TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2023-SC-0483-KB

IN RE: BENJAMIN GERALD DUSING 

IN SUPREME COURT

OPINION AND ORDER

The Board of Governors (the “Board”) of the Kentucky Bar Association 

(“KBA”) has recommended to this Court that Benjamin Gerald Dusing 

(“Dusing”) be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years, effective on 

the date of this Order and without credit for time served during his temporary 

suspension. Upon the Court’s independent review of the briefs, the record, and 

the applicable law, we agree that Dusing’s violations are troubling and 

egregious. We therefore conclude that Dusing’s conduct merits the sanction 

recommended by the Board. 

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Benjamin Gerald Dusing was licensed to practice law in the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky on May 1, 2002. His KBA member number is 

89178 and his bar roster address is 809 Wright Summit Parkway, Suite 120, 

Fort Wright, Kentucky 41011. Dusing has no prior disciplinary matters before 

this Court. While commendable, although not particularly relevant, Dusing 

points out to us that he has engaged in some humanitarian work with the 

citizens of the Ukraine.
2

In 2015, Dusing opened proceedings in Kenton Family Court regarding 

his divorce from his wife, Julie Tapke, and custody and visitation of their three 

children (the “Tapke litigation”). In 2019, Dusing also became party to another 

proceeding in Kenton Family Court, this time regarding the paternity and 

custody of a daughter born from a relationship Dusing had with Jill Bakker 

(the “Bakker litigation”, and collectively with the Tapke litigation, the “Family 

Court Proceedings”). Dusing was both represented by counsel and allowed to 

practice pro se in the Family Court Proceedings.1 Now-retired Family Court 

Judge Christopher Mehling presided over both cases.

An independent review of the Family Court Proceedings below results in 

the conclusion that they were decidedly acrimonious. During the litigation, 

Dusing—both pro se and by counsel—filed at least seven motions for Judge 

Mehling’s recusal, as well as numerous interlocutory appeals before the Court 

of Appeals. Dusing also moved to continue trial several times and moved for 

disqualification of opposing counsel three days before one scheduled trial date. 

He threatened disciplinary complaints against both Judge Mehling and 

opposing counsel, and approached law enforcement to discuss what he 

contends was criminally corrupt conduct in the proceedings. Dusing asserts 

that as a result of this and other experiences in Family Court, he and his 

1 This accommodation, that Dusing was granted the ability to proceed pro se 

when he was also represented by counsel, is unusual in that Kentucky law has long 

held a party represented by counsel in civil litigation may not also act pro se. Talbot v. 

Talbot’s Reps., 25 Ky. 3, 4 (1829) (enslaved person at issue) (“A party has the right to 

appear ‘in propria persona’ or by counsel. This right is alternative. A party has no 

right to appear both by himself and counsel. It would be irregular and very 

inconvenient to permit him, ‘ex gratia,’ to do so.”); Abert v. Berry, 8 Ky. Op. 343 (1875).
3

attorney, Katy Lawrence, formed Families Advocating for Reform of the Courts 

(“FARC”), a group advocating for reform of the court system. Generally, this 

Court respects and encourages the public’s right to advocate for betterment of 

the justice system.

On November 2, 2021, Dusing posted a video to Facebook that he 

acknowledges was “crass,” “offensive,” “imprudent,” and “undoubtedly a 

mistake of judgment.” Before delving further into the facts of this incident, 

however, some brief background on the pre-ruling practices of the Kenton 

Family Court is necessary. Like at least some other family courts in the 

Commonwealth, the Kenton Family Court utilizes a pre-ruling docket to 

address motions filed with the court. Kenton Fam. Ct. Local Rule (“LR”) 203. 

Under this system, the family court judge will consider motions filed for motion 

hour and issue initial “pre-rulings” on those motions. LR 203.03. Pre-rulings 

may include granting or denying a motion, directing the parties to obtain a 

hearing date from the court for the motion, or designating the motion as “to be 

called” meaning the judge will hear it at the next regularly scheduled motion 

hour. Id.; LR 203.04. If a party objects to the judge’s pre-ruling on a motion, 

the motion is placed on the motion docket and will be heard by the judge at the 

next motion hour. LR 203.05.

Dusing contends the video he posted to Facebook was prompted by 

improper communications between Bakker’s counsel, Stephanie Dietz, and 

Judge Mehling’s staff attorney, Alice Keys. We disagree the communications 

were improper. The communications that prompted the video began on 
4

October 29, 2021, when Dietz sent an email to Keys, with Dusing and his 

counsel Lawrence copied, stating that two motions she had filed—one 

regarding a name change and one regarding Ring videos—were not addressed 

in the Family Court’s pre-rulings. Keys responded that the motions would be 

added to the pre-rulings as “to be called,” and that Judge Mehling would 

consider the motions at the regularly scheduled motion hour. Lawrence then 

responded to note her objection to the motions, further noted she had filed 

motions on the same subject matter that had been passed to a December 20, 

2021, hearing date, and asserted Dietz’s motions should likewise be passed to 

that hearing date. 

On November 1, 2021, Keys responded to Lawrence and Dietz and 

advised that Judge Mehling had reviewed the two pending motions and preruled that Dietz’s name change motion would be denied and the Ring video 

would be called at the motion docket. Keys also noted that because Lawrence 

had objected, the Ring video motion would be called at the next motion docket 

on November 15, 2021 in accordance with Local Rule 203.05.

The following day, Dusing posted an incredibly disturbing and 

threatening video on Facebook setting forth the following diatribe, which we set 

forth here in full:

Alright. Alice Keys and Stephanie Dietz, we need to have a little 

talk, so I appreciate you taking the time. I need to deliver a 

message to you on behalf of the families, kids, and parents of 

Kenton County. Now I do need to warn you. The following 

message that I am going to deliver is going to be—as they say--

BGD style.[2] This is going to be some fairly direct messaging. 

2 “BGD” are Dusing’s initials.
5

Now I understand both of you are more into sort of the victim 

culture that’s the latest fad and I’ve tried to abide by those 

standards for a long time now and being very restrained in trying 

to talk to you about the things that y’all are doing and I have used 

all the fluffy fluff fluff words that I can come up with and have 

stood down time and time again and making it clear I had hoped to 

the two of you that we were on to you. We know exactly what 

you’re doing, and you know, it is not appropriate. And also, 

inviting you to simply stop doing it. The fucking bullshit that 

you’re engaged in, and I’ve avoided using curse words. I’ve spoken 

very softly and in general terms without naming names for the 

most part. Inviting you time and time and time and time and time 

again to knock it the fuck off and stop your corrupt fucking 

bullshit. The problem with that approach as it turns out is that it 

hasn’t worked, and in my experience that tends to be the case, and 

the conversation that we’re gonna have now and the message 

that’s going to be sent is going to be really fucking direct. Now, 

you’ll have a choice at the end and it will be a fundamental choice. 

You can’t go cry to your mommy and say Ben’s a meany pants, 

play the victim, talk about how I motherfucked you up and down, 

and reamed your ass out, which I’m about to. You can do that, 

make it all about you, and be a victim of Ben’s little direct 

messaging here. That’s one of your choices that you’ll have. The 

other choice is that you can learn a fucking lesson. You can get 

honest and get humble and recognize that what you’re fucking 

doing is big-time fucking wrong, and there are serious fucking 

consequences to it, and you can change, get better and grow, and 

that’s your choice. But I want to make sure you have that choice. 

And I want to be very fucking clear today about the message I’m 

sending on behalf of all the people, all the lawyers, all the litigants, 

all the families, all the kids of Kenton County. And that message is 

this: Knock it the fuck off. I want to be very clear, so help me God 

if I see any shit like this again, if I see it one more fucking time, 

that the restraint that I feel I have shown to both of you, that the 

ample opportunities I’ve given both of you to fucking just knock it 

the fuck off and stop doing petty corruption like this, and it’s not 

that petty. I don’t know who the fuck you think you are or what 

the fuck you think you’re doing and how the fuck long you think 

you can get away with it. It’s a pretty crafty little scheme, but at 

the end of the fucking day, we don’t do this shit. This is a court of 

fucking law, and so long as I fucking see this, I just ain’t gonna 

have it. I just ain’t gonna have it, you understand me? My 

concern is that you don’t understand me, and let me say this 

again. I ain’t gonna fucking have it. I feel like I have gone to great 

lengths to make it clear in a generalized and indirect way that I am 

aware of what you’re doing. And I have invited you to just knock it 
6

the fuck off, just stop it. And yet, it is quite clear that the message 

has not gotten through. I have also become acutely aware that I 

speak not only on behalf of myself, but on behalf of a lot of fucking 

people, and I deign today, I am comfortable speaking on behalf of 

the public directly to you motherfuckers and saying this: Knock it 

the fuck off. If you’ve got a problem with my language, or what I’m 

saying or how I’m doing it, you fucking stand up like big girls and 

speak out. Please sue my ass. I would be delighted to make your 

coffee and have you sit in my conference hour, conference room, 

and answer all the questions that the public has for you, on behalf 

of all the people that have suffered this bullshit. This shit doesn’t 

just happen in my case, I know that and you know that. Not 

everybody has the ability to stand up to you, but I do, and I am. 

