69–006 

110TH CONGRESS REPT. 110–582 " ! HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2d Session Part 1 

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR SECURE ELECTIONS ACT 

OF 2008 

APRIL 14, 2008.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. BRADY of Pennsylvania, from the Committee on House 

Administration, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

together with 

MINORITY VIEWS 

[To accompany H.R. 5036] 

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office] 

The Committee on House Administration, to whom was referred 

the bill (H.R. 5036) to direct the Administrator of General Services 

to reimburse certain jurisdictions for the costs of obtaining paper 

ballot voting systems for the general elections for Federal office to 

be held in November 2008, to reimburse jurisdictions for the costs 

incurred in conducting audits or hand counting of the results of the 

general elections for Federal office to be held in November 2008, 

and for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with amendments and recommend that the bill as 

amended do pass. 

The amendments are as follows: 

Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 

2008’’. 

SEC. 2. PAYMENTS TO CERTAIN JURISDICTIONS CONDUCTING 2008 GENERAL ELECTIONS. 

(a) REIMBURSEMENT FOR CONVERSION TO PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEM.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Election Assistance Commission shall pay to each eligible jurisdiction an amount equal to the sum of the following: 

(A) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction 

to replace any voting systems used to conduct the general elections for Federal office held in November 2006 that did not use or produce a paper ballot 


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verified by the voter or a paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at 

the time the vote is cast with paper ballot voting systems. 

(B) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction 

to obtain non-tabulating ballot marking devices that are accessible for individuals with disabilities in accordance with the requirements of section 

301(a)(3) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002. 

(C) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction 

to obtain ballot marking stations or voting booths for the protection of voter 

privacy. 

(D) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to obtain paper ballots. 

(E) The documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction 

to obtain precinct-based equipment that tabulates paper ballots or scans 

paper ballots. 

(F) The documented reasonable administrative costs paid or incurred by 

such jurisdiction that are associated with meeting the requirements for an 

eligible jurisdiction. 

(2) ELIGIBLE JURISDICTION DEFINED.—In this subsection, an ‘‘eligible jurisdiction’’ means a jurisdiction that submits to the Commission (and, in the case of 

a county or equivalent jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time 

and in such form as the Commission may require, an application containing—

(A) assurances that the jurisdiction conducted regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office in November 2006 using (in whole or in 

part) a voting system that did not use or produce a paper ballot verified 

by the voter or a paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at the time 

the vote is cast; 

(B) assurances that the jurisdiction will conduct the regularly scheduled 

general elections for Federal office to be held in November 2008 using only 

paper ballot voting systems; 

(C) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will obtain a sufficient number of non-tabulating ballot marking devices that are accessible 

for individuals with disabilities in accordance with the requirements of section 301(a)(3) of the Help America Vote Act of 2002; 

(D) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will obtain a sufficient number of ballot marking stations or voting booths for the protection 

of voter privacy; 

(E) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will obtain a sufficient number of paper ballots; 

(F) such information and assurances as the Commission may require to 

make the determinations under paragraph (1); and 

(G) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require. 

(3) DETERMINATIONS OF REASONABLENESS OF COSTS.—The determinations 

under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by the Commission. 

(4) PAPER BALLOT VOTING SYSTEM DEFINED.—In this subsection, a ‘‘paper ballot voting system’’ means a voting system that uses a paper ballot marked by 

the voter by hand or a paper ballot marked by the voter with the assistance 

of a non-tabulating ballot marking device described in paragraph (1)(B). 

(b) REIMBURSEMENT FOR RETROFITTING OF DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS TO PRODUCE VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORDS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall pay to each eligible jurisdiction an 

amount equal to the documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to retrofit direct recording electronic voting systems so that the systems will produce a voter verifiable paper record of the marked ballot for 

verification by the voter at the time the vote is cast, including the costs of obtaining printers to produce the records. 

(2) ELIGIBLE JURISDICTION DEFINED.—In this subsection, an ‘‘eligible jurisdiction’’ means a jurisdiction that submits to the Commission (and, in the case of 

a county or equivalent jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time 

and in such form as the Commission may require, an application containing—

(A) assurances that the jurisdiction has obtained or will obtain a printer 

for and retrofit each direct recording electronic voting system used to conduct the general elections for Federal office held in November 2008 so that 

the system will produce a voter verifiable paper record of the marked ballot 

for verification by the voter; 

(B) such information and assurances as the Commission may require to 

make the determinations under paragraph (1); and 


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(C) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require. 

(3) DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS OF COSTS.—The determinations 

under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by the Commission. 

(c) REIMBURSEMENT FOR PROVISION OF BACKUP PAPER BALLOTS BY JURISDICTIONS

USING DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission shall pay to each eligible jurisdiction an 

amount equal to the documented reasonable costs paid or incurred by such jurisdiction to obtain, deploy, and tabulate backup paper ballots (and related supplies and equipment) that may be used in the event of the failure of a direct 

recording electronic voting system in the regularly scheduled general elections 

for Federal office to be held in November 2008. 

(2) ELIGIBLE JURISDICTION DEFINED.—In this subsection, an ‘‘eligible jurisdiction’’ means a jurisdiction that submits to the Commission (and, in the case of 

a county or equivalent jurisdiction, provides a copy to the State), at such time 

and in such form as the Commission may require, an application containing— (A) assurances that the jurisdiction will post, in a conspicuous manner at 

all polling places at which a direct recording electronic voting system will 

be used in such elections, a notice stating that backup paper ballots are 

available at the polling place and that a voter is entitled to use such a ballot upon the failure of a voting system; 

(B) assurances that the jurisdiction counts each such backup paper ballot 

cast by a voter as a regular ballot cast in the election, and does not treat 

it (for eligibility purposes) as a provisional ballot under section 302(a) of the 

Help America Vote Act of 2002, unless the individual casting the ballot 

would have otherwise been required to cast a provisional ballot; 

(C) such information and assurances as the Commission may require to 

make the determinations under paragraph (1); and 

(D) such other information and assurances as the Commission may require. 

(3) DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS OF COSTS.—The determinations 

under paragraph (1) of whether costs paid or incurred by a jurisdiction are reasonable shall be made by the Commission. 

(d) AMOUNTS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such 

sums as may be necessary for payments under this section. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization under this subsection shall remain available 

until expended. 

SEC. 3. PAYMENTS FOR CONDUCTING MANUAL AUDITS OF RESULTS OF 2008 GENERAL ELECTIONS. 

(a) PAYMENTS.— (1) ELIGIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS.—If a State conducts manual audits of the results of any of the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office in November 2008 (and, at the option of the State, conducts audits of elections for 

State and local office held at the same time as such election) in accordance with 

the requirements of this section, the Commission shall make a payment to the 

State in an amount equal to the documented reasonable costs incurred by the 

State in conducting the audits. 

(2) CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE AND COSTS.— (A) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—In order to receive a payment under this 

section, a State shall submit to the Commission, in such form as the Commission may require, a statement containing— (i) a certification that the State conducted the audits in accordance 

with all of the requirements of this section; 

(ii) a statement of the reasonable costs incurred in conducting the audits; and 

(iii) such other information and assurances as the Commission may 

require. 

(B) AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.—The amount of a payment made to a State 

under this section shall be equal to the reasonable costs incurred in conducting the audits. 

(C) DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS OF COSTS.—The determinations 

under this paragraph of whether costs incurred by a State are reasonable 

shall be made by the Commission. 

(3) TIMING OF PAYMENTS.—The Commission shall make the payment required 

under this section to a State not later than 30 days after receiving the statement submitted by the State under paragraph (2). 

