C.: January 14, 2011.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 37 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Maritime Security: Ferry Security Measures Have Been Implemented, but 

Evaluating Existing Studies Could Further Enhance Security.

GAO-11-207. Washington, D.C.: December 3, 2010.

Maritime Security Responses to Questions for the Record.

GAO-11-140R. Washington, D.C.: October 22, 2010.

Maritime Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port 

Security. GAO-10-940T. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress but Not 

Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for Its Global Nuclear Detection Efforts or 

Closed Identified Gaps. GAO-10-883T. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

Maritime Security: Varied Actions Taken to Enhance Cruise Ship 

Security, but Some Concerns Remain. GAO-10-400. Washington, D.C.: 

April 9, 2010.

Supply Chain Security: Feasibility and Cost-Benefit Analysis Would Assist 

DHS and Congress in Assessing and Implementing the Requirement to 

Scan 100 Percent of U.S.-Bound Containers. GAO-10-12. Washington, 

D.C.: October 30, 2009.

Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but 

the Need for Duplicate Data Should Be Reviewed. GAO-09-337. 

Washington, D.C.: March 17, 2009.

Supply Chain Security: CBP Works with International Entities to Promote 

Global Customs Security Standards and Initiatives, but Challenges 

Remain. GAO-08-538. Washington, D.C.: August 15, 2008.

Maritime Security: National Strategy and Supporting Plans Were 

Generally Well-Developed and Are Being Implemented. GAO-08-672. 

Washington, D.C.: June 20, 2008.

Supply Chain Security: Challenges to Scanning 100 Percent of U.S.-

Bound Cargo Containers. GAO-08-533T. Washington, D.C.: June 12, 

2008.

Supply Chain Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Has 

Enhanced Its Partnership with Import Trade Sectors, but Challenges 

Remain in Verifying Security Practices. GAO-08-240. Washington, D.C.: 

April 25, 2008.
Related GAO Products

Page 38 GAO-14-32 Small Vessel Security

Maritime Security: Coast Guard Inspections Identify and Correct Facility 

Deficiencies, but More Analysis Needed of Program’s Staffing, Practices, 

and Data. GAO-08-12. Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2008.

Supply Chain Security: Examinations of High-Risk Cargo at Foreign 

Seaports Have Increased, but Improved Data Collection and Performance 

Measures Are Needed. GAO-08-187. Washington, D.C.: January 25, 

2008.

Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address Challenges in 

Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy Commodity 

Tankers. GAO-08-141. Washington, D.C.: December 10, 2007.

Maritime Security: The SAFE Port Act: Status and Implementation One 

Year Later. GAO-08-126T. Washington, D.C.: October 30, 2007.

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to Ensure 

Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection Equipment.

GAO-07-1247T. Washington, D.C.: September 18, 2007.

Information on Port Security in the Caribbean Basin. GAO-07-804R. 

Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007.

Port Risk Management: Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in 

Disaster Planning and Recovery. GAO-07-412. Washington, D.C.: March 

28, 2007.

Maritime Security: Public Safety Consequences of a Terrorist Attack on a 

Tanker Carrying Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification. GAO-07-316. 

Washington, D.C.: February 22, 2007.

(441133)
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