U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

Documentation of OMB Review Under Executive Order 12866 

Title of Action: 

Docket#: FRL#: RIN:

This action was submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for review under Executive Order (E.O.) 

12866, titled Regulatory Planning and Review (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993). Whenever EPA makes publicly available 

a regulatory action that was reviewed under E.O. 12866, section 6(a)(3)(E) of the E.O. directs the Agency to also: 

(1) Make available to the public a copy of the information that was provided to OMB’s Office of Information and 

Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review under the E.O., i.e., the text of the draft regulatory action and, if applicable, 

an assessment of the potential costs and benefits, as well as additional information for those actions that are 

determined to be economically significant under the E.O. (Information requirements are described in sections 

6(a)(3)(B) and (C)). 

(2) Identify for the public any substantive changes between the draft submitted to OIRA and the action that was 

subsequently issued, using a method that is complete, clear, and simple. 

(3) Identify for the public those substantive changes made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA.

For this regulatory action, were substantive changes made to information reviewed under E.O. 

12866? [Please check the appropriate answer.]

No. [In the docket, include the information identified in item (1) below.]

Yes. [In the docket, include the information identified in items (1) – (3) below.]

Accordingly, the Agency has included this form and the following information in the public 

docket for this regulatory action: [Please check the appropriate information.]

(1) A copy of the information that was provided to OIRA for review under the E.O. 

(2) Documentation of any substantive changes made to the draft regulatory text that was 

submitted to OIRA when compared with what was subsequently made publicly available.

The documentation is provided on the pages following this form. Changes made at the 

suggestion or recommendation of OIRA, if any, are clearly identified through attribution to 

OIRA. EPA has used one or more of the following methods to note changes: [Select the 

appropriate option(s).]

(a) Redline-Strikeout – A copy of the draft regulatory action submitted, using redlinestrikeout to show the substantive changes that were made.

(b) Hand Markup – A copy of the draft regulatory action submitted, using handwritten notes 

to show the substantive changes that were made.

(c) Note to the file - A document that identifies the substantive changes that were made, 

with page and paragraph references to the draft regulatory action that was submitted.

If you have any questions about this regulatory action or this documentation, please call the 

contact:

Name: Email: Phone: 

Revised 05/05/2010 

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the Clean Air Act, Section

112(r)(7)

EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328 9911-62-OSWER 2050-ZA07

James Belke belke.jim@epa.gov 202-564-8023
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EO12866_Risk Management Program Request for Information 2050-AZ07 RFI FR doc_20140514 redlined 

response to interagency comments_20140714

 6560-50-P 

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

40 CFR Part 68 

[EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328; FRL-XXXX-XX9911-62-OSWER] 

RIN 2050-ZA07 

Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the 

Clean Air Act, Section 112(r)(7) 

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 

ACTION: Request for information. 

________________________________________________________________________

SUMMARY: In response to Executive Order 13650, theThe Environmental Protection Agency 

(EPA)), in response to Executive Order 13650, requests comment on potential revisions to its 

Risk Management Program regulations and related programs. In this Request for Information 

(RFI), the Agency asks for information and data on specific regulatory elements and process 

safety management approaches, and the public and environmental health and safety risks they 

address., and the costs and burdens they may entail. The EPA will use the information received 

in response to this RFI to determineinform what action, if any, it may take. 

DATES: Comments and additional material on this Request for Information must be received 

on or before [INSERT DATE 90 DAYS AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE 

FEDERAL REGISTER]. 
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ADDRESSES: Submit comments and additional materials, identified by docket EPA-HQ-OEM2014-0328 by any of the following methods: 

 http://www.regulations.gov: Follow the on-line instructions for submitting comments. 

 Mail: Send comments to: OSWER Docket, EPA Docket Center, Mail Code 28221T, 

Environmental Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington DC 

20460, Attention Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328. Please include two copies of 

your comments. 

 Hand delivery: Deliver two copies of your comments to: Environmental Protection Agency, 

EPA Docket Center, Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington DC, 

Attention Docket ID No. EPA–HQ–OEM–2014–0328. Such deliveries are only accepted 

during the docket’s normal hours of operation and special arrangements should be made for 

deliveries of boxed information. 

Instructions: Direct your comments to Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328. The 

EPA’s policy is that all comments received will be included in the public docket without change 

and may be made available online at http://www.regulations.gov, including any personal 

information provided, unless the comment includes information claimed to be confidential 

business information (CBI) or other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Do not 

submit information that you consider to be CBI or otherwise protected through 

www.regulations.gov. The http://www.regulations.gov website is an “anonymous access” 

system, which means the EPA will not know your identity or contact information unless you 

provide it in the body of your comment. If you submit an electronic comment, the EPA 

recommends that you include your name and other contact information in the body of your 

comment and with any disk or CD-ROM you submit. If the EPA cannot read your comment due 
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to technical difficulties and cannot contact you for clarification, the EPA may not be able to 

consider your comment. Electronic files should not include special characters or any form of 

encryption and be free of any defects or viruses. For additional information about the EPA’s 

public docket, visit the EPA Docket Center homepage at: http://www.epa.gov/dockets. 

Docket: The EPA has established a docket for this information request under Docket ID 

Number EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328. All documents in the docket are listed in the 

regulations.gov index. Although listed in the index, some information is not publicly available, 

e.g., CBI or other information whose disclosure is restricted by statute. Certain other material, 

such as copyrighted material, will be publicly available only in hard copy. Publicly available 

docket materials are available either electronically in regulations.gov or in hard copy at the EPA 

Docket Center, EPA West, Room 3334, 1301 Constitution Ave., NW, Washington, DC. The 

Public Reading Room is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, excluding 

legal holidays. The telephone number for the Public Reading Room is (202) 566-1744, and the 

telephone number for the EPA Docket Center is (202) 566-1742. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION: For more detailed information on specific aspects of this 

RFI, contact Mr. James Belke, Chemical Engineer, United States Environmental Protection 

Agency, Office of Emergency Management, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 

20460; telephone: (202) 564-8023; email: belke.jim@epa.gov. 

Electronic copies of this RFI and related news releases are available at EPA’s Web page 

at http://www.epa.gov/emergencies. Copies of this RFI are also available at 

http://www.regulations.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Here are the contents of today’s notice. 

I. Background 

A. Statutory Authority 
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B. Executive Order 13650 

C. EPA Risk Management Program Regulations 

II. Discussion and Request for Data, Information, and Comments 

A. Introduction 

B. Potential Costs and Economic Effects of Regulatory and Policy Changes 

C. Items in OSHA’s RFI relevant to EPA’s RMP regulation 

1. Update the List of Regulated substancesSubstances

a. Adding Other Toxic or Flammable Substances 

b. Adding High and/or Low Explosives 

c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate 

d. Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards 

e. Adding Other Categories of Substances 

f. Removing Certain Substances from the List or Raising their Threshold Quantity 

g. ReducingLowering the Threshold Quantity for Substances Currently on the List 

2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements 

3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally 

Accepted Good Engineering Practices 

4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements to Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment 

5. Require Owners and Operators to Manage Organizational Changes 

6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits 

7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability 

D. Additional Items for which EPA Requests Information 

1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis 

2. Emergency Drills to Test a Source’s Emergency Response Program or Plan 

3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances 

4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements 

5. Compliance with Emergency Response Program Requirements in Coordination with 

Local Responders 

6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements 

7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes Involving 

Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together 

8. Public Disclosure of Information to Promote Regulatory Compliance and Improve 

Community Understanding of Chemical Risks 

9. Threshold Quantities and OffsiteOff-site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for 

Regulated Substances Based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity Values 

10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data 

11. The “Safety Case” Regulatory Model 

12. Streamlining RMP Requirements 

I. Background 

A. Statutory Authority

The statutory authority for this action is provided by section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act 

(CAA) as amended (42 U.S.C. 7412(r)) and by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
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to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), (42 U.S.C. 11001 - 11050), which was enacted as Title III of the 

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (Pub. L. 99– 499), (SARA). 

B. Executive Order 13650 

On August 1, 2013, President Obama signed Executive Order 13650, entitled Improving 

Chemical Facility Safety and Security. The executive orderExecutive Order establishes the 

Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group (“Working Group”), co-chaired by the 

Secretary of Homeland Security, the Administrator of EPA, and the Secretary of Labor or their 

designated representatives at the Assistant Secretary level or higher, and composed of senior 

representatives of other Federal departments, agencies, and offices. The Executive Order 

requires the Working Group to carry out a number of tasks whose overall aim is to prevent 

chemical accidents, such as the explosion that occurred at the West Fertilizer facility in West, 

Texas, on April 17, 2013. 

Section 6 of the Executive Order is entitled “Policy, Regulation, and Standards 

Modernization”, and among other things, requires certain federal agencies to consider possible 

changes to existing chemical safety and security regulations. Specifically, section 6(e)(ii) of the 

Executive Order requires the Secretary of Labor to issue a RFI designed to identify issues related 

to modernization of the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard and related standards 

necessary to meet the goal of preventing major chemical accidents. The Occupational Safety and 

Health Administration (OSHA) published a RFI responsive to this portion of the order on 

December 9, 2013 (78 FR 73756).; http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-12-09/pdf/2013-

29197.pdf ). The OSHA RFI requested information on 17 potential policy and rulemaking topics 

relating to modernization of the PSM standard and other related OSHA standards. 
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While Executive Order 13650 does not requirespecifically direct EPA to publish a similar 

RFI, EPA believes it is an appropriate step for several reasons. First, section 6(a)(i) of the order 

requires the Working Group to develop options for improved chemical facility safety and 

security that identify “improvements to existing risk management practices through agency 

programs, private sector initiatives, Government guidance, outreach, standards, and regulations.” 

With regard to EPA specifically, section 6(c) of the order requires the Administrator of EPA and 

the Secretary of Labor to “review the chemical hazards covered by the Risk Management 

Program (RMP) and the Process Safety Management Standard (PSM) and determine if the RMP 

or PSM can and should be expanded to address additional regulated substances and types of 

hazards.” Information collected through this action will inform the results of this review. 

Second, the EPA RMP regulation incorporates by designclosely tracks the accident 

prevention measures contained in the OSHA PSM standard because Section 112(r)(7)(D) of the 

CAA requires EPA to coordinate the RMP regulation with “any requirements established for 

comparable purposes” by OSHA. Consequently, the OSHA PSM standard and EPA RMP 

regulation are closely aligned in content, policy interpretations, Agency guidance, and 

enforcement. Since the inception of these regulations, EPA and OSHA have coordinated closely 

on their implementation in order to minimize regulatory burden and avoid conflicting 

requirements for regulated facilities. For example, owners and operators of RMP-covered 

processes also subject to the OSHA PSM standard will generally have met their RMP accident 

prevention program obligations if they have properly implemented their PSM program. This RFI 

will allow EPA to evaluate any potential actionupdates to the RMP regulation in parallel to 

OSHA’s actions onOSHA’sevaluation of potential updates to the PSM standard. Lastly, this RFI 
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addresses a number of added topics in which the Agency is interested that are not raised in the 

OSHA RFI. 

Lastly, this RFI addresses a number of added topics the Agency is interested in that are 

not raised in the OSHA RFI. 

Topics are divided into two categories – those addressed in parallel to the OSHA RFI, 

and additional topics not raised by OSHA. Readers are encouraged to review the OSHA RFI in 

detail, as this notice does not always reiterate OSHA’s full justification on the same or similar 

topics. 

Information collected under this RFI will inform EPA as it considers what actions, if any, 

may be necessary to update the RMP regulations. It does not commit the Agency to rulemaking. 

If the Agency elects to undertake rulemaking, it will do so in accordance with established 

rulemaking procedures as set forth in the Clean Air Act section 307(d), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d). 

C. EPA Risk Management Program Regulations 

Both EPA’s 40 CFR part 68 RMP regulation1 and OSHA’s 29 CFR 1910.119 PSM 

standard were authorized in the Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments of 1990 (1990 CAAA), in 

response to a number of catastrophic chemical accidents occurring worldwide that had resulted 

in public and worker fatalities and injuries, environmental damage, and other community 

impacts. OSHA published the PSM standard in 1992 (57 FR 6356, February 24, 1992), as 

required by section 304 of the 1990 CAAA, using its authority under 29 U.S.C. 653. 

                                                            

1 40 CFR part 68 is titled, “Chemical Accident Prevention Provisions,” but is more commonly known as the “RMP

regulation,” the “Risk Management Program,” or “the RMP.”  The RMP may also refer to the document required to

be submitted under subpart F of 40 CFR part 68, the Risk Management Plan.  This document generally uses RMP or

Risk Management Program to refer to 40 CFR part 68. See http://www.epa.gov/oem/content/rmp/ for more

information on the Risk Management Program.
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The 1990 CAAA added to the accidental release provisions under CAA section 112(r). 

The statute required EPA to develop a list of at least 100 regulated substances for accident 

prevention and related thresholds (CAA section 112(r)(3)-(5)), authorized accident prevention 

regulations (CAA section 112(r)(7)(A)), and required EPA to develop “reasonable regulations” 

requiring facilities with over a threshold quantity (TQ) of a regulated substance to undertake 

accident prevention steps and submit a “risk management plan” to various local, state, and 

federal planning entities (CAA section 112(r)(7)(B)). 

EPA published the RMP regulation in two stages. The Agency published the list of 

regulated substances and TQs in 1994 (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994) (the “list rule”)2

 and 

published the RMP final regulation, containing risk management requirements for covered 

sources, in 1996 (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996)).3.

,4 Both the OSHA PSM standard and the EPA 

RMP regulation aim to prevent or minimize the consequences of accidental chemical releases 

through implementation of management program elements that integrate technologies, 

procedures, and management practices. In addition to requiring implementation of management 

program elements, the RMP regulation requires covered sources to submit a document 

summarizing the source’s risk management program – called a risk management plan – to EPA. 

The RMP regulation required covered sources to comply with its requirements and submit initial 

risk management plans to EPA by June 21, 1999. 

The RMP establishes three “program levels” for regulated processes: 

                                                            

2 Documents and information related to development of the list rule can be found in the EPA docket for the

rulemaking, docket number A‐91‐74. 3 Documents and information related to development of the RMP regulation can be found in EPA docket number

A‐91‐73. 4 The 40 CFR Part 68 RMP regulations apply to owners and operators of stationary sources that have more than a

TQ of a regulated substance within a process.  The regulations do not apply to chemical hazards other than listed

substances held above a TQ within a regulated process.   
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Program level 1 applies to processes that would not affect the public in the case of a 

worst-case release and with no accidents with specific offsiteoff-site consequences within the 

past five years. Program 1 imposes limited hazard assessment requirements and minimal 

prevention and emergency response requirements. 

Program level 2 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 or subject to Program 3, 

and imposes streamlined prevention program requirements, including safety information, hazard 

review, operating procedures, training, maintenance, compliance audits, and incident 

investigation elements. Program 2 also imposes additional hazard assessment, management, and 

emergency response requirements. 

Program level 3 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 and either subject to 

OSHA's PSM standard under federal or state OSHA programs or classified in one of ten 

specified North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes listed at 40 CFR 

68.10(d)(1). Program 3 imposes elements nearly identical to those in OSHA’s PSM standard as 

the accident prevention program. The Program 3 prevention program includes requirements 

relating to process safety information, process hazard analysis, operating procedures, training, 

mechanical integrity, management of change, pre-startup review, compliance audits, incident 

investigations, employee participation, hot work permits, and contractors. Program 3 also 

imposes additionalthe same hazard assessment, management, and emergency response 

requirements that are required for Program 2. 

EPA believes the RMP regulation has been effective in preventing and mitigating 

chemical accidents in the United States and protecting human health and the environment from 

chemical hazards. However, major incidents, such as the West, Texas explosion, highlight the 

importance of reviewing and evaluating current practices and regulatory requirements, and 
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applying lessons learned to continuously advance process safety management where needed. 

This RFI seeks public input on process safety and risk management issues relevant to the RMP 

regulation to inform potential actions that may further reduce the number of chemical accidents 

within the United States. 

II. Discussion and Request for Data, Information, and Comments 

A. Introduction 

This section discusses each RMP item and provides specific questions to collect data, 

information, and comments. The Agency invites the public to respond to any questions for which 

they have specific knowledge, data, or information, regardless of their involvement in RMPcovered operations. Note that at several points in this document, we discuss whether modifying, 

clarifying, strengthening, or making more explicit a requirement is an appropriate way to address 

an issue. The solicitation of comment on these matters should not be read as EPA, OSHA, the 

Department of Justice, or any other federal entity admitting or acknowledgingsuggesting legal

ambiguity in the relevant regulations or recognizing ana particular interpretation or action of a 

facility owner or operator is permissible underby any regulated entity of either CAA section 

112(r) or the RMP regulation. For purposes of this comment solicitation, we may treat a 

subjectexploration of ways to further clarify particular aspects of the current regulations should 

not be viewed as potentially requiring modifiedan indication that the current language oris 

inadequate, or in any way undermines our ability to enforce these regulations as an addition to 

the RMP regulation when we already view the RMP regulation as addressing the subjectwritten. 

B. Potential Costs and Economic Effects of Regulatory and Policy Changes 

As part of this RFI, the Agency is requesting data and information on the potential costs 

and economic impacts of amending regulatory requirements relevant to the various issues 
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identified, including any possible significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. EPA requests that commenters discuss potential economic impacts, whenever possible, 

in terms of quantitative benefits (e.g., reductions in injuries, fatalities, and property damage), 

costs (e.g., compliance costs, including paperwork burden, or decreases in production), and 

offsets to costs (e.g., less need for maintenance and repairs, less loss or waste of product) when 

responding to the questions in this RFI. EPA also requests that commenters provide data and 

information on economic effects that any amendments may have on market conditions or 

services (e.g., market structure and concentration), and in particular, any special circumstances 

related to small entities, such as potential market-structure disruptions or uniquely high costs that 

small entities may bear. 

EPA requests that commenters discuss economic impacts in as specific terms as possible. 

For example, if a regulatory or policy change would necessitate additional employee training, 

then helpful information would include the following: the training courses necessary; the types 

of employees or contractors who would receive the training; topics covered; any retraining 

necessary; and the training costs if conducted by a third-party vendor or in-house trainer. The 

Agency invites comment on the time and level of expertise required to implement potential 

regulatory or policy changes discussed in this RFI, even if dollar-cost estimates are not available. 

For discussion of equipment-related costs, EPA requests that commenters estimate relevant 

factors, such as purchase price, cost of installation, cost of equipment maintenance, cost of 

training, and expected life of the equipment. The Agency also requests that, when responding to 

the questions in this RFI, commenters discuss any disproportionate impacts to communities near 

chemical facilities, particularly with respect to economically distressed, low-income, or 

predominantly minority communities. For example, disproportionate impacts could be changes 
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that affect the number of local residents employed at a facility or the number of residents 

affected by a release from a facility. Commenters should also include specific information about 

any technical feasibility issues or implementation challenges associated with any of the possible 

revisions discussed in thie RFI. EPA also welcomes input on which potential amendments to 

regulatory requirements should be given priority for further development over any others along 

with the basis for such prioritization. For example, identify those issues posing a greater safety 

risk than others; those requiring less time or effort to amend; those with less costs to industry; or 

other reasons. 

C. Items in OSHA’s RFI relevant to EPA’s RMP regulation 

This section discusses items that are the same or related to items in the OSHA RFI that 

could also apply to or affect the RMP regulation. Each item discussion is followed by specific 

questions to collect data, information, and comments on each issue.item

1. Update the listList of regulated substancesRegulated Substances

Section 112(r)(3) of the 1990 CAAA authorized EPA to develop a list of at least 100 

substances which, in the case of an accidental release, are known to cause or may reasonably be 

anticipated to cause death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or to the 

environment. EPA was required to use, but was not limited to, the list of extremely hazardous 

substances (EHSs) published under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act 

(EPCRA), with modifications as appropriate. The initial list was also to include 16 substances 

specified by statute. EPA was to consider the following criteria: 1) the severity of any acute 

adverse health effects associated with accidental releases of the substances; 2) the likelihood of 

accidental releases of the substances; and 3) the potential magnitude of human exposure to 
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accidental releases of the substances. The TQ for each substance was to account for the toxicity, 

reactivity, volatility, dispersibility, combustibility, or flammability of the substance, and the 

amount that if accidentally released could cause death, injury or serious adverse effects on 

human health. The list may not include any air pollutant for which a national primary ambient 

air quality standard has been established (except anhydrous sulfur dioxide which is required by 

statute to be included on the list), nor any CAA title VI stratospheric ozone pollutants. The list 

may be revised by EPA or by petition and it must be reviewed at least every 5 years. 

The August, 1999 Chemical Safety Information, Site Security and Fuels Regulatory 

Relief Act amended section 112(r)(4) of the CAA to exempt from RMP reporting “a flammable 

substance when used as a fuel or held for sale as a fuel at a retail facility... because of the 

explosive or flammable properties of the substance, unless a fire or explosion caused by the 

substance will result in acute adverse health effects from human exposure to the substance, 

including the unburned fuel or its combustion byproducts, other than those caused by the heat of 

the fire or impact of the explosion.” However, flammable substances used as a feedstock or held 

for sale as fuel at a wholesale facility are still covered. 

The list now consists of two categories of chemicals – 77 toxic substances and 63 

flammable substances. The regulated substances and TQs are found in 40 CFR 68.130. The list 

of toxic substances is based on a subset of the EHS acute toxics found in 40 CFR part 355. The 

RMP list of substances was further limited to gases and volatile liquids (vapor pressure equal to 

or greater than 10 mm of mercury (Hg) at 25°C), focusing accident prevention regulations on 

those chemicals that were more likely to become airborne and have an adverse effect beyond a 

facility’s fence line in the event of an accidental release. 
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Flammable gases and volatile flammable liquids with the National Fire Protection 

Association (NFPA) flammability ratings of 4 (i.e., gases and liquids having a flash point below 

73°F (22.8°C) and a boiling point below 100°F (37.8°C)) were listed. Only chemicals in 

commercial production were included on the list and several non-EHS toxic chemicals were 

listed based on high production volumes and accident history. Most of the sixteen substances 

mandated by statute were also identified bythrough the listing criteria for toxic or flammable 

substances. 

