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40–480 PDF 2008

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

REPRINTED

FROM THE

2007 ANNUAL REPORT

OF THE

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE 

COMMISSION ON CHINA

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

OCTOBER 10, 2007

Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov 

CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

House Senate

SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio 

MICHAEL M. HONDA, California 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey

BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

SHERROD BROWN, Ohio 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

MEL MARTINEZ, Florida

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS

PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State 

CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State 

HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor

DOUGLAS GROB, Staff Director 

MURRAY SCOT TANNER, Deputy Staff Director

(II) 

(1)

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

INTRODUCTION

The Commission’s previous recommendations addressed three 

areas where China’s citizens do not enjoy the right to free expression. First, the Commission has noted that restrictions on the free 

flow of information threaten the well-being of Chinese citizens and, 

increasingly, citizens around the world. In its 2003 Annual Report, 

the Commission noted that China’s news media restrictions prevented citizens from being fully informed during the 2003 SARS 

crisis. After China began considering a proposal in 2006 to further 

limit media coverage during public emergencies, the Commission 

recommended in its 2006 Annual Report that the President and 

Congress urge China’s leaders to recognize the importance of complete transparency in the administration of public health, and the 

importance of an unimpeded press in providing critical information 

to the public in a timely manner. Recent international concern over 

the global health impacts of food, drugs, consumer products, disease outbreaks, and pollution originating from China underscore 

the importance of the free flow of information. 

Over the last five years, public access to government information, 

at least on paper, has improved, but major obstacles to government 

transparency remain, reflecting the Communist Party’s overarching 

concern that it maintain control over the flow of information. In 

2007, the government passed China’s first national ‘‘freedom of information’’ regulation, but it remains subject to a ‘‘state secrets’’

exception that gives the government broad latitude to withhold information. The Party and government continue to maintain tight 

control over the press, and the prospects for a free press remain 

dim. While foreign reporters in theory were granted some increased 

press freedom in accordance with promises China made in 2001 as 

part of its successful bid to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, 

China continues to use upcoming important events such as the 

Party’s 17th Congress in October 2007, and corruption among Chinese reporters, as a pretext for increased restrictions on domestic 

media. The lack of a free press to monitor the government leaves 

citizens poorly informed about major problems and unable to fully 

investigate the root causes of such problems and the extent to 

which the Party or the government should be held accountable. 

Second, previous Commission reports highlighted China’s pervasive censorship of the Internet and other electronic media. In its 

Annual Reports from 2002 to 2006, the Commission recommended 

that the President and Congress urge the Chinese government to 

stop blocking access to foreign news broadcasts and Web sites, and 

allow its citizens freer access to information on the Internet, particularly information concerning the rights of Chinese citizens to 

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ommended that the President and Congress urge China to cease 

detaining journalists and writers, many of whom are punished for 

posting essays critical of the Chinese government on the Internet. 

Over the last five years, the Party and government have continued to emphasize management and control over the Internet. They 

have done so by requiring Web sites to be licensed, blocking access 

to politically sensitive information on the Internet, and detaining 

citizens who criticize the government online. In 2007, Hu Jintao 

called for ‘‘purifying’’ the Internet, saying ‘‘the stability of the state’’ 

depended on the Party taking full advantage of and successfully 

controlling the Internet. The Internet poses a daunting challenge 

for the Party. In 2007, citizen activists used the Internet and cell 

phones to raise public awareness about cases involving slave labor 

and the construction of a hazardous chemical plant, driving the reporting agendas of the state-controlled press and forcing the government to address these problems. Their success, however, reflects 

the creativity of China’s citizenry in evading censors and the difficulty in trying to monitor China’s growing online environment, 

rather than any government policy of liberalization. Furthermore, 

journalists and writers who criticize the government online continue to face imprisonment for such crimes as ‘‘inciting subversion.’’ 

Third, the Commission’s previous reports have noted China’s 

prior restraints on publishing, which prevent citizens from freely 

expressing ideas and opinions. In its Annual Reports from 2003 to 

2006, the Commission recommended that the President and Congress urge the Chinese government to eliminate prior restraints on 

publishing. Over the last five years, public officials in China have 

maintained prior restraints on publishing and continue to ban and 

confiscate books and magazines that do not conform to the Party’s 

political requirements. This past year, publication and propaganda 

officials stepped up their efforts to clean up the publishing industry 

in preparation for the Party’s 17th Congress to be held in October 

2007. 

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION

Improvements and Obstacles to Government Transparency 

The Commission notes that over the last five years, the Chinese 

government has made progress in increasing public access to government sources of information. The Communist Party and State 

Council have directed all levels of government to increase transparency.1 In its 2003 Annual Report, the Commission noted that 

most provinces and major cities had set up detailed government 

Web sites.2 By March 2007, 86 percent of all government agencies 

had official Web sites.3 Many of the Web sites provide detailed and 

substantive information.4 In addition, by the end of 2006, most central government institutions and all provinces, autonomous regions, 

centrally administered municipalities, and top-level courts had

established public spokesperson systems.5

Over the last five years, the government has also sought to improve its ability to respond to public emergencies and make information available to the public more quickly. The government’s slow 

response to the SARS disease outbreak in 2003 and to the Songhua 

River chemical spill in 2005 led to passage of measures to prevent 

3

provincial and local officials from covering up such incidents.6 The 

Regulation on the Handling of Public Health Emergencies, for example, requires provincial governments to report a public health 

emergency to central officials within one hour and requires central 

officials, or provincial governments who have received approval 

from central officials, to release information in a timely manner.7

However, as the Commission noted in its 2003 and 2006 Annual 

Reports, these reforms were not intended to relax the government’s 

control over the media or the free flow of information to the general 

public.8 Rather, the goal was to increase the flow of information to 

central authorities in Beijing, control how the press reported on the 

matter, and prevent private citizens from publishing opinions regarding the government’s handling of the crisis. 

In April 2007, the State Council issued the Regulation on the 

Public Disclosure of Government Information (Public Disclosure 

Regulation), the first national ‘‘freedom of information’’ regulation 

requiring all government agencies to release important information 

to the public in a timely manner.9 The new regulation, which takes 

effect on May 1, 2008, requires government agencies to timely disclose vital information regarding the government’s handling of 

issues that have been at the forefront of controversy in recent 

years, such as food, drug, and product safety, public health emergencies, environmental protection, land expropriation, the sale of 

state-owned property, and population planning.10 The regulation 

also provides citizens, legal persons, and other organizations with 

the right to request information from a government agency and to 

file an administrative lawsuit to appeal an agency’s decision not to 

provide information.11 The State Environmental Protection Administration subsequently issued implementing measures in April 

mandating public disclosure of information on China’s environment.12 [See Section II—Environment.] 

The impact of these freedom of information regulations is limited, however, by the presence of a ‘‘state secrets’’ exception that 

gives the government broad latitude to withhold information from 

the public.13 This policy reflects the continuing perception by the 

Party that relinquishing too much control over the flow of information will cause ‘‘social instability’’ and challenge the Party’s supremacy. Chinese laws and regulations provide lists of what may 

be deemed a state secret, but these lists are broad and vague, encompassing essentially all matters of public concern.14 For example, information about China’s environmental pollution that would 

‘‘reflect negatively on China’s foreign affairs work’’ is considered a 

state secret.15 Legal scholars in China have noted that the inclusion of a ‘‘state secrets’’ exception in the Public Disclosure Regulation gives officials too much discretion to withhold information.16

In addition, the Public Disclosure Regulation’s heavy penalties for 

officials who fail to protect state secrets may encourage even less 

transparency.17 Moreover, citizens and journalists have encountered resistance from local officials when requesting information 

under similar administrative rules already in place in some Chinese cities. In June 2006, a Shanghai journalist sued the Shanghai 

Municipal Planning Bureau under a similar freedom of information 

regulation, but lost the case and was fired from his job as a result.18 Some legal experts in China have also questioned whether 

4

provisions in such regulations, granting citizens the right to request information, would apply to citizens acting in their role as 

journalists, an interpretation that would severely limit the law’s 

impact.19

The National People’s Congress recently issued the Emergency 

Response Law, which requires people’s governments to publicly disclose accurate and timely information regarding emergencies.20 The 

law was issued in August 2007 and will take effect on November 

1, 2007. The Commission noted in its 2006 Annual Report that a 

draft of this law contained a provision that would have imposed a 

heavy fine on domestic or foreign media who reported on a public 

emergency without government approval.21 The Commission noted 

that the provision would have impeded the efficiency of the Global 

Public Health Intelligence Network, an electronic surveillance system used by the World Health Organization to monitor the Internet for reports of communicable diseases and communicable disease 

syndromes. In a positive step, the provision was removed from the 

final version of the law.22 The law, however, now contains a provision prohibiting the fabrication and spread of ‘‘false information.’’ 23

Media who violate this provision may be shut down.24 This provision could have a chilling effect on journalists who worry that the 

government retains too much discretion to determine whether information is false or not.25 In January 2006, for example, public officials sentenced journalist Li Changqing to three years in prison 

for violating a Criminal Law provision that prohibits the ‘‘intentional dissemination of terrorist information that is knowingly fabricated to disturb public order,’’ even though Li’s reporting on a 

dengue fever outbreak turned out to be materially similar to the 

government’s own accounts.26

Public officials have punished citizens for sharing second-hand 

information over the Internet or cell phones, threatening the free 

flow of information and forcing citizens to wait for the government’s official version of the ‘‘truth’’ before discussing important 

public events. Commentators in China have expressed concern over 

the government’s liberal application of Article 25 of the Public Security Administration Punishment Law, which provides for the detention of citizens who spread rumors with the intent to disturb 

public order.27 [See Section II—Rights of Criminal Suspects and 

Defendants for more information about this law.] For example, in 

July 2007, officials in Jinan city, Shandong province, detained a 

resident for noting in an online discussion that she had heard that 

citizens had perished in heavy flooding that hit the city.28

The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) has continued its campaign to 

increase public access to court proceedings. As the Commission 

noted in its 2003 Annual Report, the SPC has taken steps to improve the quality and availability of judicial decisions.29 In June 

2007, the SPC issued several opinions calling on courts to provide 

public access to all stages of the trial process,30 and to make more 

judgments available in publications and over the Internet.31 The 

opinions, however, contain the ‘‘state secrets’’ exception, which 

courts have commonly used to conduct politically charged trials behind closed doors.32 [See Section II—Rights of Criminal Suspects 

and Defendants for more information about these opinions.] In addition, court officials concerned about media threats to judicial 

5

independence have sought to limit media reporting of court activities. 

In September 2006, top officials at the SPC announced a policy prohibiting news media from interviewing judges or court officials 

without government permission and directing the media not to 

issue commentary on pending court cases.33

NO FREE PRESS

China’s restrictions on the press violate the right to freedom of 

expression as provided for under international human rights standards and China’s Constitution. Both the International Covenant on 

Civil and Political Rights34 (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration 

on Human Rights35 (UDHR) guarantee the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information, through any media, regardless of 

frontiers. Article 35 of China’s Constitution provides China’s citizens freedom of speech and the press.36 While this freedom is not 

absolute, the ICCPR and UDHR provide that restrictions may be 

imposed only to protect the following interests: national security or 

public order, public health or morals, or the rights or reputations 

of others. Furthermore, the restriction must be prescribed by law 

and must not exceed the scope necessary to protect a compelling interest.37 China restricts the press for political and ideological reasons. Restrictions such as directives from propaganda officials are 

not prescribed by law because they are issued by a Communist 

Party entity, rather than one of the parties authorized to pass legislation under China’s Legislation Law. 

Party and Government Control Over Media 

China’s media could play an important role in helping inform the 

public about important events but, as noted above, recent laws and 

regulations dealing with government disclosure and public emergencies limit this potential. A more fundamental limitation, however, is the Party’s continued control over all media in China,

either directly or through its control over the government agencies 

that regulate China’s media. The Party exercises direct control over 

the media through the Central Propaganda Department (CPD). 