And I want you to understand this. You want to give me the 

best fucking Christmas gift anybody’s ever given me? Give me 

a fucking reason to blow your asses up. It’d be the best 

Christmas gift I’ve ever gotten. I’ve been accused of a lot of shit, 

ok? I’ve heard a lot of stuff, all the normal shit. You know what 

I’ve never heard? I’ve never heard somebody’s asked me for help 

and I haven’t helped them. I’ve never heard that I made a 

commitment and I didn’t follow through on it. And I want to make 

sure that you understand the commitment that I make to you and 

the people of Kenton County today. And that commitment is this, I 

swear to fucking God if I see anything like this again every 

resource in my arsenal, every ounce of energy that I have and every 

person that works at this law firm will be committed full bore to 

bringing the fucking wrath of motherfucking God down on both of 

you guys. You understand? It’s fucking bullshit, we’re better than 

this. It’s a court of fucking law and this shit goes on all the 

fucking time and we know it, everybody knows it. And this shit 

stops right fucking now. Right now. And if anybody out there, any 

other lawyers or litigants, experiences the same thing, which they 

almost certainly will not, it’s taken a long time to get to the point 

where, because of our objections, that the matter is brought to the 

attention of the judge, and kudos to the judge for doing the right 

thing and getting it right, and I’ve always believed that if things 

operated the way that should and people were aware of these 

things, he’d get it right, and he did. He followed the law. But that 

fucking shit is bullshit. Alice Keys, you’re not the fucking judge. 

Stephanie Dietz, it is fucking wrong to knowingly avail yourself of 

that kind of corruption. I don’t want to hear that kind of shit, that 

chickenshit bullshit, I didn’t do anything wrong, I just emailed the 

fucking court. You emailed the fucking court knowing what you 

were fucking doing and you were going to get the fucking outcome 

that you fucking wanted. You made the decision to take advantage 

of a corrupt actor and that’s just as corrupt and I don’t want to 
7

hear it. Listen, bring everything you fucking got if you want to on 

me, and go fucking nuts that I put this on fucking Facebook. I 

only care about one fucking thing, I’ve caught the two of you with 

your hand in the fucking cookie jar ten times, and I’ve stood down 

a lot. No more. On behalf of the people of Kenton County, knock if 

the fuck off. I’m glad that we had this talk.

Judge Mehling became aware of Dusing’s video and, although he had 

previously denied at least seven motions to recuse by Dusing, sua sponte

recused from both Family Court Proceedings given the appearance of 

impropriety that would have arisen from his presiding over a case involving a 

litigant who made physical threats against his staff attorney. In his recusal 

order, Judge Mehling stated: 

This court has attempted to do its duty in each case, be fair to all, 

hear the evidence and make rulings while following the law. This 

court still believes that this court can be fair and impartial . . . that 

is this court’s duty. However, by making a direct threat to this 

court’s staff attorney this court believes that there will now be an 

appearance of impartiality regardless of the facts. KRS 

26A.015(2)(e) requires recusal if the judge “has knowledge of any 

other circumstances in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.”[3]

 For this reason and this reason alone, this court 

now recuses in both cases.

Judge Mehling further noted,

if any litigant can behave in this manner without any 

consequences, our justice system surely is in grave peril. This 

behavior is nothing more than bullying of a court by a litigant. 

This is magnified by the fact that the litigant is a lawyer authorized 

to practice law in this Commonwealth. . . . This court is quite 

reluctant to enter this order; on first blush the bully has won. 

However, this court believes that it is my duty to now recuse 

because of the appearance issue, even though it is self-created by 

Dusing.

3 See also Kentucky Supreme Court Rule (SCR) 4.300, Rule 2.11 (stating “[a]

judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's 

impartiality* might reasonably be questioned[]”).
8

Dusing asserts that his purpose in posting the video was not to make 

physical threats, but rather to advocate for reform of the court system. The 

video, including its foul and threatening language, speaks for itself. In a 

separate incident, Dusing wrote to a guardian ad litem (GAL) in the Family 

Court Proceedings that “[t]his is the last time I use words to express my 

deepest objection to your conduct in this litigation both personally and 

professionally.” This, too, he contends was not intended as physical threat.

In yet another notable incident, Dusing hired Dr. Ed Connor as a 

consulting psychologist to advise him in the Bakker litigation. After Dr. 

Connor issued a custodial evaluation, Dusing’s attorney, Joseph Otis, went to 

Dr. Connor’s office and offered him some form of payment. Dusing contends 

the payment was not a bribe, but rather was for additional services and that 

Dr. Connor was confused about his role in the litigation. In a written order, 

however, the Family Court found that Otis at Dusing’s direction had offered Dr. 

Connor $5,000 to change his custodial evaluation and to designate it as 

preliminary. 

The KBA brought three sets of charges against Dusing, all arising from 

his conduct in the Family Court Proceedings. The first, Case No. 21-DIS-0046, 

sets forth five charges relating to Dusing’s conduct in the Bakker litigation. 

Count I alleges Dusing violated SCR4 3.130(3.5)(d) by filing repeated and 

frivolous motions and appeals, all with intention to disrupt the tribunal. 

4 Rules of the Supreme Court.
9

Counts II and III allege Dusing violated SCR 3.130(3.4)(f) when he threatened 

or presented criminal or disciplinary charges against Judge Mehling and 

opposing counsel Dietz solely to obtain an advantage in the proceedings. 

Count IV alleges Dusing violated SCR 3.130(3.4)(b) and SCR 3.130(8.4)(a) when 

he assisted or induced his attorney Otis to offer $5,000 to consulting expert Dr. 

Connor to change his custodial evaluation. Count V alleges Dusing violated 

SCR 3.130(8.2)(a) when he made numerous knowingly or recklessly false 

statements in pleadings concerning the qualifications or integrity of Judge 

Mehling. 

 The second case, Case No. 21-DIS-0142, sets forth three charges 

relating to Dusing’s conduct in the Tapke litigation. Count I alleges Dusing 

violated SCR 3.130(3.1) by filing multiple motions and pleadings that lacked 

basis in law or fact. Count II alleges Dusing violated SCR 3.130(3.5)(d) by filing 

numerous frivolous motions and appeals and by repeatedly emailing the GAL, 

all for the purpose of disrupting a tribunal. Count III alleges Dusing violated 

SCR 3.130(4.4)(a) because he also engaged in this same conduct for no 

substantial purpose other than to delay, embarrass, or burden a third person.

Finally, in the third case, Case No. 21-DIS-0192, the KBA alleges that 

Dusing’s posting of the November 2, 2021, Facebook video violated SCR 

3.130(3.5)(d). 

On February 24, 2022, we found probable cause to believe that Dusing’s 

conduct “poses a substantial threat of harm to his clients or to the public.” 
10

Inquiry Comm’n v. Dusing, 647 S.W.3d 260, 264 (Ky. 2022).5 We therefore 

entered an Order temporarily suspending Dusing from the practice of law until 

further Order of the Court. Id. at 264-65. We also ordered that Dusing submit 

to a full psychological evaluation within ninety days. Id. at 265.

A Trial Commissioner was appointed to hold a hearing regarding the 

charges against Dusing. Before the hearing, the KBA moved the Trial 

Commissioner to give the Family Court order regarding Otis’s offer of money to 

Dr. Connor preclusive effect under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The Trial 

Commissioner granted the KBA’s motion. However, the Trial Commissioner 

also allowed Dusing to offer testimony as to whether he had in fact 

inappropriately offered Dr. Connor money to change his report.

On December 12 through 14, 2022, the Trial Commissioner held a 

three-day hearing regarding the charges. The KBA did not present witnesses, 

but rather presented documentary evidence consisting largely of pleadings and 

records from the Trial Court Proceedings. Dusing also presented documentary 

evidence, as well as his own testimony which spanned a three-day period. He 

did not present any other witnesses.

On April 24, 2023, the Trial Commissioner issued his Report in which he 

found Dusing guilty of all the charges against him. The Trial Commissioner 

5 The Petition for Temporary Suspension was based on Dusing’s actions in 

posting the Facebook video, KBA File No. 21-DIS-0192, and a bar complaint filed by 

one of Dusing’s clients, Michael Hild. KBA File No. 21-DIS-0187. This latter matter 

was not addressed or mentioned by the KBA Trial Commissioner and does not factor 

into our decision.
11

also noted that while he had granted the KBA’s motion to give preclusive effect 

to the Family Court’s order regarding the payment to Dr. Connor, that ruling 

was ultimately irrelevant. While Judge Mehling’s ruling supported a finding of 

such conduct, the Trial Commissioner, even without benefit of that ruling, 

determined he would have reached the same conclusion on the basis of the 

evidence he heard. As a sanction, the Trial Commissioner recommended a 

three-year suspension without credit for the time Dusing has already been 

temporarily suspended.

On subsequent motion by the KBA’s counsel, the Trial Commissioner 

entered an Amended Report on June 12, 2023, correcting typographical errors 

but reaching the same substantive conclusions. Dusing appealed to the Board 

of Bar Governors. After the Trial Commissioner’s Amended Report had been 

issued, Otis testified before the Kenton Family Court that no bribery of Dr. 

