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MICHELLE GUARINO, ADMINISTRATRIX (ESTATE

OF GEORGETTE DUFRESNE) v. ALLSTATE

PROPERTY AND CASUALTY

INSURANCE COMPANY

(SC 19168)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.

Argued September 19, 2014—officially released January 6, 2015

Gerald S. Sack, with whom, on the brief, was Jonathan A. Cantor, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Joshua O. Balter, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

McDONALD, J. The plaintiff, Michelle Guarino,

administratrix of the estate of Georgette Dufresne,

brought this action against the defendant, Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, to recover

underinsured motorist benefits after she settled other

actions against two motorists whose negligence she

alleged had caused Dufresne’s death. The issue before

this court is whether, under such circumstances, it is

necessary for a trier of fact to apportion fault and damages before coverage may be reduced under Dufresne’s

underinsured motorist policy for amounts paid by or

on behalf of the underinsured motorist, or ‘‘anyone

else responsible.’’

The trial courtrejected that proposition and rendered

summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that Dufresne had no underinsured motorist coverage available because the plaintiff’s recovery of

settlement payments in an aggregate sum in excess of

the policy’s underinsured motorist coverage reduced

her coverage to zero. The Appellate Court affirmed the

judgment. Guarino v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins.

Co., 142 Conn. App. 603, 610–13, 67 A.3d 300 (2013). In

her certified appeal to this court, the plaintiff contends

that the Appellate Court improperly failed to apply binding precedent under which a fact finder must apportion

fault and damages before an insurer’s liability may be

reduced by settlement payments. We conclude that an

underinsured motorist carrier is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law when all alleged tortfeasors settle

the insured’s claims against them for the injuries giving

rise to the underinsured motorist claim in an aggregate

sum in excess of the policy limits. We further conclude

that the apportionment cases on which the plaintiff

relies are inapposite in such circumstances. Accordingly, we affirm the Appellate Court’s judgment.

The issue before us arises in the context of the following undisputed facts. Dufresne died as a result of injuries sustained when her automobile was struck by

another vehicle as she proceeded through an intersection without stopping at a stop sign posted there. The

plaintiff thereafterfiled actions, sounding in negligence,

against Anton Paving, LLC (Anton), and Lombardi Tire

and Auto Repair, LLC (Lombardi), the owners of two

vehicles that she claimed had been parked at the side

of the road in a manner that obstructed Dufresne’s view

of the stop sign.

At the time of the collision, Dufresne carried automobile insurance issued by the defendant that included

coverage for bodily injuries caused by underinsured

motorists. Dufresne’s underinsured motorist coverage

limit was $100,000 per person per accident. The policy

contained the following language: ‘‘The limits of this

coverage will be reduced by . . . all amounts paid by
or on behalf of the owner or operator of the uninsured

auto or underinsured auto or anyone else responsible.’’

The plaintiff commenced the present action against

the defendant after she settled the claim against Anton

in return for a payment of $20,000. The plaintiff alleged

that she was entitled to recover underinsured motorist

benefits under Dufresne’s policy because Anton’s negligence had caused Dufresne’s death and because she

had exhausted Anton’s policy for an amount less than

her policy coverage. Pursuant to the defendant’s

request, the pending action against Lombardi was consolidated with the plaintiff’s action against the defendant. Thereafter, the plaintiff settled the claims against

Lombardi in return for a payment of $225,000. As part

of that settlement, she executed a release similar to

that signed as part of her settlement with Anton. Neither

release included a stipulation of fault; in fact, both

releases disclaimed liability.

Following Lombardi’s settlement, the defendant filed

a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the

plaintiff was not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits because she had received payments from Anton

and Lombardi in an amount that exceeded Dufresne’s

$100,000 policy limit. The plaintiff opposed the motion,

contending that there would have to be a finding of

fault and an apportionment of damages before there

could be any reduction in coverage for Lombardi’s payment. The court agreed with the defendant, granted its

motion and rendered judgment in its favor.

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which

affirmed the judgment. Guarino v. Allstate Property &

Casualty Ins.Co., supra, 142Conn. App. 604. The Appellate Court first determined that the policy provision

setting forth the coverage limitation conformed in all

material respects to insurance regulations governing

that matter. Id., 608–10. It then determined that this

court’s decision in Buell v. American Universal Ins.

