IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs February 23, 2015

IN RE J.R.C.

Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Campbell County

No. J2013-364 Joseph M. Ayers, Judge

No. E2014-00830-COA-R3-PT-FILED-APRIL 27, 2015

In this parental termination case, the Department of Children’s Services (DCS) took 

emergency custody of J.R.C. (the Child) following the arrest of his mother, B.C. 

(Mother) on charges of (1) promoting the manufacture of methamphetamine and (2) child 

neglect. The Child was adjudicated dependent, neglected, and severely abused. After a 

trial, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that (1) grounds for termination were established, and (2) termination is in the 

best interest of the Child. Mother appeals and challenges each of these determinations. 

We affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court

Affirmed; Case Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL 

SWINEY and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, JJ., joined.

R. Keith Hatfield, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, B.C.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, and Mary Byrd Ferrara, Assistant 

Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of 

Children=s Services. 

OPINION

I.

The Child was born to Mother in April 2012. No father is listed on the birth 
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certificate.1 The Child remained continuously in Mother’s custody until Mother=s arrest 

on June 6, 2013, for allowing methamphetamine to be manufactured in her home with the 

Child present. DCS immediately placed the Child in foster care. A urine screen revealed 

there was methamphetamine in his system, and a hair follicle test confirmed positive 

results dating back 90 days. Following her arrest, Mother remained in jail for a total of 

twelve days, until June 18, 2013. In October 2013, Mother was convicted pursuant to her 

guilty pleas of promotion of methamphetamine manufacture, simple possession of a 

Schedule II controlled substance, and child neglect. She was placed on supervised 

probation for a period of four years and granted judicial diversion. 

In July 2013, DCS developed a permanency plan with a goal of returning the 

Child to Mother. On August 7, 2013, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s rights to 

the Child. The petition alleged two grounds for termination – abandonment by wanton 

disregard and severe child abuse. On November 27, 2013, following an adjudicatory 

hearing, the juvenile court declared the Child dependent, neglected and severely abused. 

Trial on the termination petition took place on February 6, 2014. Regarding her criminal 

convictions, Mother admitted that she had allowed a third party to manufacture 

methamphetamine in the home she shared with the Child. In return, she was paid $50 

and given drugs for her own use. According to her testimony, Mother began using 

methamphetamine three years earlier and regularly smoked it some three times a week. 

Mother said she stopped using methamphetamine while pregnant with the Child, but 

resumed her drug habit when the Child was two months old. After the Child=s removal, 

she stopped smoking methamphetamine but continued to smoke marijuana for a few 

more months, until September 2013. As a result, she failed three drug screens 

administered by DCS after her release from jail. 

The proof showed that Mother completed permanency plan tasks including 

parenting classes, and a mental health and drug/alcohol evaluations, and she was set to 

complete recommended intensive outpatient drug treatment within a week. She had 

passed weekly drug screens since October 2013. Mother had exercised regular visitation 

with the Child except during her brief time in jail. 

The Child’s DCS foster care worker, Christy Lester, described the Child as being 

“wild,” with “no regulation of emotion whatsoever” and uncontrolled behavior when he 

initially entered state custody. Since entering foster care, the Child had become “much 

more calm and loving,” and was developing normally. As a result of the severe abuse 

adjudication, DCS was relieved of exercising reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and 

 

1

In June 2013, the putative father, R.M., signed a “Waiver of Interest and Notice.” R.M. did not 

appear at trial and is not a party to this appeal. 
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the Child. Ms. Lester testified, however, that she remained in contact with Mother, 

encouraged her to work on her permanency plan tasks, and made efforts to assist her to 

secure suitable housing. Regarding Mother’s interactions with the Child, Ms. Lester had 

observed visits and concluded that Mother loved Child but had very little control over 

him. 

At the time of trial, the Child was nearly two. He had remained in the same foster 

care home throughout the nine months since his removal. Ms. Lester observed that he 

was “very attached” to his foster parents, particularly his foster mother. The foster

mother had worked with the Child and he had progressed from the “violent” behavior he 

showed initially – throwing objects, biting, pulling hair and otherwise trying to harm 

himself or others B to age-appropriate play and an ability to better control his emotions. 

Since accepting the Child into their home, the foster parents had become interested in 

adopting him. 

For her part, Mother had lived in three different places since the Child’s removal. 

