MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions

Decision: 2020 ME	

Docket: Wal-19-401

Argued: May	11,	2020

Decided: June	11,	2020

Panel: MEAD,	GORMAN,	JABAR,	HUMPHREY,	HORTON,	and	CONNORS,	JJ.

DAWN	H.	HASKELL	et	al.

v.

STATE	FARM	FIRE	AND	CASUALTY	COMPANY

MEAD,	J.

[¶1]	 	Dawn H. Haskell	 and	Martin	W.	Witham	 appeal	 from	 a	 summary	

judgment	entered	by	the	Superior	Court	(Waldo	County,	R.	Murray,	J.)	in	favor	

of	State	Farm	Fire	and	Casualty	Company	on	Haskell	and	Witham’s	complaint	

to	reach	and	apply	the	State	Farm	vehicle	insurance	coverage	of	a	man	found	

jointly	and	 severally	liable	 to	Haskell	and	Witham	 for	damages.		Haskell	and	

Witham	 argue	 that	they	 were	 entitled	 to	 a	 summary	 judgment	 because	 the	

underlying	 tort	 judgment	 established	 that	 State	 Farm’s	 insured	 had	 caused	

their	injuries	and	that	the	State	Farm	automobile	insurance	policy	covers	the	

damages	awarded	to	them	for	those	injuries.		We	affirm	the	court’s	judgment.
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I.		BACKGROUND

[¶2]	 	 The	 material	 facts	 are	 drawn	 from	 the	 parties’ statements	 of	

material	 facts,	which	were	properly	supported	by	citations	 to	 the	record,	see

M.R.	Civ.	P.	56(h)(4),	viewed	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	Haskell	and	Witham.		

See InfoBridge,	 LLC	 v.	 Chimani,	 Inc.,	 2020	 ME	 41,	 ¶ 12,	 --- A.3d	 ---.	 	 On	

March 27, 2013,	 Grover	 Bragg	 owned	 a	 truck	 insured	 by	 State	 Farm. Bragg	

used	 that	 truck	 in	 the	 early	 morning	 hours	 to	 transport	 an	 intoxicated	 and	

delusional	 friend	away	 from	Bragg’s	home.		Bragg’s	 friend	jumped	out	of	 the	

truck	while	the	truck	was	moving.		Bragg	pulled	over	but	did	not	exit	his	truck.		

Bragg’s	 friend	 then	 broke	 into	 Haskell	 and	 Witham’s	 house	 and	 thoroughly	

damaged	 windows	 and	 other	 property.	 	 At	 one	 point,	 he	 got	into	 the	 bed	 of	

Bragg’s	 truck,	 but	 he	 left	 again	 and	 reentered	 Haskell	 and	 Witham’s	 house.		

When	 Witham	 attempted	 to	 restrain	 him,	 he	 assaulted	Witham,	 resulting	 in	

injury.

[¶3]		The	insurance	policy	on	Bragg’s	vehicle insured	Bragg	“for	.	.	. the	

ownership,	maintenance,	or	use	of”	his	vehicle.		The	policy	provided	as	follows	

regarding	coverage	for	liability	to	others:

We will	 pay	 damages	 an	 insured becomes	 legally	 liable	 to	 pay	

because	of:

a. bodily	injury	to	others;	and	
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b. damage	to	property

caused	by	an	accident	that	involves	a	vehicle	for	which	that insured	

is	provided	Liability	Coverage	by	this	policy.

(Emphasis	omitted.)

[¶4]	 	 In	 April	 2014,	 Bragg	 was	 served	 with	 Haskell	 and	 Witham’s	

complaint	alleging	Bragg’s	negligence,	among	 other claims	that	 they	brought	

against	 Bragg’s	 friend	 and	 others.	 	 Bragg	 did	 not	 file	 a	 timely	 answer,	 and	 a	

default	was	entered	against	him	in	June	2014.		By March	2015,	State	Farm	had	

received the	complaint, and	in	2016,	it	employed	counsel	to	represent	Bragg,	

admitting	 that	 it	 had the	 duty	 to	 defend.	 	 Bragg,	 through	 counsel,	 filed	 an	

answer	but	did	not	move	to	set	aside	the	entry	of	default.

