SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA

En Banc

STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANIES, ) Arizona Supreme Court 

 ) No. CV-06-0338-PR 

 Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 

 ) Court of Appeals 

 v. ) Division One 

 ) No. 1 CA-CV 04-0465 

PREMIER MANUFACTURED SYSTEMS, ) 

INC., an Arizona Corporation, ) Maricopa County 

 ) Superior Court 

 Defendant/Appellee. ) No. CV2001-016394 

 ) 

 )

 ) O P I N I O N

__________________________________) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

The Honorable Ruth Harris Hilliard, Judge

AFFIRMED

________________________________________________________________

Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One

213 Ariz. 419, 142 P.3d 1232 (App. 2006)

AFFIRMED

________________________________________________________________

THE SITTU LAW FIRM, P.L.L.C. Scottsdale

 By John D. Sittu

Attorneys for State Farm Insurance Companies

BAIRD, WILLIAMS, & GREER, L.L.P. Phoenix

 By Robert L. Greer

 Craig M. LaChance

Attorneys for Premier Manufactured Systems, Inc.

LAW OFFICES OF CHARLES M. BREWER, LTD. Phoenix

 By Charles M. Brewer

 John B. Brewer

 David L. Abney

 Dane L. Wood

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 

Law Offices of Charles M. Brewer, Ltd.
2

HARALSON, MILLER, PITT, FELDMAN & McANALLY, P.L.C. Tucson

 By Stanley G. Feldman

And

LAW OFFICE OF JOJENE MILLS Tucson

 By JoJene E. Mills

And

ADELMAN GERMAN, P.L.C. Scottsdale

 By Daniel J. Adelman

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 

Arizona Trial Lawyers Association

BOWMAN AND BROOKE, L.L.P. Phoenix

 By Jeffrey R. Brooke

 Thomas M. Klein

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae 

Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

________________________________________________________________

H U R W I T Z, Justice

¶1 This case requires us to decide whether liability 

among tortfeasors in strict products liability actions is joint 

and several or several only. We conclude that the legislative 

abolition of joint and several liability in 1987 extends to 

strict products liability actions. In such cases, liability is 

several only and fault must be apportioned among tortfeasors. 

I. 

¶2 In 2001, an insured of State Farm Insurance Companies 

(“State Farm”) discovered that a leak in his water filtration 

system had damaged his home and personal property. State Farm 

paid the homeowner $19,270.86 to cover the loss. 
3

¶3 Premier Manufactured Systems, Inc. (“Premier”) 

assembled, packaged, and sold the water filtration system, which 

consisted of a series of filters inside plastic canisters linked 

by tubing. Worldwide Water Distributing, Ltd. (“Worldwide”) 

manufactured the plastic canisters and sold them to Premier. As 

subrogee for its insured, State Farm sued Premier and Worldwide, 

alleging that each was strictly liable in tort for distributing 

a defective product. 

¶4 Worldwide failed to respond to the complaint, and the 

superior court entered a default judgment against it. In a 

subsequent motion for partial summary judgment, State Farm 

argued that Worldwide and Premier were jointly and severally 

liable for 100% of the homeowner’s damages. Premier argued in 

response that under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-

2506 (2003) the defendants’ liability was several only and that 

the statute required allocation of fault between Premier and 

Worldwide. The superior court denied State Farm’s motion. 

¶5 State Farm and Premier then entered into a stipulated 

judgment, which stated that the leak had been caused by either a 

design or manufacturing defect in one of the canisters. The 

judgment provided that Worldwide was 75% and Premier 25% at 

fault and that Premier was liable to State Farm “only to that 

extent” for the damages caused by the leak. Because Worldwide 

had gone out of business and had no insurance coverage, State 
4

Farm could therefore recover only 25% of its insured’s damages. 

The stipulation preserved, for purposes of appeal, State Farm’s 

argument that liability of the two defendants should have been 

joint and several. 

¶6 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under 

§ 12-2506 liability of Premier and Worldwide was several only 

and that fault must be allocated between them. State Farm Ins. 