The CPD issues directives informing publishers and editors what 

stories can and cannot be covered. It works together with lowerlevel propaganda departments to deliver these directives to all 

media and to appoint media managers to monitor each publication.38 The CPD also requires editors and publishers to attend

indoctrination sessions. In addition, government agencies heavily 

regulate the media. News publishers must be licensed by the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) and have a 

government sponsor.39 GAPP requires all journalists to be licensed.40 The State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television 

(SARFT) controls the content of radio, television, satellite, and 

Internet broadcasts. 

Major media, such as the People’s Daily and Xinhua, remain 

closely affiliated with a Party or government entity.41 Central 

Party and government officials use journalists to gather information so that they can monitor provincial and local officials, under 

a policy called ‘‘public opinion supervision.’’ 42 Stories they deem too 

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stead forwarded as intelligence reports to relevant officials through 

classified channels.43 Commercialization of the industry in the 

1990s and the ‘‘public opinion supervision’’ policy has led to the development of media with a reputation for more hard-hitting journalism, including Southern Metropolitan Daily and Caijing.44 Yet, 

even these more independent media remain subject to control by 

propaganda officials and have been singled out for punishment in 

the past.45

Roles the Media Is Expected to Play 

The media in China is expected to act as the Party’s mouthpiece.46 Just before becoming President and Party General Secretary, Hu Jintao, in 2002, reiterated this longstanding policy, 

which has remained firmly in place during Hu’s first five years in 

power.47 For example, the Party’s Central Committee issued a resolution at the end of its sixth plenum meeting in October 2006, calling 

on the news media to promote Hu’s ‘‘harmonious society’’ policy.48

To create a ‘‘positive public opinion atmosphere’’ for the Party’s 

17th Congress in October 2007, propaganda officials issued guidelines restricting media coverage of 20 topics, including the 50th anniversary of the anti-Rightist campaign, judicial corruption, and 

campaigns by legal rights defenders.49 SARFT ordered television 

stations to air only ‘‘ethically inspired TV series’’ during prime time 

in the months leading up to the Party Congress.50

The Party also expects the media to paint central Party and

government officials in a positive light. While media may report 

critically on the activities of provincial and local officials, their 

criticisms must remain at that level and may not threaten Party 

supremacy. The media must emphasize efforts by central Party and 

government officials to remedy the situation. For example, after 

news media and Internet activists exposed the widespread use of 

forced labor in brick kilns in May and June 2007, authorities chided local officials for trying to hide information from the media, but 

then instructed journalists to limit their coverage and to applaud 

the rescue efforts of central Party and government officials.51

Media that disobey propaganda directives or publish content

unacceptable to censors continue to risk being disciplined or 

censored by the Party. In November 2006, the CPD ordered senior 

executives at the Beijing-based weekly magazine, Lifeweek, to engage in self-criticism and required its journalists to undergo political training after the magazine violated a Party directive not to 

highlight politically sensitive events.52 Staff at a newspaper in 

Sichuan province were suspended for inadvertently running an

advertisement that included a veiled reference to the Chinese government’s June 4, 1989 crackdown on the Tiananmen Square democracy protests.53 In March 2007, Caijing was reportedly ordered 

to withdraw an issue containing an article about a contentious 

draft of the Property Law then under consideration.54

Consequences of the Lack of a Free Press 

Over the last five years, events such as the SARS crisis in 2003 

and more recent government scandals show that the Party’s control 

over the press denies citizens critical information at important 

7

times. Chinese citizens and citizens around the world cannot effectively monitor the Chinese government because they remain dependent on the willingness of one unsupervised source, the Party, 

to provide accurate, timely, and unbiased information. Some recent 

examples include:

• Even after measures implemented following the SARS crisis 

in 2003 discouraged local officials from hiding information, 

local officials in the provinces of Jilin and Heilongjiang delayed 

notifying relevant officials and the general public about a 

chemical plant explosion in 2005 that released chemicals into 

the Songhua River, the main water source for the Heilongjiang 

capital of Harbin.55 They imposed a two-week press blackout, 

and the incident led to panic among citizens and a diplomatic 

incident with Russia. 

• When the top Party official in Shanghai was forced to step 

down in September 2006 amid allegations that he had mismanaged the city’s nine billion yuan (US$1.2 billion) pension 

fund,56 propaganda officials ordered local media to publish only 

official news reports from Xinhua.57 During this time, Shanghai’s municipal government reportedly did not hold a press 

conference for almost four months.58

• In May 2007, international and Hong Kong officials complained that Chinese officials were tight-lipped about a rumored epidemic affecting pigs in a province near Hong Kong, 

and about contaminated pet food that had reportedly caused 

large numbers of cats and dogs in the United States to become 

ill.59 China’s media had reportedly issued few reports on the 

incidents.60

• In July 2007, the Financial Times reported that officials at 

the State Environmental Protection Administration and Ministry of Health asked the World Bank to remove from a joint 

report the figure of 750,000 premature deaths every year in 

China, caused mainly by air pollution.61 Officials reportedly 

said the information was ‘‘too sensitive’’ and could cause ‘‘social 

unrest.’’ 62 A foreign ministry official denied the charge that 

any information had been censored.63

• In July 2007, propaganda officials ordered restrictions on 

food safety reports after a Beijing reporter issued a false news 

report alleging that food vendors were filling steamed buns 

with pieces of cardboard.64

Limited Prospects for a Free Press 

Central government officials have urged local officials to cooperate more with the media, but this development should not be interpreted as a shift in government policy to allow for a freer press.65

For example, in July 2007, a State Council Information Office official criticized local officials for blocking media coverage of the 

forced labor scandal at brick factories in central China.66 This criticism is consistent with the central government’s ‘‘public opinion supervision’’ policy of relying on journalists to gather information so 

that they can monitor provincial and local officials. The central 

government’s support of this policy has, however, given commentators in China justification for calling for broader press freedom,

8

although they have been careful to do so in the context of local initiatives to restrict press freedom and to fashion arguments consistent with ‘‘public opinion supervision.’’ 67 For example, a deputy 

editor at Southern Weekend argued in an editorial that the purpose of news is not to serve as a propaganda tool, and that the central government’s ‘‘public opinion supervision’’ policy is intended for 

the press to be a check on public power.68 The editorial was in response to the Anhui provincial government’s issuance in October 

2006 of rules requiring journalists to write a minimum number of 

‘‘positive’’ stories about Anhui in order to receive a promotion.69

The Chinese government also allowed foreign journalists greater 

freedom in 2007. To fulfill China’s commitment to give journalists 

‘‘complete freedom’’ to report on China when it bid for the 2008 

Summer Olympic Games in 2001,70 Premier Wen Jiabao signed 

into law new regulations in December 2006, which eliminate the 

requirement that foreign journalists must obtain government permission before conducting interviews.71 The new rules, which went 

into effect on January 1, 2007 and expire on October 17, 2008,72

have had mixed results. The Foreign Correspondents Club of 

China, an association of Beijing-based foreign journalists, and 

Human Rights Watch both issued reports noting that while some 

journalists have said that China’s reporting environment has improved, harassment, intimidation, and detention of foreign journalists and the Chinese citizens they interact with remains commonplace.73 Problems have included intimidation of citizens who speak 

to foreign journalists,74 harassment of journalists in politically sensitive areas such as the Tibet Autonomous Region,75 harassment of 

citizens who work with foreign journalists,76 and the refusal of 

local officials to recognize that the new rules extend to non-Olympics related coverage.77 It remains to be seen whether the rules 

will be extended beyond the Olympics and what effect they will 

have on domestic journalists. For a more detailed and updated 

analysis on the impact of these regulations on freedom of expression in China, see the Commission’s Web site at www.cecc.gov.

One obstacle to press freedom in China is that the state’s control 

over the media contributes to corruption in the media. According 

to David Bandurski, a research associate at the China Media 

Project at the University of Hong Kong: ‘‘Media corruption is facilitated by the quasi-official status of reporters, who are seen by 

many Chinese as government functionaries with special authority. 

This combination of power and profit motive is a key ingredient in 

many extortion attempts.’’ 78 In May 2007, the People’s Daily reported that a person who had posed as a reporter and top editor 

at the paper had collected 3.79 million yuan (US$500,000) in bribes 

before being caught and sentenced to life in prison.79 Problems of 

journalists asking for bribes in return for not publishing negative 

news or writing a positive story are reportedly widespread.80

This corruption has provided the state with a pretext to restrict 

China’s media even more.81 In March 2007, for example, the GAPP 

issued a notice requiring media to take greater measures to purge 

their local offices of unlicensed journalists after one was beaten to 

death by the owner of an illegal coal mine who thought the journalist was seeking a bribe.82 Later in 2007, a Beijing journalist falsified a report on food vendors filling steamed buns with cardboard. 

9

Amid rising international concern over China’s food exports, China 

responded with a crackdown on false news and illegal publications, 

including ‘‘illegal political newspapers and magazines that fabricate 

political rumors.’’ 83

INTERNET CENSORSHIP

China’s Internet Policy 

Since the Internet first became popular in the late 1990s, China’s 

policy has emphasized management and control over this medium. 

In a January 2007 speech to Politburo officials, Communist Party 

General Secretary Hu Jintao called for ‘‘purifying’’ the Internet environment, saying that ‘‘the stability of the state’’ depended on the 

Party taking full advantage of and successfully controlling the 

Internet.84 China has controlled the Internet through licensing requirements for Web sites, shutting down and blocking access to 

Web sites that post political content, and detaining citizens who 

criticize the government online or post politically sensitive content. 

Its efforts have been relatively successful. Despite heavy censorship, many citizens consider the Internet in China to be quite free, 

with unprecedented access to information about sports, entertainment, and business, and in some cases, political content that China 

fails to block. According to a recent survey, more than 80 percent 

of Internet users in China are satisfied with the diversity of content.85

Far from simply limiting online information that runs counter to 

the Party’s ideology, the Party has sought to use the Internet to 

bolster its monopoly on political power and to drive China’s economy. According to the World Bank, information and communication 

technologies have led China’s economic ascent, growing two to 

three times faster than China’s overall GDP over the last 10 

years.86 Internet use has skyrocketed from 59 million users in 2002 

to 162 million in June 2007.87 According to Tim Wu, an expert on 

China and a professor at Columbia Law School, ‘‘the Chinese government has seen the Internet as an enormous opportunity at igniting public opinion in its favor.’’ 88 During his January 2007 

speech to Politburo officials, President Hu emphasized the central 

role the Internet plays in the Party’s efforts to shape public opinion.89 China views the Internet as a battleground for public opinion 

that is currently monopolized by the West,90 and has sought to 

overcome this perceived monopoly by increasing Chinese sources 

for online information. The fact that it is easy to communicate with 

large numbers of people over the Internet, and that users rely 

heavily on the Internet for news and information, make the Internet 

a powerful platform for promoting the Party’s ideology and policies. 

Measures To Control the Internet 

China’s measures to control the Internet do not conform to international standards for freedom of expression. Under the ICCPR 

and UDHR, such restrictions may be imposed only if they are provided by law and are necessary to protect national security or public order, public health or morals, or the rights or reputations of 

others.91 In some cases, China has imposed restrictions to address 

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ments, spam, online pornography, and youth addiction to the Internet.92 But public officials in China also prohibit citizens from

accessing or posting online content if they find such content to be 

politically unacceptable without any formal determination of necessity based on ICCPR and UDHR standards. 

