I n a pp e a ls f ro m c a se s invo lvi ngthe te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts , th e ru le s o f a pp e llate 1 proce dure r equire the us e o f an al ias to ref er to a minor, “and if ne cessa

ry to protect the minor’ s identity , to the minor’s pare nt or other f amily member.” Tex. R. App. P . 9.8. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 9 -00 672 -CV

N. S. , A ppe lla nt
v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF HAY S COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 2008 -14 12- A , HO NORAB LE WI LLIAM HENRY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Ap pe lla nt N .S. appea ls fr o m t h e trial c ourt’s rulingthat her a ppeal of that court’s 1 order terminating her pa

renta l rig hts to her two childre n is frivolous. After the trial court sig ned the termination order , N.S. filed a motion for a n ew t ri al an d a motion for a f ree appellate rec ord and appointment of appe llate counsel , t h e latter motion i ncluding a stateme nt of points on appeal a s require d by

statute. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.405(b), ( b-1) ( West 2008). Pursuant to the family code, the trial co urt held a post-tria l hear ing on N .S.’s motions
. See id. § 263.405(d). Followingthe hea

ring , the trial cour

t signe d an orde r deny

ing N .S. ’s m o t i o n fo r a new trial and finding that N.S. was indig ent and e ntitled to a court -a p p o i n t ed attorne y on appea l, but that her appea l was fr ivolous and theref ore she was not entitled t o a fr ee r eporte r’s re cord of the trial. OnN.S. included additional appe llate issues in her state ment of points presente d to the trial 2 court, a rguing that the evidenc e supportingthe best-inter est findi n g wa s i n sufficie nt, that the trial court e rre d in failing to appoint N.S. manag ing c onservator of the c hildren, and that the trial court “abuse d its discretion by

actingas an a dvocate instead of a n impartial trier of fac t.” N.S., howeve r, does not raise these issues on appe al, and c onsequently we do not address them her e. See F rank R. v . Te x as De p’ t of Fa mi ly & Pr ote c tiv e Se rv

s. , No. 03-09-00436-CV, 2010 Tex. App. L EXI S 2763, at *5 (Te x . App.—Austin Apr. 13, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (notingthat additional points had been ra ise d in state me nt of po int s, inc lud ingsu ff ic ie nc y of e vid e nc e of

statut or y g ro un ds and

be st- int e re st finding , but addre ssing only those points argued on appe al to appellate court). Th e De pa

rtme nt a lso pe tit ion e d fo r te rm inatio n of the fathe r’ s ri g hts . T he fa the r i s n ot a 3 pa rt y to t his a pp e a l. The fac ts r ecited he rein a

re f rom the transc ript of the hea ring held post-trial to deter mine 4 whether the appe al was f

rivolous and the ac company ing c lerk’s r ecor d. 2 appea l to this Court, N.S. a rgues that her points on appea l c halleng ing the two statutory g rounds for terminating her pare ntal rig hts a re not f rivolous. N.S. doe s not c halleng e the finding s relatingto the best interest of the children. See id. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2009) ( requiring one statutory g round and findingof best intere st to invol untarily terminate pa

renta l rig hts). 2
BACK GR OUND The Te x as De partment of Family and P rotec tive Service s (“the D epar tment”) filed a petition to terminat e N.S .’s par ental rig hts to her two childre n. After court-or dere d mediation, 3 N.S. entere d into a settlement ag ree ment dictating the terms under which she c ould retain c ustody of her chil d ren. Among the terms of the me diated settlement a g ree ment wer e stipulations that violation of the ag ree ment would constitute statutory g rounds for te rmination under the f amily code, see id. § 161.001(1)( O), and that N.S. w ould sig n an aff idavit voluntar ily

relinquishing he r par ental rig hts within five months of the date of the s et t l em ent agr eeme nt if she fa iled to comply with the terms of the a g ree ment. See id. § 161.001(1)( K), § 161.103 (West 2008). 43 Th e pa rt ie s pr e se nte d the se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt t o th e tr ia l c ourt se ve ra l da

y s a ft e r i t
wa s si g ne d. At

that ti me , th e tr ia l c ourt ind ic a te d that th e a g re e me nt w ou ld o nly be a pp ro ve d if