Cos. v. Premier Manufactured Sys., Inc., 213 Ariz. 419, 420 ¶ 1, 

142 P.3d 1232, 1233 (App. 2006). The court rejected State 

Farm’s argument that applying comparative fault principles to 

strict products liability actions violated Article 18, Section 6 

of the Arizona Constitution. Id. at 426 ¶ 28, 142 P.3d at 1239. 

¶7 We granted State Farm’s petition for review because 

whether § 12-2506 applies to strict products liability actions 

is an issue of statewide importance. See ARCAP 23(c)(3). We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 5(3) of the 

Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24 (2003). 

II. 

¶8 The common law generally imposed joint and several 

liability when the conduct of several persons caused a single 

injury to a plaintiff. See, e.g., Holtz v. Holder, 101 Ariz. 

247, 251, 418 P.2d 584, 588 (1966). In such a case, the 

plaintiff could collect his entire damages from any defendant. 

Id.; see also 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 385, at 1078 
5

(2001); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of 

Torts § 47, at 328-29 (5th ed. 1984). A defendant who paid the 

plaintiff’s damages, however, could not seek contribution from 

other tortfeasors. Holmes v. Hoemako Hosp., 117 Ariz. 403, 405, 

573 P.2d 477, 479 (1977); 2 Dobbs, supra, § 386, at 1078. Thus, 

a single defendant could bear the entire burden of the judgment. 

¶9 In 1984, the legislature alleviated the common law’s 

harshness by adopting the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors 

Act (“UCATA”). 1984 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 237, § 1 (codified as 

amended at A.R.S. §§ 12-2501 to -2509 (2003)).1

 Under UCATA, a 

jointly liable defendant “who has paid more than his pro rata 

share of the common liability” can seek contribution from other 

tortfeasors. A.R.S. § 12-2501(B). This right can be enforced 

either in the underlying tort action or in a separate suit for 

contribution. Id. § 12-2503(A) & (B). When a defendant seeks 

contribution, the finder of fact must apportion liability 

according to the relative degrees of fault of each tortfeasor. 

Id. § 12-2502(1). 

¶10 The 1984 legislation expressly provided that the right 

to contribution applied to defendants held strictly liable in 

 

1

 The 1984 Arizona bill drew from both the Uniform 

Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955 and the Uniform 

Comparative Fault Act of 1977, while also incorporating a number 

of provisions unique to Arizona. See Scott Butler, III & G. 

David Gage, Comparative Negligence & Uniform Contribution: New 

Arizona Law, 20 Ariz. B.J. 16, 17, 34 (1984). 
6

tort for distribution of a defective product. Id. § 12-2509(A). 

The statute provided that, for purposes of apportioning 

liability among such tortfeasors, “the relative degree of fault 

of each is the degree to which each contributed to the defect 

causing injury to the claimant.” Id. § 12-2509(C). 

¶11 The adoption of comparative fault in the 1984 version 

of UCATA did not entirely protect defendants from paying more 

than their allocated share of a judgment. The legislation did 

not alter the common law rule of joint and several liability; 

each defendant remained liable to the plaintiff for the entire 

amount of the judgment. The right to contribution was thus of 

limited or no practical utility if one or more of the 

tortfeasors were insolvent or if a judgment for contribution 

could not be collected. Under those circumstances, a defendant 

who had paid more than his share still absorbed a 

disproportionate loss. See Gehres v. City of Phoenix, 156 Ariz. 

484, 487, 753 P.2d 174, 177 (App. 1987).2

¶12 The legislature solved this problem in 1987 by 

 

2

 UCATA provides for a redetermination of contribution shares 

when “all or part of a tortfeasor’s contribution share . . . is 

uncollectible from that tortfeasor.” A.R.S. § 12-2508. 

Although this provision offers potential partial relief to 

defendants held jointly and severally liable, its application 

will necessarily result in a defendant paying more than his pro 

rata share. And, in cases (such as the one before us) in which 

only one defendant is solvent, § 12-2508 offers no relief to the 

solvent defendant. 
7

amending UCATA to abolish joint and several liability in most 

circumstances. 1987 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 1. The 1987 

amendment, codified at A.R.S. § 12-2506, establishes a system of 

comparative fault, making “each tortfeasor responsible for 

paying his or her percentage of fault and no more.” Dietz v. 