Licensing System 

As noted in the Commission’s 2006 Annual Report, the government requires all Web sites in China to be either licensed by, or 

registered with, the Ministry of Information Industry (MII).93 Web 

sites that fail to register or obtain a license may be shut down and 

their operators fined.94 Authorities appear to be shutting down 

more Web sites in preparation for the 17th Party Congress, many 

for being unregistered.95 Anyone wishing to post or transmit news 

reports or commentary relating to politics and economics, or military, foreign, and public affairs, must also have a government license.96 According to the OpenNet Initiative, ‘‘In large measure, 

the registration regulation is designed to induce Web site owners 

to forego potentially sensitive or prohibited content, such as political criticism, by linking their identities to that content. The regulation operates through a chilling effect.’’ 97 China continues to 

draft regulations to bring new forms of online media into the registration system. In April 2007, for example, Xinhua reported that 

the General Administration of Press and Publication (GAPP) had 

drafted the Regulation on the Supervision of Internet Publishing, 

which would require online magazines to be examined and approved by GAPP prior to publication.98

Monitoring, Blocking Access, and Filtering Content 

China has continued to block access to foreign Web sites, which 

it is able to do because it controls access at the gateway connection 

between China and the global Internet.99 Over the past five years, 

the Commission has noted that at various times China has blocked 

the Web sites of AltaVista, Google, and foreign news providers such 

as the Voice of America, Radio Free Asia, and the BBC, and human 

rights advocacy groups such as Human Rights Watch, Human 

Rights in China, Reporters Without Borders, and the Committee to 

Protect Journalists. The Commission has noted in its recommendations on the Internet that China’s censorship system prevents its 

citizens from accessing information about their rights and China’s 

violations of them. Since May 2005, the Chinese government has 

prevented its citizens from accessing the Commission’s Web site. In 

June 2007, China reportedly unblocked access to the English 

Wikipedia Web site after it had been blocked for most of the last 

18 months, but the version of Wikipedia designed for Chinese users 

remained blocked. Bloggers reported that certain pages on the 

English site remained blocked as well, such as those relating to 

Tibet or Tiananmen Square.100 In July, Yahoo!’s photo sharing 

Web site, Flickr, reported that China had blocked its site, after ruling out the possibility of a technical problem.101

China employs a large number of public security officials to monitor the Internet and is improving its monitoring capabilities as 

Internet usage grows. In April 2007, Xinhua reported that by the 

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itored by ‘‘virtual cops’’ of the Ministry of Public Security.102 In 

May, the MII announced that by October the ministry would complete a database of registered Web sites that would make it easier 

for law enforcement officials to keep track of the rapidly growing 

number of Web sites.103 Xinhua reported that more than 2,000 Web 

sites are registered each day.104

China compels Internet companies to assist in censorship by requiring them to filter search results and to monitor the Internet activities of its customers to ensure that ‘‘harmful information’’ does 

not come online. Chinese search engines such as Baidu, and the 

China-based search engines of Yahoo!, MSN, and Google filter 

search results, including those relating to the Voice of America, 

Radio Free Asia, and human rights.105 Providers of Internet access 

and services must monitor customers’ online activity, maintain 

records of such activity, provide such information to officials as 

part of a ‘‘legal investigation,’’ and remove any ‘‘harmful’’ information.106 In February 2007, Radio Free Asia reported that Sohu.com, 

a major Chinese Internet portal, had shut down two of the blogs 

of Pu Zhiqiang, a prominent lawyer who has promoted citizens’ 

legal rights.107 Internet cafes, where many Chinese access the 

Internet, are also required to record the identities of their customers, monitor their online activity, and maintain records of both 

for not less than 60 days.108

Internet companies have also repeatedly pledged publicly to support China’s censorship policies over the last five years, although 

they have shown a willingness to resist some proposals. This past 

year, the Internet Society of China (ISC), a think tank affiliated 

with the MII, sought to implement a policy requiring all bloggers 

to register under their real names. Real name systems may be useful for encouraging civil discourse and accountability, but in the 

context of China’s tightly censored Internet it threatens what has 

become a haven for expression, as bloggers had come to rely on a 

veneer of anonymity109 that had emboldened many to publicly express opinions they otherwise would not have. Real name systems 

that have already been implemented have reportedly led to dramatic drops in participation.110 In May 2007, the ISC decided 

against making the proposal mandatory following industry resistance.111 Instead, major Internet companies such as Sina Corporation, NetEase.com, Inc., TOM Online, Inc., Yahoo! China, which 

Yahoo! retains a minority stake in but reportedly does not have 

day-to-day operational control over,112 and MSN’s China service, 

signed a self-discipline pledge in August to encourage Internet 

users to use their real name when posting blogs or essays online.113 Yahoo! and MSN, however, both indicated that there were 

no current plans to require customers to use their real names to 

register for blogging services.114

Imprisoning Online Critics 

Over the last five years, public officials in China have frequently 

used Article 105 of the Criminal Law to detain citizens for criticizing the government and the Party online, especially on Web sites 

outside of China.115 Article 105 outlaws ‘‘subversion’’ or ‘‘incitement 

of subversion.’’ The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has 

criticized China’s use of such ‘‘vague, imprecise, and sweeping’’ proVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:06 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40480.TXT DEIDRE
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visions to punish peaceful expression of rights guaranteed in the 

UDHR and ICCPR.116

Over the past year, public officials in China have punished numerous online critics in the run-up to the 17th Party Congress and 

the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games.

• In October 2006, a court in Hebei province sentenced Internet essayist Guo Qizhen to four years in prison for inciting 

subversion in connection with 30 essays he posted on a U.S.-

based Web site.117

• In October 2006, a court in Shandong province sentenced 

Internet essayist Li Jianping to two years in prison for inciting 

subversion in connection with essays he posted on foreign Web 

sites.118

• In March 2007, a court in Zhejiang province sentenced writer Zhang Jianhong (whose pen name is Li Hong) to six years 

in prison for inciting subversion by ‘‘slandering’’ the government and China’s social system in 60 essays he posted on foreign Web sites.119

• In April 2007, a Zhejiang court sentenced painter and writer 

Yan Zhengxue to three years in prison for inciting subversion 

by ‘‘attacking the Party’s leaders’’ on foreign Web sites.120

• In August 2007, a Zhejiang court sentenced writer Chen 

Shuqing to four years in prison for inciting subversion after he 

criticized the government online.121

The above individuals in Zhejiang were reportedly members of 

the China Democracy Party (CDP) or charged with being a CDP 

member,122 and joined other reported CDP members in Zhejiang 

who were punished this past year, including Chi Jianwei and Lu ̈

Gengsong. Chi was sentenced to three years in prison in March for 

‘‘using a cult to undermine implementation of the law’’ 123 and Lu ̈

was detained in August on charges of inciting subversion.124 [See 

Section III—Civil Society for more information on the CDP.]

Authorities also refused to renew the license of Li Jianqiang, the 

lawyer who represented Chen, Zhang, Yan, and Guo.125 Li has represented numerous writers and activists, including freelance writer 

Yang Tongyan (whose pen name is Yang Tianshui), sentenced in 

May 2006 to 12 years in prison on ‘‘subversion’’ charges for criticizing the government online and attempting to form a branch of 

the CDP.126

Public officials in China have also used Article 105 to punish citizens who criticize China’s human rights record in the context of the 

2008 Olympic Games. In August 2007, public security officials in 

Jiamusi city, Heilongjiang province, arrested Yang Chunlin and 

charged him with inciting subversion after he organized an open 

letter titled ‘‘We Want Human Rights, Not the Olympics,’’ and 

gathered more than 10,000 signatures from farmers who had reportedly lost their land.127

Additional information on these cases and others is available on 

the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database [See Section I—Political Prisoner Database]. 

Both the UDHR and ICCPR allow for restrictions on free speech 

only to the extent necessary to protect national security. Available 

opinions from these cases, however, provide no examples of any 

subversive language and make no attempt to show that the actions 

13

in question caused or were likely to cause a threat to China’s national security.128 Moreover, the courts did not place any constitutional limitations on the authority of the government to criminalize 

certain types of speech, or balance the need to protect national security with the right to freedom of expression. Chinese officials 

have also begun to punish citizens for simply looking up and viewing Web sites deemed to be reactionary or a threat to its power. 

Zhang Jianping was barred from using the Internet for six months 

after he allegedly accessed the Web site for the Epoch Times, a 

New York-based newspaper linked to Falun Gong and known for 

its critical coverage of China.129

Challenges to Control 

The Internet presents a daunting challenge for the Party. Its decentralized nature and the ability to send information to large 

numbers of people quickly makes it increasingly difficult to control.130 This challenge is expected to increase over time as more 

people use the Internet and rely on it for information. With a penetration rate of only 12.3 percent of China’s population, below the 

world average of 17.6 percent, there is plenty of room to grow.131

The average number of hours per week spent online rose from 11.5 

in 2002 to 18.6 in June 2007. Almost all Internet users in China 

look to the Internet first for information and more than threefourths said that they first found out about a major news event 

from the Internet. 

Commentators have noted recently that the Internet and blogs in 

particular are becoming a powerful vehicle for citizens to provide 

one another information that contrasts with information in the 

state-controlled press and Party propaganda. The number of blogs, 

personalized Web pages that citizens use to provide running commentary on all kinds of topics, has grown to an estimated 20 million in China.132 Xiao Qiang, Director of the China Internet Project 

at the University of California at Berkeley, testified at the Commission’s hearing in September 2006 that ‘‘[o]nline discussions of 

current events, especially through Internet bulletin board systems 

(BBS) and Weblogs, or ‘blogs,’ are having real agenda-setting 

power.’’ According to Ashley Esarey, a Middlebury College professor 

and expert on China’s media controls, China’s blogs exhibit much 

higher freedom and pluralism than the state-controlled press.133

The Internet has provided a platform for ‘‘citizen journalists’’ who 

operate largely outside of the censorship system for traditional 

media134 and citizens are using less regulated blogs to break news 

stories. ‘‘[E]very blogger is a potential source of news. The Internet 

has the power to take any local news story and make it national 

news overnight,’’ said Li Datong, the ousted former editor of Freezing Point, a weekly published by the China Youth Daily, who now 

writes for the current affairs Web site openDemocracy.135

Other information sharing technologies, especially cell phones, 

are posing similar challenges to China’s information control. Cell 

phone use is ubiquitous in China and popular among broad segments of the population. By July 2007, cell phone usage had grown 

to 500 million, almost 40 percent of the population.136 Rural residents made up nearly half of China Mobile’s 53 million new cell 

phone subscribers in 2006.137 While cell phones are a less conduVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:06 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40480.TXT DEIDRE
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cive platform for exchanging large amounts of information, in 

China they are a popular tool for sending short text messages. Chinese of all ages use the ‘‘text messaging’’ function much more often 

than in the United States, where it has remained largely the province of the young.138 China also employs censorship technology to 

filter out politically sensitive text messages.139

Citizens have been using the Internet and cell phones with increasing success to shape and even drive the reporting agendas of 

mainstream news outlets, and to force governments to address 

problems. Censors have not been able to stop an initial tide of information and instead have been left to contain the situation after 

the fact. Several high-profile instances over the last year include:

• Officials in the southeastern port city of Xiamen, home to 

more than 2 million people, planned to build a 300-acre, 10.5 

billion yuan (US$1.4 billion) hazardous chemical plant in a 

heavily populated neighborhood.140 In March 2007, central government officials criticized the project’s safety,141 but officials 

in Xiamen kept local residents in the dark about the concerns 

and made sure local media touted the project’s economic benefits.142 A local resident who became aware of the concerns 

began to use his blog to organize opposition to the plant, telling readers the plant would hurt the local property market and 

tourism industry.143 Word quickly spread over the Internet. 

Meanwhile, residents began to circulate cell phone text messages comparing the plant to an ‘‘atomic bomb.’’ 144 Xinhua

reported that citizens sent nearly one million text messages opposing the project, leading local officials to suspend construction in May 2007.145 Despite local officials’ efforts to censor the 

Internet and cell phones, area residents used both to organize 

and document protest marches in early June that attracted 

thousands.146

• The Internet also helped bring nationwide and international 

attention to the kidnapping of migrant workers forced into 

labor in brick factories in central China. In early June 2007, 

the relative of a rescued child posted a plea on the Internet on 

behalf of hundreds of parents still looking for missing children.147 The post was rejected by a Xinhua forum for containing ‘‘sensitive content,’’ but was successfully posted on

another forum. Her original post and a re-posting were each 

viewed hundreds of thousands of times. Following the postings, 

China’s traditional media outlets gave the story extensive coverage, exposing in graphic detail the large numbers of migrant 

workers, including many children and mentally ill, who were 

forced under heavy guard to work for no pay and little food.148

In response, the government launched raids involving a reported 35,000 policemen, ordered media to highlight the Party’s rescue efforts, sought to discredit the Internet activist who 

helped uncover the scandal, and warned parents and lawyers 

for victims not to speak to journalists.149 [See Section II—

Worker Rights for more information on the labor issues relating to this case.] 

