ORDER OF THE COURT (Seventh Chamber)

10 December 2015 ([\*](#Footnote*))

(Appeal — Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice — Restrictive measures taken against Iran — List of persons and entities subject to the freezing of funds and economic resources — Inclusion of the appellant’s name — Admissibility — Period allowed for commencing proceedings — Point from which time starts to run — Manifest inadmissibility)

In Case C‐153/15 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 30 March 2015,

**Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Sàrl,** established in Pully (Switzerland), represented by J. Grayston, Solicitor, P. Gjørtler, advokat, G. Pandey and D. Rovetta,
avocats, and M. Gambardella, avvocato,

appellant,

the other party to the proceedings being:

**Council of the European Union,** represented by M. Bishop and I. Rodios, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

THE COURT (Seventh Chamber),

composed of C. Toader, President of the Chamber, A. Rosas (Rapporteur) and A. Prechal, Judges,

Advocate General: E. Sharpston,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

having decided, after hearing the Advocate General, to give a decision by reasoned order, in accordance with Article 181 of
the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice,

makes the following

**Order**

1        By its appeal, Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Sàrl requests the Court to set aside the order of the General Court of the European
Union of 20 January 2015 in *NICO* v *Council* (T‐6/13, EU:T:2015:60; ‘the order under appeal’), by which the General Court dismissed as manifestly inadmissible the appellant’s
action for annulment in part of:

–      Council Decision 2012/635/CFSP of 15 October 2012 amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against
Iran (OJ 2012 L 282, p. 58; ‘the decision at issue’), and

–      Council Implementing Regulation (EU) No 945/2012 of 15 October 2012 implementing Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive
measures against Iran (OJ 2012 L 282, p. 16; ‘the regulation at issue’, and, together, ‘the acts at issue’),

in so far as the appellant’s name appears on the lists of the persons and entities to whom the restrictive measures decided
upon under those acts apply.

**Article 102 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court**

2        Article 102 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991, as amended on 24 May 2011 (OJ 2011 L 162, p. 18;
‘the Rules of Procedure of the General Court’), is worded as follows:

‘1.      Where the period of time allowed for commencing proceedings against a measure adopted by an institution runs from the publication
of that measure, that period shall be calculated, for the purposes of Article 101(1)(a), from the end of the 14th day after
publication thereof in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

2.       The prescribed time-limits shall be extended on account of distance by a single period of ten days.’

**Background to the dispute**

3        The appellant is established in Switzerland.

4        On 26 July 2010, the Council of the European Union adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against
Iran and repealing Common Position 2007/140/CFSP (OJ 2010 L 195, p. 39). Annex II to that decision lists the persons and entities —
other than those designated by the United Nations Security Council or by the Sanctions Committee created by Resolution 1737
(2006), mentioned in Annex I to that decision — whose assets are to be frozen.

5        Article 24(1) to (3) of Decision 2010/413, as amended by Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP of 23 January 2012 (OJ 2012 L 19, p. 22),
provides:

‘1.       Where the Security Council or the Committee lists a person or entity, the Council shall include such person or entity in Annex
I.

2.       Where the Council decides to subject a person or entity to the measures referred to in Articles 19(1)(b) and (c) and 20(1)(b)
and (c), it shall amend Annex II accordingly.

3.       The Council shall communicate its decision to the person or entity referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, including the grounds
for listing, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such person or entity
an opportunity to present observations.’

6        On 23 March 2012, under the FEU Treaty, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 concerning restrictive measures against
Iran and repealing Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 (OJ 2012 L 88, p. 1).

7        Article 46(1) to (3) of Regulation No 267/2012, provides:

‘1.                Where the Security Council or the Sanctions Committee lists a natural or legal person, entity or body, the Council shall include
such natural or legal person, entity or body in Annex VIII.

2.       Where the Council decides to subject a natural or legal person, entity or body to the measures referred to in Article 23(2)
and (3), it shall amend Annex IX accordingly.