[¶5]	 	 At	 a	 hearing	 on	 damages,	 Bragg	 raised	 arguments	 and	 offered	

evidence	about	the	extent	of	damages	attributable	to him.		The	court	concluded

that	 Bragg	 and	 his	 friend	 were	 jointly	 and	 severally	 liable	 to	 Haskell	 and	

Witham	 and	 awarded damages in	 the	 amount of	 $428,071.64.	 Bragg’s	

negligence	was	based	on	findings	that,	worried	about	the	safety	of	people	in	his	

home	and	possible	property	damage,	Bragg	took	his	intoxicated	and	delusional	

friend	for	a	drive, rather	than	calling	the	authorities, and	followed	his	friend’s	

directions	in	going	down	the	road	where	Haskell	and	Witham	live.		Based	on	
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the	default,	the	court	accepted	as	true	the	allegations	that	Bragg	was	aware	of	

and	assisted	his	friend	in	becoming	intoxicated	before	driving	his	friend	away	

from	his	home.		We affirmed	 that	judgment	 on	appeal.		See Haskell	v.	Bragg,	

2017	ME	154,	167 A.3d	1246.

[¶6]		Haskell	and	Witham	then	commenced	the	present	action	seeking	to	

reach	and	apply	Bragg’s	vehicle	insurance	policy,	see 24-A	M.R.S.	§	2904	(2020),	

and	 to	 obtain	 a	 declaratory	 judgment	 that	 the	 coverage	 applies.	 	 State	 Farm	

moved	 for	summary	judgment,	and	Haskell	and	Witham	 filed	a	cross-motion	

for	summary	judgment.

[¶7]		The	court	entered	a	summary	judgment	in	favor	of State	Farm	and	

denied	 Haskell	 and	 Witham’s motion	 for	 summary	 judgment.	 	 The	 court	

reasoned	that,	although	State	Farm	was	bound	by	the	judgment	finding	Bragg	

liable	to	Haskell	and	Witham,	State	Farm	could	argue	that	the	conduct	for	which	

Bragg	 was	 held	 liable	 was	 not	 covered	 by	 the	 State	 Farm	 policy.	 	 The	 court	

concluded	that	the	damages	payable	to	Haskell	and	Witham	were	not	damages	

that	 Bragg	 became	 liable	 to	 pay	 because	 of	 “an	 accident	 that	 involve[d]”	 a	

vehicle	covered	by	the	State	Farm	policy	and	that	the	damages	did	not	arise	out	

of	Bragg’s	use	of	the	vehicle.
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[¶8]		Haskell	and	Witham	timely	appealed.		See 14	M.R.S.	§	1851	(2020);	

M.R. App.	P.	2B(c)(1).

II.	DISCUSSION

[¶9]	 	 We	 review	 a	 court’s	 entry	 of	 summary	 judgment	 de	 novo	 as	 a	

question	of	law.		Kelley	v.	N.	E.	Ins.	Co.,	2017	ME	166,	¶	4,	168	A.3d	779.		Two	

issues	have	been	 raised	 on	appeal:	 (A)	whether	 the	judgment	entered	in	 the	

underlying	 litigation	 determined	 all	 issues	 of	 causation	 pertinent	 to	 the	

coverage	decision,	and	(B)	whether	the	incident	for	which	Bragg	was	held	liable	

falls	within	the	coverage	of	the	State	Farm	policy.

A. Causation

[¶10]		“Upon	the	entry	of	a	default	for	failure	to	timely	appear	or	respond	

in	an	action,	the	facts	alleged	in	the	complaint	are	deemed	to	have	been	proved	

and	 affirmative	 defenses	 are	 deemed	 to	 have	 been	 waived.”	 	 Haskell,	

2017 ME 154,	 ¶	 4,	 167	 A.3d	 1246	 (citing	 M.R.	 Civ.	 P.	 8(b)-(d)).	 	 Thus,	 the	

complaint’s	 allegations	 that	 Bragg’s	 negligent	 actions	 caused	 damages	 to	

Haskell	and	Witham	are	deemed	to	have	been	proved.		Id. ¶	17.