Connor had occurred. Dusing moved the Board to consider that testimony, 

which the Board denied. On October 25, 2023, the Board by an 11-5 vote 

adopted the Trial Commissioner’s Amended Report and recommended Dusing 

be suspended from the practice of law for three years without credit for time 

served during his temporary suspension. Pursuant to SCR 3.370(8), Dusing 

now seeks review by this Court.
12

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

In disciplinary proceedings, the KBA bears the burden of proof, and facts 

must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. SCR 3.330(4). Following 

a hearing before a Trial Commissioner, the Trial Commissioner shall issue a 

report of findings of fact and conclusions of law containing charges made and 

defense offered; the proceedings; the facts deemed proved by a preponderance 

of the evidence; and recommended sanction. SCR 3.360(1). Following the 

issuance of the report, either party may file a notice of appeal, SCR 3.360(4), 

and the matter is then reviewed by the Board. SCR 3.370. Since this Court 

makes final determinations of bar discipline, we have held that “the findings of 

fact by the Trial Commissioner and the Board are advisory only. The Court 

makes an independent review of the record and findings of fact and may ‘enter 

such orders or opinion as it deems appropriate on the entire record.’” Ky. Bar 

Ass’n v. Maze, 397 S.W.3d 891, 897 (Ky. 2013) (citation omitted) (quoting SCR 

3.370(7) and (8)); see also Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Blum, 404 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Ky. 

2013) (holding “we review alleged violations de novo[]”). We likewise consider 

an appropriate sanction de novo. Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Steiner, 157 S.W.3d 209, 

211 (Ky. 2005) (recognizing this Court’s “job to establish the appropriate 

sanction[]”); see also Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Rice, 229 S.W.3d 903, 903 (Ky. 2007) 

(imposing sanction of permanent disbarment where Board recommended fiveyear suspension). 
13

B. 21-DIS-0046 (Bakker litigation)

In 21-DIS-0046, the KBA brought five charges against Dusing alleging 

six rule violations, all arising out his conduct in the Bakker litigation. 

Perhaps the most serious charge is that Dusing assisted or induced his 

counsel Otis to bribe Dr. Connor in violation of SCR 3.130(3.4)(b) and 

3.130(8.4)(a). The former rule states “a lawyer shall not knowingly falsify 

evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to 

a witness that is prohibited by law[;]” and the latter rule states “it is 

professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the 

Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or 

do so through the acts of another[.]” We hardly need mention that bribing a 

witness is a class D felony. See KRS 524.020 (providing “(1) [a] person is guilty 

of bribing a witness when he offers, confers or agrees to confer any pecuniary 

benefit upon a witness or a person he believes may be called as a witness in 

any official proceeding with intent to: (a) Influence the testimony of that 

person[]”). 

Pertinent to this charge were Judge Mehling’s findings in the Bakker 

litigation:

The other custodial expert was Dr. Ed Connor, who was retained 

by [Dusing]. This court should note some troubling aspects as to 

Dr. Connor. He is a well-known expert in this court and various 

Northern Kentucky courts. He was retained by Deanna Dennison, 

who was one of several attorneys who co-counseled with [Dusing] 

throughout the case; [Dusing] also represented himself pro se. 

After Dr. Connor’s report was issued and after Ms. Dennison had 

withdrawn from the case, [Dusing] took the position with this court 

that he had NOT retained Dr. Connor. The record reflects 

otherwise, and [Dusing] told Dr. Feinberg he had retained Dr. 
14

Connor. Dr. Connor’s report was not disclosed consistent with [Ky. 

R. Civ. Proc.] 26.02(4)(a), 35.01 and 35.02 as an expert retained to 

testify. This court had to issue an order for a release of the report. 

Most troubling of all, Dr. Connor testified that after issuing his 

report, [Dusing]'s co-counsel Jeff Otis appeared at his office and 

offered him $5,000.00 if he would denote the report as preliminary. 

He then provided Dr. Connor with a large amount of extra records. 

Dr. Connor refused the request; he did review the additional 

records and issued an addendum indicating that the records 

reinforced his opinion. In [Bakker’s] rebuttal case she called Tina 

DeAngelis who had previously been the caretaker of the [Dusing]'s 

children and was in a sexual relationship with [Dusing]. See more 

findings below. DeAngelis testified that Dusing and Otis discussed 

Dr. Connor in her presence. [Dusing] instructed Otis to “manage” 

Dr. Connor by either paying him or suing him.

Before the Trial Commissioner, Dusing offered the following proof: his 

own testimony denying instructing or offering a bribe and his claim that Dr. 

Connor’s report was favorable thereby and thus no incentive to offer such a 

payment existed. He argues Otis testified no bribe occurred.

Based on his review of the trial court record, the Trial Commissioner 

concluded that Judge Mehling’s finding was entitled to preclusive weight in this 

disciplinary proceeding. See Moore v. Commonwealth, 954 S.W.2d 317, 319 

(Ky. 1997) (identifying four issues necessary to assert issue preclusion: “(1) 

identity of issues; (2) a final decision or judgment on the merits; (3) a necessary 

issue with the estopped party given a full and fair opportunity to litigate; (4) a 

prior losing litigant[]”); Chesley v. Abbott, 524 S.W.3d 471, 482 (Ky. App. 2017). 

Furthermore, we have applied this doctrine in attorney disciplinary 

proceedings. Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Harris, 269 S.W.3d 414, 418 (Ky. 2008); Ky. Bar 

Ass’n v. Horn, 4 S.W.3d 135, 137 (Ky. 1999). Additionally, the Trial 

Commissioner stated he had reviewed the hearing transcript and the witnesses’ 
15

testimony and concluded that Judge Mehling’s finding was correct. Like the 

Trial Commissioner, we conclude that Dusing caused Otis to offer a cash 

inducement to Dr. Connor to change his report, and that in so doing Dusing is 

guilty of violating both SCR 3.130(3.4)(b) and SCR 3.130(8.4)(a).

We also find Dusing guilty of all remaining charges in 21-DIS-0046. 

Dusing filed at least seven repetitive motions for Judge Mehling’s recusal and 

an inordinate number of separate appeals. Dusing’s litigation tactics exceeded 

reasonable advocacy and were solely calculated to disrupt the Family Court 

Proceedings. This conduct violated SCR 3.130(3.5)(d)’s prohibition against 

engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal. 

Next, Dusing’s scheme to disrupt the Family Court Proceedings also 

extended to the making of threats of disciplinary complaints against both 

Judge Mehling and Dietz. This resulted in two violations of SCR 3.130(3.4)(f). 

The mere filing of such complaints, of course, is not afoul of the Rule, but 

rather the violation occurs in the filing or threatening to file such complaints 

“solely to obtain an advantage in any civil or criminal matter.” SCR 

3.130(3.4)(f). Whether the disciplinary complaints have merit is tangential to 

this issue. See Blum, 404 S.W.3d at 850 (stating “[i]n our view, it is ‘only 

marginally consequential whether the target lawyer has in fact behaved 

unethically.’ Rather, the ‘focal point here is the purpose of the threat and not 

the conduct of the lawyer being threatened[]’” (quoting 

Douglas R. Richmond, Saber–Rattling and the Sound of Professional 

Responsibility, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 27, 61 (Summer 2010)). The evident 
16

purpose of such threats was solely to intimidate the participants in these 

judicial proceedings and thereby obtain a disruption in order to gain an 

advantage. See Adams v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 843 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1993) (unethical 

and unprofessional conduct to threaten arrest for nonpayment of school 

material fees). We thus find Dusing guilty of two violations of SCR 

3.130(3.4)(f). And, because his campaign against Judge Mehling involved

intentionally or recklessly made false statements against the judge, Dusing also 

violated SCR 3.130(8.2)(a): “[a] lawyer shall not make a statement that the 

lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity 

concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge[.]”

C. 21-DIS-0142 (Tapke litigation)

The next set of charges against Dusing arose out of his conduct in the 

Tapke litigation. With respect to these charges, we find Dusing guilty of 

violating SCR 3.130(3.5)(d) and SCR 3.130(4.4)(a)6 insofar as his disruption of 

the Family Court Proceedings included a barrage of motions and repetitive 

emails to the GAL appointed in that case for the obvious purpose of burdening 

the GAL and thereby further disrupting the proceedings. While Dusing 

attempts to justify these actions regarding the GAL, we simply state his 

excuses are non-availing.

6 SCR 3.130(4.4)(a) prohibits a lawyer from using “means that have no 

substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, or use 

methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.”
17

In this matter, the KBA also charged a violation of SCR 3.130(3.1), which 

states “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or 

controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so 

that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 

modification or reversal of existing law.” Our review of the Trial 

Commissioner’s Report is that neither he nor the Board seems to have found a 

violation of this rule. The record, however, is replete with multiple instances of 

Dusing filing frivolous motions and appeals, and being sanctioned by Judge 

Mehling for violations of CR7 118. That Dusing violated this rule is amply 

demonstrated by the Trial Commissioner’s summation of a Court of Appeals 

Order, dated November 16, 2021:

[O]ver the course of the single year, Dusing had brought a 

total of 22 appellate actions against Tapke and/or Bakker 

consisting of three original actions and 19 direct appeals. All 3 

original actions have been denied. The Court of Appeals found:

7 Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.