(4) MANDATORY IMMEDIATE REIMBURSEMENT OF COUNTIES AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS.—If a county or other jurisdiction responsible for the administration 


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of an election in a State incurs costs as the result of the State conducting an 

audit of the election in accordance with this section, the State shall reimburse 

the county or jurisdiction for such costs immediately upon receiving the payment from the Commission under paragraph (3). 

(5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as may be necessary for payments under 

this section. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization under 

this subsection shall remain available until expended. 

(b) AUDIT REQUIREMENTS.—In order to receive a payment under this section for 

conducting an audit, the State shall meet the following minimum requirements: 

(1) Not later than 30 days before the date of the regularly scheduled general 

election for Federal office in November 2008, the State shall establish and publish guidelines, standards, and procedures to be used in conducting audits in accordance with this section. 

(2) The State shall select an appropriate entity to oversee the administration 

of the audit, in accordance with such criteria as the State considers appropriate 

consistent with the requirements of this section, except that the entity must 

meet a general standard of independence as defined by the State. 

(3) The State shall determine whether the units in which the audit will be 

conducted will be precincts or some alternative auditing unit, and shall apply 

that determination in a uniform manner for all audits conducted in accordance 

with this section. 

(4) The State shall select the precincts or alternative auditing units in which 

audits are conducted in accordance with this section in a random manner following the election after the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) 

has been announced, such that each precinct or alternative auditing unit in 

which the election was held has an equal chance of being selected, subject to 

paragraph (9), except that the State shall ensure that at least one precinct or 

alternative auditing unit is selected in each county in which the election is held. 

(5) The audit shall be conducted in not less than 2 percent of the precincts 

or alternative auditing units in the State (in the case of a general election for 

the office of Senator) or the Congressional district involved (in the case of an 

election for the office of Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the Congress). 

(6) The State shall determine the stage of the tabulation process at which the 

audit will be conducted, and shall apply that determination in a uniform manner for all audits conducted in accordance with this section, except that the 

audit shall commence within 48 hours after the State or jurisdiction involved 

announces the final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) in each precinct in which votes are cast in the election which is the subject of the audit. 

(7) With respect to each precinct or alternative audit unit audited, the State 

shall ensure that a voter verified paper ballot or paper ballot printout verifiable 

by the voter at the time the vote is cast is available for every vote cast in the 

precinct or alternative audit unit, and that the tally produced by counting all 

of those paper ballots or paper ballot printouts by hand is compared with the 

corresponding final unofficial vote count (as defined by the State) announced 

with respect to that precinct or audit unit in the election. 

(8) Within each precinct or alternative audit unit, the audit shall include all 

ballots cast by all individuals who voted in or who are under the jurisdiction 

of the precinct or alternative audit unit with respect to the election, including 

absentee ballots (subject to paragraph (9)), early ballots, emergency ballots, and 

provisional ballots, without regard to the time, place, or manner in which the 

ballots were cast. 

(9) If a State establishes a separate precinct for purposes of counting the absentee ballots cast in the election and treats all absentee ballots as having been 

cast in that precinct, and if the state does not make absentee ballots sortable 

by precinct and include those ballots in the hand count described in paragraph 

(7) which is administered with respect to that precinct, the State may divide 

absentee ballots into audit units approximately equal in size to the average precinct in the State in terms of the number of ballots cast, and shall randomly 

select and include at least 2 percent of those audit units in the audit. Any audit 

carried out with respect to such an audit unit shall meet the same standards 

applicable under paragraph (7) to audits carried out with respect to other precincts and alternative audit units, including the requirement that all paper ballots be counted by hand. 

(10) The audit shall be conducted in a public and transparent manner, such 

that members of the public are able to observe the entire process. 

(c) COLLECTION AND SUBMISSION OF AUDIT RESULTS; PUBLICATION.—


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(1) STATE SUBMISSION OF REPORT.—In order to receive a payment under this 

section, a State shall submit to the Commission a report, in such form as the 

Commission may require, on the results of each audit conducted under this section. 

(2) COMMISSION ACTION.—The Commission may request additional information from a State based on the report submitted under paragraph (1). 

(3) PUBLICATION.—The Commission shall publish each report submitted under 

paragraph (1) upon receipt. 

(d) DELAY IN CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS BY STATE.—No State may certify the results of any election which is subject to an audit under this section prior to completing the audit, resolving discrepancies discovered in the audit, and submitting 

the report required under subsection (c). 

SEC. 4. PAYMENTS FOR CONDUCTING HAND COUNTS OF RESULTS OF 2008 GENERAL ELECTIONS. 

(a) PAYMENTS.—

(1) ELIGIBILITY FOR PAYMENTS.—If a State, county, or equivalent location tallies the results of any regularly scheduled general election for Federal office in 

November 2008 by conducting a hand count of the votes cast on the paper ballots used in the election (including paper ballot printouts verifiable by the voter 

at the time the vote is cast) in accordance with the requirements of this section, 

the Commission shall make a payment to the State, county, or equivalent location in an amount equal to the documented reasonable costs incurred by the 

State, county, or equivalent location in conducting the hand counts. 

(2) CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE AND COSTS.—

(A) CERTIFICATION REQUIRED.—In order to receive a payment under this 

section, a State, county, or equivalent location shall submit to the Commission (and, in the case of a county or equivalent jurisdiction, shall provide 

a copy to the State), in such form as the Commission may require, a statement containing—

(i) a certification that the State, county, or equivalent location conducted the hand counts in accordance with all of the requirements of 

this section; 

(ii) a statement of the reasonable costs incurred by the State, county, 

or equivalent location in conducting the hand counts; and 

(iii) such other information and assurances as the Commission may 

require. 

(B) AMOUNT OF PAYMENT.—The amount of a payment made to a State, 

county, or equivalent location under this section shall be equal to the reasonable costs incurred by the State, county, or equivalent location in conducting the hand counts. 

(C) DETERMINATION OF REASONABLENESS OF COSTS.—The determinations 

under this paragraph of whether costs incurred by a State, county, or equivalent location are reasonable shall be made by the Commission. 

(3) TIMING OF PAYMENTS.—The Commission shall make the payment required 

under this section to a State, county, or equivalent location not later than 30 

days after receiving the statement submitted by the State, county, or equivalent 

location under paragraph (2). 

(4) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such sums as may be necessary for payments under 

this section. Any amounts appropriated pursuant to the authorization under 

this subsection shall remain available until expended. 

(b) HAND COUNTS DESCRIBED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—A hand count conducted in accordance with this section is 

a count of all of the paper ballots on which votes were cast in the election (including paper ballot printouts verifiable by the voter at the time the vote is 

cast), including votes cast on an early, absentee, emergency, and provisional 

basis, which is conducted by hand to determine the winner of the election and 

is conducted without using electronic equipment or software. 

(2) COMPLETENESS.—With respect to each jurisdiction in which a hand count 

is conducted, the State, county, or equivalent location shall ensure that a voter 

verified paper ballot or paper ballot printout verifiable by the voter at the time 

the vote is cast is available for every vote cast in the jurisdiction. 

(c) PROCESS FOR CONDUCTING HAND COUNTS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to meet the requirements of this section, a hand 

count of the ballots cast in an election shall be conducted in accordance with 

the following procedures: 

(A) After the closing of the polls on the date of the election, the appropriate election official shall secure the ballots at the polling place (or, in the 


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case of ballots cast at any other location, at the office of the chief election 

official of the jurisdiction conducting the hand count). 

(B) Beginning at any time after the expiration of the 8-hour period that 

begins at the time the polls close on the date of the election, the jurisdiction 

shall conduct an initial hand count of the ballots cast in the election, using 

the ballots which are eligible to be counted in the election as of the time 

the polls are closed. 