Gen. Elec. Co., 169 Ariz. 505, 510, 821 P.2d 166, 171 (1991). 

Under this system of several-only liability, plaintiffs, not 

defendants, bear the risk of insolvent joint tortfeasors. 

A. 

¶13 State Farm argues that the general abolition of joint 

and several liability in 1987 was not intended to apply to 

parties strictly liable in tort for distributing a defective 

product. We disagree. 

¶14 Under A.R.S. § 12-2506(A), 

[i]n an action for personal injury, property damage or 

wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for 

damages is several only and is not joint, except as 

otherwise provided in this section. 

(Emphasis added.) An action for strict products liability is 

clearly one “for personal injury, property damage or wrongful 

death.” Therefore, under the plain language of the 1987 

enactment, each defendant’s liability in such an action is 

several only, subject only to the specific exceptions in § 12-

2506. 

¶15 Section 12-2506 provides only three exceptions to the 
8

general regime of several-only liability: 

The liability of each defendant is several only and is 

not joint, except that a party is responsible for the 

fault of another person, or for payment of the 

proportionate share of another person, if any of the 

following applies: 

1. Both the party and the other person were acting in 

concert. 

2. The other person was acting as an agent or servant 

of the party. 

3. The party’s liability for the fault of another 

person arises out of a duty created by the federal 

employers’ liability act, 45 United States Code § 51. 

Id. § 12-2506(D). State Farm correctly concedes that this case 

falls within neither the first nor the third exception. 

¶16 State Farm instead relies upon § 12-2506(D)(2), which 

imposes joint liability when another person “was acting as an 

agent or servant of the party.” This argument, however, suffers 

from obvious deficiencies. State Farm does not contend that a 

conventional principal-agent or master-servant relationship 

existed between Worldwide and Premier. Premier simply purchased 

the defective canister from Worldwide and then incorporated it 

into its water filtration system. The mere purchase of a 

product from a supplier does not establish a master-servant or 

principal-agent relationship between the buyer and seller. See 

2 Dobbs, supra ¶ 8, § 335, at 910-13, §§ 336-38, at 917-29; 

Keeton et al., supra ¶ 8, § 70, at 501-08; Restatement (Third) 

of Agency § 1.01 cmts. b & c (2006). 
9

¶17 Instead, relying on Wiggs v. City of Phoenix, 198 

Ariz. 367, 10 P.3d 625 (2000), State Farm argues that we should 

impute an agency relationship between Premier and Worldwide for 

purposes of § 12-2506(D)(2). Wiggs involved an automobile 

accident in which a car struck and killed the plaintiff’s 

teenage daughter as she crossed a Phoenix intersection at dusk. 

Id. at 368 ¶ 2, 10 P.3d at 626. The plaintiff’s suit against 

the City of Phoenix alleged that improper maintenance of a 

streetlight at the intersection caused the accident. Id. at 368 

¶ 3, 10 P.3d at 626. 

¶18 The City had contracted with Arizona Public Service 

(“APS”) to operate and maintain the streetlight at the 

intersection. Id. The City named APS as a non-party at fault 

under A.R.S. § 12-2506(B). Id.

¶19 This Court held that the City could not escape or 

reduce its liability by claiming the tort had been committed by 

an independent contractor. Id. at 371 ¶ 15, 10 P.3d at 629. 

Rather, because the City had a non-delegable duty to maintain 

the streetlight, we concluded that the independent contractor 

was effectively an agent of the City, making the City 

vicariously liable for any negligence of APS. Id. at 370-71 

¶¶ 10, 13, 10 P.3d at 628-29. Thus, the City was responsible 

for 100% of any fault allocated to APS. Id. at 371 ¶ 16, 10 

P.3d at 629. 
10

¶20 The Wiggs doctrine does not avail State Farm. We may 

assume, as State Farm argues, that each entity in a chain of 

distribution has a non-delegable duty not to distribute a 

defective product. See, e.g., Van Buskirk v. Carey Canadian 

Mines, Ltd., 760 F.2d 481, 497 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that 

under Pennsylvania law, “the duty to provide a non-defective 

product is non-delegable”); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 391 

P.2d 168, 170 (Cal. 1964) (holding that a “manufacturer of a 

completed product cannot escape liability by tracing the defect 

to a component part supplied by another”); Robinson v. ReedPrentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. 