At the time of trial, she was living with a friend of her mother, but testified she had 

arranged to rent an apartment of her own with assistance provided through her outpatient 

drug treatment program. She was employed for the past three weeks at McDonald’s. 

Prior to then, her last employment was a year earlier, when she worked at a marina for 

three months. Mother relied on food stamps and other government assistance and help 

from her parents for support. 

On March 24, 2014, the trial court ordered Mother’s parental rights terminated. 

The court found that the ground of severe abuse was clearly and convincingly established 

as reflected by the November 2013 adjudicatory order. The court found that the 

remaining ground alleged B abandonment by wanton disregard B was not established.2 

The court further found, also by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. Mother filed a timely notice of 

appeal. 

II.

As taken verbatim from her brief, Mother presents the following issues for our 

 

2

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(1) provides for “abandonment by the parent or guardian” as a 

ground for termination. “Abandonment” is defined, in relevant part, as when “a parent or guardian has 

been incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) months immediately preceding the institution of such 

action or proceeding, and ... the parent ... has engaged in conduct prior to incarceration that exhibits a 

wanton disregard for the welfare of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). 
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review: 

1. Did the trial court err by terminating the Mother’s parental 

rights even though [DCS] failed to allow [M]other the 

opportunity for reunification . . . by prematurely filing [a] 

Petition to Terminate Parental Rights?

2. Did the trial court err by finding by clear and convincing 

evidence that it was in the best interest of [the Child] to 

terminate the Mother’s parental rights? 

III.

With respect to parental termination cases, this Court has observed:

It is well established that parents have a fundamental right to 

the care, custody, and control of their children. While parental 

rights are superior to the claims of other persons and the

government, they are not absolute, and they may be 

terminated upon appropriate statutory grounds. A parent’s 

rights may be terminated only upon “(1) [a] finding by the 

court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for 

termination of parental or guardianship rights have been 

established; and (2) [t]hat termination of the parent’s or 

guardian’s rights is in the best interest[ ] of the child.” Both of 

these elements must be established by clear and convincing 

evidence. Evidence satisfying the clear and convincing 

evidence standard establishes that the truth of the facts 

asserted is highly probable, and eliminates any serious or 

substantial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions 

drawn from the evidence.

In re Angelica S., E2011B00517BCOABR3BPT, 2011 WL 4553233 at *11B12 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. E.S., filed Oct. 4, 2011) (citations omitted). 

On our review, this Court has a duty to determine “whether the trial court’s 

findings, made under a clear and convincing standard, are supported by a preponderance 

of the evidence.” In re F.R.R., III, 193 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Tenn. 2006). The trial court’s 

findings of fact are reviewed de novo upon the record accompanied by a presumption of 

correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence is against those findings. Id.; Tenn. 

R. App. P. 13(d). Great weight is accorded the trial court’s judgment of witness 
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credibility, which determinations will not be disturbed absent clear and convincing 

evidence to the contrary. See Jones v. Garrett, 92 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002). 

Questions of law are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness. Langschmidt 

v. Langschmidt, 81 S.W.3d 741 (Tenn. 2002).

IV.

First, Mother challenges the trial court’s finding of sufficient evidence to establish 

grounds for termination. Her precise argument, however, is somewhat difficult to 

discern. Her statement of the “issues presented for review” notwithstanding, she takes

the position that “[t]he trial court erred by terminating . . . Mother’s parental rights even 

though [DCS] failed to produce sufficient evidence of Mother’s willful abandonment due 

to incarceration.” The substantive portion of her argument, in its entirety, is as follows: 

Mother was incarcerated in the Campbell County Jail for a 

period of 12 (twelve) days from June 6, 2013 through June 

18, 2013.3 

Proof produced at the Termination Hearing showed that 

Mother had sole custody of the minor child since his birth up 

to and until her arrest on June 6, 2013.

Mother avers that the Department was premature in the filing 

of their petition to terminate parental rights on August 7, 2013 

given that she was not convicted of any criminal offenses 

until October 7, 2013. The department should have made a 

best effort attempt at reunification of the parent and child 

upon her release from custody [on] June 18, 2013. 

Mother argues that the evidence presented at trial failed to 

establish willful abandonment due to incarceration.