Co., 224 Conn. 766, 621 A.2d 262 (1993), supported the

trial court’s conclusion that the defendant was entitled

to summary judgment under the undisputed facts of

the case. Guarino v. Allstate Property & Casualty Ins.

Co., supra, 610–13.

In her certified appeal to this court, the plaintiff contends that the trial court and the Appellate Court

improperly failed to follow Garcia v. ITT Hartford Ins.

Co., 72 Conn. App. 588, 805 A.2d 779 (2002), which she

characterizes as applying the law set forth in Collins

v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 257 Conn. 718, 778 A.2d

899 (2001). She contends that Garcia held that, in a

multitortfeasor context, a set off cannot be had for

money recovered from a settling tortfeasor until a trier

of fact apportions fault and damages. The plaintiff characterizes Garcia as factually and legally indistinguishable from the present case and as implicitly recognizing

that Buell was overruled by Collins. Applying Garcia
to her case, the plaintiff contends that, although a reduction of damages for the $20,000 settlement with Anton

as the underinsured motorist would be proper, it is not

proper or possible to determine whether and to what

extent Lombardi’s settlement may reduce coverage

unless a trier finds that he is ‘‘responsible’’ for

Dufresne’s injuries and apportions damages for Lombardi’s proportionate responsibility.1 We conclude that

the defendant was entitled to summary judgment under

settled legal principles applied in this court’s decisions.

We further conclude that there is no tension between

those cases and the apportionment cases on which the

plaintiff relies.

We first are guided by the underinsured motorist

statutory and regulatory scheme. Under that scheme,

‘‘[a]n insurance company shall be obligated to make

payment to its insured up to the limits of the policy’s

uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage after

the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability

bonds or insurance policies applicable at the time of

the accident have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements . . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 38a-336 (b). ‘‘The limit of the insurer’s

liability may not be less than the applicable limits for

bodily injury liability specified in subsection (a) of section 14-112 of the general statutes [currently $20,000],

except that the policy may provide for the reduction

of limits to the extent that damages have been (A) paid

by or on behalf of any person responsible for the injury

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.) Regs., Conn. State Agencies

§ 38a-334-6 (d) (1) (A); see, e.g., Fahey v. Safeco Ins.

Co. of America, 49 Conn. App. 306, 312, 714 A.2d 686

(1998) (concluding that claimant was not entitled to

recover under policy when trier of fact awarded damages in amount less than settlement). It is undisputed

that Dufresne’s underinsured motorist policy conforms

to these requirements because it reduces the $100,000

limit of coverage for each person in each accident by

‘‘all amounts paid by or on behalf of the owner or

operator of the . . . underinsured auto or anyone

else responsible.’’

It has often been stated that ‘‘[t]he public policy established by the [under]insured motorist statute is that

every insured is entitled to recover for the damages he

or she would have been able to recover if the [under]insured motorist had maintained [an adequate] policy of

liability insurance.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 27,

699 A.2d 964 (1997); accord Gormbard v. Zurich Ins.

Co., 279 Conn. 808, 819, 904 A.2d 198 (2006); Harvey

v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 188Conn. 245, 249, 449 A.2d

157 (1982). However, ‘‘[t]he statute does notrequire that

[under]insured motorist coverage be made available

when the insured has been otherwise protected . . . .

Nor does the statute provide that the [under]insured

motorist coverage shall stand as an independent source
of recovery for the insured, or that the coverage limits

shall not be reduced under appropriate circumstances.

The statute merely requires that a certain minimum

level of protection be provided for those insured under

automobile liability insurance policies . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Orkney v. Hanover Ins. Co.,

248 Conn. 195, 205, 727 A.2d 700 (1999).

The aforementioned parameters and policies are the

same irrespective of whether there is a single tortfeasor

or multiple tortfeasors. In either case, the claimant is

required to exhaust the policies of only one tortfeasor

in orderto recover underinsured benefits. General Accident Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 207, 603 A.2d

385 (1992). This liberal rule, however, does not supersede the insurer’s right under the regulation to limit

coverage by any payments received by the claimant in

settlement of claims for an indivisible injury.