N. S. completed a n a f

f id av it o f r e li n qu is h me n t in a dv an c e , to b e h e ld in tr u s t b y th e a tt o r

n e y f o r the Depa rtment and used only

upon a bre ach of

the s ettlement agr eeme nt. Accor dingly , N.S. executed an af fidavit of relinquishment three day s after the date of

the settlement ag ree ment and turne d it over to t he De pa rtme nt. Acc ording to the Depa

rtment, N.S. failed to c omply with nume rous provisions of the settlement ag ree ment in t h e m o n t hs following its execution, including failing to attend re quired
m e e t i n g s f

o r h e r a f t e r c a re pr og ra m, whic h in c lud e d N arc oti c s A no ny mou s me e tin g s, fa ili ngto o bta in stable employ

ment, and fa iling to obtain stable housing . On September 25, 2009, trial was he ld on the Depa rtment’s petition to terminate N.S.’s p ar en t al rig hts. Accor ding to the tr ial court’s
rec ollections at the post-trial hea ring , N.S. arrive d at trial “in a state of the most e x treme influe nce of some ki n d , ei t her dr

ugor alc ohol.” The tria l court explained that N.S., who had a history of p rescription-drugabuse, a ppear ed unstea dy

on her f eet. In addition, her spee ch wa s slurred a nd slow, her e y es we re r ed, and, dur ing he r testimony , she fe l l o u t o f t he witness stand. When questioned duringher te stimony by the trial court, N.S. a dmitted that she had take n medication, and upon the re quest of the tria l court, she r etrieve d the medication bottl e she ha d broug ht with her. The bo ttl e ind ic a te d a

pr e sc ri pti on

fo r V ic od in. Th e pr e sc ri pti on ha d b e e n f

ill e d thr e e da

y s b e fo re tr ia l,
an d n i n e o f t h e o r i g i n a l 9 0 p r e s c r i b e d p i l l s r e m a i n e d

i nt h e b o t t l e a tt h e t i m e o f N
. S
. ’ s t e s t i m o n y. Whil e N.S. was on the stand, the af fidavit of re linquishm ent she ha d signe d was admitted into evidence . At th e conc lusion of trial, the trial cour t entere d judgme nt terminating N.S.’s4

pare ntal rig hts to her two childre n, based on the statutory gro u n d s of execution of an a ffidavit of relinquishment of pare ntal rig hts, see id. § 161.001(1)( K), a nd failure to comply

with the provisions of a c ourt order

that specific ally established the actions necessar y for the pare nt to obtain the return of her children. See id. § 161.001(1)( O). N.S. filed a motion for a new

trial and a

motion requesting a fr ee r ecor d on appea l a

nd appointment of appellate counsel, and included a stateme nt of points on appea l. See id. § 263.405(b)( 2). After a hearing on the m otions, the court entere d an orde r finding N.S.’s points to be frivolous and denying he r a f ree appellate rec ord, and this appe al followed. See id. § 263.405(g ) (a llowing pa rent to appe al finding of fr ivolousness of appea l).
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We reviewa trial c ourt’s deter mination that an appea l is frivolous under an a buse of discretion standa

rd. In re M

.N.V. , 216 S.W .3d 833, 834 (Tex. App.—San Antonio, no pet.). Unde r this standard, we decide whether the trial cour

t acted w ithout refer ence to guidingrules and principles or if the act c omplained of is ar bitrary and unre asonable
. Lump ki n v. Texas D ep’t of Fa mi ly & Pr ote c tiv e Se rv

s. , 260 S.W .3d 524, 527 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t D ist.] 2008, no pet.).

DI SCU SSIO N Our re view is limit ed to ana ly sis of t he trial court’s finding that N.S.’s statement of points presented no substantial que stion for appe llate re view, re nderingher a ppeal f rivolous. The fa mil y c od e dir e c ts the tr ia l c ourt to d e te rm ine wh e th e r a

n a pp e a l f ro m a te rm inatio n o rd e r i s frivolous as provide d by

section 13.003(b) of the civi l prac tices and r emedies c ode, which in turn provides that, “[i]n determining whe ther a n appea l is frivolous , a judg e may consider whether

the5

appellant ha s prese nted a substantial question for ap p el l at e revie w.” See Tex. Fam Code Ann. § 2 63 .4 05 (d )( 3) (c iti ngTe x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Co de Ann. § 1 3. 00 3( b) (We st 2 00 2) ); Lum pk in , 26 0 S. W.3 d at 527
. An a pp e a l is fr ivo lou s whe n it la c ks an ar gua ble ba sis e ith e r in l aw o r i n f a c t. Lum pk in , 260 S.W .3d at 527