• In March 2007, Chinese bloggers made a national news sensation of a couple in Chongqing city in western China who resisted pressure to sell their home to developers, leaving their 

15

house protruding in the air like a nail after the land around 

it had been excavated.150 Bloggers posted photos of the ‘‘awesome nail house’’ and traveled to the scene to conduct their 

own reporting of the story, which hit the headlines shortly 

after the landmark Property Law had been passed.151

While these technological tools have offered citizens new opportunities to express themselves and to elude censors, they have not

increased citizens’ freedom of expression per se, as the Chinese 

government has consistently responded to these outpourings of discontent with increased restrictions. Officials imposed restrictions 

on media coverage, blocked access to or removed offending blogs 

and cell phone text messages, and in some cases warned citizens 

not to speak with the media.152 After the Xiamen chemical plant 

protests, for example, local officials drafted legislation that would 

prohibit area Internet users from commenting on blogs and discussion forums anonymously and require local Internet service providers to improve their capability to filter out ‘‘harmful and 

unhealthy’’ information.153

FREEDOM TO PUBLISH IDEAS AND OPINIONS

Government Policy Toward Publishing 

The Chinese government’s licensing scheme for print media154

that has remained in place over the last five years does not conform to international standards for freedom of the press.155 An individual who wishes to publish a book, newspaper, or magazine 

may not do so on their own, but must do so through a publisher 

that has been licensed by the General Administration of Press and 

Publication (GAPP).156 The GAPP requires that to obtain a license, 

publishers must have a government sponsor and meet minimum financial requirements.157 Every book, newspaper, and magazine 

must have a unique serial number, and the GAPP maintains exclusive control over the distribution of these numbers.158 GAPP officials have explicitly linked the allotment of book numbers to the 

political orientation of publishers.159

While not speaking specifically about this licensing scheme, Premier Wen Jiabao acknowledged in March that government agencies 

with too much licensing authority, and little restraint or oversight, 

had bred corruption among officials.160 In July, popular writer 

Wang Shuo accused television censors of abusing their authority 

and collecting bribes in exchange for a television show’s approval, 

a situation that one official acknowledged, but denied being widespread.161 Concern over corruption has not stopped officials from 

continuing to expand their licensing authority over free expression. 

In April 2007, the Ministry of Culture announced that it would 

begin to require actors, singers, directors, and other artists to receive certification in order to be hired.162

Publishers and writers must serve the Communist Party’s interests. Long Xinmin said in October 2006 while he was director of 

GAPP that press and publishing departments must ‘‘insist on the 

unwavering guiding position’’ of Marxism and the Party.163 In November, President Hu Jintao told writers that the Party hoped that 

‘‘each would make their own contribution to building a harmonious 

society.’’ 164 In March 2007, Long Xinmin said that press and pubVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:06 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40480.TXT DEIDRE
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lishing industries must ‘‘firmly grasp the correct guidance of public 

opinion and create a good public opinion environment’’ for the Party’s 17th Congress and ‘‘harmonious society’’ policy.165

Banning and Confiscating Illegal Publications 

The government continues to target publications that contain

political and religious information and opinions with which the government disagrees or for simply not having a license to publish. Between 2002 and 2006, public security officials in China confiscated 

590 million ‘‘illegal publications.’’ 166 Many of the publications are 

targeted for violating intellectual property rights or containing pornographic content, but in 2004, for example, public officials confiscated hundreds of thousands of copies of publications solely

because of their political content. In 2005, officials seized 996,000 

copies of ‘‘illegal political publications.’’ During a two-month period 

in 2006, officials seized 303,000 copies of ‘‘illegal publications’’ 

deemed to have harmed social stability, endangered state security, 

or incited ethnic separatism.167 During that same period, officials 

confiscated 616,000 unauthorized newspapers and periodicals.168 In 

February 2007, a GAPP official explained that a crackdown on ‘‘illegal political publications,’’ including those that ‘‘attacked the Party’s leaders,’’ ‘‘slandered the socialist system,’’ or concerned Falun 

Gong, would be a major focus of the ongoing Sweep Away Pornography and Strike Down Illegal Publications campaign in preparation for the Party’s 17th Congress.169 [See Section II—Freedom of 

Religion—Religious Speech for more information on restrictions on 

religious publications.] In the first three months of 2007 alone, authorities confiscated 357,000 copies of publications deemed to have 

harmed social stability, endangered state security, or incited ethnic 

separatism.170

China’s onerous licensing requirements encourage citizens to 

publish illegally, eroding the rule of law, and subjecting them to 

the risk that they will be caught and their publication shut down. 

One editor of a college magazine in China said in June 2007 that 

he had set up his own campus magazine because he had been disappointed with other magazines in China, which he described as 

‘‘homogeneous, very contrived, and lacking in energetic content.’’ 171

A professor commenting on the publications, however, said that 

without a publication number the students were engaged in illegal 

publishing. The professor said the licensing system was intended to 

ensure that publications were not ‘‘abused by certain groups.’’ 172

Censoring Publications 

Authors who have published through a licensed publisher still 

risk being censored. Propaganda officials decide what to censor behind closed doors, making verification difficult and a legal challenge impossible. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post 

reported that at a meeting in January 2007, GAPP said it had 

banned eight books because propaganda officials determined they 

had ‘‘overstepped the line.’’ 173 The books dealt with topics such as 

China’s media, SARS, the Cultural Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, and democracy. Officials reportedly criticized one of the 

17

books for ‘‘romanticizing’’ Japan’s occupation of China in the 1930s 

and 1940s and others for revealing state secrets.174

In response to media attempts to confirm the ban, GAPP officials 

denied its existence.175 Publishers, however, confirmed the ban.176

As punishment, authorities reportedly required the editors at one 

publisher to write self-criticisms and forego bonuses, and reduced 

the publisher’s allotment of book numbers by 20 percent. Zhang 

Yihe, the daughter of a prominent rightist figure from the 1950s 

and whose book on the repression faced by classical opera stars in 

1960s China was banned, sought to have a Chinese court overturn 

the action, but two courts in Beijing refused to accept her application.177

Preventing Writers From Traveling Freely 

Chinese officials have also punished critics by restricting their 

travel. In February 2007, local police officials prevented 20 writers 

from attending an International PEN conference in Hong Kong by 

refusing to approve their travel documents or warning them not to 

go.178 The writers included Zhang Yihe and Zan Aizong, a journalist who was detained in 2006 after he posted reports on

foreign Web sites about detentions of Protestants protesting the destruction of a church in Zhejiang province. 

POLITICAL PRISONER DEVELOPMENTS

The case of Shi Tao, a Chinese journalist currently serving a 10-

year sentence for ‘‘illegally providing state secrets to a foreign organization,’’ 179 gained greater attention outside of China in 2007, as 

new information about his case became public. In 2004, Shi Tao reportedly e-mailed notes to a New York-based democracy Web site 

that were from a propaganda document restricting media coverage 

during the 15th anniversary of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy 

protests. Shi Tao’s conviction in 2005 was based in part on information provided by Yahoo! China, then under the control of 

Yahoo!.180 In July 2007, the Dui Hua Foundation and Boxun released a copy of the request Chinese police made to Yahoo! China 

seeking information about Shi Tao’s e-mail account. The release of 

the request brought to light new information about the basis of the 

request as communicated to Yahoo! China because it indicates that 

the request related specifically to a suspected ‘‘illegal provision of 

state secrets’’ case.181 In addition, Shi Tao’s case remains significant because he exposed China’s censorship of its media. As the 

global impact of events within China has grown, China’s censorship 

of the media has become more important because the rest of the 

world relies on China’s media to better understand such events. 

The Commission will continue to monitor and note future actions 

by Chinese officials to punish citizens for exposing censorship of 

China’s media, in violation of these citizens’ internationally protected right to freedom of expression. 

Another journalist, Zhao Yan, completed his three-year sentence 

for fraud and was released in September 2007.182 Authorities originally arrested Zhao, a Chinese researcher for the New York Times 

(NYT), for providing state secrets to foreigners.183 Sources said the 

‘‘state secret’’ was information that former President and ComVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:06 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40480.TXT DEIDRE
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munist Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin had offered to resign 

as Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Jiang’s resignation was later reported in the official press. In August 2006, an intermediate court in Beijing sentenced Zhao to three years in prison 

on an unrelated fraud charge dating from 2001, but acquitted him 

of disclosing state secrets. Jerome Cohen, an expert on Chinese law 

and advisor to the NYT on Zhao’s case, testified at a Commission 

hearing in September 2006 that Zhao was ‘‘sentenced to three 

years in prison after another trial that can only be regarded as a 

farce, and after highly illegal—according to Chinese law—pre-trial 

detention, interrogation, et cetera.’’ 

In a positive sign, one journalist was released early while another received a sentence reduction. Local officials released former 

Xinhua journalist Gao Qinrong from a prison in Shanxi province in 

December 2006, 4 years before his 12-year sentence was to expire.184 Gao was sentenced in 1999 after he exposed corruption at 

an irrigation project in Yuncheng district, Shanxi province, that 

implicated top provincial officials. Xu Zerong received a nine-month 

sentence reduction on an unknown date and is due for release in 

September 2012.185 Xu, a senior research fellow at the Guangdong 

Academy of Social Sciences in Guangzhou city and head of an independent publishing company in Hong Kong, was sentenced to 13 

years in prison in 2001 for revealing state secrets by copying and 

sending historical material dating from the 1950s about the Korean 

War to researchers overseas, and illegally operating a business by 

selling books and periodicals without officially issued book numbers. 

Additional information on these cases and others is available on 

the Commission’s Political Prisoner Database [see Section I—Political Prisoner Database].

19

Endnotes 

1 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 103. According to a 2005 State Council Information Office White Paper: ‘‘The Chinese government requires its subordinate departments at all 

levels to make public their administrative affairs as far as possible, so as to enhance the transparency of government work and guarantee the people’s right to know, participate in and supervise the work of the government.’’ State Council Information Office, White Paper on Political 

Democracy, 19 October 05. 2 CECC, 2003 Annual Report, 2 October 03, 61–62. 

3 ‘‘China Effectively Promotes Administrative Transparency,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 23 

March 07. 4For example, the Web site for the State Environmental Protection Administration contains 

links to relevant policies, laws, and regulations, a daily report on air quality in major cities, 

and news stories on the environment. State Environmental Protection Administration of China 

(Online), visited on August 28, 2007. 5 ‘‘China’s Media Announcement Work and Construction of Media Spokesperson System 

Makes New Progress’’ [Zhongguo xinwen fabu gongzuo he xinwen fayanren zhidu jianshe qude 

xin fazhan], China.com.cn (Online), 22 January 07; ‘‘Supreme People’s Court and High Courts 

Have Already All Established News Spokespersons’’ [Zhongguo zuigaofayuan he gaojifayuan yi 

quanbu jianli xinwen fayanren], Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 12 September 06. 6See, e.g., Regulation on the Handling of Public Health Emergencies [Tufa gonggong weisheng 

shijian yingji tiaoli], issued 9 May 03, art. 45; Ching-Ching Ni, ‘‘China Toughens Stance on Environmental Protection,’’ Los Angeles Times (Online), 22 February 06; Elaine Kurtenbach, ‘‘Environmental Agency Says Disasters Must Be Reported Within One Hour,’’ Associated Press, reprinted in South China Morning Post (Online), 7 February 06. 7 Regulation on the Handling of Public Health Emergencies, arts. 19, 25. 

