U.S. Army Research Institute 

for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

Research Report 1876 

PACERS: Platoon Aid for Collective Employment of 

Robotic Systems 

Paula J. Durlach 

U.S. Army Research Institute 

 

August 2007 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
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for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

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1. REPORT DATE (dd-mm-yy)

 August 2007 

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 January 2003 – May 2007 

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

PACERS: Platoon Aid for Collective Employment of Robotic 

Systems 

5a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER 

 5b. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 

 622785 

6. AUTHOR(S) 

Paula J. Durlach (U.S. Army Research Institute) 

5c. PROJECT NUMBER 

 A790 

5d. TASK NUMBER 

 273 

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 H01 

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Orlando, FL 32826

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 Research Report 1876 

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13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 

Subject Matter POC: Paul J. Durlach 

14. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words): 

This report presents guidance to help train platoons equipped with organic unmanned systems. The Army 

currently is supplying platoons with both prototype and commercially available unmanned systems to evaluate 

military utility and to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures; however, the training provided prior to these 

“experiments” focuses almost entirely on individual operator training. While different unmanned systems 

require different detailed procedures, there are certain aspects of operation applicable across systems, and 

training could be given on these system-general aspects of employment. The purpose of this report is to (1) lay 

out these system-general aspects and (2) suggest a list of activities to focus on to help train system integration. 

Each activity has associated observations and related after-action review questions applicable to both air and 

ground assets, and avoiding the particulars of any specific system. Trainers will not have the opportunity to 

become conversant with the specifics of the myriad of systems they may encounter. Besides being systemgeneral, the training guidance provided is also mission-general. It suggests appropriate observations and 

questions to facilitate coaching and after action review discussion specifically with respect to system 

employment. Therefore, these represent an addition to, not a replacement of, mission-specific observations 

and after-action review topics. 

15. SUBJECT TERMS 

Platoon, unmanned, robotic, training, after-action-review, RSTA

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703-602-8047 
ii
iii

Research Report 1876 

PACERS: Platoon Aid for Collective Employment 

of Robotic Systems 

Paula J. Durlach 

U. S. Army Research Institute 

Simulator Systems Research Unit 

Stephen L. Goldberg, Chief 

U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

2511 Jefferson Davis Highway, Arlington, Virginia 22202-3926 

August 2007 

Army Project Number Personnel Performance 

622785A790 and Training Technology 

 

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 
iv
v

PACERS: PLATOON AID FOR COLLECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF ROBOTIC SYSTEMS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Research Requirement: 

 Unmanned or robotic systems (RS) are envisioned to be a key part of the Army’s future 

force. One motivation for the addition of RS is to provide greater reconnaissance, surveillance, and 

target acquisition (RSTA) information, with less risk to manned elements. Research and 

development with RS has tended to neglect employment training, however. When putting 

prototypes in the hands of Soldiers, individuals or operator teams receive operator training, and then 

units are expected to employ the system in a mission context in order to evaluate military utility or 

explore tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). Without some explicit guidance or feedback on 

techniques and procedures, however, the unit may never properly examine tactical utility (Alberts & 

Hayes, 2002; Durlach, 2005). This may particularly be the case when operators are designated, 

rather than dedicated, as is envisioned for operators of the future Class I unmanned aircraft system. 

There is a need to get units functioning efficiently on techniques and procedures prior to evaluating 

the tactical utility of a prototype or prior to training on tactics with an operational system. 

Procedure: 

 From readings, discussions, and interviews with people involved in research and 

development concerning small RS, and from actual observation of training with small RS, it 

appeared that several activities and goals involved in RS employment techniques and procedures are 

common across systems. Focusing on a platoon with organic RS assets, guidelines were formulated 

in terms of how to observe whether the unit engaged in these activities and achieved these goals. In 

addition, questions to support coaching and after action review discussion were generated. The 

resulting tool is called PACERS: Platoon Aid for Collective Employment of Robotic Systems. The 

initial draft of the PACERS guide was assessed by the author during the Micro Aerial Vehicle 

Advanced Technology Demonstration 2007 Soldier experiment, during which a Stryker 

Reconnaissance Platoon experimented using a prototype Class I unmanned aircraft system in 

various mission contexts. The guide was then revised based on observations made during the 

experiment as well as additional feedback on an earlier draft from subject matter experts. 

 

Findings: 

 If small robotic systems are going to be employed to gather real-time RSTA information 

during a mission, as opposed to merely during pre-mission reconnaissance, the employing platoon 

must become adept at planning and coordinating so that the robotic asset is positioned in the right 

location at the right time. This will require close coordination between commanders and operators, 

both in planning and execution. It is crucial that operators understand commander’s intent, and just 

as crucial that the commander understands the restrictions and limitations of the system’s 

capabilities posed by terrain, communications links, battery-life, etc. It is yet to be determined 

whether platoons will be able to function with designated operators, as opposed to specialized, 
vi

dedicated operators. The PACERS tool should assist in making that determination, by facilitating 

the initial collective training phase of system employment. 

Utilization and Dissemination of Findings: 

 Any platoon-sized or smaller unit tasked with employing small RS for the service of their 

own missions could benefit from the utilization of PACERS. It is recommended that unit leaders 

and unit trainers familiarize themselves with the PACERS table. This will provide a focus on the 

activities and goals the unit should adopt in order to employ the RS effectively. PACERS suggests 

what behaviors to look for, and what questions to ask, to facilitate mastery of system employment. 

The author welcomes feedback from any units that utilize this product. 

 An earlier version of this report was circulated to potentially interested parties at PM Future 

Combat System, PM Unmanned Aviation Systems, Training and Doctrine Command, Program 

Executive Office Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation Command, Army Research Laboratory, 

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Robotics Systems Joint Program Office, Infantry Combat 

Development Center, Defense Analysis Research Projects Agency, Air Assault Expeditionary 

Force, and the Soldier Battle Laboratory. Feedback was mixed, with comments from different 

responders diametrically opposed. Some respondents thought the material in the report was right on 

target, timely, and needed, whereas others thought it was not useful (too generic) or already known. 

Many of the comments have been incorporated into the final draft. 
vii

PACERS: PLATOON AID FOR COLLECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF ROBOTIC SYSTEMS 

CONTENTS 

Page 

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1

BACKGROUND..................................................................................................................... 4

PARTICULAR CHALLENGES AT THE PLATOON LEVEL............................................ 6

PACERS................................................................................................................................... 8

The Seven Activities and Illustrative Examples...................................................................... 9

Decide Whether/How to Employ the RS................................................................................. 12

Select RS Team and Plan RS Missions Within the Overall Mission Context......................... 13

Defining roles of unit personnel during RS mission............................................................... 15

Troop Leading Procedures and Pre-Employment Checks....................................................... 18

Develop or Refine Unit SOPs and TTP................................................................................. 20

Operation at a Site Remote From the Rest of the Unit............................................................ 20

Record Keeping....................................................................................................................... 22

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................................................. 23

REFERENCES........................................................................................................................ 25

APPENDIX A: PACERS TABLE......................................................................................... A-1

APPENDIX B: MISSION, ENEMY, TIME, TROOPS, TERRAIN, AND CIVILIAN 

CONSIDERATIONS IN ROBOTIC SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT......................................... B-1

APPENDIX C: INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN RS-OPORDER........................... C-1

APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS................................................................................................. D-1

LIST OF TABLES 

TABLE 1. ACTIVITIES AND GOALS ADDRESSED BY PACERS................................. 2

TABLE 2. FORMAT OF PACERS....................................................................................... 9

TABLE 3. PLANNING RS MISSIONS................................................................................ 14

TABLE 4. DEFINING ROLES OF UNIT PERSONNEL DURING RS MISSION............. 16
viii

CONTENTS 

Page 

LIST OF TABLES 

TABLE 5. TROOP LEADING PROCEDURES AND PRE-EMPLOYMENT CHECKS.... 19

TABLE 6. DEVELOP OR REFINE UNIT SOP AND TTP............................................. 21

TABLE 7. OPERATION AT A SITE REMOTE FROM THE REST OF THE UNIT......... 22

TABLE 8. RECORD KEEPING........................................................................................... 23

LIST OF FIGURES 

FIGURE 1. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR G-MAV 

OPERATION.......................................................................................................................... 11
1 

PLATOON AID FOR COLLECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF ROBOTIC SYSTEMS (PACERS) 

INTRODUCTION 

 This report explains, in a generic way, what is involved in the employment of an organic 

unmanned system for the purposes of reconnaissance, surveillance, or target acquisition (RSTA). 

Although different current-day systems differ in their details, they all share several common 

employment aspects, and making these common aspects explicit may aid leaders and trainers in 

understanding system requirements and employment considerations. There is a need for systemgeneric guidance, because the Army is currently in an exploratory phase testing different 

prototype or commercially available systems, and trainers at places like the Joint Readiness 

Training Center or the National Training Centers will need to provide guidance without detailed 

knowledge of the specific systems they may encounter. It is anticipated that trainers will have the 

same problems coaching robotic employment as they currently have with coaching the use of 

digital battle command systems. With digital battle command systems, each rotation comes to 

training with a unique collection of digital command and control systems. Moreover, individual 

systems are continually evolving and up-to-date technical manuals are not necessarily available. 

For example, the “Digital TOC Integration Guide” (Leibrecht, Lockaby, Perrault, Strauss, & 

Meliza, 2006) is already considered outdated. The rapidly changing technology of digital 

command and control and of unmanned systems makes it difficult for trainers to provide 

guidance on how to apply these technologies unless they can address their employment in a 

generic way. 

 The report groups the common aspects of unmanned system employment into seven 

categories or activities. These activities and the associated goals of these activities are listed in 

Table 1. For each of these, there are suggested observations that trainers can make and questions 

that trainers can ask, to help coach system employment. These will be explained further in the 

body of this report. 

 The activities, goals, observations and questions suggested as aids to training will be 

referred to collectively as Platoon Aid for Collective Employment of Robotic Systems 

(PACERS). PACERS focuses on the procedures and techniques involved in the employment of 

small unmanned ground vehicle systems (SUGV) or small unmanned aviation systems (SUAS). 

In order to emphasize the generic nature of PACERS, this report will simply call these robotic 

systems (RS). PACERS does not address operator training. It assumes operators have been 

trained in the detailed elements required for control of the specific RS system in use; although it 

does not assume that the training has been perfect, nor executable in a tactical context without 

some supervision. 