. N.S. argues that the trial c ourt err ed in findi ng that her points on appe al cha lleng ing the statut or

y g ro un ds fo r te rm inatio n of he r pa re nta l ri g hts are fr ivo lou s. Th e fi rs t g ro un d li ste d in the trial cour

t’s order , codified unde r subsec tion (K) of se ction 161.001(1) of the family

code, a pplies when ther e is clea

r and convincing evidenc e that the pare nt “ executed befor e or afte r the suit is filed
an unr e vo ke d o r i rr e vo c a ble a ff ida vit of relinq uis hme nt o f p are nta l r ig hts a s p ro vid e d b y thi s chapte r.” Te x . Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001(1)( K), .103 (listing require ment s fo r affidavit of relinquishment). While N.S. does not disput e that she sig ned an aff idavit of relinquishment that on its face complied with the re quirements of the family code, she argues that the a ffidavit she sig ned
w a s i n v a l i d

b e c a u s e i tw a s n o ts i g n e d

v o l u n t ar i l y. An i n v oluntarily

executed af

fidavit is a complete de fense to a termination dec ree . Vela v. M arywood , 1 7 S. W.3 d 7 50 , 7 59 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 00 , p e t. d e nie d) . B e c a

us e an a ff ida vit
o f r e l i n qu i s h m e n tw a i v e s a

c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r i ght , i t

m u s t b e m a d e v o l u n t ar i l y, k

n o w i n g l y, i n t e l l i g e n t l y, and with full awa

rene ss of its lega l conseque nces. Id. The proponent of the aff idavit ha s the burde n to e sta bli shby c le ar a nd c on vin c ing e vid e nc e that the a ff ida vit wa s exec ute d a c c or din g to t he te rm s of se c tio n 16 1. 10 3 of the fa mil y c od e . Te x. F am. Code Ann . § 16 1. 103; Ve la , 17 S.W .3d at 758. O n c e t h e p r o p o n e n th a s m e tt h a tb u r d e n , t h e b u r d e n t h e ns h i f t s t o t h e a f

f i an tt o e s t a

b l i s hb y a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that the a ffidavit wa s ex ec u t ed as a result of fr aud, dure ss, orCounsel f or the Depa

rtment disputed this ve rsion of events, statingthat N.S.’s trial counsel 5 ma de on ly

on e ob je c tio n w he n th e a ff

ida vit wa s a dmi tte d, on

the bas is th a t th e wi tne sse s to its e xec uti on ha d n ot b e e n d isi nte re ste d. Un de r t he fa mil y c od e , w itn e sse s to the sig nin g of an a ff ida vit of re linquishm ent must only be “cre dible,” not disinterested. Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.103(a) (2) (West 2008). I t is unclea

r from the rec ord whether counsel’s comment reg arding coer cion ref ers to the 6 aff idavit of relinquishment or to the mediate d settlement ag ree ment. 6 coer cion. Monroe v . Alternatives in Motion , 234 S
. W
. 3 d 56, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 20 07 , no pet .); Ve la , 1 7 S. W.3 d at 75 8; see also Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.211( c) ( West 2008) (stating that att ack of

termination order

“base d on an unre voked af fidavit of re linquishm ent of pare ntal rig hts . . . is li mited to issues relatingto fraud, dur ess, or c oerc ion in the execution of the af fidavit”). Her e, N.S. ar g ues that she did not execute the a ffida v i t voluntarily . Howeve r, she points to no evidence that might lead to the c onclusion that her e x ecution of the aff idavit resulted from fr aud, dure ss, or coe rcion. Ac co rd i n g to counsel for the Depa

rtment, no evidenc e wa s prese nted at trial to cha lleng e the v o l u n t ar i n ess of the affidavit, either whe n the af fidavit was ad m i t t edi n t o ev i d en ce
—

wh i l e N
. S
. wa s o nt h e s t an d

— o r a tan y

o t h er p o i n t d

u ri n g t h e p ro ce ed i n g. Whil e N.S.’s trial c ounsel indicated that he made “a number of objec tions,” such objec tions do not 5 constitute evidenc e, and tr ial counsel did not cha lleng e the De p ar t m en t ’s asser tion that “[t ]here
cer tainly was no e vidence prese nted” that the a ffidavit wa s not voluntarily executed. Indeed, N .S.’s trial counsel a dmitted that he was “ [n] ot arguing that . . . my client didn’t understand what she wa s doing” w h e ns h e s ign e d