The 1994 final list rule included as covered chemicals, any “high explosives” which were 

explosives classified by the Department of Transportation (DOT) as Class 1, Division 1.1 and 

listed as such in 49 CFR 172.101 (the Hazardous Materials Table). Subsequently, the explosives 

were deleted from coverage in 1998 (63 FR 640, January 6, 1998)5

. due to settlement of 

litigation with the Institute for Manufacturers of Explosives (IME) (discussed in more detail 

below). 

EPA is requesting information on whether the Agency should modify the list of regulated 

substances by: 

 Adding other toxic or flammable substances 

 Adding high and/or low explosives 

 Adding ammonium nitrate 

 Adding reactive substances and reactivity hazards 

 Adding other categories of substances 

 Removing certain substances from the list or raising their TQ 

                                                            

5 Documents and information related to deleting explosives from the list of RMP‐regulated substances can be

found in EPA docket number A‐96‐08.
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 ReducingLowering the TQ for substances currently on the list 

Each of these areas is briefly discussed below. 

a. Adding otherOther Toxic or Flammable Substances 

EPA is interested in identifyingdetermining whether there are other substances that meet 

the established acute toxicity or flammability criteria for listing, are in commerce, and are 

present in sufficient quantities that would present a risk to the community if accidentally 

released. 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

i. What other chemical lists or other sources of information should be reviewed to 

identify acutely toxic or flammable chemicals meeting the RMP listing criteria? 

ii. What chemicals, if any, should EPA add to the RMP list of regulated toxic and 

flammable substances? Please provide references to the acute toxicity studies, 

sources of flammability information or summary results of such studies, information 

showing that the chemical meets the listing criteria or incident examples of incidents

related to the hazards associated with the chemicals. 

iii. Please provide any information on the annual amount of the individual substance 

manufactured, imported or used, the extent of its availability in commerce and the 

typetypes of U.S. industries that manufacture, import, or use the substance. 

iv. What would be the economic impacts of adding other toxic or flammable chemicals 

to the RMP list of substances? Are there any special circumstances involving small 

entities that EPA should consider with respect to adding such chemicals to the RMP 

list of substances? 

b. Adding High and/or Low Explosives 
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In light of the April 17, 2013 explosion in West, Texas involving ammonium nitrate (AN) 

fertilizer, EPA is consideringreconsidering whether it should revisit listinginclude explosives on 

the RMP list. EPA listed high explosives on the RMP list in 1994 but removed them on January 

6, 1998 (63 FR 640). Some forms of AN formulated as explosives would have been covered 

under the 1994 RMP list rule, but the rule would not have included AN fertilizer, which was not 

classified as and was not intendedIn addition to function as an explosive. However, the 

explosion at West Fertilizer highlighted the explosive properties of AN fertilizer under certain 

conditions (heat, shock, contamination and/or confinement) and its potential to adversely impact 

communities if it decomposes and detonates. Thisraising concerns about AN, this accident has 

shifted attention to how well facilities handling other potentially explosive materials are 

safeguarding communities from their hazards and whether emergency responders are prepared to 

deal with accidents involving such materials, whether or not they are designed to be used as 

explosives. This subsection of the RFI addresses explosives other than AN - Further discussion 

of regulating AN, including AN fertilizer, is covered later in this section.

EPA listed high explosives on the RMP list in 1994 but removed them on January 6, 

1998 (63 FR 640) (see discussion below regarding settlement of litigation with IME). 

The 1994 final RMP list rule (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994) included Division 1.1 

explosives - a category of high explosives defined by DOT classification. DOT Division 1.1 

explosives are those that present a mass explosion hazard, which is an explosion that affects 

almost the entire load instantaneously. Explosives were initially listed because of their potential 

to cause offsiteoff-site effects from blast waves. In addition, EPA believed that potential gaps 

existed in emergency planning and response communication that made risk management 

planning appropriate for sources with explosives. 
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EPA chose to list only DOT Division 1.1 explosives because EPA's analysis indicated 

that low explosives, which primarily pose a fire hazard rather than a mass explosion hazard, were 

less likely to cause a catastrophic event when compared to the same quantity of high explosives. 

The deflagration or burning of a low explosive generates lower pressures and is less destructive 

than the detonation of a high explosive, although the Agency recognized that it may be possible 

for some low explosives to detonate under unusual conditions, with effects similar to the 

detonation of a high explosive. The DOT Division 1.1 explosives were listed because of their 

potential to readily detonate, causing offsiteoff-site impacts. High explosives were listed as a 

class, rather than as individual substances, because explosives are usually mixtures or 

formulations rather than specific chemicals. An individual chemical could be a component of a 

high explosive or a low explosive, or could be non-explosive, depending on various factors, such 

as particle size, concentration, and other components of the formulation. 

The Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) petitioned for judicial review challenging 

the final listing of high explosives (IME v. EPA, D.C. Cir. No. 94-1276). Among IME’s 

objections to the rule, it argued were that existing regulations by the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), DOT, Mine Safety and Health Administration 

(MSHA), and OSHA already adequately regulated DOT Division 1.1 explosives. In a settlement 

with IME, the Agency agreed to propose delisting explosives and IME agreed to undertake 

certain measures to enhance local emergency response and dismiss its case if EPA ultimately 

delisted high explosives (61 FR 13858, March 28, 1996). The measures that IME agreed to take 

included the following: 
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 IME member companies would post at their facilities warning signs at all normal 

access routes stating, ‘‘Danger. Never Fight Explosive Fires. Explosives are stored on 

this site,’’ and providing an emergency phone number. 

 Whenever a new Division 1.1 commercial explosives storage or manufacturing 

location is established at a temporary job site, IME member companies wouldwill

notify Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and other local authorities 

(e.g., fire departments and law enforcement agencies) of the type, quantity, and 

location of explosives on site. 

 At Division 1.1 commercial explosives storage or manufacturing locations with 5,000 

pounds or more of Division 1.1 explosives (not including temporary job sites) where 

preparation of emergency response plans is not already required, IME member 

companies would prepare emergency response plans, notify LEPCs and other local 

authorities of the type, quantity, and location of explosives on site, provide the 

emergency response plans to local emergency responders, and respond to reasonable 

requests for information from said authorities. 

 IME member companies also would inform their customers and IME would inform 

other non-IME commercial explosives manufacturers of the contents of the 

Settlement Agreement and the actions to be taken. 

EPA proposed to delist high explosives from the RMP list on April 15, 1996 (61 FR 

16598) and removed high explosives in a January 6, 1998 final rule (63 FR 640). Both rules 

have discussion in theirThe preambles ofto both rules discuss the measures IME was to take to 

enhance local emergency response. 
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Even after the removal of high explosives from the RMP list, most forms of explosives 

(not just high explosives) remainedremain subject to hazardous chemical inventory reporting 

requirements under EPCRA. The owner or operator of any facility with more than a reporting 

threshold of any hazardous chemical requiring a safety data sheet (formerly material safety data 

sheet) under the OSHA Hazard Communication Standard is required to submit safety data sheets 

to their State Emergency Response Commission (SERC), LEPC, and local fire department, and 

to annually report their inventory of hazardous chemicals to their SERC, LEPC, and local fire 

department.6

 This information should better prepare local authorities to respond to emergencies 

at facilities that handle hazardous chemicals, including explosives. 

ATF regulates “explosive materials” which are defined as explosives, blasting agents, 

water gels and detonators. Explosive materials include, but are not limited to, all items in the 

“List of Explosive Materials,” which is published annually7. 

ATF regulations8 provide specific construction requirements for storage of explosive 

materials in magazines and limit the amount of these materials that can be stored in each 

magazine. Such magazines must be regularly inspected and meet the Table of Distance 

requirements which specify distances that the materials must be stored away from inhabited 

buildings, public highways, and passenger railways, to ensure an accidental explosion will not 

produce blast waves that are hazardous to people at distances where the public could be affected. 

ATF inspects licensed facilities to ensure the safe and secure storage of explosives, their proper 

                                                            

6 See 40 CFR part 370 7 The 2013 List of Explosive Materials can be found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR‐2013‐10‐28/pdf/2013‐

25370.pdf

8 27 CFR 555, Subpart K
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inventory and control, and accurate recordkeeping. However, ATF does not inspect or regulate 

manufacturing processes.9

OSHA regulates the manufacture, keeping, having, storage, sale, transportation, and use 

of explosives and blasting agents under its Occupational Safety and Health Standards for 

explosives and blasting agents (29 CFR 1910.109). Section 1910.109(k)(2) of this standard also 

requires that explosive manufacturers meet the requirements of the PSM standard (29 CFR 

1910.119). OSHA regulations also provide construction requirements for explosive materials 

storage magazines and specify minimum distances between magazines with explosives and 

blasting agents, between stores of AN and blasting agents, and between blasting agents and 

inhabited buildings, passenger railroads, and public highways.

Regulations involving the storage of all grades of AN, including fertilizer grade, but not 

blasting agents, are found at 29 CFR 1910.109(i). 

Significant accidents involving explosives have raised questions concerning whether 

existing safety regulations are adequate. An April 8, 2011 explosion at Donaldson Enterprises in 

Waikele, Hawaii, killed five workers who were disposing of fireworks. The U.S. Chemical 

Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigated the explosion and determined that 

gaps in federal regulations – specifically with regard to dismantling and disposal of explosives – 

contributed to the accident10. The January 7, 1998, explosion at the Sierra Chemical Company’s 

Kean Canyon explosives manufacturing plant prompted the state of Nevada to develop 

regulations covering certain explosives manufacturing facilities under the state’s Chemical 

Accident Prevention Program11, which is similar to EPA’s RMP regulation. 

                                                            

9 Sierra Chemical Co. Final Investigation Report, CSB, 9‐23‐1988. 10 CSB Report No. 2011‐06‐I‐HI 11 http://ndep.nv.gov/bapc/capp/capmore.html
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EPA is seeking information relating to the potential regulation of explosives under the 

RMP. EPA requests information on the following questions: 

i. Should EPA reconsider listing explosives on the RMP list? What are the safety gaps in 

the current regulatory environmentregulations and practice (e.g., EPCRA, other 

federal programs, state programs, and industry efforts) that can best be filled by 

expansion of the RMP? Are there other approaches for filling any such safety gaps? 

What type of explosive materials should be covered and why? How many facilitlies 

manufacture, store or use explosives and what are the typical quantities stored on-site 

by type of facility or industry? What TQs should be established, and what should be 

the basis for the TQs? If EPA were to list explosives and establish a TQ at 5000 

pounds (the same TQ that was established for explosives in the 1994 list rule), how 

many facilities would exceed that TQ and potentially be regulated? 

ii. Are there other incidents involving the manufacture and processing of explosive 

materials that should be reviewed to determine if covering these operations under the 

RMP would decrease the risk of an accidental explosion affecting the off-site 

communityan off-site community? Does the presence of explosives impose unique 

risks on rural, disadvantaged, or otherwise environmentally burdened communities? 

iii. Should the RMP regulation apply to manufacturers of explosives, end users, and/or 

explosive recyclers? 

iv. If the RMP regulation is amended to cover explosives, should EPA consider 

establishing requirements for safe separation distances between explosive materials 

and public receptors similar to those required by ATF and OSHA (see section II.D.4 

of this RFI for additional discussion of stationary source location requirements)? 
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What other requirements should EPA consider? Which if any of these requirements 

could have prevented or minimized the impacts of specific historical accidents?

v. What would be the economic impacts of adding explosives to the RMP list of 

substances? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA 

should consider with respect to adding explosives to the RMP list of substances? 

Does the presence of explosives impose unique risks on rural, disadvantaged, or 

otherwise environmentally burdened communities?

vi. As an alternative to expanding the scope of the RMP, would expanded use of EPCRA 

information (such as better integration of information on explosive hazards into local 

emergency plans) and other governmental and industry programs (including 

voluntary programs) be able to address safety gaps? What are the advantages and 

disadvantages of such an approach relative to expansion of the RMP? 

c. Adding Ammonium Nitrate:

As previously discussed, EPA listed high explosives on the RMP list in 1994 but 

removed them on January 6, 1998 (63 FR 640). Some forms of AN formulated as explosives 

would have been covered under the 1994 RMP list rule, but the rule would not have included AN 

fertilizer, which was not classified as and was not intended to function as an explosive. 

However, the explosion at West Fertilizer has highlighted the explosive properties of AN 

fertilizer under certain conditions (heat, shock, contamination and/or confinement) and its 

potential to adversely impact communities if it decomposes and detonates. 

Industry manufactures millions of tons of AN annually in the United States. High-density 

or fertilizer-grade AN, with Chemical Abstracts Service Registry Number (CASRN) 6484-52-2, 

is commonly used in fertilizer; low-density or technical-grade AN is used to manufacture 
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explosives or blasting agents. Approximately 80% of AN is used in explosives and blasting 

agents and 20% is used as a fertilizer. 

Blasting agents are relatively low sensitivity explosives which cannot be initiated by 

blasting caps and are unlikely to explode except under special conditions. A blasting agent is a 

fuel plus oxidizer, intended for blasting, and not otherwise classified as an explosive. Blasting 

agents are frequently formulated with AN as the oxidizer.

Ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO or AN/FO) is a blasting agent widely used in coal 

mining, quarrying, metal mining, and civil construction. Mining and construction sites that use 

ANFO may not be as likely to have explosions adversely affecting the public because they are 

often remote.

 AN has an NFPA instability rating of 3, indicating it is capable of detonation, explosive 

decomposition, or explosive reaction; ignition requires a strong initiating source or heating the 

substance under confinement. Stored AN is generally stable, but explosions of AN can be severe 

and have resulted in many injuries and fatalities. 

There are several examples of accidents involving AN. As discussed earlier, on April 17, 

2013, an AN explosion at the West Fertilizer Company storage and distribution facility in West, 

Texas involving about 30 tons of AN killed 15 people and injured over 160 others. As an initial 

action, EPA and its partner agencies OSHA and ATF issued an updated chemical advisory on the 

safe storage, handling, and management of AN.12 

The deadliest industrial accident in United States history was an AN explosion in Texas 

City, Texas, on April 16, 1947. In that case, the initial explosion of a ship carrying AN, and the 

                                                            

12 Chemical Advisory: Safe Storage, Handling, and Management of Ammonium Nitrate, EPA 550‐S‐13‐001,

published by EPA, OSHA, and ATF, August, 2013.  http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/AN_advisory.pdf
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subsequent chain reaction of fires and explosions in other ships and nearby oil-storage facilities, 

killed at least 581 people and injured thousands of others. The AN was coated with wax, a 

combustible material, to prevent caking. New process technologies and safe practices introduced 

in the 1950s eliminated the use of wax coatings and AN currently produced for fertilizer use 

contains less than 0.2 percent combustible material. Ammonium nitrate with more than 0.2 

percent combustible substances is now regulated by DOT as an explosive material with specific 

storage requirements and restrictions in cargo vessels.

On September 21, 2001, a massive explosion occurred in a warehouse at the Azote de 

France fertilizer factory in Toulouse, France, involving 200-300 tons of AN, which was stored in 

bulk in a hangar. The explosion resulted in the death of 30 people, 2,500 injuries, the destruction 

of the factory, and an additional 10,000 buildings being heavily damaged. The exact cause of this 

accident remains unknown. Storage of incompatible material with AN is believed to have been a 

factor. 

On December 13, 1994 at Terra Industries in Port Neal, Iowa, AN solution exploded in a 

neutralizer vessel in a manufacturing process that was in standby mode, causing four deaths13. 

The blast resulted in major plant damage, including damage to on-site ammonia tanks, creating 

an ammonia cloud that resulted in the evacuation of 2,500 people. 

EPA is requesting information on how to best address the safe storage, handling and risk 

management of AN. Despite its widespread use as an explosive and as a fertilizer, AN 

explosions are rare, but when they do occur, can result in deaths, injuries, and extensive property 

damage. 

                                                            

13 http://www.epa.gov/oem/docs/chem/cterra.pdf
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Currently, AN is not a listed substance under the RMP regulation. 29 CFR part 

1910.109(k)(2) requires that the manufacture of explosives shall also meet the requirements 

contained in §1910.119, thus manufacturing of explosives containing AN would be covered 

under PSM regulations. OSHA does not regulate AN storage and handling by distributors and 

users under the PSM standard., but it does regulate certain processes and activities involving AN 

under other specific standards (see below). Therefore, under federal regulations, AN 

distributors, such as bulk fertilizer retailers, are not required to implement any RMP or PSM 

accident prevention program elements (such as conducting a process hazard analyses, developing 

written operating procedures, etc.), perform an off-site consequence analysis, or develop an 

emergency action plan or emergency response plan. 

ATF regulates the storage and handling of AN as an explosive material (either as part of 

an explosive or as a blasting agent) (27 CFR 555.201-224). The ATF regulations specify 

construction requirements for storage magazines, limitations on the type and amount of material 

that can be stored in each type of magazine and minimum distances that must be maintained 

between AN in explosive materials and public receptors and between AN and explosives and 

blasting agents. 

OSHA regulates the storage and, handling, and transportation of AN when it is used in 

explosives, water slurries, gels or blasting agents (29CFR 1910.109 (a) – (h), (j), (k)) or when 

stored on-site with explosives or blasting agents, including their storage at use sites and mixing 

and packaging operations. The requirements detail various procedures and safeguards that must 

be followed for these operations. The OSHA standard requires minimum specified separation 

distances between AN and explosives or blasting agents stored on the same site. Construction 
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requirements for buildings and bulk storage bins containing blasting agents (which can contain 

AN) are also specified. 

OSHA also regulates bulk storage of AN over 1000 pounds in a building or structure in 

the form of crystals, flakes, grains, or prills including fertilizer grade, dynamite grade, nitrous 

oxide grade, technical grade, and other mixtures, but not blasting agents, containing 60 percent, 

or more, AN by weight, in 29 CFR 1910.109(i) for storage of AN over 1000 pounds in a building 

or structure.). This standard limits the dimensions of piles of bagged AN and bulk AN in storage 

bins, and specifies the conditions for storage and the type of the construction materials for 

storage bins. The standard does not specify minimum separation distances between stored AN 

and public receptors such as are required for explosives and blasting agents. The standard 

requires separation of AN from incompatible or combustible materials and use of fire-resistive 

building materials if combustible materials are stored within a certain distance. A building with 

more than 2,500 tons of bagged ammonium nitrate must be equipped with an automatic sprinkler 

system. OSHA CFR 1910.109 (a-h) covers storage, handling and transportation requirements of 

explosives and blasting agents, including their storage at use sites and mixing and packaging 

operations. The requirements detail various procedures and safeguards that must be followed for 

these operations.

Approximately 80% of AN is used in blasting agents and 20% is used as a fertilizer. 

OSHA’s PSM standard covers some reactive chemicals. Ammonium nitrate, although it is a 

reactive chemical (oxidizer) and met the original criteria that OSHA used to add substances for 

coverage, was not covered by the PSM standard. The Explosives and Blasting Agents standard 

is a specification standard based on a consensus standard, while PSM is a performance-based 

standard and would require employers to put management systems in place that would include 
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requirements to evaluate hazards and follow industry recognized best practices. As explained 

above above, OSHA issued an RFI seeking, among other items, comments on potential revisions 

to its PSM standard and its Explosives and Blasting Agents standard. The RFI specifically 

invited comments on safe work practices for storing, handling, and managing ammonium nitrate 

and on regulatory requirements to improve its approach to preventing the hazards associated with 

ammonium nitrate. OSHA is working to determine whether ammonium nitrate hazards are best 

handled in the Explosives and Blasting Agents standard, the PSM standard, or a combination of 

both, and will pursue any appropriate regulatory changes as expeditiously as possible. As OSHA 

develops its approach to improve workplace safety associated with ammonium nitrate hazards, 

EPA will consider if additional action to protect the community is needed to complement OSHA 

regulations. EPA is considering whether the coverage provided to ammonium nitrate facilities 

will be sufficient or whether ammonium nitrate should be included in the RMP regulation. 

Blasting agents are relatively low sensitivity explosives which cannot be initiated by 

blasting caps and are unlikely to explode except under special conditions. Ammonium 

nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO or AN/FO) is a bulk industrial explosive widely used in coal mining, 

quarrying, metal mining, and civil construction. Mining and construction sites that use ANFO 

may not be as likely to have explosions adversely affecting the public because they are often 

remote.

Because past AN accidents with adverse effects off-site, such as blast waves, have 

typically involved its storage in large quantities, EPA could list AN on the RMP list with a high 

threshold in order to prioritize process safety requirements for those facilities and locations 

where large amounts of AN are stored. When EPA had included high explosives on the RMP 

list, the TQ was based on a trinitrotoluene (TNT) weight equivalent weight; EPA could 
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determine a threshold amount for AN, based on a TNT-equivalent weight calculation adjusted 

for AN14. The RMP requirements for AN could be adjusted to meetestablished at the statutory 

minima and to tailorwith more specific provisions fortailored to particular types of facilities, e.g., 

manufacturers, fertilizer distributors and other facilities that have large amounts of explosives, 

blasting agents or fertilizers. EPA is authorized under CAA section 112(r)(5) to establish a 

greater TQ for, or to exempt entirely, any substance that is a nutrient used in agriculture when 

held by a farmer. Therefore, farmers who hold AN for use as a fertilizer could be exempted 

entirely, in the same way as EPA has done forexempted farmers holding ammonia for use as a 

fertilizer (see 40 CFR 68.125). 