 The term “small” here refers to RS where all system components (i.e., platform or vehicle, 

control and communication equipment, and payload) are transportable by dismounted troops. Such 

systems have relatively low logistics requirements, which allow them to be used without an 

established base of operations (such as required by large fixed wing aircraft). Ideally, they provide 

the commander with real time information about the immediate surroundings; what’s over the next 

hill, in the next alleyway, or on the roof of a building. It is these small systems that are most likely to 

be deployed organically at the platoon level. 
2 

 

Table 1. Activities and Goals Addressed by PACERS 

Activity Goals 

Decide whether/how to employ 

the RS 

 Potential benefits vs. risks of employing the RS are 

considered in light of overall mission objectives, METT-TC, 

and weather. 

Select RS team* and plan RS 

missions within the overall 

mission context 

*RS team—any personnel 

involved in 

- Operation of the RS 

 - Interpretation and/or 

communication of information 

gained from the RS 

- Security for above 

 Provide adequate number of personnel to conduct RS 

operations and provide security 

 Ensure RS team members understand their mission 

 Ensure RS employment is integrated into the overall 

mission 

Define roles of unit personnel 

in tracking the RS mission, 

interpretation of RS sensor 

imagery, and reporting on 

CCIRs. 

 Intel acquired by the RS gets to the people who need it in a 

timely manner. 

 RS mission can be dynamically re-planned based on new 

intelligence 

Pre-deployment checks  Necessary RS-related equipment and supplies are present 

and in fully working order 

 Communication frequencies for operator use have been 

cleared with higher and specified to operator 

 Radio nets for voice communications specified and 

checked 

 Coordination with higher on A2C2 (for air platforms) 

Develop or refine unit SOPs 

and TTPs 

 Improve efficiency and effectiveness of RS employment 

Record keeping  Safety incidents recorded and reported 

 Use and Maintenance logs kept up to date 

 Operator training currency and logbooks kept up to date

Preparation for launch and 

recovery at a remote site 

 RS team safety 

 Timely RS launch 

A2C2 = Army Aviation Command and Control 

CCIR = Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

METT-TC = Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops, Terrain, and Civilians 

SOP = Standard Operating Procedure 

TTP = Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 

 Integration of unmanned systems may be particularly challenging at the platoon level. 

This is because the extra workload and synchronization required for system employment will fall 

on platoon leaders, the Army’s least seasoned commanders. In addition, because unmanned 

systems at the platoon level may be operated by designated, as opposed to specialized personnel 
3 

(Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2002), there will be extra challenges in terms of manpower 

allocation and delegation of responsibilities. 

 

 PACERS is based on the state of RS technology as it exists in 2007. It should be useful 

for training platoons assigned to test prototype RS or platoons actually equipped with new small 

RS within the next several years. PACERS is just a starting point for collective training. The 

particular behaviors and questions associated with each set of activities and goals may be 

modified by trainers according to individual systems, changes in technology, or changes in unit 

organization; however the underlying activities and goals should remain relevant despite such 

changes. 

 PACERS was compiled because there is a lack of training guidance with respect to the 

employment of small RS at the platoon level. This is not surprising. It is currently rare for an RS 

to be given to a platoon as an organic asset to be used in the service of their own missions. 

However, the Army has been testing experimental systems under such conditions, and intends to 

equip platoons with such systems in the future. Infantry platoons under the Future Combat 

System (FCS) are expected to have SUAS and SUGVS as organic assets. The Army needs to test 

prototype systems in mission contexts; but there is currently no guidance on conducting 

collective training with RS. 

 This work was conducted under the Leader Adaptability Army Technology Objective 

(ATO), performed by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

(ARI). This ATO has the general goal of enhancing battle command training by better 

understanding the impact of networked battle command on leadership and battle command skills 

and by identifying learning methods and techniques to develop the required skills. The specific 

goal of the current work was to consider the training that will be required as small RS are 

introduced into the force. Currently, such training is concentrated on the operators of RS, and 

there is a lack of consideration for the collective aspect of employment. PACERS was 

developed to fill this need. 

 In work performed under ARI’s prior Methods and Measures of Commander Centric 

Training ATO, the impacts of networked command, control, and communication (C3) systems 

on the training process were considered. Issues concerning the employment of networked C3 

systems add substantially to the topics that may be addressed during training. To help leaders and 

trainers address unit application of the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below 

(FBCB2) system and C3 systems in the tactical operations center (TOC), ARI developed the 

FBCB2 Exploitation Tool (Leibrecht, Lockaby, and Meliza, 2003) and the Digital TOC 

Integration Guide (Leibrecht, Lockaby, Perrault, and Meliza, 2006), respectively. PACERS is 

intended to be a guide of the same vein. That is, it is aimed at assisting trainers with the 

additional topics that will need to be addressed when RS are employed in a collective mission. 

Unlike these previous products, however, PACERS is intended to be applicable across a range of 

systems. 
4 

BACKGROUND 

 RS are envisioned to be a key part of the Army’s future force. One motivation for the 

addition of RS is to provide greater RSTA information, with less risk to manned elements. The 

FCS is the material solution to equip the future force, including RS. The backbone of FCS will 

be an advanced communications network, intended to enhance situational awareness, situational 

understanding, and synchronization of operations. The network will transmit the RSTA 

information collected by RS to decision makers, so that it can contribute to their situational 

awareness and understanding. 

 In the original FCS vision, each echelon of the FCS Brigade Combat Team (BCT) from 

platoon up through brigade was expected to have organic unmanned aviation systems, referred to 

as Class I through IV, respectively. The Class I (platoon level) was to provide the dismounted 

Soldier with RSTA and communications relay services. The Class I should be backpackable and 

capable of operating in urban terrain. It should have vertical takeoff and landing capability, as 

well as a modular payload capability. For example, its payload might be changed from an 

electro-optical (EO) color camera to an infrared (IR) camera . 

 Various unmanned ground vehicles would also be employed at the platoon level 

(dependent on mission). These include the SUGV, the Armed Robotic Vehicle (ARV), and the 

Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment (MULE) vehicle. The SUGV would be a small, 

lightweight, man-portable vehicle capable of operating in urban terrain, tunnels, and caves. Like 

the Class I, it will have modular payloads, enabling it to perform a variety of high-risk RSTA 

missions including chemical detection. In addition, the SUGV might be used for more than just 

RSTA; payloads might include articulated arms for remote manipulation, or weaponry. Relative 

to the SUGV, the ARV and MULE would be large vehicles that can support mounted or 

dismounted forces, with modular payloads to support various missions. 

 The current FCS program timeline incorporates four “spirals.” In each spiral, new 

equipment will be tested by the FCS Evaluation Brigade Combat Team, and then subsequently 

introduced into the current force. The purpose of these spirals is to get new technology into the 

hands of Soldiers as soon as they become available. These spirals are slated to occur in 2008, 

2010, 2012, and 2014. 

 The FCS represents the official material development route for the future force; however, 

other activities have already put small RS into the hands of Soldiers. This has been accomplished 

through rapid equipping initiatives. One such initiative, for example, provided Soldiers with 

Packbots modified to assist in explosive ordinance disposal missions. Advanced Concept 

Technology Demonstration (ACTD) projects have also developed small RS that have 

subsequently been adopted by the Army. For example, the fixed-wing Raven SUAS was initially 

developed by the Pathfinder ACTD. A ducted-fan prototype Class I has been developed by the 

Micro Air Vehicle (MAV) ACTD, and is currently under evaluation by the 25th Infantry 

Division. In fact, the Army has been experimenting with small RS for several years already, to 

evaluate their performance capabilities and how their employment will fit into future missions. 

One example is the Air Assault Expeditionary Force (AAEF), a multiyear project initiated in 

2003, which conducts discovery experiments with emerging technologies in a live field 
5 

environment (U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, 

2006). One of their foci is to address employment of sensors and sensor management at the small 

unit level. 

 Heretofore, collective training with respect to small RS has received scant training time. 

Often, if collective training is given, it takes the form of briefings, rather than live or simulated 

training exercises; and the first opportunity for collective employment may not occur until the 

equipped unit reaches the National Training Center. With respect to experimentation, it is the 

same story. Typically individuals or operator teams receive hands-on operator training. Then 

their units are expected to employ the system in a mission context in order to evaluate military 

utility. It is not typical for the unit to be given any prior training on TTP before the evaluation 

phase, except perhaps via briefing. In the AAEF Spiral C report (Meshesha, et al.,2007), the 

authors explicitly acknowledge that such training could make their future experiments far more 

profitable in terms of exploring military utility and useful tactics. As they say, “TTP and lessons 

learned from previous spiral experiments must be included in the technology train-up in followon spirals, to avoid ‘relearning the wheel’ in each spiral (page 3-19)”. 

 Hands-on unit level training that is not part of formal experimentation could greatly 

enhance the benefits of exploratory experiments, as well as subsequent operational efficiency. 

Unit training concerns the integration of system employment into the organization of 

responsibilities of the unit as a whole. Individual operator training is not sufficient for system 

employment. Unit commanders and squad leaders require training on system capabilities and 

requirements, as well as the practicalities of integrating system use into their operations. There 

is enough commonality in goals and activities across systems to allow for initial collective 

practice involving planning, synchronization, and communications. Such training could 

maximize the amount of time a unit spends establishing the more tactical aspects of TTP and 

minimize the time spent on working out responsibilities and coordination issues. The immediate 

aim of PACERS is to help facilitate this initial training stage of RS employment in a unit context, 

so that the team dynamics can be more quickly established and the ultimate goal of determining 

tactical utility can be addressed. The longer term aim of PACERS is to assist in collective 

training once operational units actually are assigned small RS. 

 There are several challenges involved in the integration of RS into the force, whether the 

RS be large or small. In order to be a force multiplier, these systems must be relatively easy to 

maintain, control, and employ. The benefits of employing the RS must more than offset the 

burden in terms of personnel requirements, workload, and operations tempo. For example, a 

SUGV that requires two operators plus a security detachment, and that cannot travel as fast as a 

dismounted Soldier could be more of a burden than an asset. Much of the research in RS has 

been devoted to increasing system intelligence and autonomy in order to reduce the operational 

burden. One focus of this development has been on making system behaviors more autonomous 

in order to relieve the operator from having to control everything the system does. A first step is 

to replace direct control of electro-mechanical changes with higher level instructions. For 

example, to raise altitude, a flight operator could select a raise-altitude-function, without having 

to be aware of the necessary mechanics for doing this (e.g., changes in pitch, yaw, engine 

revolutions, etc.). This step has been achieved for many prototype systems. Moreover, several 

RS allow the operator to program a route by designating a series of waypoints along with 
6 

velocity, and other aspects of platform behavior. During program execution, control software 

converts these directions into the electro-mechanical behaviors required, allowing the operator to 

concentrate on sensor data, rather than flight/maneuver control. 