3.       The Council shall communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing, to the natural or legal person, entity or body
referred to in paragraph 1 or 2, either directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing
such natural or legal person, entity or body with an opportunity to present observations.’

8        Article 2 of the decision at issue states that ‘Annex II to Decision 2010/413/CFSP shall be amended as set out in the Annex
to this Decision’. Thus, by the decision at issue, the appellant’s name was added to the list in Annex II to Decision 2010/413,
as amended. Under heading I — ‘Persons and entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities
providing support to the Government of Iran’ — in Annex II to Decision 2010/413, as amended, the appellant is mentioned at
point 133 in Part B which lists the entities concerned.

9        The information and grounds for the appellant’s listing are as follows:

‘Name: Naftiran Intertrade Company Srl

Identifying information: Sàrl Ave. De la Tour-Haldimand 6, 1009 Pully, Switzerland

Reasons: Subsidiary (100%) of the Naftiran Intertrade Company Ltd.

Date of listing: 16.10.2012’.

10      On the same date, the Council adopted the regulation at issue. In accordance with Article 1 of that regulation, ‘Annex IX
to Regulation ... No 267/2012 shall be amended as set out in the Annex to this Regulation’. Thus, by the regulation at issue,
the appellant’s name was added to the list in Annex IX to Regulation No 267/2012, as amended. Under heading I — ‘Persons and
entities involved in nuclear or ballistic missile activities and persons and entities providing support to the Government
of Iran’ — in Annex IX to Regulation No 267/2012, as amended, the appellant is mentioned at point 133 in Part B which lists
the ‘entities’. The information and grounds in relation to the appellant’s listing in the regulation at issue are identical
to those contained in the decision at issue.

11      On 16 October 2012, the Council also published the Notice for the attention of the person to which the restrictive measures
provided for in Decision 2010/413, as implemented by Decision 2012/635, and in Regulation No 267/2012, as implemented by Implementing
Regulation No 945/2012 concerning restrictive measures against Iran apply (OJ 2012 C 312, p. 21).

**The order under appeal**

12      Pursuant to Article 64 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, the General Court adopted a measure of organisation
of procedure requesting the parties to answer questions relating, inter alia, to the admissibility of the action brought by
the appellant. The parties lodged their written replies on 6 October 2014.

13      In paragraph 13 of the order under appeal, the General Court considered that there was sufficient information in the documents
before it and decided, pursuant to Article 111 of its Rules of Procedure, to give a decision on the action without taking
further steps in the proceedings.

14      After having recalled the time-limit for bringing an action for annulment laid down in the sixth paragraph of Article 263
TFEU, the General Court made the following findings:

‘16      In the present case, the Council sent a letter to the applicant notifying it of the [acts at issue] on 16 October 2012. That
letter was received by the applicant on 19 October 2012, as is apparent from the acknowledgement of receipt produced by the
Council. This is undisputed by the applicant.

17      It must therefore be found that the [acts at issue] were communicated directly to the applicant on 19 October 2012. As the
period for bringing proceedings began to run on that date, and taking into account the extension of ten days on account of
distance provided for in Article 102(2) of the Rules of Procedure [of the General Court], it expired on 31 December 201[2],
that is to say before the lodging of the application for annulment on 8 January 2013. ’

15      The appellant maintained before the General Court that it was not time-barred, and put forward the following three arguments.

16      In the first place, it claimed that the publication of the acts at issue in the L-series of the *Official Journal of the European Union* constituted a fundamental condition of their entry into force, so that the period within which the persons and entities concerned
by those acts could bring proceedings did not start to run until the date of such publication and could not be reduced as
a result of the individual notification of those acts.