Alternatively, under CAA 112(r)(7)(A), EPA could require safe storage practices of solid 

AN forms similar to thosethe practices required in the OSHA standard for Explosives and 

Blasting Agents at 29 CFR 1910.109(i) or in the NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code, Chapter 

11. Promulgating regulations separate from the RMP requirements may be more appropriate to 

cover facilities whose handling of this chemical does not involve typical manufacturing and 

processing operations normally seen with chemicals that are hazardous gases and liquids, such as 

fertilizer distribution facilities. However, manufacturers of AN who handle molten and liquid 

AN in processes involving chemical reactions, at elevated temperature and pressure, or in 

                                                            

14 TNT equivalent‐weight calculation is a method for estimating the quantity of an explosive required to produce

blast effects at various distances from the source of the explosion. The method uses the scaling law of distances,

which relates quantity of explosive material and distance for a given overpressure.  For explosives other than TNT,

an empirically‐derived equivalency factor is used to account for differences between the explosive characteristics

of the actual explosive and those of an equivalent weight of TNT.  Additional information on EPA’s threshold

methodology for high explosives can be found in the Technical Background Document, Development of Threshold

Quantities for List of Regulated Substances for Accidental Release Prevention, Clean Air Act Section 112(r).   See:

Technical Background Document for the Development of Threshold Quantities for List of Regulated Substances for

Accidental Release Prevention, Clean Air Act Section 112(r). Original Docket# A‐91‐74, document # III‐B‐2, June 21,

1992.     
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process vessels, tanks, pumps and associated control equipment may be more appropriately 

covered by the RMP regulation. 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

i. Are there safety gaps in the current regulations for AN that could be addressed using 

regulations under CAA section 112(r)? Should EPA regulate AN under CAA section 

112(r) authority to improve chemical safety practices at facilities handling AN? What 

types of AN and AN facilities should be subject to the RMP regulations to prevent 

chemical accidents involving AN that could have adverse effects, such as blast 

overpressure, on the public, environment and off-site property? Should EPA consider 

safety regulations to cover the storage and handling of AN fertilizer only and 

continue to rely on ATF regulations and OSHA standards to cover AN in explosives 

and blasting agents? What role should voluntary industry programs (such as the one 

undertaken by IME for high explosives) have in a decision on whether safety gaps 

exist? that warrant regulation under the RMP? Please discuss the economic impacts 

associated with the potential regulation of AN under CAA section 112(r), including 

any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider. 

ii. Should EPA amend the RMP requirements to address the hazard posed by AN? If so, 

what specific requirements would be appropriate for AN? Alternatively, should EPA 

use its regulatory authority under CAA 112(r)(7)(A) to require more tailored safety 

steps for facilities handling AN and list AN at a high threshold to better focus these 

requirements on fewer holders of large quantities that pose the greatest risk? What 

would be the benefits of regulating AN under the RMP regulations as opposed to only 
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maintaining the current SDS and hazardous chemical inventory reporting already 

required under EPCRA?

iii. If EPA were to regulate AN under 40 CFR part 68, what quantity of AN poses a 

sufficient hazard to be covered? What would be the basis for establishing this TQ? 

iv. Does your facility store, handle, or manage AN? If so, in what form (e.g., solid, 

liquid) and in what grade (e.g., high density, low density)? If you are not a 

manufacturer of AN, how does your facility process or use AN? What quantities of 

AN are typically stored at your facility at one time? 

v. Are there any other standards, including consensus standards, applicable to AN 

storage, handling, and management that your facility follows? If so, which ones? 

vi. Please provide any data or information on accidents involving the storage, handling, 

and management of AN that affected people or property. 

vii. Please provide data on the population surrounding AN sites, including socioeconomic information and other environmental burdens on surrounding communities. 

viii. If EPA were to regulate AN under CAA Section 112(r), should EPA exempt farmers 

who store AN for use as a fertilizer? How many farmers would be eligible for such an 

exemption? Should there be any limits on such an exemption, such as maximum 

quantity on-site at any given time? Please provide the reasoning and any available 

data supporting your views. 

d. Adding Reactive Substances and Reactivity Hazards:

Although the chemicals listed in 40 CFR 68.130 were listed based on their toxicity or 

flammability, a number of them could be considered reactive chemicals based on a variety of 

metrics, including consensus standard sources. For example, the RMP list currently includes 
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three chlorosilanes listed as toxic substances15. These compounds are included on the list 

because their levels of acute toxicity based on animal studies met the RMP listing criteria. 

However, they primarily produce acute toxic effects on exposed populations because of their 

rapid and intensive reaction with moisture in the air to produce hydrogen chloride, which can 

cause acute injury to any body tissue contacted as well as nasal, throat, or lung irritation, 

coughing, wheezing, and shortness of breath. Nevertheless, while certain listed substances such 

as these are reactive, the RMP list does not specifically focus on reactive chemicals. There are 

other chemicals that do not meet the RMP listing criteria, but could potentially be listed based on 

the hazards of their reaction byproducts (e.g., other chlorosilanes that produce hydrochloric acid 

upon release to the air). 

EPA has long been aware of the hazards associated with reactive chemicals. In the 

January 19, 1993 proposed rule for listing substances (58 FR 5102), we considered whether to 

include on the list chemicals whose reactive properties could cause effects, in the event of an 

accident, that would impact nearby communities. In order to meet the conditions in CAA section 

112(r)(3) for the listing of substances, EPA sought to determine the common physical-chemical 

characteristics or properties that would be used as criteria to identify a set of chemicals to be 

listed and to provide the technical basis for these criteria. For toxic and flammable substances, 

the listing criteria included inherent properties of the chemical substances, such as physical state 

or boiling point, that are indicators of the potential to pose a severe threat to the community. 

EPA attempted to evaluate the hazards associated with reactive substances and develop an 

adequate technical basis to determine potential effects on the community. One difficulty is that it 

                                                            

15These include methyltrichlorosilane (CASRN 75‐79‐6), dimethyldichlorosilane (CASRN75‐78‐5), and

trimethylchlorosilane (CASRN 75‐77‐4).
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is not feasible for national listing decisions to take into account process- and site-specific factors, 

which can vary widely. EPA has instead addressed these factors in the accident prevention 

regulations. (e.g., owners and operators implement hazard controls based on a PHA or hazard 

review that identifies the specific hazards of their regulated processes). Using criteria from other 

organizations, for example, an NFPA 4 instability rating of 4 assigned to materials that are 

readily capable of detonation, explosive decomposition, or explosive reaction at normal 

pressures and temperatures, provides important information but gives little indication of the 

potential impact on a community from an accident that takes place inside an industrial facility. 

The 1993 proposed rule requested comments from the public on approaches that could be used to 

evaluate the consequences to communities from incidents involving reactive substances. 

However, very few comments were received and no specific methods or listing criteria were 

identified by commenters. Several commenters suggested that a small number of highly reactive 

chemicals, specifically those that have toxic byproducts as a result of degradation or combustion, 

and have been involved in serious accidents, be added to the list. Several other commenters 

suggested deferring the listing of reactive substances based on the complexity of the technical 

issues, the lack of a methodology to screen reactive hazards, and the expectation that reactive 

substances are unlikely to migrate offsiteoff-site. 

Serious accidents involving reactive chemicals have called attention to their hazards and 

raised questions regarding whether reactive chemicals are adequately regulated. In response to a 

1995 chemical explosion that killed five workers at Napp Technologies, Inc., in Lodi, New 

Jersey, OSHA and EPA investigated the accident and concluded in a jointly-issued report16 that 

                                                            

16 EPA/OSHA, EPA/OSHA Joint Chemical Accident Investigation Report – Napp Technologies, Inc., Lodi, New Jersey

(EPA‐550‐R‐97‐002, October, 1997).
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the explosion was most likely triggered by an uncontrolled chemical reaction of water, sodium 

hydrosulfite, and aluminum powder. However this investigation did not result in any regulatory 

action from eitherchanges in OSHA or EPA regulations. 

In August 2000, after investigating a runaway reaction at Morton International in 

Patterson, New Jersey that injured nine employees, the CSB initiated a comprehensive review of 

reactive hazards nationwide and issued a final report17 in 2002 with recommendations to reduce 

the number and severity of such incidents. The report recommended that EPA revise the RMP 

regulation to address catastrophic reactive hazards that have the potential to seriously impact the 

public, including those resulting from self-reactive chemicals and combinations of chemicals and 

process-specific conditions. It also recommended coverage of chemicals based on a class of 

highly reactive properties, similar to the way the existing PSM standard defines a class of 

flammable liquids or gases. The CSB argued that a performance-based approach to evaluating 

reactive hazards would allow for both a comprehensive analysis and flexibility in 

implementation, but cautioned that a proper analysis would require expertise in reactivity 

hazards. 

CSB also recommended that EPA modify the accident reporting requirements in risk 

management plans and in “RMP*Info” (EPA’s database for risk management plans) to define 

and record reactive incidents and add the term "reactive incident" to the four existing "release 

events" in EPA's current 5-year accident reporting requirements (Gas Release, Liquid 

Spill/Evaporation, Fire, and Explosion). According to CSB, structuring the information 

collection in this way would allow EPA and its stakeholders to identify and focus resources on 

                                                            

17 CSB, Hazard Investigation – Improving Reactive Hazard Management, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard

Investigation Board (Report No. 2001‐01‐H, October 2002).

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/ReactiveHazardInvestigationReport.pdf
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industry sectors that experienced the incidents; chemicals and processes involved; and impacts 

on the public, the workforce, and the environment. Consequently, in 2004 EPA amended the 

format for risk management plan submissions to include uncontrolled chemical reactions on the 

list of possible accident causes that covered sources may select when completing five-year 

accident history reports. Since amending the format, 29 reactive chemical incidents have been 

reported in RMPs submitted to EPA. In total, these accidents resulted in zero deaths, 48 injuries, 

190 people evacuated, approximately $3 million in off-site property damage, and approximately 

$33 million in onsite property damage. Processes in 16 different NAICS codes were involved in 

these incidents; however, processes in NAICS 325211 (Plastics Material and Resin 

Manufacturing) accounted for 9 of the incidents. No other NAICS code accounted for more than 

3 incidents.

One approach to regulating reactive hazards is the approach adopted in the New Jersey 

Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA), which includes a ‘List of Individual Reactive 

Hazardous Substances,’ as well as a list of ‘Reactive Hazard Substances Mixture Functional 

Groups.’18 They includeTCPA includes substances with certain functional groups and molecular 

structures that have been identified as highly reactive, based on scientific research and accident 

history. Under the TCPA, covered facilities must determine if any of the chemicals they are 

intentionally mixing include components on the Functional Group list. If so, then the facility 

must determine the heat of the reaction and the corresponding TQ for TCPA coverage. This 

approach takes into account not only certain specific chemicals, but also their overall reactivity 

in determining the level of coverage. 

                                                            

18 The New Jersey Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act is the state’s process safety regulation.  It adopts the federal

RMP requirements, and includes additional state‐level requirements.  See

http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/index.htm
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In 2010, the NFPA published the first edition of its Hazardous Materials Code (NFPA 

400). NFPA 400 was subsequently updated in 2012 (i.e., NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code, 

2013 Edition)19. NFPA 400 specifies storage, use, and handling requirements for various 

categories of hazardous materials, including unstable (reactive) solids and liquids, water reactive 

solids and liquids, and others. EPA could adopt similar requirements as the basis for reactive 

hazards regulations.

EPA is considering including reactive chemicals on the RMP list and is seeking 

information on potential approaches to addressing reactive hazards, including the approach used 

in the TCPA, application of the requirements contained in NFPA 400, or others. EPA requests 

information on the following questions: 

i. What are the best criteria to use in classifying reactive hazards? How do you identify 

a reactive chemical or a reactive mixture? 

ii. Should EPA add reactive chemicals to the list of RMP-covered chemicals in 40 CFR 

68.130? If so, which chemicals? What criteria should EPA consider using to 

establish TQs for reactive chemicals? Should EPA add only specific chemicals, or 

groups of chemicals defined by particular chemical characteristics?

iii. Should EPA list additional chlorosilanes as toxic substances on the RMP list due to 

its their reactive hazard from formingdue to formation of hydrochloric acid when a 

chlorosilane is accidentally released into the air and reacts with moisture? 

iv. If your facility is covered by the New Jersey TCPA, have those requirements been 

effective in protecting human health and the environment from reactive hazards? 

Please describe any economic impacts associated with TCPA coverage (e.g., costs 

                                                            

19 http://www.nfpa.org/catalog/product.asp?pid=40013&cookie_test=1
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and benefits, cost savings, shifts in usage of reactive chemicals, special circumstances 

involving small entities, etc.). 

v. Should EPA revise the RMP regulation to use chemical functional groups similar to 

those in the TCPA20 to define hazardous reactive mixtures? If so, which chemical 

functional groups should EPA use? 

vi. Does your facility follow NFPA 400 for reactive hazards? If so, please describe the 

economic impacts associated with following NFPA 400 (e.g., cost of additional 

equipment, cost of additional training, benefits of quality management, special 

circumstances involving small entities, etc.). Is following NFPA 400 an effective way 

of protecting human health and the environment from reactive hazards? Please 

explain. 

vii. Has your facility implemented a reactive-hazards management program other than a 

program specified by the TCPA and NFPA 400? If so, please describe your facility’s 

program, whether it protects human health and the environment more or less than the 

TCPA and NFPA 400, whether it is voluntary or mandatory and, if the latter, under 

what authority, any economic impacts associated with the program, and any special 

circumstances involving small entities. 

viii. What alternative regulatory approach to TCPA or NFPA 400, if any, should EPA 

consider using to comprehensively address reactive hazards? What would be the 

economic impacts of this approach and would there be any special circumstances 

involving small entities? Are there specific requirements that EPA should 

                                                            

20 The definition of “reactive hazard substance (RHS) mixture” in the TCPA references a list of chemical functional

groups specified in N.J.A.C. 7:31‐6.3 (a), Table I, part D, Group II. Whether any of the chemical functional groups

are present determines in part coverage of an RHS mixture under the TCPA.
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consideringconsider adding to the RMP regulations to ensure that owners and 

operators adequately manage reactive hazards? 

ix. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents, near misses, or other 

safety-related incidents involving reactive hazards not covered under the existing 

RMP regulation. MightWhat reactive-hazards management requirements in the RMP 

regulationmight have prevented thethese incidents if they had been included in the 

RMP regulation? 

e. Adding Other Categories of Substances 

This section addresses substances which are not traditionally classified as highly toxic, 

flammable, or explosive but that have nonetheless caused or contributed to serious accidents. 

Other categories of substances beyond highly toxic and flammable liquids and gases could cause 

death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the environment in the event of an 

accident. For example, certain types of flammable and explosive solids and non-volatile liquids 

can explode and cause blast waves that have the potential to injure people and cause property 

damage beyond a facility’s fence line. Such explosions or detonations could involve categories 

of chemicals not currently regulated as RMP substances or previously discussed in this section as 

potential additions to the RMP list. Examples of these include organic peroxides, oxidizers, 

combustible dusts or other flammable solids. 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

i. Should EPA consider adding these examplesorganic peroxides, oxidizers, combustible 

dusts, flammable solids, or other additional types of chemicals, or are to the RMP 

list? Are there any particular chemicals belonging to these or other classes which 
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present a high hazard that could cause adverse effects beyond a facility’s fence line in 

the event of an accidental release? 

ii. If a particular new category of chemicals should be considered for inclusion on the 

RMP list, what criteria should be used to prioritize the hazard(s) and determine which 

chemicals should be listed? 

iii. If EPA were to add combustible dusts to the lists of covered chemicals, are there 

categories of dusts, such as agricultural dusts (e.g., grain dust, pesticide dust, etc.), 

that should be excluded? What factors, such as existing handling practices, accident 

history, and potential risk to surrounding communities should EPA consider in 

evaluating potential exclusions? 

f. Removing Certain Substances from the List or Raising Their TQ:their Threshold 

Quantity

EPA is also seeking information on whether certain substances should be removed from 

the current list of regulated substances. There are six RMP chemicals (four toxic, two 

flammable) for which EPA has never received a RMP report. The four toxic chemicals are 

arsenous trichloride CASRN 7784-34-1), cyanogen chloride (CASRN 506-77-4), sulfur 

tetrafluoride (CASRN 7783-60-0), and tetramethyl lead (CASRN 75-74-1). The two flammable 

chemicals are: chlorine monoxide (CASRN 7791-21-1) and ethyl nitrite (CASRN 109-95-5). 

 EPA’s 2012 Chemical Data Reporting (CDR) information on the production and use of 

chemicals manufactured or imported into the United States also showed no facilities reporting 

any data for these six chemicals, when searched by CASRN21. EPA’s Envirofacts system22, 

                                                            

21 http://www.epa.gov.cdr/ However, manufacturing or production volume data was only required for CDR when

2011 site‐specific production volume for reportable chemicals equaled or exceeded 25,000 pounds.  Chemicals

manufactured only for non‐TSCA uses such as pesticides or chemicals regulated by the FDA are not required to be
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which contains reporting on chemicals from the various environmental databases and reporting 

systems managed by EPA, also did not show any reports for these six substances, when searched 

by CASRN. A search of the E-Plan database, which contains EPCRA Tier II Emergency and 

Hazardous Chemical Inventory reports for most states, showed that four of the six chemicals 

were reported in E-Plan for filing year 2012, but only one facility each reported for three of the 

chemicals and five facilities reported for sulfur tetrafluoride. However, E-Plan only contains 

reports from about 40 states, and for several of these, the database does not contain complete 

information. The search results show that four of the six chemicals are in commerce, although 

the Tier II amounts reported on site were below RMP reporting thresholds. 

One of the sixteen substances mandated by Congress for the initial listing of regulated 

substances for accident prevention was toluene diisocyanate (TDI). TheIn order to ensure that 

all forms of TDI were listed, the RMP list of toxic substances contains three listings representing 

this chemical, which includesincluding both the 2,4 and 2,6 isomers (also listed as EHSs) and the 

unspecified isomerisomers or mixture of isomers (not listed as an EHS), all of which have 

distinct separate CAS Registry numbers, in order to ensure all forms of TDI were covered:.

Toluene, 2,4-diisocyanate CASRN 584-84-9 

Toluene, 2.6-diisocyanate CASRN 91-08-7 

Toluene diisocyanate, unspecified isomer CASRN 26471-62-523

                                                                                                                                                                                               

reported under CDR. Also, small manufacturers (including importers) are generally exempt from CDR requirements

if their annual company sales do not exceed certain limits.

22 http://www.epa.gov/enviro/index.html 23 This CASRN is used for the “generic TDI” for any mixture of the 2,4‐TDI and 2,6‐TDI isomers, of varying ratio

between the two specific isomers.
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Although the vapor pressure for TDI is relatively low at ambient temperature (< 0.5 mm 

Hg) and does not meet the vapor pressure listing criteria of ≥ 10 mm Hg for a regulated toxic 

substance, EPA believed that the language of CAA section 112(r)(3) precluded the Agency from 

omitting TDI from the initial list of RMP substances. The Senate Report on its version of the 

1990 CAAA24 says “the Administrator is not authorized to remove substances from the initial 

list.” Fifty-three accidents involving TDI have been reported in RMP accident history reports 

since 1995, but none of these resulted in fatalities or offsiteThe format of CAA 112(r)(3), which 

mandates the initial list contain certain chemicals and requires a more expansive list by 

rulemaking, first appears in the Senate Bill. However, the statute itself does not prohibit later 

deletions of substances that were mandated for inclusion on the initial list. The final enacted 

CAA section 112(r)(3) authorizes both additions and deletions from the list, in contrast to the 

version in the Senate Report that only authorized additions.25 The enacted language is similar to 

the structure of the hazardous air pollutant (HAP) “initial list” under CAA section 112(b), which 

authorizes revisions and deletions and is cross-referenced in CAA section 112(b)(3) for its 

revision procedures. Fifty-three accidents involving TDI have been reported in RMP accident 

history reports since 1995, but none of these resulted in fatalities or off-site injuries. 

Currently the TQ for all three TDI listings is 10,000 pounds. EPA is considering whether 

the TQ for TDI should be higher because its much lower vapor pressure would result in a lower 

volatilization rate and less potential for an air release. The current TQs were assigned based on a 

ranking scheme using a Level of Concern (LOC) based on acute toxicity and the potential for 

airborne dispersion. For each chemical, a ranking factor was calculated that equaled the LOC 

                                                            

24 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Senate Report No.

228, 101st Congress, 1st Session 211 (1989), page 220. 25 See Senate Report at 560 (section 129(c )).
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divided by an air dispersion factor (V). Chemicals were assigned TQs of 500, 1,000Currently 

the TQ for all three TDI listings is 10,000 pounds. EPA is considering whether the TQ for TDI 

should be higher because its much lower vapor pressure would result in a lower volatilization 

rate and less potential for an air release. The current TQs were assigned based on a ranking 

scheme using a Level of Concern (LOC) based on acute toxicity and the potential for airborne 

dispersion. For each chemical, a ranking factor was calculated that equaled the LOC divided by 

an air dispersion factor (V). Chemicals were assigned TQs of 500, 1000, 2,500, 5,000, 10,000, 

15,000 or 20,000 pounds based on the order of magnitude ranges of the ranking factors. The 

LOC was based on the Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) level developed by 

the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) or an approximation of the 

IDLH based on animal toxicity data. For gases, V = 1, while for liquids, V was based on a 

volatilization model using the molecular weight and boiling point of the chemical. The TQ 

methodology is described in detail and the ranking factors for each chemical are provided in the 

Technical Background Documents for the Development of Threshold Quantities26, which are 

available in the public docket for this notice. The minimum level of TQ was set at 500 pounds to 

represent a drum sized container. The highest TQ of 20,000 pounds represented typical handling 

quantities and allowed the range of thresholds to better reflect the relative hazards among the 

listed toxic chemicals. 

Applying EPA’s TQ ranking methodology, the ranking factor for TDI was 0.73, which 

was midrange for the toxic substances assigned the TQ of 10,000 pounds. Other toxic chemicals 

                                                            

26 USEPA.  June 21, 1992. Technical Background Document for the Development of Threshold Quantities for List of

Regulated Substances for Accidental Release Prevention, Clean Air Act Section 112(r). Original Docket# A‐91‐74,

document # III‐B‐2.

USEPA.  January 14, 1994. Technical Background Document Supporting Development of Threshold Quantities for

Regulated Substances under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act. Original Docket# A‐91‐74, document # V‐B‐2.
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assigned the 10,000 pounds TQ had ranking factors ranging from 0.3 to 0.9. The acute toxicity 

of TDI is relatively high compared to most of the other toxic chemicals. The LOC toxicity value 

of TDI is 0.07 g/m3

 (10 ppm) and the LOC toxicity values for the other toxic chemicals range 

from 0.0025 g/m3 to 4.9 g/m3 (the lower the LOC toxicity value, the more toxic the chemical). 