8 CECC, 2003 Annual Report, 37; CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20 September 06, 102. 

9 Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Public Disclosure of Government Information [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo zhengfu xinxi gongkai tiaoli], issued 5 April 07, art. 1. 10 Ibid., arts. 10, 11, 12. 11 Ibid., arts. 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24. 12Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure (Trial) [Huanjing xinxi gongkai banfa 

(shixing)], issued 11 April 07. 13 Regulation on Public Disclosure of Government Information, art. 14; Measures on Environmental Information Disclosure (Trial), art. 12. 14See, e.g., Provisions on the Protection of Secrets in News Publishing [Xinwen chuban baomi 

guiding], issued 13 June 92, art. 14: ‘‘Anyone wishing to provide a foreign news publishing organization a report or publication with contents that relate to the nation’s government, economy, 

diplomacy, technology or military shall first apply to this agency or their supervising organ or 

unit for examination and approval.’’ See also PRC Law on the Protection of State Secrets 

[Zhonghua renmin gongheguo baoshou guojia mimi fa], issued 5 September 88, art. 8; Measures 

for the Implementation of the Law on the Protection of State Secrets [Zhonghua renmin 

gongheguo baoshou guojia mimi fa shishi banfa], issued 25 April 90, art. 4; and Article 1 of the 

Explanation of Certain Issues Regarding the Specific Laws to be Used in Adjudicating Cases 

of Stealing or Spying to Obtain, or Illegally Supplying, State Secrets or Intelligence for Foreigners [Guanyu shenli wei jingwai qiequ, citan, shoumai, feifa tigong guojia mimi, qingbao 

anjian juti yingyong falu ̈ ruogan wenti de jieshi], issued 20 November 00, which states: ‘‘The 

term ‘intelligence’ in Article 111 of the Criminal Law refers to items which involve the security 

and interests of the nation, but which are not public or which, according to relevant regulations, 

should not be made public.’’ See also ‘‘Secrets Protection Knowledge’’ [Baomi zhishi], posted on 

the Administration for the Protection of State Secrets of Guangdong province Web site, which 

states: ‘‘ ‘Relating to the security and interests of the nation,’ means that, if a secret matter were 

known by people who do not currently know it, it would result in various kinds of harm to the 

security and interests of the nation.’’ In September 2003, the Guangzhou Daily published a 

warning to readers that everyone from Internet users to garbage collectors can run afoul of China’s state secrets legislation. ‘‘If a Nanny Can Disclose State Secrets, Then Average Citizens 

Should Raise Their Awareness of Preserving Secrets’’ [Baomu jingran xielou guojia jimi baixing 

yexu tigao baomi yishi], People’s Daily (Online), 5 September 03. 15 Regulations on the Specific Scope of State Secrets in Environmental Protection Work, issued 

28 December 04, art. 2; Human Rights in China (Online), ‘‘State Secrets: China’s Legal Labyrinth,’’ June 2007, 174. 16 Ye Doudou and Duan Hongqing, ‘‘How Wide Is the Door to Chinese Governments’ Information Disclosure,’’ Caijing (Online), 2 May 07; ‘‘China Issues Landmark Decree To Encourage 

Gov’t Transparency,’’ Xinhua (Online), 24 April 07. 17 Human Rights in China, ‘‘State Secrets: China’s Legal Labyrinth,’’ 51. 18 Committee to Protect Journalists (Online), ‘‘Falling Short, As the 2008 Olympics Approach, 

China Falters on Press Freedom,’’ August 2007, 17; ‘‘Shanghai Journalist Sues Municipal Authorities for Refusing Interviews’’ [Caifang zao jujue shanghai jizhe qisu shi guihua ju xinxi bu 

gongkai], Xinhua (Online), 2 June 06. 19 Ibid. 20PRC Emergency Response Law, enacted 30 August 07, art. 53. 21 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 20. 22 ‘‘China Adopts Emergency Response Law,’’ People’s Daily (Online), 30 August 07. 23PRC Emergency Response Law, art. 54. 24 Ibid., art. 65. 25The South China Morning Post quoted one Shanghai journalist as saying, ‘‘Who gets to define what false information is? It’s still up to the government. They can still do whatever they 

20

want. As long as the system stays the same, I can’t imagine any major improvement.’’ Ting Shi, 

‘‘Journalists Welcome Revision of Rules on Reporting Emergencies,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 26 June 07. 26 ‘‘Li Changqing Gets Three Years Imprisonment for Reporting Disease Outbreak,’’ CECC 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, February 2006, 15–16. 27PRC Public Security Administration Punishment Law, enacted 28 August 05, art. 25. See, 

e.g., Yan Lieshan, ‘‘Xin Yanhua’s Luck and the Bad Fortune of the Three Xinyi Netizens’’ [Xin 

Yanhua de jiaoxing he xinyi sanwangmin de buxing], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 12 

July 07; and Zhan Jiang, ‘‘Selectively Taking Citizens’ Text Messages Out of Context Violates 

Freedom of Communication’’ [Suiyi jiequ gongmin duanxin qinfan tongxin ziyou], Southern 

Daily (Online), 27 July 07. 28 Yu Wei, ‘‘Accused of Spreading Rumors While Participating in Discussion Over Rainstorm, 

23 Year Old Female Jinan Internet User Who Posted Is Detained’’ [Canyu bayou taolun bei zhi 

sanbu yaoyan jinan 23 sui nuwangyou gentie bei ju], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 25 

July 07. 29 CECC, 2003 Annual Report, 64. 30Supreme People’s Court Several Opinions on Strengthening Open Adjudication Work of the 

People’s Courts [Zui gao renmin fayuan guanyu jiaqiang renmin fayuan shenpan gongkai 

gongzuo de ruogan yijian], issued 4 June 07, arts. 5, 15. 31 Ibid., art. 22. 32 Ibid., art. 3. 33 ‘‘Supreme People’s Court Clarifies ‘Restricted Area’ for People’s Court News Publishing 

Work’’ [Zuigaofayuan minque renminfayuan xinwen fabu gongzuo ‘‘jinqu’’], Xinhua (Online), 13 

September 06. For a discussion of the competing roles that the media and the courts play for 

the Party, and the media’s influence over China’s courts and legal development, see Benjamin 

L. Liebman, ‘‘Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System,’’ 105 Colum. 

L. Rev. 1, 7 (2005). 34 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A(XXI) of 16 December 66, entry into force 23 March 76 [hereinafter ICCPR]. China 

has signed, but has not yet ratified, the ICCPR. The Chinese government has committed itself 

to ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into conformity with, the ICCPR, and reaffirmed its commitment as recently as April 13, 2006, in its application for membership in the UN Human 

Rights Council. China’s top leaders have previously stated on three separate occasions that they 

are preparing for ratification of the ICCPR, including in a September 6, 2005, statement by Politburo member and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress on Law, in statements by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe tour, and in a January 27, 

2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao before the French National Assembly. 

Article 19 of the ICCPR states: ‘‘1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 

interference. 2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 

freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 

either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.’’ 35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217A(III) of 10 December 48 [hereinafter UDHR]. Article 19 of the UDHR states: ‘‘Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 

media and regardless of frontiers.’’ 36PRC Constitution, art. 35. Article 35 of China’s Constitution states: ‘‘Citizens of the People’s 

Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession 

and of demonstration.’’ 37This language is found in Article 19 of the ICCPR. Article 29 of the UDHR states the following: ‘‘everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 

the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and 

of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.’’ 38 Ashley Esarey, ‘‘Speak No Evil, Mass Media Controls in Contemporary China,’’ Freedom 

House, February 2006, 3–4. 39 Article 11(2) of the Regulations on the Administration of Publishing states that publishing 

work units must have a sponsoring work unit and a managing work unit recognized by the 

State Council’s publishing administration agency. The ‘‘sponsoring work unit’’ must be a government agency of a relatively high level, and the publishing work unit must answer to its sponsoring work unit and managing work unit. Circular Regarding Issuance of the ‘‘Temporary Provisions on the Functions of the Sponsoring Work Unit and the Managing Work Unit for Publishing Work Units’’ [Guanyu fabu ‘‘Guanyu chuban danwei de zhuban danwei he zhuguan 

danwei zhize de zanxing guiding’’ de tongzhi], issued 29 June 93, arts. 5–6; Regulations on the 

Administration of Publishing [Chuban guanli tiaoli], issued 25 December 01, art. 11(2). 40Measures for the Administration of Journalist Accreditation Cards [Xinwen jizhezheng 

guanli banfa], issued 10 January 05; Measures for the Administration of News Bureaus 

[Baoshejizhezhan guanli banfa], issued 10 January 05; Interim Provisions for the Administration of Those Employed as News Reporters and Editors [Guanyu xinwen caibian renyuan congye 

guanli de guiding (shixing)], issued 22 March 05; Interim Implementation Rules for the Administration of Those Employed as Radio and Television News Reporters and Editors 

[Guangdianzongju yinfa ‘‘guangbo yingshi xinwen caipian renyuan congye guanli de shishi 

fangan (shixing) de tongzhi’’], issued 1 April 05. GAPP has used its licensing authority to punish 

journalists for their reporting. In September 2006, GAPP revoked the license of Zan Aizong, a 

journalist who was detained for one week in August 2006 after he posted reports on foreign Web 

sites about detentions of Protestants who were protesting the destruction of a church in 

Xiaoshan city, Nanjing province. ‘‘September 17–21, 2006’’ [2006 nian 9 yue 17 ri — 9 yue 21 

ri], Mediainchina.org.cn, 27 September 06. In March 2007, police in the city of Nanjing reportVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:06 Feb 01, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 U:\DOCS\40480.TXT DEIDRE
21

edly harassed a reporter for the U.S.-based news Web site Boxun, accusing him of working for 

an illegal news outlet and failing to have a journalist license. Committee to Protect Journalists 

(Online), ‘‘China Reporter Arrested Following Months of Police Harassment,’’ 4 June 07. 41Liebman, ‘‘Watchdog or Demagogue?,’’ 18–20. 42 CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 5 October 04, 47; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 56–57. 43Provisions on the Protection of Secrets in News Publishing. For example, in April 2003, two 

editors at the Xinhua news agency were fired for publishing a news report about SARS that 

had been classified as secret. ‘‘Two Chinese Editors Sacked over Confidential SARS Document,’’ 

South China Morning Post, 29 April 2003. 44 Committee to Protect Journalists, ‘‘Falling Short,’’ 25. 45See, e.g., CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 48; and Andrew Batson, Geoffrey Fowler, and Juying 

Qin, ‘‘China Magazine Is Pulled,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 9 March 07. 46 CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 47; CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 56–57. 47 ‘‘Hu Jintao Delivers Important Remarks at National Meeting of Propaganda Department 

Directors’’ [Hu Jintao zai quanguo xuanchuan buzhang huiyi shang fabiao zhongyao jianghua], 

Xinhua (Online), 12 January 01. 48 ‘‘Party Uses Journalists, Artists, Academics To Promote ‘Harmonious Society’,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 10. Following the plenum, top officials 

such as Li Changchun, a Politburo member, and Liu Yunshan, a top Party official and Director 

of the Central Propaganda Department, told journalists that their ‘‘foremost duty is to study, 

publicize, and carry out’’ the spirit of the sixth plenum and the important statements of President Hu to unify the thoughts of the whole party and the whole nation, and to be ‘‘loyal to the 

Party’s news work and protect the interests of the Party and the people.’’ The duty of journalists 

to be caretakers of the Party’s ideology is also embodied in formal regulations. See, e.g., the Interim Provisions on the Administration of Those Employed as News Reporters and Editors 

issued jointly by the General Administration of Press and Publication, the Central Propaganda 

Department, and the State Administration of Radio, Film and Television in 2005, which provides that reporters and editors must be ‘‘guided by Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, 

Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the important ideology of the ‘Three Represents’, support the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and support the socialist system’’ and ‘‘protect the interest of the Party and the government.’’ Interim Provisions on the Administration of Those Employed as News Reporters and Editors, art. 1. One Chinese court has recently held that for purposes of China’s criminal law, journalists at state-owned newspapers are state functionaries. 

