J-A05013-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

KYRA ELIZABETH KNOLL

Appellee

v.

CHARLES A. KNOLL, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 317 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order January 27, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Civil Division at No(s): FD05-008306-005

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and MOULTON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2017

Appellant, Charles A. Knoll, Jr. (“Husband”), appeals pro se1from the 

order entered in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which denied 

his petition for reimbursement of alimony payments. We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. 

Husband and Appellee Kyra Elizabeth Knoll (“Wife”) married on November 

28, 1998. The parties have three children together. On June 3, 2008, Wife 

filed a divorce complaint seeking, inter alia, equitable distribution, child 

support, sole custody of the parties’ children, alimony, alimony pendente 

lite, and counsel fees. On April 14, 2009, the parties entered into a marital 

settlement agreement, memorialized by a stipulation and order of court, 

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1 Husband is an attorney. 
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regarding matters of equitable distribution, alimony, and child support 

(“Stipulation”). The Stipulation contained the following relevant provisions 

regarding alimony: 

Stipulation And Order Of Court

* * *

6. Beginning May 1st, 2009, Husband shall pay alimony 

to Wife in the amount of $1,000.00 (One-Thousand 

Dollars) per month for a period of 5 years or through & 

including March, 2014[;]

* * *

10. In the event that Wife’s wages exceed $59,999.00 

gross yearly then alimony shall terminate;

11. The parties shall exchange year end wage and income 

information on or about January 31st of each year[;]

* * *

(Stipulation, dated April 14, 2009, at 2 ¶¶ 6, 10-11). On October 31, 2011, 

the court entered a divorce decree, which incorporated for enforcement 

purposes the April 14, 2009 Stipulation. 

On May 18, 2012, Husband filed a petition to terminate alimony, 

arguing the language of the Stipulation mandates termination of alimony 

once Wife begins earning a salary of at least $60,000.00 per year. Husband 

claimed Wife’s April 2012 paystub included year-to-date earnings of 

$24,022.96, projecting an annual salary of $72,068.88. 

By order dated June 11, 2012 and entered June 27, 2012, the court 

denied Husband’s petition to terminate. Specifically, the court stated: 
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Husband’s motion to terminate alimony is denied in that 

[W]ife has not yet earned $60,000.00 per year. However, 

[W]ife shall supply [H]usband with a pay stub which 

includes year to date earnings on July 1, 2012 and every 

three months thereafter so that [H]usband may present a 

motion for modification if appropriate. 

(Findings of Fact, filed June 27, 2012, at 2 ¶8). 

On December 11, 2015, Husband filed the current pro se “petition for 

reimbursement of improperly accepted alimony payments.” Husband 

claimed Wife’s earnings for 2014 exceeded $60,000.00 and she 

“fraudulently” accepted alimony for January through April 2014. Husband 

requested reimbursement of those payments in the amount of $4,000.00, 

plus costs. The court subsequently scheduled a conciliation conference for 

January 27, 2016. 

The court held a conciliation conference on January 27, 2016. Due to 

the nature of the proceeding, the court did not activate the audio recording 

mechanism, so there is no transcript of this proceeding. Following the 

conference, the court denied Husband’s petition for reimbursement. The 

court stated: “[Husband’s] Petition for Reimbursement is Denied as the 

[Stipulation] of April 14, 2009 (and its paragraph 10) was to be applied 

prospectively, not retroactively, thus estopping [Husband] from this claim.” 

(Order, filed January 28, 2016, at 1). 

On February 25, 2016, Husband filed an emergency motion for 

reconsideration. The court denied Husband’s motion on the following 

grounds:
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1. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the 

parties intended any special definition of the word 

“terminate” to apply for purposes of interpreting Paragraph 

10 of their [Stipulation] dated April 14, 2009.

2. Application of the word “terminate” with respect to 

[Husband’s] alimony obligation under the [Stipulation] 

means “come to an end”; contrary to [Husband’s] 

suggestion, it does not mean, “[Wife] becomes 

retroactively ineligible for alimony and must return every 

alimony payment she received for that calendar year.”

3. Had the parties intended some broader definition of 

the word “terminate” to apply to their [Stipulation], they 

should have specified it.

(Order, filed February 25, 2016, at 1). 

Husband timely filed a pro se notice of appeal on February 26, 2016. 

On June 6, 2016, the court ordered Husband to file a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); Husband 

timely complied on June 16, 2016.

Husband raises one issue for our review:

DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT AN ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION AND ERR AS A MATTER OF LAW IN

(ADMITTED PER THE OPINION OF THE [TRIAL] COURT) 

FAILING TO ACTIVATE THE COURT 

TRANSCRIBING/RECORDING MECHANISMS, THEREBY 

RESULTING IN AN INCOMPLETE RECORD AVAILABLE AND 

NECESSARY FOR REVIEW BY THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA AS REQUIRED BY PA.R.A.P. 1921?