Although the vapor pressure of TDI is much less than the cutoff vapor pressure of 10 mm 

Hg used to select other liquid toxic substances, the air dispersion factor (V) does not use the 

vapor pressure at ambient temperature to determine the volatilization rate. Instead, the equation 

for calculating V uses the boiling point of the chemical to reflect worst case conditions of 

accidental releases that are likely to involve heat (e.g., fires, exothermic runaway reactions, or 

upset process conditions), which cause more rapid volatilization of the liquid. 

To assign TDI a TQ based on its vapor pressure, a different rationale would have to be 

used for determining the threshold such as using ambient liquid temperature conditions instead 

of boiling liquid temperatures for calculating the air dispersion factor V. EPA is requesting 

information on whether the methodology for assigning TQs should be changed to account for the 

much lower vapor pressure of TDI, and if so, information on a rationale for how it should be 

done. 

One consideration for retaining TDI on the list of substances despite its low vapor 

pressure is that TDI is known as a potent dermal and lung sensitizer. In sensitized individuals, 

exposure to even small amounts of diisocyanates may cause allergic reactions such as asthmas 

and severe breathing difficulties. The LOC toxicity value for TDI was based on a 1990 IDLH 

value of 10 ppm, which has since been revised to 2.5 ppm27. The Acute Exposure Guideline 

                                                            

27 http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/idlh/584849.html
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Level -2 (AEGL-2) for a 1-hour exposure has been established at 0.083 ppm28 which is a 

concentration above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible 

individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health effects or 

an impaired ability to escape (see section II.D.9 later for further discussion about AEGLs). 

However, neither the revised IDHL or AEGL values are based on exposures of individuals or 

animals sensitized to TDI. Thus, some accidental releases of TDI that would not cause severe 

acute health effects in most individuals, may trigger breathing problems or severe allergic 

reactions in sensitized individuals. The sensitizing nature of TDI should be considered when 

evaluating whether to raise the TQ of TDI and perhaps should be considered as a reason for 

lowering the TQ instead of raising it.

One of the flammable chemicals on the RMP list, 1,3-pentadiene (CASRN504CASRN 

504-60-9), fails to meet the flammability criteria discussed earlier in this section. Its inclusion in 

the RMP list of flammable substances was due to a typographical error in the boiling point of the 

substance as reported by one reference source. NFPA had listed the boiling point for 1,3-

pentadiene as - 43 o C29, but according to other data sources, it is actually + 43 o C, which is 

above the cutoff of 37.8 o C for an NFPA flammability 4 rating. NFPA has since corrected the 

boiling point and changed the flammability rating to 3.

30. Therefore, 1,3- pentadiene does not 

meet the flammability and volatility criteria for RMP-listed flammable substances. 

                                                                                                                                                                                               

28 http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/pubs/tsd47.pdf

29 NFPA. 1994. NFPA 325 Guide to Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable Liquids, Gases and Volatile Solids, 1994 ed.

National Fire Protection Association, Pg 325‐77.

30 NFPA. 2010.  NFPA Fire Protection Guide to Hazardous Materials, 14th ed., Fire Hazard Properties of Flammable

Liquids, Gases, and Volatile Solids.  National Fire Protection Association. Pg. 325‐95.
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EPA requests information on the following questions:

i. Would it be appropriate for EPA to delete TDI (a substanceThe Senate Report on its 

version of the 1990 CAAA31 says “the Administrator is not authorized to remove 

substances from the initial list.” The format of CAA 112(r)(3), which mandates 

listing certain chemicals and requires a more expansive list by rulemaking, first 

appears in the Senate Bill. Nevertheless, the statute itself does not address deletions 

from the initial list. Would it be appropriate for EPA to delete TDI (a substance 

mandated by Congress to be included on the initial RMP list) from the RMP toxic 

substances list because its vapor pressure does not meet the vapor pressure listing 

criteria established by EPA? 

ii. If it is not appropriate to delete TDI, would it be appropriate for EPA to continue to 

list TDI on the RMP list but with a higher TQ for RMP reporting? Should EPA 

change the methodology for assigning TQs be changed to account for the much lower 

vapor pressure of TDI, and if so, how should itthis be done?  Currently, the TQ for all 

three TDI listings is 10,000 pounds. 

iii. If it is not appropriate to delete TDI because it is a sensitizer, should EPA continue to 

list TDI on the RMP list but with a lower TQ because of its unique toxicity, and if so, 

what should be the basis for setting a lowered TQ? 

iv. Are there other listed substances that should have a higher TQ? If so, which ones, 

what are the appropriate TQs, and why? 

                                                            

31 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, Senate Report No.

228, 101st Congress, 1st Session 211 (1989), page 220.
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v. Should EPA delete from the RMP list any of the six substances for which the Agency 

has not received any RMP report if the Agency believes that they are not widespread 

in commerce or only stored in quantities well below the RMP TQ? EPA requests any 

available information about the extent of these six chemicals’ manufacture and use in 

commerce, including any annual amounts manufactured, imported or used in the U.S. 

vi. Is there any reason that EPA should not delete 1, 3-pentadiene from the RMP list as 

it does not meet the listing criteria for flammable substances and was erroneously 

listed? Are there any other RMP substances that are known to be listed based on 

erroneous data? 

g. ReducingLowering the TQThreshold Quantity for Substances Currently on the List:

EPA is also seeking information on whether the TQ for any substances currently on the 

list should be reduced: 

i. Are the current TQs protective of human health and the environment, or are there 

certain substances for which the TQ is too high? If so, which substances? For such 

substances, what TQ should EPA establish and what would it be based on? 

ii. What would be the economic impacts of any lowering of the TQ which might be 

warranted? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA 

should consider with respect to lowering of a TQ? 

2. Additional Risk Management Program Elements.

Approaches to chemical process safety have continued to evolve since both the RMP 

regulation and OSHA PSM standard were promulgated. New management system elements and 

best practices are now being recognized as essentialused to address human health, worker safety 

and environmental protection. Lessons learned from data collected in RMP submissions 
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regarding safety management systems have also informed EPA’s perspective on the issue. The 

Agency is requesting information on the management system elements OSHA has identified in 

their RFI, but with a focus on their applicability to the RMP requirements, and how they can 

enhance the protection of human health and the environment. 

Like OSHA, EPA is considering requiring three elements taken from the Risk Based 

Process Safety Program recommended by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS)32 : (1) 

Measurements and Metrics; (2) Management Review and Continuous Improvement; and (3) 

Process Safety Competency. A “Measurements and Metrics” element would require the facility 

to establish performance and efficiency indicators to track the effectiveness of the risk 

management system and to identify opportunities for improvement of its elements and work 

activities. This element would guide facilities in measuring the real-time performance of their 

process safety management systems An example of a measurement and metrics indicator would 

be to track the frequency of process upsets and near-miss accidents. A “Management Review and 

Continuous Improvement” element would focus on ongoing ‘due diligence’ management 

reviews that fill the gap between day-to-day work activities and periodic formal audits. This 

element would require facilities to regularly evaluate the management systems in place, as 

opposed to waiting for an incident to occur, or for scheduled audits to identify deficiencies. A 

“Process Safety Competency” element would encompass three interrelated activities: (1) to 

continuously improve on knowledge and competency, (2) to ensure appropriate information is 

available to those who need it, and (3) to consistently apply lessons learned. The main focus of 

                                                            

32 American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Risk Based Process

Safety, New York, Wiley, 2007
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this competency element is organizational learning, so that the process knowledge can be applied 

to situations in order to effectively manage risk. 

The Agency is also requesting information on two additional management-system 

elements that were identified by OSHA in their review of relevant safety standards promulgated 

by other federal agencies. Specifically, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 

(BSEE) promulgated revisions to their Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS 

II) requirements (78 FR 20423; April 5, 2013) to help ensure the safe operations of their 

regulated facilities. The revisions included a number of management-system elements not 

addressed in the RMP regulation. The two elements the Agency is focusing on are a “Stop Work 

Authority” and an “Ultimate Work Authority.” In its SEMS II Fact Sheet33, BSEE describes 

these elements as follows: 

• Developing and implementing a stop work authority that creates procedures and 

authorizes any and all offshore industry personnel who witness an imminent risk or 

dangerous activity to stop work. 

• Developing and implementing an ultimate work authority that requires offshore 

industry operators to clearly define who has the ultimate work authority on a facility 

for operational safety and decision-making at any given time. 

While the requirements under SEMS II focus on offshore facilities under the jurisdiction 

of BSEE, the concept of requiring these elements may be applicable to facilities subject to the 

RMP regulation. Established procedures for any and all employees on the facility to implement 

a stop work authority when witnessing an activity that creates a threat of danger, and clearly 

                                                            

33   http://www.bsee.gov/Regulations‐and‐Guidance/Safety‐and‐Environmental‐Management‐Systems‐‐‐

SEMS/Fact‐Sheet/
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defined requirements establishing who has the ultimate authority on the facility for operational 

safety and decision making at any given time would also servecould help to better protect human 

health and the environment. 

In addition to the management system elements identified in the OSHA RFI, EPA is also 

interested in receiving public comment on whether there are other accident prevention elements 

that should be considered for inclusion in the RMP regulation. The Agency notes that both the 

CCPS Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety and the BSEE SEMS regulations contain 

additional management system elements not present in the RMP regulation. One such element is 

“conduct of operations” which CCPS defines as “the execution of operational and management 

tasks in a deliberate and structured manner.” Conduct of operations includes a variety of 

measures such as formal communications between workers, work groups, and work shifts. It 

also involves establishing clear rules governing access to key process areas, such as control 

rooms, performing regular tours or rounds to monitor equipment status and keeping written shift 

logs of equipment status and ongoing process activities, maintaining clear and accurate labeling 

for process equipment, and maintaining good housekeeping in process areas. 

Another element contained in the CCPS Guidelines is “process safety culture.” CCPS 

defines process safety culture as “the combination of group values and behaviors that determine 

the manner in which process safety is managed.” Poor safety culture can lead to accidents by 

allowing production pressures to overshadow safety concerns, or by limiting the free exchange of 

important safety information among plant personnel. Safety culture has been implicated in 

recent serious accidents, such as the August, 2012 accident at the Chevron refinery in Richmond, 

California. In that accident, the CSB found indications that a weak safety culture may have led 

to the normalization of deviance in the refinery’s mechanical integrity management system. 
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Consequently, the California Interagency Working Group on Refinery Safety published a report 

concluding that both the California OSHA PSM requirements and the California Accidental 

Release Prevention RMP requirements should be strengthened to require California refineries to 

conduct safety culture assessments at least every three years34. 

The BSEE SEMS regulations contain requirements to conduct a “Job Safety Analysis.” 

BSEE indicates that the Job Safety Analysis (JSA) is an operations/task level hazard analysis 

technique used to identify risks to personnel associated with their job activities. The Agency is 

requesting public comment on whether these or other additional management system elements 

should be added to the RMP regulation, and whether and how these elements relate to prevention 

of accidental releases. 

Additionally, the Agency seeks public comment on whether management system 

elements that are currently contained within the RMP regulation should be modified, clarified or 

strengthened. For example: 

 Contractors are increasingly used in a variety of roles at chemical process facilities, 

yet the RMP rule imposes fewer safety requirements on contractor owners and 

operators than on the owners and operators of the regulated stationary source. In 

October 2007, five contractor workers were killed at Xcel Energy, in Georgetown, 

Colorado, when a fire occurred inside a tunnel at the company’s hydroelectric power 

                                                            

34 California Interagency Working Group on Refinery Safety:  Improving Public and Worker Safety at Oil Refineries,

California Environmental Protection Agency, February 2014,

http://www.calepa.ca.gov/Publications/Reports/2014/RefineryRpt.pdf.
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plant. The CSB found that inadequate contractor safety practices and oversight 

contributed to the accident35; 

 The RMP rule requires owner/operators to conduct a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) 

for Program 3 processes and a hazard review for Program 2 processes. PHAs and 

hazard reviews are intended to identify potential equipment malfunctions or human 

errors that could cause an accidental release, and safeguards needed to prevent such 

malfunctions and errors. However, the rule does not explicitly describe the types of 

failure scenarios or damage mechanisms that must be considered during PHAs and 

hazard reviews, and during some compliance inspections EPA has reviewed PHAs 

and hazard reviews that did not address failure scenarios such as natural disasters 

(e.g., floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, etc.), corrosion, vehicle collisions, and others. 

Additionally, the rule requires hazard reviews to be “updated”, and PHAs to be 

“updated and revalidated” at least every five years, but does not clearly define what is 

required in order for a hazard review to be updated or for a PHA to be updated and 

revalidated. EPA is interested in receiving comment on whether PHA and hazard 

review requirements should be clarified, and whether hazard review and PHA updates 

should be required more frequently than every five years, or whether certain events 

should trigger hazard review or PHA updates prior to the next scheduled 5-year 

update. 

 The Pre-Startup Review element (section 68.67) requires the owner or operator to 

perform a pre-startup review for new stationary sources and for modified stationary 

                                                            

35 CSB, Investigation Report – Xcel Energy Hydroelectric Plant Penstock Fire, U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard

Investigation Board (Report No. 2008‐01‐I‐CO, August 2010).

http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Xcel_Energy_Report_Final.pdf
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sources when the modification is significant enough to require a change in the process 

safety information. However, the rule does not clearly state what modifications 

would require a change in process safety information. Also, EPA notes that process 

unit startup is a significantly more hazardous period compared to normal process 

operations, and that serious accidents such as the March 23, 2005 explosion at the BP 

America refinery in Texas City, Texas have occurred during process startup even 

when no significant equipment modifications were made to the process during the 

preceding turnaround. 

EPA requests information on any additional management-system elements or on 

potentially modifying, clarifying or expanding existing elements, including those discussed in 

this RFI, which would serve to improve protection of human health and the environment. The 

Agency welcomes data and information on management-system elements from consensus 

standards, safety organizations, federal standards, or other sources that could increase process 

safety if the RMP regulation were expanded to include them. The Agency invites the public to 

respond to any questions for which they have specific knowledge, data, or information, 

regardless of their involvement in RMP-regulated operations. Specifically, EPA requests 

information on the following questions: 

a. Does your facility follow any management-system elements not required under part 

68 for RMP-regulated operations? If so, please describe the additional managementsystem elements, the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with following 

the elements, and any special circumstances involving small entities. 

b. Would expanding the scope of the RMP regulation to require additional managementsystem elements, or expanding the scope of existing RMP management-system 
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elements, improve the protection of human health and the environment? Should EPA 

require safety culture assessments, job safety analyses, or any of the other new 

management system elements described above? If so, please describe the elements, 

the safety benefits, any economic impacts associated with expanding the scope of the 

RMP regulation in this way, and any special circumstances involving small entities 

that EPA should consider. Would current staff at a facility be able to implement these 

additional elements or would new staff need to be hired?

c. In systems using management and metrics, how do facilities develop useful leading 

indicators? Do you track the frequency of events such as process upsets, accidental 

releases, and “near miss” incidents? Does tracking such events allow managers and 

employees to make changes that prevent accidental releases? What other metrics and 

indicators do you use, and how do they help prevent releases? 

d. Would requiring RMP facilities to conduct periodic safety culture assessments 

meaningfully strengthen the safety culture incentives that already exist, such as 

avoidance of deaths, injuries, property and environmental damage, production loss, 

community impacts, damage to company reputation, etc., that may result from 

accidents? 

d.e.Would expansion of the RMP employee participation provision to include 

requirements such as the SEMS II stop-work authority, or other efforts to involve 

employees in all management-system elements, enhance protection of human health 

and the environment? 

e.f. Are there any other management-system elements in the existing RMP regulation that 

EPA should expand or clarify (e.g., a new requirement that facilities perform a root-
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cause analysis for incidents under § 68.81, clarify PHA and hazard review 

requirements, require more frequent PHA and hazard review updates, strengthen 

contractor requirements, or require pre-startup reviews prior to all process startups)? 

If so, please describe the additional requirements, the safety benefits, any economic 

impacts associated with expanding the RMP regulation in this way, and any special 

circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider. 

f.g. Are there any data or information on workplace accidents, near misses, or other 

safety-related incidents that the facility could have prevented by following 

management-system elements not currently required under the RMP regulation? 

h. What would be the paperwork burden associated with the revisions to managementsystem elements discussed above? What special skills or training would employees 

need to implement these elements, including associated reporting and record-keeping 

requirements? What would be the costs of additional reporting and record-keeping 

requirements, including costs for worker training and any required data management 

system upgrades? 

3. Define and Require Evaluation of Updates to Applicable Recognized and Generally 

Accepted Good Engineering Practices.

The OSHA PSM standard’s references to recognized and generally accepted good 

engineering practices (RAGAGEP) are almost identical to those contained in Subpart D of 40 

CFR part 68 (i.e., Program 3 Prevention Program). § 68.65(d)(2) requires the owner or operator 

to “document that equipment complies with recognized and generally accepted good engineering 

practices.” At facilities with “existing equipment designed and constructed in accordance with 

codes, standards, or practices that are no longer in general use,” § 68.65(d)(3) further requires the 
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owner or operator to “determine and document that the equipment is designed, maintained, 

inspected, tested, and operating in a safe manner.” These requirements parallel the requirements 

in paragraphs (d)(3)(ii) and (d)(3)(iii) of § 1910.119, respectively, with the only difference being 

that OSHA uses the term “employer” where EPA uses the term “owner or operator.” The RMP 

rule and PSM standard also contain identical references to RAGAGEP in § 68.73 / § 1910.119(j) 

(i.e., Mechanical Integrity). Additionally, Subpart C of 40 CFR part 68 (i.e., Program 2 

Prevention Program) contains references to RAGAGEP in § 68.48 (Safety information) and §

68.56 (Maintenance). 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. What does your facility use as a definition for RAGAGEP? Would adding a 

definition for RAGAGEP to the RMP rule improve understanding of RMP 

requirements and prevent accidental releases? If so, what specific definition for 

RAGAGEP should EPA add to the RMP rule? What would be the economic impacts 

of adding such a definition? 

b. From what sources (e.g., codes, standards, published technical reports, guidelines, 

etc.) does your facility select applicable RAGAGEP for operations covered under the 

PSM standard? 

c. Does your facility evaluate updates to its selected RAGAGEP? If so, how does your 

facility monitor any updates, and how often do you evaluate them? 

d. Please provide any data or information on accidents, near misses, or other safetyrelated incidents involving failure to evaluate and/or implement updates to applicable 

RAGAGEP for RMP-covered processes. Would requiring employers to evaluate 

and/or implement updates to applicable RAGAGEP prevent such accidental releases? 
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e. Should owners or operators covered by the applicable provisions of the RMP 

regulation be required to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP? Should owners 

and operators be required to comply with new RAGAGEP requirements that occur 

after the owner or operator’s initial compliance with the applicable provision of the 

RMP regulation? How would such updates or new requirements be identified? What 

would be an appropriate time period in which to conduct this evaluation and/or to 

comply with updated RAGAGEP? What would be the economic impacts of this 

change? 

f. Would a requirement to evaluate updates to applicable RAGAGEP be more 

appropriate in another paragraph of the RMP rule? For example, should such a 

requirement become part of the Process Hazard Analysis revalidation requirements at 

§ 68.67(f), or the management of change requirements at § 68.75? How would EPA 

incorporate such a requirement for Program 2 processes? 

4. Extend Mechanical Integrity Requirements to Cover Any Safety-Critical Equipment.

EPA is interested in receiving information on whether the scope of the mechanical 

integrity provisions of the RMP rule should be expanded to cover the mechanical integrity of any 

safety-critical equipment, and whether additional mechanical integrity requirements should be 

added to the rule’s provisions. In its RFI, OSHA notes that the mechanical integrity provisions 

of the PSM standard apply to six specific categories of equipment, including pressure vessels and 

storage tanks, piping systems (including piping components such as valves), relief and vent 

systems and devices, emergency shutdown systems, controls (including monitoring devices and 

sensors, alarms, and interlocks), and pumps. While these categories of equipment encompass 

most safety-critical equipment within regulated processes, during some compliance inspections 
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EPA has observed that facilities have failed to apply mechanical integrity program measures to 

certain additional types of equipment and systems that could reasonably be judged to be critical 

to process safety. Examples of such equipment would include computer software systems that 

interact with process components, electrical power systems, and other utility systems that interact 

with pumps, valves, or control systems. 

EPA notes that the RMP Program 2 maintenance requirements, which were intended as a 

streamlined version of the mechanical integrity requirements for Program 3 processes, apply to 

all process equipment, rather than being restricted to specific categories of equipment. This 

potentially causes the unintended result where certain aspects of a process subject to Program 2 

must meet more rigorous maintenance requirements than the same equipment located in a 

Program 3 process. EPA is interested in receiving feedback on whether expanding the scope of 

the Program 3 mechanical integrity requirements wouldor reducing the scope of the Program 2 

maintenance requirements would appropriately address this potential discrepancy. 

In addition to expanding the scope of the rule’s existing mechanical integrity provisions 

to cover any safety critical equipment, EPA is also interested in whether additional requirements 

should be added to this section, or whether any existing requirements need to be clarified. For 

example, emergency shutdown systems are one type of process equipment covered under the 

rule’s mechanical integrity provisions. However, the regulation does not explicitly require that 

all covered sources install emergency shutdown systems. 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Should EPA amend the mechanical integrity provisions of the RMP rule to explicitly 

cover all safety critical process equipment? If so, what type(s) of equipment? Did 

you identify safety-critical equipment not explicitly covered under § 68.73? If so, 
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how did your facility determine that the equipment was safety-critical, and does your 

facility treat the equipment as if it were RMP-covered for safety or other reasons? 