17      In paragraphs 24 and 25 of the order under appeal, the General Court recalled paragraphs 57 and 58 of the judgment in *Gbagbo and Others* v *Council* (C‐478/11 P to C‐482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258). In paragraph 26 of the order under appeal, it recalled paragraph 59 of that judgment,
in which it is stated that while, admittedly, the entry into force of measures such as the acts at issue is effected by their
publication, the period for the bringing of an action for the annulment of those measures under the fourth paragraph of Article 263
TFEU runs, for each of the persons and entities whose names are listed in the annexes to those measures, from the date of
the communication which they must receive.

18      In the second place, the appellant claimed that when the communication of the grounds for inclusion is carried out by means
of the publication of a notice in the C-series of the *Official Journal of the European Union*, the period for bringing proceedings runs from the date of that publication and cannot be reduced as a result of an individual
notification. According to the appellant, in so far as the acts at issue were published in the C-series of the *Official Journal of the European Union* of 16 October 2012, the period allowed for commencing proceedings did not expire until 9 January 2013, since both Article 102(1)
of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court relating to the 14-day publication period and Article 102(2) of those rules
of procedure relating to the 10-day extension on account of distance were applicable. It thus took the view that the General
Court could not rule that the time-limit for bringing proceedings began to run from receipt of the individual notification
on 19 October 2012, expiring on 31 December 201[2], as only the aforementioned Article 102(2), relating to the 10-day extension
on account of distance, was applicable.

19      In paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that the Council is not free to choose arbitrarily the means
of communication of acts imposing restrictive measures on a person or entity, but is obliged, in principle, to communicate
them directly to those persons. It is only if it is not possible to communicate directly that it may discharge its communication
obligation by publishing a notice in the *Official Journal of the European Union*. To take a different approach would, *de facto*, allow the Council a convenient means of evading its obligation to effect individual communication. The General Court referred,
to that effect, to the judgments in *Gbagbo and Others* v *Council* (C‐478/11 P to C‐482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258, paragraph 61); *Sorinet Commercial Trust Bankers* v *Council* (T‐157/13, EU:T:2014:606, paragraph 38); and *Sharif University of Technology* v *Council* (T‐181/13, EU:T:2014:607, paragraph 31).

20      In paragraph 30 of the order under appeal, the General Court noted that, therefore, ‘when the Council is able to communicate
the listing measures directly to the persons and entities concerned, the period for the bringing of an action cannot begin
to run from the date of the indirect communication of those measures through the publication of a notice in the *Official Journal [of the European Union]* without infringing the right of those persons and entities to effective judicial protection’. It also observed, in paragraph 32
of that order, that the strict application of procedural rules serves the requirements of legal certainty and the need to
avoid any discrimination or arbitrary treatment in the administration of justice.

21      The General Court concluded, in paragraph 33 of the order under appeal, that ‘the fact that some of the restrictive measures
were published immediately in a notice in the *Official Journal [of the European Union]* cannot confer procedural rights on the persons and entities concerned to whom those measures were already communicated individually,
and cannot enable them to choose the starting point of the period for bringing proceedings by opting for the date of the publication
of the notice, increased by fourteen days, in accordance with Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure [of the General Court]’.

22      By its third argument, the appellant requested, in the alternative, leave to bring proceedings out of time because of the
legal uncertainty regarding calculation of the time-limit for bringing proceedings when the action was brought. The Council
had created confusion by communicating the acts at issue individually and at the same time publishing a notice in the *Official Journal of the European Union*.

23      The General Court considered, however, that the appellant had not invoked nor, therefore, established the existence of unforeseeable
circumstances or *force majeure* which would have prevented it from bringing its action in good time.

24      It noted, in paragraph 37 of the order under appeal, that ‘the obligation to communicate the listing measures directly to
the persons and entities concerned had clearly been demonstrated by the Court of Justice in paragraphs 47 and 52 of the judgment
... in *Bank Melli Iran* v *Council* (C‐548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735)’. In paragraph 40 of that order, the General Court noted in that context that ‘it was expressly
stated in the Council’s letter of 16 October 2012 that its purpose was to notify the applicant of the restrictive measures
adopted in its regard’. The General Court also held that, in addition and in any event, even if in doubt, it was for the appellant
to proceed with prudence and diligence following receipt of the Council’s letter of 16 October 2012, and to accept 19 October
2012 as the starting point of the period for bringing proceedings, in order to protect itself against the risk of the action
being brought out of time.