(Husband’s Brief at 7). 

Husband argues the court’s failure to activate the recording 

mechanism at the conciliation conference deprived Husband of his right to 

meaningful and proper appellate review. Absent a transcript of the 
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proceeding, Husband asserts the Court is left to speculate about what 

transpired at the conference and what legal basis the trial court relied on to 

reach its decision. Husband suggests this Court cannot rely on the trial 

court’s statement in its opinion that no material dispute existed about what 

happened at the conciliation conference, in the absence of a transcript to 

verify that statement. Husband suggests preparation of a “Statement in 

Absence of Transcript” or an “Agreed Statement of Record” under Pa.R.A.P. 

1923 or 1924 would be an exercise in “utter futility” because the parties 

would likely be unable to agree on what transpired at the conference. 

Husband concludes the court erred by failing to record the conciliation 

conference on his petition for reimbursement, and this Court must remand 

for a new and recorded proceeding.2 We disagree. 

“A settlement agreement between spouses is governed by the law of 

contracts unless the agreement provides otherwise.” Stamerro v. 

Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2005). Interpretation of a 

marital settlement agreement is a question of law. Kraisinger v. 

Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa.Super. 2007). As a general rule: “When 

there are no disputed questions of fact and the issue to be decided is purely 

one of law or policy, a case may be disposed of without resort to an 

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2 Notably, Husband’s sole claim on appeal concerns the trial court’s failure 

to record the conciliation conference. Husband does not assert substantive 

questions about the court’s interpretation of the Stipulation. 
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evidentiary hearing.” Dee-Dee Cab, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 

Com’n, 817 A.2d 593, 598 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003), appeal denied, 575 Pa. 698, 

836 A.2d 123 (2003). 

Instantly, the trial court addressed Husband’s issue as follows:

First, [Husband] argues that this [c]ourt committed 

reversible error and abused its discretion by failing to 

activate the recording mechanism during the [c]ourt’s 

January 27, 2016 conciliation. On December 10, 2015, 

[the court] issued an Order of Court which scheduled a 

“conciliation before newly assigned judge” on the meaning 

of Section 10 of the parties’ [Stipulation]. The Department 

of Court Records’ docket entry for [the] order identified the 

event scheduled for 9:30 a.m. on January 27, 2016 as a 

“hearing,” probably due to the fact that it was scheduled to 

take place in a Family Division courtroom instead of in 

Chambers (as is the local custom when, as here, the 

parties are self-represented). However, in accordance with 

the text of [the December 10, 2015] Order, this [c]ourt 

treated the January 27, 2016 event as a conciliation 

instead of as a hearing, and therefore did not activate the 

courtroom’s electronic recording device. While the [c]ourt 

acknowledges with hindsight that an audio recording of the 

proceedings might have been quite useful, there exists no 

material dispute as to what transpired during the 

conciliation, and the [c]ourt’s failure to electronically 

record it does not constitute reversible error in the 

absence of any such dispute.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed July 12, 2016, at 4) (internal footnotes omitted). 

We see no reason to disrupt the court’s analysis. Initially, Husband 

cites no rule of court or other relevant authority to support his contention 

that the court must record conciliation conferences. See generally Estate 

of Whitley, 50 A.3d 203 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 724, 69 

A.3d 603 (2013) (explaining argument portion of appellate brief must 
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include pertinent discussion of particular point raised along with discussion 

and citation of pertinent authorities; this Court will not consider merits of 

argument which fails to cite relevant case or statutory authority). Further, 

the purpose of the conciliation conference was to interpret the parties’ 

Stipulation, which is a question of law. See Kraisinger, supra; Stamerro, 

supra. Significantly, Husband does not allege that any disputed questions 

of fact existed in this case regarding the Stipulation. Absent disputed 

questions of fact, the court was free to decide the legal issue of whether 

Husband was entitled to reimbursement of alimony payments under the 

Stipulation, without the necessity of an evidentiary hearing.3 See Dee-Dee 

Cab, Inc., supra. Consequently, Appellant’s claim merits no relief. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

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3 Husband’s reliance on Estate of Wolongovich, 489 A.2d 248 (Pa.Super. 

1985) and Mansfield v. Lopez, 432 A.2d 1016 (Pa.Super. 1981) is 

misplaced, where those cases involved the removal of an estate executrix 

and a finding of paternity, respectively. The nature of those cases gave rise 

to material disputes of fact, necessitating a transcript of the underlying 

proceedings for meaningful appellate review. Here, Husband failed to 

identify any material issues of fact regarding the interpretation of the 

Stipulation, which were presented at the conciliation conference. Likewise, 

Husband failed to identify any material dispute about what took place at the 

conciliation conference, so we are free to rely on the trial court’s statement 

in its opinion that there is no material dispute about what transpired at 

the conciliation conference. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/13/2017