Did you identify the equipment as safety-critical through an RMP process hazard 

analysis? 

b. Please provide any data or information on accidental releases, near misses, or other 

safety-related incidents related to the mechanical integrity of safety-critical 

equipment not explicitly covered under § 68.73. 

c. Would expanding the scope of § 68.73 to explicitly cover the integrity of all 

equipment critical to process safety make it more likely to prevent accidental 

releases? 

d. Should EPA add additional requirements to the mechanical integrity provisions, or 

clarify any existing provisions? For example, should the Agency require that certain 

types of covered facilities install emergency shutdown systems, such as redundant 

power supplies, emergency flares, vents, or scrubbers, etc., in order to prevent 

accidental releases resulting from uncontrolled emergency shutdowns? 

e. Are there any other provisions of this section that should be enhanced or clarified? 

Does labeling § 68.73 as “Mechanical Integrity” cause owners and operators to 

disregard or neglect the maintenance, functionality, or integrity of process 

components that would not typically be considered “mechanical” components, such 

as electrical and computer systems? 

f. What would be the economic impacts of revising the mechanical integrity provisions 

as discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that 
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EPA should consider with respect to revising the mechanical integrity provisions of 

the RMP? 

5. Require Owners and Operators to Manage Organizational Changes.

In its RFI, OSHA notes that while the PSM standard requires employers to establish and 

implement written procedures to manage change, including all modifications to equipment, 

technology, procedures, raw materials, and processing conditions other than replacement in kind, 

the standard does not explicitly require employers to follow management-of-change procedures 

for organizational changes, such as changes in management structure, budget cuts, or personnel 

changes. However, OSHA highlights a policy interpretation indicating that it is OSHA’s view 

that the PSM standard does cover organizational changes if the changes have the potential to 

affect process safety. Additionally, OSHA notes the 2005 BP Texas City Refinery accident, 

where the CSB identified a lack of organizational management of change as a significant causal 

factor in the accident. 

The RMP rule contains management of change requirements for Program 3 processes 

(see § 68.75) that are virtually identical to the PSM standard. Therefore, EPA is also interested 

in receiving public comment on whether the RMP rule’s management of change requirements 

should be expanded to include management of organizational changes. 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. What do you consider to be an organizational change within the context of process 

safety management practices? For example, would you consider the following, or 

similar, changes to be organizational changes: reducing the number of operators in a 

shift; changing from 5-day to 7-day operations; changing from 8-hour to 12-hour 

operator shifts; replacing a unit manager; reducing the facility operations or 
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maintenance budget; relocating a technical group to a remote corporate location; 

changing a supervisory or compensation structure; or hiring contractors to do work 

formerly performed by employees of the regulated facility? Are there other examples 

of organizational changes that may be relevant to safety management practices?

b. If your facility has established and implemented written procedures for management 

of organizational changes, please describe any economic impacts associated with the 

procedures. Please note any implementation challenges that may be associated with 

requiring that such procedures be developed and followed.

c. Would clarifying § 68.75 with an explicit requirement that employers manage 

organizational changes prevent accidental releases? What would be the economic 

impact of such a clarification? Are there any special circumstances involving small 

entities that EPA should consider with respect to this option? 

d. Please describe any organizational changes made in your facility that have had the 

potential to affect process operations. Were management-of-change procedures 

followed before making the changes? 

e. What do you consider to be the best safety practices concerning management of 

organizational change? 

f. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents, near misses, or other 

safety-related incidents involving the failure to manage organizational change. Would 

following management-of-change procedures under § 68.75 have prevented these 

incidents? 

6. Require Third-Party Compliance Audits.
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Sections 68.58 and 68.79 of the RMP regulation (Program 2 and 3 Compliance Audits) 

are almost identical in language to that found in 1910.119(o) of the OSHA PSM standard, with 

PSM’s focus on worker safety and RMP’s on protecting human health and the environment. 

Both section 68.58 and 68.79 require that “the owner or operator shall audit the compliance with 

the provisions of the subpart at least every three years.” In addition, both require that “the 

compliance audit shall be conducted by at least one person knowledgeable in the process.” 

Neither OSHA nor EPA requires employers to use a third-party in conducting compliance audits. 

There may be advantages to third-party audits. For example, OSHA’s RFI discusses 

CSB’s findings concerning a lack of rigorous compliance audits in the 2005 BP Texas City 

Refinery explosion accident. OSHA’s settlement with BP Texas City required BP to retain a 

third-party compliance auditor with adequate experience36. The CCPS argues that experienced 

third-party auditors, like those provided by consulting companies, can provide the most 

objectivity37. 

Additionally, BSEE’s Safety and Environmental Management Systems (SEMS) standard, 

30 CFR 250, Subpart S, requires that audits be conducted by independent third-parties subject to 

BSEE approval, or to avoid conflict of interest, personnel that are considered to be qualified by 

the employer. In their revisions to the SEMs II final rule, BSEE discussed its third-partyauditing requirements. 

 EPA seeks information on whether to revise 40 CFR 68.58 and 68.79 to require facility 

owners and operators to use a third-party for compliance audits, on whether requiring a thirdparty auditing process would increase protection of human health and the environment, and on 

                                                            

36 United States of America Occupational Safety and Health Administration, BP Products North America Inc.

Settlement Agreement, September 21, 2005 37 American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Risk Based Process

Safety, New York, Wiley, 2007
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whether the existing compliance audit requirements are sufficiently clear or if changes should be 

made to strengthen the audit requirements. Specifically, EPA requests information on the 

following questions: 

a. Does your facility use a third-party for conducting compliance audits under § 68.58 

and § 68.79 for safety or other reasons? What was the basis for that decision? How 

has it affected the overall safety record of your facility? 

b. Please provide any data or information on workplace accidents, near misses, or other 

safety-related incidents that could have been prevented by conducting more effective 

compliance audits for operations covered under § 68.58 and § 68.79. What were the 

deficiencies in those audits? Were the audits in question conducted by in-house staff 

or a third party? 

c. Would revising § 68.58 and § 68.79 to require owners and operators of RMPregulated facilities to use a third-party for compliance audits help prevent accidental 

releases? What would be the economic impacts of revising § 68.58 and § 68.79 in this 

way (e.g., typical consultant fees, additional work hours required, special 

circumstances involving small entities, etc.)? 

d. Should EPA revise § 68.58 and § 68.79 to require owners and operators to use 

compliance auditors (internal or third-party) with certain minimum credentials or 

certifications? If so, what minimum credentials or certifications should the Agency 

require? 

e. How should owners/operators of RMP-regulated facilities address the findings of the 

third-party auditor? Should EPA amend the RMP rule to require owners/operators to 

document how they addressed each of the findings of the third-party auditor? Should 
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a timeframe for addressing those findings be included in the RMP regulation? Should 

EPA include a procedure for how an owner/operator may appeal the findings of the 

third-party auditor? 

f. Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses to conduct a full 

compliance audit under § 68.58 or § 68.79, as appropriate? Would such a 

requirement create a perverse incentive to underreport incidents or near misses? 

g. During compliance inspections at multiple-process sources, EPA inspectors have 

noted that some owners or operators have audited only a subset of covered processes 

at the source. Should EPA clarify § 68.58 and § 68.79 to explicitly indicate that all 

covered processes must receive a full compliance audit at least every three years? 

h. Does the identity of the auditor (e.g., in-house, contractor, professionally-certified, 

party licensed by EPA) affect the credibility of the audit for potentially impacted 

communities? 

7. Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability.

RMP Program 2 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 or subject to Program 3, 

whereas Program 3 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 and either subject to OSHA's 

PSM standard under federal or state OSHA programs or classified in one of ten specified NAICS 

codes (see section II.B.10 for a listing of Program 3 NAICS codes). A review of the current 

RMP national database indicates that approximately 5360 RMP facilities have reported Program 

2 processes within their RMP (in most cases, these facilities have reported a single covered 

process). Approximately 4000 (75 percent) of these are bulk agricultural chemical distributors 

such as West Fertilizer. These facilities generally store large quantities of anhydrous ammonia, 

as well as other agricultural chemicals, for distribution or sale. Although the presence of 
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anhydrous ammonia above an RMP TQ in a process would normally make that process subject 

to both Program 3 requirements (assuming it did not qualify for Program 1 by virtue of its 

remote location and lack of accident history) as well as OSHA PSM, these facilities generally 

claim that they are exempt from the OSHA PSM standard, and therefore eligible for RMP 

Program 2, based on the OSHA “retail facility” exemption in 29 CFR 1910.119(a)(2)(i). 

In its RFI, OSHA has requested information on whether that Agency should change its 

enforcement policy for retail facilities. OSHA notes that its current application of the PSM 

exemption for retail facilities is inconsistent with the normal meaning of “retail” and the 

explanation of the purpose of the exemption provided in the preamble to the PSM standard. The 

OSHA RFI states: “As stated in the preamble, OSHA chose to exclude retail facilities from PSM 

coverage because the limited container, package, or allotment sizes of the chemicals typically 

found at these facilities do not present the same safety hazards as those encountered at 

establishments working with large, bulk quantities of materials.... As a result of increased 

workplace hazards associated with large, bulk quantities of highly hazardous chemicals, OSHA 

believes that only retail-trade facilities listed in NAICS sectors 44 and 45 that sell highly 

hazardous chemicals in small containers, packages, or allotments to the general public qualify for 

the retail-facilities exemption in 29 CFR 1910.119(a)(2)(i).” 

If OSHA were to change its policy such that only facilities selling small containers, 

packages, or allotments to the general public would qualify for the retail facilities exemption, 

EPA believes that virtually every bulk agricultural chemical distribution facility process 

currently claiming Program 2 eligibility under the RMP regulation would henceforth be subject 

to Program 3 (unless the process were to meet Program 1 eligibility criteria). 
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Of the remaining (i.e., non-agricultural) Program 2 processes, over 70 percent are water 

or wastewater treatment facilities located in states without federally-delegated, state-run 

occupational safety and health programs. These facilities are generally not subject to PSM 

requirements because they are operated by state or municipal government employees, who are 

not subject to federal OSHA standards in states without delegated OSHA programs, (i.e., federal 

OSHA only regulates private employers). It is a peculiarity of the RMP regulation that two 

identical RMP-covered water or wastewater treatment plants – one located in a state with a state 

OSHA program and the other in a state without a state-delegated OSHA program – are subject to 

different levels of accident prevention requirements under the RMP rule. Non-PSM-covered 

water and wastewater treatment facilities are not classified as Program 3, by definition. Water 

and wastewater treatment facilities are covered under the RMP regulation due to the presence of 

large quantities of highly toxic substances, such as chlorine and sulfur dioxide. Processes in 

private industry sectors involving similar quantities of these chemicals are virtually always 

subject to Program 3 as a result of their risk to nearby receptors. EPA is interested in receiving 

public comment on whether RMP-covered municipal water and wastewater plants that are not 

eligible for Program 1 should also be subject to RMP Program 3, regardless of whether or not 

they are located in a state with a federally-delegated OSHA program. 

Other than bulk agricultural chemical distributors and water and wastewater treatment 

facilities, there are fewer than 400 RMP facilities currently reporting Program 2 processes to 

EPA. Of these, EPA believes that approximately half are either non-agricultural bulk chemical 

distributors that would also become Program 3 in the event that OSHA were to restrict eligibility 

for its PSM retail exemption, or processes that incorrectly reported as Program level 2 in their 

RMP (i.e., processes that are actually already subject to Program 3). In summary, if OSHA were 
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to restrict eligibility for its retail exemption to facilities selling small containers, packages, or 

allotments to the general public, and EPA were to require all RMP-covered water and 

wastewater treatment plants not eligible for Program 1 to comply with Program 3, EPA believes 

that there would be approximately 200 RMP-covered processes nationwide that would remain 

eligible for Program 2. In light of these facts, EPA invites comment on whether it should modify 

Program 2 eligibility criteria, or alternatively, eliminate Program 2 and require all formerly 

Program 2 processes to comply with Program 3 or Program 1 requirements38. 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Do you currently operate a facility with Program 2 covered processes? Please 

indicate what type of Program 2 process your facility operates. Do you implement 

accident prevention measures that go beyond RMP Program 2 for this process? If so, 

why? What additional prevention elements do you use? Do you believe Program 2 

requirements are necessary for the safe operation of this process? Do you have any 

Program 2 processes that may be adequately managed under Program 1? Please 

explain the basis for your views.

b. Do you operate a water or wastewater treatment plant that is subject to the RMP 

regulation? If so, what level of accident prevention requirements do you believe are 

warranted for such facilities? If you operate a Program 2 process at a water or 

wastewater treatment plant, how much additional burden would be involved in 

implementing the additional RMP elements required for Program 3 processes? 

                                                            

38 This would mean that formerly Program 2 processes would henceforth be subject to the 5 Program 3

management system elements not required under Program 2 (i.e., Management of change, Pre‐startup review,

Employee participation, Hot work permits, and Contractors), as well as the more rigorous versions of the 7

Program 3 elements for which there are Program 2 analogs (e.g., Mechanical integrity under Program 3 vs

Maintenance under Program 2).
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c. Should RMP-covered municipal water and wastewater plants that are not eligible for 

Program 1 always be subject to RMP Program 3, regardless of whether or not they are 

located in a state with a Federally-delegated OSHA program? Why or why not? 

d. If OSHA restricts its retail exemption to facilities selling regulated substances in 

small containers, should EPA eliminate RMP Program level 2 entirely or 

alternatively, modify Program 2 prevention elements or otherwise change the 

eligibility criteria for Program 2? If so, why? 

e. Would eliminating Program level 2 simplify rule compliance for the regulated 

universe and improve human and environmental health and safety, or does the current 

three-tiered prevention program framework under the RMP provide an appropriate 

level of protection? 

f. What would be the economic impacts of modifying or eliminating Program level 2? 

Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider 

with respect to modifying or eliminating Program 2? 

D. Additional Items for Whichwhich EPA Requests Information 

This section discusses items that were not previously raised in the OSHA RFI. Each item 

discussion is followed by specific questions to collect data, information, and comments on each 

issue. 

1. Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis.

EPA has recognized the importance of considering safer alternativetechnology and 

alternatives techniques39 that may result in improved process safety. EPA’s existing guidance40

                                                            

39 In this document, “safer technology and alternatives” is intendedrefer to encompass various similar terms

including inherently safer technology, inherently safer processes, and the likerisk reduction strategies developed

through an analysis using a hierarchy of controls.
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on the “general duty clause” in CAA section 112(r)(1) states that, “The owners and operators 

should try to substitute less hazardous substances for extremely hazardous substances or 

minimize inventories when possible. This is the usually the most effective way to prevent 

accidents and should be the priority of a prevention program.” When EPA issued the RMP rule, 

we noted, “Good PHA techniques often reveal opportunities for continuous improvement of 

existing processes and operations. EPA encourages sources to continue to examine and adopt 

viable alternative processing technologies, system safeguards, or process modifications to make 

new and existing processes and operations inherently safer.”41 Additionally, the structure of the 

applicability provisions of the RMP rule, with TQs, encourages minimizing the presence of 

regulated substances in processes. Thus, EPA’s historic approach to safer alternatives under 

CAA section 112(r) has been to support and encourage them but not mandate their use or 

analysis42technology and alternatives under CAA section 112(r) has encouraged many chemical 

plant operators to introduce safer technology and alternatives to help reduce the overall risk of 

their facilities but has not mandated their use or analysis. As we noted in the preamble to the 

1996 final RMP rule, “Application of good PHA techniques often reveals opportunities for 

continuous improvement of existing processes and operations without a separate analysis of 

alternatives” (61 FR 31674, June 20, 1996). In addition, in CAA Section 112(r) enforcement 

cases, facilities have occasionally entered into consent agreements involving implementation of 

safer alternatives. As a result of the Executive Order 13650 Report for the President43, EPA and 

                                                                                                                                                                                                40 http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/gdcregionalguidance.pdf 41 See 61 FR 31700. 42 In CAA Section 112(r) enforcement cases, facilities have occasionally entered into consent agreements involving

implementation of safer alternatives.   43 Chemical Facility Safety and Security Working Group, Executive Order 13650 Report to the President – Actions to

Improve Chemical Facility Safety and Security – A Shared Commitment, May 2014;

https://www.osha.gov/chemicalexecutiveorder/final_chemical_eo_status_report.pdf
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other agencies will be considering various additional actions related to safer technologies and 

alternatives. 

In July of 2012, a coalition representing 54 organizations and individuals petitioned EPA 

to use its rulemaking authority under CAA section 112(r)(7)(A), and to issue guidance under the 

general duty clause in section 112(r)(1) to “to require the use of inherently safer chemical 

processestechnologies, where feasible, atby facilities that use or store hazardous chemicals.” 

The petioners also requested that “pending completion of a rulemaking under section CAA 

112(r)(7)(A), EPA revise its guidance concerning the enforcement of the Clean Air Act’s general 

duty clause, section 112(r)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1), to make clear that the duty to prevent 

releases of extremely hazardous substances includes the use, where feasible, of safer 

technologies to minimize the presence and possible release of hazardous chemicals”44. While 

EPA shares the petitioner’s goal of preventing hazardous chemical releases and minimizing their 

risk to communities, the Agency requests additional information on the best wayspossible 

approaches to promotepromoting risk reduction through a safer technology and alternatives

approach. 

A July 2010 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) report prepared by CCPS45

described inherently safer technology (IST) as a philosophy and an iterative process, including 

eliminating a hazard, reducing a hazard, substituting a less hazardous material, using less 

hazardous process conditions, and designing a process to reduce the potential for, or 

consequences of, human error, equipment failure, or intentional harm. It stated that there is no 

clear boundary between IST and other strategies, that ISTs are relative and can only be described 

                                                            

44 https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/404584‐petition‐to‐epa‐to‐prevent‐chem‐disasters‐filed.html

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/404584‐petition‐to‐epa‐to‐prevent‐chem‐disasters‐filed.html, at 10. 45 CCPS Final Report: Definition for Inherently Safer Technology in Production, Transportation, Storage, and Use,

July 2010
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as inherently safer when compared to a different technology, including a description of the 

hazard or set of hazards being considered, their location, and the potentially affected population. 

Because an option may be inherently safer with regard to some hazards and inherently less safe 

with regard to others, the decision process must consider the entire life cycle, the full spectrum of 

hazards and risks, and the potential for transfer of risk from one impacted population to another. 

This report also noted that there is currently no consensus on either a quantification method for 

IST or a scientific assessment method for evaluation of IST options. 

The CCPS has also published a guideline book46 intended to provide tools and guidance 

on approaches to implementing inherent safety. Among other information, the book contains an 

extensive checklist intended to assist industrial facilities with reviewing existing hazards and 

their safeguards, evaluating the feasibility of inherently safer alternatives, and documenting the 

results of this analysis. 

A 2012 National Academy of Sciences report47 found that while inherently safer process 

assessments can be valuable components of process safety management, inherently safer process 

assessments will not always result in a clear, well-defined, and feasible path forward. Although 

one process alternative may be inherently safer with respect to one hazard—toxicity of 

byproducts, for example—the process may present other hazards, such as an increased risk of 

fire or more severe environmental impacts. Choosing between options for process design 

involves considering a series of tradeoffs and developing appropriate combinations of inherent, 

passive, active, and procedural safety systems to manage all hazards. 

                                                            

46 American Institute of Chemical Engineers, Center for Chemical Process Safety, Inherently Safer Chemical

Processes:  A Life Cycle Approach, Second Edition, New York, Wiley, 2009 47 http://dels.nas.edu/resources/static‐assets/materials‐based‐on‐reports/reports‐in‐brief/MIC‐Summary‐Final.pdf
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 There are some state and local governments that have included inherent safety 

requirements in their regulations. An IST Review Rule was adopted under the New Jersey TCPA 

program in May 2008. It requires IST reviews of all facilities covered by the TCPA by 

evaluating the four IST principles: minimization, substitution, moderation, and simplification. 

The rule includes a checklist developed under the direction of the New Jersey Domestic Security 

Preparedness Task Force. The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection recommends 

three methods for IST analysis48: (1) reviewing and completing a checklist containing a number 

of practical inherent safety considerations, (2) avoiding a particular hazard at a part of the 

process by employing a particular inherently safety strategy and (3) integrating IST into the 

facility’s PHA study. A facility must determine thean identified alternative’s feasibility, and 

must provide written justification based on both qualitative and quantitative evaluations of 

environmental, human health and safety, legal, technological, and economic factors if it decides 

not to implement it. For IST alternatives implemented, an implementation schedule must be 

provided. A January, 2010 report prepared by the New Jersey Department of Environmental 

Protection to summarize the DepartmentsDepartment’s review of 85 IST reports indicated that 

approximately 48% of facilities reported that they had implemented or scheduled to implement 

IST measures as a result of conducting the IST review.

49.

California’s Contra Costa County’s Industrial Safety Ordinance50 requires stationary 

sources to consider IST in the development and analysis of mitigation systems resulting from a 

process hazard analysis for each covered process, and in the design and review of new processes 

and facilities. The stationary source must select and implement inherently safer systems to the 

                                                            

48 See: http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_guidance.pdf;

http://www.njwec.org/PDF/Factsheets/CS_IST_FactSheet.pdf 49 See: http://www.nj.gov/dep/rpp/brp/tcpa/downloads/IST_SUMWEB.pdf 50 See:  http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/2006_iso_official_code_complete.pdf
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greatest extent feasible, documenting in detail a determination that an inherently safer system is 

not feasible. A February, 2013 report prepared by Contra Costa County Health Services 

indicated that 4 of 7 facilities covered under the ordinance’s IST provision implemented at least 

one inherently safer measure within the previous year.

51.

The CSB has released reports for two recent accidents that the Board indicated could 

have been avoided if safer technologies had been employed. CSB found that the use of a safer 

material, such aas high-chromium steel, would have prevented the accelerated corrosion and 

failure of carbon steel involved in the equipment rupture at the Tesoro Refinery in Anacortes, 

Washington in 2010, which resulted in an explosion and fire that killed seven employees52. CSB 

also cited the failure to use more corrosion resistant high-chromium steel as a factor in the 2012 

Chevron Refinery accident in Richmond, CA which released hydrocarbons that ignited, 

endangering 19 employees53. 