25      In paragraph 41 of the order under appeal, the General Court considered that ‘the immediate publication of a notice in the
*Official Journal [of the European Union]*, at the same time as the notification of the [acts at issue] to the applicant, was not such as to create confusion, thus
preventing the applicant from understanding that, by its letter of 16 October 2012, the Council directly communicated to the
applicant its decision to include it on the list of persons and entities in Annex II to Decision 2010/413 and in Annex IX
to Regulation No 267/2012, as expressly stated in that letter. Furthermore, the applicant could be misled even less, as regards
the nature of that letter, by the publication of the notice, since the [acts at issue] were not concerned solely with the
applicant, but also concerned other persons and entities without ties to the applicant’.

**Form of order sought on appeal**

26      The appellant claims that the Court should:

–        set aside the order under appeal and declare the action for annulment to be admissible;

–        refer the case back to the General Court; and

–        order the Council to pay the costs of the present appeal proceedings.

27      The Council contends that the Court should dismiss the appeal and order the appellant to pay the costs.

**The appeal**

28      The appellant puts forward two grounds of appeal. By the first ground, it submits that the General Court made manifest errors
of assessment by holding, first, that a complete individual notification took place on 19 October 2012, and, secondly, that
this notification occurred prior to the publication of a general notice of notification in the C-series of the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 16 October 2012. By the second ground of appeal, it submits that the General Court made errors of law, first, by failing
to take into account the requirement that a notification must include a statement of reasons; secondly, by holding that an
individual notification could have the effect of shortening the time-limit for a judicial challenge to a legal act of the
European Union; thirdly, by disregarding the legal consequences of the choices made by the Council in relation to the notification
procedure; and, fourthly, by failing to take into account the legitimate understanding of the law at the time of the application.

29      Under Article 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, where an appeal is, in whole or in part, manifestly inadmissible
or manifestly unfounded, the Court may at any time, acting on a proposal from the Judge-Rapporteur and after hearing the Advocate
General, decide by reasoned order to dismiss that appeal in whole or in part, and it may do so without opening the oral procedure.

30      It is appropriate to make use of that power in this case.

*The first ground of appeal*

31      By the first argument of the first ground of appeal, the appellant takes issue, first of all, with paragraphs 13, 16 and 17
of the order under appeal. It submits that the court file does not contain anything to show that copies of the acts at issue
were annexed to the letter of 16 October 2012, received by the appellant on 19 October 2012. By failing to verify this, the
General Court failed to fulfil its obligation to check of its own motion that the time-limit for bringing an action had been
complied with.

32      It must be noted in that regard that the appellant annexed to the application for annulment submitted to the General Court
a copy of the Council’s letter of 16 October 2012, which stated the following: ‘A copy of the Council Decision and of the
Council Implementing Regulation including your company on the abovementioned list is enclosed herewith’. It is not apparent,
however, from the appellant’s written pleadings before the General Court that the appellant had claimed that annexes to that
letter of 16 October 2012 were missing.

33      A party cannot, in principle, put forward for the first time before the Court of Justice a plea in law which it has not raised
before the General Court, because that would amount to allowing the Court of Justice to review the legality of the findings
of the General Court in the light of pleas which the latter did not have occasion to hear and determine (judgment in *Germany* v *Commission*, C‐544/09 P, EU:C:2011:584, paragraph 63).