 Strides are being made in the area of autonomous behavior, but these accomplishments 

will always be limited by developments in the area of autonomous sensing. The challenge is to 

provide RS with some degree of situation awareness and understanding. This will require 

breakthroughs in networking, image processing, and data fusion. With these breakthroughs, there 

is the potential to release operators from having to monitor the sensor data constantly for 

obstacles or targets. In the absence of significant progress in these areas humans will be required 

to monitor, interpret, and disseminate information obtained from remote sensors. 

PARTICULAR CHALLENGES AT PLATOON LEVEL 

 The actionable use of real-time sensor data by a small unit, such as a platoon, may be 

limited to pre-mission reconnaissance, unless the workload demands of system employment can 

be minimized. Consider a platoon with a mission to enter an urban neighborhood and secure a 

building. During the actual assault will the platoon leader (PL) have personnel to spare for RS 

operation? If he chooses to employ the RS, how will he coordinate its actions with those of his 

other assets? If the PL is remote from the operator, how will they maintain common situation 

awareness? Will the PL have time to keep abreast of the information provided by the RS and use 

it to make mid-mission adjustments? 

 The current vision for the future force is that RS operators at the platoon level will be 

“designated, not dedicated.” The platoon will not have a special attachment of personnel to 

operate the RS. The operator team must be drawn from the pool of personnel within the platoon 

(and platoons are not envisioned to become larger). In addition, it might be necessary to provide 

the operator team with a security detachment, if they are remote from the rest of the platoon. The 

attentional demands of system operation (at least currently) do not allow operators to also 

maintain their own safety. Several experiments with RS at the platoon level indicate this is an 

issue for PL. For example, the PL participating in both the 2005 and 2006 MAV ACTD Soldier 

experiments felt they needed more people to properly utilize the MAV in coordination with an 

ongoing mission. They were both concerned that to use the MAV, they had to “pull people out of 

the fight” and so reduce their fire power. The same reservations were expressed after AAEF 

spiral C (Meshesha, et al., 2007). 

 Another issue is the current lack of digital networking. Few RS are networked to any 

other Army digital systems. Consequently, the operator team may have difficulty maintaining 

awareness of the rest of the unit’s situation (unless they are in sensor view or the team has other 

systems providing blue-force tracking). Without this awareness the operator may be unable to 

tailor real-time information gathering to unit needs. This was a particular concern of the PL in 

the 2006 MAV ACTD Soldier experiment. He mentioned that his operators tend to lose situation 

awareness, so even when they were operating on the move from a Stryker with the rest of their 

squad, personnel from that squad were needed to supervise them, again removing people from 

the fight. 
7 

 The PL may or may not have access to the sensor data through a remote video terminal 

(RVT). If available, the RVT may or may not provide information about sensor location. 

Without this, the PL may have difficulty using the sensor data without additional voice 

communication with the operator team. Even if the PL has all this information within arm’s 

reach, he may not have the resources to monitor it. Unlike at higher echelons, the PL does not 

have a staff to monitor, filter, and interpret intelligence information. Voice communications with 

a remote operator team will likely be essential and this will increase the number of radio nets 

required for the PL to monitor. Meshesha, et al. (2007) suggest that a specialized robotics noncommissioned officer (NCO) be assigned to these duties. 

 Another issue is that PL tend to be relatively unseasoned leaders and tacticians. It is not 

clear that the “see first-understand first” potential of RS will be fulfilled at the platoon level 

unless specific collective training objectives are outlined for its employment. The most common 

platoon weaknesses observed at the Joint Readiness Training Center involve errors that could 

undermine effective use of RS. These include poor troop-leading procedures, failure to conduct 

mission rehearsal, failure to conduct pre-combat checks, and failure to delegate tasks and 

responsibilities clearly (Odom, Gates, Hardwick, and Ehrlich, 2005). 

 According to Switzer (2005), the most common mistake among PL is failure to involve 

others in planning. Since optimum use of RS will require integrating the RS operator into the 

planning process, this is a weakness that needs to be overcome. Training for RS employment 

must include leader training on mission analysis, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, and 

coordinating timelines and priorities. The capabilities of the RS must be taken into account in 

terms of weather, terrain, communications range and battery life. Emplacement and recovery 

sites must be selected, and a security team assigned to protect the RS operations crew. Potential 

benefits vs. risks of employing the RS must be considered, as well as contingency plans should 

technical difficulties prevent its use. 

 Switzer (2005) also suggests that platoons are particularly weak at maintaining shared 

situation awareness, with respect to the enemy and to adjacent friendly units. This is because the 

information fails to be communicated, with failures occurring both top-down and bottom-up. 

Clearly, the extent to which a RS will enhance situation awareness depends on transmission of 

the information provided within the unit. Since poor communications among platoon members 

has already been highlighted as a weakness, it is not clear that the mere provision of the RS will 

provide much of a benefit without dedicated training on team communication and coordination. 

This also applies across units. If adjacent units are also equipped with RS, coordination between 

them will be crucial to avoid stepping on one another’s radio link frequencies. Units will need to 

establish procedures on how to communicate and what to communicate, and this will remain an 

issue at least until RS become a lot smarter and/or integrated with other digital systems. 

 In summary, to attain the potential benefits of RS, platoons should have mission training 

objectives involving the employment of RS and train on these. Operator training is not sufficient 

for proper employment, and briefings are not sufficient to achieve proper coordination and 

communications. Unless this kind of training is included much time will be expended clarifying 

misunderstandings in organization, responsibilities, and communications. The purpose of 

PACERS is to provide experimenters and trainers with some guidelines on how to conduct this 
8 

phase, with a guide to diagnose unit employment capabilities and provide self-evaluation and 

improvement through after action review (AAR) questions. 

 PACERS was developed on the basis of readings, discussions, and interviews with people 

involved in research and development concerning small RS. This included companies 

developing systems, managers and participants of exploratory experiments with systems and 

reports on those experiments, combat developers, training developers, and initial impressions 

reports on fielded systems. More information was collected on SUAS than SUGV, because of 

the networks and contacts the author was able to establish. The initial draft of PACERS was 

then piloted by the author at the MAV ACTD 2006 Soldier experiment. This piloting did not 

involve actual application of PACERS as a training intervention; rather, it involved only 

assessment of whether the items included in the draft tool were relevant, as well as the 

identification of new elements. This assessment was conducted through observations of 

commander-operator interaction, AAR, and individual interviews with operators and their 

platoon leader. 

PACERS 

 The matrix format of PACERS is illustrated in Table 2, which shows one of the seven 

activities (Decide whether/how to employ the RS), along with associated observations and 

potential questions. The “Observe” column suggests behaviors to observe which are indicative of 

the unit accomplishing integration of the RS into their organization. The “Ask/AAR Questions” 

column suggests questions to ask either during or after a mission, in order to stimulate the unit to 

think about what they are doing and how to improve organization. Who should be asked is also 

indicated. The time to use PACERS is subsequent to operator training, when a RS is first 

introduced to a unit for employment in the context of a training mission. 

 PACERS does not address operator performance in terms of mastery of purely operator 

tasks; however, there will likely be some need to check that operator training transfers to the 

more complex mission context setting. These checks could easily be integrated with the use of 

PACERS. PACERS does not address performance of any specific military mission, per se (such 

as route reconnaissance); rather it is to be used in addition to the proficiency observations that 

would be made for those missions. PACERS does not directly assess tactics, as in most near term 

opportunities for application, these will not have been developed yet. PACERS could be said to 

address the “procedures” part of TTP, without getting into the details of specific systems. The 

full PACERS tool is given in Appendix A. 

 Besides being used by trainers, PACERS can also be used by platoon members prior to 

training, in order to identify or review many of the considerations and procedures that are 

important in the application of RS. It is hoped that use of PACERS in this way will motivate and 

guide what platoons do to prepare for collective training exercises where RSs are to be 

employed. Trainers and unit leaders have the option of using the suggested observations and 

questions for coaching and mentoring activities, in addition to stimulating discussion during 

AAR. 
9 

Table 2. Format of PACERS 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activity: 

Decide whether/how to employ 

the RS 

Goals: 

Potential benefits vs. risks of 

employing the RS are considered 

in light of overall mission 

objectives, METT-TC, and 

weather. 

SEE APPENDIX B FOR 

ADDITIONAL DETAILS 

 Was airspace clearance 

checked (air systems)? 

 Was there any coordination 

with adjacent units wrt RS 

employment? Specifically on 

communications frequencies? 

 If indirect fires are available, 

was there any consideration of 

how this might impact RS 

employment? 

Ask Platoon Leader

 What factors did you consider 

in deciding to employ (or not 

employ) the RS? 

 What did you view as the 

potential advantages of using 

the RS? 

 What did you view as the 

potential disadvantages of 

using the RS? 

 Is there a process for 

coordinating with adjacent 

units? 

METT-TC = Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops, Terrain, and Civilians 

The Seven Activities and Illustrative Examples 

 This section explains the seven activities outlined in PACERS, and provides illustrative 

examples from the MAV ACTD 2006 Soldier Experiment. Because the purpose of PACERS is 

to help improve unit performance, examples will focus on errors and deficiencies. This should 

not be read as evaluation of the ACTD nor the unit. The unit participating in the MAV ACTD 

2006 Soldier experiment did not have access to the initial draft of PACERS to help prepare for 

the experiment; the lessons learned by the unit were incorporated into a revised PACERS 

document to provide future users of RS with a head start. In order for the reader to better 

understand the examples below, a more thorough explanation of the MAV ACTD experiment 

will be provided first. 

 Participants in the MAV ACTD 2006 Soldier experiment were a relatively newly 

constituted Stryker Reconnaissance Platoon, of the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks 

on Oahu. The experiment was managed on behalf of the ACTD by the Soldier Battle Lab. The 

experimental system was the g-MAV developed by Honeywell, Inc., a prototype Class I SUAS. 