As we have noted, DCS’s petition alleged only two grounds for termination: severe child 

abuse and abandonment by wanton disregard. In setting out its findings, the trial court 

expressly concluded, (based on evidence indicating that she was jailed incident to her 

arrest only until being released on bond and that she was sentenced to no jail time upon 

her conviction), that Mother was not “incarcerated” for purposes of establishing 

abandonment as defined in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv). Accordingly, the trial 

 

3 Citations to the record as set forth in Mother’s brief have been omitted. 
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court concluded that abandonment by wanton disregard was not established in Mother’s 

case.

4

 In granting the petition, the court relied instead upon the finding that Mother 

committed severe abuse against the Child as “a sufficient ground to terminate her 

parental rights to the child.”

In this manner, the court clearly terminated Mother’s parental rights on the sole 

ground of severe abuse. We are therefore at a loss to understand Mother’s singular focus 

on abandonment by wanton disregard in contesting grounds for termination.

Although Mother does not challenge severe abuse as grounds for termination, we 

have undertaken our review mindful that, at a minimum, a single statutory ground must 

be clearly and convincingly established in order to justify a basis for termination. In re 

Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 862 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-

113(g)(4) provides for the initiation of parental termination proceedings, in relevant part, 

as follows:

The parent or guardian has been found to have committed 

severe child abuse as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior 

order of a court or is found by the court hearing the petition to 

terminate parental rights . . . to have committed severe child 

abuse against the child who is the subject of the petition . . . .

In turn, Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(23)(D) (2012) defines “severe child abuse,” in 

relevant part, as “[k]nowingly allowing a child to be present within a structure where the 

act of creating methamphetamine . . . is occurring[.]” 

In the present case, the trial court previously found, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the Child was severely abused by Mother “in that she knowingly allowed 

 

4

In concluding its consideration of the abandonment by wanton disregard, the trial court further 

stated:

The Court, having found that [Mother] was not incarcerated within the 

meaning of the statute, need not determine whether [Mother] engaged in 

conduct prior to incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the 

welfare of the child. In the interest of preparing a complete record in the 

event of an appeal, however, and assuming that [Mother] was 

incarcerated during all or part of the four (4) months immediately 

preceding the institution of this action, the Court finds that there was 

sufficient evidence that [Mother] engaged in conduct prior to 

incarceration that exhibited a wanton disregard for the welfare of the 

child.
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the child to be present within a structure where the act of creating methamphetamine . . . 

is occurring.” The court therefore decreed the Child “a severely abused child . . . 

specifically, as defined by Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(23)(D), . . . and that the severe 

abuse finding is as to [Mother].” Mother did not appeal the November 2013 adjudicatory 

order. As the State correctly contends, the order is thus final, and the severe abuse 

finding is established as a matter of law.

In short, grounds for termination were conclusively established by the 

adjudicatory order and its finding of severe child abuse. The trial court did not err in 

terminating Mother’s rights based on her severe abuse of the Child. 

V.

Having affirmed the trial court’s finding that grounds for termination exist, we 

next consider the issue of the Child’s best interest. As we have noted, before terminating 

a parent’s rights, a court must determine that two things have been clearly and 

convincingly proven – “not only that statutory grounds exist but also that termination is 

in the child=s best interest.” In re Valentine, 79 S.W.3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002) (citing 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(c)). We are guided on our review by the list of 

non-exclusive factors enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i). Those factors are as 

follows:

(1) Whether the parent or guardian has made such an 

adjustment of circumstance, conduct, or conditions as to 

make it safe and in the child’s best interest to be in the home 

of the parent or guardian;

(2) Whether the parent or guardian has failed to affect a 

lasting adjustment after reasonable efforts by available social 

services agencies for such duration of time that lasting 

adjustment does not reasonably appear possible;

(3) Whether the parent or guardian has maintained regular 

visitation or other contact with the child;

(4) Whether a meaningful relationship has otherwise been 

established between the parent or guardian and the child;

(5) The effect a change of caretakers and physical 

environment is likely to have on the child=s emotional, 

psychological and medical condition;

(6) Whether the parent or guardian, or other person residing 

with the parent or guardian, has shown brutality, physical, 

sexual, emotional or psychological abuse, or neglect toward 

the child, or another child or adult in the family or household;
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(7) Whether the physical environment of the parent’s or 

guardian’s home is healthy and safe, whether there is criminal 

activity in the home, or whether there is such use of alcohol, 

controlled substances or controlled substance analogues as 

may render the parent or guardian consistently unable to care 

for the child in a safe and stable manner;

(8) Whether the parent’s or guardian’s mental and/or 

emotional status would be detrimental to the child or prevent 

the parent or guardian from effectively providing safe and 

stable care and supervision for the child; or

(9) Whether the parent or guardian has paid child support 

consistent with the child support guidelines promulgated by 

the department pursuant to § 36-5-101.