34      It follows that the first argument of the first ground of appeal is manifestly inadmissible.

35      By the second argument of the first ground of appeal, the appellant takes issue with paragraph 20 of the order under appeal,
which is worded as follows:

‘20      Secondly, the applicant claims that when the communication of the grounds for the inclusion has been carried out by means
of the publication of a notice in the C-series of the *Official Journal [of the European Union]*, the period for bringing proceedings begins to run on the date of that publication and cannot be reduced by an earlier individual
notification. ’

36      The appellant submits that the first event was the publication on 16 October 2012 of the acts at issue, the second, the publication
of the notice in the C-series of the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 16 October 2012, and the third, the receipt of the Council’s letter on 19 October 2012.

37      In that regard it is sufficient to note that paragraph 20 of the order under appeal is a summary of the argument which the
appellant put forward in paragraph 5(ii) of its reply to the General Court’s questions, lodged on 6 October 2014. It should
be noted that the appellant does not dispute one element of the General Court’s reasoning which led to the decision as to
the inadmissibility of the application submitted to it, with the result that the second argument put forward by the appellant
in its appeal is ineffective.

38      It follows from these points that the first ground of appeal is, in part, manifestly inadmissible and, in part, manifestly
unfounded.

*The second ground of appeal*

39      This ground of appeal is in four parts.

40      By the first part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant submits that the General Court made an error of law in finding
that the Council had notified the acts at issue to the appellant by the letter of 19 October 2012, when that letter did not
contain a statement of reasons. It notes that, under Article 46(3) of Implementing Regulation No 267/2012, ‘the Council shall
communicate its decision, including the grounds for listing ...’.

41      It must be noted in that regard, as the Council submits, that the letter of 16 October 2012 addressed to the appellant expressly
stated that ‘the grounds for your designation appear in the relevant entries in those Annexes’.

42      Inasmuch as the appellant criticises the insufficiency of the statement of reasons, it must be held that that argument concerns
the legality of the acts at issue, not the question of the inadmissibility of the action on account of its lateness which
the General Court addressed in the order under appeal. It follows that that argument, which does not relate to the order under
appeal, is ineffective.

43      By the second part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant argues that the General Court erred in law in holding that
the notification to a person of an EU act which has also been published in the *Official Journal of the European Union* may have the effect of shortening the time-limit for bringing an action against that act. It takes the view that, according
to the General Court’s interpretation of the judgments in *Bank Melli Iran* v *Council* (C‐548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735) and *Gbagbo and Others* v *Council* (C‐478/11 P to C‐482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258), the principles of legal certainty and of the right to effective judicial protection
which guarantee that legal remedies are effective are not enhanced but diminished by the fact that legal effects are conferred
upon the notification of an EU act which has also been published. By the third part of the same ground, the appellant submits
that, by publishing a notice concerning the acts at issue in the C-series of the *Official Journal of the European Union* on 16 October 2012, the Council necessarily accepted that the time-limit for bringing judicial proceedings in respect of those
acts expired only after the end of the period of two months laid down in the sixth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, the starting
point of which had to be determined pursuant to Article 102(1) and (2) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Accordingly,
that time-limit would have started to run only from the end of the 14th day following publication in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, in accordance with paragraph 1 of that provision, and had to be increased by an extension on account of distance of 10 days,
pursuant to paragraph 2 of that provision. Those two parts of the second ground of appeal, which both relate to the determination
of the starting point of the period allowed for bringing an action, must be examined together.

44      As the Court recalled in paragraph 47 of the judgment in *Bank Melli Iran* v *Council* (C‐548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735), the principle of effective judicial protection means that the EU authority which adopts an act
imposing restrictive measures against a person or entity is bound to communicate the grounds on which it is based, so far
as possible, either when that act is adopted or, at the very least, as swiftly as possible after it has been adopted, in order
to enable those persons or entities to exercise their right to bring an action.

45      It is for the purpose of complying with that principle that Article 24(3) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 46(3) of Regulation
No 267/2012 provide that the Council is to communicate to the natural or legal person, entity or body concerned its decision
to include them on a list of persons or entities subject to restrictive measures, including the grounds for listing, either
directly, if the address is known, or through the publication of a notice, providing such natural or legal person, entity
or body with an opportunity to present observations.