1980) (noting that a “manufacturer is under a nondelegable duty 

to design and produce a product that is not defective”). But in 

a strict products liability action, the various participants in 

the chain of distribution are liable not for the actions of 

others, but rather for their own actions in distributing the 

defective product. Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 183 Ariz. 

399, 402, 904 P.2d 861, 864 (1995) (stating that strict products 

liability is established by proof that the product was defective 

when it left the defendant’s control, that the defect made the 

product unreasonably dangerous, and that the defect proximately 

caused the plaintiff’s injuries); O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 

103 Ariz. 556, 559-60, 447 P.2d 248, 251-52 (1968) (quoting and 

adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)). Thus, 
11

the judgment below did not impose vicarious liability on 

Premier. Rather, Premier and Worldwide each is liable solely 

for its own conduct. 

¶21 Indeed, the 1987 amendment of UCATA recognizes this 

principle. The types of fault that must be compared to arrive 

at an allocation of responsibility for a judgment specifically 

include strict liability and products liability: 

“Fault” means an actionable breach of legal duty, act 

or omission proximately causing or contributing to 

injury or damages sustained by a person seeking 

recovery, including negligence in all of its degrees, 

contributory negligence, assumption of risk, strict 

liability, breach of express or implied warranty of a 

product, products liability and misuse, modification 

or abuse of a product. 

A.R.S. § 12-2506(F)(2). In a strict products liability action, 

every party in the chain of distribution of a defective product 

has committed its own “actionable breach of legal duty.” Fault 

is thus found because of what each tortfeasor did on its own –

distribute a defective product – rather than because of its 

relationship to other wrongdoers. 

1. 

¶22 State Farm also argues that A.R.S. § 12-2509 

contemplates that joint and several liability remains the rule 

in strict products liability actions. That statute provides for 

a right of contribution among tortfeasors, including those whose 

liability is “based on . . . strict liability in tort or any 
12

product liability action.” Id. § 12-2509(A). The statute 

further specifies that “[a]mong two or more persons strictly 

liable in tort who are entitled to claim contribution against 

each other, the relative degree of fault of each is the degree 

to which each contributed to the defect causing injury to the 

claimant.” Id. § 12-2509(C). State Farm argues that these 

provisions would be wholly unnecessary if the liability of 

products liability tortfeasors were several only. 

¶23 The argument fails to withstand analysis. Section 12-

2509 was enacted as part of the original UCATA in 1984, when 

joint and several liability was the rule in all tort cases. The 

subsequent 1987 amendment of UCATA, as noted above, abolished 

joint liability in all actions except those specified in § 12-

2506(D). Section 12-2509 provides a right of contribution only 

when, under the applicable law, two or more tortfeasors are 

jointly liable; it does not itself enact a general doctrine of 

joint and several liability in strict liability actions or 

purport to limit the sweep of the 1987 legislation. See Dietz, 

169 Ariz. at 510, 821 P.2d at 171 (“With a few specified 

exceptions, contribution will become virtually unnecessary in 

actions filed after the effective date of § 12-2506.”). 

¶24 Indeed, if we accepted State Farm’s argument, § 12-

2506 would be entirely vitiated. Section 12-2509(A) refers not 

only to contribution among tortfeasors in strict liability and 
13

product liability actions, but also among “all tortfeasors whose 

liability is based on negligence.” A reading of the statute 

requiring joint and several liability in all cases covered by 

§ 12-2509 would render § 12-2506 a dead letter. Rather, the 

only sensible continued application of § 12-2509 is to the 

relatively rare situations in which § 12-2506(D) provides for 

joint and several liability.3

2.