‘‘Former China Business Times Reporter Meng Huaihu Final Sentence of 12 Years for Extortion’’ [Zhonghua gongshang shibao jizhe Meng Huaihu zhongshen yi shouhui zui panxing 12 

nian], Xinhua (Online), 19 April 07. 49 ‘‘Liu Yunshan: Begin Contruction of a Good Ideological and Public Opinion Atmosphere for 

the 17th Party Congress’’ [Liu Yunshan: wei shiqi da yingzao lianghao sixiang yulun qifen], 

Xinhua (Online), 9 July 07; ‘‘Perform Well News Publishing Work, To Create a Positive Cultural 

Environment for the 17th Party Congress’’ [Zuohao xinwen chuban gongzuo wei shiqi da zhaokai 

yingzao lianghao wenhua huanjing], Xinhua (Online), 16 July 07; Edward Cody, ‘‘Broadcast 

Media in China Put On Notice,’’ Washington Post (Online), 27 February 07; Cary Huang, ‘‘Party 

Introduces New Censorship Rule,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 16 January 07. 50 ‘‘China To Show Only ‘Ethically Inspiring TV Series’ in Prime Time From Next Month,’’ 

People’s Daily (Online), 22 January 07. 51Gordon Fairclough, ‘‘Finally Rescued, China’s ‘Slaves’ Detail Their Plight,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 19 June 07; ‘‘1,340 Rescued from Forced Labor,’’ Xinhua (Online), 13 August 07. 52 Cary Huang, ‘‘Magazine Censured for Political ‘Defiance’,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 30 November 06. After further investigation, propaganda officials docked the magazine six 

points under a 12-point punishment system imposed in January 2007 (12 points meaning closure of the magazine) and issued a serious internal warning to the executive editor. Cary 

Huang, ‘‘Editor and Magazine Disciplined by Party,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 26 

April 07. 53Kristine Kwok, ‘‘Two Newspaper Staff Suspended for ‘June 4’ Advert,’’ South China Morning 

Post (Online), 8 June 07. 54 Batson, Fowler, and Qin, ‘‘China Magazine Is Pulled.’’ 55 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 102. 56 ‘‘Shanghai’s Top Leader Removed Over Scandal Involving Alleged Misuse of City Pension 

Funds,’’ Associated Press (Online), 25 September 06; James T. Areddy, ‘‘China Warns of Broader 

Corruption Probe,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 27 September 06. 57 ‘‘Media Told To Downplay Demise of Party Boss,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 27 

September 06. 58 ‘‘Shanghai City Government Press Conferences Come Back Online, No Mention of Chen 

Liangyu’’ [Shanghai shi zhengfu xinwen fabuhui chongxin dengchang bu ti Chen Liangyu], 

Boxun (Online), 4 November 06. 59Keith Bradsher, ‘‘China Tells Little About Illness That Kills Pigs, Officials Say,’’ New York 

Times (Online), 8 May 07. 60 Ibid. 61 Richard McGregor, ‘‘750,000 A Year Killed by Chinese Pollution,’’ Financial Times (Online), 

2 July 07. The article also said that the World Bank removed a map showing the areas with 

the most deaths because it was too sensitive. 62 Ibid. 63 ‘‘China Denies Requiring WB to Delete Environmental Data from Report,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 5 July 07. 64 ‘‘Censors Clamp Down on Food Safety Reports,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 31 

July 07. 65For example, in March 2007, State Council Information Office (SCIO) Director Cai Wu said 

that ‘‘leaders should not be afraid of reporters.’’ ‘‘Cai Wu: Some Leaders Fear Facing Reporters 

22

Because They Worry They Will Lose Their Official Posts’’ [Cai Wu: moxie lingdao pa jian jizhe 

shi danxin diudiao ziji de wushamao], Chinanews.com, 9 March 07. In January 2007, SCIO’s 

vice-minister, speaking about foreign journalists, said that the Chinese government was moving 

away from its practice of ‘‘managing the media’’ and was preparing to ‘‘serve’’ and not shy away 

from reporters. ‘‘China Gov’ts ‘Serve Media, Not Manage Them,’ ’’ China Daily (Online), 4 January 07. 66 ‘‘Official: Transparency Key to Public Faith,’’ China Daily (Online), 29 July 07. 67 ‘‘Anhui Requires Journalists To Write ‘Positive’ Reports for Promotion,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 18–19 68 ‘‘Linking Professional Evaluations to Positive Reporting Is Absurd’’ [Zhicheng pingding yu 

zhengmian baodao guagou tai huangtang], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 27 October 06. 69 ‘‘Anhui Requires Journalists To Write ‘Positive’ Reports for Promotion,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 18–19 70 In 2001, when the Chinese government was bidding to host the 2008 Summer Olympic 

Games, Wang Wei, then the Secretary-General of the Beijing Bid Committee, said that the government would give the news media ‘‘complete freedom’’ to report on China and that the guarantee had been made in China’s bid documents. ‘‘Journalists To Write Whatever They Like if 

Beijing Holds 2008 Games,’’ China Daily (Online), 12 July 01. 71 Regulations on Reporting Activities in China by Foreign Journalists During the Beijing 

Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period [Beijing auyunhui ji qi choubei qijian waiguo jizhe 

zai hua caifang guiding], issued 1 December 06. 72The regulations expire one month after Beijing hosts the 13th Paralympic Games. The 

Paralympic Games follow the 2008 Summer Olympics Games, which run from August 8 to August 24, 2008. ‘‘Paralympic Games Schedules Set,’’ China Daily (Online), 22 May 06. 73 In a survey of 163 journalists conducted by the Foreign Correspondents Club of China and 

released in August 2007, 43 percent of the respondents said that China’s reporting environment 

had improved, although 95 percent said reporting conditions still did not meet what they considered to be international standards. Respondents reported 157 incidents of interference, including 

57 instances of intimidation of local citizens who spoke with foreign reporters. Foreign Correspondents Club of China, ‘‘Foreign Correspondents: China Yet To Fulfill Olympic Pledge of 

Free Media Coverage, Harassment Still Common,’’ 1 August 07. A report by Human Rights 

Watch also found that government and state security officials, as well as unidentifiable thugs, 

were harassing, intimidating, and detaining foreign journalists, but that some foreign reporters 

also said that the new rules ‘‘significantly widened access to sources and topics previously taboo, 

such as access to certain prominent political dissidents and to villages with public health emergencies.’’ Human Rights Watch (Online), ‘‘Beijing 2008 China’s Olympian Human Rights Challenges,’’ 10 August 07. 74Foreign Correspondents Club of China, ‘‘China Yet To Fulfill Olympic Pledge of Free Media 

Coverage.’’ 75 Ibid. In May 2007, a foreign ministry official reportedly summoned two foreign journalists 

to the ministry to reprimand them for stories they had written about the TAR. Reporters Without Borders (Online), ‘‘Two Foreign Reporters Summoned and Warned About Tibet Stories,’’ 25 

May 07. The new regulations do not contain any exception or carve-out for Tibet or any other 

region of China. Foreign ministry officials, however, have indicated orally that existing regulations applicable to Tibet, such as special permit requirements, remain in effect. In a February 

13, 2007, press conference Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu said the following about 

the new rule’s applicability to Tibet: ‘‘The new Regulations should be abided by generally when 

foreign journalists conduct reporting activities in Tibet and elsewhere. In the meantime, due to 

restraints in natural conditions and reception capabilities, Tibetan local authorities have some 

regulations for foreigners’ access there, which should be abided by. Please contact the local foreign affairs office for conducting reporting activities in Tibet.’’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on 13 February 

2007,’’ 14 February 07 (English translation); Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Online), ‘‘Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu’s Regular Press Conference on 13 February 2007’’ [2007 nian 2 

yue 13 ri waijiaobu fayanren Jiang Yu juxing liexing jizhehui], 13 February 07 (Chinese). 76 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Beijing 2008 China’s Olympian Human Rights Challenges.’’ 77 In March 2007, local officials in Hunan province detained two BBC journalists covering a 

riot, telling them the rules apply only to Olympics coverage. Reporters Without Borders (Online), ‘‘Disturbing Lapses in Application of New Rules for Foreign Media,’’ 22 March 07. Foreign 

ministry and State Council officials have publicly stated that the rules cover not only the Olympics but also politics, economy, society, and culture in China. ‘‘Journalists Promised Wide Access 

in 2008,’’ China Daily (Online), 2 December 06; ‘‘Foreign Journalists ‘Welcome in China’,’’ China 

Daily (Online), 29 December 06. The ‘‘Service Guide for Overseas Media Coverage of the Beijing 

Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period’’ issued by the Beijing Organizing Committee for 

the Games of the XXIX Olympiad state that under the rules ‘‘[f]oreign journalists can carry out 

reporting activities not only on the Beijing Olympic Games and the preparatory period, but also 

on politics, economy, society, and culture of China.’’ Beijing Organizing Committee for the 

Games of the XXIX Olympiad, ‘‘Service Guide for Overseas Media Coverage of the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period,’’ 3. 78 Christopher Bodeen, ‘‘China Media Seen as Corrupt, But Experts Blame Communist Controls for Skewing System,’’ Associated Press (Online), 31 January 07. 79 ‘‘Fraudster Who Impersonated People’s Daily Deputy Editor-in-Chief Liu Yonghong Sentenced to Life’’ [Maochong renmin ribao fu zongbianji zha pian zhe Liu Yonghong bei pan wuqi 

tuxing], People’s Daily (Online), 9 May 07. 80 Edward Cody, ‘‘Blackmailing By Journalists in China Seen as ‘Frequent’,’’ Washington Post 

(Online), 25 January 07; Winny Wang, ‘‘China To Improve Supervision of Reporters,’’ Shanghai 

Daily (Online), 9 July 07. 

23

81The Commission noted in its 2004 Annual Report that the media in China often focus on 

the ethical problems within its own industry. CECC, 2004 Annual Report, 48. 82 Notice Regarding Further Improving Standards for Supervision of Press Journalist’s Stations [Guanyu jin yibu guifan baoshe jizhezhan guanli de tongzhi], issued 18 March 07. 83 ‘‘China Targets ‘False News’ Ahead of Party’s Congress,’’ Associated Press (Online), 16 August 07; ‘‘Special National Operation Launched To Resolutely Rid News Publishing of the ‘Four 

Dangers’’’ [Quanguo kaizhan zhuanxiang xingdong jianjue qingchu xinwen chuban ‘‘si hai’’], People’s Daily (Online), 15 August 07. 84 ‘‘Hu Jintao: Increase the Building and Administration of Internet Culture with a Spirit of 

Innovation’’ [Hu Jintao: yi chuangxin de jingshen jiqiang wangluo wenhua jianshe he guanli], 

Xinhua (Online), 24 January 07; ‘‘Hu Asks Officials To Better Cope With Internet,’’ Xinhua (Online), 24 January 07. 85 China Internet Network Information Center, 20th Statistical Survey on Internet Development in China, 18 July 07. 86 ‘‘Infocom Is ‘Vital’ for China,’’ Xinhua (Online), 27 April 07. 87 China Internet Network Information Center, 11th Statistical Survey on Internet Development in China, 15 January 03; China Internet Network Information Center, 20th Statistical 

Survey. 88 ‘‘China’s Internet Conundrum,’’ Podcast with Tim Wu, CNET News.com (Online), 1 June 07. 89 ‘‘Hu Jintao: Increase the Building and Administration of Internet Culture with a Spirit of 

Innovation,’’ Xinhua. In his January 2007 speech, President Hu Jintao also said it was important to ‘‘strengthen the battlefield position over ideology and public opinion on the Internet.’’ 90 ‘‘Build Up An Online Culture, Solidify Our Position Online’’ [Jianshe wangluo wenhua 

gonggu wangshang zhendi], Guangming Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 19 June 07. 91This language is found in Article 19 of the ICCPR. Article 29 of the UDHR states the following: ‘‘everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 

the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and 

of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.’’ 92 Ariana Eunjung Cha, ‘‘In China, Stern Treatment for Young Internet ‘Addicts’,’’ Washington 

Post (Online), 22 February 07; ‘‘New Measures Come Out: Excessive Senders of Junk Mail To 

Be Recorded on ‘Black List’’’ [Xin cuoshi chutai lanfa lese youjian jiang jiru ‘‘hei mingdan’’], 

Xinhua (Online), 1 March 06; ‘‘Authorities Crack Down on Internet Porn,’’ Agence France-Press, 

reprinted in South China Morning Post (Online), 15 August 07; ‘‘China’s News Websites Vow 