46      The Court added, in paragraphs 50 to 52 of the judgment in *Bank Melli Iran* v *Council* (C‐548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735), that if the communication of individual and specific reasons could be regarded as accomplished
through publication of the decision in the *Official Journal of the European Union*, it is difficult to imagine why express reference is made to such communication, since that decision must be published in
any event. The Council is required to communicate a decision individually in order to satisfy its obligation.

47      In paragraph 58 of the judgment in *Gbagbo and Others* v *Council* (C‐478/11 P to C‐482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258), the Court held that, having regard to the individual nature of the measures by
which persons or entities are entered on the lists of persons or entities to whom restrictive measures are to apply, the sixth
paragraph of Article 263 TFEU would not be applied consistently if, when applied to those persons and those entities, the
starting point for the calculation of the period for bringing an action for annulment was fixed as the date of publication
of the measure at issue and not as the date when that measure was communicated to them. The purpose of that communication
is precisely to ensure that persons to whom the measures are addressed are able to defend their rights in the best possible
conditions and to decide, with full knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in their applying to the EU
judicature (judgment in *Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation* v *Council and Commission*, C‐402/05 P and C‐415/05 P, EU:C:2008:461, paragraph 337).

48      In paragraph 59 of the judgment in *Gbagbo and Others* v *Council* (C‐478/11 P to C‐482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258), the Court concluded that, while the entry into force of acts imposing restrictive
measures on persons or entities is effected by their publication, the period for the bringing of an action for the annulment
of those acts under the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU runs, for each of those persons and entities, from the date of
the communication which they must receive.

49      It follows from Article 24(3) of Decision 2010/413 and Article 46(3) of Regulation No 267/2012, referred to in paragraph 45
of the present order and interpreted in the light of the judgments in *Bank Melli Iran* v *Council* (C‐548/09 P, EU:C:2011:735) and *Gbagbo and Others* v *Council* (C‐478/11 P to C‐482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258), that where the address of a person or entity subject to restrictive measures is
known to the Council, the latter must send it an individual communication, and it is the receipt of that communication that
causes the period for the bringing of an action for annulment to run.

50      The General Court did not therefore err in law in ruling, in paragraph 29 of the order under appeal, that the Council is not
free to choose arbitrarily the means of communication to the persons concerned of acts imposing restrictive measures. Similarly,
it correctly held, in paragraph 33 of that order, that the fact that some of the restrictive measures were published immediately
in a notice in the *Official Journal of the European Union* cannot enable the persons and entities concerned, to whom those measures were already communicated individually, to choose
the starting point of the period for bringing proceedings by opting for the date of the publication of the notice, increased
by 14 days, in accordance with Article 102(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

51      The periods prescribed for instituting proceedings are mandatory and are not subject to the discretion of the parties (judgment
in *Muller-Collignon* v *Commission*, 4/67, EU:C:1967:51, p. 372). The rules in that respect must be applied by the Court in such a way as to safeguard legal
certainty and equality of persons before the law (judgment in *PKK and KNK* v *Council*, C‐229/05 P, EU:C:2007:32, paragraph 101).

52      In the present case, the appellant’s address appeared both in the decision at issue and in the regulation at issue. It follows
that the restrictive measures concerning the appellant had to be communicated to it individually, the receipt of such communication
causing the period for the bringing of an action for annulment of those measures to run. The appellant is thus wrong to take
the view that the period for bringing an action against those measures began to run from the end of the 14th day following
the publication of the general notification notice in the *Official Journal of the European Union.*

53      Consequently, contrary to the appellant’s submissions, the individual communication had the effect not of shortening the period
for bringing an action for annulment, but of causing it to run as regards the appellant. Furthermore, the effective legal
remedies are not diminished by an individual notification which, unlike the publication of a general notification notice in
the *Official Journal of the European Union*, gives greater assurance that the person or entity subject to restrictive measures has been made aware of the acts imposing
those measures.