The g-MAV is a gasoline fueled vehicle with vertical take-off and landing capability. Its range 

and endurance depends upon the weather and terrain, but in general it can range out to 10 km, fly 

up to 1000 feet or more, and has a flight endurance of up to 40 minutes. The vehicle itself is 

quite loud, and so is not at all stealthy at low altitudes. It can carry two fixed cameras, either EO 

or IR, transmitting sensor data in near real time. One camera points forward, and the other points 

downward. The sensor imagery must be interpreted by a human; the system has no object 

recognition or sense-and-avoid capabilities. It can be flown manually or semi-autonomously, 

hover, and rotate in place. Line-of-sight (LOS) with the ground control station (GCS) is required 

for manual flight and streaming video; however, the system is capable of flying autonomously 

and storing imagery if a preprogrammed flight plan takes it out of direct LOS. It can also be 

programmed to respond in various ways to loss of communications link with the operator. 
10 

 Figure 1 illustrates the components essential to operate the g-MAV (and most RS). Twoway communication is required between the operator and the air vehicle (“uplink” and 

“downlink” in the figure). These communications are handled by the GCS, consisting of an 

operator control unit (OCU) and ground data terminal (GDT). To distinguish these 

communications channels from other forms of communications, these channels will be referred 

to as for up-down links (UDL). 

 The OCU acts as the human-system interface. It translates human inputs to machine level 

commands and displays information sent back from the vehicle. The GDT acts as the vehiclesystem interface, sending the lower level commands to the vehicle and receiving data from it via 

the UDL. The Global Positioning System (GPS) supplies both the air vehicle and the GCS with 

position information via satellites; although the system does have some backup navigation 

control if GPS information is lost. The GPS information allows the vehicle to follow a preprogrammed route, and allows the operator to keep track of its location, as well as his own 

location on a situation awareness map. The GCS is not integrated with any other blue-force 

tracking systems, however. The system can be controlled by a single operator, although launch 

preparation is more efficient with two people. This way, one person can attend to the actual air 

vehicle and the other the OCU during the required pre-launch checks. The person at the air 

vehicle can conduct physical vehicle checks and engine start, while the other person can monitor 

the data sent back from the vehicle to the OCU. 

 An official “system” consists of two air vehicles, one GCS and two pairs of payload pods 

(one EO and one IR); however, during the course of the MAV ACTD experiment, the unit was 

allowed to use any combination of equipment available. For example, they were not limited to 

one GCS, which allowed the PL to use a second GCS as a RVT, or to have two operators 

controlling different air vehicles simultaneously using different GCS and UDL. 

 The PL and NCO received operator training (one week) from Honeywell engineers at 

Honeywell facilities approximately one month prior to the experiment. Subsequently, remaining 

members in the platoon received operator training (one week) from Honeywell engineers at 

Schofield Barracks, during the week prior to the experiment; however, not all of them could 

attend the entire training session. Four Soldiers (three privates and a corporal) were fully trained 

to act as g-MAV operators for the experiment. On average, 15 platoon members participated in 

each experimental mission, and they were equipped with three or four Stryker vehicles, 

depending on maintenance status. Training was assisted by three (previously trained) NCO from 

Operational Test Command, who subsequently assisted in ACTD data collection during the 

experiment. 

 The platoon conducted four main missions on Schofield Barracks ranges over the course 

of a month: Urban Reconnaissance (Day), Urban Reconnaissance (Night) Route Reconnaissance 

(Day) and Area Reconnaissance (Day). Each mission was performed first without the g-MAV 

(baseline), and then subsequently at least two times with the g-MAV. Missions lasted between 

one and four hours, from PL reading his Operations Order (OP-Order) to end of mission 
11 

Figure 1. An illustration of the essential equipment for g-MAV operation. The human operator 

interacts with the ground control station (GCS), which in turn communicates with the air vehicle 

using the uplink radio frequency. The vehicle can send data down to the GCS via the downlink 

frequency. Satellites provide information to the global positioning systems (GPS) receivers 

allowing the GCS to display the location of both the GCS and the air vehicle on a situation 

awareness display. The primary means of communication between the operator and a remote 

commander would be by voice radio. 

(Endex). Endex was called at either a logical mission conclusion or transition point, or because 

of technical issues. Missions ending for purely technical reasons were repeated on another day. 

Most missions were followed up with an AAR, with AAR leadership varying among Battle Lab 

Staff, PL, or platoon sergeant (PSgt). The Urban Reconnaissance missions involved entering a 

small village and securing two adjacent buildings. The Route Reconnaissance missions involved 

traversing and clearing a winding, uphill route, with abrupt elevation changes and dense foliage 

in adjacent terrain. The Area Reconnaissance missions involved reconnaissance and clearing of 

a relatively flat area, except for berms and foliage, which obstructed ground-level line of sight. 

For the Urban Reconnaissance missions the PL chose to employ the MAV from a stationary rear 

position. For the Route and Area Reconnaissance missions, he used this same strategy for some 

missions; but also tried controlling the MAV on the move, with the operator mounted on one of 

the Strykers. For each mission, a varying number of people (6 – 12) were available to play the 

role of local civilians or hostiles, some unknown number of whom could be hostile and armed, 

Satellite 

 Uplink 

 Downlink 

GPS 

GPS 

Air Vehicle 

Remote 

Commander 

Ground Control Station (GCS) 
12 

and who may have emplaced explosive devices in the area. Rules of engagement instructed 

platoon members not to fire unless an unknown displayed clear hostile intent. Hypothetical 

indirect fires could be called for during the Area Reconnaissance missions. 

Decide Whether/How to Employ the RS 

 Table 2 (above) lists the observations and questions associated with the activity, “Decide 

whether/how to employ the RS.” The associated goal is to ensure that potential constraints, 

benefits and risks of employing the RS are considered in light of overall mission objectives, and 

prevailing conditions (Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops, Terrain, and Civilians, or (METT-TC)). 

Consideration must be given as to whether employment of the RS will contribute positively to 

attaining mission objectives. This includes consideration of what potential enemy response to it 

might be (e.g., if it makes a lot of noise or gives clues to mission objectives). Most RS will have 

constraints on their employment according to weather, terrain, personnel requirements, available 

UDL frequencies, and air space privileges (for aerial vehicles). It is important that these factors 

be taken into account. Dedicated UDL are essential to ensure no interference in operator control. 

If an adjacent unit were to use the same UDL, there is a potential for loss of control. 

 All RS will also have operating characteristics that could affect appropriateness of 

employment. For example, the spatial communication range of the system, its stealth (or lack 

thereof), and its battery/fuel supply must be factors contributing to determining whether and how 

to employ the RS in the context of a particular mission. During training, it is important to 

establish that consideration of these factors becomes a routine step before employing the system. 

Appendix B contains a more detailed list of considerations, organized by METT-TC. 

 In the MAV ACTD 2006 Soldier experiment, it was pretty much assumed that if the gMAV was available (non-baseline mission), and the weather conditions permitted, the unit 

should use it (as the purpose of the experiment was to give them as much opportunity to try it out 

as possible). Therefore, in the context of the experiment, the issues listed in this section came 

more into play in planning how the g-MAV would be used rather than whether it would be used. 

Nevertheless there were coordination issues that affected whether missions could be conducted. 

Coordination with range control was required to ensure air space clearance and noninterference 

with/from adjacent areas. Radio frequencies available for UDL had to be coordinated prior to the 

experiment. 

 With respect to how missions would be conducted, one of the prime considerations by the 

PL in the MAV ACTD 2006 experiment was workload and manpower. He preferred to use the 

MAV primarily for leader’s reconnaissance, prior to maneuver on his main mission. His Strykers 

were equipped with the Long-Range Advance Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), providing 

pretty good sensor coverage even without the MAV. Employing the MAV during maneuver 

involved removing personnel from the actual operation, and also complicated use of the radio 

nets (as a net was needed between PL and remote RS team). It also added another 

synchronization problem to his workload; not only did he have to synchronize squads, he also 

had to synchronize MAV maneuver with squad maneuver. This was particularly complicated if 

the operator was not stationary and remote, but instead mounted on one of the Strykers. In this 

case, issues of terrain (blocking LOS) and landing (recovery) sites for the MAV became 
13 

additional factors for consideration. It is important that the PL think through and synchronize all 

activities if the RS is going to be used during the maneuvering part of a mission, as opposed to 

only for pre-mission reconnaissance. Indeed, it has been suggested by some subject matter 

experts that, at least given the current state of the art, RS should be used by small units only for 

pre-mission reconnaissance, unless the team operating the RS is a specialized dedicated 

attachment to the unit. 

Select RS Team and Plan RS Missions Within the Overall Mission Context 

 Table 3 lists the observations and questions associated with the activity, “Select RS team 

and plan RS missions within the overall mission context.” RS team refers to any personnel 

involved in the RS operation, interpretation and/or communication of information gained from 

the RS, and security for these personnel. The associated goals involve delegating tasks, assigning 

responsibilities, integrating the use of the RS into the larger mission plan, and making sure the 

plans are understood. 

 One issue that arises when the RS team is designated, not dedicated, is that a different set 

of people may constitute the RS team from one mission to another. As a consequence, people 

may not have established roles nor feel responsible for particular duties involved in RS 

operation, unless explicitly assigned the task. The PL or PSgt should not assume that the RS 

team will systematically work out these responsibilities on their own. For example, during the 

MAV ACTD experiment, the RS team had several steps to conduct before the aerial vehicle 

could be launched. This included vehicle set up, fueling, engine tuning, setting the 

communications channels, and various pre-flight vehicle checks. One step that could have been 

conducted ahead of the final launch sequence, but typically was not, was pre-checking the 

functioning of the UDL between GCS and g-MAV. Despite the fact that the RS team usually had 

ample time to do so, they often neglected to check this until the planned launch time. Technical 

problems were often encountered at this stage (either due to user errors or omissions in previous 

steps or because of genuine hardware/software glitches). Consequently g-MAV launch was 

delayed until the nature of the problem could be established and corrected. Had the team checked 

the UDL prior to the scheduled launch time, the delays could have been averted. No one was 

ever explicitly assigned responsibility for this task, and therefore a pre-check was conducted only 

when someone happened to show initiative and do it. Only one person ever did this; this was an 

NCO, not one of the operators. The problem was never addressed during an AAR (why hadn’t 

the UDL been checked prior to launch?), and continued to be a source of delayed MAV flights 

throughout the experiment. Unless problems like this are explicitly addressed during AAR they 

will continue to plague the operation. 

 It is important that all critical details of the RS mission be specified for the RS team. 

Especially when the RS team is ad hoc, there should be no assumptions made about what the 

team already understands or knows about their responsibilities and mission. All the information 

regarding employment of the RS should be briefed to the RS team, and ideally specified in a 

written form. Units may benefit by adopting a standard format for this to ensure that no details 

are omitted. A potential list for inclusion is provided in Appendix C. 
14 

Table 3. Planning RS missions 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activity: 

Select RS team* and plan RS 

missions within the overall 

mission context 

Goals: 

 Provide adequate number of 

personnel to conduct RS 

operations and provide security 

 Ensure RS team members 

understand their mission and 

individual responsibilities 

 Ensure RS team has adequate 

time to move to emplacement 

site and prepare RS for maneuver 

 Ensure RS employment is 

integrated into the overall mission 

* RS team—any personnel 

involved in 

- Operation of the RS 

 - Interpretation and/or 

communication of information 

gained from the RS 

- Security for above 

 Did PL or PSgt ask questions 

to ensure RS team understood its 

mission? 