The application of that principle is demonstrated by

our decisions in Buell v. American Universal Ins. Co.,

supra, 224 Conn. 766, and Hartford Casualty Ins. Co.

v. Farrish-LeDuc, 275 Conn. 748, 750–51, 882 A.2d 44

(2005) (Hartford Casualty). In Buell, the claimant

received payments in settlement of actions brought

against two motorists that she claimed had caused her

injuries. Buell v. American Universal Ins. Co., supra,

768. The aggregate sum of the settlements was less

than the claimant’s underinsured motorist coverage.

Id., 768–69. Thereafter, the claimant commenced an

arbitration proceeding against her underinsured motorist carrier. Id., 769. Despite the fact that the arbitral

panel found that one of the two motorists was not at

fault; id.; this court held that the panel properly reduced

the insurer’s liability by the aggregate of both settlements. Id., 773–75. The court rejected the claimant’s

contention that the regulation permitting an insurer to

reduce its liability by amounts paid ‘‘by or on behalf of

any party responsible for the injury’’ was inapplicable

to the settlement by the motorist found by the panel

not to be at fault. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 773–74. The court reasoned that the liability of the

settling motorists was never formally litigated, as they

were not parties to the arbitration. Id., 774. The court

further reasoned that permitting the reduction of the

insurer’s liability by both motorists’ settlement payments was supported by the dual legislative intent of

providing a minimum level of protection to underinsured motorists while also preventing double recovery

on the part of the insured. Id., 775.

Hartford Casualty followed the rationale of Buell.

In Hartford Casualty, the claimant had $600,000 in

underinsured motorist coverage at the time she was

injured in an accident allegedly caused by two motorists. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Farrish-LeDuc,

supra, 275 Conn. 751. The claimant’s action against one

motorist was withdrawn after the case settled for a
total payment of $127,835.30. Id., 752. That payment

exhausted that motorist’s insurance policy limits, thus

allowing the claimant to file a claim for underinsured

motorist benefits. Id., 752–53. The claimant’s action

against the second motorist was dismissed because it

had been brought after the statute of limitations

expired. Id., 752. Thereafter, the claimant received a

$656,581 payment in settlement of a legal malpractice

action she brought against the law firm representing

her in the dismissed action. Id., 753. In the arbitration

of her underinsured motorist claim, the claimant and

the insurer agreed that her coverage had been reduced

by the underinsured motorist’s settlement but disagreed

whether the law firm’s settlement also reduced coverage. Id. In a subsequent proceeding entertaining

motions to vacate and to confirm the arbitration award,

the parties reserved the question of law to this court

whether the insurer was statutorily entitled to reduce

the limits of the underinsured motorist coverage by the

$656,581 received in settlement of the claimant’s legal

malpractice complaint. Id., 751.

This court characterized the issue as ‘‘essentially distill[ing] to the question of whether that [settlement]

payment constitutes damages ‘paid by or on behalf of

any person responsible for the injury’ within the meaning of [the governing regulation].’’ Id., 758. In answering

that question in the affirmative, the court first determined that the settlement of the legal malpractice claim

was ‘‘the functional equivalent of a payment from [the

motorist’s] insurance carrier.’’ Id., 760; see id., 759–60

(reasoning that malpractice claim would have required

claimant to prove that she would have recovered damages in dismissed action and that damages from malpractice action were same as those that would have

been recovered against motorist had law firm properly

pursued negligence action). Accordingly, the court concluded that there was ‘‘no logical reason to treat the

payments as distinct for purposes of [the regulation].

It is true, of course, that neither [the law firm] nor its

professional liability insurance carrier was responsible

for the injuries that [the claimant] had sustained as

a result of [the motorist’s] negligent operation of his

vehicle. Nevertheless, [the law firm] essentially conceded, by virtue of its settlement payments, that it

had caused the economic harm that flowed from the

accident. To preclude the [insurer] from reducing the

limits of the [claimant’s] uninsured/underinsured

motorist coverage by the $656,581 in settlement payments that the [claimant] had received from [the law

firm’s] professional liability insurer would permit the

[claimant] to recover twice for the same element of

damages, a result that is at odds with the ‘time-honored

rule that an injured party is entitled to full recovery

only once for the harm suffered.’ ’’ (Emphasis added.)