An additional complication to assessing safer technologies and alternatives is the varying 

amount and quality of information available regarding their implementation by industry. While 

some facilities have converted to processes generally deemed asconsidered to be inherently safer, 

other facilities may not have sufficient information available to effectively assess the impacts 

from changing existing processes to ones considered inherently safer. The differences that exist 

among chemical facilities, in terms of chemical process, facility layout, and ability to finance 

implementation, may challenge mandatory implementation of safer technologies and alternatives 

at regulated entities. 

                                                            

51 See:  http://cchealth.org/hazmat/pdf/iso/iso‐report.pdf 52 See:  http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Tesoro_Anacortes_2014‐May‐01.pdf 53 See:  http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/Chevron_Interim_Report_Final_2013‐04‐17.pdf
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EPA is consideringplanning the following optionssteps to advance safer technologies and 

alternatives: 

• Publishing ana joint alert or advisory to notify regulated facilities ofwith OSHA 

illustrating the concepts, principles and examples of safer alternative technologies 

technology and alternatives to make industry more aware of the need to consider this 

approachinformation, while providing. sources of information on analysis and 

alternatives for further investigation and review, 

• Publishing a voluntary guidance document with OSHA for operators on how to 

reduce risks by employing safer technology and alternatives, by offering a more 

thorough examination of alternative measures and safety techniques, including 

examples of safer technology and alternatives or practices, 

• Based on the evaluation of feedback from the alert, guidance, and this RFI, EPA 

would consider proposing an amendment to the RMP regulations that requires: 

o An analysis and documentation of safer technologies and alternatives 

o Integration of the safer technologies and alternatives analysis into the PHA 

o Implementation of safer technologies and alternatives where feasible; EPA 

would not make any determination regarding the specific analysis, 

technology, design, or process selection by chemical facility owners or 

operators. 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Should EPA require a safer alternatives options analysis either as a new prevention 

program element or, as part of the existing PHA/Hazard Review element under 
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authority of CAA section 112(r)(7)(B), or as a separate new requirement under CAA 

section 112(r)(7)(A)? 

b. How should safer alternatives be defined if it were to be a requirement under CAA 

section 112(r) regulations? What specifically should a safer alternatives analysis 

require and how would this differ from what is already required under other 

provisions of the RMP?

c. How should industries determine if a safer alternative exists for their particular 

process? What safer alternative chemicals are available for the listed RMP chemicals 

and for ammonium nitrate? 

d. What should facilities consider when determining if such technologies, when 

identified, are effective, available, and affordableeconomically justified for their 

particular process or facility? Can the RMP*Info national database, Lessons Learned 

Information System54 or other federal databases be structured to promote the 

exchange of information both within industry and with other stakeholders on 

potentially safer technologies? 

e. If EPA were to require facilities to undertake an evaluation of the potential to 

incorporate safer alternatives, what should be theminimum criteria required to make 

should this evaluation be required to meet? How would the evaluation determine if a 

particular alternative is feasible, cost effective and results in less risk? What 

requirements or incentives, if any, should there be for implementation of identified 

safer alternatives? How should any such requirements be structured and enforced?

                                                            

54 https://www.llis.dhs.gov/topics/chemical‐facility‐safety‐and‐security
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f. Should EPA require facilities to use a safer alternatives evaluation method such as the 

CCPS Inherently Safer Technology Checklist55? 

g. How should EPA and facilities address the risk tradeoffs that could result when 

changing a process to incorporate safer alternatives? 

h. Should EPA consider similar IST requirements similar to those used by the State of 

New Jersey or Contra Costa County, California, and if so, why? What have been the 

benefits of such programs in risk reduction or process safety for the facilities covered 

under these requirements? What have been the limitations or drawbacks of these 

programs?

i. If EPA were to develop regulatory requirements for safer alternatives, which facilities 

should be subject to those requirements? Should all RMP facilities be subject to such 

requirements, or only “high risk” facilities, such as refineries and large chemical 

plants? How would “high risk” be defined? Are there particular processes or 

chemicals that should be targeted or prioritized for implementation of such 

requirements? 

j. What barriers exist for industry to adopt safer alternatives? What incentives can be 

used by government to have facilities implement safer alternatives? Should the 

Agency provide special recognition to companies that implement safer alternatives? 

k. What are other options (other than regulatory requirements) exist to encourage 

facilities to investigate, develop or implement safer alternatives and how can EPA 

further these efforts? Should EPA consider producing a safer alternatives alert, 

advisory, and/or guidance in lieu of regulations? 

                                                            

55   CCPS, Inherently Safer Chemical Processes:  A Life Cycle Approach, Second Edition (2009), Appendix A
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l. If RMP facilities are required to perform safer alternative options analyses and 

implementation plans, should EPA require that the analyses and/or implementation 

plans be submitted to the Agency? Should EPA have any role in approving such 

analyses or plans? In lieu of an approval, can EPA promote safer alternatives through 

reporting and the dissemination of information on potentially applicable practices? 

m. If RMP facilities are required to consider safer alternative options, what role should 

local communities have in these analyses? Should facilities be required to disclose 

these analyses or recommendations resulting from such analyses to local authorities 

or the public prior to the selection of options? Are there any other disclosure options 

that will ensure that decisions on implementing safer technologies are made with 

transparency? Are there any means of oversight other than disclosure that would 

ensure that safer alternatives analyses are thorough and implementation decisions are 

appropriate? 

n. What would be the economic impacts of requiring facilities to analyze safer 

alternative options? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that 

EPA should consider? 

2. Emergency Drills to Test a Source’s Emergency Response Program or Plan.

Under Subpart E of 40 CFR part 68, RMP-covered facilities are required to coordinate 

emergency response actions with local emergency planning and response agencies. RMP 

facilities with Program 2 and Program 3 processes must also develop and implement an 

emergency response program in accordance with § 68.95 if facility personnel will respond to 

accidental releases. As part of the emergency response program, an emergency response plan 

must be maintained at the stationary source; the program must include procedures for the use of 
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emergency response equipment and for its inspection, testing, and maintenance; training for all 

employees in relevant procedures; and procedures to review and update, as appropriate, the 

emergency response plan to reflect changes at the stationary source and ensure that employees 

are informed of changes. For those Program 2 and Program 3 facilities at which facility 

employees will not respond to accidental releases, coordination with community emergency 

planners and responders is required and an appropriate mechanism must be in place to notify 

responders when there is a need for a response. 

Exercising response plans is critical to ensure that response personnel understand their 

roles, local emergency responders are familiar with the hazards at the facility, and that the 

emergency response plan is appropriate and up to date. It ensures that personnel are properly 

trained and can be used to identify future training needs. Other EPA and Federal agency 

programs require exercises and drills as an element of their emergency response programs. For 

example, under the Oil Pollution Prevention regulation (40 CFR part 112), Facility Response 

Plan (FRP) holders are required to conduct drills and exercises, including evaluation procedures 

(§ 112.21). Exercises at FRP facilities may follow the National Preparedness for Response 

Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines56 which were developed to provide a mechanism for 

compliance with EPA, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) 

exercise requirements for oil pollution response. The PREP guidelines include both internal and 

external exercise components. Internal exercises include notification exercises, emergency 

procedures exercises, spill management team tabletop exercises, and equipment deployment 

                                                            

56 A copy of the National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) Guidelines, August 2002, can be

accessed on the USCG Web site at http://www.uscg.mil/vrp/faq/oil.shtml under “Additional References.”   
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exercises. External exercises include area exercises, that include members of the response 

community, and government-initiated unannounced exercises. 

Another example are exercises that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), in 

conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and State and local 

government perform at nuclear power plants. The exercises evaluate both onsiteon-site and 

offsiteoff-site emergency preparedness capabilities. The NRC also requires Research and Test 

Reactor (RTR) emergency plans to address the necessary provisions for coping with radiological 

emergencies at each facility in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) and Appendix E to 10 CFR 50. 

Operators of RTRs are required to train personnel and perform emergency preparedness 

exercises in order to ensure the feasibility of the emergency preparedness plan. 

Finally, industry guidelines recommend conducting exercises and drills. The CCPS 

Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety57 recommend periodically testing the adequacy of 

emergency response plans and level of preparedness of responders, including contractors and 

local response agencies. 

In order to improve coordination with community responders and ensure that facility 

personnel have practice responding to accidental releases, EPA is considering requiring RMPregulated facilities to perform exercises or drills as an element of the emergency response 

program identified under Subpart E of the RMP regulation. 

In considering this issue, EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Are RMP-regulated facilities currently exercising their emergency response plans? If 

so, are they doing these exercises to comply with other federal, state or local 

                                                            

57 Center for Chemical Process Safety, Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety, American Institute of Chemical

Engineers, New York, New York, 2007.
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regulatory requirements? What references or guidelines were used to develop the 

exercise program? 

b. What should be the scope of an exercise/drill program? Should the exercise/drill 

program include internal (emergency response, notifications, and evacuation) and 

external elements (involving community and federal and state responders, as 

appropriate)? What elements should be exercised as part of the drill/exercise 

program? For example, should itthe program include communications, coordination, 

logistics, and evacuations/accounting for personnel, etc? What response scenarios 

should be considered for the exercise/drill program? 

c. How frequently should drills/exercises be performed? 

d. Who should be involved in the exercise program? How should the management team 

be engaged as part of the drills/exercises? How should contractors be included in the 

exercise/drill planning and when conducting exercises/drills? Who should be the 

designated official responsible for coordinating the exercises and drills conducted at 

the RMP facility? How should other federal, state and local agencies be included in 

the exercise/drill program? 

e. Should all RMP facilities be required to participate in some type of exercise/drill 

program or only those who are required to develop an emergency response program? 

Should Program 1 facilities (and Program 2/Program 3 facilities that do not respond 

to accidental releases with their own employees) be required to conduct external 

exercises with community responders and test notification procedures? Should 

Program 2 and Program 3 facilities whose employees respond to accidental releases 

conduct both internal and external exercises? 
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f. How should lessons learned and recommendations be documented and addressed? 

What timeframe should be considered for completing such records? How long should 

records of exercises/drills be maintained? 

g. Should stationary source operators be required to document and address lessons 

learned and recommendations when they respond to an actual accidental release? 

h. Should information such as the date of the most recent exercise involving the 

emergency response plan be required to be reported to EPA in the facility’s RMP? 

i. What would be the economic impacts and paperwork burden of requiring an 

exercise/drill program for all or a subset of RMP facilities? Would such a 

requirement substantially improve preparedness for dealing with emergency 

situations? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA 

should consider with respect to an exercise/drill program? 

3. Automated Detection and Monitoring for Releases of Regulated Substances.

A process hazards analysis is intended not only to identify existing hazards, but also the 

likelihood that safety and mitigating systems, including detection and monitoring equipment, 

would function properly to eliminate or reduce the consequences that may occur as a result of 

those hazards. The RMP Program 3 Prevention Program requires regulated facilities to conduct a 

process hazard analysis (§ 68.67). The rule specifically requires a facility’s hazard analysis to 

address engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their 

interrelationships, such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early 

warning of releases. Examples of acceptable detection methods identified in this requirement 

include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware. 

Likewise, emergency response procedures can reduce the severity of a release and protect 
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employees, emergency responders, and the public from harmful exposure to the regulated 

substances. RMP-regulated facilities must have procedures or mechanisms in place for 

informing the public and local emergency response agencies about accidental releases. These 

process hazards analysis and emergency program elements, while addressing detection 

methodologies, early warnings, and incident notifications, include no specific requirements for 

automated detection and monitoring systems to be installed. The active utilizationuse of such 

systems may enhance both the prevention of and the response to accidental releases. However, 

the Agency understands that the need for and appropriate deployment of such systems is likely to 

be highly site-specific, and that facilities may already have appropriate incentives to deploy such 

systems where warranted and cost-effective. 

The Agency recognizes that even equipment that is properly designed and maintained can 

sometimes fail. Automated detection and monitoring systems can be used to not only to assess 

the effectiveness of existing control measures, but also to provide early warning of system upsets 

which could be acted upon to prevent a more serious or catastrophic incident. Linking these with 

alert systems and proper communications with the public and first responders may enhance 

emergency response efforts in the event of an incident, resulting in better protection of human 

health and the environment. For example, large increases in emissions due to a piping leak, a 

significant tear in a storage vessel seal, or other similar event can signal a process upset. Systems 

in place to detect leaks (or the conditions that might result in leaks) in a timely manner would 

allow for corrective measures to be taken more rapidly than if a facility relied solely on 

traditional monitoring and inspection methods. RMP inspection and enforcement history has 

shown this to be of concern, particularly for facilities that are not staffed on a full-time basis and 
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which may also be located in close proximity to population centers or environmentally sensitive 

areas. 

While facilities may identify the benefits of installing automated detection and 

monitoring systems as they conduct their process hazards analysis, or as they develop their 

emergency response plan, the decision to invest in such equipment may be influenced by many 

factors. For example, automated detection and monitoring technologies may not be available for 

particular chemical hazards, or industry standards may not address their proper use. They may 

also be costly. Nevertheless, the Agency is requesting information on the need for new or 

expanded requirements for automated detection and monitoring systems that would supplement 

either the existing process hazard analysis and/or emergency response requirements. Specifically, 

EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Should facilities be required to install monitoring equipment or sensors to detect 

releases of RMP regulated substances, or the conditions that could lead to such a 

release? Should the systems provide for continuous detection and monitoring? How 

should any such requirements be crafted to provide appropriate site-specific 

flexibility?

b. Are there specific issues that need to be considered for unmanned and/or remote 

facilities? 

c. Should an automated mechanism to notify, alert and warn the local responders and 

surrounding public of an incident be considered as part of any detection and 

monitoring system requirement? If so, how should the potential for false alarms be 

addressed within such a requirement? 
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d. How can a requirement for automated detection and monitoring systems be best 

coordinated with the community emergency response plan? What are the 

advantages/disadvantages between of continuous monitoring conducted by automated 

systems in contrast to third-party alarm agencies? 

e. How would a requirement for appropriate detection thresholds be best established for 

activating alarms and/or alerts? 

f. How would the significance and appropriate protective response action of the 

alarms/alerts be best communicated to responders and the public (including shelterin-place and evacuations)? 

g. What involvement should LEPCs and SERCs have in the development of the 

emergency response plan, particularly with respect to what actions are to be taken in 

the event of an incident where and alarm/alert is activated? 

h. How frequently should monitoring equipment or sensors to detect releases of RMPregulated substances be tested? How should these tests be documented? How long 

should records of such tests be maintained? Should automated monitoring records for 

periods of normal operations be maintained, so that past records may serve as an aid 

in determining what may have gone wrong prior to an accident (e.g., a gradual 

increase in emissions)? Should EPA specify requirements in this area, or are these 

aspects of program implementation best left to the facility?

i. Leak detection and repair programs are common under the CAA’s routine emission 

programs. Can these programs be integrated with the accidental release prevention 

program to reduce accidental releases and to simplify requirements for stationary 
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sources subject to both the RMP and these other programs? Are there jurisdictional 

issues that prevent integration? 

j. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional monitoring and 

detection requirements in the RMP? Are there any special circumstances involving 

small entities that EPA should consider with respect to such monitoring and detection 

requirements? 

4. Additional Stationary Source Location Requirements.

As part of the directive under Executive Order 13650 to prevent chemical accidents, EPA 

EPA is considering whether to amend 40 CFR part 68 to provide more specific requirements to 

address stationary source siting. In 2005, a series of explosions occurred at the BP Texas City 

refinery during the restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerization unit. Fifteen workers were killed 

and 180 others were injured. Many of the victims were in or around work trailers located near an 

atmospheric vent stack. The CSB investigation identified the siting of the trailers as a key factor 

that led to the fatalities. The PSM standard and RMP rule both require that facility siting be 

addressed as one element of a PHA (see 29 CFR 1910.11 9(e)(2) and (3)(v)), and 40 CFR 

68.67(c)). However,While EPA has not provided any guidance on how to adequately address 

stationary source siting in the PHA. RMP facility owner/operators can refer to industry 

standards to addressguidance on siting considerations. The following publications provide 

guidance on facility siting: 

• American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice 752, Management of 

Hazards Associated With Location of Process Plant Buildings, 3rd Edition, December 

2009; 
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• API Recommended Practice 753, Management of Hazards Associated with Location 

of Process Plant Portable Buildings, First Edition, June 2007 

• CCPS, Guidelines for Facility Siting and Layout (2003); and 

• CCPS, Guidelines for Evaluating Process Plant Buildings for External Explosions and 

Fires, and Toxic Releases, 2nd Edition (2012). 

Both the siting of processes within a stationary source and the siting of the stationary 

source itself can affect the impact of an accidental release. Siting within a stationary source can 

impact the surrounding community not only by the proximity of the accidental release to off-site 

receptors adjacent to the facility boundary (e.g., people, infrastructure, environmental resources) 

but also by increasing the likelihood of a secondary “knock-on” release through compromising 

nearby processes. 

Siting of a stationary source itself may allow the potential impact of an accidental release 

to dissipate depending on the distance from the source to receptors. The lack of sufficient 

distance between the source boundary and neighboring residential areas was a significant factor 

in the severity of several major chemical accidents, including, among others, the Bhopal disaster 

and the recent West Fertilizer accident. Facility designers have long recognized the potential 

benefits of adding buffer or safety zones - controlled areas separating the public and other 

facilities from the consequences of process incidents – when selecting the location for new 

chemical facilities (see, e.g., CCPS (2003)). For existing facilities, owners have sometimes 

compensated nearby residents to relocate away from the facility boundary in order to create a 
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buffer zone where one did not previously exist, or where adjacent residential areas had been 

developed after the facility itself was constructed58. 

Should EPA amend the RMP rule to include more specific siting requirements as part of 

the PHA by, for example, establishing buffer or setback zone requirements for new covered 

stationary sources, or by establishing safety criteria for siting of occupancies inside the facility? 

Would such requirements provide significant incremental protection over current industry 

practice based on the references cited above? In considering this issue, EPA requests 

information on the following questions: 

a. Would additional specifics on stationary source siting and occupancy siting under the 

RMP minimize the impacts of chemical accidents to local communities? How should 

RMP stationary source siting requirements relate to OSHA PSM and other industry 

standards? 

b. What guidance should EPA consider in the development of stationary source siting 

requirements? 

c. What information should EPA consider in the development of stationary source 

buffer or setback zones for different risks? How should EPA address siting when 

limited space is available? 

d. What administrative processes and controls should be incorporated into stationary 

source siting requirements? 

e. What safety and process devices, instruments and controls should be incorporated 

into stationary source siting requirements? 

                                                            

58 See Matthews, Joe. “Paying neighbors to move Mossville: Residents of this Louisiana town, like those in

Wagner’s Point here, faced a showdown with Condea Vista. Their experience is instructive.” The Baltimore Sun 6

Dec. 1998. Web. 8 May 2014, and Gallagher, John. “Marathon offers to buy out Detroit homeowners near refinery

amid $2.2B expansion.” The Detroit Free Press 2 Nov 2011. Web. 8 May 2014.
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f. What criteria are appropriate for siting of occupancies (such as offices, control rooms, 

cafeterias, etc.) near an RMP-regulated process? 

g. How often should stationary source siting be evaluated for effectiveness? What 

criteria should be used? 

h. What documentation should be required for evaluating stationary source siting 

determinations? 

i. Is it appropriate to reflect the environmental burden of the surrounding community in 

siting criteria for either new facilities or expansions within an existing site? Is it 

appropriate to consider chronic burdens or only burdens associated with accidental 

releases? 

g. What challenges would the agency face in specifying uniform siting requirements for 

the wide variety of covered sites? What site specific factors would need to be 

addressed? 

h. If EPA mandated siting criteria, how should EPA account for local zoning codes 

when establishing such criteria? Would setting federal requirements overstep into the 

normal state and local zoning process, or would it act as a supplemental measure 

ensuring minimal safety standards across the country? 

i. What would be the economic impacts of specifying additional siting requirements? 

Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider 

with respect to siting requirements? 

5. Compliance with Emergency Response Program Requirements in Coordination with 

Local Responders.
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Subpart E of the RMP regulation offers owners and operators of RMP-covered facilities 

with Program 2 or 3 processes two emergency response options. For facilities whose employees 

will respond to accidental releases of regulated substances, section 68.95 of the regulation 

requires owners or operators to implement an emergency response program that includes an 

emergency response plan, procedures for the use of emergency response equipment, training for 

employees, procedures to review and update the response plan, and other elements. 

“RespondingThese “responding” facilities are also required to coordinate their emergency plan 

with local response authorities. 

For facilities whose employees will not respond to releases, the RMP regulation states 

that owners and operators of these sources need not comply with the provisions of section 68.95 

provided that the source is included in the community emergency response plan (for sources with 

regulated toxic substances) or has coordinated response actions with the local fire department 

(for sources with only regulated flammable substances), and that appropriate notification 

mechanisms are in place to notify emergency responders when there is a need for a response. 

Subpart E can be read as offering owners or operators the choice of whether to be a 

responding or non-responding facility. However, EPA did not intend to allow sources handling 

TQs of RMP-regulated substances to fail to provide for an adequate emergency response in 

situations where local public responders are not able to respond to releases at the source. RMPregulated facilities indicate within their risk management plan whether or not they are a 

“responding” facility (i.e., by indicating compliance with mandatory elements of emergency 

response plans required in section 68.95(a)(1)), and EPA has found that the majority of RMP 

facilities claim to be “non-responding” facilities. However, during facility inspections, EPA has 

often found that facilities are either not included in the community emergency plan or have not 
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properly coordinated response actions with local authorities. This problem occurs with both 

responding and non-responding facilities, but it is particularly troublesome for non-responding 

facilities, because if the facility itself does not maintain the capability to respond to emergencies, 

and local authorities are not able to respond, then a proper response to an accidental release at the 

facility may not occur or may be significantly delayed. EPA requests comment on whether this 

problem could be addressed through better enforcement of existing requirements, and if so, how 

best to do this.

In some cases, accidental releases have been made significantly worse due to poor 

emergency response planning and coordination. For example, following the August 2008 

explosion and fire at the Bayer CropScience facility in Institute, West Virginia, poor 

coordination between the facility incident commander and local authorities prevented important 

information, including a shelter-in-place order, from being timely communicated to local 

authorities. Additionally, facility authorities initially prevented local responders from gaining 

access to the site of the incident. In another instance, the emergency responder fatalities at West 

Fertilizer may also be tied to the facility’s failure to adequately coordinate with responders in 

advance of the incident.