 Was a rehearsal conducted? 

 Did the rehearsal cover the 

entire RS mission? 

 Were CCIRs/PIRs explicitly 

discussed? 

 Did the PL prepare a written 

RS-OPORDER? 

 Was all the information 

required for the RS team 

operations briefed? 

(SEE APPENDIX C) 

 If the RS team would be 

remote from the rest of the unit 

was a trigger for reuniting 

specified? 

 When entering autonomous 

missions in the RS OCU, does the 

user check this mission with 

respect to terrain/other factors 

 Was there a discussion on how 

to program response to loss of 

UDL links? 

Ask RS Team 

 What was your mission? 

 How did your mission relate to 

the overall mission? 

 Were you briefed on all the 

information you needed to 

conduct your mission? 

 Were problems encountered in 

preparing to launch that might 

have been addressed with 

additional personnel? 

 Did you run into any situations 

that you were not sure how to 

respond to? 

 Was time a problem in 

preparing for the launch? 

 

 Were each individual’s 

responsibilities clearly defined? 

 PL or PSgt should ask questions of the RS team to make sure they understand their role 

in the mission in terms of RS operations and the means of communicating RS status and 

intelligence gathered. Ideally, a mission rehearsal would be conducted, including 

synchronization of RS operations with the rest of the unit. 

 During the MAV ACTD 2006 Soldier experiment, the PL was generally thorough in 

briefing the RS team; however, he did not provide the RS team with a standardized briefing and 

there were instances when critical pieces of information were omitted. These included how to 

program the “loss of link” response, where the landing site should be, which payload pod to use, 

and which UDL channels to use (when the plan included two vehicles in the air at the same 

time). Operators typically asked for clarification at some later point, but sometimes not until the 

critical time when they realized they needed it and didn’t have it. This was particularly the case 

with setting UDL when multiple vehicle missions were planned. This omission is related to the 

point above with respect to checking UDL prior to launch time. 

 An essential consideration for the leader is who and how many people to assign to the RS 

team. Elements for consideration include known operator competency and operator familiarity 

with the terrain. Also to be considered is whether assigning a person to the RS team would leave 
15 

some other crucial position vacant. For example, during some days of the MAV ACTD 2006 

Soldier experiment, the entire platoon element was not present. This limited who the PL could 

assign to be an operator because the platoon was short a gunner, and one of the operators was 

also a gunner. During the experiment, the chosen operator was always accompanied by a 

“supervisor,” either the PSgt or the PL himself. A security team was required for them if 

dismounted. If a Stryker was taken to the launch site, the minimum RS team was one operator, 

PSgt, and a driver. The PSgt normally acted as the radio relay between the operator and the 

(remote) PL while the driver pulled security. When multiple missions were planned in quick 

succession, two operators were assigned, so that one could refuel a recently landed vehicle, while 

the other launched the next flight. This was insufficient personnel for quick succession night 

flights. In the dark, fueling became a 2-person task. The PSgt could not both help refuel and act 

as radio relay. The driver manned the radio instead, but he had difficulty hearing the operator. 

Observers actually assisted in relaying the operator’s words to the driver. The point is, the PL 

must consider the conditions under which RS operation will occur (METT-TC again), and assign 

the RS team accordingly. 

Defining Roles of Unit Personnel During RS Mission 

 Table 4 lists the observations and questions associated with the activity, “define roles of 

unit personnel in tracking the RS mission, interpretation of RS sensor imagery, and reporting on 

commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR).” The goals are to make sure that the 

intelligence acquired by the RS gets to the people who need it in a timely manner, and to make 

sure that RS operation is responsive to unfolding events and the advent of new intelligence. 

Currently fielded RS tend to be stand alone systems, not networked with any other military 

digital displays. This may create some difficulties in terms of the PL keeping abreast of mission 

progress and fully utilizing the sensor information provided by a RS. 

 For now and several years to come, a human will be required to interpret sensor imagery. 

This includes understanding what they are seeing, and relating it to a geographic location. It is 

important to make sure that designated interpreters have the capability to do this. If non-natural 

sensors, such as IR are used, the interpreter must have the ability to understand this type of 

imagery. Besides understanding what they are seeing, the interpreter must also be able to judge 

the location. It is all too easy for imagery observers to become disoriented when the camera is 

pointing in one direction, but they are facing in another direction. This occurred twice during the 

MAV ACTD experiment. It can not be assumed that imagery interpretation or spatial orientation 

training will be covered in operator training. It might be necessary to designate an “interpreter” 

in addition to an operator, to glean relevant meaning from the sensor imagery. The interpreter 

may be right next to the operator or remote from the operator, depending on the ability of the 

system to transmit sensor data to a RVT. Multiple experiments have shown that a two person 

team is better at detecting targets than a single operator (Murphy, 2004; Rehfeld, Jentsch, Curtis, 

& Fincannon, 2005), with one person primarily responsible for control of the RS and the other 

for imagery interpretation. 

 In addition to perceptual interpretation, some degree of tactical judgment will be required 

to filter the information gained from the sensor imagery. For example, if the goal of a RS 

reconnaissance mission is to identify possible ambush sites, the interpreter needs to know about 
16 

Table 4. Defining roles of unit personnel during RS mission 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activity: 

Define roles of unit personnel in 

tracking the RS mission, 

interpretation of RS sensor 

imagery, and reporting on 

CCIR. 

Goals: 

 Intel acquired by the RS gets 

to the people who need it in a 

timely manner. 

 RS mission can be 

dynamically re-planned based on 

new intelligence 

 Who monitors and reports 

progress of the RS mission? Was 

responsibility for this clearly 

defined? 

 Who interprets RS imagery 

and reports on CCIR to the PL? 

Was responsibility for this clearly 

defined? Was the communication 

chain clearly defined? 

 Did the PL look at real time 

streaming video or imagery 

selected/filtered through someone 

else first? 

 If person(s) were designated to 

monitor RS mission progress 

and/or imagery were they 

involved in mission planning? 

 What status reports does the 

RS operator provide? Are there 

SOPs on what to report and how 

to report? 

▪ Are RS missions changed midmission? Who makes the decision 

for this dynamic re-planning? 

 Did the intel acquired by the 

RS contribute to the platoon’s 

performance? 

 How was intel acquired by the 

RS acted upon ? 

 Were other digital systems 

and/or higher echelons updated 

with intel provided by RS? 

Ask Platoon Leader

 Were you able to keep track of 

the progress of the RS mission? 

 How did you utilize the 

intelligence provided by the RS 

mission? If you did not, why not? 

 Did RS functioning meet the 

expectations you had during 

planning? Why or why not? 

 If there was a point you lost 

track of the RS mission status, 

when and why do you think that 

occurred? How might you avoid 

this in the future? 

Ask Platoon Leader, RS

operator(s), and designated 

Third Parties

 Was it clear what the RS 

operator was responsible for 

reporting or recording? 

 Was it clear who was 

responsible for interpretation of 

sensor imagery? 

Ask person(s) who performed 

sensor imagery interpretation

 Did you experience any time 

pressure while interpreting sensor 

imagery? 

 Did you experience any 

conflict between sensory analysis 

and your other responsibilities? 

 Were there times when you 

were unsure what you were 

seeing? 

 Were there times when you 

were unsure how to relate the 

imagery to a place on a map or in 

the environment? 
17 

terrain characteristics that make good ambush sites. This kind of tactical knowledge may be 

variable across operators—thus the potential need for an additional person to do interpretation. 

The operator or interpreter can not and should not provide a running commentary on every single 

thing observed. The interpreter of the imagery must be briefed on key information to report, the 

commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). They need to be briefed on what to look 

for (e.g., the latest trend in hidden explosive devices). In addition, they need to have a clear 

understanding of mission intent, so that they can make judgments based on what they observe 

(continue to watch this truck or move RS to another location). Finally, if the RS has the ability 

to record imagery, the operator needs to have a clear understanding about what to record and 

save (because of limited storage capacity). 

 In addition to understanding what they are seeing, the interpreter has to be able to 

communicate it clearly. Without some protocols for communication, there may be opportunity 

for confusion. During the MAV ACTD urban reconnaissance missions, each platoon member 

had a map with each village building clearly numbered. The PL instructed them how to refer to 

sides of buildings. This greatly facilitated communication between the g-MAV operators and the 

PL or PSgt about the location of observed targets. Without such conventions there is danger that 

relative terms such as left and right will be used and mislead personnel oriented in different 

directions. It is important that people in different locations have a clear way to communicate 

specific places. 

 In order to track MAV mission progress, PL introduced brevity codes. The operators 

were to radio in these codes at different stages. These specified fifteen points of a MAV mission 

including engine start, ready to launch, vehicle landed, vehicle retrieved, etc. This was 

abandoned after two missions. No one could remember the codes (letters from the phonetic 

alphabet: alpha, bravo, etc.), and they covered g-MAV mission progress in far more detail than 

the PL had time to be concerned with, or the operators cared to report. The original idea of using 

codes was a good one, however. The unit only needed to work out the essential elements to 

report; unfortunately they never really established a system. The operators were left uncertain 

regarding what they were supposed to report, or what actions required explicit authorization. For 

example, if the PL radioed to launch as quickly as possible, did they need to report when they 

were ready to launch and get an explicit ok? Observation indicated that the operators didn’t 

know. 

 In terms of who looked at and interpreted sensory imagery during the MAV ACTD 

missions, several approaches were tried. Sometimes the PL stayed right by the operator and 

watched the OCU screen over his shoulder. PL watched the raw sensor imagery, and when so 

doing often directed the operator how to control the MAV and camera zoom. He might as well 

have been flying it himself. This clearly would not be possible if he had other things going on 

requiring his attention. In one instance the PL’s stationary Stryker was actually overrun from 

behind because of lack of immediate situation awareness. The PL was busy watching over the 

operator’s shoulder. The driver and gunner were attending to four potential enemy dismounts 

located to their front. Radio messages from another Stryker alerting PL about the enemy 

approaching from their rear were not received because of congestion on the radio nets. 
18 

 Sometimes the PL would have a RVT set up, so that he could watch the sensor imagery 

without having to be right next to the operator. He felt that this better allowed him to multi-task, 

and not get caught up in micro-managing MAV operation. More frequently, communications 

concerning real-time imagery were radio-relayed to the PL (operator to PSgt to PL, although 

sometimes there was an additional person between the PSgt and the PL). When such a chain is 

used, it is important that participants understand what to communicate and how to communicate. 