(C) Any ballot which is eligible to be counted in the election but which 

is not included in the initial count conducted under subparagraph (B), including a provisional ballot cast by an individual who is determined to be 

eligible to vote in the election or an absentee ballot received after the date 

of the election but prior to the applicable deadline under State law for the 

receipt of absentee ballots, shall be subject to a hand count in accordance 

with this section and added to the tally conducted under subparagraph (B) 

not later than 48 hours after the ballot is determined to be eligible to be 

counted. 

(D) The hand count shall be conducted by a team of not fewer than 2 individuals who shall be witnessed by at least one observer sitting at the 

same table with such individuals. Except as provided in paragraph (2), all 

such individuals shall be election officials of the jurisdiction in which the 

hand count is conducted. The number of such individuals who are members 

of the political party whose candidates received the greatest number of the 

aggregate votes cast in the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal 

office held in the State in November 2006 shall be equal to the number of 

such individuals who are members of the political party whose candidates 

received the second greatest number of the aggregate votes cast in the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office held in the State in November 2006. 

(E) After the completion of the hand count, the ballots may be run 

through a tabulating machine or scanner for comparison with the tally, if 

such a machine or scanner is available. 

(2) USE OF OTHER PERSONNEL.—An individual who is not an election official 

of the jurisdiction in which a hand count is conducted under this section may 

serve on a team conducting the hand count or may serve as an observer of a 

team conducting the hand count if the jurisdiction certifies that the individual 

has completed such training as the jurisdiction deems appropriate to conduct 

or observe the hand count (as the case may be). 

(3) LOCATION.—The hand counts conducted under this section of the ballots 

cast in an election shall be conducted—

(A) in the case of ballots cast at a polling place on the date of the election, 

at the polling place at which the ballots were cast; or 

(B) in the case of any other ballots, at the office of the chief election official of the jurisdiction conducting the hand count. 

(4) INFORMATION INCLUDED IN RESULTS.—Each hand count conducted under 

this section shall produce the following information with respect to the election: 

(A) The vote tally for each candidate. 

(B) The number of overvotes, undervotes, spoiled ballots, and blank ballots cast (or their equivalents, as defined by the State, county or equivalent 

location). 

(C) The number of write-in ballots and the names written in on such ballots pursuant to State law. 

(D) The total number of ballots cast. 

(E) A record of judgement calls made regarding voter intent. 

(5) PUBLIC OBSERVATION OF HAND COUNTS.—Each hand count conducted 

under this section shall be conducted in a manner that allows public observation of the entire process (including the opening of the ballot boxes or removal 

of machine-printed ballots from their containers, the sorting, counting, and notation of results, and the announcement of final determinations) sufficient to 

confirm but not interfere with the proceedings. 

(6) ESTABLISHMENT AND PUBLICATION OF PROCEDURES.—Prior to the date of 

the regularly scheduled general election for Federal office held in November 

2008, a State, county, or equivalent location shall establish and publish procedures for carrying out hand counts under this subsection. 

(d) APPLICATION TO JURISDICTIONS CONDUCTING ELECTIONS WITH DIRECT RECORD- ING ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS.—

(1) REQUIRING SYSTEMS TO PRODUCE VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER RECORD.—If a 

State, county, or equivalent location uses a direct recording electronic voting 

system to conduct an election, the State, county, or equivalent location may not 

receive a payment under this section for conducting a hand count of the votes 


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cast in the election unless (in addition to meeting the other requirements applicable under this section) the State, county, or equivalent location certifies to the 

Commission that each such system produces a paper record printout of the 

marked ballot which is verifiable by the voter at the time the vote is cast. 

(2) TREATMENT OF PAPER RECORD PRINTOUTS.—In applying this section to a 

hand count conducted by a State, county, or equivalent location which provides 

a certification to the Commission under paragraph (1), the paper record printout referred to in such paragraph shall be treated as the paper ballot used in 

the election. 

(e) ANNOUNCEMENT AND POSTING OF RESULTS.—Upon the completion of a hand 

count conducted under this section, the State, county, or equivalent location shall 

announce the results to the public and post them on a public Internet site. 

(f) USE OF HAND COUNT IN CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS.—The State shall use the 

results of the hand count conducted under this section for purposes of certifying the 

results of the election involved. Nothing in this section may be construed to affect 

the application or operation of any State law governing the recount of the results 

of an election. 

SEC. 5. STUDY, TESTING, AND DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTS AND PRACTICES TO ENSURE ACCESSIBILITY OF PAPER BALLOT VERIFICATION AND CASTING FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS. 

(a) STUDY, TESTING, AND DEVELOPMENT.—The Director of the National Institute 

of Standards and Technology (hereafter in this section referred to as the ‘‘Director’’) 

shall study, test, and develop products and practices that ensure the accessibility 

of paper ballot verification and casting for individuals with disabilities, for voters 

whose primary language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in literacy, 

including the mechanisms themselves and the processes through which the mechanisms are used. In carrying out this subsection, the Director shall specifically investigate existing and potential methods or devices, including non-electronic devices, 

that will assist such individuals and voters in creating voter-verified paper ballots, 

presenting or transmitting the information printed or marked on such ballots back 

to such individuals and voters in an accessible form, and enabling the voters to cast 

the ballots. 

(b) REPORT.—Not later than June 30, 2009, the Director shall submit a report to 

Congress on the results of the studying, testing, and development of products and 

practices under subsection (a). 

(c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated 

to the Director such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section, to remain 

available until expended. 

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS. 

In this Act—

(1) the term ‘‘Commission’’ means the Election Assistance Commission; and 

(2) the term ‘‘State’’ includes the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 

Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the United States Virgin Islands. 

Amend the title so as to read: 

A bill to direct the Election Assistance Commission to reimburse certain jurisdictions for the costs of obtaining paper ballot voting systems for the general elections 

for Federal office to be held in November 2008, to reimburse jurisdictions for the 

costs incurred in conducting audits or hand counting of the results of the general 

elections for Federal office to be held in November 2008, and for other purposes. 

EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR SECURE ELECTIONS ACT OF 2008 

PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATION

In 2002, in response to the public’s mounting concern about election administration problems stemming from the controversial 

presidential election in 2000, Congress passed the Help America 

Vote Act (HAVA) P.L. 107–252 (42 U.S.C. 15301) to improve the 

voting process in a number of ways. One improvement to the election process involved the replacement of punch card and lever voting machines with paperless direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines. Although these machines are generally easy to use 

and, if properly equipped, accessible to voters with disability and 

language assistance needs, the 2006 election revealed that these 


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1 Examples of news articles include: Tinsley, Anna M. and Anthony Spangler. ‘‘Vote Spike 

Blamed on Program Snafu.’’ Fort Worth Star-Telegram, March 9, 2006; Tinsley, Anna M. ‘‘Judicial Candidate Files Challenge.’’ Fort Worth Star-Telegram, April 6, 2006; ‘‘Pottawattamie County Recorder’s Race Leads to Recount.’’ The Associated Press, June 8, 2006; Rabin, Charles and 

Darran Simon. ‘‘Glitches Cited in Early Voting; Early Voters are Urged to Cast Their Ballots 

with Care Following Scattered Reports of Problems with Heavily Used Machines.’’ The Miami 

Herald, October 28, 2006; McCormick, John. ‘‘Voting Equipment Glitches Lingering.’’ Chicago 

Tribune, November 2, 2006; Smith, Tammy M. ‘‘New Voting Machines Pose Election Day Problems.’’ Sun Herald (Mississippi), November 7, 2006; ‘‘Voting Problems Reported in NJ.’’ New Jersey—WABC, November 7, 2006; Glendenning, Lauren. ‘‘Voting Glitch in Fairfax, Some Machine 