8 Cr 11 states in relevant part,

The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him 

that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of 

his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it 

is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith 

argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, and 

that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or 

to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . 

. . If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, 

the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 

person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate 

sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties 

the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of 

the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's 

fee.
18

Finally, Dusing has expended an inordinate amount of 

this Court’s time and resources with frivolous motions and 

appeals. . . .

Dusing has repeatedly attempted to [a]ppeal from 

interlocutory Orders and, stated quite frankly he should 

know better. We could discern no legitimate reason to 

explain why Dusing has chosen to proceed in these appellate 

cases. We can only conclude Dusing’s purpose is to harass, 

cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 

litigation for Tapke and Bakker.

We conclude Dusing violated SCR 3.130(3.1), SCR 3.130(3.5)(d) and 

3.130(4.4)(a).

D. 21-DIS-0192 (Facebook Video)

Finally, in 21-DIS-0192, the KBA charged that by posting the November 

2, 2021, Facebook video, Dusing violated SCR 3.130(3.5)(d)’s prohibition 

against attorneys engaging “in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” We 

find Dusing guilty of this charge as his posting of the Facebook video was 

plainly intended to—and indeed did—disrupt the Family Court Proceedings.

Dusing, as he must, apologizes for posting the video and acknowledges 

that it was a mistake of judgment. Dusing argues that he was not trying to 

disrupt the tribunal but was, instead advocating for court reform. While he 

claims the video was due to his frustration at the “corruption” between trial 

court staff and Bakker’s counsel, the incident which led to the video was, in 

fact, a standard email communication between counsel and court staff which 

included both Dusing and his counsel, and for which no one was given 

advantage or disadvantage. As to Dusing’s pitch for “court reform,” we refer to 

the transcript of the video, supra, although we note that the transcript simply 
19

does not do full justice to how completely inappropriate Dusing’s actions were 

in this regard.

Furthermore, Dusing’s video tirade was entirely consistent with his 

abusive and threatening language directed against the mothers of his children, 

as recounted by Judge Mehling’s various orders. We recount just one such 

instance, merely because including others only serves to unduly lengthen this 

opinion, and the following actually serves to give insight into Dusing’s complete 

lack of self-awareness. The Family Court noted Dusing also wrote Bakker, 

“[y]ou are a horrible horrible horrible example for your children. . . . God 

you’re such a little bitch victim I lose so much respect. Even if you are a 

fucking super bitch nonsense woman it’s still important to me to be a man 

of character, decency and respect.” (Emphasis added). Considering the full 

record of the Family Court Proceedings, this must be the most ironic statement 

in all of Kentucky’s jurisprudential history.

As to Dusing’s post-hoc protests that he did not intend his statements in 

the video as a physical threat, we recognize that “blowing someone up” can 

have alternative meanings. One is a literal meaning to harm physically or to 

kill by an explosion, as with dynamite. The other is an idiomatic meaning to 

make someone’s life a living hell, by posting scurrilous and libelous matter on 

social media, engaging in frivolous litigation tactics, and the like. 

On one hand, the fact that Dusing had just “blown up” Dietz and Keys, 

in the idiomatic sense, by his Facebook video, and had a history of engaging in 

frivolous litigation in the Family Court Proceedings supports the conclusion 
20

that his threat to blow them up was, in fact, a threat of physical violence. 

Additionally, family court litigation, unfortunately, is replete with incidents of 

physical violence. See, e.g., Boyfriend kills girlfriend, her mother in shooting 

outside Kentucky courthouse,” ABC News, Aug. 19, 2024 

(https://abcnews.go.com/US/elizabethtown-kentucky-courthouseshooting/story?id=112953536) (last accessed Aug. 26, 2024). Any reasonable 

person—and certainly any attorney with a history practicing in criminal 

matters such as Dusing—would plainly understand that threatening to “blow 

[someone’s] asses up” might be perceived as a physical threat of violence. 

Dusing’s contention that he did not intend or expect Judge Mehling or the staff 

attorney to see the video is simply untenable. Dusing posted the video in a 

public social media forum and made pointed attacks on the staff attorney and 

opposing counsel by name. Indeed, Dusing expressly addresses the staff 

attorney and opposing counsel from the very opening lines of the video, stating 

“[a]lright. Alice Keys and Stephanie Dietz, we need to have a little talk . . . .” 

Plainly, it was inevitable for the video to make its way to its intended targets.

On the other hand, we find it difficult to believe that someone, especially 

an attorney with 20 years’ experience, would post a physical threat on a public 

forum. Common sense typically dictates that most people seeking to commit a 

crime do not telegraph their plans. Doing so not only warns the intended 

target but also tips off law enforcement. As to possible crimes, Dusing’s video 
21

most approximated either menacing,9 or terroristic threatening in the third 

degree,10 both of which are misdemeanors. Notably, Dusing was not charged 

with either crime.

In sum, we conclude that Dusing did not post the video to remedy any 

actual or even perceived corruption in the courts. Rather, Dusing seized upon 

the unremarkable communications between Dietz and staff attorney Keyes as 

an opportunity to attack those participants in the legal system and obtain 

Judge Mehling’s recusal. In so doing, Dusing unquestionably intended to—and 

did—disrupt the Family Court proceedings by improperly obtaining the recusal 

of Judge Mehling, and thus also violated SCR 3.130(3.5)(d). See Blum, 404 

S.W.3d at 854 (noting that “disrupt” for purposes of the Rules means, among 

other things, “to interrupt the normal course of unity of[]”).

III. SANCTION

As a sanction for Dusing’s misconduct, the Board recommends we 

impose a three-year suspension running from the date of this Order without 

credit for time served by Dusing during his temporary suspension. Dusing 

argues that in the event we find him guilty, we impose a 180-day suspension 

with credit for the time served since his temporary suspension became effective 

on February 24, 2022. After careful consideration of the range of sanctions, 

9 See KRS 508.050(1): “A person is guilty of menacing when he intentionally 

places another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.”

10 See KRS 508.080(1): “[A] person is guilty of terroristic threatening in the third 

degree when: (a) He threatens to commit any crime likely to result in death or serious 

physical injury to another person[.]”
22

including possible permanent disbarment and a lengthier term of years’ 

suspension, we agree to impose the Board’s recommended sanction of a threeyear suspension from the date of this Order without any credit for Dusing’s 

previous time of suspension since February 24, 2022.

We have previously noted that the purpose of lawyer sanctions includes 

protecting “the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have 

not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely properly to discharge their 

professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal 

profession.” Ky. Bar Ass’n v. James, 575 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Ky. 2019) (quoting 

the ABA Standards). In determining an appropriate sanction, we often find 

persuasive the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Anderson v. Ky.

Bar Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Ky. 2008) (stating that “[w]hile the ABA’s 

Standards are not binding authority on this Court by any means, they can at 

times serve as persuasive authority.”). Relevant considerations in determining 

an appropriate sanction include the lawyer’s mental state, the duties or ethical 

obligations violated, and actual or potential injury to a client. See Ky. Bar 

Ass’n v. Powell, 681 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Ky. 2023). We also find relevant the 

extent to which the attorney’s conduct demonstrates a lack of respect for the 

judiciary and the judicial process, brings the judiciary or the legal profession 

into disrepute, threatens the fundamental integrity of the judicial process, or 

otherwise results in injury to the judiciary or the profession. See, e.g., Mefford 

v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 474 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Ky. 2015). We also consider the 
23

existence of any aggravating or mitigating factors. See Powell, 681 S.W.3d at 

159.

As an initial matter, we reject out-of-hand Dusing’s proposed 180-day 

suspension with credit for time already served. Our rules on reinstatement 

explicitly recognize a difference between a suspension of fewer than 181 days, 

and one of 181 days or more. Compare SCR 3.501 with SCR 3.502. 

Admittedly, both processes may wind up in the same place, with a hearing 

before the Character and Fitness Committee, but a suspension of less than 181 

days includes an intermediate Inquiry Commission determination, for which 

approval ends the process and automatically serves to restore the applicant to 

practice. SCR 3.501(6). Our view is that Dusing’s behavior (i) is sufficiently 

egregious that a 180-day suspension with credit would be tantamount to a slap 

on the wrist, and (ii) has raised enough red flags that his reinstatement should 

be viewed by as many persons as possible with its attendant burden of proof. 

SCR 3.503.

Dusing argues that no Kentucky case has ever suspended an attorney for 

his actions in representing himself, and that the purpose of lawyer disciplinary 

proceedings is to protect the public and not to punish lawyers. As to Dusing’s 

first point, he ignores that the Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct 

explicitly provide otherwise:

VI. A lawyer's conduct shall conform to the requirements of 

the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's 

business and personal affairs. A lawyer shall use the law's 

procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or 

intimidate others. A lawyer shall demonstrate respect for the legal 

system and for those who serve it, including judges, other lawyers 
24

and public officials. While it is a lawyer's duty, when necessary, to 

challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a lawyer's duty to 

uphold legal process.