Id., 760–61. The court bolstered its conclusion with the

fact that its resolution of the issue was consistent with
its prior interpretation of the uninsured/underinsured

motorist scheme in cases involving third party settlements, specifically discussing the court’s analysis in

Buell. Id., 761–62.

Thus, Buell and Hartford Casualty collectively stand

for two propositions. First, settlement payments

received in exchange for the relinquishment of a claim

for the damages arising from a motor vehicle accident

constitute a permissible reduction of coverage as a payment ‘‘by or on behalf of any person responsible for

the injury . . . .’’ Regs., Conn. State Agencies § 38a334-6 (d) (1) (A). In other words, the meaning of

‘‘responsible’’ includes persons who assume responsibility for the loss by making a voluntary payment. Cf.

Collins v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra, 257 Conn. 741

(‘‘[w]ithout proof of the negligence of a tortfeasor and

without proof of damages from such negligence or an

inference of negligence and damages that prompts the

uninsured motorist carrier to settle, there can never

be a recovery of uninsured motorist benefits’’ [emphasis

added]); Roy v. Centennial Ins. Co., 171 Conn. 463, 466,

370 A.2d 1011 (1976) (parties agreed that underinsured

motorist coverage would be reduced to zero by aggregate settlements from tortfeasors in excess of such

coverage if insurance regulation permitting reduction

of coverage ‘‘by any amount paid on account of the

bodily injury either by the uninsured motorist himself or

by any other person or organization jointly and severally

liable together with the uninsured motorist for the

bodily injury’’ was valid); Waite v. Godfrey, 106 Cal.

App. 3d 760, 768, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980) (‘‘[a]lthough

there was no special finding of [the hit-and-run driver’s

negligence] made by the trial court, a de facto finding to

that effect was obviously made by . . . [the] plaintiff’s

insurance carrier, as indicated by its payment of $12,000

in settlement of [the] plaintiff’s uninsured motorist

claim’’). The settlement evidences the assumption of

financialresponsibility forthe injury, even if the settling

party cannot be deemed legally responsible for that

injury by virtue of that payment for other purposes.2

Second, the cases reflect that, in the multitortfeasor

context, coverage is reduced by the aggregate sum of

the settlement payments without any relationship to the

tortfeasors’ proportionate fault in causing the accident.

To the extent that the plaintiff claims that Buell was

overruled sub silentio by our decision eight years later

in Collins v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra, 257 Conn.

718, because the two cases cannot be reconciled, she

is mistaken. We first point out that Hartford Casualty,

which relied on Buell as support, was decided four

years after we issued our decision in Collins. More

fundamentally, Collins is readily distinguishable from

Buell. Collins was a negligence action in which settlement had been reached on behalf of only one of two

tortfeasors. See Collins v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra,

721. The issue in Collins was whether the nonsettling
tortfeasor’s statutory right to apportionment was

impacted by the fact that the claim against the second

tortfeasor, an unidentified hit-and-run motorist, had

been settled by the plaintiff’s uninsured motorist carrier

as a proxy for that motorist. Id. The trial court concluded that, because the plaintiff had settled an uninsured motorist claim, the settlement should be treated

as one arising out of a contract action, to which apportionment does not apply. Id., 726. Thus, the trial court

permitted the plaintiff to keep the settlement and to

recover the entire damages award from the nonsettling

tortfeasor. Id. In reversing the trial court’s judgment,

Collins relied on the unremarkable proposition that,

following the legislature’s rejection of joint and several

liability in favor of apportioned liability, a nonsettling

party in a tort action has a statutory right to have the

trier determine his or her proportionate liability. See

id., 727, 729–32 (considering application of General Statutes § 52-572h under plain error doctrine). The court

concluded that apportionment applied irrespective of

the fact that the uninsured motorist carrier had made

the settlement payment because it did so as a surrogate

for the unidentified motorist and therefore should be

viewed as a joint tortfeasor. Id., 743–44; see id., 743

(underscoring significance of fact that insurer was

‘‘brought into the litigation solely to litigate the blameworthiness of the unidentified driver’’ [emphasis in original]); id., 738, 742 (referring to ‘‘hybrid nature of

uninsured motorist coverage’’ when insured’s liability

is predicated on negligence of ‘‘phantom’’ driver).