54      It follows that the General Court did not err in law in finding, in paragraph 34 of the order under appeal, that since the
acts at issue had been communicated directly to the appellant, the period for bringing an action began to run, in the appellant’s
case, from the date of receipt of that communication.

55      By the fourth part of the second ground of appeal, submitted in the alternative, the appellant submits that should the Court
rule, in accordance with its case-law, that the date of receipt of the letter of 19 October 2012 is to be regarded as the
point of departure for the calculation of the deadline for bringing an action against the acts at issue, it would have to
be held that, at the material time, the case-law that could lead to such a conclusion had not yet been issued by the Court.
It submits in particular that the judgment in *Gbagbo and Others* v *Council* (C‐478/11 P to C‐482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258) was not delivered until 23 April 2013, that is after the action for annulment was
lodged on 8 January 2013. The doubt as to the application of the rules for calculating the time-limit for bringing proceedings
had led the appellant to make an excusable error.

56      In that regard, the General Court did not err in law when it pointed out, in paragraph 35 of the order under appeal, that,
according to the second paragraph of Article 45 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘no right shall
be prejudiced in consequence of the expiry of a time-limit if the party concerned proves the existence of unforeseeable circumstances
or of *force majeure*’, and that it is for the party concerned to establish, first, that abnormal circumstances, unforeseeable and outside his
control, made it impossible for him to comply with the time-limit for bringing proceedings laid down in the sixth paragraph
of Article 263 TFEU and, secondly, that he could not guard against the consequences of those circumstances by taking appropriate
steps without making unreasonable sacrifices.

57      Nor did the General Court err in law in paragraph 36 of that order when it found that, in the present case, the appellant
had not invoked any particular circumstance which was such as to prevent it from bringing its action in a timely manner.

58      In any event, as the General Court recalled in paragraph 37 of the order under appeal, the obligation to communicate the listing
measures directly to the persons and entities concerned had clearly been demonstrated by the Court of Justice in paragraphs 47
and 52 of the judgment in *Bank Melli Iran* v *Council* (C‐548/09 P, ECR, EU:C:2011:735) in relation to the right to effective judicial protection. The judgment in *Gbagbo and Others* v *Council* (C‐478/11 P to C‐482/11 P, EU:C:2013:258) merely confirmed that case-law.

59      That obligation was, moreover, expressly laid down in Article 24(3) of Decision 2010/413 and in Article 46(3) of Regulation
No 267/2012, which made clear that where the address of a person or entity subject to restrictive measures is known to the
Council, the latter must send it an individual communication. As is evident from the information concerning the appellant
contained in the acts at issue, the appellant’s address was referred to therein and was therefore known to the Council.

60      The appellant could not therefore have been in any doubt as to the fact that the acts at issue concerning it had to be brought
to its attention by an individual communication and that it was the receipt of that communication that would start time running
for the purposes of the prescribed time-limit for bringing proceedings.

61      The General Court thus correctly held that the acts at issue had been brought to the appellant’s attention by an individual
communication, the date of receipt of which was the starting point for the period allowed for bringing proceedings against
those acts laid down by the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU.

62      It follows from all of these considerations that the second ground of appeal is manifestly unfounded.

63      The appeal must therefore be dismissed in its entirety.

**Costs**

64      Under Article 137 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1)
thereof, a decision as to costs is to be given in the order which closes the proceedings.

65      Under Article 138(1) of those rules, which applies to appeal proceedings by virtue of Article 184(1) thereof, the unsuccessful
party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party’s pleadings.

66      Since the Council has applied for costs and Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Sàrl has been unsuccessful, the latter must be
ordered to bear its own costs and to pay those incurred by the Council.

On those grounds, the Court (Seventh Chamber) hereby orders:

1.      **The appeal is dismissed.**

2.      **Naftiran Intertrade Co. (NICO) Sàrl shall bear its own costs and shall pay those incurred by the Council of the European Union.**

[Signatures]

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[\*](#Footref*) Language of the case: English.