Malfunctions Could Fuel Arguments for Recount.’’ The Connection Newspaper (Virginia), November 8, 2006; ‘‘Some Electronic Voting Machines Not ‘up to date’.’’ Pittsburg Tribune-Review, 

November 8, 2006; Burk, Jennifer. ‘‘Bibb Voting Glitches Nothing Out of the Ordinary, Carr 

Says.’’ The Telegraph (Georgia), November 9, 2006; ‘‘Disabled Voters Disappointed with TouchScreen Problems.’’ WISH–TV, November 10, 2006; King, Lauren. ‘‘Count on Recount in E. City 

Mayor’s Race.’’ The Virginian-Pilot, November 11, 2005; ‘‘Arkansas Mayoral Candidate Disputes 

Tally of Zero Votes, Says He Voted for Himself.’’ The Associated Press, November 11, 2006; 

‘‘Hendersonville Voters Back Building Height Restriction.’’ Tryon Daily Bulletin, November 13, 

2006; ‘‘Another Voting Glitch in Baldwin County.’’ The Associated Press, November 14, 2006; 

Spoto, Maryann. ‘‘Voting Mishap Blamed on Software Problems, Some Ballots Counted Twice, 

Sparking a Call for a Check of Totals at Shore.’’ Star-Ledger (New Jersey), November 14, 2006; 

Peters, Paul. ‘‘Communication Breakdown.’’ Missoula Independent, November 16, 2006; ‘‘E-voting Glitch Turns up in Texas.’’ CNet.News, November 16, 2006; Toland, Bill. ‘‘If You Think the 

Computer ‘Flipped’ Your Vote, You’re Not Alone; Though Solid Evidence is Hard to Pin Down, 

Complaints Abound About Voting Machines.’’ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 10, 2006. 2Zimmer, Beau ‘‘Touch screen problems reported in Hillsborough’’ Tampa Bay 10, January 29, 

2008; Kidwell, David ‘‘Chicago polls go well—despite punches, broken machines, wrong ballots 

and ‘invisible ink’ ’’ Chicago Tribune, February 5, 2008; Walsh, Diane ‘‘Voting machines produced errors in primary’’ The Star Ledger, February 20, 2008; Carmen, Barbara ‘‘County’s voting machines examined’’ Columbus Dispatch, March 16, 2008; Gier, Nancy ‘‘Democrats reporting 

irregularities in 14th District voting machines’’ Daily Herald, March 8, 2008. 

machines suffer from an essential flaw: the digital results reported 

from these machines cannot be audited independently. The only 

output available is a digital readout that relies on the accuracy of 

the electronic software during the voting process and cannot be recounted. As a result, many of these paperless DRE voting machines 

are not properly equipped to independently demonstrate voter intent during a recount or audit. 

If a voter casts a vote on a paperless electronic voting machine, 

the only thing the voter verifies—the information displayed on the 

touch screen surface for a few moments while the voter votes—disappears forever the moment the voter hits the ‘‘cast vote’’ button 

and leaves the voting booth. No election official, no computer scientist, and no voting system vendor can reconstruct what that 

voter intended because the voter votes in secret. Because of the secret ballot, only the voter can verify that his or her intention is recorded correctly, and it is impossible for the voter to verify an electronic record. 

When questions arise, candidates, voters and election officials 

alike are left to trust voting system vendors who insist their tradesecret-protected software counts votes accurately. This difficulty became glaringly apparent in the 2006 election, when reports revealed voting problems in numerous jurisdictions, producing a lack 

of voter confidence and uncertainty regarding election results.1

Furthermore, recent 2008 primary elections have revived concerns 

about the paperless touch screen voting machines.2

In order to increase public confidence and secure the 2008 general election, the law must be revised to support paperless jurisdictions’ efforts to invest in voting systems that are equipped with an 

independent paper copy of each vote—verified by the voter him or 

herself—to serve as a check on any electronic tallies reported by 

the voting machines. Support should also be provided for jurisdictions that choose to adopt additional safeguards such as manually 


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auditing the 2008 general elections and/or conducting hand counts 

of the 2008 general election. 

H.R. 5036 would reimburse paperless jurisdictions for reasonable 

costs associated with converting to paper ballot voting systems. Jurisdictions that transition to paper based voting systems in time for 

the 2008 general elections would have the option to continue to rely 

on the expediency, convenience and accessibility of computer-assisted voting, while preserving the critical ability to independently 

confirm that the will of the voters is reflected in the final results. 

H.R. 5036 does not mandate paper ballots and audits nationwide; 

rather, it provides an incentive to states and counties that want to 

implement a paper ballot voting system to prevent unauditable, 

unresolvable problems by opting in to the solution. 

Additionally, H.R. 5036 includes reimbursement for obtaining, 

deploying, and tabulating backup paper ballots in the event of the 

failure of electronic voting systems. Eligible jurisdictions must post 

notification and voter rights to backup paper ballots at all polling 

locations and must count each backup ballot as a regularly cast 

ballot. 

In amending H.R. 5036, the Committee has taken into account 

concerns raised by state and local officials and other stakeholders 

concerning the audit system. As reported, the bill allows jurisdictions to include at least 2% of all precincts, auditing units, or Congressional districts and designate an appropriate, independent official to oversee the administration of the audit. Audits, which shall 

include all ballots, including absentee, early, backup, and provisional ballots, should be conducted in a public and transparent 

manner, with the public able to observe the entire process. 

H.R. 5036 does not alter the HAVA mandate requiring that voting systems be equipped for individuals with disabilities in each 

polling place. The Committee assured reliable voting for all eligible 

voters by working extensively with prominent organizations and 

advocates in the disability community to ensure the standard of 

providing every voter access to a private and independent ballot, 

established by HAVA, is not violated. Diane Cordry Golden, Ph.D., 

Director, Missouri Assistive Technology conveyed in testimony presented before the House Administration Committee’s Subcommittee 

on Elections on March 15, 2007 that Congress should not restrict 

the rights of the disabled to vote privately and independently with 

new laws. H.R. 5036 does not change section 301(a)(3)(A) of HAVA, 

which requires each polling place be equipped with a voting machine that is accessible for individuals with disabilities, including 

nonvisual accessibility for the blind and visually impaired, in a 

manner that provides the same opportunity for access and participation (including privacy and independence) as other voters. 

Improvements in technology and practices for voters who have 

been disenfranchised historically are essential to ensure all eligible 

voters are confident in their ability to vote independently and have 

their votes accurately counted. As such, the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology will study, test, and develop products 

and practices that ensure the accessibility of paper ballot 

verification and casting for voters with disabilities, for voters whose 

primary language is not English, and for voters with difficulties in 

literacy. It should be noted that the Association of Assistive Technology Act Programs are the Federally supported experts on accesVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:42 Apr 15, 2008 Jkt 069006 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\HR582P1.XXX HR582P1

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sible technology for persons with disabilities. It is the Committee’s 

expectation that, in carrying out its responsibilities under H.R. 

5036, NIST shall take advantage of the ATAP’s significant and valuable expertise in assistive technology to make voting systems accessible. The Committee is eager to review the results of the study, 

tests, and development of products next year. 

The 2008 general election is quickly approaching and options 

must be provided to increase the integrity of the vote. Through 

H.R. 5036, jurisdictions are provided ample flexibility to select 

which provisions they wish to implement. If the bill is enacted 

promptly, jurisdictions should have adequate time to purchase and 

implement the voting system upgrades and/or the other provisions 

of this bill. 

SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY OF LEGISLATION

The bill, as reported, directs the Election Assistance Commission 

to reimburse certain jurisdictions for the costs of obtaining paper 

ballot voting systems for the general elections for Federal office to 

be held in November 2008, to reimburse jurisdictions for the costs 

incurred in conducting audits or hand counting of the results of the 

general elections for Federal office to be held in November 2008, 

and for other purposes. 

Section 1.—Short Title—This section establishes ‘‘The Emergency 

Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008’’ as the short title of the 

Act. 

Section 2.—Payments to Certain Jurisdictions Conducting 2008 

General Elections—This section authorizes such sums as necessary 

for the November 2008 Federal Elections to reimburse eligible jurisdictions that convert to paper ballot voting systems or retrofit 

paperless Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Systems with 

a voter verifiable record as well as reimburse jurisdictions using 

DRE Voting Systems for costs incurred in obtaining, deploying, and 

tabulating backup paper ballots in the event of a failure of the 

DRE Voting System. 

Section (2)(a).—‘‘Reimbursement for Conversion to Paper Ballot 

Voting System.’’ This subsection authorizes the Election Assistance 

Commission (EAC) to reimburse states for reasonable costs incurred by a jurisdiction that does any of the following before the 

November 2008 Federal Elections: replaces any paperless voting 

system with a paper ballot voting system; obtains non-tabulating 

ballot marking devices for voters with disabilities; obtains ballot 

marking stations/voting booths; obtains paper ballots; and obtains 

precinct-based equipment that tabulates paper ballots or scans 

paper ballots. This subsection also establishes the following requirements for a jurisdiction to become eligible: used a paperless 

voting system in the November 2006 federal elections; will conduct 

federal elections in November 2008 using only paper ballot voting 

systems; obtains a sufficient number of non-tabulating marking devices that are accessible to disability voters; obtains a sufficient 

number of ballot marking stations/voting booths to ensure voter 

privacy; and obtains a sufficient amount of paper ballots. To receive 

payments the subsection requires each eligible jurisdiction to submit an application to the EAC containing assurances that it has or 

will meet the eligibility requirements set forth in this section. In 

Section (2)(a)(4) it defines ‘‘paper ballot voting system’’ as a voting 


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system that uses a paper ballot marked by the voter by hand or 

a paper ballot marked by the voter with the assistance of a nontabulating ballot marking device. 

Section (2)(b).—‘‘Reimbursement for Retrofitting of Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems To Produce Voter Verifiable 

Paper Records.’’ This subsection authorizes the Election Assistance 

Commission (EAC) to reimburse jurisdictions for reasonable costs 

incurred by retrofitting paperless Direct Recording Electronic 

(DRE) Voting Systems with a voter verifiable record, including obtaining printers to produce the paper records. This subsection also 

defines eligible jurisdictions as those that submit an application to 

the EAC containing assurances that the jurisdiction has or will obtain a printer and retrofit each DRE Voting System used to conduct the November 2008 Federal Elections. 

Section (2)(c).—‘‘Reimbursement for Provision Of Backup Paper 

Ballots By Jurisdiction Using Direct Recording Electronic Voting 

Systems.’’ This subsection authorizes the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to reimburse jurisdictions for costs incurred in obtaining, deploying and tabulating backup paper ballots (and related 

supplies and equipment) in the event of a failing Direct Recording 

Electronic (DRE) Voting System. This subsection also establishes 

the following requirements for a jurisdiction to become eligible: 

post notification and voter rights to backup paper ballots at all 

polling places as well as count each backup paper ballot as a regular ballot and not a provisional ballot. To receive payments the 

subsection requires each eligible jurisdiction to submit an application to the EAC containing assurances that it will meet the eligibility requirements set forth in this section. 

Section (2)(c).—‘‘Amounts.’’ This subsection authorizes such sums 

as necessary for payments under this section until all funds are expended. 

Section 3.—Payments for Conducting Audits of Results of 2008 

General Elections—This section authorizes such sums as necessary 

for the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to reimburse states 

for reasonable costs incurred when conducting manual audits, in 

accordance with the requirements set forth in this section, of the 

results of any of the regularly scheduled November 2008 Federal 

Elections (including any concurrent state and local election). 

Section (3)(a).—‘‘Payments.’’ This subsection authorizes such 

sums as necessary to reimburse States for reasonable cost incurred 

if they conduct a manual audit, in accordance with the requirements set forth in this section, of the results of any November 2008 

Federal Election. In the event that a county or other jurisdiction 

administers such audits this subsection requires states to reimburse the counties or jurisdiction for such costs immediately upon 

receiving the payment under this section. In addition, the subsection requires the Election Assistance Commission to make payments no later than 30 days after receiving certification from 

States or counties that the audit was conducted in accordance with 

all the requirements. 

Section (3)(b).—‘‘Audit Requirements.’’ This subsection establishes the following requirements that States must meet in order 

to receive payments under this section: establish and publish auditing procedures and standards 30 days before the November 2008 

general elections; designate an appropriate and independent official 


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to oversee the administration of the audit; select precincts or alternative auditing units in a random as well as uniform manner after 

the final unofficial vote has been announced; select at least one 

precinct from each county in which the election is held; conduct the 

audit to include no less than 2 percent of the precincts, auditing 

units, or Congressional districts involved; commence the audit 

within 48 hours after the State or jurisdiction announces the final 

unofficial vote count; ensure a paper based voting system is available for every vote cast and that the tally produced by counting all 

of the paper ballots or printouts by hand is compared with the corresponding final unofficial vote count; include all ballots including 

absentee, early, backup, and provisional ballots in the audit; for 

States that establish a separate precinct for purposes of counting 

absentee ballots the State shall divide absentee ballots into audit 

units, approximately equal in size to the average precinct, and include at least 2% of those units; and conduct the audit in a public 

and transparent manner. 

Section (3)(c).—‘‘Collection and Submission of Audit Results; Publication.’’ This subsection requires the State to submit to the Election Assistance Commission a report on the results of each audit 

conducted under this section. 

Section (3)(d).—‘‘Delay in Certification of Results by State.’’ This 

subsection requires that no state may certify the results of any 

election prior to completing the audit, resolving discrepancies discovered, and submitting the required report. 

Section 4.—Payments for Conducting Hand Counts of Results of 

2008 General Elections—This section authorizes such sums as necessary for the Election Assistance Commission to reimburse states 

for reasonable costs incurred from tallying the election results by 

a hand count, in accordance with the section requirements, of the 

votes cast on the paper ballots for the November 2008 Federal 

Election. 

Section (4)(a).—‘‘Payments.’’ This subsection authorizes such 

sums as necessary to reimburse States or counties for reasonable 

cost incurred if they conduct a hand count, in accordance with the 

requirements set forth in this section, of the votes cast on the 

paper ballots used in the November 2008 Federal Election. It also 

requires the Administrator to make payments no later than 30 

days after receiving certification from States or counties that the 

hand count was conducted in accordance with all the requirements. 

Section (4)(b).—‘‘Hand Counts Described.’’ This subsection provides a definition of a hand count and the standard of completeness 

it should ensure. It defines a hand count as a count of all the paper 

ballots cast in the election (including paper ballot printouts, early 

voting ballots, absentee ballots, emergency ballots, and provisional 

ballots) by hand to determine the winner of the election without 

the use of electronic equipment or software. To guarantee completeness the State or county is required to ensure that a voter 

verifiable paper ballot or paper ballot printout verifiable by the 

voter is available for every vote cast in the jurisdiction. 