Because the case had to be remanded to determine

the nonsettling tortfeasor’s proportionate liability, this

court expressly declined to address the tortfeasor’s

claim that it would violate the rule against double recovery to allow the plaintiff to keep the settlement and

the damages award. Id., 726. Nonetheless, the court

determined that the settlement payment would not

directly bear on the tortfeasor’s proportionate liability

because § 52-572h expressly requires the reduction of

damages by a released person’s percentage of negligence. Id., 734–35.

It is clear from this discussion that whether a tortfeasor has a statutory right to pay only his fair share of

damages for injury he or she has caused in part is an

entirely different matter than whether an insurer has

a contractual right to reduce coverage as a result of

payments tortfeasors have made to the claimant. See

Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799, 817, 695

A.2d 1010 (1997) (‘‘The substance of the cause of action

in the first trial was an action in tort; specifically,

whether [the tortfeasor] was liable to the plaintiff for

the negligent operation of his motor vehicle. An action

to recover under an automobile insurance policy, on

the other hand, is not an action in tort but, rather, an

action in contract.’’); Savoie v. Prudential Property &

Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Conn. App. 594, 601–607, 854 A.2d
786 (recognizing distinction for purpose of apportionment), cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932, 859 A.2d 930 (2004);

see also Bovat v. Waterbury, 258 Conn. 574, 601, 783

A.2d 1001 (2001) (‘‘[w]here a joint tortfeasor is entitled

to apportionment, settlements are not deducted dollar

for dollar from the jury verdict’’).

The plaintiff misconstrues the import of two statements in Collins: (1) that ‘‘[a] plaintiff’s settlement with

one tortfeasor in a multitortfeasor context . . . does

not necessarily represent a claimant’s fair, just and reasonable damages but, rather, represents, in part, the

parties’ assessments of the risks of litigation’’; Collins

v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., supra, 257 Conn. 735; and

(2) that ‘‘the legislature, in enacting §§ 52-572h and 38a336, did not intend to create a separate law of damages

for uninsured motorist claims different from that which

exists for traditional negligence awards.’’ Id., 742. Both

statements are correct, but irrelevant to the issue in

the present case, in which all tortfeasors are identified

and have settled the claims against them. Moreover, a

settlement payment may not reflect a full and fair measure of damages, but it undoubtedly serves a compensatory purpose. See Buell v. American Universal Ins.

Co., supra, 224 Conn. 773 (payment made in settlement

of action against alleged tortfeasor ‘‘served two purposes—to avoid litigation of the claim against [the

alleged tortfeasor] and to compensate [the claimant]

for her bodily injuries’’).

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s reliance on the Appellate

Court’s decision in Garcia, in which the Appellate Court

viewed the issue as a variant of the one presented in

Collins, is similarly misplaced. In Garcia, the claimant

sustained injuries in an accident caused by an identified

motorist and an unidentified hit-and-run motorist. Garcia v. ITT Hartford Ins. Co., supra, 72 Conn. App. 589.

In reverse of the facts in Collins, the known tortfeasor

settled in an amount that exceeded the uninsured

motorist coverage, and the claimant brought an action

against the underinsured motorist carrier as a surrogate

for the unidentified motorist. Id., 589–90. The Appellate

Court recognized that the carrier was ‘‘standing in the

shoes of the unidentified tortfeasor, whom the [claimant] has not settled with in any amount.’’ Id., 600. The

court framed the issue before it as ‘‘whether, in a multiple tortfeasor context, the injured party is precluded

as a matter of law from recovering under an uninsured

motorists policy where she has settled with one tortfeasor for an amount greater than the uninsured motorists

coverage against which she is claiming.’’ Id., 594. It

viewed Collins as ‘‘requir[ing], in the multitortfeasor

context, a fact finder to apportion the plaintiff’s damages and that any setoff apply to only a percentage of

the damages rather than to a dollar for dollar reduction.’’ Id., 595. The Appellate Court reasoned that the

order in which a party settles or pursues claims should

not dictate different outcomes. Id., 599. Therefore, it
determined that the claimant had a right to have a trier

of fact apportion the percentage of negligence of the

nonsettling party. Id., 598–99.