Dusing’s actions in the Family Court Proceedings, although involving his 

personal affairs, did not conform to the requirements of the law, that is, the 

Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Morgan, 465 S.W.3d 

447 (Ky. 2015) (holding attorney’s failure to provide support for his two minor 

children in violation of court order justified 90 day suspension since an 

attorney’s “duty and . . . responsibility . . . as an officer of the court [is] to 

conduct [his or her] personal and professional life in such manner as to be 

above reproach[]”). Dusing failed to use the law’s procedures for legitimate 

purposes and instead intentionally sought to harass and intimidate others. 

And, he clearly failed to demonstrate respect for the legal system, the judges, 

especially Judge Mehling, and other lawyers, specifically attorneys Deitz and 

Keys. In other words, the fact that a lawyer is representing himself does not 

give him a free pass. Regardless of whether no previous Kentucky case has so 

sanctioned a lawyer, there is one now and the Bar should accordingly be 

disabused of any notion otherwise.

As to Dusing’s second point, about the public protection being purpose of 

lawyer discipline, he does not quite go far enough. “The purpose of lawyer 

disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of 

justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are 

unlikely to properly discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, 

the legal system and the legal profession.” James, 575 S.W.3d at 693; ABA 
25

Annot. Stds. for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”) § 1.1 (2d ed. 

2019). Dusing ignores that the Family Court Proceedings involved the 

administration of justice and that he, as a lawyer, failed to properly discharge 

his professional duties. Again, the fact that he represented himself does not 

give him a free pass.

The parties cite the ABA Standards for the framework to consider in 

imposing a sanction: “In imposing a sanction after a finding of lawyer 

misconduct, a court should consider the following factors: (a) the duty violated; 

(b) the lawyer’s mental state; (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the 

lawyer’s misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors.” 

ABA Standards § 3.0.

Duties Violated. Dusing violated SCR 3.130(3.1); SCR 3.130(3.4)(b); two 

counts of SCR 3.130(3.4)(f); three counts of SCR 3.130(3.5)(d); SCR 

3.130(4.4)(a); SCR 3.130(8.2)(a); and SCR 3.130(8.4)(a). We accept Dusing’s 

argument that none of these counts violated duties to a client. However, as 

pointed out by Bar Counsel, these violations are of duties owed to the public

and the legal system. The ABA Standards provide that “lawyers violate their

duties to the public when they commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on 

their honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer.” ABA Standards § 3.0 at 

130. While this matter did not involve criminal charges, the KBA proved by a 

preponderance of the evidence, at a minimum, that Dusing sought to bribe Dr. 

Connor. And, “lawyers, as officers of the court, owe a duty to the legal system 

not to engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice or conduct 
26

that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation to a court.” Id. 

All the remaining counts implicate Dusing’s duties to the legal system.

Dusing’s Mental State. The ABA Standards recognize three mental 

states: intentionally, knowingly, and negligently. Id. at 133. These mental 

states determine the degree of culpability, since intentional or knowing conduct 

threatens more harm to the public, the legal system and the profession. Id. 

(citing In re Van Dox, 152 P.3d 1183, 1186 (Ariz. 2007)). The ABA Standards 

state that “intentional” misconduct “arises when a lawyer acts with a conscious 

objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” Id. at 134. By 

contrast, “knowing” misconduct “occurs when a lawyer acts with conscious 

awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct, but 

without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result.” 

Id. at 135 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The least culpable mental 

state is negligence which “occurs when a lawyer lacks awareness of a 

substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow.” Id. at 

136-37 (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The Trial Commissioner found that Dusing acted intentionally since he 

acted repetitively and over a significant period of time. Bar Counsel agrees 

with the Trial Commissioner. Dusing argues that his conduct was at most 

knowing, and flowed from the understandable circumstance that he was 

involved in litigating a family matter involving his children. We agree with the 

Trial Commissioner that this extensive record reveals that Dusing’s violations 

were intentional.
27

Potential or Actual Injuries Caused. The Trial Commissioner stated that 

no proof was offered as to any serious or potential serious injury, but that “it is 

not hard to imagine the toll taken on the litigants and the Court.” “Serious 

injury, actual or potential” is not, however, the injury case law addresses. Our 

jurisprudence is replete with cases in which no actual injury occurred, either 

by failure to keep clients advised, failure to communicate, or failure to properly 

account for trust funds (although client moneys were not lost). See, e.g., 

Mohon v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 638 S.W.3d 417 (Ky. 2022) (finding multiple violations 

and ordering suspension and conditions, including restitution). Rather, actual 

injury can be inflicted on a client, the public, the legal system, or the 

profession. ABA Standards § 3.0 at 138-39. Dusing’s actions caused real, 

actual injury to the public, i.e., the attempted bribe of Dr. Connor, and to the 

legal system, i.e., Dusing’s legal assault on the Court of Appeals (which ruled 

Dusing is a frivolous litigant and created a procedure to address his appeals), 

Judge Mehling, attorneys Dietz and Keys, and not least of all, the mothers of 

his children, Tapke and Bakker, who have endured years of frivolous and 

vexatious litigation. Dusing might pause to consider the emotional wellbeing of 

his children who undoubtedly suffer as a result of his actions towards their 

mothers.

Aggravating or Mitigating Factors. The Trial Commissioner found no 

mitigating circumstance and did not address aggravating circumstances, other 

than a lack of remorse.
28

Dusing claims a number of mitigating circumstances: a) improving the 

court system through his Facebook video; b) substantial monetary sanctions 

imposed by the trial court; c) loss of income due to suspension; d) attorney fees 

incurred; e) reliance on independent counsel; f) high quality of prior legal work; 

g) no prior discipline; h) public service in Ukraine following suspension; i) 

extreme negative publicity throughout proceedings; and j) limitations on seeing 

his children. We find the Ukraine public service is commendable and that the 

lack of prior discipline is a mitigating factor. However, five of these “mitigating 

circumstances” are merely the likely and foreseeable consequences of Dusing’s 

actions.11

As to aggravating factors, we agree with the Trial Commissioner that 

Dusing has no remorse about his actions. Further, we agree with Bar Counsel 

that he displayed a dishonest or selfish motive in that his actions were not on 

behalf of a client, but only on his own behalf; Dusing’s actions were not an 

isolated case, but instead involved a series of actions over a protracted period; 

the actions were consolidated from two domestic cases and involved three 

separate disciplinary files; Dusing was found guilty on all ten counts; Dusing 

has substantial experience as an attorney, 20 years; and, arguably, the 

attempted bribery of Dr. Connor was a criminal offense.

The Trial Commissioner recommended, and the Board approved a threeyear suspension without credit. Both parties have cited Blum, 404 S.W.3d 841, 

11 An apt analogy is the boy who is convicted of murdering his parents and then 

asks the court to show mercy because he’s an orphan.
29

in support of their positions. In Blum, an attorney was charged with five 

violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct arising from his representation 

of a schoolteacher charged with misconduct. Ultimately, Blum was found 

guilty of only three violations, SCR 3.130(3.4)(f) (threatening disciplinary 

charges to obtain advantage); SCR 3.130(3.5)(c) (conduct intended to disrupt a 

tribunal); and SCR 3.130(8.2)(a) (knowing or recklessly false statements about 

qualifications or integrity of judge, adjudicatory officer or public legal officer). 

Superficially, Blum’s actions and these three charges, in a sense, parallel those 

of Dusing. We note, however, the differences: Dusing was found guilty of ten 

charges; his actions were incurred in two cases; those actions were not merely 

in zealous advocacy of a client but for selfish purposes of his own. And, 

significantly, notwithstanding our giving Dusing some of the benefit of the 

doubt on the Facebook video, in that moment, that video had the effect of 

terrorizing two lawyers and was sufficiently concerning to Judge Mehling that 

he recused. That conduct is simply unacceptable and merits a more severe 

punishment.12

We affirm the sanction recommended by the Board of Governors.

12 The two most severe sanctions typically imposed by this Court are a five-year 

suspension and permanent disbarment. We are not, however, limited to five years. 

Because the sanction in this case is imposed without credit, it effectively results in a 

suspension exceeding five years.
30

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Respondent, Benjamin Gerald Dusing, KBA No. 89178, is suspended 

from the practice of law for a period of three years from the date of 

this Order. Dusing shall not receive credit for the time temporarily 

suspended by this Court on February 24, 2022.

2. Pursuant to SCR 3.390, Dusing, if he has not already done so, shall, 

within twenty days from the entry of this Opinion and Order, notify all 

clients in writing of his inability to represent them, and notify all 

courts in which he has matters pending of his suspension from the 

practice of law, and furnish copies of said letters to the Office of Bar 

Counsel, assuming that this is necessary given that he is currently 

suspended from the practice of law.

3. Pursuant to SCR 3.390, Dusing shall, to the extent possible and 

necessary, immediately cancel and cease any advertising activities in 

which he is engaged, assuming that this is necessary given that he is 

currently suspended from the practice of law.

4. In accordance with SCR 3.450, Dusing is directed to pay the costs of 

this action in the amount of $18,014.33, for which execution may 

issue from this Court upon finality of this Opinion and Order.

VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Thompson, JJ., 

sitting. Bisig, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion in 

which Conley, J., joins. Nickell, J., not sitting. 
31

BISIG, J., CONCURRING IN PART & DISSENTING IN PART: I agree with

the majority Opinion’s conclusion that Dusing is guilty of violating the ethical 

rules cited above. However, I strongly disagree that the three-year suspension 

recommended by the Board of Governors is a sanction sufficient for the 

egregious—and unprecedented—nature of the conduct before us.

Put simply, Dusing manifested unmitigated contempt for the judicial 

system and its important work of providing justice to the citizens of the 

Commonwealth—an endeavor he is ethically bound to honor and serve as an 

officer of the court. He nakedly defied our ethical rules in the pursuit of 

seemingly manipulating and distorting the facts and defrauding the court in 

order to achieve his desired goal in litigation. And perhaps most significantly, 

he broadcast blatant public threats of physical violence against our courts and 

staff.

In my estimation, a three-year suspension is overwhelmingly inadequate 

to address the profoundly serious and troubling nature of Dusing’s conduct. 

This Court is duty-bound to ensure that the citizens of this Commonwealth are 

served by competent attorneys of high ethical standards. This Court is also 

duty-bound to protect the judges and other judicial staff under its aegis from 

threats of violence and attack. Those duties may only be met by the issuance 

of a significant sanction against the conduct we consider today. Woefully, 

because the Court’s sanction falls far short of the mark, I respectfully dissent.
32

ANALYSIS

This Court’s review of attorney disciplinary matters is conducted de novo. 

That is, “[t]he findings of fact by the Trial Commissioner and the Board are 

advisory only. The Court makes an independent review of the record and 

findings of fact and may ‘enter such orders or opinion as it deems appropriate 

on the entire record.’” Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Maze, 397 S.W.3d 891, 897 (Ky. 

2013); see also Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Blum, 404 S.W.3d 841, 846 (Ky. 2013) 

(“[W]e review alleged violations de novo.”). We likewise consider an appropriate 

sanction de novo. Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Steiner, 157 S.W.3d 209, 211 (Ky. 

2005) (“It is our job to establish the appropriate sanction.”). In other words, we 

are not bound by the Board’s sanction recommendation, but rather may 

increase or decrease the severity of the sanction as we deem appropriate. 

Indeed, we may even impose permanent disbarment where the Board 

recommends only suspension from the practice of law. See Kentucky Bar Ass’n 

v. Rice, 229 S.W.3d 903, 903 (Ky. 2007) (imposing sanction of permanent 

disbarment where Board recommended five-year suspension). In attorney 

disciplinary proceedings the KBA bears the burden to prove the facts by a 

preponderance of the evidence, while the respondent attorney bears the burden 

of proving any credible defense to the charge. SCR 3.330(4); Steiner, 157 

S.W.3d at 213.

I. 21-DIS-0192

In 21-DIS-0192, the KBA charges that by posting the November 2, 2021 

Facebook video, Dusing violated SCR 3.130(3.5)(d)’s prohibition against 
33

attorneys engaging “in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.” I agree with 

the Majority that Dusing is guilty of this charge as his posting of the Facebook 

video was plainly intended to—and indeed did—disrupt the Family Court 

Proceedings.

Dusing apologizes for posting the video and acknowledges that it was a 

mistake of judgment. Dusing asserts however that the video was not intended 

to disrupt the tribunal. Rather, he asserts he posted the video as part of a 

public advocacy effort to reform the courts. I am unpersuaded.

First, the credibility of Dusing’s contention that he posted the video in 

righteous indignation at purportedly corrupt conduct in the Family Court 

Proceedings is significantly undercut by the fact that the communications 

between Dietz and Judge Mehling’s staff attorney were in no way indicative of 

judicial corruption. In his testimony before the Trial Commissioner, Dusing 

asserted that Dietz intentionally filed her motions late to keep them off the preruling docket, then raised the issue of the motions with the staff attorney, who 

then designated the motion as “to be called” at motion hour. Perhaps most 

obviously, the conduct of which Dusing complains was opposing counsel’s late 

filing of the motion. Dusing offers no evidence that the court had any 

involvement in deciding when Dietz would file her motions, or that the court’s 

decision to place the late-filed motions on for hearing at motion hour was 

somehow preferential treatment. Indeed, the ultimate result was simply that 

one of Dietz’s motions was denied, with the other passed to motion hour for 

consideration by Judge Mehling. Moreover, there was plainly no surreptitious 
34

effort by opposing counsel to obtain beneficial judicial treatment, given that 

Dusing and his counsel were included on all the communications at issue. 

Quite simply, any reasonable attorney would have seen the 

communications between Dietz and Keys as entirely anodyne and 

unremarkable. And certainly, no reasonable attorney could possibly conclude 

those communications warranted such an overwhelmingly vitriolic and public 

diatribe. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine language less appropriate to address 

the simple passing of a motion to motion hour for consideration by the judge—

or indeed to address even serious judicial impropriety—than “[g]ive me a 

fucking reason to blow your asses up. It’d be the best Christmas gift I’ve ever 

gotten.” Or “[y]ou can’t go cry to your mommy and say Ben’s a meany pants, 

play the victim, talk about how I motherfucked you up and down, and reamed 

your ass out, which I’m about to.” In short, Dusing’s assertion that the video 

was provoked by judicial impropriety is entirely preposterous.

Second, the extreme nature of Dusing’s tone and language also further 

undermines the credibility of his assertion that the video was intended to 

further his advocacy for judicial reform. The types of thinly veiled threats of 

physical violence, ad hominem attacks, and coarse and abusive language used 

by Dusing have no place in legitimate public discourse. I find it hard to 

conclude that anyone, much less an attorney, could believe such language 

would be appropriate, much less effectual, in persuading public opinion on a 

need for judicial reform. 
35

 During the hearing before the Trial Commissioner, Dusing presented as 

an intelligent and articulate speaker. From this I deduce both that Dusing is 

capable of adopting an appropriate tone for public advocacy, and that he would 

have known the tone employed in the video was ill-suited to the purpose of 

advocating for judicial reform. I thus conclude that the video was not intended 

to further any advocacy Dusing may have undertaken for reform of the court 

system.

Tellingly, the extreme language used by Dusing in the video is instead far 

more consistent with his previous personal attacks on others than with any 

public advocacy. When considering Dusing’s defense of these statements as 

legal reform, it is instructive as to his motive to note this record has additional 

examples of Dusing’s use of similarly threatening, abusive, and bullying 

language in personal attacks. For example, the Family Court noted in its 

custody judgment that Dusing had made the following written statements 

about his ex-wife: 

Do I enjoy wearing Julie out? Why yes, yes I do. Toe across the 

line. SLAP! Finger across the line. SLAP!!!! Will do this until the 

cows come home. And then they just get tired and give up and 

start doing the right thing not because they really want to do the 

right thing, but b/c they’re just tired of getting SLAPPED! All. 

Fucking. Day.

As the Majority notes, the Family Court further also found that Dusing wrote 

Bakker “You are a horrible horrible horrible example for your children. . . . 
36

God you’re such a little bitch victim I lose so much respect. Even if you are a 

fucking super bitch nonsense woman it’s still important to me to be a man of 

character, decency and respect.” He also wrote to Bakker 

You are such a despicable human for crushing people and kids . . . 

How many lives are you trying to ruin. . . . You are scum. Total 

scum. You will pay for this . . . . You are a selfish, irresponsible, 

kid-killing horror . . . a dike bit by cunt rag of a human to me . . . . 

Now listen you stupid homewrecking kid-killing worthless tramp. 

You are trash. You really are. Abort that baby or give it up for 

adoption. You are no mother. Maybe you are going to do us all a 

favor and die of cancer in a year or something . . . . You deserve to 

rot in hell. . . . I hope you die.

Like these statements, the language in Dusing’s video launched repeated ad 

hominem attacks laced with coarse and abusive language and thinly veiled 

wishes of physical harm. Given this striking similarity, I conclude an 

evident intention of Dusing’s Facebook video was to personally attack Keys and 

Dietz, not to further any legitimate public advocacy for judicial reform.

Finally, I also conclude Dusing posted the video not only to personally 

attack Dietz and Keys, but also more fundamentally to disrupt and control the 

Family Court Proceedings. Tellingly, at the time Dusing posted the video he 

had filed at least seven unsuccessful motions to disqualify Judge Mehling. In 

posting his extreme and physically threatening video, Dusing publicly attacked 

Judge Mehling’s chambers and the handling of his case, and also placed Judge 
37

Mehling’s staff attorney in fear for her life. And of course, any reasonable 

attorney—and particularly one with as much litigation experience as Dusing—

would know that such conduct would require the recusal of the judge. It is 

thus unsurprising that after Dusing posted his video, Judge Mehling was 

forced to recognize the appearance of impropriety that would arise from his 

continued involvement in a case involving a litigant who had engaged in such 

conduct and recuse sue sponte from the Family Court Proceedings. As such, I 

must conclude that a significant motivation—and likely the primary 

motivation—for Dusing’s posting of the video was to obtain the recusal of Judge 

Mehling he had been unable to achieve by motion practice. Such an intention 

was of course also an intention to disrupt the Family Court in its consideration 

of his cases. See Blum, 404 S.W.3d at 854 (noting that “disrupt” for purposes 

of the Rules means, among other things, “to interrupt the normal course of 

unity of.”).

