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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

UNPUBLISHED In re HARRIS, Minors. August 16, 2016

No. 331025 Oakland Circuit Court Family Division LC No. 15-828979-NA

Before: B ECKERING , P.J., and C AVANAGH and G ADOLA , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

. Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order termina ting her parental rights to her minor daughters, KH and DH, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( ii ), (g), and (j). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm.

I. BASIC FACTS

KH and DH were removed from respondent’s care and placed in re lative and foster care respectively after the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) received a report that respondent’s fiancé, who was KH’s legal father and DH’s putativ e father, severely injured DH while both children were in his sole care. 1 On the day of the incident, respondent left the children with their father while she went to work. DH was a he althy, normal three-month-old baby at the time. When respondent returned from work, she foun d DH unresponsive and took her to the hospital. Doctors determined that DH sustained a se vere brain injury from having been shaken in an extreme manner. At the time of the terminati on hearing, DH required aroundthe-clock care because she was legally blind, unable to walk or crawl, and had intestinal problems as a result of the abuse.

DHHS asked the court to terminate respondent’s parental rights as part of the original petition. The court initially granted respondent supervised pa renting time with the children, and she acted appropriately during the visits. Respondent was empl oyed, but she had no health insurance. She believed she could properly care for her childr en. At the termination hearing, it was revealed that respondent knew the father had violent tenden cies and a bad temper before the abuse of DH occurred. Evidence also showed that respondent rem ained in contact with the

1 The trial court also terminated the father’s parental rights t o KH, which he has not appealed.-2- father after he was arrested for the abuse, and she wrote a letter in his support for his criminal case, stating that he was a great father and a family man.

The trial court found that DHHS presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental righ t under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( ii ), (g), and (j), and that termination was in the children’s best interes ts. Accordingly, it entered an o rder terminating respondent’s parental rights to her minor children.

II. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clea r and convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground under MCL 712A.19b(3) has be en established.” In re Laster
, 303 Mich App 485, 491; 845 NW2d 540 (2013) (citation and quotat ion marks omitted). We review a trial court’s findings i n this regard for clear error. Id . “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm convic tion that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special oppor tunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Moss , 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 1 82 (2013) (citation and quotat ion marks omitted). We also review a trial court’s determination regarding a child’ s best interests for clear error. Laster , 303 Mich App at 496.

B. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b (3)(b)( ii ) if there is clear and convincing evidence that “[t] he child or a sibling of the c hild has suffered physical injury or physical or sexual abuse” and the parent “had the opportunity t o prevent the physical injury or physical or sexual abuse [and] failed to do so and the court fi nds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the fo reseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.” The record establishes that DH was three month s old when she sustained a serious brain injury as the resu lt of being shaken by her fathe r. Evidence revealed that respondent did not initially believe the father was responsible for the abuse, and she speculated that the injuries could have been caused by DH’s excessive cryi ng. The trial court determined that respondent’s explanation for DH’s injuries was not plausib le.

Testimony presented at the termination hearing also revealed that respondent was aware of the father’s violent tendencies, and his family members warn ed her about his bad temper before the abuse occurred. Evide nce showed that respondent and the father argued frequently, he threatened her, he pushed her to the floor while she was pregna nt, and she left with the children on at least one occasion because she was afraid of him. The tr ial court found that respondent minimized the domestic violence in their relationship. Father’ s aunt also testified that he once disciplined KH for kissing a lit tle boy when she was less than one year old by forcefully putting her on a counter and yelling at he r for being “fast and promisc uous.”

At the termination hearing, respondent claimed she was no long er in a relationship with the father, but testimony revealed the she contacted him as rec ently as the month before the hearing. During her previous contacts with the father while he was in jail, respondent told him that she loved him, wanted to be with him, and would wait for h im. The trial court was-3- concerned that respondent maintained contact with the father de spite knowing that he was charged with abusing her daughter. Considering this evidence, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that clear and convincing evidence supported term inating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)( ii ).

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b (3)(g) if “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custo dy for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the p arent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” In this case, th e termination petition was based, in part, on anticipatory neglect, wh ich provides that evidence of a parent’s treatment of one child is probative of how she may treat the other children. In re Hudson , 294 Mich App 261, 266; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). DH sustained life-threatening injuries at the hand of her putative father after respondent left the children w ith him. At trial, respondent sa id that she did not believe he caused the injuries and speculated that they could have been caused by DH crying too much. Although respondent was not previously involved with child protective se rvices, testimony revealed that she was aware of the father’s bad temper and violent tendencies . Despite this knowledge, respondent often left her childre n in his sole care. Responden t’s actions support the trial court’s finding that she failed to provi de proper care and custody of h er children and that there was a reasonable likelihood of foreseeable neglect if the court retur ned the children to her. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that terminat ing respondent’s parental rights was justified under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g).

A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b (3)(j) if “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” Although respondent no longer lives with the father, evidence showed that she maintained ties with him. As recently as a month before the termination hearing, respondent contacted the father in jail. She acknowledged that while he was in jail, she told him that she loved him, wanted t o be with him, and would wait for him. Respondent was aware that the father was responsible for DH’s injuries, but she testified that she was not concerned about him being around KH. On this record, the trial court did not clearly err by concluding that t here was a reasonable likelihoo d that the children would be harmed if they were returned t o respondent’s care. Further, th e fact that the father is now in prison is inconsequential because it is respondent’s behavior that is in question and shows her failure to acknowledge the abuse and to place her children’s ne eds before her own. See In re Gonzales/Martinez , 310 Mich App 426, 432; 871 NW2d 868 (2015) (holding that term ination was warranted even though the ch ildren’s abuser was in jail bec ause evidence showed that the respondent had placed and would continue to place her desire to be with her boyfriend, despite the abuse, over the needs of her children). The trial court di d not clearly err by terminating respondent’s parental right s under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j).