This Court has observed that “[t]he above list is not exhaustive and there is no 

requirement that all of the factors must be present before a trial court can determine that 

termination of parental rights is in a child=s best interest.” State Dep’t of Children’s 

Servs. v. B.J.N., 242 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Dep’t of Children’s 

Servs. v. P.M.T., No. E2006-00057-COA-R3-PT, 2006 WL 2644373, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. E.S., filed Sept. 15, 2006)).

In the case at bar, the trial court expressly considered each of the statutory factors 

and concluded that several weighed in Mother’s favor. This conclusion, however, did not 

end the court’s analysis. The court further reasoned, in relevant part, as follows: 

In summary, factors 1, 2, 3, and 4 weigh in favor of [Mother]; 

factors 6, 7, and 9 weigh against [Mother]; and factors 5 and 

8 are inapplicable to the case at bar. It would appear that 

termination of [Mother’s] parental rights would not be in the 

child’s best interest because four of the factors weigh in her 

favor and three weigh against her. Determining a child’s best 

interest, however, is not simply a matter of adding up the 

factors and declaring a winner.

Ascertaining a child’s best interests does not call for a rote 

examination of each of Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(i)’s nine 

factors and then a determination of whether the sum of the 

factors tips in favor of or against the parent. The relevancy 

and weight to be given each factor depends on the unique 

facts of each case. Thus, depending upon the circumstances 

of a particular child and a particular parent, the consideration 
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of one factor may very well dictate the outcome of the 

analysis.

In re Audrey S., 182 S.W. 3d 838, 878 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) 

(citing White v. Moody, 171 S.W. 3d 187, 194 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 2004). 

In this case, two of the factors weighing against [Mother], 

factors six (6) and seven (7), are particularly egregious. 

[Mother] allowed a third party to manufacture 

methamphetamine in her home while the child was present in 

the home. Upon removal, the Department’s case worker took 

the child to a hospital where he was screened for controlled 

substances. A urinalysis detected the presence of 

methamphetamine. Christy Lester, the Department case 

worker, testified at trial that a subsequent hair follicle test also 

indicated the presence of methamphetamine. As a result of 

these facts, this Court has previously found [that Mother] 

severely abused her child. . . . At trial, [Mother] testified as 

to her drug use and her efforts at rehabilitation since the 

child’s removal. The Court acknowledges her remarkable 

progress in the eight months since the child’s removal, but 

[Mother], by her own testimony, has relapsed in the past and 

the Court cannot find with any degree of certainty that she 

will not relapse in the future and, as a result, . . . be 

consistently unable to care for the child in a safe and stable 

manner. These factors are more relevant to the unique facts 

of this case, and should be accorded more weight than the 

other factors due to the circumstances of this particular child 

and this particular parent. The Court, therefore, finds that 

termination of [Mother’s] parental rights is in the best interest 

of the child.

In this manner, the trial court properly considered the evidence in light of the 

relevant law. The court placed a heavy emphasis on the extremely dangerous living 

environment Mother created for the Child as the result of allowing methamphetamine to 

be manufactured in their home. In addition, the court was unable to conclude, based on 

her admitted resumption of her use of the drug that Mother would be able to provide 

appropriate care for the Child on a consistent basis going forward. The proof was to the 

effect that in the not-so-distant past Mother was able to cease her illicit drug use during 

her entire nine-month pregnancy with the Child, but thereafter resumed her habit within a 
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month of becoming a parent and the Child=s sole care-giver. 

The facts do not preponderate against the trial court’s findings in support of its 

determination of the Child’s best interest. As properly viewed from the Child’s 

perspective, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that it is in his best interest 

for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. We therefore uphold the termination order.

VI.

The judgment of the trial court terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child, 

J.R.C., is affirmed. Costs on appeal are taxed to the appellant, B.C. This case is 

remanded to the trial court, pursuant to applicable law, for enforcement of the trial court’s 

judgment and the collection of costs assessed below.

_____________________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., CHIEF JUDGE