[¶11]		We	need	not	decide	whether	those	allegations	should	be	deemed	

proved	against	the	insurer	in	this	reach-and-apply	action,	however,	because	the	

parties	 do	 not	 dispute	 the	material	 facts	 set	 forth	in	 the	 summary	judgment	
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record,	 and	 those	 facts	 are	 consistent	 with	 the	 complaint’s	 allegations.	 	The	

question	for	 us	 to	 decide	 is	 whether	 the finding of	 negligence	 based	 on	 the

alleged	facts requires	the	insurance	company	to	apply	the	policy’s	coverage	for	

bodily	 injury	 and	 property	 damages	 “caused	 by	 an	 accident	 that	 involves	 a	

vehicle”	insured	by	the	policy.		(Emphasis	added.)

[¶12]	 We	“have	repeatedly	stated	that	an	insurer’s	duty	to	indemnify	is	

independent	from	its	duty	to	defend	and	that	its	duty	to	defend	is	broader	than	

its	 duty	 to	 indemnify.”	 	 Elliott	 v.	 Hanover	 Ins.	 Co.,	 1998	 ME	 138,	 ¶ 11,	

711 A.2d 1310.	 	 State	 Farm	 did	 not,	 by	 conceding	 that	 the	 allegations	 of the	

complaint	may	fall	within	Bragg’s	policy	and	honoring	the	duty	to	defend,	waive	

its	claims	regarding	coverage.		See	id.		Counsel	appeared	under	a	reservation	of	

rights,	 and	the	 coverage	 issue	 remained	 unresolved	 through	 the	 underlying	

litigation.

[¶13]		Thus,	whether	 or	 not	Haskell	and	Witham	 proved	causation	 for	

purposes	 of	 the	 negligence	 action, the	 terms	 of	 the	 policy will	 determine	

whether	 coverage	 is	 owed.	 	Id. (holding	 that,	 even	 when	 an	 insurer	 fails	 to	

defend	 its	 insured,	 the	 policy—not	 the	 finding	 of	 tort	 liability—determines	

whether	the	insurance	company	must	pay	the	insured).		The	court	was	correct	

that,	 although	 Bragg’s	liability	for	injuries	may	 have	 been established	in	 the	
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underlying	litigation,	the	injuries	were	not	necessarily “caused	by	an	accident	

that	involves	a	vehicle”	insured	by	the	policy.		The	question	here	is	whether	the	

facts presented	on	summary	judgment,	 viewed	in	 the	light	most	 favorable	 to

Haskell	and	Witham, see InfoBridge,	LLC,	2020	ME	41,	¶ 12, ---A.3d ---, bring	the	

damages	within	the	coverage	of	Bragg’s	vehicle	insurance	policy.

B. Summary	Judgment	on	Policy	Coverage

[¶14]		Haskell	and	Witham	do	 not	contend	 that	 there	 are	 any	genuine	

issues	 of	material	 fact.	 	 Rather,	 they	 argue	that	 the	 court	misinterpreted	 the	

language	of	the	policy	in	concluding	that	the	damages	awarded	to	Haskell	and	

Witham	in	the	underlying	lawsuit	were	not	caused	by	an	accident	that	involved	

Bragg’s vehicle.

[¶15]		“The	review	of	a	judgment	in	a	reach	and	apply	action	requires us	

to	first	identify	the	basis	of	liability	and	damages	from	the	underlying	complaint	

and	judgment	and	then	to	review	the	.	.	.	insurance	policy	to	determine	if	any	of	

the	 damages	 awarded	 in	 the	 underlying	 judgment	 are	 based	 on	 claims	 that	

would	be	 recoverable	pursuant	 to	 the	 .	 .	 .	policy.”		Kelley,	2017	ME	 166,	¶	 5,	

168 A.3d	779	(quotation	marks	omitted).		“The	meaning	of	language	contained	

in	an	insurance	contract	is	a	question	of	law	that we review	de	novo.”		Patrons	

Oxford	Ins.	Co.	v.	Harris,	2006	ME	72,	¶	7,	905	A.2d	819.		“If	the	language	of	an	
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insurance	policy	is	unambiguous,	we interpret	it	in	accordance	with	its	plain	

meaning,	 but we	 construe	 ambiguous	 policy	 language	 strictly	 against	 the	

insurance	 company	 and	 liberally	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 policyholder.”	 	 Kelley,	

2017 ME 166,	 ¶	 5,	 168	 A.3d	 779	(quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 We read	 the	

policy’s	 language	 “from	 the	 perspective	 of	 an	 average	 person	 untrained	 in	

either	the	law	or	the	insurance	field	in	light	of	what	a	more	than	casual	reading	

of	the	policy	would	reveal	to	an	ordinarily	intelligent	insured.”		Id. (quotation	

marks	omitted).