Section (4)(c).—‘‘Process for Conducting Hand Counts.’’ This subsection establishes the general requirements for how, where, and 

when the hand count shall be conducted. It requires a hand count 

to commence, at the earliest, 8 hours after the polls close. For any 

ballot not counted in the initial hand count but deemed eligible 


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(provisional or a late arrival absentee ballot), it shall be subject to 

a hand count and added to the official tally no later than 48 hours 

after the ballot is determined to be eligible. This subsection also requires the hand count to be conducted by no fewer than two individuals and at least one observer, who all must be election officials 

of the jurisdiction and be comprised of equal representation from 

both political parties. In regards to the location, the subsection requires hand counts to be conducted at the polling place on the date 

of the election and for other delayed ballots at the office of the jurisdiction’s chief election official. The hand count must also be conducted in a manner that allows public observation of the entire 

process, including the opening of the ballot boxes or removal of machine printed ballots from their containers; the sorting, counting, 

notation of results; and the announcement of the final determinations. Lastly, the hand count should be conducted in a way to 

produce the following information: number of votes for each candidate; number of overvotes, undervotes, spoiled votes, and blank 

ballots cast; number of write-in ballots and the names written on 

such ballots; total number of ballots cast; and a record of judgment 

calls made regarding voter intent. Following the hand count this 

subsection allows for a jurisdiction, if it wishes, to run the ballots 

through a tabulating machine or scanner for verification. 

Section 4(d).—‘‘Application to Jurisdictions Conducting Elections 

with Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems.’’ This subsection 

allows a jurisdiction using a Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) 

Voting System to receive payments under this section if it certifies 

to the Election Assistance Commission that each system produces 

a paper record printout of the marked ballot. 

Section (4)(d).—‘‘Announcement of Posting of Results.’’ This subsection requires a State or county upon completion of the hand 

count to announce the results to the public and post them on a 

public Internet site. 

Section (4)(e).—‘‘Use of Hand Count in Certification of Results.’’

This subsection requires that the results of the hand count should 

be used solely for the purpose of certifying the results of the election and not be construed to affect the application or operation of 

a recount. 

Section 5.—Study, Testing and Development of Products and 

Practices to Ensure Accessibility of Paper Ballot Verification and 

Casting for Certain Individuals—This section authorizes such sums 

as necessary for the Director of the National Institute of Standards 

and Technology to conduct a study to test and develop products as 

well as practices that ensure the accessibility of paper ballot 

verification and casting for: individuals with disabilities; individuals whose primary language is not English; and individuals with 

literacy difficulties. 

Section 6.—Definitions—This section defines the terms ‘‘Administrator’’ as the Administrator of General Services and ‘‘States’’ as including the District of Colombia, the Commonwealth of Puerto 

Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 


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COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF THE LEGISLATION 

INTRODUCTION & REFERRAL

On January 17, 2008, Mr. Holt, along with 36 members of the 

House, introduced H.R. 5036, which was referred to the Committee 

on House Administration, and additionally to the Committee on 

Science and Technology for consideration of matters under the jurisdiction of that committee. 

HEARINGS

The Committee on House Administration held hearings during 

the 1st Session of the 110th Congress on matters relating to H.R. 

5036. 

On March 15, 2007, the Subcommittee on Elections held a hearing titled: ‘‘Election Reform Hearing: Machines & Software.’’ The 

following members were present at the hearing: Subcommittee 

Chair Zoe Lofgren, Juanita Millender-McDonald, Susan Davis, and 

Kevin McCarthy. 

Witnesses 

Panel 1: 

1. The Honorable Eric Clark—Secretary of State, Missouri 

2. Dr. Diane C. Golden—Director, Missouri Assistive Technology 

3. Dr. Ted Selker—Director, Voting Technology Project, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 

4. Mr. Kelly Pierce—Disability Specialist, Cook County (IL) State 

Attorney Office 

Panel 2: 

1. Dr. Brit Williams—Professor, Kennesaw State University 

2. Dr. David Wagner—Associate Professor, University of California, Berkeley 

3. Mr. Brain Behlendorf—Founder & Chief Technology Officer, 

CallabNet 

4. Mr. Hugh Gallagher—Managing Director, Election System Acquisition & Management Services, Inc. 

5. Mr. Matt Zimmerman—Staff Attorney, Electronic Frontier 

Foundation 

On March 20, 2007, the Committee on House Administration 

Subcommittee on Elections held a hearing titled ‘‘Election Reform 

Hearing: Auditing.’’ The following members were present at the 

hearing: Subcommittee Chair Zoe Lofgren, Charlie Gonzalez, Susan 

Davis, Kevin McCarthy, and Vern Ehlers. 

Witnesses 

Panel 1: 

1. Ion Sancho—Supervisor of Elections, Leon County (FL) 

2. Matt Damschroder—Director, Franklin County (OH) Board of 

Elections 

Panel 2: 

1. Candice Hoke—Director, Cleveland State University Center 

for Election Integrity 

2. R. Doug Lewis—Executive Director, National Association of 

Election Officials 

3. Lawrence Norden—Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice 


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4. Tammy Patrick—Federal Compliance Officer, Maricopa County (AZ) Elections Department 

5. Pamela Smith—President, VerifiedVoting.ORG 

In addition to these hearings, the late Chairwoman Juanita 

Millender-McDonald and Ranking Member Vernon Ehlers hosted a 

voting machine forum on March 15, 2007. This forum gave Members of Congress and their staff an opportunity to learn more about 

voting systems first-hand. The following companies were in attendance: Avante, Automark, Diebold Election Systems, Hart 

InterCivic, Inc., IVS—Vote by Phone, Perfect Voting System, Sequoia Voting Systems, Inc., and Unisyn Voting Solutions. 

MARKUP

On Wednesday, April 2, 2008, the Committee on House Administration met to mark up H.R. 5036. The Committee ordered reported 

favorably H.R. 5036, as amended, by a voice vote. A quorum was 

present. 

MATTERS REQUIRED UNDER THE RULES OF THE HOUSE 

COMMITTEE RECORD VOTES

Clause 3(b) of House rule XIII requires the results of each record 

vote on an amendment or motion to report, together with the 

names of those voting for and against, to be printed in the committee report. There were no recorded votes. The first amendment 

introduced was an amendment in the nature of a substitute by Ms. 

Lofgren. All of the following votes, until the vote on the Lofgren 

substitute, were on amendments to the Lofgren substitute. 

Lofgren amendment in the nature of a substitute 

Offered by Ms. Lofgren. The substitute addresses a number of 

concerns that were raised by disability groups and state and local 

government stakeholders during the timeframe between introduction of the original bill and the mark-up. The substitute makes several changes to the legislation, while keeping the core purpose of 

the bill to providing a voter verifiable paper and auditable paper 

trail. These changes, particularly to the audit section, DRE retrofitting, and the use of funding for backup paper ballots, were specifically made to reflect many of the concerns expressed by the civil 

rights and election official advocates. The substitute reimburses jurisdictions for retrofitting paperless touch-screen voting machines 

(DREs) with systems that produce a voter verifiable paper record, 

obtaining backup paper ballots in the event of failure of electronic 

voting systems, and conducting a manual audit of federal, as well 

as any state and local, elections in November 2008 in no less than 

two percent of the precincts. 

The Lofgren substitute changes the original bill in the following 

areas: 

Reimbursement Authority—The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) shall administer funds and reimburse jurisdictions 

for the costs related to implementing the provisions of this bill in 

lieu of the Administrator of the General Services. 

Authorized Funding—Authorized funding amounts have been 

changed to ‘‘such sums as necessary.’’


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Retrofitting Paperless Touch Screen Voting Machines (DREs)—

Section 2(b) has been added to authorize the EAC to reimburse 

states for reasonable costs incurred by retrofitting paperless DREs 

with systems that produce a voter verifiable record and obtaining 

printers to produce the paper records. 