I am unmoved by Dusing’s post-hoc protests that he did not intend his 

statements in the video as a physical threat. Any reasonable person—and 

certainly any attorney with a history practicing in criminal matters such as 

Dusing—would plainly understand that threatening to “blow [someones’] asses 

up” is and will be perceived as a physical threat of violence. I am also 

unpersuaded by Dusing’s contention that he did not intend or expect Judge 

Mehling or the staff attorney to see the video. Dusing posted the video in a 

public social media forum and made pointed attacks on the staff attorney and 

opposing counsel by name. Indeed, Dusing expressly addresses the staff 
38

attorney and opposing counsel from the very opening lines of the video, stating 

“[a]lright. Alice Keys and Stephanie Dietz, we need to have a little talk . . . .” 

Plainly, it was inevitable for the video to make its way to its intended targets.

In sum, it is apparent that Dusing did not post the video to remedy any 

actual or even perceived corruption in the courts. Rather, I conclude that 

Dusing seized upon the unremarkable communications between Dietz and staff 

attorney Keys as an opportunity to attack those participants in the legal system 

and obtain Judge Mehling’s recusal. In so doing, Dusing unquestionably 

intended to—and did—disrupt the Family Court proceedings by improperly 

obtaining the recusal of Judge Mehling, and thus also violated SCR 

3.130(3.5)(d).

II. 21-DIS-46

In 21-DIS-46, the KBA makes a number of additional charges against 

Dusing all arising out his conduct in the Bakker litigation. The first I will 

address is the KBA’s charge that in assisting or inducing his counsel Otis to 

bribe Dr. Connor, Dusing violated SCR 3.130(3.4)(b). That Rule provides that a 

lawyer shall not “knowingly falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to 

testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law.” 

Kentucky law prohibits offers of pecuniary benefit to a witness or potential 

witness with intent to influence testimony. See KRS 524.020. 

Dusing testified before the Trial Commissioner that he did not and would 

not ask anyone to offer a bribe, nor would he expect that such a direction 

would be followed. He also contends that Dr. Connor’s report was favorable 
39

and thus he had no incentive to offer such a payment. He further points us to 

testimony by Otis after the Trial Commissioner’s hearing in which Otis testified 

there was no bribe. Again, after a review of the record, I am unpersuaded.

At an evidentiary hearing before the Family Court, Dr. Connor 

explicitly testified that Otis offered him a $5,000 payment to say his 

report was not yet complete:

[M]y report was complete. . . . And then Mr. Otis came to my office 

basically saying that there was additional information he wanted to 

give me to review and that – asserted that my report was not 

complete. And I stated that it was, and he offered the $5,000 

basically to state that the report was not complete. . . . I was 

struck by his insinuation that there was so much more work to be 

done that he could offer me a certain amount of money to agree to 

that. And I do not agree to that.

I find Dr. Connor’s testimony particularly credible given that a former friend of 

Dusing’s also testified to a conversation she heard between Dusing and Otis 

about Dusing sending Otis “to manage Dr. Connor and get the – what they 

wanted out of him. Get the answers they wanted. They were willing to pay, or 

they were going to sue him personally.” Moreover, Dusing points us to no 

motivation Dr. Connor would have had to falsely testify he had been offered 

money to change his report. 

And while Dusing contends Dr. Connor mistakenly believed he had been 

retained by the court rather than Dusing, that in no way negates the 

straightforward testimony from Dr. Connor that Dusing’s counsel offered him a 

monetary payment to change his report. I also find unpersuasive Dusing’s 

contention he had no incentive to bribe Dr. Connor because Dr. Connor’s 

report was favorable him. As the Family Court noted in its judgment, Dr. 
40

Connor recommended that Bakker have sole custody; recommended a very 

limited parenting schedule for Dusing; indicated that Dusing was “selfcentered, degrading and demeaning” and “incapable of negotiation or 

cooperation;” had concern about Dusing’s use of public humiliation to 

discipline his children; and expressed concerns about child safety given 

Dusing’s conduct. Dr. Connor’s report was certainly not favorable to Dusing, 

and I find Dusing’s assertion that he had no reason to seek alteration of the 

report uncredible. 

Finally, while Otis may have testified after the hearing before the Trial 

Commissioner that no bribe was offered to Dr. Connor, he certainly has strong 

incentive to deny such criminal conduct. As such, I conclude that Dusing 

caused Otis to offer a cash inducement to Dr. Connor to change his report, and 

that in so doing Dusing is guilty of violating SCR 3.130(3.4)(b).

I also find Dusing guilty of both remaining charges in 21-DIS-46. First, 

Dusing’s filing of at least seven repetitive motions for Judge Mehling’s recusal 

and his filing of an inordinate number of separate appeals was also patently 

part of a scorched earth litigation effort designed to complicate and disrupt the 

Family Court Proceedings. The materials filed (including one motion to 

disqualify with text 87 pages in length) were far beyond the bounds of any 

reasonably zealous advocacy and were simply another tool used by Dusing in 

his efforts to disrupt the Family Court Proceedings. This conduct violated SCR 

3.130(3.5)(d)’s prohibition against engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a 

tribunal, and I find Dusing guilty of this charge.
41

Second, Dusing’s barely disguised scheme to disrupt the Family Court 

Proceedings also extended to the making of threats of disciplinary complaints 

against both Judge Mehling and Dietz. It is of course not the mere filing of 

such complaints that runs afoul of the Rules, but rather the filing or 

threatening to file such complaints “solely to obtain an advantage in any civil 

or criminal matter.” SCR 3.130(3.4)(f). It matters little whether the 

disciplinary complaints have merit. See Blum, 404 S.W.3d at 850 (“In our view, 

it is ‘only marginally consequential whether the target lawyer has in fact 

behaved unethically.’ Rather, the ‘focal point here is the purpose of the threat 

and not the conduct of the lawyer being threatened.’”). Considered more 

broadly in the context of Dusing’s extreme efforts to thwart the Family Court 

and its proceedings, it is apparent his repeated threats of disciplinary 

complaints were part and parcel of his overall scheme to scuttle his cases 

before Judge Mehling. Perhaps most telling is Dusing’s filing of a motion 

whose ominous title included “Notice of Judicial Conduct Complaint, Notice of 

Referral to State and Federal Investigative Authorities, [and] Notice of KBA 

Investigation.” The evident sole purpose of such threats was to intimidate the 

participants in these judicial proceedings and thereby obtain a disruption in 

order to gain an advantage. I thus also find Dusing guilty of violating SCR 

3.130(3.4)(f).

III. 21-DIS-142

The third and final set of charges against Dusing arise out of his conduct 

in the Tapke case. With respect to these charges, I find Dusing guilty of 
42

violating SCR 3.130(3.5)(d) and SCR 3.130(4.4)(a) insofar as his campaign to 

disrupt the Family Court Proceedings extended to a barrage of motions and 

repetitive emails to the GAL appointed in that case for the obvious purpose of 

burdening the GAL and thereby further disrupting the proceedings.

Dusing contends he believed the GAL made a misogynistic comment in 

referring to Dusing’s counsel Lawrence as his “girlfriend.” In response, Dusing 

sent the GAL an email stating “This is the last time I use words to express my 

deepest objection to your conduct in this litigation both personally and 

professionally. . . . Your decisions and conduct moving forward should take 

this into account.” As with his numerous other instances of deploying wildly 

inappropriate invective during the Family Court Proceedings, the extreme and 

inappropriate nature of this blatant threat of physical violence reveals Dusing’s 

true purpose was not to remedy inappropriate misogynistic comments, but 

rather to burden and threaten the GAL. Moreover, his abusive conduct became 

so overwhelming that the GAL was forced to file a motion for a protective order. 

Again, it stretches credulity that Dusing’s conduct was mere advocacy. Rather, 

considered in the context of Dusing’s other behavior, it is plain his conduct 

against the GAL was simply part of his broader campaign to disrupt the Family 

Court Proceedings and burden its participants with overwhelming litigation 

tactics and threats of physical violence. As such, I also find Dusing’s conduct 

in the Tapke Case violative of SCR 3.130(3.5)(d) and 3.130(4.4)(a).
43

IV. An Appropriate Sanction

As a sanction for Dusing’s misconduct, the Board recommends we 

impose a three-year suspension running from the date of this Order without 

credit for time served by Dusing during his temporary suspension. Dusing 

argues that in the event we have found him guilty, we impose a 180-day 

suspension with credit for the time served since his temporary suspension 

became effective on February 24, 2022. After careful consideration, I conclude 

that only a ten-year suspension would be sufficient to address Dusing’s severe 

misconduct. 

In determining an appropriate sanction, we often find persuasive the ABA 

Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (the “ABA Standards”). Anderson v. 

Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 262 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Ky. 2008) (“While the ABA’s 

Standards are not binding authority on this Court by any means, they can at 

times serve as persuasive authority.”). Relevant considerations in determining 

an appropriate sanction include the lawyer’s mental state, the duties or ethical 

obligations violated, and actual or potential injury to a client. See Kentucky 

Bar Ass’n v. Powell, 681 S.W.3d 152, 159 (Ky. 2023). We also find relevant the 

extent to which the attorney’s conduct demonstrates a lack of respect for the 

judiciary and the judicial process, brings the judiciary or the legal profession 

into disrepute, threatens the fundamental integrity of the judicial process, or 

otherwise results in injury to the judiciary or the profession. See, e.g., Mefford 

v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 474 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Ky. 2015) (finding permanent 

disbarment warranted where attorney’s “appalling and reprehensible conduct 
44

besmirche[d] the dignity of the profession.”). We also consider the existence of 

any aggravating or mitigating factors. See Powell, 681 S.W.3d at 159.

Here, when considered in toto it is readily apparent that Dusing’s 

misconduct was all part of an intentional effort to disrupt and thwart the 

Family Court Proceedings and to inflict injury on the participants in those 

proceedings. Neither Dusing’s multiple threats of physical violence nor his 

efforts to induce Dr. Connor to alter his report can reasonably be seen as 

merely negligent. Moreover, Dusing repeatedly violated a number of ethical 

duties, including the prohibitions against intentionally disrupting judicial 

proceedings, attempting to induce witnesses to provide false evidence, 

threatening disciplinary complaints for the sole purpose of gaining an 

advantage in the proceedings, and harassing and burdening participants in the 

legal process. And while Dusing was both client and lawyer and thus the only 

client injured was himself, he also plainly demonstrated a profound contempt 

for the judiciary and the judicial process. He did so publicly in a campaign 

that included, at best, multiple thinly disguised threats of physical violence 

against participants in the legal process. Such public conduct by an officer of 

the court not only brought the legal profession into disrepute but also 

threatened the fundamental integrity of the Family Court Proceedings and the 

judicial process more generally. These factors weigh heavily in favor of a more 

severe sanction.

I further note the existence of additional aggravating factors that further 

militate in favor of a far more severe sanction than the three years proposed by 
45

the Board of Governors. Aggravating factors supporting a more severe sanction 

in lawyer disciplinary matters include “prior disciplinary offenses, a pattern of 

misconduct, multiple offenses, substantial experience in the practice of law, 

and refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of [the] conduct.” James, 575 

S.W.3d at 693. Here, I acknowledge that Dusing was not the subject of 

disciplinary action before the present proceedings. However, as noted above, 

his conduct consisted of multiple offenses that violated numerous ethical 

obligations in furtherance of a blatant and cynical scheme to thwart and 

undermine the very judicial process itself. Moreover, Dusing has at most 

merely paid lip service to acknowledging responsibility for his misconduct. For 

example, rather than acknowledging the profoundly troubling nature of his 

physical threats, he chose instead to describe them as poor word choices. 

Similarly, Dusing has also repeatedly sought to lay blame for much of the 

conduct at issue at the feet of his counsel. Perhaps most disturbingly, Dusing 

wholly fails to own his misconduct against staff attorney Keys and the GAL, 

instead seeking to shift blame to them by repeating plainly false allegations of 

misconduct and corruption where no such behavior occurred. His unflinching 

defense of his actions weighs against a shorter sanction. Dusing shows neither 

true accountability for his behavior nor resolve to take steps to remedy the 

issues leading to his serious violations. 

Dusing’s motives appeared to be wholly selfish, given that his conduct 

was simply part of an unrelenting and merciless campaign to gain every 

advantage for himself that he could in the Family Court Proceedings. An 
46

additional aggravating factor is Dusing’s almost-twenty years in the practice of 

law at the time of his misconduct, including time spent clerking for judges and 

as a prosecutor. Finally, I also note that Dusing’s conduct in attempting to 

bribe a witness and in physically threatening participants in the legal process 

were not only ethical violations but undoubtedly unlawful and possibly also 

criminal.

As for mitigating circumstances, I again acknowledge that Dusing has no 

history of disciplinary violations before the present proceedings. I also 

acknowledge that Dusing had a history as an accomplished and respected 

attorney, and that he has not been sanctioned in the Family Court Proceedings 

since a new judge was appointed. However, aside from these facts I perceive no 

further mitigating circumstances. Dusing urges as additional mitigating 

factors that he has suffered significant financial sanctions and attorney fees in 

the Family Court Proceedings, negative publicity, and interference with his 

ability to see his children. However, those are simply the consequences of 

Dusing’s misconduct that in no way mitigate his culpability or the injurious 

nature of his conduct. Like the Trial Commissioner, I also find irrelevant 

Dusing’s post-suspension work in Ukraine. While laudable, I fail to see how 

those efforts in any way lessen the severity of Dusing’s misconduct or his 

culpability. 

In sum, I find that there are numerous severe aggravating 

circumstances, offset only by the fact that Dusing had a record as an 

accomplished and respected attorney without a disciplinary history. Of course, 
47

Dusing’s status as an accomplished and respected attorney cuts both ways, as 

the public loss of respect for the legal profession is greater when our brightest 

representatives behave in such a profoundly troubling way. The behavior is a 

callous threat to our very system of justice. As such, I conclude that the 

factors considered overwhelmingly weigh in favor of a far more severe sanction 

than the three-year suspension recommended by the Board.

I am not persuaded by the cases relied upon by Dusing in arguing that a 

lesser sanction is warranted. Those cases are readily distinguishable. First, 

while several involved distasteful and disruptive conduct by attorneys, none 

involved bribery, threats of physical violence, and a concerted and direct attack 

on the fundamental integrity of the judicial process itself like that at issue 

here. See, e.g., Blum, 404 S.W.3d 841 (imposing 181-day suspension for 

attorney’s threatening to file disciplinary complaints, making repetitive and 

unnecessary filings, and making false or reckless statements regarding hearing 

officer’s integrity); Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Lavit, 351 S.W.3d 210 (Ky. 2011) 

(imposing public reprimand for attorney’s intemperate outburst that reflected 

lack of civility, loss of dignity, and use of aggressive and bullying tactics). And 

while others involved significantly serious misconduct, again those cases did 

not involve conduct so apparently designed and capable of undermining the 

judicial process. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Kaiser, 814 S.W.2d 923 (Ky. 

1991) (imposing three-year suspension for attorney’s unlawful practice and 

dishonesty in Ohio); Wickersham v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 585 S.W.3d 766 (Ky. 

2019) (imposing three-year suspension for attorney driving intoxicated with 
48

child in car); Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Embry, 152 S.W.3d 869 (Ky. 2005) 

(imposing five-year suspension for drug possession and manslaughter). 

Unsurprisingly, we have little precedent for guidance as to an 

appropriate sanction for such extreme misconduct as confronts us in this case. 

Notably, we have previously found permanent disbarment warranted for 

attorneys engaged in bribery. Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Taylor, 993 S.W.2d 950, 

951 (Ky. 1999) (agreeing with Board recommendation of permanent disbarment 

where attorney made kickback payments to bank loan officer). Perhaps more 

significantly, however, we note that Dusing engaged in not one, but rather 

multiple acts that demonstrated overwhelming disregard for the judicial 

system. He publicly threatened physical violence against court staff. He 

threatened physical violence against a GAL. And he attempted to monetarily 

induce a witness to change evidence. Considered as a whole, his conduct was 

at best a thinly veiled effort to deploy bribery, threats of physical violence, 

disciplinary complaints, and inappropriate scorched earth litigation tactics to 

bend the Family Court Proceedings to his whim. Such conduct manifests a 

wholesale disregard for the honor and integrity of the judicial system and 

process. Where, as here, such conduct is undertaken by an attorney, it also 

stains the dignity and reputation of the legal profession.

I conclude that a three-year suspension for the type of conduct we have 

before us here is literally unthinkable. See Mefford, 474 S.W.3d at 924 

(permanent disbarment warranted for “appalling and reprehensible conduct” 

that “besmirche[d] the dignity of the profession.”). Indeed, on the facts before 
49

us, permanent disbarment would be consistent with the ABA Standards, which 

provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 

engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the 

intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes serious or 

potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal system.” ABA 

Standards § 7.1. Here, Dusing violated his ethical obligations as a Kentucky 

lawyer in furtherance of an effort to disrupt and control the Family Court 

Proceedings and to procure false evidence from Dr. Connor in his favor by 

means of a financial bribe. Such conduct was plainly for Dusing’s benefit. 

Moreover, Dusing’s conduct was a blatant attack upon the integrity of the 

judicial process, showed overwhelming disregard and contempt for that 

process, and resulted in serious public injury to the honor and integrity of the 

judiciary and the dignity and reputation of the legal profession as a whole. 

Thus, in considering the relevant factors and the totality of the circumstances, 

I conclude that only the significant and severe sanction of a ten-year 

suspension is sufficient to address Dusing’s gravely contemptuous, unethical, 

and violent conduct. 

Conley, J., joins. 

ENTERED: September 26, 2024

______________________________________

LAURANCE B. VANMETER,

CHIEF JUSTICE