¶25 State Farm and its amici also argue that the indemnity 

provisions in A.R.S. § 12-684 (2003) contemplate the 

continuation of joint and several liability in products 

liability actions. As an initial matter, this argument suffers 

from the same flaw as State Farm’s arguments about § 12-2509; 

the indemnification provisions in § 12-684 were first enacted in 

1978, and thus can hardly be thought to negate sub silentio the 

broad abolition of joint and several liability in 1987. 

¶26 More important, as the court of appeals correctly 

recognized, the regime of several-only liability does not 

conflict with the indemnity statute. State Farm, 213 Ariz. at 

425 ¶ 24 & n.9, 142 P.3d at 1238 & n.9. Section 12-684(A) 

 

3

 Even after the general abolition of joint and several 

liability in 1987, joint and several liability can be imposed in 

strict products liability actions under A.R.S. § 12-2506(D)(2) 

if the entities in a chain of distribution have a true masterservant or principal-agent relationship. Contribution would be 

allowed under § 12-2509 at least in those situations.
14

provides for a tender of defense by a seller to a manufacturer 

in a products liability action. A manufacturer rejecting the 

tender must “indemnify the seller for any judgment rendered 

against the seller and shall also reimburse the seller for 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by the seller in 

defending such action,” unless the seller had knowledge of the 

defect or engaged in certain unauthorized modifications or 

installations of the product at issue. Id. § 12-684(A). The 

statutory scheme does not require joint and several liability of 

defendants; indemnification is not at all inconsistent with 

apportionment of fault under § 12-2506. See

Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, L.L.C. v. A.P.S. Rent-A-Car & 

Leasing, Inc., 207 Ariz. 502, 511-12 ¶¶ 37-38, 88 P.3d 572, 581-

82 (App. 2004). 

3. 

¶27 State Farm and its amici also rely heavily upon 

opinions from other states holding participants in the chain of 

distribution jointly and severally liable for an injury caused 

by a product defect. See Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp., 65 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 532, 541 (Ct. App. 1997); Owens v. Truckstops of Am., 

915 S.W.2d 420, 432 (Tenn. 1996). These authorities, however, 

do not address Arizona’s statutory scheme. Given the explicit 

language of our statutes, we find the Tennessee and California 

decisions inapposite. 
15

¶28 Owens arose after the adoption of comparative fault by 

the Tennessee Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 

52, 56, 58 (Tenn. 1992). After adopting comparative fault as a 

matter of common law, the court found good policy reasons to 

limit the sweep of the doctrine in strict products liability 

actions. Owens, 915 S.W.2d at 432. Although that decision has 

much to commend it as a matter of policy, we engage today not in 

the development of the common law, but rather in statutory 

interpretation. Because our legislature abolished joint and 

several liability in all but the situations specifically 

enumerated in A.R.S. § 12-2506(D), we are not free to engraft 

further exceptions into the law simply because we might favor 

them as a matter of policy.4

¶29 In Wimberly, the California court interpreted a 

comparative fault statute quite different from § 12-2506. The 

California statute did not define “fault” or “comparative 

fault,” see Wimberly, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 536, and the court was 

thus free to conclude that the law did not require allocation of 

fault in strict products liability actions. 

¶30 In contrast, our statute specifically includes strict 

liability and products liability within the types of “fault” 

 

4

 Similarly, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of 

Liability § 7 cmt. j & § 13 cmt. a (2000), which State Farm 

cites, simply set out preferred common law principles and do not 

purport to interpret any statute. 
16

that must be apportioned by the finder of fact. A.R.S. § 12-

2506(F)(2). As we have previously stated, our statutes do not 

“limit the application of comparative fault principles to 

negligence theories.” Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 404, 904 P.2d at 

866. Rather, the broad definition of fault in A.R.S. § 12-

2506(F)(2) requires the finder of fact in strict products 

liability cases to compare fault among all tortfeasors. See 

Zuern v. Ford Motor Co., 188 Ariz. 486, 491, 937 P.2d 676, 681 

(App. 1996) (noting that because UCATA “expressly defines 

‘fault’ to include ‘strict liability,’ all of the different 

types of fault identified in that section, if contributing to 

the same injury, must be compared . . . in assessing percentages 

of fault”) (citations omitted). 

