[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-14454

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-01204-JFK

TODD BERNARD MILES, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(June 21, 2016)

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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, MARTIN and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Todd Miles appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the 

Commissioner of Social Security’s (the “Commissioner”) final decision denying 

his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, 

42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). On appeal, Miles argues that the administrative 

law judge (“ALJ”) erred by discrediting Miles’s testimony regarding pain and by 

substituting his own medical diagnosis for the opinions of medical providers. 

After careful consideration, we affirm the district court’s judgment in favor of the 

Commissioner.1

I.

Miles, who previously worked as a mail carrier and postal clerk, applied for 

disability benefits, claiming that he was disabled due to headaches, mental 

disorder, back pain, neck pain, diabetes, high blood pressure, and shoulder pain. 

After a hearing, the ALJ denied his application, finding that because Miles could 

perform light work subject to certain limitations, there were a significant number 

of jobs in the national economy that he could perform. The Appeals Council 

denied Miles’s request for review. Miles then filed an action in federal district 

court, asking the district court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision. After 

 

1 Because we write only for the parties, we set out only those facts necessary to explain 

our decision.

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briefing, the district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. This is Miles’s 

appeal. 

II.

We review the decision of the ALJ as the Commissioner’s final decision 

when, as here, the ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review. 

Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). “[W]e review de novo the 

legal principles upon which the Commissioner’s decision is based.” Moore v. 

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The Commissioner’s factual 

findings are reviewed with deference, and the “factual findings are conclusive if 

they are supported by substantial evidence, consisting of such relevant evidence as 

a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Doughty, 

245 F.3d at 1278 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Even if we find that the 

evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] decision, we must affirm if 

the decision is supported by substantial evidence.” Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 

1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). “This limited review precludes deciding the facts 

anew, making credibility determinations, or re-weighing the evidence.” Moore,

405 F.3d at 1211. 

III.

An individual claiming disability benefits must prove that she is disabled. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). In determining whether a claimant is “disabled,” the 

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ALJ in a sequential process examines whether the claimant: (1) is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe and medically determinable 

impairment; (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the 

criteria of a “listing”; (4) can perform her past relevant work in light of her present 

abilities, which comprise her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) can 

adjust to other work in light of her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). 

On appeal, Miles asserts that the ALJ erred in the analysis of whether he was 

disabled by (1) improperly discounting his subjective complaints of pain and (2) 

substituting his own medical diagnoses for the diagnoses of two physicians. We 

consider these arguments in turn.

A.

Miles testified before the ALJ that he experienced neck pain, shoulder pain, 

back pain, and chronic headaches. He described how his neck pain radiated into 

his upper extremities and how he experienced weakness and numbness in his upper 

extremities. He also testified that he had lower back pain from a herniated disk

and experienced constant headaches. The ALJ found that Miles’s statements about 

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely 

credible. Although Miles asserts that the ALJ erred by rejecting his subjective 

complaints of pain, we discern no error. 

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When a claimant attempts to establish a disability through his own testimony 

concerning pain or other subjective symptoms, we require “(1) evidence of an 

underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence 

confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined 

medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.” 

Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002). If the record shows that 

the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be 

expected to produce her symptoms, the ALJ must evaluate the intensity and 

persistence of the symptoms in determining how they limit the claimant’s capacity 

for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). In assessing the claimant’s credibility about 

her symptoms and their effects, the ALJ must consider in addition to the objective 

medical evidence: the individual’s daily activities; the location, duration, 

frequency, and intensity of the individual’s pain; precipitating and aggravating 

factors; the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication taken to 

relieve the symptoms; treatment, other than medication, for pain; any other 

measure used to relieve the symptoms; and any other factors concerning functional 

limitations and restrictions due to the symptoms. Id. § 404.1529(c)(3). 

The ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence so long as the 

decision does not broadly reject the claimant’s case and the decision is sufficient 

for a reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ considered the claimant’s medical 

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condition as a whole. See Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 

782 (11th Cir. 2014). “If proof of disability is based upon subjective evidence and 

a credibility determination is, therefore, critical to the decision, the ALJ must either 

explicitly discredit such testimony or the implication must be so clear as to amount 

to a specific credibility finding.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 

1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We conclude that the ALJ properly applied our Court’s pain standard and 

that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Miles’s testimony 

was not credible. The ALJ correctly recited our standard in his decision and 

indicated that he considered all Miles’s symptoms based on the requirements set 

forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Then, the ALJ articulated specific reasons for his 

credibility determination. The ALJ explained that approximately a year after a

2006 neck surgery, Dr. David Gower, the surgeon who operated on Miles, stated 

he could not find an objective reason why Miles could not return to work and 

opined that Miles was malingering. And the ALJ explained that medical records 

from other physicians contradicted Miles’s subjective complaints of pain. These 

records indicated that Miles had a normal gait, normal muscle strength, normal 

range of motion in his back and shoulders, normal fine and gross coordination, and 

normal x-rays of the lumbar and cervical spine. The ALJ also noted Miles was 

only taking over-the-counter medication for his pain. See 20 C.F.R. 