[¶16]		The	insurance	policy	provided	coverage	to	Bragg	for	his	use	of	the	

vehicle	and	covered	his	liability	for	bodily	injury	or	property	damage	to	others	

“caused	by	an	accident	that	involves	a	vehicle”	covered	by	the	policy.		Thus,	we	

consider	whether	the	causal connection	between	the	conduct	and	the	vehicle	is	

sufficient	 when	 an	 insured	 uses	 his	 vehicle	 to	 drive	 an	 intoxicated	 and

delusional	 person	 to	 a	 place	 where	 that	 person	 exits	 the	 vehicle	 and	inflicts	

harm.

[¶17]		As	we	have	held	in	determining	whether	injuries	resulted	from	the	

“use”	 of	 a	 vehicle,	“[t]he	 causal	 relationship	 between	 the	 proper	 use	 of	 the	

vehicle	 and	 the	 subsequent	 injury	 need	 not	 be	 the	 proximate	 cause	 of	 the	

injury;	 coverage	 will	 be	 extended	 if	 there	 is	 a	 reasonable	 causal	 connection	
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between	the	use	and	the	injury.”		Me.	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co.	v.	Am.	Int’l	Underwriters	

Ins.	 Co.,	 677	 A.2d	 1073,	 1075	 (Me.	 1996)	 (quotation	 marks	 omitted).	 	 We

recently	 opined	 that	 a	 dog	 bite	 that	 occurred	 in	 an	 insured	 vehicle	 did	 not	

constitute	an	“auto	accident” covered	by	the	pertinent	insurance	policy.		Kelley,	

2017	ME	 166,	 ¶	 7,	 168	 A.3d	 779.	 	We reasoned	 that	 an	 auto	 accident	is	 “an	

unintended	 and	 unforeseen	 injurious	 occurrence	 involving	 an	 automobile,”	

which	may	include	incidents	other	than	a	collision	or	car	crash,	but	which	does	

not	 include	 “bodily	 injury	 from	 a	 dog	 bite	 that	 occurred	 in	 a	 car	 that	 had	

absolutely	 no	 causal	 connection	 to	 the	 injury	 and	 that	 was	 not	 even	 in	

operation.”		Id.

[¶18]		Here,	the	policy	language	is	similar	to	the	terms	we	employed to	

construe	the	term “auto	accident.”		Id.		We	interpreted	that	term	to	mean “an	

unintended	and	unforeseen	injurious	occurrence	involving an	automobile,”	id.

(emphasis	added),	and	Bragg’s	State	Farm	policy	covers	damages	caused	by	“an	

accident	that	involves a	vehicle”	insured	by	the	policy (emphasis	added).	 Thus,	

we	 find	Kelley	 useful	 in	 interpreting	 the	 policy	 at	 issue	 here	 as	 we	 consider	

whether	 the	causal	link	between	 the	 vehicle	and	 the	injuries	is	 sufficient	 for	

coverage	to	apply.
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[¶19]	 	 We	 are	 also guided	 by	 our	 interpretations	 of	 insurance	 policy

provisions covering	damages	arising	 from	 the	 “use”	 of	a	 vehicle.		We held	in	

Maine	Mutual	 Fire	 Insurance Co.,	 677	 A.2d	 at	 1075, that	when	 a	 person	was	

injured	by	a	dog	who	was	tethered	to	a	truck	and	sitting	on	the	flatbed,	the	“‘use’	

of	the	vehicle	as	an	object	to	secure	[the] dog	was	not	directly	incidental	to	the	

operation	 of	 the	 vehicle	 and,	 accordingly,	 there	 [wa]s	 an	 insufficient	 causal	

connection	between	the	injury	and	the	use	of	the	vehicle	to	fall	within	the	terms	

of	the	automobile	policy.”

[¶20]	 	 In	 contrast,	 we held	 that	 there	 was	 a	 “reasonable	 causal	

connection”	between	the	“use”	of	the	vehicle	and	the	injury	suffered	when	the	

injury	 arose	 from	 the	 removal of	 a	loaded	hunting	 firearm	 from	 the	insured	

vehicle.		Union	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co.	v.	Commercial	Union	Ins.	Co.,	521	A.2d	308,	309,	

311	(Me. 1987).