Finally, respondent argues that termination was improper becau se she was not given an opportunity to participate in re unification services. We disag ree. Reunification services are not required in every situation. In re Terry , 240 Mich App 14, 25 n 4; 610 NW2d 563 (2000). When, as here, DHHS seeks to terminate parental rights as part of the initial petition, it is unnecessary to develop a case serv ice plan or to provide servic es because the agency’s goal is termination, not reunification. See In re HRC , 286 Mich App 444, 463; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). Accordingly, the trial court did not err by terminating respond ent’s parental rights, despite the-4- fact that she was not offered re unification services. In sum, the trial court properly concluded that DHHS established statutor y grounds to terminate respondent ’s parental rights by clear and convincing evidence.

C. BEST INTERESTS

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests , the court shall order termination of parental rights . . . .” MCL 712A.19 b(5). “[W]hether terminat ion of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moss , 301 Mich App at 90. In determining a child’s best interests, the trial cour t may consider a variety of factors including a child’s bond to the pa rent, a parent’s ability to p arent, a child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home ov er the parent’s home. In re Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). A trial court m ay also consider a respondent’s history and psy chological evaluation. In re Jones , 286 Mich App 126, 131; 777 NW2d 728 (2009). A child’s placement with relatives weighs aga inst termination, and must be explicitly considered by the c ourt when determining a child’s b est interests. MCL 712A.19a(6)(a); Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App at 43.

The trial court did not clearly err by finding that terminatin g respondent’s parental rights was in the best interests of the children. The record shows th at respondent loved her children, regularly visited them, and acted appropriately when she was wi th them. Although DH’s young age and severe injuries preven ted a finding regarding any bond between parent and child, evidence showed that KH loved respondent and was happy when she saw her. Respondent testified that she was not present when DH was injured, and she had no history with child protective services. Respondent a lso testified that she could provide for her children through her employment, support from extended family, and governmental serv ices. She claimed that she was no longer in contact with the father and did not intend to return to him or allow him around the children after his release from prison.

However, the record also shows that respondent was aware of th e father’s violent tendencies and bad temper, yet she failed to remove her childre n from the dangerous living situation and allowed him to care for the children. In additio n to assaults against respondent herself, testimony showed that respondent witnessed the father’ s volatility toward her children during the incident in which he disciplined KH at a family gath ering. Respondent refused to acknowledge the seriousness of the father’s offense, and continued a relationship with him even after he was charged wit h abusing DH and put in jail.

The psychologist who evaluated respondent concluded that her o ngoing contact with the father demonstrated “extremely poor judgment.” Respondent’s ps ychological evaluation indicated that she had narcissis tic tendencies and an inabilityto appreciate her choices and to place the needs of others, including her children, above her ow n. This was further evidenced by the fact that respondent wrote a letter of support in the fathe r’s criminal case. The trial court found that respondent’s stated reason for writing the letter—to make the father feel better—was not believable. The court found that respondent demonstrated p oor judgment, minimized the seriousness of her relationship problems, even to the extent of characterizing her relationship-5- with the father as being strong, and placed herself and her chi ldren at risk by continuing to reunite with the father eve n after his abusive actions.

Evidence also showed that respond ent lacked a proper plan to c are for the children. Her income from her two part-time jobs was insufficient to provide financially for the children, especially because DH required around-the-clock care and extens ive medical treatment. The trial court found that respondent’s plan was “very, very sparse .” Respondent had no health insurance and planned to rely on yet-to-be approved government assistance to pay for DH’s medical expenses.

The children were thriving in their temporary placements. The trial court found that DH’s foster parents had increased her life expectancy through t heir constant care, and KH was well-adjusted living with her p aternal great-grandparents and h ad bonded with them. The children were very young, and the trial court found there was aneed for permanency and stability in their lives. Considering these facts, the trial c ourt did not clearly err by finding that termination of respondent’s parent al rights was in the children ’s best interests.

On a related issue, respondent c ontends that the trial court f ailed to address whether termination was appropriate in light of the placement with rela tives. Again, because a child’s placement with relatives weighs against termination, “the fact that the children are in the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explici t factor to consider in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests.” Olive/Metts , 297 Mich App at 43 (citation and quotation marks omitted). If a trial court fails to explicitly address whether termination is appropriate in light of a child’s placement with relatives, we deem the factual record inadequate to make a best-interest determination. Id. In this case, DH was placed with foster parents who were not relatives, and KH was placed with h er paternal great-grandparents. In rendering its best-interest decision, the trial court explic itly addressed the fact that KH had been placed with relatives, finding that she was well taken car e of in her placement and that she had bonded with her great-grandparents. The court nevertheless concluded that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in KH’s best interests. There fore, the trial court properly considered this factor. In s um, respondent has not shown any e rrors warranting relief.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane M. Beckering /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh /s/ Michael F. Gadola