B. 

¶31 State Farm and its amici argue that if § 12-2506 is 

interpreted to preclude joint and several liability among 

defendants in a strict products liability action, the statute 

violates Article 18, Section 6 of the Arizona Constitution. 

That section provides that 

[t]he right of action to recover damages for injuries 

shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered 

shall not be subject to any statutory limitation. 

1. 

¶32 The first clause of Article 18, Section 6, the “antiabrogation clause,” protects the right of access to the courts 
17

and prevents abrogation of common law tort actions. Cronin v. 

Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531, 538 ¶ 35, 991 P.2d 231, 238 (1999). A 

statute that completely abolishes a right of action is by 

definition an unconstitutional abrogation. Duncan v. Scottsdale 

Med. Imaging, Ltd., 205 Ariz. 306, 314 ¶ 33, 70 P.3d 435, 443 

(2003). On the other hand, the legislature is entitled to 

regulate common law tort actions. Id. at 313 ¶ 30, 70 P.3d at 

442. “We differentiate between abrogation and regulation by 

determining whether a purported legislative regulation leaves 

those claiming injury a reasonable possibility of obtaining 

legal redress.” Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 

9, 18, 730 P.2d 186, 195 (1986). The legislature may not, 

“under the guise of ‘regulation,’ so affect the fundamental 

right to sue for damages as to effectively deprive the claimant 

of the ability to bring the action.” Barrio v. San Manuel Div. 

Hosp., 143 Ariz. 101, 106, 692 P.2d 280, 285 (1984). 

¶33 Strict products liability actions are protected by 

Article 18, Section 6. Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 

Ariz. 340, 344, 861 P.2d 625, 629 (1993). Hazine held 

unconstitutional a statute forbidding the filing of a strict 

products liability action more than twelve years after the 

product was first sold to a consumer even if the injury occurred 

years later. Id. at 345, 861 P.2d at 630. Because the statute 

could abolish the right of action before an injury had even 
18

occurred, it deprived an injured claimant of any possibility of 

redress, and thus violated the anti-abrogation clause. Id. at 

342, 861 P.2d at 627. 

¶34 In contrast, the abolition of joint and several 

liability in strict products liability cases does not deprive an 

injured claimant of the right to bring the action. Nor does it 

prevent the possibility of redress for injuries; the claimant 

remains entirely free to bring his claim against all responsible 

parties. Thus, § 12-2506 does not on its face violate the antiabrogation clause. Cf. Dietz, 169 Ariz. at 511, 821 P.2d at 172 

(finding no violation of anti-abrogation clause in applying 

comparative fault principles in case involving injuries caused 

by both the defendant and a statutorily immune employer). 

¶35 State Farm and its amici argue, however, that joint 

and several liability is so integral to the tort of strict 

products liability that instituting several-only liability 

effectively abolishes the cause of action. Specifically, they 

argue that it is impossible to allocate “fault” in strict 

liability actions and that imposition of several-only liability 

will effectively deprive claimants of the right to sue 

“innocent” sellers in the chain of distribution. 

¶36 Nothing in § 12-2506, however, prevents a claimant 

from suing all participants in a defective product’s chain of 

distribution and obtaining a judgment for the full amount of his 
19

damages. Nor does the statute excuse any responsible party from 

liability. Under the doctrine of strict products liability, a 

defendant breaches its legal duty when it distributes a 

defective and unreasonably dangerous product. Torres v. 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 163 Ariz. 88, 91, 786 P.2d 939, 942 

(1990). A defendant who does so is at “fault” under § 12-

2506(F)(2), and a claimant is entitled to recover against any 

such defendant under the statutory regime of several-only 

liability. See Daly v. Gen. Motors Corp., 575 P.2d 1162, 1170 

(Cal. 1978) (rejecting argument that applying comparative 

negligence in strict products liability cases “somehow will 

abolish or adversely affect the liability of such intermediate 

entities in the chain of distribution” and noting that jurors 

are capable of fairly assessing the relative legal 

responsibilities of manufacturers and subsequent distributors in 

strict products liability actions). 