[¶21]		Interpreting	analogous	language	in	homeowner	policy	exclusions,	

we similarly held	 that	 an	 injury	 suffered	 when	 the	 insured	 and	 the	 injured	

person	were	carrying	an	item away	from	a	vehicle to	the	insured’s	shed	did	not	

fall	within	an	exclusion	in	the	homeowner’s	policy	for	injuries	“arising	out	of	

the	ownership,	maintenance,	use,	loading	or	unloading	of”	a	vehicle.		Foremost	

Ins.	Co.	v.	Levesque,	2005	ME	34,	¶¶	4,	11,	16,	868	A.2d	244	(emphasis	omitted)
11

(quotation	marks	omitted).		We	concluded	that	the	exclusion	was	inapplicable	

because	the vehicle	was	not	involved	in	the	injury,	which	occurred	because	the	

insured had	negligently	 placed an	 object	in	a	walkway	 or	 on	 the	 floor	 of	 the	

premises.	 	Id. ¶¶ 11,	15-16.	 	Conversely,	we	 held	that	 an	identically	worded	

homeowner’s	policy	did	exclude	coverage	for	a	gunshot	wound	suffered	when	

another	 person	 was	 loading	 a	 rifle	 into	 the	 open	 back	 of	 his	 pick-up	 truck.		

Worcester	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.	 Dairyland	 Ins.	 Co.,	 555	 A.2d	 1050,	 1051-52	 (Me.	 1989)	

(citing	Union	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	Co.,	521	A.2d	at	311-12).

[¶22]	 	 Although	 we	 have	 not	 considered	 issues	 of	 vehicle	 insurance	

coverage	 for	 damages	 arising	 from	 assaults	 or	 other	 torts	 committed	 by	

passengers	 outside	 of	 the	 insured	 vehicle,	 courts	 of	 other	 jurisdictions	 have	

confronted “the	general	question	of	whether	personal	injuries	resulting	 from	

physical	assaults	by	insured	vehicle	passengers	or	operators	‘arose	out	of’	the	

ownership,	 maintenance	 or	 use	 of	 the	 vehicle.”	 	 Nationwide	 Mut.	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.	

Brown,	 779	 F.2d	 984,	 988	 (4th	 Cir.	 1985).	 	 Those	 courts “have	 almost	

unanimously	found	no	causal	relation	between	the	‘use’	of	the	vehicle	and	such	

assault-caused	injuries.”		Id. Thus,	when	a	person	used	a	truck	to	transport	a	

person	 to	 the	 scene	 of	a	 shooting,	 the	United	States	Court	 of	Appeals	 for	 the	

Fourth	Circuit	held	that	the	truck	use	“was	merely	incidental,	remote	from	the	
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type	of	conduct	 that	is	reasonably	 foreseeable	with	 the	normal	use	of	such	a	

vehicle;	and	not	 the	causative	 factor	in	producing”	 the	resulting	harm.		Id. at	

989.		The	“assault,	an	act	wholly	independent	of	the	use	of	the	truck,	caused	the	

death.		Thus,	the	incidental	use	of	[the]	truck	in	the	shooting	does	not	meet	the	

causal	relation	test	of	coverage.”		Id.

[¶23]		Similarly,	in	Kangas	v.	Aetna	Casualty	&	Surety	Co.,	235 N.W.2d	42,	

43-44	 (Mich.	 Ct.	 App.	 1975),	the	 court	 considered	 whether	 the	 policy	 could	

cover	damages	incurred	when	the	insured	driver pulled	his	vehicle	over	and	

several	 occupants	 exited	 the	 vehicle and	 assaulted	 a	 pedestrian.	 	 In	 a	 civil	

action,	the	driver was	found	to	have	aided or	abetted	in	an	assault	or	battery.		