 The final element of this activity is acting on the intelligence information gathered from 

the RS. There is no point in employing a RSTA system if the information it provides is not used. 

In order to make the most use of it, the PL may need to think through contingency plans ahead of 

time, so that he can quickly and efficiently re-task his squads based on unfolding events. He must 

also consider what information needs to be sent to his higher command, either through radio 

contact or the updating of his digital military systems. In some cases, PL may need to designate a 

person responsible for this activity. This will continue to be an issue until RS are networked with 

digital command and control systems and some kind of automated target recognition is available. 

Troop Leading Procedures and Pre-Employment Checks 

 Table 5 lists the observations and questions associated with the activity, “Pre-launch 

checks.” The associated goal is to make sure that all preparations for employment of the RS are 

conducted in a timely manner, so that the RS mission can be executed on schedule. Part of this 

involves clear delegation regarding who has the responsibility to conduct the associated tasks 

involved in preparing for RS employment. Fundamental to RS employment is making sure that a 

dedicated communications frequency is available for data passing between the GCS and RS 

platform (UDL). Additionally, for air vehicles, air space authorization may be required, and 

procedures for obtaining this must be established. All practical considerations regarding the 

particular RS system should be checked. Is the platform in working order? Are batteries 

charged? Is fuel available? For small RSs, some assembly of modular parts is likely. Are all the 

parts present? Will any spare parts be taken on the mission? Is a technical manual being brought 

along? 

 During the MAV ACTD training session, operators were instructed to always use a 

checklist while emplacing the MAV and conducting pre-launch checks. A checklist was 

provided in the back of the technical manual. Operators, however, did not routinely use a 

checklist, and were overconfident in their ability to perform the required tasks without one. 

Technical manuals tended to be pulled out only when a problem was encountered, or an NCO 

insisted that operators had one. Checklists might have been used more if they were in a different 

format (e.g., a separate checklist card, instead of a page in the back of the technical manual). 

Moreover, there was some confusion about whether technical manuals were supposed to stay 

with operators or systems. Initially operators packed the manual with the system; but the next 

day, they might receive a different system to use from Honeywell, without a manual inside the 

case. Working out procedures like this may seem trivial but can payoff greatly down the line in 

terms of timely mission starts. 
19 

Table 5. Troop leading procedures and pre-employment checks 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activity: 

Pre-employment checks: 

Goals: 

 Necessary RS-related 

equipment and supplies are 

present and in fully working 

order 

 Download and upload 

frequencies have been cleared for 

use 

 Coordination with higher on 

A2C2 (air vehicles) 

 Is a checklist being used to 

make sure no items/steps are 

overlooked? 

 Have uplink/downlink 

frequencies been coordinated 

internally and with adjacent 

units? 

 Were any crucial items 

missing or steps skipped before 

attempt to launch? 

Ask Platoon Leader and RS

Operators

 Who is responsible for 

selecting OCU/ RS 

communication channels? 

 Who is responsible for 

deconflicting 

channels/frequencies within the 

unit if multiple platforms will be 

used? What about deconflicting 

with adjacent units? 

▪ Who is responsible for ensuring 

that pre-employment checks are 

done according to SOP? 

Ask RS Operators

 Is it clear when all your preemployment checks should be 

performed? 

 Were there any technical 

problems encountered during preemployment checks? How did 

you deal with them? 

▪ Are aware of unit SOPs for preemployment checks? Did you 

follow them? 

 Errors during pre-launch checks and procedures led to delays in several RS missions 

because certain items or tasks were omitted. In one instance the tuning rod required for tuning 

the MAV engine was missing. In another instance, the person setting up the platform (who was 

not the subsequent operator) forgot to connect the fuel line; it took quite a while to figure out that 

this was the reason the engine would not start. In another instance, the MAV was set up with the 

wrong payload pod. The operator decided to switch out pods, but did not consult the manual and 

did not follow the correct procedures. This ultimately ended in an aborted mission. Finally, it has 

already been mentioned that deconflicting and checking the UDL was often left to the launch 

time, instead of being checked ahead of time. 

 Partial support for pre-flight checks was provided by the OCU. The operator had to go 

through a series of steps listed on the OCU before the g-MAV engine could be started. In 

general, compliance with pre-employment checks could be encouraged by better job aide design 

(e.g., checklists that can be tucked away in a pocket), or are required by system startup software. 

In addition, requirements to file checklists after each mission might also aid compliance. 
20 

Develop or Refine Unit SOPs and TTP 

 Table 6 lists the observations and questions associated with the activity, “Develop or 

refine unit SOPs and TTP,” with the overall goal of improving efficiency and effectiveness of RS 

employment. Examples of various activities that could be addressed by an SOP or TTP are also 

listed. The observations suggested in this row of the PACERS table are to a large extent 

redundant with items found in other rows; however, associated questions are aimed at 

encouraging the unit to identify ways to improve their procedures. Mistakes and inefficiencies 

may be identified during AAR, but it takes additional initiative to decide how to put procedures 

in place in order to avoid these same mistakes in the future. It is one thing to identify lessons 

from past mistakes, another to actually take corrective action. 

 Several of the SOP a unit may find useful will likely deal with the specific quirks of the 

system they are using, and which will only be discovered with increasing experience under 

varying conditions. SOP may include work-arounds for discovered equipment inadequacies in 

particular situations. For example, in the MAV ACTD 2006 Soldier Experiment, a flaw in the 

housing of the near-ground altitude detector allowed water to collect inside the housing during 

rain. This detector is used to determine automatic shut off of the MAV engine during landing. 

The consequence was if a land command was given, the sensor could be “fooled” into thinking it 

was close to the ground because of the water in the housing, and shut off the engine when in fact 

the g-MAV was still high in the air (resulting in a crash). Once this was discovered, the unit 

adopted the policy of manually lowering altitude to a few feet off the ground before issuing a 

land command, if there was any chance that water may have collected below the sensor. 

 An example of a more tactical procedure that might require development has to do with 

coordination of fires, to avoid destruction of the RS platform. During some of the ACTD 

experiment missions, PL and squad leaders had the option to call for indirect fires. The PL was 

asked what he would do to ensure that a MAV in the air would not be hit by incoming mortars. 

He had discussed this with his commander, and the strategy suggested was to raise MAV altitude 

above that of mortar trajectory, when a call for indirect fire was made. In order to implement this 

it would be important that the RS operator is made aware that a call for fire had been given. 

Therefore, an SOP on the communications chain to ensure operator notification would be useful. 

Operation at a Site Remote from the Rest of the Unit 

 Table 7 lists the observations and questions associated with situations in which the RS 

team is operating from a site remote from the rest of the unit. This section is somewhat redundant 

with the section on pre-launch checks; however, it also addresses the situation in which the RS 

team is responsible for its own security. The observations and questions are aimed at ensuring 

that the RS team understands how to select an appropriate site from which to operate. The 

appropriateness of a site should be considered from both a security aspect and RS aspect. For the 

latter, there may be specific terrain features that could hinder UDL, GPS signals, or maneuver of 

the RS vehicle. 
21 

Table 6. Develop or Refine Unit SOP and TTP 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

 Activity: 

Develop or refine unit SOPs 

and TTP 

Goals: 

Improve efficiency and 

effectiveness of RS employment 

Examples: 

-- mission specification format 

(RS-OPORDER) 

--response to specific threat 

situations to an airborne RS 

--response to specific threat 

situations to a remote RS team 

-- response to loss of link 

-- response to other technical 

difficulties with RS 

-- significant events during the 

RS mission that the operator 

should report 

-- language for verbal 

communication regarding 

significant RS events 

-- language for verbal 

communication regarding target 

location 

--A2C2 coordination 

-- frequency coordination with 

nearby units 

--Use of checklists 

--Refinement of SOPs based on 

lessons learned 

-- Development of new TTP 

based on lessons learned 

 Was the RS mission briefed 

systematically in a step by step 

fashion or were specifics written 

in a standard format? 

 Did people involved in 

controlling the RS appear 

confident and certain about what 

they were supposed to be doing? 

 Were there any technical or 

other difficulties which could 

have been avoided? 

 If the unit has SOPs, are they 

being followed? 

 Was there any loss of 

uplink/downlink with the RS? 

How was this reacted to? 

 Were there any real or 

potential mishaps? What were the 

likely causes? 

Ask Platoon Leader and RS

Operators

 Is there anything that happened 

during the mission that suggests 

the basis for a new SOP or TTP? 

 Is there a unit SOP that defines 

the information that should be 

included in a RS mission plan? 

 Do you have any SOPs 

associated with any key situations 

(e.g., detection of an enemy 

sniper)? 

 Were there instances in which 

you found verbal 

communications regarding the RS 

confusing? How could these be 

addressed through an SOP? 

 Did new information 

requirements become evident 

during a mission? If yes, what 

was done to address the need? 
22 

Table 7. Operation at a Site Remote from the Rest of the Unit 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activitiy: 

Preparation for 

launch/recovery at a remote site 

Goals: 

 RS team safety 

 Timely RS launch 

 Does the team maintain 

security en-route and 

immediately set up security upon 

arrival? 

 Is the site checked for 

suitability? 

 Are checklists used during the 

set up or break down processes? 

 Is everyone in the RS team 

fully employed either providing 

security or preparing for launch? 

 Is RS launched on schedule? 

 If multiple missions are 

conducted from the same 

location, what is the inter-mission 

turn around time? Was it as 

planned? 

Ask RS team

 Did you have adequate 

personnel to secure the launch 

site? 

 Were problems encountered in 

establishing communications, 

GPS signal, fueling procedures, 

etc.? 

 During the MAV ACTD Soldier Experiment, there was often inadequate 360 degree 

security at a remote operations site, primarily due to lack of personnel. Had this been a real 

mission, as opposed to an experiment, the PL would have had to seriously question whether a 

remote operating team was feasible. 