EPA believes thatis considering whether the Emergency Response provisions in Subpart 

E of the RMP regulation should be clarifiedrevised to state more explicitly that owners and 

operators of RMP-regulated facilities must comply with the emergency response program 

requirements of section 68.95 unless local public responders both have the means and agree to 

respond to releases of regulated substances at the facility, and to describe what facility owners or 

operators must do to coordinate with local authorities on the development of community 

emergency response plans. 
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EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Do you own or operate an RMP-regulated facility that relies on public authorities to 

respond to accidental releases of regulated substances at the facility? What steps do 

you take to ensure that public responders are prepared to properly respond to 

accidental releases at your facility? Should EPA clarify what steps RMP facilities 

should take in order to properly coordinate their emergency response plan with the 

community emergency response plan? 

b. If your facility uses its own employees or response contractors provided by the 

facility to respond to emergencies, what factors led to your decision to use your own 

employees or contractors to conduct emergency response operations? What steps 

have you taken to coordinate with local responders on emergency response planning? 

c. Are you a member of an LEPC, municipal fire department or municipal hazardous 

materials response team? If so, do you believe that “non-responding” RMP facilities 

in your jurisdiction have generally provided the appropriate information and support 

to your organization to ensure an appropriate response to hazardous substance 

emergencies at those facilities? Is your organization capable of responding 

appropriately to such events at RMP facilities? How often do you visit RMP facilities 

in your jurisdiction? Do you conduct emergency drills at RMP facilities? Do you 

believe that RMP facilities should generally respond to emergencies using their own 

employees, or rely on public responders? Should EPA should clarify what is 

necessary for RMP facilities to adequately coordinate their emergency response plan 

with the community emergency response plan? Would new regulations in this area 

significantly improve emergency response planning in your area?
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d. Are there certain substances or types of facilities that present particular response 

challenges for local authorities? If so, which substances or types of facilities? Should 

such facilities be required to prepare and implement comprehensive emergency 

response programs instead of relying primarily on public responders? Do public 

responders in your area have adequate existing authority to require this now?

e. If public responders are not capable of responding to a particular type of chemical or 

release event at an RMP-regulated facility, should the owner or operator of the 

facility be required to provide for an effective response, either with the facility’s own 

employees, response contractors, a mutual aid agreement with nearby facilities, or 

some other means? 

f. What would be the economic impacts of expanding the emergency response 

requirements as discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving 

small entities that EPA should consider with respect to modifying emergency 

response requirements? 

6. Incident Investigation and Accident History Requirements.

Incident investigations and accident history reporting can provide valuable information 

about potential hazards and the steps needed to prevent future events. Many times, the cause of 

an incident is the result of a series of other problems that need to be addressed to prevent 

recurrences. For example, an operator's mistake may be the result of poor training, inappropriate 

procedures, or poor design of control systems; equipment failure may result from improper 

maintenance, misuse of equipment (e.g., operating at too high a temperature), or use of 

incompatible materials. Through incident investigation a facility owner or operator would 

determine not only the initiating event that led to the release, but more importantly its root 
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cause(s). Accident history reporting provides an avenue to disseminate that information. Without 

thoroughThorough investigations and reporting, may help facilities may miss opportunities to

identify and address root causes. 

The RMP’s incident investigation requirements closely track those established in 

OSHA’s PSM accident investigation requirements. Likewise, EPA's hazard assessment 

requirements include a five-year accidental release history, which has some overlap with similar 

OSHA process hazard analysis requirements. While most catastrophic releases affect workers 

first, there are incidents where workers are protected but the public and the environment may be 

threatened, e.g. emergency relief devices working as designed to vent hazardous atmospheres 

away from the workplace and into the air where they may be carried downwind. Although the 

PHA process may have recognized and addressed the potential off-site impact offsite associated 

with safety measures that protect workers (e.g. an emergency vent scrubber system), the RMP 

requires that facilities consider such possibilities and integrate the protection of workers, the 

public, and the environment into one program. Thus, RMP facilities must investigate each 

significant incident which resulted in, or could reasonably have resulted in a catastrophic release. 

A catastrophic release is defined for purposes of the RMP as one where a major uncontrolled 

emission, fire, or explosion, involving one or more regulated substances presents an imminent 

and substantial endangerment to public health and the environment. Imminent and substantial 

endangerment includes offsiteoff-site consequences such as death, injury, or adverse effects to 

human health or the environment, or the need for the public to shelter-in-place or be evacuated to 

avoid such consequences. In contrast, the accident history requirement includes a five-year 

record of only those accidents from covered processes that resulted in deaths, injuries, or 

significant property damage on-site, or known offsiteoff-site deaths, injuries, evacuations, 
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sheltering in place, property damage, or environmental damage. Near-miss accidents or accidents 

with only the potential for consequences are not required to be included, and the accident history 

requirement applies only to covered processes. 

EPA has encouraged facilities to investigate all accidental releases. However, the focus of 

the current incident investigation and accident history reporting requirements is limited. EPA’s 

experiences with RMP facility inspections and incident investigations show there have been 

incidents that were not investigated, even though under slightly different circumstances, the 

incident could have resulted in a catastrophic release. While these unplanned “near miss” events 

did not result in deaths, injuries, adverse health or environmental effects, or sheltering-in-place, 

only a fortunate break in the chain of events prevented a catastrophic release of a regulated 

substance from happening. For example, a runaway reaction that is brought under control by 

operators is a near miss that may need to be investigated to determine why the problem occurred, 

even if it does not directly involve a covered process. Similarly, fires and explosions near or 

within a covered process, any unanticipated release of a regulated substance, and process upsets 

that could have led to a release of a regulated substance may also be one step away from 

initiating a chain of events leading to a catastrophic release. Additionally, there have been some 

cases where the facility chose not to conduct an investigation because the owner/operator elected 

to decommission the process involved, or because the process was destroyed in the incident. 

While an investigation would have no impact on a decommissioned or destroyed process, other 

similar processes or operations at the facility, or at similar facilities, wouldcould potentially 

benefit from its findings. In other instances, facilities have failed to investigate serious releases 

because they claimeddetermined there were no actual or potential offsiteoff-site consequences. 

Investigating these types of incidents and including them as part of the RMP accident history 
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report could provide facilities with important information on what problems could lead to an 

incident, and allow for the facility to address them before a catastrophic release occurs. Further, 

including some of these incidents as part of the accident history could also improve process 

safety at facilities with similar processes, where operators could learn from the shared 

information. 

Incident investigations may result in improved process safety through the dissemination 

of lessons learned and the implementation of recommended corrective actions. Conducting these 

investigations as soon as possible after an incident willmay yield better quality data and 

information, though time may also be required to collect, validate, and integrate data from a 

range of sources. EPA has discovered situations where incident investigations by regulated 

facilities have been indefinitely delayed. Delays could result in an increased risk of incident 

recurrence as root causes and the appropriate corrective actions are not necessarily promptly 

identified or implemented. The need forvalue of conducting incident investigations and 

communicating lessons learned in a timely manner was also recognized by the CSB. In 

recommendations to the Agency, the CSB called for RMP accident histories to be updated on a 

more timely basis in view of the valuable information they provide for chemical accident 

prevention and preparedness efforts by government, industry and the public59. EPA agreed with 

the CSB recommendation and amended the RMP accident history requirements to require that 

facilities who have had an accident meeting the criteria for the five-year accident history to 

update their RMP accident history to include the new accident history information within six 

months of the date of the accident. 

                                                            

59 Joint Chemical Safety Board, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health, and EPA Roundtable on Developing Improved Metrics on Accidental Chemical Process Releases,

November 14, 2002
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The Agency believesis considering whether broadening the incident investigation and 

accident history requirements to include clear requirements to investigate near misses and 

determine root causes of accidents, near misses, and process upsets would promote increased 

safety. The Agency is requesting information on the appropriateness of requiring root cause 

investigations of incidents, process upsets and near-misses, and of establishing specific time 

frames for incident investigations to be completed. Specifically, the Agency requests detailed 

information on the following questions: 

a. Are the RMP incident investigation requirements too narrowly focused? Would 

identifying a broader range of incidents requiring investigation (e.g., near misses) 

help prevent additional accidental releases? Please provide specific examples where 

possible. EPA requests information on alternative definitions or incident 

classifications that could be included within the rule’s incident investigation 

requirements. 

b. Are there any data or information on process upsets, near misses or other incidents 

that were not required to be investigated, but where an investigation and resulting 

changes in management systems might prevent accidental releases? 

c. Does your facility routinely investigate incidents not required to be investigated under 

part 68? If so, please describe the types of incidents investigated, and the safety 

benefits youreffects these investigations have had on facility had accrued as a 

resultoperations. 

d. Would a specific time frame for incident investigations to be completed benefit 

overall safety? What should be the basis for establishing an appropriate timeframe 
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requirement for an incident investigation to be completed? What are the challenges 

and limitations to completing an incident investigation within a specified timeframe? 

e. Is Are there a need to clarifybenefits from requiring that investigations must be 

performed even in cases where the owner/operator elects to decommission the 

process involved, where the process is destroyed in the incident, or where a facility 

claims determines there were no actual or potential offsiteoff-site consequences? 

Would such a requirement provide a disincentive to decommission potentially risky 

processes? 

f. Would a modification of the definition of "catastrophic release" assist in addressing 

the concerns forregarding the need to investigate a broader setappropriate scope of 

incidents that require investigation? 

g. Would a modification of the accident history reporting requirements to reflect a 

broader range of incidents being investigated assist in disseminating lessons learned 

across industry? 

h. Should EPA require facilities that have incidents or near misses to conduct a full 

compliance audit under § 68.58 and § 68.79? 

i. Is it appropriate for facilities to share the results of accident investigations with the 

local community or alternatively a summary of the accident, and its root cause? Is 

there an appropriate role for the local community in conducting investigations? 

j. What would be the economic impact of broadening the RMP incident investigation 

requirements to require root cause investigations of near misses? Are there any 

special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider? Would 

small businesses have the capacity to investigate near miss incidents? 
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7. Worst Case Release Scenario Quantity Requirements for Processes Involving 

Numerous Small Vessels Stored Together.

Section 68.25(b) of the RMP rule requires the owner or operator to determine a worstcase release quantity. The regulation states that “the worst case release quantity shall be the 

greater of the following: (1) For substances in a vessel, the greatest amount held in a single 

vessel, taking into account administrative controls that limit the maximum quantity; or (2) For 

substances in pipes, the greatest amount in a pipe, taking into account administrative controls 

that limit the maximum quantity.” Based on a review of past RMP submissions and facility 

inspections, EPA believes that in most cases the current requirements result in a reasonable 

estimate of worst case releases. However, for certain categories of facilities, like chemical 

warehouses, where large numbers of regulated chemical containers are stored closely together, 

the Agency has questions about whether a different approach would better characterize the 

potential process hazards and associated risks. This is of particular concern for those cases where 

each storage container may only contain a few pounds of a regulated substance, but there are 

numerous such containers stored in close proximity to one another. 

This type of situation occurred on June 24, 2005, where a fire involving propylene 

cylinders occurred at the St. Louis Praxair Distribution site. A small fire that began in one 

propylene cylinder spread to other nearby propylene cylinders and then to acetylene and propane 

cylinders. The exploding cylinders flew up to 800 feet in the air, started fires, and damaged 

property in the community. The fire consumed 8,000 cylinders, or almost the entire inventory of 

flammable gases at the facility. Similar accidents have occurred at Air Liquide in Phoenix, 

Arizona in June 1997, Airgas in Tulsa, Oklahoma in August 2003, and Praxair in Fresno, 

California in July 2005. An October 2006 accident in Apex, North Carolina, involving 
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numerous small containers of flammable and toxic materials stored at a hazardous waste disposal 

facility caused a fire, multiple explosions, and the release of a toxic vapor cloud that resulted in 

the evacuation of 16,000 nearby residents. 

EPA seeks information on whether to revise section 68.25(b) of the RMP regulation to 

better account for processes involving numerous small vessels stored together, such as on pallets, 

cylinder racks, and in groups. EPA is looking for information on whether including the entire 

quantity in one location or one process in worst case considerations, instead of just the single 

largest vessel or pipe, would better represent the true worst case scenario quantity, and thereby 

increase protection to human health and the environment and help prevent future accidents from 

occurring. EPA also requests comment on whether there are ways of grouping vessels or pipes 

short of including all the vessels or pipes at a facility that would be appropriate for worst case 

scenario analysis. EPA is also interested in receiving information on whether worst-case 

scenario requirements should account for the potential cascading effects of separate facilities that 

are interconnected (e.g., a manufacturer that provides product to an adjacent source through an 

interconnecting pipeline). Specifically, EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Should EPA revise § 68.25(b) to require the owner or operator of any regulated 

process involving numerous small containers stored together to consider as the worst 

case release quantity the sum of the quantity of all containers in the process, or a 

subset of such containers, or the containers within one storage area of the process? 

b. Would revising the worst case scenario quantity determination requirement in this 

manner better represent the true worst case scenario for such processes? 

c. Would this change promote stronger process safety controls and help prevent 

accidents? 
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d. In situations where numerous small containers are stored together, are there any kinds 

of protective barriers or other methods of storage that would reduce the likelihood of 

a release from one container causing additional releases from adjacent or nearby 

containers? How shouldShould such barriers or storage methods be incorporated into 

the rule’s worst case scenario requirements?, and if so, how? Would revising §

68.25(b) cause any type of additional burden on facilities where large amounts of 

chemicals are stored together? 

e. If EPA were to revise § 68.25(b) to take into account numerous small vessels being 

stored together, what types/kinds of vessels should be covered? Should there be any 

limits on the size of containers subject to the aggregation requirement? What would 

such limits be based on? Similarly, should there be a specific distance between 

vessels established in order to consider them as grouped together for purposes of 

worst case scenario calculations? What would that distance be based on? 

f. Should EPA revise § 68.25 to require the owner or operator of a regulated process to 

consider the potential for worst case release scenarios to involve adjacent facilities or 

other nearby facilities that are interconnected through pipelines? Would this change 

raise any confidentiality or security issues? How would EPA adjust its worst case 

scenario modeling requirements to account for such a change? 

g. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the worst case scenario analysis 

requirements as discussed above? Are there any special circumstances involving 

small entities that EPA should consider with respect to worst case scenario analysis? 

8. Public Disclosure of Information to Promote Regulatory Compliance and Improve 

Community Understanding of Chemical Risks.
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EPA is seeking public comment on whether there are additional steps the Agency could 

take to improve compliance through increased information disclosure to the public and local 

authorities. For example, would requiring RMP-covered facilities to post on a company website 

unrestricted (i.e., non-offsiteoff-site consequence analysis) RMP information on a company 

website, such as the facility’s RMP executive summary, emergency contact information, identity 

of the LEPC, or links to the local emergency response plan and/or the facility’s most recent 

EPCRA Tier II report, lead to improvements in facility safety and better regulatory compliance? 

Would disclosing a summary of the facility’s compliance audit, PHA, or incident investigation 

reports to the LEPC result in improvements in emergency planning and response? Would such 

disclosures raise any concerns regarding facility security or proprietary business information?

We note that the RMP rule was published in 1996 before many of the current 

information-sharing technologies were conceived. While the Agency has modernized 

mechanisms for reporting and handling risk management plans, we have made only minor 

adjustments to the RMP rule for new information technologies. We have not systematically 

reviewed the rule to see if enhanced facility and community interaction through the use of these 

technologies can promote safer operations, perhaps at a reduced cost of compliance and 

oversight. 

Ensuring that communities, local planners and local first responders have appropriate 

facility chemical hazard information is critical to the health and safety of the responders and the 

local community. As directed by theIn response to Executive Order 13650, EPA seeks to find 

ways to enhance information sharing and collaborative planning between chemical facility 

owners and operators, tribal and local emergency planning committees and first responders. 

EPA is interested in identifying ways to make RMP-regulated facility information more readily 
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available to local responders and local communities without creating additional security 

concerns. EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Should EPA amend the RMP regulation to require RMP-regulated facilities to post 

chemical hazard-related information on their websites (if they have one) such as RMP 

chemical names, chemical quantities, executive summaries, links to the LEPCLEPCs, 

community emergency planplans, Safety Data Sheets (SDS) for hazardous chemicals 

present on site, EPCRA Tier 2 reports, release notification reports, accident history 

and cause and other similar information? What requirements should be considered 

for facilities that do not have a website? 

b. Would requiring facilities to make this information available on the company website 

promote improved regulatory compliance? What additional economic burden would 

be associated with such a requirement? 

c. Do RMP-regulated facility owners/operators have any safety or security concerns 

with posting the executive summary from the RMP, or linking to EPCRA reports and 

community response plans on the company websites? Please explain any concerns 

regarding specific elements of this information. 

d. Would posting the RMP executive summary on a website cause facility 

owner/operators to remove important information from the executive summary? 

Does EPA need to better define the contents of an executive summary in order to 

allay security concerns?

e. Is there other information (web-based or otherwise) that would assist local 

communities, emergency planners, and responders in understanding facility risks that 

should be made publicly available? For example, would disclosure of the facility’s 
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PHA or compliance audit to local authorities such as the LEPC result in improved 

safety? 

f. Does your facility interact with community groups (e.g., a citizen advisory panel)? If 

so, what information do you provide to such groups? 

g. Are there other activities or measures that RMP-facility owner/operators can use to 

ensure that communities, planners, and responders have access to appropriate 

information? 

h. Can the use of social media or other forms of community outreach be incorporated 

into hazard assessment, prevention, and response to leverage community involvement 

in oversight? For example, would increased public disclosure of RMP-related 

information, such as accidental releases, near misses, and subsequent safety 

enhancements, or increased community involvement in facility emergency response 

planning, lead to improvements in facility safety? Please identify aspects of the RMP 

rule where there are opportunities for community involvement. 

9. TQsThreshold Quantities and OffsiteOff-site Consequence Analysis Endpoints for 

Regulated Substances Based on Acute Exposure Guideline Level Toxicity Values.

EPA is considering the use of Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)60 developed by 

the National Advisory Committee (NAC) for AEGLs for Hazardous Substances (NAC/AEGL 

Committee) to recalculate RMP reporting thresholds and toxic endpoints for offsiteoff-site

consequence analyses in order to better reflect the potential for adverse effects of an accidental 

release upon a community. 

                                                            

60 http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/
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EPA originally set the TQs for the RMP toxic substances using a ranking method similar 

to that used in developing the threshold planning quantities (TPQs) for the EPCRA EHSs. A 

factor for each toxic chemical based on its toxicity level of concern “LOC” and its potential to 

become airborne and disperse “V”, was derived and used to develop a ranking factor equal to 

LOC divided by V. Chemicals with lower ranking factors were assigned lower thresholds. A 

low numerical LOC value represents a high toxicity and a high value of V represents a high 

potential for air dispersion. Therefore, the ranking factor was designed such that lower LOC 

values or higher V values (or both) resulted in lower ranking factors. For example, the V for all 

gases is assigned a value of 1, which is higher than the calculated values of V for all liquids. For 

the RMP substances, thresholds were assigned based on order of magnitude ranges in the ranking 

factor, using TQ categories of 500 pounds, 1,000 pounds, 2,500 pounds, 5,000 pounds, 10,000 

pounds, 15,000 pounds and 20,000 pounds (59 FR 4478, January 31, 1994). 

The toxicity LOC was the maximum short term exposure concentration level in air for 

each chemical that would not lead to serious irreversible health effects in the general population 

when exposed for a relatively short duration. The Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health 

(IDLH) value developed by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) or 

an approximation of the IDLH based on animal toxicity data was used as the basis for the LOC. 

The IDLH is defined as the maximum concentration from which one could escape within 

30 minutes without any escape-impairing symptoms or any irreversible health effects. The IDLH 

was presented in the 1990 edition of the NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards and was 

used where available to develop the LOC toxicity levels for RMP toxic substances. For 

substances without a published IDLH value, a value equivalent to the IDLH was derived from 
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mammalian toxicity data using a methodology described in Appendix D of the Technical 

Guidance for Hazard Analysis, Emergency Planning for Hazardous Substances61. 

In some cases, revised or updated toxicity data were used, based on the December 1990 

Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances (RTECS) rather than the toxicity data used to 

derive TPQs for EHSs. 

 EPA is considering recalculating the current TQs IDLH-based upon IDLH valuesTQs for 

the following reasons: 

 The IDLH is based upon response of healthy male worker-population and does not 

take into account the exposure of more sensitive individuals, such as the elderly, 

pregnant women, children or people with various health problems. 

 The IDLH is based upon a maximum of 30 minutes-minute exposure period which may 

not be realistic forreflect (may underestimate) actual exposures to accidental airborne 

releases. 

 The IDLH may not indicatereflect the concentration that could result in serious but 

reversible injury because IDLHs were designed only to protect workers against 

concentrations that would prevent death or irreversible health effects or would prevent 

other deleterious effects (e.g. disorientation or incoordination) that would prevent escape. 

EPA recognized the limitation of using the IDLH values when it developed the TPQs for 

the EHSs in 1986 and 1987, but the agency was only just beginning the development of more 

appropriate chemical emergency exposure levels for the general public. Therefore, EPA chose to 

continue using the IDLH because there were many more published IDLH values available than 

                                                            

61 USEPA/FEMA/DOT, Technical Guidance for Hazard Analysis, Emergency Planning for Hazardous Substances,

December 1987, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013‐

08/documents/technical_guidance_for_hazard_analysis.pdf
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other potential exposure limits and because there was already a method available for deriving an 

IDLH equivalent from toxicity data.62

Due to the limitations outlined above, EPA is now considering the use of AEGLs to 

recalculate RMP TQs. AEGLs represent threshold exposure limits (exposure levels below which 

adverse health effects are not likely to occur) for the general public and are applicable to 

emergency exposures ranging from 10 minutes to 8 hours. AEGLs are developed by the National 

Advisory Committee (NAC) for AEGLs for Hazardous Substances (NAC/AEGL Committee), 

which was established to identify, review, and interpret relevant toxicologic and other scientific 

data and develop AEGLs for high-priority acutely toxic chemicals63. AEGLs are developed for 

five exposure periods (10 and 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, and 8 hours) and distinguished by 

varying degrees of severity of toxic effects. AEGLs are designed to protect the general 

population, including susceptible subpopulations, such as infants, children, the elderly, persons 

with asthma, and those with other illnesses, which are groups not generally considered in the 

development of workplace exposure levels. AEGLs for 471 priority chemicals have been 

developed or are now under development. for 471 priority chemicals. 