To Clean Up the Internet,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in China Daily (Online), 18 May 07. 93 All commercial Web sites must obtain a government license. Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services [Hulianwang xinxi fuwu guanli banfa], issued 20 September 00. All non-commercial Web site operators must register. Registration Administration 

Measures for Non-Commercial Internet Information Services [Fei jingyingxing hulianwang xinxi 

fuwu bei’an guanli banfa], issued 28 January 05. Because the MII’s registration system gives 

the government discretion to reject an application based on content (i.e., whether the Web site 

operator intends to post ‘‘news,’’ and if so, whether it is authorized to do so), it is qualitatively 

different from registration which all Web site operators must undertake with a domain registrar, and constitutes a de facto licensing scheme. 94Peter Ford, ‘‘Why China Shut Down 18,401 Websites,’’ Christian Science Monitor (Online), 

25 September 07; ‘‘MII Reports China’s Government Has Met its Goals in Private Web Site 

Crackdown,’’ CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2005, 5; ‘‘Ministry of 

Information Industry: Web Sites That Fail to Register May Be Shut Down,’’ CECC Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, June 2005, 3. 95Ford, ‘‘Why China Shut Down 18,401 Websites.’’ 96 ‘‘Government Shuts Down Web Site; China Scholars and Activists Respond,’’ CECC China 

Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, September 2006, 12–13; ‘‘Government Agencies Issue 

New Regulations Restricting News Reporting on the Internet,’’ CECC China Human Rights and 

Rule of Law Update, November 2005, 4; Provisions on the Administration of Internet News Information Services [Hulianwang xinwen xinxi fuwu guanli guiding], issued 25 September 05. 97OpenNet Initiative (Online), ‘‘OpenNet Initiative: Bulletin 011–Analysis of China’s NonCommercial Web Site Registration Regulation,’’ 22 February 06. The Opennet Initiative comprises researchers at the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University 

of Toronto, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School, the Advanced Network Research Group at the Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge, and the 

Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford University. 98 ‘‘GAPP Drafts Supervision Regulation, Celebrity Magazines To Be Supervised’’ [Xinwen 

chuban zongshu ni qicao guanli tiaoli mingren zazhi jiang shou jianguan], Shanghai Youth 

Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 23 April 07. 99OpenNet Initiative (Online), ‘‘Internet Filtering in China in 2004–2005: A Country Study,’’ 

14 April 05; China Internet Network Information Center, 20th Statistical Survey. 100Steven Schwankert, ‘‘English Wikipedia Unblocked in China,’’ IDG News Service (Online), 

18 June 07; Simon Burns, ‘‘Wikipedia Partly Unblocked in China,’’ VNUnet (Online), 18 June 

07. 101 Juan Carlos Perez, ‘‘Flickr Investigates Blocking of Images in China,’’ IDG News Service 

(Online), 11 June 07. 102 ‘‘Clean Up Cyberspace,’’ China Daily, reprinted in Xinhua (Online), 19 April 07. 103 ‘‘China’s Law Enforcement Internet Database Set for Completion This Year,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 28 May 07. 104 Ibid. 105 CECC, 2006 Annual Report, 35. 106Measures for the Administration of Internet Information Services, arts. 14, 15, 16. 

24

107 ‘‘Lawyer Pu Zhiqiang Sees 2 Blogs Closed Within 10 Days’’ [Lu ̈ shi Pu Zhiqiang shi tian 

nei liangge boke bei guan], Radio Free Asia (Online), 21 February 07. 108 Regulations on the Administration of Business Sites of Internet Access Services 

[Hulianwang shangwang fuwu yingye changsuo guanli tiaoli], issued 29 September 02, arts. 19, 

23; China Internet Network Information Center, 20th Statistical Survey. 109 Bloggers are never truly anonymous because they can be traced back to an IP address. 

Jason Leow, ‘‘Why China Relaxed Blogger Crackdown, Registration Plan Was Dropped In Face 

of Tech-Industry Protests,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 17 May 07. 110See, e.g., ‘‘Real Name Registration in Full Bloom, ‘Lilac’ Withers and Falls: To Post on Harbin Institute of Technology’s BBS Requires Information About Full Name and School Department’’ [Shimingzhi shengkai zidingxiang diaoxie hagongda BBS fatie xuyao xingming he yuanxi 

xinxi], Southern Metropolitan Daily, 13 July 07. 111 Jason Leow, ‘‘China Eases Real-Name Blog Effort,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 23 May 

07. 112The Internet in China–A Tool of Freedom or Suppression?, Joint Hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations, and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 15 February 06, Testimony of Michael Callahan, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Yahoo! Inc.; ‘‘Congressional Committee to Investigate Disparity Between Documents and Hearing Testimony by Yahoo!,’’ House Foreign Affairs Committee (Online), 3 August 

07. 113 Internet Society of China (Online), ‘‘Internet Society of China Formally Issues ‘Blogging 

Services Self-Discipline Pledge’ To Promote Orderly Development of Blogging Services’’ 

[Zhongguo hulianwang xiehui zhengshi fabu ‘‘boke fuwu zilu gongyue,’’ cujin boke fuwu youxu 

fazhan], 21 August 07. 114 Reporters Without Borders (Online), ‘‘Yahoo! and MSN Comment on ‘Self-Disciplinary 

Pledge’,’’ 28 August 07. 115PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 

01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 06, art. 105. 116 UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Mission to China, Addendum, 29 December 04, para. 78. 117 ‘‘Authorities Sentence Guo Qizhen to Four Years in Prison for Online Essays,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 5–6. 118 ‘‘Shandong Court Sentences Internet Essayist Li Jianping to Two Years’ Imprisonment,’’ 

CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 12–13. 119 ‘‘Well-Known Online Article Writer Zhang Jianhong Sentenced for Inciting Subversion of 

State Power’’ [Wangshang zhuanwen da Zhang Jianhong shandong dianfu guojia zhengquan an 

xuanpan], Xinhua, reprinted in Phoenix Television (Online), 20 March 07. 120 Independent Chinese Pen Center (Online), ‘‘ICPC Statement Regarding Protest of Member 

Yan Zhengxue’s Sentence’’ [Duli zhongwen bihui guanyu huiyuan Yan Zhengxue bei panxin de 

kangyi shengming],’’ 19 April 07. 121 ‘‘China Jails Internet Writer for Subversion, Disbars Lawyer,’’ Reuters (Online), 16 August 

07. 122 Independent Chinese Pen Center, ‘‘ICPC Statement Regarding Protest of Member Yan 

Zhengxue’s Sentence’’; ‘‘Overseas Service Center of Chinese Democracy Party Calls for Attention 

to Case of China Democracy Party’s Chen Shuqing and Li Hong (Zhang Jianghong)’’ [Zhongguo 

minzhu dang haiwai fuwu zhongxin huyu guanzhu Chen Shuqing, Li Hong (Zhang Jianhong) 

zhongguo minzhu dang yi an], Radio Free Asia (Online), 19 September 06. 123Gao Shan, ‘‘Zhejiang China Democracy Party Member Chi Jianwei Sentenced to 3 Years 

in Prison’’ [Zhejiang sheng zhongguo minzhu dang chengyuan chi jianwei bei pan xing 3 nian 

tuxing], Radio Free Asia (Online), 27 March 07. 124 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Pro-Democracy Activist Detained for ‘Inciting 

Subversion’ Government Must End Criminalization of Free Speech,’’ 25 August 07. 125 ‘‘Lawyer for Journalists and Cyber-Dissidents Loses License,’’ Reporters Without Borders 

(Online), 6 August 07. 126 ‘‘Authorities Arrest and Imprison Writers for Online Essays Criticizing Government,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 4–5. 127 Chinese Human Rights Defenders (Online), ‘‘Yang Chunlin Accused of ‘Subversion Against 

the State Power’,’’ 4 September 07; ‘‘Refused Meeting With Lawyer, Yang Chunlin’s Sister Reveals Police Intimidation’’ [Ju lu ̈ shi huijian Yang Chunlin mei jie jingfang konghe], Epoch 

Times, 17 September 07. 128See, e.g., ‘‘Authorities Sentence Guo Qizhen to Four Years in Prison for Online Essays,’’ 

CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November 2006, 5–6 and ‘‘Shandong 

Court Sentences Internet Essayist Li Jianping to Two Years’ Imprisonment,’’ CECC Human 

Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 12–13. 129 China Information Center (Online), ‘‘Administrative Penalty Decision for Zhang Jianping’’ 

[Xingzheng chufa jueding shu], 17 April 07. In punishing Zhang, officials relied on the Measures 

for the Administration of Security Protection of Computer Information Networks with International Interconnections, which prohibit individuals from using the Internet to look up ‘‘information that incites the subversion of state power and the overthrow of the socialist political system.’’ Measures for the Administration of Security Protection of Computer Information Networks 

with International Interconnections [Jisuanji xinxi wangluo guoji lianwang anquan baohu guanli 

banfa], 11 December 97. Zhang filed an administrative appeal with the Changzhou PSB. The 

PSB denied the appeal on June 6 and noted that there was evidence that Zhang had browsed 

certain hostile foreign Web sites, and used censorship circumvention tactics. ‘‘Changzhou Public 

Security Administrative Reconsideration Decision Calls Tianwang A Hostile Foreign Web Site’’ 

[Changzhou gongan xingzheng fuyi cheng tianwang jingwai didui wangzhan], 64tianwang.com, 

6 June 07. 

25

130 Xiao Qiang, ‘‘China Censors Internet Users With Site Bans, Cartoon Cop Spies,’’ San Francisco Chronicle (Online), 23 September 07. 131 China Internet Network Information Center, 20th Statistical Survey. 132 ‘‘China Eases Off Proposal for Real-Name Registration,’’ Xinhua (Online), 22 May 07. 133 Access to Information in the People’s Republic of China, Hearing of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 31 July 07, Written Statement Submitted by Ashley 

Esarey, Luce Fellow of Asian Studies and Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics, 

Middlebury College. 134 Edward Cody, ‘‘China’s Muckrakers for Hire Deliver Expose ́s With Impact,’’ Washington 

Post (Online), 2 May 07; Edward Cody, ‘‘Text Messages Giving Voice to Chinese,’’ Washington 

Post (Online), 28 June 07. Because they post on the Internet, however, such journalists are still 

subject to China’s censorship of that medium. 135 Clay Chandler, ‘‘Is China Emerging from a Media Ice Age,’’ Fortune (Online), 1 June 07. 136 ‘‘500 Mln Cellphone Users Mark China’s 20th Anniversary of Mobile,’’ Xinhua, reprinted 

in People’s Daily (Online), 20 July 07. 137 China Mobile Limited (Online), visited on September 27, 2007. 138Mitchell Landsberg, ‘‘Chinese Activists Turn to Cellphones,’’ Los Angeles Times (Online), 

1 June 07. 139Louisa Lim, ‘‘China To Censor Text Message,’’ BBC (Online), 2 July 04. Until recently, prepaid phones could be purchased anonymously. In 2005, in an apparent move to curb fraud and 

spamming, mostly committed via text message, the government began to require real name registration of cell phones. ‘‘China Cracking Down on Cell Phone Fraud, Spam,’’ Reuters (Online), 

28 December 05. This was aimed mostly at pre-paid phones, which in 2006 represented more 

than half of all mobile phones. It is unclear how widely enforced this requirement is. 140 ‘‘Xiamen Suspends Controversial Chemical Project,’’ Xinhua (Online), 30 May 07. 141 Ibid. 142 Cody, ‘‘Text Messages Giving Voice to Chinese.’’ 143Landsberg, ‘‘Chinese Activists Turn to Cellphones.’’ 144 Cody, ‘‘Text Messages Giving Voice to Chinese.’’ 145 ‘‘Xiamen Suspends Controversial Chemical Project,’’ Xinhua. 146Many around China followed the protests in real time through written reports and cell 

phone photos posted on blogs. Some sites were blocked but many of the reports had already been 

forwarded to other sites around China before censors could react. Cody, ‘‘Text Messages Giving 