Record Keeping 

 Table 8 lists the observations and questions associated with record keeping activities. It is 

important that the unit knows how to handle safety incidents, as well as record operator hours 

and systems logs for maintenance purposes. In some cases the records to be kept may be dictated 

by higher authorities. It is important that responsibilities are assigned for these tasks, and that 

assigned personnel understand the requirements. Of course, these duties might not be necessary 

if an RS is being tested by a unit in a one-off experiment. In the case of the MAV ACTD 

experiment, it was anticipated that the 25th ID would subsequently continue to evaluate the gMAV, supported by the Army. Therefore, there was some recording of personnel training and 

flight experiences, as they would likely be involved in future exercises. What exactly needed to 

be recorded, and the format of the records was not clearly specified (the MAV being an 

experimental system); however, the unit was consulting with the Army’s UAV Center of 

Excellence for guidance on record keeping. 
23 

Table 8. Record Keeping 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activity: 

Record keeping 

Goals: 

 Safety incidents recorded and 

reported 

 Use and Maintenance logs kept 

up to date 

 Operator training currency and 

flight logbooks kept up to date 

 Are records being made and 

kept in an organized way? 

 Is system operation in 

compliance with safety 

release specifications? 

Ask Unit

 Do they know what defines a 

safety incident? 

 Do they know the operating 

parameters specified in the safety 

release? 

 Does each system have a 

maintenance log? 

 Does each operator keep a 

logbook? 

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 PACERS considers the application of RS at platoon level -- a situation where the work 

involved in planning and executing employment strategy and analyzing sensor feeds will be 

performed without a dedicated staff. Although PACERS is based largely on the author’s research 

and observations concerning small aerial RS, it is intended to be applicable to any small RS, 

aerial or ground-based, or even littoral, where the RS is employed by a designated ad hoc team 

from within the unit (as opposed to a dedicated attached team). The extent to which PACERS is 

useful, independent of the RS system, will need to be assessed by trial application to units 

equipped with RS systems other than the MAV. 

 In an attempt to remain generic, PACERS deliberately avoided addressing individual 

operator training. The advantage of a generic approach is that it avoids the necessity for trainers 

to become conversant with the details of a myriad of systems, as well as the need for continuous 

revision due to technical upgrades. Nevertheless, there are aspects of operator training that are 

relevant to system employment, which will be mentioned here. Depending on who designs the 

training operators receive, and how much time is allotted for operator training, operators may not 

actually receive all the training truly required to operate the system. For example, a table of 

approved UDL frequencies for the local area might be required, but the operator may have not 

been trained where to get this or how to load it into the OCU even if he/she had it. Or map 

imagery might be required for the operating area but the operator may have not have been trained 

how to integrate available imagery into the OCU. Or, the OCU may be capable of recording 

video or still photos, but the operator may not have been trained how to download these for 

export to other systems. 

 Even if operator training has covered these many technical aspects, there are potentially 

several other skills required for employment which have not been trained. For example, an RS 

might be equipped with an IR camera; however, training on IR imagery interpretation may not be 

a part of operator training. Or, terrain analysis skills might be required to set routes, interpret 

maps, or interpret sensor images; but operator training may not address terrain analysis skills. 

The point is that to employ a RS beneficially, there are other skills required besides mere 
24 

operator training. Leaders will have to include knowledge of how these other skills are 

distributed among their personnel when assigning RS teams. 

 Another variable element in operator training is trouble shooting. Training will likely 

vary in how much attention is given to problem solving when something goes wrong. But things 

do inevitably go wrong (Meshesha, et al., 2007; Murphy, Stover, & Burke, 2005). Explicit 

practice on dealing with malfunctions or other problems is recommended, and leaders may need 

to arrange opportunities for this if it was not adequately dealt with during operator training. 

Knowledge of how different members of the unit deal with various dilemmas (both practically 

and emotionally) may need to be considered in assigning RS teams. Recall the example of the 

disconnected fuel line given above. The main reason that happened was that Soldiers had 

encountered so many technical problems during the experiment, that it was hard for them to 

imagine that this time, the problem was as simple as an unconnected fuel line. Of course, if a 

checklist had been used, the problem would have been avoided. 

 Providing units with guidance on how to apply new technology when that technology is 

constantly changing is a real challenge. ARI’s FBCB2 Exploitation Tool and the Digital TOC 

Integration Guide will require repeated updating to reflect changes in the capabilities of 

networked systems. This report has tried to avoid this problem by providing guidance that is 

more related to functional aspects of RSTA RS, as opposed to the specifics of any one particular 

system. The assumption is that the underlying goals of employing a RSTA RS system will 

remain the same, even though the specifics of the system might change. Yet changes in 

technological capabilities may eventually make the guidance provided here obsolete. In 

particular, some of the issues addressed here may become non-issues when RS become better 

integrated with C3 networks and/or when RS themselves gain more intelligence and autonomy. 

For now, however, there remain questions of how the position of and the information provided 

by the RS will be integrated with the rest of the Army’s digital battle command systems such as 

FBCB2, Command Post of the Future (CPOF), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems 

(AFATDS), and Tactical Airspace Integration System (TAIS). 

 Finally, it is recommended that designers of RS systems give some consideration to 

incorporating the collection of data for AAR aids into their systems. Many small RS systems 

include a tablet computer, and could record data on how the RS was employed during a mission. 

This includes recording of platform routes, sensor coverage and sensor imagery, mission timings, 

and alerts and warnings sent to the operator by the system. Using the RS itself to collect and 

display these data in the form of visual aids could greatly facilitate the AAR process. 
25 

REFERENCES 

Alberts, D. S. & Hayes, R. E. (2002). Code of best practice experimentation. Command and 

Control Research Program Information Age Transformation Series. Washington, D.C. 

Durlach, P. J. (2005). Training for Multicell and Dismounted Command and Control. 

Proceedings of the Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference 

(I/ITSEC), December, Orlando, FL. 

Leibrecht, B. C., Lockaby, K. J., & Meliza, L. L. (2003). A practical guide for exploiting 

FBCB2 capabilities (ARI Research Product 2003-05) 

Leibrecht, B. C., Lockaby, K. J., Perrault, A. M., Strauss, C. P., and Meliza, L. L. (2006) 

Tailored Exercise Planning and Feedback for Digitized Units (ARI Research Report 

1858). 

Meshesha, D., Dusina, J. Pandullo, M., Bruner, S., Edwards, D., Ruecking, D., Scalsky, D., 

Farquhar, J., Schmid, M., Buck, S., Johnson, K., Wallace, P., Chandler, R., Nellans, T., 

& Strukel, S. (2007). Air Assault Expeditionary Force (AAEF) Spiral C Experiment Final 

Report. U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, Alexandria, VA. 

Murphy, R. (2004). Human-robot interaction in rescue robotics. IEEE Transactions on Systems, 

Man, and Cybernetics-Part C: Applications and Reviews, Vol. 34 (2), 138-153. 

Murphy, R. R., Stover, S., & Burke, J. (2005). Rescue Robot Awareness Training. Tampa, FL: 

Center for Robot-Assisted Search and Rescue and University of South Florida. 

Odom, T. P., Gates, J. W., Hardwich, J., & Ehrlich, R. (2005) Transformation: Victory rests with 

small units. Military Review. May – June, 81–85. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (2002). Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Roadmap, 2002- 2027. 

Washington, D.C. 

Switzer, R. (2005). Combat success rests with platoons. Center for Army Lessons Learned. 

Article downloaded 10/31/2005 from https://call2.army.mil/products/trainingtechniques/asp/articles/COMBAT/combat.asp. 

Rehfeld, S. A., Jentsch, F. G., Curtis, M., & Fincannon, T. (2005). Collaborative teamwork with 

unmanned ground vehicles in military missions. Proceedings of the 11th Annual HumanComputer Interaction International Conference, Las Vegas, NV. 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Office of the Chief of Public Affairs (2006). AAEF 

tests the capability of air assault. Article downloaded 01/26/07 from 

http://www.tradoc.army.mil/pao/TNSarchives/December%202006/120606-1.html. 
26 
26 

APPENDIX A: PACERS TABLE 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activity: 

Decide whether/how to employ 

the RS 

Goals: 

Potential benefits vs. risks of 

employing the RS are considered 

in light of overall mission 

objectives, METT-TC, and 

weather. 

SEE APPENDIX B FOR 

ADDITIONAL DETAILS

 Was airspace clearance 

checked (air systems)? 

 Was there any coordination 

with adjacent units wrt RS 

employment? Specifically on 

communications frequencies? 

 If indirect fires are available, 

was there any consideration of 

how this might impact RS 

employment? 

Ask Platoon Leader

 What factors did you consider 

in deciding to employ (or not 

employ) the RS? 

 What did you view as the 

potential advantages of using 

the RS? 

 What did you view as the 

potential disadvantages of 

using the RS? 

 Is there a process for 

coordinating with adjacent 

units? 

Activity: 

Select RS team* and plan RS 

missions within the overall 

mission context 

Goals: 

 Provide adequate number of 

personnel to conduct RS 

operations and provide security 

 Ensure RS team members 

understand their mission and 

individual responsibilities 

 Ensure RS team has adequate 

time to move to emplacement 

site and prepare RS for maneuver 

 Ensure RS employment is 

integrated into the overall mission 

* RS team—any personnel 

involved in 

- Operation of the RS 

 - Interpretation and/or 

communication of information 

gained from the RS 

- Security for above 

 Did PL or PSgt ask questions 

to ensure RS team understood its 

mission? 

 Was a rehearsal conducted? 

 Did the rehearsal cover the 

entire RS mission? 

 Were CCIRs/PIRs explicitly 

discussed? 

 Did the PL prepare a written 

RS-OPORDER? 

 Was all the information 

required for the RS team 

operations briefed? 

(SEE APPENDIX C) 

 If the RS team would be 

remote from the rest of the unit 

was a trigger for reuniting 

specified? 

 When entering autonomous 

missions in the RS OCU, does the 

user check this mission with 

respect to terrain/other factors 

 Was there a discussion on how 

to program response to loss of 

UDL links? 

Ask RS Team 

 What was your mission? 

 How did your mission relate to 

the overall mission? 

 Were you briefed on all the 

information you needed to 

conduct your mission? 

 Were problems encountered in 

preparing to launch that might 

have been addressed with 

additional personnel? 

 Did you run into any situations 

that you were not sure how to 

respond to? 

 Was time a problem in 

preparing for the launch? 

 

 Were each individual’s 

responsibilities clearly defined? 

A-1 
26 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activity: 

Define roles of unit personnel in 

tracking the RS mission, 

interpretation of RS sensor 

imagery, and reporting on 

CCIRs. 

Goals: 

 Intel acquired by the RS gets 

to the people who need it in a 

timely manner. 

 RS mission can be 

dynamically re-planned based on 

new intelligence 

 Who monitors and reports 

progress of the RS mission? Was 

responsibility for this clearly 

defined? 

 Who interprets RS imagery 

and reports on CCIRs to the PL? 