th e a f f id av it
. H e e xp la in e d

th a t “ [t ]h e r e ’ s n o qu e s ti o n , s h e s ign e d the
a ff ida vit , s he kn e w e xac tly

wh a t it wa s, ” and state d, “ Ia bs olute ly do n’ t be lie ve sh e wa s c oe rc e d into signingthis.” F ur

the r, N. S. ba se s h e r a

pp e llate argume nt o n th e fa c t th a t th e se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt, 6A plurality of the Te x as Supreme Court ha s opined that shifting the burden to the pa rent 7 t o p ro v e f

rau d , d u re s s , o r c o er ci o nb y

a p re p o n d er an ce o f t h e e v i d en ce i s i n co rr ec t , p re fe rr i n g a formulation under

which the pe titioner is required to pr ove b y clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that the af fidavit was e x ecute d voluntarily
. See I n re L.M.I. , 119 S.W .3d 707, 720 (Tex. 2003) (Owe n, J ., concur ring and dissenting ). Even unde r this formulation, howeve r, the pa rent must produce some evidenc e that the a ffidavit wa s not voluntarily executed. See id. (noting that while ultimate burden of pr oo f r e sts wi th p e tit ion e r, pa re nt c ha lle ng inga ff

ida vit mus t st ill pr od

uc e “ so me e vi den c e ” to challeng e voluntarine ss of aff idavit). But see id. at 716 (Wainwrig ht, J., concurr ing) (“[P] lacingthe burden on the pare nts to set aside the af fidavit may

run af oul of constitutional and statutory mandates for t h e burde n of proof and quantum of e vidence nece ssary to terminate pa

renta l rig hts.”). Ac co rdi ng ly , even unde r the more lenient standar d set forth by the L.M.I. plurality , there is no ind ic a tio n th a t N. S. p ro du c e d th e e vid e nc e re qu ir e d to c ha lle ng e the vo luntari ne ss o f t he a ff ida vit
. 7 which ca lled for the sig ning of the re linquishm ent af

fidavit, was invalid or void. S uch evide nce, even if prese nted at trial, doe s not indicate that N.S. did not u n d er s t an d t h e natur e or te rms of the relinquishment aff

idavit when she sig ned it, or that t he decision to sign the aff idavit was influenc ed by fra ud, duress, or c oerc ion. As the br iefs and

re c or d o f t

he po st- tr ia l he ari ngpr ov ide no ind ic a tio n th a t N .S. proved by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e at tria l that the relinquishment aff idavit was ex ecute d as
a re sult of fraud, dur ess, or c oerc ion, she has f ailed to ra ise a substantial appe llate issue re g arding 7 the vo luntari ne ss of the a ff ida vit
. Ac c or din g ly , we c on c lud e tha t the tr ia l c ourt did no t a

bu se its discretion in deter

mining that N.S.’s cha lleng e to statutory g round (K) was fr ivolous. See Te x. F am. Code Ann. § 161.001(1)( K). F urther, a s N.S. appea ls o n l y o n s t at u t ory g rounds, and a s only

one statutory g round is require d to support an orde r of ter mination, see id. § 161.00 1 (1 ), we n eed not addre ss N.S.’s remainingarguments. See I n re A.V. , 113 S.W .3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (dec lining to a dd re ss a dd iti on a l st a tut or

y g ro un ds a ft e r o ne g ro un d h a s b e e n u ph e ld) ; see also In reJ.J.S. , 272 S.W .3d 74, 80 (Tex. A p p . —Waco 2008, pet. filed) (apply ing sa me appr oach in a

ppeal of8

fr ivo lou sn e ss d e te rm inatio n) ; In re M

. N

. D .L. Z. , No. 04-09-00389- CV, 2010 Tex. App. L EXI S 2265, at *6-7 (T ex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 31, 2010, no pet.) (me m. op.) (same ).
CO NC LU SION We affir m the judgme nt of the trial court that N.S.’s appea l is frivolous and that she is not entitl ed to a f

ree appellate rec ord.

__________________________________________ Diane M. H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: June 18, 2010