Paper Ballots—Section 2(c) emergency paper ballots have been 

replaced with backup paper ballots. 

Election Auditor—The entity selected to oversee the administration of the audit shall now be selected by the State and the entity 

must meet a general standard of independence as defined by the 

State. 

Minimum Percentage of Audits Conducted—Audits shall be conducted in no less than two percent of the precincts, auditing units, 

or Congressional districts involved, rather than a minimum of 

three percent. 

Application of Audit Section to Jurisdictions Conducting Elections with Direct Recording Electronic Voting Systems (DREs)—Section 4(d) has been added to allow a jurisdiction using a DRE to receive payments under the audit section if it certifies to the EAC 

that each system produces a paper record printout of the marked 

ballot. 

Alternative Ballot Sampling Methods Approval by the National 

Institute of Standards and Technology—has been removed. 

Ehlers’ amendments to the Lofgren substitute 

The first vote of the mark up was on a bloc of three amendments 

offered by Mr. Ehlers to amend the Lofgren substitute. The first 

amendment, Ehlers Amendment # 1, adds language that allows for 

audits to commence 48 hours after states or relevant jurisdictions 

involved announce the unofficial vote count. The second amendment, Ehlers Amendment #2, adds language that requires no hand 

count to commence until at least 8 hours after the polls close and 

requires the ballots to be in a secured location until the hand count 

commences. Lastly, the third amendment, Ehlers Amendment #4, 

adds language that ensures hand counting teams when conducting 

a hand count of the election results have equal representation from 

both political parties of the candidates who received the two greatest numbers of aggregate votes cast. The amendments en bloc were 

passed by a voice vote. 

Following the passage of the en bloc amendments, the Committee 

then held a vote on the final amendment offered by Mr. Ehlers, 

Ehlers Amendment #3. This amendment adds language that requires that after the hand count is complete that the ballots be run 

through a tabulating machine or scanner for verification of the 

tally, if such a machine or scanner is available. During debate on 

the amendment the Committee agreed to amend Ehlers Amendment #3 to remove the requirement and instead give states the option to run the ballots through a tabulating machine or scanner for 

verification of the tally. As a result, Ehlers Amendment #3 was 

changed to include ‘‘may run the ballots through a tabulating machine or scanner for verification of the tally, if such a machine or 

scanner is available.’’ The amendment, as amended, was agreed to 

by a voice vote. 

The Lofgren substitute, as amended, was then adopted by voice 

vote. 


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COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT FINDINGS

In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee states that the findings 

and recommendations of the Committee, based on oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the descriptive portions of this report. 

GENERAL PEFORMANCE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Committee states, with respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII 

of the Rules of the House of Representatives, that the goal and objective of H.R. 5036 is to provide an incentive to States and counties that want to implement a system to prevent non-auditable, 

non-resolvable problems in the November 2008 general election. 

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY

In compliance with clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII, the Committee 

states that Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority to make laws governing the time, place and 

manner of holding Federal elections. 

EARMARK IDENTIFICATION

Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XXI, H.R. 5036, the Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008, does not include any congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or limited tariff benefits 

as defined in clause 9(d), 9(e), or 9(f) of rule XXI. 

PREEMPTION CLARIFICATION

Section 423 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 requires the 

report of any committee on a bill or joint resolution to include a 

committee statement on the extent to which the bill or joint resolution is intended to preempt state or local law. H.R. 5036 is intended to apply in all States and preempt laws to the contrary in 

their application to Federal elections. 

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE COST ESTIMATE

In compliance with clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of the 

House of Representatives, the Committee sets forth, with respect to 

the bill, the following estimate and comparison prepared by the Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the 

Congressional Budget Act of 1974: 

Summary: H.R. 5036 would amend the Help America Vote Act of 

2002 to require the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to reimburse states for the costs of converting to voting systems that 

produce paper ballots. The legislation also would reimburse any jurisdiction for the costs of conducting manual audits or hand recounts of the federal election to be held in November 2008. Finally, 

the legislation would direct the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) to study systems for verifying paper ballots. 

CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 5036 would cost $685 

million in 2009, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. 

Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending or revenues. H.R. 

5036 contains no intergovernmental or private sector mandates as 


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defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) and would 

impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments. 

Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated budgetary impact of H.R. 5036 is shown in the following table. The costs 

of this legislation fall within budget functions 250 (general science, 

space, and technology) and 800 (general government). 

By fiscal year, in millions of dollars— 

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 

CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION 

Ballot Verification: 

Estimated Authorization Level ................................................... 554 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ...................................................................... 554 0 0 0 0 

Hand Count of Paper Ballots: 

Estimated Authorization Level ................................................... 95 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ...................................................................... 95 0 0 0 0 

Manual Audits of Elections: 

Estimated Authorization Level ................................................... 10 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ...................................................................... 10 0 0 0 0 

Other Provisions: 

Estimated Authorization Level ................................................... 25 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ...................................................................... 25 0 0 0 0 

Reporting Provisions: 

Estimated Authorization Level ................................................... 1 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ...................................................................... 1 0 0 0 0 

Total Proposed Changes: 

Estimated Authorization Level .......................................... 685 0 0 0 0 

Estimated Outlays ............................................................. 685 0 0 0 0 

Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill 

will be enacted near the end of fiscal year 2008, that the necessary 

amounts will be appropriated, and that outlays will follow historical spending patterns for similar programs. CBO estimates that 

implementing H.R. 5036 would cost $685 million in 2009, assuming 

appropriation of the estimated amounts. 

Ballot verification: Section 2 of H.R. 5036 would authorize the 

appropriation of whatever sums are necessary for grants to states 

to pay for the cost of providing a permanent paper record of each 

voter’s ballot. Activities covered would include purchasing or upgrading voting systems, and counting backup paper ballots from 

certain types of electronic voting machines. Based on information 

from the EAC about the number and types of voting machines currently in use, CBO estimates that implementing this provision 

would cost $554 million in 2009, assuming appropriation of the 

necessary amounts. 

Hand count of paper ballots: Section 4 would authorize the appropriation of whatever sums are necessary for the EAC to reimburse states for the costs they incur to hand count votes cast on 

paper ballots used in the November 2008 elections. Using information from the EAC about the number of ballots cast in the 2006 

elections, CBO estimates that, if all states found it necessary to 

conduct a hand count of ballots, the costs nationwide could reach 

nearly $270 million. However, for this estimate, CBO assumes, 

based on information from the EAC, that fewer than 20 states 

would have closely contested elections that would need hand 

counts. Under that assumption, CBO estimates that implementing 

this provision would cost about $95 million in 2009, assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. 


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Manual audits of elections: Section 3 would authorize the appropriation of whatever sums are necessary for the EAC to reimburse 

states for costs they incur to conduct manual audits of two percent 

of the results of regularly scheduled general elections in November 

2008. CBO expects that such audits would entail a review about 

3,500 of the almost 180,000 voting precincts in the United States. 

Using information from the EAC regarding the average number of 

voters per precinct and an average audit cost per ballot of $2.20, 

CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost about 

$10 million in 2009. 

Other provisions: Implementing H.R. 5036 would increase the responsibilities of the EAC. The agency expects that it would need 

additional staff to distribute funds, manage the new programs, 

monitor spending, and prepare audits. Based on information from 

the EAC, CBO estimates that additional costs for those activities 

would total $25 million in 2009. 

Reporting provisions: H.R. 5036 also would authorize the appropriation of whatever sums are necessary for NIST to study and report to the Congress on ballot verification methods for individuals 

with disabilities. Based on information from NIST, CBO estimates 

that implementing this provision would cost $1 million in the 2009. 

Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 5036 contains 

no intergovernmental or private sector mandates as defined in 

UMRA. The bill would benefit state, local, and tribal governments 

by allowing them to apply for reimbursement from the EAC for certain costs they incur during the 2008 general election. 

Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Matthew Pickford; Impact 

on state, local, and tribal governments: Elizabeth Cove; Impact on 

the private sector: Paige Piper/Bach. 

Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant Director 

for Budget Analysis. 


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MINORITY VIEWS OF THE HONORABLE VERNON J. EHLERS, 

THE HONORABLE DAN LUNGREN, AND THE HONORABLE 

KEVIN MCCARTHY 

H.R. 5036: EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FOR SECURE ELECTIONS ACT OF

2008 

The Committee on House Administration ordered H.R. 5036 reported favorably by voice vote. H.R. 5036 provides optional grant 

programs for states or jurisdictions that seek to convert to a paper 

based voting system or a voting system that produces a paper 

record, to have an ample supply of emergency paper ballots, and 

to conduct post election audits or tally election results by hand for 

the 2008 election. While we applaud the Committee for retreating 

from its support of overly prescriptive legislation in the area of 

elections, H.R. 5036 contains provisions that pose concern regarding potential consequences for states or jurisdictions that choose to 

participate. 

VOTING MACHINES

Over the past two centuries, we have made significant improvements to our election process. The Committee and the Congress 

were successful in working in a bipartisan manner to improve our 

nation’s voting systems with the passage of the Help America Vote 

Act of 2002 (HAVA). Under HAVA’s provisions pertaining to voting 

machine replacement, states and local election administrators had 

the flexibility to determine what qualifying voting system was preferable in their specific locale based on demographics. Some states, 

like Michigan, purchased optical scan voting machines while other 

states and jurisdictions purchased paperless Direct-Recording Electronic Voting Machines (DRE) to satisfy HAVA requirements. 

We are pleased with the successful deployment of HAVA-compliant voting machines across the nation. Over the past several years, 

numerous elections have been conducted without evidence of voting 

machine malfunction. In the 2006 election cycle, the only significant allegation that voting machines malfunctioned was proven to 

be without merit. The allegation arose from the election results for 

the Congressional race in Florida’s Thirteenth Congressional District which showed a significant amount of undervotes. The undervotes were alleged to be caused by machine malfunction rather 

than poor ballot design or abstention by voters for that race. The 

Committee established a Task Force that directed the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct an investigation of the voting machines used in Florida’s Thirteenth Congressional District. 

After a 10-month long investigation that involved extensive testing 

of the voting machines, the GAO concluded that the voting machines operated properly and accurately recorded election ballots. 


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H.R. 5036 would provide an incentive for states and jurisdictions 

that currently use paperless DRE voting systems to change to voting systems that are paper based or can produce a paper record. 

The proponents of H.R. 5036 argue that voter verifiable paper 

records would provide increased confidence in our voting systems. 

While we are not opposed to a state or jurisdiction’s choice to convert to a voting system that provides a voter verifiable record, we 

question the necessity and utility of this bill. 

Over the past year, election officials, state and Federal legislators, county and city clerks, election machine vendors, and interested parties from across the country have voiced concern to the 

Committee about implementing changes to the administration of 

Federal elections during a Presidential election year. During our 

Committee hearings last year for H.R. 811, ‘‘The Voter Confidence 

and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007,’’ testimony presented demonstrated the severe burden that would be placed on election officials if they were required to change their voting systems for the 

2008 Presidential election. With the November elections a mere 7 

months away, we are skeptical of states and local jurisdictions converting to a different voting system, even if sufficient funds were 

available. It appears that the only states or jurisdictions that qualify and would likely seek reimbursement would be states that have 

already committed to converting to a paper based voting system for 

the November 2008 elections, e.g. Florida. It is reckless for the Federal government to encourage states to hastily switch voting machines in a Presidential election year. 

MANUAL AUDITS

H.R. 5036 provides reimbursement for the costs of manual audits 

of any of the regularly scheduled general elections for Federal office 

in November 2008. While we support auditing election results, we 

are not convinced that the manual audits contained in H.R. 5036 

should be so extensive or overly prescriptive. Although the administration of manual audits is optional, we have reservations about 

establishing an unsubstantiated threshold for the number of precincts and races that are subject to an audit. States and local jurisdictions should be given flexibility to conduct audits without specifying a percentage of ballots to be counted and should also have the 

option to exempt certain Federal elections from a manual count, if 

the election was decided by a substantial margin of victory. Further, under the audit structure, elections subject to an audit cannot 

be certified until after completing the audit, resolving discrepancies 

discovered in the audit, and submitting the audit report to the 

Election Assistance Commission. Requiring an audit to be completed before reporting the official election results for some states 

could be an impediment to a timely and efficient recount of a presidential election. States and local jurisdictions are responsible for 

administering Federal elections and have the wisdom of how and 

when to perform audits. 

HAND COUNTING PAPER BALLOTS

H.R. 5036 also allows states and jurisdictions to receive funding 

if they elect to hand count paper ballots to determine election results for all Federal elections, rather than using a tabulating maVerDate Aug 31 2005 09:42 Apr 15, 2008 Jkt 069006 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6604 Sfmt 6604 E:\HR\OC\HR582P1.XXX HR582P1

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chine or scanner to count ballots. While we respect decisions by 

certain states and jurisdictions to tally votes by hand based on 

their demographics and resources, we do not support providing a 

Federal subsidy to encourage states to switch to hand counting. 

Further, hand counts have been documented to be the most inaccurate means of tabulating ballots as they are more prone to 

human error. We also have concerns with the increased potential 

for fraud in counting paper ballots by hand. Mr. Capuano during 

Committee markup expressed his concerns regarding hand counting paper ballots. Specifically, he noted: 

‘‘The only elections I have ever seen stolen is when 

there’s nothing but a hand count . . . that’s the only elections I’ve ever seen stolen.’’ . . . ‘‘A hand count can get stolen, and I can tell you how to do it.’’ ‘‘. . . Local officials 

are perfectly capable of making these decisions . . . [those] 

people have been running these elections for a long time 

. . . they know how to do it . . . we don’t have to hold 

their hand at every step along the way.’’

We should strive to make reforms to our elections process that 

improve the voter confidence, however, we are skeptical that providing financial incentives to states and local jurisdictions to perform a hand count of paper ballots in lieu of a tabulation using the 

electronic tabulator will increase voter confidence in the outcome of 

an election. In fact, it may decrease it. 

We are pleased that the Committee adopted the amendment offered by Mr. Ehlers that requires states or jurisdictions to wait at 

least 8 hours before the polls close before performing a hand count. 

We want to ensure that poll workers responsible for the hand count 

are not required to work through the night after having worked at 

least 12 hours at the polls all day on Election Day. The Committee 

also accepted the amendment offered by Mr. Ehlers, to provide that 

the team of individuals conducting the hand count shall consist of 

an equal numbers of representatives from each of the major political parties. This amendment is crucial to ensure fairness and integrity when counting ballots by hand. 

CONCLUSION

When contemplating Federal election reform, the Committee 

should be mindful not to roll back the progress made through the 

enactment of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), and at the same 

time, not to jeopardize the successful administration of our 2008 

General Election. Providing a grant program to induce states and 

local jurisdictions to make widespread changes to the electoral 

process, especially in such a short time frame, may have unintended consequences. We suspect given the current fiscal climate 

that the Federal government will be unwilling to expend additional 

funding to reimburse states or jurisdictions that elect to participate 

in the grant programs outlined in H.R. 5036. 

VERNON J. EHLERS. 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN. 

KEVIN MCCARTHY. 


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