Id. at	43.	 The	court	concluded	that,	whether	or	not	an exclusion	for	intentional	

acts	precluded	coverage, the	acts	that	caused	the	injuries	did	not	“aris[e]	out	of	

the	 ownership,	 maintenance,	 or	 use”	 of	 the	 vehicle.	 Id. at	 45-50 (quotation	

marks	omitted).		The	court	concluded	that,	although	in	some	circumstances	the

foreseeable acts	of	others	inside the	vehicle	might be	covered,	the	connection	

between	the	conduct	and	the	vehicle	was	not	“more	than	incidental,	fortuitous	

or	but	for”	when	the	passengers	assaulted	someone	outside	the	vehicle.		Id. at	

50.
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[¶24]	 	 Thus,	 if the	 assailant	 left	 the	 insured	 vehicle	 to	 commit	 the	

misconduct, or “the	vehicle	merely	provide[d]	a	situs	for	the	tort,” the	injuries	

do	 not	 arise	 out	 of	 the	 vehicle’s	 use.	 State	 Farm	Mut.	 Auto.	 Ins.	 Co.	 v.	Davis,	

937 F.2d	1415,	1422	(9th	Cir.	1991);	see	Kelley,	2017	ME	166,	¶	7,	168	A.3d	779.		

When	the use	of	a	vehicle	has	been	held	to	have	a	sufficient	causal	relationship	

to	the	injuries,	the	violence	is	generally	perpetrated	from	a	moving	vehicle.		See,	

e.g.,	Davis,	937	F.2d	at	1417,	1420	(shooting	from	a	moving	vehicle); Cung	La	v.	

State	Farm	Auto.	Ins.	Co.,	830	P.2d	1007,	1008,	1011	(Colo.	1992)(maneuvering	

of	vehicle	to	facilitate	a	shooting	from	the	vehicle).

[¶25]		Consistent	with	these	previous	interpretations	of	analogous	policy	

terms,	we	conclude	that	the	conduct	that	occurred	when	Bragg’s	friend	exited	

the	vehicle	and	inflicted	property	damage	and	personal	injuries	did	not	involve

the	vehicle within	the	plain	meaning	of	the	policy.		See	Kelley,	2017	ME	166,	¶ 7,	

168	A.3d	779.		There	is	no	“reasonable	causal	connection”	between	the	use	of	

the	vehicle	and	the	injuries	suffered	by	Haskell	and	Witham.	 Me.	Mut.	Fire	Ins.	

Co.,	677	A.2d	at	1075	 (quotation	marks	 omitted).	 All	 of	 the	acts	 that	caused	

damages	 occurred	 while	 Bragg’s	 passenger	 was	 outside	 of	 the	 vehicle.		

Although	Bragg’s	negligent	act	may	have	incidentally	involved	him	using	 the	

vehicle	to	take	his	friend	away	from	Bragg’s	home,	the	injuries	and the property	
14

damage are	not	causally	connected	to	the	vehicle	use	in	a	way	that	brings	them	

within	the	insurance	coverage.		See Kelley,	2017	ME	166,	¶	7,	168	A.3d	779;	see	

also Doe	 v.	 State	 Farm	 Fire	&	 Cas.	 Co.,	 878	 F.	 Supp.	 862,	 867	 (E.D.	 Va.	 1995)	

(“[T]here	must	be	a causal	connection	between	 the	injury	and	 the	use	of	 the	

vehicle	as	a	vehicle.” (emphasis	omitted)).1

[¶26]		Because	the	facts,	viewed	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	Haskell	and	

Witham,	do	not	bring	their	damages	within	the	policy’s	coverage,	we	affirm	the

summary	judgment	entered	by	the	Superior	Court.

The	entry	is:

Judgment	affirmed.

Marc	N.	Frenette,	Esq.,	and	Adam	R.	Lee,	Esq.	(orally),	Trafton,	Matzen,	Belleau	

& Frenette,	LLP,	Auburn,	for	appellants	Martin	Witham	and	Dawn	Haskell

Matthew	K.	Libby,	Esq.	(orally),	Monaghan	Leahy,	LLP,	Portland,	 for appellee	

State	Farm	Fire	and	Casualty	Company

Waldo	County	Superior	Court	docket	number	CV-2018-24

FOR	CLERK	REFERENCE	ONLY

 1		Because,	viewing	the	evidence	in	the	light	most	favorable	to	Haskell	and	Witham, we	conclude	

that	their	damages	were	not	caused	by	incidents	that	“involved”	Bragg’s	truck,	we	do	not	address	

other	issues	of	policy	interpretation,	such	as	whether	those	incidents	constitute	an	“accident.”