Was responsibility for this clearly 

defined? Was the communication 

chain clearly defined? 

 Did the PL look at real time 

streaming video or imagery 

selected/filtered through someone 

else first? 

 If person(s) were designated to 

monitor RS mission progress 

and/or imagery were they 

involved in mission planning? 

 What status reports does the 

RS operator provide? Are there 

SOPs on what to report and how 

to report? 

▪ Are RS missions changed midmission? Who makes the decision 

for this dynamic re-planning? 

 Did the intel acquired by the 

RS contribute to the platoon’s 

performance? 

 How was intel acquired by the 

RS acted upon ? 

 Were other digital systems 

and/or higher echelons updated 

with intel provided by RS? 

Ask Platoon Leader

 Were you able to keep track of 

the progress of the RS mission? 

 How did you utilize the 

intelligence provided by the RS 

mission? If you did not, why not? 

 Did RS functioning meet the 

expectations you had during 

planning? Why or why not? 

 If there was a point you lost 

track of the RS mission status, 

when and why do you think that 

occurred? How might you avoid 

this in the future? 

Ask Platoon Leader, RS

operator(s), and designated 

Third Parties

 Was it clear what the RS 

operator was responsible for 

reporting or recording? 

 Was it clear who was 

responsible for interpretation of 

sensor imagery? 

Ask person(s) who performed 

sensor imagery interpretation

 Did you experience any time 

pressure while interpreting sensor 

imagery? 

 Did you experience any 

conflict between sensory analysis 

and your other responsibilities? 

 Were there times when you 

were unsure what you were 

seeing? 

 Were there times when you 

were unsure how to relate the 

imagery to a place on a map or in 

the environment? 

A-2 
26 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activity: 

Pre-employment checks: 

Goals: 

 Necessary RS-related 

equipment and supplies are 

present and in fully working 

order 

 Download and upload 

frequencies have been cleared for 

use 

 Coordination with higher on 

A2C2 (air vehicles) 

 Is a checklist being used to 

make sure no items/steps are 

overlooked? 

 Have uplink/downlink 

frequencies been coordinated 

internally and with adjacent 

units? 

 Were any crucial items 

missing or steps skipped before 

attempt to launch? 

Ask Platoon Leader and RS

Operators

 Who is responsible for 

selecting OCU/ RS 

communication channels? 

 Who is responsible for 

deconflicting 

channels/frequencies within the 

unit if multiple platforms will be 

used? What about deconflicting 

with adjacent units? 

▪ Who is responsible for ensuring 

that pre-employment checks are 

done according to SOP? 

Ask RS Operators

 Is it clear when all your preemployment checks should be 

performed? 

 Were there any technical 

problems encountered during preemployment checks? How did 

you deal with them? 

▪ Are aware of unit SOPs for preemployment checks? Did you 

follow them? 

A-3 
26 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

 Activity: 

Develop or refine unit SOPs 

and TTPs 

Goals: 

Improve efficiency and 

effectiveness of RS employment 

Examples: 

-- mission specification format 

(RS-OPORDER) 

--response to specific threat 

situations to an airborne RS 

--response to specific threat 

situations to a remote RS team 

-- response to loss of link 

-- response to other technical 

difficulties with RS 

-- significant events during the 

RS mission that the operator 

should report 

-- language for verbal 

communication regarding 

significant RS events 

-- language for verbal 

communication regarding target 

location 

--A2C2 coordination 

-- frequency coordination with 

nearby units 

--Use of checklists 

--Refinement of SOPs based on 

lessons learned 

-- Development of new TTP 

based on lessons learned 

 Was the RS mission briefed 

systematically in a step by step 

fashion or were specifics written 

in a standard format? 

 Did people involved in 

controlling the RS appear 

confident and certain about what 

they were supposed to be doing? 

 Were there any technical or 

other difficulties which could 

have been avoided? 

 If the unit has SOPs, are they 

being followed? 

 Was there any loss of 

uplink/downlink with the RS? 

How was this reacted to? 

 Were there any real or 

potential mishaps? What were the 

likely causes? 

Ask Platoon Leader and RS

Operators

 Is there anything that happened 

during the mission that suggests 

the basis for a new SOP or TTP? 

 Is there a unit SOP that defines 

the information that should be 

included in a RS mission plan? 

 Do you have any SOPs 

associated with any key situations 

(e.g., detection of an enemy 

sniper)? 

 Were there instances in which 

you found verbal 

communications regarding the RS 

confusing? How could these be 

addressed through an SOP? 

 Did new information 

requirements become evident 

during a mission? If yes, what 

was done to address the need? 

A-4 
26 

Activity & Goals Observe Ask/AAR Questions 

Activitiy: 

Preparation for 

launch/recovery at a remote site 

Goals: 

 RS team safety 

 Timely RS launch 

 Does the team maintain 

security en-route and 

immediately set up security upon 

arrival? 

 Is the site checked for 

suitability? 

 Are checklists used during the 

set up or break down processes? 

 Is everyone in the RS team 

fully employed either providing 

security or preparing for launch? 

 Is RS launched on schedule? 

 If multiple missions are 

conducted from the same 

location, what is the inter-mission 

turn around time? Was it as 

planned? 

Ask RS team

 Did you have adequate 

personnel to secure the launch 

site? 

 Were problems encountered in 

establishing communications, 

GPS signal, fueling procedures, 

etc.? 

Activity: 

Record keeping 

Goals: 

 Safety incidents recorded and 

reported 

 Use and Maintenance logs kept 

up to date 

 Operator training currency and 

flight logbooks kept up to date 

 Are records being made and 

kept in an organized way? 

 Is system operation in 

compliance with safety 

release specifications? 

Ask Unit

 Do they know what defines a 

safety incident? 

 Do they know the operating 

parameters specified in the safety 

release? 

 Does each system have a 

maintenance log? 

 Does each operator keep a 

logbook? 

CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirement

METT-TC Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain/Weather, Time, Civilians 

OCU Operator Control Unit 

PIR Priority Information Requirement 

PL Platoon Leader 

PSgt Platoon Sergeant 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 

TTP Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

RS Robotic System 

WRT with respect to

A-5 
26 A-6 
26 

APPENDIX B: MISSION, ENEMY, TIME, TROOPS, TERRAIN, AND CIVILIAN

CONSIDERATIONS IN ROBOTIC SYSTEM EMPLOYMENT 

Mission 

o What are the critical information requirements (CCIRS) for this mission? 

o Considering all assets available, how could information collected by the RS best support 

the mission? 

o Can the RS system provide information that nothing else can? 

o Can the RS system provide information that could be obtained some other way, but with 

less risk? 

o How would employment of the RS complicate mission synchronization? 

o Could the RS system be used as a communications relay? 

o What are the trade-offs in risks vs. benefits in RS employment? 

Enemy 

o Could employment of the RS give away mission intentions or friendly positions? 

o Could the RS be used for deception? 

o What are the ways the enemy could detect the RS? 

o What are the ways the enemy could disable the RS? 

Time 

o What are the time requirements to prepare for employment of the RS? 

o What are the time constraints on duration of RS employment? 

o Do these requirements and constraints fit with the needs of the mission? 

Troops 

o Are there sufficient personnel for RS employment? 

o Do the personnel available possess the correct training and skills? 

o Will a security element be required for the RS team? 

o Is the equipment in full operational condition? 

o Are the necessary supporting equipment and supplies all available? 

o Is a dedicated UDL channel available? Has it been coordinated with adjacent units? 

o Is air space clearance required? 

Terrain 

o Does the weather allow employment? 

o Are there aspects of the terrain that will interfere with line of sight communications? 

o For SUGVS: is the ground traversable? 

o Are there appropriate emplacement or launch sites? 

o Are there appropriate recovery sites? 

o If capable of programming, how should the RS behave subsequent to a loss of 

communications with the operator? 

Civilians 

o How might civilians respond to the RS? 

o How might RS employment pose risk to civilians? 

B-1 
B-2 26 
26 

APPENDIX C: INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED IN RS-OPORDER 

This information should be included as an annex to the PL’s OPORD. As such it does not specify 

information that should already be in the OPORD, such as overall mission objective, concept of 

operations, CCIRS, tasks to squads, etc. 

o Main RS mission objectives 

o RS team personnel and responsibilities 

o Launch or Emplacement Location (and route to it, if remote) 

o Recovery Location 

o Payload 

o UDL channel 

o Means of operator control (manual or semi-autonomous) 

o Intended route of travel for RS systems 

o Who has the authority for dynamic replanning of RS mission 

o Time or trigger for RS mission start 

o Other coordinating instructions 

o Actions on loss of UDL 

o Actions on contact (RS team) 

o Actions on contact (RS platform) 

o RS mission abort criteria 

o Communications channels and networks (equipment and people) 

o RS mission status information to report (what to report, brevity codes, and means of 

communication) 

o RS sensor data to report (what to report, when to report, brevity codes, and means of 

communication) 

o RS sensor data to record (what to record or how, if multiple methods)

C-1 
C-2 
D-1 

APPENDIX D: ACRONYMS 

A2C2 Army Airspace Command and Control 

AAEF Air Assault Expeditionary Force 

AAR After Action Review 

ABCS Army Battle Command System 

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration 

AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems 

ARI U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences 

ARV Armed Robotic Vehicle 

ATO Army Technology Objective 

BCT Brigade Combat Team 

C3 Command, Control, and Communication (systems) 

CCIR Commander’s Critical Information Requirements 

CPOF Command Post of the Future 

EO Electro-optical (camera) 

FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (system) 

FCS Future Combat System 

GCS Ground Control Station 

GDT Ground Data Terminal 

GPS Global Positioning System 

IR Infrared (camera) 

LOS Line of Sight 

LRAS3 Long-Range Advance Scout Surveillance System 

MAV Micro Air Vehicle 

METT-TC Mission, Enemy, Time, Troops, Terrain, and Civilians 

MULE Multifunctional Utility/Logistics and Equipment 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 

OCU Operator Control Unit 

OP-ORDER Operations Order 

PACERS Platoon Aid for Collective Employment of Robotic Systems 

PIR Priority Information Requirement 

PL Platoon Leader 

PSgt Platoon Sergeant 

RS Robotic System 

RSTA Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition 

RVT Remote Video Terminal 

SOP Standard Operating Procedure 

SUAS Small Unmanned Aerial System 

SUGV Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

TAIS Tactical Airspace Integration System 
D-2 

 

TOC Tactical Operations Center 

TTP Training, Tactics, and Procedures 

UAS Unmanned Aerial System 

UDL Up and Down Links between GCS and RS 

UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle 

WRT With Respect To