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§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv) (permitting an ALJ to consider the type of medication used to 

alleviate a claimant’s pain). We conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s decision not to credit Miles’s subjective complaints of pain. See Wilson, 

284 F.3d at 1226 (“In citing to § 404.1529 and based on the findings and 

discussion, it is clear that the ALJ applied this Circuit’s pain standard.”).

2

 

Miles also argues that the ALJ unfairly characterized his daily activities

based on his testimony. There is no question that the ALJ was required to consider 

Miles’s daily activities in considering the severity of his pain. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1529(c)(3). The ALJ relied on portions of a function report Miles 

completed showing that he could prepare simple meals, do laundry, drive, shop in 

stores, pay bills, use a checkbook, and handle a savings account. Miles contends

that the ALJ erred by considering only his statements that supported the conclusion 

that he was not disabled while ignoring his other statements that supported a 

disability finding. We reject Miles’s assertion that the ALJ erred by not discussing 

all portions of the function report because the ALJ’s opinion make clear that the 

ALJ considered Miles’s condition on the whole. See Mitchell, 771 F.3d at 782. 

 

2 Miles further argues that the ALJ improperly based the credibility determination on the 

fact that Miles was able to return to work for a period of time after he was in a motor vehicle 

accident and had neck surgery. But we have recognized that the fact that the claimant was able 

to work for several years in spite of his injuries constitutes substantial evidence to support the 

ALJ’s decision that the claimant was not disabled when medical opinions also support the 

conclusion that the claimant was not disabled. See Ellison v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 

(11th Cir. 2003). 

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B.

Miles also argues that the ALJ erred by substituting his own medical 

diagnoses for the opinions of examining physician Dr. James and treating 

physician Dr. Kingloff. We conclude there is no error. 

“[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different 

medical opinions and the reasons therefor.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). In weighing a medical opinion, the ALJ 

must consider, among other things, the medical source’s treatment and examining 

relationship with the claimant, the evidence supporting the opinion, and the 

opinion’s consistency with the record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). 

Generally, the opinions of treating physicians are given more weight than 

examining physicians. See id. 

Dr. James, who examined but did not treat Miles, opined that CT scans

showed Miles had spinal stenosis and compression of the nerve root.3

 The ALJ 

gave little weight to Dr. James’s opinion on the basis that it was inconsistent with 

other evidence in the record. Although Dr. James reported that CT scans showed 

compression of the nerve root in Miles’s cervical and lumbar spine, the ALJ found 

that the CT scans showed only “minimal proximal left S1 nerve root effacement.” 

 

3 Dr. James also opined that Miles was totally and completely disabled. Of course, 

this opinion cannot be controlling because that decision is reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1) (“A statement by a medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to 

work’ does not mean that [the Commissioner] will determine that you are disabled.”). 

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ALJ Decision at 9 (Doc. 7-2).4 Miles argues that the ALJ substituted his own 

medical diagnoses for the opinion of Dr. James when he characterized the root 

effacement as “minimal.” We disagree. The ALJ’s description of the CT scans is 

consistent with the opinion of Dr. Gower who treated Miles and also reviewed the 

CT scans. Dr. Gower opined that while the scans showed some “minor frontal 

stenosis,” he was “not at all convinced that this is the source of any component of 

[Miles’s] pain.” Progress Note (Doc. 7-7). Given these conflicting medical 

opinions about the CT scans, we cannot say that the ALJ erred in giving greater 

weight to the opinion of Dr. Gower, who treated Miles, over the opinion of Dr. 

James, who merely examined him. 

Miles also argues that the ALJ “put words into the mouth” of Dr. Kingloff, a 

physician who treated Miles, Appellant’s Br. at 25, by stating that Dr. Klingoff 

“believe[d] the claimant’s physical problems have been largely resolved.” ALJ 

Decision at 8 (Doc. 7-2). We disagree. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

characterization of Dr. Klingoff’s opinion. In treatment notes, Dr. Kingloff 

repeatedly stated that Miles needed and would be helped by psychiatric counseling. 

When Miles reported neck and back pain, Dr. Kingloff noted that he was not 

prescribing any medication because psychiatric treatment was “going to be the 

only therapy that is really going to help [Miles].” These records constitute 

 

4 Citations to “Doc.” refer to docket entries in the district court record in this case. 

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substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Klingoff believed 

Miles’s physical problems had been largely resolved. Accordingly, the ALJ did 

not insert his own diagnosis in the place of Dr. Klingoff’s medical professional 

opinion.

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, the district court’s judgment is affirmed. 

AFFIRMED.

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