A chemical may have up to three AEGLs values, each of which corresponds to a specific 

tier of health effects. The three AEGL tiers are defined as follows: 

 AEGL-1 is the airborne concentration, expressed as parts per million or milligrams 

per cubic meter (ppm or mg/m3) of a substance above which it is predicted that the 

general population, including susceptible individuals, could experience notable 

                                                            

62 USEPA. June 21, 1992.  Technical Background Document: Development of Threshold Quantities for List of

Regulated Substances for Accidental Release Prevention, Document No. II‐B‐2, Docket No. A‐91‐74, page 7. 63 see: http://www.epa.gov/oppt/aegl/
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discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic nonsensory effects. However, the 

effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation of exposure. 

 AEGL-2 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3

) of a substance 

above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible 

individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health 

effects or an impaired ability to escape. 

 AEGL-3 is the airborne concentration (expressed as ppm or mg/m3) of a substance 

above which it is predicted that the general population, including susceptible 

individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death. 

The use of AEGLs to recalculate RMP reporting thresholds would better reflect the 

potential for adverse effects of an accidental release upon individuals in a community compared 

to IDLHs because theyAEGLs take into account the potential exposure of more sensitive 

individuals, the potential for longer periods of exposure, and the potential for serious but 

reversible injuries. 

In situations where no AEGL exists for a chemical, EPA would use Emergency Response 

Planning Guidelines (ERPGs), if available, to recalculate reporting thresholds. ERPGs estimate 

the concentrations at which most people will begin to experience health effects if they are 

exposed to a hazardous airborne chemical for 1 hour. (Similar to IDLH values, however, 

sensitive members of the public—such as old, sick, or very young people—aren't covered by 

these guidelines and they may experience adverse effects at concentrations below the ERPG 

values.) ERPGs are developed by the Emergency Response Planning committee of the American 

Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA). ERPGs shouldcould be used to help protect the public 

when AEGLs aren't available and there has been a chemical release that is short-term in duration. 
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There are about 145 chemicals with ERPGs.

64. A chemical may have up to three ERPG values, 

each of which corresponds to a specific tier of health effects. 

The three ERPG tiers are defined as follows: 

 ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that 

nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or 

developing life-threatening health effects. 

 ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that 

nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or 

developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could 

impair an individual's ability to take protective action. 

 ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that 

nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other 

than mild transient health effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odor. 

EPA previously used EPRG values in 1996 (61 FR 31668, June 20, 1996) to establish 

toxic endpoints (i.e., air concentrations) for each RMP toxic chemical to be used when 

conducting the off-site consequence analysis (OCA). The endpoints chosen were the ERPG-2 

values developed by AIHA; the toxic endpoint was the level of concern (LOC) from EPA’s 1987 

Technical Guidance for Hazards Analysis for those substances that did not have an established 

ERPG-2, updated where necessary to reflect new toxicity data. EPA chose ERPG-2 values first 

because they were specifically developed by a scientific committee for emergency planning to 

protect the general public in emergency situations and are subject to peer review. EPA had 

                                                            

64 http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/erpgs
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rejected use of the ERPG-3, which is a lethal exposure level, because it is not protective enough 

of the public in emergency situations. 

One consequence however, of the agency using separate toxicity values for TQs (based 

upon IDLH) and toxic endpoints (based upon EPRG-2) for the RMP regulations as a whole is 

some inconsistency in the representation of the relative toxicities of certain substances compared 

to others. For example, chlorine and sulfur dioxide, both have relatively similar ERPG-2 toxic 

endpoints, 0.0087 mg/L and 0.0078 mg/L, respectively, both based on their ERPG-2 values. 

Butbut chlorine is listed with a reporting threshold of 25002,500 pounds while sulfur dioxide has 

a reporting threshold of 50005,000 pounds. As gases, both chlorine and sulfur dioxide have the 

same air dispersion factor (V) of 1. The difference in thresholds was based onis due to the use of 

1990 IDLH values, with chlorine having an IDLH (0.087 mg/L or 30 ppm), which appears 

asthat suggests it is three times more toxic than thesulfur dioxide ( IDLH of sulfur dioxide (0.261 

mg/L or 100 ppm). To remedy such issues, EPA is considering the use of AEGLs as the basis 

for determining both the RMP reporting thresholds and the toxic endpoints. Furthermore, in 

those cases where an AEGL is not available, using EPRG-2 values to calculate both the reporting 

threshold and toxic endpoint will also remove such inconsistencies. Finally, using AEGLs when 

available to recalculate current toxic endpoints will also take into account the potential exposure 

of more sensitive individuals, which is not addressed when using ERPG-2 values. 

Concerning the agency’s suggestion to recalculate reporting thresholds and toxic 

endpoints using AEGLs (or EPRG-2 values when AEGLs are not available), EPA requests 

information on the following questions:With few exceptions, AEGL-2 values are significantly 

lower than LOC values for a given substance, and generally somewhat lower than the 

corresponding ERPG-2 value. However, this does not necessarily mean that TQs would always 
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decrease. As indicated above, when originally developing TQs, EPA used the LOC value 

divided by the V factor for each chemical to develop a ranking index. Substituting AEGL-2 

values for LOC values and recalculating the ranking index values would generally result in much 

lower index values. However, index values do not correlate directly to a TQ. Instead, a range of 

index values was assigned a TQ. For example, all substances with index values less than 0.01 

were assigned a TQ of 500 pounds, substances with index values greater than or equal to 0.01 

and less than 0.05 were assigned a TQ of 1000 pounds, substances with index values greater than 

or equal to 0.05 and less than 0.1 were assigned a TQ of 2500 pounds, and so on, up to the 

maximum TQ value of 20,000 pounds. If EPA used the new index values to assign TQs based 

on these current ranges, then TQs for substances that currently have higher TQs would tend to 

drop, while TQs for substances with lower TQs would generally remain unchanged. Therefore, 

under this scenario, most substances would be grouped into the lower TQs. 

Alternatively, if EPA established TQs by redefining the index value ranges for each TQ 

according to the new range of index values alone (i.e., disregarding the old index ranges), then 

the change would have the effect of reshuffling substances into new TQs. In this scenario, 

incorporating AEGL values would likely result in reducing the TQ for some substances (those 

with the lowest AEGL-to-LOC ratio), while raising it (or causing no change) for others. As the 

purpose of assigning TQs according to a distribution of index values was to assign lower TQs to 

the more toxic and easily dispersed substances and higher TQs to less toxic and less easily 

dispersed substances, this approach may be more appropriate. 

Adopting AEGL-2 values in place of ERPG-2 values to establish new toxic endpoints 

would have a more direct effect. AEGL-2 values are often, but not always, lower than the 

existing toxic endpoints. Where the AEGL value is lower than the current toxic endpoint for a 
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particular substance, the new toxic endpoint would likewise be lower, and vice versa. The 

practical effect of changing toxic endpoints would be to change the off-site consequence analysis 

distance to endpoint for a given substance and release quantity. For all processes containing 

substances with new lower toxic endpoints, larger worst case and alternative release scenario 

zones would result, whereas processes containing substances with new higher toxic endpoints 

would have smaller off-site consequence zones. If most toxic endpoints were to either decrease 

or remain the same, another result would likely be that fewer regulated processes would be 

eligible for Program 1. 

EPA requests information on the following questions regarding recalculating reporting 

thresholds and/or toxic endpoints using AEGLs (or EPRG values when AEGLs are not 

available): 

a. Would revising the RMP rule to incorporate AEGL-2 and ERPG-2 values (when an 

AEGL is not available), as the basis for TQs and toxic endpoints make the RMP rule 

more protective of human health and the environment? Would it result in significant 

changes to the universe of RMP-regulated facilities due to potential changes in TQs? 

If so, what number and types of facilities would be most affected and what changes 

would occur? 

b. The IDLH values used for setting the existing TQs are based on an exposure period of 

30- minutes. If the IDLH was not available, the acute toxicity data used to determine 

the equivalent IDLH varied depending on the chemical and actual study, and these 

numbers could typically varyranged from 1 to 8 hours. The ERPG-2 values used for 

the toxic endpoints represent an exposure timeperiod of 1 hour. Given that AEGLs 

are established with five different exposure periods (10 minutes, 30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 
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hours, and 8 hours), which exposure time should be used if the AEGL is used to 

determine the TQs and/or toxic endpoints? 

c. What should be the hierarchy for developing an alternative or equivalent LOC when 

an AEGL value has not been established for a toxic substance? Should ERPG values 

be substitutedused instead if they exist? If no ERPG value exists, should an LOC 

based on the IDLH value be used instead if it exists? If there is no IDLH value, how 

should the LOC be calculated for either the TQ or toxic endpoint? Is there an 

alternate method for establishing an equivalent LOC for those chemicals not having 

an AEGL or ERPG that will result in an appropriate TQ? 

d. Currently, RMP worst-cast scenarios can be based on 10-minute or 60-minute release 

times. Because many AEGL-2 values are established for 1-hour, 4-hour and 8-hour 

exposure timesperiods, should requirements for determining the worst-case and 

alternative release scenarios also incorporate four and eight hour release times using 

the 4-hour and 8-hour AEGL-2 values for a particular toxic chemical? 

e. Should EPA consider using AEGL-1 rather than AEGL-2 values for calculating 

reporting thresholds and toxic endpoints in order to coveraddress acute effects that are 

transient and reversible (such as discomfort and irritation)? 

f. What would be the economic impacts of recalculating TQs as discussed above? Are 

there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider 

with respect to recalculating TQs? 

10. Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History Data.

When developing the RMP, the Agency scaled the regulatory requirements based on the 

potential risk posed by a source and the steps needed to address the risk, rather than imposing 
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identical requirements on all sources. To this end, processes subject to RMP requirements were 

divided into three tiers: Programs 1, 2, and 3 (see section I.C). Eligibility for any given Program 

is based on process criteria so that classification of one process in a Program does not influence 

the classification of other processes at the source. The Agency established the most stringent 

RMP requirements under Program 3 for those industry sectors that represented a potentially 

higher risk of accidental releases. 

Industry accident records represent a reasonable criterion for identifying high risk 

sources. If an entire industry has a long history of accidental releases, it may indicate that the 

materials handled and handling conditions generate a higher potential for serious releases, or that 

the government or industry standards applicable to that industry area are not effectively 

minimizing risks. Additionally, accident history associated with industry sectors was identified 

by EPA as a better surrogate for underlying risk than individual source accident histories because 

accidents are rare events; a source with no accidental releases over the previous five years is not 

necessarily safe. Further, serious chemical accidents occur infrequently even at sources with 

poor process safety practices. 

Program 3 eligibility is based in part on the NAICS associated with the covered 

process65. The specific codes identified for Program 3 were based on an analysis of reported 

                                                            

65 The 1996 final RMP rule based Program 3 eligibility on the old Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code

system, which assigned four‐digit codes to different industry sectors.  However, in 1997, the U.S. Government, in

cooperation with the governments of Canada and Mexico, adopted a new industry classification system, the North

American Industry Classification System (NAICS), to replace the SIC codes. NAICS codes are either five or six digits,

depending on the degree to which the sector is subdivided. As a result, in 1999 EPA revised RMP requirements

whose applicability was originally based on SIC codes (64 FR 964, January 6, 1999). All "SIC code" references were

replaced with "NAICS code" and the nine SIC codes subject to Program 3 prevention program requirements were

replaced with ten NAICS codes.  
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accident histories within industry areas, selecting those that evidenced a higher risk potential66. 

EPA selected the industry sectors that showed a high frequency of the most serious accidents 

across a significant percentage of all sources within the sector to avoid mischaracterizing an 

industry based on isolated, problematic sources. Accounting for the number of reports from 

individual sources was intended to avoid selecting a sector because of a small number of sources 

with serious safety problems. The analysis included not only offsiteoff-site impacts, but also 

accidental releases that caused death, hospitalizations, or injuries on site, as these may serve as 

an indicator of significant safety problems that could lead to releases with offsiteoff-site impacts. 

Program 3 applies to processes not eligible for Program 1 and in NAICS 32211 (pulp mills), 

32411 (petroleum refineries), 32511 (petrochemical manufacturing), 325181 (alkalies and 

chlorine), 325188 (all other inorganic chemical manufacturing), 325192 (other cyclic crude and 

intermediate manufacturing), 325199 (all other basic organic chemical manufacturing), 325211 

(plastics and resins), 325311 (nitrogen fertilizer), and 32532 (pesticide and other agricultural 

chemicals). Program 3 also applies to all processes subject to the OSHA PSM standard, unless 

the process is eligible for Program 1. 

The RMP national database now contains nearly two decades of accident history reports 

from covered sources, and the Agency believes that these reports represent a more 

comprehensive picture of the relative accident risks associated with different industry sectors 

regulated under the rule than was available to the Agency prior to the rule’s publication. Based 

on these accident reports, the ten NAICS codes most frequently associated with accidents in 

RMP-regulated processes are 32411 (petroleum refineries), 325199 (all other basic organic 

                                                            

66 EPA Report:  Development of Decision Criteria For Accident History by SIC Code Approach and 100 or More

Employee Approach, EPA Docket Number HQ‐OAR‐2004‐0365, February 28, 1995.
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chemical manufacturing), 325188 (all other basic inorganic chemical manufacturing), 22131 

(water supply and irrigation systems), 42491 (farm supplies merchant wholesalers), 22132 

(sewage treatment facilities), 325181 (alkalies and chlorine manufacturing), 311615 (poultry 

processing), 49312 (refrigerated warehousing and storage), and 32211 (pulp mills).67 The 

Agency is requesting information on the appropriateness of reevaluating the NAICS industry 

sectors originally identified to determine Program 3 applicability based on the collected RMP 

data. Specifically, EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. Should industry sectors represented in RMP data as those with the most accidental 

releases be used to update and replace the existing set of Program 3 NAICS codes 

with a new set? 

b. How can the RMP accident history data best be used to update the current list of 

NAICS codes that trigger Program 3 requirements? Should the agency take into 

account the number of sources in each sector, or the severity of reported accidents, or 

other factors, in selecting updated Program 3 NAICS codes? Is the methodology used 

to develop the SIC/ NAICS code list applicable to the RMP accident history 

database? 

c. Would limiting the data analysis or the selection of NAICS codes to only those 

industry sectors represented in the RMP data provide a complete and accurate picture 

of high risk industry sectors? 

                                                             67 We note that for purposes of categorizing RMP processes based on accident frequency, some different

NAICS codes represent essentially the same type of chemical process.  For example, facilities in NAICS 311615

(poultry processing) and 49312 (refrigerated warehousing and storage) generally become RMP‐regulated as a

result of using large anhydrous ammonia refrigeration systems.  Similarly, there are several NAICS codes for RMP‐

regulated processes that represent bulk storage of anhydrous ammonia by agricultural chemical distribution

facilities.  EPA could account for this by aggregating accidents from similar process types when updating Program 3

NAICS codes.   
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d. Should an analysis of the RMP data be combined with an analysis of other current 

accident history databases to inform any revisions/updates? If so, what other 

databases should be used? How much weight should be given to the RMP data set in 

comparison to other sources? 

e. Should the original NAICS codes continue to be included? Would not including the 

NAICS codes historically identified under Program 3 cause increase risks to those 

industry sectors by having them no longer subject to the more stringent measures? 

f. Should an analysis of accident history data be limited to a specific time frame? 

g. Would it cause confusion within the regulated community to change the list of 

NAICS codes for which Program 3 is required? 

h. What would be the economic impacts of modifying the list of NAICS codes for which 

Program 3 is required? Are there any special circumstances involving small entities 

that EPA should consider with respect to modifying the list of covered NAICS codes? 

11. The “Safety Case” Regulatory Model.

The “safety case” regulatory model68 is a framework for regulating high-risk industries 

where owners or operators of industrial facilities are required to demonstrate to the regulator that 

they have reduced risks to a level that is “as low as reasonably practicable”, or ALARP. In the 

safety case model, operators must present to regulators a structured argument, supported by a 

body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is safe 

for a given application in a given operating environment. This regulatory approach is used in the 

chemical and refining industries by some countries outside the U.S., including the United 

                                                            

68 http://www.csb.gov/working‐papers‐on‐the‐safety‐case‐regulatory‐model‐and‐its‐attributes/
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Kingdom, Australia, Norway, and others, and is similar in practice to the U.S. regulatory regime 

for nuclear reactor facilities regulated by the NRC. 

In its December 2013 Draft Regulatory Report on the Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe 

Rupture and Fire, the CSB advocates the safety case approach as a safety management 

framework for U.S. refineries69. The CSB specifically recommends that the California 

legislature adopt the safety case approach for refineries in California, and that OSHA, as part of 

that Agency’s response to Executive Order 13650, “develop questions and evaluate issues raised 

from the findings and conclusions in this report concerning the safety case regime.” As the CSB 

report was published after OSHA published its RFI under Executive Order 13650, OSHA was 

not able to include questions concerning the CSB’s safety case recommendation within its RFI. 

However, because the OSHA PSM standard and EPA RMP regulation are closely linked, and 

together constitute the federal regulatory framework for chemical process safety management 

regulation in the U.S., EPA believes it is appropriate for the Agency to raise this issue within this 

RFI. 

Completely replacing the current RMP regulation (and PSM standard) with a safety case 

approach would require significant changes to the existing regulatory regime for chemical 

process safety in the United States. Nevertheless, EPA is requesting public comment on whether 

EPA and OSHA should consider these actions. As an alternative to a wholesale adoption of the 

safety case approach, EPA and/or OSHA could potentially implement selected aspects of the 

approach within the current regulatory framework. For example, EPA and OSHA could require 

owners and operators to submit a PHA or a similar document to EPA and OSHA, and require 

                                                            

69 At its January 15, 2014, meeting, the Board refused to endorse this aspect of the draft report.  The majority

directed the CSB staff to revise the report within 120 days.  http://www.contracostatimes.com/rss/ci_24922079.
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Agency approval of the PHA. Also, EPA and OSHA could limit the applicability of the safety 

case approach to selected categories of high-risk facilities, such as petroleum refineries. 

EPA requests information on the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a safety case 

approach to replace the RMP regulation and PSM standard, or alternatively, of incorporating 

aspects of the approach into current regulations or for selected categories of facilities. In 

particular, EPA requests information on the following questions: 

a. If you own or operate any RMP or PSM-covered facilities and also own or operate 

facilities in countries that use a safety case regulatory regime, please describe the 

process of developing and obtaining approval for your safety case. How long does 

development and approval of a safety case take for a large petroleum refinery or 

chemical processing facility? What are the advantages and disadvantages of the 

safety case approach in comparison to the existing U.S. regulatory regime for 

chemical process safety? Is there any evidence that the safety case approach reduces 

the frequency and severity of accidental releases and near misses? If so, please 

provide any information, data, or studies to EPA that demonstrate these effects. How 

expensive is it for facility owners to implement the safety case approach in 

comparison to implementing RMP or PSM? Do you already incorporate aspects of 

the safety case approach in your risk management program? 

b. The CSB Draft Regulatory Report on the Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture 

and Fire70 highlights the NRC as a U.S. regulator that has established a safety case 

approach for licensing and oversight of commercial nuclear power plants in the 

United States. The NRC oversees approximately 100 nuclear reactor and 3000 

                                                            

70 http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/19/CSB_Chevron_Richmond_Refinery_Regulatory_Report.pdf
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nuclear materials facilities in the U.S.71; the NRC has nearly 4000 employees and an 

annual budget of over $1 billion72. What additional resources would be required by 

EPA and OSHA in order to establish and oversee a safety case regulatory regime for 

RMP and PSM-covered facilities? 

c. Is the safety case approach suitable for all RMP and PSM covered facilities, or, if 

adopted, should it be limited to only the most high-risk facilities, such as petroleum 

refineries and other high-risk chemical processing facilities? 

d. What would be the economic impacts of moving to a safety case based regulatory 

regime for chemical facility safety? Are there any special circumstances involving 

small entities that EPA should consider with respect to safety case based approach? 

12. Streamlining RMP Requirements 

In addition to the items listed above, EPA is interested in gathering information on any 

other areas within part 68 that should be modernized, strengthened, or clarified. In particular, 

EPA invites comment on any potential revisions to the RMP rule that would make it easier for 

regulated sources to comply with (or make it more difficult to violate) its requirements. EPA 

also requests information on the following questions: 

a. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the process of determining whether 

the RMP rule applies to particular facilities? Are there other potential revisions to the 

rule that would make it easier for regulated entities to comply with (or more difficult 

to violate) its provisions? 

                                                            

71 http://www.nrc.gov/info‐finder.html 72 http://www.nrc.gov/reading‐rm/doc‐collections/nuregs/staff/sr1100/v29/fy2014‐cbj.pdf
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b. Are there steps that EPA could take to simplify the RMP submission process? For 

example, are there advances in electronic reporting or information technology that 

EPA could use in order to make RMP submissions easier? 

c. Should EPA require that RMP submissions be certified by a senior corporate official, 

such as the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chief Operations 

Officer, or the equivalent to ensure corporate-wide awareness and accountability in 

the RMP submission? 

d. Is the three-tiered program level structure of the RMP regulation appropriate, or 

should EPA consider simplifying the rule to make only two program tiers, or only a 

single prevention program applicable to all facilities? 

e. Are the accident prevention program elements clearly defined? Should EPA further 

clarify any of the existing elements? 

f. Are the regulatory terms and definitions contained in section 68.3 sufficiently clear? 

Are there additional terms that EPA should define in this section? 

Dated: 

___________________________________________________ 

Mathy Stanislaus, 

Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response.