¶37 It may, of course, be difficult in some circumstances 

for the finder of fact to allocate statutory fault among the 

various participants in the chain of distribution of a defective 

product. But this may also often be the case in other contexts. 

Notwithstanding the potential difficulty of the task, “[w]e have 

no doubt that jurors are capable of evaluating degrees of fault, 

and the statute reflects our legislature’s agreement.” 

Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 51, 55 ¶ 21, 961 P.2d 
20

449, 453 (1998).5

2. 

¶38 Nor does our application of several-only liability in 

strict products liability cases violate the second clause of 

Article 18, Section 6, prohibiting limitations on damages.6

 In 

Jimenez, we rejected a claim that allowing product misuse as a 

form of comparative fault under UCATA violated Article 18, 

Section 6. 183 Ariz. at 407, 904 P.2d at 869. In so holding, 

 

5

 Indeed, even before the abolition of joint and several 

liability, UCATA required that finders of fact allocate fault 

among “two or more persons strictly liable in tort” in 

determining contribution rights. A.R.S. § 12-2509(C). Section 

12-2509(C) defines “the relative degree of fault,” for purposes 

of determining contribution among two or more defendants 

strictly liable in tort, as “the degree to which each 

contributed to the defect causing injury to the claimant.” 

Because the parties in this case stipulated to the 

allocation of fault between Premier and Worldwide, we have no 

occasion today to address the precise standards that should 

guide a finder of fact in making fault determinations under 

§ 12-2506. See State Farm, 213 Ariz. at 425 ¶ 22, 142 P.2d at 

1238 (“[I]t is for the finder of fact to examine and assess the 

differing conduct, roles, duties, and responsibilities played by 

all the participants in the distribution chain of an allegedly 

defective product and to decide, based on these and other 

relevant considerations, the degree of fault to allocate to 

members of the chain.”). 

6

 Article 2, Section 31 of the Arizona Constitution prohibits 

enactment of any law “limiting the amount of damages to be 

recovered for causing the death or injury of any person.” That 

provision is not implicated in this case, which involves only a 

claim for property damage. Cf. Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 407 n.10, 

904 P.2d at 869 n.10 (noting that the limitation of damage 

clause in Article 18, Section 6 and the similar language in 

Article 2, Section 31 “must be read together and are intended to 

accomplish the same result”). 
21

we directly analogized the misuse defense to “instituting a 

several-only system of liability,” which we noted “regulates 

responsibility for cause rather than limits the damages 

recoverable.” Id. (emphasis added). As is true with the misuse 

defense, several-only liability does not limit the damages 

recoverable, but rather serves “only to limit each defendant’s 

liability to the damages resulting from that defendant’s 

conduct.” Id.

¶39 To be sure, an injured claimant may not be able to 

recover the full amount of his damages under a regime of 

several-only liability when a defendant is insolvent or full 

collection of the judgment against each defendant is not 

possible. But as we stated in Jimenez, “almost any statute 

dealing with tort actions will affect the amount or potential of 

recovery.” Id. at 407-08, 904 P.2d at 869-70. Our Constitution 

provides only that a statute cannot limit the “amount 

recovered”; it is not a guarantee that the entire judgment will 

be collectible from a single defendant or indeed from any of the 

responsible parties. Id. 

III. 

¶40 For the reasons above, we conclude that the 

legislature abolished joint and several liability for 

participants in a defective product’s chain of distribution with 

its amendment in 1987 of A.R.S. § 12-2506 and that this statute 
22

does not offend Article 18, Section 6 of the Arizona 

Constitution. We therefore affirm the judgment of the superior 

court and the opinion of the court of appeals. 

 _______________________________________

 Andrew D. Hurwitz, Justice

CONCURRING:

_______________________________________

Ruth V. McGregor, Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Rebecca White Berch, Vice Chief Justice

_______________________________________

Michael D. Ryan, Justice

_______________________________________

W. Scott Bales, Justice