Voice to Chinese.’’ 147Zhu Hongjun, ‘‘She Started the Storm Over the Shanxi Illegal Brick Kilns’’ [Shanxi hei 

zhuanyao fengbao bei ta dianran], Southern Weekend (Online), 12 July 07. 148Fairclough, ‘‘Finally Rescued, China’s ‘Slaves’ Detail Their Plight.’’ 149 ‘‘China’s Internet Justice,’’ Wall Street Journal (Online), 21 June 07; Josephine Ma, ‘‘Beijing’s Damage Control Moves Behind the Scenes,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 10 July 

07; Josephine Ma, ‘‘Top Official Plays Down Scale of Kiln Slavery,’’ South China Morning Post 

(Online), 14 August 07. 150 Howard French, ‘‘In China, Fight Over Development Creates a Star,’’ New York Times (Online), 26 March 07. 151 ‘‘Blogger Also Comes to Report on the ‘Awesome Nail House’’’ [Boke ye lai baodao ‘‘zui niu 

dingzi hu’’], Southern Metropolitan Daily (Online), 30 March 07. 152Ma, ‘‘Beijing’s Damage Control Moves Behind the Scenes’’; Geoffrey York, ‘‘The Coolest 

Nail House in History,’’ Globe and Mail (Online), 29 March 07. 153 ‘‘Draft Xiamen Regulation of Online Forums Abolishes Anonymous Comment Function’’ 

[Xiamen ni guiding luntan quxiao niming fatie gongneng], Taihai Wang, reprinted in Sina.com, 

4 July 07. 154 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing. 155 Although no absolute international standard prescribes what constitutes freedom of the 

press, international human rights standards set forth a minimum prerequisite: no legal system 

can be said to respect freedom of the press if it subjects the print media to any prior restraint 

through a licensing scheme. In 2003, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and 

Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on 

Freedom of the Media, and the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on 

Freedom of Expression issued a joint declaration saying that licensing schemes are unnecessary 

and subject to abuse. The UN Human Rights Committee ruled in March 2000, that a licensing 

scheme in Belarus similar to China’s violated Article 19 because the government of Belarus had 

failed to show how the licensing requirements were necessary to protect any of the legitimate 

purposes set forth in Article 19. The Commission has recommended in its annual reports that 

China eliminate this prior restraint on publishing. 156 Notice Regarding Prohibiting the Transmission of Harmful Information and Further Regulating Publishing Order [Guanyu jinzhi zhuanbo youhai xinxi jinyibu guifan chuban zhixu de 

tongzhi], issued 5 November 01: ‘‘No one may establish an entity whose primary purpose is to 

transmit news information and engage in other news publishing activities without permission 

from the press and publication administration agency.’’ 157 Circular Regarding Issuance of the ‘‘Temporary Provisions on the Functions of the Sponsoring Work Unit and the Managing Work Unit for Publishing Work Units’’, arts. 5–6; Regulations on the Administration of Publishing, art. 11(2). 158 Regulations on the Administration of Publishing, art. 29. 159Guangdong Press and Publication Administration (Online), ‘‘Responsible Person at the 

General Administration of Press and Publication Book Office Reports on the Previous Year’s National Book Publishing Administration Work’’ [Zongshu tushusi fuzeren tongbao qunian quanguo 

tushuchuban guanli gongzuo], 24 February 05 (saying that authorities should use the opinions 

provided when screening the selection of topics to determine the distribution of book numbers, 

because this ‘‘reduces the risks relating to orientation’’). 

26

160 ‘‘Wen Jiabao: Pushing Forward Political Reform, Strengthening People’s Supervision of the 

Government’’ [Wen Jiabao: tuijin zhengzhi tizhi gaige jiaqiang renmin zhengfu de jiandu], China 

Court Network (Online), 16 March 07. Premier Wen also said that more public supervision of 

the government was needed. 161 ‘‘China’s TV Watchdog Vows To Fight Corruption in TV Drama Censorship,’’ Xinhua, reprinted in People’s Daily (Online), 21 June 07. 162The move was intended to improve the quality of talent and combat commercially driven 

‘‘talent shows,’’ but it also increases the government’s control over artists and entertainers. ‘‘If 

You Want To Be a Music or Movie Star, You’ll Need Certification’’ [Yao dang gexing yingxing 

xu xian chi zheng shang gang], Beijing News (Online), 19 April 07. 163 Hebei Administration of Press and Publication (Online), ‘‘GAPP Director Long Xinmin 

Comes to Our Province To Inspect Guidance Work’’ [Guojia xinwen chuban zongshu shuzhang 

Long Xinmin dao wo sheng diaoyan zhidao gongzuo], 15 October 06. 164 ‘‘Party Uses Journalists, Artists, Academics To Promote ‘Harmonious Society’,’’ CECC 

China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, December 2006, 10. 165 ‘‘Long Xinmin: Publish Large Volume of Outstanding Publications To Serve Readers and 

as Favor to Masses’’ [Long Xinmin: chuban dapi youxiu chuban wu fuwu duzhe hui ji qunzhong], 

People’s Daily (Online), 28 March 07. 166 ‘‘Public Security Organs Capture 590 Million Illegal Publications of All Kinds Over Five 

Years’’ [Gongan jiguan 5 nian shoujiao gelei feifa chubanwu 5.9 yi jian], Xinhua (Online), 29 

March 07. 167 ‘‘100 Day Anti-Piracy Action: 368 Business Licenses Rescinded’’ [Fan daoban bairi 

xingdong: 368 jia danwei jingying xuke zheng bei diaoxiao], People’s Daily (Online), 17 September 06. 168 Ibid. Li Baozhong, head of GAPP’s Market Supervision Department, said that ‘‘compared 

to pornographic publications, the harm from these kinds of illegal news and economic publications is even greater. Lawbreakers follow their own prerogatives to edit and publish these publications, severely deviating from the correct news orientation.’’ General Administration on Press 

and Publication (Online), ‘‘Illegal Periodical ‘China New Observer’ Investigated and Prosecuted’’ 

[Feifa qikan ‘‘zhongguo xin guancha’’ bei chachu], 8 May 07. 169General Administration on Press and Publication (Online), ‘‘Nationwide ‘Sweep Away Pornography, Strike Down Illegal Publications’ Method: Three Major Points to Implement, Maintaining High Posture’’ [Quanguo ‘‘saohuang dafei’’ban: shishi san da zhongdian baochi gaoya 

taishi], 27 February 07. 170 ‘‘In the First 3 Months of the Year, 36 Million Pieces of Illegal Publications of All Kinds 

Were Confiscated’’ [Zhongguo jinnian qian 3 ge yue shoujiao gelei feifa chubanwu 3600 duo wan 

jian], Xinhua (Online), 14 April 07. 171 ‘‘Guangzhou College Students Self-Publish Newspaper and Magazine: Legality In Question’’ [Guangzhou daxuesheng zi ban baozhi zazhi hefaxing shou zhiyi], People’s Daily (Online), 

20 June 07. 172 Ibid. 173 ‘‘Eight Books Banned in Crackdown on Dissent,’’ South China Morning Post (Online), 19 

January 07. 174 ‘‘GAPP Director Clarifies That Regarding Reported Banning of ‘Past Stories of Peking 

Opera Stars’ and Other Books: We Never Banned Even One Book’’ [Zhongguo xinwen chuban 

zongshu chengqing ‘‘lingren wangshi deng shu bei jin’’: women yi ben shu dou mei chajin], 

Zaobao.com, 1 February 07; ‘‘Eight Books Banned in Crackdown On Dissent,’’ South China 

Morning Post. 175 ‘‘GAPP: Investigated and Found No Book Ban, Zhang Yihe Counters That Officials Don’t 

Understand When To Admit Error’’ [Chubanzongshu: you chachu wu jin shu Zhang Yihe bochi 

guanyuan bu dong ren cuo], Ming Pao (Online), 9 February 07; ‘‘GAPP Director Clarifies That 

Regarding Reported Banning of ‘Past Stories of Peking Opera Stars’ and Other Books: We Never 

Banned Even One Book,’’ Zaobao.com. 176 ‘‘Publishers Confirm Being Punished for Printing Controversial Books’’ [Chubanshe 

zhengshi bei fa], Ming Pao (Online), 2 February 07. 177This year is the 50th anniversary of the start of the anti-rightist movement, a purge of 

intellectuals that followed the Hundred Flowers Campaign’s brief tolerance of dissent. Propaganda officials have reportedly ordered China’s media to limit coverage of this topic. Vivian Wu, 

‘‘Court Reject Author’s Plea on Ban,’’ South China Morning Post, 27 April 07. 178 ‘‘China Keeps Its Critics At Home While Promising Greater Freedom for Foreign Media,’’ 

Associated Press (Online), 5 February 07. 179 CECC, 2005 Annual Report, 11 October 05, 62; Reporters Without Borders (Online), ‘‘Journalist Faces Possible Life Sentence for Posting Tiananmen Document on Website,’’ 4 February 

05; Keith Bradsher, ‘‘China Announces Media Crackdown,’’ New York Times (Online), 15 August 

07. 180 Yahoo!’s general counsel testified at a congressional hearing that in October 2005 Yahoo 

merged Yahoo! China with Alibaba.com, a Chinese company. Yahoo! maintained a large equity 

stake but no longer has day-to-day operation control over Yahoo! China. The Internet in China–

A Tool of Freedom or Suppression?, Testimony of Michael Callahan. 181Dui Hua Foundation (Online), ‘‘Police Document Sheds Additional Light on Shi Tao Case,’’ 

25 July 07; ‘‘Regarding Court Decisions and Security Bureau Documents for Shi Tao, Wang 

Xiaoning’’ [Guanyu Shi Tao, Wang Xiaoning de zhongguo fayuan panjue he anquanju wenjian], 

Boxun (Online), 23 July 07; Reporters Without Borders (Online), ‘‘Information Supplied by 

Yahoo! Helped Journalist Shi Tao Get 10 Years in Prison,’’ 6 September 05. The Internet in 

China–A Tool of Freedom or Suppression?, Testimony of Michael Callahan; ‘‘Congressional Committee to Investigate Disparity Between Documents and Hearing Testimony by Yahoo!,’’ House 

Foreign Affairs Committee (Online), 3 August 07; Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Richard Waters, 

‘‘Yahoo Faces Scrutiny in China Case,’’ Financial Times (Online), 7 August 07. In May 2007, 

27

Shi Tao also joined a lawsuit against Yahoo! filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of California, alleging, among other things, that the company had aided and abetted 

the commission of international human rights violations. See Amended Complaint for Tort Damages, Xianing et al v. Yahoo! Inc., et al., U.S. District Court Northern District California, Oakland Division, 29 May 07. 182 Jim Yardley, ‘‘China Releases Jailed New York Times Employee,’’ New York Times (Online), 15 September 07. 183The Beijing High People’s Court upheld the sentence in December 2006. ‘‘Beijing Court Rejects Zhao Yan’s Appeal, Affirms Three-Year Sentence,’’ CECC Human Rights and Rule of Law 

Update, December 2006, 3–4. 184 Reporters Without Borders, ‘‘Journalist Gao Qinrong Released Five Years Early,’’ 11 December 06. In August 1999, a court in Shanxi province sentenced Gao for accepting bribes, 

fraud, soliciting prostitutes. ‘‘After Anti-Corruption Journalists Speaks the Truth’’ [Fan fu jizhe 

jiangle zhenhua yihou], Southern Weekend (Online), 12 December 02. Gao’s reporting exposed 

a sham irrigation project in Yuncheng in 1998. ‘‘Gao Qinrong,’’ PEN Canada (Online), December 

2006. Investigative reports by several Chinese news media found that authorities in Yuncheng 

detained Gao in the absence of reliable evidence, started building a criminal case against him 

only after he was detained, and convicted him on the basis of insufficient evidence. ‘‘After AntiCorruption Journalists Speaks the Truth’’ [Fan fu jizhe jiangle zhenhua yihou], Southern Weekend (Online), 12 December 02; ‘‘To Only Have Right To Interview Is Not Enough’’ [Jin you 

caifangquan shi bugou de], Legal Daily (Online), 14 May 01. 185Dui Hua Foundation, ‘‘Nine-Month Sentence Reduction Confirmed for Xu Zerong,’’ 26 September 06.

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