We construe Garcia as simply treating the uninsured

motorist carrier as if it were the tortfeasor and applying

the rules of apportionment that apply in the multitortfeasor context. Although the Appellate Court implicitly

questioned whether Collins might impact this court’s

earlier holding in Buell, it nonetheless recognized that

the cases were inapposite. Id., 600. Indeed, in a subsequent case decided by a panel comprised of two of the

three members of the panel in Garcia, the Appellate

Court expressly recognized that the apportionment

analysis in Garcia had no bearing on a case in which

a claimant seeks underinsured motorist benefits after

all tortfeasors have settled. See Savoie v. Prudential

Property & Casualty Ins. Co., supra, 84 Conn. App.

601–607 (holding that recovery barred when payments

from multiple tortfeasors exceeded coverage).3

Ultimately, the plaintiff has confused her right to

recover damages with the right to recover the minimum

guaranteed by underinsured motorist coverage. When

the plaintiff settled her claims with both tortfeasors,

she necessarily relinquished her right to recover damages. All that was left was her right to recover insurance

benefits, if any coverage remained after a reduction for

the settlement payments. To the extent that the plaintiff

complains that she has not been fairly compensated for

the tortfeasors’ negligence, any such deficiency arises

by virtue of her tactical decision to settle both claims

and the resources of the tortfeasors. With respect to

insurance benefits, the plaintiff has gotten exactly what

Dufresne bargained for—a guarantee that she could

recover up to $100,000 for an injury or death resulting

from an accident caused in whole or in part by an

underinsured motorist. Neither the regulatory scheme

nor her policy required more.4

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 The plaintiff does not explain why her coverage can be reduced by her

settlement payment from Anton without a finding of fault and proportionate

responsibility, whereas her settlement payment from Lombardi cannot. It is

unclear, therefore, whether she makes this distinction because her complaint

alleges negligence only by Anton or because she construes the policy limitation and the related regulation as requiring proof of responsibility only as

to someone other than the underinsured motorist. In any event, we conclude

that this distinction is not material to our analysis. To the extent, however,

that the plaintiff’s claim is predicated on the notion that there is a separate

limit of underinsured motorist liability for each tortfeasor, the discussion

that follows indicates that the authority is to the contrary.

2 We note that, in Todd v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 121 Conn. App.

597, 604, 999 A.2d 761, cert. denied, 297 Conn. 929, 998 A.2d 1196 (2010),

the Appellate Court concluded that the claimant’s acceptance of a settlement

payment from a party alleged to be responsible for the tortfeasor’s liability

did not, as a matter of law, establish that party’s liability to the claimant

for purposes of the claimant’s recovery under her own underinsured motorist

conversion coverage. Assuming, without deciding, that this determination

is correct, we find Todd distinguishable from the matter before us. In Todd,

the question was whetherthe claimant had satisfied the statutorily mandated
precondition to coverage, namely, exhaustion of all insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident. Id., 600–601. In the present case, the issue

is not whether the plaintiff is entitled to bring an underinsured motorist

action, but whether her coverage in such an action is reduced by settlement

payments. The latterimplicates the well settled rule barring double recovery;

see Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, supra, 243 Conn. 22 and n.6; a

concern not implicated in Todd. Indeed, Todd makes no mention of Savoie

v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 84 Conn. App. 594, 601–607,

854 A.2d 786, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 932, 859 A.2d 930 (2004), which held

that settlements are payments made by a person ‘‘responsible for the injury’’

within the meaning of § 38a-334-6 (d) (1) of the Regulations of Connecticut

State Agencies.

3 A treatise often cited by this court has criticized Garcia for failing to

clearly distinguish between a reduction of policy limits (the issue in the

present case) and a reduction of damages, and has suggested that ‘‘Savoie

emasculated, if not overruled, the import of Garcia in the context wherein

reduction of policy limits (not damages) is sought.’’ J. Berk & M. Jainchill,

Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage (4th

Ed. 2010) § 4.9.D, pp. 468–70 n.100. We have no occasion in the present

case to clarify or otherwise comment on the merits of Garcia’s reasoning,

as we are not confronted with an unidentified motorist on whose behalf no

settlement has been reached.

4 This court previously held that an underinsured motorist carrier was

not bound by the liability and damages determination obtained by its insured

in an action against the tortfeasor. See Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra,

240 Conn. 810–19 (determining that doctrine of collateral estoppel did not

apply). Nothing in this opinion should be construed to indicate anything to

the contrary.